T140 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger - Guido Goldman
January 2, 1973
11:00 a.m.

K: Hello.

G: Hi, Henry. Happy new year.

K: Happy New Year to you, Guido.

G: Thank you. I'm calling mainly about the Glucksnick question just to see what your preference is. Do you still feel that it would be valuable if they were to meet and ask you to join them for a meeting in Washington?

K: Well, let me wait until I have seen Dayan. I've gotten a lot of static about Klucksnick and I just want to make sure I'm not making my life harder.

G: I see. You know, he's pro-Israeli but independent. You know he only wants to be constructive.

K: Oh, I know that. He's a fine man. I liked him very much when I met him.

G: The group is very high level and the others are willing to fly back from a holiday----so they take it very seriously. And I think the main point that I want to say is that if you think it is inoportune for you to set a date in the near future, I think perhaps you would want to keep this as an option for later on.

K: No, I will do it within the next two weeks almost for certain.

G: I see. The thing is, do you think there would be any value in --if you don't want to set a firm date soon---to call Klutchsnick or would you want to call him---

K: I'll call him early next week.

G: OK, I think he would appreciate it--not just for himself--but to be sure that he is helpful to you.

K: I understand that.

G: He's aware of all the politics.

K: I've never seen the list that he wanted to put together.

Gus

G: I can give it to you. It's Exxx Levy, Fred Lazareth, Raymond Nasher, Walter Hass, Ed Gabromski, Marver Berstein, Alex Shindler, Gershin Cohen, and probably Henry Lasoshski.

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K: Well, now that I've met with the Fischer group, I don't see any reason not to meet with other Jewish groups.

G: Right, that would be my feeling but I don't---I want to be sure that this is helpful to you.

K: No, I will do it in the next two weeks.

G: Very good. Until the beginning of next week, he will be in Europe. So if there were communication, it would have to be done before the weekend or after next week. I don't want to pressure you in any way but I just sort of read him as being unclear---that he may be doing something that may be awkward for you and he must let his people know. He thought if he could communicate with him this week that it might be helpful.

K: No, I'll call him before Friday night.

G: I'll be down in Washington on Friday and a little bit on Saturday if you would like to see me.

K: Why don't you leave you number at my office where I can reach you. I'm now on the West Coast but I'm planning to be back tomorrow night. I may have a dinner with Nancy and a few other on Friday night. Why don't you keep that open. ~~That would~~

G: That would be lovely. I certainly will do that. Good, Henry. And I hope the year is a very, very good one for you.

K: I hope the same for you.

G: It certainly is a difficult one. Anything that I can do to help at any stage I would be happy to do.

K: Well, I appreciate that. The Israeli election is not helping any.

G: No, I realize that. I mean, you are really remarkable. So many things to confront at one time. But, I'm hoping for you.

K: Thank you.

G: Hoping to see you Friday.

K: OK, bye.

G: Bye.

T142 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON dp 7
Mr. Phillip Klutsnick/Secy Kissinger
12:10 p.m., January 2, 1973

PK: Hello, Mr. Secretary. Happy New Year.

HK: Happy New Year to you.

PK: Thank you.

HK: Mr. Klutsnick, I'm sorry we've had so much trouble getting together because I've been away.

PK: I know and you're doing more important things.

HK: No, but I would like to get together with that group you suggested.

PK: I understand some of the things that have happened and I think they are for the better. So, when would you like to do it?

HK: Why are they for the better?

PK: Well, I think the meeting you had was an essential meeting. I'm glad you had it.

HK: Oh, you mean with the Leadership Group?

PK: Yes, I'm happy you had it. If I had known that you were willing to take that kind of meeting, I would have urged you to do it long ago.

HK: Yeah, it makes it easier than to meet with other Jewish leaders.

PK: Of course. But on top of that, they all feel very sensitive and you know there's no way you can keep a complete secret in this world. Except in your office. So what date would you suggest?

HK: How about some time the week after this. Say the week of the 14th.

PK: The week of the 14th. Could it be just as well the following? I'm thinking of a couple of fellows that are out of the country.

HK: Sure.

PK: If it could be just as well the following, it would be better.

HK: Okay, let's do it the following.

PK: Which day would you prefer?

HK: What are the dates?

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PK: From the week of the 21st.

HK: Well, let's say the 22nd.

PK: The 22nd.

HK: Yeah.

PK: The 22nd is all right.

HK: All right.

PK: And what time would you like it? The same arrangement or would you rather have it in your office? In light of --

HK: In light of the fact that I saw the others in my office.

PK: Yes.

HK: Why don't we do it in my office?

PK: At what time?

HK: Let's say at 5 o'clock. Or six, whichever is easier for your schedule.

PK: It doesn't make a wit of difference, 5 or 6, whichever is best for you.

HK: Let's say at 5

PK: At 5:00 and I will immediately contact them and confirm it with Mr. Campbell.

HK: That's right. 22nd at 5:00.

PK: 22nd at 5:00.

HK: Good, look forward to that.

PK: Likewise and thank you very much.

HK: And thank you.

T152 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Gen Scowcroft/Secy Kissinger
January 2, 1974

K: Brent, did we let the State Department know about that Dayan message?

S: Yeah.

K: And what did they say?

S: Oh, excuse me, I thought you meant the announcement.

K: The announcement, that's what I mean. So that they can cover it at their briefing. But I hope that we gave them different questions and answers.

S: Well, we gave them our questions and answers just for background.

K: The fact that I disapprove most of them, would that bother anybody?

S: I hadn't heard that. I didn't know that. I didn't know that.

K: Would you kindly reclaim them and get them made consistent?

S: Yes, I sure will. I will do it immediately.

K: I mean, they were not violently different but I gave it a slightly different focus.

S: I'll get on it immediately.

K: Thank you.

S: Right.

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T148 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Larry Eagleburger/Secy Kissinger
January 2, 1973 [1974]

K: I want to attend the Bohlen funeral.

E: All right, sir.

K: What time is it?

E: I'll have to find out sir. It's in the morning, I don't think they've got a firm time yet. I'll call that back to you as soon as I get it.

K: I think we should put out a statement today.

E: I've got a letter which I just cleared and they're now typing up in a telegram from you to Mrs. Bohlen, which I don't have in front of me but which says how terribly sorry you are that this great --

K: And also a good friend.

E: Good friend and great Foreign Service Officer and so forth.

K: Yeah, but I think we should issue an statement from the State Department and soon.

E: In addition to the letter?

K: Would we publish the letter?

E: Yeah, we would publish the letter. I think that's better.

K: No, that's fine.

E: Okay, we'll publish. I'm getting that off right away and get George to release it. Here it is right here. Let me read it to you: The death of your husband has filled all of his friends and associates in the Department of State and Foreign Service with a deep sense of loss. I share this sorrow knowing as I do how much he contributed to the Foreign Service and how much -- I share this sorrow knowing as I do how much the Foreign Service meant to him and how much he contributed to his country. He was a good friend. Chip Bohlen will be remembered not only as an outstanding --

K: What did I say -- And in addition I have a deep sense of personal loss because I considered him a good friend.

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E: Chip Bohlen will be remembered not only as an outstanding expert on the Soviet Union as a respected counselor to the Presidents but as a distinguished Ambassador.

K: To Presidents and Secretaries of State.

E: Okay. But above all, as a warm human being whose charm and integrity won him the affection and loyalty of all those who knew him.

K: Put integrity first.

E: Okay. He both represented and helped to create the best traditions of the Foreign Service. Your husband's memory will be with us always and serve as an inspiration and example to those who follow him in the American Diplomatic Service. You and your children have my deepest sympathy. Sincerely, Henry A. Kissinger.

K: And warmest good wishes.

E: Okay, we'll get that released right away. And I'll get back to Jerry with the time for the funeral.

K: Okay. Now, on the personnel things, I do not want you to check with Volpe. Why should you check with Volpe if he isn't Volpe's candidate?

E: I meant if he had any candidates.

K: I don't want him to give us candidates.

E: All right.

K: Now, also the President will take Catto if Bush doesn't veto him.

E: Do you want me to pursue that?

K: Yeah.

E: Anything else?

K: No, that's all.

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
The President/Secy Kissinger
12:45 p.m., January 3, 1974

K: Mr. President.

P: Hi, Henry. Everybody tells me you did a fine job at your press conference.

K: Well, I laid into them.

P: Good.

K: Actually, they asked our sort of question. What about this story that you're conducting an independent foreign policy? So this gave me a chance to say how often we meet, how you give me directions before I go, how I am in touch every evening, how I am on top of it in touch with Scowcroft whom you see regularly and Haig. And I said, but moreover I don't like the idea of a government of independent fiefdoms wasn't run by feudal barrons. The President is in charge of foreign policy. That's the way the constitution provides it; that's the way it is; that's the way it will always be as long as I'm in the Department and the President is in the White House.

P: That's good, Henry.

K: You know, that was --

P: Great!

K: Then they said: How can the President conduct foreign policy when he's being impeached? I said: Well, you've got one thing wrong. He's isn't being impeached. And they said: Well, as long as there's a threat of impeachment. I said: You read the President's annual Foreign Policy Report. He has designed a strategy; he is pursuing it. He is pursuing it for the sake of the peace of the world and he is in no way influenced by any of the domestic considerations which you imply and he will do what is right and only what is right.

P: That's very good.

K: And I also indicated at great length that you were spending a lot of time on the energy problem and I said you were going to approach various heads of government next week. We're spelling out these proposals and that gave me a chance to give them your approach to it, which is more than we could have done -- We couldn't release the letter so we would have had to have had Ziegler just say it.

P: Sure, much better for you.

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K: No, much better for you.

P: Much better for you to say it though.

K: It gives a much better ride to the story.

P: Of course.

K: So I thought it was a pretty good press --

P: Oh, everybody thought so, yeah. Ron and Al both called me and said they thought it was great.

K: Al told you about that letter I had from the Saudis --

P: Yeah.

K: A fellow called McMullin going around there saying that on behalf of Ford that you're going to be impeached in two months.

P: That's a curious thing. Have you ever met him?

K; I don't even know who he is. Do you know who he is?

P: No, never heard of him.

K: Probably one of these goddamn oil executives.

P: No, but we know most of those. Hummm. But we'll run it down.

T157 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Haig/Secretary Kissinger
January 4, 1973
3:35 pm

K: How are you? I wanted to check one thing to get your personal judgement. I have had a very good talk with Dayan. They have basically bought our concept. It is a tremendous advance. Really incredible. But there are enough wrinkles in it for them so it is hard to handle through diplomatic channels. If I talk to Sadat I could get the .....accomplished. But I know what our leader would think if I was to go out there. I would just go to Cairo and Tel Aviv.

H: Yeah.

K: I can have our Ambassadors present it to him but the explanations would have to be so complex.

H: What are you telling me?

K: If I do it I should do it next week. some time if you are that eager to get it settled.

H: Sure. Would you go to Cairo?

K: If we present this in Geneva and let the Russians hack at it we may get a stalemate..

H: Is Dayan speaking for her?

K: yes. This thing is now for the first time within manageable range but still not acceptable to the Egyptians. The Egyptians want them to withdraw to the Mitla Pass...the Egyptians watn...two kilometers at the Suez Canal. They are willing to give them two battalions. They have given up the idea of tanks east of the Canal..if they are willing to have...but if every concession becomes the result of a cable..do you see what I mean?

H: I understand.

K: I don't want to present it to him because he will go into orbit.

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H: I think we ought to do what will get this thing settled.

K: I got him good publicity yesterday.

H: Excellent, excellent. That problem is manageable.

K: I am not so eager to take another trip out there....if this is the last Israeli position..

H: That's right.

K: I would go to Cairo and Tel Aviv and I may hop to Damascus to keep them quiet -- but essentially it will be Cairo and Tel Aviv for three or four days...My worry is we put it into Geneva and the Egyptians will_____ and I may have to get to break a deadlock.

H: That's a traditional problem, but the basic problem is if you go there and get caught up in a vice...I would hate to think, if you should go and get caught in a stalemate, I mean you are included in it.

K: He wo uld like it and then he could get rid of me.
How is our frame of mind?

H: Fine, much better than yesterday.

K: I left San Clemente very depressed. I am beginning to wonder how long this is manageable.

H: It is...in the Los Angeles Times.

K: That part is manageable. I think we have it won. What may not be is our...

H: No, that is manageable...the question is that this thing will rise or fall on what is accomplished. I think if there is opposition and it is real and now and not a situation where you are rendered inoperative then we ought to take it.

K: Let us analyze the plan and find out if the Israelis mean this is there final position because then there will be a deadlock...I may be able to bring about a meeting with Dayan and their top man but let me think about it. You think you can manage it if I find it desirable to go.

H: We can manage whatever is necessary.

K: OK, fine.
END

T215

TELCON
Donald Kendall/Sec. Kissinger
Thursday, January 10, 1973
11:10 a.m.

[1994]

RELEASED IN FULL

DK: Hello, Henry.

K: How are you?

DK: Fine, thank you. I don't know whether you have heard but they have kidnapped another one of our people in Argentina.

K: Pepsi?

DK: Yes. They took one in August. I talked to Jamison of EXXON. They took one of their pepple also. I told him I thought it was about time the US companies called a halt to this. We are not going to pay anymore ransom. The one before they started with a million and a half? and they finally came down to $70,000 and when we got him back turned out he was mixed up in it. This one is for real. They contacted us this morning and told us to name a figure of how valuable he was. Our people are anxious to offer something nominal fee -- enough so they could keep it going -- $110,000. There are eleven guys involved and that would be $10,000 a piece. If I do this, I am planning then to take a full page add in an Argentina paper and will say we are announcing we are not paying anymore ransom money for people. We have advised our people and if they are worried to pull out of the country. Regardless of what they do we are not going to pay anymore -- even if they kill someone.

K: I am in favor of that.

DK: I think the other companies should do that and may be it would be useful for one of your guys down there to call a meeting of the companies down there and call a halt to it. Otherwise, it will just keep on.

K: Good, I agree. I would prefer to wait until Bob Hill gets down there. That must be within a week.

DK: I don't know where he is but I will try and get in touch with him. When you get settled down with your present problem I would like to have lunch with you someday.

K: Good. Let's do that. I will be back by the end of next week. Get in touch with me then.

DK: Godd. Thanks.

END

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T 254

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Secretary Kissinger/S. Alsop
January 23, 1974, 8:10 p.m.

(It was virtually impossible to hear Mr. Alsop on this call.)

K: When do you think you'll leave the hospital?

A: I'm hoping on Friday. I'll take a couple of weeks easy and then do some work.

K: Then I'd better keep away from you.

A: You've done a brilliant job. _____

K: That was rather funny.

A: No. You have done a marvelous job. As usual, I have my justified suspicions. _____

K: No. You overestimate me. But I'll tell you this. For the first time I can see how a settlement can come about. I don't have it, but I can now imagine it, which is more than I could have said six months ago.

A: _____ do a piece on the simple lesson, the difference between _____ and Hirsh's book -- and a post-piece.

K: Today you mean.

A: Yes. A great deal is happening in American journalism.

K: I didn't want to talk serious business with you, but I am really outraged.

A: For the Times to supplement that kind of story without any balance at all is unbelievable.

K: Here is a man who _____. I sent him to Ehrlichman. Ehrlichman turns him over to a staff guy, and that proves I knew about the plumbers.

A: But you've done a marvelous job, and once I'm on

K: I'm anxious to see you. Can you be visited?

A: Not quite yet. I lost forty pounds.

K: That will only instill me with envy. Well, maybe next week.

A: I'll be all right.

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K: Will you be home in Washington or will you go to the farm?

A: At home for a couple of weeks at least.

K: I'll call you from time to time and see how things are going. I think of you with affection.

A: This is a pleasant surprise. Maybe we can get together.

K: Will you take the initiative when you're ready?

END

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/ Secretary Kissinger
12:57 PM March 21, 1973

D: Hello

K: Anatoliy.

D: Oh, hello, Henry.

K: How are you?

D: Thank you. You have just been in press conference?

K: Yes.

D: I have not had chance to read it, but I hope to read it after dinner.

K: Well, I hope it was friendly. I understand they have moved the talks to Moscow.

D: Yes, I just received this on the receiver in this morning. I have two questions. One is about Pompidou from Brezhnev. Second, he asked me if it would be more convenient location to have meeting in Moscow. With the understanding that you and your children will be in a separate house. You will be there and some of your main aides. As for others they will be put in hotels. You remember the residence.

K: Yes.

K: You put all of them in the hotels.

D: No, no. Only in the hotels will be the secondary. Your main aides and you and your children are in the residence which you used in Moscow before.

K: O.K.

D: Brezhnev asked to tell you personally if you would like to go to river one of the evenings.

K: Oh, he and I.

D: To talk, and have expedition of hunting. If you like, he will accompany you.

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K: I leave this entirely up to him. That will be very pleasant. I am delighted of course.

D: He said for me to tell you. He would accompany you and go there for an evening. He would like to if you would. Have a talk and for hunting. Is that all right?

K: Of course.

D: Witht the children now it is easier. You don't need to put them in the Embassy. They will stay with you and all of the problems are taken care of. As to when I will see you. Maybe tomorrow if you have time. I will talk to you about Pompidou. It is not urgent.

K: I have letter for you from the President to Brezhnev. A fairly long one.

D: Maybe I drop in for 10 or 15 min to talk about your ideas on SALT.

K: I will give that to you too. Why don't we aim for 5:30.

D: Today.

K: Yes.

D: In your office.

K: Yes, at the State Department.

D: Thank you very much Henry.

*

(S3)

TELCON
Bernard Gwertzman/HAK
3:50 p.m. - 9/22/73

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

G: Mr. Secretary.

K: How are you, Bernie?

G: I wasn't able to get to your swearing-in. I wanted to add my personal congratulations.

K: Aren't you nice.

G: My family happened to be in town so I really couldn't.

K: Look, I more than understand.

G: The other thing is, I have to do a story for Monday's paper about, sort of your schedule and things. Can you give me some idea? I know some of the State Department people are a little unclear themselves.

K: I don't know why they should be. I think there's a lunch for the African delegates at noon.

G: On Monday?

K: On Monday. Then I'm seeing Alec Hume, Ohira, then I'm going to a reception that friends are giving for the, or am I? I don't know exactly, I think I am, yeah, for the European Security Council.

G: This is on Monday.

K: Yeah, and then I'm giving a dinner for Gromyko.

G: On Monday?

K: Yeah.

G: I see, and on Tuesday?

K: I'll see Sharp, of Canada; Andersen of Denmark; I'm going to listen to Gromyko at the UN; and I'm going to the lunch for Jobert. I know the afternoon is filled, too.

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G: Are you seeing any Arabs that day?

K: No, the next day.

G: Wednesday. On Tuesday....

K: Tuesday night I'm getting an award from Project Hope, the Eisenhower Award.

G: Oh, I see.

K: That's been scheduled for months. That's got nothing to do with my....

G: I understand. And where will that be, some hotel?

K: The Plaza Hotel.

G: Do you have to give a speech for that, too?

K: Yeah, well, like this morning, extemporaneous.

G: And Wednesday---

K: Did I tell you I'm seeing Ohira on ...

G: You told me Ohira on Monday.

K: Yeah. No, I'm giving the lunch for the Arab delegates on Tuesday. I was wrong.

G: I see, so, let me get this.... Arab delegates on Tuesday. And then the lunch for Jobert is Wednesday?

K: Yeah.

G: I see. And you're seeing the Israelis this week, or....

K: No, I don't think they're there.

G: I see. O.K. And then Wednesday night is the Waltheim dinner?

K: Yeah. And I'm going to call on Brandt on Wednesday.

G: I see, and the, Far East / Foreign Minister you'll just see him at the Big Five?

again.

K: No, I'm seeing him, I see the maniacs have dropped him off the schedule./ I'm seeing him on Wednesday afternoon, or blood will flow.

G: O.K. Now, on most of these....

K: I'm not going to have him for dinner the following week, but I want to have ....

G: _____?

K: I think it's _____.

G: He's the regular delegate there?

K: No, that's the Vice Foreign Minister. O.K. Bernie, I've got to get back to that speech.

G: Fine. O.K. It'll be a good speech, I trust.

K: I hope so, but it's tough going when you have to do it in two days.

G: He talks about the European trip off, are they too strong?

K: That's too strong.

G: It doesn't look too good.

K: Well, we just want to see how these discussions are going a little more rather put ourselves in a straight jacket by setting a date.

G: I see. You don't have any sort of thing with the NATO people as a group yet?

K: No, but the Assistant Secretary level is going to meet at the end of the week.

G: In New York?

K: Yeah.

G: I see, just one last thing. Who are you taking up there with you? All your Assistant Secretaries?

K: Well, I'm not taking them with me, but they'll all be present for the meeting with their respective people.

G: I see. O.K. Much thanks. Bye.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELCON
Marvin Kalb/HAK
6:00 p.m. - 9/22/73

Kalb: ....[redacted] B6

K: I heard that.

Kalb: But I wanted to tell you that that would be the only thing that would have kept me from participating in your joy today.

K: Well, Bernie already told me and....

Kalb: You know, I just, I.....

K: and I've been so moved by the attitude of so many of your colleagues and yourself. We'll be at each other's throat again tomorrow, but it was very touching today.

Kalb: That's a different kind of story but I did wish you well from the bottom of my heart, the wisdom and the grace and the tolerance that are going to be so necessary to success because I very much have the feeling in the long sweep of history perhaps that your tenure is going to prove to be larger than simply something that has to do with diplomacy. There's a human and a psychological component here which has to be vindicated in a major way and I feel that very strongly and I wish you towering good luck.

K: Well, I hope that I can fulfill this, Marvin.

Kalb: Oh, I have no doubt you will. I think you will do it and I was on the phone just a moment ago with my mother and she asked me to pass on to you as a lady of 74 sitting in Queens, that there are an awful lot of people like her who wish you well and feel very strongly that you are going to do a marvelous job.

K: Well, you are so nice.[redacted] B6

Kalb: That's my problem right now.

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K: [redacted] B6

Kalb:

K:

Kalb: I certainly will.

K: And if he won't see you, because he's unbelievably busy, let me know. He'll see you for me.

Kalb: I thank you. [redacted] and get up to New York I will. B6

K: Because he's really a genius.

Kalb: Oh, that's marvelous. I will certainly try that. And Henry thank you and very, very good luck.

K: Thank you.

Kalb: O.K. Bye.

K: Bye.

*
(S5)

TELCON
Robert Frost/HAK
2:50 p.m. - 9/22/73

RELEASED IN FULL

K: It's been a very warm day.

F: How marvelous. I've been following it day by day and knowing what the outcome would be but obviously estatic to read this morning's papers and estatic about what's happened today. I'm sure I'm not as happy as you, but I'm very, very happy.

K: Well, I hope to see you very soon.

F: It would be lovely. I'm in the States until Thursday, but I mean your life in the next few days is _____foreign ministers, isn't it really?

K: I'm afraid so. I'll be in New York. Where are you staying?

F: I'm at the Plaza.

K: Well, let's try to call each other.

F: Oh, that would be lovely. Where will you be?

K: At the Waldorf.

F: At the Waldorf. From when to when?

K: From tomorrow night till Wednesday night.

F: Oh, lovely. Well, it would be lovely to call one another and maybe we'll achieve five minutes in your mad schedule, but I know what the next few days are going to be like.

K: Good, let's do our best.

F: Oh, lovely.

K: Bye.

F: Lovely and congratulations again.

K: Thank you so much.

F: Lovely to hear you. Bye, bye, Henry.

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S2

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Mr. Kissinger
Prime Minister Bhutto
10:21 a.m. 9/22/73

XXX Hello, who is speaking?

K: This is Mr. Kissinger

XXX Hold on just a minute, the Prime Minister wants to talk to you.....Hello?

K: tap, tap, yes, I'm holding on.

B: Hello, Dr. Kissinger?

K: Yes.

B: I only wanted to telephone to say congratulations

K: Oh Mr. Prime Minister, how very xxx nice of you and how very thoughtful of you.

B: I wanted to contact you and tell you we are very happy--we think our relations are in safe hands.

K: Well you can count on our friendship and we never let down our friends.

B: I know that. Best of luck.

K Thank you Mr. Prime Minister and I hope to see you soon again.

B: Fine.

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S1

TELCON
Mr. Kissinger/Senator Fulbright 10:15 a.m.
9/22/73

RELEASED IN FULL

F: Good morning, Mr. Secretary.

K: Mr. Chairman. I look forward to seeing you very shortly. I wanted to check two things one, I very much agreed with what you said yesterday about the detente

F: Good.

K: And I think what is going on there is one of the most irresponsible things I have ever seen and I would like when wemeet on Thursday to talk to you about how we can jointly do in that area.

F: I think it is said, but that's the way I certainly read the signs.

K: It's a weird combination of right-wingers and intellectuals and Jewish pressure groups, and its going to be a total disaster in a country that is totally unpreparedd to face the consequencesof that disaster.

F: These stories they are putting out -- their direct purpose--there is one in the morning paper you know, all this new business of pop up missiles, every year, just before we vote on the military, you get these stories, and don't accredit it to anyone--

K: But that is almost irrelevant to the basic question anyway

F: But the fallout you see is that we're being threatened by very aggressive forces, and so on, their purpose is to get money for the military, it has this other effect of reinforcing the people who are against detente.

K: I agree completely.

F: How in the hell we can combat it, I would be--

K: I would like to talk to you, maybe we should consider some open hearings, or you are more of an expert on that than I am--

F: I think this is a possibility of--

K: Just discuss east/west relations--and I am no judge of this but I'd be very prepared to consider it if you thought it appropriate.

F: I do think it is appropriate

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F: So we'll go try to set up something.

K: Now the second thing I called you about Mr. Chairman, I've gotten together a few friends and -- just 14 or 15 people for dinner tonight and if you and Mrs. Fulbright would be free to join us, I'd be very pleased.

F: Well I thank you very much, but we already accepted a dinner with Miss Lewis at 7:30--wish we were free, I'd love to do it,

K: Well I sorry I gave you such short notice, but some people came in to town for the swearing in and some of our--

F: I appreciate it very much , but I can't hardly cancel this--

K: No, no, there is no need for it, entirely social and we'll do it soon again.

F: All right, thank you very much.

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(56)

TELCON
Mr. Kissinger/Mr. Crewdson
9/22/73 6:15 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

C: The story is somebody tapped your telephone

K: On what basis are we talking here?

C: Let's go on background for the time being or even deep background and then we won't have to go off the record, unless--

K: I beg your pardon?

C: I said I'm reluctant to go entirely off-the-record unless you think it's moreadvisable.

K: You know this is not the day in which I'm particularly eager to discuss those things.

C: I understand.

and

K: Why not tell me what the problem is and ~~then~~ let's do it off-the-record for a moment--then if you tell me you need to have some other basis we can discuss it.

C: All right, that's fine. The problem simply is that I have been told by a source who is not in the executive branch that the "plumbers" in his words--put a tap on some telephone used by you at some point in the last 4-1/2 years. When he says plumbers , I don't know who he's referring to--I don't think he means the generic plumbers in the sense of Krogh and Young, I think he probably means the Caufield people--it was not done by the FBI I know that, it was not done by the Secret Service, I think --I don't know when it was done, I don't know where, but this fellow told me that-

K: Is he reliable?

C: Well you know he has been up to now, but there is always a first time-but he further told me that you had been told that this had been done. That you knew of it?

K: When it happened?

C: No afterwards.

K: There is a limit to masochism.

C: I'd like to write this story--I don't have many details and I think the story would have done you a fair amount of damage last week, probably not any now.

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K: I don't know why it would do me damage.

C: Certainly cause other questions to be asked for the Senate committee and might have delayed things even a bit longer. But now that that is all tucked away

K: Well Mr. Crewdson, in all honesty, I really don't know anything about it. I've had--this is off-the-record--I've had ideas but I really don't know anything authoritative. I really don't

C: You've got suspicions but not--

K: Not fact

C: Not fact--no one has ever come to you in a formal way and said we think you ought to know that we had your phone wired.

K: That is correct.

C: Can you tell me something about your suspicions?

K: No, I don't want to go

C: That would be helpful.

K: No, because that is no credit to anybody--Bill Safire mentioned it to me and-- don't know enough about it.

C: Oh I mentioned it to Bill--didn't know whether he called you or not --I'm at an impasse

K: I just don't want to talk about any--whatever I can tell you I have never been formally told

C: Would you object to this sort of a story appearing.

K: I don't think it does anybody any good, but if you--it really depends on your confidence in your source.

C: Even if my confidence in my source is complete--this involves you in rather a personal way--and if you don't think it is going to do you or anybody else any good, perhaps there is no value, you know in reporting it for the sake of reporting it.

K: I don't see how it can do me any good--I don't think it does my any harm.

C: That's all problematical--I could argue either side of that question-- and there's no point in doing that.

K: How could it do me any harm--except by opening that whole issue over and over

C: The problem is of course whenever it is disclosed that someone's telephone is tapped, then in the great minds of the American people, the suspicion is born that others in power believed this person to be in some way untrustworth The positive aspect is if you know if they were tapping you, then what you say about your minimal role in the other wire taps might also be substantiated and reinforced.

K: I know what I said about my role in the other wiretapp--its true.

C: Ah yes, indeed, I'm sure--

K: I don't know that to be true and in fact if anything understated in relation~~s~~-to--be Mr. Crewdson--I really feel as far as I'm concerned, I'd just as soon not have any more wire tap stories

C: Whether they involve you or not--or only if they involve you.

K: I really basically believe that that period ought to be put behind us at some point fairly soon

C: Of course--I don't mean to sound fecitious, but it is not the NY Times that was doing the tapping

K: Of course

C: The case of Tony Lake for example--that is very serious whether it was sloppiness or intentional--to leave it on after ~~it~~ he had gone to work for Mr. Muskie ~~for~~ as one of his top aides, seems to me to be quite a serious matter.

K: O--Well, I'm not telling you not to pursue any of that. I mean you called me, I didn't call you.

C: Yes, indeed.

K And I have fully explained what I knew about these circumstances and--

C: I wish I could convince you to discuss the nature of your suspicions if only for my own guidance--

K No, I don't think I should--and they may be totally unfounded anyway, but I am assuming this conversation is off-the - record

C: Yes,

K: Thank you.

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(S7)

TELCON
September 23, 1973/12:23 p.m.
President/HAK

P: Now that you've been Secretary of State for 24 hours how does it feel.

K: I've been spending most of my time working on the U.N. speech.

P: Oh yeah. Now you find out all those burdens are going to be greater.

K: Yeah. But I think it will be helpful. I wanted to thank you Mr. President for the really beautiful way you conducted the swearing-in yesterday and everybody that I've talked to has commented on your speech.

P: It wasn't a speech it was just...

K: Well, it was profound and very human and humerous and really all my friends who.

P: Are these your liberal friends?

K: Oh yes.

P: I noticed that Joan Bradon came through she said with a little grin, you know everytime I see you I like you.

K: She called and she was really raving about your speech.

P: What did the;y like about it? You mean they liked the humor I suppose. I use that all the time though.

K: They liked the easy human qualityand they thought there was a lot of thought in it and I don't know whether the Chief Justice spoke to you when he left.

P: Unfortunately, I didn't even see him leave. He wasn't feeling welk you know.

K: Well, he said it was a very profound and speech and he said there was a great deal more than a person may think and he said he hoped both of our speeches would be shown on television in their entirety.

P: There were some awfully good points you know, that one where, they said that, Hubert, I know there were others too but Hubert the tears were running down his cheeck when you made your comment about this only in America could a man with my background be standing here bseide the President of the United States which was done with great understatement but neverthèless, that must have appealed to an enormous

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P: number of people. I noticed Blutash, who is a doctor up here, one of the doctors, and he was touched by it because he said his parents were born in Europe, I don't know where, I think he said ____ or something and when you stop to think of it you probably were speaking, that probably reached 40 to 50% of the American people who are either first or second generation American. You just didn't reach people who happen to have Jewish background.

K: No, and of course you never mentioned that which I was very grateful for.

P: Of course not. That's the point you reached people with all sorts of backgrounds. It could reach Italians and others. They sort of feel a little pride for that sort of thing and now it doesn't have to be _____ and everybody will know it.

K: It was really....

P: I think of course you'll get a hell of a reception at the U.N.

K: I don't know.

P: The communists have to give you a good reception and that's one of the reasons we never got one, I never got one. Second, I think it will be alright. I just think they won't be ~~XXX~~ wild.

K: Well I'm taking a few cracks, not at the Arabs but ~~XXXXXXXX~~ at the nonaligned I'm saying lets not have blacks, let's not _____ an alignment of the nonaligned.

P: One point that is very, the idea that we had, of this idealism in policy is good. You and I both know Henry that alot of that's malarkey, but it's very important malarkey. What I meant is you and I both know that as far as our Soviet friends are concerned to them it's pure pragmatism and power. It's true of China and Japan and others. On the other hand, it's very important to make the point which we do believe you know that we must have something other than simply a test of strength and abalance of strength. There must be, a nation must mean something to others or it means something to itself and that sort of thing. These are some great lines in there. I want that speech of yours transcribed.

K: But the whole atmosphere yesterday Mr. President was so warm and everybody.

P: How did your hollywood friends like it?

K: They were crazy about it.

P: They were. Kirk Douglas and that...

K: Oh, he was absolutely. Well there were not just crazy...

P: I didn't realize that Kirk Douglas's parents were from Russia. I didn't know that.

K: I didn't know it either.

P: I thought he was a....

K: No they were moved.

P: They really were. That's good. It's more important to move than to .....

K: Even the tough newsmen felt this way.

P: Is that right? You talked to some of them.

K: Oh yes. Bernie Kalb and Gwertzman and Faleriony(?).

P: They really were?

K: Oh yes. And they've written it in a rather warm manner. And they all, I don't know whether you've seen the papers, are quoting you and...I liked that crack you took at the Committee.

P: How did that come out finally. How did they print it? Where I said about the ...

K: Without results.

P: Well, of course, the Churchill quote is so well known it's almost trite.

K: I hadn't heard it to tell you the truth.

P: Well many haven't but of course it's a great quote and he said it in relationship to the only company was under fire when he was in India you know. He went galloping along and they got his horse off from under him and he said it's the most greatest exhilerating thing in life to be shot at without results but I thought too when I said that, I looked over at the committee, Fulbright and the rest of them. They looked a little like...

K: Javits was almost beside himself?

P: Javits would appreciate that I think.

K: He said to me, you had put a real challenge to the committee now.

P: How's that. By saying they had to cooperate.

K: That's right and when you made the remark about doing it with Congress and I then picked it up.

P: No, too, I think too that it was good for you that I said that, which I probably the Chief Justice picked up, and certainly the newsmen must have appreciated it where I said that there is a tendency to over personalize achievements. That Kissinger did by reason of a trip to Moscow or the President did it. I said, these things are done by support of fine dedicated people and as you noticed I crossed my cheek when I said that but you know in the State Dept. and I even threw in the Congress. But I think that was a good thing to say.

K: I think that was very good.

P: That will help with your bureaucracy and you can always quote that. I was thinking, the next foreign service thing they put out you might tell the guy to emphasize that point.

K: I think we're going to print your whole speech in the foreign service thing. And from now on, the separation between this Dept. and the White House.

P: Sometimes I wake up at nights and say this problem we've got now but I've got to check with State and I say oh thank god I don't XXX have to do that anymore. That's going to be such a load off my mind.

K: Well, you can now go to meetings. You don't have to worry who maneuvers who.

P: And we are going to make it difference if we just didn't have some other current problems. Joe Aslop talked to Haig because he's terribly concerned about the VP thing and he points out that we continue to have destruction of authority and so forth because the Russians are watching and two years they'll come to the Chinese.

K: Could be.

P: Now, on the other hand, what we have to do is to go forward and do our job regardless of the Vice Presidential thing, however, it comes out because he's planning on Henry, just for your information only, a very tough game. He's now talking about going to the Congress. He says 100 members of Congress he's heard from, most supporting. He doesn't realize that they'll support him right up to the crime if the evidence shows he's quilty and he doesn't realize that those guys will support him are going to drop away if he ever does anything where they think it's something that he'll want. Don't you agree.

K: Exactly, no question about it.

P: It's just too bad isn't it but we can survive it if they go on the impeachment road, I mean if he decides to go.

K: WQ ell, I think there is no choice Mr. President. We didn't create the evidence and if he goes that route.

P: The problem is from our standpoint, he is going to take on Richardson for being so hard on their witnesses and so on but you know the average person doesn't give one damn about that, if the truth comes out. What I meant is, people only care about whether or not you are rough on the witnesses when you're going after an Ellsburg. Then they feel it is important but if they're going after an Agenw they don't give a damn if they use a rubber hose on him. Don't you agree.

K: Exactly, and the only reason the liberals are sympathizing with him right now is because they're afraid of Connolly or Rockeffeller or somebody that they think might beat them in 76.

P: Yeah. Incidentally, you have knowledge, as you know, I know you have that, you know have as Secretary of State your own security. Right?

K: Well, I haven't taken it because they look so incompetent and I wanted to take a look at them first.

P: Aren't they secret Service or?

K: No, they are State Dept. Security. We took them away from protecting foreign dignataries because they screwed the Pompidou visit so much up

P: I aremember. Let me think about it. Maybe we ought to put Secret Service on you the reason being they are pros and you see you'll be a hell of alot more target than Rogers ever was. You've got to realize that.

K: That's true.

P: And you'll... let me suggest this. That I would urge you to let Al kind of work that out. He had mentioned to me... so that you don't have to bust them. See my point.

K: Right.

P: Your protection of course is something that I have to take responsibility for and I'm going to be damn sure that its adequate.

K: Let me talk to Al about it.

P: You talk to Al about it. I hadn't realized, that if you think those people are not competent by golly, get some...

K: Well, I would like to get Kelly's opinion about that. Or somebody who knows. They don't look competent to me to tell you the truth.

P: Are they FBI people then or...

K: No, they have their own security force but they don't protect anyone else except their secretary so they don't have the communications or the

P: See, when the Secret Service goes into town they immediately set out a network with the police and everybody else and that's why they are so important and the FBI of course works with them.

K: These people have nobody else to protect except the Secretary.

P: I see. That'll work out. That's the least of our problems. When you get the speech done and work in those calls to Firestone and those people.

K: What I wanted to check with you Mr. President. I think now after having talked to Ingersoll who knows Anderson well, he thinks we should send somebody like Packard or David Rockefeller to Japan. He thinks Anderson would be better for a country like Britan.

P: That's fine with me if that's where Anderson wants to go.

K: Does Anderson know Annaburg is leaving.

P: Oh yes.

P: Annanburg is just - her actuallynthan Anderson but
A ite group and probably as I said
a ecutives in America. Now the
o , your friend from the Cleveland
p Missing Page 7 ers you know buckled at sending
h: but he really isn't that is he.
C

K: A: From Master

P: Ri

K: Ev of his thought he wasn't good
en

P: Ho ..ke Canada how about giving
hin. a shot at that.

K: Oh yeah, that'd be excellent.

P: But give him a shot at something because he's been one of the really few constant friends as a publisher and I think he feels a little let down. The other thing that I thought of for him, I don't know whether he'd like to do it. We do need a...I wonder if he'd take protocol. He'd be great at that you know. His wife is pretty.

K: That's an interesting point.

P: You see Smoke is...

K: [redacted] Thurmond has asked us specifically to keep him until his retirement, about Feb. 1st and then he'll have five years in grade. B6

P: Fine, but let me say I really feel that the other fellow would be great, really great, as chief of protocol.

K: Oh yeah, he'd be good for that.

P: Because he's socially pleasant. He'd be good and very helpful to you and us too with the new guys. He's one of them and they like him even though they don't think he's the brightest guy they like him because they know he's with them.

K: He'd do that well.

P: Annanburg is just as smart and tougher actuallythan [redacted] but [redacted] is suave and part of the elite group and probably as I said among the 3 or 4 top businessmen executives in America. Now the other thing I was thinking of was our, your friend from [redacted] You don't think...Rogers you know buckled at sending him to Bonn. Said he was too dumb but he really isn't that is he. Could he do it. B6 B6 B6

K: After I checked on him.

P: Right huh.
David

K: Even Rockefeller was a great sponser of his thought he wasn't good enought for Bonn.

P: How about this, if Firestone doesn't take Canada how about giving him a shot at that.

K: Oh yeah, that'd be excellent.

P: But give him a shot at something because he's been one of the really few constant friends as a publisher and I think he feels a little let down. The other thing that I thought of for him, I don't know whether he'd like to do it. We do need a...I wonder if he'd take protocol. He'd be great at that you know. His wife is pretty.

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K: He'd do that well.

P: And so I want to be sure that, no hurry, but within the week that you give him a call and say that this is going to open up in February and that you're upgrading the position you know and all that sort of thing but these calls can wait until after you finish your speech. Don't do any of this stuff until you get your speech out of the way and then you can run them in between foreign ministers up there. In the meantime on the VP thing, let me say that if worse comes to worse and he does go the impeachment route we'll survive that too.

K: I think the more we function as a government the more these things will be seen as aspects of the past.

P: I wonder if, take the Russians, they aren't going to think this with Agnew is all that earth-shaking are they?

K; Well, the erosionable authority in this country is a problem with us for the Russians, it is a problem with the Europeans. But you take the Europeans, in June they were being very snutty about your coming to Europe, the great favors we're going to do. Now we confronted them for 2 or 3 months and showed them that we still had a little bark left and now they're practically on their knees begging you to come.

P: Also we've come back some here too.

K: And we've come back here.....

Changing tapes.

K: Comes between the 26th and 29th of October.

message

P: How did the ~~xxxxxx~~ come through.

K: Through their Ambassador here.

P: Was he back.

K: Well, their Deputy Ambassador.

P: 26th and 29th. When can we announce that.

K: thr 4th.

P: ~~xxxxxx~~ You have to wait until the 4th to announce that.

K: That's what they said.

P: That's alright.

K: But that's only a week away.

P: That's good. We don't need any announcements/but you can announce this week that on the 4th and I was thinking if Agnew does go the impeachment route this week rather than next week and I'd like to open it with that.

K: I think we'd better not. That would really upset them but you can do it on the 3rd.

P: The 3rd I could do it huh.

K: The 3rd here is the 4th there.

P: I thought we could beat it by 24 hours they aren't going to be squealing much anyway.

K: I think they would. On things like that they are relly prety.

P: I mean the 3rd what do you mean that is the same day.

K: If you do it on the 3rd that's the 4th there. That we can do.

P: What day of the week is the 3rd.

K: Wednesday.

P: A week from this coming Wednesday. I'll have that in mind because i want to make that announcement in any event. Incidentally, it's sort of good to have a positive.

K: Absolutely, and even if you weren't there. If you were not holding a press conference that day it could go out from the White House rather than ....

P: I could announce it to the press and walk off.

K: That would be good too.

P: Then maybe have you stay and answer any questions on it.

K: Whichever you want.

P: ALright fine. Good luck with your speech.

K: Thank you Mr. President. Thank you for yesterday.

P: You don't need to worry about, I know the content is very important from other stand points but believe me, because it's the first but your talk yesterday, you said everything that really needed to be said. One thing I could urge you. Keep it to 2500 words if you possibly can. Don't go longer than 20 minutes. Can you do that?

K: I haven't seen the full draft yet but I'll do my best.

P: If you go. Or at least at a maximum X 3000 words and count the words because when you go over. They're used to long speeches there but it's very impressive to go up and say it and get the hell out.

K: They don't _____ me so much. It isn't that sort of an assembly.

P: I understand. You get better than I do thank God.

K: Well you were there during, as you said, all the communists were against you that meant all the noncommitted couldn't do anything.

P: And also the communists and so were the Arabs at that time.

K: That's what I mean. The communists, the nonaligned and the Arabs. So you didn't have a very good... Then you had the Vietnamese war

P: And also let's face it. We had in the U.N., that great tower of strength Charlie Yost. Remember.

K: Charlie Yost, exactly. And this was before your great positive achievements so I wouldn't judge it by that.

P: Alright Henry. Good luck.

TELCON
Senator Fulbright/Secy Kissinger
8:30 a.m., September 27, 1973

RELEASED IN FULL

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(88)

K: I look forward to seeing you today at 1:00 but I have two questions before that. One, a number of networks are interested in filming my first day in the Department but I didn't want to let them take a picture of you and me unless you approved.

F: Oh, I approve. It's your first day in the office?

K: It's my first day in the office because I spent all my time ....

F: Oh, sure, it's all right with me.

K: I'd be very pleased.

F: I'm glad you called, I'll have to get out a clean shirt.

K: (laughs) Now, the second question I have, Mr. Chairman, is this: I wanted to bring somebody in for a few weeks to look at this whole problem of Congressional-State relationships and how one can have this dialogue you and I were talking about and I was wondering what you thought if Dave Abshire did this for me for about three weeks. His only job would be to go around the Hill and talk to senior people to find out how they envisage it.

F: Oh, he's experienced. He's okay with me.

K: Would that be agreeable to you?

F: Sure.

K: Good. Well, then we may announce it today or tomorrow. And that will be about three weeks on a consulting basis.

F: All right. That's all right with me.

K: Because then I won't be flying so blind.

F: I must say, Henry, this performance over there in the Senate and what they did in the Ways and Means is not very encouraging.

K: I want to talk to you about that at lunch today.

F: Yeah.

K: I think what you said last week about the threat to the whole structure of our foreign policy is absolutely real. I had a long talk with Gromyko and these people are just going down _____ as if detente were the most

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K: (cont'd) normal thing in the world and as if Russia were New Zealand.

F: Yeah. They can't believe that this Congress, you know, can be that obstructus and so defiant of the Executive. You see, it's been so subservient to the Executive for about 10-15 years and now they are turning around in a way you don't want them to.

K: Yeah, yeah.

F: It's a very puzzling thing.

K: That's right.

F: Henry Jackson is calling the shots over there because he's got all the Pentagon, all the Admirals -- Admiral Rickover and all those boys behind him.

K: Well, it's an unfortunate combination of a lot of circumstances.

F: It is.

K: I think it's really a profound threat to everything that we've been trying to do on East-West relations.

F: I do too. I certainly do. I said that yesterday. I said what I thought -- The Trident's a symbol of -- Your signal that you are sending is that detent is off. There is no sense in speeding it up two years just to please Rickover. It's going to be a close fight. We vote at 11:00 today. I think it's a damn shame if we lose it. It's going to be close. If you've got any special boys you can influence, I think you ought to do it. You know what was going to happen yesterday on that vote -- the first vote we won, 49 to 46. Then they reversed it and we lost, 51 to 44.

K: On the Mansfield?

F: Yeah.

K: Well, on Mansfield, I totally disagree with you.

F: I know. What I'm talking about is the same powers that turned that around are for the acceleration of the Trident. It's a demonstration of power, not just the substantive value.

K: Oh, I see what you mean.

F: You see, they had the muscle to influence the vote. There's a good story in the morning paper about how four of them changed.

K: I look forward to seeing you at 1 o'clock.

F: Okay.

K: Good. Bye.

RELEASED IN FULL

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(S9)

TELCON
Senator Mansfield/Sec. Kissinger
9/27/73 8:32 a.m.

M: Good morning , Mr. Secretary.

K: How are you Senator?

M: Fine, Henry and you?

K: Okay

M: How did you make out in New York?

K: I think that I had a very good reception by the UN

M: I'm delighted.

K: And, of course, one always meets a lot of the foreign ministers, but I think we laid the basis--had a very good talk with Huang Hua

M: Good

K And I'm having dinner with them next week.

M: Good

K: And Gromyko and then with various other delegates from Europe and Asia and Latin America.

M: Well you've got your hands full

K: Well, Senator the reason I'm calling you this morningis because I thought that before I made a move on this relationship between the Congress and the State Department which I was talking about in my confirmation hearings, I might get somebody to look at that whole problem how we can have that closer relationship I was talking about.

M: Hm huh.

K: And if you thought well of it, I would like to bring in Dave Abshire for a few weeks as a consultant to go around the Hill to talk to senior people how they envisage it and then I can make some specific decisions if you think well of him and if you think that this might be a good way of going about it, I'd like to announce it today or tomorrow--I don't know yet which day.

M: Good enough.

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K: Do you think that is a useful idea?

M: Sure, I think it would, very useful.

K: And do you think Dave Abshire is a ~~good~~ acceptable enough on the Hill to do that, he's got a lot of experience and is well thought of in the State Department

M: Yes, I would guess so.

K: Good, well then I'll proceed on that basis, I hope you can come next week, I'm giving a dinner for --a big affair for all the UN delegations and --not the ~~11~~-just the heads of the mission and foreign ministers on October 4 and ~~/~~you and Mrs. Mansfield could come in NY

M: What day is that, Henry?

K: That's a Thursday.

M: A week from today?

K: Yes.

M: We'll keep it in mind and do our best--we've got work to do around here too.

K: I know you do. It would be a good symbolic gesture if the leaders could come to that.

M: Oh, allright. Listen did you see Chiaou up there?

K: No, I'm having dinner with him next Wednesday--he hasn't arrived yet.

M: Oh, oh.

K: He's arriving on Monday.

M: Good enough.

K: And I'm going to--for your information, I haven't had a chance to tell this to anyone yet. I'll be going to China from the 26 to 29th of October.

M: AOh, good.

K: And I'll be talking to him if you permit me about your trip.

M: Good enough, I wish you would, Henry.

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K: And if there could be a few days overlap, that would be great, from my point of view.

M: My point of view, too.

K: I think it would be a very excellent thing to have happen.

M: Xxx Well, that's great. Okay, Henry, and we'll be in touch.

K: Good Senator.

M: Bye.

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S14

TELCON
Mr. Kissinger/Amb. Moynihan
9/27/73 6:40 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

M: Mr. Secretary!

K: How are you Pat?

M: After four days on the Hill trying to ~~thex~~ get these people in India, I'm pretty weary.

K: Am I ever going to hear from you again?

M: Of course you are, listen I have arranged to meet in Tokyo on Sunday and I'm going to have a long talk and I'll send you a cable from there, okay--I'm trying to work it out, but I know you can't last forever and --but I've got to talk to my wife--it's just as simple as that--

K: Okay, I understand.

M: You know what that is like. How are you?

K: I'm fine.

M: Listen--I assume it is impossible, but I said to Hal Saunders that if you could take me in to see the President for five minutes--

K I'll do my damnest, when are you leaving?

M: I'm leaving Saturday morning--When we put out the statement that the integrity and independence of Pakistan is the cornerstone of the--our foreign policy--

K: Yeh

M: _____ rushed to the phone and called the Indian Embassy and thank God they got the Minister up there -- and he said, well the independence and the integrity of Pakistan is even more a cornerstone of Indian foreign policy--

K: (laughs)

M: If I could just take back to Mrs. G a statement that the President knows that I thought that was very helpful--thinks we are getting along, glad to see the scholar thing worked out--most of these things seem to be moving

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M: Wouldn't take me more than three minutes to get that to the President, but would give me a chance to say he asked me to tell her something--you hear this from 130 ambassadors

K: No, let me do my damnest to work it out--now Pat, we ought to talk for five minutes before you talk to your wife just so that we fully understand each other

M: Hmhuh, hmhuh.

K: About --no time is good tomorrow--there is a goddamn cabinet meeting--are you going to be in the Department tomorrow--

M: I'm going to be at the Hill all day--but I can be anywhere anytime obviously.

K: Well why don't you come to the Department around 4:30 or so --you may have to wait a bit, and we don't really need a hell of a long time

M: No, no

K: Because we really said most of the important things--

M: If you can get me in--my talk with the President can be a standup two minutes--

K: Can it be as late as Saturday morning

M: Well no

K: Let me do my best tomorrow

M: If you can

K: Maybe we should aim here for around 4:00

M: I'll be at the WH at 4:00

K: Right.

M: Okay sir.

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S12

TELCON
Senator Scott/Sec. Kissinger
9/27/73 8:45 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hugh, how are you?

S: Fine.

K: Hugh I wanted to check with you about a matter I've been considering; I wanted to bring Dave Abshire in for a few weeks to help me study how we can work out this relationship between the Hill and State Department.

S: Sure, sure.

K: And I didn't want to do it without the cooperation of the leaders

SL It would be fine with me. I think he is very knowledgeable about it. He's done that job. No reason why not. I don't think there would be any objection on that.

K: Good. Then I'll proceed on that basis.

S: Yes, of course.

K: Good Hugh. See you later.

S: You bet.

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S11

TELCON
Dave Abshire/Secy Kissinger
10:29 a.m., September 27, 1973

RELEASED IN FULL

A: Henry, on Africa. I think it would be an unfortunate mistake to put Reinhardt in there, partly because of the Black situation. Second, I gather that maybe he didn't really do that good a job in Nigeria.

K: Oh, really.

A: You can get separate judgments on that but I would hold the judgment on putting a black in there anyway. I think blacks should be used in high positions in the Department but I question the wisdom of doing it in the African post, just as I would question sending a Jewish Ambassador to Israel.

K: Dave, I've got to run to a meeting with the President. We're going to announce you today.

A: Good.

K: And everyone is enthusiastic. We've checked with the leaders.

A: Good. You've talked to Fulbright?

K: Right.

A: Wonderful.

K: Good.

A: I've got some other suggestions on Africa.

K: I must talk to you about it later. Give me the names quickly.

A: Mac Godley, Roundtree - Ambassador to Brazil.

K: I know. Or was, I don't know where he is now. I think he's retired.

A: I think he's a good man. There's a younger man I'd like to talk to you about over the weekend.

K: What's his name?

A: Well, I'd rather go into it with you personally.

K: But how about giving me the name anyway.

A: Samuels, he's Executive Assistant to Ken Rush.

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K: Yeah, I know he is.

A: He's non-Foreign Service. He would have to be put in as a Deputy and flighted up.

K: Right. Okay.

A: I've got a suggestion on a Legal Advisor -- Cecil Homestead.

K: No, I've got a Legal Advisor already. I've got to run because we've got the Prime Minister of New Zealand.

A: Understand. Thank you, Henry.

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S13

TELCON
Senator Stennis/Secy Kissinger
10:32 a.m., September 27, 1973

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Mr. Chairman.

S: Yes, sir, yes sir; you're making a fine start, let me say that.

K: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Well, I count on working very closely with you.

S: Well, I look forward to it.

K: You've been our main stay. Now, Mr. Chairman, I'm taking the liberty of calling you today about this MASF issue.

S: About which?

K: The issue of transferring MASF to MAP and then moving . . .

S: Yes, yes.

K: . . it from the Armed Services Committee. Now, we feel very strongly that for this year ~~think~~ it is imperative that it stay with your Committee and that it not be transferred to MAP. And if you could, as Chairman of the Committee, perhaps intervene to oppose this, it would really be in the overwhelming national interest. You know I don't appeal to you often.

S: No, I know. Well, listen, I can do that and I will do it. Just in parenthesis, I've got a terrific virsus with a high fever and all last weekend and it's holding on some. I just can't say for sure I will be here on the floor; I'm at the floor now, but I'm planning to make some remarks on that and put it on the grounds for this year it was part of the agreement that was had back yonder several years ago and so forth.

K: Well, if you could do this, it would be one more of the many services you've rendered this country.

S: That's all right. Now, I really can't speak for the years hereafter because I'm more or less tied out on that some things I said a few years ago, you see.

K: Well, Mr. Chairman, in subsequent years we can all sit down and talk about it.

S: Yes.

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K: But it's terribly important that on top of the cut-off of bombing and all the other problems we have, that this sock not be administered now.

S: Yes. Well, you're so right and it's unthinkable that we'd do anything less than that. They don't propose to do anything, not let you have any money. I can't live with that and I'm going to say so.

K: Well, Mr. Chairman, if you would do this, it would be a great service.

S: Well, that's all right. I'll certainly do it.

K: And I hope you'll let me call on you within the next week to pay my respects.

S: Thank you. That would be fine.

K: We'll arrange it.

S: All right. Thank you.

S21

TELECON
Maj. Gen. Haig/Sec. Kissinger
September 28, 1973
7:40 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

H: Hello?

K: Al?

H: Yes.

K: How are you. I'm telling you I am getting treated like a cabinet member or something. They said leave your name and we will see if we can get back with you.

H: I was with the boss.

K: I am calling you in a few minutes on another matter, but I have with me a man I am trying to recruit for the Under Secretary for Mutual Security... for supervision of a lot of high priority things like energy and management of the Department. I was wondering if you could talk to him on Tuesday. I have mentioned him to you before, Bill Donaldson. Can I tell him to call your office on Tuesday?

H: Sure.

K: Do you know what two good appointment times are now for Tuesday?

H: I know.

K: What, are they between 1 and 2:30?

H: There's been also.... and what can

K: How is he, is he at ease on what's going on here?

H: Although he mentioned to me today on personnel that he had talked to you about. I want to be sure we haven't made any mistakes.

K: We are meeting tomorrow aren't we, Sonnenfeldt, Eagleburger and I, I want to go over all the plans.

H: I would like to bring in a fellow I've mentioned, Jones.

K: You want him to sit in on the meeting.

H: I wanted...

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K: Why don't we talk first and then have him co me in.

H: You will find him very reliable.

K: That's fine with me.

H: There are a lot of things we have had trouble wi t . Like George Bush matter.....

K: We ha ve to make these announcements fast or we will never get the place organized. I would like to do it by the 9th or 10th.

H: Good

K: What you told me yesterday, the 9th or 10th.

H: OK

K: Don;t you think... are you going to be there a bit?

H: I'll be on the phone til about eight.

K: I'll call you again a little bit after 8.

S18
RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Senator Javits/Secretary Kissinger
Friday, September 28, 1973
1:00 pm

K: How are you?

J: And you?

K: OK.

J: Understand you were brilliant and we had a wonderful time Tuesday.

K: Marian is lovely.

J: Women's World gave you about two full pages.

K: Really. I did not see it.

J: I will send it to you. You have invited me to a working lunch on Monday. I was due to go up-state -- political appearances, etc. If you feel it vital...

K: Not vital in that sense. It is a working lunch. It is one way to establish relationships with the Committee instead of having briefings. I invited Fulbright and you, together with four of my colleagues and three of the Europeans. We would just conduct business as if you were not there.

J: It would be wonderful and I would like it but I don't think it would be reason enough for me to change my political plans.

K: I understand. There will be other opportunities.

J: Would love to do that kind of thing with you and I probably could be useful in it.

K: I thought it would be useful and would help you in your work which you are doing really in our interest.

J: Very much.

K: This is not a one shot affair. There will be other opportunities.

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J: Bear in mind that I am anxious to do it. One other thing. I am having a press conference on October 2 on this report of the Committee of Nine. I have gotten agreement now from Scheel of Germany, Vandertol of the Netherlands and assurances that Mitchell Sharp -- all three will make statements. I am trying to get Alex Douglas Humes which I think I will be able to do. I would like very much if you would have the document studied to see if it is worthy of a statement by you.

K: I will let you know tomorrow.

J: I have talked to Scheel and Vandertol personally and they will make a statement. Ruth Farkas, your Ambassador in Luxembourg, called me this morning and said the Prime Minister or whatever he is Thorn would be here on Tuesday and his nose is out of joint because he cannot get in to see you for five minutes. I am just depositing this with you.

K: I will see him. I was going to see him anyway. If I saw every Foreign Minister that wants to see me I would do nothing else.

J: I know. She said they are good allies and a good source of information. I would love to see you when you get a chance. I want to talk to you about my own decision. I am just in the throes about running for reelection.

K: I will not run against you.

J: I really would like to talk to you in a personal way.

K: I consider that a compliment. Next week or ...

J: I will give you a ring.

K: Look forward to it.

J: Thanks.

END

S16 *

TELCON
September 28, 1973/9:15
Senator Mansfield/HAK

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Chancellor Brandt is going to be in town tomorrow and at first he was going to leave right after his meeting with the President but now he can stay long enough for me to give a very small lunch for him and I was wondering whether you might be free to attend at Blair House around 1:00. There would be just four on each side.

M: OK.

K: I think it would be very nice.

M: Fine. 1:00 at Blair House.

K: 1:00 at Blair House. If there is any change through the State Dept. I'll call your office. But if you don't hear from me it's 1:00 at Blair House.

M: OK Henry. I'll see you then.

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* RELEASED IN FULL

S17

TELCON
Senator Sparkman/Sec. Kissinger
Friday, Sept. 28, 1973
5:10 p. m.

S: How are you doing?

K: O. K.

S: About settled?

K: Getting settled. A little hectic.

S: I know it must be. I did not want to press too soon, but one man, a friend of mine, I wanted to speak to you about, Armistice Selden. He was a congressman for sixteen years.

K: He was at Defense.

S: Right. He used to be. I believe he headed up ISA for a time.

K: He was Deputy.

S: Yes. He was on the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House throughout. I just want to offer his name to you as a suggestion in filling some of your ambassadorial posts.

K: All right.

S: I think he would be excellent.

K: I know him and I think well of him.

S: He is a good person.

K: I want get around to the ambassadorial posts until another four to six weeks.

S: I figured that.

K::Any recommendation from you counts for a lot.

S: Thanks to you.

K: See you soon.

End

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TELECON
Hedley Donovan/Sec. Kissinger
September 28 [1973]
7:30 pm

* (S19)

RELEASED IN FULL

K: You know I will be in New York for the UN next Thursday and Friday. I was wondering whether you think it's a good idea to try to get together some people -- how can we have a rational foreign policy. Not just Time-Life. How do you frame the issues properly. Would you be willing to help me get the people together? Are you free for lunch on Thursday? You could invite them or I could invite them.

D: Are you free any other time?

K: Thursday is the only possible day. Whom do you think I should ask? You are the first person I am calling.

D: Entirely from the press or other areas?

K: No, we can have other areas.

D: Press people -- John Oats, Abe Rosenthal

K: Arthur Elliot

D: Arthur Taylor of CBS?

K: Yes

D: Do you want some of the Council on Foreign Relations people?

K: That's where I got my start, . . . Bill Bundy

D: Cy Vance

K: Cy Vance is excellent, especially Vance

D: R. Dillon

K: The group shouldn't be too large because otherwise we won't be able to talk

D: How many people, 10 or 12?

K: Yes, 10 or 12

D: Couple of University people?

K: OK

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D: Do you know Jim Hesler?

K: No, but I have heard good things about him.

D: McGill

K: Should I make the invitation or how should we do it?

D: I would be glad to call, Henry. I could say I was calling at your request. I am worried about the actual date . . but lunch Monday, I can't do it then, are you free for Friday lunch?

K: No, I am giving a luncheon Friday

D: How about dinner?

K: No, I am giving a dinner for the UN Delegation. In fact, you should have been invited to that.

D: If it is Thursday. . . However, let me see, if that's out perhaps we can fix him up some other day.

K: Good, will you call me whenever you know because it will be Monday and that group you mentioned will be excellent. What I have in mind, I will tell them some of my perplexities to this group and see how we can form some sort of consensus in the nation on the issues or what we can tolerably do.

D: I think it is a good idea.

K: I think it is terribly important.

D: Yah, You are right. I will try to fix that up and come back to you on it.

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S15

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Gen. Scowcroft - Sec. Kissinger
September 28, 1973
6:25 p. m.

Conversation re personnel.

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(S20)

TELECON
Gov. Rockefeller/Sec. Kissinger
September 28, 1973
7:35 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

R: Where are you? In the old office?

K: No, I am in the new one. It will never look the same again after Mrs. Miller gets through with it. It's going to be a . . .

R: I want to say its great

K: She has picked some spectacular paintings

R: I am thrilled.

K: And she's throwing out all the furniture

R: No kidding

K: My people are really. . . . it all too requested.

R: That's great. How are you?

K: It will look more like the Chase Bank

R: Well, we won't mention that. Happy was thrilled with the picture of you and she in Women's Wear Daily. There was a picture of both of you.

K: I didn't see it. I was moved by your talk last night.

R: Well, thank you, I am so excited about what you are doing for the country and the world. Just the greatest.

K: Nelson, I have just been talking to Bill Donaldson in my office. He is very tempted to take the position with me but he wonders whether you would be willing to talk to him and give him a little feel for how you see it. Can you do this? Can he call you?

R: Of course, Henry.

K: Where should he call? When are you in the country?

R: Well, I am going out to Michigan around lunch time tomorrow and I will be back here late tomorrow night. I will be here Sunday.

K: Let me tell you what I'm talking to him about. . There is a job in the Department for Under Secretary for Mutual Security. It is a nothing job in its present state. The man handles military assistance programs. It

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K cont.

K: takes up 20% of an ordinary man's time.

R: Didn't Paul Nitze have that...

K: He had it in the defense, but I want Donaldson to do that job plus taking on high priority projects like energy, science,... and shock troup for me in the Department, keep an eye on management, supervise bureaus that have no home science, education and cultural affairs. You know what I am trying to do. If you could talk to him about what you think the country needs right now.

R: Delighted

K: Delighted. I will give him your number

R: Good. How are things going.

K: Pretty well. They have no idea here of what I am planning to do. I had a staff meeting this afternoon with Assistant Secretaries and Under Secretaries and I had them tell me their problems....unless they can elevate their concerns a little bit. They should come to me with problems only the Secretary can solve and give me direction. (He gave an example of a ridiculous problem of air shipment versus other type of shipment) They will not do that in two weeks from now.

R: Stetinnius used to have staff meetings. Not bad if you can get them to raise really good policy issues.

K: They will have to learn what I consider policy.... but they must raise their level of concern. This was the first meeting.

R: The other ones, in different fields.. of balance. You understand what's going on.

K: I don't have a policy planning staff yet, I'll have it in another three weeks.

R: What's happened to the Under Secretary of the Treasury?

K: Who's that? Oh, you mean Sonnenfeldt? He's doing fine. I am bringing him in too.

R: That's grand

K: Love to Happy.

Then the line went bad and they blamed on too many people listening. HAK offered to place the call again but R said he would talk to him again.

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(S22)

TELCON
Mr. Kissinger/Prof. Doty
9/29/73 10:03 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

D: Henry.
K: Paul.
D: Good morning.
K: How are you?

D: Okay. Sorry I didn't see you out here--I have just one or two points that might be of interest this morning. One is a very interesting report that Marian Darnholf got about two or three weeks ago on cleavage--in the Politburo and I don't know if you heard about it.

K: No, I've not.

D: But she has told it to Brandt and if it comes up---pursuing it with him and if it doesn't I can put it in a letter to you or call you another time, but it is very interesting.

K: Yes, could you do that?

D: Yes, the other thing, I didn't see much of Mr. Brandt but I could see he was a little upset by what must have transpired between you and the foreign minister in Denmark--thinking you weren't taking it seriously enough, so that--the only,

K: That I was not taking him seriously enough?

D: Yeh, he was representing the Common Market and to know he was from a country of foreign stature and--

K: Yeh, but that's nonsense-what we don't accept--it has nothing to do with the Danish Foreign Minister, we don't accept that they give us a note and that then their foreign minister has no right to negotiate it--that he is just a messenger boy--that's our objection--got nothing to do with the size--if it were Sheel we would treat him the same way. What we can't accept is that he brings a document to us, then collects our reactions and runs back to Europe so we are left without anyone to negotiate with in Europe.

D: I see--that's understandable--okay, that's about all--talk to you some time.

K: Good, I hope so. Let me know when you come to Washington--will you do that? And thank you Paul and send me a note on clevage--

D: Very good--I will do that. Bye bye.

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S23

TELCON
Mr. Kissinger/Joe Alsop
9/29/73 1:44 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Joe.

A: Afternoon, excellency.

K: Have we worked out how to get out there today?

A: I thought I was going out in your car.

K: I know but have they fixed the time.

A: It will be anytime that anyone calls me to tell me to be ready.

K: Good, well it will be around 4:30 or 5:00

A: I'll be on the doorstep at 4:00

K: No, no --we'll call you.

A: I mean I'll be ready from 4:30.

K: Okay and youwill forgive me if I do some work in the car.

A: Yes, I will, but I --what I was thinking was that I could get a chance to talk to you, which I have been wanting for a long time and not bother you for another month.

K: Are you coming back with me or staying over?

A: I think I'll come back with you.

K: I'll talk to you for a bit, but I'm so far behind in my work, that I absolutely must get some work done too.

A: Okay. Getting back means I'll have to limit my enjoyment, because I don't drink if I have to talk toyou.

K: If you have to talk to me.

A: If I talk to you on the way back, then I can't drink all evening.

K: I don't want you to talk to me on the way back--I want to work.

A: Well, okay, let me talk to you a little bit on the way out then.

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K: You can be absolutely loaded for all I care.

A: I'll go to sleep (laughs) I think I will come back with you, If I may --I think it'd be better. I think Stu --

K: Now you sent a message--I got an enigmatic comment from you that I'm the extra man at that dinner--do you want me to bring somebody?

A: No, no. You are the essential extra man--I would have to replace you.

K: Oh I see.

A: I want to sit you next to Lady Bird and all of that.

K: Good, I didn't understand.

A: Now that you are--'

K: And the Alsop's won't talk to any of my girlfriends except Nancy.

A: (laughs)

K: I know you wouldn't let me into your house with any one except Nancy, I didn't know what the message meant.

A: No. The message meant that you were essential as a bachelor, which I hope is only a temporary condition.

K: Do you have a candidate for me?

A: You know my candidate.

K: Do you realize what your brother said to me the other day when I met him with some other girl? He said you can come to my house on Saturday, you can bring anyone you want, but of course you know whom I prefer. (laughs) I've got the message.

A: We both prefer the real show. So there you are.

K: But for reasons which you and you alone have correctly analyzed the ladder --

A: The spectacle of you coming into that den--it was some old/recorded un- testament hero in the hyena's den

K: At the department?

A: No at dinner the other evening.

(S28)

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Mr. John Meyer/Secretary Kissinger
September 30, 1973
6:55 pm

K: Mr. Meyer, Arthur Burns has mentioned to me that I may benefit from having a talk with you regarding some of the economic problems we are facing in the Department and in general. And I am wondering whether when I am in New York at the end of this week you might have some time to spare me.

M: Yes, I am not sure I can add anything but I would be delighted to see.

K: I don't have my precise calendar here right now. We could try Thursday morning around 9 o'clock.

M: Gosh, that is the one day that I have been committed for for three weeks.

K: Friday?

M: I would be glad to come to Washington.

K: No, I will be in New York Thursday and Friday.

M: All right.

K: What I have to do is shift some of the things I have to do on Friday to Thursday. May I call you tomorrow.

M: Where would you like to meet?

K: In New York at the Waldorf?

M: Fine.

K: Will you be in town Saturday?

M: Saturday morning.

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K: Maybe Saturday morning if that would suit you.
We will call you tomorrow. Will you be at the same number?

M: No this is my residence. I will be at the office tomorrow.
The number is (212) 483-3594.

K: OK, we will call you there tomorrow.

S26

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Mark Palmer/Secretary Kissinger
September 30, 1973
2:40 pm

K: ... toast for the UN statement.

P: Yes.

K: Do you have it with you at home?

P: Yes.

K: I wonder whether you might be able to redo it for me for tomorrow. There are a number of things wrong with it. I won't read it anyhow. I will do it extemporaneously. First, we have to pay tribute to the people that are there, the bipartisan nature since Mansfield will be there and a number of others. I need a paragraph on them to indicate support of the United States World Concept. The first page should be a little more personal. I like the Emerson quote. But then it tends to repeat almost verbatim what I said at the UN. Pick up more from the UN speech. Also pick up those parts on page 6 and 7 of the Pacem in Terris speech. It won't hurt to repeat that; no one ever hears what was said in a toast. You might want to elevate it more than the usual State Department jargon. There are enough people around that will qualify everything I say.

P: Yes. First thing tomorrow.

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
General Scowcroft/ Secretary Kissinger
September 30, 1973

12:00 noon -- discussion of personnel matters

3:45 pm -- discussion of personnel matters

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Winston Lord/Secretary Kissinger
September 30, 1973
2:10 pm

Opening discussion of the football game.

K: I want to ask you your view ... Can I get Palmer ... Is he over there with you.

L: No, he must be at State .

K: I would like him to redo that toast for the UN a bit. Don't you think?

L: You mean for the Metropolitan thing?

K: Do you have your pride involved ?

L: No.

K: It is pretty good. I would like him to take some of the stuff from the speech I am giving next week rather than quote from the preceding one.

L: He must be over there.

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TELECON
Mr. McCloskey/ The Secretary
September 30, 1973

S2VA

K: Why don't you come in around 12

M: I was planning to come in around noon. Can I get something to eat here.

K: You wanted to call Kraft

M: Do you want me to get him or...

K: I would be happy to have my people do it.

M: What time do you want to see him?

K: Around 12:00. Let him come in about 12:45

M: OK, I'll give him a ring.

K: I'm glad you put out that statement yesterday. We would have been hard to.....

M: It was treated rather modestly

K: We'll have to hit it again tomorrow. Also, what do you think about the page 8 New York Times Article?

M: We don't have NYT yet, I have the Post and Star. I'll have to buy it.

K: I'll tell you I don't want you to go to such extremes. You can read it when you come in.

M: What's it say?

K: European Embassies leaked... on the Declaration... on talks I had with their Foreign Ministers and claimed it was inconsistent with the press conference because..... constructive atmosphere. I think we should say something tomorrow.

M: I'll read it when I come in.

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
(✓) Release ( ) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 12/12/2000 Exemption _____

(S25)
RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Helmudt Sonnenfeldt - Secretary Kissinger
September 30, 1973
10:25 a.m.

(missed several minutes)

S: What did you think of that scandalous article in the Times?

K: What article?

S: In the New York Times on about page 8. David Binder.... saying that what you said to the Foreign Ministers in private does not agree with what you said in your press conference. They don't know what you are up to, making public statements which are optimistic and in private ....

K: So what?

S: Well, it just puts the whole thing in the public domain again.

K: Do they want a public fight? We can give it to them if that's what they want.

S: I made a very strong pitch in the meeting yesterday for them to stop that .... it will harden everybody's position.

K: Why do they do it?

S: I don't know....it apparently came out of Washington... somebody just decided to talk.

K: I don't think it is the British.

S: It sounds more like the Danes than anybody else from the quotations. I was not there in your meeting with the Danes but from all..... Binder says he talked to four of them.

K: Well, I can't worry about that. ... say there is not any progress...

S: They said you were very tough and hard and unbending in the private talks. They don't know how to interpret the talks and what you said in public.

K: Anyway, what I said in public wasn't contradictory.

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S: We should tell people this really can't be handled this way, and Ambassadors should control their diplomats.

K: Yes.

S: Why don't we get Stoessel in Monday and...

RELEASED IN FULL

S30

TELCON
Sen. Mansfield/Sec. Kissinger
Monday, Oct. 1, 1973
3:30 pm

M: I have looked over my schedule and I find I will be in Boise, Idaho, on the 20th. The dates you had were the 19th, 20th and 21st.

K: Correct.

M: Could you make it the 19th and I will see if I can get a schedule out the next morning.

K: I will do my damnedest. The 21st you could not do?

M: No. I will be out there.

K: I will do my best to do it on the 19th.

M: O. K. When are you leaving on Wednesday?

K: I will be leaving about 5:30 in the afternoon.

M: If I can make it, can I go with you.

K: I would be delighted.

M: If I cannot I will go the next day.

K: Of course, Mrs. Mansfield is invited too.

M: She is in New Jersey with a cold. She might come over and she might not.

K: I will be delighted to take you on Wednesday and if you come commercial on Thursday, we will pick you up at the airport.

M: Fine

END

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S 33

TELCON
Sonnenfeldt/HAK
10/1/73 - 9:22 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hel lo?

S: Yes.

K: As long as we're so busy, you got to get off our back. We can't clear everything with you. I've got a right to do a few things on my own.

S: Well, I was simply wanting to make sure...

K: How the hell did you find out?

S: Because I was talking to Stoessel.

K: Probably Eagleburger should have told you but we're all working all day Sunday. We 're drowning in work. It's bound to happen that some things don't get cleared, particularly what you and I had talked about.

S: No, but this is a fairly important one and I just wanted to be sure that I knew what you were doing. I run into these people, I have my hearing today and if I run into these people I want to be sure that...

K: Well, you get a copy of....

S: ... we're on the same wave length and...

K: Well, are we on the same wave length?

S: Yeah, I understand that you wanted even to say something about not going to Europe if this goes on and I just want to be sure that I know what you're thinking.

K: Well, now that paragraph I'm dropping.

S: Particularly since I will be having lunch with Ortoli and you today, so it's just a matter of knowing what everybody's doing, so we say the same thing.

K: No, no. You should get these copies, but while you are still over here with no official position in State it isn't always to get these things around, particularly when we're all drowning in work.

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S: Well, I was drowning in it over here, but anyhow, I'm going up in about half an hour for this hearing and I will stick to the line that we discussed the other day, if I'm asked about whether I'm really going to go to the Treasury or not.

K: Which is what?

S: Which is that's what I was nominated for and that's what my intention is but that I'm.....

K: I'm going to call Long right now.

S: What are you going to say to him?

K: I'm going to say I hope very much _____. I want him to know in fairness that I'm considering you for a position in State.

S: Are you going to say that no decision has been made but that....

K: No final decision has been made...

S: But it's a possibility and ....

K: That makes it all the more important that they clear him because it would deprive you of two jobs.

S: But I think as long as you just alert him to the possibility rather than making it a firm decision, hopefully he will not say, well, if you're considering, why don't we wait until you're finished considering.

K: No, I don't think....

S: He told me on Friday that he wants to clear the thing through.

K: Well, I think it's better, though, for me to call him rather than say_____

S: Well, as long as it's just an alerting thing it is a matter of courtesy to show him....

K: O.K. Let me call him before he gets to you.

S: O.K.

RELEASED IN FULL

S29

TELCON
Senator Mansfield/Secretary Kissinger
Monday, October 1, 1973
1:00 p.m.

K: I keep bothering you. I have three problems. One is I am giving a lunch here at the State Department on October 11 for Huang Chen and I was wondering if you were in town if you would like to join.

M: Let me check on it, Henry, and call you back.

K: October 11. A week from Thursday.

M: Lunch for Huang Chen.

K: Second is of same nature. They want to give a dinner for me. I am going there the 26th through the 29th. This will not be announced until Wednesday of this week and they want to give a dinner for me on my departure and they asked me to suggest a guest list and I of course would very much like you and Mrs. Mansfield to be present.

M: O. k. What is the date?

K: We were thinking of the 19th, 20th, or 21st but before giving them a date, I wanted to check with you.

M: We will be delighted. Any one of those days.

K: Third question. I mentioned to you that Byrd Amendment on India. I wanted to ask your advice on how to handle that. Should we wait for a conference or should we...

M: I think the best thing to do would be to talk to Stennis and Symington; and Tower and Thurmond, and also the House members who will be in the conference there. This matter was not in the House Bill. It would be taken in conference and they will either split the difference or obliterate it entirely.

K: Not a lot of difference to split. I will get Rush to talk to the Senate and House members.

M: O. K. A good idea.

K: Good. I will hear from you about the 11th and we will let you know which evening is selected by the Chinese.

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END.

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Walter Stoessel/Secy Kissinger
9:02 a.m., October 1, 1973

K: Walt, did Eagleburger talk to you yesterday about talking to these Ambassadors?

S: Yeah, he did.

K: Now on these talking points we did for you, I think you should drop the one threatening to cancel my trip to Europe. I think that's the sort of thing that invites them to hit you. Don't you think so?

S: I think so, yeah. Henry, I haven't seen these talking points yet. Larry said he was working on them but --

K: There was nothing to work on; they were done. It's only a page and a half. And I told him to consult with you. You mean you haven't got them now?

S: I haven't got them now.

K; You'll have them in two minutes.

S: But he told me what was involved and I had read the article of course.

K: But could you do that today, just dropping that one paragraph?

S: Sure, sure.

K: Then give me a call after you have them to tell me what you think.

S: All right.

K: It should have been in your hands.

S: Yeah. I thought, Henry, I would also perhaps give them what we gave the Nine up in New York. Some of them had asked for the Ambassadors to be informed here.

K: Yeah, but you better tell the Ambassadors that we insist that they keep their staffs under control.

S: Right, right.

K: I don't know whether I want to be that concillatory -- Well, just give it to them but let them know we are teed off.

S: Sure.

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K: What I wanted you to do is to see the people that I saw in New York because the leaks had to come from them.

S: Yeah, sure.

K: But also see Ortona at whose house this took place but be very concillatory with him. I don't know why you don't have this yet -- why don't you get it and then let's talk.

S: All right, all right.

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(S32)

TELCON
Speaker Carl Albert/HAK
10/1/73 - 9:13 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

A: Hello.

K: Mr. Speaker, how are you?

A: Fine, how are you?

K: Mr. Speaker, two things. As you know, I tried to reach you last week and couldn't, but I've asked Dave Abshire to look into the question of how we can have closer relationships between the Congress and the Department, and he'll be calling on you, with your permission. But I also thought that if you thought well of the idea that I might have a breakfast with the House leaders plus Doug Morgan next week at your convenience.

A: Fine.

K: Just to review where we stand and what's likely to come up, not in a legislative way, but just to give you a feel.

A: That's good.

K: If you agree with that.

A: I certainly do. I think, just to throw out something here that may be, just in setting it up, timewise, Monday is Columbus Day and there won't be anybody back here before Tuesday noon. That is...

K: Well, how about Wednesday or Thursday?

A: I think Wednesday or Thursday would be the best day.

K: Could we aim for Wednesday?

A: That would be fine with me.

K: Well, I will have Dave Abshire call the offices of all the leaders and maybe tell them that I've spoken to you about this?

A: Fine.

K: The leaders, plus Maynard and Morgan.

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A: Alright. Fine.

K: And, finally Mr. Speaker, I'm giving a dinner Thursday evening in New York for all the Chiefs of the delegations of the UN, and I'm asking a number of the Congressional leaders whether they would be willing to join that, and you know, show some bipartisan interest.

A:] I would like to. I have a very difficult, I'm leaving Thursday for England for the weekend because my college at Oxford is doing something for me.

K: I see, well then you probably can't.

A: I'm sort of tied into that, with a long-standing commitment and I hate to do it, but I just feel that it would inconvenience so many people.

K: No, no, you can't cancel that.

A: That's just a weekend affair but I've got to leave Thursday. I appreciate your inviting me and you can certainly tell everyone that I am still very much in support of a strong bipartisan/nonpartisan approach to foreign policy.

K: Well, that you have proved over the years, Mr. Speaker. I look forward to seeing you, then, at breakfast either Wednesday or Thursday, and we'll aim for Wednesday.

A: Alright. Thank you very much.

K: Thank you. Goodbye.

(S37)

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELECON
Peter Flanigan/Secretary Kissinger
Monday, Oct. 1, 1973
6:40 p.m.

F: I have some reports on Meyer. He is very thoughtful; not an inovator. He is about as far as you can get from Walter Wriston. But he is a very s ound man. He is 67 years old. I would think age alone gets him. That job would make him an unlikely candidate. Wouldn't you think so?

K: Not necessarily. Do you have a better candidate?

F: I have not been thinking about it. I am not of the same mind with you on the incumbent.

K: I have another suggestion to you for the incumbent. How about President of the Export-Import Bank. He could do that superbly.

F: The trouble is, we have asked a guy and he has agreed to that.

K: Who?

F: A fellow by the name of Wyman(?).

K: Didn't you raise David Smith with me this morning.

F: He is shot down already. [redacted] B6
Kearns was pushing him. The person does not have the job and he could be removed.

K: Let's keep that in mind. The President is prepared to remove Casey.

F: If it is to be done should be done tomorrow.

END

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all copies
S39

TELCON
Sen. Jackson/Sec. Kissinger
Monday, Oct. 1, 1973
7:15 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

J: I know you are busy. I will only take a minute.

K: I am calling you. You cannot tell me how much time to take.

J: I talked to the President. He called me on the defense thing. At times you have to stand up and fight and it paid off.

K: You and I agree on the MFN on tactics but not on strategy. We know who our friends are.

J: Two quick things I wish you would give some thought to. I mentioned it to the President. I have had the Canadians in because I have this energy problem with the pipeline coming down. You need to get someone on top of this thing on the international thing. You have to find an individual. This thing is a mess. Love does not know what is going on.

K: I could not agree with you more.

J: He is going to get the Administration in deep trouble. He has fooled around for two months on this mandatory thing. It will be one snafu after another. Someone needs to do this job foryyou on the international side.

K: I have a man. I cannot talk to you about it now. I completely agree. I have tried for six months to do it out of the White House and I will do it out of State now. Can you and I get together sometime in the next week?

J: I will get back to you when we can find the time. We are having nine to ten roll calls a day up here. I will get word to your secretary.

K: I will be able to tell you what we are going to do concretely in the energy field within three days. I mean organizationally.

J: I understand. Second thing. I talked to the Chinese today. We are trying to get a group together. They have okayed it for the middle of November. Don't know if we will be able to get out of here then.

K: I am most anxious for you to do it.

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TELCON
Oct. 1, 1973

J: Pass on to the Russians if they want me to come over, I will be glad to do it. I don't want to leave the impression we are trying to do a counter-veiling move here.

K: I have been living on that.

J: You know how to do it.

K: That's right.

J: You may at sometime want to pass that on to them.

K: When I see Dobrynin next, I will tell him that. You are one of the people about whom Brezhnev had some real feeling.

J: Love and affection.

K: I did not say that.

J: I keep them in business. If you don't have some adversary you cannot do it well at home you know.

K: I am anxious to talk to you about this and I would really like to talk to you about whether we can at least have a discussion on the MFN when it gets further down the road. That is independent of where we stand on the arms program and on energy.

J: Right. If you get hot on this energy thing -- all of a sudden hell is going to break loose.

K: It is among the top three things I am going to do here. You can be sure of it.

J: The impact domestically. I have some ideas on the Quadafi problem.

K: I am anxious just to discuss that. It is an absurd idea for us to be financing revolutions all Africa.

J: It is setting apprecedent. The blue-eyed Arabs in the North are in trouble. We will go over this the first break I get here.

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K; You call me and I will rearrange my schedule.

J: Are you still an early morning type?

K: Yes.

J: We will try to work it in then.

K: You set the time. I will be in New York at the end of the week. Except for that, you set the time.

J; We will check in and work it out.

K: Fine.

END

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(S34)

TELCON
Walter Stoessel/HAK
10/1/73 - 9:28 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

S: Hello, Henry.

K: Walt, has the thing finally shown up?

S: Yeah, I just got it. It takes a long time to move.

K: O.K. I think you should drop the paragraph that says, "If this is the case I should reconsider my trip." Don't you think?

S: Yeah. I think that's bad. That's too threatening, I think.

K: Because I don't want them to say something on which I then may have to act.

S: Right.

K: But it should be very tough in every other respect. And it should ask for some assurance.

S: Yeah. Do you ;think I should just see those people who you saw in New York?

K: Well, what do you think?

S: Well, I think certainly that. I don't know about the others because they spread this word around among them. I could run through the whole group. Or maybe it's better just to focus on the big ones.

K: Because they had that meeting.

S: Right, right.

K: It really could have come from anybody.

S: It could have. Now Binder speaks of four ambassadors.

K: Well, I'll have them all down, but start with the ones I saw. But you might call their attention . . . Italian. if he could ;split from the others. They probably are the leakers. What I would like to do is thank him for all his help. I want to see whether Morer won't come over here next week. I don't see how I have enough time to see him there.

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S: It would be difficult unless you could fit him in onthat Monday or Tuesday, the 15th or 16th.

K: Yeah, but it won't be a long session anyway.

S: No.

K: O.K. Well, will you do that Walt?

S: O.K. I'll do that.

K: Good. I'll see you at lunch. Yeah, fine. And bring Ortoli up for five minutes when you are through with him. That means it's got to be in the afternoon.

S: You want to see Ortoli what, after lunch?

K: No, not Ortoli, I mean the other guy. What is his name? The Ambassador?

S: Ortona.

K: You Ortona will keep the schedule.

S: O.K.

K: Well, thank you.

S36

TELCON
The President & Secretary Kissinger
Monday, Oct. 1, 1973
5:55 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

N: When I called Jackson to thank him for his help in the defense procurement he said he would appreciate it when you have some time to see him about energy in foreign policy and I said I would let you know.

K: Absolutely.

N: I told him I would leave it to you and you would contact him.

K: I wanted an excuse to see him anyway.

N: I told him I would call you and you would call him. How did you get along with the Frenchman?

K: We had a good lunch. He was very impressed by your talk. You said the right things.

N: The thing about him is it is like pulling teeth to get him to say anything. He is a smart fellow.

K: He wants to get you to talk.

N: I was very impressed by him. Much better than the other fellow.

K: No comparison.

N: He has an excellent manner. I was very impressed.

K: We had him here for lunch and we had...

N: I think he will be helpful.

K: I think he will be helpful too. I am trying to get on with ohim and what you said played well into it. I want to give them the feeling if they are helpful politically, we will be helpful in monetary and other things.

N: I saw how you linked that. When we double team that way -- we say we don't like it but it is a fact of life. If we do well on one front we do better on the other. The atmosphere is better. He gets the point.

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TELCON
Oct. 1, 1973

K: I think also when the monetary thing is settled that will be an historic event this time. It will be a new system. It should not be done as a technical negotiation. I think you should make the big decision with Pompidou and Heath.

N: Excellent idea. I had the idea of pushing for thing thing.

K: You broke the deadlock in the Azores and when in fact it is all done it should be signed at the head of government level. It should not be treated as technical.

N: Good idea.

K: At Reykjavik we had strong advice against it. When you go to Europe and meet Pompidou you should take that occasion to break the deadlock on the monetary thing. The technicians can work out the details. That would give him something domestically.

N: We will do that. If you could give Scoop a call. I think call him tonight to impress on him that I followed-up.

K: I will call him when our conversation is over.

N: When do you have time to run the State Department?

K: I am here now.

N: I know. I called you there.

END

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(S35)

TELCON
Sen. Long/HAK
10/1/73 - 9:37 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

L: How are you, Mr. Secretary?

K: How are you, Senator?

L: Fine.

K: Senator, I understand you are having hearings today on Mr. Sonnenfeldt.

L: We hope to wrap it up today. At least the hearings.

K: Right. Well, Senator what I wanted to tell you, on a confidential basis, is that I'm considering him, without a decision having been made also, for a position in the State Department which will also require confirmation. And I'm making a decision on that within the next two or three weeks. I felt in fairness I should tell you this so that you don't feel he's not being open with you. It makes approval by your committee even in a way more important. Because... well, you understand why.

L: Yeah, well, I really feel we should have confirmed him already, frankly, but we got a couple of Senators here who have been sort of dragging their feet on the matter so what I'm concerned, I know all I want to know about it and I'll get this thing over with as soon as I can.

K: Right. And you understand that if within the next two weeks we should send signals on you?

L: In other words if we should pin him down for some other job it would be a job of equal significance in some other capacity.

K: It would be a job of equal significance in another department and then of course it would be very important if your committee could nevertheless give him favorable consideration so there isn't any conflict between two committees.

L: Well, that's fine. I'll try to bring that about. I don't see any reason why he shouldn't be confirmed.

K: It may not happen, Senator, you know, I'm still juggling positions at State. But if I proceed it will be on the basis for a position of equal importance.

L: Yeah. O.K. And I'll try to reach a favorable conclusion on this end, too.

K: That would be very nice. Hope I have a chance to see you soon.

L: Thank you. Bye.

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Winston Lord/Sec. Kissinger
Tuesday, October 2, 1973
5:15 p.m.

K: Could you have me a draft by the very first thing Thursday morning.

L: Sure.

K: I seem to have about three hours on my schedule then.

L: O.K.

K: I will try to get something to you tonight which is going to be very badly written but it will show you what I am after to supplement the outline I have given you.

L: I had lunch with Donaldson. I was very impressed and I was struck by him the way you were. I liked him very much immediately. I told him specifically that I was not to give him a selling job but hoped he would consider working with you.

K: I Hope you were (truthful).

L: I was candid. It was a realistic assessment. I tried to give him the feel of the excitement and the importance of this time. It was in a low key so as not to pressure him into the job. His slightest hesitation is whether his colleagues have a problem at this time with the Wall Street in such a mess. I don't think there is any problem there. I told him what he should start reading.

K: What is your view about Joe Sisco?

L: We discussed this briefly the other day. I am at a disadvantage because I have never worked with him. I am attracted to his dynaism and energy and willingness to work hard. Under your control I do not think the loyalty would be a problem.

K: That is what I said about Halpern. What do you think about Newsom?

L: I know even less about him. I wish I could be more helpful. I did not deal that much with the bureaucracy over the last few years. I have heard he is a very good man. Whether he is up to number three

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man, I do not know. I would like to be more helpful but it would not be fair. I just don't know these people.

END

S51

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Senator Javits - Secretary Kissinger
October 2, 1973
7:00 p. m.

J: ....no, but we put through your Foreign Aid bill...

K: What happened to Section 13?

J: What's that about, police?

K: No, that's the part about the availability of the right to demand State Department papers.

J: Most of the bad part was stricken. I'll have my secretary call back to your secretary with the stricken out part, if she has a copy of the bill, but they struck out that part that would bother you. They also dealt with the section on police forces in an intelligent way, carved up that section except where....helping foreign governments to educate their police force....cutting out all that business of torture etc. .....there were only a few nettlesome things, the recycling provision was knocked out....

K: Are you coming...

J: We are coming up Thursday night. And I wanted to tell you that Marian suggested... she knows the place very well and she wanted to know who's dinner is it, yours or their's?

K: Mine.d

J: Well, she thinks the place is quite cold and she may have some good suggestions for warming it up a bit. She could call in the morning if you will give me the name of someone she could call.

K: Oh, that would be great. Believe me, my people who are doing it are...well, I have got to redo the Protocol Department. That's very nice of you.

J: She can be very helpful, she's had experience in this sort of thing and she knows the place, she's been there many many times. But give me the name of someone she can call.

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K: Well, Larry Eagleburger or Jerry Bremer.

J: Now, I wanted to talk to you about one other thing. We are giving a dinner for Huang Wa (*?) who has a new position over there, whatever it is, on the night of the 30th.

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K: I'll possibly be out of the country.

J: 30th of November?

K: Oh, November?

J: Yes, November. We will really have a top flight group, so...

K: I'll try my damndest to be there. There is something I wanted to ask you about. If there is somebody I want to put in a position which requires confirmation, from New York, who do I check with, you?

J: Right, me and if he's from New York, me both for Foreign Relations and me from New York as well as Buckley.

K: How much advance notice do you need before we put it before the Committee.

J: Well, as much as possible.

K: But, how much advance do you need?

J: Of course it depends on how much you've got. I wouldn't require....

K: I'll tell you, I have found a guy, we're not locked in and I would like to keep it confidential, but he's Bill Donaldson.

J: of Donaldson, Luft and Geneva?

K: Yes, he was on the Yale Council, you know.

J: Yes, he's a good man. He was mentioned for Mayor of New York along with me and ....

K: Exactly.

J: He's a good man.

K: You would support him?

J: He's got a very good reputation. Yes, I would. I can say flatly.

K: Should I check with Buckley?

J: Let me check him out, politically, I mean, how he's enrolled, etc.

K: I think he's a Republican.

J: Yes, let me check out his file and then we might check with Buckley. We have a file in the office.

K: Good, but it is not yet known to anybody so I would appreciate it if you...

J: Right, I understand. I will look at his file and let you know.

There is one other thing I want to raise with you. We're looking at people for Exim Bank.... two fellows who don't rate it.

K: Who are they?

J: One is Smith.

K: I've already looked at him and crossed him off.

J: I don't know where they got him. And the other fellow, Wyman may have inside trouble with, in terms of some thing he's done or been responsbile for. I have checked back but don't really think... Your office or someone in the State Department is checking in Japan to be sure there are no...His name is Tom Wyman.

K: Yes, He has been mentioned to me.

J: I'd like to have my friend Herb Salzmann appointed. He's been passed over so many times, its the most ridiculous thing.

K: Let me talk to Flanigan about it.

(550)

TELECON
Mr. Rush/Secretary Kissinger
October 2, 1973
6:05 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Have you spoken to Senator Long?

R: I have set that up. I'm going to see him tomorrow at 4:00. I will take the entire file. He told me it was a very bad session this morning. There was alot of shouting. It was very confused .

K: Who was shouting?

R: The witnesses. The witnesses got out of control. The whole thing was very chaotic. One of them walked out.

K: Who walked out?.

R: One of the witnesses.

K: Do you think he will clear?

R: He indicated he would. I've talked to Carl Hogis and Hal. . . . now have the impression if Sonnenfeldt goes over to State it should pass over to Foreign Relations Committee. He wants the full story. . . not given the full story by the FBI. We'll have the full story from State.

K: He couldn't to it before tomorrow.

R: He said I'll call you back. . . work out a firm date and we have set it for 4:00 tomorrow .

K: I guess that's all we can do.

R: I don't think we can do any more than this.

K: OK

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S48

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TELCON
Stoessel/Kissinger
Oct. 2, 1973
3:30 p.m.

K: My instinct is that we should at least keep open the possibility that we don't table the NATO declaration.

S: It is open now. We have not said that we would. I want to make sure that we d

K: I want to make sure that we don't that we proceed by amending their's. Look at their's and see how we should amend and what paragraph we would want to add even if it leads to a 14-1 split.

S: It probably will. Do you want to say now that you really don't want to table our draft or do you want to wait and see how it goes with the French?

K: Let's wait and see.

S: We had thought if we were to do it might be best to...

K: Table our draft.

S: Yes.

K: Let's wait and consider it and on Friday or Monday whensay we think the French draft is so good we will proceed by amending it in the operative portions.

S: O.K. By then we will have a little sense of what reactions have been also.

K: Yes. I think Rumsfeld should call it consttructive.

S: He was instructed to do that.

K: Where do I stand on my European trip.

S: We are still waiting on Foreign Min. Sheel. I am with the German fellow now. He has not heard whether Sheel will come to London or not. Once we find that out the Italian question falls into place.

K: Moro not coming here.

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S: We have not heard.

K: Now I just as soon have him meet me there. I could have lunch with

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him on Tuesday and leave from there. Let's aim for that.

S: There is a question if you have to go to Bonn that might make some cosmetic problems for him. We will see.

K: Let's see. Lunch on Tuesday.

S: I will see you tomorrow in NY.

K: Fine. Bye

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542

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Warren/Sec. Kissinger
Wednesday, October 2, 1973
9:40 a.m.

W: The President wanted me to check with you. In this press conference today, can he say or have you already said or have your people said, that Kreisky should change his position in relation to immigration center? Have we asked them to reverse the order? He feels we should.

K: We have not asked them to reverse the order. We have not asked him to reverse the order. We have said we disagree with it.

W: We have said we disagree with the order. Can we say anything beyond that?

K: Is he there now?

W: No. He is in the other room.

K: If he goes bejond that he should put it on the ground of terrorism, not on the grounds of telling the Austrian what to do. We think it a bad mistake to yield to terrorism under these conditions.

W: We he could say we have already stated that we disagree with the order and then get into the terrorism part. It is his view that people should not react to terrorism.

K: Not reward terrorism.

W: That really takes on Kreisky. You have no problem with that.

K: No. If he puts it on that basis. Second--tell him to please not to talk about the China trip too much.

W: He is going to announce it at the start.

K: That he can do. On Cambodia, he should not indicate that I want to see Sihanouk. He should say that we think it is primarily a matter for the Cambodians to settle themselves. If we indicate we want to see him they will kick us in the teeth.

W: Primarily a matter they should decide themselves.

K: The Cambodians should settle it themselves.

END.

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S43

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Deputy Sec. of Treasury Simon/Sec. Kissinger
Wednesday, October 2, 1973
9:55 a.m.

K: How are you?

S: Fine, thank you. How are you? I am sorry when I did not get you yesterday. I spoke to Rush. Hal was upset after his hearing yesterday. Understandably so. It is quite a circus up there. I talked to Long as I have almost daily for the past week. He has been helpful although Hal fails to think so.

K: This is a crisis but don't let Sonnenfeldt drive you.

S: I don't. I just want to help him.

K: So do I.

S: It is not easy. Basically, Ken answered my questions as far as the State Department files, etc. Do you have anything for George. I will be calling him.

K: No. Tell him I have been given jurisdiction over Treasury but to exercise it lightly.

S: I read that in the paper and I will be sending you some White gloves.

K: Tell him that is what happens when he is out of town for a while.

S: Hold a press conference on economic policy.

K: I will do that. I have firm ideas about exchange rates.

S: So do I. There should not be any.

K: What do you think of Henry Wallick.

S: I think he is a super guy.

K: Are you considering him.

S: No. He is the head of our consultants here in Treasury.

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K: What do you think if I offered him something here.

S: As your economic consultant you could not do better.

K: How about head of the Economic Bureau.

S: Good.

S: Peter mentioned to me after the 8:00 o'clock meeting about John Meyer. I new him in the banking world. A super guy. Peter said he passed along my comments. He is an ultra conservative; an old school banker. While he is energetic, he is not energetic in the way of Tom Gates but I think you could do better with a younger banker if that is the type you want.

K: Like who. I am looking for someone like you. Quite seriously.

S: Let me think about that and jot some names down. Are we talking about Bill's job.

K: Bill who?

S: Bill Casey.

K; Conceivably.

S: I made the suggestion to George that Bob Alsworth would be super man for that job. Smooth negotiator and comes from that area. I will get some names to you.

END

(S46)

TELCON
Lord/Sec. Kissinger
October 2, 1973
11:00 a.m.

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K: I am all disconnected here. Have they given you the new draft?

L: I have it here. A few typoes here and there and obviously some difficulty in reading your handwriting.

K: I have not read it yet. I have no question that they screwed it up.

L: I am going to work on it from the new draft.

K: I don't think INR cleared that last part. It is badly written. I wanted to explore it with them.

L: I will expand and fix it up.

K: All right. On the troops to Europe. I supposed I will have to write...I would like all of this as well as the five power world theme of what are the issues before us. Soviet relationship. What is the relationship of values to each other. Troops to Europe relationship to security. Five power world--what are we aiming at. I would begin by having some of the material from the UN speech. But say that is not where we are now. Instead of making it a rebuttal of charges.

L: You want to use some of that material?

K: Oh, yes. But in a different framework.

L: Of the current world.

K: What are you going to have -- will you have another draft for me the first thing in the morning. using some of these thoughts? I have set aside from 8:00 to 11:00 to work on it in the morning.

L: Yes.

K: Soon we should get a good draft that will be an improvement.

END

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(544)

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Warren/Sec. Kissinger
Wednesday, October 2, 1973
10:01 a.m.

W: He wants to say it is a matter they should decide themselves and does not want to talk China but he needs to know the dates when you will be in Peking.

K: That is in the announcement.

W: He does not have that .

K: He has to read the announcement exactly. He cannot deviate from one word.

W: I will get it from Scowcroft. I thought he had it, but he said he did not. I will get it.

END

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
Tuesday, October 2, 1973
3:30 p.m.

S: Sen. Long called me about a conversation he had with you about a State Department file on me. You said if I requested it, you would be willing to release the file. He asked if I would be willing to do it. I said not at all. I thought it all one file and when I agreed to it previously, I certainly intended to include the State Department file. I don't know where it stands.

K: I have approved it and Rush is working on it.

S: Someone has to locate it.

K: We have it.

S: I appreciate that. I think that will break it.

K: It will clear you.

S: He is very, very slippery.

K: Long? I don't think so.

S: He is running for reelection.

K: I think he has a good point. Mollennoff is running around against you.

S: Same game. Mollennoff is claiming he warned you and never heard from you.

K: That is quite right. Why should I negotiate with Mollennoff about your security.

S: This was when he was Counsellor.

K: Even then, I would not negotiate. It is none of his business.

S: Second thing, Long said was that you indicated to him that you might want to take me over to the State Department. Long said maybe with all of this mess and trouble the thing to do is to just not bother this Committee with it. On the other hand you will have to face this anyway and perhaps we should go through with it.

K; I said this is what I would wish.

S: I told him that. I said the rest is beyond my control but it would be unfortunate since I have not been offered a job (at State). Even if I

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get neither job at State or Treasury, these issues have been raised and it should be settled. Byrd raised the question on the record and I again used the same line when they get together in executive session after he has seen the file, tomorrow or Thursday, they could have their session then. I think it is something that will have to be faced and see what they do. Supposedly they are all set with the possible exception of Harry Byrd.

On Germany. I will plan to go tomorrow evening but I need guidance from you.

K: I need now, above all, time to work on my speeches. Evenito the extent of not having you well briefed. I have been trying for a free hour and a half and I have no time.

S: On this offset. I presume Schultz' position is we need maximum offset. The issue is between Treasury and Defense on whether we need some loans.

K: I agree with Defense.

S: Final thing is your other German friend. If you want me to see him we will have to send a message today.

K: If there is anything worth discussing with him. All I want is to line him up for support.

S: It is up to you. Otherwise we can turn it off.

K: It depends on whether he can be helpful in getting Brandt to move this thing. You see him and see what you can do.

S: I will do that and I will send a message through our channel if it is convenient for him.

K: Correct.

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(540) *

TELCON
Sec. Rush/HAK
10/2/73 - 9:13 a.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: .... diplomatic contacts, but I don't want to go into the details of how to do it. And I won't pursue it very far, I'll just do it now to get the sense of the others.

R: Right.

K: With Sihanouk , I mean we can talk about it when I get back to the Department.

R: Good. I won't say a thing about that.

K: No, no, I'll raise it and I think you should state the general view, but I wouldn't go into the tactics.

R: Alright, alright I'll do that.

K: On the Sonnenfeldt matter. Have you seen the Tarr memo?

R: No, I haven't.

K: [redacted] B6

R:

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[redacted] B6

K: That I have in a memo.

R: Right. So that my feeling really is, Henry, that unless the , unless we go along with Long and let him see the file, with Hal's consent, we're in a position of wrecking Hal's career. As far as other people are concerned. As far as the President is concerned, this is a case where Hal, himself, wants his file to be seen so he can be confirmed. And anyone in the future who is willing to let his file be seen in my opinion it should be seen. So we're not establishing a precedent of opening up files to Senators against the consent of the person involved, it's the other way around.

K: Now we could do this, or we could, if he's willing to settle for a compromise we could make a summary of the file for him.

R: Yes, if he will settle for that. Now I don't think he will settle for it probably.

K: And then let him see the file on a personal basis as long as he doesn't refer to having seen it.

R: That's right. But I haven't seen Kurt's memo, but the memo basically is don't let anyone see the file, not even the individual just to see his file. But after all the individual also has a career and the precedent is that we're willing to prevent a career from being wrecked by complying with that person's request that his file be seen by the Chairman of the Senate committee. Well, that's not a bad precedent, as I see it.

K: So you would go ahead with it?

R: If Hal wants to do it I would go ahead with it.

K: O.K. I'll call Hal.

R: O.K. Now one other thought is this, whether it would be better for Hal himself to go up...

B6

K: [redacted]

R:

K: O.K. Thank you.

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(541)

TELCON
Sen. Long/HAK
10/2/73 - 9:47 a.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: Hello?

L: Hello Mr. Secretary. Russell Long. How are you?

K: Hello Mr. Chairman. Sorry to keep bothering you about that Sonnenfeldt matter .

L: Part of the job.

K: [redacted] B6

Now the problem is how we can get that information to you so that you're satisfied.

L: That's right.

K: And there is a very strong feeling in the Department that these personnel files have a lot of information in general, and have never been made available in the past to Congressional committees. And they don't want to set a precedent. Now my own feeling is we don't want to destroy a man's career just for a precedent and I was wondering whether the following would be acceptable to you. If we made a rather full summary of what was in there, [redacted] B6

the answer to

L: Well, I don't think.... Well, first let me suggest what I think/this thing would be. We have had situations before - I recall on the security of someone on a previous occasion that they had Senator Taft and one Democrat. I can't recall who the Democrat was, maybe Senator Russell, go up there and look at certain information and then they said as far as they were concerned they were satisfied. Now, I don't think that it would be adequate for us to look at a Departmental summary because in this

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case it seems to me as though we'd have to look at the raw record

[redacted] B6

K: But how could you tell that by looking at the file?

L: Well, but the difference, for example, between us seeing what is available to us, [redacted] B6

K: Yeah. I know, I understand your point very well.

L: Now, I'm a lawyer, myself, Mr. Secretary. I also know why B6

K: [redacted]

L: [redacted]

K: [redacted]

L: [redacted]

K: [redacted]

L: [redacted]

K: Well, what do you think would be the best way to handle this, Mr. Chairman?

L: I think the best way to handle the thing is send one Democrat and one Republican up here and put me and myself and Wallace Bennett and we'll show them these secret security matters and just we ....
Now we already had the benefit of the FBI record, but that FBI record doesn't have what we are looking for.

K: Now would that become public?

L: No, oh no, no. Now what would result from that would be, if it's as you say it is, I'd assume that Senator Bennett and myself, and Senator Bennett's the best friend the President's got on that committee, Senator Bennett... I would say, well,

K: But you're a good friend too, Mr. Chairman.

L: I'd like to think so. [redacted] B6

K: No, no one would ask you to.... But what would you say after you had seen the file? Would you say you had seen the file?

L: I'd say I'd been shown the parts that would appear to be the key thing and I'd have to say that having seen all that I think the man ought to be confirmed.

K: O.K. I think we could go ahead on that basis.

L: Well, nowis that a definite answer, or do you want to think about it?

K: When would you have to know?

L: Well, we're holding a hearing right here today and it would be good to know as soon as we can. I mean, frankly, I would like to say that I'm going to ask the Secretary of State to make available to me the information, to let me see and to let Senator Bennett see the information that... which was not in the FBI record. [redacted] B6 But it doesn't have the documentation that your files would have.

K: If you could avoid leaving the impression that you're looking through the whole file. If you can just say that I will make available to you, at the request of Mr. Sonnenfeldt, that information which goes beyond the FBI file [redacted] B6

L: Well, Sonnenfeldt's in there right now to testify and I could just ask him, well now I would like to see this, I think that under State Department procedures this might require your request to make this available to me.

K: Would you do it in an open hearing?

L: Yeah. Or however you want to do it.

K: Well, I'd rather have you ask him privately.

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L: Well, o.k. then, privately.

K: If he agrees, I will go along with it.

L: O.K. That's what we'll do then.

K: Good, Mr. Chairman, and then we'll work it out.

L: Alright then, thank you.

K: Bye.

(S45)

RELEASED IN PART
B3, CIA, B6

TELCON
Colby/Secretary Kissinger
October 2, 1973
10:45 a.m.

K: I want to talk to you about the INR problem.

C: Right.

K: Do you have anybody at CIA. Could you recommend somebody I could take for that position?

C: We have a fellow, [redacted] I am not sure he is quite up to it. I gave his name to Brant a short time ago. I was thinking of him for the Near East thing. Very competent but not much in this field now. B3, B6

K: Do you know anyone else.

C: Let me run through, if I may. I would like to think it out a little. I will call you back in an hour. mI think I may be able to come up with a name for you.

END.

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S57

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
October 3, 1973
12:46 p. m.
Senator Hugh Scott - Secretary Kissinger

S: I guess its "ni hon way" this week, rathernthan"dobri utro"?

K: How are you?

S: Fine, how are you?

K: Good.

S: I'm calling on a matter which personally disturbs me very much. .... Bill Brown, head of the EEOC... the White House wants to name the deputy, Powell to that job. It's all right and his background fully warrants it. Ambassador Hall tentatively suggested that he be on the Commission to Geneva last year, but at the last minute some other name went up, I think from the White House. He was offered a couple of jobs which never appealed to him, in the nature of Ivory Coast and Haiti, but he would like a chance to be ambassador to a more challenging post..... some interest from the top. I know you can't follow everything, but...

K: As it happens Al Haig spoke to me about him on Saturday. I have first to fill a few vacancies here in the Department. As soon as that is done, I am going to turn to Ambassadors. I want to have all those filled by the end of this year. So, I very well am aware of him, and I am sure he's going to get most serious consideration. You can assure him you talked to me and I will personally keep him in mind. You think highly of him?

S: I got Johnson to appoint him... only Presidential commission I ever got. ... He's a good lawyer, very well thought of and has a big following around the country. He could be useful in many ways.

K: Right. You know the Chinese are giving a dinner for me before I go off to China. They asked me to give them names for a guest list. I wondered if you and your wife are free?

S: We'll be glad to if we are free.

K: I think it will be the 19th.

S: That sounds all right.

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K: We will confirm it.

S: I will certainly give it the highest priority and make if we possibly can.

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TELCON
Mr. McCloskey - Secretary Kissinger
October 3, 1973
p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

M: ....up to the Secretary...that he could come home in light of the Senate action asking for his recall as a diplomatic. I talked to EUR...but I wanted to be sure you have no problems with his coming home.

K: Not if....

M: He wanted to come back anyway...

K: Just as basic guidance, though, I do not like that kind of diplomacy. I think... it's a bitch...We do not have that much .... on this issue, but I don't think it's proper and I think really as guidance we should do what's right and not worry about Congressional pressures. Don't say he's coming home as a protest, that he was coming home on business anyway.

M: Now that the China announcement is out of the way, I think we should say something about the European trip. I'll say simply that you will be in London speaking on that day, will be participating in the Chiefs of Mission conference to some extent...

K: And you can say that I plan to see Heath, Home and Scheel there and will see Jobert here at the end of next week. Make it clear that since I will be seeing Jobert here, there is no need to see him in Europe.

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(S56)

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Senator Byrd - Secretary Kissinger
October 3, 1973
12:45 p.m.

B: Good to talk with you. I wrote to your Mother and Father.

K: Aren't you nice.

B: I wanted to tell them how sorry I was that I wasn't able to speak with them at the swearing-in.

K: Aren't you nice. I appreciated your being there.

B: I remember meeting your father at the inauguration.

K: He has about 15 scrapbooks. If you ever see him don't mention scrapbooks, you will have to read them all. I am calling you about two matters, but after I get back from New York and abroad, you and I should have that drink which we have promised ourselves for a long time. Anyway, there are two items. One, first, we are considering selling a ship, possibly a cruiser, to the Turks at scrap value, a ship of WWII vintage to replace a WWI vintage ship that the Turks have now. I know you take an interest in these matters and I was reluctant to go ahead with these plans .....Turkey is an old and close ally and we have had to cut back military aid recently because of Congressional restrictions on funds and military aid. It would mean alot to them and we would be taking a ship out of mothballs anyway. We would never use it again.

B: Would it delay it too much for the Congress to act on it?

K: Do you think there would be a problem...getting Congressional?

B: I don't think so.

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K: Since there's no requirement that there be Congressional approval?

B: Well, the legislation has passed the Senate but not the house..

K: So if we go ahead. ... I will be honest with you, we are concerned that, probably we can get approval in this case, but what happens when .....we are not really in favor of that legislation, even though I know...

I am concerned about the legislation itself, but I'm not raising that now. Our problem is that the Turks have asked for an answer in a week, and it is possible under existing legislation. We are prepared to go ahead if Congress passed this law, it will after all have to be submitted to Congress. Would that be satisfactory to you?

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B: I think you are entitled to do that. You would not be strictly complying with the intent of the Senate.

K: What we would do then, if the Congress passes this, then we will submit it, retroactively submit it.

B: Oh, retroactively.

K: Yes, you and I understand each other. If Congress passes the legislation in this session then even though this agreement was consummated before,we would nevertheless submit the request to the Senate. If it doesn't pass, we would go ahead on the existing basis.

B: I think that's all right, Henry.

K: On another matter, the Indian rupee proposition. You know my own personal feelings about the Indians. I have been castigated bitterly by some of the liberal people around. This is a matter .... dealing not with dollars but with Indian rupees. .....

B: But you're only getting three cents on the dollar, which isn't very much really. The main point I was concerned about, the Senate..... that the State Department should act unilaterally because after all, it is tax funds.

K: It is, as I understand it, though I haven't had an opportunity to really familiarize myself fully... put before the Agriculture Committee and they have 30 days to register objections.

B: I don't know if that's exactly the situation....

K: As I understand it, that is something we would be prepared to do here. I am not asking you to do anything because the amendment has already passed.

B: .... I am looking at it from the point of view of the legislature and you are looking at it from the point of view of the State Department.

K: Exactly. I am looking at it from the point of view of the general relationships with India, having negotiated... in any event, after a month or so here, you won't have the feeling that the State Department is excessively inclined to cater to foreigners.

B: Glad to hear that, Henry, and I appreciate your calling. We should have that drink together, too.

K: As I said, after I return from New York and my trip abroad, perhaps we can get in that drink together, let's aim for the first week in November.

B: That sounds fine, Henry. And it was mighty nice of you to call Henry.

S55

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Dean Rusk - Secretary Kissinger
October 3, 1973
12:15 p. m.

R: I have been trying to do a little work behind the scenes on this Jackson stupidity in connection with the trade bill. This morning I had a good talk with Hubert Humphrey (and I would appreciate it if the fact that I talked to him you would keep to yourself).

K: Of course.

R: I think what may be a considerable possibility since what the Soviet Union is now doing is pretty reasonable, ...it could be worked out on the basis of a bill that would say if the President finds that such and such and such and such, the President is authorized to withdraw Most Favored Nation...

K: We can live with that.

R: Yes, I think you can. He suggested that there are six Senators with whom you might want to have a good, private, personal talk, if you have not already done do.

K: As a group?

R: No, individually. Because they ... want to find their own way on this thing.

K: Right.

R: Anyway, the names are: Javits, Gaylord Nelson, Russel Long, Herman Talmadge, Senator Mondale and also, although I'm a little hesitant about this on, Caiborne Pell.

K: These all sound like plausible names to me.

R: I think it should be very private, He thinks since the five would be inclined to be helpful. And, of course, if you get Long and Talmadge and Javits and Mondale you will be a long way down the road. I realize this is an old idea. Nothing new from my end.

K: The names are new.

R: What can be worked out, although in the present situation is ....as soon as we give MFN to the Soviets they may backslide.

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R: possibly work out on that basis rather than .... piece of legislation. I don't know how that fits the situation as you see it but... a little time helps here.

find some way not to launch to immediate conclusions. Some of these fellows have taken public positions and they need time to sort of back away from them.

K: We could do that in the Senate, but the House bill, which is a collection of stupidity is coming to a vote. What we need to get is the house bill sufficiently different to permit a reasonable conference...I think we could then hold the Senate bill until early in the session next year, I mean.

R: If I thought it would be of any help to call Carl Albert on this...

K: That would be terrific. ...the Senate roll, if he is given a restricted roll on the amendment to put... if we could even drop title V. like big scope for a conference.

R: Right. I would just like you to bear in mind that I have a very strong interest in this. On the advice of a senator I have not written a letter, say to the Washington Post, because they feel that quiet, behind the scenes work is the way this thing will be worked out. If there are individual senators ....

K: If you would have a talk with Albert and see what he thinks

R: Right.. Also I have one other suggestion while I have you on the phone.

K: Please, I want to ask you about something, too.

R: I think one of the problems for you is going to be to get our relations with Latin America. We should do something about the feeling of neglect they seem to have fallen into. I think you ought to get Latin American Ambassadors and Ambassadors from the OAS to take them on a boat ride, give them some drinks and just make them feel ...

K: Well, I am giving a lunch Friday in New York for Latin American reprresentatives at the UN. I know that's not exactly it, what you are suggesting, but...

R: That's right, that kind of courtesey, flattery if you like. It is greatlsy appreciated by the Latinos, who respond to that sort of thing more so than people from other parts of the world.

K: Yes, apparently.

R: On the second day of President Johnson's administration he called in all the Latin American Ambassadors to the White House as one of the first acts of the administration. They were so flattered that it was one of the first things he did and it made a big difference for quite awhile.

K: Excellent idea.

R: It doesn't have to be aimed at a particular subject, or anything. It is just one of those couresies they will appreciate.

K: I think your'e right.

R: Just give them a chance, its important to these Ambassadors, to send a telegram back hom saying I was on the river with the Secretary of State , and I said to him and so forth, sort of build themselves up back home, you see.

K: I may do it next week.

R: Before the weather closes in....

K: Also, I would like your opinion on the following. I am thinking of replacing Bill Porter as Under Secretary. He's a fine man and I will give him a good embassy, but I don't think he has the sort of intellectual mind that is needed.

R: I agree on that. I've known Bill Porter a very long time and I have the same feeling. Although he's a dedicated and loyal employee, he doesn't have the wide-ranging imgaination and initiative on that particular job.

K: I am considering the following people: Joe Sisco, Bill Sullivan, Nat Davis, Dave Newsom, Phil Habib. Of course, Phil I can't really take because I will kill him.

R: Oh.

K: Really, he had a very serious heart attack and he really might have died if he had not had it in a hospital.

R: If that's true I think that would eliminate him. Its a tough job sometimes. Free ..... came through on it. Dave, Newsom, though I would put at the bottom to start with, for that particular job. He's a little too much like Bill Porter.. I have unlimited respect for his talents and capabilities, that is Joe Sisco He's one of the ablest fellows to come down the track and I think he also knows Washington, he knows the Hill, he knows how the wheels of government turn. Bill Sullivan would be very good, if you want to change him as quickly as this. I don't know, I would put Joe Sisco in the number one and Bill Sullivan in the number two spot. In my time, you know, I almost put Joe Sisco in that job.

K: The only reservation I have about Joe Sisco...I share your view of his capabilities, but there is one problem. I think if he worked for you that would be a good test, but he does a lot of free wheeling, all over the place, frankly tending to place the Whiate House over the Department, which is something I benefited from at the time in my previous position, but I wouldn't appreciate it. now.

R: I don't think that is a problem, the free wheeling or the loyalty. Seriously, the way I delegated when I was there, I didn't mind a good deal of free wheeling as long as it was within the policy the President and the Secretary of State. I want to point out too that if you can harnass those same very considerable talents to work for you, this can be a great asset.

K: What do you think of Nat Davis. Frankly, I don't know him very well...

R: Very competent. He doesn't sparkle or inspire or reflect those qualities of leadership... but he's competent and I don't think you would regret it.

K: So you would prefer Sisco to Newsom

R: Yes.... he has the experience. and I have watched him go up and up in my estimation

K: Well, that's a very high test.

R: I would say so. I should mention, too that he is reinforced by an able and attractive wife. She's really something.

K: Yes, I know her. Bob McCloskey and I had a long talk last night. We both spoke of you with great affection. I hope you will be able to come up some time.

R: I do hope to get up some day, Henry, I just want to have you realize, that I wish you the best of luck and I want to see you succeed.
....
K: Dean, you have proved that. I want you to feel free .... if you see something that isn't quite right.. to call me or come up and talk.

R: Henry, I thought you might be amused by that 100 days letter.

K: I read it with the greatest interest. Very amusing.

.....end of conversation

S53

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Len Garment - Secretary Kissinger
October 3, 1973
11:00 a.m.

G: Yes....

K: Were you telling me this morning, though, that the Jewish Community does not want to talk to me.

G: No. Not at all. They were in and had an excellent meeting with Rush on the other matter. Never better. Never a better feeling about this. What three or four leaders are trying to do is to talk man to man to key people so that when they have a meeting it will be most productive and we are still pointing tentatively to the date you set.

K; I misunderstood you. I wanted to tell you the night before that in the Pacem in Terris speech I will publicly support MFN.

G: Everyone understands that. Next monday, right?

K: I will speak of negotiations completed, achievements we have made....

G: and the general spiritual problems, given the nature of the convocation, you will talk about that...?

K: Oh, yes.

G: I think things are generally on the track. It will take some work, rather than throwing together....what about the possibility of getting the UN to do something about Schoenau. Italked to Kreisky....

K: If IO agrees here we may do it...

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Not to Sanitized
S58

TELCON

RELEASED IN FULL

Dr. Henry Wallich - Secretary Kissinger
October 3, 1973
3:45 p.m.

K: How are you?

W: Fine. How are you?

K: Fine. d___ told me he talked to you yesterday about some of my problems here and I was wondering whether you were free in New York to see me, either late on Friday or Saturday or Sunday?

W: This week?. Yes, that would be possible and Friday would in some respects be better.

K: How would late in the day be, should we aim for 6:00? At my suite at the Waldorf, 35A.

W: Very fine. I will be glad to be there. Dave made very general reference to my, to whether I might be interested or be able to give advice on other people.

K; Exactly. the economic position, Assistant Secretary. Exactly right, that's what I wanted to talk to you about.

W: That would be very nice. I'll be there at 6:00.

K: Could you give your phone number, in case...

W: Surely, Office: 204/436-8390, Home: 203/562-2727.

K: OK, if you don't hear from me, see you at 6:00 on Friday.

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S52

TELCON
David Abshire/HAK
October 3, 1973/9:28

RELEASED IN PART
B3, CIA

A: And I've done some further checking. I just think he would be most outstanding in the East Asian area. As an Ambassador to Japan or if you were not bringing Bob back as Assistant Secretary to East Asia. I think that his ability is not as rounded geographically as might be needed to be Assistant Secretary for the Economics Bureau. I wanted to suggest to you Henry Wallich, Professor Henry Wallich. Henry of course is a good Republican. He's worked on the platform. He's widely regarded.

K: I know him but would he take it.

A: Henry is, feels that he's got about a 25% chance of an offer of something that would better. I imagine -- he's an advisor to Treasury -- it's in that area.

K: You don't know any Irishmen who want a job do you?

A: I don't know Irishmen. Just strange names.

K: That's the one problem I have with all these guys.

A: Henry Wallich is worth it. He's just tremendous.

K: I know him. He's superb. Have you talked to him.

A: Yes I have. He's a very close friend of mine.

K: Might he take it.

A: He might take it if this other offer does not come through.

K: What is the other offer.

A: He didn't reveal it to me. I presume it's Treasury or maybe if they haven't settled on Sellner(?) to be Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, maybe it's that. I don't know. But he said he thought there was a 25% chance.

K: Where is he now.

A: He's based at Yale. I got him at Yale yesterday.

K: I'm going to ask him to see me in New York.

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A: But if the Under Secretaries position didn't gel I think Henry would be great for that.

K: I've got to reserve one position for a Wasp on this. I know it takes 10 in the Jewish religion for a prayer service but I can't have them all on the 7th floor. One Wasp. Am I entitled to that for Congressional reasons.

A: I'm trying. I've just come up with the wrong names.

K: Well you got me Sisco, can you imagine that line up on the 7th floor Kissinger, Sisco, Sonnenfeldt, Wallich.

A: You want people to keep a sense of humor.

K: It's a talented country, but there is a limit. And maybe a Negro. OK. But no, I like Wallich. I think its a superb idea. Really creative idea.

A: That is what I try to come up with. You should talk to Wheeler on East Asi

K: Well, I've locked myself in with Ingersoll but I might consider him for an Ambassadorship.

A: What about Japan?

K: I could consider him for that.

A: Could you see him in New York.

K: I have to prepare a speech for that Pacem in Terris conference, that's my problem. How we doing on Frelinghousin.

A: I took one reading confidentially from Hugh Scott yesterday and he thought Peter is great where he is doing what he is. He just felt that he was not ideal for the Senate situation.

K: Who is?

A: I'm going to talk to Doc Morgan and get a further view. But Peter has real problems with Fulbright and Case. I've got a possibility for a good Deputy in [redacted] Congressional relations. Not the top spot. But I pause to give you the name.

K: Who.

A: [redacted] B3

[redacted] B3

K: I'm glad Dave that you are taking such a constructive approach to your assignment.

A: I'm going to the Baptist church to look around.

K: But I must say the Wallich idea is worth a chance. Particularly as all his competitors have the impediment.

A: I had lunch with Carl Marcy and I'm going to see Fulbright and Marcy today.

K: Is Marcy alright.

A: He is fine. He can fully understand it if you don't change the Congressional relations for the next five weeks. He thinks Congress is going to be out within the next 5 or 6 weeks. So he doesn't expect...

K: I may have to recruit McCloskey.

A: Will Bob take it.

K: No, but he won't get another job if he won't. I'm going to be brutal. I will not accept State Dept. people telling me what's better for their career when I tell them what's better for the country.

A: I believe in that motto for everyone but me.

K: Well you're not a foreign service officer.

A: That's right. I think that before you go back to the Foreign Relations Committee that you should offer to appear before that House Committee

K: I've offered it.

A: I didn't know that.

K: And Morgan thought I should do it in November.

A: Well good enough.

K: Make sure he understands that.

A: I will.

K: Tell him I'm going to the Foreign Relations Committee and that he told me on the plane to New York that I shouldn't go until I had something to report and he thought coming back from my China trip would be the right occasion.

A: That's fine.

K: In the first week of November.

A: In my consultations with other people on the Committee when they bring it up I'll point that out.

K: Good.

A: Henry, Hugh Scott said when he was at the Israeli Embassy the other night. First he found the Israeli diplomatic side alot more understanding on the Soviet Jewry situation than the Jewish lobby groups here in Washington. He said from a number of sources some of those people were telling him that they thought it was to our advantage for you to make a statement of progress in this area as soon as possible.

K: Progress of what?

A: With regard to the situation on Soviet Jewry and Soviet Jews leaving the Soviet Union. Not negotiations progressed but some of the developments and clarification of the statistics this calander year.

K: OK. I may do that at the Pacem in Terris conference.

A: Perfect place for it.

K: OK. Good.

A: Good luck Henry.

S54 *

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Director Colby
10/3/73; 11:20 A.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6, B3, CIA

C: I have a few names for you just to run through your mind.

K: Good.

C: From this building, I think there are two that are remote possibilities but only that. One is [redacted] who just went over to start working for Schlesinger on MBFR. The other is [redacted] which I don't think would be a good idea. B3 B3

K: No.

C: Outside . . .

K: Although I like him.

C: Yeah, I do too. But I really don't think that would fit -- well. [redacted] - obvious. And then outside into the great world . . . B6

K: [redacted] would be good. B6

C: Yeah, he really would. He'd be great. You know, come to the right tickets and everything. And then the rest of the world . . .

K: Where is [redacted] B6

C: He works for you someplace in the building -- in State now. He just came back from being at the Air War College. He had a tour, actually, in INR once so he knows something about it. Out in the real world there is [redacted] (Sp. ?). B6

K: Yeah.

C: [redacted] B6

K: Could he do it?

C: I don't know [redacted] I just picked that name up. I think [redacted] probably could. B6

K: He was in intelligence, wasn't he?

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C: I don't know whether he ever was or not.

K: The trouble with [redacted] is that it takes him about six hours to make a point. B6

C: The only reason I mentioned his name is that I was talking to [redacted] and I was talking about getting people for this intelligence job that I have here and I said you know I want some people from outside if I can get it -- people like [redacted] but I probably wouldn't get him. He said don't be too sure, he may be a little bored with academia. He might like the job for a couple of years. B6 B6

K: Humph!

C: Then one -- I don't know whether this would be politically wise or not -- but [redacted] B6

K: Yeah.

C: Now he wrote that thing on . . .

K: Yeah, I know [redacted] He isn't in the class with the others. B6

C: Yeah.

K: Let's see now, [redacted] . . . B6

C: [redacted] B6

K:

C:

K: How about [redacted] at CIA? B6

C: I don't think he has the push. He is a good fellow but he doesn't have much power.

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K: Yeah.

C: And I am probably being unfair but he doesn't come on very strong and I think you'd want somebody with a little force.

K: Yeah.

C: One I suggest you not take -- but I don't think I need too -- [redacted] B6

K: Oh, God, no! Not a chance.

C: Not a chance, no. Anyway there are a few ideas for you and I'll think about it and if I think of anybody else, I'll. . . . .

K: Good. Many thanks.

C: Right. Bye.

(S120)

RELEASED IN FI

TELECON
Dobrynin/Kissinger
October 6, 1973
PM (Last Call)

K. He wanted me to...what he supposed that I have said to you. He was a little restless that I said we would wait another 12 hours. Did want to say we'll wait til 9:00. I will have to act without cooperation with you.

D. That is understandable...you have decided.

K. No, we have not yet decided to do it. We had decided to do something. Now we want to wait to see if something else comes about. He asked me to call you and tell you this.

D. It is difficult. Not a plan as to what to do. Any suggestion from you I will appreciate. Especially Moscow...they will appreciate.

K. If I have any ideas I will call you.

D. O'k, goodbye.

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S122

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Dobrynin/Kissinger
October 6, 1973
6:20

K. Just talked to the President again. He just wanted me to reaffirm to you personally that he supports everything I have said to you and that..... said that we will wait another 12 hours. I explained your problem. He has no complete idea at the moment. Wait until 9:00 to decide on some position he will take.. May not be public.

D. Public position?

K. That is not decided yet. Whatever he will have to do he will have to do without cooperation with you.

D. Understandable, don't want understand that.... isn't to Moscow decided to do at a .....

K. Not yet decided to do it. Originally decided to do something tonight. Now want to wait to see whether something else can emerge.

D. There are no specific....

K. He just asked me to call you to reaffirm.

D. Thank you, if you have any suggestion I will appreciate, especially in Moscow. They will appreciate. This is really the point.

K. O'k I will call you.

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S 121

RELEASED IN FULL

Saturday, October 6, 1973
11:00 p. m.

TELEPHONE CALL TO COMMANDER HOWE

Sec. thought at first it was Gen. Scowcroft. Sec. asked if we got off the cable about ICCS to Le Duc Tho. Howe said it had not left. Sec. said this is the fourth week of crapping around with that. Howe said it is with the Secretary's things. Sec. said it must be brought to his attention - we cannot keep playing around and letting the ICCS compromise. Howe understood.

jmr

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S 119

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
9:07 p.m. 10/6/73

K: I just called Zayyat to take his temperature, and the guy is in a panic--he says he doesn't insist on having an assembly debate and if I tell him not to have one, he'll cancel it, and all he wanted to do is to read his letter and if I tell him that's no good, he won't do it, and I said why don't you go to the statusquo ante--he said if I proposed that they'd kill me--

S: That's understandable from his point of view.

K: But he said if I had any proposal at all, he would get on the next plane to Cairo, he said, could I say that we stand for the territorial integrity of Egypt, probably not, can we?

S: Well, territorial integrity of Egypt well no, I don't think you should get yourself in that at the moment. You have told him what you can, namely, we're for the restoration of the statusquo ante--

K: No, no, no, no, no. I mean for the ultimate negotiation

S: I know he is referring to the ultimate negotiation and they will interpret that as you having given a commitment in terms of total sovereignty. I think you have to stick to the formulas you have stuck to thus far, namely, reconciling sovereignty and security on the ultimate settlement.

K: Look Joe can you think up, he pleaded with me to give him anything tomorrow morning and I think he is looking for a face-saving thing but you think of something I can say to him

S: Right, that will at least be encouraging

K: If he wants to claim as a new initiative, even if it doesn't mean anything.

S: Just a--yes

K: Just a paragraph. Can you think of?

S: Sure, let me focus on it, I'll come up with sometihng.

K: I'll be back in 45 minutes.

S: At the moment I'm organizing a few of the long-going studies that we need to do as a result of WSAG.

K: What I need you to do is think up that one paragraph

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S 11

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon NYC
Minister Shalev/HAK
October 6, 1973; 11:55 a.m.

K: I have talked to the President again and to the Soviets. I want you to know what we are doing. We are getting our fleet together in the Mediterranean and start moving it toward the Eastern Mediterranean. This will take us about 12 hours and we will start ~~going~~ moving it toward the Eastern Mediterranean. We will almost certainly approve tomorrow the military equipment within reason that you may need, especially if the Soviets line up with the Arabs, then we will certainly do it.

S: You will do it.

K: If the Soviets line up in the UN with the Arabs we will sure do it and if not we will probably do it, but we just want to see. But we would appreciate from you as much of the true military situation as you feel you can give us so we can make our evaluations, and also any plans you may have. We are going to propose when there is a Security Council meeting, whether or not the Soviets agree, that there should be a restoration of the ceasefire and a restoration of the ceasefire lines.

S: And you are doing that irrespective of their agreement or not.

K: We will wait a few hours to get their agreement. If not, we have concerted with the British and they will call a meeting and we will then propose this.

S: All right.

K: Do you have any views on the subject?

S: Well, I know there isn't and wasn't any decisions yet on whether to ask for a Security Council.

K: I think it is better if you don't.

S: I think ~~that~~ at one stage we wanted you to wait before calling one.

K: We are waiting still.

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S: Good.

K: We are not going to do it until about 2 or 3 this afternoon for a meeting 5 or 6 this afternoon. And all we will do is ask for a ceasefire and ~~we~~ ask for a return to the ceasefire lines. The British are prepared to say they think the Arabs started this.

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S: I think it is quite clear. The UN observers have also reported that from ~~behind~~ both fronts.

K: To all practical purposes there is no question.

S: The information I have on the military situation is that in the Syrian front the attempt by the Syrians to advance have been halted. On the Egyptian front I know about 16 Egyptian planes down, some of the Egyptian troops crossed the Canal and our people are dealing with that now. I wouldn't like to be in the shoes of those that are being dealt with.

K: (laughs) Well, that is what we are counting on.

S: You shouldn't worry.

K: We are operating on the assumption that you will win.

S: There isn't the slightest doubt.

K: But it would be helpful to us if you kept me informed.

S: Yes, all right.

K: Thank you.

S: Thank you, sir. Goodbye.

*
S 74

TELCON
Haig/Kissinger
10/6/73
8:35 a.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

K: We may have a Middle East War going on today.

H: Really.

K: I want you to know what is happening. I am sending a report to the President and to you of the events this morning. We got a report at 6:00 this morning that Israelis were expecting Syrian and Egyptian attack within 6 hours.

H: Yes.

K: First I thought it was an Israeli trick for them to be able to launch an attack although this is the holiest day. I called the Israelis and warned them to restrain. I called the Egyptian For. Min. urging restraint. I called Dobrynin. I gave all of our communications to Dobrynin and he called Moscow. I got a return call from the Israelis giving us assurances that no pre-emptive Israeli would be taken. The Egyptian called me back to say Israelis were launching a naval attack in the Gulf of Suez and 15 mins. later a call came from the Israelis saying that the Egyptians and Syrians were bombarding all along the fron and launching air attacks. Now it is not conceivable that the Israelis would launch an attack with single action in the Gulf of Suez. That has to be the prediction and all I want you to know is that we are on top of it here. You should say that the President was kept informed from 6:00 a.m. on and I will let you know what is going on.

H: Have there been any border crossings?

K: As of this moment I just know of a report from Jerusalem relayed to me by the Israeli minister. -- Air attacks all along the Egyptian and Syrian fronts. I don't know what Israeli counter action is. I have a report from the Egyptian that Israeli naval units are shelling them in the Gulf of Suez and they will be driving them off.

H: What is your view of the Soviet attitude?

K: My view is that they are trying to keep it quiet and they are surprised.

H: Do you believe that?

K: Yes. I think it is to insane for them to have started it.

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CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 25X6
DECLASSIFY AFTER: INDEFINITE
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TELCON
Haig
10/6/73 -2-
8:35 a.m.

H: You never know. A lot of difficulties here.

K: That is the one factor. I think our domestic situation has invited this. I think what may have happened is the Soviets told the Egyptians, [redacted] that there will not be any progress unless there is stirring in the Middle East and those maniacs have stirred a little too much. It looks to me now that the Israelis are certainly going to hit back hard. They have already partially mobilized. Probably, I will be going back to Washington and will decide in a few hours. I am having Scowscroft call a WSAG meeting. We are locating the 6th Fleet. No two ships are in any one place. It will probably take us a week to round up the sailors. We will have to move it by tomorrow if something is going on. B1

H: O.K. Henry.

K: Don't let Ziegler shoot off at the mouth without our known. Your position is that the Presi dent is on top of the situation and getting regular reports. from the UN (New York) this morning. We have nothing further to say. If there are any announcements to be made I will check with you as to whether they should be made from here or the White House.

H: I will say the President received a report at 6:00.

K: Say 6:30. Say I have been in contact with all of these people and we will give no comment. We have sent message to Saudi Arabia and Jordan and urged them to restrain.

H: O.K.

K: You stay near the phone. If you are with the President tell the switch board to put me through.

END

S81

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Dobrynin/Sec. Kissinger
Oct. 6, [illegible] 1973

K: I have just talked to the President and he asked me to make the following suggestion to you. There will be undoubtedly a security Council meeting today don't you think?

D: I think so. Because the situation is very dangerous.

K: We would be prepared to take a neutral position in the Council as to the facts of ~~this~~ the matter asking that we don't know who started what but we are in favor of status quo ante.

D: Your suggestion is restoration of ceasefire line.

K: Restoration of ceasefire line and restoration of ceasefiring and then have a fact finding commission. We are prepared to proceed with the disdussions which Gromyko and I and the President agreed on on the settlement.

D: Outside the SC.

K: Yes.

D: Just between us.

K: Right. We are willing to look at the whole situation. Now if you take the position that ~~xxxxxxxx~~ you will have to defend the Arabs we will be forced into the position of defending what we believe -- of making clear we believed the Arabs launched the Attack and we are then in a hell of a mess. It will effect a lot of our relationships.

D: I understand.

K: Moscow's constructive approach would be if we both took the position of not the time to discuss who started what. Let's get the fighting stopped and restore the ceasefire line and call on all parties to observe the ceasefire line .

D: I think it is a constructive way to start.

K: We will hold up anything until we hear from ~~xxx~~ you. Can you get us a quick answer.

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Dobrynin
Oct. 6

D: If I could use the hot line . I have my own ticker. It is open.

K: This is no secret.

D: I will use the ticker.

K: Do it on the ticker. I would say people listening in on your end under better control than on ours. I think it all right.
You go ahead.

D: O.k.

END

S 79
RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Shalev/Sec. Kissinger
Sat.; Oct. 6, 1973
9:00 a—

S: The latest I have is there is a full scale battle along the canal with the Egyptians trying to cross in our direction. They have bombed various places in Sinai. The story about a naval battle is a cover-up for their action.

K: Right. I need as many facts as you can give me on the naval battle even if it did not take place. I am quite persuaded, Mr. Minister. I know whatever actions you take will not happen because of their attack, if that is an Arab charge to cover their action. It is clear the dominant action is in the Canal and along the Golan Heights. We would appreciate as much information as possible.

S: I am passing all along that I get. I will pass it directly to you.

K: Good. I have not decided whether to stay up here or go to Washington. I will probably go to Washington during the day. You will be kept informed.

S: Thank you.

END

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S78

TELCON
Sec. Gen. Waldheim/Sec. Kissinger
Saturday, Oct. 6, 1973
am

RELEASED IN FULL

W: I wanted to give you the latest information we got from our observer units. There is fighting in all sectors. The Egyptian ground forces have crossed the Canal in five places. The impression we have is this is really a rather big scale operation and it goes on to say the Syrian forces have crossed lines near and south of Kanetra. This is about the cable we got a few minutes ago.

K: Thank you very much. I appreciate it and we will reciprocate by letting you know anything we learn.

END

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(S80)

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Dobrynin/Sec. Kissinger
Oct. 6 - 9:20 p.m. C19731

K: Our information is that the Egyptians and Syrians have attacked all along their fron ts and also...

D: Is it the canal.

K: The Canal and the Golan Heights. Zayyat is claiming the Israelis launched a naval attack on some isolated spot in the Gulf of Suez and that triggered the whole thing.

D: I saw on a ticker they claim that Israel began attack. Zayyat told you.

K: He told me not along the Canal but in the Gulf of Suez. We are all going to have to be taking formal positions. You and I know that is baloney if they are going to attack they will not launch an attack in the Gulf of Suez and noat at the key points . Not their style.

D: I understand.

K: How is it that the Syrians and Egyptians are starting at the same minute -- all along the front ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ If it started with an Israel naval attack , you and I are having a problem in how to get this stopped. We are using our maximum influence with the Israelis to show restraint. So far they tell me they have kept their response to their side of the line and that they have not made any deep penetration of Arab territory. But you no them as well as I do and it will not last much longer.

D: O.K. I will send additional message to Moscow. Really madness.

K: Total madness. I will probably come back to Washington during the day and we should meet y urgently. We should, I think use this occasion to first not to have everything we have achieved destroyed by maniacs on wither side and after quieting it down to see what can be done constructively.

D: All right. Thank you very much.

END

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(S82)

TELCON
McIntyre/ Sec. Kissinger
Saturday, Oct. 6 [1973]
10:08 am

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I wanted to talk to you about our general state of knowledge of the Middle East problem as you undoubtedly know.

M: Yes.

K: We received an urgent call this morning from our Ambassador in Israel that they thought an attack might be imminent and they were asking us to use our influence and also to assure other interested parties they would not make a pre-emptive attack. We did that and I called the Egyptian Foreign Minister and the Soviet Ambassador, etc. Events seem[illegible] to have overtaken us. Now we are consulting with various parties and seeing what time is best for a Security Council meeting. We will keep you informed about whatever conclusions we reach. We would be grateful for any conclusions you reach. We would like to get a sense of what would emerge in a SC meeting before we go into one. I am speaking to you very frankly about what we are doing.

M: Thank you very much indeed. I might mention to you that the Israeli Permanent Representative has called me not to ask for a meeting but to simply give me an outline of what happend as he understands it and too he told me he had been speaking to your Mission here and that some consulting was going on and he promised to keep me informed likewise of anything that developed. That is where we stand. I have not heard anything from the Egyptians or other Arab representatives.

K: I had a brief talk with the Sec. Gen. to bring him up to date on what we have done. Of course, we believe this is a SC matter and not a Gen. Assembly matter.

M: Yes. Where are you speaking from?

K: From the Waldorf. Where I was preparing a speech devoted to peace on earth if you would like to make some suggestions as to appropriate themes.

M. I shall think about it.

K: It does not have my undivided attention. One thing I did want to say, is if there is a meeting and when there is we will do our utmost and we would appreciate any help we could get to keep it at as high a level as obtainable and avoid any cheap shots. You appreciate this situation which is fraught with exaggeration and we are trying to avoid that.

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M: I appreciate that very much needless to say.

K: I have no question about that. We will be in touch with you later.

M: Do you have any indication of who fired the first shot.

K: Our impression, but it is very personal, is that it is one that the Arabs started. That is our impression; that is not a considered opinion but on the external evidence the fact that it started on the holiest day plus no overwhelming fact for the Israelis to do anything now plus the fact they offered assurance they would not pre-emptive attack. We told them if they launched a pre-emptive attack we would oppose them. It leads me to believe they would have been really reckless if they launched it. It is an impression for your own personal information. Once we have decided on our position on an informal basis we may inform you of it.

M: Thank you Mr. Secretary.

K: Nice to talk to you.

END

S89

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Gen. Haig/ Sec. Kissinger
Saturday, Oct. 6, 1973
12:45 pm

H: I wanted to tell you the President feels he definitely has to come back to Washington.

K: I think you are making a terrible mistake.

H: We are not going to announce it and we will not go back until 7:00 tonight.

K: I would urge you to keep any Walter Mitty tendencies under control.

H: That is not the problem. He has a situation with Agnew which prohibits his staying down here. On top of that he knows if he is sitting here in the sun and there is a war going on he is in for terrible criticism.

K: What time are you leaving.

H: We would leave about 7:00 and announce it around 3:00 or 4:00. We could do it low key.

K: There is no low-key way to do it.

H: That is true but he feels very strongly that he is just not going to sit down here.

K: What does he thinks is going on?

H: He thinks nothing is going on.

K : Are you with him now?

H: No, I just left him.

K: What we don't need now is a war council meeting and getting ourselves into the middle of it. We are not in the middle of it. To the American people it is a local war. Let them beat them up for a day or two and that will quiet them down.

H: We have no doubt about that but suppose you get a negative response.

K: So what. Our line is we are for a ceasefire and a return to pre-ceasefire positions. Let the Soviets take another line and we will start moving the fleet around a little bit which will take 48 hours to surface. I just think we should be tough in substance but not have any dramatic moves.

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UNCLASSIFIED

2.
Haig
Sat., Oct. 6, 1973

H: We are returning to Washington.

K: What is he going to do.

H: It is conceivable we will have an announcement about the Vice President. That is the first thing.

K: That is a slightly different problem.

H: You bet it is and what I am telling you is the two are going to be linked together. He cannot be sitting down here in the sun with what is going on in the VP thing. It is not firm yet but we will know very shortly.

K: If that other thing is happening then I can see a reason for coming back from that point of view of diplomacy. I would keep his return for later. Suppoing the Soviets get tough and if he then returns that would be a good move. If he returns early it looks like an hysterical move. I am giving you my honest opinion. If the Soviets took a position of having kicked us in the teeth that would be a signal that return is a siganl that things are getting serious. We will not have heard by 3:00. We probably won't know until the first thing in the morning.

H: Alright. I will try to hold this down here.

K: I would hold him until the first thing in the morning.

H: O.K.

K: We have put him into the involvement with all morning phone calls. Ron can put that out too.

H: Right. O.K.

K: But don't you agree, speaking personally?

H: I know, except I know about the other problem.

K: You are a better judge of that. The problem I am handling in my judgment is if we played this as a crisis -- say nothing, act tough, without stirring up the atmosphere.

H: Right. I will be in touch. I will go back to him on this thing.

K: Thank you.
END

588

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON Winnacklin
Sir Don ~~MacLean~~/Sec. Kissinger
Saturday, Oct. 6, 1973
11:35 am

K: I just received your message about your views on the Security Council. I wanted you to know that we have approached the Soviets to take with us a joint position asking them to return to the ceasefire line and a ceasefire ant to take a neutral position.

M: Absolutely.

K: We wonder if you would agree until we have heard from the Soviets that we try to defer a meeting.

M: I see the argument.

K: There is one problem in our mind. As we do establish the facts it may be more difficult to get that kind of resolution. There seems to be no question in our mind that the Arabs started this one.

M: Quite likely. Our government without cutting across any consultations or any bilaterals outside...

K: Our proposal is to do it in the Security Council.

M: Our feeling is while we are doing this if we could show ourselves in business and call for a ceasefire and return to the original line and go into recess to allow our real work to go on.

M: I am not sure the Soviets will go along with that. But when were you thinking of doing this?

K: We felt we should not let today pass.

M: I agree on this.

K: We are not rushing into anything this morning. I was thinking about something in the course of the afternoon.

M: I am in agreement with you on that if you could say...

K: I am trying to get back to Washington and I am trying to get a quiet two hours in which to do it. As a general proposition if you felt inclined say two or three o'clock to call for a meeting would not sound unreasonable to us.

M: That is what we had in mind.

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K: We wanted a couple more hours today.

M: I would not interfere with that. We felt it would be wrong for the world to know these large scale operations to go on and we have not shown our heads.

K: No problem with us on that.

M: Thank you very much and I will keep in touch with your people.

K: You do that and let us know ahead of time what you do.

M: I will.

K: If we hear from the Soviets before that we will let you know. If you would lean on the Soviets in that sense Sir Donald we would favor that. You don't have to wait until then to tell them what your view is.

M: I am about half way through in my consultations and with that knowledge I see no problem with that.

K: Thank you.

M: Good bye.

END

S 86

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sen. Javits/Sec. Kissinger
Saturday, Oct. 6, 1973
11:01 am

J: Quite a Yom Kippur. What is your report?

K: My personal estimate which I don't want you to repeat -- it is clearly an Arab attack. The Israelis would not attack on Yom Kippur without provocation and the Egyptians have crossed the Canal in five places. And one report is that they broke through in one place. The Syrians have attacked in two places and have penetrated and I got a report at 6:00 that such an attack might be imminent. I called Zayyat and Dobrynin. The Syrians are not answering their phone. Also Eban. I got an Israeli promis that they would not launch a preemptive attack. As late as yesterday Zayyat was telling me the Egyptians would be very calm, quiet and give diplomacy a chance and are eager to meet with me in November and wanted to come to Washington next week.

J: What do you think broght this to a boil this way.

K: What we have to determine now, Jack, is whether there was Soviet collusion or not. We have offered the Soviets joint action in the Security Council to restore the ceasefire and the ceasefire lines with approval of the Israelis. This should smoke them out.

J: All will be nullified if these fellows -- if they make any effort.

K: The resolution is to return to the ceasefire line.

J: I know the diplomatic thing would work that way but all could be very very sharply affected if the Arabs have any success. It will be very hard to deal with them.

K: Our estimate is that unless the Israelis were totally surprised which is not impossible because of Yom Kippur they would be in their lowest posture ever.

J: No question about it.
K; Don't you think?
J: I am sure. I had second hand report that (Saper)(phonetic) called this morning and said they were in considerable difficulty. Said it had been very hurtful. I am sure they caught them at their lowest ebb of preparation. I gather it has been boiling up for a couple of days.

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2.
Javits
Oct. 6, 1973

K: Not that we got any reports. The first report we got that seemed remotely dangerous was at 8:00 last night and we were still checking it when I was awakened with an appeal from the Prime Minister giving us authority to approach other countries to restrain themselves. I got up immediately and did it. I saw Eban at 4:30 on Thursday and he thought the situation very calm and when I said we should consider a diplomatic move after the election he said you should consider whether it could ever be calmer than it is now.

J: There security was very high.

K: Not a case.

J: That is on the Syrian side.

K: For your information I was reading reports and asking for special intelligence information as late as Wednesday and assessment both from the Israelis and our own intelligence that there was nothing to it. Not that we knew it and were sitting on it.

J: Of course. I think we had better see what goes on. I will not say anything.

K: I am in New York now but I will go back to Washington as soon as I see a break.

J: Has the President had any reaction.

K: I have talked with him and if he agrees that it looks like Soviet collusion we have to do Sept. 1970 again. If there is Soviet collusion, we will come down hard. If they pull away from the Arabs we will pull away and stay neutral from them. We are assuming that the Israelis can take care of themselves. If that is wrong we have to go back to the drawing board.

J: What I have heard did not make me very happy.

K: We are keeping in closest touch with the Israelis. We are not making a move without discussing it with them.

J: May I feel free to call you again.

K; Where.

J: I am home.

K: Leave your number when you move with the White House board., END

(584)

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Gen. Haig/Sec. Kissinger
Saturday, Oct. 6, 1973
10:35 am

K: I wanted to bring you up to date on where we stand and to tell you my strategy. You may have to calm some people down.

H: Good. I am sitting with the President.

K: O.K. The Egyptians have crossed the Canal at five places and the Syrians have penetrated in two places into the Golan Heights. This we get from the UN observers. Our assessment here is re the facts, it is inconceivable that the Israelis attack would turn in two hours and have the Egyptians crossing the Canal.

H: No question about that.

K: Inconceivable. We have to assume an Arab attack.

H: I think the President feels that way.

K: The open question is, is it with Soviet collusion or against Soviet opposition. On that we have no answer yet. I have called first, as for as our public position, the Sec. Gen. who leaks like a sieve, to tell him about all of the efforts we have made and I have told him that I have been in touch with the Soviets. I have been in touch with Dobrynin and said we should jointly call a Security Council. The Soviets and we. And we jointly offer a resolution calling for an end of the fighting and return to the ceasefire lines established in 1967. I have told them this would be a sign of good faith towards both of us and we would hold up calling for a Security Council until we hear from them. I have informed the Sec. Gen. of that. The Soviets said they would get an answer from Moscow. This is designed in part to smoke them out. If they want the fighting stopped this will stop it fast. If they refuse to do this then we have to assume some collusion. Now if they refuse to do it we have two problems. The first is to get the fighting stopped and the second is the longterm policy. In order to get the fighting stopped we cannot give the Soviets and the Arabs the impression that we are separating too far from the Israelis. That will keep it going.

H: Right.

K: Therefore, as to the facts of the issue, if the Soviets could cooperate with us we will take a neutral position. We will say we don't know the facts but they should stop fighting. You see what I mean?

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H: Right.

K: If the Soviets do not cooperate with us and whole heartiedly back back the Arabs on the immediate issue of the fighting we, in my judgment, have to lean toward the Israelis.

H: Right.

K: For these reasons: 1) In order to get the fighting stopped; 2) to prevent the Soviets from coming in at least with (bluster and get a cheap shot?) and 3) to put some money in the bank with the disassociation with the Israelis in subsequent efforts to get a settlement. All depends now on the Soviet reaction. Then after we get the fighting stopped we should use this as a vehicle to get the diplomacy started. Now there is no longer an excuse for a delay. The return to the ceasefire will have two aspects. If today the problem means the Arabs would have to give up a little territory - my estimate is that starting tomorrow evening the (Arabs) will have to give up territory. My view is if the Israelis make territorial acquisitions we have to come down hard on them to force them to give them up. You see.

H: Yes.

K: We have to do that in case of the Arabs but I think it is an embarrassment ~~xxx~~ we won't have very long.

H: Yes. Unless we have had a terrible erosion there.

K: That is the strategy that I am proposing. I think we have no choice. I think the worst thing we could do is to now take a sort of neutral position while the fighting is going on, unless the Soviets take a neutral position with us. If they take one with us, we should take a neutral position. That is ideal. If they don't join us and go to the other side we have to tilt.

H: Sure.

K: You see what I mean?

H: Absolutely.

K: If the Soviets are all out on the other side we have a mischievous case of collusion and then we have September 1970 all over again and we had better then be tough as nails.

H: The President is seriously considering going back to Washington.

K: I think that a grave mistake. There is nothing we can do right now. You should wait to see how it develops. Wait until at least this afternoon. So far not even a Security Council meeting has been called.

H: He agrees with that. His problem is if it is an all out war for him to be sitting down here in this climate would be very, very bad.

K: Let's wait for the Soviet answer. If the Soviets refuse to cooperate with us, we will know we are in a confrontation and he should then take leadership.

H: I think he will be comfortable with that.

K: If the Soviets do not face us, then I think he should stay down there.

H: Right. O.K.

K: You will make sure that the President is comfortable with this strategy. I think it is our only possible course and it has to be seen in the general context of his ability to act and of what follows afterwards.

H: Is there any effort to get the fleet in a decent posture. The President is concerned about that.

K : That is right. The fleet has been instructed into a position just short of calling them back to ship. They are to locate their people and move on several hours notice.

H: He does xxx want them assembled as soon as possible for appropriate action if needed.

K: That is being done but we wanted to wait until reports are confirmed and that will be issued within the hour. They need that much time to locate their people.

H: I will be back after discussing it with the President.

END

S85

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Min. Shalev/Sec. Kissinger
Saturday, Oct. 6, 1973
10:35 am

S: The Prime Minister wants to give you a personal assurance on the basis of the trust that exists between you and her that the attacks were initiated by others.

K: That is our assessment too and I have just said this to the President.

S: About the specific questions of a naval engagement the Egyptians talked about. There is no truth to that at all.

K: I cannot believe that you would start a naval engagement and have the Arabs cross the Suez Canal.

S: She will go on the radio in just a few minutes.

K: I want to inform you on a personal basis only for the Prime Minister that we have proposed to the Soviets that we jointly call -- the US and the Soviets -- a Security Council meeting and return to the ceasefire lines. An attempt to smok them out to see if they were behind it and ~~xk~~ give us a basis for leaning toward your position in the actual debate. This is only for the Prime Minister.

S: I will pass that on. You have had no reply on that.

K: No. I will call you the minute I get a reply.

S: One think, I wish to raise -- our military people have submitted a list of urgent items that they need very much in a hurry.

K: I am coming back tonight and we had better discuss that in person.

S: Thank you.

K: Bye.

END

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3

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Dobrynin/Sec. Kissinger
Oct. 6 [illegible] [illegible]1973

K: I am checking about the SC. I was told that the Egyptians asked for the GA meeting. But it is impossible to get the GA until Monday and in any event it is a threat to the peace and security and we will not have it in the GA.

D: I understand.

K: It is a grievious suggestion. We cannot accept it.

D: I understand.

K: I have talked to the President again and he wanted me to call you and to underline again his very grave concern that this not be used to destroy everything that it has taken us three years to build up.

D: By whom.

K: By any of us.

D: Who really?

K: If you take the position of support all out for the Arabs that would be in effect encouraging what seems clearly to us and Arab attack no one in their right mind believes that the Egyptians could have ~~xxxxxx~~ crossed the canal in five places. I would be glad to have your military analysis on that part. Since all of the fighting on Israel territory I think the facts are clear. We are prepared before the SC to take a neutral position if you do and we are prepared to make a joint resolution just calling for ceasefire lin.

D: I understand and I have sent that.

K: Today the Arabs are on Israeli territory but we don't believe this will last 72 hours and after that the problem will be to get the Israelis back to the ceasefire line. If we agree on this course no matter what the military operations no matter how successful the Israelis may be we will stick to this proposal and we will be prepared to oppose them.

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D: As you say back to the ceasefire line, I understand.

K: Right.

D: This is essentially what you mentioned.

K: We have not responded to an urgent Israeli request for additional military supplies. If it gets out of hand we will be forced to do that. For all of these reasons it will be important to our own relationship that it be handled as much jointly as we can and you should say this to the Sec. Gen. on behalf of the President. He just got through talking to me. I am coming back to Washington this afternoon and I will be in touch with you then.

D: O.K.

K: The reason I am hopeful we will settle it is that you did not leave town.

D: If I did not received your call until 9:00 I would have gone today We planned to take quite a nice dinner at our Maryland estate and we were leaving for vacation. You see how it happens. I ~~hpe~~ hope we can handle it.

K: Your Arab friends were terribly deceitful. Zayyat told me there would be at least the 3 months of quiet and he would meet me again in November and he wanted to come to Washington next week and since our conversations and the President's conversation with Gromyko we thought we had this time period to make a reasonable approach.

D: My impression too.

K: We are taking this matter extremely seriously. If you will let your colleagues know we would appreciate it as quickly as possible.

END

(S83)

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Waldheim/Sec. Kissinger
Saturday, Oct. 6, 1973
10:22 am

W: I wanted to tell you the following. We got confirmation from our observers in the Middle East saying about what you told me that there is heavy fighting along the Egyptian and Syrian lines. There is no fighting along the Jordanian lines. They indicated they would send more detailed reports as soon as they get more information from our observers. I had a conversation with Zayyat and he is asking for a General Assembly meeting to be convened. I told him that I doubted if it could be technically be done. I doubt if we could convene so quickly. I asked him about requesting a meeting of the Security Council. For the time being he has no instructions but will send a document to us and ask for circulating of these documents.

K: Our view is that it should go to the Security Council first.

W: Exactly. I don't think the Gen. Assembly has a chance. It is not technically possible before Monday. I do feel it is a matter for the SC. I asked him this question and he said he had no instructions with this reagrd. I expressed my deep concern and told him they should do everything to calm down the situation. He got rather angry and said "We don't attack. The others do and so on."

K: Our information -- our impression is the opposite. For your personal information and do not share it with others we are talking with the Soviets to see if we can develope a common approach in the SC. Untile we have that I think if there could be a slight delay if anyone pushes for a meeting which has not been the case yet, until we get the Soviet reaction if we are draging our feet a little bit it is to get the Soviet reaction. I understand no one has asked.

W: Nobody.

K: Our point is peace and security issue and it belongs in the SC and a Gen. Assembly meeting would be frivolous and we would oppose it.

W: I rather discouraged Zayyat.

K: We would oppose it even on Monday. I want to make that clear.

W: I'm glad you are telling me.

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K: We are trying to come up with a constructive SC meeting and for your personal information what we are trying to do is to see if a common approach could be developed with the Soviets for restoration

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of a ceasefire and the ceasefire lines. If that can be done someone would call a SC meeting.

W: That would be the best approach. Hope it works. If there is any question I will call you.

K: If you call me and this would give the two governments a chance to concert their action.

W: Right. I think it important to keep in close contact. Don't you think the Soviets would be afraid to do that because of their relations with the Arabs.

K: They also have to worry if they are afraid of their relations with us.

W: I think the approach very good and I hope for the common approach.

K: Again speaking privately my estimate is the same as yours -- that they will not agree to it.

W: I know from my experience they are very much interested in not doing anything which would create the impression that they are working against the Arabs; or doing anything that would make their relations with the Arabs negative.

K: I think it so important to try that we should give it a chance. So far no one has asked for a meeting and we will not ask for one until we have the Soviet reply. If you can avoid it -- I know your position. If you can delay a meeting until we have had a Soviet reply; if anyone should ask...

W: You mean a meeting of the Security Council?

K: Call me when you get a request and we will discuss.

W: If I get a request, I will contact you. I tried very hard to get the Syrians information number. The Deputy PM left for London El Zayyat said he tried to get the Deputy but he left for London. El Zayyat is trying to reach him in London. The Ambassador cannot be reached because they do not answer the telephone. I have tried repeatedly and there is no answer.

K: Thank you. END

RELEASED IN FULL

S10 *

TELECON
Haig/Kissinger
October 6, 1973
6:05 p.m.

K: we are considering possible steps we are taking. Dobrynin says we'll hear again in another hour. In New York the Egyptians are against the Security Council meeting. The Soviets are without instructions. The British are getting cold feet. I'll wait til 6 for the Soviets. If we don't get it we call the Security Council. By tomorrow if we haven't got them to stop it we arx will be accused of collusion. ...a wild propoganda battle in the GA we will shut off our phones. They had better comt to us now. .....Defense wnats to turn ataingst the Israelis. At this stafe a Israeli-Pakistan situation.

H: Sounds like Clemenets

K: It's manageable here. Aroudn 6:00 I'll call the Security Council meeting. In New York as I was leaving a microphone was pushed in fron t of me. I told them the President has instructed me to return to Wasington.. As a former Deputy of mine...do you agree with ths approach?

H: I think tha's fine. The only assessments we need to worry is how the Soviets read us.

K: We cannot be soft guys. in this case. It will help us on MFN and,,

H: No we can't be soft.

K: You will be kept informed.

H: We;ll be here.

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(S95)

TELECON
Minister Shalev/Secretary Kissinger
October 6, 1973
4:00 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you ?

S: Hungry.

K: Well that I can appreciate. Can't you get dispensation to eat on a crisis.

S: I have passed it on and they are preparing something.

K: What about the pilots? I hope they are eating.

S: Don't you worry. Special rations for thing of this sort.

K: Do you have anything more for me?

S: I hope I'll have it at some later point. I just have some information based on some phone conversations.

K: Since we talked?

S: Yes. . . They are slowly pulling them out. . two bridgeheads. . we are able to establish. I think the number of planes we downed is about 20 on the Egyptian side and half of that on the Syrian side.

K: OK. In terms of strategy, please pass this on to Mrs. Meir, doesn't go any further, not the whole cabinet.

S: It will. . . nobody here.

K: You know that the Egyptians have asked for a special meeting of the General Assembly. It will go into a debate on Monday. Our judgment is the General Assembly is a bad forum for you. . . extremely bad. Officially Waldheim and Benites. . . in order to make effective we must call a Security Council meeting .

S: Yah.

K: We have had a response from the Soviets about the proposal. . . they are non-committal at this point. Saying they are studying the matter and they are trying to find out. . . . . May use it. Must keep it . . ours in which case we will effect hard. . . 600 for the meeting of the Security Council for some time. Afterwards in order to have platform from which we can operate.

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K: I understand... Force Soviets into that.. a position and that is our general strategy. If I have already told the Soviet s if the General Assembly turns nasty into a propaganda battlefield, we will become very tough.

S: Yah.

K: I will be glad to have any.. current information, but this is what we have decided to do.

S: I will pass on to Mrs. Meir. I know from earlier conversation Soviet reply was not quite..

K: We don't know exactly what the Soviet reply is..

S: ...

K: What I have told you is the Soviet's reply is friendly at th s point but non-committal. We would like some expression as to your strategy.

S: I will pass this on right away.

K: I know they have other things to do in Jerusalem, but if they could give us as frequent as possible a report as to.. help us from looking foolish. When is Dinitz coming back ?

S: Day after tomorrow, or tomorrow, not sure.

K: Keep us closely informed.

(S94)
4

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Dobrynin/sSec. Kissinger
Oct. 6 - 3:[illegible] p.m. [illegible]1973 I

K: Anatol I have your message. I can't say it is a model of solidity. It either means you are confused or you are cooperating with them.

D: With whom?

K: The Arabs.

D: Why.

K: What do you think it means. Will you explain it.

D: It was very clear that they do not know exactly what is going on but from their side they will compare it -- we both will compare together as for their definite planning ~~work~~ we will do that later.

K: How much later? We feel very strongly and let me have your reaction. The Egyptians want to put in the GAs and we consider this a frivolous act. We must say if it turns into a GA debate, then we will let it take its course. We are certain it will turn out to be a military victory for the Israelis. Then everyone one will come to us. If it turns nasty we will shut off communications for a while. We feel we should put it into the SC.

D: Yes.

K: But we have turned it off until we have heard from you. How much longer should we wait until we heard from you?

D: One hour. They are having a meeting there.

K: I will wait until 5:00 to make a decision. Let me assure you we want to cooperate with you.

D: That is our answer.

K: That is my impression from your ~~ask~~ answer. What I said to you is for the benefit of your friends. No one should think they can diddle us along.

D: No. No.

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K: And have a great propaganda debate on Tuesday, What we are thinking is weill call the SC. We will oppose without condemnation of either side a ceasefire and a return to the ceasefire line.

D: That is it.

K: I will send over to you a draft resolution.

D: It is changed?

K: No. Essentially what I told you.

D: Ceasefire and return to the ceasefire line.

K: Yes. I wanted to tell you I like the tone of your reply but I wanted to tell you if this thing drags on to Monday...

D: No. No. No. And if the Israelis win...

K: I have explained to Gen. Scowcroft today means it is only a matter of a few hours. It means a matter of hours.

D: Did I understand you to say a matter of hours.

K: Scowcroft says no more than necessary. If I have not heard from you by 5:00 you will hear from me. Now go back and watch the baseball game.

D: O.K.

K:. Fine.

ENC

(S93) *

TELCON
Ambassador Scali - Secretary Kissinger
October 6, 1973
3:45 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I had a sort of nothing response saying we got the information at the same time we contacted them. They would like to coordinate action with them and will contact us . I th nk we should hold off another hour or so unt l I can talk to Dobrynin.

S: That's just the opposite of the impression we are getting here. The information here is that Malik of Securiety Council.

K: That may be the direction. They don't say coordinate action in the Security Council.

S: Right, and that we know definitely that Egypt doesn't want a Security Council meeting.

K: We are going to call them. I just want to have one more reading from Dobrynin.

S: Risk having a full scale debate on Monday.

K: Which we will oppose. We must make it clear that we are opposing....

S: Even if we oppose it, it will be supported by them.... because the Security Council is in session, therefore the Security Council has prior jurisdiction. It will be overturned. We face public ..... complete right that the Arabs will bring big names into the Assembly.

K: In that case we will ..are going to have to....are determined to p rove their ....

S: That depends where they want to make propaganda for a far better audience, far better foreign min sters to toos into the breech a t the General Assembly. We will of the Security Council .....unless they wish to give Israel free reign to make defense.....

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S 105*

RELEASED IN FULL

Abba Eban
Oct. 6

Bring you up to date. ...gone on air .. Moshe Dayan said following category association convinces operations of supplemental pre occupation ... nknow objectives

simply to get them to go back will
ceae fire expect public hope Jordan will continue to be abstentious
air attack beyond front brigdges will remain open lights in admnistered
areas will continue to be normal UN observances we

was ther Syria opened fire. My vew they have

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S116 *

TelCon:9:38/10/6/73
Secretary Kissinger/
Ambassador Cromer

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D), B5

K: Hello.

C: Hello, Henry.

K: I just wanted to check in with you. There is no particular to. Our thinking is that we probably won't be able to avoid ~~asked~~ calling for the Security Council meeting tomorrow sometime.

C: No. That is OK.

K: But we really feel very strongly that a simple ceasefire is (a) short sighted in the present circumstances and I will tell you why. Our judgement is that within 72 hours the Israelis will be pushing deep into Syria. They may not go into - beyond the ~~Jewish~~ canal but they will wipe out what is there. And we may then find such a resolution extremely handy on getting them back. Oh, well

C: Oh, well I think . . .

K: In addition to the general principles which I stated earlier. Now we are quite determined that if the Israelis go beyond the present ceasefire lines that we will push them back.

C: Yes, that is the point I was trying to make. If they do do that then I think we are going to have a new situation.

K: Yes, but if we don't position ourselves now. Let me tell you Eban(?) is not eager to have a Security Council meeting.

C: I am sure he is not.

K: [redacted] B1

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 25X6
DECLASSIFY AFTER: HAK'S DEATH
DATE/CASE ID: 07 JUN 2004 200102979



B5

S98*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Senator Masnfield/Kissinger
October 6, 1973
4:45 pm

K: Refused to communicate. We did... got the Israelis not to launch a preemptive attack, despite our efforts it started at 9:00 and both wit h. . . . now engaged in lining up Soviets to join our approach to call Security Council meeting without condemning either party, return to the status quo ante, formalization of cease-fire.

M: Good , I think that's right.

K: A non-committal reply. Giveing them another two hours until 6:00 to see whether they will join us. If no, we will have to go to the Security Council on our own,, ask for a cease-fire and status quo ante, we don't want to do that, it will go on Monday into a fight in the General Assembly debates will be.... Right now the Arabs are across the Suez Canal. They started with 5 bridgeheads and now are down to 2. By tomorrow evening none, then into Arab position .. have to be an even-handed position. no change in cease-fire lines.

M: Only course is to pursue ... work down the middle line.

K: Ask for a simple resolution ..... hope to get it tonight.

M: Where are you? In New York?

K: No, I returned to Washington to start planning. I will talk to Senator Fulbright later tonight. Out of touch right now. If he thinks it desirable I'll tell him I will be glad to meet with the committee in Executive Session on Tuesday.

M: I suggest you contact George Aiken and Morgan in the House. Incidentally, on my way out yesterday before I came back, I paid a courtesy call on Chio Quang Hua.

K: Isn't that nice.

M: Much better than last time.

K: Didn't you have an impression of more warmth?

M: Oh yes. Much, much better than when I saw Quan Hua.. a couple of weeks ago.

END

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(S1Ø6)

TELCON
FonMin Eban - Secretary Kissinger
October 6, 1973
6:25 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

E: I have a very detailed report on military situation up to this minute. Perhaps I could give it to you now.

K: All right.

E: In the future, perhaps I could give it to your people instead of...

K: Depends on what people. The important thing is to get it to Washington as quickly as possible. If we could do that it would be a help.

E: Syrian advance has been checked because of the nightfall. Garrison surrounded.... (place name) but we do not have a report on what has happened to the people in it. We have no communication from them. We have destroyed 60 Syrian tanks. A number of ours have been put out of action. Haven't been given a number. Syrians have fired three missiles of the "frog" type. They fell ... not where they were intended. They were destined for Nazareth, but fell in a small village called (place name) causing civilian casualties. Also kibbutz (place name). There are 10 killed and 30 wounded.

K: How many planes?

E: We don't have that. On the Egyptian side our base described the position on the Egyptian front as difficult. Have managed... to get a foothold on the Eastern bank in a couple of places. Definitely ... got a bridgehead .... air-to-ground missiles aimed toward Tel Aviv. On of our air craft managed to shoot it down from the air while in flight. We have brought down about 15 of their helicopters full of troops and 10 of their aircraft and we have lost three aircraft on the Egyptian fromt. On the Egyptian front.. losses more drastic... 50 killed 100 wounded. Total 60 killed and 140 wounded on this Yon Kippur day.

K: I understand. You don't have any idea... on plans.

E: Defense Minister said it will take some days but we will ... improve position and confident with time we will be able to..... it.

K: Another item. We are considering going to the Security Council... think we should not be too percipitous?

E: I will get a judgment. If it is feasible... but if they enter the

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the General Assembly, will be a big....

K: Then we have to do it tomorrow.

E: There is the pre-emptive aspect. There are all sorts of degrees of....even when the debate begins.

K: Right now considering whether to go tonight or tomorrow. Have to go before Monday to avoid General Assembly debate.

577*

TELCON
Eban/Sec. Kissinger
Saturday, October 6, 1973
9:07 am

RELEASED IN FULL

E: The PM asked me to tell you that the story of naval action by us at the Gulf of Suez is false. Her Hebrew vocabulary is very rich and she poured it out. I asked about our action so far. Our reaction so far has been defensive. I presume this means going on within our area.

K: Are you going to the Security Council?

E: She asked me to wait a little but inform the Sec. General.

K: What is your view about going to the Security Council?

E: I will ask that. It is not unreasonable. If we did so, I think a point for us. I have recommended it and if accepted we should be the injured party.

K: You recommend that we do not do it.

E: So long as there is a possibility of our doing it quickly, I think it a more natural course.

K: Could you let me know. Find out about that.

E: Certainly.

END

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S02 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
10/6/73 9:10 p.m.

K: Hello, I called your ally, El Zayyat

D: Yes, what was his reaction?

K: I think you can keep them.

D: (laughs)

K: Total irrationality, if you want my frank opinion. It was discouraging on one level and encouragingon another.

D: Just beginning to look for the good news.

K: He said he doesn't insist on the debate himself, on Monday and if we tell him not to have it, he won't have one.

D: If we tell him?

K: If I

D: If you tell him

K: Yeh.

D: But you tell him. But you mentioned to him that _____ to have it, I'm sure.

K: I told him I'd call back tomorrow.

D: Why didn't you tell him from the very beginning?

K: I told him I'm against it.

D: But you said that he will do it if you talk to him, so what is he waiting?

K: I want him to think a little bit. I told him I'm against the debate.

D: Why is he waiting then?

K: If you would let me finish, what he wants also is another thing, I told him our assessment was that they would be driven back at least to where they were, he said he cannot propose withdrawal to Cairo, they'd fire him. But he said if I propose anything at all to him, they would be very receptive.

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D: This I think is what I really--what I tried to tell you in the sense not to just propose withdrawal but to provide them with something.

K: Can you give some thought to some formula overnight?

D: About what kind of things we could propose?

K: Yeh, I don't know myself, if I have an idea, I'll mention it to you.

D: Okay, I will put it this way, Henry, because this is really up to _____, but I would rather if you have a chance by 9:00 to get in touch with Cairo (?) but I will try to do it.

K: Well, or maybe to us.

D: I understand in this case, but either your proposal would like to consult Cairo--not a proposal they wouldn't accept--what really they had in mind--to mention indications outlining their thinking.

K: Yeh.

D: So this kind of thing would be whetherhe would like some kind of statement from both of us, or mention to them in order to get them set up to say look here, I was then, but I was asked to do on with --I don't know--oil consultations or something along this line, you see.

K: Exactly.

D: He'll understand.

K: That's my impression.

D: This is the point, so to be more precise, do they want really peace because ask if something is unacceptable--it is one thing, or would it be in more general terms this would be good preparation, but at th the same time emphasizes once again the urgency of the situation which we told you and they told you.

K: Exactly.

D: So along those lines, I think it is all right.

K: That's the way I think.

D: So, I will put this in to Moscow, but the only thing I'm no sure they will get back by 9:00, but in any case, they will try their best to make a decision--preliminary observation by tomorrow.

K: Exactly.

D: Okay, Henry. Bye.

(S99)*

TELCON

RELEASED IN FULL

Senator Aiken - Secretary Kissinger
October 6, 1973
5:00 p.m.

K: I wanted to bring you up to date. We tried to call you earlier but you were on the way back. We received word very early, around 6:00 a. m. that the Israeli's were concerned that an attack was imminent. We got in touch with Egypt, Soviets and the Secretary General of the UN.

A: Yes,

K: We asked the Israelis not to make a pre-emptive move. They agreed. We informed the Arabs of this but war broke out anyway... just not enough time. We are now trying to coordinate action with the Soviets to perhaps get a resolution in the Security Council to return to cease fire line and for a cease fire. The Egyptians don't want ... Security Council, t they want ... General Assembly, and that.... will turn into a propaganda battle. If we can't get anyone to come along, we will go ahead and call for a cease fire and return to the status quo ante.

A: Are you back in Washington?

K: Yes, Senator. So, the Russians are goingto answer us in a couple of hours. I'll let you know what...

A: That will tell the story probably.

K: From the Russian point of view if they go along with an even-handed view, the Arabls will be furious.

A: Can't believe the Russians wo uld do that... wish Scoop would drop his amendment...

K: I can assure you that it doesn't help matters any.

A: Well, it looks like its up to the big ones now.

K: If we and the Russians can get together that might take care of it.

A: If I can do anything, let me know. I was at the Saudi Arabian Embassy last night, incidentally.

K: I will call in the next couple of hours or first thing in the morning.

A: Apparently this came as a complete surprise. I would have gotten wind of it last night... if....

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K: Our intelligence pointed in the other direction.

A: Well, I'll be around if you want to call.

K: Good, thank you Senator.

(S100) *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Ambassador Scali - Secretary Kissinger
October 6, 1973
5:10 p.m.

S: Sending you a message on a flash basis but it will take 7 minutes. Let me read it to you. ... I just finished talking with Security Council President...feeling now developing among Security Council members including British that instead of formal meeting there be informal consultations among.... individual members...the aim of the consultations would be to produce a piece of paper under McIntyre's name of the name of the Secretary General which would appeal to both sides only for a cease fire . I said we would be .....to return .... I questioned whether informal sessions of Security Council would be adequate unless Security Council if formally seized of the matter might lead to big General Assembly debate.....public attention focused.... invoke formal session prior to .... could be expected. MacIntyre said he feels call to parties to return to prior positions would be .....automatically voted down.... Malik felt very strongly should be handled in General Assembly....
....convene Security Council under Article 9. Call to have Security Council meeting for US, Israel and Western powers ....expressed very firm opinion formal Security Council meeting prior to Monday's General Assembly could not ...legally..., so long as Security Council session is already seized of it. Nothing could be done to prevent speakers giving major emphasis to speeches...
.....El Zayyat has said he may address assembly Monday.
Maitland says his government feels it should be ...feasible for the Security Council meeting to show something is being done . He is very insistent on the point that return to prior positions...this would be aimed...to positions of 67 or 48. We are simply

K: Try to end present fighting...anyone wants to return to '48 or '67 absolutely.

S: ...point he made...something should be done today. He felt that a formal meeting would be far preferable to....

K: I understand. We are getting messages from the Soviets in the next hour.

S: What do I tell the other gues here. ....simple cease fire not adequate. not only in this case What you have outlined still stands?

K: Don't push it, we will have specific instructions in the next hour.

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S102 *

TELECON
Minister Eban/Kissinger
October 6, 1973
6:30pm

RELEASED IN FULL

E: Detailed report..

K: If you could get it to me as soon as possible. If you give it to our people in .... they will make ...copies and they will have it in Damascus before I see it.

E: The Syrian advance fell because of nightfall. A garrison surrounded at ____(Harmer).. No communication with the people in it. We have destroyed 60 tanks. A number of ours are out of action. Syrians have fired ~~X~~ 3 missles of the frog type, that's..

K: I know what that is.

E: They didn't fall ~~xxx~~ where intended. Fell in a small valley (Mikal). Bombarded the Kibbutz... 10 killed in the North and 30 wounded.

K: How many planes were shot down.

E: I don't know that. On the Egyptian front our position is difficult. Secure a foothold on the eastern bank. Have a bridgehead and during the ~~xxx~~ night will try to pass forces over them. They shot one air to ground missile toward Tel Aviv. One of our sircraft shot it down--brought it down while still in the air. Brought down about 15 of their helicopters. Lost 3 aircraft on the Egyptian front. 50 killed and 140 wounded.

K: This is the sort of information -- you ~~have~~ have no idea of any plans -- offensive..

E: ~~XX~~ Our Defense Minister said it will take some days but we will restore our position. I have confidence we will restore it.

K: You think we should not be precipitate .....what is your personal view.

E: That is ~~x~~ my personal view.

K: of not being precipitate. The ability of our government ~~xx~~ not to be precipitate is well tested.

E: There are all degrees of precipitation even when the debate is beginning.

K: Ipm considering whether to go tonight or tomorrow.

E: I would say tomorrow....
END

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S104 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
October 6, 1973
6:20 p.m.

K: I haven't seen the text of your message yet. . give me your interpretation. What do you think . . . really saying. It will be polemical.

D: My impressions that we don't have information from the Arabs. Tomorrow will be alright. They find it will be polemical session. . a small unit and on first line you and we will be. They don't like this idea.

K: What are you saying?

D: None of the participants are asking for the Security Council so what's really for us to do. . . then this forced you to say old story about our position. . .

K: What we have is a case of a mi litary attack. A difficult position. . a question of negotiation. . . It is one thing for the Soviet Union to take a stand in preoiminary negotiation. . . it is another to take a stand after hostilities have started. . . in 3 days you'll be beggin us for it.

D: I understand. . our position. . In Moscow don't want to become involved immediately. They will try to get territory back. . .

K: What are you telling them privately?

D: We don't like this idea.

K: Yet -- if you knew of it why didn't you consult with us.

D: Not a question of that --

K: We told Gromyko what ; ur intentions to do. . . we Told. . . .

D: The question is how far do we go or not go. The situation could be some discussion on our. . .

K: If there was evacuation on your part.

D: I don't have that information. . .

K; two conclusions. .

D: Just saying we don't like this idea.

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K: I would have though in light of questions. . . you might have given us your view. . . and we did not inform. . ahead of time. If we had you would have every right to complain. We assume there was an evacuation. . . . everything moot on Monday. Then we have to argue in front of 100 people. . . three points: first, public opinion, secondly Congress, and then the special relationship we thought existed between us. If you tell us in debate on Monday. . . we understand. . you tell us to wait we will have a real donnybrook. . do you know what that means? We will have a brawl in the General Assembly. and will then make it insoluable. We've been holding up the Israelis on bombing. I don't know if we can keep this up.

D: That's clear to me.

K: Zayyat has asked for the floor on Monday.

D: All I can tell you is that I will talk to Moscow.

K: I'll talk to Key Biscayne and tell you what we are going to do. I'll call you back so don't go to Maryland.

END

S11:

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon NYC
Ron Ziegler/HAK
October 6, 1973; 10:10 a.m.

Z: I will check with you and set up the thing with McCloskey. He is with you?

K: He is with me now. What you should say is that I was awakened this morning with a message from Jerusalem that there was an attack made on them and asking for our telling all interested parties they had no intention to launch an attack. I think the best thing is not to go into the details of what happened this morning.

Z: I agree.

K: You should say we received reports on a total situation this morning in the Middle East at 6 this morning. From then on I was in touch with the President, with the Foreign Ministers of Egypt and Israel, and the President as well as with the Secretary General of the UN, and the President was kept fully informed of developments. That's what you should say.

Z: The picture is still unclear and therefore we can't expand.

K: Yes, but you have to be careful. You must not take any position that will prevent us from siding with anybody. Just say it is not yet clear what the extent of the fighting is and therefore it would be wrong, but don't make any comment on who started it.

Z: The picture is still unclear. But we will keep you informed.

K: You can also say there has been a WSAG meeting in Washington.

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Z: I have told the President he should not return to Washington.

K: There is not a goddam thing he can do. But I want to be in a...

Z: Your returning to Washington can hypo this.

K: And it makes it an American... We would have to do something.

Z: That's what I say. You have to pay your way back. You can't just come back to Washington. What if they ask if you have been in touch with the Soviets?

K: You will say yes.

Z: And what action will you take?

K: No statement whatever.

Z: What about US citizens in the area?

K: We will take care of that.

S114

RELEASED IN FU

Telcon NYC
Abba Eban, Israeli Minister for Foreign Affairs/Sec. Kissinger
October 6, 1973; 8:50 a.m.

E: I got a message a quarter of an hour ago at least that the Syrians attacked at 2 o'clock with artillery and bombs in Golan and Schmona from Syria then, and the next news was that the Egyptians also an air attack ~~from xxx xxx~~ at a place called in Sinai, and attempts on their part to cross ~~xx~~ the Canal.

K: Do you have any reports on your reactions yet?

E: No, This was the first news I got.

K: I have a report from the Egyptians alleging that you started everything with a naval attack near Syria near some oil fields.

E: We have nothing on that.

K: I don't myself believe that you would start a general war with a naval attack in one place, but you always do surprising things. Could you get me the facts?

E: They said the first move was a naval attack?

K: They claim the first move...

E: South of the Suez.

K: South of the Canal. The Egyptian Foreign Minister called me and gave me a name but it was an Arabic name. If you were attacking some place you presumably knew where it was.

E: Yes. That is not at all convincing. The news preceding this - there was a very wild exodus of Soviets from _____. Do you have that?

K: I have my news and I have called it to the attention of the Soviets.

E: And couldn't do so and are just leaving headlong in Syria. I have just ascertained that much.

K: The only other thing I have done since we talked is to call the Secretary General and tell him what we have done.

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E: Yes, I will call him as well and we will probably convene the Security Council ourselves, but I am waiting for instructions on that.

K: All right, and we will be in close touch.

E: Thank you.

S96

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

TELCON
Gen. Haig - Secretary Kissinger
October 6, 1973
4:15 p.m.

K: Dobrynin says he will hear again in another couple of hours and as far as where we stand in New York, Egyptians are against the Security Council meeting and the Soviets who are without instructions are supporting Egypt, The British who wanted to call it are getting cold feet. Tell the President we are still waiting for the Soviet reply. If we don't get it at 6:00, we will call a Security Council meeting.

H: Right.



B1

K: It is manageable here. He will want to know exactly what we will be doing. At 6:00 we will call a Security Council meeting. I will say the President has instructed me to go back to Washington. And I will say the President will have something to say at a later time.

H: That's fine.

K: So I thin it is well.

H: So do I, no difficulties here.

K: I have my own debates.

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H: The President agrees with this approach. I think that's fine. Henry. The only worry we have here is about the Soviets.

K: ....and for that, we have to be prepared to take them on. They will have to be prepared to help on this kind of thing as on MBFR, or on everything we cannot be the soft guys in this crisis.

H: No question about that. We can't take that.

UNCLASSIFIED

S90

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Gen. Haig/ Sec. Kissinger
Sat., Oct. 6, 1973
1:10 pm

K: My view on that return unless you have an overriding thing, is until -- first of all this thing may be over twenty-four hours. Second, it might be amicably settled and third we should use the President when it will do ~~xxx~~ him some good. He must avoid looking hysterical. If it turns bad, we will have to adopt the posture you used in Jordan. See what I mean?

H: Exactly. I have taken care of it and he has settled down.

K: I will move into the White House when I get back. I will hold a WSAG meeting there and I will make sure to be reporting to you in detail.

H: That is helpful. You know the game. You know the problem.

K: I know the problem. I am trying to get him involved in a way that will do the country some good.

H: We may have to come back in any event tomorrow.

K: You may even want to come back tomorrow from my point of view. I know what his problem is but it is not all that certain to turn out well that he would want to be the man. It is one thing for him to be directing the moves and another for him to be in the command post.

H: I agree.

K: By 6:00 tonight we will have a pretty good idea.

H: You can be sure. Tell me what you think and no second guessing here.

K : I know what you are up against. It is not the first one we have been through together.

H: We are in good shape.

K: Fine.

END

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UNCLASSIFIED

(591)

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec. Gen. Waldheim/ Sec. Kissinger
Sat., Oct. 6, 1973
1:20 pm

W: I want to keep you informed of the developments here. Zahed (?) came to see the President and saw him in my presence. He asked him to convene an urgent meeting of the General Assembly. I mentioned this to you that he had already suggested that to me. He came then personally to the President requesting him to convene the meeting. The President reacted as I did. He said it was not technically possible. He cannot do it so quickly. After a lengthly conversation El Zahed agreed to send him a letter which he had prepared and signed in the office of the President and instead of having a special meeting of the GA he asked to circulate this letter. It is a two page letter which accuses the Israelis to have started the aggression and that they had to react and they accused the Israelis for having launched this aggressing along the Egyptian-Syrian border and continues the Israeli's policy of occupation of the Arab territory and the increasing of the utilization of the Arab territories.

K: I guess we will see it eventually.

W: It is an accusation of Israel for not having accepted the UN resolution etc. This is the situation and this letter will be circulated as a GA document on request of El Zahed, and to speak on Monday morning in the GA. He came to my office and told me that he had still no request for any Security Council debate. Is that right? I can imagine they don't want it.

K: We feel there should be a Security Council debate sometime later this afternoon and we will oppose any GA debate of the subject.

W: It is a case for the Security Council.

K: We do not think the GA competent.

W: It has been declined to have a GA meeting. We don't have this problem at least over the weekend. If El-Zahed asks for the floor, the President has to give him the floor. When I asked him , he said he would ask for the florr only when he sees how things develop. I think he wants to see how the military operations develop.

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K: Yes. We will almost certainly support or call for a Security Council meeting this afternoon.

W: I have been contacted by some of the permanent members. Sir Donald ~~Maxxxxx~~ Macklin suggested to convene the Council but I tol him the best way is to consult with the other members and I assume he has done it in the meantime. That he contacted you.

K: We will be in touch within about an hour or two and probably then call for a meeting.

W: In my talk with Macklin this morning after talking to you, he told me he has no instructions whatsoever on this subject and that he does not know whether they will do something in this matter.. He avoided any discussion of the substance.

K: Good. Mr. Sec. Gen., we will be in the closest touch with you. I am returning to Washington and I will call you from there to establish contact.

W: Thank you. I thought it important for you to know.

K: Very, and extremely helpful. Goodbye and I appreciate your cooperation.

W: Of course. We have gotten a series of cables now from our ceasefire observation groups. One think I wanted to add -- our Chairman there has made an appeal. He says, he has conveyed my appeal to the Governments of Egypt, Israel and Syria to adhere to the ceasefire agreement.

K: Thank you.

W: I wish you a good trip to Washington.
K: Goodbye.
END

S 11

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon NYC
The President/HAK
October 6, 1973; 9:25 a.m.

P: Hello, Henry. I wanted you to know I am keeping on top of reports her The Russians claim to be surprised.

K: The Russians claim to be surprised and my impression is that they were supposed to be surprised because apparently there has been an airlift of dependents out of the area going on for the last 2 or 3 days.

P: I agree.

K: And so our impression is that they knew about it or knew it was possible. They did not warn us.

P: What is happening now? What is the status?

K: Fighting has broken out on the Golan Heights and along the Sinai. The Egyptians claim that the Israelis had launched a naval attack in the Gulf of Suez which triggered the whole thing. That I just can't believe. Why a naval attack? The Israelis claim that so far the fighting is still mostly in Israeli territory and that they have confined themselves to defensive action. My own impression is that this one almost certainly was started by the Arabs. It is almost inconceivable that the Israelis would start on the holiest holiday for the Jews when there is no need to and there is no evidence that the Israelis launched air attacks, and they gave us an assurance which we passed on this morning that they would not launch a preemptive attack and we told the Arabs that if the Israelis launch a preemptive attack that we would oppose them and they should exercise restraint. My view is that the primary problem is to get the fighting stopped and then use the opportunity to see whether a settlement could be enforced.

P: You mean a diplomatic settlement of the bigger problem?

K: That is right. There is going to be a Security Council meeting almost certainly today and we are still debating whether we should call it or the Israelis should. Somebody has to call it in the next hour.

P: I think we should. We ought to take the initiative. Can't we get the Russians to? I think we ought to take the initiative and you ought to indicate you talked to me.

K: Let me call Dobrynin right away on that. In the debate there are going to be a lot of wild charges all over the place.

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P: Don't take sides. Nobody ever knows who starts the wars out there.

K: There are two problems on the immediate thing. The long term I think it is impossible now to keep maintaining the status quo ante. On the immediate thing we have to get the Soviets drawn in on the side of the Arab group - then it would be involved. If they join us in a neutral approach in which both of us say we don't know who started it but that we want to stop it, that would be best. If they make a defense on the part of the Arabs. But first we ought to see if they will join us in a neutral approach - that will be the best.

P: Let me know what develops.

K: We have sent you a report an hour ago, but that is already overtaken. I may return to Washington today.

P: OK, thank you.

(S97)

TELCON
Lord Cromer - Secretary Kissinger
October 6, 1973
4:25. p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

K: Our worst mistake was to throw you out of the Canal zone.

C: And a little late, it was a mistake.

K: Our first mistake was to push you into the Canal zone.

C: What did they do now?

K: I wanted to give you -- and this is for the Prime Minister only -- the general strategy. We hope to work as closely as we did in September 1970.

C: I'm sure we would wish to do that too.

K: Whatever the situation in Copenhagen, it doesn't apply with regard to the Eastern Mediterranean. Let me give you our reading of the situation. We are quite confident that the Arabs started this and we in fact were given assurances, when we transmitted to the Egyptians and Soviets our request not to launch pre-emptive attack. We told them that if Israel launched an attack, we would oppose them publicly.

C: Was this recently?

K: That was during the night, but it was too late to be ...to affect decisions. Once we had the information. Now the ... our assessment of the situation is this We have approached the Soviets and proposed calling a Security Council meeting and that there be a simple resolution calling for a return to the cease fire lines and a cease fire. We are doing this because that is a neutral type of resolution which requires no condemnation and we suspect within a couple of days, unless our judgment is really off, the Arabs will be on their knees begging us to do this. We want to have a platform of having moved in this direction before that.

C: Before that, yes.

K: If the Soviets support us in this we are home free. If they do not, we will have to move quite drastically to make it clear that the Arabs were the aggressors in this particular instance, and more or less side with the Israelis. The reasons for this -- We are beginning, as you could see from the newspapers, and as I have told you, a series of diplomatic moves in an attempt to make at least some progress and this action depends on being able convince the Israelis, to make other security guarantees.

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Cromer/kissinger

C: I discussed with....

K: If they are not even prepared to see what we can do, then no guarantees by us will have the slightest significance. If the Soviets don't join us in quieting things down, you have to assume collusion before _____. We are not prepared to take them on. It is in the interest of everybody, including Western Europe, not to run across us in this particular instance.

C: When would the Security Council meet?

K: I have called Dobrynin. We have had already a reply from the Soviets. -- and I will not give anybody else the full flavor of this -- If the General Assembly turns into a propaganda battle, we will be unreachable for the rest of the week. No matter what beautiful speeches are given in New York. We will not then be as easy to deal with as we are now. On the other hand, we are willing to cooperate now to proceed on a neutral line.

C: Sure.

K: We will wait..-- I have given him until 5:00 and we will wait an extra hour until 6:00 this evening, to produce a reply from Moscow. If not, I have been asked by the President to ask Ambassador Scali to call for a Security Council meeting. We will not be condemnatory at the meeting unless the Soviets turn towards the Arabs. Wewill be very grateful. If your representative could be instructed to coordinate support.

C: I will get on this right away.

K: Let me know what your representative is instructed to do?

C: Was this completely out of the blue, as it is to me?

K: Oh, yes, the first time -- and this is for your Prime Minister -- we were requesting [redacted] reports, even called in the Israeli Ambassador [redacted] they predicted fully defensive preparations. I got a report this morning. They were still maintaining that last night. We received the first confirmation this morning. Then I got on the telephone, gave assurances to everybody...but three hours later it started. B1 B1

C: You have got friends, like in North VietNam and other parts of the world, they are a little unreliable.

K: In Moscow, you mean?

C: No, I mean among the Arabs. Don't you think they have been clever.

K: Oh, yes, very clever. Whether they have committed suicide depends....depends on how the military operation goes. Our information is, though we don't have the complete picture, is that they have crossed at 5 points, only 2 are left.

C: 2 left?

K: 2 are under attack now.

C: OK, I'll get on it right away.

K: And 20 Egyptian and 12 Syrian airplanes.

S92

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Deputy Secretary Rush - Secretary Kissinger
October 6, 1973
3:40 p. m.

R: Set for the 6:30 meeting. I have just talked to White House security... He thinks there may be some security risk having the Chiefs of Mission meeting and bringing together all the Ambassadors...

K: Tell the White House, let's just relax about that.

R: When I went to Tehran our own security people were raising hell. because as you know .... went off fine. I think we are making a great mistake if we went for that sort of thing.

K: Of course, I may be kept here by events if things get worse.

R: Still having WSAG meeting at 6:30.

K: Unless you want to come in at 5:30 and I'll tell you what the strategy is.

R: Fine.

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S 1Ø *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Gen. Haig - Secretary Kissinger
O ctober 6, 1973

7-1-0

H: Just talked to the President. He feels that we possibly should not wigt too much longer for the Soviet answer before moving wieth the resolution.

K: Exactly right. First, though, a Soviet answer is coming in now. Second, my recommendation is to move tonight, whatever is in thea nswer we move into the Security Council as soon.... We will put forward a call for a cease fire and return to the status quo ante before the fighting started. The reason is we have to do that is we will be rewarding the attacker....once the Israelis start beating up on the Arabs ....israelis grab Arab territory. I feel we must recommend ceasse fire and return to status quo ante if it gets voted down...best position with the Chinese. Can't have precedents set in which ...can grab territory and then call for a cease fire.

H: Henry, what do you think about our announcing here, first on that thing.

K: That's fine. Just say that the President has instructed Dr. Kissinger tc move immediately .....Wait for the Soviet answer. Its coming in now but I will let you make the announcement down there. I'll call you as soon as I have got the answer

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S109 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Scali - Secretary Kissinger
Oct. 6, 1973
6:40 p. m.

S: Security Council now holding meeting... shall we stay where we are?

K: I heard they are not going to call a formal meeting, but have informal consultations. Same position...to be forea cease fire and return to the status wuo ante, and you should not call attention to.....following points:

If we call only for a cease fire, we would be using the UN to sanctify aggression.....can grab territory, ask the UN to call a cease fire and then if the victim.....creates a dangerous precedent.

If the military situation takes a turn and Israeli starts beating up on the Arabs, it should be kept in mind that we are prepared to stick, even if ....with the resolution for a status quo ante.

It would be unbecoming for the UN to turn itself into a ..... that is our position and we will maintain it throughout the crises.

As Popper pointed out we did not follow it in '67 but in '73 we will.

S: We are following it in '73 is the main point.

K: Yes, the main point, but I think we should stay calm and not go around discussing it too much. I will let you know whether we decide to go directly for a Security Council tonight, when we've got more information.

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S111 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Haig/Secretary Kissinger
October 6, 1973
1:50'

K: You don't mean we have to do it... British will support resolution for simple cease-fire but not cease-fire ante. This faces us with a problem. Next move -- sanction against Israel for refusing a cease-fire. By Tuesday or Wednesday Israel may be in Arab territory and then they will accept it. Third point -- anyone who can grab territory and then submit to a cease-fire... Number one do we go to Security Council tonight, Number 2, with what sort of Resolution. My

H: My instincts are today up there..we can

K: We can give the Soviets til tomorrow morning at 9:00. If they are surprised they are confused -- if not surprised then stalling for time.

H: I don't know how the battle is going.

K: They are aggressive. The Israelis are being excessively timid.

H: They are not surrounded... Syria

K: Do.... but not any missile attacks on other line.

H: Don;a want a missile attack. I think the Egyptian want them to come in there against their missiles.. and the Israelis didn't nibble. We could probably wait til morning -- not overly hungry as long as we aren't snockered.

K: By 9:00 in the morning we should go.

H: That's what I think.

END

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S112*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Ambassador Bennet/HAK
October 6, 1973/8:45 p.m.

K: Hello.

B: Yes Mr. Secretary.

K: Were you with Scali at the...

B: Yes I was sir.

K: What happened.

B: We were successful in preventing any statement tonight.

K: Well, did anyone want to make a statement.

B: Yes. The Australian President had a statement already prepared Which would have said that tomorrow that we were consulting for meetings that I have it right here in front. I can read it to you if you like.

K: Yes.

B: The President of the Security Council announced on 6 October that he had consulted urgently the members of Council on the fighting which had broken out in the Middle East that day. Paragraph. On the basis of information so far available the members of the Council had expressed serious concern that the situation which has developed and deplored the fact that hostilities had been resumed in breach of the cease fire. Paragraph The President had been authorized by members of the Council as a first step to ask the Secretary General to call on all sides for an immediate cessation of all military activities and to report promptly to Council members on their response. Paragraph. The members of the Council had authorized these provisional measures in accordance with _____ of the juanta without prejudice to the rights and claims or positions of the parties concerned. John Scali pointed out that this would be quite unacceptable from our side without a withdrawal at the same time that was coequal with the ceasefire from our point of view.

K: Very good.

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B: And the final upshot of it was consultation with the British, French, Austrians and the Australians and the upshot was they agreed on no statement at all and John said that he would hope to have instructions by 10 in the morning.

K: Good. Perfrdct.

B: The Chinese have taken the position that they will not agree to any statement because neither Syria or Egypt has asked for Security Council action.

K: Would they agree to a meeting tomorrow?

B: I suspect they will oppose it but every member has the right to call for it.

K: But that means they'll veto any action.

B: That may well be the result.

K: OK. Bye.

B: We'll be here and John is making his Columbus Day Speech at the Waldorf.

K: No, you tell him he's doing a great job.

B: Thank you very much.

K: Bye.

S 110

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Genl Haig/Sec. Kissinger
Sat., Oct. 6, 1973
7:10 p.m.

K: ..... and claimed that the Russians alluded to the Israelis. I told them in three days they would ~~through~~ throw them out and be coming to us.

H: Sure.

K: I told them the Gen. Assembly debate on Monday which will start if we don't start on the Security Council--my recommendation unless you feel strongly to the contrary. I have told him unless he hears from me to the contrary, I will give him until tomorrow to avoid this dilemma.

H: Yes.

K: If not, we will have to go to the Council. If we don't do that we will get creamed in the GA on Monday.

H: I think they have understood the position they are talking; tonight is fine.

K: I told Dobrynin if it goes to the GA and if the US is taken over the coals I want them to know we are taking the position that words are words and deeds are deeds and people who can commit deeds will be let run loose for a couple of days. You make sure the President is fully informed.

H: I will. I know he is anxious to do something in the morning.

K: By 10:00 you will be able to announce he has asked that it be moved to the Security Council.

H: I don't understand what the Soviets think they are going to gain.

K: Actually, they seem to have gotten across in larger force than they thought possible.

H: Really.

K: The Israelis say there is a real bridgehead across the Canal. Sixty dead and 110 wounded. You have to multiply that by a hundred to get the equivalent American casualties. If we suffered 6,000 dead and 15,000 wounded in one day. No joke. The Israelis say they have shot down six helicopters with troops.

H: There are generally 10 to 15 in a helicopter.

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K: O.K. We will proceed on that basis.

H: If you feel you need to change.

K: I am comfortable with this.

H: I take it you had rather do it tomorrow.

K: Yes.

H: You will get much better news play tomorrow. From a political point of view, it is better to have given the Russians a few more hours and lean over backwards.

K: We had better keep book on that. If they play it the hard way we know what we are up against. There are two things: No. 1) is I think as long as we know that the Soviets have been capricious and that way it proves to be there will be no limits on what we can do. If they play soft and spongy it would be very hard to be tough.

H: With the President.

K: That's right.

H: He will be making a mistake.

K: You have to figure as you go down this thing if the Soviets are using us we have to call a spade a spade and not play with them whatever the price.

H: That is my view.

K: We are in good shape.

H: That is totally my view. I don't think we can play it spongy.

K: As long as you play it that way.

H: They will be playing it spongy and we will still have to call a spade a spade.

K: That is alright too. That has a time limit on it. I have given them until 9:00 tomorrow morning. I think it would be a mistake because we have no one else lined up.

H: Precisely. I told him that.

K: Would he rather go tonight.

H: Instinctively, he would. I told him the British fell off the status quo anti aspect and you felt we ought to be very careful not to go against the others until they had thought about it. If you go back to Dobrynin and tell them this is what we are going to do.

K: I have already told them that.

H: As much as you can.

K: I told them I would try to sell this in Key Biscayne.

H: Alright, Henry.

END

S 1Ø8

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Dobrynin/Sec. Kissinger
Oct. 6 - 7

K: Here is what we will do. In deference to the message which you have sent us we will not go to the SC tonight though it originally was to go at 6:00 o'clock. We will wait for a decision on how to proceed until 9:00 tomorrow.

D: In the morning.

K: Yes. Give you a chance to go to church If you could get me an answer from Moscow which is a little more specific than this.

D: On what.

K: What exactly are your intentions. My impression is -- I understand you dont want to get into a public disassociation.

D: I will put it quite friendly. We are rather in a difficult position publicly.

K: If you can give us some indication what you are doing privately. You and I have handled these things private. We are interested in the results. We want a ceasefire and status quo ante. I repeat by Tuesday you will be asking us. It is not a question in which we are asking for a favor. We are trying to prevent an exacerbation of our relationship. A situation where in this country and the Congress will have very serious consequences. If you tell us you are working with the Egyptians and the Syrians and by Monday morning this will be over and no further debate is necessary.

If you will tell us that you believe that by Monday morning that there is in effect a ceasefire and return to the status quo ante. We don't want this to become a public affairs. Tell us something we can understand. It will be kept confidential as everything has been kept between us. I am not asking for you to agree for concerted public ation. I am asking you tomorrow morning for a concerted practical action. That will lead to the result we want. I genuinely believe and you will tell Gromyko and Brezhnev by Tuesday at the latest the situation will be a different show. Right, no?

D: I understand.

K: Our reading of the situation is that the Arab attack has been totally contained that now they are going to be pushed back and this process will accelerate as the mobilization is completed which will be no later than Monday morning and after that we will ~~say~~ what we have

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seen before. This is our military reading of the situation. We think if the matter could be wound up tomorrow. The Arabs have proved their point. They have attacked across the Canal. They can withdraw on their own and return to the status quo. We can both enjoy a good SC debate.

D: I don't under stand in a political sense what do you think. What do you want from our point of view our position which is a principle from the beginning of '67.

K: I know your position.

D: It is not a public debate that I am telling you for use to tell the Arabs is very difficult. I had rather hear from Moscow but as I understand our position the difficulties we are now facing is that ~~Israel~~ the Arabs are trying to regain the lands occupied by Israel. They have been using that argument to us and for us to tell them you cannot free your land, it is rediculous.

K: I recognize the situation. I am not saying it is all easy. We have a different situation. There have not been any raids on Damascus and Cairo but I would not bet anything on tomorrow.

D: I understand.

K: Is is possible for the Politburo to imagine a complete course of action which we agree on privately.

D: What course of action do you propose besides SC.

K: A defacto return to the status quo ante a defacto return of the ceasefire. I have already told the Egyptians that I would make an effort after the Israeli election. I have told Gromyko I would talk to him in January. None of this we will do if these pressures continue..

D: I understand.

K: We have a framework out of which we could crystallize. The Arabs have now proved their point.

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D: Henry, how could they?

K: You see they are going to lose. It is not a case where we are asking. Not like India and Pakistan.

D: I understand. The military point of view. I cannot argue with you. You know the situation better. I am trying to understand the situation better politically. Million or half a million.

K: ~~What~~ They have next to nothing.

D: What is the question -- asking them to return somewhere if they have nothing.

K: We have two choices; we can let this war continue until the exact calibrated moment when the Israelis have pushed out of every territory but before they start heading for Damascus. If we are lucky and hit that moment exactly right we can hit the ceasefire then. Probability is that the Arabs can hold on another 24 hours and then going to retret to their capital and wait for winter.

D: I understand what the situation really is. But for us to go to the Arabs and say look here I don't know how many you have one - one or two miles but you have to go back. They say you invite us to give back territory that belongs to us.

K: Can you not say that it was your understanding that an effort was going to be made for negotiations. They have proved their point of the urgency in which they see this and this is a good psychological moment for them to make a generous gesture rather than wait until the outcome of these hostilities. By Monday evening they will be flown out of there anyway.

D: I understand.

K: This is a new strategy of using the threat of ones own defeat.

D: I know. There are many that could be said. The question is from the practical way. From a practical point of view because they put on us all the cats and dogs. On the Russians because we asked them to give back ~~xxxxx~~ land which we have already said....

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K: I understand your dilemma.

D: They will say you are in collusion with the US and Israeli.

K: Who will be the first.

D: Cairo. From a man you met. The Russians were in collusion with the US and (unable to understand).

K: If you and we could find a way of settling this now then it would be an overwhelming argument in all of the things we have been going through as to what the practical consequences have been of our relationship.

D: I understand.

K: I think it would overwhelm in one blow all of these things we have been facing. If it goes the other way and Monday you and we are going to be up at the rostrum calling each other names. It will be a disaster

D: I can assure you we will not be calling the US names. I am not sure what the Israelis will be calling.

K; You know some of the local people cannot always distinguish those two.

D: We will try to put them out of the country on this particular American line. You understand?

K: I understand.

D: This we could take care of.

K; It still would not change the objective condition. The various people who are harrassing you will be more inflamed.

D: I know. That is why I keep returning to the practical thing. You understand.

K: I understand it.

D: They would say you have spoken of liberating. It is impossible for us.

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5
Dobrynin
Oct 6

K: I think directed against both of us.

D: For us ro tell Sadat make a communique.

K: Anatol with all due respect we will face this problem somewhere in the next 48 hours. Suppose you do nothing and we do nothing by Tuesday, or Wednesday at the latest the Arabs will be defeated unless our estimates are wrong. At that point what are we going to do.

D: Did you approach once more the Egyptians.

K: No. You think I should.

D: I think you should. Tell them your estimate. Otherwise it would be such an invitation. You are ~~quick~~_____ and we their friends are saying go back from your own land.

K: I will approach them to night and I will call you after I have talked to them.

D: I think it would be much better. From us, it would look like we are trying to sell them out.

K: We have to leave it at this. We will not go to the SC tonight to give ourselves a chance to think. You think and we will think. Try to get me an expression from Moscow by 8:00 in the morning.

D: Ask for ~~10:00~~ 9:00. That is 5:00.

K: Tell them they will have to go to early mass.

D: They would find it strange to have these kind of discussions going on over the weekend.

K: I can imagine what kind of discussion is going on there. I understand the _____- are very happy today.

D: This is a basic problem. I also understand your ingenuity.

K: If I have any ideas I will call you.

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D: Not at night. I go to sleep quite early.

K: You are not going to bed now are you.

D: No.

K: What you have to understand is if it turns into a propaganda battle on Monday in the GA, then our only protection is to be extremely tough and to teach the facts of life to people who like to make great speeches and we will see what is more important -- a speech or reality. I will be very brutal. That will be our strategy. We want to get it settled before then at least with an understanding.

D: As from the US no particular attempt from our side.

K: Anatol, in the GA it will be a bloody mess. No body can control it.

D: You are right.

K: It is going to be a blood bath.

D: It is true.

K: Then your allies are going to get up there and you will have to do as well as they.

D: As to speaking about allies I read you were going to build a pipeline.

K: A pipeline .

D: I mean your Asian friends.

K: I am saying the GA will be a mess. Why don't you report to this to Gromyko.

D: You keep in mind what I mentioned to you. About asking them to withdraw from what is theirs.

K: I understand that problem. Maybe there is some formula we can both think about. Let's not let time slip by. I believe the military will rapidly deterioate and we will be in a mess.

END

S 113*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Foreign Minister Zayyat
October 6, 1973/8:48 p.m.

K: Hello.

Z: Hello

K: Mr. Foreign Minister. How are you?

Z: Fine thank you.

K: I just wanted to touch base with you at the end of a rather hectic and I'm sure rather trying day for you and for all of us. Let me tell you candidly what our evaluation is and I'll speak to you in the candor that we always have. First, I thought we had done rather well in our discussions yesterday, in establishing a basis of some mutual confidence and I look forward to seeing you down here and resuming our discussions in November. Now we are in the difficult situation that if the fighting doesn't get stopped in a reasonable time events may again get out of control. Now, our evaluation is that if the fighting goes on the Israelis will probably gain the upper hand. You know, you can disagree with this but this is our estimate and therefore when we suggest that we would prefer a ceasefire plus a restoration of the status quo anti.l...

Z: Anti what Mr. Kissinger.

K: No anti, before this last round started.

Z: Very strange.

K: I understand your point and we talked about that on Friday but then that will in time work to the advantage of the Arab side if the evolution is the way it may be. I just wanted you to know on a personal basis that if the fortunes of war should go the other way we would not look with favor on any further Israeli territorial claims. And we would like to have this thing wound up in a way that does not make it more difficult to resume what I thought was a beginning of a better possibility for discussion. I don't have a very concrete proposal and we have tried to be restrained today in the hope that perhaps something could be developed.

Z: Of course the question of you know when you think about 5,000 Egyptians killed and then going back to where we were is something out of the question, in Cairo. If I were in Cairo I would think madness.

K: How many Egyptians killed?

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Z: I don't know how many people but I don't know how many killed but could be thousands killed.

K: Of course, our impression is that the action was initiated probably by your side this time but we may be wrong.

Z: Even so, but how can you advise anyone after doing this to go back where he was. I mean this is completely unreasonable. And just remember that you were speaking what can we give them since they ceasefire. Everything was so good that they started the cease/fire the fact of their occupation for 7 years 6 years was quite alright because of the ceasefire. I think it better for them and the evolution to find there is a war really and therefore find a solution for it.

K: That I agree with you on completely.

Z: They were so pleased and didn't want to do something because there was a ceasefire. And the ceasefire which was costing us every day that which I spoke to you about. I don't know who began this or how it began but we should move with the best _____ which we have now.

K: Which is what?

Z: I don't know but a position of going back to where we were of course nobody can suggest this to the government but me anyhow but I don't know what other positions are up. I didn't go to the Council because really I _____ to a rough frame. I didn't know what to do in the Council, the Council can have votes with me but with one veto. XXXXX

K: What is your view?

Z: I don't know. Do you have any suggestions. You have been studying this for some time and you know the other people we don't have relation with them.

K: You see our theory is that the other side is going to launch a very strong attack within the next day or two and then we will have another major problem to contend with and we would like to keep the fighting contained as much as possible to give diplomacy an opportunity. I mean you have certainly made your point which you had already made to me eloquently about the intolerable nature of the situation.

Z: The situation is really impossible for us. It has been repeatedly said this is American land. Nobody can _____. Security was assured for Israel by the water canal and therefore how can they leave the security.

K: No, I think it was a very effective operation in many ways.

Z: There is no security there. Security is possible only at the acceptance of coexistence.

K: I unfortunately don't have a concrete plan Mr. Foreign Minister but I do believe you have made a very, the events of today, have made a very strong point and now the question is how to go from here to some positive result rather than to an expansion of the war which then could reverse many of the things that have happened.

Z: I would like Cairo.. I would do anything. I don't care very much for war or for all this kind of thing.

K: Look, I really, you convinced me yesterday very much of your serious intent and good will.

Z: In any world how to get peace is the most important thing.

K: I couldn't agree more.

Z: The question now, what can I suggest to go back to establish the _____ of yesterday. I don't think I can even whisper it.

K: Supposing it happens in a day or two anyway.

Z: You know _____ of their occupying Cario because then we have the German _____ or the British _____. I hope that you are not going to help them do that.

K: Certainly not. I told you we will oppose it.

Z: Yes. So I think if there is no extra help from anywhere we can defend what we have to the best of our abilities but there is a point now that this question of security was over-rated and perhaps no protection. We can tell that now and begin asking something, doing something perhaps.

K: That I understnad and from that point of view we now show statesmanship. Something positive could emerge out of all of this. If it's done in some concrete and practical way. That's why I called you know, I don't really know. I just wanted you to know that I'm open for discussion and that we are not lined up in order to create difficulty.

Z: Well I should hope not because it is not good for anyone.

K: But you see this now goes to the General Assembly.

Z: I'm not going to the General Assembly. There is a mistake about that. What I wanted to do is to give the General Assembly the note I gave them today. On Monday I am going to give the ____ again and that's all. We don't want a debate in General Assembly.

K: You do not want a debate.

Z: No.

K: Well, that is a misunderstanding. I thought that you wanted it.

Z: No. I don't want it until November to give you a chance. What I am expecaed to do is to read the letter which I gave to the President today to read it as a statement of what had happened and sit down and hear other speakers of _____ as they wish. Because there was no meeting today I _____ any demand or request for a debate. I know the radio says difference but I hope you look _____. But I didn't ask for a debate and did not even raise the question. If this would help. But this is something _____. Ask them what is going to happen in the spot, this is more important.

K: Now supposing you know we said we were going to give this opportunity. How can we get the fighting stopped now.

Z:I don't really know. You are far away. You can have more cool head, you can tell me what to think and I plan to take a plane tomorrow morning to see the President and then come back. I will do anything because I sincerely believe until the end all wars are going to end by some sort of peace and athe peace that we want. For this I think there is understanding, you have said it repeatedly.

K: You explained that to me on Friday.

Z: Yes, and it has been said before you can say clearly, perhaps you cannot say it but this a fact. So if we can have any encouragement of any endorsement of this by America for example you can _____ think clearly that the _____of all states to preserve rewards for rewards. Something like this. I'm not speaking for myself. I don't know, can you think about it until tomorrow and we will call you again and see what can be done.

K: Let me think about it tonight and I will call you tomorrow.

Z: I think this is a chance for Americans to do something and if you were sincerely, and I'm sure you were, _____ of the _____ of _____. Now is your chance to speak to them both, without the great confidence that

Israels had and the great lack of confidence which he had.

K: Yeah. I understand.

Z: If you don't want me to raise the question on Monday let me know.

K: Good. Alright.

S04 *

Saturday - 10/6/73
2:10 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

Message to President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger from Soviet Government - Telephoned by Ambassador Dobrynin.

"The Soviet leadership got the information about the beginning of military actions in the Middle East at the same time as you got it. We take all possible measures to clarify real state of affairs in that region, since the information from there is of a contradictory nature. We fully share your concern about the conflagration of the situation in the Middle East. We repeatedly pointed in the past to the dangerous situation in that area.

"We are considering now as well as you do, possible steps to be taken. We hope soon to contact you again for possible coordination of positions."

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RELEASED IN FULL *

S65

Telcon
Roy Atherton/ HAK NYC
October 6, 1973:7:30 a.m.

A: Received a report from Ambassador Keating, speaking to Mrs. Meir a few hours ago. The central thing is she asked that we pass the following message to the Egyptians and to the Soviets: Israel is not planning to attack Syria and Egypt and is deploying its forces in case of foreign attack and on a contingency basis has called up some reserves. Israel is well aware of the militant feeling of the Egyptians and Syrians. If they attack they will lose although the attacker can cause damage ~~from Israel~~ which Israel wishes to avoid. Israel will not repeat not launch an attack, noting that Israel would successfully defend itself if attacked, she emphasized that the Israeli Government wishes to avoid bloodshed.

K: When did we get that?

A: It just arrived on the basis of a meeting the Ambassador had with her at a meeting earlier today.

K: That is the most important part of it. Get it over to Scowcroft right away. And, Roy, can you hush the thing up as tight as we can?

A: Yes, we will do that.

K: And I will get the piece shut up in my shop. OK, thank you.

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RELEASED IN FULL *

(S63)

Telcon
October 6, 1973; 7:00 a.m. NYC
Foreign Minister (Egypt) Zayad/ HAK

K: Mr. Foreign Minister, sorry to disturb you. We have had a report, which does seem very reliable, and an appeal from the Israelis to the effect that your forces and the Syrian forces are planning attacks within the next several hours.

Z: Several hours?

K: Yes. We have been in touch with the Israelis. The Israelis have asked us to tell you of the seriousness and that they have no intention of attacking, so that if your preparations are caused by fear of an Israeli attack, they are groundless.

Z: Yes.

K: And on the other hand, if you are going to attack, they will take extremely strong measures. This is a message I am passing to you from Israel. I want to tell you I have just called the Israeli Minister and I have told him that if Israel attacks first we would take a very serious view of the situation and have told him on behalf of the United States that Israel must not attack, no matter what they think the provocation is.

Now, I would like to ask you, Mr. Foreign Minister, to communicate this to your Government.

Z: I will do that.

K: Urgently. And to ask them on our behalf to show restraint at a time when we are at least beginning to...

Z: I will do this immediately although I am very apprehensive that this is a pretext on the Israeli part.

K: If it is a pretext we will take a strong measure against them.

Z: Thanks for calling, and I will take care of this.

K: All right, Mr. Minister.

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S61

TELCON
Dobrynin/Sec. Kissinger
Saturday, Oct. 6, 1973
6:40 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Where did we get you?

D: At home.

K: Are you in Maryland.

D: I am in the Embassy.

K: We have information from the Israelis that the Arabs and Syrians are planning an attack within the next 6 hours and that your people are evacuating civilians from Damascus and Cairo.

D: Syrians and who?

K: And Egypt are planning and attack within the next 6 hours.

D: Yes.

K: And that your people are evacuating some civilians from Damascus and Cairo.

D: Yes.

K: And they want us to tell all interested parties that if the reason is that you are expecting an Israeli attack -- not you -- there is no intention of any attack.

D: What was the last phrase?

K: They have no intention of attacking.

D: Israelis?

K: Have no intention of attacking, if your motives for attacking are defensive. If there is attack they will react very strongly and violently.

D: Yes.

K: I want to add a United States world to this.

D: They asked you to tell us this?

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Oct. 6, 1973
6:40 a.m.

K: They asked us to tell this. I have just received this message from the Israelis.

D: This is what they said.

K: That is correct.

D: (Unable to hear)

K: The Israelis are telling us that Egypt and Syria are planning an attack very shortly and that your people are evacuating from Damascus and Cairo.

D: Yes.

K: If the reason for your evacuation...

D: For our...

K: Yes. The Soviet evacuation is the fear of an Israeli attack, then the Israelis are asking us to tell you as well as asking us to tell the Arabs.

D: The Israelis?

K: Yes. They have no plans whatever to attack.

D: Yes.

K: But if the Egyptians and Syrians do attack the Israeli response will be extremely strong.

D: Yes.

K: But the Israelis will be prepared to cooperate in an easing of military tension.

D: What?

K; Cooperation in an easing of military tension.

D: Yes

Oct. 6, 1973
6:40 a.m.

K; All right. From us to you. The President believes that you and we have a special responsibility to restrain our respective friends.

D: Yes.

K: We are urging communicating to the Israelis.

D: You?

K: Yes.

D: Communicate to the Israelis?

K: If this keeps up this is going there is going to be a war before you understand my message.

D: I understand. You have communicated with the Arabs and Israelis.

K: Yes and particularly to Israeli warning it against a precipitated move.

D: I understand.

K: And we hope you might do the same thing and use your influence to the greatest extent possible with your friends.

D: Just a minute. This is the end of message.

K: That is right. I would like to tell you as you no doubt -- that this is very important for our relationship that we do not have an explosion in the Middle East right now.

D: What is our relationship?

K: Until an hour ago I did not take it seriously but we have now received an urgent phone call from Jerusalem saying the Israelis believe it will happen within six hours and they are mobilizing.

D: Who? Israelis? Don't you think the Israelis are trying to do something on their own.

Oct. 6, 1973
6:40 a.m.

K: If it is, we are telling them not to do it. I cannot judge it. As of yesterday, our evaluation was that the Egyptians and Syrians were making military preparations but we thought another one of those bluffs. You understand?

D: I understand.

K: As of yesterday, Israelis had made no preparations that we had picked up but as you know they can move fast.

D: I understand and I will transmit this message. I will do it and take all measures necessary.

K: You can assure Moscow we are taking most urgent messages with Israeli.

D: I understand and will do it right away. You are where?

K: I am in New York.

D: Very good. I can reach you.

K: Yes. On Chile -- never mind you had better get your message off.

D: Could we use the...

K: Use the White House. Use the hotline and I will tell Scowscroft.

D: On ordinary phone. The military you will tell.

K: Are you coming to the White House.

D: Could I call through the ordinary phone.

K: Certainly. Can Scowscroft get you on the direct line?

D: Yes.

K: On the line that goes to my office. We will move immediately.

D: Thank you very much.
END

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S62

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Min. Shalev/Sec. Kissinger
Oct. 6, 1973
6:55 a.m.

S: Good morning.

K: How are you?

S: All right.

K: We have a report from Keating that you people are expecting military operations in about six hours.

S: Yes.

K: First of all I must tell you should have come in with your message yesterday. You should not have relied on doing it in Washington when I am here.

S: I did not have it at that time. They told me you would not be able to see me anymore.

K: You must be kidding. Let's not worry about that.

S: Did you not get the message.

K: Yes, but very late at night.

S: We announced fifteen minutes ago that we have taken precautionary measures and instituting alert of the army which includes mobilization of some troops.

K: I want to say the following. We are in touch with the Soviet and the Egyptians uring the utmost restraint. Dobrynin has said they will cooperate with us. We are setting up special communications. We would like to urge you not to take any pre-emptive action because the situation will get very serious if you move.

S: Yes.

K: If you could communicate this.

S: I will do this immediately.

K: We will keep you informed of any responses and of any conversations we have. You stand by your phone.

END.

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S64

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Scowscroft/Sec. Kissinger
Oct. 6, 1973
7:15 a.m.

K: Does Dobrynin have the message in front of him while he is talking.

S: It is on the way out but probably has not reached him yet.

K: Are they actually on the way.

S: Yes. I told them.

K: O.k.

END

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566

TELCON
Yedanov/Sec. Kissinger
Oct. 6, 1973
7:25 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I know the Ambassador is talking to Moscow. I want him to have some information. Make sure he does not get off the line until we are through. We have just been given an assurance by Israel that at our request they would not launch a pre-emptive attack.

Y: Yes. I see.

K: And we would like Moscow to know this and we would like Moscow to use their influence with Egypt and Syria in this same direction.

Y: O.K.

K: We have assurances behind which we stand.

Y: Yes.

K: All right.

Y: Thank you. I will report to the Ambassador.

END

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S 76

TELCON
Scowcroft/Sec. Kissinger
Saturday, Oct. 6, 1973
8:50 am

RELEASED IN FULL

S: Do you want me to send a plane there.

K: Yes. It should have been done. They will have to come up and stand-by.

S: All right.

K: Whoever kept these messages from me have a heavy responsibility. It is not often you can get a war started.

S: Have you talked to the President.

K: Yes. Have you gotten the messages to to Dobrynin.

S: Yes. The messages are with him. There is a WSAG meeting in two minutes.

K: Tell them to stay quiet. Any discussion will be from Key Biscayne or McCloskey. Put the fleet into position;if we want them to move they can move; and find out how long to get them together. What reinforcements are available. Get a plan from Moorer by noon. to see what we can move if this gets out of hand and tell DOD to shut-up about military moves or anything. If they need a presidential order, I will get one for them in writing.

S: Right. I have told DOD and CIA that.

K: CIA is no problem but tell the Chiefs also. From Moorer find out what forces are available for movement throughout the Atlantic and how quickly it could be done.

S: These two carriers probably cannot get the troops back since this is a weekend.

K: Find out by noon how long it will take. Also what additional forces are available. No one is to move anything but they should get ready to move. I would not call troops back until noon. They should get themselves in a position to do it if they get the order.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 03 MAY 2004 200102979

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RELEASED IN FULL

V (573)

Telcon NYC
Minister Shalev (Israel)/ HAK
October 6, 1973; 8:29 a.m.

S: Just had a call from Jerusalem that while _____ was in session news was received that hostilities were opened by the Egyptians and by the Syrians. Apparently mainly by aerial bombardment along the borders.

K: I have had a call from the Egyptians saying you were undertaking naval actions on the Gulf of Suez on the Egyptian side.

S: Well, I don't know about that.

K: It has not in the past been your preferred method of operations.

S: No.

K: It is not how in the past you have started things. What are you doing?

S: I presume we are taking care about that.

K: Again I would like to urge the greatest possible restraint.

S: I think you have assurances from us that we are not going to open, but it looks that they have already opened.

K: Do you know what has happened?

S: No. This whole thing started only 20 minutes ago.

K: Will you please keep me informed?

S: I will do so.

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S75

Telcon NYC
Secretary General (UN) Waldheim/ HAK
October 6, 1973; 8:40 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Mr. Secretary General, I wanted to report to you about some events that have happened this morning that may conceivably get out of control. I received a call at 6 this morning from our Ambassador in Jerusalem that the Israelis believed that an attack by Egypt and Syrian forces was imminent, and since then I have been on the phone with the Israeli Foreign Minister, with the Egyptian Foreign Minister several times to urge maximum restraint on all parties and I have received word from the Israelis that they would not launch preemptive action. The Egyptians called back and said there was an Israeli naval attack taking place in the Gulf of Suez which was not the usual method of Israeli attack. As soon as I hung up from that I received a message from the Israelis that Egyptian and Syrian air attacks were going on all along the fronts. No troops had yet crossed at least. This is what I know as of this moment and I just wanted to talk to you and express our cooperation that we are attempting to establish.

W: Thank you very much.

K: I don't know what action is called for yet. I think we should try to calm the situation as much as possible, but it may get out of hand. What would be helpful if you could contact the Syrians before you contact the Egyptians.

Executive and the Foreign Minister

W: I was sitting next to the Syrian/Minister/ yesterday, but they did not say anything about this.

K: I was sitting next to the Egyptian Foreign Minister yesterday but he did not say anything.

W: I will contact you again if there is anything further.

K: Thank you, and let's stay in touch.

W: Will you stay here?

K: I will stay for another couple of hours.

W: I shall immediately try to contact these two nations, but I don't know whether I shall be able. Thank you very much for your information.

K: Goodbye.

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RELEASED IN FULL

S71

TELCON
Zayat/Sec. Kissinger
Oct. 6, 1973
8:15 a.m.

K; I am getting to be your good friend.

Z: Hope you will stay such.

K: No question about it.

Z: I could not get the President. He is in operation room. I got this following information. At 6:00 this mornign there was some navy units and airplane units -- Israelis took some provocation on the Egyptian borders. We have actually tried to repell them and are doing so.

K: Did they try to cross the Canan?

Z: In the Gulf of Suez; a maritime action supported by planes. This is in our territory. It is far way from the Syrian borders and the Suez Canal. There is a first communique which has been published.

K: Are these Israeli naval units.

Z: He said naval actinn supported by plans. I don't know exactly. I have asked for more information. Apparently this military contact is happening in Egyptian waters in Zafara and Sukhna. Far from the Suez Canal. South of Canal.

K: O.K.

Z: I see from the Israelis here are calling a meeting of For. Ministers.

K: As I told you we will oppose any Israeli offensive action by anyone else.

Z: I got your message.

K: I will work on this immediately. I would urge in the meantime to show restraint as much as possible and to confine any action to the place where it has started.

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TELCON
Oct. 6,
8:15 a.m.

Z: Inside Egypt is a bit difficult.

K: If inside Egypt, of course you will want to repell and we are not urging not to defend your territory but to try to confine and we will get to Israelis immediately. We will set up if you want to we will arrange communications to Cairo if you want to get in touch immediately.

Z: I have told them. What kind of communications?

K: Commander Howe will call you or call one of your assistants and tell you how to have very quick communications.

Z: He should call our Ambassador Meguid.

K: We will contact him and tell him how to get fast communications. Give my warm regards and we will do what we can.

END

* RELEASED IN FULL
S67

TELCON
Zayat/Sec. Kissinger
Oct. 6, 1973
7:35 a.m.

K: Sorry to borther you again. I want to keep you informed. I have had a reply from the Israelis to my request not to initiate any military operations. They have given formal assurance they will not launch attack nor initiate military operations. I want to tell you if they break this promise to us we will take the most serious view.

Z: Thank you. This seems like what happened in 1967. Because Russians were telling us there was a concentration on the frontier.

K: Are the Russians telling of this concentration?

Z: Yesterday someone from the Delegation told us that there was concentration on the Syrian front.

K: That is why we should learn from 1967. We now have an Israeli promis they will not launch a pre-emptive attack and we are giving you all the information we have. We are doing the utmost to get restraint by them.

Z: I am sending this by cable and by phone.

K: If you need any more let us know.

Z: We have good communications.

K: We will tell people to get your calls through immediately.

Z: Thank you.

K: I appreciate the spirit with which you are dealing with us on this. You can be sure we are doing our utmost to prevent a repetition of 1967. If Israel takes pre-emptive attack after this assurance from them we would oppose them.

Z: May I ask how you are contacting. Is Eban here?

K: The Israeli Ambassador in Washington. His communications are better. I am now going to contact Eban. Between you and me connections between the Ambassador and Meir are better than between Eban. We think speed is more important than protocol.

Z: I see.

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TELCON
Oct. 6, 1973
7:35 a.m.

K: We will keep you informed if we learn anything else. We have approached the Soviets.

END.

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S68

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Dobrynin/Sec. Kissinger
Oct. 6, 1973
7:47 a.m.

D: I have talked to Gromyko and I sent your message.

K: Have you seen the messages we gave you.

D: Not yet.

K: Not in your hands?

D: No.

K: If I kill some people and get the bodies to you can you get them out of the city.

D: HA. HA. HA.

K: You got the message we have Israeli assurance no pre-emptive attack.

D: Yes. I already have passed that along.

K: The messages that are coming to you are overtaken by events.

D: I have already passed your message and Scowcrofts to Moscow.

K: So you are up to date. I have talked to the Egyptian For. Min. and passed on the Israeli message to him. I have also told him about the Israeli assurance that there would be no pre-emptive attack and that we will see to it that that is carried out. He told me he would communicate this urgently to Cairo. We have not been in touch with the Syrians. That is the weak point in this situation.

D: I understand.

K: Our influence in Syria is not as good as it is in Jerusalem.

D: I understand.

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TELCON
Oct 6, 1973, 7:47 a, m.

K: You can pass that on to Moscow in case they don't know it. That is about all we have done.

D: All has been done as you have directed me.

K: Accept that we have talked to the Egyptian For. Min. about it.

D: You spoke with him on the telephone.

K: He is in N.Y. We had a good conversation in N.Y. Yesterday we had a friendly meeting but inconclusive. As I told you we I told you, we are not going to play any games. You will be told what we do. You can reassure Moscow on that point.

D: You will be back in Washington.

K: Yes.

D: When in Washington.

K: Tomorrow night unless this gets out of control.

END

S-70

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Howe/Sec. Kissinger
Oct. 6, 1973
7:51 a.m.

K; When I ask you to do something, it must be done that second. We have asked that two messages go to the Soviet Embassy and they have not gotten there yest.

H: I will look into it.

K: Get these people off their behinds. What conceivable reason not to have the s ent there yet.

H: I don't know unless they have to be sanitized.

K: That is a zerox problem as I understand it.

H: I will take care of it.

K: I want them there and in there hands and a report back.

END.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 03 MAY 2004 200102979

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S69

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Shaley/Sec. Kissinger
Oct. 6, 1973
7:45 a.m.

K; We have passed the word to the Soviets that you are not planning any pre-emptive moves, and that we have your assurances. We have certain responsibilities if the Israeli's cave.

S: Yes.

K; We are in facilitating communications with the Egyptians to Cairo. The Soviets have talked to Moscow on some of our lines.

S: What about the Syrians.

K: We have no means of communicating with them. The Soviets will have to do that. I may send someone to the Syrian Embassy.

S: Good. I have passed on the other message. I am at your disposal.

K: Good. You can be certain you will be informed of all we do.

END

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DATE/CASE ID: 13 NOV 2002 200102979

S132 *

TELCON
The President - Secretary Kissinger
October 7, 1973
2:07 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I talked to Dobrynin this morning. He hasn't gotten a message yet. I think if we don't hear by 4:00 we should go ahead anyway and call for a Council meeting for tomorrow. I have talked to Waldheim, Eban, oh I have talked to everybody and its a sort of a kaleidescope. Nobody knows what's...

N: At least calling for a Council meeting shows some action and we still might decide to do nothing tomorrow.

K: .....

N: We don't have to hear from Brezhnev. If we want to change our views, we can change our views.

K: That's right. But its almost inexplicable how a war can go on for two days without the UN even meeting. I think Ziegler should say something like that, that war has been going on for two days, we think there ought to be a Council meeting.

N: Absolutely right.

K: And the US will....

N: Whatever you work out with Ron is fine with me. The war's going on about as it was?

K: Actually the Arabs are fighting much better than expected....

N: Which, the Egyptians or Syrians, or both?

K: Both, actually the Syrians are advancing, the Egyptians are across the Canal....you know yesterday was a Jewish holiday. The Egyptians caught the Israelis unprepared...

N: Like Pearl Harbor isn't it?

K: Right. .....until tomorrow and then introduce the idea of return to pre-case fire line. By tomorrow the Israelis will be reversing the tide.

N: Do you think they will?

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K: By tomorrow they could turn the tide..... work against Israel. If we introduce the idea today the Arabs will claim we are trying to push them back. By Wednesday morning at the latest Israel will be in Arab territory.

N: Do you think they have the stuff to do it. Israel is convinced they can do it despite...

K: I am seeing the Israeli Ambassador who has just returned from Israel, promised to come in about 6:30 to give me the latest....

N: Boy, don't you wish Rabin were there now?

K: Oh, gosh.....

N: He won't know what's ..... Can't you get a message from somebody out there, Moshe Dayan or ....

K: We are in contact with Dyan

.....

K: more tractable.....and that's why we have a difficult tightrope .... not dissoiating in a crisis...

N: I understand, right.

K: That issue hasn't actually come up.

N: Better not to have a situation where you have got a double headed...

K: That would be unmanageable.

N: No, we just couldn't manage it, could we.

K: .....

N: Are you working well togetherover there?

K: Working well. ....you have noticed .....newspapers that as a team, rather than playing ~~against~~ State against the White House.

N: Right. You go ahead and tell Ziegler whatever you want.

K: If there is any message I will get it to you immediately.

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N: You think you will get one from Breshnev?

K: Yes. I'll let you know if there is anything

*
S134

TELCON
Ambassador Dobrynin - Secretary Kissinger
October 7, 1973
3:25 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

D: Received the text. I could read it to you but then I could give to you oral, however you like.

K: What's the essense&

D: This say -- it is a letter from boss to boss -- it is saying about that recollection how question was discussed between them, Minister to minister, saying we are always in favor here to do something but nothing done. We regret very much it bothers you. And thean after.... these things, then it goes like this. It would be possible to say a lot more to this but the main thing now we are warning...is to take urgent effective measures to get rid of the cause of the conflict. With the situation in the Middle East will continue to remain a source of constant danger. It would be very important if there came on the part of the Israelis a statement of its rediness to negotiate. Keeping in mind at the same time the security of the Israelis ..... countries so that area would be guaranteed what is aceeptable for Israel. to the interest of the Israeli people themselves. And if at all possible to seek security of states in a seizure of foreign territoreis as you know Mr. President, we have always exercised restraint....political settlement by the lack of ....
In effect the effectiveness of such a...for the Israelis...claim of the Arabs lands which insures turning point in the dangerous situation in the Middle East, could be the beginning of the process of settlement on the basis of UN decisions. We would like to hope that now when the situation is especially urgent, demands this will use its possibilities for a necessary. .... of Israel in this direction. It goes without saying that we are ready to continue American confidential consultations on the whole Middle East problem. along the lines as we have talked about during meeting with you Mr. President. I would like to underline specifically, we firmly proceed from the premise that the current activities in the Middle East should not ....all the things that have developed ....in American relations. We do not allow even thought to the contrary.

zx Then there is an oral thing that in our recommendation to the Arabs to the Arab leadership I wish to say that ....I do not have that ....will come in further communication.

K: You recognize as non practical possibility in the present situation.

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K: You know as well as I do it doesn't say anything.

D: Explain to you that we ...from Israel not only Egyptian and Syrains take into consideration, UN and Chile where you do the same thing. Decided to make this move without preliminary consultation with Egypt and Syrian government. Without asking their agreement.

K: Well, Anatoly, we will have a critical period this week, it is obvious to me.

D: I hope it will not be crisis.

K: You know yourself we are perfectly prepared to ask Israel after it is over to make acclerated diplomatic moves.

D: Have you seen the statement made by El-Zayyat.

.....

K: That doesn't mean anything either.

D: Saw it on the ticker...

K: OK Anatoly. Could you get it typed up and sent to Gen. Scowcroft

D: Translate it too.

K: Yes and translated, send it to Gen. Scowcroft1

D: Maybe we could manage something direct - you know through your house to another house. There are many things I prefer not to say by telephone, you know.

K: Oh, yes. We can do it easily. Listen, Anatoly, I wanted to ask you. I am making a speech tomorrow night in which I was going to advocate MFN among other things. Frankly may not , have to drop that section from the speech, depanding on developments tomorrow. But let me read what I have written. There's a long defense of it which I won't bother you with, just one point which follows:

Quiet diplomacy has produced results. The tax on immigration is not being collected. We have received assurances it is not being applied, hardship cases submitted to the Soviet government ....the rate of immigration is in the tens of thousands, where it was in 1960

D: OK, why not.

K: Do they want to jeopardize this. I'm not asking you to approve only the part on MFN.

D: In the context.... the part on quiet diplomacy will sound quite good. x

K: Well, if tomorrow we are in a debate in the UN, if ....attacks Israel this doesn't help ....

D: Not about the US. Nothing new in attacks on Israel... same old thing ..... I understand....

K; You know what we decided. We are prepared immediately after the Israeli election to start diplomatic effort. In order to have any chance of success means the present conflict has to be brought to a reasonable conclusion

D: Are the British going to have the Security Council....

K: Well, they haven't asked.

D: I heard Heath and Brandt....

K: They denied it to us.

.....

S136

TELCON
Secretary Schlesinger - Secretary Kissinger
October 7, 1973
3:45 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K; Talked to the President again on this supply thing. He's decided to go ahead.

S: Can't guarantee we can do it without exciting attention.

K: We did it in '67. We would like them to pick it up.

S: Are you willing to use US aircraft?

K: No, they are coming here.

S: I've got a scheme. Tell you about it later at the meeting.

K: We would like them to pick it up.

S: Well, I want to talk to you about that, when we get over there.

K: I have had to shift the meeting to 6:00. I had an effective turn-down from the Soviets. Only way now to get resolution is to let Israel get back to the cease-fire line without our help and then get negotiations going afterwards. If we force them back to the cease-fire line now we will make points with the Arabs, rescue them from the Israelis.

K: Can you have a separate meeting, you, Brent and I?

S: Sure. We have some alternatives to present to you.

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DATE/CASE ID: 04 MAY 2004 200102979

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S135

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Ron Ziegler - The Secretary
October 7, 1973
4:15 p. m.

K: Sure you want to talk to me? . . . you insist on dealing with McCloskey now.

Z: Don't want to bother you

K: He's right here, he want to give you some instructions.

Z: Thanks alot.

K: Are you going at 5:00

Z: Yah. Not right on the nose, but around that time. 5 is about right, or 5 mintues on either side, all right?

K: Don't go before 5 because we have . . .

Z: Okay, 5 or shortly after.

K: Let me read to you, it's very simple: At the President's direction, the Secretary of State has been in extensive consultation yesterday and today, with the fighting in the Middle East still continuing. The President has now instructed the Secretary to take the matter to the UN and to request a meeting of the Security Council. Now, if you get a question ~~ox~~ when will that meeting of the Security Council take place, we are now consulting other members as to the best time. If you on guidance want to say tomorrow, ok, but don't want to look like we are delaying
Z: it overnight. Not going to get in a lot of trouble. . . no one else wants it. Say Amb. Scali now consulting, effort would be to get a cease fire.

K: No, shouldn't go into that becuase its a big issue - the cease fire and return to the previous lines before fighting started. Don't mention cease fire without returning to preiouvs lines. Don't want to tie the President to. . .

Z: What I would like to do ~~xxxx~~ is have Jerry, say the White House down here say you have been in constant contact with the President as you were yesterday.

K: Two or three times a day.

Z: Then give to the press what you just gave me and say Bob McCloskey at State can give further details.

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K: Perfect. Then

Z: Then Bob, who is there with you can

K: Bob will brief after the WSAG, or at least after you have ....

Z: Is McCloskey there now?

K: I will put him on, just a seoond

Z: ....defers any question toyou

M: That will be fine. You can't handle the cease fire return to previous lines you will have to start from the origian...with the press in Miami Beach

Z: Okay, is Henry stil there. You know we are coming back at 7:30

K: Leaving at 7:30&

Z: Right home by about 10. You know, the departure, combined with this announcement will hyper this quite a bit.
KX
K: Not so eager to have that. Don't make any impresssion. Will come down now and drive for solution, only I will expalin when you get back. Don't want to discuss it on the phone.

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S133

TELCON

RELEASED IN FULL

General Haig - Secretary Kissinger
October 7, 1973
3:10 p. m.

K: I am beginning to think those sons of bitches in Moscow are schnookering us. I think we should go at 5:00.

H: Yes, we can do it at 5:00. We're not going to be leaving until 7:30 so they can do it.

K: I have to make some phone calls. Get Ziegler positioned for it.

H: I told him to get in touch with McCloskey.

K: No, get in touch with me. Has to call me for the language McCloskey doesn't know beans about the substance.

H: I told him to make a simple statement. I will have him call though.

K: We are getting frantic appeals for Sidewinders ~~and~~X from the Israelis and the Defense Department is giving them the run around.

H: You can tell them the President said to do it.

K: The idea was to have the stuff delivered to an air base and have them come out in El Al and pick them up. This is money in the bank. Now whatever happens in negotiations, if the Arabs come out ahead they will be totally unmanageable. This way, if we don't help them they won't come out ahead and we will wind up with nothing.

H: I've discussed it with the President and he is in full agreement.

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S131

TELCON
Secretary Schesinger - Secretary Kissinger
October 7, 1973
1:30 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I have been talking to the President all morning on where we stand. We have had another very urgent request from the Israelis for some ammunition and various items from that list, including 40 Phantoms which of course is out of the question, but the President's inclination is that if the Israelis will be able to pick it up, to give them some other stuff, laying claim for diplomatic....

S: They are most interested in sidewinders at the moment, Henry.

K: Do you think you could handle it at defense so that it doesn't leak?

S: I think we can do it.

K: We did it in '67.

S: They have indicated they would pick it up, and not have to get our transport involved.

K: Could you let me know by the time of the WSAG?

S: Yes, sir.

K: Perhaps you could go through the list of things you think we could give them.

S: Sidewinders are what they are most interested in now, in fact they are sort of quietly desperate about that.

K: They have made three separate appeals to the President now. They say their losses have been very heavy.

S: Well, their aircraft losses have been substantial because of the SAMs. There is something very peculiar about the Egyptian front. They seem to want Egypt to come in.... Egyptians didn't move their forces heavily across the Canal last night. The Israelis seem to be lying back. The forces they moved across were relatively small. The Syrian front is much more problematical. In both cases they may be .... subtle game of attempting this time to show they really are vulnerable in view of the feeling around the world that they are just bullies.

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K: We intend to get paid for whatever support we give them now. Don't want to have screams ... could get the Jewish community to think ... support now makes it a little harder to scream in six weeks.

S: They can too.

K: They will do it, too. I'm not so worried about the Jewish community.
.....

S: The fact that they have been deterred from pre-empting may lead them to hold back in response just to gain sympathy, to show they have made themselves vulnerable.

K: I don't think that's what they are doing. I think they really were surprised this time.

S: Then why haven't they moved in vigorously in the South?

K: Well, I don't know.... OK, goodbye.

S137 *

TELCON:
Ron Zeigler - Secretary Kissinger
October 7, 1973
4:20

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Very much want to avoid coupling the Presiden't departure from this announcement. Whatever headline you get, you will pay the price for Tuesday or Wednesday.

Z: Don't want to....

K: Separate it...disconnect it

Z: Just want you to know its absolutely impossible to convince them

K: If you hyper it, you will pay the price. The strategy here is to slow things down.

Z: I only raised it because I wanted to point out that its going to very difficult to keep the press from interlocking.

K: Why don't you just step back on the plane, and give an account during the day, that I talked to the President several times.... What time did you announce the President's departure?

Z: Announced two hours ago.

K: Oh, well, that's pretty good. You can say at 4:00 he decided after first reviewing the situation with me, to move to the Council

Z: Right, we'll say this decision for a meeting was made at 4:00 and what I would like to do is to say that Mr. McCloskey at the St. Department can give details.

K: If you follow the announcement of his departure with announcement of the Council meeting, we will really be in trouble.

Z: The reason I raised it before, but they will combine them even so, the meeting and his returning

K: Well, just keep it slow and keep it calm.

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5125*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON 10:~~20~~ 15 a. m. October 7, 1973

Secretary Kissinger/Amb. Dobrynin

D. Good morning, Henry. I hope you slept well.

K. I slept very well, thank you.

D. Ihave just received a telegram stating that in about two hours I will be getting a message for the President. I don't know what is in it. I will transmit it to you. This is for your information.

K. Thank you very much.

mj

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 04 MAY 2004 200102979

S127

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Haig/Secretary Kissinger
October 7, 1973
12:35 pm

K: Let me tell you where matters now stand. The Egyptians have told the British -- he didn't want a Security Council meeting but if one were held...and that suggests...we will be totally alone in our.. My suggestion is we hold our announcement til 4:00 this afternoon. No since forcing a vote and getting all stirred up. No since rushing in and getting nothing out of it. By Wednesday or Thursday, it is my thinking it will be over...so UN can contribute to situation as it exists. With the Israelis and the Arabs not yet wanting a meeting, I think we should hold off til about 4:00 this afternoon.

H: Yeah, I think that's fine.

K: We'll say we're prepared...tomorrow morning or tonight. Might be better to have informal consultations tonight. We haven't heard from the Soviets yet but will soon.

H: I agree with you. He is comfortable. Knows it will be short and he doesn't want to go up there and get licked.

K: Right. Now all we will get is a cease-fire but should..get a position to handle the after period. The Arabs want to get me into this.

H: Good, Henry. I think this is alright. We'll hold til around 4:00 I'll get back to you on the Soviet thing.

K: You're reachable within the next hour.

H: Oh yes, I'm right here.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 04 MAY 2004 200102979

S 129

TELECON
Secretary General Waldheim/Kissinger
October 7, 1973
12:55 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

W: Good Morning.

K: How are you.

W: Worried and busy. I wonder if you can tell me about your affairs and decisions?

K: I was going to call you. We have been exchangeing thought with the Soviets to see what could be done. The Soviets are not willing to do very much.

W: My impressions to. Most of the members are. . . . not having a Security Council today.

K: What worries me is here is a major military conflict and if the Security Council can't meet what is it for.

W: This is why I thought I should ring you up. We can explain it to our experts but what do we say to the public. .

K: We are expecting a communication from the Soviets. I would like to call you around 4:00 and see about moving the Security Council.

W: Good

K: We could ask for it tomorrow morning.

W: Then we could avoid debate on the General Assembly under the rules of procedure the G. A. can't meet on it if the Security Council is meeting. .

K: Zayat told me he wasn't that insistent.

W: If there is a meeting of the Security Council easier to avoide debate in the General Assembly especially if Zayat doesn't want to speak.

K: If you can use your influence with the President to keep Middle East debate from breaking open into an inflamatory. . . (They were disconnected and the call was placed again.)

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K: You haven't had any requested from anyone else to do anything.

W: I just got a report that West German and Britian have called immediately for a Security Council meeting. By chance I had the British Ambassador here when it came in. I am trying to verify the matter.

K: We should stay in touch. We are prepared as soon as possible . . we get the other communication. I will be helpful if you use your influence to keep the debate out of the General Assembly. We will call for a Security Council meeting tomorrow.

W: We'll be able to clarify the West Germany and British move. I don't know if this is true. Thank you very much. I'll keep you informed.

K: Are you reachable.? I will call you. no later than 4:00.

W: Good, Mr. Secretary.

K: Goodbye Mr. Secretary General

END

*
S 128

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Kissinger
October 7, 1973
12:40

RELEASED IN FULL

D: I'm really nailed down. I'm still waiting for a message.

K: I think you should tell Gromyko that I'm so used to his customary precision that this worries me.

D: I will.

K: We've been holding up doing anything til we've heard from you. I've talked to Key Biscayne but that can be managed. I want to say as a friend of yours if you make a unilateral move... we've made no move. I am trying to protect ourselves against moves that may not take factors into account.

D: I am waiting for this message. I don't know what it involves.

K: Now its 10:00 in Moscow.

D: They are in _____

K: Are they still there in ___. Is this good for the boys with a Middle East crisis?

D: (Laughter) Good for them. I am sitting and waiting.

K: We'll wait a little longer. You let me know. Call me by telephone and tell me its coming. I have no reason... if in your judgment there is any chance this could put my considerations to my contacts.

D: I sill advide Gromyko and tell him.

K: OK. We'll be in touch.

D: There is nothing specific.

K: We are waiting for you message. We are holding off the British until we hear from you. We don't want to talke with them til we hear from you.

D: OK, I will call you even before the translation.

K: Good.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 14 NOV 2002 200102979

S126

TELECON 10:40 a. m. Oct. 7, 1973

RELEASED IN FULL

Secretary/Senator Percy

P. I spoke to Gen. Gowon in New York. I have had a very friendly relationship / with him stemming from the trip you sent me on a couple of years ago. I wanted to determine his attitude. He has a very constructive attitude. He thinks we should think of our major goals. He likes the President's statement on Africa. It only needs implementation. He would respond favorably to a future visit -- a State visit or whatever. He is distressed by the newspaper comments that did not take into account the President's heavy schedule. He has a good feeling toward you and General Haig. I think a phone call by you or the President . . he's in his room now.

K. Would he take a call from me?

P. He spoke very favorably and friendly when I asked if he had seen you. He is an absolutely stupendous person and a future force in Africa. I think a phone call . . . he will certainly take a call from you. He took my call.

K. I see.

P. I recommend a phone call from the President. Then if he accepts a chance to come back . . . The demogogues will call this thing anti-Black.

K. We offered to have him at Key Biscayne.

P. I told him my original appointment was the same day as his and I know it was cancelled also. The time offered for Key Biscayne was Friday afternoon between the Secretary General's lunch and the Foreign Policy Association in the evening. There was no possibility in two hours and forty minutes . . to fly down and get back. The others I can't explain. I'm not trying to excuse him at all. He won't try to make anything out of this. His number is 212-355-3000, it's the Waldorf, extension 2647 or 2645. He will pick up the phone himself.

K. Nice to talk to you. Somebody will call him.

mj

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 04 MAY 2004 200102979

S 126 A *

TELECON, 11:20 a.m. Oct. 7, 1973

Secretary/Senator Griffin

G. I have to go on Meet the Press at 12:00. Do you have any guidance you can give me on the Middle East?

K. For your guidance--but don't use it--the Israelis aren't doing so well. Nobody is being active at the UN--the Arabs because they think they are winning and the Israelis because they think they're losing.

G. There's been some talk of a Security Council meeting tonight.

K. We might do that but I wouldn't nail myself to that at all becasue we haven't heard from the Soviets. You can say we're very active. We have been talking to the Russians, the Israelis, the British, the Egyptians . . There is a good chance we'll go to the Security Council either tonight or early tomorrow.

G. The military situation . . .

K. Well, the Israelis have not fully mobilized yet. You can say your impression is that ~~xxx~~ it is clear the Arabs attacked.

G. OK. There's a UN report that says that. I think it will be helpful and I will be very careful. I might say I talked with you this morning.

K. You can say that and you can say you favor some kind of UN action.

mj

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
(✓) Release ( ) Excise ( ) Deny ( ) Declassify
Date 12/12/07 Exemption

*
(S 130)

TELECON
Eban/Kissinger
October 7, 1973
1:15 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

E: The best way to proceed is the way you suggested yesterday.

K: We will probably proceed later this afternoon.

E: I had a report that Heath and Brandt will convene...

K: I just talked to Waldheim who gave me the same report. We are thinking we should table the resolution today and ask for a meeting in the morning. I have to wait a few hours til I can get to the President. We ..proceeding on discussion we had earlier today.

E: I think the urgent thing is a public decision by the US to convene the Council. Trouble about tabling the resolution is you don't get in you won't have priority.

K: But if we call a meeting we will have priority.

E: Yes. I get the impression that in the last few hours the military situation has improved. Attacks on bridgeheads have succeeded.

K: Yes

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 04 MAY 2004 200102979

S123 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON 9:35 a. m. 10/7/73

Secretary/General Haig

K. Where are you?

H. In my room, about to go to see the boss.

K. We haven't heard from the Soviets. I think around noon Zeigler ought to say we are going to the Security Council. Before it's done check again. We have next to no support. On the other hand the Arabs are doing better than anyone thought possible. I have just talked to the Israelis. They will need until Wednesday or Thursday. They are not all that eager for a Security Council mtg. In fact, nobody is--the Israelis, the Soviets, the Egyptians, the British. On the other hand I think we can have a low-key meeting. For the Security Council to do nothing while fighting goes on is absolutely intolerable and I think we have to go ahead. We should seek return to the status quo ante.

H. Yes -

K. If we go we must ask for return -- the Israelis will never forgive us for a straight ceasefire and they'd never observe it anyway.

H. It's going to be tough if we are all alone.

K. On the other hand, a simple ceasefire request would make it seem that we have turned against the Israelis and this would have incalcuable domestic consequences . . and international ones too, and we would have changed our position of yesterday.

H. Are the Israelis panicking?

K. They are almost . . they are anxious to get some equipment which has been approved and which some SOB in Defense held up which I didn't know about. I think myself we should release some of it.

H. I think so, too.

K. I think if the Arabs win they will be impossible and there will be no negotiations. A change would be ascribed to our own domestic crisis.

H. Right, I agree. I think we have got to stand by principle.
We'll have to provide the stuff we have been committee to unless they can stabilize this thing quickly -- two or three days.

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K. That's what they think. If we don't move today somebody will move with a simple ceasefire resolution.

H. On our return --I though we should go back normally tonight.

K. I think you should come back tonight. That's when you were coming back anyway?

H. We had planned to come back tomorrow night.

K. I think it would have ginned (?) things up too much if you had come back last night.

H. If you need anything . . .

K. If Zeigler makes the statement, that's enough. They have been in touch with me and . . . check with me again because I might have heard from the Soviets.

H. Anything else the boss should know, Henry?

K. No, those are the main things.

H. Interesting report. The Israelis are shocked by the confidence of the Arabs.

K. Yet, that's right.

H. This might make easier negotiations.

K. Depends on how we conduct ourselves. We must be on their side now so that they have something to lose afterwards. Therefore I think we have to give the equipment.

H. What are we talking about, ammunition and spares?

K. Let me see, I have it here. (reads from list) What we can do is send those which have already been approved.

H. Do we airlift them.

K. We don't have to do anything. They are sending a plane over and we could do it on the ground that they were picking up things they had already ordered. My profound conviction is that if we play this the hardway, its the last time they're going to listen. If we kick them in the teeth they have nothing to lose. Later if we support them they would be willing to help with Jewish emigration or MFN or other stuff.

H. Will be in touch before noon.

K. Have Zeigler read the announcement to me.

*
(S147)

TELCON
Senator Mansfield - Secretary Kissinger
October 7, 1973
8:15 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I just called you earlier in the day to tell you what we had decided to do. Now, we have already taken it to the Security Council. We have been in consultation all day with the British, Israelis, Arabs and we think conditions are right now to start discussions in....

M: What's the attitude of the Russians?

K: Their attitude.. My impression quite honestly is that they were taken aback by what the Arabs did this time. This is confidential information, but they have informed us they pulled out all advisors against the wishes of the countries before the fighting began.

M: Since the fighting broke out?

K: Before the fighting broke out, they knew about it about two days in advance. So, there are no Russians involved.

M: That's good. The position we are going to take tomorrow is to request a return to the situation to what it was before the fighting started. Our estimate is with the Israelis succeeding, now that will look increasingly attractive.

M: Right down the middle?

K: Exactly. We will keep you informed if anything else happens.

M: Good, thank you Henry.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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S149

TELECON, 10:18, October 7, 1973

RELEASED IN FULL

The President/Secretary Kissinger

K. I just wanted to tell you we have had a call from Dobrynin that a message from Brezhnev to you is coming through in the next two hours so I think we should hold this thing up until we get this message. I know this might be impatient-making . .

P. It what?

K. I know that these delays are difficult but the problem is we may end up with no support at all.

P. We can't do that.

K. I think we should make a record that we have been very active before we go to the Security Council and not get totally isolated. It is best to know where the cards lie. I think we can wait even if we take some flak. If we can see this through we have a major platform

P. We'll have to do that. With Brezhnev I don't think we will learn anything.

K. . . . Somebody on the Arab side will put in a simple ceasefire resolution. It will be the India/Pakistan thing all over again. We're going to be in a hell of a position in vetoing or voting against a simple ceasefire. We had a message saying they will have their equipment by Wednesday or Thursday but they will not accept a ceasefire before they have thrown them out. My view is that if we can not break ranks during this crisis we can really do it afterwards because then they will have something to lose.

P. One thing that we have to have in the back of our minds is we don't want to be so pro-Israel that the oil states--the Arabs that are not involved in the fighting will break ranks.

K. So far we haven't done anything.

P. You are keeping Scali informed?

K. Yes.

P. PR is terribly important. Even if we don't do anything... Let Scali go out... he can do a lot and prattle and cause no problem.

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K. We held a meeting of 4 Perm Reps and some others to . .

P. You keep one step removed . . we can use you for the power punch.

K. I recommend that you announce that you have asked for a meeting of the Security Council as soon as we have the Soviet message. I have told Dobrynin that we are not hell bent on a Security Council meeting --- that if the Soviets made a proposal where we could settle outside the Security Council, we would consider it. I called the Egyptian Foreign Minister last night. Some of our oil people in this country are

(not finished)

S152

TELECON
Ambassador Dinnitz/Secretary Kissinger
October 7, 1973
11:20 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

.....

D: I have one or two items I thought I should call to your attention. The Soviets are definitely involved in the Syrian operation. We know of a number of advisers in a regiment as well as in the brigade. In one case, although the adviser not one of.. took charge of brigade and commanded (perhaps at his own initiative) it. I thought that should be brought to your attention.

K: I will make a strong protest to Dobrynin in the morning.

D: We have taken Kenetik (sp. ?) back. The third item is that so far we've lost 35 planes.

K: Of what type?

D: I don't have the breakdown, but mostly skyhawk.

K:

D: I have another item. After I talked to you our people went to make the arrangements. They had difficulty with ..... Where we had a plane ready to take the... they wouldn't let the plane land at any of the airbases.

K: That's nonsense. We had it all arranged.

D: ....we hire an American plane and fly it to Israel... to land one of our planes there and pick it up.

K: Oh, those God Damn idiots.

D: Should we do anything?

K: Its awfully late if you want to do it tonight.

D: Our boys are now working on chartering a plane to fly to Israel. If get decision reversed...

K: Why don't ;ou keep the plane here for some of the ammunition tomorrow.

D: Alright. Our boys will work on the charter.

K: Good

END

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DATE/CASE ID: 14 NOV 2002 200102979

S 150 *

TELCON
John Lindsay/Secy Kissinger
7:10 p.m., October 7, 1973

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello, John.

L: Mayor Lindsay calling.

K: Yes, how are you?

L: I think that the Arab Ambassador here is hysterical.

K: (laughs) Not the Ambassador, it's the Foreign Minister.

L: Whoever it is that was calling.

K: He told me he didn't care about his life but the lives of so many innocent people.

L: Well, there's 6,000 people demonstrating. It is well under control. The action is all moved down to the courts because our police arrested a whole mess of people, both JDLs and Arabs. So the crowd has moved down to the Courthouse where they're all in the can at the moment. They're arrested anyway.

K: Okay.

L: We believe it is well under control. We've got almost 1,000 cops on. I'll be glad to send the bill for overtime to the State Department.

K: Oh, control your enthusiasm.

L: I think it's all right. If there's any developments that changes, I'll of course call you.

K: Many thanks.

L: I've been in touch with Scali and I've just got off the phone with Waldheim. So I think they're reasonably calm at the moment.

K: Many thanks.

L: And we'll be alert all through the night and all day tomorrow.

K: Good.

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L: I'm supposed to be at a reception a little bit later tonight where you're supposed to be.

K: Oh, at Molly Parnis'.

L: Molly Parnis.

K: Yeah, I was going to be there but I had to come back to Washington because of this war.

L: Of course.

K: No, I'm sorry to miss you.

L: We'll look forward to seeing you again.

K: That would be nice.

L: I'll keep you posted.

K: Thank you. It was nice of you to come the other day.

L: I was delighted to be there. It was a lovely party.

K: Thank you.

L: Lots of luck to you.

K: Thank you.

*

(5148)

TELCON
B/ G Scowcroft - Secretary Kissinger
October 7, 1973
8:20 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

S: at the White House around 8...you want your reading glasses over there though.

K: Israelis say they desperately need anti-tank ammunition and electronic ...that's all they insist on. Could we get them that tomorrow?

S: Anti-tank and electronic.. I'll put Defense on it.

K: Will you call me with the other stuff.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 04 MAY 2004 200102979

S146*

TELCON
Zayyat/HAK
10/7/73 - 6:20 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

Z: Hello.

K: Mr. Foreign Minister.

Z: Yes, Mr. Kissinger. Sorry to call you on such a small matter.

K: Not at all.

Z: But we have demonstrations here in front of our Mission, breaking all the windows and it is not important if it is only our lives, but we have all the Foreign Ministers of other countries and they will be...

K: No, no, no, it is inexcusable. On behalf of the U.S. Government let me apologize to you.

Z: Well, it's not a question of apologies, it's a question of...

K: It is under the jurisdiction of the New York police. We will take immediate steps.

Z: I know, but we don't care if it is under the New York jurisdiction or the San Francisco jurisdiction...

K: No, no, Mr. Foreign Minister, we will take immediate steps.

Z: Alright. Thank you very much.

K: Immediately.

Z: Thank you.

K: Thank you.

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S138

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Cromer/Kissinger
October 7, 1973
4:25

K: I 've been talking to the President and we are going to ask for a Security Council meeting

C: For today?

K: No. We'll propose it for tomorrow and we'll not break our backs getting a resolution quickly. We will lean towards a resolution along the lines I described to you.

C: yes, s; mething about stately pace.

K: Stately pace is right. I think by Tuesday a de facto situation may have resumed.

C: Very likely.

K: We will be glad to drop that part of what we disagree on. . we will keep it if the de facto situation turns against the Arabs. .. Perhaps not oppose it too violently.. greater use to obfuscate..

C: I see.

K: If I could figure out something we could table and if your man could cooperate with us in keeping discussion going .. on the next day we could go over to your side of de factor situation . . or you go to our side of it.. against the Arabs. By Thursday, can be a totally new situation.

C: Right

K: All this of course is only for the Prime Minister or Foreign Minister.

C: Yes. I'll have to talk to Maitland. We are motivated that its ethically more correct and the Arab world will take offense the other way.

K: I understand your points very well. more problem... is that the Arabs will take a licking

C: yes.

K: If that's the case then the problem of our representative cooperating so he doesn't draw the issue . . . that quickly. That gives both the greater possibility.

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C: Do you think the other members of the Security Council will come along.?

K: How can they refuse? .... a messy debate. A dangerous precedent to have a war going on for 48 hours and for the Security Council not to be seized with it.

C: Quite. I agree with you. Have the Russians expressed a point of view?

K: They havepromised to concentrate criticism on Israel and not on us.

C: Won't they try to stir up the debate?

K: I don't object if they draw it out. That doesn't bother us right not, isn't that what I understood you to say yesterday?

C: oh, yes...

K: a discussion going.. and a framework. the idea of stopping the Arabs is not going to be our problem on Wednesday. .. this is really..

C: I agree entirely.

K: If we wait until Israel has won and then come out.. we're in trouble.

C: I agree. I'll get on to London then.

K: We can count on tactics being supported.

C: Yes

K: Good, thank you.

*

S139

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Dobrynin/Kissinger
October 7, 1973
4:40 pm

.....

K: Where is your grandaughter?.

D:...

K: You're going all the way down there tonight? Are you planning an attack tonight.

D: You watch from 5-11.

K: Anatoyl, I wanted you to know what the President has decided to do. We'll announce at 5:00 we are asking for a S. C. meeting.

D: When are you announcing?

K: In about 45 minutes, it shouldn't be on the TASS tickers before that. We haven't yet decided whether we will propose a resolution or what it will be. It may be just a discussion. But we don't see how we can avoid asking for a session. I think its useful . . . keep the principle we discussed yesterday and we keep calm with each other. If your Ambassador conducts himself the same way we will get through the day. I'll let you know in the morning... we're not going to table a resolution tonight even if we table one tomorrow -- we can discuss. I will let you know a couple of hours before we do it.

D: alright.

K: The President comes back tonight and I will have a change to talke with him. I understand your view....a certain lapse in events that may overtake our discussion.

D: Alright.

K: That's why we're not tabling anything. That gives us several hours to decide what to do.

D: We can ask for instructions from the government.

K: We are not going to push you and if you don't push us.

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D: no, no.

K: Right now we must get the Security Council to . . . All the best the best to your grandaughter and tell ____ that next time he won't be treated so nicely.

D: OK. goodbye.

UNCLASSIFIED [7 Oct 73?]

S 141

TELECON
Waldheim/Kissinger
4:50 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Mr. Secretary General

W: Good afternoon.

K: I have just completed several conversations with the President. We're going to announce that we will ask for a meeting of the Security Council probably for tomorrow. We've not yet decided to put forth a resoltuion or just a general discussion. We will be prepared to have informal consultations tonight. .. major reason is the argument you made to me earlier with respect to the impact of a war going on for 48 hours without anyone doing anything .

W: Thank you very much. This is the right approach. Whatever the outcome of the meeting should be, I think it will show the UN that at least we are trying.

K: Our ... will be non-inflamatory and low-key.

S: good.

K: It will not turn into a propaganda battle.

W: We can continue consultations even with debate g;ing on.

K: Of course, dangerous to substitute bilateral consultation for Security Council consultations.

W: I agree completely. As far as the General Assembly, neither Egypt or Syria wants debate in the General Assembly. What is agreed is that before the beginning of the debate :. Egypt and Syria and if Israel wants -- the three delegations. . make informal statements. Agreed that nobody else should speak so then after these 3 or 4 statements, general debate would continue.

K: Very constructive approach. That means the Security Counc l meeting will be in the afternoon.

W: I assume the President would have to contact Egypt and Syria again.

K: .....the information statement would not block it. quite acceptable to us.

W: After your announcement I would discuss procedures with the President and 3 delegated.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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K: If you call me I would appreciate some information.

W: . . . yet to be clarified. I assume the President will have to contact. . . of course I wish to keep close contact. . . . when do you expect to make the formal request.

K: in the nest 45 minutes to an hour.

W: OK . I will wait til the formal request comes. will then contact the President as to whether they want to speak in the General Assembly or address the Security Council.

K: Or they can do both.

W: Exactly.

K: Thank you

W: Thank you.

END

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S143

TELECON
Fulbright/Kissinger
October 7, 1973
5:00 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I wanted to tell you that we will be asking in the next half hour for a meeting of the Security Council, probably in the morning.

F: UMhum.

K: And that this will then seize the UN with it. We have also talked with the Secretary General and others this afternoon. I think we have it worked out so we won't have debate in the General Assembly.

F: Good. And is the Secretary General agreeable.

K: Well, that isn't so clear yet. I think there will be in particular, a non-contentious spirit toward the US.

F: I think that sounds hopeful. Any new developments on the war front?

K: It's night now.

F: What about tomorrow night? Are you going to..

K: I'll be up there. You have got a set up. I haven't been able to work on the speech. You've got me tied down to a lousy text.

F: Don't get a text.

K: Moreover, you're going to speak second. No idea what I'm doing.

F: You can do better without a speech. You're going to come?

K: I'll come. I'll get through it.

F: I'm not a bit worried.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 14 NOV 2002 200102979

S144 *

TELECON
Aiken/Kissinger
October 7, 1973
5:05 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

A: Things any better?

K: I think that by the end of this week this will be behind us. We are going to ask for a meeting of the Security Council tomorrow.

A: You'll ask for one tomorrow?

K: Yes and to have informal consultations tonight.

A: I see. You say the Russians were tolerant.

K: Russians are confused and wasting time. Maybe they don't know what they are going to do.

A: That's possible that they don't. Too bad we had this three-day holiday all at once and Yom Kippur on top of it all. These things always happen, like the seventh of December.

K: Yes , that's right always on a weekend.

A: I have had a feeling that you are going to do alright.

K: I think we'll calm it down.

A: On of the press called me last night and said you said you called Mike and me. If you said you had, of course you had. I have got a feeling, though, you are going to come out of this, maybe looking better than you did before.

K: I think in the long term we can use this.

A: Russiand withdraw from Egypt?

K: They pulled out all their advisers. They expected something was coming but they didn't want to get involved.

A: I think you're doing it just right..

END

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S142

TELCON
Foreign Minister El-Zayyat - Secretary Kissinger
October 7, 1973
4:55 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Television star here. I can't retaliate. If you put me on Egyptian radio, no one would understand me, what I was saying.

Z: Of course of course, but if you came to my country....

K: I hope to be able to come...

Z: Have you got.....letter ?

K: Was it substantive or personal?

Z: I think it's important.. It speaks about our continual searching for peace.

K: Oh, that's very constructive and I am delighted. You can be sure we will respond in a positive way. I want to tell you what we are planning to do. .....way you have handled the situation. As I understand, you will make a statement but not ask for debate....very much in the spirit of our conversation.

Z: Of course, well I promised you that...

K: We are going to ask in the next hour for a Security Council meeting tomorrow. We have not really made up our mind whether we will come forward with a resolution, ...thought it not possible not to have key discussion in the UN. Our.... will be the same, as it will be low key and decided to permit constructive ..... conditions of our relationship. Only reason I wanted to explain to you that we are doing it as a matter of principal of not having a war go on which isn't even discussed in the UN. We will conduct the debate on our side without criticism of any country. We haven't yet decided yet whether we will put forward a resolution. If we do I will let you know. .....

Z: This would be very embarrassing.

K: I understand that and ....we will take a new look at the situation.

Z: Of course, our reaction would be ....to object... you understand we cannot. ...

K: We are not asking for support. I assure you, thought, that whatever happens tactically in the next week, our strategy will be the one I

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discussed with you.. continuing the atmosphere from our side....

Z: ....get the letter....

K; Certainly, when I get the letter I may call you after I have seen it.

S140 *

TELECON
Scali/Kissinger
October 7, 1973
4:45 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: John, how are you.? Where are you?

S: I'm fine. I'm in my office.

K: Where we now stand is the President is going to announce that we are asking for a meeting of the Security Council. We are going to ask for it tomorrow morning. I have explained the strategy to Popper and he will call you.. but the main thing is to delay as long as possible to obfuscate the situation. I have told the British what are general line is and they have sworn they will cooperate without question and keep it open. If the situation is restored the second part of our thinking .. become moot. You are not to indicate that we're to table a resolution. Just ask for the meeting.

S: alright.

K: Let them guess. Our primary purpose is to beat the Assembly. David will call you and give you the details.

S: alright.

K: Major thing is to not do too much too fast.

S: Very good, Henry.

END

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S145 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Foreign Minister Abba Eban - Secretary Kissinger
October 7, 1973
5:08 p. m.

K: Good afternoon. We have now decided to go ahead long the lines we discussed earlier. Therefore, you mustn't do anything .... The President.., not the President himself but Key Biscayne, is going to announce that we will ask for a meeting of the Security Council. We will then, around 5:30, ask the President of the Security Council for a meeting tomorrow. We will let it go at that for tonight. We will not indicate today whether we will table a resolution or what it will be. Don't want to get too much ....generated. We will table a resolution along , this is for your private information, lines we discussed. I understand you will have to speak before the Council.

E: I will have to speak very early.

K: At the Council...we will count on your elequence... and in this case wouldn't mind if you sacrificed eloquence to length.

E: Oh, yes, I agree it often happens in inverse relation. I'll just say we want..... cease fire in full.

K: Not necessary for you to make any proposal as long as you discuss the situation in great detail.

E: ..... saying Egypt and Syria encroached on us and not us on them. I assure you we are keeping an eye on other Western Europeans, presume you are doing so as well.

.....

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(S 124)

TELECON 10:00 a. m. Octo 7, 1973
Secretary Kissinger/ Foreign Minister Eban

RELEASED IN FULL

E. I have two things to add to what Shalev told you. You will be getting a military roundup very soon. I have had some telephone talks ... the night was not particularly good. More forces were sent over.

K. You're talking about Sinai?

E. I'm talking about Sinai but even in the north there was further penetration there, in the Herman area. Our garrison fell at Mt. Herman. We're not at full capability because of the special circumstances of yesterday. You'll get the military reports and I think they will reinforce the conclusions in the message.

K. I have just discussed it with my colleagues--not the message but the general strategy.

E. I understand you're asking for a special Security Council meeting tonight to pre-empt . . .

K. Yes, to pre-empt somebody else introducing a straight ceasefire resolution.

E. You could ask for a meeting and table a resolution tonight. Then ask for discussion tomorrow.

K. Well, if that can be done. Our judgment is that we need a platform on which to stand.

E. I have just been given a radio report that Britian had received instructions to call for a meeting. Perhaps you can have a word with them telling them not to hurry . . If you could ask your Ambassador to be in touch we could go over it.

K. We haven't given him instructions. Let me check with the British about whether they are going to proceed. I can't believe they are going to proceed without checking with us.

E. You could make two points (a) you will ask for a meeting (b) it's your opinion that is all it requires. That will have pre-emptive effect and gain time. The full military report will reach you and will reinforce the conclusions in the message. The Ambassador will return this afternoon and will want to see you.

K. I will see him as soon as he arrives and we will check with the British.

mj

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S151

TELCON
The President - Secretary Kissinger
October 7, 1973
10:30 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

K: Hello.

N: Hello Henry, what's new?

K: We have got the thing pretty well orchestrated, Mr. President. The Security Council meeting is set for 3:30 tomorrow afternoon.

N: At our request.

K: Yes at our request.

N: I mean is anybody joining us?

K: In calling it? No but we don't need anyone to join us.... I've got us well positioned. I think we should not, Mr. President, not to propose a resolution which will only be defeated, but develop our philosophy...how it should end.

[redacted] B1

K: No, Scali can do it.

N: If the UN is going to fail, let if fail without us.

K: By Thursday evening everyone will be pleading with us to introduce that resolution. I told the Russians we were not introducing a resolution ...have consultations.

N: No message from Brezhnev?

K: Oh, yes we heard from him.

N: What did he say?

K: It was a friendly message, but it didn't say anything. One thing it did say was that the Russians pulled out all their advisers against the wishes of the Arab governments and we have confirmed that through our sources. Also they have withdrawn their fleet in the Mediterranean.

N: Where's our fleet?

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K: Well actually our two fleets are very close together. Ours went East and theirs went West. They have moved back and we have moved up. ..... military situation sufficently clear. Everybody wants a settlement. Also arrangement for Israelies to stick to..... if they go beyond the ..... side, if you appeal to them to return, they must return. I have checked this with Mrs. Meir and she agrees.

N: I see. With regard to the report I was reading co ming up on the plane, possibly out of date by now, but the doggoned Syrians surprised me. They're doing better than I ever thought.

K: the Israelis haven't thrown in the reserves yet. They're doing damned well. They've taken _____, penetrated two pointsand that mountain, you must have seen it when you were there

N: Yes, I remember.

K: They have done pretty well. Implacement won't be complete until tomorrow. Then Ismail sent me a message suggesting possible framework for negotiations. Not yet adequate. It's where North Viet-Nam was 4 months before the breakthrough. The same message was sent through the Shah, but its not yet adequate and its not quite time to do . We have to get the war stopped first. Then ....diplomacy.

N: The thing to do now is to get the war stopped. That would be great achievement. One of the greatest achievements of all. People in this country wo uld think .....really tough

	B1

N: I know. They are emotional, delightful, but completely unorganized. None of them have their heads screwed on right.

K: Its a little premature. One usually smells a point when one can say they see it come together. Wednesday or Thursday perhaps. I've been calling a lot of Senators in your behalf, after you decided to go to the UN.

N: I will be in in the morning. Will you be at the White House tomorrow.

K: I'll be in around 8, 8:30.

N: Good. Why don't you come over and we'll have a talk, publicize it.

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S177

TELCON
Waldheim/Sec. Kissinger
Monday, Oct. 8, 1973
4:55 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: When I suggested that we cooperate I did not think we would carry it to these extremes.

W: I am delighted.

K: I did not think we would have a crisis this soon.

W: I appreciate that we are keeping such close contact.

K: You called me?

W: No. I reached you at your lunch.

K: I heard you wanted to talk again.

W: No.

K: Just a misunderstanding. Since then I have talked to Eban and he has agreed not to speak unless the Egyptians speak and may be not even then.

W: I have talked to Amb. McKee. There are two developments I want to bring to your attention on this occasion. As far as the military situation is concerned, I got this call from Amb. McKee telling me that Port Said has been attacked by Israeli airplanes and he is quite upset about this and instructed by his government to bring that to my attention and to the attention of the Assembly and SC.

K: By what reasoning.

W: I think they still don't understand that war is war. If one has a war, one cannot avoid civilian targets.

K: It is the civilian targets.

W: The civilian population of Port Said.

K: They object to the bombing of civilians.

W: That is correct.

K: And they have every right to.

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W. I don't know whether they will ask the Ambassador to talk: saying attacked by Israeli aircraft and wanted to bring to my attention and to the attention of the President of the Council. Zayyat will make a statement on that this afternoon. He wants to interrupt the general debate in the pleniary. I asked him if he would make this statement in the SC. He said no they would not speak in the SC. You would speak in this procedure as originally (planned.)

K: I have never seen a diplomacy like this. Have you any idea of what they think they are doing. All our information is that they are going to get beaten in battle. I have never known why a side that is losing a war insists on time. We will maintain our position no matter who is winning.

W: For your information. The Ambassador told me sort of confidentially, I don't know why he stressed it but he said the military was in good position as far as the two bridges along the Suez Canal. He said the military situation was not bad for them. I got different information but I think it is in the light of this opinion that the SC debate is not good for them.

K: I think by tomorrow the debate will pick up.

W: Exactly. My opinion is the situation will be different and they will be happy to...

K: My view too.

W: The other important information I want to give you is yesterday evening I got a report from our observers from the General saying the Egyptian high command requested withdrawal of all of our observers along the Suez Canal. Request to be made by your Government or the Sec. Gen. It was a consensus of the SC on the 10th of July, 1967, after the 6 day war that these observers were sent to the Canal Zone.

K: Exactly right.

W: I waited during the night for a request and did not get it. I rank up this morning and asked him and he said he did not know about it and he would check with Cairo and shortly after that he contacted_____ and came to see me. He said he had gotten instructions of withdrawl along the canal for their own security. They are now behind our lines and cannot serve any purpose any more and thanking us for the good services done in the past and they are not needed anymore and we ask your withdrawal. I sent around 10:00

this morning a letter to the President informing of this request and informed MacIntyre about this. In the meantime, which is also important, we got the report that some of them -- 2-3 of them have been escorted to Cairo by the Egyptian forces. The rest apparently still there. We are waiting for a final report. This is the situation that is rather awkward.

K: There is nothing you can do about it.

W: Nothing because it is quite clear they cannot serve any purpose.

K: Right. I have to get our Ambassador before the meeting starts. I will talk to you later.

END

S175

JR
LE

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
George Ball/Sec. Kissinger
Monday, Oct. 8, 1973
3:50 a.m.

B: The only way to break Russell Long off is if you were to call Bennett and Curtis and tell them quite catagorically that the Administration needs Hall in this job or if you could get Schultz to call. If Bennett and Curtis come to Long and say they have been told that the Administration really needs Hal Long will crack on this one.

K: Right.

B: Otherwise what he is worried about is that Long is going to hold firm and this will become a cause celebre of Human Events and blow-up into a right wing incident.

K: The hell of it is, I want Hal over here.

B: I appreciate that.

K: And if the crazy bastard had not fought it so stupidly I would have had him by now.

B: I would think there would be no reason for your not saying that.

K: I will get Schultz to call Curtis and Bennett and I will join the calls. It is his Committee and he should call them first.

B: As a matter of courtesy he should.

END.

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S173 *

TELCON
Scali/Sec. Kissinger
Monday, Oct. 8 [illegible]
2:15 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: You got the Statement. It will not shake the world. Our information here is that there is a chance that no one else will speak but in any event if the Egyptian speaks and you feel obliged to reply be very gentle with them. I don't insist that you reply but be very gentle and refer to the fact that the spirit of my conversation about peace is maintained. We don't want a confrontation with the Egyptians. It is my understanding that the Soviets are instructed to lay off us.

S: I was at a lunch with the For. Min. of Sudan and the permanent Rept. Malik left early because he has in scribed himself to speak.

K: When did he do that?

M: About 40 mins ago when he left this lunch.

K: To inscribe himself?

S: Yes. My understanding from the Security Council President.

K: You will have to judge the situation. We don't want a donnybrook with the Soviets this afternoon. If he gets offensive we will have to. If anything, my understanding is he will work over the Israelis. We will say we have deliberately avoided putting blame in our statement and we regret that he has concentrated on the past in such an erroneous way and we urge him to concentrate on the future. O.K.?

S: Right. We know the Syrians and Israelis have asked to participate but with no sign that they will speak today.

K: My information from the Israelis is that if the Egyptians do not speak, even if the Syrians do, Eban may not speak. Eban is confining himself to saying simply what he said this morning.

S: Very well. I have the text of this thing before me. I thought it essential for me to be there at the lunch.

K: You had to do that.

S: I will follow the instructions implicitely.

K: You are doing a great job. I think tomorrow this thing will get lively. I think the Arabs have not yet understood what the military risks are.

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S: If I can detect the atmosphere , the feeling is they were winning and held the upper hand.

K: HA. HA. HA. That has to be lack of communications. That is not our information.

S: This is the very definite feeling I picked up at the lunch.

K: By Tuesday or Wednesday it will be changed.

S: Bye.

END

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S174

TELCON
McCloskey/Sec. Kissinger
Monday, Oct. 8, 1973
3:45 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

Conversation concerning personnel announcement.

M: I was thinking of it for this week.

K: Do you think we should do it in the middle of all of this.

M: Yes.

K: Just because you want to go back to Cyprus.

M: You don't mean that. People will be walking around wondering what is going to happen. Speculation is building up and I am concerned that it will leak out and it will be all screwed up.

K: O.K. Lets plan on it for Thursday.

M: O.K.

END

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S176

TELCON
Ziegler/Sec. Kissinger
Monday, Oct. 8, 1973
4:45 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K:. You know the joke where somebody said to the Russians: They must have taken your advice they are retreating to Cairo and waiting for the winter.

Z: You don't mind if I say that ... the President called Scott and Mansfield.

K: Has the resolution gone through?

Z: Yes.

K: I would not; it is better for us to be pushed by the Congress.

Z: You are quoted as saying "I find no fault with the resolution at all."

K: Then he is a horses[illegible]. I am telling the Egyptians we are being pushed by the Congress.

Z: The lead is: Resolution believed to reflect the Administration's opinion and was introduced by Mansfield and Scott and was passed by a unanimous vote.

K: I was not thinking. They called and asked me if I had any objections.

Z: Goes on to say White House and Kissinger were called.

K: I think, stick with that. That is good.

Z: If they ask...

K: Say they asked me if I was bothered by that resolution but it was their jurisdiction.

Z: Has the SC met?

K: No. The Arabs think they are winning. I have asked for more time to be in better shape.

Z: They are not, are they?

K: No they are getting creamed.

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Z: I will not mention that.

K: I would not. Our major worry now is that the Arabs will turn against it. If we can navigate this without the Arabs turning it would be a master piece but we cannot be that lucky.

Z: Good, Henry.

END

(S178)*

TELECON, October 8, 1973, 4:55 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

Secretary/ SecGen Waldheim

W. I should inform you of recent developments. The Council President postponed the meeting til 6 o'clock. Scali is upset. There was a rumor that the non-aligneds wanted to prepare a draft resolution. I checked with Minic, the Yugoslav and he said no, this is not their intention. It seems that the reason they asked for the postponement is that they heard that Zayyat was informed by you that in the statement which Scali is going to make there will be a call for a return to the 1967 lines . .

K. That is not true. . .

W. He said if this is true he needed new instructions from Cairo. He c annot accept this without making an adequate answer to the American speech. So I thought I should let you know immediately.

K. The non-aligned intend to place a res . .

W. To give Zayyat time to prepare a statement--to get in touch with Cairo on how to behave when

K. I guess I shouldn't have told him what we were going to do. It is a very general statement making general principles. It does not say what we will accept or not accept.

W. Could you instruct Scali to get in touch --perhaps it's better to call Zayyat. This is the information I got from the Yugoslav.

K. OK. Fine. Thanks -- thank you very much Mr. Secretary General.

mj

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S157 *

TELCON
Stewart Alsop/Sec. Kissinger
Monday, Oct. 8, 1973
11:20 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I know you have already talked to Sisco but I wanted you to have a word from me too about the situation. What we have tried -- I want to give you a sense of our strategy. First we tried to prevent the outbreak and when that failed, we tried to get it ended but the situation was that the Arabs did not want a Security Council meeting and therefore no other member of the SC wanted to have one. We canvassed all day Saturday both for a meeting and a resolution that might pass. Of course, we were in the closest touch with the Israelis. When it became apparent that all would happen in a Security Council meeting would be a shouting match and inconclusive, we continued this strategy. We tried to keep the Russians from doing anything rash by staying in touch. I think it is being worked out now. We moved it unilaterally to the SC last night. I think we will crystallize this thing over the next 24-48 hours.

A: Fine. I told Joe that in 1956 Dulles stopped them you know and Lescoff (sp), the field leaders, said they took a swim in the canal, and we stopped them. In 1967 I was with Alazar (sp). We were in a village close to Damascus. He now runs the whole show. On the ground he is the Commander in Chief. I said you made a mistake. He said you mean going to Damascus. I said yes. He said you know who pulled us off. You did. They have lost their greatest asset of 1967 and I listened to all of the plans. With their air superiority I believe they will get control. And that we should not try to stop them.

K: We have maneuvered in such away that they have not had too much interference.

A: As the Shah once said to me, "I am sympathetic with the Arabs. They can lose a hundred battles but the Israelis cannot lose one.

K: We have maintained a position and I think the Israelis are satisfied with what we are doing and yet we have not broken off with the Arabs and we are going to try to dance that line for awhile.

A: Wish you luck. Anyway that I can be of service, let me know.

K: Thank you. You have been a good friend and I will keep you informed.

END

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S184 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
The President/Secy Kissinger
7:14 p.m., October 8, 1973

P: Henry, I thought you would be intrigued to know that Tricia called me last night. She had to go to the Italian Columbus Day parade -- she knew the press would grab her. I just talked to her a few minutes ago and she said all they asked about in addition to how did you like the parade was Israel. She had asked me last night what should I say. I said just tell them that your father says that the survival of Israel is a cornerstone of American foreign policy so she told them that. She said they just went away just thinking that was great. That really covers the New York situation. Also, that will get back to Golda.

K: Well, it will get back to her and Dinitz is going around town - You know, know, about 20 Senators have called him to ask him what to do.

P: Is that right?

K: And he says just support the President.

P: Great, great. Dinitz is all right then.

K: Oh, he's terrific.

P: But you see that little statement -- you can read it tomorrow -- used it with Pakistan, used it again -- the survival of Israel is a cornerstone of American foreign policy. That's all you have to say.

K: Right, Mr. President.

P: Okay. Good.

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S182 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin/Sec. Kissinger
Monday, Oct. 8, 1973
5:45 p.m.
(not on first minute)

D: I want to tell you that they are expecting this information. We are not going to do anything at the Council. No kind of resolution in the Security Council. Our representatave in the SC has instructions not to have any prolemics with the American representative. Meanwhile we continue to consult urgently with the Arab side. In this connection, we would like and hope that you will do everything not to force the SC to accept any resolutions.

K: You can count on that.

D: Until we have finished our consultations with our allies.

K: May I make a suggestion to you. Your Arab friends are going around New York saying I am giving them an ultimatum.

D: In New York?

K: Yes. I thought we had an agreement specifically.

D: They are trying to delay the SC meeting.

K: It is not going on yet.

D: No?

K: It has been delayed. My own recommendation is we don't care whether it take place or not much. Let's have it, get it over and adjourn it. I promise you we will not introduce a resolution.

D: I can give instructions along those lines. In Moscow it is now _____ hours.

K: Let's see what happens. You can promise Moscow flatly there will not be a resolution in the near future. There will not be a resolution. We are making a very mild statement.

D: I understand.

K: It states our general position in such a vague way. We are not saying there must be a return to the ceasefire line. Just saying one way to achieve peace.

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D: I understand. We would like to have consultation.

K: I promise you we will not introduce a resolution. I would hope you would not spring one on us.

D: I have specific assurances on this.

K: Let's have an understanding that neither one of us will introduce a resolution without giving the other one notice.

D: Exactly my instructions from Moscow.

K: We will not do it I promise you without giving you time to consult with Moscow. You do the same for us.

D: Good.

K: Fine.

END

S180

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Dinitz/Sec. Kissinger
Monday, Oct. 8, 1973
5:05 p.m.

D: We have received a full account of today's battle for delivery to you. I will do that later. I am telling you no in answer to the specific question that our ground forces are not repeat not operating on the western side of the Canal.

K: Good. I don't know why I am saying good. That is up to you.

D: I am calling your attention to what our Chief of Staff said in answer to that question he said not yet. The cable I have said not operating yet. I presume we are now busy mopping up the remainder of the Egyptian forces on our side of the Canal.

K: May I make one other suggestion. It would help if your Foreign Minister in New York would not make a proposal.

D: I want to make that point. He told me you talked to him.

K: It puts us in the position of having aligned ourselves with you which we don't object to but it is in our common interest to keep precipitating.

D: Absolutely. He said this to me and I confirmed no need for him to talk. Now he called me and said the rumor at the UN is that the Syrians, the French and British will probably talk. Even if the Syrians do talk we prefer they do not but their is still the possibility we will say nothing.

K: I don't object to your talking as long as you do not put forth a definite proposal.

D: No. I suggested to Eban and said if the Syrians do talk he said he would say what he said this morning and reserve rights for future meetings of the Council.

K: I think it would be better.

D: Is there any information that the Syrians will be talking.

K: My information from the Sec. Gen. is that no one would talk.

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D: Even if you can influence the British and French not to talk it would be better. If the Syrians do talk and the information we have concluded with the For. Min., even in this case, unless something gets out of hand, will not talk but at best he will say what he said this morning.

K: I am not in contact with the French but I will call the British.

D: I will tell Eban we are of the opinion that no one will talk. If the Syrians talk and he feels it necessary to say something he will say something about this morining.

K: No concrete proposals. You will find our statement extremely mild but our major point is to prevent the Russians from replying. The less we do now to precipitate the better.

D: The exercise is to be very conservative.

K: Yes.

D: I can call latter with news of the battles.

K: Call Scowcroft and tell him you have talked to me. Discuss with him about the movement of some of the ammunition and electronics.

D: I will call him now.

END

S 181

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Scali/Sec. Kissinger
Monday, Oct. 8 [illegible]
5:3[illegible] p.m.

S: The Secretary General has confirmed to me that El Zayyat definitely took what you said to mean...

K: I know. I have explained to the Sec. Gen. and I have called back Zayyat so the record is clear. There are too many busy bodies in New York.

S: You are right. May I make a suggestion. We have one line in here where we say the least damaging way to bring this about is to bring the parties to the ceasei-fire line.

K: We want that to stay.

S: I understand it is not a demand.

K: If he interprets it as not a demand.

S: Once in confrontation with me he said I had given him an ultimatum. When we say the least damaging way to do it this means there may be 50 other ways but this is the least damaging . Does not mean we will settle for something when we are trying to force them back. Or he said we presented him with an ultimatum.

K: That is the chance we have to take.

S: We will take the chance.

K: Yes.

S: I am prepared to go ahead.

K: I think you should make noise but no drama.

S: Of course not.

K: If you don't get to give the speech, if there is no meeting, then you should protest. You should say we wanted to say that we were set for a constructive meeting. Don't give the impression that it is the end of the world. Should be statesmanlike and cool. If we cannot get it today we will get it tomorrow.

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S: We would hope that the other side would agree tomorrow.

K: Right.

S: Do you think you have mdlified El Zayyat.

K: No. He wants not to be mollified.

S: He will put out a statement saying you have given him an ultimatum.

K: That would be a lie. Why would I.

S: I am telling you what his tactics are.

K: How can he claim that we have given him an ultimatum when we want give him a speech. If he listens to it and claims we have given him an ultimatum, we will handle it.

S: Misinterpretation of the English language.

K: Total misunderstanding. We have other ideas. We wanted to say that -- no resolution or proposal. Certainly the Sec. Gen. said he also understood it that way.

S: Zayyat?

K; I don't know about him.

S: O.K. The latest is Mosjov is spreading rumors that he has had a second call from Kissinger and he is deleting that part of the statement.

K: Fine.

S: We can live with that?

K: Of course, we can. We don't have to answer every idiosy of the Yugoslavs. Now I gave him an ultimatum and now I have deleted it. Now he can go to the meeting. Just don't delete anything from the speech. Now there is no ultimatum in the speech. He will claim he got it taken out by me. Great. Shows I am concilliatory. You are very scrupulous by keeping me informed.

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S: Perhaps it is Zayyat's way of saving face.

K: Yes. We are in good shape.

END

S183*

TELCON
The President/Secy Kissinger
7:08 p.m., October 8, 1973

RELEASED IN FULL

P: Hi, Henry. What's the latest news? I got the military news.

K: Yeah. Well, on the diplomatic front we had another message from Brezhnev asking us not to table a Resolution and promising us he would not table a Resolution without consulting with us, telling us they are using a great effort on the Arabs.

P: Yeah.

K: First of all, if this turns out to be true -- Well, first of all, we're in no hurry to table anything.

P: No.

K: We're making our record. We're the only ones that are pushing for anything.

P: Yeah, yeah.

K: But if we bring it off -- By Thursday it will be over in my view.

P: Oh, sure.

K: If we bring it off, Mr. President, if this thing ends without a blowup without either the Arabs or the Soviets, it will be a miracle and a triumph.

P: Right. The one thing we have to be concerned about,which you and I know looking down the road, is that the Israelis when they finish clobbering the Egyptians and the Syrians, which they will do, will be even more impossible to deal with than before and you and I have got to determine in our own minds, we must have a diplomatic settlement there.

K: I agree with you.

P: We must have. We must not tell them that now but we have got to do it. You see, they could feel so strong as a result of this, they'd say: Well, why do we have to settle? Understand? We must not, we must not under any circumstances allow them because of the victory that they're going to win - and they'll win it, thank God, they should - but we must not get away with just having this thing hang over for another four years and have us at odds with the Arab world. We're not going to do it anymore.

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K: I agree with that completely, Mr. President. But what we are doing this week is putting us in a position to do --

P: To do something, that's right.

K: To do something.

P: And to do something with the Russians too.

K: Exactly.

P: I'm not tough on the Israelis. Fortunately, the Israelis will beat these guys so badly I hope that we can make sort of a reasonable -- You and I both know they can't go back to the other borders. But we must not, on the other hand, say that because the Israelis win this war as they won the '67 war, that we just go on with status quo. It can't be done.

K: I couldn't agree more. I think what we are doing this week will help us next month.

P: Maybe. I hope so. But in any event, on Brezhnev, he may be wanting -- Of course, the other thing that Brezhnev may be thinking of, his clients are going to get clobbered. You know, that's the only reason Kosygin came to see Johnson.

K: Yeah, but in '67 they were ~~scheming~~ manuvering their fleet around, they were threatening war, they were castigating us at the Security Council ..... breaking diplomatic relations with us, threatening our oil installations. And no one has made a peep against us yet.

P: That's great.

K: And that's a major triumph for our policy and we can use it in the MFN fight.

P: Thank God, yeah. You've got the Congress in good shape and you've got ...

K: I had a good talk with Stennis.

P: How good? Does he think we're doing the right thing?

K: Oh, he says he's marking it down on his calendar. He said it's a great day.

P: Because why?

K: Because he thinks we're in control and we're handling it well.

P: Right. Good, good, good. That's good. Actually though, the Israelis are really moving now, aren't they?

K: Well, they will be by tomorrow morning. I mean, they're in a position now from which they will --

P: They'll cut the Egyptians off. Poor dumb Egyptians getting across the Canal and all the bridges will be blown up. They'll cut them all off -- 30 or 40 thousand of them. Go over and destroy the SAM sites. The Syrians will probably go rushing back across now.

K: No, the Syrians -- that will turn into a turkey shoot by Wednesday.

P: Yeah, yeah. .... surrender.

K: Either surrender or a terrific shellacking.

P: Just so the Israelis don't get to the point where they say to us: We will not settle except on the basis of everything we got. They can't do that, Henry. They can't do that to us again. They've done it to us for four years but no more.

K: The first thing we've got to do is to get them back to their lines prior to the ceasefire.

P: I agree.

K: Which this they've promised us. But no one else knows we're going to manage it. And the next step then will be to start the diplomatic offensive.

P: Right.

K: Right after the election, which is two weeks from now.

P: That's right. Oh, I know, you've got to wait until after that. The first of November.

K: Right.

P: Good. Let me know if anything comes along.

K: But if we can hold this present situation another 48 hours, Mr. President it will be a great triumph for you.

P: Maybe that's right.

K: No. Yeah, because we can brief the hell out of this one.

P: Why?

K: Just compare it to '67.

P: Yeah, I guess so. Well, we thought we could brief the #@*! out of Jordan. It didn't help much.

K: Jordan we never briefed much.

P: Never did, did we?

K: No.

P: That was really a good one though.

K: But there we couldn't tell the truth.

P: We really with no cards at all - just like India/Pakistan - played a hell of a game.

K: Exactly.

P: This time we don't have any cards either.

K: We're playing a pretty good game.

P: That's right. Okay, Henry, thank you.

K: Right.

S179 *

TELECON, October 8, 1973, ~~4:58~~ 5:00 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

Secretary/ Zayyat

K. We're getting to know each other very well.

Z. Yes, we are.

K. Mr. Foreign Minister, in the rumor mill at the UN I have heard that you have heard that we will make certain statements that you will not accept. This is false. We are making a general statement.

Z. Yes, I got that.

K. I just wanted you to know that what we're saying is so vague-- it will leave all options open. I just want you to understand so that you don't get upset.

Z. No, no, I understood that. I know that.

K. Thank you very much.

mj

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S 158

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
MANSFIELD/Sec. Kissinger
Monday, Oct. 8, 1973
11:25 a.m.

K: How are you, Senator? I wanted to give you a brief word on the state of play. We have now had information from the Russians saying they are using their influence to restrain and they hoped we are doing the same thing. Of course, we are already doing this. Also, very confidentially, I have made this exchange with the Egyptians and I have concerted with the British for the SC meeting this afternoon and with the Russians to keep it from degenerating into a shouting match. The reason we are not formally putting forward a resolution is because it does not do any good to have a lot of competing resolutions, all of which will fail. We are trying to crystallize a consensus and I wanted you to understand our strategy. As soon as a consensus exists we will support it as we were ready to do from Saturday on. For your own private information, we took the position that everyone should return to their position when the fighting started. The Arabs told us this would be very unsatisfactory to them. We took that position because we assume the Israeli position would change.

M: You mean last Friday.

K: I want you to know that whoever is ahead at the time of the resolution, we are going to be urging a return to the positions of Friday. My judgment is this will be working against the Arabs soon. You may be catching some flack on this. I don't see how we can have another territory grab.

M: Akin called me. He got wind of a resolution and he was much opposed to it. He wanted to support your position and not have something contrary to what you were trying to do. Scott came in later and agreed. We said we would take that position. It is impossible to have any resolution here until you get a chance to make your position known and make these contacts.

K: We don't object to a resolution that calls for a return to a position of Friday for the reason that we think that position will be reached certainly by tomorrow and after that the Israelis are going to be advancing into the Arab country.

M: I see. O.K. You can talk to Scott on that basis and I wish you would too.

K: I don't want to have it said that I urged it.

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Mansfield
Oct 8
11:25 a.m.

M: I will talk to Scott and say that I asked you. And if he wants to cal you..

K: And that I would be happy to talk to him.

M: Good, Henry.

END

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S163

TELCON
Ziegler/Sec. Kissinger
Monday, Oct. 8, 1973
1:00 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Did you say at your briefing that the Israelis were attacked on a high holy day just as we were attacked at Pearl Harbor.

Z: No.

K: You are quoted on a ticker. He told newsmen that it is clear that the Israelis were attacked ....

Z: Nothing like that came up in the briefing. Ken Saba -- a fellow asked a question. I was making a point that we were in equal touch with the Israelis and the Arabs.

K: If you inflame the situation now...

Z: Henry, you are lecturing me on something that I did not say.

K: Perhaps they have clipped something together

Z: I am going to find out the @#$$%¢& at State that did.

K: It says Israelis were attacked on a high holy day and was caused...

Z: I said my reference is on a different part.

K: As long as you did not say it that is fine. It is on a clip. I have it hear Mid East 40 is the lead. Don't worry about it if you did not say it. We will just deny it.

Z: Is McCloskey with you now.

K: No. It was brought inby someone else.

Z: I think playing it the way I said it is fine -- Soviet contact, etc.

K: The first page of what I have is fine and the second page is wrong.

Z: I was asked a question. This guy said is there any doubt in your mind that the Israelis did not start it because it was a high holy day and I said my reference to equal contact.

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Ziegler
Oct. 8

K: You were not violating what you were told. We should cut out the reference to Brezhnev. I now have another ticker someone brought me. It is apparent that Scott said this.

Z: Scott said this.

K: He got everything screwed up. It does not make any difference. I owe you an apology.

Z: Tell McCloskey if he is there...

K: He is not here.

Z: I have the AP 40 bulletin and they said what Scott said. O.K. I hope all went well.

K. It went o.k.

END.

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S161

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
The President/Sec. Kissinger
Monday, Oct. 8, 1973
11:50 a.m.

N: Regarding Scott and Mansfield, did you in effect tell them -- are they going to put out that we support such a resolution.

K: Yes. They are saying this -- they are not saying this is a resolution. They are saying this should be our objective.

N: They will indicate that the Administration favors that objection.

K: That we should favor that objective. I said this would not run afoul of anything we are trying to do. I did not tell them to do it. Otherwise they were going to do something much stronger.

N: Yes. Would it be helpful if I were to lean on them and to tell them not to go too far?

K: No. Mr. President, this is not going too far.

N: On their part.

K: No. No. Not going too far on their part. Scali will have spoken before they can get any resolution like this passed. This is essentially opposition. They are supporting you.

N: If I had to be in touch with them I could say we appreciate that support.

K: I think that would be appreciated. That would be a nice gesture.

N: Fine. Fine. O.K.

K: O.K.

N: One other brief thing. On Japan, how about Doug Dillon.

K: He would be excellent.

N: Sort of a hand across the sea. He is basically on the other side. He is a business man.

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K: I don't think he will take it. I understand he does not want to go back into Government.

N: You call him and tell him that the President wants him to take it.

K: Absolutely. Lynn Firestone is in Japan. I have not been able to nail him.

N: You are going to offer him Canada.

K: That is what you suggested.

N: Did you try Anderson.

K: I think we should have him to Britain.

N: You have not tried him. I would offer Dillon Japan.

K: That would be the best appointment.
If you talk to Mansfield and Scott the best would be to thank them. They have held off a lot of wild men who wanted to make extreme resolutions.

END

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S159

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sen. Scott/Sec. Kissinger
Monday, Oct. 8, 1973
11: 35 a.m.

K: You are a mind reader. I was going to call you.

S: Mike and I were talking and of course to Akin and as Mike tole you both of us are taking the position that you need all the elbow room you can get.

K: Right.

S: There will be God knows any number of Senators coming in with any number of resolutions and the major question -- the reason Mike is here with me now is shall we continue to say no resolution as far as we are concerned or should we give some thought to a resolution which supports you.

K: If you think you could get a Senate resolution supporting the course we have taken and expressing the view that the Senate favors a ceasefire and return to the positions the parties occupied Friday.

S: That is our position.

K: Before the outbreak of hostilities. We have not said that publicly but it will be the position we will take. If we could point to strong Senate support that would be helpful.

S: All right. Mike is right here. Suppose we do that. Most of the resolutions are being sent in to me and they are very firey and partisan.

K: I think the best thing from our selfish point of view and from the national point of view is if the Senate could express support for the way the crisis has been handled and expresses the hope that the Administration will seek an early ceasefire and return to the positions occupied when the fighting started.

S: All right. I think that is all right with Mike. We will work out a joint resolution. We will do that.

K: That would be very helpful.

END

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S 155

TELCON
Senator Stennis/HAK
October 8, 1973/10:20 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Never any lack of excitement Mr. Chairman.

S: You're at the right place though. You'll find a way.

K: Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to call you to bring you up to date on what's going on.

S: That's mighty nice of you.

K: What we are doing is, we're not making any grandstand plays. We could have called a Security Council meeting on Saturday but we first told the Russians we wanted to stay in step with them and have them act responsively. We then went to the Egyptians and Israelis and to the British and French and it turned out that there was no consensus for anything.

S: No what.

K: No agreement to do anything so rather than force a confrontation in which we would get out voted we stayed in contact with them and kept offering our good _____. Then yesterday afternoon we went ahead and unilaterally called a Security Council Meeting for today and now this morning we had a message from the Russians saying they want to stay in step with us and they would do their utmost to keep the situation from getting out of control. So even though you may not see much visible action, I think we've contained the crisis and we think that in another couple of days we'll have it quieted down.

S: That's fine.

K: So, we think the Israelis will destroy the military situation and just for your information we will be in favor of the restoration of the ceasefire lines as they were when the fighting started. That was our position Saturday afternoon when the Arabs were gaining territory. This will be our position tomorrow when the Israelis will be gaining territory. We'll apply it totally even-handedly.

S: Well you're referring back to the other war?

K: No, to this one. In other words we want them all to go back to where they were Saturday noon before the fighting started. You know when the Arabs were gaining they didn't want to go back to their lines. By tomorrow it is our judgment the Arabs will be pleading to get back to those lines. Or by Wednesday at latest and our position will remain constant.

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S: Right.

K: we are in favor of everybody going back where they were before the fighting started, whoever is ahead.

S: Yes. That's good.

K: Don't you think. And we will try to keep the Soviets from interferring, we've used the 6th fleet, part of the 6th fleet out of Athens so that its ready in case there is any problem with American civilians in the area but we are not doing anything provocative.

S: No. Well, I have alot of faith in your judgment and I certainly will back you up in any way I can.

K: Well, you've been a tower of strength Mr. Chairman and the President wants to thank you for everything you've done for the country.

S: Well, I've done very little.

K: You're one of the great patriots I've met.

S: You'll stay on this thing and you'll have an answer sometime.

K: We'll have it worked out Mr. Chairman. I'm quite confident now.

S: I'm jotting down a little note here with the date on it about your call and I like your points here. That's fine.

K: Thank you Mr. Chairman.

S: If there is anyway I can help you let me know.

K: We'll keep you briefed Mr. Chairman.

S: OK. Bye.

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S160

TELCON
McCloskey/Sec. Kissinger
Monday, Oct. 8, 1973
11:45 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: For your information in case it hits before you get briefed. I have gotten Mansfield and Scott to introduce a resolution into the Senate expressing the Senate's support for the Administration's handling of this crisis.

M: Good.

K: And urging a solution which involves a ceasefire and return to the position of ceasefire prior to the fighting. The reason I did that is so that when this turns against the Israelis we have some support with us.

M: O.K. That will be done sometime today?

K: Yes. Also it keeps a lot of other resolutions from being voted on.

M: Good.

K: Don't mention it.

M: No. No.

K: Just in case there is a question asked. You can say for the Senate to decide.

M: Can I say you have been in contact with them.

K: You can say I have talked to Fulbright, Mansfield, Scott, Stennis and Symington and also also some others and Morgan from the House Foreign Affairs.

M: Fulbright, Mansfield, Stennis, Symington and Morgan.

K: Yes.

END

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S162

TELCON
Sen. Javits/Sec. Kissinger
Monday, Oct. 8, 1973
11:55 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

J: Has hugh Scott talked to you about this resolution.

K: Yes.

J: Have you worked anything out with him.

K: I talked to him and to Dinitz too to make sure it did not bother them. We would welcome a resolution along the following lines. An expression of approval and recommendation that supported a restoration of the ceasefire at the line prior to the Friday hostilities.

J; They have one in here that exercizes it full diplomatic ...and elsewhere to achieve a defensible border. Whatever the words of the 242 are. Does that bother you?

K: No.

J: We have two parts. Approving the way the crisis is being handled and supporting restoration of the agreed upon ceasefire line.

K: I would not use ceasefire line -- that creates confusion like in 67.

J: Support restoration.

K: Of the positions the two sides occupied before the outbreak of hostilities.

J: Last is the pragmatory phrase. O.K.?

K: Good.

J: Is that all right today.

K: That would be fine.

END

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S164

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Ziegler/Kissinger
Monday, Oct. 8, 1973
1:10 p. m.

K: I have traced the screw-up. Some eagerbeaver at the Operations Center slapped this together and rushed it up here.

Z: There is no problem. It is Scott. I just checked and UPI said Scott said it.

K: Someone at the Ops Center here put mine together.

Z: You know I would not say that.

K: The way they had it pasted together, it followed right along. I thought here is Ziegler; he will do anything for a headline.

Z: I have not done anything like that in four years.

K: You must admit it was quiet a story. It would have started riots in the Middle East.

Z: Right.

K: O.K. Ron. My apologies.

end

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S172

TELCON
Scowcroft/Sec. Kissinger
Monday, Oct. 8, 1973
p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I would like to send a copy of the message I sent to Zayyat -- by messenger.

S: All right.

K: I will find out where to deliver it and will call you back.

END

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S171

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Dobrynin/Sec. Kissinger
Monday, Oct. 8, 1973
3:00 p.m.

K: The power is getting weak on your line. Both of our intelligence is listening. I want to tell you we are sticking with what I told you this morning. We are making a field statement saying we don't want to assess blame and we are saying some principles of a settlement in a very general way which includes the ideas I gave you but stated so vaguely they are just there to invoke later on. If your representative can restrain himself I think we can have a quiet session. I understand the Egyptian may not speak and we have urged the Israelis not to speak unless the Egyptian speaks. And I understand the Egyptian said he would not speak. If we can get these two quieted down we could have a brief session.

D: You will not propose a resolution.

K: No. We are making a philosophical statement. Just translated from the German.

D: Good.

K: I am counting on you to not come in with a resolution.

D: For all of my information there is none.

K: As I understand it Malik is not a member of the Central Committee and he would not dare overrule you.

D: Definitely.

K: In all seriousness I wanted to know your instructions to avoid any confrontation with Malik. Our statement is phrased in such away that it should provoke no reaction by even the Arabs. We have just one sentence referring to return to previous positions. It is not as a proposal but will facilitate a good atmosphere. In our judgment by tomorrow evening it will be greatly welcomed by your friends.

D: By tomorrow evening?

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K: Or Wednesday.

D: You mean the ceasefire.

K: I don't know whether they will want a ceasefire but the military will be such they will not be occupying much of Israeli territory by tomorrow evening. It does not make any difference then, we can drop it,; we are not putting in any resolution. After this speech, we will do nothing. I assure you we will not do one other thing today. We do not now plan to put in a resolution.

D: This is the point.

K: As I understand Brezhnev's message this morning it was we should stay in concert with this. Our answer to that is yes. We will do nothing until we hear from you.

D: Have you had a chance to speak to Zayyat?

K: I have talked twice to him.

D: Today?

K: Yes.

D: Is he going to with the war?

K: HA. HA. HA. You must know the present situation of thought is not their most distinguished characteristic. His position is they are going to win the war. I said to him what if the Israelis gain territories. He said we will force them to take Cairo and we will not stop until they have taken Cairo. Because then we won't settle. You must recognize this is a terrible threat to make.

D: Yes. What are you going to do then?

K: If the Israelis take Cairo, I can tell you informally, I will not hold a Security Council meeting on that issue.

D: You will not.

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K: I don't think that is our problem to talk sanely about. Anatol, we will be willing support no matter who is at what side of the line a return to the previous positions. When sanity returns this has to be the outcome. It may be easier for you to support this if the Israelis cross to the otherside.

D: I have no command of this. I understand what you are saying, you are going to leave it with a proposal for the time being.

K: My impression is their assessment is they think they may be winning.

D: He thinks one way publicly and the other way privately. It is difficult to say.

K: He did not make a specific proposal. He was not nasty. He just did not have a specific proposal. It is a new theory of warfare. I don't know if they learned it at your staff college or not. I am convinced that if you start a war you know where you are going.

D: O.K. Be in touch.

K: O.K. We will have a line put in tomorrow.

END

S169

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
The President/Sec. Kssinger
Monday, Oct. 8, 1973
2:35 p.m.

K: I forgot to mention to you this morning that I had worked out with Benites, the President of the GA, that he would recognize only three speakers. We did not want a debate in the General Assembly. It would have been a massacre. The Syrians, Egyptians and Eban spoke and the GA adjourned on that topic. This afternoon at 3:30 we are speaking. We have a rather good statement for the Security Council but it is mild.

N: Yes.

K: So far no one else has asked for the floor. The Soviets are playing the game we discussed this morning. They are laying low.

N: Yes.

K: We will be the only ones speaking and the only one with a proposal. I have just talked to the Egyptian For. Min. and he will not speak unless Eban does. I have a call into Eban to tell him not to speak. I have Waldheim lined up. The tactical situation is that we will be the only one with a proposal on the table. It will not be rejected and will not be voted on. By tomorrow they all will be begging for it.

N: We hope. I had an interesting talk with Kendall on the phone. The day after Schultz left, Brezhnev asked to see Kendall. Kendall had a couple of hours with him and brought in three nice projects. On the MFN he explained the situation that this whole opposition is pretty much the Jewish Community. Some elements of labor which opposed it for reasons that had nothing to do with trade. He said that at the conclusion Brezhnev very warmly said he did not want minorities in either country to destroy this relationship he had established with President Nixon. He is prepared to go further and to work on it. That was his attitude at least.

K: He has a big investment in this.

N: One thing on that I wanted to tell you. The question came up as to whether the trade bill would come down the Jackson/Vanik amendment but with credit in it. I told him if it came in with the credit in it I would veto it. I don't want to start the MFN if credits are in the trade bill. I will veto it. I would rather not have it. You give that signal out.

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K: I will do that. Mansfield and Scott called and the Senate is going to pass a resolution applauding your action up to now and urging us to have a ceasefire and a return to the previous positions which is our position. The reason this is good for us is if we have to turn on the Israelis and turn them back we will have all of the Israeli supporters lined up.

N: They will not know what has hit them. That is good. Fine. Fine.

K: Right Mr. President.

END.

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S167

TELCON
Sen. Kennedy/Sec. Kissinger
Monday, Oct. 8, 1973
1:40 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

TK: You are very nice to call.

K: I tried to reach you yesterday. Were you calling me?

TK: No. Just returning your call.

K: I just wanted to bring you up to date. On Saturday, first our efforts were to prevent the outbreak of the war and after that to get it ended. The difficulty we faced was that the Arabs were opposed to a Security Council meeting and for their own reasons so were the Israelis. We tried to stay in touch with the Soviets, the British and not one member of the SC was ready to have a meeting. Therefore, no resolution could have passed ad we thought it a mistake to try to force a resolution which would just have exacerbated every body. Curiously enough the Arabs, Israelis, British and Soviets were pleading with us to take that course.

TK: You mean not to have a SC meeting.

K: Not to have a formal one. We held informal ones all day Sat. night and it enabled the Soviets not to be in opposition with us and it enabled us to say in close touch with the Egyptians as well as the Israelis. We decided yesterday afternoon just not to go to the UN. It would leave the UN totally discredited so we asked for a SC meeting and we are going to present not a formal resolution but our view which is the outbreak of hostilities should be ended and a return to the positions held by the parties before the fighting started. That is going to look more attractive to the Arabs today that it did Saturday because the Israelis are gaining the upper hand and it will look more attractive to them tomorrow. We are prepared to turn this into a resolution if it gets any support. In the meantime we have had active exchanges with the Soviets. We are trying to keep them out of this and it now looks as if we are in a pretty good position.

TK: What do you thin, -- I don't know what that beep is --

K: Are you recording?

T: No. I did not know what the possibilities were that it might continue. What are the pressures going to be on the Israelis to slow down. Is that real?

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Kennedy
Oct. 8, 1973

K: We have already told the Israelis we cannot support them beyond the present positions for mopping up, etc. But our judgment is by the end of this week it will be over. Both sides are suffering very heavy losses.

TK: I guess it is all going for the Israelis?

K: This afternoon it looks as though the Israelis are gaining the upper hand.

TK: You saw the resolution by Mansfield?

K: Yes. It looked all right to me. I understand that Eagleburger and your assistant are setting up a lunch or a meeting.

TK: Yes.

K: I will support that.

TK: Thanks, Henry. Appreciate that.

END

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S166

TELCON
Sen. Scott/ Sec. Kissinger
Monday., Oct. 8, 1973
1:15 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: When you hung up it occurred to me there might be some slight ambiguity. The return to the ceasefire line is the one that existed on Friday night, Oct. 6, not in 1967.

S: In the legislative history we have covered the fact we were acting in support of what you had already done as well as what you were trying to do in the future. Javits has been in the meeting. I am with the VN legislators now. He will make more of a point of that. Resolution reads -- deploring of outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East. Resolved that it is the sense of the Senate that we deplore the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East and we support the good offices of the United States President and the Secretary of State to urge the participants to bring about a ceasefire and the return of the parties involved to lines and positions occupied prior to the outbreak of current hostilities and further that the Senate expresses the hope for a more stable condition leading to peace in that region.

K: Excellent.

S: We did not say more peaceful -- more stable position leading to peace.

K: Could not be better from my point of view.

S: We have made legislation history by saying we support what you have done as well as what you are trying to do. Javits, I think wants to be in on the act. But he is going to say on the floor what a great guy you are.

K: I cannot object to that. Tell him I agree with it.

S: Sure. A pleasure.

K: Good-bye and thanks.

END

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S168

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Zayyat/Secretary Kissinger
Monday, October 8, 1973
1:45 p.m.

K: Mr. Foreign Minister, two things. I have softened the statement we are making to an almost unrecognizable point and I have added another point to you that peace in the Middle East requires observance of all the UN resolutions which I am sure you will recognize the Israelis will not be enthusiastic about.

Z: Thank you. I will hear it.

K: You will find that it is a minimum statement given our conditions here that we can make.

Z: I will have to hear it.

K: I just wnat to tell you and assure you as you will see from my communication to Izmael that we are trying to maintain.

Z: I am now very disappointed.

K: Mr. Foreign Minister, you should think back to previous meetings. You will find that this is the least that has ever been done.

Z: I was looking at Life Magazine and I was reading something from you that we must see how much physical security is necessary to get...

K: That is right.

Z: Now you are really helping them to stay on this false issue of security.

K: My position is the one I explained to you on Friday and that position will be maintained. Secondly, the principles we are announcing will be maintained even if the Israelis are gaining territories.

Z: As I said, we would not allow it.

K: I understand. There would be no one who would understand it.

Z: No one would understand it.

K: I have no question about that. I understand you. Where shall I send that message to Izmael.

Z: I am here at the Waldorf Towers, 37F.

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Zayyat
Oct. 8, 1973

K: O.K. What time would be a good time to deliver it.

Z: Any time. My wife is always here.

K: We can give it to her.

Z: Yes.

K: We will deliver it to the Waldorf at 37F and we have instructed our delegate -- are you planning a reply.

Z: Of course I was going to reply if they want to stay on our land.

K: I think you will find that not the case. You will find enough reference to other resolutions that it will say exactly the opposite. I have done my very best and you will see that we are facing enormous congressional pressure here but we are doing our best and you and I should maintain a contact because we want to move in the direction you and I discussed. Your statement today, I have read and it is a very constructive one.

Z: Thank you.

K: You have behaved throughout in a most statesman like manner.

Z: This I hope so.

K: We will do our best.

Z: All right.

K: You and I should talk every day while this is going on.

Z: It is beginning to be a habit.

K: It is a pleasant habit.

END

(S170) *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Eban/Sec. Kissinger
Monday, Oct. 8, 1973
2:40 p.m.

K: Mr. For. Minister, I have been told by the Secretary General that he has agreement of the Egyptians not to speak at the Security Council if you will not.

E: I have given my agreement.

K: I think this would work well.

E: It works well in what we are trying to achieve.

K: This is what will happen at the SC unless something unexpected occurs. Scali will put forward opposition and then it will adjourn.

E: I have spoken to the Australian Prime Minister and he is willing to cooperate too.

K: The only items before the SC will be something we are phrasing generally. We are saying Egyptians and Israelis started it. We are not here to assess blame. Our principle is that the Governments should set a ceasefire and a lot of words ending up with the Governments should return to the original positions. I think it would be helpful if you would not urge this for awhile so it does not look like American colusion.

E: I think so. We have made our point. I don't think we have to say anything to anybody today or to the press.

K: We are getting a Congressional resolution passed down here.

E: I have heard from the Ambassador about that.

K: Which urges this.

E: Yes.

K: I don't think there is any need for you to make that point again. We don't want to make it easy for the Egyptians to claim colusion.

E: I want to know whenever silence will be helpful.

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Eban'
Oct. 8, 1973

K: You are prepared for a six hour speech or silence.

E: Right. And your advice is always one of those extremes.

K: I do tend to go to extremes. You are quite right.

E: Unless I hear from you to the contrary I will not speak. I will be there as a courtesy but will not ask for the floor.

END

S165 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Dinitz/Sec. Kissinger
Monday, Oct. 8, 1973
1:14 p.m.

K: How are you?

D: Fine. How are you? Is this call from me to you.

K: It is from me to you.

D: With your permission I will give you the latest information I have and the special thing from the Prime Minister. The situation on the front looks considerably better. We have gone over from the containment to attack both on the Sinai and Golan Heights. Our military people think that a good possibility we will push the Syrians all the way across the ceasefire line and we are also moving out the Egyptian forces in the Sinai.

K: I have seen a report that you have crossed the canal.

D: I have seen this too and I talked to the Prime Minister's office an hour ago and I could not get any confirmation. I was waiting confirmation on that. I will read to you this subsequent message. Continuing with the military revue. It is all the more important for us to gain time to complete the job. We will not only reject -- I am waiting instructions from the Prim Minister -- we not only reject that which freezes the cease fire but which calls for return which is unrealistic because there is no guarantee they will withdraw their fordes. I want to tell you we suffered very heavy casualties both in human and equipment. From the SAM-6s which were very effective against our planes. I don't have an additional figure against the 35 planes I told you about yesterday. The human casualties I think are over 100 or maybe hundreds. We have no confirmation.

K:: Hundreds?

D: Yes. Hundreds. It is quite possible that we will take some military positions on the other side of the canal. I am saying this without confirmation. The earlier message from the Prime Minister is that it is possible that we will take military positions on the other side of the canal and on the former ceasefire line of the Golan Heights in hot pursuit and to insure ourselves against new attacks and to have some new political cards to play as we talked yesterday. I don't have confirmation of any action such as this because the fighting is still to the best of my knowledge still on our side of the ceasefire line. Now I have a special message from the Prime Minister to you which I will read and when we see each other I will take it to Peter

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Dinitz
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so he can take it. "The Prime Minister wishes to convey to you her profound appreciation not only for your help but for your wise counsel. She says in the cable that you understand exactly the situation that goes on in our minds as if you were sitting with us here. The aims of our fighting are absolutely clear to you. It is our objective that the heavy blows we will strike at the invaders will deprive them of any appetite they will have for any future assault. Our extraordinary military efforts extolled a heavy price , especially planes. We are faced with a tremendous gap in quantity. Our planes are hit and being worn out. The Prime Minister urgently appeals to you that there is an immediate start of delivery of at least some of the new Phamtom planes. End of message."

K: I will do my best and tell her for her information I have talked to the President this morning and to General Haig about the replacing of aircraft losses which as you know met some oppostion yesterday and he has agreed in principle.

D: I see. How do we proceed. Shall I wait to hear from you.

K: You had better wait to hear from me. It might effect your own calculations .

D: That is very important. I will send a message right away.

K: I don't want to mislead you. We will maintain our position on the ceasefire line. We discussed this yesterday withour prejudice to the immediate military operations. That is the position we will take at the Security Council. We will not introduce a resolution just a philosophical talk.

D: Of course.

K: One other thing. We have had a much more conciliatory Soviet message this morning urging us to urge restraint but we have answered that we are urging restraint. At any rate we are warning them against any action and I am giving a speech tonight in the Pacem in Terris conference and I am making two pointed references that detente cannot survive irresponsible actions. In one context I mention specifically the Middle East. I am going also in this speech to mention our MFN position and I hope to God this is not a week whenever Jewish league will start attacking me on this position.

Dinitz
Oct 8

D: To a degree I can speak in the name, that I don't think that it will happen this week in any way.

K: I don't think it would be very wise. That is not my major problem. The final question I have Mr. Ambassador is the Lebanese have asked us to appeal to you that you should not violate their sovereignty and rather than send you a message through the ambassadorial channel I thought it easier to tell you directly and not have too much paper work.

D: I am sure we have no designs to violate their sovereignty.

K: If you have no such designs and you could pass such a message to me that I could pass to them and to the British it would help establish the climate we all need.

D: I will confirm it to you. We will keep the British out.

K: Confirm it to me and if you could do it soon it would be helpful.

D: I have one item for you -- an additional item. I have received many calls during the morning from senators of all sorts. All with sympathy and request for help. I assured them all that American Government is urging peace, stability and seeing things eye to eye and that we have no problem. Some wanted to sponsor a resolution and instead of this I think what they are doing at this stage is coming out with a statement. Scott will be contacting you shortly.

K: He has done so and I have told him that I have no objection to the sort of resolution and I discussed it yesterday with him. I am not pushing it.

D: I am not either by the way. Sen. Bayh and Senator from Calif. and Kennedy came out with a statement. They are all lining up. I am not asking any initiative on their part. Just briefing them and many are asking whether they can help materially. I say to them I am in close touch with the Government and we have no outstanding problems.

K: Right.

D: Yesterday I gave you information from our intelligence re the Russians and the Syrians. I have a correction. They are not sure about it and ask me to tell you not to use it unless we have further confirmation.

Dinitz
Oct 8

K: O.K.

D: Whatever can be done on the planes and other equipment we would be grateful and it would be helpful.

K: The other equipment I will do something about today.

D: I will wait to hear from you and I will tell the Prime Minister what you have told me.

K: I will try to get the anti-tank and electronic stuff today.

D: Perhaps we should schedule to see each other -- you are going to...

K: We might be able to do it later this afternoon.

END

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S156

TELCON
Lord Cromer/Sec. Kissinger
Monday, Oct. 8, 1973
11:00 a.. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I wanted to bring you up to date on what we are doing .

C: Thank you.

K: We have decided not to introduce a resolution this afternoon. We will state our general objective along the lines of a ceasefire and a return to the positions prior to Oct. 6 but not in the form of a resolution but in a form of a philosophical statement. We thought this would give you an opportunity to -- we will then not have votes and competing views. Our instinct is that by tomorrow this whole question will be mute.

C: As quickly as that.

K: Say Wednesday. My personal instinct is tomorrow. My recommendation to you is not too push for a straightout ceasefire because you may be ratifying Israeli territory again. I think our Saturday position will look better to you tomorrow night.

C: I have long thought this might be the case.

K: I would urge -- we will put ours forward constructively and ambiguously. If you could get your demon draftsmen in London to do the same thing --

C: Fine. Thank you for letting me know. Incidentally, I gather something is on the AP tape that says Fulbright and the British Ambassador are reluctant about what is going on. I am not reluctant. We are hand in hand with what is going on.

K: I have not seen that and I would think Fulbright is going along. I think you and I are in good standing.

C: Right.

K: We don't mind a shade of difference that would permit us to move to another position. Let's play it that way through the rest of the day and tomorrow we will see what will have crystallized.

C: Have you decided whether to do anything concerning the Lebanon plea to you to intercede on their behalf with the Israelis.

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Oct 8, 1973
11:00 a.m.

K: I am not aware of that.

C: I think they made an appeal formally.

K: To us?

C: That is my understanding. That is what he told us he is going.

K: If so, we either have not received it or my associates are not keeping me informed about countries with less than 10 million population. If the Lebanonese made such an appeal we would intercede on their behalf.

C: I will ask my people at a lower level to get in touch with yours.

K: Tell your people to get in touch with Sisco.

C: All right, Henry.

END.

S08 *

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Dobrynin
10/8/73; 9:54 a.m.

D: Hello.

K: Anatol!

D: Hello, Henry. I just received an oral message -- a very short one, but I think it is fairly urgent. An oral message from Brezhnev to the President and he asked me to tell you personally about it. The message is very short and I will just read it. "We have contacted the leaders of the Arab states on the question of of ceasefire. We hope to get a reply shortly. We feel that we should act in cooperation with you, being guided by the broad interests of maintaining peace and developing the Soviet-American relations. We hope that President Nixon will act likewise."

K: I can answer that for you right away because I have just come from the President. This reflects our spirit and we will also -- we are eager to cooperate in bringing peace. I was going to call you. Just for your guidance -- with reference to the discussions we have had, we were not going to put in a resolution at the Security Council this afternoon.

D: Not going to?

K: No, we are just going to have a general discussion. But we would appreciate it since we are doing that, that you don't confront us with one without discussion.

D: I don't know -- I have a telegram from -- which will sent to our Ambassador to the delegation to the United Nations -- with instructions -- I don't know yet.

K: Will you let me know what you are going to do.

D: But I will right now mention to them that you are not going to put any -- you are not going to today, yes?

K: We have no intention to put one in today unless there is a drastic change.

D: Of the situation.

K: We thought that since you wouldn't agree with us on our proposal and since we wouldn't agree with you, it would be best to have a general discussion.

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D: I think so. Maybe there will be some reply and then we will be in touch with you, of course. But as of now my personal feeling is that the best thing to do is a general discussion without . . .

K: Why don't you inform Moscow of this?

D: I will do that right away.

K: Also, we will take a conciliatory -- you know not a conciliatory but . . .

D: I understand -- under the circumstances.

K: We will follow your line of not attacking you.

D: I understand.

K: And I will include finally some reference of the discussion of MFN in my speech tonight.

D: I think, under the circumstances, it would be a good idea -- from our side, too.

K: I will do that. Good.

D: What about the telephone? Couldn't you extend this particular telephone. Your own people probably know.

K: I will get it done within the next few days.

D: Yeah. It's just an extension of your telephone in your office to the department. There is nothing to be done on my side, really.

K: No, no, it will be done. You can be sure.

D: Because otherwise to call by . . .

K: No, no, I understand. You can count on it.

D: Okay.

K: Bye.

D: Bye. Bye.

*
S154

TELCON
Mr. Kissinger/Chairman Morgan
9:46 a.m. 10/8/73

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Mr. Chairman, we've had a difficult time getting together.

M: Yeh, I've been moving around

K: And I was at a meeting. Just wanted to give you a brief rundown on where we stand.

M: Right.

K: Mr. Chairman, ever since we got word of impending conflict, what we have been trying to do is to get--first to try to prevent it and that failed, and then we tried to get it stopped -- now we are still in touch with all the permanent members of the securi ty council and constantly in touch with the Egyptian and Israeli foreign ministers, and very much contact with the Soviet Union, we tried on Saturday to get a security council meeting started asking for an end of hostilities and we couldn't generate any support for it from anybody and therefore a call for it would simply have meant that there would be no resolution and we would have been worse off. So we spent all our time trying to generate a consensus on some resolution that people might agree on, we also asked the President of the Security Council to have informal consultations and he couldn't get any support, so we went through that process all day yesterday and then finally late in the afternoon we decided to call for a meeting ourselves when no one else would do it with us and we are now going to have a meeting this afternoon and we will try to get the fighting stopped, but I wanted you to know that--

M: the resolution now--just--

K: We want to see what the [redacted] situation is, we don't think it is a good idea to have a resolution that doesn't have support, because then we're worse off, and we don't want if we can avoid to be in a confrontation with the Soviets and Egyptians and so we are now positioned that we are the only country that's in touch with all the parties--and we will put in a resolution just as soon as we think it has enough support to pass

M: Yes, ah huh.

K: But I wanted you to know that we a re very active, and that as soon as we see anything jelling that can work, we'll propose it but I think you'll agree what we don't want is a yelling match that makes the situation worse;

M: I agree with that.

K: Right, Mr. Chairman, I'll keep you informed. M: Okay, Mr. Secretary. Thank you.

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S185 *

TELCON
Joe Sisco/Secy Kissinger
7:20 p.m., October 8, 1973

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

K: Joe, did that Council meeting ever get off?

S: Yes it did. Scali spoke and it went that way. Zayat is speaking right now and I have not been able to catch it and is still rolling on.

K: Oh, Zayat is replying?

S: Well, I don't know that it is a reply. He really is going -- as little as I heard -- is that he is going into the history of the efforts to achieve a peace, which was pretty much the line that he took in the General Assembly as well. So he is speaking.

K: Okay. That is fine. Then they'll adjourn, you think?

S: I think so. It will roll on a little bit longer. Now, one other development. What has occurred since you and I read that little message from Hussein about the Faisal business? B1

K: [redacted] So what I've done for you --

K: Now, look, I've got to get off to my speech. Can you give me a one-minute summary?

S: Sure. 30-second summary. The message you will be getting suggested to you will be fuller than the one you and I talked about because there are a couple of questions that have to be answered and the message seeks to answer them. So therefore ....

K: What are the questions?

S: Well, one, he feels that this is a good time to strike while the iron is hot and see if you can't get a negotiating process started and I make the right kinds of noises in the reply without, you know, making . . .

K: Just say that I have offered that to the Egyptians already.

S: All right, I'll add that. I also reminded him that you started explorations in New York and his Foreign Minister you hope really reported that you see.

K: Yeah.

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CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 25X1, 25X6
DECLASSIFY AFTER: INDEFINITE
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S: But glean through the message when you come back tonight is the point I'm making. I'll just position it in the White House for you.

K: Okay.

S: Good.

K: Right, thank you.

S: Thank you very much. And have a good speech.

K: Wait a minute! The Israelis have formally replied on Lebanon.

S: Oh, good.

K: You can get a message off. They promised to guarantee its sovereignty and independence.

S: Guarantee sovereignty and independence.

K: The only thing they ask, provided that Lebanon undertakes no military actions of its own against Israel.

S: Provided that it does not undertake any military action of its own against Israel. Okay.

K: And they authorize us to communicate that to the Lebanese.

S: Good. I'll send that out.

K: Right.

S: Thamk you.

K: Thank you.

S153*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Roland Evans/HAK
October 8, 1973/[redacted] 8:51 a.m.

E: I just want to know whether this is serious business in the Middle East or what?

K: Serious.

E: Is this to embarrass you, the United States, does it expect the Security Council to move.

K: No they don't want the Security Council.

E: It makes no sense Henry.

K: I agree with you.

E: They are going to be bloodied or smashed by Israel before this is over. A few days I would say.

K: No matter what the Washington Post says we've been trying to get a ceasefire since Saturday. The only trouble is the Arabs don't want either a meeting or a resolution so they and their friends just won't cooperate. AThis is not to be attributed.

E: I understand that. What about the Russians? Are they in on this at all as far as we know.

K: I'm not sure. I doubt it.

E: Then the upshot is going to be to restrain Israel from going to Damascus.

K: That could well turn out to be the problem later this week.

E: Can you see it clear on anything to--I mean the Israelis are so obviously militarily superior power that I can't understand this without some fallback position in Cairo. There's got to be something -- a backboard--athey're working against.

K: Well if there is they haven't revealed it to anybody

E: Do you believe the attack that they say the Israelis [redacted] made where the pipeline was ---

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K: No, that's insane.

E: You sure.

K: Look, you know the Israelis with --that they attacked on their holy holiday at one place where there is a pipeline and then let the Egyptians and the Syrians at the same hour cross--

E: I know. Did you have any intelligence before this before it happened, Henry- anything before it started.

K: Yeh.

E: And suddenly it lookedpossibly productive.

K: Something that looked--I would make it one much less than possibly productive but at least--I don't throw that down the drain.

E: And this was since the UN started meeting or did it go back before that.

K: I don't want to go into it.

E: That is my _____, you can tell me anything on it

K: I really can't Roland, I've got to run.

E: Am I going to see you tomorrow.

K: I don't know--call me

E: First thing in the morning.

K: Yeh.

E: Thanks a hell of a lot--Henry.

509 *

TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin/Secy Kissinger
11:29 a.m., October 9, 1973

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Anatol.

D: Oh, hello, Henry.

K: How are you?

D: Thank you very much. Are you in White House now or you already have connections with State Department?

K: No, no, I'm in the White House. Anatol, I just got a message from Amman.

D: Yes, saying what? What's happening there?

K: Well, saying that your Charge -- Let me read it to you.

D: Okay.

K: "The Soviet Charge asked to see King and was received this morning. Charge said Soviets fully support Arabs in conflict with Israel. He said Soviet Union thought all Arab States should enter battle now."

D: Soviet, what?

K: "Soviet Union thought all Arab . . ."

D: Soviet Union?

K: Yes.

D: Thought or fought?

K: Recommending to the King.

D: Un-huh.

K: "King considers this a Soviet request for him to send his army into action."

D: We asked King to go into action?

K: Yeah.

D: Unbelievable story. Was it ours . . ? I don't have any information at all. I could quite [readily accept] that we discuss with them and saying

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D: (cont'd) that we _____ our support of Arab countries is nothing new. But as you said we asked King to send..... yes?

K: That's right.

D: I will check with Moscow right now. It was our initiative or it was --

K: No, it was your initiative.

D: It's an unbelievable story, I should say.

K: You know, I'm not drawing any conclusions but we really urge you to keep people calm.

D: No, no. May I have a second try once again? Soviet Union thought . . .

K: "Soviet Union thought all Arab States should enter the battle now."

D: Enter the battle?

K: Yes.

D: He actually mentioned to the King?

K: Yes.

D: Okay, I will check this with Moscow right away. It's an unbelievable story.

K: Okay.

D: I'm sure on this country I should know. (laughs) I think this is really unbelievable, that he asked him to do this. He may just say in general. Well, I will check with Moscow, then I will be back with you, all right?

K: Okay, good.

D: There is for the time being nothing new I understand.

K: No. On my promise, we will make no move.

D: No.

K: Now, let me tell you something -- We're assuming when you say this and we're having this arrangement that we will not be confronted with an Egyptian move which you support.

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D: Well, you see the situation, I don't want really to do this in any way because I don't know what Egyptians will do and quite frankly [as a matter of fact] sometimes even Moscow doesn't know. I don't want you to [later on] tell me I am sorry you give me a solemn promise which I couldn't keep. In a sense I couldn't keep, not deliberately; we have an agreement but simply Zayat is uncontrollable. Today he refused -- Yesterday he refused to come ..... which you mentioned when he spoke with _____. He was not intending to make a speech in Security Council but then he consented to make it. On the General Assembly again he refused to have it in the morning or to make his speech when we asked him to find out what he's going to say he was unavailable on. So this is like you say he may come with a resolution or situation which overall the principal of support against the aggression and Malack will be forced to support. I'm speaking from this end. But Malack in a specific agreement to do something to put you in an embarrassing situation I.....

K: You have to help us study the problem you know.

D: I know because with the telegram going to Moscow I tell you very frankly that we will prepare to keep our part of the bargain but sometimes it could happen that U.N. will allow something that I couldn't control in Moscow.

K: Anatol, we will keep our side of the promise.

D: We will do the same.

K: Move up the Israelis restraint in so far as we can.

D: Henry, this is the impression I get that they are beginning to bomb civilialns. That's not a very good idea. I have instructions. My remarks are off. Damascus and somewhere in Cairo. It was an article that was published for the Republic of Science.

K: We'll wait until we hear from you. OK. Bye.

S 197

E

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Michael Sterner (State Mid-East Task Force)/Secy Kissinger
October , 1973/

K: Hello.

R: Yes Mr. Secretary.

K: I just wanted to find out what happened at the Security Council.

R: Well, we made our statement. The Egyptians then spoke and they -- Zayyat said that he -- they would not accept a ceasefire resolution or call for any return to the status quo ante unless we meant by that a return to the June 5, 1967, lines.

K: Did he leave open that _____ accept a straight ceasefire resolution.

R: No he did not. Oh did he leave open. Yes he did. He didn't really give any hope that he would but he didn't rule it out.

K: Was it nasty or was it in sorrow or in anger.

R: I would say it was mostly pretty straight. The one thing that seemed to anger him was when he spoke about our trying to pin the blame for starting the hostilities on the Egyptians at which point his voice rose a coupe of decibals and he said, you know, let the U.N. speak for itself let's not site evidence which they themselves have not put forward on this point. Then the Chinese spoke. I didn't hear that one sir but I don't believe it was... someone told me it was pretty much a straight Chinese line.

K: Which is what.

R: You know, it was blaming the super powers both of them for the situation and calling on the Israelis to withdraw in saying this is all the Israelis fault but I do not have the details on that.

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K: How was it left.

R: I gather that no resolutions were put forward. The Egyptians said that they were not going to put a resolution forward. Eban spoke briefly and said merely that what they had said about the Israelis beginning the hostilities was a lie but that he would reserve any further statements until a later time. I'm not absolutely certain, there may have been another speaker because we were tied up at the time but I'm told the U.K. spoke. I'm sorry I don't know exactly what the U.K. said. I was told Mr. Secretary that no one put forward on this occasion any specific draft resolutions or anything more specific than we really did in indicating that return to the previous conditions would be the least damaging way to.

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K: He supported that?

R: D,d the U.K. support? I don't know and I can try to find out for you.

K: It's not important. It's just how to understand what's on the Arab mind because by Wednesday that's going to be-~~XXXXXXXX~~ the Arabs are going to be thrown out of everything and the Israelis will be in Arab territory.

R: Well, I think it sounds likely that thats the case although we have some interesting late reports that the Israelis have taken quite a beating not only in aircraft which you know about but you may not have seen the latest thing which says that on the Syrian front they lost 150 tanks.

K: Really.

R: And they have reduced the estimate of Syrian losses from 400 to 300 which is the ratio which means the Israelis have taken quite a beating in relative terms you know compared to anything before. Are you reading me Sir, there seems to be alot of static.

K: No, I understand I was just thinking. OK. Thank you very much.

S 188

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

TELCON
Amb. Dinitz/HAK
Oct. 9, 1973 - 11:37 a.m.

K: Hello.

D: Dr. Kissinger?

K: Yes, Mr. Ambassador. We have to meet with the President, that won't be possible because of the visit of the Ivory Coast President until 4:00 this afternoon. You will hear from me sometime afterwards.

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D: After 4:00.

K: Yes.

D: Fine.

K: The most accurate information you can give me about the real military situation before then would be very important.

D: Fine. At 4:00 you will get it.

K: Well get it for me by 3:00 if you can.

D: Fine. I will do this and then you will get back to me after the meeting.

K: I'll get back to you after the meeting. I don't whether you have a correct assessment about domestic situation here. If you do, I don't think they have in Jerusalem.

D: About what?

K: About what is possible in our government.

[redacted] B1

D: [redacted] I wanted to ask you, Tuesday morning I had a stream of calls from the Senate and the House - individuals, asking what they can do and what the situation is. B1

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K: Well, I can't discuss that with you on the telephone.

D: I see. So we will discuss it when I see you?

K: Right. You know, we don't object to Senators and Congressmen asking for support, as long as they don't get specific.

D: Right.

K: And that they can do in the meantime.

D: Right.

K: And as much as possible.

D: Right.

K: O.K.

D: O.K. Thank you.

K: Bye.

RELEASED IN FULL *

5010

TELCON
Dobrynin/HAK
October 9, 1973 - 12:32 p.m.

D: American, yeah?

K: It's an American monitor. I'll send it over. Which quotes from a message of Brezhnev to Boumediene which in effect says the thing as the Jordanians did. Which, in effect, asks them to join the struggle. I hope Moscow understands that if it turns out that you fooled us you are going to pay a heavy price in your relationship with us.

D: It's understandable. Please send me with messenger immediately. O.K.?

K: Right.

D: Thank you very much.

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S198 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Cromer/HAK
October 9, 1973/11:38 p.m.

K: Hello

C: Oh, Henry, I didn't want to intrude on your evening.

K: Not at all. I was at a dinner for the President of the Ivory Coast.

C: It sounds immensely rewarding.

K: Mercifully. It just ended. He thought it was necessary for him to speak for half an hour in French with another one half hour translation.

C: We're very alone on the line aren't we.

K: Yes.

C: It's merely this. You and I talked about this thing between the ceasefire lines one way or the other. Eban made some remarks in New York which would point that if the politicians in Israel have their way they'll stop on the line and if they do that and this is an entirely a _____ remark. It's not HMG at all. I think its very important that the U.S. and/or the west get its credit for them stopping on that line. I think we want to think about some wording for that.

K: Let me understand it.

C: If the Israelis can push the Arabs back to the line and stop there and don't go beyond it (which is what we were talking about before). We want to get some credit if we can for the U.S. and all of us for having started them to do just that.

K: I agree. That's been our strategy all along.

C: But have we worked on any wording on this. Because it could happen suddenly.

K: Is that what you think?

C: Well, it's my personal thought. It's not my government's thought. It could happen quite suddenly and very soon that they get to the ceasefire lines, the Israelis, and they stay put. And then this sort of strategy we were talking about before really doesn't work very well. Do you see what I mean?

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K: Yes. I see what you mean.

C: If it was either one way or the other way we have the problem that you and I discussed that if the Israelis push them back to the line and then the Israelis stay on that line and don't push further then we've got a new situation in a kind of way which we need diplomatically before we review our situation with the Arabs. I mean to take credit for if we can contrive to do so.

K: I couldn't agree more.

C: Are minds work the same way.

K: And I can tell you that if the Israelis cross the line they'll move against us.

C: If they do that.

K: I see, but if they don't you want us to take credit for it.

C: That's my suggestion. It's not my _____ view.

K: But how would we do it?

C: I don't know. That's why I think why we want to apply our minds to wording which is directly what we hoped would happen.

K: What is your view -- well it's happening now.

C: Well, Eban's remarks in New York that implied they might do that. He made that today ....

K: That they might stop at the line?

C: Yes.

K: OH, yes, that I think is possible and that we strongly urged him to do.

C: Oh you have done.

K: Yes.

C: Then you can take credit for it.

K: Oh yes we can take credit for it.

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C: Well that's fine.

K: I thought you wanted some public statement.

C: Yes. If it does happen because I think they'll have political problems in Israel. I think the military will want to go on further.

K: Well, what do you think is going to happen in the Security Council? Are you people planning to put forward some resolutions.

C: No, not at all.

K: Because you think it would be vetoed.

C: I don't think we have any particular proposition to put forward.

K: You mean like the straight ceasefire.

C: Well, we could do that but I think you felt, and I think we say in view of that was rather too simple. But I think if the Israelis stop on the line the sort of statutes that you and I were discussing a couple days ago are slightly overtaken by events. Because We were thinking either it would swing one way or the other.

K: Right.

C: But if they do, I mean, it saves self-restraint that they do do that and in a way makes the western diplomacy more difficult. With the Arabs I mean.

K: That I agree with.

C: It's still a question of just trying our minds of that contingency and if we have any ideas. I haven't gone to London mind you. If we have any ideas on that it could happen quite abrupt see and we ought to take advantage of it from the relations with the Arab world and everyone else.

K: Are you people surprised at the course of hostilities.

C: No. They are going rather slower than I think we anticipated.

K: Us too.

C: That's the only element of surprise in it.

K: But that makes alot of difference.

C: Yes, but it also gives us a little bit of opportunity to think out what we're going to do.

K: Exactly.

C: I do emphasize that this is really my own personal thinking and not based on any instructions I've had.

K: I fully understand that but our thinking is exactly on the same direction as mine.

C: Fine. and if I can think of any formula. That could pose a new question so to speak in the posture we end up with, if the Israelis just stop on the ceasefire lines.

K: I agree. If they could stop there that would be the easiest way to end it.

C: It's the easiest way to end it but in a way will leave more things unresolved.

K: I think Rollie, the situation has changed fundamentally. This has been such a brutal fight for the Israelis. They will not have the same cockiness again.

C: No, but I think that this does, if they were to do that, it does provide quite an opportunity for you to step in if you want too.

K: That's right. And that's our intention.

C: That was the thought that was put in ~~the~~ mind by me I thought.

K: Exactly. Thank you.

S 186 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Ken Rush/HAK
October 9, 1973/9:20 a.m.

R: Hello

K: Ken, I have just had some very personal information to the President from the Israelis which isn't too good but which I [redacted] want you to share and which I don't want to repeat on the telephone.

R: Alright.

K: But I'm holding a meeting of the principals only of WSAG and therefore none of you. Maybe we could treat you as a principal for this purpose Why don't you get over here.

R: What time is it?

K: Immediately. And without any debriefing in State. Don't say you're coming over to see me.

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S196

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
B/G Scowcroft - Secretary Kissinger
October 9, 1973
7:35 p. m.

S: I think so. I did mention it to him and he said OK, if that's the way Henry wants to do it.

K: I don't really object to keeping a clear line, not get any argument.

S: ....carefully controlled.

K: But if he wants to, I don't object to their being there.

S: I can run it past him again.

K: Of course, I think I could give a more coherent picture without them.

S: OK, I'll check it with him.

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S195

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON, Oct. 9, 1973

Secretary/ Secretary Schlesinger

K. I have talked to Dinitz in the sense that you and I talked and they ~~xxxx~~ will be getting in touch with your people. He also said that at some ppoint somebody on your staff should suggest that he see you and I strongly favor that.

X.
X.
S. ....

S. I'm for it.

K. . . . . might institute what might have to take on an emergency basis on the heavy stuff

S. That's right. You inderstand we'll have to take over the equipment of the (?) for the M'28's. We'll have to stand down a division.

K. Give them some M-48's.

S. We're pretty well clean of that

K. They seem to have enough airplanes.. they are willing

S. With this kind of movement we won't be able to keep it ~~xxxxxx~~ quiet. With all the Israeli planes flying around it will be impossible for the Arabs not to find out.

K. It's extremely important to keep it low key as we possibly can.

S. Right.

K. If we can get through this crisis with antagonizing the Arabs

S. The Russians are acting up

K. Yes, I'm going to scare the bejesus out of Dobrynin in about 5 minutes.

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(S 193)

TELCON
Rush/HAK
Oct. 9, 1973 - 5:55 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Ken?

R: Yes, Henry.

K: Ken, over here people are leaning towards my holding back on the personnel announcement.

R: Well, I can understand that and I certainly don't want to rush it because I....

K: So let's not send out any _____ stuff.

R: Alright. That suits me very much. I want to talk to you before we do it anyway.

K: Well, I just thought this thing might sort of move along.

R: No, no, I've done nothing and I as you know have my own doubts as to the timing.

K: It seems to me now, looking at it realistically, that I'll have to cancel my trip to Europe.

R: You think so?

K: Well, I don't see how I can be out of town for four days, for three days, Saturday, Sunday and Monday.

R: I don't see, really, how you can either.

K: Because this thing, I thought it would be wound up by Thursday, but it now looks like there won't be a military outcome before Thursday night which means there won't be a diplomatic outcome for another 5 or 6 days.

R: That's right. I think this is right, Henry. In that case the urgency is pretty well diluted I think. I also have very serious doubts about doing this at a time when it won't even be noticed. Because I want to see you get some real impact from it.

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K: Well, it also might... it has a sort of a self-serving quality if you go ahead moving a lot of people around in the middle of a crisis. People will wonder, what the hell, couldn't it wait a few days?

R: That's the point. Instead of being an affirmative it could have some negative aspects. I think you're probably right. I think we should wait.

K: O.K.

R: I'll do nothing further until we get together.

K: Good.

R: O.K. Henry, thanks a lot.

K: Thank you.

S 191 *

TELCON
Amb. Dinitz/HAK
10/9/73 - 3:45 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

D: Dr. Kissinger?

K: Yes.

D: I explained to Eagleburger a few lines on the current situation in....

K: Yeah, come on, I'm in a great hurry. What is it?

D: There are no basic changes on the ground. The major thing is we have destroyed a hundred Syrian tanks today. Only 30 Syrian tanks remained in the Golan Heights.

K: You destroyed 100 today?

D: We destroyed 100 today. Only 30 Syrian tanks remained within our area of the Golan Heights. There are more outside. Our losses in planes increased to 49 from the beginning of the war. We lost 11 today. All of them six____ Syria. The rest can... not meaningful, the rest of the changes. The Egyptian front remains steady. They lost several dozens of tanks when they tried to cross the bridges today. On the ground there was no change.

K: We have a report here that you hit the Soviet Embassy in Damascus.

D: Somebody just heard it on the radio, but we have no report of this whatsoever. I would inquire of course in Israel.

K: O.K. Well, I have to run to see the President.

D: Fine. I'll expect to hear from you. Thank you.

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S190*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
David Frost/Secretary Kissinger
October 9, 1973
1:45 pm

F: I was calling you as we said we would talk today on your movements .

K: I'm still not sure. Can you call me tomorrow or I'll call you.

F: Easily. Easily. I'll call you tomorrow and if you're not there I'll leave the number with your secretary.

K: That's fine.

F: Well, have a good luncheon, Henry. Oh, I gave your greetings to John.

K: I was hoping to see him.

F: Perhaps we can get together if you're free on the night of the 14th.

K: Let's aim for something like that.

F: Lovely, Lovely. I'll get John to reserve a date. I'll call you tomorrow. Goodbye.

K: Fine, goodbye David.

END

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S192 *

TELCON
Ziegler/HAK
10/9/73 - 5:47 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

Z: Hi, Henry.

K: Yes, Ron.

Z: What is your judgment about announcing the Leadership Meeting tonight?

K: I'd announce it, well....

Z: You know, it's 9:00 in the morning.

K: Yeah. I don't know. What do you think?

Z: If we don't announce it tonight it will spring as a real surprise in the morning.

K: Well then announce it - too late for the evening....

Z: That's what I thought. I said maybe we'd announce it about 7:00 or 7:30.

K: Just a special meeting.

Z: Bi-partisan leadership meeting.

K: Right.

Z: Subject - Middle East.

K: Right.

Z: Now do you still expect to hold a news conference this week?

K: Well, that's what I wanted to ask you. What do you think?

Z: I think you should definitely leave your option open to do it later in the week.

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K: Well, it's scheduled now for 11:00 on Thursday.

Z: Well, let's discuss it tomorrow afternoon, don't you think?

K: I was going to make personnel announcements then. This isn't a good week for it though.

Z: Absolutely not.

K: O.K. Fine.

Z: Don't do that. I expect McCloskey would agree with that.

K: No, he wants it done.

Z: He wants personnel announcements?

K: Yeah. But I think.... ;You see, I'll have to cancel my trip to Europe. I won't be able to go to Europe Saturday morning, Ron.

Z: Not if things keep going the way they are, no sir.

K: The earliest they can now break is Thursday night. You know, by Thursday night if the Israelis haven't won, they have lost. And then it will take us 4 or 5 days to wrap it up. You know, to go through the maneuvers.

Z: Right.

K: O.K. I agree with you.

Z: O.K. But we can discuss it tomorrow.

K: Right. Bye.

S 194

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Ambassador Dinitz - Secretary Kissinger
October 9, 1973
7:25 p. m.

K: Mr. Ambassador. I have talked to Schlesinger. You can now go ahead. The only other thing I would like to point out to you is a situation now developing in which it is very hard for us to resist a cease-fire in place proposal. Therefore in designing your strategy you should keep that in mind.

D: Cease-fire in place, you mean back to the lines...

K: Cease-fire to whatever line they are at...Eban and I discussed. You might be ready to accept Tuesday night.

D: Next week?

K: It depends on the tactical position. It's a hell of a position for the United States to take. ...Our tactical assessment is that we may be in a position where we veto a resolution urging you to go back to '67 borders.

D: Yes, but nobody takes that seriously.

K: Maybe not, but we can get a majority vote. May not be serious but it will pass unless we veto it. ....going back to the line, also their staying where they are after weeks of fighting it will be a hell of a thing to defend in public opinion. There is no reason to suppose that will develop. If I were an Egyptian with some sense of balance, I might at some point tell the Russians....

D: When I last talked to Eban he was under the notion that such a resolution would be vetoed by you.

K: That was on Sunday. He told me he ..... Tuesday. Here it is Tuesday...until Thursday or Friday. Going to be extremely tough. at that point.

D: Naturally we will do our best.

K: I am referring to one particular comment you made.

D: About letting ...

K: letting the situation develop slowly.

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D: We would not on our own initiative want it to be slowly. We would just take necessary time, no more than the necessary...

K: Don't think we should discuss it on the telephone but I think they should be aware in Jerusalem out the tactical situation is developing. We can drag it out but there is a limit to what can be done. We of course would not specifically introduce it, you have no worries on that score.

D: Of course not, I will make them aware of the situation, both Eban in New York and in Jerusalem.

S 187 *

TELCON
Amb. Dinitz (Israel)/ Secy Kissinger (at home)
1:45 a.m., October 9, 1973

RELEASED IN FULL

D: I hope I didn't wake you.

K: It's all right.

D: I didn't want to wake you up but your secretary said ..... The reason I am disturbing you, we have an evaluation of the situation up to midnight. I am sitting here with the Military Attache who was the Commander of our _____. The situation really is placing us a number of difficult situations which to make a long story short, whether we will be able to get the parts we need as well as the planes. But I thought if it is not possible now, maybe very early in the morning I would like to bring the Military Attache with the material to you for you to get a complete picture and together we can then cable the Prime Minister the situation we are facing.

K: All right. Let me see, let's aim for about 8:00 -- shortly after 8:00 in the Map Room of the White House.

D: Fine, I will be there.

K: Is it a difficult situation?

D: Difficult in the choices that we are facing. To make it simple, in the Canal we have ..... 5 divisions of Infantry, which means about 50,000 people and 700 tanks. Although the bridges are destroyed behind them, the choice is then to press forward with the Canal behind them. The question that we are facing is how to handle the situation and that depends on what we will be able to get .... planes and etc.

K: Anti-tanks is easier than planes in the short time.

D: I suggest that we wait until the morning. If you think it is advisable that Haig (I believe he means Scowcroft) participate too because I will bring my General.

K: Let me see what I find in the morning.

D: Thank you very much. I will see you in the morning.

wgh

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S 189 *

TELCON
Senator Church/Secy Kissinger
11:48 a.m., October 9, 1973

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello, Frank, how are you?

C: Well, I'm fine. I know you're a very busy man, Henry, and I won't take much of your time.

K: Not at all, always happy to hear from you.

C: More on the Middle East. Now that it has broken out and you're right in the midst of it, I think the only good that might come of it is that these Egyptian and Syrian forces are broken sufficiently to eliminate the threat for a long time to come. I was wondering about the losses that the Israeli Government has sustained in the air and what we can do about helping replace those losses.

K: Well, of course, we have two problems, Frank. One is to help and the other to start a massive influx of equipment while the battle is going on is a rather serious matter.

C: But the Phantoms, is there a way that they can be slipped in? Because I understand the Egyptian and Syrian forces are getting rapid replacement from their Arab allies.

K: Well, frankly, we are looking into it today. And we are, incidentally, on other equipment not inactive.

C: Uh-huh.

K: And it's a difficult thing to discuss on the telephone.

C: I understand.

K: But I understand what you are saying.

C: Well, I just wanted to express my concern about it and I think its a tragedy that this thing has broken out again but that's it. If we act more decisive, the victory I think the better under the circumstances.

K: I agree.

C: All right.

K: I think on the strategy we are in substantial agreement.

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C: All right, Henry. I just wanted to express my feeling and I won't .....

K: No, I'm glad. You know, I won't suffer any pain if you say anything publicly as long as you don't mention the type of thing that should be done.

C: Right.

K: You know, if you just say equipment or something like that without mentioning the types.

C: All right, I'll do it.

K: Good, Frank.

C: All right.

K: Bye.

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(S207)

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
October 10, 1973
4:50 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Did you tell him we have not told anybody?

S: I told him we haven't told anyone. I told him we had told noone and we were telling him ...you were in discussion with the President He said could you tell me what direction they're going in. I said no that they were discussing it now.

K: Yeah.

S: And, let's see, he is still worried about resupply..to run it up.

K: You can call and say we have definitely decided not to have any meeting today and we have authorized the charter service to ...we favor chartering planes to Israel.

S: No indication of the trend of your thinking?

K: Say -- no joint US/Soviet resolution. we will try to stay away from... Did you tell him not to do anything?

S: I said keep fighting hard but it would be disastrous to do anything to pre-empt the President -- like anything foolish like bombing downtown Cairo. He said the Prime Minister has said we will not rest til we have punished them severely for their aggression . I said we were aware of what the Prime Minister said. I'll call him back and tell him

K: You think we're doing the right thing.

S: I do. I tried..if they have any idea of their time-table it would be helpful...we're not the only factor. He didn't respond. He said he had another 40 aircraft grounded for the rest of the week -- that means one-third of the airforce is out of action. He said had delivered 2 and in addition there would be 5 more. I said no, there would be 3 more for a total of 5.

K: You call Schlesinger and say if we have to sweeten the pot how many aircraft can we spare to do it, but call him on the secure line.

S: Yes.

END

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(S209) *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON 5:45 p.m., October 10, 1973

Secretary/Ronald Zeigler

Z. Yes, Henry?

K. What is your view on the press conference?

Z. I would say Friday.

K. You would?

Z. I have not had a chance to discuss it with him. Do you have to decide tonight?

K. Let me give you the advantages of tomorrow. . . There may be something by Friday that I would want to stay away from. But these

Z. You know Richardson is having a press conference tomorrow at 11.

K. Then let's definitely aim for Friday.

Z. OK, Henry.

K. Good.

mj

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S 210 *

TELECON

RELEASED IN FULL

Mr. Schlesinger/Secretary Kissinger
October 10, 1973
7:15 pm

S: I indicated that I have talked to you about the 2 Phantoms before we sent them off. There is no other practical way to do it than to send along a US tanker.

K: When do you do that?

S: Let it go at 6:00 am tomorrow. It has already hit the newspapers. Some spokesman indicated that we were continuing to supply

K: Well, you might as well let them go

S: Secondly, we were preparing to send some Marines to the Mediterranean ...normal transfer ...ready at Norfolk

K: I would do that for a week.

S: You would do that.

K: Yes, I mean I would not send them for a week. Well, you're keeping a..there.

S: Well it takes ten days to get to Gilbralter.

K: Well, hell, in ten days it will be over.

S: You're confident about that?

K: Well, if not we'll need them. Is that all of your business?

S: And I have noticed that 40 USAF have been ..

K: Jim, you have my word that we'll make no move in that direction without letting you know. ...option one plus 5 plus replacements for losses nad you handle replacements of heavy equipment.

S: yes.

K: I don't know if you heard from Scowcroft

S: No.

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K: Well, if I want to sweeten the pot for the Israelis -- what planes can you scrape together?

S: I just don't know.

K: Look, this is based on the assumption of no combat.

S: Only phantoms..

K: The Israelis told me this afternoon that in addition to the 52, they have lost,40 others are out of action.

S: We're scrapoing spare parts for them to try and fix that up..... the Soviet resupply operation.

K: Good, it is much more massive than ours. Dobrynin called me and he said Henry, I know you too well. When I read about our resupply I know you're doing it too.

S: You know him too well.

K: That's right and maybe that will get us out of this. I think we may be able to gin something up here.

S: Good. You know what the problems are.

K: I am painfully aware of the problems and it won't be much longer. We're working on that right now.

S: When do you expect a WSAG?

K: As soon as I have something to say but I will give you a special briefing on the phone tomorrow.

S: Good. thank you.

END

S208 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Ron Ziegler - Secretary Kissinger
October 10, 1973
5:18 p.m.

K: ....had had a press conference, we could desist from personnel announcements...what does, Bob McCloskey thinks, and there is a lot to be said for it, that we should go ahead and....the Vice President strengthens this. ....foreign governments not that sure...impression of assurance.

Z: Don't think you should announce

K: Personnel, I'm not arguing that...

Z: Have to stay away from the Vice President...

K: Most useful not to talke about the Vice President, but speak firmly and positively about foreign policy.

Z: I agree.

K: What is your judgment? We could do it Thursday or Friday.

Z: Friday, but...

K: Let me look at cables first to see what's going to be going on Thursday and Friday.

Z: Do you want me to raise it with the President? Really should.

K: Why don't you.

Z: I'll tell him I favor it.

K: Tell him we've already sort of announced it, after checking.

Z: Now, Henry. You received the letter at 2:05?

K: I received the letter at 2:05 in my office, at the White House.

Z: Yes, sir.

K: I took the letter to the President, we talked for a bit and I attended a White House meeting.

Z: I am going to say Henry, that Haig received the same letter at 2:06, then took it to the President.

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K: That's true.

Z: For a change. Oh, that's wasn't a proper thing to say. OK Mr. Secretary.

K: ...

(S 206) *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Ambassador Dinitz/Mr. Kissinger
10:46 a.m. 10/10/73

K: How are you Mr. Ambassador?

D: Good, and you.

K: Okay. What is the--how do you see the situation? What is your latest word?

D: The latest word in the field is the following. The bridge- head which the Egyptiar have --are occupying in the canal is very narrow; it is 3 to 5 miles. They are completely contained, there were some attempts during the night to break south web and all the tanks were eliminated. They lost some tanks, some planes, the situation is that they are completely contained to narrow--and this is important that the bridge is narrow so they cannot develop a _____. We are continuing--I'm still on the Egyptain--continuing a regular air attacks on air fields and missiles. The Egyptians are guarding their planes, they don't send them up. They are using the missiles instead. We are expecting--we have information about additional _____ squadrons from Libya and a Mig squadron from Algeria as well as some _____ from Iraq.

K: Yeh.

D: On the Syrian side, the thing is going well. The last telephone call we had is we are almost in complete control of the land and the problem that we are trying to do now is to hit the reserve arm brigades that are still outside of the Golan Heights by air action and to prevent the joining of the Iraqi _____ position which according to our information is moving toward Syria. There are increased operation from Lebanon of guerrilla operations--40 incidents . Then we now have information which we cannot confirm so I'll wait with it

K: What is it.

D: That is there is supposedly an airlift Syrian but I don't--

K: That's probably true.

D: Is it?

K: Yeh.

D: You have information

K: I have a pretty good report.

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D: Well we have it still in a very doubtful question, but we will see how it develops then.

K: We've already warned the Soviets against it.
I've given them a very strong warning.

D: Yes. Then I have a message from the Prime Minister to the President.

K: I am in a terrible hurry to get to a meeting to the President, ould you give me a in two sentences--

D: Yeh. Sure. The sentences are--I was told this morning of the vital decision you made to assure the immediate and so on__. Your decision will have a great influence in our fighting capability. I know it is now that I can count on your understanding. We are fighting against very heavy odds, but we are fully confident that we will come out victorious. When we do we will have you in mind. Golda Meir. And a small message from her to you saying that she is more than words to thank you and she says to tell you, that Israel defense forces are doing everything in their power to hit the enemy effectively and swiftly .

K: The major thing is to get them back to the ceasefire--pre-Saturday lines because we will--we are under unbelievable diplomatic pressure from everybody along that line which we are holding, but you understand.

D: I understand this.

K: And I tried to explain that to you last night. I have the impression from something you said that it might be part of your strategy not to take the bridgehead for a while

D: No, what I said to you was just my own idea, maybe we would leave some until we ~~think~~ finish the job so that they would not be calling for a--

K: I know

D: ----situation.

K: I know but I just

D: But this is not our strategy, our strategy is as soon as we can to drive them out.

K: My feeling is that beyond some point given the oil pressures, I mean I have to talk to you some other time, you have no idea what pressures we are unde

K But we are containing. So luckily there is no specific proposal around. But if a specific proposal gets around, we'll be in trouble and that is what I meant to say to you yesterday.

D: Right. I got the message yesterday. I will re-emphasize it today.

K: Good.

D: Can we be in touch later when you finish the meeting

K: Absolutely.

K: And you talked to Scowcroft about supplies in about 15 minutes. I need his attention which is not easy--

D: I have a meeting with Schlesinger at noon so at 2:00/I would like to talk to you before that.

K: Right. Thank you.

D:

S211 *

TELECON, 8:59 p.m. October 10, 1973

RELEASED IN FULL

Secretary General Scowcroft

.....

K. HEM 70 AD - still in the experimental stage. He claims we have about 300 of them. I don't know whether that is true.

S. I was told we ~~heard~~ hda hadn't picked up enough signals. Could be we are still experimenting and --based on the fact that we hvent' picked up enough signatls -- that's why we are playing with it. This could be a useful experiment.

K. Can you please tell those guys in Defense to expedite these shipments?

S. On those F-4's, two are scheduled to go tomorrow and three the next day. Yes, I'll get on on the rest.

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S201*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Scali - Secretary Kissinger
October 10, 1973
12:15 p. m.

K: I know what you are going to tell me and I already know it. I want you to just... stay cool...

S: No, I want to tell you something new. I know you have talked to Malik. If Scowcroft is doing his job... I want to tell you something new. Hoveda the Israeli Ambassador still manages to be on friendly terms with El-Zayyat and he said to El-Zayyat, it seems to me you already have a victory. you should now be thinking of the next step. El-Zayyat said, "We are open to a move towards peace and will study it."

K: That's all right. Just sit tight, John. We've got to get all the pieces together. But you must give me this kind of information.

S: Could you give me some guidance for my own personal information.

K: I don't know yet... expecting to hear something later on today. I will be in touch with you as soon as we have confirmed it.

S: Larry McIntyre, the President of the Security Council, now feels under some pressure to show the manhood of the Security Council. He is quite willing to do nothing today, but I don't think I can keep him from resuming tomorrow.

K: Exactly what I am counting on.

S: Avoid today if we can. ?

K: Try to avoid it today. Try to make sure to get all the pieces in place and be ready to move tomorrow. Going to do some more cross checking today.

S: All right.

K: ...all the principal parties... we are being in touch with .. to not to get any eager beavers up there, jumping the gun...

S: Nobody's going to jump the gun...

K: I don't mean you.. other people up there who may be getting some sense of things.

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S: Just a moment ago the Syrians urgently went to Malik saying they needed to discuss something of great importance.

K: Well, I think the Israelis are bombing in Syria again.

S: They said it was very, put it in very urgent terms.

K: OK, John, as soon as I know something ....

S: Just remember on the other end I can't do what I am supposed to do....

K: Actually, John, you probably know a tiny bit more than I do. But I don't want to move until I have all the pieces in place. As soon as I have more information I will call you.

S: I know that, I understand and approve of that.

S199 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger/Sec. Schlesinger
8:27 a.m. 10/10/73

S: ...the Soviet resupply operations

K: Yeh

S: That's gone overt now, and in particular the movement of the Saudi forces up to Syria--

K: Are they moving?

S: Yeh you remember the original brigade which the Jordanians would not permit to move--

K: Yeh

S: They have now requested rights to move other brigades from Saudi proper through Jordan and Jordan can't really resist it.

K: Yeh

S: So I think that we are going to get into a position in which all of our interests in Saudi Arabia are at risk and it might be desirable to examine the fundamentals of our position--

K: Well what are the fundamentals of our position, as you see it?

S: Well, the fundamentals are that we may be faced with the choice that ~~lies~~ lies cruelly between support of Israel, loss of Saudi Arabia and if interests in the Middle East are at risk, the choice ~~of~~ between occupation or watching them go down the drain

K: Occupation of whom?

S: That would remain to be seen--it can be partial

K: But which country are we occupying?

S: That's one of the things we'd like to talk about.

K: Who's we?

S: Me.

K: Okay, I have heard an urgent message which I've got to take up withthe President and I'll be back to you later this morning and we'll get together this morning.

S: Okay.

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K: Wait a minute, how are our supply things going?

S: Okay. Fairly well, given the limitation on aircraft.

K: Right.

S: If ththey are able to get contract aircraft of course they can move the stuff more rapidly.

K: Okay, well I'll be back to you.

S: Okay.

K: Bye.

S204 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Schlesinger/Secretary Kissinger
October 10, 1973
12:45 pm

K: As I understand it you're seeing Dinitz today.

S: I don't know. I am with the Appropriations Committee right now.

K: If you are I'm not sure you should. If you are be very forthcoming. Before I move in the other direction. Give me credit for it this morning. Give him some sense of satisfaction.

S: I thought they had that -- a sense of satisfaction.

K: They have a great sense of satisfaction and I don't think they want anything

S: OK, fine.

K: Good Jim and many thanks.

END

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RELEASED IN FULL

S203

TELECON
Eban/Kissinger
October 10, 1973
12:35

E: I would like to share a few thoughts with you. I talked with the President of Security Council and others. Before that I would like to thank you and your gp vernment warmly for response to certain requests we have been making. Everybody in Israel very moved by that. The second matter, very strange situation indicates deadlock likely to be prolonged. Third, Soviet/Arab position of asking for a cease-fire with return to the situation of 7 years ago. Not put forward. No consensus. know it wouldn't be adopted.

K: We wo uld veto that.

E: Sufficiently assumed that deter anybody from making proposal. Secondly, your Ambassador suggested.

K: I understand, I have several people waiting for me...and thirdly it is the straight cease-fire in place, right?

E: Cease-fire in place. British admit position on ground no....to it. My feeling is they are going to get regular cease-fire. On the news Arabs, Sadat told European Ambassadors that even if they lost 1 million men there..they wouldn't have a cease-fire. We must get used to the idea that won't have a cease-fire unless the Soviets change.

K: Suppoisng we could get one, what would you say?

E: Position remains as it was. Some...recalled to my people that we do....balance of interests.

K: That would be my advice.

E: It may be happening in the North. Even no sure they could do more.

You have to understand what I have told our Ambassador. We will not put anything forward. Will become very tough for us if somebody else puts something forward.

E: I agree we have seen no signs of it here . Did not wish...

K: I have just instructed Scali to do nothing today which is gaainst his temperament.

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E: While I was in McIntyre's office Waldheim called saying there has to be a meeting. Press is talking about lack of a meeting. Australian very dry about....

K: Good, Mr. Foreign Minister. I'll call you later this afternoon when we are able to see things here more clearly.

E: I also want to talk about the Soviets role. Perhaps if I can get away to Washington, we should talk about that.

K: We might do that later tomorrow morning.

END

(S200) *

TELCON
Ron Ziegler/Secy Kissinger
10:59 a.m. October 10, 1973

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Ron, on the way into the President.

Z: Right. _____ did well. The quote is that Mansfield said that as far as the Congress is concerned, we support completely the course of action being undertaken by President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger.

K: Excellent.

Z: Now, the only touchy part and I just wanted to get your quick advice. They were asked about did anything come up about the Soviets encouraging other Arabs to join in and the way they answered that was simply that Dr. Kissinger made it clear that he is in constant touch with the Soviet Union, the PRC, and all permanent members -- you know, constant touch was the line they used.

K: Fine.

Z: Is that the way you want Gerry and me to handle it?

K: No, you can say we are urging in very strong way restraint on all the parties, especially the Soviet Union.

Z: Should I say anything about the message?

K: No, no.

Z: Okay. We are urging restraint.

K: On all parties. Don't ever mention another message between Brezhnev and the President.

Z: All right.

K: Good. Bye.

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S205*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin - Secretary Kissinger
October 10, 1973
5:40 p. m.

D: He just mentione to me, wasn't Harrison... information he received... wanted some additional information.

K: Its unbelievable.

D: He was on the telephone. I was there, exactly on my left hand, he himself was surprised. Harrison... was calling on instructions from Scali. Malik knows all about it.

K: I am telling you Anatoly, nobody is authorized, nobody in our government knows anything about our conversations except the President and me.

D: He was referring to Scali, not to the government... said Scali had asked for some details like he wanted to clarify from Malik. Malik doesn't know anything. It is nothing,... said ... when could he....

K: Tell Malik nobody in New York knows anything, tell him not to say anything to anybody.

D: Yes, Henry. OK.

K: Yes, I will be in touch a little later.

D: You can call me.

K: I will call you. Presents significant problems for us. As well as for you. Would not push you. I understand, privately, waiting for a couple .....problems. We consider it a serious proposal and we have to think this thing through to think how to answer.

D: Henry, I see in the news media... build-up.

K: For your information, we are doing next to nothing.

D: It says build-up going on in news media, suspect beginning of new, ...check with Malik doing something or not ?

K: Anatoly, you have gone through too many crises with me. We are trying to get this thing settled. You are going to hear from us during the course of the evening.

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D: Did you receive a letter?

K: When, this morning you mean.?

D: Of course, you received letter at 2:05.

K: Oh, from the Vice President.

D: Henry, why it was you who received it?

K: According to law I sign all commission so resignations have to be made to me.

D: So, if you refused it couldn't be made.

K: I threatened the President with that.

D: Makes you the second, perhaps the first, most powerful man in the country because you could refuse to accept it.

K: Telephone...from the State Department.

D: You are calling from State?

K: Connected in a straight line from the White House, they can just throw the switch when I am at the State Department.

D: Scowcroft called me...Malik on the telephone. I call....

S202 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
B/G Scowcroft - Secretary Kissinger
October 10, 1973
12:25:p. m.

K: You talked to Dobrynin. Were you firm?

S: I was firm. He said he would call off Malik right away and tell him to shut up.

K: Tell him to stop running around in New York. Because that could get unmanageable...if this thing gets out.

S: .....back to the position.

K: You tell him, ...that that's the position and we will do it...

S: That's what I told him.

K: Then there's no need for me to call him.

S: I don't think so. No.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 04 MAY 2004 200102979

SD 13 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin/Secy Kissinger
11:45 a.m., October 10, 1973

K: Anatol, I just wanted to tell you the following. We are having a major domestic problem, which as you will see, even you will recognize it's major, which is coming to a head early this afternoon.

D: Yeah.

K: And so there will be decisional delay until I can get you -- But you will get your formal answer.

D: You mean it happens today or tomorrow?

K: By the end of the day I will give you an answer.

D: By the end of the day.

K: I just want you to know. You will see that this is not a delaying tactic.

D: Yeah. But what is the crisis? Could you tell me that?

K: Well, it concerns the Vice President.

D: Oh, I see.

K: So I wanted you to know that and I'll be in touch with you around 4:00 or 5:00 o'clock this afternoon.

D: 4:00 or 5:00.

K: Right.

D: Okay.

K: We are thinking very seriously about what you said.

D: No, I think this is really a chance for both of us.

K: No, no, I recognize it. Now, may I urge you, however, really both you and your friends, not to force us into anything prematurely.

D: But what really our friends could force you, really? I don't -- Could you really mention what our friends could force you, for example?

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K: Well, for example, give us a chance to have a meeting on the subject here.

D: But what they could do up till 5 o'clock, nothing?

K: I don't know what they could --

D: Neither do I.

K: They crossed the Suez Canal, maybe they'll cross the Hudson River.

D: Oh, this is another story. This is another story. (laughs) Well, as for us, there will be no trouble. But as for them, well, I couldn't give a guarantee. They have a Minister here sitting so he knows better than I do. But, speaking theoretically, I do not see any way in which they could force you to do something.

K: No, no. Well, they can't force us but we would like not to be forced into verbal battles.

D: No, no, I understand.

K: No, we can't be forced. You've experienced that often enough.

D: No, no, I know. But as of now, what we are doing there will be no statement from our representative. We will not be eager at all to have another Security Council. So on this side, it's safe. On our side, you're not going to say anything which could --

K: Well, then we will not say anything and I'll be in touch with you around 5'clock.

D: Yeah. And we didn't tell anyone about what [we] mentioned to you . . . .

K: And just for your information, we have not told anyone. And I repeat anyone.

D: I understand. And Malik has the same instruction. Except he might be in contact with -- He has instruction, I am telling you off-the-record, that if this thing will come, it's settled okay. And it will come Security Council. Then he has instruction to come to Scali before the meeting and tell him how he will vote.

K: Good. But let him not go to Scali either now. Make sure he doesn't go to Scali.

D: Okay. I will mention to him specifically.

K: Okay. Good.

D: Because his instruction now is before he has to notify because he will make a statement against -- on a principle position about, not touching you at all, but about Israel, that kind of thing, but at the same time he will not tell him that it doesn't matter . . . . [obscure thing].

K: Right.

D: Okay?

K: Right.

D: So I will just warn him not to tell anything to Scali, as I understand you want it. Or is it better not to tell them ..... they'll be sitting there -- I don't know, what do you think?

K: Tell them not to go to Scali because Scali doesn't know anything about it and he's very excitable.

D: (laughs) I understand.

K: And we have told -- The only people who know up to now are the President.

D: I understand.

K: And, as you will see very soon, the President cannot possibly address this question for a couple of hours.

D: I understand.

K: But what I've told you about this domestic situation, Anatol, is a sign of my great confidence in you.

D: No, no, no. I understand. But does this coming affect in any way --

K: It affects nothing.

D: Nothing. I mean, from the point of view of foreign policy.

K: In terms of foreign policy, it, if anything, strengthens our abilities.

D: I speak in a sense of ability not a public relations because sometimes .....

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K: In terms of our foreign policy, it either affects it not at all or strengthens it.

D: Okay.

K: But in terms of making a decision and in terms of getting time with the President, that is now very difficult until into the afternoon.

D: I understand. Okay. Well, until the end of the day.

K: And, therefore, we don't want to get anything started with a lot of other countries.

D: Yeah, I understand.

K: Good.

D: Thank you very much. I will await your call.

K: And we have emphatically not yet discussed it with the Israelis.

D: I understand.

K: Because we do not want their lobby to start working here.

D: Yeah, I think this is the wise thing.

K: Before we have a chance to ....

D: To make your own decision.

K: To make our own decisions on how to handle it.

D: I understand.

K: Good.

D: All right.

wgh

S 217

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dinnitz/Secretary Kissinger
October 10, 1973
10:00 pm

K: Sometime during the courseoof tomorrow. You have to understand when I said .. Monday or Tuesday that my nightmare is that the Egyptians will come into a resolution which we might have to veto and that would be regretable. .. if were Egyptians asking for a cease-fire.. so this is the reality I want you to know. I am not asking you to accept it.

D: I understand. I am now in the process of receiving some cables from Israel that might shed some light on this.

K: I must have an idea of how much time you will need, if if you want to pass this on to Eagleburger...

D: I can't because it is of an operational nature.

K: Can I call you?

D: Anytime, anytime. I will be in the office all night. I have talked to my staff about the charter.. I hear from my Air Force that the Phantoms that were to leave tomorrow will be delayed because of a hurricane.

K: Well, I can't help that.

D: I know, this is something that I just learned and..

K: That means five will go on Friday.

D: So, maybe all five can go on Friday. I am just telling you this.. but it may get out. So, I'll expect a call from you..

K: Yes, I'll call you and thank you.

END

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SD 13 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin/Secy Kissinger
11:45 a.m., October 10, 1973

K: Anatol, I just wanted to tell you the following. We are having a major domestic problem, which as you will see, even you will recognize it's major, which is coming to a head early this afternoon.

D: Yeah.

K: And so there will be decisional delay until I can get you -- But you will get your formal answer.

D: You mean it happens today or tomorrow?

K: By the end of the day I will give you an answer.

D: By the end of the day.

K: I just want you to know. You will see that this is not a delaying tactic.

D: Yeah. But what is the crisis? Could you tell me that?

K: Well, it concerns the Vice President.

D: Oh, I see.

K: So I wanted you to know that and I'll be in touch with you around 4:00 or 5:00 o'clock this afternoon.

D: 4:00 or 5:00.

K: Right.

D: Okay.

K: We are thinking very seriously about what you said.

D: No, I think this is really a chance for both of us.

K: No, no, I recognize it. Now, may I urge you, however, really both you and your friends, not to force us into anything prematurely.

D: But what really our friends could force you, really? I don't -- Could you really mention what our friends could force you, for example?

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K: Well, for example, give us a chance to have a meeting on the subject here.

D: But what they could do up till 5 o'clock, nothing?

K: I don't know what they could --

D: Neither do I.

K: They crossed the Suez Canal, maybe they'll cross the Hudson River.

D: Oh, this is another story. This is another story. (laughs) Well, as for us, there will be no trouble. But as for them, well, I couldn't give a guarantee. They have a Minister here sitting so he knows better than I do. But, speaking theoretically, I do not see any way in which they could force you to do something.

K: No, no. Well, they can't force us but we would like not to be forced into verbal battles.

D: No, no, I understand.

K: No, we can't be forced. You've experienced that often enough.

D: No, no, I know. But as of now, what we are doing there will be no statement from our representative. We will not be eager at all to have another Security Council. So on this side, it's safe. On our side, you're not going to say anything which could --

K: Well, then we will not say anything and I'll be in touch with you around 5'clock.

D: Yeah. And we didn't tell anyone about what [we] mentioned to you . . . .

K: And just for your information, we have not told anyone. And I repeat anyone.

D: I understand. And Malik has the same instruction. Except he might be in contact with -- He has instruction, I am telling you off-the-record, that if this thing will come, it's settled okay. And it will come Security Council. Then he has instruction to come to Scali before the meeting and tell him how he will vote.

K: Good. But let him not go to Scali either now. Make sure he *doesn't* go to Scali.

D: Okay. I will mention to him specifically.

K: Okay. Good.

D: Because his instruction now is before he has to notify because he will make a statement against -- on a principle position about, not touching you at all, but about Israel, that kind of thing, but at the same time he will not tell him that it doesn't matter . . . . [obscure thing].

K: Right.

D: Okay?

K: Right.

D: So I will just warn him not to tell anything to Scali, as I understand you want it. Or is it better not to tell them ..... they'll be sitting there -- I don't know, what do you think?

K: Tell them not to go to Scali because Scali doesn't know anything about it and he's very excitable.

D: (laughs) I understand.

K: And we have told -- The only people who know up to now are the President.

D: I understand.

K: And, as you will see very soon, the President cannot possibly address this question for a couple of hours.

D: I understand.

K: But what I've told you about this domestic situation, Anatol, is a sign of my great confidence in you.

D: No, no, no. I understand. But does this coming affect in any way --

K: It affects nothing.

D: Nothing. I mean, from the point of view of foreign policy.

K: In terms of foreign policy, it,if anything, strengthens our abilities.

D: I speak in a sense of ability not a public relations because sometimes .....

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K: In terms of our foreign policy, it either affects it not at all or strengthens it.

D: Okay.

K: But in terms of making a decision and in terms of getting time with the President, that is now very difficult until into the afternoon.

D: I understand. Okay. Well, until the end of the day.

K: And, therefore, we don't want to get anything started with a lot of other countries.

D: Yeah, I understand.

K: Good.

D: Thank you very much. I will await your call.

K: And we have emphatically not yet discussed it with the Israelis.

D: I understand.

K: Because we do not want their lobby to start working here.

D: Yeah, I think this is the wise thing.

K: Before we have a chance to ....

D: To make your own decision.

K: To make our own decisions on how to handle it.

D: I understand.

K: Good.

D: All right.

wgh

SO 12 *

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger/Amb. Dobrynin
8:39 a.m. 10/10/73

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Anatol.

D: Yeh.

K: I just wanted to tell you we won't really have a chance for a systematic examination until after Mobuto has left around 11:30.

D: 11:30?

K: Yes. So we'll get an answer sometime in the afternoon.

D: All right.

K: And we would urge you--because we have to do a lot of talking now also

D: I understand. No, no. If I understand correctly, you do just not want to do anything to discuss--

K: We would appreciate it if you now didn't do anything until we've had a chance to discuss it here. And then during the course of the afternoon I'll let you know what our reaction is.

D: Okay.

K: Now, may I say another thing--we notice there is a very substantial airlift of Soviet supplies going into Egypt and Syria

D: Airlift?

K: Airlift. I can give you the numbers and types of aircraft, but I'm sure Grechko knows it.

D: He should know as well as you do. Sometimes he know better, maybe, no?

K: But we really don't think that is very helpful, because that's going to force us to do at least the same.

D: Okay, I will flash to Moscow--I'll get back to Moscow.

K: And we--it really, Anatol

D: You say heavy?

K: Heavy--about 22 airplanes, I consider that pretty heavy.

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K: Coming through Budapest, just in case they are looking for the last airport--

D: I see.

K: It will make it kx easier to find them

D: I understand.

K: It really is important Anatol, that our actions can't be latter represented as our having been maneuvered or tricked--

D: No, I understand. On this around a half-a-day--

K: I would expect it by the middle of the afternoon

D" One or two hours plus / minus--Okay?

K: Good

D: Okay, bye.

S212

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Secretary General Waldheim/Secretary Kissinger
October 10, 1973
8:27 pm

W: I am sorry to disturb you but I thought I should inform you about the situation here. The meeting was not satisfactory. As you know .. the controvery with Malik. Zayyat informed the non-aligned countries not to do.. to avoid any resolution in the Security Council because they wanted to continue fighting and any resolution would prevent this. That is why the non-aligned did not insit on working out a draft resolution. As you know the Israelis are not interested in having a resolution. I talked to Eban and he told me that the Council debate cannot continue ...on a resolution... they intend to hold .. tomorrow afternoon... have 3 speakers.

K: who?

W: Peru, Kenya, and Guinea.

K: Who?

W: Guinea.

K: I didn't know Guinea was in the Security Council.

W: It is not definite yet. The situation here is that both sides don't want a resolution. Both sides don't want a cease-fire because both think they will gain ..

K: I have asked John Scali to come back here and give me a full story and we'll be in touch with you.

W: I hope to give a brief statement to all parties about stopping the fighting.

K: Let's see what the situation is and I will give you my judgment.

W: I would appreciate if if you could let me know what you are feeling.

K: You're not bound by my views but why don't we talk in the morning.

W: More and more people and people in the government are asking me what is the Secretary doing to stop the fighting. ..why is the Secretary not trying to stop the fighting and get them back to the negotiating table. That's the psychological background.

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K: I understand and I am not objecting. I thought if I could give you my view and then you could do what you want.

W: I am very grateful and I understand. My impression is that they are not interested in doing anything against wish of Arab countries. And I am very worried about the message from Breshnev to ____ and the airlift to Syria is very dangerous...dangerous developments.

K: We agree and we're saying something about this tomorrow.

W: Thank you very much.

K: Please stay in touch and I will take the liberty of contacting you in the morning.

END

S213

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
October 10, 1973
8:59 pm

K: Brent, look, the Defense people are just going to have to stop dragging their feet. First, the Israelis are going wild. They think we are stabbing them in the back

S: They are really up-tight.

K: Yes, why shouldn't they be. What is your personal judgment?

S: I wish we could get some feeling about what is going to happen over the next 48 hours. If we settle into a stalemate we will have big trouble. If they break out we can move ahead on track but if not there will be strong pressure for a cease-fire. We either have to go for a cease-fire or a massive re-equipment. Did he give you any idea of what may happen?
K: No. He asked for a chance for Golda Meir to reply. Dobrynin can wait.

S: You still have an excuse.

K: I don't need an excuse just tell him I can't get a decision.

S: I think you can get by tonight.

K: But in 48 hours we face the same problem. If there is no resolution in 48 hours can we get through the weekend.

S: I don't think we can.

K: The only thing that is holding us up is that they are all afraid of our veto.

S: I don't think we can get through the weekend, do you?

K: No.

S: Without knowing . . their prospects . . anything decisive happens, we can get through to Friday. You can build on maybe 48 hours but we can't stall 48 hours because I think somebody will do something.

K: Right. and we cannot veto it.

S: I think that would be disastrous.

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K: OK, fine. Thank you.

S214
alrd

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Haig/Secretary Kissinger
October 10, 1973
9:14 pm

K: Al, where are you?

H: In my office.

K: I have just had a bloody session with the Israeli Ambassador and he says he cannot acquiese to this without giving Mrs. Meir a chance to get to the President so we have to wait til tomorrow morning. My judgment is that we have to give them the 12 hours.

H: Absolutely, absolutely.

K: I'll just call Dobrynin and tell him we can't give them an answer. Another thing, what happens if...

H: They have to understand if the thing is gonna go that's it. Do you think there is any way..

K: They are also saying the end result will be a victory achievement with Soviet arms and both sides of the Canal in Egyptian hands.

H: What will be the outcome?

K: They think they are going to win.

H: They think they can do it. You know they can ...we could make a proforma cut off and no addition til somebody asked..if they are trying to stall us for 2 weeks or a month -- that's impossible.

K: Yes, that's impossible. Well, I'll get a time from them.

H: I knew that time would be the issue

K: Could you stiffen Schlesinger's back because the guy is totally panicked. Clements is beating after him...if the Egyptians win we will lose our position. It is the Soviets that are putting in the strong..

H: No question about it.

K; Almost like the India/Pakistan

H: What we have to do ..you have to see how long you can hold it together.

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K: OK, I'll tell Dobrynin we need til tomorrow.

H: Sure and we have flexibility as long as they have kept us waiting.

K: That means nothing much will be done tomorrow.

H: Yeah

END

S215

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
October 10, 1973
9:45 pm

D: I am going to have a quiet dinner alone.

K: Alone'. Do you want me to send someone over?

D: Laughter.

K: Anatoyl, given all the events of today and that we have to talk to some other people, we won't be able to give you an answer til tomorrow.

D: OK, you will call tomorrow.

K: Yes. I will call and I must say from all reports I have heard, your people are much more disciplined than mine. We may have a lousy foreign policy in the next month that I am here but there will be discipline.

D: I understand. You are playing quite well. Don't overplay the theme of Russian irresponsibility.

K: Who has said anything about Russian irresponsibility?

D: From your speech, as you know.

K: That was just a little warning. I did not say you had as yet been irresponsible.

D: I am just telling you .. that I not argue with you.. they use expression you usually use.

K: What was that, look , if it was Marvin Kalb.. I did not talk to him.

D: Well, I don't know.. the theme on the radio is the State Department wants..

K: I will keep things quiet tomorrow. I promise you there will be no comment from the State Department about Russian irresponsibility or else.

D: But this then goes on.. in the briefing.. some off the record and some on the record.

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K: By whom? what do you think... no one has been authorized..just a minute Anatoyl, before you go into one of your wild charges.

D: You understand that..

K: Your engaged in a massive airlift in the Middle East and that is not helpful because we have been very restrained.

D: I don't know.

K: I'll be glad to send you the figures. I spend all day at the White House but tomorrow I promise you..

D: Even McCloskey made some comment on and off the record. I like him -- he is very nice -- but he too makes comments

K: What did he say?

D: I don't recall but on the record he said,, he was asked what Russians were restrained... He said he couldn't report..

K: You have to ..that the message to the General Secretary sent to ____ did not fill us with ectasy.

D: Well, nothing really...nothing followed after this.

K: Anatoyl, I will tell you now, no State Department spokesman will say tomorrow -- or will any White House spokesman or will Defense Department make any statement. Now you can inform Moscow this on behalf of the President.

D: Good

K: We will be in touch tomorrow.

END

S216 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Haig/Secretary Kissinger
October 10, 1973

K: I haven't had a chance to tell you that I think that you brought it off great. It is a horrible, human disaster. but it is the only thing to do.

H: No alternative.

K: I don't intend to offer any suggestions. My personal view would be Rockefeller. Failing that it would be Ford.

H: I don't think he will make up his mind for a while. He is asking for recommendations.... Mansfield said they would take John Sherman Cooper or Bill Rogers.

K: We can't afford Rogers.

H: My God. I think Gerry Ford would go right through.

K: I think Rogers has done enough damage. He....with his vanity.

H: I said, Mr. President we have been in this crisis since Saturday and I have yet to read of one leak....

K: Even if he didn't...do it..he did nothing to discourage it. They'll do anything over here. Over here the Secretary is God.

H: That how it is at Defense. but I think it is tighter at State.

K: They do anything the Secretary says. Al, I wonder if I can take your mind off the domestic for a bit. I,, the Israelis that the Soviets oppose a joint resolution for a cease-fire. that was to scare the pants off them. I have now told him that we are thinking of a joint abstention. Has Schlesinger been bugging you about this.

H: Since early this morning.

K: If you could give him a call and tell him to stop panicing.

H: Oh my God.

K: I think he is a decent guy. I didn't realize that he just panics easily -- more than I though. You are aware that this may draw some flack.

H: You bet.

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K: And the President is aware.

H: Yes, he knows.

K: ..the resolution is..if if surfaces that we rejected a simple cease-fire we're through in the Arab world and here.

H: I know...I hope..we can.. keep the noise down.

K: I will see Dinnitz tonight. I will then see Dobrynin too late to do anything. I will then propose to Dobrynin that tomorrow night we are moving in the Security Council ..and getting the British to put up a proposal ...that is dilatory so that it will be adopted on Friday. This will give them Friday as a fighting day and if they reject it they get even another day. If they have suffered the losses they have -- they may not get to do much fighting.

H: I think they're making more noise than feeling..;

K: If they ...lost...in Sinai were crushed..

H: Oh boy.

K: They are just not doing well.

H: We just can't take any other position.

K: What's the alternative.

H: There isn't any. talke about materiel, but..

K: We have the King ready to go on and the Saudis ready to go and I am holding them both.

H: The agreement on a resolution that can be strongly imposed...only 48 hours away.

K: I got the gist of this in the morning but I didn't want to get the President hepped up. I have gotten some time -- 36 hours .

H: Good, I think its being handled bery well. It's agonizing for the Israelis as long as it goes on. It gives the Arabs a sense of unit and confidence will grow. It will be totally unmanageable.

K: Yes.

END

SO 11 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Dobrynin/HAK
October 10, 1973/8:13 a.m.

D: When I called you about an hour ago you were still home.

K: An hour ago?

D: No, half an hour. Henry, I received a message for the President and to you from the Secretary General. I have not translated it yet but I will translate from the telegram as I read it.

K: But you'll send over the substance a little later?

D: OK. "Acting in the spirit of mutual understanding reached with the President on this score, we during the last days were having consultations with the leaders of Egypt and Syria on the correction of ceasefire. Frankly speaking these conversations with the Arabs were difficult and prolonged but we have now the opportunity to say to the President that the Soviet Union is ready not to oppose the resolution of the Security Council in favor of ceasefire. The President of course understands that in the present situation to work in the Security Council for the resolution of ceasefire the Soviet Union could not do it but the main thing is that we will not oppose. We will not vote against. Our representative will abstain during their voting. To come to this decision was not really easy. A decisive factor was that we, took into consideration this particular case, the pro-interest of supporting this and other developments, preserving and developing all those positives which have taken place during the last years of the Soviet/American relations and in the international situation in general. We would like to draw attention President, to one more circumstance. It is necessary to limit for the first time being the decision to ceasefire and either we will broaden the resolutions with more additional conditions on this matter for instance about their creating certain kinds of conditions or withdrawing troops on a condition. This very clearly will lead to the failure(?) that would really matter. This would have the ability to act combined. We are mentioning about this only because there were some hints on this kind of decision which were heard in a speech made by the representative of the U.S. during the last Security Council meeting. If that kind of position were put forward it would put us in a very difficult situation and the Soviet representative would be sure in this circumstance to object and vote again. We hope that this will refrain from happening and the combined action of the Soviet Union and the United States will facilitate or help to establish

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this line on the Middle East and the resumption of actual efforts to reach a political settlement. This business about a revelation or perhaps allegation of your sending supplies to Israel. This was really a very important step and of course could ruin the whole national situation and we got rather hot on this matter. We are giving the whole Security Council, and we hope that they will try, a chance to act in conjunction with us.

K: We need a few hours to consider this and we will let you know later today.

D: D: I will wait to hear from you

K: Wait till you hear from me but you can say it's a constructive message.

D: OK.

K: You will hear from me. I have to meet with the President. If you could get me the text of this sent over.

D: Alright. It will take an hour or so.

S224 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Shalev/Sec. Kissinger
Thursday, Oct. 11, 1973
11:10 a.m.

K: What is the Ambassador doing in a Synagogue on Thursday.

S: It is the first day of _____ and a bar mitzvah and for morale he went for a few minutes.

K: For my morale, it is not very good for you on the one hand to ask me to slow down the UN and you get Dyan to say on radio and TV that you are heading for Damascus. How can we get the UN to slow down when you make this kind of announcement by your Defense Minister.

S: You have a point.

K: With the greatest difficulty I got the President to slow things down and now I am confronted with that news item. What will I tell the Soviets now?

S: I will get on to Israeli.

K: Point two. The President is beside himself with what he considers inspired newspaper articles and I urge you to keep your people under control in what they say to the press. If it gets back to the White House that someone has talked to Israeli personnel there will be hell to pay.

S: Do you have anything specific?

K: I have nothing but he said he has. I was going to wait and call you about this after I had something else to talk to you about. If you want to cooperate with us diplomatically you must cooperate with us on this. We cannot ask the UN to slowdown with this announcement that is out. I am sitting here with my associates now working on this 36 hour delay when we get this ticker. Second, what in the hell am I now going to tell the Russians. This looks like the most extreme form of collusion and bad faith. You would have had the 8 hours for the reality of this to become apparent if you had kept quiet. See what you can do to quiet things down in Israel and for God's sake stay off the radio and TV. Will you let me know?

S: I will.

END

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S223

TELCON
The President/Sec. Kissinger
Thursday, Oct. 11, 1973

RELEASED IN FULL

11:05 a.m.

N: Because of other games we are playing, I think it would be helpful if you called Mansfield and tell him the President raised this question and you are going to contact them through your own channel. Since he is interested in going. This is another game I am playing.

K: I will do it.

END

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(S243)

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
October 11, 1973

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I was told by Sisco that he had arranged with Schlesinger that MAC would charter those twenty airplanes. Now I have told Dinnitz that I had ..that that had been agreed to and now I find out that is wrong. Schlesinger says it can be done by Transportation. I think if we can do that it would be better.

S: That way we will get alot more people into the act.

K: Hold on just a minute... Look, if Brinegar tells the guys to charter to the Israelis then we'll still be out of it. Can you talk to him?

S: OK

K: Look, if it can't be done, we will have to go back to Schlesinger to night because we have to be ready for the other thing tomorrow.

S: OK, I'll talk to him.

END

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S 234

TELCON
McCloskey/Sec. Kissinger
Thursday, Oct. 11, 1973
5:20 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: The Soviet Ambassador called me about a UIP ticker #130 that said you said at the briefing that I am holding a press conference to discuss the stress of the Arab/Israeli war on Soviet/American relations.

M: Absolutely not so. I said in response to the last questions that if the circumstances permit the Secretary will have a press conference tomorrow. Dobrynin goes around with a lot of tickers that don't say what I say.

K: He just sent it over.

M: I have the transcript.

K: It says Kissinger will hold a news conference tomorrow to discuss the state of the Arab/Israeli war...

M: I will get it and also I will get the transcript.

K: You don't have to get the transcript. I just wondered what it was based on.

M: I would think that a press conference would be dominated by you on news of the war.

end

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S236

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sisco/Kissinger
Oct. 11, 1973
5:35 p.m.

K. Can't reach Scali for possible instructions. I have reliable information that the Security Council is meeting tonight. It was called by the Kenyans who want to make a speech. Zayyat feels he has to express something and will express his outrage about the bombing and about the call for....

S. Sure, right.

K. Now, under no circumstances is Scali to say anything.

S. If the press ask... No press. Scali called and said he would like to see Malik. I told him not to see him until I get to talk to Henry.

K. He should not see Malik. I will do my best.... Tell him if it is an attack on us he should say nothing.

S. I will call Scali with these instructions. You are not to say anything.

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(S241)

TELECON
Dobrynin/Kissinger
October 11, 1973
8:25

RELEASED IN FULL

K. We think we should move with the British and we have had a call from the Prime Minister to that effect. I told him we will talk first thing in the morning.

D. The Security Council will meet in the morning.

K. In the morning? Just let me set it up first.

D. As to now, what exactly can I say about the British?

K. I do not have a ... now but I have started my discussions with them.

D. The first impression was all right?

K. The first impression was positive.

D. As of now the first reaction was favorable but the final reply will be given tomorrow.

K. That is right but I have not told them about your involvement. I don't want an overzealous man in your Embassy staff in London to go running.... Let me handle it. I will be back to you tomorrow around noon at the latest. I will tell you by one. Nothing will happen at the Security Council meeting that isn't fully coordinated with you. We are arranging that only after you approve will we proceed so there will be no call to meeting unless you approve. We will try to work out some resolution and if you approve it we will get someone to call a meeting. We will get the British to call the meeting.

D. That is all right. I think it is maybe good to tell our people.

K. I can't let Scali into this until I have the British lined up.

D. Tomorrow you will call. In the meanwhile I will explain to Moscow that they need to think it over.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 14 NOV 2002 200102979

S237

TELECON
Rush/Kissinger
October 11, 1973
6:50 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K. Ellsworth Bunker came in this afternoon and I asked him about Under Secretaries. I didn't give him any particular one, only four possible candicates: Sisco, Davis, Sam Burger, and Unger. I knocked out Berger and Unger right away. He thinks Mat Davis is by far the best.

R. Is that right? [redacted] B6

K. From whom?

R. I have been tapping my sources, including my own assistant. They know him and have worked with him and don't feel he is right for the job. I hear he is ambiguous.

K. You hear ambiguous reports about me, too.

R. I only hear good things about you, Henry. I would really rather go with Sisco. Let's face it, Ellsworth is a wonderful man but I don't think he has had any real contact with these men.

K. We will stay as it is with the Under Secretary position for awhile.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 03 MAY 2004 200102979

S242

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
October 11, 1973
11:37 pm

K: What do you have -- just the three line UPI item?

S: Yes, that and I was just handed an item from the Israeli Consul It reports that 1600 Israeli tankers and infantry have brokedn through the Syrian line.. the armored battalions are 4 kilometers east of..

K: I don't care about that.

S: The other item is that Dayan made the statement in a news conference in Tel Aviv, that..

[redacted] B6

S: I just wanted you to know.

K: OK, He made the statement at a news conference.

S: Yes

K: OK

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 05 MAY 2004 200102979

S 238

TELECON
Scowcroft/Kissinger
October 11, 1973
7:55 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K. Hello.

S. This is..., Henry. The switchboard just got a call from 10 Downing Street to inquire whether the President would be available for a call within 30 minutes from the Prime Minister. The subject would be the Middle East.

K. Can we tell them no? When I talked to the President he was loaded.

S. We could tell him the President is not available and perhaps he can call you.

K. I will be at Mr. Bradens and the President will be available tomorrow morning our time.

S. Are you coming over here at all this evening?

K. No, first thing in the morning.

S. Did you talk to ~~Schermerhorn~~ Schlesinger (?) about the F-4s scheduled for tomorrow?

K. I think two a day is fine.

S. Two a day can ....

K. Throw in another one and make it six.

S. They have in mind keeping a two a day schedule. Send two from here and two from Europe and then two from here again.

K. For an indefinite period?

S. At least through six.

K. Then tell Dinitz he is getting at least six but that we may keep it going.

S. Right, ok. I will say the President will not be available until first thing in the morning but you will be this evening.

K. In fact, I would welcome it.

S. Very good.

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DATE/CASE ID: 04 MAY 2004 200102979

RELEASED IN FULL

S 235

TELECON
Popper/Kissinger
October 11, 1973
5:30 p.m.

K. Not being able to reach you I called Sisco and was given some information on the Security Council.

P. Did he tell you what he knows about the Council meeting? It is at 6:45.

K. No, I didn't know that. The Kenyans called it and they will want to talk first. Zayyat will now make some statement about the bombing....

P. He did that...and he may do it again. I am surprised, Mr. Secretary, Scali talked to the President of the Council who told him Zayyat had called the meeting.

K. My point is for us to stay out of the line of fire and under any circumstances for Scali to stay quiet.

P. Right. You will....

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*

S233

TELECON
Sisco/Kissinger
October 11, 1973
4:40 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

S: If you could see him tomorrow it would be very nice.

K: We have to get our ducks in a row. with the Saudis. I have the Chilean Foreign Minister on my schedule -- and he can't do anything for us.

S: Why don't I try to work something out with Jane and.

K: Tomorrow afternoon -- I have a press conference in the morning.

S: Tomorrow afternoon. I will call this guy and set it up for tomorrow afternoon.

K: I want to keep them from doing something crazy.

S: Well the latest from the King...it just came in one hour ago. I have developed a proposal..I wish I could meet with you.

K: I will meet with you..when I have something..

S: Well we have to revise the procedures . Everybody is so busy and noone want to barge in on you. I will call the 7th floor and get them to get this information into you.

K: We have to get the bloody Saudi in..I should call him

S: OK

K: Alright, I will call him.

END

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 14 NOV 2002 200102979

S222

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
October 11, 1973
11:00

S: Did you see the UPI ticker? It says war tanks and carriers have crossed over the border..

K: No.

S: It has been described by Moshe Dayan as a drive all the way toward Damascas. The CIA says the sortie level is high.

K: Let me call Dinnitz.

S: OK

END

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 04 MAY 2004 200102979

S225

TELCON
Sisco/Sec. Kissinger
Thursday, Oct. 11, 1973
2:40 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: The Israelis are running amuck on this ~~2284~~@##$ charter thing.

S: I know. Let me tell you where we are. This is the point where you had better intervene. The charter people have been very cooperative in the sense they are scouting around trying to find them. The problem is there does not seem to be a great deal available. Whether this is in any way politically motivated on the part of these people, I do not know. What has been done before is when this came up in the context of other emergencies -- I think related to VN -- what we threatened to do is the Secretary of Defense has the authority in coordination with the Secretary of Transport to mobilize up to 200 aircraft for DOD operations in support of this kind of an emergency. This would be civilian type. When the Defense Department threatened to do this then the civilian carriers got off their dime and did something. The situation of course is not necessarily comparable in the sense that they were talking about VN rather than Israel. We have been having a problem on the Pentagon side. They are dragging their feet. That is our impression. I would suggest if you could take a minute with Schlesinger and ask him what he thinks of this notion. The civilian carriers are not falling in line.

K: Could you call them and find them and tell them this is what we will have to do.

S: I will call you back.

K: And I will call Schlesinger.

END

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 04 MAY 2004 200102979

S 227

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dinnitz/Secretary Kissinger
October 11, 1973
3:05 pm

D: I just got a cable from Golda. She says she is doing everything in her power to restrain.

K: Not in action but in words..

D: I said your remark was to the words and not the action. She understands the situation and well I'll let you talk now.

K: Two things: First, I have just ordered the military to charter twenty aircraft and then you'll have them. They will be civilian aircraft chartered by us.

D: Good.

K: Secondly, I can delay the Security Council meeting through tonight. But I can't avoid doing something with the Russians. I have been avoiding Dobrynin all morning, though he has called every half hour. I think by tomorrow night we'll have to move in that direction. You should develop a "yes/but" strategy.

D: Anstandstill resolution -- is that what you have in mind?

K: That's what I have in mind.

D: You think the Russians will want a standstill resolution by tomorrow night ...the Russians want to....the resolution now.

K: Well they are driving me crazy since early this morning. If he has another proposition for..

D: Could you tell me what he has in mind?

K: Of course, there will be no tricks..no trickery. The President is getting furious because he thinks you are churning up the press.

D: We are caught in a real dilemma. We are not telling them that the Resolution is no alright. When we saythe President is as usual, we can't tell them anything. All this situation ..one contradictory after the other and everybody is speculating, but you can assure the President..

K: Look, you know what the problem is. Jackson called me about my lack of attention to the problem.

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D: He called you after he talked to .. I told him we have a logistical problem. ...that is what he called about and he said that Dr. Kissinger ... but Schlesinger is scared..

K: He is.

D: damn right. We are appreciative of the charter. Can you do somthing about the planes?

K: They will move tomorrow.

D: The five.

K: Yes.

D: Can we get a large scale ..should I talk to Schlesinger?

K: Let me talk to him.

END

S 229 *

TELCON
Maw/Sec. Kissinger
Thursday, Oct. 11, 1973
3:45 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: We are thinking about announcing your appointment tomorrow.

M: Fine. Where do you want me and when?

K: You don't have to be down here.

M: Very well.

K: We will just announce it tomorrow then. We won't have anybody present.

M: All right. I will wait your instructions. I have a few things to talk to you about when you have time and when we get together.

K: Fine.

NLD
END

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S231

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Scoweroft/Sec. Kissinger
Thursday, Oct. 11, 1973
4:40 p.m.

K: I forgot what I called you about.

S: I have talked to Brinegar and he will get right on it and call me back.

K: That would be the best solution. Call off the WSAG for 6:00.. What is my schedule for in the morning. They don't seem to share it with me.

S: An energy meeting at 10:00. You have nothing before that.

K: Will I get a book.

S: Too early. Do you want to hold that one.

K: I don't know what is in the book. How do I know?

S: I will get it over to you.

K: I am wondering about having a WSAG in the morning. I have a press conference at 11:00. Cancel th SRG.

END

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DATE/CASE ID: 04 MAY 2004 200102979

S230

TELCON
Dinitz/Sec. Kissinger
Thursday, Oct. 11, 1973
4:30 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

D: I want to bring you up to date on the situation up to 5:00 (6 hours ago in Israel). We have penetrated in a front which is 18 Ks wide and 10 Ks inside the Road to Damascus.

K: Right.

D: I have another cable.

K: You are going to wind up like Paul on the road to Damascus.

D: As long as we don't wind up like Peter. Another cable says we have advanced 20 Ks. Probably some places 20 Ks.

K: You understand that I was not telling you...

D: I understood you completely but I don't think my boss did. Even before I talked to you. We have since that time, the Syrian troops are dismantling. The Syrian troops and armour are in disaray.

K: Good.

D: I don't want to bother you with the airports we have bombed. It is important that the Syrian Air force not particularly active and seven were shot down. We observed 5 ton 12 airplanes from the Soviet were on the way to Damascus. They returned to their base in Europe because of our tanks at the airport. They came again in the afternoon and this time they landed. Twelve landed in Syria with equipment. Until 5:00 our losses on the two fronts were 10 aircraft -- 3 Phantoms, 6 Skyhawks and 1 Super_____.

K: How many?

D: 10 Aircraft -- 3 phantoms, 6 Skyhawks and 1 super_____.

K: How did you lose them?

D: All to missiles. We have information that on the Egyptian front there has been no change. Our air force was active there. We estimated 700-800 tanks on the East bank of the Canal. There attempt to go to Adaz(sp) was not successful. We have

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information that the A_____ are concentrating some forces at the northern airport. We don't know their intention. I think that is all. Do you have any reply from your talk on the heavy stuff from Schlesinger?

K: I mentioned it to him and he said he would look at the schedule again.

D: For your information about 12 senators called me.

K: Good.

D: All are on the Committee for Appropriations. Schlesinger said to them there were no problems. To some he said the White House is being difficult. To others he said there were logistic problems with transportation. Sen. Jackson said to to him perhaps we can move equipment from Europe or other places. Schlesinger said that they had not been asked to look into that.

K: That is a lie.

D: Jackson said I know for sure that Kissinger has asked him to look into all possibilities. There is pressure being put on him. I have good news on the MFN. In half an hour I think we will have it delayed 10 days or 2 weeks.

K: 2 weeks would be better.

D: I have pressed very hard for that.

K: Thank you.

END

S 228 *

TELECON
Ambassador McCloskey/Secretary Kissinger
October 11, 1973
3:35 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Just not solid enough for the Under Secretary to make it. I have just been too uneasy. Will it still be a respectable list with out that?

M: Certainly. Yes. It won't have as much impact if you were to announce it.. someone for that reason. So we'll probably drop that announcement tomorrow and the Middle East one. So, we'll only have about seven

M: OK, sir.

END

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S226

TELCON
Sisco/Sec. Kissinger
Thursday, Oct. 11, 1973
3:00 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

S: I am on the other phone with Schlesinger now.

K: I have promised you tomorrow morning to give a briefing before the House.

S: Yes. I want to talk to you about the Russian angle and the supply angle. Other than that, I can handle it.

K: Good.

S: I have laid this out to Jim. He tells me that the White House had promised to nudge this National Air Association. Who in the White House can I talk to. Brent?

K: Yes.

S: I will get back to Jim on the phone now.

END

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*

(S232)

TELECON
Saudi Arabia Foreign Minister
October 11, 1973
5:00

RELEASED IN FULL

.....

K: I have not yet received your message but I expect to receive it shortly.

S: I have already sent somebody.

K: I was wondering if you would like to come down to talk to me. We could meet tomorrow morning at , say, 9:00.

S: Tomorrow morning at 9:00?

K: Or, say, 9:30?

S: Thank you very much. I don't have much to tell you. I'll be there at 9:30.

K: Good. I won't have a great deal of time but I think we could at least review the situation.

S: Alright, I don't have much information. Goodbye.

END

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S240

TELECON
Dinitz/Kissinger
October 11, 1973
8:10 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

D. Good evening.

K. How are you?

D. All right.

K. I want to tell you about the conversation with Mr. Breman(?) He sounded now much more urgent even than yesterday. I don't have to know....He wanted to deliver a personal letter to the President. I told him I would have to think about it overnight, and in the meantime the British have approached us on two matters. They have been approached, as we have, by the King of Jordan who is under enormous pressure. He wants to move a brigade into Syria out of harms way but wants our assurance.

(The conversation was interrupted because of disconnection)

K. I am in an insane hurry. It was that the Jordans, in order to avoid the pressures, want to move a brigade out of Syria [illegible] which is out of harms way. They don't care what you do but they want to make sure you don't attack them.

D. Is it an infantry brigade?

K. An armor brigade.

D. Will they fight us or will they just stand there?

K. They will just stand there.

D. I will have to pass it on to my Government.

K. We will get you the name of the area.

D. This is called, Dr. Kissinger, to fight war with all of the conveniences.

K. He said it is a wooded area and not agreeable. Eagleburger will call you. Call me through the White House board. I promised the British an answer tonight. They have to promote a ceasefire and they are getting extremely restive. I told them

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to wait until tomorrow. My present plan is to tell the British Ambassador around one that they should start exploring it, which should delay it into Saturday to give us another 48 hours.

D. When you said ceasefire, both in regard to Britian and Russia, is that ceasefire and standstill?

K. ...But you should be in a good position.

D. My judgment is that you should be better off...With the situation in the far north after tonight I have an inkling that the Russians will not be interested in a standstill tomorrow.

K. Well, that is their problem. I can only deal with one thing at a time.

D. I wouldn't wish that on the Russians, Mr. Secretary, that they should have your mind.

K. If they now do have a new proposal I will have to think it over and we should have another 48 hours. I think I should get it going underway.

D. I think the important thing now is to gain time. I have another several things I would like to discuss.

K. I was told by Scowcroft only a half an hour ago that the planes will be on their way.

D. I was told this afternoon to call the Secretary of Transportation who was out. I talked to the Under Secretary who said he would help me and get back. Scowcroft said he would get back to me.

K. I was told half an hour ago they are forthcoming. I can't actually handle it at this moment. Ignatious and Brinager were meeting to work it out. Where are the El Al planes?

D. They sent two yesterday and one or two flew today.

K. I am moving heaven and earth here....I want to tell you another thing. We are sending two tomorrow, two the following day, and two the next day. That is better than one a day because it gets a pipeline going.

D. If I see it that is six in three days.... I got another message from the Prime Minister and she cannot understand the delay. Is there any movement on the tanks.

K. Lets get the present stuff moving before we get too frantic on something else. Can I call you around midnight? Will let you know about Britain.

D. All right.

S 218

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Ziegler/Sec. Kissinger
Thursday, Oct. 11, 1973
9:30 a.m.

Discussed the fact that a journalist said he had gotten word that the US had advance warning of the attack. He asked if this was a worthwhile theme.

Z: You, in a Cabinet meeting, made it clear that it was not the case but I did not want to give...

K: You tell him it is totally untrue. I am on the way to see the President now. Tell him it is untrue.

Z: You mean, can I give him a little bit of the 6:00 a.m. bit.

K: Yes. Yes, just say totally untrue.

Z: Concerning the press conference with thim...

K: I have pretty well committed myself to do it tomorrow.

Z: Tomorrow is fine.

K: Not if the Middle East explodes on us.

END

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*REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
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S221

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
The President/Sec. Kissinger
Thursday, October 11, 1973
11:00 a.m.

N: Are you back at State?

K: Yes.

N: The thing I wanted to say was this. In following this strategy I want you to lean very hard on the Israeli Ambassador that I am very distressed about these stories and I have information -- I am talking to the press people -- it is not coming from him but from lower level people who are putting out the line that we are not supporting Israeli. I will not tolerate this and if I hear any more of this I will hold him responsible. Will you tell him?

K: Yes.

N: You and I know that Israel is not going to lose this war but we cannot fight both sides. If we hear any more stuff like this I will have no choice domestically except to turn on them. I can get the names of these people.

K: These fellows that are writing...

N: I know but these people go over there. They think it helps the Israelis but it does not. The Embassy people should have them cool it.

K: I will have them do it immediately.

N: We are helping them; he knows that doesn't he?

K: Yes.

N: It is like the Agnew thing. He talked all right but his lower level people did not. The Israelis have to trust us or there is no game.

K: I will call him immediately.

END

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* REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 04 MAY 2004 200102979

S219*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Cromer/HAK
October 11, 1973/9:45 a.m.

C: That what we're hearing about the Russians is the same as what you're hearing I'd expect.

K: It's very massive.

C: So I gather. Theres nothing we can do about it is there.

K: Well, not very quickly.

C: Things haven't moved quickly as both you and I anticipated.

K: No, that's the problem.

C: I don't know whether there is anything we can work on that the fact that to the extent so far the Egyptians have somewhat proved their virility and got them over this tremendous inferiority complex they had before. You know what I mean.

K: Well, Rollie, I may be--I have to see the President today--right now. If you have nothing urgent and operational what I would like to do is see him and then perhaps get togehter with you later today.

C: I'd like that very much.

K: Because I think we might want to talk.

C: Let's do that. I'm at your disposition obviously.

K: Good. Bye.

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S220*

TELCON
Governor Rockefeller/HAK
October 11, 1973/10:18a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

R: Henry.

K: Nelson, how are you?

R: Listen, every day I just thank God you're there. Although I know its awful tough.

K: It's a rough situation.

R: But theres a little outside chance someday I might be there with you. Any advise. I'm just staying quiet.

K: I think you should stay quiet. I think it's beyond anything you can do. What I'm trying most now is to keep Connolly out.

R: Fantastic.

K: I think anything positive I do is going to be counter-productive.

R: Very interesting. I agree. And I feel anything I might do would be counter-productive.

K: Exactly. But I think we've made major progress in that area.

R: You do. Fantastic. I'm even embarrassed to talk to you about this you know when you've got everything else.

K: No, good God no.

R: But it has some effect on your future structure there too.

K: Look, you know my view about, not for yourself but for the Country.

R: Henry, I'm with you and if something does happen...

K: But I think as long as its anyone other than Connolly your situation in 1976 remains very promising, don't you.

R: I do. I'm here on this panel now and with Muskie, Jack Jackson, McCarthy, McGovern and Hubert Humphrey.

K: When are you going back?

R: I'm going back at 12:30

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K: Oh you are.

R: I don't want to bother you because I...

K: Nelson, there is no possible way you could bother me.

R: Yeah, but you're handling the problems of...

K: As in most crisis there is really not a hell of alot you can do.

R: Just pray.

K: You know we're trying to, it's a high wire act. The Israelis are letting us down by not winning as quickly as they should.

R: That's right. They were a little over-confident maybe. Have they _____ with the Syrians.

K: No, my judgment is that they're going to leave the Egyptians alone but they haven't solved that problem because the Egyptians have put in massive anti-aircraft defenses so they can't use air to knock out the Egyptian tanks and they haven't got the artillery because they counted so much on the air.

R: A pity.

K: If I had to bet I would bet that they're going to now go for Damascus.

R: Oh brother, well hold on tight Henry.

K: Nelson, Haig and I are working on the other problem.

R: I understand and I'm just with you and I just wanted to touch base.

K: But as soon as I hear something I'll be in touch.

R: Great. Take care.

SL6

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Gen. Haig - Secretary Kissinger
October 12, 1973
12:55 p. m.

K: How are things going?

H: Good, good. How about you, how did the press conference go?

K: I sort of was very even handed so the Jewish Community. They might be mad. I think my task is to keep the Arabs quiet and the Soviets quiet while slowing.....stop there.

H: You know the Soviets have alerted three airborne divisions.

K: Well, I am seeing Dobrynin for lunch. If they did that, that's it.

H: They are going to force us to counter. We can't ignore that.

K: How did you learn about it.

H: Latest SitRep.

K: Absolutely. If they do that we are going in. Tell that to Dobrynin at lunch, but we better alert some of ours.

H: Yep. Well, I think, if it's true, I haven't seen it...

K: It's one of those code word exercises.....Is he going to announce the Vice President at 8:30?

H: 9:00.

K: I thought it was 8:30.

H: Its always been 9:00.

K: I was told to be there at 8:30. East Room?

H: We want you there and seated for preliminary camera work, etc.

K: Has he decided?

H: Yes, he has decided. You won't be unhappy, you won't be happy but you won't be unhappy.

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K: If it isn't Conally I will be all right. That's a no no. I think if it's a neutral choice. I told him when he asked me Thursday I preferred Rockefeller. From his point of view, I could see having someone permitted a campaign between Conally and Rocefeller after 74. ....no that gives me no pain.

H: like our aim you know,

K: I am not saying a thing...

H: Absolutely. He's not telling anybody, not Laird, not Ron, nobdy.

K: Look, I'm not going to say a thing. I have the Saudi Foreign Minister...

H: I, OK Henry, I haven't told him anything about the Soviet thing.

K: I will increase the readiness of our forces.

H: Something they can read, but no one else can.

K: Yah.

SL7

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Senator Humphrey - Secretary Kissinger
October 12, 1973
2:30 p. m.
(in 8th floor Dining Room with Amb. Dobrynin present)

H: I know you are very busy, Henery, but I felt it necessary to call you since I can't make it to the Senate Foreign Relations Committe meeting this afternoon. I feel very strongly that we should insure prompt delivery of the necessary planes for Israel. I understand we are making deliveries right now, but that they are rather slow and may be strung out over several months. I would like to see a number of planes made available promptly.

K: Hubert, that is not exactly what is being done. You understand, keep in mind that whatever we do give them, they come back the next day asking for 5 times as much.

H: But I understand the Russians are replenishing the Arab stocks Some Senators up here on the Hill have heard that they are taking delivery on SAM-6 missiles and that several antonov planes are landing daily.

K: From what we can tell, most of these deliveries are consumables. If we are wrong, that is some thing we will have to look at.

H: I just don't think we can let that little country that we have so much invested in get clobbered.

K: Hubert, let me say something as a friend. we have to navigate carefully.

H: How do we know the Russians aren't fooling us?

K: If the Russians are fooling us we know what we will have to do. Any time you have any suggestions, feel perfectly free to call me.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 21 APR 2004 200102979

SL20

RELEASED IN FULL

TelCon:10/12/73-11:45 p.m.
Secretary Kissinger/
Secretary Schlesinger

K: Hello Jim.

S: Hi Henry.

K: I've just been meeting on an urgent basis with Dinitz, who says they a running out substantially of ammunition. They based their strategy on the assumption that they would get the ammunition replaced this week, as the President had promised them on Tuesday, and that they a stopping their offensive in Syria because they can't move because of lack of supplies. And the Egyptians have transferred artillery over ar now they are saying ~~the~~ there is problem of a major thrust into the Sinai. A: it is true we gave them our assurances.

S: Well, what do you want to do?

K: Well, I don't know what I wa nt to do. I just feel that we did make some undertaking - you know it would help us. I was raising hell with them for not keeping their offensive going for a day while we were setting up the scenario on diplomacy. And now they have got to stop it.

S: Well, we can . . .

K: Are you sure that your people - I know that you are serious, but I frankly have no confidence that Clements and Hill and Company aren't sabotaging this every step of the way. If you want my candid opinion.

S: Well . . .

K: I just don't find the initiative. If something ~~wants~~ they wanted to happen then it would happ

S: You mean on the obtaining of charter flights?

K: Well, on just getting - you know some way in four days could have been found. I don't know what it is, it isn't my job. I just don't see... except for you I don't know anyone over there who has any intention of making this happen. You know that Clements would just as soon move them the other way.

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S: Well, ~~he~~ he will do what the President wants.

K: Yea, but the way he interprets what the President wants is not necessarily what the President wants.

S: Well we have the possibility of just telling the U.S. aircraft to go on whatever they need.

K: I just findit hard to believe that every company would ~~xxfxxx~~ refuse to charter unless somebody sort of told them in a half-ass way.

S: Well the problem with that is that they have good business outside. Unlike other circumstances, back during the Vietnamese war when they agreed to charter, they were going around with their feet - equivalent half empty on the charter flights.

K: For example, did anyone talk to - you know I never objected the question by the fella I had - who is head of Continental Airlines? ~~Siebo(?)~~ Six?

S: ~~Siebo~~ Six, right.

K: Bob ~~Siebo~~ Six. Now I know Goddamn well he is a great patriot and if somebody told him we needed airplanes, I just can't believe that he wouldn't do it, unless you winked at him and said but if it doesn't happen until next week my heart won't be broken.

S: Well, it is -- what is --when are they going to start running out of reserves?

K: They are out now. They have stopped their offensive. And they are now in deep trouble in the Sinai. I am basing this on a message from the Prime Miniter to the President. And you know maybe it is not true, but it is a hell of a responsibility to take.

S: Well, if we started now and really turned the screws on these guys, I suspect that we can collect a few aircraft for tomorrow. But I think if you want to do something about it, you better let a U.S. aircraft fly all the way in.

K: That I would have to discuss ~~that~~ with the President.

S: Or another thing we could do . . .

K: But can't we turn the screws on these charter companies? I am just convinced that if the screws were turned, they would have produced.

S: I think that that may be right. We never went back at them again because of the decision to go with the Military Airlift Command to. . .

K: Well then _____. They could then pick it up in the Azores if they wanted to. It is already there.

S: The stuffs in the Azores. What do you mean they? Are you talking about the charters?

K: Well, if the charters picked it up here and the Israelis picked up what is already in the Azores, that would at least put some steam behind it.

S: Well, how much do they need?

K: I have no estimates of that.

S: OK. let me see what I can do. One thing we could do we could take these ten or 12 C-130s that we are planning to give them and load them up and let them go all the way.

K: Well, let's do that. Well, I will call Dinitz and tell him to have his military guy get in touch with you.

S: OK.

K: But will you tell Sumner (W) for Christ sakes to get off his ass, because if a catastrophe happens there is going to be some accounting. From our point of view we needed the Israeli offensive moving. If the Israelis are on their knees tomorrow night, we are not going to . . .

S: Well, Henry it would have been desirable for them to tell us that they were going to run out of ammunition.

K: Well, on the other hand I must tell you we told them every day that this stuff was coming. There wasn't a day that we didn't tell them

that they ~~had~~ would have 20 aircraft in the morning and then they didn't have them in the evening.

S: I really can't say that that was the case until the night before last it was assumed that these guys were going to be able to haul them themselves along with the aircraft that they would round up. It wasn't until yesterday that we - the night before - that we started this search for aircraft on their behalf. So, ah, the situation . . .

K: We can reconstruct what went wrong later. Let's see what we can get going here.

S: OK

K: Because this whole diplomacy is going to come apart if they look impotent. It can only work if they look as if they were gaining, not if they look as if they were losing.

S: OK. The first thing to do is to have those C-130s that we turn over carrying ammo. Do you want US pilots to fly in those C-130s? I don't see any reason why not.

K: I've never thought this thing through from that point of view. Why don't you work that out with their military attache?

S: OK, very good.

K: OK, good.

S: OK.

K: Thank you.

S: You bet.

SLS

TELCON

RELEASED IN FULL

Amb. Dinitz - Secretary Kissinger
October 12, 1973
11:04~~p~~ a. m.

K: I am on my way to a press conference.

D: OK, I just wanted to tell you we are 30 kilometers from Damascas. We are shelling the airport of Damascus which is a military airport not of the city.

K: OK.

D: Something other things I want to tell you, but I will tell you when you come back.

K: When you get into the outskirts you can take public transportation.

D: On the way to Egypt there are now 13-14 (Soviet) transports.

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SL 8

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Shalev/Sec. Kissinger
Friday, Oct. 12, 1973
3:15 p.m.

K: I wanted to check your message to Eagleburger.

S: Yes.

K: Does that mean we can move any time? Because so far we have been delaying.

S: That means that the latest proposal you made us about time table which would sort of bring us up to tomorrow evening I thought.

K: Is that what you accept.

S: We accept that. We are not urging you for any further....

K: Good. That is the course on which I will stay. Thank you. I have some information for you.

S: Yes.

K: We have information that the Soviets have mobilized three airborne divions and when I called this to the attention of the Soviet Ambassador he made some extremely threatening noises. I told him we would not tolerate it.

S: Yes sir.

K: I wanted you to be aware of this development. If they intervene we will be forced to do something drastic. But you should know it. He also wants you to know they are against your getting close to Damascus. I am just passing this on to you for information. If you want to pass anything on to me for them I will do it. I told him it would lead to severe deterioration of relations with us and we would take action if they put in combat units.

S: Let me get that.

K: Look, I have to run to see the President, now.

S: Bye.

END

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SL1

TELCON
Amb. Dinitz/Kissinger
Oct. 12, 1973 - 8:35 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

D: Dr. Kissinger, good morning. I was supposed to call you at 8:45.

K: I know, I know, but I have to go to a meeting.

D: Just so I didn't delay you.

K: No. No.

D: On the Jordanian thing. Unfortunately, the answer is no. He is also Field Director to the Prime Minister, and he will get the same answer ---------- the situation there where there is so many forces in battle. The difficulty to prevent Jordanian troops there from escalating into involvement of the fighting.

K: But does that mean we'll attack Jordan?

D: No, no. It just means that we are advising them not to take the unit. The answer is we are absolutely against the _____ of the Jordanian regiment, of the Jordanian division into Syria.

K: Yeah, but of course will you attack Jordan if it moves?

D: Well, there is no answer to this and I'm, you know, the thing is that the Prime Minister has been asked the same question by the King and asked indirectly not to do this. But I don't think that it means that we are to warn Jordan, no. I will clarify this further. The answer is that we are against the concept....

K: Well, that's obvious. The question is are you going to attack Jordan if he transfers the unit?

D: O.K. I'll get this cleared within...

K: Now, secondly, we just had an appeal from Sadat, and he says that you're bombing civilian populations.

D: I have no information on this.

K: Well, could I urge you not to bomb....

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D: In Egypt?

K: Yeah.

D: Alright. I'll check on this, too.

K: Not to bomb civilian targets.

D: I'm pretty sure...

K: I don't believe you are, but I want to make sure that we have transferred the request.

D: Right. On the front, Dr. Kissinger, the battle is advancing, but there are strong counter-attacks. Strong battles and also they are putting their battle, airplanes, they, the pace is a bit slower of the advance, but our people are confident by the end of the day we will reach the original target.

K: Well, Dayan has already announced that again.

D: I understand it came from the Prime Minister saying that she will _____ all the ministers. Is this again, or is this...

K: No, I heard it on Television this morning. That he expects to have broken the Syrians by the end of the day.

D: Well, he did not say mileage. You know, even to me in the cable it didn't say mileage because it confused them so much.

K: No, no. You should know.

D: I know, I know. This is what I have and I probably will have during the morning additional information. There is one more information on the front. During the morning we probably will be confronting the armor division on the Iraqis. I don't know if we will confront them but they will appear in the front area. It is possible that another Iraqi division is already in Syria.

K: Excuse me, the President is calling me, I'll have to call you back.

D: O.K.

SL3

TELCON
Amb. McCloskey/Joe Sisco/Secy Kissinger
8:46 a.m., October 12, 1973

RELEASED IN FULL

M: Good morning, Sir.

K: How are you?

M: Fine. Joe Sisco is on the line with me.

S: Good morning, Mr. Secretary.

M: We're calling to get Joe a little advice on his session this morning, particularly on the arms to Israel question. Joe, go ahead.

S: Mr. Secretary, with all these articles that came out this morning -- they seem to be Pentagon sources to me. I'm assuming that this has not been deliberate on our part. Is that correct?

K: I haven't seen any but --

S: Yeah, well, there's a Getler article in the Washington Post.

K: Oh, those sons of bitches.

S: Yeah. The burden of the articles is that we are getting close to a decision. What I'd like a little guidance on is this, I was going to play it in the lowest possible key.

K: That is correct.

S: Even though it's a secret session, it isn't going to be a secret session with that many Congressmen on hand. Will the United States supply military equipment losses of Israel? I was just going to say what you would normally say on it publicly. I'm really not going to get into this thing and that the focus of our efforts is to get the fighting stopped and that's where we really want to keep it. Now, of course, there's a lot of heat there on the Hill on this one as you well know. Do you want me to go a little shade further or not?

K: How would you go a shade further, Joe?

S: Well, let me try it out. You know what our policy is --

K: Because I have a press conference too and I don't want --

S: That's why I'm checking. Because if I say one thing and then you and I are different, it will -- I was going to say something like this: Well, you know what our policy has been and I am not aware of any change in our policy.

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K: Of military supply.

S: We're just talking about that. How does that sound to you?

K: That's good and I'll say the same thing.

M: I think you have to say that much.

S: Now on the Russians, can I stick basically low key with what Bob said?

K: Yeah. But say we have warned them and it is too early to make a judgment whether they have in fact acted irresponsibly.

S: Yeah. Too early and could I add the sentence that Bob said that of course, if it were to become massive -- that is, if they press me, I'm not going to say any more than I have to -- why obviously, this puts a new face on the thing.

K: That's right.

S: Okay. I think that's about all I need, Mr. Secretary.

K: Okay, Joe.

M: Mr. Secretary, I have the room set up for you downstairs. Do you have any particular feelings about the Great Seal. We now have it mounted behind you. We could take that down --

K: For all I care, you could get one from the zoo and put a thing around it's neck and say this is the Seal of the United States.

M: You told me the other day you want to see things done with style and I want to be sure that it's done correctly. We could take that down and hang a smaller one in front of the lectern or do you want to leave it all in my hands?

K: Well, I don't care so much about the Seal as long as there are two heralds in front of me when I come in.

M: I can't find them yet this morning.

K: Irishmen ought to know what heralds are.

M: I know what they are, I just can't find them this morning.

K: Okay. Listen, Bob, I need about half an hour with you before the press conference.

M: OK. I'll be here.

K: And get a little guidance in terms... since I don't/b read the press riefings.

M: OK.

K: To stay consistent with what you've said. Joe, all the best this morning.

S: With your support I'll do alright.

K: You'll do great with or without my support.

S: Thank you.

SL4

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Reston/Sec. Kissinger
Friday, Oct. 12, 1973
10:35 a.m.

R: When am I going to see you in your new splendor.

K: I would be more than happy to see you. How about next week?

R: I think so, Henry. I will be going to California this weekend and coming back toward the end of the week. I begin to get the impression that our friend really has a chance.

K: In NY? You mean for the nomination.

R: Yes.

K: You mean now?

R: Yes.

K: I am not being cute. I talked briefly to him yesterday and he made an enigmatic reference that almost suggested that. I mean our friend.

R: We have cased it very, very carefully on the Hill and Connally is a non-starter. He is going to run into one hell of a battle if he tried to ram Connally through.

K: Really?

R: Yes.

K: I have not been told a thing. I have been at State practically all the time withis present mess.

R: How does it look today?

K: I think if we can hold it together--by holding together I mean without irrevocable damage with any of the parties involved or the Soviets -- for another 72 hours we may begin to get out of it.

R: Is the battlefield situation holding in the Sinai.

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K: Yes. That is stable. The Israelis seem to be advancing in Syria.

R: Let me come to see you...

K: I am going to China. When are you coming back.

R: Wednesday night. When are you going to China?

K: The following Monday night.

R: Do you think you will have any time?

K: Let's have breakfast at the Metropolitan Club Thursday morning at 7:45

R: That's great.

END

SL2

TELCON
President/Kissinger
Oct. 12, 1973 - 8:38 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Mr. President.

P: The morning report.

K: Mr. President, I was just checking ours and just talking to the Israelis to find out what was going on. The Israelis are still advancing into Syria, although they are now getting heavy counter-attacks and the Iraqi armor division is beginning to fight them.

P: The thing we have here from CIA indicates that it was pretty tough up there in the Golan Heights and that sort of thing. So apparently they are having a pretty good fight up there.

K: That's right. But they claim to be advancing and they claim to be reaching their objective. Of course it is obvious that all the fighting is tougher for the Israelis than it has ever been before.

P: Of course.

K: We had a call from Heath yesterday, transferring ~~with~~ a request from Jordan which we received already directly that if he is forced to move an armored unit into Syria, whether he could get an assurance from the Israelis that they wouldn't attack him.

P: From Jordan?

K: That was a hell of a question to ask.

P: Of course they'll attack.

K: Well, I asked, I put it to the Israelis and they said they are not trying to add to the divisions facing them from Syria, but they're not looking for an excuse to attack Jordan.

P: No, they don't want to fight another country. Well, it's really going on, isn't it?

K: Oh, yeah, we've had an appeal from Sadat to prevent Israeli attacks on civilian targets and we're sending a reply back saying we've made that appeal to the Israelis. Then we've had an appeal from King Hussein. Today diplomacy is going to begin moving. I'm seeing the press at noon, to see whether they can put up a simple cease-fire.

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P: With the idea that the Soviets really would abstain?

K: That's right. That would still pass it.

P: The Soviets certainly wouldn't, unless the Chinese .... But the Soviets why would they abstain from such a thing? I mean ....

K: Well, they just because right now there's a sort of a balance in the sense that the Israelis gained in Syria and lost in Egypt.

P: Although they haven't gained in Syria quite as much as we'd hoped apparently.

K: I can't get a clear report of that.

P: Now what about our own activities with regard to resupply, etc. Has anything gone forward in that respect?

K: Well, last night we finally told Schlesinger just to charter some of these civilian air lines, airplanes from civilian air lines for the Defense Department and then turn them over to the Israelis.

P: Good.

K: We've tried everything else and these civilian airlines just wouldn't charter to the Israelis directly.

P: That's alright.

K: So that's going to start moving later today.

P: But they have not yet actually run short of equipment?

K: No. And of course the most important assurance you gave them was that you'd replace the equipment.

P: The planes and tanks, right?

K: Right. So that they can expend what they've got, knowing they'll get more.

P: The lines that be, it seems to me, if you're .... simply that we're not going to discuss what's going to be done, but the President has always said that it is essential to maintain the balance of power in that area.

K: I'm giving a press conference today.

P: But maintaining the balance of power, do you think that's too provocative?

K: No, we've always said that we....

P: That's what I mean, That's a signal to the Israelis, etc.

K: I'm giving a press conference today. I've got to navigate that one.

P: Yeah. Well, there's no more to be done. Of course I don't know anybody that's got a better idea as to what we're doing.

K: There's nothing else to be done, Mr. President. After all.....

P: In terms of intervention, that's out of the question.

K: Impossible.

P: In terms of massive open support for Israel, that will just bring massive open support by the Russians.

K; And it wouldn't change the situation in the next two or three days, which is what we're talking about.

P: .... the Israelis are not looking at two or three days. That's our problem, isn't it? They may be looking at two or three weeks before they can really start clobbering these people.

K: In two or three weeks the international presses will become unmanageable.

P: I see. Well then, if it's two or three days then the Israelis have just got to win something on the Syrian front. Right?

K: That's right.

P: That's the point.

K: That's exactly it.

P: Do the Israelis know that the international pressure will become impossible?

K: Well, you know, they keep telling us to take care of them but that's great for them.

P: That's right. No way. Well, anyway, good luck. Call me back.

K: I'll call you back.

SL21

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon: 10/12/73: 11:54 p.m.
Mr. Kissinger/
General Haig

K: Hello.

H: Hi, Henry.

K: Al, you know having a massive problem with the Israelis because the sons of bitches in Defense have been stalling for four days and not one airplane has moved.

H: Oh no.

K: Oh yes. After the decision on Tuesday not one God xxxx damn shipload - not one has moved. And they are now out of ammunition. They are stopping their Syrian offensive. The Egyptians have transferred artillery to the other side of the Canal.

H: Oh boy.

K: And may start an offensive tomorrow so now the question is whether they are going to collapse in the Sinai, and you know what this does to the diplomatic scenario I described to you.

H: Yes, yeah.

K: Which absolutely required an Israeli offensive.

H: Yep.

K: And they told us they were running out of ammunition. They conducted the operation on the assumption that it would be replenished by the end of this week. That is a combination of Clements, Hill and Noyes. Now my orders apparently just aren't carried out over there.

H: All right. Do you want me to call Jim right away?

K: Well, I have called Jim. Will you call Clements and throw the fear of God into him?

H: Yes, sure.

K: And also throw the fear of God into Schlesinger.

H: Right, I will do that.

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K: You know that doesn't mean they should now pour American airplanes directly into, but they should do something now. They can round up charters. I do not believe for one minute that they can't get charters if they tell these charter companies that the next time they need a rate change they won't get it.

H: Charter aircraft.

K: Yes.

H: Yes. OK. Let me do that right Henry.

K: Good.

H: All right.

K: Good.

SL19

TELCON
Cromer/HAK
October 12, 1973/9:43 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

C: Yes Henry.

K: Let me read you from what is called an oral note which Dobrynin handed me. "Acting in the spirit of understanding which is characteristic of our relations with the President (don't throw up please) we were consulting during the last several days with the leaders of Egypt and Syria on the question of termination of hostilities. Frankly speaking the conversations were protracted and not easy but nevertheless we are now able to say to the President that the Soviet Union is ready not to block adoption of the caeasefire resolution in the Security Council. The President of course understands that in the present situation the Soviet Union cannot vote in the Security Council in favor of the ceasefire resolution but the main thing is that we will not vote against it. Our representative will abstain during the vote." Now this of course is in total strictest confidence.

C: Of course. Now, as far as the participants in the event of consent, [redacted] I won't claim hard to get in the slightest intention but we obviously have to get our lines fairly straight.

K: I think after you have decided to proceed we will then instruct Scali to talk to Madlen.

C: That's fine. It's what is on the ground that worries me.

K: What happens on the ground is that they will probably continue fighting until it is adopted.

C: I'm sure they will. There is no doubt about that. The question is will they go on afterwards and repute any of this. But I don't believe they will personally.

K: My smell Rollie is that this is going to do it.

C: I think its well worth the effort.

K: I don't see what we have to lose.

C: The reaction from London is thoroughly encouraging but they....

K: Will you transmit this to them.

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C: Oh sure, of course.

K: OK.

C: Ri ght away and....

K: I urge you not to trigger anything without further consultation with me.

C: What do you mean by that?

K: I mean don't have Madelin go to Scali without....

C: No...

K: We should aim for a Security Council late tomorrow.

C: Your Congressional situation here is alright.

K: We'll be alright for the weekend and I've made some preparations.

C: I made it very clear to London it needs to be over the weekend.

K: It would be helpful to be over the weekend. If you wanted Sunday thats alright too.

C: To be sure but before they go back to business.

K: But my smell of it is that we should start triggering this procedure before any of these maniacal parties changes their mind.

C: I agree. I mean I think that tomorrow is perfectly alright.

K: Because this will also give the King of Jordan and the King of Saudi Arabia an opportunity to delay.

C: Exactly.

K: OK.

C: Of course it wouldn't reach the light of day. I will start mainly in the morning I would imagine.

K: Well, we should start murmuring in the middle of the afternoon.

C: It might get out before then. Does that worry you.

K: How could it?

C: It'll be the middle of the afternoon here. Thats alright but I don't know whether... what I don't know is whether they need to assign anybody else in the Security Council before they finally make up their minds to do it.

K: I think the other members...

C: You think it is a mistake.

K: I think it is a mistake because the other members of the ... will be bided by what the Soviets and we do.

C: If you and the Soviets made the right noises they would probably lose their minds.

K: My judgment is that if you start canvassing you'll get a negative reaction while if you propose it and then we and the Soviets indicate reluctant approval...

C: I'm with you.

K: You see/what I mean.

C: I'm with you entirely. Fine. Well, we'll work on that basis Henry...

K: But since I have to keep my maniacal parties here in line you will make sure that before you move with any other party you let me know.

C: Henry, we don't need other parties.

K: Yes.

C: Henry, or any other nationality.

K: Yes.

C: OK. I will. We'll be the two participants.

K: Yes.

C: Alright. Fine. Thank you Henry.

SLIS

TELECON
Dinitz/Kissinger
October 12, 1973
7:45 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K. Hello.

D. Dr. Kissinger. I just came back from Clement. I mean Schlesinger and Clement was there, and I also had a talk with the Prime Minister. When can you see me?

K. We have a few other problems tonight.

D. I understand this. I am not trying to.... I thought I had some important things on the political situation.

K. I have Dobrynin coming in a few minutes with a very important message.

D. It might be related.

K. Can you tell me about it now?

D. We regard the message that your people sent us as very serious about the threat and the Prime Minister hopes that you are regarding reacting to it very strongly.

K. There is no question of that. I was very upset about the harrassment from the pro-Jewis senators this afternoon. As if we had not done enough.

D. The Committee, or two or three members, knew exactly what you had done. They were concerned with two Phantoms a day and that shipment did not get out even today. That was Symington and Javits. I felt I had to tell them.... and also emphasized what you had done to help.

K. We will not heed to Soviet threats and we are staying on the schedule we discussed with you.

D. The Prime Minister said we could start the schedule today.

K. It is now too late for that. Especially after the threat we should show no nervousness.

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D. You can start any time.

K. Once you have been threatened it is better to stick to your course. One thing that Javitz said was that we would make you pay for your diplomatic gains. We got the Soviet message Wednesday morning and here we are in Friday.

D. I did not enter into the political arena at all.

K. You and I will remain good friends.

D. Yes. We are very candid with each other.

K. As long as we understand each other. We know the situation. If there is time before I go to the White House after I have talked to Dobrynin I will call you.

D. I will wait for your call.

S417

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

TELECON
Dinitz Kissinger
October 12, 1973
8:25 p. m.

K. I have to be very brief again because I have to run off to the White House.

D. I know.

K. I had a talk with Dobrynin. He had two messages. One to protest against our resupply and the second extremely threatening about your bombing of civilian targets and threatening that Tel Aviv will not be spared if this continues. I said that if any Soviet planes are seen over the area.... there will be direct American involvement.

D. Let me get this down.

K. We are moving an aircraft carrier from Gibraltor to the... If any Soviet personnel, plans or ground personnel appear in the area the US will intervene. I have no authority to say this. I would not want to have Dayan hold a press conference.

D. What Dayan says never relates to our cables. That is the problem.

K. Wh You can believe this is true. I have discussed it with the President this afternoon but I would not like it to get out, especially on the day the Congress passed the War Powers Bill.

D. What?

K. A bill that limits the President's power to make war. A second problem on the scenario, I have discussed with you. We are not traggering it tonight under any circumstances. But I may do it tomorrow and can I tell the British that I have discussed it with you?

D. For instance, Eban suggested that we may do this with the Australians instead of the British.

[redacted] B1

D. Do you think the British will be reliable?

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DECLASSIFY AFTER: HAK'S DEATH
DATE/CASE ID: 24 MAY 2004 200102979

K. [redacted] B1

D. I will have to.... Maybe we will leave this question open until we reach.....

K. ...talk with them already. They called about...It won't happen until tomorrow anyway. I think we should get some diplomatic process before this gets out of hand.

D. It is imperative that we meet tonight some time because I have a very clear scenario from the Prime Minister directly.

K. We will meet between 11 and 12 sometime.

D. Can you fix a meeting with Eban?

K. I would just as soon not see him. It is just a waste of my time.

D. Well, he is flying in tonight. I cannot bring him to the meeting tonight I guess, but from now on he will have to be involved with the diplomatic procedure.

K. I must get to the White House. I cannot be late.

D. Let us talk when you get back from the White House. Good night.

SL18

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Lord Cromer/Kissinger
October 12, 1973 - 9:33 p.m.

C: Ah, look, have you got anything from Dobrynin?

K: Yes, I've had a word with Dobrynin. And he says this, he said your information is correct, but irrelevant.

C: What does he mean by that?

K: He means that, he asked me to say that they had no right to say flatly that the Egyptians will accept it, but they do say that if you put it forward on the assumption that the Egyptians will accept it it would be a very good gamble.

C: A very good gamble?

K: Yeah. But what he was really trying to tell me is, now I know the Israeli attitude which will be yes, but. They may raise one or two....

C: Well, yes, we've been explaining this to our Ambassador in Tel Aviv. I certainly didn't tell him what was going on, but he seen the Director General of the Ministery of Foreign Affairs Kidron earlier in the day. And they were just playing hard to get. They said, of course, they were under great pressure from the military as they were expected to be. They should go through with it.

K: What you people have to assume is that we wouldn't ask you to do this if we didn't think there was a reasonable possibility.

C: No, no, no, that I take 100 percent. I mean there's no problem with that at all. We have to take a little bit. I don't mean this with any mistrust of your information.

K: No, no, it's entirely up to you. I'm just giving you the answers I receive.

C: Yes, sure. When you say the information is correct but irrelevant, I'm a little bit perplexed by that.

K: They seemed to be convinced that the Egyptians do not want to be in the position of, they do not want to....

C: They do not want to be ....

K: They do not want to be in the position of having asked for it. But

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they apparently would accept it if the Security Council passed it without their indicating that they wanted it.

C: Yes. Imposed by the Security Council. I mean, without their asking for it.

K: That is correct.

C: I get the sense of that and they wouldn't come out in refutation of it in other words, obviously. I mean they might make a bad public demonstration but in reality they wouldn't.

K: Eventually they will accept it.

C: You still feel this is right Henry, don't you?

K: I would not have...

C: I mean in your own judgment.

K: My own judgment is that it is the right thing to do. I believe it is the way to peace or at least a good gamble on it and I think it would be a useful role to play and the reason we have asked you is because we thought you were the most trustworthy of the members of the Security Council.

C: I thank you Sir.

K: No, I am serious.

C: But, no, I take that in all seriousness too.

K: We have no interest in playing games with this.

C: I realize that no but there will be a pretty difficult balance, you will see. The balance on the issues and the balance on the timing and the timing on the ground is something that is really going to be the decision isn't it. That neither party on the ground wants to take it any further.

K: My judgment is... I've had very extensive conversations with the Israelis. They are aware of this scenario. They authorized me to trigger it. They did not say they would accept it.

C: No, they wouldn't.

K: But they wouldn't.

C: Naturally not.

K: But I would obviously not move if I thought this would get us into a total confrontation with the Israelis.

C: But I have from our people in Tel Aviv from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, from Kidron, is that they would be prepared to look at it unless they could do some sort of trade between the North and the South.

K: First of all....

C: This is generalistic.

K: First of all Rollie I don't believe that the Ministry would know it as well as the Prime Minister with whom I am in close contact almost 3 or 4 times a day. Secondly, I don't want to mislead you. I'm not saying that the Israelis are in fact going to accept it but we believe it may start a negotiation.

C: I think that's right. In reading this telegram from Tel Aviv of what the Ministry said it is what you expect a Ministry official to say.

K: Especially a Ministry official who to my certain knowledge, since the foreign Minister isn't being kept fully informed, the Ministry isn't.

C: It's a democratic answer again. That I agree with. Alright Henry, let me get back to London on this.

K: Let me see whether I can find the piece of paper from the Soviets that I can read to you and I'll call you right back.

C: Alright. Fine Henry.

SL16

TELECON
Lord Cromer/Kissinger
October 12, 1973
8:15 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

C.... That the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State issued these proposals. However, our information, which is recently good, is that Israel's attitude does not say that. Our firm impression is that Egypt at this stage would only be interested in what we are talking about if the terms were to regain their '67 position.

K. That will be their formal position but I think they will accept this. Just as the Israelis' formal position will be the other one. I have just had Dobrynin in atain and he again confirmed it.

C. The Israelis are less firm and our impression is they would only be interested if limited to swap of Syrian gains to Egyptian losses. We can.... I am seeking from our Ambassador in Egypt some ideas on Sadat's thinking.

K. You will probably not get the right answer. Let me get back to Dobrynin and check with you an hour after the broadcast.

C. I will be hearing from you this evening.

K. I am positive on the Egyptian side.

C. This is our information, we think it is firm.

K. Let me talk to Dobrynin again and I will call you by 9:00.

C. I will be waiting.

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SL14

TELCON
Yuri Vorontsov - Secretary Kissinger
October 12, 1973
7:00 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

V: What are you doing in town?

K: Only leave time... get damned Middle East thing....

V: I decided to stay and shoot it out.

K: One of the worst threats ever made against me.

V: I am a secret weapon and they use me ....

K: Where is the Ambassador?

V: He's opening a youth exposition, but he plans to visit you this evening. Wants to talk to you urgently. Will it be possible to reach you... in an hour's time.

K: Look, I have to be at the White House at 8:30. Tell him if he can arrange for me to be a member of the Politburo I can make him Vice President.

V: He only has an hour to make a decision.

K: Tell him to come to the State Department at 8:00.

V: And you have to be at the White House at 8:30?

K: And I can't be reached there. Have you got the message.

V: Yes, we have got the message and it is being translated now. By 8:00 he will have it... at the State Department.

K: Tell him to come....

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SL9

TELECON
Schlesinger/Kissinger
October 12, 1973
5:40

RELEASED IN FULL

S. What did you think about the Ambassador's emotional scene?

K. About being brutalized by the Foreign Relations Committee?

S. Yes.... I guess Burns outlined the package. Have you talked to Burns?

K. No.

S. We have a package of replacements work about $500 million along the lines of... meeting. Jackson wants 50 Phantoms within 24 hours.

K. Tell him to go screw himself. I don't mind you making a commitment to whatever package seems reasonable. I still think we ought to get something moving but not in quantities that would get this blown sky high.

S. We are moving in the Azores. I will call you back after I check with him. Did you have anything else?

K. I just returned your call.

S. Good. We will go ahead with the package which consists of 30 Skyhawks A-4s, 16 Phantoms, 125 tanks, including 65 M60s and a whole range of other things, 3 Hawk fighters and so on.

K. If you could tell him this was White House orders this will help us enormously.

S. I'll do that. Delighted to talk with you.

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SL11

TELCON
Foreign Minister Eban - Secretary Kissinger
October 12, 1973
5:53 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

E: I know you have a great variety of problems at this moment.

K: That's right.

E: I refer to the message I asked Minister Shalev to send you this morning about what ought to ensue in the Security Council

K: Right.

E: I would very much like before anything is done a chance to consult with you, perhaps....

K: My understanding on this is not to happen until tomorrow.

E: Yes, there is still a round of speeches... low profile on which... if I could come in tomorrow morning.

K: Not before tomorrow late afternoon.

E: Coudn't come in in the morning, anyway you would like to arrange...

K: I don't mind you coming in openly.

E: Perhaps I could do that. There are one or two things Mrs. Meir asked me to put to you...

K: All I need is the time to do it. How about 9:00.

E: Later would be better.

K: Unfortunately have Bourguiba Jr. coming at 10:00 and I have changed him twice already.

E: All right, at 9:00 then.

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SL12

TELCON
C. Douglas Dillon - Secretary Kissinger
October 12, 1973
6:13 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

D: Fine. Good to hear from you. How was your dinner at the Metropolitan.

K: Marvelous.

D: Delighted to hear it went well.

K: It went very well.

D: I'm delighted to hear it. Sorry I couldn't be there.

K: I am calling you on behalf of the President and of course on my own behalf. As you may know, I made a number of changes in the Department today, you may not know. One involved bringing back our Ambassador to Japan for the Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs. That leaves the post in Japan open. The President and I were hoping very much you might consider taking that...

D: That's very flattering, very difficult for me to do anything right now. Naturally don't want to...

K: Oh, I don't expect an answer right this minute. Let me say that as far as I am concerned it is one of the two or three top Ambassadorial posts in which the Ambassador really makes enourmous amount of difference...

D: I would agree with you on that and...

K: in which he would have considerable scope...not one of those things were instructions are sent in excruciating detail.

D: I can see that, I think you are right about that but it is, I am flattered and pleased that you would and that the President would...

K: Really very impressed by our talk and I think you would make a really great national service if you would consider it.

D: Very difficult. If I find ...find I can't do it, out of respect and to work with you and the President, but I am deeply involved in,..... and family problems.

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K: But do give it some thought.

D: .....not get that far away. I would like, naturally, but its such a surprise, naturally want to think about it. Don't know how quickly you want an answer.

K: I am going to China at the end of next week, back early the following week. Perhaps we can talk again before that.

D: All right. By the end of next week I think....I am at home now, out in the country..I can talk to my wife, and my father... problems there. I will have a clearar idea by Monday. Thank you for calling. I appreciate it. You must be having quite a hard baptism.

K: If I make it through this crises without the Arabs, Soviets or even the Israelis blowing up...

D: Really be something.

K: Look forward to talking to you.

SL10

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Scali/Kissinger
October 12, 1973
5:50

K. Hi, John. How are you?

S. Fine. What was it you called about.

K. You called me.

S. You just called me off the Council floor. (Malik?) Just said there will be grave consequences if the Israelis continue to hit civilian targets in Syria, Egypt and thinks like Soviet ships and targets.

K. We don't reply.

S. No, I don't intend to reply.

K. If they make an overt threat of any reaction by them you better warn them.

S. I will... They just said there will be grave consequences to which I will not reply. If this meeting ends I may be in town tonight for the Vice President thing.

K. I thought you would be the one.

S. Maybe I am. I have been told to come.

K. So have I. See you soon, John.

S. I will be in touch.

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SL13

TELCON
Lord Cromer - Secretary Kissinger
October 12, 1973
6:50 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: ....nominated as Vice President, thought I ought to....

C: You what?

K: I'm joking.

C: Heard nothing from London. Will you be at hand...

K: I can be reached through the White House board.

C: OK, Just as soon as I get anything I'll let you know. I passed on the second thing you gave me..

K: Not necessary to do it tonight, but it would be hel pful to get to get a preliminary reaction. What is your personal reaction.

C: My personal reaction is in favor. It seems a sensible thing to do. I think it is a role we could usefully play.

K: If they give us any trouble, you and I, why don't we just go ahead on our own.

C: Right. Get set up with our own office in the UN. One of the problems ...slowly at home logistically is damned party conference at Blackpool. but the communications are quite good and I hope to hear this evening.

K: Good because we need to design our strategy.

C: I think the options for the future are extremely difficult. Not looked at the ....paper we gave you in New York on guarantees.

K: Oh yes, it's a lot more relevant now than then.

C: That's what I mean.

K: In fact I want to talk to you about that. I was looking forward to talking to Alec about it.

C: I am at your disposition whenever you want to talk...

K: Let me get this operation under way first, then turn energetically to that aspe ct .....

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SL46

TELCON
B/G Scowcroft - Secretary Kissinger
October 13, 1973
5:22 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

S: 9 hours from now

K: When the flak will start.

S: I wouldn't think until a little after that, would you?

K: We should get together on the oil thing.
we will know if
S: [illegible]....something going to happen,.....too visibility not too high. F-4's won't get there until tomorrow afternoon. Let me see if I can get an ETA My impression is 9:00 tomorrow might be about perfect.

K: Let me know about it

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TELECON
Haig/Kissinger
October 13, 1973
3:15 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

H. ....He just was very concerned about the remark by the President that he wanted them to turn in their resignations. He wanted to know if we....

K. I just hope you backed it up.

H. I said that was exactly what the President told him. ....later their policy and spirit of it there were some suggestions that there was no spirit being followed. He said while these problems are not State's and I don't think Henry knows....

K. There was one problem for three hours on Tuesday night and it was tkane care of as soon as it was understood.

H. One of our problems with Ward and Clement was that WSA G hadn't met enough and they weren't talking with him on the problems.

K. I had him over every day.

H. That may be one of the problems.

K. I deliberately didn't want to because I was afraid they would leak. I am having them daily now.

H. Kennedy was a great help in those things and put deadlines on each one of the problems.

K. What more could be done than having him in every day?

H. I told him to get professional military men in the cornerstone of the action groups because they don't have hangups to get in the way.

K. It was probably a mistake not to have the meeting. We didn't think there would be any problems every day. They told us they had gone.

H. He was shocked to know that it hadn't moved to the Azores. He told me last night it was there. That was a case of an interdepartmental snafu. Your people weren't handling that they were working on the pick up problem.

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K. That's right. You know we have experienced this very often when bureaucracy wants to do womthing and you just have to .... and they find 500 ways of doing it or not doing it and caused no ill well.

H. Eaactly right. I think no question but that you have a position and the best we can do is keep the heat on the British and get them to realize that they are screwing themselves.

K. I will call back about 4:00.

H. If you feel the President should make a call. He may have to.

K. No. Thanks.

SL47

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
B/G Scowcroft - Secretary Kissinger
October 13, 1973
5:25 p. m.

K: Brent, tell Simon to come to the WSAG with an oil plan ready.

S: Henry, he has a plan ready.

K: I want a plan, not an analysis...

S: We've got a conlict...Simon and Love.

K: Oh Christ, don't bother me with details like that...

S: Well, I got hell from Haig because Simon and not Love....

K: All right. Get Love in and ...if he can do anything in 24 hours... Just make sure to get the plan by tomorrow. Make sure he can do it with out getting the whole town worked up.

S: We'll have somebody there who can have a plan ready.

K: And somebody who can keep his mouth shut.

S: Right.

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RELEASED IN FULL

SL45

TELECON
Scowcroft/ Kissinger
October 13, 1973
5:15 p. m.

S. I don't think until a little after that would you....

K. Either we should get together on the whole thing...

S. Yes, well something is going to happen there for sure if we go all out. With this... still isn't too high. The F4s won't get there until tomorrow afternoon. Let me see if I can get an ETA. My impression was about 9:00 tomorrow might be just about perfect.

K. Let me know.

S. Let me see if I can get an ETA.

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SL39

TELCON
Sir Alec Douglas-Home - Secretary Kissinger
October 13, 1973
3:35 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

DH: We have been over and over your suggestion with the Prime Minister. We don't think that the time is right for this initiative and we don't think we could take it now although for the next few days we will try to wrack our brains to see if we have other suggestions. Our contact with Sadat has gone so far as to say that he feels so strongly he would invoke a Chinese veto if anybody proposed something of this sort. Therefore, the Russians would in our view have no chance whatever of looking on Sadat and forcing him to do so. This, at least at present. If you really want to do this, if you and the Soviet Union were to abstain, of course we would do our best, if you wanted to get the Australians to try this line.

K: Let me get back to you if we want to revive it. If we have any other ideas we will be in touch with you.

DH: If we have any other ideas I will give you a ring tomorrow. At the moment, haven't got any idea. Didn't think we could take initiative of a simple resolution of cease fire as you ask because we think Sadat really would reject it, what's more he would reject it vehemently. I have talked to the Russians and told them this. It doesn't look really too be a starter. Australians of course might be willing to do it. MacIntyre is in a particularly good position to do it. If you want to launch it. Having gone over it again and again, don't think you can get the support in the Security Council, Anyway are you very worried about the effect generally about detente with the Russians?

K: ....massive resupply for Israel on our side....

DH: Two other things. The French have exactly the same impression as us of Sadat. We think relations being what they are with Sadat if there had been a glimmer of hope in a move like this he would have said so, on the contrary he gave us a totally, worse than negative signal.

K: I understand this. As to your question about whether detente is our motivating consideration... Detente is not an end in itself. I think developments now are going to drave us towards a confrontation.

DH: I know, this is a great worry. Couldn't you fix this with

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the Russians? Can't you get them to lay off.

K: We can attempt it.

DH: I don't want to discourage you from trying with the Australians if you...

K: Don't really think we will do it, not sure Russians would accept the Australians.

SL40

TELECON
Dobrynin/Kissinger
October 13, 1973
4:00 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K. Anatoly, I have just heard from the British and they do not feel they can proceed. They were told by Sadat 1) he did not want a resolution and 2) if such a resolution were put in he would call the Chinese to veto it. He would consider any ....

That leaves two possibilities. Either you tricked us

D. It was always easy to check with us. After all it was very clear... all the day before yesterday when our answer came. It was very easy to be approved two days ago when we came to the General Assembly but

K. First we have to get somebody to put it in.

D. I understand that. If it came to the floor we would abstain.

K. I don't doubt that you would abstain. What is the sence of such a maneuver if you thought the Egyptians wouldn't accept it. You engaged in our discussions with the Israelis..... At any rate the British won't introduce it and you don't want the Australians to introduce it.

D. .... give our instruction. I am now waiting for instructions....

K. We are not going to do anything. We are now going to wash our hands of it and let nature take its course.

D. I will be in touch.

K. I was until an hour ago operating onder the instructions.... and I interpreted your airlift as a show of good will to the Egyptians. ..... It looks as if you want this war to continue and let us go through three days of meetings with the Israelis and British in the meantime.

D. Before then how could we know that the British would wait to give a firm decision. I am sure that the British would tell you we were not in touch with them at all.

K. You might have known what Sadat would do....

D. I am just telling you that it is a very wrong assumption.

K. We operated on the assumption when you told us you had discussed with Egypt that they would accept it. There is no reason....

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D. At this very moment.... would held under the pressure so to speak.

K. Now when they say they are going to ask the Chinese to veto

D. Maybe Sadat changed his mind and....

K. And they told the British they had said the same thing to you. That is

D. No

K. To gain time.

D. For whom, for them?

K. That's right.

D. For Israel to ..... the Syrians. It was a very interesting presumption.

K. There is no sense discussing it.

D. I was waiting for the reply. What they wanted to tell us.

K. Of course how we have to look at your airlift as a continuing thing and consider the possible that we will be ....

D. Let us wait. Maybe in an hour or two. You

K. You might as well tell Moscow that nothing is going to happen today.

D. Wiill you call me when you have something.?

SL42

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Schlesinger - Secretary Kissinger
October 13, 1973
4:15 p.m.

K: Portuguese have agreed to use of the airfield.

S: For charters?

K: For anything.

S: Jesus Christ, that's a surprise. What did you tell them?

K: I just told them we wouldn't bargain. If they reject we will remember. When the crisis against which they want to protect themselves occurs. This is for your own personal information.

S: That means we can go over to charter by Monday... continue to fly the stuff into the Azores.

K: One problem you have to remember... looks like our diplomatic initiative is coming apart. The British won't play because Egypt won't play according to the British. We may be getting into a confrontation posture with the Soviets. Soviets may just figure that if they have the whole Arab world against us.... you know the 21st armoured division crossed the Canal, we just got the word from the Israelis.

S: ...leave them alone in the .....part of the Sinai. When they get out the Israelis will look better.

K: Israelis lined it up. Russians assured me Egypt was lined up.

S: I don't get the Brits. Why not tell them we are not going to give them any Poseidons or Polaris?

K: No, they're going to get them anyway, these things have to be done in cold blood. No, don't share your information yet, do it tomorrow morning.

S: Well, I'm going to tell Clements about the Portuguese. Can I tell you something ~~FUNNY~~ funny. One hell alot of stuff ready to move. We've got it on the planes in case we got the word to fly it direct to Israel. Then we found out the stuff was still sitting right here in the United States. We didn't get a clearance from the State Department. We've moved the stuff off to the Azores now, 15 C141s and 3 C58s will be airborne at noon.

K: Moving into to Tel Aviv?
S: Yes, Henry.

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S643

TELECON
Dobrynin/Kissinger
October 13, 1973
4:25 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K. Anitoly, I just talked to the President and he asked me to tell you that under these circumstances he can no longer observe any restrictions that I gave you yesterday on flying American plans.

D. Under what circumstances?

K. The plan we worked out is not being implemented because we didn't know the Egyptians real feelings. We are prepared to stop when you are.

D. What?

K. We are prepared to stop our aerial supplies when you are willing to stop.

D. I will send that right now.

K. So what I told you yesterday as of an hour from now will not be accurate.

D. You don't want to wait even an hour?

K. We can always stop it. It will not be that massive that quickly.

D. O'k.

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SL41

TELECON
Scowcroft/Kissinger
October 13, 1973
4:05 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K. Hello. And they don't want to lose that much prestige. The Russians don't want Australia to introduce the resolution. As I understand there are now 15 C-41 and 3 C-5s underway. The Portugese have ...now. You start the charters. Since we are going to be in a confrontation we should go all out. I am going to call....I want to warn him in the event you might get....Ask how long it will take the 82nd Airborne to get ready.

S. Of course.

K. Not to do anything. I think those bastards understand only brutality.

S. I was just talking to Dinitz and they are very pleased with the report that things are on their way.

K. Are you getting the two ships loaded?

S. There is one in Boston at the present time and it is almost loaded.

K. Get that on the way.

S. The other is to be in on the 15th.

K. If they want to play, we will play.

S. I think under the circumstances we have no other choice.

K. It could be that the Egyptians were willing to do it. I told Dobrynin that they were diddling us along to gain time. He told me he thought we were diddling them along for the Syrian offensive.

S. That is possible too. I will call you back on the 82nd.

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SL44

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Cromer/Kissinger
October 13, 1973
4:35 p.m.

K. Hello.

C. Henry, I still haven't heard anything.

K. I talked to Alec and your people won't do it. They have talked to the Egyptians and they say they are violently opposed to it.

C. They won't give any.... Maybe the Egyptians have changed their minds in the delusion that they may win.

K. At any rate I have just talked to the President who is taking it extremely ill. When we look over the crisis of the last three years we just don't seem to be able to get together.

C. Our clients are quite different but our objectives are the same.

K. No right for you to do to us.... We wanted to tell you we are starting an airlift into Israel. There will probably be a confrontation.

C. That was inevitable. I told our people in London that you would have no alternative. It is very disturbing.

K. Especially, since what we asked you to do is what you proposed last week.

C. I think what has changed since then is that the Egyptians obviously got all above themselves.

K. The one consolation one has is whatever the tactical... the West has... we will all go down together, at least we are doing it with the worst possible grace.

C. What will be your posture vis-a-vis when the Arabs start screaming oil at you.

K. Defiance.

C. Just defiance? It is going to be rough won't it?

K. We have no choice.

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C. Well, we tried.

K. You can transmit this to London.

SL37

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Scowcroft/Kissinger
October 13, 1973
2:25 p. m.

K. ....and if they are moving ahead would you move ahead. I have talked with Dinitz.

S. Yes, he has called me and summarized your conversation. I will call him back and keep him posted when the planes leave.

K. Good. Fine.

S. On the Romanian visit. Apparently there is no problem with the dates.

K. I will just offer them.

S. Fine. The Israelis said the Egyptians 25th armor division has crossed the canal. They feel they will try to break out.

K. The Russians will not accept an Australian proposal. It is either the British or nothing. They probably figure that the British won't move. We may be forced to pour stuff in there.

S. We may. That is a very different strategy but it may be necessary to try.

K. We can't let Israel lose.... If the Soviet side wins we will be in very bad shape. Then we will have to break the detente and go to a higher defense budget.

S. No question about it. It is very serious. if it goes that way. I am trying to stay on top of this thing now and I will keep bugging them.

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SLSS

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin - Secretary Kissinger
October 13, 1973
7:55 p.m.

D: Oral message --- First Brezhnev refers to ~~xx~~ discussion I had yesterday with your boss during reception

K: Told me about that.

D: Expresses great satisfaction ... about things what said the President to the Ambassador. Sure... shared his view and he would like me to tell to Dr. Kissinger he adheres exactly to the same points of view, Hope , no matter what difficulties, ... many good things done and will... to keep it.

K: Good, Hope ... going to prove that.

D: Situation in Middle East and Security Council ... for days, US and some countries with which they consulted don't come to the conclusion of immediately convocation of Security Council. We don't know exactly reson of that. Question, reply..... military situation in Middle East how it develops, it develops different, can only through last days. In one day don't have time . Don't think try to follow us ... our part. We concerned on position about cease-fire. Same time tells ... use bombardment of civilian tartets in territories by Israel. Make it more difficult. Indication argued ... Arab capitals and peoples. That's why difficult to discuss on this, questions specifically... nw Arabs are objecting... to accept Security Council resolution which deals only with cease fire. They insist should be accompanied simultaneous cease fire and should be another additional part of solution which had to say about, be stages withdrawals of Israeli troops from Arab territories, which was occupied in 1967. Isn't finished yet, finally consultation with Arab countries about, insist on position .... don't have text yet.

K: We have worked for three days on assumption you are now cancelling.

D: For two days might ... have been quite prepared to do, now Arabs are objecting to this. Like to decide situation on bit scale... which means will remove cause of all conflict. This will be really major decision which will have to decide thing ...

K: Well, where does this leave us? Nowhere.

D: ... now with Security Council.

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K: Now we are right back to where we were last Monday.

D: Looks so...

K: ....took 48 hours to make possible

D: For two days, the day before yesterday and yesterday and in the morning yesterday, I give you reply...even I was shaken up with you...you know I was shaken up...telegram from Gromyko don't received any for some days. Two days our position very close, we were prepared to abstain...no other interpretation. Very firmly, don't want to have complication. for two days, then Arabs changed position. Telegram from Gromyko say ehck with Kissinger, reply or not. We are complaining you don't...Really waiting until you get the British or something. For two days we are on record not not to vote at all...abstain with you. ...Arabs categorically objected.

K: In the meantime, you sent in 140 airplanes. May be why the Arabs are so tough now.

D: Not really. Security Council resolution two days ago...no connection with airlift. Holding from your side. maybe you relied too much on British. Maybe Australians ....prepared yesterday.

K: Yesterday the British talked to Sadat....what caused delay. Sadat never would have accepted....

D: Yesterday morning ...sent telegram yest4rday...I was shaken last time I talked to you. How we really have known if it wasn't mentioned to you yesterday. Very clear Security Council yesterday morning, I know up until today Malik had instructions very clear -- abstain. Sent very strong telegram to Malik, when you have complained. Immediately called to Scali, going to abstain.

K: Point is, now objective military ....despite very friendly words of Brezhnev, trying to avoid collision, you have 140 airplanes. still much ...we cannot not supply our friends while you are supplying yours.

D: Well, you had made decision.

K: You waited for 5 days. Tonight Egypt launching attack in the Sinai. ....tomorrow when som American airplanes reach Israel

Arabs are going to start yelling. We will not under any circumstances let detente be used for unilateral advantage. No illusions about that. I have .....airlift for four days. ....way of getting political settlement. Friends have refused to participate in something took you two days to get Arabs... they change their minds. I think once we were in it with you, Arabs, if President had given the word to Brezhnev... believe at last moment on day it was supposed to be implemented say they wouldn't do it. We made agreement this summer, friends objected to, ~~sx~~ went ahead with it. ...important to us. you can tell Moscow to save itself the effort, we are not going going to accept the Egyptian position. Only exacerbate the situation by proposing it to us.

D:, All right, fair enough.

K: ...want to accept Egyptian position, deal directly with it. I have had Egyptian position since Wednesday.

D: Did they propose this to you before or on Wednesday.

K: On Wednesday Egyptians sent us a proposal, of which they said they gave you a copy. and which is totally inconsistent with your proposal. Israel return to '67 borders, peace conference of great Powers, Palestine and Arabs, discuss only international .....and security and future of Palestine.

D: Wednesday, quite prepared to support...

K: I told the President, despite this message from Ismail, I relied on your word. Quite inconsistent to what Arabs told us. I assume Arabs.....you knew Egypt would agree in no sense, how you support, if Egypt wouldn't agree.

D: I understand this point of view. Change ...few days ago.

K: Fine with us and we just have to see what happens now.

D: Is completely unacceptable, two part resolution.

K: Well, what's the second part?

D: Stages, back to borders.

K: ...secure and recognized borders.

D: '67.

K: No, unacceptable, may be in .....in Moscow not to ...add obligation not to exacerbate situation. Until this afternoon I believed ....had

possibility of pressing for settlement. pressing for a cease fire. Now hasn't happened, you are pulling in, ... unable or unwilling to produce ceasefire...are obviously on collision course no matter how many .....what do you think we can say to the people on Monday, had them quieted down of the weekend ...so utility of detente ..... to both of us. You don't think we will accept a military set back in the Middl e Ea t, can't believe it.

D: Wouldn't believe it.

K: I recognize you have problems. ..... have to... No law that says you have to send in 140 airplanes.

D: I understand, is a problem.

K: Until this mumute not one American airplane has landed in Israel. Not one. ..... My whole strategy based on reliance on you. I can tell you, in addition to whatever else is achieved, my own credibility with respect to what .....not exactly high at this moment. ...but not from you personally, put in ...to me yesterday afternoon, getting contrary report from Sadat than I was from you. I said I had absolute confidence ....never liked to us before.

D: Could you imagine the situation. You are taking position proposed to other countries. Circumstances to be changed. This is situation...exactly I should put it on really stake much while people involved have two days making new suggestions . Now wer in a situation to do it.

K: Why do we have to deal with you, that depends on Sadat, why noot deal with Sadat directly.

D: Up to you and the President to decide. ....disastrous results. As you now changed situation we will not .....

K: .....work out this when finished able to demonstrate that special relationship. Developed would have concrete results, if you read the press conference, this was line I took.

D: I did.

K: On Monday this will be done to ....

D: .....public relations.

K; Monday you will have sent in 50-100 airplanes.

D: You are now free.....

K: Only inflame Arab leaders... victory for you. Only strategy is to make Arabs don't feel they can ..... so three or four days from now we'll see what the situation is. ....many proposals like 67 borders, make the situation worse.

D: All right, send back telegram.

K: President is extremely agitated. I know you ....to make favorable according...

D: In my telegram, I will quote, unquote you. I can assure you... otherwise, is dangerous.

K: We had understanding to work on basic issue in January. This has been completely disregarded now. Will not let ourselves be pressured into it. It would not be .... not be unhelpful. Hear something today, tomorrow. NSC meeting....Don't have to get it today, meeting isn't til Monday

D: All right.

SL57

TELECON, 8:07, October 13, 1973

RELEASED IN FULL

Secretary/ Lord Cromer

K. I'm going to a meeting with the President.

C. I have had nothing over night. . . I will try to

K. I would guess they will try and go ahead.

C. OK. Fine. As soon as I know anything I will let you know.

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SL58

TELCON
Secretary Schlesinger - Secretary Kissinger
October 13, 1973

RELEASED IN FULL

K: We are going to have an NSC meeting on Monday morning.

S: OK

K: We don't know yet at what time. Will let you know.

SOK

K: It would be helpful if we could get an accurate report of Israeli military situation from somebody. Can your Defense Attache handle it? Or should we send somebody out there.

S: Our attache is pretty good, as a matter of fact we are about to reward him for his reporting...

K: Could we get a comprehensive report by tomorrow evening.

S: Supply situation .....up to his ears in stuff. Did you hear the comment Gen. G_____ made to our people. "Stop worrying about ammunition, don't want to jam up airports with that. Much more interested in other things." ...wise to send it in. Once trade fields...tied down in the Azores.....

K: We could represent the American airlift as a legimate temporary thing.

S: This charter thing was no use to us until the Portugues cracked.

K: Monday morning.

S: May be able to use publicly or ...privately. Announce publicly willing to turn off military airlift. Charters will not work for government of Israel. Only work for Department of Defense. Part of problem with Brinegar. ....national emergency.. in effect as favor to government. I would , say require DOD to pay for it.

K: What do we achieve by charters.

S: Not a hell of a lot. Thin cover at this stage....permitted Government of Israel to hire them...our government disengaged. Supply less effective cover in which we were going to hire them on behalf of Israeli, requested to do so by Department of Transportation. .....
shifting to charters, public announcement.

K: Yes, but somebody will ask who chartered what. Defense Department still American military planes, what do we achieve.

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S: We achieve the ability to reduce the uniformed military role in this operation.

K: OK, that's worth something.

S: It's not worth a hell of a lot. Worth something to use it to get something more... Soviets in there with military people and...

K: Trouble is facing Soviets alone. Don'g give a goddamned....

S: Its the Arabs

K: Arabs worry me on airlift ....

S: I think you can turn it into a virtue.

K: Keep in mind tomorrow at the WSAG how to handle that. What achieve with charters.. Find a better cover for it.

S: Would permit more effective use of Israel air fleet. What we would do is to have charters fly the stuff to the Azores.

K: I would prefer that.

S: We have a number of options -- for charters to fly into Tel Aviv, rather than US military personnel. Liklihood of government taking .... with US government or private chartered by US government.

K; Chartered by US government. Don't know what to gain from it.

S: What ....10 short fall. Israel no suport ... everyone treats them as ....or pariahs.

K: This thing continue to po nt out what a...I wanted to avoid. Arabs wanted it to achieve.

S: Coudn't agree more.

K: How could we have avoided it?

S: Don't think you could.

K: OK, we'll discuss the charter principal tomorrow.

SL56

TELECON, 8:05 October 13, 1973

RELEASED IN FULL

Secretary/ General Scowcroft

K. Have you called the WSAG meeting?

S. I'm just calling around now. You wanted it at 10:45?

K. Yes.

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SLS4

TELECON
Clements/Kissinger
October 13, 1973
7:40 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K. Bill, I was talking to Jim about your problem. I knew you were going to get charters together once we convinced you of what we needed.

C. I didn't know that was what you wanted. It is all done.

K. Can we find a better cover than the Defense Department?

C. That is a tough one, Henry. I will think about it and see what I can do.

K. If we could announce that we are switching from military command charter flights, except a one day emergency flight, then we will be o'k.

C. I have raised this question with the airlines and they prefer some kind of cover. Another name which would represent a pool in which all the planes would be shown.

K. Who is paying for it is the question.

C. That is a serious question. These people will not function except under DOD auspices and their guarantee of repayment. We can use a cover but--

K. Iven if we guarantee the repayment?

C. No, they will not charter to Israel.

K. Excuse me I have another call. I will get back to you.

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SL48

TELECON
Cromer/Kissinger
October 13, 1973
5:25 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K. Rowley. I hope you understood what I was telling you before was under instructions. That was not my own although I am not saying I disagreed with it.

C. I took it that way.

K. I have an intelligence report I don't want to read over the phone. It substantiates that we were not liedto. Would you like to come by for about five minutes?

C. Where are you? The State Department? Why don't I come in 20 minutes or so. I have some things I would like to talk to you about.

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SL49

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
B/G Scowcroft - Secretary Kissinger
October 13, 1973
5:30 p.m.

S: On the oil contingency plan. Al talked to Love, calling him in now.

K: Haven't got anything against Love, just don't want to give it to Rogers Morton. In that case prefer to call the New York Times directly.

S: Well, Simons has done a plan and he gave it to Charlie deBona two days ago to work on...

5:45 p.m.

K: .....got to get to Clements....protect his oil interests.

S: Talked to Love...had Charlie deBona working on the plan.

K: Is Love going to be there?

S: Yes.

K: Ooooh.

S: Do you want DeBona too?

K: Going to be a slow meeting. Just have him there during that part. Don't want him to hear the rest of it.

S: OK.

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SL51

TELECON
Dobrynin/Kissinger
October 13, 1973
7:33 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K. I am going to see the President in a little while and he asked me to check with you about any information you were waiting for.

D. I expect it in five or ten minutes. I will get it. No more.

K. Sadat told the British Ambassador that he had told your Ambassador that he would not accept the resolution.

D. Just a little while. The message is already here but I will not get it for about 10 minuets at the latest.

K. All right.

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SL52

TELECON
Eban/Kissinger
October 13, 1973
7:35 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

E. I have thought about the political action we discussed today.

K. You understand it is not possible today. Hasn't Dinitz told you about the British.

D. He told me about the British refusal on... and the Soviet's refusal of the Australians. I only wonder whether the Soviet refusal is so strong that there is no chance they will change their minds... and if they want it it seems to indicate....

K. I am no longer so sure they want it and I am assuming you don't want us to present it.

D. I gave Mrs. Mier a negative answer and she endorsed that.... The other proposal is that the privilege of appearing in the Council is not limited to the Council. I thought vaguely about Denmark, Brazil, but I don't think they would be any more reasonable to the Soviets than Australia. The British refusal you think is quite final. It either does not happen at all unless the U.S. presents it and even then the Chinese veto is a possibility. If you think their objection to Australia is as firm as that all I ask is confirmation from him. The only possibility is that you.... I am also trying to find out from home what the urgency is. We have managed to overcome the trouble this morning. I will find out if there is any.... I am not recommending the second one at all. I will let you know.

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SL50

TELECON
Scowcroft/Kissinger
October 13, 1973
6:45 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

S. That might be a little drastic right now. The helicopter carrier will be leaving on Monday. The one that is going to release the one in the Med. That will be some movement in that direction. I just think that the news about the 82nd shouldn't break at the same time resupplies does. It may be..

K. I don't want that to happen. How ehe dirt is going to start flowing.

S. That is too bad.

K. I had to use the British refusal with Russia to justify the airlift which you knew we were going to do anyway.

S. That's right. Let's see, the first airplane will not get to Israél the earliest before 6:00 in the morning our time. I think the meeting is about right.

K. O'k. Thanks.

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SL53

TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin - Secretary Kissinger
October 13, 1973
7:40 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I am going to see the President, wanted to check with you to see if you had an explanation yet.

D: In five or ten minutes I will get it. Could you wait.

K: Sadat informed the British that he informed your Ambassador under no circumstances would he accept such a proposal.

D: I will call you in ten minutes. Right?

K: OK.

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SL22

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec. Schlesinger/Sec. Kissinger
12:49 a.m. 10/13/73

K: Jim,

JS: What is this telegram that you have, what--

K: Look, I don't want it spread all over the bloody Defense Department, that is the problem. They claim ~~they~~ they have now stopped offensive on the Syrian front because they are out of ammunition. They claim further that I had told them that they could keep going because they were getting--that their ammo replenished and in relying on that they've kept going and they didn't get them. Now what this does to the diplomacy I described to you yesterday is near disaster because they were supposed to be triggered yesterday, diplomacy was supposed to be triggered tonight --tomorrow night , Saturday night, but that diplomacy requires Israeli pressure--

JS: I understand that.

K: Which will now not be forthcoming. On the other hand, the Israelis will now hoard the stuff we rush in and then they'll strike when the diplomacy was supposed to have been concluded. That's water over the damn now, we'll have to discuss that some other time. But I just think there was massive sabotage.

JS: It's just not true, Henry.

K Well, let's not get into that. One thing we cannot have now given our relations with the Soviets is American planes flying in there. Any thing else is acceptable.

JS: Okay, now they claim Henry it's only five hours ago we talked to these people, we've been asking them what their daily supply is, they have exhibited no uneasiness about it at all.

K: Because they don't trust thepeople in the room

JS: You mean to say that when General ~~Gore~~ Gur is alone General Sumner that he doesn't trust him?

K: No, with ~~Gore~~ Gur with Sumner, he should trust him.

J:S Sumner has been trying to get it out of ~~Gore~~ Gur for five days and ~~Gore~~ Gur has been perfectly relaxed about ~~it~~ the day supply.

K: Because ~~Gore~~ Gur claims that -- I mean Dinitz--I don't know ~~Gore~~ Gur ~~xxx~~--Dinitz claims that was because every day we told them which is true that they were going to get 20 planes moving. And every day it didn't happen.

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K: If it had been moved, they would have been all right.
So they say.

JS: Every day goes back one night--

K: Now I told them Tuesday night based on an assurance of Sisco, about which youhave nothing to do--said they were going to get 20 charters the next day. And we told them Wednesday night if everything else failed, we were going to requisition it through MAC (?). Then we told them Thursday night it would now be requisitioned through Mac and then we told them Friday morning that this wasn't working.

JS: That's right. It's two days --

K: It's about 48 hours, but youre responsible for 24 hours, I'm responsible for --be that as it may, let's not worry about what happens. It seems to me we have these options. We've got the 10 C-130's which we could load.

JS: Right. We've got ammo in the _____ now.

K: Yeh, but we don't know when that's going to be released.

JS How about your negotiations with the Portugese ?

K: We just send a telegram two hours ago.

JS: Okay. Well they simply cannot be that short of ammo, Henry. It is impossible that they didn't know what their supply was--and suddenly they've run out of it.

K Look they have obviously screwed up every offensive they've conducted. And they are not about to take the responsibility themselves. I have no doubt whatever that they are blaming us for their own failures.

JS: Right.

K: But you try to make that case here and above all, I really think we have this thing 90% licked. And you tell the madman you have of a deputy who is spreading the word that I'm driving the Saudis crazy that I have a promise from the foreign minister Saudi Arabia--

JS: I told them at about 6:00 this evening--he seems to be somewhat relieved.
You mentioned this to me earlier to tell him.
He said he hoped it worked out that way.

K: It may not work out that way, but the only way it is going to work out if we are going to get a quick end of the war. Of which we nearly have all pieces in place, but we need an Israeli offensive.

JS: Okay, now Henry if they have enough ammo to carry him tomorrow we can get the ammo in by tomorrow evening. But first of all we have to find out what their supply situation is.

K: I would give a hell of a lot if I could keep them going through tomorrow so that they are not sitting there when this goes into the Security Council.

JS: The only way to do that is to move ammunition in tonight. And it's almost ---it must be damn near dawn there.

K: It is dawn in Israel. It's 8:00 in the morning.

JS: Are they ought of ammo or aren't they?

K: How the hell would I know.
They said they were stopping their offensive.
I was meeting with them tonight to synchronize the diplomacy for tomorrow. And I said where are you going to be tomorrow night, I was getting leary when they called me after having pleading with me to give them another day, they called me at 4:00 this afternoon and said you can trigger everything tonight. And I couldn't do it because I didn't have--I had geared my timing in such a way that I couldn't recover all the pieces. I could have done it yesterday--I need 24 hours to get it going.

JS: It's amazing to me--I sat with them from 5:30-6:30 and they simply did not mention ammunition problems -- they didn't indicate any issue in that area. All they talked about was the re-equipment and to get it in within two days.

K: They are so terrified now--or claim to be terrified of Israeli thrust into the Sinai--I mean Egyptain thrust.

JS: That's incredible planning on their part.

K: Look, they fucked it up.

JS: Hm huh. Okay, let me try to find out what the hell their status of supplies situation is. We had the impression that they had 15 days of supply.

K: I bet you they counted their supply on the experience of the six-day war.

J: Could well be.

K: I bet you they didn't expend as much in the whole six-day war as they do in one day of this offensive.

JS: That might very well be, Henry.
I think that is very likely. Sooner or later they could have come back and told us what their problem was.

K: Well because they would have had to face themselves and I must say in their defense--not on the airplanes on which they and we never agreed--but on the other one,we told them time and again that they were getting all the consumables and they should fight as if they were coming.

JS: Right. But they never told us they were running short.

K: Because you know what happened--as well as I do. These guys got the whole thing screwed up--every time. They are living in 1967. All day long yesterday they were telling me they were heading for Damascus and they were going to stop on the outskirts. This morning they told me they would stop ____public transportations if they can. Now they obviously can't make it.

JS: Okay.

K: No question in mind that 80% of the blame is theirs. But that doesn't help me tomorrow night. And you know I just have to have them going
q as a fierce force while this is going on.

JS: If they are out of ammo now, there is nothing we can do to get it there for today's offensive. The nearest step is in the Azores and you know that's kind of screwed up unless we takethe US aircraft off and fly it in. It won't be in for 5 hours--

K: How about at least C-130's.
I think what we have to do is to get them the 10 C-130's. We have to twist the arm of the charters by telling them they will never get another defense contract--that's going to produce.

JS: That's right, but we can get that stuff out all right, but we are not going to get it out there for Saturday.

K: No, but that at least will get it moving.
So let's do it --a combination of the Azores ____, the 10C-130's and forced charters. And that I think will be it if we put Sumner working on it tonight

JS: He's there now. We've got John Wickam there--Look we have a group that is working this 24 hours a day.

K Jim you and I have no problem because we are in complete agreement on the strategy, as far as I can see. You have to delegate it and I have and you have a few people down the line who were put there tkx to sabotage that stuff not by you.

JS: I think it's

K: *I think on the other hand you have the goddamn Israelis screwing up everythin*
they are doing.

JS: If only they had said they had a problem. Four days, they've been sitting there. Three days ago they were telling us how happy they were about the consumable situation.

K: Let's you and I try to work it out as quickly as possible.

JS: Okay, very good.

K: Good.

SO 21 [*]

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin - Secretary Kissinger
October 13, 1973
7:55 p. m.

D: Oral message --- First Brezhnev refers to ~~rx~~ discussion I had yesterday with your boss during reception

K: Told me about that.

D: Expresses great satisfaction ...about things what said the President to the Ambassador. Sure... shared his view and he would like me to tell to Dr. Kissinger he adheres exactly to the same points of view, Hope , no matter what difficulties, ...many good things done and will... to keep it.

K: Good, Hope ... going to prove that.

D: Situation in Middle East and Security Council ...for days, US and some countries with which they consulted don't come to the conclusion of immediately convocation of Security Council. We don't know exactly reson of that. Question, reply..... military situation in Middle East how it develops, it develops different, can only through last days. In one day don't have time . Don't think try to follow us ...our part. We concerned on position about cease-fire. Same time tells ...use bombardment of civilian tartets in territories by Israel. Make it more difficult. Indication argued ...Arab capitals and peoples. That's why difficult to discuss on this, questions specifically... ~~rx~~ Arabs are objecting... to accept Security Council resolution which deals only with cease fire. They insist should be accompanied simultaneous cease fire and should be another additional part of solution which had to say about, be stages withdrawals of Israeli troops from Arab territories, which was occupied in 1967. Isn't finished yet, finally consultation with Arab countries about, insist on position ....don't have text yet.

K: We have worked for three days on assumption you are now cancelling.

D: For two days might ...have been quite prepared to do, now Arabs are objecting to this. Like to decide situation on bit scale...which means will remove cause of all conflict. This will be really major decision which will have to decide thing ...

K: Well, where does this leave us? Nowhere.

D: ...now with Security Council.

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DATE/CASE ID: 12 MAY 2004 200102979

K: Now we are right back to where we were last Monday.

D: Looks so...

K: ....took 48 hours to make possible

D: For two days, the day beforeyesterday and yesterday and in the morning yesterday, I gave you reply...even I was shaken up with you...you know I was shaken up...telegram from Cairo don't received any for some days. Two days our position very close, we were prepared to abstain...no other interpretation. Very firmly, don't want to have complication. For two days, Arabs changed position. Telegram from Cairo say stick with Mr Singer, reply or not. We are complaining you don't...Really waiting that you get the British or something. For two days we are on record not not to vote at all...abstain with you. ...Arabs categorically objected.

K: In the meantime, you sent in 140 airplanes. May be why the Arabs are so tough now.

D: Not really. Security Council resolution two days ago...no connection with airlift. Nothing from your side. Maybe you relied too much on British. Maybe Australians ....prepared yesterday.

K: Yesterday the British talked to Sadat....what caused delay. Sadat never would have accepted....

D: Yesterday morning ...sent telegram yesterday...I was shaken last time I talked to you. Now we really have known if it wasn't mentioned to you yesterday. Very clear Security Council yesterday morning, I know up until today Malik had instructions very clear -- abstain. Sent very strong telegram to Malik, when you have complained. Immediately called to Seuli, going to abstain.

K: Point is, now objective military ....despite very friendly words of Brezhnev, trying to avoid collision, you have 140 airplanes. still much ...we cannot not supply our friends while you are supplying yours.

D: Well, you had made decision.

K: You waited for 5 days. Tonight Egypt launching attack in the Sinai. ....tomorrow when some American airplanes reach Israel

Arabs are going to start yelling. We will not under any circumstances let detente be used for unilateral advantage. No illusions about that. I have .....airlift for four days. ....way of getting political settlement. Friends have refused to participate in something took you two days to get Arabs...they change their minds. I think once we were in it with you, Arabs, if President had given the word to Brezhnev...believe at last moment on day it was supposed to be implemented say they wouldn't do it. We made agreement this manner, Israelis objected to, we went ahead with it. ...important to us...you can tell Brezhnev to save itself the effort. We are not going to accept the Egyptian position. Only exacerbate the situation by proposing it to us.

D: All right, fair enough.

K: ...want to accept Egyptian position, deal directly with it. I have had Egyptian position since Wednesday.

D: Did they propose this to you before or on Wednesday.

K: On Wednesday Egyptians sent us a proposal, of which they said they gave you a copy, and which is totally inconsistent with your proposal. Israel return to '67 borders, peace conference of great powers, Palestine and Arabs, discuss only international .....and security and future of Palestine.

D: Wednesday, quite prepared to support...

K: I told the President, despite this message from Israel, I relied on your word. Quite inconsistent to what Arabs told us. I amuse Arabs.....you knew Egypt would agree in no sense, how you support, if Egypt wouldn't agree.

D: I understand this point of view. Change ...few days ago.

K: Fine with us and we just have to see what happens now.

D: Is completely unacceptible, two part resolution.

K: Well, what's the second part?

D: Stages, back to borders.

K: ...secure and recognized borders.

D: '67.

K: No, unacceptable, may be in.....in Moscow not to...and obligation not to exacerbate situation. Until this afternoon I believed....had

possibility of pressing for settlement. pressing for a cease fire. Now hasn't happened, you are pulling in .....unable or unwilling to produce ceasefire...are obviously on collision course no matter how many .....what do you think we can say to the people on Monday, had them quieted down of the weekend ...so utility of detente .....to both of us. You don't think we will accept a military set back in the Middle East, can't believe it.

D: Wouldn't believe it.

K: I recognize you have problems. .....have to...No law that says you have to send in 140 airplanes.

D: I understand, is a problem.

K: Until this mumute not one American airplane has landed in Israel. Not one. .....My whole strategy based on reliance on you. I can tell you, in addition to whatever else is achieved, my own credibility with respect to what .....not exactly high at this moment. ...but not from you personally, put in ...to me yesterday afternoon, getting contrary report from Sadat than I was from you. I said I had absolute confidence ....never liked to us before.

D: Could you imagine ~~[illegible]~~ You are taking position proposed to other countries. Circumstances to be changed. This is situation...exactly I should put it on really stake much while people involved have two days making new suggestions. Now wer in a situation to do it.

K: Why do we have to deal with you, that depends on Sadat, why not deal with Sadat directly.

D: Up to you and the President to decide. ....disastrous results. As you now changed situation we will not .....

K: .....work out this when finished able to demonstrate that special relationship. Developed would have concrete results, if you read the press conference, this was line I took.

D: I did.

K: On Monday this will be done to ....

D: .....public relations.

K; Monday you will have sent in 50-100 airplanes.

D: You are now free.....

K: Only insane Arab leaders...victory for you. Only strategy is to make Arabs don't feel they can..... so three or four days from now we'll see what the situation is. ....many proposals like 67 borders, make the situation worse.

D: All right, send back telegram.

K: President is extremely agitated. I know you ....to make favorable recording...

D: In my telegram, I will quote, unquote you. I can assure you... otherwise, is dangerous.

K: We had understanding to work on this basic issue in January. This has been completely disregarded now. Will not let ourselves be pressured into it. It would not be ....not be helpful. Hear something today, tomorrow. NSC meeting....Don't have to get it today, meeting isn't til Monday

D: All right.

1. A call to the sides to immediately cease fire and all military action on the positions where the troops actually are.

2. A demand to start immediately after the ceasefire phased withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories to the line in accordance with Res. 242 of the Security Council, with completion of this withdrawal in the shortest period of time

3. A decision to start immediately and concurrently with the ceasefire appropriate consultations aimed at establishing a just and honorable peace in the Middle East.

1 —

SD 17 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Amb. Dobrynin-Kissinger
October 13, 1973
8:37 a.m.

K. I still haven't heard from the British. I am having a call placed to Hume to see what's going on.

D. You have talked on the telephone with him...placing a call...

K. We agreed it should happen today. If they don't do it maybe we should try the Australians.

D. All right.

K. The second thing, we just received information that the Egyptians are planning airborne landings in the Sinai.

D. I don't know the significance of this....

K. We all have to realize that if anything looks like trickery we will have to....it will affect things.

D. Better to practice something on which we both agree. I didn't know anything about Sinai really....

K. Of course, you don't know the details....

D. I don't know if...otherwise as I understand the situation in the Sinai....military thinks in the...along the canal along the line covered with something how much they could...there from Sinai. It doesn't look like it is very convincing.

K. We have not heard anything from the Israelis.

D. Nothing from the Israelis, I can pass this information to Moscow do you think?

K. If we don't hear from the British by noon, we will go th the Australians.

D. Is this decided?

K. I will check with you after I have talked with Hume.

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D. I should check with Moscow but I don't really see that there is any difference.

K. No, I don't think you should check with them. We have to see what the British will do it.

D. I expect to hear from you by noon. I will wait for your call.

SO 18 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Amb. Dobrynin/Kissinger
October 13, 1973
9:50 p. m.

D. Hello.

K. I just talked to Hume. They have been talking to Sadat and Sadat says they will never accept a straight ceasefire.

D. They discussed directly with Sadat? I must send a telegram to Moscow right away....

K. I am pressing them and they will call me back in three hours.

D. Both our countries will abstain. Even in this case it is my firm decision....

K. We will still press the British to....

D. If Sadat even told them so, we will definitely abstain and will keep our word in this case. If we both abstain it will be of political significance. What is now the problem? The British are not decided?

K. The British are reluctant because they think that Sadat will not agree to it. If Moscow could talk to him.

D. In three hours I will not get an answer unless I go by ordinary telephone.

K. No, that is too dangerous.

D. I think so. Really, even if he said so....

K. Because the British are afraid of Sadat saying no and going ahead....

D. Maybe we should go with Australia.

K. That is what we will do. Australia has nothing to lose Egypt. I will be in touch with you in three hours. I will try to do something by tonight.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 14 NOV 2002 200102979

1*

TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin - Secretary Kissinger
October 13, 1973
9:30 a.m.

K: Just talked to Cromer. They have been talking to Sadat who say's they will never accept a straight cease-fire now. So they are reluctant to put in the resolution.

D: They talked directly with Sadat... only thing to do... send telegram right away... Why not press....

K: I am pressing. They will call back in three hours.

D: Under the circumstances think it should be shown that both our countries....

K: We are still pressing the British to put it in anyway.

D: We are definitely.... going to keep our word... up stand, something of political significance. Don't you think?

K: Yes.

D: Problem is now that they are not deciding... bridges...

K: British are reluctant. They say the Egyptians will never agree to it.

D: With in the next three hours. Never get an answer in three hours... can't do it by ordinary telephone you see... nothing really has changed, even if he said so... Why not go...

K: British are afraid with Sadat having said no.

D: Then go to the Australians...

K: That's what we will do. The Australians have nothing to lose with Egypt. I will be in touch with you in three hours, we will try to get something done within three hours.

SL23

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Dinitz/Sec. Kissinger
10/13/73 1:03 a.m.

D: My military attache is just standing next to me. He just came into my office and said that General Sumner called him and General Sumner told him that because we cannot _____ The Golan Heights tonight or tomorrow he has an order to send some ammunition immediately that we need badly just now.

K: That's what you wanted isn't it?

D: Yeh, we wanted ammunition but we want Sumner to _____. So what is exactly--you have any idea how many pleans or anything?

K: We are going to do three separate things. We are going to give you the ten- C-130's immediately.

D: Ten C-130 . Directly.

K: Immediately. Now you have to work out with Defense--we would prefer it if you knock Israeli pilots in the Azores.

D: We understand.

K: If at all possible.

D: I would like to find out.

K: Well you find that out. Second we are going to force some charters out of the airlines. And thirdly, we are going to use the Azores with your El Al so you have three different operational---

D: Just to be sure I understand. The ten C-130 which will approach either directly to Israel or throughthe Azores depends on the availability of the Israeli pilots to continue to take--

K: Yeh, but make a big effort to put Israeli pilots

D: Of course we will, we will need Israeli pilots for--the charter will go all the way to Israel?

K: Yes.

D: You have any idea how many?

K: No, but we are going to force them out--we will try to force 20 of them.

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DATE/CASE ID: 21 APR 2004 200102979

D: I see.
And now we'll have to fly from the Azores. So what we have to see is--

K: You will have all three of them going simultaneously.

D: We'll have to try and see whether we have enough pilots for El Al and for the ten C-130--we'll check on it and will tell the Defense. We have to deal with Defense, right?

K: Right, because--but if there's any problem call General Scowcroft.

D: Okay, at this point I'll call Scowcrfot. All right, thank you Doctor.

K: Now, wait a minute, since I'm interested in the diplomacy of this, I can't tell you how to conduct military operations but I think it would be a disaster for you just to stop tomorrow;

D: Right. I will pass this information immediately to the Prime Minister including these items you just told me.

K: Because if you are seened to be weak, there's no telling what will happen.

D: Hm huh. I know. I know. That is why I was a bit concerned that Sumner of this weakness.

K: I'm dealing with a bunch of idiots.

D: Yeh. Yeh. From Sumner, God knows where it will go.

K: Okay, let me get Schlesinger again.

D: To tell his aides to set up--

K: Right.

D" All right. And I will pass the information on as soon as my military attache will get timetable. Because that is crucial.

K: That's right.

D: I don't want to mislead the government again. So I'll get the timetable first before I cable the Prime Minister.

K: This time if you don't get action I'll quit.

D: Well it will be a double ring ceremony.

K: You know it is an unbelievable situation.

D: I know. I will put them to work right away and I willinform Scowcroft of the details.

K: Good. Thank you.

SL29

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Amb. Dobrynin/Kissinger
October 13, 1973
9:50 p. m.

D. Hello.

K. I just talked to Hume. They have been talking to Sadat and Sadat says they will never accept a straight ceasefire.

D. They discussed directly with Sadat? I must send a telegram to Moscow right away....

K. I am pressing them and they will call me back in three hours.

D. Both our countries will abstain. Even in this case it is my firm decision....

K. We will still press the British to....

D. If Sadat even told them so, we will definitely abstain and will keep our word in this case. If we both abstain it will be of political significance. What is now the problem? The British are not decided?

K. The British are reluctant because they think that Sadat will not agree to it. If Moscow could talk to him.

D. In three hours I will not get an answer unless I go by ordinary telephone.

K. No, that is too dangerous.

D. I think so. Really, even if he said so....

K. Because the British are afraid of Sadat saying no and going ahead....

D. Maybe we should go with Australia.

K. That is what we will do. Australia has nothing to lose Egypt. I will be in touch with you in three hours. I will try to do something by tonight.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 21 APR 2004 200102979

SL27

TELECON
Amb. Dobrynin-Kissinger
October 13, 1973
9:37 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K. I still haven't heard from the British. I am having a call placed to Hume to see what's going on.

D. You have talked on the telephone with him...placing a call...

K. We agreed it should happen today. If they don't do it maybe we should try the Australians.

D. All right.

K. The second thing, we just received information that the Egyptians are planning airborne landings in the Sinai.

D. I don't know the significance of this....

K. We all have to realize that if anything looks like trickery we will have to....it will affect things.

D. Better to practice something on which we both agree. I didn't know anything about Sinai really....

K. Of course, you don't know the details....

D. I don't know if...otherwise as I understand the situation in the Sinai....military thinks in the...along the canal along the line covered with something how much they could...there from Sinai. It doesn't look like it is very convincing.

K. We have not heard anything from the Israelis.

D. Nothing from the Israelis, I can pass this information to Moscow do you think?

K. If we don't hear from the British by noon, we will go to the Australians.

D. Is this decided?

K. I will check with you after I have talked with Hume.

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D. I should check with Moscow but I don't really see that there is any difference.

K. No, I don't think you should check with them. We have to see what the British will do it.

D. I expect to hear from you by noon. I will wait for your call.

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

S/25

TelCon:12:32-10/13/73
Secretary Kissinger/
Ambassador Dinitz

K: Hello, Mr. Ambassador.

D: Yes, Dr. Kissinger.

K: A number of things. We are going to fly three C-5As today.

D: The Cs - the big ones with 60 tons.

K: Right. And we are just going to fly them through the Portugese base [redacted] And we are going to fly at least three of the C-141s that are in the Azores to Israel and we have increased the number of phantoms to 14. B1

D: Fourteen.

K: They will be there by Monday night.

D: Monday night.

K: Now, in the meantime, however, I must ask something of you Mr. Ambassador. I just again have been called by Jackson threatened with a Congressional investigation, being told this is a lousy example of crisis management and he is going to demand an overall of the national security system. I must say this - if I get one more threatening call by anybody I am going out of the supply business. And with all my friendship I am not going to stand for it.

D: Dr. Kissinger, I really want you to believe me that I have not talked *not - yesterday I didn't even see him. I talked to Symington* and to Javits yesterday and I haven't seen him yesterday or today - haven't spoken one word to him.

K: Well that may be but someone has to get the word to him as to what is going on.

D: I am willing to call him and explain to him exactly what the situation is and when I talked to him three days ago the one thing I said was that we never had a better friend than Dr. Kissinger. And I can repeat it in his eyes. So I am willing to call him right now and say to him exactly what the situation is but I am not calling any Senators.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS, A/RPS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 25X6
DECLASSIFY AFTER: INDEFINITE
DATE/CASE ID: 24 MAY 2004 200102979

K: Well the major point is we cannot hold still for a situation in which a massive attack is launched on our handling of this crisis. First of all I think it has been handled rather well. Even with some delays of delivery.

D: Exceptional _____ yes.

K: Well - but this item has been ~~xxxxxxxx~~ recovered now by flying in C-5s.

D: Right

K: And ah

D: Can I ask you on this supply thing sir so that I will be completely clear. The three C5s will fly today. You don't have an estimate morning - night- or something.

K: By this evening I am certain.

D: By evening. The three C-141s - this is an additional element, right.

K: Yes.

D: And that will also go out todayfrom the Azores.

K: Yes.

D: Where will they pick up the supplies.

K: They brought the supplies to the Azores for you to pick up yesterday.

D: They have got the supplies.

K: And they are just going on with the supplies they brought to the Azores.

D: I see. Going on. I see. I didn't know this. Frankly you - on the charters?

K: And we are going to get 20 charters. This time I am sure we will get them.

D: All right. Do I have to tell our _____ people anything.

K: Well you just tell all of this to General Eerher(? ? sp). If there is any problem you let me know.

D: Fine.

K: You know I have to tell you this. Our whole foreign policy position depends on our not being represented as having screwed up a crisis and with all affection for Israel, if it turns out that we are going to be under attack for mismanagement in a crisis, we will have to turn on you. I don't care who does it, if that happens, we will defend ourselves.

D: I understand this but there is no one - not only me - there is noone from our Embassy I can assure you. I beg of you to believe me - I know you do what

K: Well, we are not going to do it now but we are going to give our side of the story and you know - you practically have been able to make American diplomatic moves and if you think this is going to be ~~xx~~ the result, then we just have to consult our own interests.

D: I - I'm - the only thing I can say is that to an extent if anyone will talk to me _____, I will say exactly what I have been saying and this is that

K: Yes, but it isn't just my personal role it is the whole position of the national security machinery that is involved.

D: I understand, I understand but I will - you know - how would you say - exactly what the situation is and I will add your cooperativeness. That is what I have been doing and tthat is what I will do.

K: Well let's see what else happens.

D: Yes.

K: Good. Thank you.

SL28

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Hume/Kissinger
October 13, 1973
9;38 a.m.

K. Hello.

H. Henry.

K. I am so sorry we will not be able to meet tomorrow. I was just talking with the President about the matter discussed with Rowley yesterday. We were hoping that you might see your way clear to doing that matter which we discussed.

H. Yes. Have you seen or have the Israelis told you what Sadat said last night? Sadat said that a ceasefire in situ might be possible but they would have to have the agreement that Israel go back to the '67 line. They have repeated their one condition. I have sent our Ambassador in Cairo back to see him. I said suppose we were to propose a ceasefire in situ immediately followed by the introduction of an international force, immediately followed by a conference or some international initiative by the Secretary General. Would this appeal to him.

K. We just can't cooperate in that. We are not ready for that. We think he will accept, unless we have totally been misled. We believe the other thing will work as long as they claim they are yielding to somebody.

H. Suppose Sadat turns us down?

K. Then we are in a stalemate.

H. Then we will be in a worse position than before. We will have lost any ability to make a move. It looks like they will turn this down.

K. That is what you think. I have been told by the others that they will accept.

H. You have been told by the Russians?....

K. I don't see any reason for them to say this and not mean it. What are they to get from it? It was repeated no more than an hour ago.

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H. Sadat says no, according to our sources.

K. When you speak of an international force you mean total withdrawal?

H. What I think is this. Suppose Sadat agrees to a ceasefire in situ. The international force is introduced while an international conference or Secretary General or some international machine goes in.... Won't that be possible without a full withdrawal?

K. It won't be what... I think we have agreement on this from the Russians and might from the Israelis.

H. All you have is Dobrynin's word that the Russians believe that Sadat would agree and our information is that they could not agree to this. It would be an almost direct conflict of report unless the Russians were willing to pressure Sadat. Would they agree to this?

K. My impression is that if they have tricked us on this they will pay the price of our entire relationship. They have all to lose.

H. I will have another talk with Ted and give you a ring back but I think our credability will be completely lost if we were to make the public initiative and he would not have it. He himself has given us the conditions to which he would agree to a ceasefire and it includes all the old things.

K. And the Israelis have given us the other position. The Israelis said it has to go back to the Canal. We can probably get them to go along and the Soviets can get the Egyptians to go along. Maybe we should try.

H. The decision doesn't have to be made by Sunday night.

K. I thought by tonight. We can also ask the Australians to do it.

H. My impression is I can't see how the Russians can do this unless they are willing to say they will cut off their arms.

K. Maybe that is what they are willing to do. They didn't ask for you to do it and since we can't propose the resolution it can't be a maneuver directly against you. They would have preferred France to introduce the resolution.

H. I see. What time is it in the US? About 10:00 in the morning? I am traveling to London tonight with Ted in his plane and I will have

another talk with him. We can't really risk being turned down by Sadat and on our present information from him, we will be.

K. Unless they are committing a treachery the Russians assure me they will go along with it. Where would they be to put it forward and we abstain and Sadat refuses and they back him up. I don't understand what they have to gain. Especially when they wanted us to ask France.

H. What do you think the Israelis response will be? Yes?

K. Yes, but it will not be accepted unconditionally. Let them put forth their conditions and then we might be able to go.... It is just having these maniacs in some sort of balance....

H. We have to try something.

K. Therefore, the Russians said any complicated ceasefire will be refused. The only thing they are willing to abstain from is a simple ceasefire.

H. Let me think about it again and say in another three hours I will have another report in from our Ambassador who is meeting with Sadat again.

K. You will not get a prior agreement from Sadat.

H. No, but then I can't say. Suppose Russia...him into saying yes. That is not going to be a happy situation. Let me think about it and if it is to be worthwhile.

K. If this goes on we will have to send a massive airlift in there. I just know....

H. What is the state of the battle?

K. The Israelis claim that they have beaten the Iraqis and I would expect them to turn on Sinai. Today we start flying into Israel which is very dangerous.

H. Let me ring you back in three hours. Thank's for ringing.

SL24

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Schlesinger
Secretary Kissinger

10/13/73 1:06 a.m.

K: Hello, Jim. Now I've got a distraught Dinitz calling me saying Sumner was yelling at his military attache that they were stopped because they're out of ammunition and he said their whole security depends on that fact not getting out. And that if Sumner says it to him, to whom else has he said it.

S: Sumner hasn't said it to anybody else, I presume, I'm going to the Pentagon now.

K: You--well could you make sure that they don't blab around the Pentagon with this because that really would kill everything.

S: Right. Well the point that we've got to get Henry is to find out what the hell their situation is--can't they tell us. Somebody to get ~~Gore (op)~~ Gur to come to the Pentagon to tell us what his problems were.

K: That's all right, but make sure Sumner doesn't talk to anyone else.

S: Okay, very good.

K: Good. Thank you.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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SL26

TELCON
Gen. Haig - Secretary Kissinger
October 13, 1973
9:35 a. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

H: How are you feeling this morning on this thing? Talked to Jim... he thinks no move with US left...

K: We've got no choice... strongly infected by the s. o. b.'s.

H: Jim admitted to me he investigated this thing and his people did drag their feet. He's goddamned upset about it, which was the surprising thing.

K: If they had come directly.... we wo uld have a civilian airlift going.

H: Yah, but the Jordanians have apparently entered it ...

K: No, no. They have moved a brigade into Syria, that has been arranged. Their way of staying out of it. .... civilian airlift blow sky high, our interest in this... Israelis are trying to get us locked in...

H: Have you told the President about this.

K: Yes, I talked to him, he called me I didn't call him.

H: Do you want me to say anything to him?

K: You have to tell him this thing will sort of rep things. a bit. .... vicious, stupid bastards. I had their investments protected, I had assurances from the Saudis.

H: Secondly, Jim said he things it is a plan to get us drawn in. I told him these are judgements for Henry and the President to make and you hav e to do what the President wants done.

K: You know my scheme. If we had been able to get a stop.... could be dropping it down.

H: Have to take that chance...

K: Now there are three airborne units of Egyptians that may land in the Sinai overnight.

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H: Yup.

K: They have moved artillery across the Canal. This is getting rough, and they still have got a whole air force. It's not amateur

night anymore. If we could have gotten the stuff in, breaking the Syrian front.

H: Jim called a few minutes ago....

K: And its got the whole diplomacy thing screwed up.

H: Really?

K: Well, I mean we've got them coming in at the wrong time. Instead of coming in to give the Arabs, ... slackening off when we need their pressure and when we want them to slacken off the stuff will be in there, and they will want to fight again.

H: Well, Henry, I don't think that's entirely true. It will take a week to get the stuff in there to the battlefield.

K: OK

8L32

TELCON

RELEASED IN FULL

Lord Cromer - Secretary Kissinger
October 13, 1973
10:26 a. m.

C: How did your talk go?

K: Very unsatisfactorily because you are now negotiating separately with the Egyptians.

C: Don't know about negotiating exactly...

K: Well, trying to sign separate resolution with the Egyptians. Both sides will accept ..... thought you might get word to him while he is thinking.

C: Take your point entirely.

K: After talking to Alec, I talked to Dobrynin. Dobrynin claims you have misconception of the situation.

C: ...that Egypt will agree.

K: Misconception about some kind of Soviet trick, but they didn't even know who we were going to to set up the resolution. Alec said Dobrynin's word against Sadat's, why take Dobrynin's?

C: I see what's happening and of course I take your point.

K: What we have decided to do, if you are still dancing around and will not go along with any resolution other than what we have proposed. You are trying to come up with an idea of a peace keeping force of peace conference, we will veto it. Too complicated.

C: Yes, well what I said yesterday... simplicity...

K: If you can press .....to participate in the maneuver, which could not have had you as an object, we will move to Australia or France.

C: Quite. I don't think that will make a whole lot of difference. Don't think it will work any better.

K: Well, it probably won't with France, but it might with the Australians.

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C: I don't think they will do it, still...

K: I will tell you honestly, if I can't get ....to introduce the resolution, we will pour in supplies and see when the battle breaks. If the West can't get together....

SL35

RELEASED IN FULL

telcon
Sec. Kissinger/Sec. Gen. Waldheim
10/13/73 1:13 p.m.

W: I was calling to congratulate you on your press conference, I think it was really well handled, the way you answered all these delicate questions.

K: Thank you.

W: And I wanted to thank you for the way you dealt with the UN.

K: Well, I think you are very nice.

W: It was very helpful--Dr. Kissinger, but what I wanted to tell you is the following. I had a long talk yesterday with El Zayyat after the Security Council meeting--and they decided the following which I wanted to let you know--apparently they feel very strong militarily, whether it is justified or not, at any rate, he put to me the following points. He said they are ready to accept a ceasefire, if the Israelis give a commitment to withdraw to the 1967 lines.

K: Yeh, well that's out of the question.

W: I told them this. I said I don't think there is any chance to get this. But I thought I should tell you because he mentioned quite a number of points, point one, commitment to withdraw to the 6th of June lines, point two--this commitment --the help could be done indeed by the United States, then three, he would give an Egyptian commitment to international forces in Sharm ash Shaykh and also to international buffer zones these international troops in the Golan Heights--not in the whole area but in an area along Syrian border and then he said we would accept an international conference to negotiate details, etc., but some sort of arrangement for the Palestinians would be found and the Palestinians would have--participate in such a conference. I thought I should let you know this. I am of course fully aware that especially the first point is not acceptable to Israel because I have spoken to Aba Eban the day before. And I told him this first point is as far as I can judge, definitely not acceptable to Israel. He said but why should we not be more flexible since we have military advantages before.

K: Right.

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W: They apparently feel militarily strong now and believe they are able to keep what they got under East Bank and don't want to be more flexibile.

K: Right. Well I appreciate this very much, Mr. Secretary General and if I have anything to report to you I will take the liberty of calling you.

W: Well thank you very much. Do you have the impression that it sounds a major progress in your talks with the Russians.

K: I'll have a little better judgment of that later this afternoon and I'll call you if there is anything to report.

W: Thank you very much. I'm sorry that I have --

K: No, no it is important for you and me to keep in touch.

W: Thank you very much.

K: Good bye.

W: Goodbye, Dr. Kissinger.

SO 20 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin - Secretary Kissinger
October 13, 1973
5:00 p.m.

K: I have just heard from the British who don't want to proceed. They were told by Sadat, one, that he did not want the resolution and two, such a resolution were put in, they would ask the Chinese to veto it. They would consider it an unfriendly act if it were put in. Leaves two possibilities. Either the Russians tricked us or.

D: It was very easy to check with us.

K: What do you mean.

D: It was clear this particular resolution.....our answer again. It was very easy to be both, even two days ago. Move to the General Assembly, both abstain. d

K: Got to get somebody to put it in.

D: As it.....

K: Don't doubt that you would abstain. What's the sense of such maneuver if the Egyptians wouldn't accept it. At any rate, British won't introduce it and you don't want the Australians to introduce it.

D: In this connection, please wait until I receive instructions.

K: We're not going to do anything. We are now going to wash our hands of it and let nature take its course.

D: Second possibility was nature.

K: Until about an hour ago, we operated on the assumption you wanted to settle it and the airlift to the Arabs was to show your good will. .....we can't let war go on three days getting Israel lined up and the British.

D: Before ...Henry, how could we make that ...I have no knowledge at all.

K: You might have known what Sadat would do.

D: In this case it was easy.

K: No sense debating it.

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[redacted]
Amb. Dobrynin - Secretary Kissinger
October 13, 1973
7:40 p. m.

K: I am going to see the President, wanted to check with you to see if you had an explanation yet.

D: In five or ten minutes I will get it. Could you wait.

K: Sadat informed the British that he informed your Ambassador under no circumstances would he accept such a proposal.

D: I will call you in ten minutes. Right?

K: OK.

SL36

TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin - Secretary Kissinger
October 13, 1973
1:40 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

D: I have had telegram from Moscow which says the Australian variation is not really a good one.

K: Isn't?

D: That's all I received is the telegram and it says further explanation will come. I would like simply to tell you what I have as of now.

K: Maybe the British are trying to become a world power as a result of this.

D: Could be. Anyway, the telegram says we will send you further instructions on this point. I simply am trying to tell you. I don't know why they are objecting, I only wish you to know what I have just received.

K: You have seen the press coverage of my press conference. It was very moderate with respect to our relations. I think it achieved the objective. Don't you.

D: To a certain extent, yes.

K: On the other hand, really, I hope, I see the massive airlift is continuing today.

D: On the same scale.

K: Now 105 planes flown in.

D: Altogether, from the very beginning you mean?

K: An that's a terrific amount.

D: I know, I don't know the figures but it is....

K: ...beyond a certain point, and we are approaching a point where we will have to do something, not done fully yet. I mean we are besieged by Senators yelling and screaming. I hope Moscow understands. I am saying this as a friend, if we are played with we will have to do something, with all reluctance, you should try to pick up some easy victories -- well, you know there are no easy victories.

D: No, that's very clear.

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K: As soon as I hear from Britain I will be in touch with you.

D: OK, good.

K: Bye.

SL30

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin - Secretary Kissinger
October 13, 1973
9:50 a. m.

K: Just talked to Cromer. They have been talking to Sadat who say's they will never accept a straight cease-firenow. So they are reluctant to put in the resolution.

D: They talked directly with Sadat... only thing to do... send telegram right away... Why not press....

K: I am pressing. They will call back in three hours.

D: Under the circumstances think it should be shown that both our countries....

K: We are still pressing the British to put it in anyway.

D: We are definitely....going to keep our word...up stand, something of political significance. Don't you think?

K: Yes.

D: Problem is now that they are not deciding...bridges...

K: British are reluctant. They say the Egyptians will never agree to it.

D: With in the next three hours. Never get an answer in three hours...can't do it by ordinary telephone you see...nothing really has changed, even if he said so...Why not go...

K: British are afraid with Sadat having said no.

D: Then go to the Australians...

K: That's what we will do. The Australians have nothing to lose with Egypt. I will be in touch with you in three hours, we will try to get something done within three hours.

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SL31

TELECON
Scowcroft/Kissinger
October 13, 1973
10:15 a. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K. Do we have to get permission to refuel American planes in the Azores?

S. I will have to check. I don't believe so.

K. If the answer is yes, then why do we have a base there?

S. The U.S. Military does not need permission.

K. I want to know the name of the person who is inventing obstacles and have him removed from this operation immediate.

S. Did you hear this from the Israelis?

K. Yes. The Israelis are here now and were told the planes could not leave because of refueling. Whoever told them that will have to be removed from this operation now. Can you do that immediately?

S. I can do that.

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SL33

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON, October 13, 1973

Secretary/ General Scowcroft

S. On ~~xxx~~ the M letter we haven't sent a date because of a posible trip.
k

K. Why don't we set it around the 20th when there isn't a trip.

S. Christmas?

K. 20th of November.

S. Yes, I guess we can do that.

K. You think we can do it before M comes? In the next two hours?

S. I don't know when there won't be a trip.

K. It is idiotic to keep a Government waiting four months --they aren't boys from Iowa.

S. Thanksgiving is the 23?

K. That is impossible.

S. No, its the 29 . . no the 22nd.

K. How about the 20th or 21st? Can you check?.

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SL65

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon:11:10-10/14/73
Secretary Kissinger/
The President

K: Hello, Mr. President.

P: Hi, Henry. I talked to Al and got a little fill-in because I had to go over some other things with him.

K: Right.

P: And I am glad to hear that we are going out all on this.

K: Oh it is a massive airlift Mr. President. The planes are going to land every 50 (15?) minutes .

P: That right. Get them in there. And the only ~~condition~~ addition that I said - I told them to check the European theater to see if there were some of those smaller planes that they need and fly them detailed down there so that they can replace their aircraft losses. And the other thing is that these big planes you can put some of those good tanks - those M 60 tanks on if necessary if that would have some good effect and put a few of them in there too.

K: Right, Mr. President.

P: So in other words don't - if we are going to do it, don't spare the horses just let

K: ~~I~~ Actually- with the big planes Mr. President we have also flexibility. We can fly the skyhawks in.

P: Put them on the plane you mean.

K: Yes. I don't think there is a way - no country will let them overfly.

P: All right. How many can a big plane take?

K: It can take five or six.

P: All right - put some skyhawks, do that to. You understand what I mean If we are going to take heat (?) for this well let's go.

K: I think that is right. And I think Mr. ~~President~~ President we discussed this in the group - I think after I(?) left. We can offer to stop the airlift if the Russians do after a ceasefire is signed.

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P: Exactly. I think we should say - I think a personal message now should go. I mean you have been sending messages, but one should go from me Brezhnev saying

K: Everything I am sending too goes in your name

P: Good. But I think he should know now look here. Thex peace of ~~this~~ not only ~~xxxx~~ this area but the whole future relationship is at stake here and we are prepared to stop if you are and we are prepared - you know what I mean. I don't know - have you got anything developed along those lines so that we just don't have

K: I have - I am developing it now and I think I could call Dobrynin and point it out to him.

P: Right, right. Put it in a very conciliatory but very tough way that I do this with great regret because - great reluctance but that we cannot have a situation that has now developed and we are prepared to _____ tit for tat. The situation which regard to nothing on the battle so far.

K: On the battle - it is the Israelis _____ no, that hasn't been announced yet that they have knocked out 150

P: And lost 15. Yes I heard that this morning.

K: Something like at 10:30 this morning.

P ThE Egyptians

K: Again seem to be heading more south than east and are not ~~x~~ really trying to break into the Sinai at this point. So they are just keeping their defensive position of _____ down the coast. And they may be ~~gxxxgx~~ going for _____. But ah

P: Nothing new in Syria.

K: In Syria the Israelis have told us this morning they have stopped their advance on Damascus. They stopped about 20 kilometers short. And they are now heading south for Syrian infantry divisions. There is a report from some foreign correspondents that went up to the front from Damascus on this Syrian side and indicated the Syrian army now was getting to be demoralized and were abandoning equipment. But still Mr. President they are the reason why the Egyptians are holding. Much of the Israeli army is still tied up down there. The estimate of our

group was that it would take the ~~K~~ Israelis three more days to knock out the Syrians and that they couldn't really turn to the Egyptians for another four days to five days.

P: What than do we plan then.

K: Well what we plan ~~xxxxx~~ is to try to get it wound up this week.

P: _____

K: Yes.

P: Well I know you are going to get ~~xxxxx~~ it until someone is knocked out. That is the problem. Well at least I feel better. The airlift thing is - as I told Al if I contribute anything to discussion it is the business that don't fool around with three planes. ~~Xxxxxxx~~ By golly no matter how big they are. Just go gun ho

K: One of the lessons I have learned from you is that if you do something you might as well do it completely.

P: Do it completely and

K: You never have the choice to do it half out right.

P: Even Jackson will support this. OK. Best of luck.

SL63

TelCon-11:45-10/14/73
Secretary Kissinger/
Chairman Arthur Burns

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

B: Hello, Henry.

K: Arthur, how are you.

B: All right. Rough days for you my friend.

K: Yes, very difficult.

B: _____ Henry.

K: Well I have - have you a few minutes.

B: Yes.

K: Well actually I have to run off to a meeting.

B: I could talk to you by phone, it might be a little better if I saw you in person for a couple of minutes.

K: When do you want to do it?

B: As soon as possible - it is an urgent matter.

K: OK, well why don't you come over now but I have only about five or ten minutes.

B: That is enough for me.

K: Good.

B: OK, I will be right over.

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SL62

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon:11:34-10/14/73
Secretary Kissinger/
Senator Griffin

K: Hello.

G: Henry, this is getting to be a weekly habit here.

K: That is right.

G: Sorry, to bother you again. But I am going on Issues and Answers. I wish I could have been in the foreign relations briefing you had for us the other day but we had that damn fight about the rules commitee

K: I know, I understand

G: It was very unfortunate and I had to be up there. But I am just wonder if they go after me on the Middle East which I imagine they will - again do you have any guidance or suggestions in lightof some of the developments that are taking place.

K: Well, ah

G: For example, the Post has a story this morning that the United States and the Soviets are seeking to get Israel to go along with the ceasefire in place.

K: I wouldn't go into any of this.

G: Yes, I am aware of those reports but I certainly couldn't comment on them or something like that.

K: About - yes I would say it is a very fluid diplomatic situation. But you can assume that the Administration is making _____ to bring about a ceasefire.

G: Yes.

K: But you know we are in close touch with the Israelis on all of these matters. On resupply - just for your information we have begun airlifting stuff in there which we are not too eager to get circles(?) before we have to because of the Arab reaction.

G: I was notified by the Defense Department yesterday, but ah it wouldn't be appropriate to say that it is in process, I take it at least until it gets there, huh.

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K: It is in process - you can say that you can be sure that the United States won't stand by and let the Soviets put arms in there.

G: Yes. The effect on our relations with the Soviet Union up until now - the way you answered the question the other day in your press conference, does that stand.

K: That you still hope the Soviet Union will keep involvement within responsible limits. Say it has not reached intolerable - well you know we may have to throw down the _____ later this week but that is a pretty irreversible step.

G: Yes. Is Jordan coming into it.

K: Well Jordan has moved a brigade in there - just for your information in an area well out of arms way so that they don't have to engaged themselves on their front.

G: Well out of what way?

K: Well out of harms way. Out of the combat operation.

G: I see.

K: They have moved it into Syria.

G: But not into the combat zone?

K: Well I wouldn't say that, but for your information it is not in the immediate zone.

G: I see.

K: That is really miles away. It is the absolute minimum they could do.

G: I see. Well that is good. Well I also want to bring up what is happening in Thailand but is there anything else on the Middle East that you think I should be aware of.

K: No, I think those are the major developments. You know the Soviet airlift continues at a fairly substantial level.

G: There was a comment I saw in one of the papers this morning that the Russian involvement hasn't yet reached the stage that it was in 1967 in terms of their attitude and their ah

K: That is right.

G: Yes. And another thing that could come up is the threat - the possibility of cutting off the oil. I was thinking in terms that that did happen in 1967, we hope that won't happen in this situation, but we must fact the possibility that it could happen and then I am going to take off after the Congress for not getting the oil fueling from Alaska.

K: Exactly, I think that is right thing to do. OK

G: What about the Thailand situation. What can I say

K: Well, I don't know any more than you do. Apparently the Government has resigned, but we don't know what it means.

G: Or why they have resigned, or anything?

K: No.

G: Yes. OK Henry. Thanks for call me.

K: My own guess is that it means a switch toward neutralism in Thailand but I wouldn't speculate yet.

G: OK, fine. Thank you.

K: Right. Bye.

SL64

Telcon
Amb. Dobrynin/Kissinger
10/14/73 - 12:36 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello, Anatol.

D: Hello Henry. How are you?

K: How are you?

D: Yes.

K: I just talked to the President.

D: Yes.

K: And he wanted me for the benefit of your leadership to know two things -- to tell you two things. One, we are now engaged in an airlift as you know of equipment to Israel.

D: Is it heavy equipment or consumables?

K: It is mostly at this point consumables and we are keeping some restraints at the moment on heavy equipment. Considerable restraints on heavy equipment and a little but very little. We are prepared to stop the airlift immediately after a cease-fire if you are prepared to stop your airlift. But if not we can first of all increase it considerably and include heavy equipment. I mean we are not going at our maximum capacity or anywhere near.

D: No, I understand. It is not that you will continue intermittently.

K: Well, if it goes on we will be forced into it sooner or later. As you know, we are already as you know under massive pressure on the phantoms. We are sending a few but not like anything what we are asked to do.

D: Yes, I understand. Yes.

K: You know those were the major items he wanted me to.....

D: At the beginning you said you begin an airlift, yes?

K: Beginning - it is in process. It is beginning now. Yes.

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D: Well, that is a matter of information.

K: Well, it is a matter of information _____ proposal. If you are prepared to stop your airlift after a cease-fire, we are prepared to stop ours immediately.

D: Alright, but it is connected with the cease-fire you mentioned, yes.

K: In connection with the cease-fire, yes.

D: O.K. I'll pass it on right away.

K: You know, Anatol, we all know now what is at stake because if this goes on much longer, ...

D: Well, _____ if you had a chance to read my telegram what I sent yesterday it was exactly what I am told.

K: No, no I....

D: I make my own reservations of course, but it was a direct quotation everything you said. It is not only fair, but it is important for them to know the mood. At a certain point of our usual thing, I don't do direct quotations, but a summary, I make it. But yesterday I was rather in a detail of what you said because this is what I feel and...

K: But also I give you advice. I have kept press guidance for today to an absolute minimum and we will say nothing but ....

D: For press, you mean.

K: Well, we will just say we are doing something but starting tomorrow as I have already explained to you we'll be forced to say something.

D: Yes, I understand. I am already make it clear for tomorrow after this you might say something unless maybe there are some other things.

K: Well, unless we know where we are going.

D: Yes, I understand. I will telephone tomorrow.

K: O.K., good.

D: O.K. Tell me, do you expect _____ 4:00, for 4 hours?

K: I don't expect we will do anything between 4 and 8.

D: Nothing. Yes, because I just wanted to see you -- to go and then come back.

K: No, no.

D: O.K.

K: Good.

D: Bye, bye.

SL61

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon11:16-10/14/73
Secretary Kissinger/
Jerry Schecter

S: Mr. Secretary, good morning.

K: How are you Jerry.

S: Oh, fine thanks. And you.

K: Are you going camping in the ~~desert~~ desert.

S: Yes, I hear that is the only way to get in there.

K: Really.

S: Yes, I am going to try to ~~fly~~ fly into Gazzie(??) tomorrow from London and then go in by car. One of our people

K: I understand the Israelis are manning the customs point.

S: Pardon.

K: I understand the Israelis have the customs point.

S: Oh, I am glad to see that you are in your usual good mood this morning. How is it going.

K: Well it is a much messier war than the Israelis ~~were~~ ever thought it would be.

S: Yes, yes. I hear you are going to try to stop it tomorrow. You and Dobrynin together.

K: Who told you that.

S: What.

K: Who told you that.

S: Well you know - that is what we hear it is kind of in the works.

K: Really. I haven't heard that.

S: Oh, OK.

K: But than Joe Sisco hasn't given me his instructions yet.

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S: What shall I tell them when I get to Cairo. Have you got any messages.

K: I don't think so. We are in pretty closetouch with them.

S: OK. How are the Russians behaving.

K: That will be a little clearer in another day or so. You know it is easy to grand stand around town here but ah - a lot of the people who want to throw up in the grave (? ?) would be the first to scream that the whole foreign policy has fallen apart. I mean Egypt as I said in my press conference - has its own pressors and _____ is going to let his friends go. So the question is whether in trying to maintain our positions with our friends we are going over the brink in our mutual relations.

S: Yes, well you know the impression is being built up that we are not helping our friends as much as they want to be helped.

K: Listen short of giving them the strategic air command and the 6th Fleet, there is no way you can help our friends as much as they want to be helped. I think when the whole story of this comes out, it will be fairly obvious that we are helping the brothers of stature. We have also the requirement (new tape) yea, good. Well what - you know the Egyptians are going to ask me what the Americans are going to do. You know.

K: We are willing to make a major help to bring about a permanent peace once the fighting stops.

S: Yea. Well I presume that means the fighting stops where the troops are now.

K: I don't want to speculate on this.

S: No, of course not. But ah - you know. All right. I mean not for publication but is there any idea any more specific than that. I mean

K: With the Egyptians.

S: Yes,

K: No, because really Jerry, we have rather good contact with them now.

S: I see. Good.

K: But youknow, you can tell them whatever judgment you can make about my sincerity.

S: Yes. OK, good. Good.

K: All but favorably, that is.

S: Of course, that is understood isn't it.

Schecter

K: When are you going to be back./ Well, I don't know. I want to go to China with you.

K: Well that will be next week.

S: Yes.

K: You are on the list, aren't you.

S: Well, I don't know. I put my name in for the list, yes. Myabe if things quiet down I can get back in time to go.

K: I thought you were on the list.

S: Well, I hope so. Good. Well thanks a lot Henry.

K: And if things don't quiet down I won't be able to go.

S: Yes, well I will see what I can do once I get over there. But I am trying to see Sadat. We haven't met for years and I think we have a very good chance of doing it so I want to try and get in there.

K: Right, OK.

S: OK. Thanks a lot for calling.

K Bye.

S: Bye.

SL66

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
B/G Scowcroft - Secretary Kissinger
October 14, 1973
1:53 p.m.

K: We should have WSAG tomorrow.

S: All right.

K: About 9:00.

S: Good.

K: Or, about 10:45 or 11:00. Let's have it at 11:00.

S: 11:00 is OK, fine. Then an NSC in the afternoon.

K: If its got to be. Let's have it around 4:30, not before 4:00.

S: Good, fine.

K: Would you do a talking paper for the President for the NSC. I'm doing the big one, but one that says he should call on Schlesinger first, then Colby, etc. you know.

S: OK

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SL 70

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Schlesinger - Secretary Kissinger

S: How are you proceeding in relation to plans for re-supply We've got four more Phantoms to augment the ten we discussed this morning. Shall we send them in tomorrow?

K: I would send them in tomorrow, then have a day's pause, or a day's pause tomorrow and send them Tuesday.

S: That would bring the total up to twenty, if we should want to do it. On another item, the Tows. As you know, they have never appeared out there before so there will be a certain dramatic effect. We are prepared to strip down our inventory a bit and....

K: What are they exactly?

S: It's an anti-tank missile, guided missile... much better, longer range and far more accurate.

K: Longer range than, oh...

S: 2-3,000 meters range.

K: But your question is not numbers, your question is wisdom of sending them. What's your instinct?

S: My instinct is yes.

K: My instinct is now we have started we had better win.

S: Well, I just want to be in line with the diplomatic timing.

K: The diplomatic timing is...I told the Russians that if they want to effect anything here...by tomorrow morning. It doesn't hurt to teach them that when they cross us something violent happens.

S: Your inclination then is to drag out some and send them off on an early flight.

K: Anything else, Jim?

S: No Henry. Thanks.

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SO 22 [*]

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Amb. Dobrynin/Kissinger
10/14/73 - 12:36 p.m.

K: Hello, Anatol.

D: Hello Henry. How are you?

K: How are you?

D: Yes.

K: I just talked to the President.

D: Yes.

K: And he wanted me for the benefit of your leadership to know two things -- to tell you two things. One, we are now engaged in an airlift as you know of equipment to Israel.

D: Is it heavy equipment or consumables?

K: It is mostly at this point consumables and we are keeping some restraints at the moment on heavy equipment. Considerable restraints on heavy equipment and a little but very little. We are prepared to stop the airlift immediately after a cease-fire if you are prepared to stop your airlift. Bit if not we can first of all increase it considerably and include heavy equipment. I mean we are not going at our maximum capacity or anywhere near.

D: No, I understand. It is not that you will continue intermittently.

K: Well, if it goes on we will be forced into it sooner or later. As you know, we are already as you know under massive pressure on the phantoms. We are sending a few but not like anything what we are asked to do.

D: Yes, I understand. Yes.

K: You know those were the major items he wanted me to.....

D: At the beginning you said you begin an airlift, yes?

K: Beginning - it is in process. It is beginning now. Yes.

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D: Well, that is a matter of information.

K: Well, it is a matter of information _____ proposal. If you are prepared to stop your airlift after a cease-fire, we are prepared to stop ours immediately.

D: Alright, but it is connected with the cease-fire you mentioned, yes.

K: In connection with the cease-fire, yes.

D: O.K. I'll pass it on right away.

K: You know, Anatol, we all know now what is at stake because if this goes on much longer, ...

D: Well, _____ if you had a chance to read my telegram what I sent yesterday it was exactly what I am told.

K: No, no I....

D: I make my own reservations of course, but it was a direct quotation everything you said. It is not only fair, but it is important for them to know the mood. At a certain point of our usual thing, I don't do direct quotations, but a summary, I make it. But yesterday I was rather in a detail of what you said because this is what I feel and...

K: But also I give you advice. I have kept press guidance for today to an absolute minimum and we will say nothing but ....

D: For press, you mean.

K: Well, we will just say we are doing something but starting tomorrow as I have already explained to you we'll be forced to say something.

D: Yes, I understand. I am already make it clear for tomorrow after this you might say something unless maybe there are some other things.

K: Well, unless we know where we are going.

D: Yes, I understand. I will telephone tomorrow.

K: O.K., good.

D: O.K. Tell me, do you expect_____ 4:00, for 4 hours?

K: I don't expect we will do anything between 4 and 8.

D: Nothing. Yes, because I just wanted to see you -- to go and then come back.

K: No, no.

D: O.K.

K: Good.

D: Bye, bye.

SL69

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Mr. Sisco - Secretary Kissinger
October 14, 1973
2:58 p m

(missed first part - apparently asked if bringing El-Zayyat down would be good)

S: I think it would be a good idea. You had Eban here. There is this factor, that you would have to have a concrete proposal and it will become .....Of course dangerpublicly is undue expectation I think he would accpt... something to say.

K: Tell him we should review the situation together.

S: With good backgrounding, Bob making sure ahead of time ...coming up Tuesday, general explanation, keeping the lid on. It would be good. On the public side I am not worried as far as the country is concerned.

K: Think going to come up with proposal.....just keep lid on when the airlift starts.
S: Keep it in context of general exchange

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TELCON
B/G Scowcroft - Secretary Kissinger
October 14, 1973
2:32 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

(missed first part of call)(re Foreign Minister ?)

K: just information...primarily that our purpose is to stop Soviet influence.

S: OK

K: Don't you think that they ought to know?

S: Think it's a good idea, for information.

K: About 6:30 or 7:00.

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SL67

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
McCloskey/Sec. Kissinger
Sunday, Oct. 14, 1973
2:10 p.m.

K: Where did she get this story from?

M: It says from informed sorces.

K: Who could it have been.

M: Must have been the Israelis. No possible other way. I asked the people here who participated in the Eban meeting and no one had any contact with her. When she says informed sources, I think she is protecting the Israelis. She has a lot of access there. The question is there motive in doing it.

K: What do you think?

M: Building up some sympathy for them being forced into that position.

K: Starting Friday they were pleading for me to do it.

M: I understand. This is the only conclusion I can make of it.

K: When this is over I think I have to say something. I have to give a briefing to explain how this happened.

M: I think so. You went pretty far on Friday. I had said you would do this when this was over. Mr. Secretary, you are still of the mind that we have to make some kind of announcement.

K: Yes. I have arranged it with Defense. You do it around noon.

M: I will give you a draft statement.

END

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SL79

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
B/G Scowcroft - Secretary Kissinger
October 15, 1973
1:15 p. m.

S: The President just told Steve he didn't want to have an NSC meeting today, wanted to wait for further developments.

K: I agree. Is he going to the Stennis thing or am I going all alone?

S: I'll find out. Did you hear what he said at the Medal of Honor ceremony?

K: Yes, I am throwing up all over.

S: Think we should have Jerry Warren say on background...

K: that he was talking about principles, not tactics.

S: He made it sound like we were sending in troops and the the press got it that we were considering intervention.

K: We can't say on background we are not considering intervention, we are worse off.

S: I know, if we say it on background, sure as hell won't .... get it off.

K: Well, what I have told McCloskey to say is that the President was talking about principles in trying to achieve peace, not tactics.

S: and principle is to play peace-keeping role.

K: Right.

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SL78

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Senator Fulbright/Secretary Kissinger
October 15, 1973
12:35 pm

F: That number you gave me is busy. I finally called my office and got someone to have you call me. I talked to him for an hour. He talked for 30 minutes about the various treatment..He has ...

K: He's right.

F: It comes down to this. He seems to agree this is an opportunity to compromise. I made points about the cease-fire with ...about implementation. I ...same thing I told you. Gave no...about accepting. Then the other thing is about Golan and,,...I said this is not my business to do that but this is not insoluable.

K: That's right.

F: He was in a good humor and asked me to come to dinner. I suggested the idea of a third party to initiate this so that he and we could come along reluctantly...He mentioned India as a possibility . I said some third party ought to..He said that this was reasonable.

K: Good..

F: He was in a good humor but he talked so fast. I must say some of these pepple got under his skin.

K: If we asked ourselves how we would react if some people threatened our Ambassador in this way...it's unbelievable.

F: That right. He raised all these points . He was very up-tight. I tried to explain this was the kind of thing that happened in this country. I made the best pitch I could. I said Jackson did not represent this whole country.

K: I think it is a great service you have done. The general direction you outlined to him is the one we are more than willing to go.

F: He said a good deal about supply..the re-supply thing.

K: If we get a cease-fire we'll stop if they do.

F: Of course.

K: Many thanks, Mr. Chairman. I'll call you later to tell you what has happened.

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SL77

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
McCloskey/Sec. Kissinger
Monday, October 15, 1973
11:15 a.m.

M: I don't know everything that the President said at the Medal of Honor ceremony this morning.

K: ooh!! ooh!!

M: An AP ticker has him saying our policy is the same as in 1958 and 1970. You know in 1958 we sent troops into Lebanon. @#$%¢!

K: Ha. Ha.

M: I might have a little trouble with that. I will sort of wobble around on it.

K: We have to let them out of the cage once in a while.

M: I could say we need a new speech writer.

K: The problem is he has already taken powers for something that has not happened. Say it is just policy, not referring to tactics. Say that. Otherwise it looks like a threat.

M: O.K. I will avoid criticizing him.

M
K: I implored him not to say this. I wish I had thought of that argument. That might have done it. Do they make a lot of it?

M: Just a small story so far.

K: You had better shoot it down.

M: O.K.

END

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SL76

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Senator Ribicoff/HAK
October 15, 1973/10:00 a.m.

K: Since the Berlin airlift and a plane is landing in Israel every 45 minutes. We're trying to keep it as quiet as possible because we don't want an oil cutoff which would mobilize Western Europe against us and produce and we are also flying in F-4s at a fairly substantial rate now.

R: I've been told that generally all the Phantoms you've got allocated at 14 when they desperately need 50.

K: With...wait a minute, they have to have some understanding for our problem. First of all its at 20 now. We just tell them every day what is coming in the next day because we have to scrape them out of combat units and elsewhere.

R: In other words, you say you've got 20.

K: It is now at 20.

R: Now at 20. Henry, will it be up to 50?

K: It will be up to what they need to replace their losses which we've promised them. I haven't got the exact figure here.

R: The question is so damn desperate. I mean will it be soon.

K: It's going to be at a substantial rate every day between...and you know I think, I'm not talking about myself, but it's very poor tactics to come after the President when the President's alone overruling everybody and has been doing things beyond what any of his advisors recommended. This is what I'm telling you as a friend and if some of the people who are bringing pressure could keep that in mind it would really help matters.

R: Well, I agree. There is only only one man that can make the decision and that is the President.

K: And he has made that very big decisions constantly all week long. I mean who do you think is keeping the Jordanians, Saudis, and the whole diplomatic thing in line.

R: I understand he is probably seeing Stennis and Jackson and I think this is something he ought to tell them.

K: I don't know whether he is seeing Stennis or Jackson.

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R: I think so.

K: I just wanted to let you know that I've given you a long time interest in this and I think that you can talk to [redacted] Dinitz, I don't know if he would tell you.

R: I don't know whether he would or not. Let me think about what you told me. I appreciate what you've told me.

K: Good. Good bye.

SL85

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon:9:50-10/15/73
Secretary Kissinger/
Senator Fulbright

K: Hello.

F: Well, good morning. How are you?

K: How are you Mr. Chairman. I was just going to call you to bring you up to date on somethingsthat have happened.

F: Good.

K: I have been talking to the Soviet s since early this morning. This is again strictly for you.

F: Yes.

K: And they are now exploring with the Arabs a possibility of a ceasefire link with the reference to Security Council Resolution 242. On that we could live with on our side and we'll have to do a little arm twisting with the Israelis but I think we can sell it. And they promised us an answer within a reasonable time. I would guess by the end of the day.

F: Well I ah - do you still think - I was going to call after I talked to you to see what you thought. (When I see the Soviets? ? ? ?)

K: I would - if you could spare the time Mr. Chairman. Just point out to him how important this is for the detente. I wouldn't go into excessive detai l on a particular formula.

F: Well I can't do that anyway.

K: But if you were willing to point out to him that what we are trying to do is to keep the detente alive and that this could really be a crucial turni ng point in this respect. Coming from you ~~this would~~ that would have a t remendous amount of weight.

F: Well I thought Jackson's speech was really terrible.

K: Well, it is outrageous.

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F: Well they just looked determined to present us detente.

K: Well it really is unbelieveable t hat - what they are trying to do is get us back to the ~~XXXX~~ Dulles period, at an age in which both sides can kill humanity. I don't know what kind of a world they think we will be living in if that happens.

F: Yes.

K: If they succeed. And if we think what would happen to this country if we had Berlin crisis, Middle East crisis, Cuban crisis every x six months.

F: It seems to me if we don't position who decides going to allow the other to be eliminated so you have inevitably just be a constantly increasing arms build up on both sides.

K: Exactly.

F: And then it becomes more and more difficult to solve anything here. That is the way it looks - I don't pretend to be an expert. It is more or less of a stalemate is that right?

K: It is essentially - its a strategic stalemate. I mean there will be somebody gaining tactically here and there but neither side can score a knock out.

F: The other big powers just won't allow it. I mean when it gets really critical they'll put something in.

K: Exactly.

F: I was going to ask you a technical question in view of various moves. It doasn't seem to me there is really any authority without asking Congress to send troops in there, is there? You don't want to comment on that.

K: Frankly, I haven't looked into this.

F: There is no formak of commitment. There is no treaty or anything else. I don't think the old - so called Eisenhower Doctrine is still applicable to this country's (wish??). I mean maybe these lawyers can straighten it out but its long since passed out of that era - it was so long ago.

K: I would have to look into this.

F: Well, I don't x want you to _____

K: But I can tell you Mr. Chairman that this is not our intention.

F: Well, of course I want to tell, Henry, if he asks me about it you know I want to say well there is or isn't - these are facts of life. I mean just as I

K: Well, I don't know whether that is a happy thing to tell him right now because that might - might liberate some of the adventuristic _____ I have already assured him that if it stays confined to Arabs against Israel that there was no chance of an American

F: Well there shouldn't be.

K: Of an American military involvement. But I left open what we would do if Soviet troops showed up.

F: Yes. Well that was really the contingency that I meant if it did develop. But I think whether or not there is any commitment or legal justification then you just have to

K: Well I would have thought if Soviet troops were at, the President would not want to do this without Congressional support. I don't frankly know what the legal situation is, but

F: Well, I am going to call him and tell him that in view of this hour and so on if it is still convenient I'll come by there unless he has changed his mind or something and we talk on the phone. And I will call him now in just a few minutes.

K: Good. If you would be willing to give me a call after you have talked to him [redacted] I would appreciate it.

F: Well I will not be back in my office here. I am going from there to the airport. So how would I get you.

K: Well ah

F: See that you give me the right number if you want me.

K: Well call me at the White House and if I am at the State Department I have a direct line. And I will make sure that it gets to me.

F: Well which numbers shall I call.

K: 456-1414.

F: OK. That is the White House. Your number is often very busy anyway because I will be on my way to the airport and I have to leave [redacted] at 1 o'clock.

K: And will your office have numbers where I can reach you. I will [redacted] call you tonight in any event and bring you up to date on where we st and.

F: Fine. Well I'll see what we can do with him

K: The major thing now is to urge Soviet restraint and to keep in mind that those of us who want to bring about detente really will be put in an impossible position if we don't settle it in cooperation with the Soviets.

F: Yes, well I - do you think you will have any influence with him.

K: Not ~~xxx~~ until we and the Soviets have made a decision.

F: Oh, I just thought there might be a good intermediary with the - ~~if~~ somebody would take an initiative.

K: Well I think after the Soviets and we have agreed then we need somebody to put forward the resolution.

F: That is what I mean.

K: And then I think we should use the Indians to restrain them.

F: OK.

K: Many thanks Mr. Chairman.

F: Good ~~xxxx~~ luck.

K: Fine.

SL83

TELCON
Dean Rusk/HAK
October 15, 1973/7:15 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

R: Henry.

K: Dean, how are you?

R: Fine. Say I think this call has been overtaken by some things I heard the President say but I just wanted to be sure that somebody had reminded you of this quarter century policy of supporting the political independents and showing integrity of all the states in the Middle East in one way or another, we've supported that policy in relation to Kuwait, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Daman, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, etc. One of the reasons I mention this is that I found that in private talks with Arabs intelligence that some reminder of this didn't really convince them but at least took some of the sting of feeling out of the conversation. Because its worth quite a stirry of interest in and support of Arab countries in a variety of situations since 1948 but I notice that President Nixon picked up a couple of points in relation to Lebanon and Jordan but this applies to most items. After all we strained our relations with France to support Algerian independence. We strained our relations with Britain and France in support of Egypt in the Suez crisis and all sorts of things so I just wanted to mention this as a--something that I have found sometimes helpful in talking to individual Arab representatives. But if you've got somebody to give you a full list of them it would be quite a list.

K: Good. Well, that's very helpful. And it was _____ to some extent by what the President said.

R: Thats right and thats the reason why I said I think my call has been really overtaken by events to some extent. I think its obvious that you people up there are fully aware of this and I would assume that Joe Sisco would long since have recalled some of these situations but its something that is not unhelpful when talking to highly excited Arab Ambassadors or Arab Foreign Ministers.

K: Right. When will you be able to come up here Dean.

R: It'll be a little time yet but I do hope to get up sometime maybe in another couple of weeks but you expect joint action by the Arab States to cut all the oil?

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K: No.

R: Well, I think this is very sad business these days. I just hope that the Washington and Moscow can figure out a way to limit their involvement in it.

K: That's what we're trying to do against the opposition of the same groups who when the Russians were pouring arms into Vietnam never the less were preaching.

R: Well, I think about you frequently these days and good luck to you my friend.

K: Thank you Dean. Bye.

SL81

TELECON
Governor Love/Secretary Kissinger
October 15, 1973
4:05 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

L: I have a wire copy from AP saying the government today released figures saying the US could get along without Arab oil. Simon, Chairman of the Presiden t's Oil Committee said the country could reduce oil consumption, and so forth. Its pretty much a condensation of... I am trying to get a hold of Simon to get this thing stopped.

K: Tell him for Christ's sake we don't neet provocative calls right now.

L: Alright.

END

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S482

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Robert O. Anderson - Secretary Kissinger
October 15, 1973
4:15 p. m.

A: Duties of office weighing heavy these days.

K: Starting off with some excitement. Where are you, in Aspen?

A: No, I'm in New York. Say, the Brandt thing went very well. He had a good time and it all came off beautifully. Sorry you couldn't make it. I guess you've got your nose to the grindstone.

K: Yes, I was going to call you today, though to talk to you about something the President and I discussedlast week. As you know, Annenberg is going to leave London, after the President has been there which may be a matter of months away. We were wondering whether you would be willing to go there as Ambassador.

A: I'd like to visit with on it. If there was a real job to do I would be interested and not just a social position. I've been too active all my life to ....

K: Isn't a social position, you could make it what you wanted to.

A: Henry, for 6 years I was Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Bank, ...I know oil and agriculture...I would like to come down and visit with you about it though.

K: Could you come down next week.

A: I'll call Monday or Tuesday. Henery, ...just back from Middle East. I've known the Shah personally in a very friendly way for a good many years. Just spend two hours with him last Tuesday. ....Faisal is as good a friend of our country as it has ever had but he doesn't believe he can contain the young activists in Saudi Araia if we become active in a partisan way in the Middle East....problem.. You know the Shah is more than a casual observer.

K: I appreciate this. On the other hand the Soviets are pushing us in the other direction.

A: I know, I know, they can catch you with your foot off base.

K: Win or lose, they win....and if Soviets defeat Israel, Faisal's future is not worth a damn either.

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A: I guess to say these are difficult times is a real understatement.

K: Well, can't have any worse crisis than this for six months..

A: Good, I'll give you a ring next week.

SL84

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Zayyat/HAK
October 15, 1973/7:29 p. m.

K: Heloo

Z: Mr. Secretary.

K: Yes, Mr. Foreign Minister. How are you?

Z: I'm sorry to disturb you this late.

K: Not at all Mr. Foreign Minister. It's always a pleasure to hear from you.

Z: I got a cable from _____ this morning. I think he sends you a message and he sent me this message. Don't you think it is better to postpone our meeting tomorrow for the time being.

K: It's entirely up to you.

Z: I think it would be better to leave it until we see what has come out of this.

K: Alright. I will reply to him tomorrow.

Z: I was reading the President's remarks in the... I was reading them several times. I don't know what they really mean.

K: He was just explaining what our basic policy is and it didn't indicate any particular message.

Z: It didn't indicate any action or anything.

K: Not at this point no.

Z: Alright. Thank you very much.

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SL80

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sen. Symington/Sec. Kissinger
Monday, Oct. 15, 1973
3:15 p.m.

S: I was very reassured by what you said last night and I was a bit upset about what I read this morning.

K: About Jackson?

S: Scoop's observation. The headline. I wanted you to know I talked with Dinitz and I told him and thought it was wrong. He said he knew it was wrong. I have been talking with him pretty much everyday.

K: Aren't you nice.

S: I wanted to tell you that, if at anytime -- because you see I have felt there is no one more important than that little country and I mean it literally.

K: I know that.

S: On the other hand, in order to -- why I am not quite sure -- but I remember when Brezhnev he was pushed pretty hard and I know it makes it more difficult.

K: Now when I tell Dobrynin we will lose detent he will say what else can I lose except MFN.

S: Sometime I want you to meet a friend of mine, Abe Fineberg.

K: I would love to meet him. Does he come down here.

S: Yes. Could you see him.

K: I would love to. Could you arrange it.

S: O.K. They are pushing me pretty hard. You nor Schlesinger were available. I talked to his man but they cannot say that the Phantoms are going there.

K: For your information they are going in about 6 to 8 aday.

S: I know that but they are built in my town. Can I say that?

K: Not yet.

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S: That is what I wanted to know.

K: Stuart, I had just as soon not be praised. I don't want to be critizied but I had just as soon not be praised until after this crisis is over.

S: Well put. I know the Soviets could stop this think at 8:00 if they wanted to. I don't want to fight my colleague but this is not the way to stop it by talking extreme irrelevant matters.

K: That is what has handicapped us.

S: Call me when you need me. I only report back to my drug store when needed.

K: Thank you very much.

END.

SL86

RELEASED IN FULL

TelCon: 8:59-10/15/73
Secretary Kissinger/
Lord Cromer

K: Hello.

C: Good morning Henry.

K: Rolly I notice that your Ambassador in Tel Aviv was making soundings along the lines of our discussions. Confusing the hell out of our Ambassador

C: Really.

K: Who doesn't know anything about this.

C: I didn't know that. I will find out.

K: I just wanted to call

other

C: Did he talk to anybody else/than your Ambassador?

K: I don't know.

C: I mean that is just the worst he did.

K: You know it is not a disaster

C: I know

K: It's just that you should keep in mind that our Ambassador when we haven't told him. We wanted to wait until the thing had

C: Yes, well I will check on that. I will check on that. Are there any new developments at all?

K: Well we are beginning to think along the lines of what you had suggested. Maybe linking it to some very ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ great reference to 242.

C: Yes, yes. Well you know our thinking on that.

K: Well - you favor that don't you?

C: Oh sure, yes. Yes, certainly. Where is any possibility I don't know are we propsoing any sort of peace keeping element - depending upon happens on the Sinai front - if the Egyptians were to break through on

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that front, I wonder if we could interpose anything between them and the'49 boundaries. I don't know whether there has been any thought to that at all. It is purely personal thinking

K: No, no I think if they brought through we would almost have to think along these lines.

C: Yes, because it might be the only sensible way of stopping it from going to the opposite extremes.

K: Yes, exactly.

C: Yes.

K: Exactly.

C: But an - of course we might have to move fairly quickly if we are going to do that.

K: Our assessment is not that they are going to break through.

C: No, well they may well not. No, no there is no reason suspect they would - this is just contingency planning against the possibility.

K: Yes, well I think we should.

C: Yes. All right Henry. Well let's keep in touch.

K: Right.

C: If I have any ideas - even if they are silly - I will _____

K: I will keep you informed. I had a preliminary talks with the Russians on their ideas of linking these things together. Of course they want the '67 frontiers and I told them we would veto that.

C: Yes, well they are bound to all that aren't they.

K: Yes, exactly.

C: All right Henry, well we'll keep in touch.

K: Good, excellent. Goodbye.

C: Bye.

S187

TelCon-9:08-10/15/73
Secretary Kissinger/
Secretary Schlesinger

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

S: Hi Henry.

K: Just for your information but not - I won't use it at the WSAG - the Soviets came in around 3:00 o'clock this morning with a proposal for a new move which we are now exploring.

S: Very good.

K: Which would go back to the ceasefi re idea of Saturday and just link it to Resolution 242 which we can live with.

S: Good.

K: You know - but that we want to keep very quiet yet. I think we - the thing obviously they are sweating out is the - I think we should just keep going all out now on the supplies.

S: OK. You want to move in those additional six

K: I would move them tomorrow.

S: OK. Now there is one little leery(?) I am worrying about and that is the resupply of 175 mm ammo. As you know they have got their self-propelled 175 threatening Damascus and we ought to think very carefully about supplying ammo for the destruction of Damascus. I don't want an answer from you now but I ah

K: OK. Well let me see whether I can make sure that they won't sell(?)shell(?) Damascus.

S: OK. They are also pressing for bridging equipment and the bridges equipment in ~~view~~ view of the dearth of rivers, obviously is directed towards the move into Afghan(?) crossing this canal. Well think about those and

K: Let me think about that.

S: OK.

K: Good.

S: Anything else?

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K: No, I just wanted to give you that latest reading which I won't - I'll just mention at the WSAG(? ? ?).

S: Splendid.

K: That the diplomacy is going along.

S: Good.

K: Good. Bye.

S: Bye.

SL71

TelCon: 8:22-10/15/73
Secretary Kissinger/
Tom Pickering

RELEASED IN FULL

P: . . . when the Secretary

K: Tom, I notice that the newspapers aren't ~~talking~~ carrying that resupply yet.

P: _____ is going to put it out later.

K: Just a minute. I don't want it out - I am not saying for you to get it out. But I want to make sure our eager beaver Ambassadors aren't running out briefing on the subject that hasn't become public yet.

P: OK. Well the Circular make that clear didn't it.

K: Well

P: Do you want another followup cable sent.

K: Let's make sure that they should wait until it becomes public in their countries.

P: OK, I will send out another followup cable just saying

K: On a flash basis.

P: Right.

K: OK, good. Thank you.

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SL75

RELEASED IN FULL

TelCon-9:45-10/15/73
Secretary Kissinger/
Senator Javits

K: Hello.

J: Henry.

K: Jack, how are you?

J: Fine, thank you.

K: I didn't have the chance to call you over the week end. I just wanted to tell you what is going on. We launched on X Saturday afternoon a massive airlift for Israel which planes land there every 45 minutes and tomorrow morning we will have ~~xxx~~ equal percentage the Soviets have put in in five previous days.

J: Good.

K: And we are flying in F-4 at the average rate of about six a day.

J: That's terrific.

K: So there will be 20 in tomorrow.

J: That's great. Henry, what do you say about this political battle that is shaping up. They called me yesterday about a resolution that Jackson and the group want to put in tomorrow. I told them to read it to Marshall Wright.

K: What is their resolution?

J: A resolution - you know - urging accelerated efforts etc. exactly what you are doing. And you should ask Wright about that. He has got the text of this. And I have to pass on it this morning.

K: Well I haven't seen-- I have got to look at the text. I don't mind it if it isn't critical of the Administration.

J: No, it is not.

K: We had two problems in this respect Jack. One is the President has really gone all out.

J: I am sure of it and

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K: And for him to get lambasted then

J: He won't be if I can avoid it. And I can

K: And in fact if somebody could say something kind about it.

J: I am going to.

K: It would be rather important.

J: I am going to do it in the morning. You know when this _____ resolution is OK xxxx

influence on the bureaucracy here.

J: Right. Well now let me - leave it with me today. I am unfortunately tied up in my own state today. I will be in Washington late tonight and I will be better off tomorrow.

K: I don't want to be praised publicly - that is even worst.

J: No, no. I understand what you want and I will see to it.

K: OK, but on the substance what you ought to know is - this ~~under~~ on the ~~step~~ diplomacy we have not made one move without the Israelis.

J: Right.

K: And we have been following an Israeli timetable. Now their estimates of the situation were always excessively optimistic and therefore they never met their own timetable which was also one ~~&~~ reason for the stop and go of the resupply in the first four days because I thought it was more important for them to get assurances of total resupply than nickel and dime it to death on weapons that by their own calculations would never ~~had~~ have ended this battle.

J: Right. ~~SECRET~~

K: Second, the diplomacy is still being carried on in the closest coordination with them and it will stay this way and I told you about this resupply.

J: Of course.

K: Now publicly I have for obvious reasons to take a number of positions that are not as fire eating(?) as they might want. But even that they haven't objected to.

J: No, well they wouldn't. They have more sense than that. Henry leave it with me for the day. I may be back to you later in the day.

K: OK sir.

J: Good. And take a look at that resolution.

K: And if you could get a kind word said about the President

J: I will see that it is done and I will do it myself.

K: Not about me. That I don't want. But the President it would help.

J: Good.

K: Good. Thank you.

SL74

Telcon:9:43-10/15/73
Secretary Kissinger/
Donald ~~H~~ Marron

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

M: Henry,

K: Don, how are you.

M: How are you.

K: OK.

M: I have been travelling. I haven't called you since you have been Secretary of State so congratulations.

K: Thank you. Nice to hear from you.

M: It was not a surprise to me at all. I wanted to call when I was coming down to Washington so I could offer my congratulations in person and say hello and I am coming tomorrow and I was woddering how your schedule was at all.

K: You better call me tomorrow because you know we are in the middle of this crisis.

M: Yea, I know. Well that's why I didn't want to bother you at all.

K: No, I would like to see you.

K: Will you call me in the morning.

M: Yes, well I will tell you what I am doing. Claiborne Pell has asked us to come down to dinner so I will probably be coming down early in the afternoon so I ~~will~~ can call you in the morning from New York.

K: Good, why don't you do that.

M: Then we can work out a schedule. If you have any time at all.

K: Good.

M: OK Henry.

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K: Thank you. Good bye.

M: Bye.

SL73

RELEASED IN FULL

TelCon-9:40-10/15/73
Secretary Kissinger/
Secretary Schlesinger

K: Hello.

S: Hello Henry.

K: Jim, one thing I promised Dobrynin while this thing is still in train is that we would make no provocative statements about the Soviets.

S: Right. OK, I will be very careful to get that across.

K: Right, so you know we can whisper numbers but we ~~xxxx~~ shouldn't say anything else.

S: Well that is splendid. OK. You've got this thing moved back to 10:00 o'clock.

K: Yes.

S: OK - we maybe about five minutes late at that. We are running an armed forces ~~xxxx~~ policy council right now.

K: No, no that is OK.

S: OK.

K: Good.

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SL72

TelCon-9:03-10/15/73
Secretary Kissinger/
Mr. Sisco

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

S: Yes, sir.

K: Joe, when I couldn't reach you I called Tom.

S: ~~Joe~~ Tom. Yes, I have been over the cable and we ~~w~~ sent it out and I added a sentence which says don't do anything until we let you know.

K: Right.

S: That is basically it. Because I would agree - why should we jump the gun.

K: Right.

S: The only thing we will be going ahead on is that letter you sent to Faisal. That sort of

K: Well that letter is being delivered

S: Well - perhaps you have a later cable than I do. The last cable I had said they were going to do it this morning. So by now it is delivered.

K: Yes.

S: But that is good anyway because that gives him special treatment.

K: Yea. Now in that respect if I had known we could keep it that low profile but ah

S: I would never have guessed that.

K: I never would have guessed that.

S: My judgment was otherwise and I would have _____

K: So was mine. OK, well that is done now anyway.

S: That is all right. It hasn't done any damage.

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K: Well, we will see.

S: Yea:

K: Good.

S: Thank you.

K: Goodbye.

S4199

TELCON
Sen. Fulbright - Secretary Kissinger
October 16, 1973
2:55 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Mr. Chairman, how are you? Thank you very much.

F: Just heard about it an hour ago.

K: I heard about it in a meeting discussing the Middle East, a more unlikely setting couldn't have occurred. I didn't even know my name was in there.

F: Well, it can't have come at a better time. Hope it has some influence.

K: I think it might make it a little harder for various parties to tackle me.

F: I agree.

K: I talked to Dbrynin yesterday and your conversation with him had a good effect. He said he sent it immediately to Moscow. I thought you should know we got . exchanged some messages with the Egyptians yesterday. They invited me to come to Cairo which I didn't think I could do under these conditions.

F: Its a good omen anyway.

K: Exactly. We are saying I could come as soon as a cease fire is reached. Kosygin has gone to Cairo today. Jackson will undoubtedly say he is doing it to exacerbate things, but they don't have to go to Cairo to exacerbate things, that's perfectly clear to me now. Egyptian message had a series of demands, all unfulfillable short of total victory. If we can get the Arabs to cut down demands, and get Israelis to accept cut down list...

F: Hope you can do that.

K: Working on it. Are you having a busy schedule there?

F: I just made a speech on this subject. Going over to see Wilbur Mills this afternoon. Try to influence him to...

K: Good, if you could do that. If you tell the Soviets they are risking detente, just what exactly is being risked?

F: Well, I'm going to tell him just what's been going on, do what he can to get things back on the track. Don't think he is emotionally

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committed at all, just going along with his colleague. He has never evidenced any terrific commitment.

K: If you can it would be a big help. I hope to give you a progress report, hope its a progress report.

F: Good luck to you. Again, the prize is a great thing, great symbol.

K: I am very pleased. As I said in my statement, I made a statement, nothing could have received that meant so much to me.

F: If you get a cease fire in the Middle East we'll give you another one.

K: Hope to get a cease fire within a week.

F: Good luck to you.

K: Thanks.

RELEASED IN FULL SL101

TELECON
B. G. Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
October 16, 1973
4:05 pm

K: I think that the Flanigan position is insane and he cannot do it. Tell him you talked to me and he needs to say it is not proper conditions ... it would be a mistake. by not giving them MFN .. we would therefore respectfully urge them to drop it altogether.

S: OK. I ll call him right away.

END

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SL100

TELECON
Senator Goldwater/Secretary Kissinger
October 16, 1973
3:57

RELEASED IN FULL

G: How are ;you?

K: OK

G: I hate to bother you with this . When the Shah of Iran was here, he asked Peggy and me if we would come over. We are looking at December 1, but in view of the situation..

K: You mean in the Middle east, it will be all over before then unless we screw it up in the next few days.

G: I am sure glad to hear that. Are we working with the Soviets? No, you don't have to answer over the phone.

K: We are working with the Soviets and also with the Egyptians It's a tough situation and could blow up.

G: Then it's alright for us to go over.

K: You will have a tremendous reception.

G: For a boy who is half Jewish that's not too bad.

K: Yeah.

G: Everything else alright with you.

K: OK. I would like to meet in the next week with some of my conservative friends and tell them... I think they have some problems.

G: I hadn't heard a thing.

K: I want ;you to know the State Department is not a hostile party.

G: I know that. I am going to be here tomorrow but will leave..

K: When will you come back.

G: I will be here... and in Novem ber.

K: In November?

G: I have alot of speaking engagements the early part of November.

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K: I will get in touch with your office and we will work something out.

G: Any time I can be of help..

K: You are a great friend, Barry.

G: Goodbye.

END

SL98

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Hummel - Secretary Kissinger
October 16, 1973
2:45 p. m.

H: Can I bring up to show you the reply to the Chinese.

K: What answer.

H: The answer's favorable. Slightly gimmicky. Lon Nol requires written request from some member of the Royal family. It can be done, though, by a member of the Royal Family in Phnom Penh. Reply ..... out future possibility... channel.

K: Let's not get cute. My experience with the Chinese is that it is likely they did this to set up a channel. Let's just get the reply, then get the Chinese Ambassador in this afternoon.

H: I can have it typed an bring it up in 15 minutes.

K: (Sigh) One thing I can't get through the heads of the Department is that I would like to know the facts even if no reply is received.

H: Oh, I'm sorry, I would....

K: No, no, it isn't your fault, I just....

K: Come down at 3:30 and get the Chinese in here at 5:30.

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SL97

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sen. Javits/Sec. Kissinger
Tuesday, Oct. 16 [illegible]
2:45 p.m.

J: ...hard to tell exactly what it is except that everybody is worried about it.

K: In what way?

J: How they are faring. Everyone is please with what you and the President are doing. I have said so on the floor this morning. I have this resolution reshaped now I think in a way which I think should be o.k. It will be put in on Thursday with a lot of co-sponsors and I will see that you have a look at it.

K: Good.

J: The other thing...

K: I think everybody should stay cool. I think we are working -- we have a chance a diplomacy working on this.

J: Good. We will be very very cautious and not call people names that would aleinate them.

K: I think that important. The time may come where we have to unleash. We are now doing what can be done physically to confront the Russians there and there is no sense in talking about it.

J: I know that and everyone seems to know that to be a fact. I wanted to ask you however do you think it would be useful to use current publicity -- like an editorial in the Wall St, Journal today -- to have someone say that an oil boycott is not that big a threat to this country. The editorial is worth your time to look at.

K: We have contingency plans for that. I will look at it.

J: I will be leaving Friday night for Ankara for this NATO situation which you know about.

K: We have been doing it publicly.

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J: I know. It has been endorsed. If there is anything you or your staff think I should know before going I should be instructed.

K: We will give you a briefing before you go off.

J: Who will do that on Europe so I can work out the time. I am here today and early in the morning.

K: I thought you said you were leaving on Friday.

J: I am here in Washington.

K: George Springsteen or Hyland. I will instruct them.

J: John Cooper was in the other day and talked to me about did I think anything to Moscow for him. I said I would think about it and see. I am putting myself on record of having talked to you about it.

K: Many thanks. Appreciate it. See you soon.

END

SL96

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Ziegler/Sec. Kissinger
Tuesday, Oct. 16, 1973
2:40 p.m.

Z: Your statement played fine.

K: Did I mention the President enough.

Z: Maybe you could have mentioned him 5 more times by saying, President Nixon, President Nixon, etc. as you walked off. No it played fine.

K: Does it show on television.

Z: No I am reading it on the wire.

K: Do you have the full text?

Z: Yes. Pretty much the full one.
How should we react to the Mansfield call for convening the 6 nation summit conference to halt the war in the Middle East.

K: Six nation -- what conference. What is that?

Z: He says the President should issue invitations to Brezhnev, Pompidou, Tanaka, Heath and Brandt.

K: Tanaka [redacted]
Say we have no comment. We are engaged in delicate diplomacy and we just will not comment.

Z: That is what I thought.

END

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SL109

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
The President - Secretary Kissinger
Oct. 16, 1973

K: Mr. President.

N: Any other developments on the diplomatic front.

K: I saw the Sudanese Foreign Minister.

N: Good.

K: and he has the impression things may be breaking. he's close to the other Arabs you know.

N: I wouldn't include him in tomorrow...

K: No, they selected themselves .... let them go.

N: Think we have Sadat's position... we are not going to get a resolution of this thing until we get some kind of diplomatic offer they can save face with. The one you made was pretty good...

K: Wouldn't float that with those three tomorrow though...

N: No, no. I don't intend to float anything tomorrow.

K: I don't think we will get anything until Kosygin has returned from Cairo.

N: What tell him....

K: He's got the offer.

N: What if he returns and says they won't do it..

K: I think there's a good chance they will do it.

N: Or some variation of it. Do you think he will return tomorrow. Kosygin visit, how long will it be?

K: I'll bet he will be back by tomorrow night. or he may stay until Thursday.

N: You see Mansfield's brilliant suggestion, urging summit conference, with the British, French, Japanese, US and Russians. What in the name of heaven would be decided ....

K: Mr. President it would kill us. It would be the Israelis and [redacted] us against six other nations. Insane.

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N: It's just as it was in Viet Nam, our friends on the Democratic side are petrified it will end and they want to be out there suggesting and urging.

K: Makes no difference...unless somebody loses his cool.

N: Could happen.

K: Don't think it will though.

N: Hope we've got that airstrip in Tel Aviv damned well protected.

K: They're not going to attack it.

N: Why not.

K: Because they're afraid we'll start attacking the Soviet airlift. Chances are two out of three ...now moving towards resolution. Last week was too easy, done too much with mirrors....better solution this week when we have shown our muscle.

N: If the airlift continues. How many 50 planes? They'll have more planes in the end than at the beginning.

K: Well, they're going in at a rate of 6 a day, depends now on when it ends, is settled.

N: Well, the Israelis ought to be awfully grateful after this. Hope they, indicated privately...

K: There have been making statements on Senate floor, Javits made one today.

N: ....

K: Diplomatically, it helps us that you are not way out in front until we get it done.

N: I understand, but we will, it ought to happen when we get through.

TELECON
Scowcroft/Kissinger
October 16, 1973
6:46 p.m.

SL107

RELEASED IN FULL

S. ...Just sent one back that...

K. I will get Sisco to redo it on White House stationery in a form the President can handle.

S. I just gave this back to...

K. He has to get it tonight or else he will be useless at tomorrow's meeting. Moreso because he is so inflamed by my award he will want to settle it at that meeting.

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TELCON
Sen. Curtis - Secretary Kissinger
October 16, 1973
6:35 p. m.

SL105

RELEASED IN FULL

C: Thank you so much for returning my call. Mrs. Curtis and I were in Argentina for the inauguration of Peron. We went down on White House appointment you know and I visited quite at length around with a number of people I knew. I called to make a suggestion which seemed quite urgent. John Lodge ought to be continued on in Argentina. He has had ten years experience, been in a very difficult position, he's a linguist (speaks Spanish and Italian -- there are a lot of Italians down there), his contacts with Peron are cordial and good, he has already had a meeting with him. Mrs. Lodge has befriended Mrs. Peron and I think she relies on her a good deal. It seems likely in the troubled times, expecially there where they change so often, and there's a chance Peron will establish a stable government, a good thing that Ambassador Lodge be continued. Also the way things are hanging right now. Couldn't give you the reason for this, but the second man down there, a man named Krebs, is persona non grata with the government, both houses have passed a resolution barring him. Just wanted you to know.

K: Thank you Senator, we will consider it very seriously.

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RELEASED IN FULL

SL104

TELECON
Foreign Minister Saqqaf/Kissinger
October 16, 1973
4:35 p.m.

K. Mr. Foreign Minister. I Look forward to seeing you tomorrow.

S. Thank you. Congratulations.

K. Thank you. I am calling on behalf of the President to tell you that after the end of hostilities the President would be very pleased if His Majesty would accept an invitation to visit the United States.

S. Can we discuss this tomorrow?

K. There will be others present. Perhaps you and I can discuss it.

S. Is there a time for this?

K. We can find a time mutually convenient as soon as possible.

S. Thank you very much. See you tomorrow.

K. Goodbye.

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UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED IN FULL SL106

J: You know this thing may get fouled up and it was bad last week.

K: It did not get fouled up be my. Do you know what role I played in 1970? Who managed the crisis? I was 100% on your side. I said publicly we had to expel the Egyptians....

J: I don't know...has the President delegated the authority to you? I have tried to make clear we have to move and move fast and send the right signals to the Russians. All I can get is there is going to be a re-supply...

K: Look, Scoop. The Israelis told us they would have it cleaned up by Tuesday, then they told us they would have it cleaned up by Thursday, and then Friday. I have tried..total assurances for a resupply. It wasn't til Friday that we were told what their problem is. On Saturday we started a massive airlift.

J: I got just the opposite.

K: We tried to get some charters..and that was royally screwed up.

J: It's just outrageous in 48 hours we were told they did not move...a single plane...Well I will sit down and talk..meanwhile we have other problems that are serious. ...statement we can warn the Russians about their involvements.

K: Well, we have been warning the Russians about that. We should talk about that privately. I consider you a friend.

J: I didn't want you to construe it differently.

K: Let's have dinner again soon. Best to your wife.

J: Right.

END

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SL108

TELCON
Gen. Scowcroft - Secretary Kissinger
October 16, 1973
7:05 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: We have the paper now in good shape will send it right over.

S: Good.

K: Only thing that you have to make clear for the President is that talking points are at Tab A and he ought to read them.

S: All right. He's gone to Camp David I just found out.

K: Have it waiting for him in the morning. Is Haig with him.

S: I don't know I just found out he had gone. He's beside himself. All I can say is thank heavens it was a dual one.

K: There was no way he was going to get it, at least this way it goes to the US.

S: Yah. OK Henry.

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SU102

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
October 16, 1973
4:10 pm

K.... Lisbon 3820.. They want to ak Santa Maria International for. the return flights from Israel. I don't think we should press our luck. Make sure we don't get... which they cancelled.. The next thing.. the Reuter article. Will you keep your people shut up on this.

S: I am in the Operations Center. The Task Force takes no press calls. My point is tney have strict instructions. No one here has talked..

K: Alright, it must be INR. I need talking points for the President for his meeting with the Arabs.

S: They will be in to you in about 30 minutes.

K: They ought to be along the lines..we discussed... shouldn't I see them first. Didn't they want to see me too.

S: He did say both you and the President ...would you rather see them first or afterwards.

K: I would rather see them when... but the President ...at 10:15 in my WH office and thenfrom there to the President. And you'll be there too.

S: I'll be there. I will arrange that and unless you hear from me everything will be set up.

K: The only thing is.if the President want s to see me...we should do it tentatively.

S: If the President wants to see you at 10:15 you'll meet them after the 11:60. I understand ..limit the meeting with the Foreign Ministers to the President and you. One thing, you might want to include the Ambassadors.

K: No.

S:My question is do you want to include the Ambassador in your meeting? My recommendation is you include both the Foreign Ministers and the Ambassadors. Of course it is a moot point and..

K: Well, I don't ..I haven't got a clear idea yet. I hate those mass meetings.

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S: This is not important. It is not essential. Why don't ;you decide tomorrow morning. The Ambassadors know they are not going into the President's meeting....

K: That's right.

S: ....isn't it safer for you to do it afterwards?

K: I am going to kill my assistant. Scheduling a WSAG at 3:00 and Hays at 4:00...there is about as much chance of my seeking...total stupidity.

S: May I make an alternative suggestion. Make it for 10:30 beforehand.

K: I want to see them before. We must keep him from trying to settle it tomorrow with a group that can't settle anything. Finally, the President would like to invite Faisel to come for a visit any time and ...you call him?

S: I think you should call him.

K: Alright. When will they be going back?

S: We will work that out. I don't have the details

END

SL91

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Danny Kaye/Sec. Kissinger
Tuesday, Oct. 16, 1973
12 5 p.m.

DK: I am in New York tonight and I leave for Europe on Wednesday. I will be in Israel for about a week.

K: Call me when you get back.

DK: Yes I will.

K: I am anxious to see you.

DK: I will be gone for four or five weeks. I am on a UNECEF trip. I will go and see anybody you want me to. Anything.

K: Let me know where you will be in case I want to get you.

DK: I don't know where I will be in Israel. I will let the American Embassy know where I am.

K: Good.

DK: Do you go to collect your prize.

K: Yes. About December 10.

DK: O.K. That is about all. I was worrying about...we left you a little thing about Carol Ryder(?) and a little desk clock.

K: You were so sweet and I have not thanked you.

DK: Just wanted to know if you got it. How are things working over there?

K: The Israelis are having a much tougher time.

DK: I know that . I don't want to know about that on the phone. I know the outcome but at a great, great loss.

K: I think they will win but it is a hell of a tough fight.

DK: Congratulations. We called you the peacemaker and we were right.

K: Thank you. I would love to see you.

DK: I will be gone about 4-5 weeks and I will stop in N. Y. I would like you to come up.

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K: Fine. Bye. END

SL88

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
John Andrews
10/16/73; 10:07 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: You wanted me to call you.

A: Thank you very much. I spoke to Les Janka and sent a note to him yesterday about this but I wanted to mention it directly to you that I wonder if you have any use for my services over at the State Department.

K: Oh! Well, look, I actually may.

A: It's something I would like you to be thinking about and . . .

K: You would be willing to work there as a speech writer?

A: Yeah, that is what I would like to do. And actually, I am thinking perhaps of leaving Washington earlier next year but that's quite flexible and at least in the interim I think I could put my heart into that effort over there much more than I am able to do any more over here.

K: John, I will be back to you in a few days.

A: Fine.

K: Good.

A: Thanks very much.

K: Thank you for calling. You are being united with your wife.

A: What? Yes, I love it.

K: Good. Thank you.

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SL103

TELECON
Saudi Arabian FM/Secretary Kissinger
4:35 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

.....

K: I think it's a little premature.

S: I think so too, but if you like..

K: Will he be here tomorrow?

S: He was planning to leave tonight or early tomorrow morning.

K: Can I call you between 8:00 and 9:00 tomorrow morning.

S: Yes sir.

K: Well, I have a very busy schedule.

S: I understand.

K: If I fail to see him you and I can get together in the next 36 hours.

S: There is something ..When do you meet with Arab Ambassador.

K: I am meeting him at 10:30, so let's aim for about 9:30. Good Mr. Ambassador.

S: Good.

END

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SL89

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Dobrynin/Sec. Kissinger
Tuesday, Oct 16, 1973
11:42 a.m.

D: I hope I will be invited to the party.

K: What party?

D: Which you are going to give in connection with the award of the Nobel Prize.

K: I figure it like Groucho Marx said, "Any club that took him in, he does not want to join." I would say anything that Lee Duc Tho is eligible for there must be something wrong with it.

D: I congratulate you. You really deserve it. It will be something to remember. This call is really my best wishes.

K: I appreciate it very much.

D: Henry, Probably I am among the few that can say with judgment what actions you have done.

K: I think I deserve it more for the reasons which you know, than for the reasons which I got it. You can say this to your leaders. Whatever additional prestige I gain with this I hope I can put it to the use of the service of the policy I use with you and the Gen. Sec. which we have started.

D: It does not matter about the present difficulties. I am sure we will come out of this -- both of our countries, the Presidents and you. I think the outcome will be o.k. Basically we are...

K: I think it important. Don't say it for tactical reasons. I don't see what you and I, our countries, can gain in the Middle East compared to what we can lose and therefore we cannot let these maniacle parties drive us into confrontation.

D: This is the reason I am calling you. To congratulate you. This is for the second prize.

K: Right.

D: For the second Nobel Prize for you next year.

K: Good. We will aim for that.

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D: Thank you. END

SL95

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Gov. Rockefeller/Sec. Kissinger
Tuesday, Octl 16, 1973
2:35 p.m.

R: A group of your friends is gathered here to celebrate this Nobel Peace Prize for you.

K: Aren't you nice.

R: Most fantastic think I have ever heard.

K: I could not believe it.

R: I knew you deserved it but it is not the kind of thing that happens in this world.

K: I did not know I was up for it. My leader is upset because he thought he would get it.

R: Of course he did. You can hear the laughter. There is a whole group of us here. We will probably get drunk before the Cabinet meeting. I think it the most exciting thing that has happend.

K: You are nice. Such a good friend to call.

R: Ann told me when I came out of a meeting, she said I would not believe it but Henry has gotten the peace prize.

K: That was not a very nice think to say.

R: You know -- the way the world is today.

K: There was tremendous pressure for the others. Tito was up.

R: What did he do.

K: Nothing but he was really trying hard.

R: I just think it is wonderful and I think at this moment, particularly after Agnew's speech last night to lift us back on a high plateau.

K: He was a disaster.

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R: What message was he trying to give unless a challenge to the President.

K: To say you confess to a crime you did not commit just to get it over with.

R: And to go on and on like he was still the VP.

K: I think the outcome was all right.

R: You had your eye on the ball.

K: I used whatever influence I had in that direction. The other one would not have worked.

R: As far as the popularity thing came out, it was all right. I was not worried. I think this is the nicest thing that has happend. I think you do not think in life that what is really right will happen but it did.

K: I did not even know it was going to be announced today. I was sitting in a Middle East meeting figuring out how to get planes into Israel and how to confront the Russians when someone brought this in. Unbelievable.

R: One of those beautiful thinks like the sun breaking through on a dark cloudy day.

K: I have to say anything that Lee Duc Tho is included in , I have some doubts about.

R: You two had to stop it.

K: I have to run now to a meeting. Hope to see you soon.

R: You have all our congratulations.

END

SL94

TELECON
Mr. McCloskey/Secretary Kissinger
October 16, 1973
2:25

RELEASED IN FULL

K: What is RNR 102?

M: Sounds like Reuters.

K: ....(read scat item)....Will you shut down on these US officials.

M: At the briefing I took the line you and I agreed on.

K: It must be either the Middle East Bureau or INR. They are the only ones they take seriously.

M: You mean they don't take you and I seriously?

K: Well, I know it wasn't you or I who said it.
Did the statement go alright?

M: I thought it was eloquent. And so did everyone else. It was right out there.

K: Good.

M: I had a hell of a time at the briefing...something about the President and Laird.

K: Well just walk away from it.

M: I did and then there was something you said last night.

K: I shouldn't have said it. I didn't see the newsman standing there.

M: Well, I will have a list of newsman up to you in about one hour.

K: Good,

END

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SL90

TELCON
The President/Sec. Kissinger
~~Monday~~, Tuesday, Oct. 16, 1973
11:46 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

N: I wanted to congratulate you.

K: I know who deserves it.

N: Yes. Yes. I was going to make two suggestions. It occurred to me that you should make a little statement.

K: I have told everyone that I wanted to say that I would like to thank you for giving me the opportunity and above all for the leadership that created the conditions.

N: Fine. Fine. I was going to suggest that it might be well for you to drop over here and have a picture taken with me congratulating you. How about 12:30.

K: Absolutely.

N: That will give us some time. Come after you make your statement.

K: I will be there at 12:30.

N: Make your statement before you come so they will not ask you to do it here.

K: Right.

N: The other thing is you should consider that your portion of the award -- it would be a nice gesture for you to say you are going to contribute it to the American Red Cross for disaster relief for the Pakistanis and for the Africans and Nicaraguans. How does that sound?

K: I do not have to do that today. I have never accepted any money.

N: I think it would be a very good gesture. It would mean a great deal to those areas. It would hit the three areas. Shows interest in Africa, and our Pakistani friends and Nicaraguans. You consider it. I would not put any in for Israel.
K: I would not put any in for
K: Absolutely not. That would be out of the question. I never give to Israel.

N: You should not.

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K: No. That is out of the question.

N: O.K. Henry. See you at 12:30.

END

SL93

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Schlesinger/Kissinger
October 16, 1973
2:20

.....

S: And congratulations by the way.

K: Thank you.

S: I am sure you could have chosen a different fellow..

K: I feel a little like Groucho Marx when he said anyone who...

S: How is the diplomacy going?

K: We have had an exchange with the Egyptians which was very moderate and they invited me to Cairo. They stated extensive demands. Kosygin seems to be on his way to Cairo. I think this is going to jell.

S: I think that's right. We should remind our Egyptian friends that there is only one power that will benefit from the humiliation of the Arab States and that is the Soviets.... You were talking abou the airlift.

K: the comment is not adequate of what's going on.
My concern is to demonstrate to the Soviets that we are getting more in

S: I think we are. The airlift we are moving on. We are flying in also. I think we probably have some edge on them in terms of total capability. ..CFA s is seven times the size of the AN 12.

K: Rught. I would like us to be at least 25% ahead of the Soviet effort.

S: ...

K: All I want is when the Soviets look at this..when we have paid a ...fee. that they get a sense of their being in a mixed game. Our best hope is to get so much pressure that there will be a settlement.

S: I hope so. Very good. The Israelis are on the West Bank.

K: Yes with 25 tanks.

S: That should be quite interesting.if it goes on another week I will not be surprised to see the Egyptians los their stake.

K:I told them that in my message -- but not quite that brutally.

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S: Anything else?

K: No, that's all. You will be kept informed of details about anything that's going on.

S: OK.

END

SL92

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
B. G. Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
October 16, 1973
11:55

.....

K: President congratulated me at 12:30--I agreed to that and then I found out they had it set up for here at 12:30 so can you set it up there at 12:45?

S: OK. I'll set it up for 12:45.

K: Good. I will make a statement--answer no questions and leave right away.

S: OK. I'll set it up. What do I call you now? -- Your Excellency?

K: Laughter. No, Your Eminence.

S: Laughter. What I am going to say is the President called and congratulated you and then called you into his office.

K: Fine. But tell them it was after I got off the line with a girl.

END

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SL115

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Dobrynin

RELEASED IN FULL

10/17/73 9:42 a.m.

K: Hello

D: How are you?

K: Okay.

D: Three things, first this is a--Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Gromyko asked me to congratulateyou heartily with the Nobel Prize.

K: Thank you, I appreciate that.

D: And they would really like to congratulate you. Second, I have instructions to tell you on a very strictly confidential basis for you and for President Nixon, I am to mention to him and you that we are now having consultations with Arab Leaders.

K: Yes, and Kosygin is in Cairo.

D: Yeh, this is exactly what they asked me to tell you. But you already know.

K: No, no we know a Soviet VIP is in Cairo, we've told the Israelis to stay away from Cairo and the Cairo airport.

D: This is Kosygin.

K: We didn't have it confirmed.

D: But they specifically asked to tell you and to the President --

K: I hope you have noticed that we have tried to keep things very quiet here.

D: No, I know. I noticed that it is on low key under the circumstances. But this is really for your information.

K: You know we cannot help if there is speculation because

D: No, no, I understand

K: Frankly, we know a Soviet VIP plane is there. And therefore a lot of people know something.

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D: No, I understnad.

K: But you can be sure that we will not confirm it in any official way or leak it.

D: Yeh, I understand.
This is just they asked me specifically to tell --he is there in connection with this consultation and including a consult with the about formula issue proposal--

K: Anatol, you should understand because I don't want to mislead you, the ceasefire formula--the one on Saturday, we had discussed with the Israelis--this formula, we have not yet discussed with the Israelis.

D: About the 242?

K: Yes.

D: 242.

K: Yes. But we think they will accept it, but we didn't want frankly our press to be agitated against us.

D: Yeh, no, no.

K: So there may be 24 hours after if you come back with something.

D: Yes, I understand.

K: I just -- don't want you people to be misled.

D: Yes,

K: You can be sure that what we said to you we will stand by.

D: Hm huh. And the last one, Henry, here is some oral considerations by Mr. Brezhnev to the President. It is not immediate in the sense of proposals, but so to speak of our relations in really good terms, I should say in a quiet way, it is on four pages--probably--it's oral however, maybe I will send it to you--nothing really

K: Can you send it over within the next hour.

D: I could send it right away.

K: Send it over, just for our records.

D: Just for your own. And if you have some comments or other, please let me know.

K: Okay.

D: I could come to you anytime--or by telephone.

K: You know our policy as I have told you, is to try to really to the utmost to not only keep the detente going, but to strengthen it.

D: Yeh, this is really what--this too--this oral consideration--by Brezhnev. I think it is rather helpful, just for the whole background--there is nothing immediate or specifically new, but in general how it is presented, I think you will find it interesting.

K: Good.

D: Okay. Nothing else for the time being, no?

K: No, we are waiting for you.

D: I understand. This foreign minister not yet--in your office. The foreign ministers of _____

K: No, they are coming in at 11:30, but we don't think we should give them this formula do you?

D: No--well it's up to you, but I don't know I doubt very much if their reaction will _____ but you may have better indications that we have, but this is my impression, because they are under the pressure from _____

K: No, no we will wait for you before we make an open initiative.

D: Okay. Be in touch.

K: Bye.

SL116

TELCON
Mr. William Randolph Hearst
Secretary Kissinger
10/17/73 10:02 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

H: Thank you for getting on the phone. Congratulations--and that's twice within a week or so, I must say you are deserving of that big job.

K: Thank you

H: You deserve the peace prize, but I must say that other son-of-a-bitch didn't deserve to share it with you. I swear to God, isn't it amazing when you have to bomb them to the table and then they give him a prize --he didn't live up to a damn thing he promised, has he?

K: I couldn't agree more.

H: Listen, Henry, honest to goodness , I appreciate also the fact that there's going to be a Hearst writer on--I'm going to put Johnny Wallich on the airplane.

K: Okay.

H: He's the --a capable member of our group you know of the two of us. And he's fine--do you like him a lot.

K: I like him very much--he's a fine man.

H: Yeh, he's a good boy. Now Henry, look something very, very crucial, I'm going to be in Tokyo anyway for reasons that I'm not going to bother boring you with--it's a personal reason and so, if somebody falls off the airplane or something like--you can let me know in Tokyo--I'll be in touch with you and Jack in Tokyo. I'm going to try to have a visax, so I can just go in and out. I don't want to report, but I'd love to make the trip if I could. I'll be in Tokyo and that's all.

K: Right.

H: And I'm not going to be a pest.

K: No you couldn't be a pest.

H: Well anyway, I think a hell of a lot of you and I'm not complimenting you to get on a airplane either, but I'll see you in Tokyo--but you may put if off a day or two,

K: Yeh, I may.

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H: I'll keep in touch with John and he'll keep in touch with Bob McCloskey.

K: Excellent.

H: And good going, I wish you all the success you deserve.

K: Thank you.

S 4117

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
The President - Secretary Kissinger
October 17, 1973
1:40 p.m.

K: I wanted to let you know, these Arabs are floating on air, they say you are a great man and that you spoke to them with a sincerity they knew you would, then we went into a lot of detail on how to do it, assurances they would do it. I think we are going to get it, a cease fire within three or four days.

N: Main thing is Sadat said, the press, here's the guy who could cut off the oil for all of the world...very contructive.

K: I also talked to Joe Sisco. He also said when traveling with Rogers, he never knew what he was talking about...with you you always know what youre talking about.

N: Well...I thought it went well.

K: Thought it was spectacular.

N: That's good.

K: Just saw telegram from El-Zayyat, got the Arabs, quite important. Had a big argument with the Algerians how can we be sure we can believe the President. I told him, look here, for years I told him the President was harassed. They wanted to know were we willing to bring pressure on Thieu. Let the other side make a proposal and we will see whether we will bring pressure. I am not drawing a parallel, but you can figure out for yourself.

N: Well, I left alot of things....but I said I wanted to visit their countries, loved all of them, which was true,

K: Mr. President, I think it was a most successful morning. What's more important, they were happy ... very successful morning.

N: Now, on to the Russians. When do you expect to hear from Kosygin.

K: We've got long message from Brezhnev, now in itself doesn't say anything, he skirts the issue ...matters have not reached the point of no return and in detente...we will hear from them be tomorrow.night.

N: Meantime, you might pickup Senatoe Mansfield's brilliant suggestion.

K: Mr. President, when have they not failed us.

N: Really something.

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K: When have they ever stood behind the President?

N: no, but come up with a cockeyed scheme of going to the United Nations, having a six power conference...

K: Never support what we are doing.

N: This meeting with the Arabs just about killed the damn press people. They expected all hell to blow up.

K: Of course,

N: There was a huge number out there today.

K: Well, trotted out the poor Foreign Ministers.

N: At a time when we are supplying Israel.

K: At a time when American planes are landing in Tel Aviv every half an hour. People take everything for granted, no minor feat.

N: Anything doing with battle?

K: Seems to be a tank battle going on ....

N: I think its a stalemate, I real ly do.

K: I do too.

N; Both sides sort of bled.

K: I suppose the Israelis can barely win, but not at any price that's worthwhile.

N: OK, have a good rest.

SL-14

TELCON
Sec. Clements/HAK
October 17, 1973/9:35 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

C: Hi Henry.

K: How are you?

C: Fine.

K: Bill, we feel very strongly, I'm at the White House now, that we [redacted] should get that supplemental up today and to stop diddling around with exact figures. Let's just get a figure.

C: We're ready Henry. I looked at the draft last night.

K: Good. What is it? 31/2.

C: No Henry, its 2.9. The reason its 2.9 is because we found on investigation that the 1.7 that you heard me talk about in the meeting yesterday which is the credit to date, that cannot be cross-referenced to this supplemental. [redacted] There's no way. So that 2.9 that we're coming up with is in fact a net increase greater than the other number.

K: Good. But you're putting in something for others.

C: Absolutely. There is 500 million dollars in there plus Cambodia.

K: Good.

C: That's the whole thing now. I can get a draft of this, I mean I can get you a copy of this draft over there immediately but I think that Bill Timmons has already got it.

K: We all feel that it is essential to get it in today in case the diplomacy breaks.

C: Fine.

K: Can you do that.

C: Yes we can Henry. I was going to bring this up for review at the WASG this afternoon and I feel like you ought to look at this thing and be fully aware of what we do before we drop it in that hopper. Would you like for some of us to come over there and brief you about 15 minutes on it or something.

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K: The trouble is I've got these Arabs coming.

C: That's right. We're ready Henry. The only thing is I ....

K: When would you drop it in after the WASG? Tomorrow morning.

C: Yes tomorrow morning.

K: That shouldn't be too much of a delay should it?

C: I wouldn't think so but that was what our plan was within the morning so that it could be discussed at the WSAG.

K: That would be fine.

C: OK Henry. Good luck.

SL120

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Dinitz/Kissinger
October 17, 1973
5:20 p.m.

K. Yes, Mr. Ambassador.

D. I don't trouble you with news of the front. I keep the General informed. I have a message from Dayan who just returned from the front and called about 20 minutes ago. He just returned from the front and wants to add to the congratulatory note that he sent you on the Nobel Peace prize. He is sure he will not have any reasons to be ashamed of us at the Canal. He saw what he saw and liked it very much. Our position is such that his feeling is we don't need to beg from anyone. He means you and us. Any initiative but rather wait for them to wait for one of us.

K. You know what is developing....

D. I have pointed it out to the Prime Minister.

K. The Foreign Ministers were heading in the same direction. It's not going to be easy to do this; to reconfirm a Security Council resolution that already exists.

D. I did not get from the Secretary General the sort of language. They.....about the ceasefire and 242.

K. This should lay the basis for 242. They didn't give us a formulation. It would depend on formulation before we could make a judgment.

D. I understand. That is what I informed the Prime Minister. The point is that 242 has so many interpretations.

K. We are not going to accept any interpretations.

D. I expect by tomorrow morning I will have the response from Israel and I will let you know. I thought the Minister of Defence's message was important. That you would sense the....

K. I am delighted. What is the supply situation?

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D. Very fine. Golda talked to me on the telephone. She said people are crying in Israel. She went to the airport and saw American guys coming with the planes and said it was one of the most exciting sights of her life. I want to add my own personal regards on the Nobel prize. We here at the Embassy were all very pleased yesterday with the news.

K. Thank you. The President in this one feels that just for your guidance this is one that will be very hard to refuse. Of course, we have no language.

D. Right. I would suggest that after the answer you would probably want to see something more specific.

K. We haven't a proposal.

D. When do you expect to get it.

K. My instincts are after Kosygin comes back from Cairo, if he is in Cairo.

D. We will not accept a specific reference to the 67 borders.

K. You can expect we will not accept a specific reference to the 67 borders and that we have told the foreign ministers that. We have also told the Arab Ambassador.

D. I will pass the information along.

SL119

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Hummel/Sec. Kissinger
Wednesday, Oct. 17, 1973
3:50 p.m.

K: Have we hard from Phnom Penh?

H: I have two telegrams for your clearance and a scenario for talking with the Chinese and an outgoing telegram.

K: Give me a hint of what they said even without an outgoing telegram.

H: Both of the incoming are on your desk. The answer is entirely favorable. It is going to happen smoothly. Enders did not do quite what we wanted.

K: Why not?

H: I don't know. We told him flatly in the outgoing yesterday to make it a US Govt request but he has arranged so that one of the Royal family will make a request anyway.

K: But I told him. What the hell are we going to say to the Chinese?

H: If I could show you this outgoing cable and get your clearance.

K: I have to go to the White House for a WSAG.

H: I need some instructions about getting the Chinese in. I have talked to Win Lord.

K: Have them in at 5:30.

H: Will I be able to see you before then.

K: Yes.

H: I will tell them to come in.

K: This is the kind of bureaucratic triumph ...not worth anything. Next time tell Enders to carry out our instructions.

H: We have reminded him that he should make a request on behalf of the (reads the telegram)...(Prince so and so's request not withstanding, please see that this is done so we can tell PRC we are in front making the request.

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K: And tell them we are so informing them.

H: Yes.

K: If he does not want to do it we will send someone who will.

H: I think he can mp it up so it is not visible to anyone.

K: Tell him to do that.

H: It needs your clearance.

K: The outgoing message send it out. You do not need to show it to me if that is the substance.

H: Yes and Win Lord and I have worked on that.
Will I see you before I get the Chinese in.

K: Yes. Get them in at 5:30. Not to see me to see you.

H: Yes.

END

SL118

TELCON
Douglas Dillon/Sec. Kissinger
Wednesday, October 17, 1973
2:45 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

D: How are you?

K: Fine.

D: I have thought a lot about this and there is not really anyway I can justify my doing this. There is one think you should know and just for you and the President which I was not able to say the other night. when you talked to me. My wife has a sort of chronic illness. She has been treated the last four or five years for Parkinson Disease. The treatment is good but it leaves her very much reduced in energy to do things so this sort of rules me out of taking on anything that requires anything like that.

K: Does that rule out of possibilities in Washington.

D: Not generally. The other night she was right there and I did not want to say it.

K: I will not repeat it. How about Washington?

D: I think we would be delighted to work on that. You talked to me about this advisory committee. If you have any use for that that would be great. Beyond that I think I am too deeply involved where I am. I have problems with my father and my family which are very real and they could get much more serious because of his age.

K: I will accept it temporarily. But you won't mind if I come back to you periodically.

D: Not at all. If at anytime you would want me for this advisory committe I could come in for a few days.

K: That I will institute after the current crisis.

D: I really sympathize .

K: Started me off with a bank. I am sorry about your answer but I understand it and I hope to see you soon.

D: I want to congratulate you too. A little slow of me. A most remarkable thing. A great honor for you and the United States and for all of us that you have brought it here. I think it must be a great satisfaction after what some of the liberal and left wingers have been saying about you.

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K: They cannot even accept the fact that the war has ended, much less the fact that we did anything about it.

D: Must be a real sense of satisfaction and really deserved.

K: Thank you. Goodbye.

END

SC113

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Ambassacor Scali/HAK
October 17, 1973/9:30 a.m.

K: Hello.

S: Henry, John.

K: Yes John, how are you?

S: Pretty good. I have a quick question before I go up to the Hill to talk about Puerto Rico. Is there any chance of my sitting in with you and the President on that 11:00 meeting. For 2 reasons. (1) I will not participate (2) it would be sort of an indication that we haven't given up on the U. N.

K: The President just never has anybody in on these meetings.

S: Alright. I just didn't know what the prospects were. I just wanted to get an additional feel. Can I sit in on your geographic thing.

K: Absolutely. 12:15.

S: Thank you. Bye.

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SL110

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
The President
10/17/73; 8:44 a.m.

P: Hello.

K: Mr. President.

P: What's new on the diplomatic and military front this morning.

K: On the military front it looks still like a stalemate. On the diplomatic front -- all the intelligence analysists who don't know what is going on are now analyzing that something is going on simply because of the Russian visit, the low-key comments from Arab countries, and so forth. I don't think anything will go off until Kosygin has left Cairo.

P: Yeah, yeah.

K: And that's the big . . .

P: The question is whether -- what he is there for -- whether to gin it up or cool it down.

K: It's inconceivable -- well, either way, Mr. President, we are not slowing anything down just because he is there. We are pouring in arms at a rate about 30% greater than they do. Our total tonnage today should start exceeding theirs. We are not -- as I said -- we are not slowing anything down but it's inconceivable to me that he is going to gin it up.

P: Yeah, yeah, yeah.

K: And there is still . . .

P: You haven't received any message from him?

K: We won't until he gets back, I am sure. But their press is still mute and I think they are trying to work something out. Now whether that is possible with the Egyptians, I don't know. All the information we have is that the Egyptians have been taking a tougher line than they have.

P: This Israeli raid was not that big, huh?

K: Apparently not.

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P: I gathered that.

K: There is a tank battle going on now in the Sinai and we don't have any report of its outcome yet. Now, with these four Foreign Ministers, Mr. President, I . . .

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
The President
10/17/73; 8:44 a.m. 2

P: I have read the talking points.

K: You have?

P: Yeah.

K: The major point, remember, is that meeting was set before we did anything. They are not coming here to protest.

P: Yes.

K: And I would not float any particular idea on them because they are not the ones that are going to be able negotiate it and the particular ideas are already before the Egyptians and Russians.

P: Yeah. Well, when they come down to say Israel must withdraw to the '67 border, what do you say.

K: You say that should be negotiated after a ceasefire.

P: Well, to be negotiated -- does it mean -- do we agree to that goal?

K: Well, I think it is unattainable, Mr. President, and in my conversations I have always fudged it and said that is an issue that should be addressed within the context of the Security Council Resolution 242 and the major point to make to these people is to separate the ceasefire from the post-ceasefire and the argument that I found very effective is -- they want America to engage itself in the diplomacy afterwards -- that you promised to do. But that means also now that the war has to be brought to an end under conditions which enable us to be in touch with all of the parties. And secondly that if we now try to settle it at the result of the war it will be an endless negotiations with the war going on.

P: That's right. Well if we aren't there to work on the settlement, it leaves them with no other option -- just beat the hell out of the Israelis.

K: To have an endless war to push them bach.

P: We are the only ones who can influence the Israelis.

K: And that is a point to make. Another point to make is that the military situation has already changed as a result of the war.

P: Oh, it's changed. How do you mean?

K: Well, they will say how do we know that after a ceasefire there won't be a stalemate. And one point to make to them is that the situation has changed strategically. That no country now can claim supremecy in the area anymore and therefore they have to rely on . . .

P: In other words, basically, that Israel can no longer claim supremecy.

K: Right. I wouldn't phrase it that way because . . .

P: I understand. All right, I've got the word.

K: I talked to the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia yesterday extending your invitation to the King and he was very pleased. In fact, you can hold him back for a few minutes when the others leave.

P: Yeah.

K: And do two things -- thank him for the very moderate and constructive role he has played all week and secondly saying you hope to see the King as soon as a ceasefire is achieved as can be mutually arranged. I would tie it to the ceasefire, Mr. President, because otherwise they'll have another reason for delay.

P: Yeah.

K: And we don't want him -- it's not in his interest to be in the forefront of the diplomacy because he will be stuck with all the problems.

P: After the ceasefire . . .

K: After a ceasefire -- they may want to get him over here before.

P: We don't want that.

K: No. That would not be advantageous.

P: We don't want anybody.

K: I think by tomorrow this thing is going to break one way or the other. It may break unfavorably but then Kosygin goes back to Moscow . . .

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
The President
10/17/73; 8:44 a.m. 4

Have you seen the New York Times blasting the Nobel Prize?

P: Why have the blasted it?

K: Be cause they can't bear the thought the war in Vietnam has ended.

P: That's amusing.

K: They should call it the war prize. All the liberals all screaming their heads off.

P: Really?

K: George Ball.

P: Why is he screaming?

K: He just made a snide comment.

P: What -- that the war is not over -- or what?

K: That the Nobel Prize Commitee has a sense of humor.

P: Uh-huh.

K: They can't bear the thought -- you know, Mr. President, when they said the detente didn't work. They never say the detente enabled us to settle the Vietnam war because that is the thing they cannot bear -- with honor.

P: Yeah, that's right. When we stick to the honor -- that's the last straw.

K: Yeah.

P: All right.

SL111

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Secretary Rush
10/17/73; 9:21 a.m.

K: Ken.

R: Yes, Henry.

K: Ken, we have been diddling around for two days now with this Supplemental.

R: Right.

K: Everyone here agrees that it must go up today.

R: Right.

K: It is nuts for us to waste this time in a sort of what I am sure is insane bureaucratic squabbling that is now going on.

R: Well, Henry, I will get into it.

K: Let's put in a figure today and find the rationale for it later.

R: Right. Right. I will get into it. I told them to get the thing in today. I will check it and be sure that it gets in today.

K: Good. Many thanks.

R: Okay, Henry.

KL Bye.

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SL112

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Kaul (India)
10/17/73; 9:28 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

Kaul: *Good morning.*

K: Hello, Mr. Ambassador, how are you?

Kaul: I am very well, thank you. How are you?

K: I am fine. Mr. Ambassador, I am afraid it won't be possible for me to see your Ambassador.

Kaul: He has left, actually. He had to go back but he gave me the low down. If you think it is of interest to you I could come over. Otherwise.

K: I can't do it this morning. Let me call you -- uh. Maybe we can do it for about 15 minutes at the State Department around 2:30.

Kaul. Yes, that will be all right.

K: Good. 2:30. See you then. Bye.

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5023

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Dobrynin

10/17/73 9:42 a.m.

K: Hello

D: How are you?

K: Okay.

D: Three things, first this is a--Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Gromyko asked me to congratulateyou heartily with the Nobel Prize.

K: Thank you, I appreciate that.

D: And they would really like to congratulate you. Second, I have instructions to tell you on a very strictly confidential basis for you and for President Nixon, I am to mention to him and you that we are now having consultations with Arab Leaders.

K: Yes, and Kosygin is in Cairo.

D: Yeh, this is exactly what they asked me to tell you. But you already know.

K: No, no we know a Soviet VIP is in Cairo, we've told the Israelis to stay away from Cairo and the Cairo airport.

D: This is Kosygin.

K: We didn't have it confirmed.

D: But they specifically asked to tell you and to the President --

K: I hope you have noticed that we have tried to keep things very quiet here.

D: No, I know. I noticed that it is on low key under the circumstances. But this is really for your information.

K: You know we cannot help if there is speculation because

D: No, no, I understand

K: Frankly, we know a Soviet VIP plane is there. And therefore a lot of people know something.

D: No, I understnad.

K: But you can be sure that we will not confirm it in any official way or leak it.

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D: Yeh, I understand.
This is just they asked me specifically to tell --he is there in connection with this consultation and including a consult with the about formula issue proposal--

K: Anatol, you should understand because I don't want to mislead you, the ceasefire formula--the one on Saturday, we had discussed with the Israelis--this formula, we have not yet discussed with the Israelis.

D: About the 242?

K: Yes.

D: 242.

K: Yes. But we think they will accept it, but we didn't want frankly our press to be agitated against us.

D: Yeh, no, no.

K: So there may be 24 hours after if you come back with something.

D: Yes, I understand.

K: I just -- don't want you people to be misled.

D: Yes,

K: You can be sure that what we said to you we will stand by.

D: Hm huh. And the last one, Henry, here is some oral considerations by Mr. Brezhnev to the President. It is not immediate in the sense of proposals, but so to speak of our relations in really good terms, I should say in a quiet way, it is on four pages--probably--it's oral however, maybe I will send it to you--nothing really

K: Can you send it over within the next hour.

D: I could send it right away.

K: Send it over, just for our records.

D: Just for your own. And if you have some comments or other, please let me know.

K: Okay.

D: I could come to you anytime--or by telephone.

K: You know our policy as I have told you, is to try to really to the utmost to not only keep the detente going, but to strengthen it.

D: Yeh, this is really what--this too--this oral consideration--by Brezhnev. I think it is rather helpful, just for the whole background--there is nothing immediate or specifically new, but in general how it is presented, I think you will find it interesting.

K: Good.

D: Okay. Nothing else for the time being, no?

K: No, we are waiting for you.

D: I understand. This foreign minister not yet--in your office. The foreign ministers of _____

K: No, they are coming in at 11:30, but we don't think we should give them this formula do you?

D: No--well it's up to you, but I don't know I doubt very much if their reaction will _____ but you may have better indications that we have, but this is my impression, because they are under the pressure from _____

K: No, no we will wait for you before we make an open initiative.

D: Okay. Be in touch.

K: Bye.

SU25

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sen. Fulbright/Sec. Kissinger
Thursday, Oct. 18, 1973
1:15 p.m.

K: Mr. Chairman, how are you?

F: Fine. How are you?

K: How are things in Arkansas?

F: Fine here. I have been traveling since I have been here. I am in Little Rock now..

K: Is it exhausting?

F: Pretty much.

K: What I would think. I wanted to bring you up to date where things stand. As you may know Kosygin is in Cairo. He is basically putting forward the proposition that you and I discussed the other evening. Cease-fire in place and linked to the implementation of the Security Council Resolution #242.

F: Good.

K: The Russians have told us they were supporting it. He has tough going because the Egyptians want a fixed date to withdrawal of '67 borders. The thing we all have to remember is with all of this detente talk, without the detente Kosygin would not be in Cairo. The Soviet press would not be accepting our airlift and all hell would be breaking loose. We have talked to the four Arab oil men, including the Algerian, and made the same proposition. We made a commitment if there is a cease-fire we would put the whole prestige of the United States behind getting behind a solution to the causes of the war. Even though it seems quiet we hope within the next 48-72 hours something will break and we hope in the right direction.

F: Sounds like progress.

K: I hope we are going to get somewhere.

F: You feel the Russians are really trying?

K: There are only two interpretations -- either perpetrating a hoax on us which would rip the whole relationship and prove Jackson right for the next 10 years or they are trying to help and I don't see why the former makes

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any sense at all from a hardline point of view. Why send us a communication that they are supporting one particular approach. In order to stir things up they don't have to send Kosygin to Cairo. Things are stirred up enough.

F: If there is any rationality left at all it is the only solution I can see. I cannot see that it would be in their ineterest to go through another ten years.

K: That is also my belief. I believe they are trying. Everyone is so inflamed. I had the sense from the Arabs yesterday that with a little give here and there this might actually begin to move.

F: Yes.

K: We made the same proposition to -- to make sure we were not at the mercy of Kosygin -- to the Egyptians through a private channel to Ismail who is my opposite number in my former job and the Egyptians have not yet refused it. An interesting sign.

F: Hope it turns out this way.

K: I will keep you posted. When are you coming back.

F: Next Tuesday or Wednesday, I believe.

K: Theoretically I am supposed to go over to China Monday night but I will never make that. I have a two day cushion I was going to spend in Japan. I could still get off on Tuesday and go direct.

F: Best of luck. Wish I could do something for you.

K: You have been tremendously helpful. I will call you the date after tomorrow even if I have nothing to report.

F: Fine.

END

S426

TELECON
Dobrynin/Kissinger
October 18, 1973
8:25 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K. Anatolyi, I was just talking to the President and he is going over a message to Brezhnev in reply to his oral message. It is not very...and doesn't add anything new but is the....He was going to finish it about 10:00 tonight. We can send it over tomorrow morning but given the time differential maybe you would like it this evening. I don't want to mislead you. It won't add anything new to his message.

D. I would like to tell you within maybe 10 minutes I should have some suggestions on the resolution. I have not finished it but I assure you within five or ten minutes I will have received the whole thing.

K. Is that the result of the Cairo visit.

D. I don't know yet. I have only received part of it but I must see the end of the telegram.

K. They will have to understand in Moscow that what I am giving you tonight is in response to Brezhnev's oral message.

D. I understand that.

K. I will stay glued to my telephone. I just wish you were prettier. Fond as I am of you, in the evening I would like to talk to other people.

D. I understand that and I appreciate it. I will talk to you in five or ten minutes.

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SL124

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Rush/Secretary Kissinger
10/18/73 11:22 a.m.

R: Hello, Henry.

K: Ken, I just found out that no one from the department has been in touch with either Maw or Donaldson, either about briefing them or what they have to do about congressional hearings and so forth.

R: Donaldson is coming down on Tuesday--I meeting him and he has a series of meetings with _____

K: Because Maw is here today.

R: I'll be glad to see him today.
I got in touch with Donaldson and -- of course Maw will primarily be be involved with the legal end

K: Right.

R: But Donaldson is coming down Monday to give a speech and we're going to be seeing him on Tuesday.

K: Good could wemake them feel at home?

R: Absolutely, Henry. If Maw is here today--I will

K: Good well I'll ask him to call your office, but what can we do to get the process started with the Foreign Relations Committee?

R: That is underway. See we first have to have the FBI--the FBI report has to come in. Then as soon as that comes in, we will--it will be announced from the White House and the papers go up to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

K: Fulbright promised me expedited hearings.

R: Right, but until the FBI report is in--

K: Can we speed up the FBI?

R: Yes, we're trying to speed that up.

K: Okay, otherwise, I'll do it out of here. What is this running around about Hillenbrandt? Have you found out?

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R: No, I haven't -- all I know is that the FBI--who never tell you what they are doing, wanted to see me and they came in and they said they were investigating Hillenbrandt, Porter, Sisco and Brown--

K: Who?

R: Brown--you know, our new

K: I have no idea what that could be about.

R: These are FBI investigations. I'm trying to find out now.

K: Okay, can't we call the FBI what they are doing it for?

R: Generally, when these go in, they will not tell anyone where they came from or who asked them to do it.

K: Well, they'll tell me.

R: They'll certainly tell you.

K: Okay, thank you.

R: But Henry, I'm tryingto find out any way.

K: Good, I'd appreciate it.

SL127

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Dobrynin/Kissinger
October 18, 1973
8:45 p.m.

D. Mr. Brezhnev asked you to convince the President of the following: This is not exactly the text of the message but I'm reading..."We continue to carry on very expansive consultations with the Arab leaders. For its consideration we need a little bit more time. At the same time we - the Soviet Union, the Soviet leaders - want to think of what kind of formulation should be included in the text of the draft resolution of the Security Council. In our opinion this resolution should include the following main provisions:

1. A call to the sides to immediately cease fire and all military action on the positions where the troops actually are.

2. A demand to start immediately after the ceasefire phased withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories to the line in accordance with Res. 242 of the Security Council, with completion of this withdrawal in the shortest period of time.

3. A decision to start immediately and concurrently with the ceasefire appropriate consultations aimed at establishing a just and honorable peace in the Middle East.

This is the main point. I will repeat it. (Repeated the above three provisions).

K. Appropriate consultations with whom?

D. Our commentary involves the following conclusions. We feel that the best thing would be to have limited number of participants in these consultations. We, the Soviet Union, are prepared, if it suits you and the immediately involved participants and Israelis, for this kind of consultation on the part of the Soviet Union and the U.S.

K. Why are you so hard on your allies?

D. On what allies. We have many allies. I would like a clarification.

K. The one ally you have as a permanent member of the Security Council.

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D. For the sake of conversation, why not drop them.

K. Actually we are no more eager to have your allies there than you are. We are not much more eager to have our own allies there.

D...Let's have these conclusions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The question arises about a guarantee if the resolution is to be adopted. I agreed together with you, if it is acceptable to both of our clients, that the U.S. and the Soviet Union in a recent forum guarantee the fulfillment of this resolution. We also are prepared to guarantee the territorial integrity, security and inviolability of the borders and the frontiers of all, including Israel, taking into consideration at the same time its right to sovereignty and independent existence. With these kind of guarantees from the U.S. and the Soviet Union we feel that hardly anybody will have a doubt about the viability of the guarantee. So Mr. Brezhnev would like to share his thoughts along those lines with the President and he would like to receive the reaction of theWhite House. On my own there are two basic things: the Middle East and our relationship to cement with you.

K. I understand. You will see in the message that the President will send to you at about 10:00 or 10:30 [this he has and wants to work on it personally) --which is not an answer to this--that he makes exactly the same point without going into details. Should I still send the message of the President's to you?

D. Yes, I will mention that it was received before this.

K. Because we won't have an answer in two hours. Thinking out loud without having talked to the President, the most difficult point here is point number two about immediately after ceasefire that the Israelis should withdraw to a line under Res. 242 which really isn't established yet. First let me say I realize you're making a very constructive effort....

D. Yes, I'm being very constructive.

K. Why don't we consider it later rather than debate it out now and if we have a counter-proposal we will get back to you.

D. Did you get it all down.

K. Yes, the FBI, CIA and we all have taken it down and your KGB man too.

D. Send the President's message to me between 10 and 11, all right?

K. Yes, and on the other you will get our response before the end of tomorrow.

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SL130

TELECON
Vorontsov/Kissinger
October 18, 1973
10:20 p. m.

V. This is Vorontsov.

K. Yuri, the most depressing thought is to know you are in town.

V. That is called psychological warfare.

K. Now I know things are going to get tough. The President had made some changes in the message to the General Secretary. He thought in the light of the message we just received from you tonight he should just send the general thoughts and not get involved in a debate at this point.

V. Of course.

K. They are just general thoughts about the Middle East and our relationship with the Soviet Union. What you are getting is.... which you will see is very constructive and positive and pledges the U.S. to make a major effort but does not stress the one major point about withdrawals. We will be exchanging views on that at a later time. The President thought it might be too confusing right now.

V. I got it and will explain it by all means.

K. We have a messenger on the way over right now. It is a very warm message which we think you will feel and we believe this has to be ended by the two countries.

V. That is our approach. Thank you. I will report it to the Ambassador.

K. Just wanted to tell the General Secretary that it is slightly different than if we were handling complete negotiations. If you have any questions after you receive it why don't you call me.

V. All right.

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UNCLASSIFIED

SL129

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TELECON
The President/Kissinger
October 18, 1973
9:35 p.m.

K. Hello Mr. President. I just wanted to tell you we have had a preliminary message from the Russians. They are moving in our direction but are not quite there yet.

N. I see.

K. It is from Brezhnev. It is their preliminary observations. Kosygin hasn't left Cairo yet. They are moving definitely towards the position you outlined yesterday. We have to stay very cool and not let on to anyone.

N. Yes, we dont' want...

K. I have the impression the Israelis may be doing very well in the tank battle. They don't tell us.

N. That will move the Russians.

K. I think--well we shouldn't count our chickens but I think you have pulled it off again.

N. That is good news.

K. It will take us another 48-72 hours. I'm sending on your behalf, Brezhnev a response to his message yesterday which says nothing except you are holding things together here and want to...and that a constructive outcome is highly desirable.

N. Just assure him we are prepared to follow through. We don't want them to think we'll get in cement...Thank you.

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SL131

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Scowcroft/Kissinger
October 18, 1973
10:45 p.m.

K. When Dinitz mentioned 20 helicopters...

S. They have asked for a total of 50, 25 of two kinds. Defense is now sending eight. It's a big kind.

K. Will you let Dinitz know that tomorrow. We were supposed to tell them when we shipped the whole compliment of Sky Hawks.

S. They were talking about it and whether we should ship ten more.

K. Can you get that done?

S. I will get that done right away and...

K. The Soviets have sent us a three-point plan which I will get over to you, of which points one and three are highly acceptable. Point two is not acceptable, however. It calls for a withdrawal to the line in Res. 242 which they will not accept. As to the frontiers....I called Dinitz and left out point three so I will have something to use as an incentive tomorrow. They are as obnoxious as the Vietnamese. !

S. I think you have it started just right. By the time we get something down we can live with they will be relatively pleased.

K. They also told me they are going across with more tanks. I am afraid it will turn into a turkey shoot. If they keep going across somebody is going to get killed, that's for sure.

S. The real danger is the Egyptian army is going to panic.

K. Once they get across in division strength that means the ~~sand~~ SAM belt is gone. When they saw the army from top and bottom they are going to disintegrate. They are not that good. They won't be able to get supplies. They'll die of starvation. What I can't understand is how they broke through the Canal.

S. That is a mystery to me. They had this new defense position. They broke through two divisions, one infantry and one armor.

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K. Is that the detailed report?

S. Yes, they attacked through a strong point because if they went through a weak point they would have two strong divisions surrounding them.

K. They broke through a strong point and went across the Canal. They are a good army or the Egyptians are very bad.

S. The Israelis are very smart and audacious and willing to take chances and back them very strongly.

K. It is going to turn into a nightmare. I wonder if and when I should go to China. The Russians suggested negotiations be conducted between them and us and not have any other UN members, together with the Arabs and Israelis. You can imagine what Chou En Lai is going to say to this. Of course, the Europeans will go right up the wall.

S. Of course, the trick of trying to get negotiations with permanent members of the Security Council...

K. I am going to get a message out to Ismail. Do you think that is all right? I thought I would say this will remain my position regardless of the military outcome but it might make them suspicious.

S. I like it and you should send off a message but telling them that might tip them and antagonize them.

K. I am afraid they will all get hung. I think this is the end of Sadat.

S. I think you are right. They might just run them out.

K. They have to be careful. The fact of the matter is when all is said and done it is a Soviet defeat. The same reasons why we could not accept an Israeli defeat will operate against them and even if they say the supplies did it, that should make them realize they better get on our side.

S. In that sense it couldn't have been better.

K. When should I go to China? Next week has the advantage...Larry said the President will start a peace initiative when I am gone. I can't think he will do too much without me.

S. I will want to reflect a bit. My first reaction is that he would.

K. You think he wants to give up a winning compromise. He will be up to his eyes in alligators with Cox next week.

S. He wants to be out in front with this one.

K. Supposing I go in two weeks. He can move even more easily then. I have three choices; to go next week, to go in two weeks, or to go in four weeks. Which do you think is best?

S. Honestly I don't see how you can go next week. I think it would look bizarre now that we are at this point under almost any circumstances.

K. Should I delay two weeks or five weeks?

S. Five weeks would bring you up to November....

K. I then move up against the Nobel prize and NATO. My instincts are two weeks.

S. If things move we may be at the point of a ceasefire and the meetings or something started.

K. I will have a ceasefire my Monday. I promise.

S. I agree there will be a ceasefire but I mean all the....will have quieted to the point it should be under control. That is probably too early to anticipate any real negotiations will be underway.

K. Have you heard about the Egyptians. They have already prepared for my arrival there.

S. That is probably that draft public announcment. That's beautiful! They are something else.

K. In the nutty Arab world I am sort of a mythical figure. The Arabs think I am a magician.

S. That's right. Might not be possible right now.

K. *But I probably would have had an unbelievable welcome.*

S. I think it would have been unbelievable. They have been so far. It has to be against all their instincts. They underestimated their military capacity.

K. If they had accepted our proposition last Saturday they would have been in a superb position.

S. They really would have. They just wanted a little more I guess. It just doesn't make sense.

K. I will send those three points over to you.

S. Ok. Goodbye.

5024 [*]

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Dobrynin/Kissinger
October 12, 1973
6:45 p.m.

D. Mr. Brezhnev asked you to convince the President of the following: This is not exactly the text of the message but I'm reading..."We continue to carry on very expansive consultations with the Arab leaders. For its consideration we need a little bit more time. At the same time we - the Soviet Union, the Soviet leaders - want to think of what kind of formulation should be included in the text of the draft resolution of the Security Council. In our opinion this resolution should include the following main provisions:

1. A call to the sides to immediately cease fire and all military action on the positions where the troops actually are.

2. A demand to start immediately after the ceasefire phased withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories to the line in accordance with Res. 242 of the Security Council, with completion of this withdrawal in the shortest period of time.

3. A decision to start immediately and concurrently with the ceasefire appropriate consultations aimed at establishing a just and honorable peace in the Middle East.

This is the main point. I will repeat it. (Repeated the above three provisions).

K. Appropriate consultations with whom?

D. Our commentary involves the following conclusions. We feel that the best thing would be to have limited number of participants in these consultations. We, the Soviet Union, are prepared, if it suits you and the [illegible] immediately involved [illegible] and Israelis, for this kind of consultation on the part of the Soviet Union and the U.S.

K. Why are you so hard on your allies?

D. On what allies. We have many allies. I would like a clarification.

K. The one ally you have as a permanent member of the Security Council.

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D. For the sake of conversation, why not drop them.

K. Actually we are no more eager to have your allies there than you are. We are not much more eager to have our own allies there.

D...Let's have these conclusions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The question arises about a guarantee if the resolution is to be adopted. I agreed together with you, if it is acceptable to both of our clients, that the U. S. and the Soviet Union in a recent forum guarantee the fulfillment of this resolution. We also are prepared to guarantee the territorial integrity, security and inviolability of the borders and the frontiers of all, including Israel, taking into consideration at the same time its right to sovereignty and independent existence. With these kind of guarantees from the U.S. and the Soviet Union we feel that hardly anybody will have a doubt about the viability of the guarantee. So Mr. Brezhnev would like to share his thoughts along these lines with the President and he would like to receive the reaction of the White House. On my own there are two basic things: the Middle East and our relationship to connect with you.

K. I understand. You will see in the message that the President will send to you at about 10:00 or 10:30 (this he has and wants to work on it personally) --which is not an answer to this--that he makes exactly the same point without going into details. Should I still send the message of the President's to you?

D. Yes, I will mention that it was received before this.

K. Because we won't have an answer in two hours. Thinking out loud without having talked to the President, the most difficult point here is point number two about immediately after ceasefire that the Israelis should withdraw to a line under Res. 242 which really isn't established yet. First let me say I realize you're making a very constructive effort....

D. Yes, I'm being very constructive.

K. Why don't we consider it later rather than debate it out now and if we have a counter-proposal we will get back to you.

D. Did you get it all down.

K. Yes, the FBI, CIA and we all have taken it down and your KGB man too.

D. Send the President's message to me between 10 and 11, all right?

K. Yes, and on the other you will get our response before the end of tomorrow.

SL128

RELEASED IN FULL

1. A call to the sides to immediately cease fire and all military action on the positions where the troops actually are.

2. A demand to start immediately after the ceasefire phased withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories to the line in accordance with Res. 242 of the Security Council, with completion of this withdrawal in the shortest period of time

3. A decision to start immediately and concurrently with the ceasefire appropriate consultations aimed at establishing a just and honorable peace in the Middle East.

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SL139

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Haig/Sec. Kissinger
Friday, Oct. 19, 3:35 p.m.

H: I have an answer to your problem. He says o.k. but he wants an announcement of your trip to come from the White House.

K: Yes. Ziegler should make it. One other question, must you do it tonight.

H: Absolutely no way out of it. We have a midnight deadline to file.

K: All right. You will explain that?

H: How do you mean explain it?

K: It is my problem quite honestly. It is no joy to be in Moscow under these conditions as it is. Anything the President says makes it tougher.

H: This will strengthen it dramatically.

K: You think so?

H: No question. All the press knows we have until midnight to file.

K: Actually that is a good cover for me to get out of town. I had already explained that Ziegler should call a few selected press people about 2:00 in the morning. Tomorrow morning he could give a briefing at the White House. It would be all White House. Not State Department. Moreover, when I come back what ever comes out of it, then he should step forware.

H: I understand you and you are right.

K: Thank you.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 24 MAY 2004 200102979

SL123

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
October 18, 1973/10:07 a.m.
Ziegler/HAK

K: Hello.

Z: Hi Henry. What is your reading this morning on the general direction we should take on the middle east.

K: Stay cool. Don't jazz it up. Just hold it where it is.

Z: Should we break off at your remarks last night.

K: I wouldn't do much beyond that. I said it now. I said it deliberately in a place where it couldn't get a hell of alot of news. You know, I didn't distribute them ahead of time. I haven't seen them in the newspapers.

Z: It's on the wires.

K: But it isn't in the newspapers.

Z: It'll be in the afternoon papers. But it's not a boom headline story. But the breaking from State yesterday and your remarks indicate that there is diplomatic activity between the U.S.....

K: I scolded McCloskey. We should not...he shouldn't have done that. There is the slightly self-serving quality in all this briefing. I mean by McClosekey. It is not our custom to discuss diplomatic activity while its going on.

Z: What do you feel is our best position to take on the oil thing. He'll be asked about the 5% reduction in production.

K: Say we can handle it. I know that as a token thing but if you say its a token thing, that will force them to escalate it. Let's say you're aware of it. Isn't it possible for us in effect to say in this delicate phase we don't think any useful purpose is served by...

Z: I think that's the best answer and I think that would be useful. We had a very constructive meeting yesterday, we're in touch with all parties.

K: On the constructive I'd refer to what the Arabs Foreign Minister said.

Z: That's what I mean. And we continue to be in touch with all parties of course in touch with the Soviets and in this delicate phase it would just not serve the interest of achieving a peaceful peace in the Middle East by commenting on the oil thing. Right?

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K: That's right. I think that's the best thing to do and it will make us look better when its all over. I must tell you that if we get through this without breaking it with the Arabs or Soviets it won't be a bad achievement.

Z: That's true. Can we say anything about Eban's remarks.

K: No. Just say...just keep giving the same answer. It's premature. We said that we want to end hostilities and now so that we can have a comprehensive settlement afterwards and that is all we...there is no useful purpose to go into further discussion.

Z: Right. That's enough on the press. Now how do we stand.

K: We won't really know until Kosygin comes back from Cairo but you should not officially concern.

Z: I'm not talking press now.

K: I personally think that unless the Israelis score a spectacular victory which will then totally _____ the Arabs that we're going to bring it off.

Z: When do you think the chance exists for doing that?

K: Sunday or Monday.

Z: How does that effect your trip.

K: I'll have to delay it. You know I have a cushion of two days of the Japan stop but I might have to put it off by a week or two.

Z: OK. On that score while I have you on the line. The Daily News and I've talked to McCloskey about this, is just up the wall and....

K: I told him to coordinate it with you.

Z: We talked to some degree but I want to raise this Daily News thing with him because it's not good for you. In otherwords, the Daily News....

K: It's ridiculous. The New York Times has been killing us. Well we'll have to drop the USIA guy.

Z: I think that is probably right. Drop the USIA guy and put the Daily News on. I think it is almost essential from our stand point. The Daily News is...

K: There is no question about it.

Z: Alright. I'll talk to Bob about that and say I have discussed it with you One final thing. On this ceasefire if there are any questions about that hold the same line. Right?

K: What about it.

Z: In other words should they ask about what is our goal on the ceasefire just to stop the fighting or to have a ceasefire which relates to withdrawal.

K: We haven't been in a position have we?

Z: No.

K: Then that's what we must hold.

Z: I mean your remarks last night sort of indicated we wanted to stop the fighting now and then work for a....

K: That's our position.

Z: Yeah.

K: The problem is whether there should be a reference in the ceasefire resolution to a final settlement but that gets to complex, we shouldn't get into that. But we should say the first problem is to stop hostility and then to move toward a diplomatic settlement as rapidly as possible.

Z: OK. Bye.

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger/David Rockefeller
10/18/73 - 9:53 a.m.

K: Hello

R: Henry.

K: David, how are?

R: Well, I am just great and first of all congratulations on the Nobel Prize. I think that was really great.

K: Aren't you nice.

R: I am so pleased about it. Nobody could have deserved it more and it was rather daring of them to do it I must say...

K: You are putting it mildly.

R: My impression, Henry, is you are off to a grand start. I have been seeing it from a distance but hearing it from a number of different angles including, for instance, President Medici down in Brazil.

K: Oh, really.

R: He is very enthusiastic about your talking with Goodson(?).

K: Yes, that turned out very well.

R: And I think the whole--what you did at the Council of the Americas -- rather the Senate for Foreign Relations with regard to the Israelis -- and has just given immediately a whole new hope to the Latin Americans which I think is so important.

K: I hope we can now follow it up.

R: But I must admit your Middle East situation has certainly blown up. Is there any light in the tunnel?

K: Well, I think we can--so far we've managed to keep the Arabs and Soviets beyond the point of no return.

R: That's a great deal.

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K: If we can hold it together a few more days I think we may be able to work out a ceasefire.

R: I certainly hope so. I didn't call you about my conversation with Zayyat because I didn't really think there was anything of sufficient newness or importance but....

K: They told me they had given you a message for me and I didn't know what it was.

R: He said that?

K: Ismail said it.

R: The message was something that he felt that you had taken his proposals of two years ago and distorted them, twisted them around was the way he put it. Really resurfaced them with new proposals which would involved further compromise by him and he wasn't prepared to do it. He was very tough and at the same time extremely friendly personally.

K: Does he speak English?

R: Perfectly. I think now according to him, out at his country place outside of Alexandria, _____ Arab and I must say for a person who is about to launch a major drive, he was remarkably relaxed. I guess its been now in accordance with him. He listened veryattentatively to what I said. I did not show or read from the paper but it is very essentially what she said. He headed up--and his first statem ent was well done and then he proceeded to say that--to take a very tough line. But I didn't think this was really a message. I mean, that's why I didn't call you because I just didn't think to the Israeli--it was an attitude not a message to my mind and I think to a considerable extent the attitude was a posture more than anything else. But I tell you what did disturb me that Ismial whom I did have a very good meeting. Have you seen him.

K: Ismial no, but I've been in contact with him.

R: I see. Ismial shows with great enthusiasm about your first meeting with him in Washington and said how he thought you covered on a very phylosophical basis _____. That apparently he was very disappointed in the Paris meeting where he felt that you had sort of crawled back into a harder more sort of State Department, as he put it, line and he felt that there was a falling apart of some of the ground gained in the first meeting. Not having been at either one I'm just reporting to you.

K: The trouble was--I like Ismial very much.

R: I do too and I think he certainly likes you.

K: The problem is in the second meeting I tried to make concrete what had been discussed in the first one.

R: Apparently he didn't like the concrete.

K: I know. It's easy enough to make general statements.

R: I can undestand that but I'm just reporting. He did. .. Both he, I think probably the most positive thing was that both he and Sadat were--made it very clear that they wanted to continue conversations. There was no indication of a cutoff, they were tough, but by no means saying we won't listen or talk. I think that was all to the good. The thing I found absolutely amazing, Sadat is obviously feelimg the pressures of .....and I think he is beginning to recognize that frightening away capital is not the way to build his country. So he is clearly movin g away from naturalization and socialization that created a committee to help people who want to make private investments is aquitted by ..... and hsa mostly the more conservative people on it such as Nisner(?), the former central banker and finance minister, all of them are very good.

K: Actually David, I think once we get the present crisis behind us the chances for a diplomatic settlement are better than they've ever been.

R: I quite agree and this...you'll be interested that most of the time I was with the President he was cynical that that would happen and his reaction was that this in his judgment was an effort on the part of Sadat to save face for the Arabs and secondly to force the Israelis to the bargaining table. In other words to break the deadlock. And if thats true its great but one very interesting thing that he was very insistent that I not discuss with anyone and I have with only 2 or 3 people in the bank. He asked me whether we would open a bank in Egypt. They've closed down all the banks. I said are you serious. And he laughed and said yes, why not. Obviously there are all kinds of problems but don't you think that's extraordinary.

K: Yes.

R: What we'll do obviously. We can't do anything in the present conditions and there are lots of other angles to be considered as well but I asked him well, who could we talk with in his government and

and he saidHijazi in the Finance Ministry and so if and when this thing passes why we're going to send people to study it and keep in touch with you to see whether you feel it would be useful but I thought it was a good thing is a way that he was as friendly as he was and that he had this attitude toward private investment.

K: Absolutely.

R: We're not at all altogether negative.

K: I consider that quite positive.

R: He called me by my first name and his personal attitude just couldn't have been more positive. I reserved for one day and Ismial gave a dinner which Hijazi and for Foreign Minister and really the top people in the government came which --again for a country which doesn't have diplomatic relations and so on is good. Gorbail(?) was the fellow who organized the whole thing.

K: He was here as head of the Interest Section. David, I wanted to ask you one other thing. As you know, I'm bringing Ingersoll back as Assistant Secretary.

R: I hadn't heard that.

K: From Japan.

R: For what?

K: East Asia. And that means the Ambassadorship to Japan is open and of course I'm so anxious to have you associated with the Government I was---it is such a crucial post that I was wondering whether that could tempt you until we could make the other move.

R: I'm inclined to feel that I can do more from here for the moment than I can in an Ambassadorial post but again I don't want to give an off the cuff -- I'm going to Japan the day after tomorrow and...

K: Can you give it some thought. I'd be very grateful.

R: Of course I will but Henry this one other thought too. I'm going back to Latin America--we're looking for a new chairman for the Council of the Americas which remember had that meeting with the President and were ongoing discussions with your people there. The suggestion has been made that Bill Rogers might be a good person for this. Would this create problems from your point of view?

K: Not at all.

R: In a way you know he might enjoy it.

K: My estimate of his capabilities isn't very high.

R: But he does have a certain prestige nevertheless.

K: That's not much--he would be Chairman.

R: He would be the sort of figurehead.

K: Excellent.

R: In that respect don't you think he would be good.

K: I'd strongly support it.

R: I just didn't want to do it.

K: No hard feelings.

R: Another thing is what we're doing with respect to Israel in the thing is to continue to give them credit lines and extend credit for grain shipments and this kind of thing on a regular basis and I take it you don't see any problem about that.

K: No.

R: It seems to me the more we can do it (strictly non-war basis) that probably is a good thing.

K: I think that's right.

R: We also extended a 20 million dollar sugar credit to the Egyptians while we were there and I don't know whether we should or not but we haven't cancelled it.

K: There is no reason too because we hope to have very good relations with the Egyptians when this is over.

R: I would think this is not at all impossible and I really do think that despite his very hard line on this subject that the general fact of what he did while I was there is impressive, but a front.

K: He had to take a tough line.

R: I didn't call you because it really didn't seem to me that he had said anything new from what you already knew.

K: Thats fine and its a pleasure to talk to you David.

R: I'll be back in another week and of course you'll be in China.

K: I doubt that I'll get off.

R: Really. Oh dear.

K: It depends how that Middle East thing plays out.

R: That's too bad but it will just be postponed I hope.

K: Certainly.

R: Is that working out a little better?

K: Very well.

R: Good. Have you gotten any word on the _____ situation. The claims.

K: No, but I hope to work that out when I'm there.

R: Good. All the best Henry and congratulations again. Thanks for calling.

1

TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin - Secretary Kissinger
October 13, 1973
1:40 p.m.

SO19 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

D: I have had telegram from Moscow which says the Australian variation is not really a good one.

K: Isn't?

D: That's all I received is the telegram and it says further explanation will come. I would like simply to tell you what I have as of now.

K: Maybe the British are trying to become a world power as a result of this.

D: Could be. Anyway, the telegram says we will send you further instructions on this point. I simply am trying to tell you. I don't know why they are objecting, I only wish you to know what I have just received.

K: You have seen the press coverage of my press conference. It was very moderate with respect to our relations. I think it achieved the objective. Don't you.

D: To a certain extent, yes.

K: On the other hand, really, I hope, I see the massive airlift is continuing today.

D: On the same scale.

K: Now 105 planes flown in.

D: Altogether, from the very beginning you mean?

K: An that's a terrific amount.

D: I know, I don't know the figures but it is....

K: ...beyond a certain point, and we are approaching a point where we will have to do something, not done fully yet. I mean we are besieged by Senators yelling and screaming. I hope Moscow understands. I am saying this as a friend, if we are played with we will have to do something, with all reluctance, you should try to pick up some easy victories -- well, you know there are no easy victories.

D: No, that's very clear.

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/2.

K: As soon as I hear from Britain I will be in touch with you.

D: OK, good.

K: Bye.

[redacted]

FOR:

Please return for file to EUR
by Close of Business today.

SL121

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Secretary Rush
10/18/73; 9:50 a.m.

R: Good morning, Henry.

K: Ken, are you doing something about the people I appointed last week. You know what ever has to be done to submit them to the Foreign Relations Committee.

R: Yes. We are on that. As a matter of fact also -- and I don't know whether you know it or not -- the FBI is going around seeing everybody about Marty Hillenbrand and about . . .

K: Hillenbrand?

R: Hillenbrand -- Marty Hillenbrand.

K: What is he being considering for?

R: Damned if I know. But the came to see me about Marty Hillenbrand, Joe Sisco and Bill Porter.

K: Well how is that possible?

R: I'll be damned if I know. And they came to see me about them.

K: Well could you find out what the hell they are doing.

R: I'll see if I can find out. They just came in, you know. They wanted to see me and they brought up these various names. Just where they came from, I just don't know.

K: Well I don't understand it.

R: I don't either. I will see if I can chase it down. I'll talk to Ladd and . . .

K: Now the President would like to consider a man called Galvin who is on the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board for Japan.

R: Good.

K: You know him?

R: I don't know him, no.

K: Could you look into him and give me . . .

R: Yes I will.
K: Thank you.

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SL142

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
October 19, 1973
4:30

D: ... Could I tell them it will be a commercial flight.

K: Tell them I am coming on; a B-52.

D: Laughter.

K: As it turns out I have to stop in Copenhagen.

D: And then they will go along route of Commercial.

K: Let's say yes.

D: I think it would be safer. I will tell them you will stop in Copenhagen and you will use route used by your Pan American.

K: Yes. You have to tell us what altitude.

D: Alright.

K: Is the announcement alright?

D: I will be in touch with you.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 26 APR 2004 200102979

SL144

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Rep. Arends/Kissinger
October 19, 1973
6:20 p.m.

A. About the newspaper reports...They said that some of our troops were over there.

K. Total nonsense.

A. I don't know where it came from

K. We have kept this thing cool these last few weeks. Between you and me, while we are ramming a defeat down the Soviets throat.

A. You think we are on top of it? That suits....I know the President said we weren't going to send troops.

K. There are no plans for sending troops in and won't be unless the Soviets send troops in.

A. All right. Thanks for returning my call.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 26 APR 2004 200102979

SL146

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Dinitz/Kissinger
October 19, 1973
7:09 p.m.

K. Mr. Ambassador, I am assuming that I can just announce myself to Israel if I think it is a a useful way to get your views.

D. Sure. At any time. Would you let me know so I can go with you.

K. If I want to go from where I am going now I will do that and let Scowcroft know and you can get over there.

D. I have not told the Prime Minister, but I am sure it is all right.

K. I have no desire to do it. It is just a possible delaying move.

D. I will call her right now and give you an answer within ten minutes.

K. I have the President's approval, which I didn't have earlier, to begin with your proposal instead of his. I will begin to sell S_____ and our proposal.... That presumes that if they accept your proposal you will accept it immediately.

D. You mean by Sunday night?

K. I don't give you a time because I don't think they will, but I don't know how desperate the problem will be.

D. Very. The last report we have taken a town 35 miles from Cairo, which is halfway between the Canal and Cairo. It is 70 miles between the Canal and Cairo and this is halfway.

K. It took you a little longer. I just like to give you a tough time.

D. We have gone together with very tough times so we are allowed a little relaxation.

K. You understand my strategy as we have discussed it. To sell the other condition to (Veetre) and to refer it back to Washington. The discussions will not start before Sunday morning Moscow time and cannot conclude before Sunday afternoon Moscow time and depending on the outcome cannot be implemented before we have discussed it with you. This I tell you for your own planning. May I make one request? The importance of maintaining the President's

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good will for diplomatic performances that must follow. Because the outcome you have achieved is the destruction of the Egyptian army...you lived six years with 242 and I didn't....

D. We won't go into this again.

K. I am not asking you to change the position of your government which you cannot do. If the matters reach that point, which they will reach and which I cannot avoid, please keep in mind that after ceasefire it is important for your sake that the President look good and is not accused of having sold anybody out. You will need him very much in the diplomacy that follows.

D. Sure, I understand. You mean while....

K. Supposing the worst happens from your point of view. That resolution that I gave you will not happen. Nevertheless praise him for his statesmenlike achievements.

D. You don't even imagine that any of the linkage....

K. No phrase of section 2 will be incorporated.

D. What I understand you to say is that you want some linkage with 242....negotiation in order to implement 242.

K. Exactly. I am not saying you can count on it being refused in all its parts. It is the sort of link I give you...should it turn out to be the best possible after long consultation you should...in your head to thank the President. You will need it. They may be so disp... that they are....

D. I will call the Prime Minister on your proposal. Your trip to Moscow is secret?

K. Until it is announced at 2:00 this morning here.

D. I will try to give General Scowcroft the full situation in the field.

SL147

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Dinitz/Kissinger
October 19, 1973
7:40 p.m.

D. I talked to the Prime Minister. She said with open arms.

K. Women shouldn't say that to me.

D. There is a certain age they are safe even from you, Mr. Secretary.

K. I am trying to be prepared for any event. What if they want to go back to October 6 ceasefire at October 6 lines and no linkage on anything?

D. I will have to ask the Prime Minister.

K. The greater flexibility I have the better it will go. Tell it to Scowcroft. He can get it to me.

D. I will get it to Scowcroft by tomorrow morning.

K. And any other combination you can think of. I will open with your position in any event. I don't know if their first point is so attractive to them any more--The ceasefire at these lines. I have no doubt with all the complaining....I think you and I ran a good operation together.

D. Either we will wind up as worst enemies for best friends.

K. Most people don't realize that both diplomatically and militarily it was done very well. You did a great job.

D. Bon voyage. You have a successful trip.

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SL145

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON, 6:50 p.m., October 19, 1973

Secretary/ Deputy Secretary Rush

K. Ken, make sure your visitors understand it was at the urgent request of the Soviets.

R. OK.

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SL143

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
October 19, 1973
4:30

D: ...A short telegram from Brezhnev. He thanks the President and you for your positive answer on his proposal. He says no objection for your public statement concerning your visit to Moscow and I was told you may come without any of our men on your aircraft.

K: We are announcing it between 12:00 and 1:00.

D: But you are going at 1:00?

K: Yes, but they can't get me out at the airport.

D: No problem, no problem at all. You may do it.

K: Try to understand. We are discussing in the framework you and I have been discussing...not a final settlement.

D: No need for me to tell them that.

K: I just don't want them to be disappointed.

D: They have invited you and you tell them the position of the President.

K: Exactly.

D: OK, good.

K: OK.

END

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SL141

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Scowcroft/Kissinger
October 19, 1973
4:05

K: I just had a call from Dobrynin. He says we should fly on the commerical route of Pan American.

S: And we don't need their navigators?

K: Do you think they . . I told them for easy identification I would be flying on a B-52.

S: Oh, Henry. I'll have them get in touch with Pan American.

K: Did they tell us. . . Oh, we are going to have a merry time of it.

S: It will be dandy.

K: Do you know what I saved us from tonight?. . The President wanted to say he is firing Cox and sending me to Moscow.

S: Oh boy.

K: So, I am going in a strong position.

S: This 2:00 am announcement. . will make everyone hyper.

K: After what he is doing. . nothing will get them hyper.

S: You're right.

K: And that will explain why we didn't do it earlier. OK, you will come over here about 5:00.

S: I told Ron and he said he would try to make it.

K: Well, the hell with him. Let him send Diane Sawyer and. .

S: OK, I 'll get him.

END

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SL148

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Laird/Kissinger
October 19, 1973
7:50 p.m.

K. Yes, Mel.

L. Good luck to you. You know about the arrangements on the tapes?

K. Frankly I am not fully....

L. Senator Irwin and Baker will have Stenis listen to the tapes and summarize portions relating to the Watergate and the coverup and report back to the Special Committee. The President has made this concession to end the atmosphere....The procedure was proposed by Richardson to the Special Prosecutor and has been under discussion this whole period of time. The proposal has been rejected by the Special Prosecutor today. The President decided to put this into effect and not appeal to the Supreme Court. The Special Prosecutor has been directed not to take any further actions on this.

K. Good move.

L. Is Schlesinger with you? I have to tell him too.

K. No, he left about 10 minutes ago. I have to try to put this thing together.

L. It might work out though.

K. I will do my damnedest.

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SL 132

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
October 19, 1973/9:56 a.m.
HAK/Joe Alsop

K: Hello

S: Hello Henry.

K: Joe, how are you?

S: I'm fine. I'm going off to Hot Springs today. I really should have gone yesterday but I missed my plane to be honest with you. That's a thing I've never done before in my whole life. I'm about to do a piece on detente. You all know I'm being attacked by....

K: By the great heroes who have stood so firm on everything.

S: I think quite nasty too Henry. I talked to Phil Jana(?) about it and I don't want to go into it at any length now but I would say he is just plain hard about it.

K: Who was? Why is he a tough liner now?

S: No hes saying that detente was all that you and the President had to offer and that you were desperately anxious to hang on to your job for another three years and I don't know what.

K: Therefore, we should have a little confrontation?

S: No. He was just saying in effect that the last thread of respectability of this dreadful administration has now been torn away. I was really very shocked to be honest with you and...

K: But these people want to destroy the Administration and they are prepared to destroy the foreign policy.

S: They would destroy the country as far as I can see.

K: After all we've managed to get through two weeks of a Middle East crisis with massive air supply into the Middle East without having the Arabs or the Soviets blow it sky high. That's not a minor achievement.

S: I agree with you it's not a minor achievement. The only thing is how do you assess detente now?

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K: The way I've always assessed it. I've never had any illusions about it. We will resist foreign policy moves as we always have. We don't mix into their domestic policy. What they have done. You know, there are necessities on all great powers. We can't ask them to break all their relationships with the Arabs. I don't believe that they knew that this was coming.

S: I do myself.

K: I do not.

S: You do not.

K: No. But, they gave them alot of equipment. Since then I think....

S: It looks to me like -- another thing they were divided about.

K: Thats probably true.

S: This enormous equipment program. Really, its....

K: This enormous equipment program was also the price they had to pay for not delivering one g.d. thing for them diplomatically.

S: That's true.

K: I mean we tracked them through two summit meetings making them look like idiots.

S: That's true. I think my own instinct is that there were some of them that wanted to do it and had actually planned doing it and others who didn't.

K: That is almost certainly true.

S: I further think that you have to conclude... I found that Brent agreed with this more or less, and he's so conservative, that you have to conlude that it makes the ... that it adds a few points to the possibility that the military or military-minded faction will win the ultimate argument probably next summer.

K: Yes, but I've always expected that.

S: I know you have.

K: What is going on now Joe, unfortunately I have to go to a meeting. What's going on now is a revolting spectacle. We have had a Congress that has voted us out of every confrontation. We have been under unbelievable pressure. We have conducted detente in an absolute pragmatic cold eye way and the only reason they now want to wreck it is to punish Brezhnev for having been seen with the president. Who the hell stood fast at Shien Fu-huags(?). Who the hell stood fastat Jordan in 1970. Who the hell fought the Berlin issues. Who ever got any support from any of these people who are now screaming detente and what the hell has been our practical policy in this crisis? Who the hell started the air lift? Who's been phasing the Soviet's down? I mean for us to be attacked and being snookered by the Soviets is just revolting. What did they snooker us with?

S: I agree with you.

K: What did we not do that we should have done. And you know g.d. well that Phil Zurla isn't an advocate of a tough policy. He is an advocate of the destruction of Richard Nixon.

S: That's all.

K: And the reason they are now coming after me is because I am the one man left in the Administration who has more or less unsolid public position.

S: Well, thank God I wrote that series on American foreign policy just before all this started.

K: I mean all these people who've been cutting our defense budget, been screaming that we are to belly coast, who for 20 years have been creating the malice are now attacking the one people who have been using detente in an offensive way. But for Christ sakes if you can avoid writing about me in that sense you'll do me a great favor. I don't mind these articles.

S: Well, It think its important and you'll be pleased with the final outcome so you must trust me about that.

K: OK Joe but.....

S: How does it look?

K: I think we are going to succeed.

S: You do?

K: Yes.

S: Does that mean the emphasis is still on the East bank or not?

K: Well, if you want my personal opinion. I wouldn't bet much on that.

S: OK Sir. Thank you very much.

SL134

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Dobrynin
10/19/73; 11:10 a.m.

D: Hello.

K: Anatol, could you send us over -- just so that I have something to show to the President.

D: Okay.

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SL136

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
October 19, 1973
1:35

K: You can talk to the Chinese Ambassador. He is your ally but leave our allies alone.

D: What happens now?

K: I understand you are having lunch with the British Ambassador. I want to make sure your being..of you..Ambassador Huang Chen told me he is very fond of you. He says if you give him half of Siberia and the Mauritanian.. he will sign a non-agtgression treaty.

D: Will this say something?

K: Anatoly, about that letter. The President agrees that I should go to Moscow. You understandthis will present us with enormous domestic difficulties.

D: Well..

K: Oh, never mind. I think its important that we say publicly it was done at the invitation of the Soviet Government.

D: I see no difficulty in that.

K: In our interests to announce it about 1:00 this morning our time.

D: 1:00 am

K: Yes, I think we should leave about 12:30

D: This is acceptable.

K: Thenwwe should say it is the invitation of the Soviet Government..I am going on urgent consultations. Of course we will be delighted to have you come with us and ....we are assuming that no unilateral actions will be taken while I am in transit.

D: What do you mean?

K: No military threats. And I am assuming both of us will keep the situation calm ....I don't believe while I am there I will be able to negotiate a final settlement. I will be able to negotiate a cease-fire.

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D: A cease-fire?

K: But we can't expect to settle it in one day.

D: OK

K: Is there anyway you could get in touch with someone over there. We may be able to get an airplane that could fly non-stop.

D: I will talke to Moscow.

K: The other possibility is to stop in Copenhagen

D: I will get on it.

K: If we want to ask for the right to stop in Copenhagen.... it will then get out.

D: They won't know what plane is stopping.

K: I am not sure..

D: So, two possibilities..non-stop and stopping in Copenhagen. OK, everything is settle and you leave at 1:00.

K: Let's say 1:00 to be safe.

D: And announce at 2:00.

K: We will announce at 2:00. That way no Soviet military...I would like that I get a nights sleep before they ujump on me. And we're going to Leningrad, right?

D: One night sleep. I put on menu. You want to..I will put it this way -- that you demand it be in Leningrad.
K:
K: Say that I insist I get to go to Leningrad. I will not go unless I can meet in Leningrad . Look we appreciate the letter and we gladly accept the invitation. I am going to see if we can bring about a cease-fire. All we want is to say it is the invitation of the Soviet Government .

D: I understand.

K: We have not even told the Israelis.

D: You want a small ...

K: I will have to tell them later... Now you leave Cromer in NATO and until we get this thing settles.

D: I will not say anything.

K: Good. Bye.

END

SL138

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Gen. Haig/Sec. Kissinger
Friday, Oct. 19, 1973, 3:20 p.m.

H: On this thing we are working on. The President wants to go out tonight and announce your trip.

K: Impossible.

H: Why?

K: First of all, we have now told the Soviets we would do it at 2:00 in the morning and secondly, I will be at a Chinese dinner that the Chinese are giving me. When does he want to do it?

H: Whenever we put this other mess together which could be anywhere from 6:00-8:00. He would assemble the press in the Press Room and with cameras.

K: And say what?

H: Say in consultation with Chairman Brezhnev and that he has been in communication with him.

K: Say at the invitation.

H: He wants you to prepare the statement that he should say. Very brief.

K: Why should he do it?

H: There are a couple of reasons. One is he feels it for the reason of what he is going to announce after that.

K: He is going to make them both at the same time.

H: Yes.

K: A disaster.

H: Why?

K: My honest opinion is that it is a cheap stunt. It looks as if he is using foreign policy to cover a domestic thing.

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H; The domestic thing is not controversial. A very good one. A very good settlement. It would also look very weird for him to make a major announcement on Watergate and ignore the fact you are going to Moscow when everyone wants to know what is going on in the Middle East. I don't see it as a contrived phony. I think you have two very important things happening.

K: He is not firing Cox?

H: As of now no. Just giving him a desist order which will probably result in his resignation.

K: I would not link foreign policy with Watergate. You will regret it for the rest of your life. I don't think he has to do either of them himself.

H: He has Ervin, Baker and Stennis. We are doing a hell of a thing here. He has to do it.

K: But if he gets that mixed up with foreign policy, Al, then he has to do this with the Jewish Community. It will forever after be said he did this to cover Watergate. I really would plead with you. If he wants to make it as an announcement separate from the other.

H: He wants to do that. That is his idea.

K: No, no, no. - He is going to make both announcements together.

H: You mean at the same time.

K: Right. I would be opposed if he even wanted to make an announcement. Now the Soviets have asked us -- by his stepping out there it becomes high profile.

H: You are the best judge of that.

K: That does not bother me nearly so much. I think that is poor tactics. Also we would have to get back to the Soviets. This will be a situation where the President has put his prestige on the line. Right now the Soviets have asked us to come. We should do it as a reasonable low-key thing simultaneous announcement. We call some newsmen in the middle of the night. It is still a big thing but not the President's going before TV announcing it.

H:. O.K.

K: I tell you it will do him more good that way. It will be a second story that will override the first. I really mean it.

H: I know you do.

K: If he is insisting we will do it but I think he will regret it.

H: O.K. I will see what I can do.

K: Good bye.

END

SL137

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Harlow/Sec. Kissinger
Friday, Oct. 19, 1973, 2:00 p.m.

H: I am sorry to bother you. You are sitting on a letter to Anna Chennault.

K: Right.

H: I am trying to exercise it from you.

K: I am against whatever you want.

H: Knowing that, I would like to change the sponsorship of the letter to someone who will respond.

K: I have told Scowcroft no.

H: Can I change it to yes?

K: No. Not under the circumstances, which Scowcroft will explain to you tomorrow.

H: Nothing we can give that lovely lady.

K: No.

H: Nothing at all.

K: No.

H: Nothing from Kissinger.

K: No. We cannot afford to get into trouble with the Chinese now.

H: Can we say Happy Birthday Chiang.

K: I will talk to Scowcroft.

H: That would just be decency.

K: Decency can be expensive. We will call you.

H: O.K.

END

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SL135

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Lisa Minelli/Kissinger
Oct. 19, 1973 - 11:55 a.m.

K: Hello.

M: Hello.

K: How are you?

M: I'm fine, Dr. Kissinger, how are you?

K: O.K.

M: Listen, excuse me for bothering you, I know you've got enough....

K: I'm a great fan of yours.

M: But I felt free to call you because I really feel I have a bit of a problem and I don't know what to do. I'll just tell you exactly how it happened. I was approached yesterday by Stephanie Phillips who is my agent and she said, "You've been invited to go to Israel for the State Department. And you will be the first entertainer to ever do that." And I said, "To entertain"? And she said, "No. It's to say hello to the troops." I said, "Oh, alright." And everything got very excited around me, you know? But they went ahead and they've made all these plans, and I suddenly thought, "I don't want to endorse anything. I don't know what to say."

K: Well, when were you supposed to go?

M: I'm supposed to go tomorrow.

(silence) Hello?

K: Yeah, I'm thinking.

M: I'm afraid of going as a woman, and I don't understand why, because I once spent some time there.

K: Yeah, I think it will be alright.

M: Well, I have to make some kind of a statement and I don't want to get....

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K: Well, just say you're going, that you're an entertainer, you're not making any political judgments, you're going on, you know, you're doing this because of your friendship for the people you know there.

M: My personal friendships.

K: Your personal friendships.

M: Alrighty. O.K. I'd like to meet you sometime.

K: I would enjoy that.

M: Me too.

K: Do you ever come to Washington?

M: Sure.

K: Well, when you do, when you can, will you let me know?

M: Yes I will, sir.

K: Good, I'd love to meet you.

M: O.K.

K: Good, and all the best.

M: ..see me on the news, I hope I say the right thing.

K: Well, say as little as you can about politics.

M: Yes, well, I know nothing so I can't say anything.

K: That hasn't stopped some of your colleagues from saying things.

M: I know, but some of my colleagues I don't admire.

K: Good. I hope to meet you. All the best. Call me when you get back.

M: O.K. I will. I love you, bye.

K: Bye.

UNCLASSIFIED

SL133

TELCON HAK DOBRYNIN
October 19, 197. 11:04 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello Anatol.

D: Hello. I received a short message from Brezhnev to the President. The text I will read you. OK?

K: Yes.

D: "Dear Mr. President:

The events in the Middle East become more and more dangerous. Our two powers, as we both have agreed, must do the utmost in order to keep the events from going beyond the limits, when they could take even more dangerous turn.

K: "Right.

D: If they develop along this way there is a danger that harm could be done even to the immediate relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. We believe that neither you, nor we want to see it. If it is so then prompt and effective political decisions are needed. We have conviction that with due willingness our two powers can facilitate the finding of such decisions.

K: Right.

D: Since time is essential and now not only every day but every hour counts,

K: Right.

D: my colleagues and I suggest that the US Secretary of State and your closest associate Dr. Kissinger comes in an urgent manner to Moscow to conduct approporiate negotiations with him as with your authorized personal representative. It would be good if he could come tomorrow, October 20. I will appreciate your speedy reply.

Sincerely, L. BRezhnev, October 19, 1973 "

K: You are freindly, aren't you?

D: Hum?

K: That's a friendly suggestion.

D: Of course it is.

K: Well, I will have to get to the President and call you back.

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UNCLASSIFIED

D: Okay.

K: Okay, bye.

SL140

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Symington/Sec. Kissinger
Friday, Oct. 19, 1973, 3:40 p.m

K: How are you Stewart?

S: Fine, old fellow. I know you are busy but I thought some time and I will tell you why, if it is in order and if it meets with your plan you might give Eban a call.

K: Who/?

S: Eban. Tell him you are working on it. I have heard they feel they do not know what is going on. I thought perhaps they should not know what is going on.

K: True. I only see Dinitz twice a day. That is not as much as he would need. I have not been in toufh with Eban but I have been in touch with Dinitz. It is good advice and I will call him.

S: Good. I will appreciate your leaving me out of it.

K: I will call him on my own.

S: Good luck to you. All the best.

END

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SO 26 *

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Dobrynin
10/19/73; 11:10 a.m.

D: Hello.

K: Anatol, could you send us over -- just so that I have something to show to the President.

D: Okay.

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S025 1*

TELCON HAK -- DOBRYNIN
October 19, 1973 11:04 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello Anatol.

D: Hello. I received a short message from Brezhnev to the President. The text I will read you. OK?

K: Yes.

D: "Dear Mr. President:

The events in the Middle East become more and more dangerous. Our two powers, as we both have agreed, must do the utmost in order to keep the events from going beyond the limits, when they could take even more dangerous turn.

K: Right.

D: If they develop along this way there is a danger that harm could be done even to the immediate relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. We believe that neither you, nor we want to see it. If it is so then prompt and effective political decisions are needed. We have conviction that with due willingness our two powers can facilitate the finding of such decisions.

K: Right.

D: Since time is essential and now not only every day but every hour counts,

K: Right.

D: my colleagues and I suggest that the US Secretary of State and your closest associate Dr. Kissinger comes in an urgent manner to Moscow to conduct approporiate negotiations with him as with your authorized personal representative. It would be good if he could come tomorrow, October 20. I will appreciate your speedy reply.

Sincerely, L. BRezhnev, October 19, 1973 "

K: You are freindly, aren't you?

D: Hum?

K: That's a friendly suggestion.

D: Of course it is.

K: Well, I will have to get to the President and call you back.

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D: Okay.

K: Okay, bye.

SO 27*

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Dobrynin
10/19/73; 11:38 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

D: Yes.

K: Anatol, I have had a preliminary talk with the President and we agree in principle to a high level contact.

D: Yes.

K: And you give me your quick reaction, why should Gromyko not come over here?

D: Because I think my reaction is because Kosygin is back from there so they would like to discuss, I guess, the three of them. Brezhnev, Kosygin and Gromyko.

K: I see.

D: This is really the idea -- not to send a telegram telling what was said by Sadat or what was said back and forth. They would like you for one day to come there and then I am sure Kosygin will everybody. This is my real impression why they are asking this one because he is fresh so to speak in what he was thinking and they could discuss with you.

K: Will you come back there with me?

D: Yes, if you don't mind I would like to go both ways.

K: With me?

D: Yes.

K: Well, as long as you sit in the front compartment.

D: (Laughter) All right. I would rather be in the tail but nevertheless.

K: Now what are we going to do about navigators and so forth?

D: There is no problem. We will give you a navigator and we will take care about this.

K: Well all right. I will call you back -- oh, what is it now, a quarter to 12:00?

D: ~~XXXXXX~~ Yeah.

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*

K: No later than two.

D: No later than two. Okay.

K: We are very sympathetic to the proposal.

D: I think this is really important, Henry.

K: Anatol, when the Soviet Government makes such a proposal on the basis of urgency it is not a matter we take lightly.

D: Yes. And leave tomorrow because they really feel it is urgent.

K: Well they want me to arrive -- well I can't leave now until about midnight tonight.

D: No, I understand. So you will arrive tomorrow but . . .

K: I will arrive tomorrow but -- I will arrive tomorrow night and we could talk Sunday.

D: Sunday, yes.

K: You know I would like to get a few hours sleep before your three men starting working me over.

D: (Laughter) Oh you are a beautiful fellow. Yuri saw it in Moscow.

K: One night please I think I am entitled to.

D: No, because . . .

K: My present thinking is that I leave around midnight tonight.

D: As it was last time.

K: As it was when we went on the secret trip.

D: I think it is right. So you will arrive approximately around in the evening.

K: Around 8:00 or 9:00.

*

D: Yes and then you go to bed and fresh in the morning on Sunday -- you will be as fresh as you usually are.

K: That's right. Just tell Antanov not to offer me his diversions because I need a night's sleep.

D: Okay. He will do it afterwards.

K: Okay.

D: Then we will wait a call . . .

K: It is not yet approved.

D: No, no, I will not say anything until you finally say to me okay.

K: Okay, fine.

D: Bye

SL382

TELECON
Ronald Ziegler/Secretary Kissinger
October 30, 1973
4:50

RELEASED IN FULL

K: ...did you make the statement about the fleet today?

Z: It didn't come up.

K: I know it didn't come up. I promised Dobrynin that it would be made..

Z: Well, we can do it tonight.

K: Oh, come off that. It is impossible to do it now. I asked him to make it.

Z: He thought...about the questions.

K: I didn't give him guidnace on a question.

Z: He will do it right now..on the wires.

K: I promised Dobrynin last night and again in the morning. We would make a statement at the briefing. I expected we would plant a question and make a statement.

Z: We can do that.

K: Oh, it is senseless now. I have broken another promise..

Z: We can maintain it and do it now.

K: (He hung up)

END

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SL389

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Gov. Rockefeller/HAK
Oct. 21, 1973; 9:44 a.m.
[illegible]

R: ....and I had talked with Kenny about going with you on this trip and I told him I'd, you know, we'd make all the arrangements if you wanted him, On second thought.

K: The one problem I have is whether I can take somebody under indictment on the trip -- to be quite honest.

R: Yeah.

K: He would do me more good than any other doctor I could have.

R: Well, there's no question about it. And, of course, I got asked by the lawyer why was I still going on with a man who's under indictment and I said...

K: No, no, there's no problem what I can do alone.

R: I see.

K: And there's not the slightest hesitation on my part to see him under the conditions that were arranged last week. The question is whether on an official State Department trip travelling in a government plane, and so forth.

R: Well, I hadn't thought of that.

K: That is the only thing that delays it.

R: I got you. Well, now, Henry, have you got a counsel or somebody looking that up?

K: Yeah.

R: You do?

K: Yeah. Why?

R: I personally think the American tradition that a man is innocent until proven guilty is a pretty strong one and that indictment does not mean, and he's salvaging the thing and saying, you know those stories, that it was his accounting firm who prepared his thing, and he just signed it. But I understand what you're saying. Well, when you find out, you'll know.

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K: Right. I have to go and testify right now before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Could I call you back later today?

R: Yeah, I'll be here until 1:45. Until 2:45.

K: I was going to ask you something else.

R: Good. I'd like to talk to you.

K: About -- were you going to be at that Family of Man Dinner tomorrow night?

R: Family of Man...

K: I mean, where I'm getting an award.

R: I think so.

K: Because the problem that I face is I may not be able to get away. And if I didn't and you were going to be there anyway, I was wondering whether you would agree to accept it for me.

R: Oh, aren't you nice! Well, now, that's a very interesting idea. What I told them was, you see I had declined it first - I was going to be away. Then I said if you'd come, I'd come. Now you're asking me that - I don't see why not. I think that's beautiful.

K: It would mean a lot to me. But I don't want to make you go there if you weren't gonna go there anyway.

R: I think it's beautiful and I don't think that I can do the kind of speech I should, but...

K: See my trouble is, first of all the strain that next week...

R: Oh, no, I don't think you should come up, Henry.

K: I'm going to visit four Arab capitals in three days - and China.

R: Yeah, no, no, no, I don't think you should come. And I'd be delighted to do it.

K: And also my schedule is getting to a point where I just don't know whether I can make it. And Finally, Golda Meir is here. And considering the fact that what we will have to do to the Israelis If I don't go to see her that's gonna be considered another slap.

R: I understand what you're saying. Let me handle this one for you, if they'll accept it. I don't know whether they'll accept it.

K: Well, I think they probably will.

R: Well, maybe _____ as the Governor of the State, and coincidentally as a friend.

K: I'm delighted. The Governor doesn't mean -- I mean the Governor impresses me, but the friendship is what would mean something to me.

R: Well, you're just great, Henry, and if you want me to do it, you've got me.

K: Good. Well, we'll talk around noon, we'll talk about it then.

R: Good, let me just say one thing. I read in the paper about the leaks in the Congress on your closed session discussion. I think you've got to tell these legislators if they want you to talk, frankly, they've got to goddam well keep their mouths shut.

K: Well, first of all, I didn't say what they alleged that I said.

R: Well, that's even worse.

K: Yeah.

R: Well, you're great , Henry. I'm not doing anything, and I'll be here.

K: Fine. Talk to you later.

R: Thanks a lot. Bye, bye.

SL182

TELECON
Major General Scowcroft/ Secretary Kissinger
October 23, 1973
4:15

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I sent you two messages on Sunday night. Number 14 and asked you to tell the Israelis that since we delayed fourteen hours they could go on for a few more hours. ... They say it was never transmitted.

S: That is not correct. I told Dinnitz and Shalev.

K: They said they did not receive..

S: God damn it. I told them...

K: We want them to try it on to the twelve hours.

S: I told them that they said what we want is move them before we have to go..

K: Ok, that's all. Thank you.

END

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SL 184

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Katherine Graham/Kissinger
October 23, 1973
5:30 p.m.

K. Kay.

G. Heavens, where are you?

K. I am back in Washington.

G. Congratulations. I don't know what has happened today. Is it starting?

K. The Israelis grabbed another hunk of territory so we will have to place another resolution tonight. The major reason I am calling is about your letter. I have postponed my trip to China. I am going to go about the end of November.

G. We will hold off until then. I am so sorry to bother you.

K. I want you to understand I didn't make that selection and as McCloskey explains, he can only take one person from the weeklies. What I have---If he takes only one of the weeklies I want him to put the three names in a hat and draw for the one that should go.

G. What is this nonsense? This has not ever happened before.

K. He says if he takes one he will have to take News and World Report. I will get this thing equitably settled. I am not going for four weeks.....

G. That has no use to News Week. They probably resent us for having two seats when they only had 14.

K. The fact of the matter is when you have 14 seats there is no paper you exclude that doesn't have a grievance.

G. The point is when you are taking any there is a basic sort of six that get attacked for getting it: networks, UP, AP, the Post, Time and Newsweek, all of whom do a job of foreign reporting.

K. I will get it straightened out by the next time we meet. I will get McClosky to change his mind.

G. It is just being near you. It is a great advantage.

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K. I just want you to know I am third in line to the Presidency so you better not antagonize me.

G. Not really, how about the Speaker?

K. First Carl Albert, the President Pro-Tem and me. I want you to know that the Constitution only prohibits me from being elected and doesn't say anything about....

G. Henry, I'm going to call them up. I am so excited for you and I am so glad I will know a President and will you remember I am a friend.

K. That I have never doubted. You were right. The first time I had heard of it was when you called me. Then when you wrote--by the time we meet I will have it settled. Let me worry about it.

G. By your good cheer it is a hideous, terrible moment.

K. We can't survive crises like this. We survived a major war by the skin of our teeth. Now we have to settle it. It we have no authority in this country, we are in desperate shape. I am not excusing anything that happened. I wasn't in the country....

G. I feel so sorry for you trying to settle the war with this....

K. This is between you and me, I called Haig on Sunday about midnight in Moscow and said will you get this done right away. He said "no, I have to get a few other things settled." I asked him like what? He said firing Richardson, Cox and Rucklehaus. So I am sitting there and I am dying.

G. Henry, that was the first you heard!

K. That is the very first I heard of it on an open line to Moscow.

G. Well, listen, all I can say is you pulled off the only thing that made us all feel we were....

K. Don't worry about....I will fix it.

G. I will just shut up about it. I won't say anything to the fellows.

K. You can tell them. We will try to do something between next time. I understand Ed Cline thinks this is retaliation for the shitty thing they did to me last summer.

G. The paranoids think that Henry. You are too professional and wouldn't do anything like that.

K. McCloskey feels on very good reasons on his part he could only take one weekly. Why he settled on Time instead of Newsweek I don't know. I don't want them to carry a grudge. Tell them enough to quiet them down. How is Helmut?

G. He is on his honeymoon. He just got remarried.

K. I know, I met his fiance.

G. I will take care of this. I am just at the publishers meeting down here. I will be back in New York.....I have a serious problem with Joe that I might talk to you sometime when things are calmer. I think he has to write less often. He is just no good any more.

K. It is none of my business but if you could....

G. .....No, I can handle it I am sure. I just sort of put it off.

K. I will take care of the other thing. Looking forward to seeing you when you get back.

G. Bless you.

SL185

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Ambassador Dinnitz
October 23, 1973

S: Let me tell you where we are and what we have decided. I hope your government understand the difficult.. we are faced with a situation where , one , if we don't go along with the proposition we will be faced with vetoing or abstaining. You can well imagine the impact of what this would be. A very difficult situation. Here is what we have done.

We have suggested some changes to the Soviets and they have accepted and we will submit this jointly. The changes in the key paragraph are...

D: Wait a minute.

S: Don't you have it in front of you?

D: No.. If you will read it a little slower.

S: The text that we present.... confirm its desire about immediate cessation of all kinds of firing and of all military actions and demands that the forces of the sides be withdrawn to the positions they occupied at the moment of adoption of the cease-fire position.

D: It just shows they don't understand anything..

S: They have accepted the two changes. They are: ..the word demands, they have suggested the word urges. Next, on the forces of the.. instead of withdrawn, it should be returned to the position that they occupied at the time the cease-fire became effective. The Secretary wants you to know that he has linked it to two other things.. The first thing is it will be difficult to ... their rationale. It is better to argue in the next 48 hours about it than something more fundamental.

D: The Russians argue this.

S: Yes, they recognize the ambiguities in terms of the line but they prefer the.. to be in that rather than the key question of the resolution. What we said is because the line is ambiguous, we want it to be understood.. if someone begins to argue about what line, we say let's be clear that the line is not clear. Then, secondly, he said that the thing that will make this cease-fire in effect, is for you to carry-out the POW issue. Thirdly, the President has sent a letter to Breshnev on this POW issue. It is being submitted now, and very soon..

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D: I want you to understand and tell it to the Soviets. All during the night they have shelled the bridgeheads and caused us casualties in human being and in tanks. They started moving infantry on the bridges in an attempt to cut us out. So when we saw this we pushed them back. And we improved our position. We are not moving back no matter what resolution. I have tried to explain this to the Secretary, but he has been with the President. . I am urging you not to. . we beg you that we don't put into position something that rewards the Egyptians.

S: I understand. The first point is because of these ambuiguities. When this argument comes up and this argument will occur in circumstances when there are ambiguities.

D: You must be with us on this. The Russians are leading. . They pass the resolution with you. Then you will say you can't fight this as it is something you passed with the Russians.

S: This point, we made to the Russians.

D: So why don't you make this point to the Russians in the proposal.

S: Touche.

D: I will pass this on to the Prime Minister. She is holding on another line.

S: Fine.

END

SL 183

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Leonard Garment/Kissinger
October 23, 1973
4:10 p.m.

G. ...and the question is whether you want to see them tonight. Generally tell them they have to support the President on MFN....

K. They cannot do it.

G. I would stay away from the business of support. We don't need that.

K. You are crazy. That other thing will just open the flood gate.

G. Could be sufficient unto today's decision.

K. You never win my losing.

G. I don't have a strong...about that. Dow Jones is up 6 points.

K. That is nothing. I have a meeting here at 4:00. How about between 5:00 and 6:00.

G. Sure. I will bring them over at 5:30. Max, of course, you know and Stein are with us all the way. Moss is a Democrat. You stand on the choice....I will need to turn that around. I will deal with them directly on the thing with the President. 5:30 at your place.

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SL181

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Major General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
October 23, 1973
4:20

K: I think we should have the WSAG tomorrow morning. Anything they can do tonight..

S: The natives will be restless.

K: What do you mean.

S: I understand you talked to Schlesinger. Every one wants to cut back on supplies.

K: I will talke to them.

S: They need quieting down.

K: Why?

S: They have no idea of what is going on and now we have a cease-fire we should stop supplies.

K: At least tell them to stand by til I call. Why should we cut back on the Israelis when the Russians don't cut back on the Arabs?

S: This is another hand-holder. So we don't..

K: You don't slap them around enough.

S: True. They feel out of touch and know you had a big trip.

K: Tell them I am tied up with the Security Council and it will take place tomorrow at 10:00 without fail., if not tonight. I am sending over another hot line message.

S: OK'

END

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RELEASED IN FULL SL186

TELECON
The President/Kissinger
October 23, 1973
6:50 p.m.

K. Mr. President.

N. Were you able to make any sales on that line we were talking about this morning?

K. Yes, I can't tell how they did. I talked to Dinitz for one thing. I talked to a group of Jewish leaders. I call Mansfield.

N. Is he in town?

K. I don't know where they reached him.

N. I know, you never can tell with the White House switchboard. You got Eban. He was all right. How about Congress?

K. I called a number of them. Most of the ones we discussed. I stressed the point of the decision you made. They were all very complimentary. Nobody raised the current issue.

N. Not even Mansfield? He is probably embarrassed. Ted Kennedy is pushing him.

K. Ted Kennedy called.....and said you had settled it all this afternoon.

N. You mean about Sirica? They will want it all for the Committee.

K. They will want everything.

N. No more!

K. I am not sure you....You cannot possibly do more without impairing the Presidency.

N. I told Haig, "Now Al, there can't be any more." It is not possible. The next thing they will go into India, Pakistan, Cambodia, everything we have done. The Foreign Relations Committee will want everything. We are going to stand firm.

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This is a hell of a concession. There is stuff in there that is embarrassing....I think it is good Sirica has to give it to a Grand Jury.

K. I don't know if he is out to get the President....

N. Cox was out to get the President.

K. Cox couldn't have it.

N. Sirica will be more responsible. He is in the Grand Jury.... There has never been a leak on the Grand Jury.

K. Absolutely. A lot of newsmen have sent notes and called in on the Middle East and realize what a role you have played. I think that is an asset.

N. In terms of....compare this with the Cuban confrontation. The Russians would never have called Kennedy. With a twelve to one advantage. But in the Middle East they might have... We have no ships. Moving the aircraft they had no choice...

K. That is my key point.

N. They realize it took some nerve to do this.

K. No question. It was a tremendous victory.

N. The thing you negotiated was fantastic. To change the wording to urging was good. Very good. Well, anyway you need a good nights sleep. Tomorrow you knock them dead.

K. Day after tomorrow. The leadership meeting is tomorrow.

N. No leadership meeting tomorrow. They go Thursday morning at 9:00 and you go in the afternoon, no 11:00. If you give leaders tomorrow they will give it all away, everything is for Thursday. You can sleep in tomorrow.

K. Fine, Mr. President. Good night.

SL176

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Schlesinger/Secretary Kissinger
October 23, 1973
3:02

S: How are you?

K: A little tired but I think we made it.

S: We now have the problem of post-cease-fire.

K: We are settling that. We are introducing a joint resolution at 4:00 with the Soviet Union.

S: My query is what about the airlift.

K: We have to keep it going til we get a hand on the others.

S: So, when they cut it off, we cut it off,

K: We have made a proposal and I think we should play it hard. . . we cut it unilaterally and it will be bad.

S: *No question. . . . the Egyptians were pretty shaky.*

K: I don't think so.

S: Make it harder in same way.

K: Do you think we made a mistake joining a resolution calling for a new cease-fire?

S: I don't know enough at this stage.

K: Well, supposed the Soviets introduced a resolution alone, do we then veto it?

S: Yes, I mean no we can't

K: If we do it we will be in trouble with the Arabs.

S: The name of the game is to keep the airlift going.

K: We will have a WSAG at 5:00. I may move it to tomorrow.

S: Well, we have had a bit of excitement here.

K: Yes, and now they have given in to giving up the tapes.

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K: I think we are coming along in the Middle East..

S: How is it going with the Saudis?

K: Well if we made a mistake.....

S: Is it.. reparable?

K: Yes.

S: What about Bahrain?

K: That is certainly reparable. The Saudis we have to see about.

S: Well, we only have one facility and I am not sure we shouldn't move in and...

K: We are going to move on that thing. We will tell him if they want to support, they..

S: OK

END

SL178

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Kaul (India)/Kissinger
October 23, 1973
5:20 p.m.

Kl. Welcome back.

K. Thank your.

Kl. Are you going to Peking or have you postponed it.

K. We have postponed the trip for a month.

Kl. Our Foreign Minister is in New York with Mr.....He would like to pay a call on you. Is that convenient?

K. The Foreign Minister and the Permanent Head. What day?

Kl. Either the 31st of October or the 1st of November.

K. I will have Mr. Eagleburger call you tomorrow.

Kl. Thank you. If it is possible for you to have a quiet lunch or dinner, we will do our best.

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SL179

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Secretary Lynn/Kissinger
October 23, 1973
5:15 p.m.

L. Can you use some good news. Saturday morning I met with the presidents (he named off several Jewish organizations including the Jewish National...and Cleveland Jewish Federation). I sold them.

K. Terrific.

L. Then went to New York the following Friday night and met with 25-man...conference. They agreed unanimously to try to turn the thing around.

K. Marvelous.

L. You have to be very careful with this information.

K. It is just between you and me.

L. G_____ called me and told me the conference bought it completely. Part of it is the way you have come through to Israel. This is a man that can be trusted. If he feels we have to keep the detente....our ears should be to the ground.

K. We should see what Vanick will do.

L. You should not go to him. They will convince Vanick.

K. Thanks for everything.

L. I hope it works, Henry. They said they will try their very best. It just shows I cannot possibly get out of the international arena.

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SL177
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
President/Secretary Kissinger
October 23, 1973
3:35

.....

N: We can put this business off til Thursday, then. I probably will be speaking then..

K: I think that in light of the announcement today... To this will be a better beginning to it.

N: So, tell all hands to move it to Thursday.

K: Yes, Mr. President

END

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SL 180

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Schlesinger/Kissinger
October 23, 1973
5:09 p.m.

K. I just saw a news ticker that Pentagon sources said because of Soviet slow down on supplies we were slowing down. Will you keep your people quiet! We need the Israelis on a... They need an open supply line during.... You will keep it going full blast. We will meet at WSAG tomorrow at 10:00.

S. Maybe Bill will be there. Unless you want me there?

K. No, I told you everything today. Anyway, we are having lunch tomorrow.

S. We are? How is the ceasefire going? Are we going to crack down immediately? Or will we tolerate....down.

K. It is...is tremendous victories for us. The big pressures will have to come when we get into peace negotiations.

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SLMS

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Laird/Secretary Kissinger
October 23, 1973
2:55

K: Hello Bryce.

L: Th's is Mel. Bryce and I were making

K: Oh, Mel. I asked for Bryce and..

L: We were both making calls to the members of the Cabinet from here.

K: I know what you are going to tell me. You are a politician. Will you tell me the political significance.

L: Heh, Heh. It is difficult to interpret. Sometime we will have to talk about it. There really wasn't much else they could do after the press conference... when he said it was up to the American people.. we were lost.

K: What is your view.

L: I'll talk to you about it someti me . It hasn't been handled well.

K: It is a god damn disaster. Everything was quiet and now this.. is this going to quiet things any?

L: No. They will say we did this only to get rid of Cox.

K: Next they'll demand the papers.

L: Oh, Christ, yes.

K: I just want you to remember that I am number three in line.

L: I know. I have worried about this.

K: I might be you know. You might keep your office.

L: I may be fired next.

K: No. it takes loyalty. No sense firing a patriot.

L: Well, that's what we are calling about. Morton came on the phone and said tell me one th'ng. Will there be anything left of the government after you finish talking..

K: Well... Oh, Mel, we joint with the Soviet Union in another cease-fire

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K: resolution and are urging the parties to return to the line when the cease-fire went into effect. . . . Now the Israelis are running amuck, but we couldn't risk a veto, could we?

L: No, no.

K: OK, well, thank you.

END

SL195

TELECON
Adm. Moorer/Kissinger
October 23, 1973
8:28 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K. I placed a call earlier. I think it is now overtaken by events. I just wanted to make sure the aircraft continues full....It is not to be cut either in the sorte rate or tonnage.

M. We are running about 5 and 16 now. We will just continue.

K. We will not cut it. If you get any orders to the contrary, let me get a chance to get that man into the President's office. Load the planes as full as they should be. I want to make sure that the tonnage and sorte rate is what we promised them.

M. Yes.

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SL197

TELECON
Dinitz/Kissinger
October 23, 1973
8:30 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

D. I just talked to the Prime Minister and have the authority to pass on to Moscow that you can pass to Sadat our solemn pledge. If the Egyptians stop shooting we will not shoot either. Moreover, she gives you her personal pledge that if Egypt gives instructions to ceasefire and actually executes it, we will not shoot regardless of all the advantages we can get.

K. The second point is the same as the first.

D. No, she is giving you her personal pledge.

K. We can tell that to the Egyptians....

D. The Egyptians and Russians.....

K. That we have been given assurances.

D. If they give orders to stop firing and execute it, we will not shoot. She tells you that we will stop in spite of the fact that it will cause disadvantages in the field. She said to tell you that place you both talked about was under consideration last night. They decided to ---it out to give the ceasefire a chance. It was absolutely the decision of the Egyptians to break the ceasefire.

K. I will tell you what I would do if I was Israeli National Security Advisor--

D. She asked me to tell you she does not believe the question of the business of 200 or 300 will work. The Egyptians and Russians know where they were. She suggested this tactic. We are honestly and sincerely willing to accept the ceasefire and right now. The Egyptians resumed the war and as a result of this new territory was claimed. She asked me to tell you she honestly does not believe that 200-300 yards would work.

K. Well, she is in charge of Israel.

D. I suggest let us start with this and we will be in touch again.

K. We are in a tough position on this one. We are not saying who started it. As you are in Suez City some people will be starving in the next day or two.

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D. We have not entered the city proper. We have gone around it.

K. You have cut the road. Some people on the East Bank will not have any water.

D. They had no business being there anyway.

K. I have raised holy cane here and the airlift is continuing.

D. Mr. Eagleburger has told me. They are really doing stupid things--what they are putting in the press.

K. I have talked to each person here and they.....

RELEASED IN FULL SC198

TELECON, 8:35 p.m. 10/23/73

Secretary/Senator Fulbright

F. I just got back. I'm unpacked and everything.

K. I just got back and I have not unpacked anything.

F. Well, you had a rough time. I'm delighted you're making progress.

K. Well.

F. Have they started again?

K. We passed another resolution -- joining the Soviet Union -- asking for a ceasefire immediately and return to the lines which existed when they started and finally the introduction of UN observers. Frankly, I think we can make the lines stick but we are not sure where they were.. it will be difficult.

F. From what I read about your agreement with the Russians I was very encouraged.

K. Actually, you played a role...

F. Oh, I would hope I did.

K. I'm not saying decisively but Dobrynin referred to it a couple of time. It came out better ...we got it down to negotiations between the Arabs and Israelis -- and they say under appropriate auspices. For your information what Brezhnev and I decided was that the U.S. and the Soviets should provide the auspices under the general supervision of the Security Council.

F. That's real progress and it gets detente back on the road.

K. It couldn't be done without it. I talked to some Jewish leaders today and said knock it off on MFN. They weren't so difficult this time.

F. Sounds like you are making progress.

K. Are you free for lunch Thursday or Friday?

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F. I think so unless they made something I don't know about.

K. Would you like to come back over here?

F. Whatever you like.

K. It's easier for me here.

F. That's perfect with me. Which day?

K. Thursday.

F. That's OK. I'm delighted you are making some progress. Everybody is.

K. Now we are facing a unique opportunity to move toward a settlement.

F. Will it take?

K. Yes. The Israelis have suffered over 6,000 casualties. That's like 500,000 for us. They have learned they are totally dependent on us for supply ...and it depends on whether we think the war is worth it the next time. The Arabs have learned they have to deal with us. I've had one message from Sadat and two from one of his aides -- Ismail. We are in very active contact.

F. That's real progress.

K. I would be glad to meet with your Committee early next week.

F. You're not going off to China.

K. I have had to postpone it.

F. I think that's wise.

K. I think if I sat inPeking while this thing boils along it would not be wise.

F. I agree.

K. It's up to you. We'll discuss it on Thursday. I can do it Tuesday or Wednesday.

F. I understand the meeting in the morning is postponed to Thursday. Thanks for calling and I wish you all the best.

K. Thank you. See you Thursday at the meeting and at lunch.

SL196

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Dinitz/Kissinger
October 23, 1973
8:28 p.m.

K. I called Dobrynin after you left in low key way and told him I had expected Kosygin to return soon and I just didn't want them to get impatient if they come up with any ideas...that it would take us a reasonable 36 to 48 hours to consider. I wanted his leader to know it so that they didn't think we were stalling. I asked his assessment of the military situation. He said his reports indicated a stalemate. I said ours did too. Three minutes ago he said in two hours they will come in with a message containing a proposal.

D. Even before Kosygin arrives?

K. He didn't say what the proposal was...what urgency it has. I can call you...I just wanted you to be aware.

D. I suppose the reports from the field are beginning to reach them.

K. He gave no indication. The President doesn't...I can call them and say the President is asleep.

D. I don't know about your President but my Prime Minister is definitely asleep now.

K. I just thought if the diplomacy starts acting up you'd better be informed. Now you know everything I know. I haven't been able to tell the President and you know more than he does.

D. I will be here in the office...

K. It will take about two hours.

D. I'm in no hurry.

K. I know. I'm not hurrying.

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SL194

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Scowcroft/Kissinger
October 23, 1973
8:25 p.m.

S. He says Friedheim says all he's doing is quoting McCloskey. He read from McCloskey's press briefing, which is ambiguous.

K. Right.

S. Now I told him we would like daily tonnages and averages. I don't know if McCloskey and Friedheim talked more than this briefing.

K. I'll talk to McCloskey.

S. Our tonnage went down because for the last several days we were making up that 155 ammunition in order to get their level back up to where....

K. Anything else?

S. No, nothing else.

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SL187

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Dobrynin/Kissinger
October 23, 1973
7:10 p.m.

D. What are you doing here with Voronsov?

K. The moment he is alone here there is a crisis.

D. When I left Moscow...all the members of the Politburo... Now it looks really rather negative after your trip to Israel all these developments.

K. We had another joint resolution this afternoon.... You agree with the Egyptians on something.

D. The only point which I was surprised you refused to accept was paragraph 2 about the ceasefire line.

K. What paragraph 2?

D. Of the resolution calling for them to return to the position previously agreed upon.

K. First of all that isn't true. The extraordinary difficulty is deciding where the line started. We didn't want to get into a hassle about where the line had been. Finally we joined you. I had to talk to the President.

D. It looks fine again. Were you surprised?

K. I had absolutely no knowledge of this.

D. I think nothing really.

K. Voronsov called me at 10:00 this morning. By 1:00 we had agreed to it. That is not an undue delay.

D. What is the situation in the field?....

K. The Israelis swear that the Egyptians attacked them first. We have no separate information.

D. What is the situation? The fighting continues or stops?

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K. I think it stops. We have urged the Israelis in the strongest terms to stop it.

D. Did they begin to...the position as they issued on Sunday.

K. They say they would agree to it. But who knows what that position was. They will never agree.

D. Don't you know through your reconnaissance.

K. We haven't done any air reconnaissance. Lets say we do not know what the actual situation is frankly.

D. You don't know yet.

K. We have sent two urgent messages today to stop and I have had the Israeli Ambassador in here to stop.

D. Brezhnev, when I left....

K. It isn't right for Voronsov to say he had to complain to the Politburo. You can't give us a resolution and expect an answer in ten minutes. It is amazing. We....

D. It was agreed upon by you and Brezhnev that there would be a ceasefire in 12 hours.

K. Your resolution said they should return to the position at the time the ceasefire was agreed upon....We made another not to determine whether we could agree to something that nobody could enforce. The Egyptians say one thing, the Israelis another, you don't know and we don't know.

D. He had to call again to Moscow. He agreed on the second line. Then in a few moments Sisco called.

K. He had no right to do that. I straightened that out. It wasn't easy to get a winning side to accept a ceasefire. From that point on Israel was winning and we nevertheless agreed to it.

D. We didn't make any definition in Moscow as to who was winning.

K. We made a great effort to make the agreement.

D. I am more worried about our understanding than the Arabs....

K. We have spent all day today to get the Israelis to stop and I think they have now stopped.

D. I would like to see you tomorrow. If you don't mind.

K. I think we have the...in principal of the Israelis in our joint auspices.

D. They agreed to this one.

K. Not yet 100 percent. If we can get the prisoner thing settled they will agree to it. I had along talk with the Prime Minister. I have already sent a message to Brezhnev to that effect.

D. Do you think we should talk tomorrow. You are having a press conference tomorrow?

K. No, on Thursday. I also wanted to talk to you. There will be a few ups and downs within the next few weeks. We have settled this in a very diplomatic way....

D. This is exactly the point. All right, Henry. The most important thing is the agreement between you and Brezhnev and the whole situation in the Middle East. If we hold that firm it doesn't matter what happens, we will survive. If we drag this anchor through the winds.---

K. You have known me long enough. I will not trick Brezhnev. That is the stupidist thing I could do. Even if we win this one we could never have a trusting relationship again. We cannot control everything the Israelis do. They swear that Egyptians started it.

D. The question is to stop and continue discussions politically with the Secretary General.

K. That we are prepared to do. I had a meeting with the Jewish community on the MFN issue. We are making progress now. We are going to drop Title 4 from the House bill.

D. It all?

K. Altogether. It is too complex to change overnight. They are going to work with me to work with Jackson to change his Senate bill and when it comes to the House we will change it once more and get an acceptable bill. It was by far the best meeting we have had.

D. Were my friends there.

K. Fisher, Stein and Moss were there....I am telling it to you not to ask anything of the Soviet Union but to give you a sense of the mood. I think we had a marvelous meeting this week.

D. When Brezhnev spoke to you I was next to him by telephone. But he asked me once again to come. He was pleased with the meeting.

K. Tell me one thing....I give you my word of honor I knew nothing about what happened today except....

D. Tomorrow you will call. We can go through what happened in these few days.

K. I have postponed my trip to China.

D. When are you going there?

K. At least a month. At the end of November.

D. What was the reaction of the Chinese? I think they will have more time to prepare.

K. Not very well. They know we introduced two joint resolutions. I will call you tomorrow.

SL188

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Dinitz/Kissinger
October 23, 1973
7:20 p.m.

K. Are you in Cairo yet or the Aswan Dam?

D. No. We are, to the best of my knowledge, just reacting to Egyptian fighting which continues.

K. We have had a message from Sadat pleading with us to produce a ceasefire. Dobrynin is back and they are...themselves.

D. Of course, I will pass this message on to the Prime Minister.

K. We have been assured by Israel it is purely a defensive decision... Put that Jewish mind to work so that when the pressure starts you can start withdrawing a few hundred yards....

D. I will ask the Prime Minister if she can find some sandpile.

K. Not right now. The time to make moves is just a little bit before you are forced to and make them figure out what you just did. Then they have to generate new pressures. If you withdraw a few hundred yards....Tomorrow stop the fighting. Somebody will say announce that as of Thursday you are returning to the original position. You see what I mean?

D. Yes.

K. What I mean is that is my strong tactical advice. The trouble with your people is they have too much integrity.

D. That is the answer I got when I suggested it. How could we possibly say this. We don't issue false communiques. I am with you. I have trouble with my people in Israel.

K. Call me back in a half hour?

D. Yes, I will call you back.

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RELEASED IN FULL
SL190

TELECON, 8:00 p.m., 10/23/73

Secretary/Deputy SecDef Clements

C. Great job you're doing.

K. Thank you. Bill, I called Jim earlier. There was a Defense statement that says we have stood down the airlift in response to a stand down by the Soviets. The orders are to keep it going full blast.

C. I don't know anything about it.

K. There is to be no foot dragging. We need it for diplomacy with the Soviets. Later it has Jerry Friedheim taking the line we didn't do it in response to the Soviets.

C. I think I can tell you what may have happened..based on something like this. We are one airplane behind our schedule...

K. Look, I don't mind your...We're going to pull this thing off. But we're going to do it by our method. I have got the Soviets panicked. Can't Friedheim be brought under control?

C. Yes, I'll talk to him.

K. Whether you fly 14 or 15 doesn't matter. The average is important.

C. I understand. As always we're going to help you all we can if we know what it is we have to do.

K. We're going to have a WSAG meeting tomorrow.

C. I'll call you back.

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RELEASED IN FULL
SL192

TELECON
Scowcroft/Kissinger
October 23, 1973
8:04 p.m.

K. In writing at the end of each day by 5:00 and if there is any question we will go into the President together. Will you call me back and tell me what has been done. Make that phone call and don't tell me what you want.

S. All right. Right away.

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RELEASED IN FULL SL191

TELECON
Haig/Kissinger
October 23, 1973
8:00 p.m.

K. I just wanted to check how you felt.

H. I am pretty good. I went out and did the kind of thing I don't want to do. I went on a news briefing.

K. Don't do it again. I never did that.

H. Well, it worked out all right.

K. You are too valuable an asset. How are we going to resist giving up other documents now?

H. We will just take them case by case and see what they do.

K. That is the thing that worries me most.

H. We will handle it. Muck through as we do all the time. How is the Middle East thing?

K. The Israelis have now taken Suez City.

H. No kidding!

K. We have had a letter from Sadat, a letter and two messages from Ismail, three hot line messages from Brezhnev. We finally signed the Resolution to return from where they started from. We wrote to Brezhnev that we have no idea where they started from. We may have to push them back a little. That's all right, don't you think?

H. Yes, I do. It has been a hell of a day.

K. For you.

H. You can imagine.

K. How is his frame of mind?

H. Very down, very down. He is going to have the bipartisan meeting on Thursday, your press meeting, and then going to Key Biscayne. I think that is a good idea.

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K. It has been a tough period.

H. Yes, it's tough.

K. I haven't fully analyzed yet where it leaves him to....Where do you think it leaves him.

H. It could be a disaster, but I don't think so.

K. You mean in the immediate?

H. No,, in the short run we are in fine shape.

K. My immediate worry is where it will lead to.

H. That is the problem.

K. Have you listened to them?

H. No.

K. We are really all flying blind.

H. To a degree but not too big of a degree. I have a....

K. Win wants to hire on his staff someone who is now with Brookings Institute but not part of that, Jerome Kahan. Eagleburger knows him and says he is an o'k guy.

H. Just hire him. Just do it as long as Larry thinks that is all right.

K. Win thinks he is one of the ablest people....Is there anything I can do?

H. No, just tell those friends of ours to stop. They will be in Cairo tomorrow.

K. Their strategy is something else. They want to cut off all the roads of the Egyptian army on their side of the Canal and starve them to death.

SL189

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ziegler/Kissinger
October 23, 1973
7:30 p.m.

K. There is a lot of...over here because I am holding my press conference at the White House. Can we announce it here - the new date for the China trip at the State Department?

Z. Yes, sir. What is your new date?

K. The 26th to 29th of November, and we will have to announce it tomorrow.

Z. I may be able to go on that one....

K. The latest encounter...Listen, we had Cox all set up by Saturday. If you had followed my tactics I would have left him right where he was for three weeks. At that point no one knew who Cox was. I would have then maneuvered him into a....

Z. Even after turning the tapes over?

K. I wouldn't have turned the tapes over. If I had been willing, I would have taken them into the Supreme Court. If I had gone the Stenis route, I would have made Cox....Are you going to run off now and report that?

Z. I have to take a certain amount of the criticism myself.

K. Be that as it may. For today we came out passably well.

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RELEASED IN FULL

SL193

TELECON
Scowcroft/Kissinger
October 23, 1973
8:13 p.m.

S. I claimed the day on the President's schedule. He will get in touch with Bucharest and Bogdan and I will get back to you.

K. All right.

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SL199

TELECON
Dobrynin/Kissinger
October 23, 1973
8:35 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K. You really didn't want to sleep tonight.

D. I didn't know it myself but I was flying from Frankfurt on a plane that was going from Israel to New York. It was quite a coincidence.

K. After our call I called the Israelis and said the fighting must stop and I have their pledge that if the Egyptians stop firing they will in any event stop any advance now and if the Egyptians obey the ceasefire they will obey the ceasefire. I now have the impression they will stop. Lets get it stopped. They are now in defensive position. They are not advancing. If you could get the Egyptians to give another order to stop firing---

D. The next step should be coming back to the resolution line.

K. That is the next question. All Sadat has asked us to do is stop the fighting.

D. To stop and go back where they were.

K. The first step is to get the fighting stopped.

D. There is nothing else I want.

K. Right now they will still advance as I understand it.

D. I will get to Moscow about this.

K. Then we will see about the next step.

D. All right, Henry. Good night.

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SL157

Telcon
Minister Vorontsov/Kissinger
10:37 a.m. - Oct. 23, 1973

RELEASED IN FULL

V: Hello.

K: Yuly.

V: Yes, Henry.

K: I understand that you feel you cannot postpone the Council meeting.

V: Yeah, I had a talk with Malek and Malek said the Egyptians are absolutely mad and insisted _____ 12:00. And since we have agreed generally on the draft resolution....

K: Well, wait a minute, that's what I wanted to talk to you about. We of course have to talk to Jerusalem about it, too. But there are two things wrong with the draft resolution: one, I have never been happy about that phrase, "demands that the forces should be withdrawn to the position where they were at the moment."

V: Yeah, but if the Israelis are really attacking and taking ....

K: But wait a moment, there's another thing wrong with it. It says, "of the adoption of the decision on the cease-fire."

V: Yeah.

K: Now, that means moving further back than they were at the time the cease-fire went into effect.

V: You mean moving at the time when the decision was adopted? That is to 12 o'clock, 50 minutes, in the night, and after that they were moving or they were standing, I'm....

K: That's right. The cease-fire didn't go into effect until last night.

V: _____. .... they were occupying at the moment... or adoption of a cease-fire decision. At the moment of adoption a cease-fire decision. That's positive.

K: And that we cannot possibly go along with. That doesn't make any sense because we specifically said 12 hours after the decision.

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V: Yeah, not later than 12 hours. That's right. Well, _____ you have a point, but actually about the withdrawal to the positions I don't think you have a good point at all.

K: But only it is impossible to enforce.

V: Yeah, well, that....

K: Because no one will know where they were.

V: But, otherwise Henry, that will be something for those violators of the cease-fire later on to capitalize on. Everybody would like to violate cease-fire and get some more territory without withdrawing to..... On both sides.

K: But what about that point on the decision on the cease-fire?

V: Well, here you might have a point. I can conceive that here you might have a point. But the phrase about the withdrawal is a monster, an absolute monster. Otherwise that will be meaningless. The whole thing. And everytime each side will be tempted to take some more territory xxx will use it. There will be no cease-fire. They will be violating every.....

K: I understand that. Let me talk to the President.

V: Yeah. O.K.

K: O.K.

SL159

TELCON
Joe Sisco/David Popper/Secy Kissinger
[Conference Call]
11:10 a.m., October 23, 1973

RELEASED IN FULL

K: David, I just talked to Yuri Vorontsov. They have a Resolution that they want to submit jointly with us.

P: I see.

K: Which I'm going to send over to you in the next 5 minutes.

P: Right.

K: I have told them to do the following: (1) To get a deferral of the meeting until at least 2:00 but better till 3:00, and he's agreed.

P: Good.

K: (2) I have agreed to the Resolution, which in effect just calls on --

P: Calls on the m to observe the ceasefire?

K: To use the UN observers in Cairo. And the only other thing it has is that they should return to the positions where the ceasefire line was. I said I don't like that because no one will ever know it. He said it's better to have it in there with the understanding that no one will ever know what that line was.

S: Except that it will give both sides the opportunity to begin to charge one another with violations. They're foolish to put that in.

P: Take that paragraph out, I agree.

K: Well, then let's tell him that is the one line we want out. Otherwise, we'll accept it.

S: Why do they go the Resolution route? Have you put to them the alternative --

K: Well, what's wrong with a Resolution?

S: It's all right except it will give all sorts of people the opportunity to amend it.

K: Yeah, if they and we will agree that there will be no amendments accepted.

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P: I don't think it will make an order of magnitude difference. It is a little quicker and easier if everybody agrees the President should speak. But I am sure this will work if we both stand behind it.

S: But you ought to press them hard on the deletion of this paragraph in my opinion.

K: Okay. Well, let me get the text. But will you instruct Scali accordingly?

P: We will keep him informed, yes.

K: And tell him to get a deferral together with Malik.

P: Right.

K: Good.

P: Thank you.

K: Bye.

SL1160

TELCON
Minister Vorontsov/Secy Kissinger
11:25a.m., October 23, 1973

RELEASED IN FULL

V: Hello.

K: Yuri.

V: Yes, Henry.

K: I just talked to the President. Two things, (1) we would really like a delay if at all possible.

V: Oh, oh, that'doesn't mean that the Israelis will take some more 50 miles of territory during the delay.

K: No, no; I don't believe -- I don't know how fast they are moving --

V: I don't know either but --

K: At least an hour.

V: Well, the Security Council never meets on the dot but still maybe just to have it started at 12:00 but then the time for agreement on the Resolution and everything like that and you will have your time. But to postpone the meeting is not very good in the eyes of the Arab countries.

K: Can you see whether Malik and Scali can't get some delay?

V: Malik said he has already engaged himself on the 12 o'clock with the Arabs and with the First Chairman or President of the Security Council.

K: You can then get a delay in the vote or something?

V: But later on they can do it. Yes, I know it for sure.

K: Okay. Well, do that then. Secondly, we definitely cannot accept your phrase "withdrawn to the positon where they were at the moment of the adoption of the decision on the ceasefire."

V: How are you suggesting to change it?

K: Well, we have not yet decided. I have just talked to the President. What we could consider is "where they were at the moment the ceasefire went into effect."

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V: Went into effect. Well, okay, I just warn Moscow about this, that you'll have these changes and warn Malik. But, again, let Scali and Malik talk on this.

K: Sure.

V: Okay?

K: Good. But this is not yet definite.

V: I would rather not say definite. I would rather see it as it is in the text.

K: No, that is out of the question.

V: Out of the question.

K: That we will not accept.

V: Okay, let's work on that.

K: Good.

V: Good.

SL158

TELCON
Amb. Dinitz (Israel)/Secy Kissinger
11:04 a.m., October 23, 1973

RELEASED IN FULL

D: Dr. Kissinger, welcome back.

K: Thank you.

D: How are you?

K: I'm fine, a little exhausted.

D: I can imagine. I got very good regards of your visit. The Prime Minister is very thankful for your stop. Dr. Kissinger, I got a message from her this morning to convey to you, the essence of which I conveyed to the General, but in one sentence she wants to assure you personally, confidentially and sincerely that none of the actions taken on the Egyptian front were initiated by us.

K: Okay. Now, listen, let me ask you something.

D: Right.

K: The Russians have just come in and proposed a Resolution in which they ask for an immediate cessation of all fire and activity. You have no problem with that?

D: No, no.

K: And demands that forces should be withdrawn to the position -- you have an ambiguous statement there -- where they were at the time of the adoption of the ceasefire. Now we certainly can't say at the adoption of the ceasefire. We could say where they were at the time the ceasefire went into effect.

D: This I don't know, the second part, because I don't know what the situation this minute is in the field. Since they have initiated fighting, we have returned fighting.

K: All right. And then the rest is to get UN observers that are in Cairo into the field. That's no problem.

D: That I have to check but I understand that Tekohoah has asked the same question. He didn't get a reply yet.

K: Well, would you call?

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D: I will call the Prime Minister and I will let you know on the three points.

K: This is the Resolution: "Confirms its decision about immediate cessation of all fire and all military activity and demands that the forces of the sides should be withdrawn to the position where they were at the moment of the adoption of the decision on ceasefire."

D: Yeah.

K: That we can't accept because it would have to be when the ceasefire went into effect. (2)"Suggest to the Secretary General of the United Nations to immediately take steps for immediate dispatch of UN observers to supervise the observation between the forces of Israel and Egypt, using for that purpose first of all the personnel of the United Nations which is at present in Cairo." Now that we have to accept.

D: Yeah. You are for it?

K: For that, we are.

D: Right.

K: And we are for the first one. I have told the Russians that I'm having trouble with "where they were at the time of the ceasefire".

D: Right, right.

K: But could you let me know --

D: We'll let you know right away.

K: Can you do it within half an hour?

D: Yeah, sure.

K: Good. Thank you.

SL156

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Minister Vorontsov/Kissinger
10:12 a.m. - Oct. 23, 1973

V: Hello.

K: Yuly?

V: Yes, Henry.

K: Yuly, I recommend also we have made urgent representations in Jerusalem or Tel Aviv, whichever place you don't recognize, in Israel, to observe the cease-fire meticulously. We have also replied to, I'm just keeping you informed so that we both know what are you doing. We've also replied to the Egyptians who sent us a note in the same sense. And we think it would be very helpful if you did it to all the parties with which you are in contact.

V: Right. I'll do that. Did you receive our information ....

K: Yes, I did. I appreciated it very much and I really think that if we now hold this together for the next two or three days and then move from there to the guarantees question and the auspices then we will have done good work. Again, for your information and you should work together with us if you agree. We are telling every country that offers their auspices to us that the only joint auspices we're interested in is with the Soviet Union.

V: Yeah, we agree with that and you know that we....

K: We haven't yet committed ourselves to it but we're not entertaining any other proposition.

V: Right.

K: So if you could do that, too, I think we can bring it up as I told the General Secretary last Friday.

V: Good, Henry, thank you for this information.

K: Good, Yuly. Thank you. Bye.

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SL161
(3)

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
David Popper/Joe Sisco/Secy Kissinger
[Conference Call]
11:30 a.m., October 23, 1973

S: Henry, I spoke with Vorontsov.

K: Well, you were not supposed to talk to Vorontsov.

S: Well, I though you said you wanted us to call Vorontsov.

K: Well, but not to negotiate things I'm negotiating with them!

S: We're not negotiating. I'm just reporting something to you and we're going to ask you what you want us to tell John on this. They say that as far as the 12:00 meeting -- No, I have not touched anything; we haven't talked about this Resolution or anything -- They are under very strict instructions to go to the 12:00 meeting. Apparently they feel themselves to be under very considerable pressure from the Egyptians. So my own feeling is we ought not to make any major issue of the timing. If John has a word with Malik, if they can kind of delay it to 1:00, 1:30 or so, fine. But I don't think we ought to make an issue with the Russians on the timing because they feel themselves to be under very considerable pressure from the Egyptians.

K: Okay.

S: Do you agree? Okay. Now, we have said nothing about the Resolution, that's in your hands.

K: Well, now on the Resolution, I have just talked to Dinitz. He's calling Israel.

S: Right.

K: Now, actually, you've got the text of the Resolution.

S: Yes, we've got it but we're not going to do a thing.

K: Well, actually, there's something else wrong with that Resolution.

S: Well, I've just seen it now.

K: Because it's at the time of the adoption of the ceasefire.

S: Sure, sure. I've just read this and my advice again is to even reenforce to you more ....

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K: Yeah, but I can't go into an endless nitpick.

S: Well, I know that but I don't think that phrase is good, Henry.

K: I agree that phrase is no good.

S: All right. We're not doing a thing on the ...

K: I will wait until I hear from Israel.

S: That's right.

K: I will tell Vorontsov now we can accept it without that phrase.

S: Well, okay. I'm not going to tell John anything until you tell us what to tell John.

K: Right.

S: Okay. I have your permission to tell John what I just said on the timing, that's all?

K: Right. But I will tell Vorontsov that they should both delay as much as possible.

S: Yeah, he told us that he was under strict orders at 12:00 o'clock. Frankly, he made it very plain that it was Egyptian pressure.

K: Right.

S: And so if you tell Vorontsov that you have asked Scali to try to work out with Malik a little delay to 1:00, 1:30 or so, he'll understand.

K: Good.

S: Okay.

SL151

Telcon
Amb. Scali/Kissinger
9:44 a.m. - Oct. 23, 1973

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

S: Yes, Henry.

K: Yes, John.

S: The latest development is that we've been in touch with Malek who says he has no information, but perhaps the need to condemn the Israelis on this would appear that it be important to make sure that he gets instructions or has an even-handed... deploring of any violations and cal l on all parties to observe the cease-fire. It is also important, I think, to control as best we can Mr. Altheim who is talking about sending 2,000 stand-by troops from the northern countries and Canada _____ with the ability to have them there within 24 hours.

K: Why are we against sending forces there?

S: We're not against it, I'm just informing you. We have 268 observers standing by ....

K: Those are the ones. I talked to David Popper and he thinks we should call on the Security Council, the President of the Security Council should call on the parties.

S: That's my suggestion.

K: O.K. _____ to cease-fire.

S: That's right. ~~Unless~~ And let's try to avoid a hassle on a new resolution, which would just get everybody involved in the act.

K: O.K. Let me talk to the Russians and see whether they are willing to play.

S: Alright.

K: Good.

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SL153

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Minister Vorontsov
10/23/73; 9:47 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

V: (missed first part) message from Brezhnev and reads like that and they haven't received your message yet. They crossed each other.

K: Right.

V: So it reads like that: First, President Sadat has informed us that in the morning on the 23 of October Israeli forces in violation of the decision of the Security Council renewed firing on the West Coast of the Sues Canal and are moving into the southern direction. We would like to underline that Moscow has its own reliable information which proves that this is the fact and that the Israelis apparently decided to widen their bridgehead on the West coast of the Canal. Thus Israel once again challenges the decision of the Security Council. This is absolutely unacceptable. All this looks like as a flagrant deceit on the part of the Israelis. We will express the confidence that the United States will use all the possibilities they have and its authority to bring the Israelis to order.

K: Well, you have our answer before we got your message.

V: That's right.

K: And you can be sure we are in the most urgent contact -- of course, we get the opposite claim from the Israelis.

V: Well, but . . .

K: I just want you to know we do not have independent means of checking it. I think frankly today's order of business should be to stop it whoever started it.

V: Exactly. Henry, and that's the way it goes later on in the statement. I will continue reading, okay?

K: Oh, I am sorry. I thought you were finished.

V: No, no. No, no.

K: How the hell can I win an argument if I let you finish.

V: You won this argument already but I think you will like what I will say further on. So, it goes without saying that Israeli forces in this case should be withdrawn to the positions where they stayed during the acceptance of the ceasefire decision.

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Second, President Sadat suggests that the Soviet Union and the United States agree among themselves about measures which would insure physical parting of Egyptian and Israeli forces with the help of the observers of the United Nations.

Three, Sadat suggests in particular immediate use of the United Nations observers and first of all the personnel of the United Nations which was placed previously along side the Suez Canal and which is now in Cairo. That is our point of view, Brezhnev says, that it would be really wise to do so since the personnel of the United Nations, which is in Cairo now, need only appropriate orders and they could be immediately dispatched to the place of conflict.

K: All right.

V: Quickly we suggest that the Soviet Union and the United States urgently submit to the Security Council a draft of appropriate resolution to this effect. If the United States side agrees to that, the draft could look like that and follows the text of the draft:

K: What is it?

V: I am getting to it: The Security Council referring to its resolution 338 of October 22, 1973, (1) Confirms its decision about immediate cessation of all fire and all military activity and demands that the forces of the sides should be withdrawn to the position where they were at the moment of the adoption of the decision on ceasefire. (2) Suggest to the Secretary General of the United Nations to immediately take steps for immediate dispatch of the UN observers to supervise the observation of ceasefire between the forces of Israel and Egypt, using for that purpose first of all the personnel of the United Nations which is at present in Cairo.

K: All right.

V: Period. And the last line says that Mr. Brezhnev would like to underline to Secretary Kissinger the urgency of these matters. . .

K: Yuly, I don't have to check this with the President because I know he agrees. The only suggestion I have -- I have two suggestions.

V: Okay.

K: One, could we delay the start of the Security Council meeting until 2:00?

V: Easy.

K: So that we could get our delegates together.

V: Okay.

K: Second, I would recommend deleting from the instructions "withdraw to the line they occupied" because it will lead to endless debate. I don't think anybody gained a hell of a lot. What could they have gained in a few hours?

V: Well, obviously they have gained something. Otherwise our side wouldn't raise this question.

K: I don't know the situation and I have no basic objection to it.

V: It would be better, of course, to keep this. There will be agruments, exactly of a half a mile or something like that but politically that will be expedient of course to urge that everybody would return where they were last night.

K: Of course they will never agree on where they were last night so it doesn't make any difference.

V: Well, let them argue -- not fight at least.

K: Look, I agree and I will instruct Scali immediately. You can inform Moscow.

V: Good.

K: That we agree -- that I urge that the meeting be put off at least until 2:00. We will inform the Israelis if you will inform the Arabs.

V: Okay.

K: I will instruct Scali in this sense and we will agree to this resolution.

V: You will agree to this resolution.

K: We may have a word about "withdraw to the Line" but as long as we both understand this that is not going to be easy to enforce. I am not going to quarrel about it.

V: I think in Moscow they gave some attention to this phrase so we better keep it here.

K: Okay. Now we are sending over to you an oral message for the General Secretary about the appropriate auspices issue.

V: Fine.

K: I think he will like. Let me get my people immediately sothat we get the word.

V: Fine, Henry.

K: Send over that message.

V: I'll send the message.

K: Good.

SL154

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
McCloskey/Kissinger
9:59 a.m. - Oct. 23, 1973

K: Bob.

M: Morning, Henry.

K: Bob, we've cancelled the press conference for today.

M: Oh, you have?

K: Yes.

M. O.K. I'm trying to make my way from Chevy Chase into the Department now; that's good for me to know; I'll be there very shortly.

K: What do you mean you're trying to make it? Don't give me that _____ drama. In other words, you're going to come from Chevy Chase to the Department.

M: If the Department will send a care out to get me.

K: I'll just talk to the Deputy Secretary sitting here with me saying that everyone of the Assistant Secretaries then should get his own car.

M: Yes, well, I raised that with you on the plane last night. I'll be interested to know why, when I get a chance to speak with you, they cancelled.

K: I'll tell you now. Because Elliott Richardson is giving a press conference at 11:00, and they didn't think I could compete with him.

M: _____ later.

K: And I didn't think I could compete with him.

M: I understand. They had referred to that in one message yesterday, last night. I agree, Mr. Secretary, I .....

K: Bob, it is largely my own fault. I do not believe that foreign policy should be used, even by implication, as something that is used to take the heat off domestic politics, and I just think it looks bad if 3 hours after Richardson has done whatever he's going to do, I trot out foreign policy. The second reason why I thought it was a bad

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idea was we're meeting with the Congressional leaders at 9:30 tomorrow morning. I don't it's proper for me to give a press conference before we've even talked to the Congressional leaders. Don't you?

M: Indeed. I couldn't agree more. But they knew all of that yesterday and still wanted to do it.

K: Yeah, but I wasn't here to explain it to them.

M: Alright then, we'll probably have to go ahead with our regular little thing.

K: Yeah. Make it as uninformative as possible.

M: I took care of the prisoners' matter last night at the airport.

K: Good.

M: O.K., sir.

K: You have that great drive for purity. You don't accept surrender. It's got to be done for the right reasons, too.

M: Yeah, it's an old Irish tradition.

K: That is actually true. It enabled 2 million to dominate a nation of 200.

M: Well, I tell you, and you know that has to be some kind of an achievement.

K: It is an achievement. Good, Bob. Thank you. I'll see you when I get to the Department.

M: Thank you, sir.

K: Right.

SL152

Telcon
Minister Vorontsov
9:45 a.m. - October 23, 1973

RELEASED IN FULL

V: Hello.

K: Yuly?

V: Yes, Henry. Good morning.

K: How are you? First of all, many thanks for the great kindness with which we were treated.

V: Oh, that's wonderful.

K: And we think, and I've just come from the President, we think we did a historic work.

V: That's exactly the case.

K: And now we have to build on it.

V: Right.

K: Now I have two problems. One, I'm sending you a note which you can play with, which you can weigh, which I inform you as I have already done your Ambassador in London

V: Yes.

K: That the Israelis have agreed in principle to the guarantee that's used, subject to a few modifications.

V: Right.

K: So I hope by the end of this week we will have that on the way.

V: Yes, yes, that's good.

K: Also, for your information, I mean your leaderships' information, we have told the British that the only sponsorship we are interested in is joint sponsorship with the Soviet Union. And that we don't want any larger group, which I understand is our understanding.

V: Right.

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K: Now, we have the immediate problem of the allegations by both sides that the other side has broken the cease-fire.

V: Yes.

K: And I recommend that at the Security Council we do our utmost to act together, if that's possible. Our judgment, but we're willing to listen to you, it's just our best judgment, is that we have the Security Council ask the Secretary General to call on all parties to observe the cease-fire immediately.

V: Yep, right.

K: And, if you are willing to have the Security Council call on the UN observers to make their services available to the two parties. You know, the observers that are there. We are also willing to consider the proposal of the Scandanavian countries to send a force there, but we're not proposing it, we're telling you what we are willing to consider. But I think the meeting today at 12:15, the easiest is, rather than a new resolution, to have the President of the Security Council be asked to appeal to both parties, and to all parties, and to offer the services of the UN observers. I want to tell you that we are urgently in touch with the Israelis. Above all, I think we should not have controversy between our two delegations today.

V: Right.

K: And I have instructed Scali not to say anything critical or attacking the Soviet Union.

V: Yeah, that's good. Yeah, I'm just writing down all this to report immediately to Moscow.

K: Now if you have problems getting through to Moscow we can get you a phone line opened up.

V: No, no. It's o.k., we can manage it. I'll do it in no time.

K: Good. Will you call me back?

V: Yes, I'll call you back whenever I have something from them.

K: When is the Ambassador coming back?

V: Well, he's _____ down somewhere in Frankfurt to get here on time and something happened to the plane. So he took another plane and will be here around 4:00.

K: O.K. Good. Fine. Many thanks. Bye.
V: Thank you. Bye.

SC155

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
McCloskey/Kissinger
10:05 - Oct. 23, 1973

K: Bob.

M: Yes, sir.

K: Can you also cancel the China trip tomorrow and say we will have a new date to announce in the very near future? For your information that will be tomorrow. And the new date is the 26th to the 29th of November, but that's for your information. As a favor to you we'll fly over Cyprus on the way.

M: O.K. Thanks very much. I'll take care of that.

K: O.K.

M: Alright, sir.

K: Bye.

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SL174

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
October 23, 1973
1:40

D: We accept the changes you wanted in the first case and second. So we are accepting it together.

K: Give me ten minutes to let those maniacs in New York know..

D: I have contacted Malik and he has told Scali, so Scali knows.

K: Good.

END

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
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SL170

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Scali/Secretary Kissinger
October 23, 1973
1:15

S: Hello Henry.

K: Hi, John.

S: I am meeting with the President in his office and with Malik and Al Zayyat. And Malik is threatening to invoke the resolution on his own.

K: I have just talked with Vorontsov who is in touch with Moscow. You tell Malik to stop his god damn pressure tactics and give us the time to do it.

S: *I will tell him that. He says... (rapid talking)*

K: Will you stop a minute.. stop.. stop.. Stop your speech and I will tell you what we are for. We are for observers. We are for the cease-fire. The Soviet is contrary.. because it goes back to the line when the cease-fire was passed. What we would most like is a cease-fire with immediate establishment of observers. Afterwards we will support any condemnation of a crossing of that line.

S: I will tell Malik.

K: You tell him. Will you call me back?

S: I will call you back.

END

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
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SL172

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Dobrynin/ Kissinger
October 23, 1973
1:35

K: I should have known with you in town we are in deep trouble. Let me tell you what we have.... Confirm decision about immediate cessation of all military action.. and urges that the forces of the two sides be returned to the positions they occupied at the time the cease-fire became effective.

D: Yep.

K: And say the same thing.. We are willing to accept this and make it a joint resolution if you will.

D: Good, yes.

K: In the second paragraph.. Using for this purpose.. personnel in Middle East... and personnel on Cairo now, between you and me, I would not hold up deliberations on that.

D: Not understand..

K: It should be included in.. I think it is a reasonable proposal. Don't you?

D: I do too. I will talk to Malik and I will confirm.

K: It is better to argue about where the line is.. the principle of withdrawal. We want you and us to slow about that debate.

D: Let them argue but just not fight..

K: Secondly, we attach great importance to the understanding between the Secretary -General and me about the exchange of ..

D: I repeat this to Moscow.

K: Emphasize it again. Let me know.

D: I need 5 minutes.

K: We will make it a joint resolution.

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D: A joint resolution. Malik has insisted to make it separate.

K: Tell Malik not to . If you can accept my language. .

D: Exactly, exactly. We can accept. I. then need 5 minutes.

K: OK, good bye.

END

SL173

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Scali/Secretary Kissinger
October 23, 1973
1:36

S: Malik is acting like a god damn idiot.

K: You tell Malik to calm down. We are in the process of working it out.

S: Tell him right now?

K: Yes. Tell him right now. Vorontsov is now in the process of getting instructions from Moscow.

S: He claims that he has talked to Vorontsov and has gotten..

K: I have just talked to Vorontsov and given him our proposal. You tell Malik to hold his water or I will send him to Siberia. I know Breshnev better that he does. Ask him if he has ever been kissed on the mouth by Breshnev as I have. Tell him to go to Vorontsov. We have made a new proposal and we think we will..

S: OK, I'll tell him.

END

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SL-171

TELECON
Scowcroft/Kissinger
October 23, 1973
1:25

RELEASED IN FULL

S: It had already gone. Do you want to add another.

K: No. No, let it go. I will have another one to go later

S: Alright.

END

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
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SL169

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Major General Scowcroft/Kissinger
October 23, 1973
1:21

K: Have you sent the hot line message out yet?

S: It has just gone.

K: Can you stop it?

S: I think so.

K: Well, I want to add a line.

S: OK, I'll stop it.

K: Just call me back. I mean to add a line but call me when you have stopped it.

S: Yes.

END

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SL162

(6)

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Minister Vorontsov/Secy Kissinger
11:32 a.m., October 23, 1973

V: Yes, Henry.

K: Yuri, I will let you know within half an hour, 45 minutes, but it must be where at the line established when the ceasefire went into effect.

V: It's firm now.

K: It's not yet firm but only one we're now considering.

V: Went into effect. Right, I've got it.

K: On the other one, now, there's only one other point we have, which I know is no problemm -- where you say you think for that purpose, first of all, the personnel of the United Nations which is at present in Cairo.

V: Right.

K: What we would like to say is "using for that purpose UN personnel now in the Middle East but first of all --

V: Now in the Middle East.

K: And first of all --

V: By this line, you mean --

K: The ones that Are in Jerusalem, for example.

V: Un-huh. Not Syrian situation you have in mind?

K: No.

V: Since we are talking about Egypt and --

K: No, no. What we have in mind is the Egyptian sithation.

V: Yeah.

K: It applies specifically only to Egypt.

V: Yeah, I see. So you mean from that line, from the Israeli side, yes, to engage --

K: Just to have more personnel available.

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V: Yeah, all the personnel available there. First of all which is in Cairo. Well, I don't think there will be any problem here. But, Henry, there is a problem about postponement. Scali suggested to Malik 3 o'clock. It's terrible of course.

K: No, no; I have just instructed that they should start the meeting and delay the vote.

V: Yeah. Okay.

K: Okay?

V: Yeah, it's okay so far as I'm concerned. I don't have time to consult with the government in Moscow, you understand.

K: But tell Malik what I suggested.

V: I'll tell Malik. I'm just contacting him now.

K: Good. Thank you.

V: Okay.

E7.23.00 73 (5)

SL163

TELCON
David Popper/Secy Kissinger 8 Sept
11:

RELEASED IN FULL

K: David, I've talked to the President and I don't want any cute stuff now on what should or shouldn't be done because we've got a reality. (1) Scali should get in touch with Malik to try to delay the vote if he can't delay the meeting.

P: Delay the vote?

K: Yeah.

P: All right.

K: Secondly, we cannot consider as it's phrased "at the time of the adoption of the decision on the ceasefire."

P: Yes, I understand.

K: What we could consider is "at the time the ceasefire went into effect."

P: Yes.

K: And I don't see that we have a strong moral ground to refuse this, do you?

P: No, we do not I think. I can't see why.

K: And who will know where that was anyway?

P: Of course, there will always be disputation about it. But we do need to insist that we're talking about the moment when the ceasefire went into effect.

K: Yeah, but don't tell Scali yet that we've agreed to that!

P: All right.

K: Tell him that nothing more than that can be even considered; the President is still studying that, which is exactly the position.

P: His only action at the moment is as to timing.

K: Right.

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P: Okay, yes, sir.

K: And I've got word to Dinitz and I think we may go as far as "at the time the decision went into effect."

P: Right. You're awaiting a reply from Dinitz?

K: Right. What is your view on it?

P: I think it's absolutely right.

K: Are you sure?

P: I'm sure that the time the ceasefire went into effect is the moment we should consider; not the time the decision was adopted, yes.

K: Because I really have trouble understanding how we can not take this position now and then insist on it when the Egyptians grab a piece of territory.

P: Absolutely, absolutely. This is the only firm line we have, whether we know it is.

K: Right.

S: For example, Mr. Secretary, one other thing, but we should not raise it at this point. Really now that I've looked at this second paragraph, it says: "To supervise the observation of the ceasefire between the forces of Israel and the Arab Republic of Egypt." We really think for this purpose, first of all, the personnel of the United Nations which is present in Cairo -- Why, you've got personnel in Jerusalem, you've got personnel all over the place. But you know this is not an issue. They ought to be using personnel from both places. *That's a mere technicality.*

K: No, I wouldn't mind saying the United Nations personnel in the Middle East and first of all from Cairo.

P: That's better because there are relatively few in Cairo, quite a few in Jerusalem who could come down quite quickly.

K: Well, why don't we say that?

P: We will.

S: You want us to do this or you're going to do it because we don't want it done in two places, you see.

K: Okay. I will tell this to Vorontsov when I give him the other decision, which will be within the hour.

P: Right.

K: O^Kay.

SL165

TELCON
Sisco/HAK
October 23, 1973/12:12 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I just want to keep the lines of communication straight.

S: I'll pass along whatever you want me to pass along to him.

K: But I don't want to break Popper's morale. The Israelis of course will not accept the one even as edited. We turned to the decisions at the time that the ceasefire. Now, what I think we should tell the Russians is that if they want to make a joint resolution we can make it confirms the immediate cessation of all activities and have a second paragraph on the observer personnel. That part we can make joint. We cannot make it a joint resolution that demands that they return to the prime, at the moment of the adoption of the ceasefire because that's inconsistent with the original resolution. If they ammend it to make it at the time that the ceasefire went into effect we will abstain from it.

S: Right.

K: Don't you think?

S: Well, let me reflect on that. I think myself, if you, if the Russians go ahead on this and we end up abstaining, I think now the Russians and others begin to beat us over the head in the area. I think myself that if you press them hard enough you can get the deletion of that portion and that's what I think we ought to do in order to stay together. Because, if then, they come out on the side of God, we then put ourselves in the position...

K: OK, why don't you call Voronstov and tell him I'm in a meeting and say this is our decision and I will call him in half an hour. That way I don't get into a shouting match with him.

S: I will not say anything about the abstension because they'll bite at that.

K: Just tell him ...

S: What we need deleted.

K: And tell him that once the observers are in the field we give them our assurance we will vote for any resolution censuring people crossing the line. See what I mean.

S: Sure. Give them that kind of assurance. Also you can use the ____ argument.

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K: But that right now it's impossible to determine what the original line was .

S: Of course. That's a practical fact.

K: OK. And that this is the way to get a speedly resolution.

S: I'll take it at this level and you follow up and you're the one that has to do it. You can do it.

K: But tell him you got that from me but I'm in a meeting with the President which is continuing.

S: Thank you very much.

SL167

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Vorontsov/HAK
October 23, 1973/12:56 p.m.

K: Ury, we are having urgent meetings here but there is one thing we will certainly not accept and will certainly veto.

V: Which one?

K: The draft that says it has to be the line at the time the decision was taken. That's absured.

V: That one ...

K: I understand now that Malick is being very difficult in New York and insisted on introducing his own resolution.

V: No, I don't think he will do that. It's a pressure tactic. But, I hope I'll get on that point, instruction from Moscow any minute now but what worried me ....

K: I understand you are to worry and we're meeting urgently on that but could you get Malick quieted down in the meantime?

V: Yes, I'll try to do that if you promise to go back to the formula in whatever about the timing.

K: That's what we are meeting on now and it will take me another 45 minutes.

V: And Henry, I am afraid if you just do what Sisco said that could mean a terrible trouble for and General Secretary and between you and General Secretary because....that's absolutely terrible.

K: I must tell you he has lost his voice thank God so he can't yell at me.

V: Who did that?

K: The General Secretary has a cold. Now look.

V: He won't do it through my voice and that's the trouble.

K: We have done some historic things this weekend and we should both try to preserve it.

V: Henry, its very important.

K: Will you get Malick quieted down in the meantime until we ...

V: I'll try on the assumption you are thinking about some kind of language about withdrawal.

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SL166

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
~~XXXX~~ Popper/HAK
October 23, 1973/~~XXXX~~ 12:55 p.m.

K: Hello.

P: Mr. Secretary. I just wanted to report to you that Malick is not being cooperative in New York. They are arguing in the office of the Security Council President now. He says he has instructions and he is instructed to go with his resolution alone if we won't go with him which is of course not the understanding on our side and I've urged them to advise him strongly not to do that. It is not our understanding of the script and this argument is now proceeding up in New York.

K: With theline at the time the decision was taken?

P: Yes, with the line at the time the decision was taken without any change. We do not have an exact text of his language but it is with the provision.

K: Then Scali has to take him on and say that's absurd because that is contrary to the Security Council resolution.

P: Contrary to?

K: It's obviously contrary to the resolution because the decision meant there was a 12 hour period.

P: Yes, of course. Well, alright but the point I'm making is this...

K: I'm trying to get it turned off. I understand the point.

P: Alright.

K: Now, I've asked for a meeting and I'm coming over.

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SL164

TELCON
Dinitz/HAK
October 23, 1973/12:00 noon

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

D: Dr. Kissinger. I just got a reply from the Foreign Minister. With regard to the first paragraph we have no difficulty. With regard to the third paragraph, that of the U.N. observers, we are prepared that they should appoint a liaison officer and we discuss the thing on the spot we have no objection. With regard to the second paragraph the return to the original place. The Prime Minister wants you to know that we have intelligence document which we can pass to you as well as signs in the field that they have opened an attack, which all of this they have communicated to their forces to improve their position. They have inflicted on us _____ this both in tanks and personnel. And only then we have reacted and we can document it to you.

K: I understand that but that doesn't change the situation.

D: No, and therefore, as a result of this battle have developed, there has been no marching in the field of what the situation was when the ceasefire initiated. And therefore it is totally impossible for us or for anyone to accept that paragraph two because it is completely obsolute. It is no possibility, speaking in terms of responsibility, and it is in terms of fixing it. So that is why we would--not only we -- nobody would be able to reascertain it.

K: That I agree with but supposing such a paragraph passes. What difference does it make?

D: It makes only a difference in the sense that it would allow the Russians and the Egyptians to demand withdrawal of our forces on some of the possitions that they are right now as a result of the Egyptian violation. That is the point.

K: Because quite frankly, the President feels that if we don't agree. I mean, what they are proposoing we will not agree to which is in a position...

D: That of course is ridiculous because that wasn't even asked by the resolution.

K: Since nobody will be able to tell where that was to begin with it cannot be given practical effect.

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D: That is why it shouldn't be adopted this paragraph.

K: But it is important for any future attempt by the Egyptian side to try to grab some territory that we did not insist that the fait accompli is still...

D: That is why we accept the idea of observers. Because only when you have observers in the _____ mouth can you effectively tell whether movements have taken place so I think if I made the argument for the Russians in the discussions should be that now that there are observers a fixed position can be attained.

K: You know what will happen? There will be a majority for that position.

D: For the position of their attempt.

K: We have two choices. If we say withdraw to the position where they were at the moment of adoption of the decision on the ceasefire that's ridiculous. That's inconsistent with the resolution.

D: That shows that....

K: I know, let's not argue about it. The second point is supposing they amend it to say at the time of the ceasefire.

D: That is what we were discussing because the first one I dismissed right away and on this the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense have a very documented development.

K: My problem is what do we do at the U. N.

D: That's what I said...

K: We can veto the fourth Russian draft. That we can do. We can abstain from when it says at the time of the decision of the caeasefire but we can't veto that.

D: I think the thing is very--if I may, I don't see what difficulty there is to say that before the Security Council can determine who was at fault they cannot demand of any side that we acted through the XXX fighting.

K: Yes, but they could take the position, it doesn't make any difference who was at fault. The easy way to settle it is to go back to the line.

D: But who will determine this?

K: I think it is indeterminable.

D: That is why one should not accept a resolution that cannot be executed. Because that is what put us in our.....

K: OK Fine. Bye.

RELEASED IN FULL SL168

TELECON
Major General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
October 23, 1973
1:10

S: I told him to hold off from..but I can't keep off the line.

K: Yes, but he can't go with the other resolution.
This resolution is to do it at the time the cease-fire was voted..that is out of the question.

S: That's right

K: The only possible solution is to ..it at the time the cease-fire went into effect.

S: That's right. He said he would have him hold off.

K: good.

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SL150

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
David Popper/HAK
October 23, 1973/9:39 a.m.

K: Hello. David I need you over here but before I see you. I'm at the White House. I'd like your judgment that _____**** Waldheim says he has some U.N. forces lying around in Scandinavia.

P: What he has is a statement by Scandinavian countries... call and bring you up to date their long standing offer to furnish forces.

K: Let's not waste time on that. The Egyptians have called for a Security Council meeting at noon or 12:15.

P: Right. Can I tell you what I think the situation in New York looks like.

K: I don't give a damn what the situation looks like. I want to know what we and the Soviets can propose.

P: Well, the quickest thing would be to see if we can get the President of the Security Council after hearing the parties, to appeal to both sides to observe the ceasefire. After that it is possible to get a resolution passed as in 1967 demanding that the parties comply in violation cease. The latter will be more difficult because there will be considerable tendency to ask for a one sided resolution in which the Israelis will be found to have violated the ceasefire etc. In fact Scali has just told me I was just on the phone with him, that Mollok has not yet received instructioms but of course wants to blame the Israelis for what has happened. And this is the thing we want to avoid.

K: Right.

P: So that I would suggest that if it works that way that the President's appeal is the way to wind up this meeting quickly if we can and then we should see in the hours and days to come where we go from there.

K: How about the U.N. observers.

P: The U.N. observers are on the spot. They've been pushed out of their old observation posts. We know their headquarters is intact in Jerusalem there are some in Cairo ....

K: I know that. Can we tell them that we favor that they be activated as a first step.

P: That's exactly what I think we should do and so I've told Scali.

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K: I want to confer with the Russians. How about getting a force in there.

P: Well, we can certainly do that.

K: Well, are we in favor or not. I know we can do it. My question is what do you think.

P: Yes. I think we should get it in there soon.

K: You mean, accept the Scandinavian proposal?

P: I think we have to find our what is involved. Who they are and how many? But Scandinavian and Canadian troops I think....

K: OK. Let me get to Vorontsov so that he can get to Moscow.

P: Good.

5030 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Dobrynin/Kissinger
October 26, 1973
1:35

K: I should have known with you in town we are in deep trouble. Let me tell you what we have.... Confirm decision about immediate cessation of all military action.. and urges that the forces of the two sides be returned to the positions they occupied at the time the cease-fire became effective.

D: Yep.

K: And say the same thing.. We are willing to accept this and make it a joint resolution if you will.

D: Good, yes.

K: In the second paragraph.. Using for this purpose.. personnel in Middle East... and personnel on Cairo now, between you and me, I would hold up deliberations on that.

D: Not understand..

K: It should be included in.. I think it is a reasonable proposal. Don't you?

D: I do too. I will talk to Malik and I will confirm.

K: It is better to argue about where the line is.. the principle of withdrawal. We want you and us to slow about that debate.

D: Let them argue but just not fight..

K: Secondly, we attach great importance to the understanding between the Secretary -General and me about the exchange of ..

D: I repeat this to Moscow.

K: Emphasize it again. Let me know.

D: I need 5 minutes.

K: We will make it a joint resolution. -

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D: A joint resolution. Malik has insisted to make it separate.

K: Tell Malik not to . If you can accept my language. .

D: Exactly, exactly. We can accept. I then need 5 minutes.

K: OK, good bye.

END

50 32 *

TELCON
Minister Vorontsov/Secy Kissinger
11:25 a.m., October 23, 1973

RELEASED IN FULL

V: Hello.

K: Yuri.

V: Yes, Henry.

K: I just talked to the President. Two things, (1) we would really like a delay if at all possible.

V: Oh, oh, that'doesn't mean that the Israelis will take some more 50 miles of territory during the delay.

K: No, no; I don't believe -- I don't know how fast they are moving --

V: I don't know either but --

K: At least an hour.

V: Well, the Security Council never meets on the dot but still maybe just to have it started at 12:00 but then the time for agreement on the Resolution and everything like that and you will have your time. But to postpone the meeting is not very good in the eyes of the Arab countries.

K: Can you see whether Malik and Scali can't get some delay?

V: Malik said he has already engaged himself on the 12 o'clock with the Arabs and with the First Chairman or President of the Security Council.

K: You can then get a delay in the vote or something?

V: But later on they can do it. Yes, I know it for sure.

K: Okay. Well, do that then. Secondly, we definitely cannot accept your phrase "withdrawn to the positon where they were at the moment of the adoption of the decision on the ceasefire."

V: How are you suggesting to change it?

K: Well, we have not yet decided. I have just talked to the President. What we could consider is "where they were at the moment the ceasefire went into effect."

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V: Went into effect. Well, okay, I just warn Moscow about this, that you'll have these changes and warn Malik. But, again, let Scali and Malik talk on this.

K: Sure.

V: Okay?

K: Good. But this is not yet definite.

V: I would rather not see definite. I would rather see it as it is in the text.

K: No, that is out of the question.

V: Out of the question.

K: That we will not accept.

V: Okay, let's work on that.

K: Good.

V: Good.

TL: D TELCONS *

5029

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
October 28, 1978
1:40

RELEASED IN FULL

D: We accept the changes you wanted in the first case and second. So we are accepting it together.

K: Give me ten minutes to let those maniacs in New York know..

D: I have contacted Malik and he has told Scali, so Scali knows.

K: Good.

END

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5031 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Minister Vorontsov/Secy Kissinger
11:32 a.m., October 23, 1973

V: Yes, Henry.

K: Yuri, I will let you know within half an hour, 45 minutes, but it must be where at the line established when the ceasefire went into effect.

V: It's firm now.

K: It's not yet firm but only one we're now considering.

V: Went into effect. Right, I've got it.

K: On the other one, now, there's only one other point we have, which I know is no problem -- where you say you think for that purpose, first of all, the personnel of the United Nations which is at present in Cairo.

V: Right.

K: What we would like to say is "using for that purpose UN personnel now in the Middle East but first of all --

V: Now in the Middle East.

K: And first of all --

V: By this line, you mean --

K: The ones that Are in Jerusalem, for example.

V: Un-huh. Not Syrian situation you have in mind?

K: No.

V: Since we are talking about Egypt and --

K: No, no. What we have in mind is the Egyptian situation.

V: Yeah.

K: It applies specifically only to Egypt.

V: Yeah, I see. So you mean from that line, from the Israeli side, yes, to engage --

K: Just to have more personnel available.

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V: Yeah, all the personnel available there. First of all which is in Cairo. Well, I don't think there will be any problem here. But, Henry, there is a problem about postponement. Scali suggested to Malik 3 o'clock. It's terrible of course.

K: No, no; I have just instructed that they should start the meeting and delay the vote.

V: Yeah. Okay.

K: Okay?

V: Yeah, it's okay so far as I'm concerned. I don't have time to consult with the government in Moscow, you understand.

K: But tell Malik what I suggested.

V: I'll tell Malik. I'm just contacting him now.

K: Good. Thank you.

V: Okay.

5028 *

TELECON
Dobrynin/Kissinger
October 23, 1973
7:10 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

D. What are you doing here with Voronsov?

K. The moment he is alone here there is a crisis.

D. When I left Moscow...all the members of the Politburo... Now it looks really rather negative after your trip to Israel all these developments.

K. We had another joint resolution this afternoon.... You agree with the Egyptians on something.

D. The only point which I was surprised you refused to accept was paragraph 2 about the ceasefire line.

K. What paragraph 2?

D. Of the resolution calling for them to return to the position previously agreed upon.

K. First of all that isn't true. The extraordinary difficulty is deciding where the line started. We didn't want to get into a hassle about where the line had been. Finally we joined you. I had to talk to the President.

D. It looks fine again. Were you surprised?

K. I had absolutely no knowledge of this.

D. I think nothing really.

K. Voronsov called me at 10:00 this morning. By 1:00 we had agreed to it. That is not an undue delay.

D. What is the situation in the field?....

K. The Israelis swear that the Egyptians attacked them first. We have no separate information.

D. What is the situation? The fighting continues or stops?

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K. I think it stops. We have urged the Israelis in the strongest terms to stop it.

D. Did they begin to...the position as they issued on Sunday.

K. They say they would agree to it. But who knows what that position was. They will never agree.

D. Don't you know through your reconnaissance.

K. We haven't done any air reconnaissance. Lets say we do not know what the actual situation is frankly.

D. You don't know yet.

K. We have sent two urgent messages today to stop and I have had the Israeli Ambassador in here to stop.

D. Brezhnev, when I left....

K. It isn't right for Voronsov to say he had to complain to the Politburo. You can't give us a resolution and expect an answer in ten minutes. It is amazing. We....

D. It was agreed upon by you and Brezhnev that there would be a ceasefire in 12 hours.

K. Your resolution said they should return to the position at the time the ceasefire was agreed upon....We made another not to determine whether we could agree to something that nobody could enforce. The Egyptians say one thing, the Israelis another, you don't know and we don't know.

D. He had to call again to Moscow. He agreed on the second line. Then in a few moments Sisco called.

K. He had no right to do that. I straightened that out. It wasn't easy to get a winning side to accept a ceasefire. From that point on Israel was winning and we nevertheless agreed to it.

D. We didn't make any definition in Moscow as to who was winning.

K. We made a great effort to make the agreement.

D. I am more worried about our understanding than the Arabs....

K. We have spent all day today to get the Israelis to stop and I think they have now stopped.

D. I would like to see you tomorrow. If you don't mind.

K. I think we have the...in principal of the Israelis in our joint auspices.

D. They agreed to this one.

K. Not yet 100 percent. If we can get the prisoner thing settled they will agree to it. I had along talk with the Prime Minister. I have already sent a message to Brezhnev to that effect.

D. Do you think we should talk tomorrow. You are having a press conference tomorrow?

K. No, on Thursday. I also wanted to talk to you. There will be a few ups and downs within the next few weeks. We have settled this in a very diplomatic way....

D. This is exactly the point. All right, Henry. The most important thing is the agreement between you and Brezhnev and the whole situation in the Middle East. If we hold that firm it doesn't matter what happens, we will survive. If we drag this anchor through the winds.---

K. You have known me long enough. I will not trick Brezhnev. That is the stupidist thing I could do. Even if we win this one we could never have a trusting relationship again. We cannot control everything the Israelis do. They swear that Egyptians started it.

D. The question is to stop and continue discussions politically with the Secretary General.

K. That we are prepared to do. I had a meeting with the Jewish community on the MFN issue. We are making progress now. We are going to drop Title 4 from the House bill.

D. It all?

K. Altogether. It is too complex to change overnight. They are going to work with me to work with Jackson to change his Senate bill and when it comes to the House we will change it once more and get an acceptable bill. It was by far the best meeting we have had.

D. Were my friends there.

K. Fisher, Stein and Moss were there....I am telling it to you not to ask anything of the Soviet Union but to give you a sense of the mood. I think we had a marvelous meeting this week.

D. When Brezhnev spoke to you I was next to him by telephone. But he asked me once again to come. He was pleased with the meeting.

K. Tell me one thing....I give you my word of honor I knew nothing about what happened today except....

D. Tomorrow you will call. We can go through what happened in these few days.

K. I have postponed my trip to China.

D. When are you going there?

K. At least a month. At the end of November.

D. What was the reaction of the Chinese? I think they will have more time to prepare.

K. Not very well. They know we introduced two joint resolutions. I will call you tomorrow.

SL149

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec. Gen. Waldheim/HAK
October 23, 1973/9:32a.m.

K: Hello.

W: Good morning Dr. kissinger.

K: Hello Mr. Secretary General

W: Welcome back.

K: Thank you.

W: I am sorry to disturb you so early I know you must be very tired.

K: No, that's alright.

W: Well, we are very happy and grateful for whatyou did in Moscow and I only hope it will now help us to achieve real peace in the area...

K: I agree.

W: In this connection I have only to tell you that I talked about an hour ago to the Ambassador of Egypt and he is informing me that Israel has broken the ceasefire. He bitterly complained about it and he said that....

K: Well, I have the same call from the Israelis.

W: Yes, exactly. The Morning News also published the fact that on both sides the fighting is going on and Egypt is requesting a Security Council meeting for 12 noon. I discussed this with the President of the Security Council and he says well, of course, he has no choice. He will convene the Council for 12 noon. But, Dr. Kissinger, I wanted to tell you this. We have been informed by the Nordic countries and also by the Canadians and Austrians. They have sent 5 forces, we heard between about 4,000 to 5,000 soldiers of those Nordic countries plus Canada and Austria standing by so if you feel that we can help in this regard - because my [redacted] conviction is that as long as we don't have people, soldiers there, as observers but even better at least keeping forces in a buffer zone or whatever you want to call it as long as we don't have this I think this fighting in one way or the other will continue as...

K: We are in favor of some United Nations force there. Let me get some of my colleagues together and call you back.

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W: Yes. You see, I just wanted to let you know that I have inquired and we have the possibility if this is agreeable to you and the Russians. If you think that this can be helpful we have these soldiers ready in the Nordic countries as well as in Canada and Austria and I think within the shortest possible time they could be flown there.

K: OK. Let me consult my colleagues [redacted] and the Soviets and see what they think.

W: Fine. I will then wait.

K: You will hear from me very shortly.

W: Thank you very much. Goodbye.

SO 331*

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Minister Vorontsov
10/23/73; 9:47 a.m.

V: (missed first part) message from Brezhnev and reads like that and they haven't received your message yet. They crossed each other.

K: Right.

V: So it reads like that: First, President Sadat has informed us that in the morning on the 23 of October Israeli forces in violation of the decision of the Security Council renewed firing on the West Coast of the Suez Canal and are moving into the southern direction. We would like to underline that Moscow has its own reliable information which proves that this is the fact and that the Israelis apparently decided to widen their bridgehead on the West coast of the Canal. Thus Israel once again challenges the decision of the Security Council. This is absolutely unacceptable. All this looks like as a flagrant deceit on the part of the Israelis. We will express the confidence that the United States will use all the possibilities they have and its authority to bring the Israelis to order.

K: Well, you have our answer before we got your message.

V: That's right.

K: And you can be sure we are in the most urgent contact -- of course, we get the opposite claim from the Israelis.

V: Well, but . . .

K: I just want you to know we do not have independent means of checking it. I think frankly today's order of business should be to stop it whoever started it.

V: Exactly. Henry, and that's the way it goes later on in the statement. I will continue reading, okay?

K: Oh, I am sorry. I thought you were finished.

V: No, no. No, no.

K: How the hell can I win an argument if I let you finish.

V: You won this argument already but I think you will like what I will say further on. So, it goes without saying that Israeli forces in this case should be withdrawn to the positions where they stayed during the acceptance of the ceasefire decision.

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Second, President Sadat suggests that the Soviet Union and the United States agree among themselves about measures which would insure physical parting of Egyptian and Israeli forces with the help of the observers of the United Nations.

Three, Sadat suggests in particular immediate use of the United Nations observers and first of all the personnel of the United Nations which was placed previously along side the Suez Canal and which is now in Cairo. That is our point of view, Brezhnev says, that it would be really wise to do so since the personnel of the United Nations, which is in Cairo now, need only appropriate orders and they could be immediately dispatched to the place of conflict.

K: All right.

V: Quickly we suggest that the Soviet Union and the United States urgently submit to the Security Council a draft of appropriate resolution to this effect. If the United States side agrees to that, the draft could look like that and follows the text of the draft:

K: What is it?

V: I am getting to it: The Security Council referring to its resolution 338 of October 22, 1973, (1) Confirms its decision about immediate cessation of all fire and all military activity and demands that the forces of the sides should be withdrasn to the position where they were at the moment of the adoption of the decision on ceasefire. (2) Suggest to the Secretary General of the United Nations to immediately take steps for immediate dispatch of the UN observers to supervise the observation of ceasefire between the forces of Israel and Egypt, using for that purpose first of all the personnel of the United Nations which is at present in Cairo.

K: All right.

V: Period. And the last line says that Mr. Brezhnev would like to underline to Secretary Kissinger the urgency of these matters. . .

K: Yuly, I don't have to check this with the President because I know he agrees. The only suggestion I have -- I have two suggestions.

V: Okay.

K: One, could we delay the start of the Security Council meeting until 2:00?

V: Easy.

K: So that we could get our delegates together.

V: Okay.

K: Second, I would recommend deleting from the instructions "withdraw to the line they occupied" because it will lead to endless debate. I don't think anybody gained a hell of a lot. What could they have gained in a few hours?

V: Well, obviously they have gained something. Otherwise our side wouldn't raise this question.

K: I don't know the situation and I have no basic objection to it.

V: It would be better, of course, to keep this. There will be agruments, exactly of a half a mile or something like that but politically that will be expedient of course to urge that everybody would return where they were last night.

K: Of course they will never agree on where they were last night so it doesn't make any difference.

V: Well, let them argue -- not fight at least.

K: Look, I agree and I will instruct Scali immediately. You can inform Moscow.

V: Good.

K: That we agree -- that I urge that the meeting be put off at least until 2:00. We will inform the Israelis if you will inform the Arabs.

V: Okay.

K: I will instruct Scali in this sense and we will agree to this resolution.

V: You will agree to this resolution.

K: We may have a word about "withdraw to the Line" but as long as we both understand this that is not going to be easy to enforce. I am not going to quarrel about it.

V: I think in Moscow they gave some attention to this phrase so we better keep it here.

K: Okay. Now we are sending over to you an oral message for the General Secretary about the appropriate auspices issue.

V: Fine.

K: I think he will like. Let me get my people immediately sothat we get the word.

V: Fine, Henry.

K: Send over that message.

V: I'll send the message.

K: Good.

SL228

TELCON
Amb. Scali - Secretary Kissinger
October 24, 1973
7:25 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello John, John? Goddamnit will you listen to me.

S: Oh, Hello Henry.

K: I wanted to tell you something. I've just been told by Dobrynin that the Soviet instructions are that if somebody introducesa resolution calling on the United States and the Soviet Union to take out urgent measures to enforce the cease fire, including sending of military contingents , Malik is to vote for it. Your instructions are to vote against it.

S: I understand.

K: Veto it, and make a very strong speech on that. And, we could try to get some others to veto it too, the British....

S: ....The Secretary General will speak, Israel will speak, Guinea will speak and ask for an hour's delay and ask for the non-aligned countries to come up with a resolution which would (a) condemn Israel, and (b) call for peace forces from smaller countries to back up the observers. Some of the smaller countries already have told the UN they have such peace forces allocated.

K: We can't condemn Israel can we?

S: Of course not.

K: We will veto the condemnation of Israel and vote for the peace forces.

S: We will vote for the peace forces? I would think we would have to However, as I understand it Henry, from what McIntyre told me, we will have time during the one hour delay.

K: We are not for peace forces. We favor strong augmentation of UNTSO, nótin favor of military forces.

S: I understand that, but what if we are confronted with a resolution?

K: Veto it.

S: (a) condemn Israel, (b) peace forces.....told the Soviets to go ahead and veto it. I wanted to tell you that Huang Hua told me to pass on to you that the next time they get a resolution like we confronted them with, with no opportunity to consider it, they will veto it.

K: That's all right.

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S: He very anxious to know how we stood on sending Soviet forces.

K: Tell hj m we are violently opposed.

S:.....most we wo uld consider, sending limited number of additional observers.

K: How does he feel today....?

S: He seemed to be mollified, but he wanted the conversation relayed to you.

K: Tell him you relayed it, we understand fully his position and object to it.

S: All right.

SL229

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Scowcroft/Kissinger
October 24, 1973
7:30

K. ...for the introduction of peace keeping forces into the Middle East, including American and Soviet. We want the Chinese to know we are going to veto it and are against the introduction of any military forces, not only American. Even if they are not American and Soviet they will be under Soviet influence. Tell them you are calling because you have a direct line and I don't. We are in favor of augmentation of observers. Will you make sure of that?

S. Yes, I will call them right now.

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SL200

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Dinitz
10/24/73; 9:22 a.m.

K: Mr. Ambassador, now we have got another message that you are attacking the third army.

D: No, that is exactly what I told Eagleburger that I was running to the office because I had a direct line from Israel and I just got the message from Israel what is happening and I will get in detail to . . .

K: Just tell me in one sentence.

D: Right. I will give it to Eagleburger but I will give it to you in one sentence. The ceasefire went into effect and then the third army has tried to make efforts to break out of the siege. And started attacking and even advancing toward Mitla -- on the east and even break through in the west as well as in the north with three divisions. It is a big power. When they returned fighting they have brought 30 Egyptians planes over to support the action and fifteeen of them were shot down by us. A big battle has developed over which we are just blocking the third army from getting out of the siege. We are not advancing. We are returning the fight. And the whole thing that has happened now is their attack to try to break out of the siege. Both northward, westward and eastward at the same time.

K: Northward . . .

D: Northward, eastward toward the Mitla Pass . . .

K: Westward would put them across the Canal, you can't . . .

D: To the Mitla Pass and westward -- in three directions.

K: Well, now, wait a minute -- westward means they are going across the Canal. Are they drowning themselves?

D: No, they are trying to break through the north of Suez, the bridgehead that we have closed.

K: Look, Mr. Ambassador, we have been a strong support for you.

D: Right.

K: But we cannot make Brezhnev look like a Goddamn fool in front of his own colleagues.

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D: But, but, Mr. Secretary, I am telling you exactly what is happening there. As I was on the way to phone you they told me that you were looking for me and I will give it to Eagleburger in a very orderly form.

K: Okay, will you do that.

D: Right away.

K: Okay.

D: Thank you.

K: Now, are you prepared to stop if they stop?

D: Yes. Not only this. Even now the message is that we are not shooting except in self-defense. Except in return. We are not initiating any action. We stopped right away.

K: Okay, now you know Dayan performed another one of his genius acts.

D: What did he do?

K: Well, by announcing everything you took yesterday.

D: I talked to them about this, too, and they said if was a situation of the correspondents, but I wil check. Did he talk himself, or . . .

K: Well, no, the Defense Ministry announced the strategy which I had proposed is now impossible.

D: I told them this. I told them . . .

K: It still could have worked, which you could have withdrawn somewhat . . .

D: Yes. I will talk to them again about this. I did this morning already.

K: Well, you know, I am having trouble enough keeping the supply going as it is.

D: I understand this, Mr. Secretary. I told them this, too.

K: Okay, fine.

D: Thank you.

K: Bye.

SL220

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Roy Atherton - Secretary Kissinger
October 24, 1973
4:45 p.m.

K: .....the joint sponsorship for negotiations, so that it takes place de facto and we can inform the Security Council. Can you come up with some schemes. Should the Soviet Union and we invite the parties? Should we get the parties to invite us? How do we inform the Security Council?

A: The idea being to inform them, but keep them out of it. We have been kicking it around....let us try to get something specific ....

K: The substance is established, what we need is to get something established ....procedures. The substance has been decided, what we need is how to get it implemented.
A: Yes, we'll get something crystallized and on paper. When would you like to have it, Mr. Secretary?

K: Would you have it on my desk first thing in the morning.

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SL222

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Senator Jackson/Kissinger
October 24, 1973
6:58 p.m.

J. ...that was running around today was capped by news announcement by Sadat that they asked the UN for US and Soviet peace-keeping troops.

K. Scoop, we will under no circumstances agree to it if they are made. All we know is the news ticker. We issued a statement at the White House that this was not to be considered. Our instructions to Scali are he can be agreeable to reaffirmation of ceasefire...and augmented by neutral nations.

J. I have not talked to the Israelis.

K. There is nothing....

J. I was certain about it but I wanted to check.

K. I think we scored a tremendous victory and will not jeopardize it now.

J. Have we straightened out the line?

K. I think we should do it...

J. It will be pretty clumsy.

K. It will hurt the Egyptians more than the Israelis. The Israelis have a corridor and don't need....

J. You have a problem of how those forces will be supplied if there is an in-place ceasefire. At least they got the bloodletting stopped.

K. We would go along with an October 6 arrangement. That was our original proposal anyway.

J. My concern is using that canal opening as a strong card. I just don't want it opened.

K. There is no way. The Israelis are on both banks.

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J. Is there anything to the story that Israel crossed using Syrian tanks, speaking Arabic and crossing on the pontoon bridges?

K. I don't know.

J. Well, it is the most humerous so far.

K. Scoop, at some point I would like to talk to you about MFN. This isn't the week to do it. I think we should try to keep a gap between House position and your position so that we can talk. We have no objections that it is called the Jackson Amendment when it goes in.

J. I don't care what it's called. As soon as we get a few things squared away around here.

K. There is no hurry.

J. I want to have you out to the house when we get squared away.

SL224

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
The President/Kissinger
October 24, 1973
7:10 p.m.

K. Mr. President.

N. Now that you have your ceasefire abroad, how are you going about a ceasefire at home.

K. I have been calling various people again. I had a long talk with Jackson and the primary thing is to keep our authority and if he is that interested in Israel he better get in line. And I called Humphrey.

N. Did it do any good? Jackson is going to have egg all over his face. Detente did this and now we are the only ones who can negotiate with these thugs.

K. We have to win this domestically....criminal activities at the moment of a diplomatic triumph you would have to fight for your political life. What did you do?

N. Nothing. By turning the tapes over there can't be any doubt.

K. Your Attorney General stabbed you in the back.

N. Yes, after he and Irwin and Baker had all agreed this was a good proposition. Cox turned it down.

K. The worst you can say is the firing of Cox was a tactical mistake by being too early.

N. The point is that Cox was given an order and he defied it. If you defied an order when you were negotiating with the Russians you would go down too.

K. I didn't mean that. The worst charge you can make against the President...I wouldn't make that charge but to make a national crisi of that issue....

N. We have cooled the issue somewhat by the Sirica thing. They are not going to get another Special Prosecutor.

K. We can live with one other than Cox.

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N. Not with the authority to investigate the President. That is what Richardson sold out on.

K. He picked the wrong man. Then we gave him a charter which gave your most violent opponent his...to go after everything even if he couldn't get an indictment.

N. Anyway, how about the others. Any sympathetic voices.

K. Yes, Jackson and Doc Morgan is totally sympathetic and I am asking them to call their friends. Humphrey was basically sympathectic but he is such a weakling. I reported on what happened and what you did. That this thing is on a razors edge and we need the full authority of the government and keep in mind what is at stake.

N. There was a time, Henry, when a person in your position could call an editor of the New York Times or the Post and say we need this now and they would turn cartwheels. We don't have that now. The idea that you came back with a diplomatic triumph of first order and they don't pay any attention.

K. It was the biggest triumph in many ways. It was a very difficult situation and then you pulled it off. It was your decision to push in the chips. I did a lot of finessing but you....

N. I hope you make that point to the leaders tomorrow. You must say to the group that 'I came into see the President and told him you are going to get as much blame for 3 as for 30.

K. Everything Mr.President, that you said to leadership came out just exactly as you said it and I will never forget it.

N. Well, keep fighting. I will do the press conference tomorrow night. You'll...make the evening news. I will go on at 9:00. It is really pushing the President to go on and get kicked around by those bastards....

K. The break-in at the Watergate was a boy scount prank and the coverup a second rate effort and to back up....

N. They are doing it because of their desire to kill the President. And they may succeed. I may physically die.

K. You are at your best in adversity.

N. We will see. It will be tough tomorrow. I will not give them an inch. I can't be up to what I was in San Clemente because then I had a few days rest in Florida. I'll be all right. I'm frankly just very disgusted. It isn't just the press. The people aren't really as bad. What it is is the leadership in the ivory towers in New York and the Times and the Post. They are destroying the country. They were all McGovern supporters....

K. This weekend was one of this country's diplomatic triumphs and Time only gives it one paragraph. You can say it broke late but Cox broke late and they managed to give it six pages.

N. What they care about is destruction. It brings me sometimes to feel like saying the hell with it. I would like to see them run this country and see what they do.

K. Can you see Carl Albert in this crisis. He would be running it from Walter Reed. And Gerry Ford, fond as I am of him, just doesn't have it.

N. The real tragedy is if I move out everything we have done will crumble. The Russians will look for other customers, the Chinese will lose confidence, the Europeans will...They just don't realize they are throwing everything out the window. I don't know what in the name of God....Stu Alsop and Joe, even our friends won't step up to it. They ought to be shamed into it. Well, don't waste any time on them. Just talk to the networks.

SL226

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Dobrynin/Kissinger
October 24, 1973
7:15 p.m.

K. Anatoyl, I was talking to the President. As I understand it Malik has instructions to vote for the resolution if we go along with it, even to send over troops. We won't go along with it.

D. If a draft resolution will be introduced which will contain the appeal towards the Soviet Union and the United States--

K. If the Egyptians introduce it.

D. --to take urgent necessary measures, including our sending over military contingents to insure the fulfillment of the resolution of the Security Council about ceasefire then he is instructed to vote for such a resolution.

K. We will vote against it.

D. I would like you to know...when I talked to you I was wrong.

K. I think we should both discourage such a resolution.

D. He has already received instructions. I think it only fair for me to tell you because of our discussions this afternoon.

K. Well, we will vote against it.

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SY223

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Dobryinin/Kissinger
October 24, 1973
7:05 p.m.

D. ...which our representative in New York has now received. ...but as we discussed with you today I don't want to mislead you on this one. If the draft resolution will be introduced with address to Soviet Union and United States to take urgent necessary measures...

K. Anatoyl, I am having a call from the President. Will you call me back. Just give me a general idea of what it is.

D. He has instructions to go and vote even for sending troops to that area and for your troops.

K. We won't agree to that.

D. I am just telling you what we received.

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Nodis
SL221

TELCON
Max Fischer - Secretary Kissinger
October 24, 1973
6:55 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

F: Fine Henry. I have an important meeting today on this, this strategy we talked about yesterday.

K: Yes?

F: If they drop Title IV, the Jewish Community willnot oppose it. If the Administration proposes it officially, that puts it in a position where it gets into a conference.

K: Have you told Garment?

F: I told Len Garment, but he didn't quite understand, I told him that was the strategy we discussed. This way you can call Henry Jackson, or....so he won't make a big furor in the Community, or call Richi Moss. You could go see him on Monday.

K: I'd rather have Moss do it.

F: Sy Kennan was there.

K: Who's that?

F: _____You see, the Community had to clear its conscience. I'll tell you another thing, Henry. I know you are vert busy, but in the next week or ten days I want to sit down with you and get a formula for operation. Len didn't quite understand. Have you got a cease-fire put together?

K: I think so.

F: Henry, last night deeply impressed us, all of us.

K: You are a good friend, you were a good friend when ...in the tough days, and you are a good friend now.

F: We have to help the President now.

K: He needs it.

F: Henry I've done everything I could think of, I must have called 200 people in the last few days.

K: Aren't you nice.

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F: I will se you next week. God bless you for whatever y o you are doing.

SL227

TELECON
Dobrynin/Kissinger
October 24, 1973
7:25 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

D. Hello.

K. I have been talking to the President and we really want to urge you not to push matters to an extreme because we will veto any resolution that calls for sending over any military forces. What we need is more observers.

D. Because as I mentioned to you when I was in Moscow it was completely out of the question to send any troops. Now they have become so angry they want troops.

K. Why through us. What was achieved?

D. You allowed the Israelis to do what they wanted.

K. When this first operation started I pleaded with you to get people to return from the lines and it took a week.

D. It was already agreed upon by you and Brezhnev....

K. Be that as it may, if you want confrontation we will have to have one. It would be a pity.

D. You know we don't want to have a confrontation.

K. It is inevitable that there will be mutual charges in the first 24 hours of a ceasefire. We introduced two joint resolutions....

D. I will send this but I am sure this was what he received... I will send it right away but I am sure they discussed it and put the instruction this way. I just didn't want you to think....

K. But you have sufficient influence on the non-committed to prevent this resolution from being put forward.

D. It is a guessing game. Maybe they already mentioned it to Moscow.

K. We are going to veto and it would be a pity to be in a confrontation.

D. I will mention this and get in touch.

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S4219

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Mr. Popper - Secretary Kissinger
October 24, 1973
4:50 p.m.

K: ....that's it, or, only question of possible observers.

P: Say American idea...I would think limiting number would not expose us. If you have limited number, say 10 members from each side...of UN forces. About 200 altogether, Can't think there would be any particular harm...

K: You can instruct Scali, if it comes up, to go along with that. On thing I want to make absolutely clear, the dispatch of military attaches is not to be construed as a military thing. They are going for 24 hours to report to us what is going on. We have the right to inform ourselves what's going on. The Soviets have the same right. We have no right to tell the Soviet military attache what he can do. If he wants to go to the front, that's his business. I have informed Soviets we are sending military attache to front to report to us his judgment of who's doing the fighting. I don't want this to be confused with...

P: No, no. This is quite separate from the observers...

K: I know it's quite different, but I don't want it to be confused.

P: Any reasons why the dispatch of military attaches should arise this evening?

K: No, except the Egyptians and the Soviets know about it. My instructions are that this is to be treated as a separate thing from the UN observers group.

P: I understand fully.

K: Secondly, if the UN observers want to .....we'll leave that open. Say we will consider it. Thirdly, Dobrynin felt there is no reason for resolution at all. Don't think we should browbeat Malik .....

P: Does that mean consensus statement by the President rather than.....

K: Consensus statement by the President would be best, and that's what Scali should push. He should also in low key way present to Malik.....

P: It's going to be difficult with Malik.

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K: I know. Malik's not the easiest man to....but neither is Scali.

P: First priority after hearing parties, ...stop fighting...

K: Do not have impression Soviets will introduce any addition of US Soviet forces and...

P: Warren's statement, ... the White House recalled the statement and said Scali would articulate it later this evening. His statement should include something about how we felt. I'm just writing something now, a paragraph to....

K: Okay, but keep it low key.

SL233

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Haig/Kissinger
October 24, 1973
7:50 p.m.

K. How are things going?

H. We are mucking along.

K. I wanted to bring you up to date on what is happening. The Soviets are taking a nasty turn. They realize they were taken. They now are telling us they are approving a resolution introduced by the non-committed members which 1) condemns Israel for violation of the ceasefire, and 2) asked for introduction of military peacekeeping contingents, including Soviet and U.S. troops..... I told Dobrynin this is mischievous and outrageous. We will condemn both sides....We are totally opposed to the introduction of any military forces.

H. Is it going that far?

K. We may have to take them on.

H. We knew this wouldn't be easy.

K. I think we have to be tough as nails now.

H. Sure we do. Absolutely.

K. Of course if the Israelis had just stopped yesterday we would be that much better off.

H. I have the President calling me.

K. O'k.

H. Goodbye.

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SL231

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Dinitz/Kissinger
October 24, 1973
7:35 pm

K. Mr. Ambassador, I called to let you know we have just been informed that the Soviets will endorse a resolution which calls for introduction of peace-keeping military forces, committing American and Soviet Union..... 1) We will veto any condemning of Israel., 2) we will veto any military peace-keeping forces, and 3) we will certainly veto any introduction of American forces. What I must have of you is your complete circumspection of this military operation, I wanted to inform you what we are doing and I assume you are doing.

D. I appreciate it.

K. Will you inform Israel?

D. I talked to the Prime Minister about a half hour ago and she asked me if she could go to sleep.

K. Just keep her informed.

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SL232

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Dobrynin/Kissinger
October 24, 1973
8:02 p.m.

K. I am calling you again at the request of the President.

D. What is it now.

K. It is to urge you to avoid the confrontation between us and the UN...

D. I spoke with Malik at 6:30. The hall was full of people and there were discussions but he didn't know what the Council had prepared. They were discussing the Third World.

K. Our information is there is no fighting going on now.

D. What is the actual situation now? It is easy for you to check it. Is anybody introducing the resolution?...

K. Let me check with Scali.

D. Let me know what the exact situation is and I will send a telegram.

K. Good.

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SL234

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Dobrynin/Kissinger
October 24, 1973
8:25 p.m.

D. He said that he asked US and Soviet Union to send their forces. He is already making a speech. It is on UPI 304. Just because...

K. I would still urge you to show great restraint. It is not yet a resolution.

D. I am only saying what he said in the Security Council.

K. It would be that from the closest cooperation we turn to a very dangerous course.

D. I am only telling you.

K. O'k.

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SL241

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Scottie Reston/Kissinger
October 24, 1973

K. .....

R. Well now, I don't really feel that way. If I think something important has happened over the weekend. ....

K. I was talking about foreign policy. I called you about a point of honor. You said I had tried to persuade my good friend Richardson not to resign because of national security. This is absolutely untrue as Elliot will confirm if you call him. I saw him only once during the week for lunch, at his request, to discuss general foreign policy problems. I had no reason to tell him anything. The whole evolution was unknown to me. The lunch came about because at the unveiling of Ford he said you and I haven't really had a chance to discuss foreign policy, so I invited him to lunch. We did have a brief talk as friends about cabinet offices in this period and our conclusions would have led Elliot in the direction he took on Saturday rather than the opposite. In short, neither directly nor indirectly did I get involved in the decision.

R. Of course I saw McCloskey....of that message in my piece this morning. I think what happened....

K. I don't want you to rectify it. I just want you to understand that nothing like this happened. You can call Elliot.

R. Of course I take what you say at face value.

K. I am sure Elliot will support it.

R. It you tell me it's good enough. Let me explain how it was played. In reconstructing what had happened in those critical five days in order to be faithful I have to be vague. Al Haig was pressing upon Elliot and upon Ruchelshaus very strongly on the foreign policy question.

K. I didn't know that. If it was done at all it was without my knowledge or approval.

R. In the private information that was given to me about how strong this pressure was the point was made that he had not only done this directly to Ruchelshaus and Elliot but had involved you in it because of your friendship with Elliot.

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K. That is not true.

R. I will correct it Henry if you feel---

K. No, it's important but just really for the seriousness of our relationship the only subject that Elliot and I discussed at lunch was that our feelings at this time about Cabinet officers should do what is right and not drift because only in that way can we restore public confidence. That was not related to any specific event.

R. Of course, I was told about the lunch and it was used as evidenc on the assumption by my informant that the same thing that Haig was doing. And by the way he doesn't come out of that story very well. They had involved you.

K. Elliot and I had been meeting regularly in every position he had had because of our friendship. I left Friday night thinking that tape problem had been settled.

R. By the Stenis compromise?

K. I know very little about it. I was only told around 7:00. I was told that Richardson supported the compromise. Whether it was good or bad it seemed acceptable. I was in Moscow when I heard of the....

R. You are pushing. It was done. The only question is if you want me to correct it.

K. It was only one sentence. If you find sometime to wrap it in something else.

R. When there are recapitulations of the extraordinary chapter of the last few days it can be picked up and I will see that it isn't picked up.

K. I don't know what I would have thought about the Stenis compromise. I have not had time to analyze it.

R. I don't think I have much doubt about your answer.

K. I addressed it as a solution and not a problem and was glad to have all behind us.

R. It is not behind us. The problem now is while the presentation of the tapes may exonerate the President they open the gates to jail of a lot of people who didn't know there were any tapes and for them to get into this position when they thought they were just carrying out orders, they are going to sing. You think we are going to get out all right.

K. We have a little crisis tonight at the UN. The Soviets are toying with the idea of calling for dispatch of Soviet and US troops.

R. And if it is made?

K. We will veto the sending of any troops. The Forces will be either so huge as to overpower the other two and threaten the peace or it small to have any effect.

H. That is too....Why would Sadat come up with that.

K. Because he is desperate.

R. When you have some time I cannot let you go without saying one thing. I have seen a lot of press conferences and.....by Richardson. It was conducted under enormous pressures, emotional and otherwise, with more dignity and lucidity. He became a Presidential figure in the middle of that.

K. He is one of the finest public figures I have met. I have always felt that way.

SL240

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
11:25 p.m. October 24, 1973

D: I had the Prime Minister on the line and she asked me to suggest to you the following course of action. She thinks that maybe the President can suggest to Brezhnev that we will be prepared to exchange the forces and all the forces of Israel that are east of the Canal will be taken back to the west of the Canal and the Egyptian forces which to a large extent are encircled now on the east of the Canal, will all be moving to the west of the Canal; that there would be two demilitarized strips along the Canal on both sides of the Canal throughout the area in which there would be international observers or international supervisors --

K: They'll never agree to that, I'll tell you that right away.

D: Well, the Prime Minister -- if I may just finish -- said that she is proposing it so that the President could say that he will get Israel to do this but she has not even brought it to the Cabinet but she will put her weight behind such a proposal.

K: Okay. Well, let me discuss that with my colleagues.

D: Fine. And I'll wait for it.

K: But I am assuming you are not prepared to offer to go back to where you started from.

D: You mean before the ceasefire started? I mean, before the war started?

K: No, no, no.

D: Oh, before the ceasefire started? No, that she said is even impossible to determine. And you see, if I may -- if I'm allowed, she said what [pushes Brezhnev] is the disconnection of the 3rd Army and therefore any proposal that will open up -- That's why he wants us to return back to the line because that will open up the hole to the 3rd Army.

K: That's right.

D: That is why she says this proposal will both offer the hole to the 3rd Army; will save all this 3rd Army; and also have an ingredient for normalization.

K: You want them also to withdraw the forces that are in the northern part.

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D: All over the Canal of course. We are holding a much bigger territory in Egypt than they do.

K: Well, I don't think that will do us much good but we will try it.

D: Okay.

K: Good. Thank you.

D: Sure. Bye, bye.

SL 238

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON, 10:15 p.m., October 24, 1973

Secretary/ Dobrynin

K. We are assemblying our people to consider your letter. I just wanted you to know if any unilateral action is taken before we have had a chance to reply that will be very serious

D. Yes, all right.

K. This is a matter of great concern. Don't you pressure us. I want to repeat again, don't pressure us!

D. All right.

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SL237

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Dinitz/Kissinger
October 24, 1973
10:00 p.m.

K. ...joint resolution by the Soviet Union and the United States that we would put forces in jointly or they would go in unilaterally to stop the fighting. We obviously will not agree to joint....

D. What do they have in mind?

K. They claim all they want is to get the fighting stopped.

D. I have two items to bring to your attention. I just got information that in the city of Suez a unit of our paratroopers has been under constant fire for several hours. It has been trapped and attacked by heavy guns and fire for several hours by their commando unit. We have to rescue these units or they will be slaughtered. What we intend to do is have air assistance given to them so they can break out of the trap.

K. All right. If the Soviets have decided to go in I just think we turned the wheel yesterday one screw too much.

D. We won't go into it again.

K. Let's look at the tactics of this. We have to offer them something which puts them totally in the wrong..I want to know if you can agree to return to the position you occupied before it all started.

D. How can this be done! I can inform the Prime Minister if you want me to but I will tell you in advance....

K. I don't have time for this....

D. The Soviets will put forces to fight us?

K. That is not impossible. In fact, I think that is what they will do. I will read the letter to you as soon as I have it transcribed. The Soviets say if we don't put forces in jointly they will go in unilaterally.

D. Contigents to peace or contingents to fight?

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K. They are talking about peace....

D. I am just a representative of a very small country---

K. Look, I have no time for this! You have to check... They said either we will do it jointly with them or they will put in forces unilaterally. If there is nothing you can do I will accept that too. What should we reply as far as you are concerned?

D. I will put that to the Prime Minister.

K. All right.

SL239

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Haig/Kissinger
October 24, 1973
10:20 p.m.

H....The WSAG.

K. The principals, the WSAG now practically is the principals.

H. Have you talked to the President?

K. No, I haven't. He would just start charging around....until we have it analyzed.

H. It seems to me if the Soviets have acted in good faith in your judgment and if this would quiet it down, it is not going....and if it would be necessary to put a joint force in there I am not so sure it is totally tragic in the....I think they caused it to have a Soviet force in alone.

K. Right now it would be an absolute storm in the U.S., a storm in Europe and eventually operate against the Israelis. In other words they would have to attack us to get at them. I would rather put our force in after they put theirs in.

H. There could be committments, discussions, and willingness. What we don't want is to have them go in. I am afraid there would be some fighting and then we have a problem.

K. What do you mean?

H. Between the Soviets and Israelis. Isn't there some way of deciding the modality? If we go back tough we have to be prepared to be really tough....

K. You cannot be sure how much of this is due to our domestic crisis.

H. I think we owe a lot to that.

K. I don't think they would have taken on a functioning President.

H. They wouldn't. The only way we could do this if it is necessary to put something in there....Convince the leadership in the morning to work out modality in the meantime. If the peace-keeping forces that I cannot think....It even brings us together even more than the resolution.

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K. It would wreak havoc with the Chinese and the Europeans. The bastards may have originally had this in mind as a way of getting in there....We sent him to the front today. If Schlesinger sent him to the front....

H. The Israelis were very, very believable from what I heard from them today.

K. That is what I believe.

H. But if they have lied to us....

K. Yesterday they trapped the 3rd Army. That army is probably starving to death right now.

H. They are all on the East Bank and have no supplies I presume.

K. There was one road also which Israel cut.

H. That is not that big an area that they cannot handle that. To let that unit survive and get the hell out of there if it has to. In any event the key point is questionable. You can work a peace-keeping force....

K. Jackson has already called this afternoon protesting violently.

H. Any conception of that?

K. Yes.

H. How did he know that?

K. It leaked out of one of my meetings.

H. On top of our other problem it could be the end...or the beginning.

K. Don't forget that is what the Soviets are playing on. They find a cripple facing impeachment and why shouldn't they go in there.

H. If they do and start fighting, that is the serious thing. They go in there and that....They genuinely believe Israelis are.....I am sure the Soviets are on the ground all over the place.

K. Sure, they have their intelligence.

H. It is really a question of Israelis leveling with us and if they say....

K. The Israelis yesterday grabbed a hunk of territory and cut the last supply line for....Today the Third Army has been trying to cut its way out and has failed. That is the problem.

H. O'k.

K. I don't believe that the Israelis started it.

H. I don't after Dinitz.....

K. That was the issue. If the Russians had wanted to play fair they could have had the Israelis return to the original line rather....

H. It seems the Israelis must have.....

K. I told Dinitz to come up with some offer we can make. It will be hard as he will have to justify it. I don't think we should bother the President.

H. Are you meeting at the White House or--?

K. The State Department.

H. He has to be a part of everything you are doing.

K. Should I get him up?

H. I wish you would hold it at the White House.

K. All right.

SL736

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON, 9:50 p.m., October 24, 1973

Secretary/General Haig

K. I just had a letter from Brezhnev asking us to send forces in together or he would send them in alone.

H. I was afraid of that.

K.. I think we have to go to the mat on this one.

H. This is a reaction to your tough response?

K. No, we just said we would veto any UN resolution. What they said is they would join if someone else proposed it.

H. Where are the Israelis at this point?.
K. They've got the 3rd Army surrounded.

H. I think theyre playing chicken. They're not going to put in forces at the end of the war. I don't believe that.

K. I don't know...What's going to keep them from flying paratroopers in?

H. Just think of what it will do for them. Of course, their argument is that Israel is not complying.

K. I think the Israelis should offer to back up. That is dangerous for they might insist they back up beyond the point where they were.

H. We don't expect the Israelis to take that sort of thing.
Do the Israelis know. I mean, have you brought them along?

K. I've kept them informed. Should I wake up the President?

H. No.

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DATE/CASE ID: 24 MAY 2004 200102979

SL230

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Lord Cromer/Kissinger
October 24, 1973
7:28 p.m.

K. I have been informed the Soviets have instructions to vote for a resolution, introduced by someone else, for the introduction of peace keeping forces into the Middle East, including Soviet and American ones. I wanted you to know we are totally opposed. We will veto it. There are enough military forces running around there now.

C. You are so right.

K. We would hope very much if you would join us in veto.

C. Do you know who is introducing the resolution?

K. It is our impression it is the non-committed. They are putting it on. We believe the Chinese will veto it also.

C. We will get to that right away.

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50 35 1*
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON, 10:15 p.m., October 24, 1973

Secretary/ Dobrynin

K. We are assemblying our people to consider your letter. I just wanted you to know if any unilateral action is taken before we have had a chance to reply that will be very serious

D. Yes, all right.

K. This is a matter of great concern. Don't you pressure us. I want to repeat again, don't pressure us!

D. All right.

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SL206

TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin/HAK
10:10 a.m. - Oct. 24, 1973

RELEASED IN FULL

D: Yes.

K: Anatol, how are you?

D: Fine, Henry, I just received a telegram from Moscow.

K: Well, I wanted to bring you up to date. We have just been informed by the Israelis that they will permit American military attaches from Tel Aviv to go to the battle area to help observe that they are not taking offensive actions, and we have informed the Egyptians to that effect.

D: From Tel Aviv?

K: Yes. That we are sending U.S. military observers to make sure, to reassure that they are taking only, they're only firing back. They're not advancing. _____ that they will allow American military observers to come there to guarantee, you know, to make sure that this order is carried out.

D: _____ a United Nations _____

K: No, no, a United States military attache.

D: You said first observers from United Nations.

K: No, I meant United States military attaches, in addition to UN observers.

D: In addition . How many are you sending there?

K: Well, as many, I don't know. I'm now talking to our people to find out how many we have in the military attache's office. We don't have very many there.

D: Who requested this? Did you or they?

K: I was the initiator. I demanded to have proof that they're not taking offensive action and we were asking....

D: On a temporary basis you're sending them.

K: Just on a temporary basis. Yes, we'll withdraw them in a day.

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SO 34 1*

TELCON
Dobrynin/HAK
October 24, 1973/10:15 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

D: Hello.

K: Anatol?

D: Yes.

K: Two things. We've just been informed by the Israelis firing has been stopped on the East bank. On the West bank there wasn't much going on anyway. We are sending 10 of our people from Tel Aviv to observe it for about 48 hours until the U.N. observers are there

D: 48 hours.

K: Yes. We are willing to keep them longer if anyone asks you.

D: I understand.

K: Secondly, we've just been informed, which I can hardly believe that Brezhnev is leaving for Cuba at the end of this week.

D: To Cuba?

K: Yes.

D: This I heard for the firsst time. This I am hearing for the first time. I know that he had an invitation to go by the end of this year.

K: Our understanding was that he would leave in December.

D: This I know. And I'm sure when I was in Moscow if it was he were going]I would have been told so I am presuming, of course I didn't discuss this directly with him so I am make a small reservation in terms of unbelieveable to me but 99.9 percent it is completely untrue.

K: OK.

D: I'm rather prepared to say 100 % untrue because otherwise when I was in Moscow I was there a good 20 hours maybe....

K: You can't keep him from going to Cuba but you can imagine....

D: I am not going to mention it to him because I am sure, even when I was in Moscow he mentioned to me because he usually tells what his major plan his, where he goes. He is going to India.

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K: That I knew.

D: I am sure he will mention to me about it but I am sorry you have some problem, however, it was in December he plans to go there. What is your information based on.

K: A clearance for Brezhnev's plane.

D: They are just making sure to know before and how and so on. It was only on this one. No, I knew about these planes. He doesn't know that that plane is going there.

K: I don't think you should =-- that this would be the time. I wanted to inform you also that the Chinese trip. We have proposed going there on the 26th of November and they have now strongly urged us to come on the 10th of November and I am accepting that.

D: On the 10th. Why is it urgent.

K: I don't know.

D: Maybe some special occasion.

K: I have assured there is nothing. I repeat to you we are planning nothing. Now you know if they want to .. if something unbelievable is offered to us while we are there. At this moment or any time that I can forsee there will be nothing but general consultations.

D: I see. I am coming to you or will you be coming here.

K: Haven't they told you yet.

D: About 4:00 yes. At the White House or State Department.

K: State. Department.

D: OK. Bye.

(175)

SL235

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON, 8:52 p.m., Oct. 24

Secretary/Amb. Scali

S. He stopped short of attacking us directly. ... he just lambasted Israel and then he said as far as the Sadat request goes it would entirely justified and in accordance with the Charter. But he didn't say flatly he would buy it. He did c all for everybody to break diplomatic relations and support sanctions against Israel. He noted that you had been to Tel Aviv and has great responsibility. He believes that the U.S. is in a position to force Israel to do what it wants it to do. Said Israel is ignoring the UN resolutions

K. What are you going to do?

S. Let me finish one other point. He deplored the make-up of the observer corps and implied that it should be sent there but didn't say so directly. I have a speech which I can make

K. I would not reject something that hasn't been proposed.

S. El Zayyat formally asked us in the [redacted] Council.

K. [redacted] You had better give that speech.

S. Sadat says he wants the "great powers to interfere and move their forces in there."

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
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SL207

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Dobrynin/HAK
October 24, 1973/10:15 a.m.

D: Hello.

K: Anatol?

D: Yes.

K: Two things. We've just been informed by the Israelis firing has been stopped on the East bank. On the West bank there wasn't much going on anyway. We are sending 10 of our people from Tel Aviv to observe it for about 48 hours until the U.N. observers are there

D: 48 hours.

K: Yes. We are willing to keep them longer if anyone asks you.

D: I understand.

K: Secondly, we've just been informed, which I can hardly believe that Brezhnev is leaving for Cuba at the end of this week.

D: To Cuba?

K: Yes.

D: This I heard for the firsst time. This I am hearing for the first time. I know that he had an invitation to go by the end of this year.

K: Our understanding was that he would leave in December.

D: This I know. And I'm sure when I was in Moscow if it was he were going]I would have been told so I am presuming, of course I didn't discuss this directly with him so I am make a small reservation in terms of unbelieveable to me but 99.9 percent it is completely untrue.

K: OK.

D: I'm rather prepared to say 100 % untrue because otherwise when I was in Moscow I was there a good 20 hours maybe....

K: You can't keep him from going to Cuba but you can imagine....

D: I am not going to mention it to him because I am sure, even when I was in Moscow he mentioned to me because he usually tells what his major plan his, where he goes. He is going to India.

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K: That I knew.

D: I am sure he will mention to me about it but I am sorry you have some problem, however, it was in December he plans to go there. What is your information based on.

K: A clearance for Brezhnev's plane.

D: They are just making sure to know before and how and so on. It was only on this one. No, I knew about these planes. He doesn't know that that plane is going there.

K: I don't think you should =-- that this would be the time. I wanted to inform you also that the Chinese trip. We have proposed going there on the 26th of November and they have now strongly urged us to come on the 10th of November and I am accepting that.

D: On the 10th. Why is it urgent.

K: I don't know.

D: Maybe some special occasion.

K: I have assured there is nothing. I repeat to you we are planning nothing. Now you know if they want to .. if something unbelievable is offered to us while we are there. At this moment or any time that I can forsee there will be nothing but general consultations.

D: I see. I am coming to you or will you be coming here.

K: Haven't they told you yet.

D: About 4:00 yes. At the White House or State Department.

K: State. Department.

D: OK. Bye.

SL201

TELCON
Amb. Dinitz/Kissinger
9:32 a.m. - Oct. 24, 1973

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

D: Yes, Dr. Kissinger.

K: Mr. Ambassador, the message of Sadat to us asked us to intervene with forces on the ground.

D: The message of Sadat asked you to intervene?

K: With forces on the ground. Now if he asks the same thing of the Soviets and if the Soviets put some divisions in there then you will have outsmarted yourselves.

D: But Dr. Kissinger....

K: Foreign policy is to _____ your victories where you've got them. You had a tremendous victory...

D: Yeah, but we are not. But you have to believe me, we are not doing anything. I mean they are _____ try to break out of the cease and I have the solemn word, we are now only reacting trying to block them from advancing, and we are prepared to stop the fight any minute. I don't know how I can get it to you.

K: But will you please behave with circumspection and will you please stop bragging.

D: That I have already told them this morning.

K: You know, there's a limit beyond which we can't go and one of them is we cannot make Brezhnev look like an idiot.

D: I understand it.

K: Last night I already had a call from Dobrynin in which they are accusing me of having gone from Moscow to Tel Aviv to plot with them the overthrow of the whole arrangement we've made.

D: Well, that's ridiculous.

K: Well, it may be ridiculous, but that's how war starts.

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D: Yeah, I understand. I will talk about the announcements again to them but I was just in the process of reading to Eagleburger the situation there and when you will see....

K: Don't tell me you're taking Cairo in order to prevent the breakout of the Third Army.

D: Mr. Kissinger, they're absolute quiet on the West Side of the Canal because there there is no fighting. All the fighting is going on on this side of the Canal.

K: If you wind up tonight having captured 20,000 Egyptians you won't be able to tell us that they started the fighting.

D: May I suggest something, Dr. Kissinger? Why don't you have your military attache in Tel Aviv go into the area with our Command and see the situation?

K: O.K. Can we do that?

D: Yes, I think it's a good idea.

K: O.K. Will you arrange that?

D: I will phone right away.

K: O.K. good.

D: Thank you.

SL 205

TELCON
McCloskey/HAK
10:02 a.m. - Oct. 24, 1973

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

M: Morning.

K: Bob, you've got the instructions about the Chinese trip, they've moved it up from the 10th to the 13th.

M: Yes, I have that. You won't believe it but some maniac, to use your word, has found it impossible to get to me the basic announcement. There are some geniuses at work somewhere....

K: What do you mean, they haven't gotten it to you?

M: I've got a lot of the Q&A material that came to me from the White House, but the basic announcement....

K: It's got to be verbatim.

M: And we keep calling over there.

K: Well, whom are you calling?

M: Janka, through his office.

K: But Janka is the wrong one.

M: He may be on the phone. We'll get it and we'll be....

K: Scowcroft has it.

M: Alright. I'll get on to him. We got the material on Japan. That says, "The Japanese Government has renewed its invitation to the Secretary of State to visit Japan. The Secretary has been very pleased by the invitation and has of course accepted it. The exact dates for the visit will be worked out by consultation between the two Governments.

K: Yeah, but you can tell them on background that it will probably be after the Peking trip.

M: O. K.

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K: For your information, I'm thinking of going Morocco, Cairo, Amman, Tehran.

M: Yeah, I'm not surprised. O.K. I'm sure that at some point before eleven the basic announcement will come to us. If Scowcroft isn't with you, I'll call him immediately as I hang up. I have the Q&A.

K: And it has to be verbatim.

M: I understand.

K: Now the next thing is, Jerry Friedheim, he claims he's following your line on the airlift.

M: Well, we just spoke to one another and I clarified for him where he ought to be on it. He acknowledged the same thing that Schlesinger acknowledged to you yesterday that they made a bonehead play. Now I.....

K: No, no, Bob. I didn't read your briefing. I just wanted to make sure that you have the word.

M: I have it that our airlift is continuing.

K: _____ reduce it as the Soviets reduce theirs.

M: No, now that's the first I heard that. But I don't want you to, and I don't think we should say that that's the result of any understanding we reached.

K: No, no. We're not reducing ours. We say we are prepared to discuss with the Soviets means of reducing the military supply into the area.

M: Well, I think we're really talking about the emergency, aren't we?

K: That is right.

M: O.K. The other thing is a longer term proposition.

K: This you can stick with. We're continuing with as long as the Soviets are continuing theirs.

M: Is that going to cause any problem for the Israelis?

K: Probably.

M: O. K. Alright. Will I get a chance to see you before your lunch over here?

K: I hope so.

M: Alright. If not, may I call you there?

K: No, no, you'll see me. I'll be over about 11:30.

M: Oh, fine. Thank you very much.

SO 37 1*
RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin/Kissinger
9:45 a.m. - Oct. 24, 1973

K: Hello.

D: Hello, Henry.

K: Anatol, the madmen in the Middle East seem to be at it again. We got a message this time on the East Bank. The West Bank is quiet now. We just had a message the Israelis claim they're being attacked. The Egyptians don't say who's doing the attacking. I want you to know what we have done. We've sent ~~xxxxx~~ first a message to the Israelis telling them it had to stop and we had their assurance that they're staying in defensive positions. We sent a message to the Egyptians of which I'll send you a copy, telling them that we will totally oppose any further military ~~xxx~~ offensive military actions by the Israelis and recommending that they, too, stop offensive actions. And that is our impressions which we have no independent proof, that this time the Egyptians may have started it but we are not sure. We have no real basis for judgment. I just want you to know what we are doing. And I'm sending you the message we sent to the Egyptians but we have made a very violent representation to the Israelis.

D: Alright.

K: But one thing that Moscow is to understand we are not playing any games here. We made an agreement and it's now going to be enforced.

D: This is the point.

K: Well, you have our assurance.

D: I will send a telegram to Moscow.

K: I'll send you the message to send out immediately.

D: O.K. Thank you very much. Bye. Bye.

K: Bye.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 14 NOV 2002 200102979

SL 202

TELCON
Joe Sisco/Kissinger
9:35 a.m. - Oct. 24, 1973

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Joe.

S: Yes, sir.

K: Now fighting has broken out again on the East Bank.

S: Yes, I know, and the Egyptians have moved, or at least it appears they moved. I think that you need to get hold of Vorontsov and tell him the ....

K: The Egyptians have started that.

S: That's what I say. That's the impression we have. Your information at the White House could conceivably be better than ours.

K: Well, I've been raising hell with the Israelis; maybe they are innocent.

S: Well, on this one, that's the appearance I have, but really have Scowcroft give you what we have on....

K: But I've made the sharpest and we've got another message from Sadat here pleading with us to get it stopped.

S: What does Colby say about this and do we have....

K: I don't know, well we'll get it at 10.

S: Yeah. I think we need to focus at 10 and if we do then it seems....
k

K: Look, I haven't got time for a long thing now because I don't want to get a rocket from Brezhnev.

S: Right. O.K.

S: Well, if we think it's the Egyptians you ought to be sending the rocket.

K: O.K. Fine.

S: That's the point I make.

K: Well, that's what I want to do immediately.

S: I'll see you at 10:00.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 26 APR 2004 200102979

SO 361*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin/HAK
10:10 a.m. - Oct. 24, 1973

D: Yes.

K: Anatol, how are you?

D: Fine, Henry, I just received a telegram from Moscow.

K: Well, I wanted to bring you up to date. We have just been informed by the Israelis that they will permit American military attaches from Tel Aviv to go to the battle area to help observe that they are not taking offensive actions, and we have informed the Egyptians to that effect.

D: From Tel Aviv?

K: Yes. That we are sending U.S. military observers to make sure, to reassure that they are taking only, they're only firing back. They're not advancing. _____ that they will allow American military observers to come there to guarantee, you know, to make sure that this order is carried out.

D: _____ a United Nations _____

K: No, no, a United States military attache.

D: You said first observers from United Nations.

K: No, I meant United States military attaches, in addition to UN observers.

D: In addition. How many are you sending there?

K: Well, as many, I don't know. I'm now talking to our people to find out how many we have in the military attache's office. We don't have very many there.

D: Who requested this? Did you or they?

K: I was the initiator. I demanded to have proof that they're not taking offensive action and we were asking....

D: On a temporary basis you're sending them.

K: Just on a temporary basis. Yes, we'll withdraw them in a day.

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D: Alright.

K: But we were asked by the Egyptians to use American ground personnel to bring about an end to the action.

D: They did ask you?

K: Yeah.

K: And I'm sending you a copy of our message to President Sadat in which we inform him of that.

D: Alright. Henry, what about_____

K: Well, we are stopping it today. I promise you. I mean we have made the most violent presentations to the Israelis.

D: _____

K: We absolutely cannot tell but the Israelis swear that today the Egyptians totally started it.

D: Well, I know. It is very difficult to believe both sides.

K: I'm just telling you what they tell us. I have no independent information. You have received the first message we sent?

D: Yes.

K: The second one is on the way. Now the important thing is for you and us to stay together having made this historic achievement.

D: Now this is the point.

K: We've got to stay together for the peace settlement. That is the most important thing.

D: _____

K: Well, you have seen my first message. We have told the Israelis in the most violent terms that they have to stop it.

D: O. K. Then I will call you back when I decipher this message.

K: O. K. Well, I'll not be available for about an hour.

D: Couldn't you wait and I maybe could right now, just a minute. O. K. ? I'll call you right back.

RELEASED IN FULL SL 218

TELECON
Schlesinger/Secretary Kissinger
October 24, 1973
4:13

S: How the hell am I supposed to keep this thing going strong on the airlift when I pick up the paper and read that the State Department said..

K: That is totally wrong. What McClosky swears he said is a mutual reduction of re-supply and they translated it to airlift. What we want is a reduction of both sea and airlift and linked together. And make absolutely sure it is not repeated if it was said..I have just been talking to McCloskey and he says he never said airlift, he said re-supply.

S: The point is we are going up, not down...the other matter is Sadat has called a meeting of the Security Council.

K: I know..Our position is we are in favor of a united call for immediate compliance. Secondly, we are against US and Soviet troops in there. Thirdly, we are in favor of augmentation of observers from the neutral countries and Cyprus.

S: We have in hand an intercept given us by the Israelis that says an order from Cairo giving orders to attack.

K: I have a message from Sadat that says I would like to inform you that the Israelis are responsible for an offensive operation on the West side and it is probably true.

S: Could well be...it was orchestrated.

K: OK

S: OK

END

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SL 215

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Major General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
October 24, 1973
3:40

S: It is too late on press guidance. Jerry had already responded.

K: Alright, tell them to shut up from now on.

S: OK.

END

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SL217

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec. Schlesinger - Secretary Kissinger
October 24, 1973
4:25 p.m.

K: Are we permitted to go to the front in Israel yet?

S: We are permitted, but I'm not sure its a good idea anyway.

K: Well, is there any way we can find out if its quiet for ourselves? The Israelis tell us it is, the Soviets are telling us it isn't, and...

S: We can send them down there, they ready to go, we told them we would be moving them.

K: I don't want to send them in as a formal observer group. Don't want to send Soviets, too.... Why don't we send it as an informal group?

S: The problem is, if see US military down there, they're going to use it.

K: Can't we send somebody simply for our own information with no official status. Send two or three people and bring them right back to Tel Aviv just so I can tell the Soviets what I think we've found, ...I have no independent....

S: OK, well work it out. Incidentally, I am signing off on two Saudi students for the Naval Academy.

K: Good idea. Weren't we going to have some at the West Point too?

S: Well, I don't know about that.

K: Have they been notified officially?

S: I'm just signing the letter.

K: Good, I think it's an excellent idea.

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SL216

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Ron Ziegler - Secretary Kissinger
October 24, 1973
3:50 p.m.

Z: Mr. Secretary, the President doesn't know why you want to hold your press conference here tomorrow. You should hold your press conference at the State Department.

K: Well, Mr. Press Secretary, we will hold it over here. The President just wants to deprive me of the opportunity of being in the East Room.

Z: What time are you going to go?

K: Tell the President if he wants to push me out of the White House I can take a hint.

Z: 11:30?

K: 11:30.

Z: Has McCloskey announced it?

K: Yes, McCloskey, well I'm not sure....

Z: Bi-partisan leadership meeting at 8:30 on Middle East right?

K: Right, but no further comments on alleged proposal, say haven't received any such proposal.

Z: No intention of sending troops, right?

K: No, don't say that.

Z: But its already been said.

K: Well, don't say it again.

Z: Jerry was worried about....

K: If you get any other questions, just say position will be made clear at the Security Council meeting tonight. This was preliminary reaction and our position will be made clear tonight at Security Council.

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SL214

RELEASED IN FULL

QELECON
Major General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
October 24, 1973
3:45

K:..no more questions, no more backgrounders, no leaking..

S: Right, absolutely nothing.

K: There has been a meeting called and tell them we will explain our position in detail at the Council.

S: Right.

END

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SL208

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin/Kissinger
10:19 - 10/24/73

K: Hello.

D: Henry, we have the following message from Brezhnev to President Nixon.

Mr. President:

We have precise information that the Israeli troops are attacking now with tanks and military ships on Egyptian forces on the western part of the Suez Canal. They are trying to capture this port by violating the UN Security Council decision on the Middle East ceasefire. At the same time Israel's military forces are attacking on the Eastern part of the Suez Canal and again Egyptian troops to the south of the Canal. These violent actions of the Israelis were taken only a few hours after the Security Council once again confirmed their decision on a mutual ceasefire and after your very firm statement made to us that the United States would take the full responsibility to assure the full ceasefire from the part of Israel.

Mr. President, we are sure that you have responsibility to make clear to Israel that the troops should immediately stop their actions of provocation. We would like to hope that you and we would be loyal to our words which were given to each other and to the agreement we have reached with you. We would very much appreciate your message about the steps which are taken by you in order to insure that Israel will obey the second Security Council decision. Respectfully,

K: Thank you, Anatol. Now we will send you a message within a couple of hours on the substance but you can already tell him the following: We have told the Israelis that a continuation of these operations will mean a total reevaluation of our relations including supplies. Secondly, we have demanded that they stop the action. Thirdly, we have demanded that our own observers see that they are not on offensive operations until the UN is in the _____. Fourthly, the President has personally called, in the last five minutes, the Israeli ambassador and has made the same point to him.

D: OK.

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K: Now could you transmit this to Brezhnev and tell him that the spirit which _____ us over the weekend continues and we are not in a game of escorting five mile advantages which mean nothing to you or us.

D: Yes, this is exactly true. OK, Henry.

K: Thank you.

SL209

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Elliot Richardson/Secretary Kissinger
October 24, 1973
12:27

K: Elliot, how are you?

R: Fine. Henry, congratulations. You're doing a terrific job. God, I can imagine.

K: I couldn't tell you how saddened I am. I consider you one of the guarantees of virtue in this administration.

R: It is sad.

K: I understand.. and while I didn't know the issue then, the principles we discussed would have led you in that direction.

R: I think that's right.. One of those situations that enfold inexorably. There were points along the way when a different course might have been taken.

K: I didn't understand why the compromise had to lead to the firing of Cox.

R: It didn't. If you read my letter to the President, you'll see why I urged on Friday to prepare compromise and let the .. suggestions from the Hill and American people.. there was no need to couple with it the ultimatum to Cox. They didn't need to do that.

K: That could have been done two or three weeks ago. If that had happened it would have been Stennix versus Cox and on that you would have supported the President. The thing that bothers me is that Murry Marder and Scotty Reston both alleged that I tried to dissuade you from your course.. Now, our meeting was at your initiative and as far as our discussion of general principles, it would have led you in the opposite direction.

R: .. your name was used loosely over the weekend, but I don't think..

K: I would have thought the principles that we discussed at lunch about the proper conduct of Cabinet members would have led you into the direction you took. And since I didn't know what was going on until I was in Moscow and informed of it 20 minutes before it took place, my name couldn't have been used without my authority.

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R: I don't think anyone said your name or anything like, Kissinger urges..

K: The only point I insist on is that I didn't make any..

R: I believe you. I never thought you did.

K: When I left I had no reason to suppose anyone was moving in on Cox. Haig told me you were fully aboard on this.

R: I was aboard on the Stennis proposal and going aboard even if Cos shouldn't accept it. I was not aboard on Cox getting the ultimatum.

K: I thought you were even aboard on that. But I didn't talk ... anything about national security.

R: They gave me a big pitch on Monday about things being so sensitive .. the Middle East.

K: Oh, yes.

R: I knew about that. At the end of the week when I was to fire Cox, and..

K: I consider that a reasonable argument. My only point is that I am not involved.

R: I understand and know you're not and I will

K: The only way this country will get through this is to have some areas of policy where this country is right and my point is when I talk to someone it is my perception of the national interest.

R: That is true. I get the Post, but I don't see the Times.

K: Marder implied it and Reston said "even Kissinger's old friendship..

R: Do you want me to call him?

K: It would be nice. Or I'll call him and tell him to check with you.

R: Why don't you do that.

K: OK, but beyond that, my experience with you is at the highest level and I want us to stay in touch.

R: I feel the same way. I think I'll be around..probably writing.

K: If you'll be around Washington, why don't we make it a point to get in touch

K: as we have in the past. Maybe you'll be able to give more of your time to foreign policy.

R: Maybe, thank you for calling and the very best.

K: The very best to you.

R: I'll be thinking of you and praying and rooting for you.

K: Thank you.

END

SL211

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Ambassador Dobrynin - Secretary Kissinger
October 24, 1973
3:35 p.m.

D: Tell you message received from Moscow fromGromyko, for your information we received it around 11:30. Israel has informed you ....actually we could.....

K: There may not be as many as 10.

D: Just trying to recall what information you have because we have talked so many times. Refers to particular telegram .....follows: Just received very reliable information from leadership of Egypt and from our own sources that military actions from side of Israel are continuing and Israeli troops did not stop to fight. Therefore, information given by Israel to the White House is Israel stop fighting is false. Please immediately inform Dr. Kissinger of the false information and put information before the President.

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SL212

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Gen. Scowcroft - Secretary Kissinger
October 24, 1973
3:30 p.m.

K: Tell Ziegler to say nothing about the US-Soviet forces.

S: OK, good.

K: Tell him to stop whatever he's doing.

S: Say nothing.

K: We have no comment, there has been no official request.

S: OK, I like that, yes.

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SL210

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Marvin Kalb/Kissinger
2:47 p.m. - Oct. 24, 1973

K: Hello.

M: Henry.

K: Marvin.

M: I'm terribly sorry to disturb you, but there's an urgent bulletin from Cairo that says Sadat has asked the President and Breshnev to send Soviet and American troops to police the Suez front.

K: I haven't seen that yet.

M: It's running all over the wires now. And he said according to Cairo radio that he has sent an urgent message to the President and to Breshnev asking for this.

K: Well, he sent that earlier today. That's off the record. An urgent message to police the Suez front, but he didn't say anything about troops. But we will not agree to that, I can tell you that right now.

M: We're not getting into that now?

K: No.

M: No. O.K. I just wanted to double check.

K: No, we're not getting into it and we would strongly oppose it.

M: Right.

K: We think that should be done by UN observers.

M: Bob alluded to this today but since this late development I took the liberty of disturbing you on this thing.

K: No, no, that's alright, Marvin.

M: Thank you so much. Bye.

K: Bye.

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SL213

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Dinitz/Sec. Kissinger
Wednesday, Oct. 24, 1973
3:40 p.m.

K: We have just been told by the Soviets; I'm not saying this is true; but I want to bring you up to date -- that your forces are still continuing to attack.

D: I have just talked to Israel about 5 mins. ago and they told me all is quiet and we cancelled the blackout in Israel today.

K: I want to inform you of our strategy at the UN. If the meeting is called we will take the following position: 1) We will support the strongest call for an observance of the ceasefire; 2) we will totally oppose introduction of American and Soviet forces (unless you are for it).

D: No. No. No.

K: 3) We will strongly favor strengthening of UN observers by bringing people in like the Scandanavians and elsewhere. 4) On the question of return to the original line we strongly support the principle but have no thoughts on how to apply it. Scali will be instructed to delay and confuse it. O.K.?

D: Fine. Do you have any idea if anyone is going to propose a resolution.

K: No. I have no word. I have seen that the Egyptians and Syrians are calling a meeting. I am seeing Dobrynin at 4:00 and another matter and I will tell them not to propose it because we will oppose it. Give us as much assurance as you can that you are not taking any military actic ..

D: I called 5 minutes ago. I will tell the Prime Minister about the strategy and repeat the concern that the Russians expressed to you.

K: Thank you.

D: Thank you.

END

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SL242

TELCON
Lord Cromer/Secretary Kissinger [in Sit Rm]
1:03 a.m., October 25, 1973

K: Hello, Rollie.

C: Yes, Henry, how are you?

K: Okay. We have had some disturbing information from the Soviets in a letter from Brezhnev to the President in which he asked us to dispatch Soviet and American military contingents to the Middle East and that if we don't agree -- [Reads] "I will say it straight that if you find it impossible to act jointly with us in this matter, we should be faced with the necessity urgently to consider the question of taking appropriate steps unilaterally. We cannot allow arbitrariness on the part of Israel.

C: Oh, no.

K: Our own information is that none of this is supported by [actions] on the ground, things in Israel are quiet, the Security Council meeting this evening was very desolatory. I just wanted to tell you what our policy is and I hope in this grave situation we will get your support. We feel that the only chance we now have which will be ..... is defense readiness around the world.

C: q Globally?

K: Globally, yes.

C: Sure.

K: We are going to what they call our Def Con three alert -- cancel leave, alert planes and so forth; one carrier fromthe Eastern Atlantic is moving into the Mediterranean and one carrier to the Mediterranean; alerting the 82nd air division and our forces in Europe.

C: They are having a hell of a buildup down in the Mediterranean.

K: We will not inform our Allies of the Brezhnev letter because we don't want it to leak but we will have to inform them of what we are doing. ..... But we would like your very strong support.

C: What would you like us to do?

K: Well, doh't say the Americans have gone crazy.

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C: Of course. This letter says if we do not get this support -- Let me just get this letter down.

K: "If you find it impossible to act jointly with us in this matter, we should be faced with the necessity urgently to consider the question of taking appropriate steps unilaterally. We cannot allow arbitrariness on the part of Israel." What they are asking us to do is to join forces ..... forcing Israel to comply.

[Re-reads message to Cromer]

C: Thank you for letting me know, Henry.

K: I just wanted you to know what we are doing.

C: Thank you very much.

SL261

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
George Springsteen - Secretary Kissinger
October 25, 1973
6:55 p.m.

K: After looking over the cable fro m the Norwegians, I am wondering whether it might not be wiser just to accept the award in the Norwegian Embassy here.

S: Does that mean you lose the money in the process.

K: Well, if it does or not, I was probably going to give it away anyway.

S: Canvas the possibility for you?

K: I didn't think the Norwegian government ever found it possible to express anything yet and haven't offered participation of their own.

S: No, I thought the .....was a little fullsome.

K: Swedes normally invite you, they haven't said anything and what's the use of going up there to massive demonstrations.

S: I agree. Would you be willing to go back later and make a lecture when things calm down, or...

K: Why don't you canvass it without indicating....

S: I will get a cable out asking them to canvass possibilities quietly...

K: I don't think I'll lose the money, but its not a major consideration.

S: I was just reading how Le Duc Tho lost the money by turning it down.

K: Yes, but he turned it down. As for receiving the award, Solzelnitsin got it at the Embassy in Moscow. I have the impression there is the possibility of receiving it here.

S: Very good.

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SL259

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Dinitz/Kissinger
October 25, 1973
5:35 p.m.

K. We have now had a reply from the Soviet Union. All they are doing is offering 70 men as individual observers. So we have managed to face them down again.

D. You are going to offer....

K. We ~~will~~ are going to tell them we don't think it requires 70.

D. Yes, I see. These observers will be strictly...We will have an observer force as well as a... force. The Russians will be coming in the framework of the observer force, and you are going to tell them they don't need to offer that many. Do you have any idea what was in the five planes that landed in Cairo today?

K. No.

D. Maybe the 70 observers have landed today.

K. AYes, that is my impression.

D. All right. I will pass it on. Our policy will be the less of them that come the better.

K. That is exactly our policy too.

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SL258

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sen. Mansfield - Secretary Kissinger
October 25, 1973
4:45 p.m.

M: I hate to bother you so soon again....Senator Griffin came in to the office about an hour ago. He said he had been solicited by television to come over and make a statement. He decided he was not the proper one to do it and he came to me....Most unusual, coming from Griffin. Never done that before. He said I would be a better person to go explain I was supporting what's going on there, etc. I didn't want to do anything until I checked with you.

K: If you would do that it would be a very good thing to do. Let me bring you up to date. The Security Council voted 40 to nothing, I mean 14 to nothing, so the resolution has passed.

M: Did somebody abstain.

K: The Chinese.

M: Uh, huh.

K: Also, and this is strictly for you and you cannot refer to this now, We had a note from the Soviets saying they accepted the proposal to send observers and they are sending 70.

M: 70.

K: Yes, so the crisis is practically over. I mean, last evening they were talking about military intervention, and...

M: Yah. Well, if you think it would be useful, I will.

K: I would not yet say the crisis is over, wait a day to see who they interpret the resolution. You can say you are hopeful, you support it, if you felt you could say that...

M: I do, certainly. One other detail they may ask about, what to expect about negotiations....are they expected to start forthwith.

K: In the earlier one, not in today's.

M: Not today?

K: In today's.....a matter of weeks.

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M: Should I say it will be in Geneva, or it is indefinite.

K: Not yet formally agreed to, your understanding is that the locality has been discussed.

M: I was amazed at Griffin ....that he would get this. I was told, at least he had the impression this was sort of alert, to steer people ....implying that this was, you know, an effort on your part to turn attention from the domestic thing.

K: I noticed.

M: He told me Jackson gave the President a memorandum, I didn't know, you didn't say that, did you?

K: Absolutely not.

M: Griffin said he understood Jackson had given the President a memo in effect containing substance .....what's called .....communcation from the Soviets.

K: I refused to confirm that in the press conference. .....said Jackson was not part of the negotiations.

M: Well, Jackson said..

K: Jackson made a statement to that effect.

M: He did? Oh. I didn't put it quite together. What should I say about that?

K: I would say outsiders can never exactly judge what communications are, you noticed the Secretary in his press conference didn't characterize anything.

M: Any other suggestions?

K: To the extent you can constribute the sense that this is a serious situation which is in the process of being overcome it would be very helpful.

M: I hate to bother you with this but Griffin asked me....

K: I think you are the best man to do it.

M: OK.

K: Many thanks Mr. Chairman.

SL260

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Rush/Kissinger
October 25, 1973
6:03 p.m.

R. ...Do you want to do it tomorrow?

K. Yes, I want those idiots talked to before. I am not going to have an hours battle with a bunch of maniac oilmen. Will you be present.

R. I will be there.

K. Is someone briefing me before?

R. Do you want Bill Clements? You mentioned that before.

K. Yes, that will be fine.

R. What time?

K. That you will have to work out with Eagleburger.

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RELEASED IN FULL

SL262

TELECON
The President/Kissinger
October 25, 1973
7:15 p.m.

K. Hello, Mr. President.

N. I thought you should know that Mrs. Nixon and Tricia thought you did a hell of a job. They are pretty good critics.

K. Well, Mr. President, you rate the remarks.

N. I talked to Al and I want you to do this on a crash basis to follow up. This is the group I want you to fly down tomorrow from New York. (He named off the heads of CBS, NBC, ABC, the New York Times and the Washington Post).

K. Right, Mr. President.

N. I think you can have an enormous influence on them. Their major concern is Israel. Who saved Israel? Would anybody else have saved it? You have to tell them that. And with the fact that if Albert had been faced with it....It has to be done on a crash basis.

K. One thing for sure if we can't do it tomorrow, we can do it Monday. I will call them. We have completely dominated the news. They gave about 15 minutes.

N. I understand there was over 6 minutes with regard to the fact that we faked this whole thing on CBS. That we made it all up. Do you remember the....Kalb and R____ were both shocking.

K. I killed them with the answers.

N. Anyway they used 6 minutes on that bad point which plants in the public's mind that we made it all up. Ziegler has to make sure that that line doesn't get through. You know we were close to a nuclear confrontation this morning.

K. Mr. President, I have seen the CBS news and I think it was very good for us. They presented all the tough answers to these charges.

N. Do they point out the fact that the President....

K. No, as a leadership role.

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N. They spent half an hour....Not individually. Get the whole bunch in a room and say you are American first, and members of the American Jewish Community, and interested in Israel. Who is going to save Israel and who will save it in the future?

K. I will do my best to get it done tomorrow.

N. You did a hell of a job.

K. It was.

SL257

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
The President - Secretary Kissinger
October 25, 1973
3:30 p.m.

K: Mr. President.

N: I think it would be well for semantics, no semantics, I mean, if you could come over here, make an appearance, dash over to say hello. You know, to sort of, what are you doing now?

K: I was having a staff meeting.

N: Well, what time will you be through?

K: About 15 minutes. I can come over, I've got the Chinese coming in but I can shift them half an hour. I'll come over in about 20 minutes.

N: Well, I don't want to, you name the time. You could have them over here.

K: No, I'll be over in about 20 minutes.

N: OK.

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin - Secretary Kissinger
October 25, 1973
3:40 p.m.

K: Anatoly?

D: Hello Henry. I would like to read to you a letter from Brezhnev to the President and then I will send you. Have it now in writing, I mean handwriting.

K: Is it going to calm me down or make me go into orbit again?

D: No, not orbit. .....Prefer to stay in orbit quietly. "I have received your letter in which you alleged once again the Israelis have cease firing...contradictory to the facts we have received in Moscow. .....Israel was bombing the city of Ismail, and fighting was continuing in the straits of _____, which has until this moment not been a scene of military action. .....President of Egypt, Mr. Sadat in which addressed....We have already dispatched on October 25, Soviet .....which counted 70 persons at the Egyptian/Israeli front, of observers of .....Security Council decision. Since you are ready now, as we understand it, now to send to Egypt a group of American observers, we agree to it jointly in this question. Soviet group of observers instructed to get into contact immediately in a businesslike operation with the US group of observers, with the American group as soon as they arrive in Egypt, and without delay and discharging their tasks ....In the situation without delay. We are ready to cooperate with the American side in taking other measures which will be dictated by the situation, to insure immediate ....implementation of the Security Council resolution of the 22 and 23 of October. .....following dispatch of observers, we in an urgent memo, will contain also other political measures and corresponding to decision of the Security Council and .....to the understanding in Moscow with Kissinger who conducted negotiations on your behalf, on part of US really effective steps will be taken to guarantee implementation by Israel of decisions of the Security Council about what you, Mr. President write in your letter. Respectfully, Brezhnev. That's all.

K: OK, Anatoly. Did you hear my press conference?

D: Of course, I hear Henry. I couldn't miss you. I see on television.

K: I tried to be gentle with you, so....

D: Yes, so I noticed, from yesterday 4:00 in the morning.

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K: Oh, no. At 4:00 in the morning I didn't try to be gentle. I thought you were threatening us. Don't ...I take threats very badly. We will talk about it some time.

D: No, isn't anything to discuss now...

K: Will you get it over to me at the White House, to Scowcroft?

D: To Scowcroft. OK. We will type it up and send to him. Good. In the usual way.

K: Good.

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SL265

TELECON
Robert Toth/Kissinger
October 25, 1973
7:45 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

T. I was just wondering whether you could give me some guidance on if the Israeli humanitarian thing can help to bring this around.

K. I think the humanitarian thing helped with Sadat. I think the alert was the typical factor.

T. I understand that the thrust of the Soviet note was they would have to comply with Egypt in sending in troops.

K. I am not going to do any of it.

T. ...alerting of Soviet forces would...the movement of some of their troops back into....They didn't put on alert their nuclear forces?

K. That was not the principal factor at this point. It was the airborne alert.

T. Inside the Soviet Union?

K. Yes.

T. O'k. Finallyhow do you see now their turn around at the UN? Is the crisis in effect been calmed.

K. Let's wait a week.

T. They haven't stood down that alerted force.

K. We would not notice that right away. If the ceasefire takes hold and forces go in immediately...protest will be removed.

T. [redacted] Why do you think they acted?

K. I don't want to speculate on that.

T. Did you get my note about Erlichman and Haldeman?

K. Yes.

T. I finally did a piece about you and the Jewish Community.

K. Oh, in the Times?

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T. Yes,...I talked with the Rabi of your parent's temple. He said you are an incidental Jew. (laughter)

K. I don't know what that means.

T. That your parents are Jewish.

K. He is rather Orthodox.

T. I will have to tell you a funny story about going up their sometime. Maybe on the China trip.

K. Fine.

T. Thanks for calling back.

RELEASED IN FULL
SL 264

TELECON
Rockefeller/Kissinger
October 25, 1973
7:26 p.m.

R. Listen, how are things?

K. We faced them down.

R. You got them not to put in troops?

K. That's right.

R. I don't know how you did it. I was so worried this morning when I heard this. You got it in hand.

K. Yes, unless they break loose again.

R. That is fantastic. I heard that you had mobilized the military forces the world over.

K. They sent us a note last night saying they would put in forces unilaterally if we didn't go in with them. We refused to reply for 10 hours, mobilized, and sent them a reply.

R. Well, if you ever deserved a treat from Kenny Riland.....
(The rest of the conversation was about having a treatment from Dr. Riland, when he was arriving from New York, and the fact that he could come over the State Department or to the Secretary's home any time he wished.)

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SL2666

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin - Secretary Kissinger
October 25, 1973
8:45 p.m.

K: One other matter it is important for Moscow to understand, if this matter of our introducing airplanes becomes enormous issue, I'm sure it is obvious to you it will be necessary to (a) explain the delay, (b) prevent exacerbation of relationship. Don't have to do it before Monday, but...

D: Henry, we know this quite well, the trouble is with American public opinion.

K: Don't treat it as a threat now.

D: I didn't intend it as a threat. But Henry tell me, what do we do, realistically? What do we really do? Put yourself on our side. What do they, we do in the framework of the bigger relationship?

K: I will tell you what could be done now. _____ Resolution first, second should be guarantee withdrawal until '67. Israel has stated clearly they would not accept '67.

D: What about in the UN?

K: We think it would be better to negotiate it directly. Otherwise it will force the U.S. to betray allies in the UN or get into a totally violated position.

D: But Henry, we should say to Arabs you should accept Israeli or American resolution? What do you do?

K: If you had not sent in all those airplanes....Now Podgrony and Gromyko made imflammatory remarks to the Arab Ambassadors and we know about Brezhnev's message to Boumedianne. And sending 40 airplanes does not help the problem, it only exacerbates the situation.

D: Henry, I want you to know we have talked to no government against you. We have done nothing to exacerbate the situation.

K: Obviously you have exacerbated the ah..situation. No limit to what can be done. Do you think the Israelis like to be told to go along with a cease fire in place, should they agree?

_____

K: There was no sense in abstaining if the resolution ....if Israel rejects it.

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D: What could we do?

K: Sen. Jackson implied _____. not break down in National Security policy.

D: What he is doing now?

K: He's introducing a resolution some time soon. He called this morning, and Israel must have talked to him. Sen. Javits must have talked to him. Much more comfortable to say we tried to wrok with the Soviet and the Soviet Union violated the proposals. So far no European.

D: Anyway the question is really about the resolution, so we don't agree.

K: We can go back to what we had agreed ...back to the 242...say something about negotiations. I have not idea, but if haven't done something by 4:00 this afternoon, we plan to go ahead as planned. I've something I've never done before, I have no alternative plans. Nobody believed me and they were right. My _____forcing the Israelis to accept this.

D: 242...you are not prepared.

K: We could refer to Resolution 242.

D: Combined, cease fire and resolution 242?

K: That we can do.

D: This is not in my instructions.

K: Nor have I any authority to make a commitment, but _)_____ we will definitely veto and get very nasty.

D: Say I can , if any, wx 242, we can agree to.

K: wx 242 we can agree to.

D: So, I'll mention this when I send to Moscow.

K: That will...we have to hold things together, but you don't have to say anything until tomorrow.

SL263

TELECON
Haig/Kissinger
October 25, 1973
7:19 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K. Al, how are you?

H. Good. I wonder why. Listen, Henry, the President is at Camp David.

K. Yes, I know. He is harrassing the hell out of me. He wants me to call the Jewish leaders.

H. Not the Jewish leaders--

K. Well, the Jewish heads of organizations. You know that this is going to backfire.

H. Of course it's going to backfire. He had another item that I thought was a good one. As I look at this damn news tonight Jackson really helped us there.

K. I am beginning to think that Jackson is a menace.

H. I agree. The President said to "Tell Henry to send a message from me to Brezhnev.

K. Not at all. Let them sweat.

H. I agree.

K. They played chicken with us and they lost.

H. Have you seen that report about the amphibious force going in. They had a whole flotilla going in to Egypt and they pulled away.

K. We came so close to Soviet military intervention as we can get. Have you seen the Brezhnev letter?

H. No.

K. All he even wanted was to send 70 observers. He cannot see why we are so excited, and he wants us to send 70 too. I told him we will take 20.

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H. This came out very well.

K. I don't think they should come up for air all that fast. We faced them down.

H. They had terrific excerpts from your press conference today.

K. On TV? Did it play all right.

H. The three clips were the lousy questions they asked. All three were great.

K. As I remember I gave them some tough answers.

H. ....The last guy did it. That was just great where you took the media on.

K. About undermining the country?

H. Yes, it was really a first-class success. I just wish we had a spokesman as soon as you with some sense.

K. I think he came out fine on this.

H. Thanks to you. Last night was something. I got home and told Pat....

K. Nothing compared to this morning. The President called me out of the leadership meeting and they wouldn't leave. Schlesinger said they just sat around bitching until I kicked them out and said when I leave a meeting it ends. Off they went and bitched in their own Departments.

H. I bet. Well, those were the two items he wanted me to bring up.

K. What was the second?

H. The second was to send a message from him to Brezhnev to tell him that Jackson has blown this out of control and wants him to know it doesn't come from us.

K. Jackson is disgraceful. I may call Dobrynin later this evening and discuss it with him. You know, if they had moved it would have been more dangerous than '62.

H. Right. Good job! Good night.

SL243

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Dinitz/HAK
October 25, 1973/2:09 a.m.

K: HelbMr. Ambassador.

D: Yes, Dr. Kissinger

K: We are drafting a very tough reply and we are sending a copy of it, they are delivering it at 5:30 in the morning to keep Dobrynin up all night.

D: He is keeping us up why not him too.

K: If you want to come over and pick up a copy you can have it. We will not make you a proposal because we don't think this is the time to offer any complicated solutions. Besides they will never accept it. They won't accept the demilitarized zone. What we should consider is... What I'd like from you is your military assessment, your assessment of your military capabilities if the Soviets come in whether you can clean up that pocket quickly.

D: Clean up what Dr. Kissinger?

K: Get an Army quickly. And for God sakes be honest with me.

D: I have always been.

K: Get that to me in the morning.

D: Then I come now and pick it up. To which office Scowcaroft.

K: Yes, and you'll see we're not offering anything. All we are offering is that if they want to send up service in there we are willing to join together with them an observer force. As lon g as they are not combat troops and as long as there is a very small force. But we are not, and we're very threatening and in addition we are moving the second carrier in the Mediterranean East, the one that was near Sicily is moving to Creet, the one that was in the Atlantic is moving into the Mediterranean. And we have increased, we are alluding our 82nd Airborne Division and our forces in Europe and we are moving things into a worldwide readiness posture and we'll see now what happens.

D: Fine. So I'll be coming now.

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SL247

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
HAK/Lord Cromer
Oct. 25, 1973; 10:40 a.m.

K: We have just gotten word that your representative in New York is introducing a resolution that would prevent the British forces from participating in the peacekeeping.

C: I don't think that is right.

K: It is true it means he would open up the door to Soviet participation.

C: He did not give me that indication at all. What he did say was to go along with the suggestion you and I discussed to exclude other members. He did not necessarily exclude the...

K: We are not asking him to exclude them. Will you please confirm this. I will just talk to the President. If we split on this we have a permanent change in our relationship.

C: I will confirm it and will be back in touch with you.

K: Good.

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SL245

Telcon

RELEASED IN FULL

Ambassador John Scali/HAK
October 25, 1973; 10:13 a.m.

K: John, how are you?

S: All right.

K: Where are you?

S: I'm in the office.

K: Here is what we would like you to do. The first paragraph should read - you've already got the first paragraph. The third paragraph should read "decides to set up immediately under its authority a UN emergency force to be composed of personnel drawn from states members of the United Nations, except Permanent Members of the Security Council..."

S: Yeah.

K: "...and requests the Secretary General to report within 24 hours."

S: Right.

K: In other words, the only claims we are making is we want to exclude Permanent Members of the Security Council because we don't want a Soviet parachute division to show up there tonight as the United Nations force.

S: I understand. You want to end it at the word "24 hours?" How about...

K: "within 24 hours on steps staken to this effect."

S: All right.

K: Okay?

S: Yeah, I think we can sell that. Do we have a change in paragraph 1? Substitution of the word "return" for the word "withdraw?"

K: Yeah, "return."

S: And the time is 1750 GMT?

K: That seems all right to me. In fact, 1752. [Laughter] Never mind, we'll give them those two minutes.

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S: All right, very good. We'll get on it right away.

K: Now, we have another thing. Oh, the hell with it. We'll let you know about that later.

S: Okay.

K: We have some follow-on instructions that will be in a cable, that are not important now.

S: All right.

K: Good. Bye.

SL244

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Cromer/Kissinger
10:01 a.m. - 10/25/73

K: Hello.

C: Oh, Henry, good morning.

K: Yes, Rowley, how are you?

C: I thought you'd like to know I got a small exchange from London with regard to the letter you gave us last night and I've been asked to say that they certainly take Brezhnev's message just the same as you do and it goes on to say "I long believe that the Russians could not accept another Arab humiliation. If Brezhnev really believes that this is immenint as a result of the Israeli posturing after the Egyptian forces (to consolidate) at the Canal, he may have well been obliged to intervene unilaterally to save the Egyptians as well as his own prestige." Then he goes to say that he suggests there are three things that might be done urgently to hold the conflict situation down. First is to dispatch to the Secretary General of the United Nations as many observers as possible. Secondly, ~~xx~~ the start of the negotiations as envisaged in para 3 of 338 and thirdly, the resolution of the negotiations as the first type of a problem which endangers the whole situation namely the _____ of the Third army. Now I don't know whether there's any possibility of being able to do any deal between you and the Russians.

K: We are in communication with the Egyptians and they have now indicated that they would settle for an International force. If that is true we will support that.

C: Support an international force. I see, but we have the intention of supporting the non-aligned draft . . . . with the international force.

K: You have that intention?

C: Yes.

K: So do we.

C: Of course. I suppose at the moment it's a sort of putting in a resolution. This is me, it's not London. A call to countries not involved to keep out.

K: No, we will put an international force only in the context - we will only accept it if it excludes the permanent members.

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C: Excludes the permanent members, I see.

K: We will absolutely not support an international force if the Soviets can then show up as part of an international force.

C: I'm with you.

K: And I hope you will support us on that.

C: I would think certainly.

K: I hope we can count on you in this debate.

C: OK, Henry. Fine.

SL246

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Lord Cromer/HAK
Oct. 25, 1973; 10:06 a.m.

K: Hello.

C: Sorry to bother you again. It's just another telegram's come in. It's merely instructions to our Ambassador in Moscow telling him to make the points that I made to you to Brezhnev.

K: What are those points?

C: Well the points that dispatch to the _____ area of the battlefield as many UN truce observers as can be mustered.

K: OK, fine.

C: The start of negotiations under auspices, and that...

K: Well, that's in train and that's totally irrelevant to the problem.

C: I see. Anyhow, he will be basing his position on agency reports, not what you've told us.

K: No, no, but that isn't the point. The point is the negotiations are not the slightest problem. The Soviets and we had agreed in principle on how to start those.

C: Well that's fine. Then there's no problem there. Fairly imminently?

K: I beg your problem.

C: Fairly imminently, fairly soon.

K: Well, first we've got to get this situation quieted down, Rollie, rather than scratching it up with a lot of other matters.

C: Oh, I quite agree.

K: Within two weeks.

C: Yeah, fine.

K: Okay.

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary General Waldheim - Secretary Kissinger
October 25, 1973
1:18 p.m.

K: Mr. Secretary General, how are you?

W: Thank you, well, quite busy. I am very grateful for returning the call. I have, of course, spoken to Joe Sisco and informed him, but I wanted to keep you informed of the situation here. The situation is that as you know, the Russians got instructions to accept the new American amendment. Only the French position is reluctant. The French Ambassador was just here and he said they would ask for a separate vote on the amendment.....excludes the permanent members. They will vote for the resolution, but ask for separate vote on the amendment in order to show they are not in agreement with this.

K: You are in no doubt, Mr. Secretary General, that we will veto any resolution which doesn't have it in it?

W: Yes, I was informed of this by Joe Sisco.

K: We will not compromise on this.

W: Yes, that is understood. No problem. Any more, non-alligned .....change and the Russians, only the French want a separate vote

K: Well, that's their privilege.

W: But, after that, the French will vote for the resolution as it stands.

K: Excellent. There is one other thing that concerns me, Mr. Secretary General. We are fundamentally opposed to the introduction of any East European contingents, any communist countries. There must be enough neutrals in the world to do it. If there were Eastern European countries it would produce a crisis of confidence here, if any contingents from communist countries were included.

W: Well, there is a strong trend to have in addition to the Nordic countries one African, one Asian like Malaysia, African like Nigeria.

K: Well, we have no objection to that as long as it isn't a East European country.

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W: There is an idea of including Poland.

K: We think its a great concession to permit Sweden.

W: How is it with the Russians?

K: ....can't accept any Eastern Europeans.

W: Could lead to situation where we would have a problem with Canada.

K: Canada?

W: Yes, because of NATO

K: That's all right with us.

W: Neutral countries.

K: We will trade Canada. Also won't accept Yugoslavia.

W: There was no question of taking them....but I take note of your information and I hope we can proceed on that line.

K: Mr. Secretary General, when this is all over, and I hope it will be soon, you and I must have a drink together and reminisce.

W: Certainly look forward to that.

K: Now, if you think it necessary to obtain airlift and logistic support, you can call on us.

W: I am very grateful. That will be particularly needed. The latest development which I discussed with Scali here. Egypt wanted another meeting after the resolution was adopted, which should be in the next hour, to discuss my role in implementation of the resolution. I agree with Scali that it's not a very good idea to have this evening another meeting. Instead, I intend to write an interim report, in the form of a letter to McIntyre and....., proposing as an immediate ..... measure, I could send.....to the Middle East, Cairo.....dispatch quickly to the area three contingents, three neutral contingents from Cyprus, that is the Finnish, Austrian and Swedish, each battalion has about 200-280 people.

K: That sounds reasonable to me, if they're from Cyprus, and that's on the regular budget.

W: That's right. .....unique operation, paid out of the regular budget and since the Russians and French also voted for it, there will be no excuse and we will proceed on those lines.

SL 256

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
The President/Secretary Kissinger
October 25, 1973
3:13 pm

K: Mr. President

N: Henry, will this be announced in time, that is, the UN resolution has it been announced yet?

K: It has not been voted on yet.

N: Do you think it will be voted on?

K: Yes, in time for the evening news.

N: Yes.

K: No question.

N: I was thinking of going up to Camp David..

K: I think you can safely go now. The Soviets have agreed and it has been announced.

N: You don't think you could go up too?

K: I, uh, uh,

N: No, I understand. You think there is no problem then.

K: No problem. It would be normal for you to go up there. It is now known by the press..

N: Don't you think you should call a few of those damnable leaders and tell them?

K: I will do that now Mr. President.

N: Good boy.

END

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UNCLASSIFIED

SL255

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

TELCON
The President/Sec. Kissinger
Thursday, Oct. 25, 1973
3:05 p.m.

K: Mr. President, you have won again.

N: You think so?

K: The Soviets have joined our resolution and the UN barring permanent members after screaming like banshees and we have had a reply from Brezhnev.

N: What does it say?

K: It accepts your proposal and says he is sending 70 observers and we should send 70 observers also and that is it.

N: That is easy. We will send 170 if they want.

K: That is it. It is done.

N: You think it is?

K: Yes. We should stay on alert until midnight and start standing down in Alaska at midnight and so on.

N: How should we handle the press tomorrow?

K: I will be glad to step out in the press room tomorrow and explain it.

N: Not until tomorrow? Will the vening news carry the UN resolution?

K: They will carry it. I will explain it at the press conference. The @#$%xs are saying we did all of this for political purposes.

N: I know. Like Kalb and who else?

K: Kalb, McCarthy. Reston called here with a similar question.

N: In other words we set this up.

K: At 4:00 in the morning.

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K: I treated Kalb contemptible at the press conference.

N: What about Scotty?

K: I gave him a few facts. I said what would you do if 7 o f 8 airborne divisions were put on alert. I did not tell him about the Brezhnev letter.

N: Why does he think the President is up until 3:00 this morning.

K: I said, you think we staged all of this. He said no but we had to give all of the information.

N: I thought you had.

K: I had but I did not tell them about the Brezhnev letter and the air alert. We don't want to force him to hit you back. What you did was just another one of these moves.

N: Just as well I will not be doing the press conference. I am not in the modd to do it tonight.

K: Absolutely not. I think I would do it tomorrow or Monday.

N: I don't think I can wait until Monday.

K: Do it tomorrow night. I would treat the bastards with contempt, Mr. President. They asked me about Watergate. I said you cannot play with the central authority of the country without paying a price.

N: You are rather confident that this is going to do it.

K: Mr. President, you were prepared to put forces in [redacted] and that was way before you knew what was going to happen. I told Kalb that the President is attempting to conduct foreign policy of the US regardless... that it would be suggested that the US would alert its forces for domestic reasons....

B1

N: Good. Al told me you slaughtered the bastards. Keep it up.

K: That is what I am here for.

N: Keep it up. We will survive.

K: No question.

END

SL254

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Reston/Sec. Kissinger
Thursday, Oct. 25, 1973
3:00 p.m.

R: (On your press conference) you looked awfully tired. You must be exhausted.

K: I was up until 4:00.

R: I have had great difficulty with this decision last night and I guess my difficulty with it is this -- it was put to you at the end and I understand that you cannot really answer the thing in public. The question that I thought was the critical one and the one that bothers me is the evidence given for so important an act seemed so flimsy as not to be credible. Here it seems to me that there is a real problem.

K: That may be but if our country has reached the point where people think that the government orders an alert for other than overwhelming reasons then we are in an impossible situation.

R: That is the prior question. That is not my question. I am assuming that you had reasons and that you had justification and you did not give them and you probably could not give them.

K: Let me tell you why I did not give them. That would have produced a direct confrontation between Brezhnev and the President in which we would have a score card of winners and losers of the record which I did not think proper in the situation. Since we are still in the situation although it is easing now in which we wanted to prevent an irrevocable Soviet act -- if you read what I said -- it is clear that I was trying to prevent an irrevocable Soviet act by my press conference.

R: I think that was clear and at that point I think you got over quite effectively. I am saying now that the vote has been taken now and they voted for the resolution. I think

K: We had very strong reason to believe that there was a good possibility that they would put their own combat forces into Egypt and early next week I will be glad to give you the evidence.

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R: Don't you think it should be donw now without any involvement of the government. If we could say on our own authority, I think it very important.

K: There is no way I can give it to you. I can give you one piece of evidence which you could have gotten from others. They alerted 7 of their 8 airborne divisions and pulled all of their transport planes to where these divisions were but there was some collateral evidence on top of that that made it extremely ominous.

R: Seven of their eight airborne divisions were alerted. Were they moved?

K: No. They were put on high alert. You don't have to move them. Once they move them, it is gone.

R: Then suddenly the transport into the Middle East which led us to believe their airtransport was to be with those divisions.

K: And there was another conclusive piece of evidence which I cannot give you.

R: In other words the transport would have stopped the actual transport into the Middle East. This looked like diversion of that transport to airlift the troops.

K: Right.

R: We cannot name places.

K: No.

R: That is something.

K: I tell you even that is the less conclusive part of what concerned us. That I would like not to talk about for a bit. I think and I am confident you will recognize why I won't when I talk to you about it sometime.

R: Thank you Henry. All the best.

K: Don't ascribe this to me.

R: Not at all.

END

SL253
NV

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Joe Kraft/Secretary Kissinger
October 25, 1973
2:50 pm

K: How are you?

JK: Fine. Can I ask a few questions? Some of which arose out of today's session.

K: Sure, as long as it is on a non-attributable basis.

JK: There was a phrase about puzzeling behavior about Soviet representatives. Can you tell me what that was about?

K: It seemed to verge on the threatening.

JK: Of the negotiations? You're not talking about Malik, are you?

K: No, no. When this they unravels and I think it is beginning to resolve itself, I will tell you exactly what I meant.

JK: I take it that it was the Israelis who broke the cease-fire and whatever happened, they used the break to make a significant advantage in their position.

K: That's the case.

JK: I would imagine the Soviet leaders were very angry about that. A terrific blow to Breshnev.

K: Right. Still, doesn't mean we could accept unilateral intervention by them. I agree that it was not provoked and I think there were deeper causes.

JK: Could you say what they were?

K: They are in a touch position in the Arab world.

JK: Do you think there was internal opposition.. the three paragraph formula a concession on their part.

K: An enormous concession on their part. We gave nothing. In paragraph

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one, a cease-fire in place, Israelis having more territory than they started with. Paragraph two, reconfirm Security Council's resolution that's six years old. And paragraph three... direct negotiations...

JK: That.. enormous concession. But wasn's their internal opposition to that?

K: I had the impression that they were very tense and grave when I was there. I had the impression that if there was an 8-7 vote on Sunday, it could have gone the other way yesterday...

JK: The Israelis were very emotional .. at seeing

K: They were pleased. They expressed regret that they couldn't ..... point four, which is exactly at the other end.

JK: I know, .. did you.. it looked to me that when you first made the announcement it would be extremely difficult to hold in place.

K: I expect some commotion, but you have to expect that with a cease-fire in place.
JK: Have you got that from the Security Council yet?

K: It seems to be shaping along. I have the impression that the Soviets are going along.

JK: But you can't tell me what?

K: I can assure you there was a good reason.

JK: I know you well enought and I believe you -- I know you better than most of my colleagues..

K: There was a grave reason. We may have read it wrong, but at midnight you can't take chances.

JK: You spoke to Jackson about this this morning, didn't you?

K: No. I talked to him at 6:00 last night.

JK: Oh, he led us to believe that . .

K: I told him there would...

JK: What is your sense of their relations with the Egyptians?

K: Edgy.

JK: Did Kosygin go anywhere else besides Cairo?

K: No.

JK: OK, that covers me.

K: OK.

JK: Thank you for taking the time.

END

D

S4251

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin - Secretary Kissinger
October 25, 1973
2:40 p.m.

K: Anatoly?

D: Hello Henry. I would like to read to you a letter from Brezhnev to the President and then I will send you. Have it now in writing, I mean handwriting.

K: Is it going to calm me down or make me go into orbit again?

D: No, not orbit. .....Prefer to stay in orbit quietly. "I have received your letter in which you alleged once again the Israelis have cease firing...contradictory to the facts we have received in Moscow. .....Israel was bombing the city of Ismail, and fighting was continuing in the straits of _____, which has until this moment not been a scene of military action. .....President of Egypt, Mr. Sadat in which addressed....We have already dispatched on October 25, Soviet .....which counted 70 persons at the Egyptian/Israeli front, of observers of .....Security Council decision. Since you are ready now, as we understand it, now to send to Egypt a group of American observers, we agree to it jointly in this question. Soviet group of observers instructed to get into contact immediately in a businesslike operation with the US group of observers, with the American group as soon as they arrive in Egypt, and without delay and discharging their tasks ....in the situation without delay. We are ready to cooperate with the American side in taking other measures which will be dictated by the situation, to insure immedate ....implementation of the Security Council resolution of the 22 and 23 of October. .....following dispatch of observers, we in an urgent memo, will continu also other political measures and corresponding to decision of the Security Council and .....to the understanding in Moscow with Kissinger who conducted negotiations on your behalf, on part of US really effective steps will be taken to guarantee implementation by Israel of decisions of the Security Council about what you, Mr. President write in your letter. Respectfully, Brezhnev. That's all.

K: OK, Anatoly. Did you hear my press conference?

D: Of course, I hear Henry. I couldn't miss you. I see on television.

K: I tried to be gentle with you, so....

D: Yes, so I noticed, from yesterday 4:00 in the morning.

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K: Oh, no. At 4:00 in the morning I didn't try to be gentle. I thought you were threatening us. Don't ...I take threats very badly. We will talk about it some time.

D: No, isn't anything to discuss now...

K: Will you get it over to me at the White House, to Scowcroft?

D: To Scowcroft. OK. We will type it up and send to him. Good. in the usual way.

K: Good.

SL252

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Schlesinger/Sec. Kissinger
Thursday, October 25, 1973
2:45 p.m.

K: I think it is working.

S: You think you have won.

K: Yep. They have agreed to the SC Resolution.

S: Have we heard back from them directly.

K: Yes, and it is conciliatory. Keep that quiet for the time being.

S: Good.

K: Otherwise it looks as if we ginned this thing up.

S: O.K. I am exploring with Tom and Bill here. We have a world-wide DefCon and I think there are some places that we can relax now after this vote.

K: I think we should hold it until midnight.

S: We have the Alaskan Command which is sort of irrelevant to this thing and a few other places. I'm not talking about SAC or EUCOM.

K: Do not relax after the vote. It looks as if it is a pressure play.

S: Do it at midnight.

K: Start standing down at midnight and tomorrow let's talk at 8:00 in the morning. Do Alaska at midnight and we will talk in the morning and standown the rest then.

S: Very good.

K: You all were great last night and this morning .

S: I think your press conference was very good. Although I think rather painful for you.

K: I think we will come out of it all right.

S: [redacted]

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TELCON
2
Schlesinger
Oct. 25

S: Very good. Anything else?

K: No. Just wanted to let you know.

END

SL250

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Haig/Sec. Kissinger
Thursday, Oct. 25, 1973
2:35 p.m.

H: You did a hell of a job.

K: Was it all right?

H: Superb.

K: We have won. They have accepted the SC resolution without permanent members and we have just had a message from Brezhnev saying they are sending 70 observers to Cairo and they will be glad if we send 70 observers too.

H: WELL, well, well. And her staredown, Henry.

K: And one move less and we would have had it.

H: I think you are exactly right.

K: And you and I were the only ones for it. These other guys were wailing all over the place this morning.

H: You're telling me. Last night it seemed like someone had taken their shoes away from them. You really handled that thing magnificently.

K: I think I did some good for the President.

H: More than you know. Bayh called with tears in his eyes (mentioned something about the special prosecutor).

K: We would have had a Soviet paratroop division in there this morning. That decision was made. That letter was a final note.

H: You know it, and I know it. Have you talked to the Boss.

K: No. I will call him. Let's not broadcast this all over the place otherwise it looks like we (cooked) it up.

END

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SL303

TELECON
Scowcroft/Kissinger
October 26, 1973
10:30 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K. Brent, Dinitz has not gotten the note yet.

S. We have been giving it some final word changes and retyping.

K. Never mind about the word changes. They don't change the substance. Please get it to him so they can make a decision.

S. We have a car waiting.

K. Speed is more important than word changes. It is delaying us another hour now that they have another excuse not to talk about it.

S. O'k. It's going in right now.

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SL304

TELECON
Dinitz/Kissinger
October 26, 1973
10:32 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K. ....those word changes would make no bloody difference. It is on its way now.

D. That is the price of bureaucracy.

K. Of course I wanted you to have it because the President has made some observations.

D. The Prime Minister has been alerted. As soon as I get it I will pass it along to her and if you want, I will ring you.

K. O'k.

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pdr

SL305

TELECON
Dobrynin/Kissinger
October 26, 1973
11:15 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K. I tell you if I had looked at the military situation on Sunday I wouldn't have made a ceasefire agreement.

D. Maybe you are right.

K. Have you seen the hot line message now that we got from Moscow?

D. No, I have not gotten it. I probably will receive it in a few minutes.

K. It is about the Suez situation.

D. That was my impression.

K. One of our problems is we get totally conflicting reports from the two sides, and we have almost no means of telling it.

D. I think your people and ours could judge it better.

K. Yes, I wanted to tell you we will send an answer in a couple of hours. We will discuss the issues that are raised on a really urgent basis with the Israelis and we hope to get an answer by tomorrow afternoon our time but it is a real tough problem.

D. Do you want me to tell Moscow or will you use the red phone?

K. Red phone?

D. Hot line so to speak.

K. We will say something to that effect but were wondering if you could transmit it. They will get an answer from us now but I cannot give you a conclusive answer until we talk to the Israelis.

D. Sometime tomorrow afternoon. O'k. Good night.

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SL299

TELECON
Scowcroft/Kissinger
October 26, 1973
9:14 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

S. They are just bringing the next three pages in. (He read the note from Brezhnev)

K. That is going to be a lollapalooza.

S. It's a dandy.

K. [redacted] They are mad heroes. If they had let us communicate to them. It is just enough to be sick. B1

S. It has been another great day. I will call you as soon as the last two pages come through.

K. I don't know how we could have forced them to do it.

S. We can't really. It is so hard to see how they are not able to realize what they are doing. I don't know what more we can do without over brutalizing the whole thing.

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RELEASED IN FULL

SL301

TELECON
Dinitz/Kissinger
October 26, 1973
9:40 p.m.

K. We have received a message which gives us another day. They claim Sadat requested us to send non-military supplies. This they did not do but they say within a day if this isn't done they will take appropriate measures. I will now have to take it up with the President. I tell you now you can't expect a repeat of the performance of the other night.

D. I understand.

K. You read it and lets talk.

D. I will.

K. They are discussing a confidential understanding with us. I want you to know the only confidential understanding we have is on joint auspices which I discussed with the Prime Minister. There is no other confidential understanding.

D. For your negotiations?

K. Yes.

D. Would you like me to send somebody?

K. No, call Scowcroft.

D. Can I call him now?

K. Yes, he has it.

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SL 300

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON, 9:25 p.m., October 26, 1973

Secretary/Lord Cromer

C. I thought the President was absolutely great. By allusion to the State Department remarks this afternoon, I think you might have a hornet's nest. I was at a lunch today--as you know, I have no complaint, but they were full of complaints over no consultations on anything. So when the President goes on the air and says he has received less than cooperation from the Europeans, this can cause a lots of unhappiness. I know what..

K. Well, we are willing to take this, Rollie. We have just about--the Europeans have to face the fact that the President is fed up.

C. They weren't called in to be told.

K. That's not true of you.

C. That is what I am saying. I am ringing you up as a friend, not as an Ambassador. I have no complaint whatsoever. I'm ringing just to say you might get a blast.

K. Let's be honest. We could have consulted to the devil and back with the Europeans and they would not have changed one iota.

C. That might be true. I am not getting into the right or wrong of the thing. From what I heard at lunch today they are pretty unhappy.

K. We might reach a point where on both sides of the Atlantic there will be a need to reassess U.S. relations. Let me tell you what is irritating the President: refusal to put " " in the declaration. The whole declaration is not worth fifty percent of the effort they put in it.

C. I'm not making excuses but it will not translate into that language. If you look into the technicalities..

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K. They refused synonyms. I have told my people to stop pushing it. If you accept--if we accepted it exactly as it stands that wouldn't make a tinker's damn one month from today. If we accepted a five times revised draft it wouldn't make a difference. We're getting a blast but what can we do?

C. When you ha vetime I would like a half hour, just you and I together, because I think we are getting to a crossroads in time.

K. I agree.

C. Could be we could help more. But I think you will be getting a brick bat from this.

K. Did it bother them more than McCloskey?

C. No. I think McCloskey was very upsetting. There is no problem, except people. There's much more amour propre now.

K. What McCloskey said is that we are surprised our allies separated themselves publicly from us.

C. Well, you say that. It isn't quite that simple. They will always put their interests first--as would you and as would we.

K. You're telling me. Thank you, Rollie, Thank you.

SL302

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Dinitz/Kissinger
October 26, 1973
10:28 p.m.

D. I did not get the note yet.

K. Have you talked to Scowcroft?

D. Yes, right away. He told me he would sent it within 10 or 15 minutes.

K. O'k. I will see about it.

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SL298

TELECON
Dinitz/Kissinger
October 26, 1973
8:45 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K. Mr. Ambassador, this is a call not as Secretary but as a friend.

D. I understand.

K. We are going to get a hot line message within an hour. I just wanted to tell you it is my honest judgment if you don't move in some direction to get serious mention on the enclave you will lose everything.

D. Maybe I don't know what your suggestion is.

K. My suggestion this morning was to offer some time... You should know once the President is involved he will order that we should join the others because we have nothing to hold on to. It is water over the dam at this point.

D. The supply business? That is what you mean?

K. The supply business or something else Israeli ingenuity could produce. His suggestion is a negotiation.

D. I told you that is what we intended to offer them.

K. You told me it might be. I didn't know you wanted us to pass it on to them.

D. We don't want to reveal all of the cards. Maybe I didn't make myself very clear. I did not mean for you to withhold it from them.

K. That would be considered humiliating and it's just as well. I know what you are trying to do. Maybe you should play it your way for awhile and they may buy it.

D. We have a mutual friend and he just called me on the direct line and he said something that I wasn't going to tell you. But since you called, he said tell my friend, Henry, that if Golda Mier or any other government opens this route he will not survive 24 hours in Israel. I didn't....

K. The tragedy is that my judgment is that Israel will lose everything on this route but it is better for them to be raped and forced than to make it as a decision.

D. In this embassy we have three girls who lost either a brother or a cousin in this fighting. This is an example of what it has done to

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our country. In the closing of this route we have lost scores and scores of lives. If we open the route, we vitalize two or three divisions that will be a threat to our bridgeheads. We know what their intention is as of this evening. They are threatening us and the President of the U.S. We cannot let them execute these plans. We are not trying to....We cannot afford to have this army revitalize and they will be. They have the missiles and tanks ready for reloading. We saw them and we have tapes as of this afternoon.

K. I am trying to tell you it doesn't make a bit of difference. You w ill be forced if it reachs that point.

D. The Prime Minister asked if she should write a message to the President.

K. Write if it makes you feel good. It is almost totally impossible....

D. We are prepared to release them but should we...them. Should Israel take these enemies...

K. There is one...that you can hold the road after the ceasefire.

D. It is not a realistic argument here. The Soviet Union decided they cannot have the Egyptian army humiliated so we are trying to.....

K. Let's see what the hot line message says. We don't know what it says yet. We may not have a problem. I am honestly very pesimistic. At least there should have been a proposal that is being considered.

D. By the way, now we have allowed the Red Cross to go in for the wounded. This evening.

K. You know I am on your side. If that 3rd Army could disappear tonight nobody would be happier than I. I have no interest in the 3rd Army, but this thing is going to get too big for us. It is my judgment but in no official capacity whatever. What I advised you this morning I advise you as a tactic for what I was sure would happen. It hasn't happened yet. Let's not worry about it now.

D. We will wait and face the situation as it comes. I don't think we have any other choice.

K. I think you have practically....If you turn out to be right I will celebrate with you.

D. In any event we will celebrate that you were wrong.

K. Never have I more wanted to be wrong.

D. This is the only thing that keeps me believing is that we can work together with this.

K. You won't be pressured one second before it becomes inevitable.

D. I appreciate it.

5041 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin - Secretary Kissinger
October 26, 1973
3:00 p.m.

K: Anatoly, we have instructed Scali to work out with Malik in when they meet at 4:00

D: Today?

K: Yes, some participation from the Soviet sphere, or whatever you want to call it,

D: Good, meet today? Fine. Thank you very much. Will notify Gromyko.

K: They can settle what country.

D: That point, it is my guess _____

K: I don't worry about it....

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SO 39 *

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Telcon
Amb. Dobrynin/HAK
Oct. 26, 1973; 9:32 a.m.

D: You called me yesterday.

K: I just called you to make sure you wouldn't go to sleep early.

D: No, I was until 1:00 o'clock with your deputies.

K: I know. Can I give you one piece of advice?

D: Of course.

K: He has little influence with me.

D: It doesn't matter. He invites me and I am going.

K: I am glad you went. It is good for you. I didn't know whether I should have Scowcroft call you every hour during last night, too.

D: No, he was calling me. I went to bed and asked Vorontsov to receive this every hour on the hour during the operation - not to do anything.

K: OK. What I called you about was to tell you it isn't all that important, that we have had no contact with Jackson whatsoever and he's been operating entirely on his own.

D: Uh, huh.

K: In the inflammatory statements he's been making.

D: Well, he doesn't see in the future very much. What he is doing is make it on special items is my impression. Only he is acting like directions to do. There is not in combination of what he is doing. In his own, issued just in his own behalf which is all well known. So for me it was nothing new in his statement.

K: Right.

D: And, Henry, in connection with this United Nations Forces, Gromyko sent a telegram yesterday late, but in connection with this thing, you know, the United Nations is serious about sending UN forces...

K: Hold on a second. Hello, yeah, go ahead.

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It was decision about

D: / In connection with the Security Council/sending UN ~~xxxxxxx~~ forces in the Middle East. And judgment will tell you that we can't see the importance of the composition of these forces, the United Nations force, is an important element, so we believe that these forces would be composed of the contingents from the, as you call it, communist and socialist countries and that this termination couldn't be justified in this particular case. We mention this because amongst other measures of relief, it is not quite clear whether to do so as if the American representatives are observant against inclusion in this personnel from the socialist countries.

K: No, we want to exclude countries that belong to existing military alliances.

D: In this case...

K: Regardless of social system.

D: Yes, but, the question is, in this case...

K: We don't insist that any members from Thailand.

D: No, I understand, but this rather looks from our side.

K: Not at all. Well do you consider Sweden as being on our side?

D: Well it was _____ whether Sweden alone, but the question around representation of two different kinds of areas too, not on just representation from other areas...

K: Why don't we let them argue about that in New York.

D: Yes, but it's important for them to know, to get some instructions, because otherwise they will argue for another recourse. They will say they don't know how many it will take.

K: Well our view was that they should be drawn in the first instance from maybe some of the forces on Cyprus.

D: Yeah, I understand.

K: Because I like to have Swedes in warm climates.

D: Yes, I understand. On immediate basis.

K: And our basic view was that they shouldn't contain people that belong to existing military alliances, which would have excluded Canadians.

D: I understand.

K: But, I understand your point of view and I'll look into it.

D: Okay.

K: And then we can consider what else to do.

D: All right.

K: I think we should now both try to quiet this thing down.

D: Yeah.

K: And, you know, I didn't go to Moscow in order to produce a crisis between the Soviet Union and the United States. That wasn't the purpose of the trip.

D: Well, it looked as if...

K: I mean the way things are developing now I would have been better off never going ~~to~~ there and letting the Israelis continue military operations.

D: Well, Henry, whenever you have the time, maybe I'll. Then I'll tell him my own point of view. But it's nothing really now for what is great importance. What was done was done. The other question was his special interest in terms of anything else onto this. All right?

K; Okay, fine.

D: Okay. Bye, bye, Henry.

RELEASED IN FULL

SL309

TELECON
Secretary General Waldheim/Secretary Kissinger
October 26, 1973

W: ..but I thought I should contact you. I had a visit from Al Zayyat and he was asking me to come back to you because he is worried about what is going on in Egypt. Fighting broke out..They have the impression that this is beginning of a new attack against the 3rd Army and that is against the Security Council resolution and then he said the 3rd Army will not surrender. They will keep fighting. He was very emotional. First essential step is return of Israeli forces to line occupied on 22 of October as demanded by the Security Council resolution. If this doesn't happen, Egypt will have to extricate 3rd Army by other means. and no question of POW exchange for any country...this is turning point. If Israelis don't stick to resolution, then no chance to settle this matter once and for all. And everybody recognizes this...and US has photographic evidence of situation as of...hours on 22 October. And no doubt..details of the line..and then he asked me to put this matter to you as an essential step ..in resolution..and he asked me to ask you that the US should prevail upon the Israelis to take this step..so that the..that has been started can be seized in time. And this is the content of my conversation with him.

K: Thank you. I appreciate it. Well, I will get on it immediately.

W: One other thing. We have some problems. I remember what you tole me..the Russians are insisting on having an East bloc country...

K: I told Scali we could accept Romania.

W: We can proceed on this basis and also about the 70 Russians. I have refused to integrate them in the observer corp and I told the Russians I couldn't do it.

K: Exactly.

W: Scali mentioned the possibility of accepting twenty from both sides.

K: We don't rule that out.

W: I will wait until I get further notification from you.

K: That would be nice.

END

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RELEASED IN FULL SL307

TELECON
Dinitz/Kissinger
October 26, 1973
10:58 p.m.

D. ....is transmitting it over the telephone to the Prime Minister this minute. As soon as he is finished reading it I will go back on.

K. I will give you the President's reaction. Right now if you want it.

D. Sure, I will go back to my office. Just a moment.

K. Let me give you the President's reaction in separate parts. First he wanted me to make it absolutely clear that we cannot permit the destruction of the Egyptian army under conditions achieved after a ceasefire was reached in part by negotiations in which we participated. Therefore it is an option that does not exist. We will support any motion in the UN that will...Secondly, he would like from you no later than 8:00 a.m. tomorrow an answer to the question of non-military supplies permitted to reach the army. If you cannot agree to that, we will have to support in the UN a resolution that will deal with the enforcement of 338 and 339. We have been driven to this reluctantly by your inability to reach a decision. Whatever the reasons, this is what the President wanted me to tell you is our position. An answer that permits some sort of negotiation and some sort of positive response on the non-military supplies, or then we will join the other members of the Security Council in making it an international matter. I have to say again your course is suicidal. You will not be permitted to destroy this army. You are destroying the possibility for negotiations which you want because you are not making possible.....

D. Your proposal to let the army go is very close to our proposal.

K. You can make any proposal you want to us and we will transmit it. We are not transmitting anything to the Egyptians. We have not had an answer to the last message, but that only went out two or three hours ago. Maybe it will turn out they will accept your proposal and I will have a drink with you. As it stands now it is our official position that if you do not make some proposal along these lines, we will have to go along with the majority of the Security Council. We can probably make a proposal and you can delay the implementation of it on practical grounds and get a little more time.

D. If we make an offer on the supplying of non-military supplies?

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K. That is right. Then we could at least point to something that we have managed to achieve in the...I must tell you that you are perfectly free to play it your way and see what happens. Maybe the Egyptians will be so desperate they will accept your proposal. It is not my judgment. It is inconceivable that the Soviets will permit the destruction of the Egyptian army and that the Egyptians will withdraw their army. It will bring down Sadat. It is not something he will agree to.

D. I am not authorized or feel competent to give advise. But why can't I answer that Israel offers to let this army go intact with all side arms but cannot have 200 tanks go with these people so they can go back on us.

K. The agreement was ceasefire in place. Now they won't accept losing all that equipment and giving it to you.

D. They can blow it up.

K. You are asking them to destroy 200 tanks and pull their army out. They will never to it and the Soviets won't take that. Why don't you bluff for a day and see if you can get it.

D. That is what we tried to do.

K. If that is going to be your formal answer we will of course transmit it. It can be under no....

D. Mr. Secretary, if I asked my government to transfer to you the military plans we were able to obtain about the defenses of this army, will it make any difference. What is their operational plan?

K. Right now I don't think they have any plans.

D. They do as of today. We have it on tape.

K. That is their way of breaking out.

D. If they want to break out and go home we could help them. They don't have to kill our people. Their plan is to cut us and fortify themselves with tanks and missiles. It is suicidal for us in either way.

K. It is.

D. 10,000 tons of supplies that the Soviets have provided them. Twenty-four hours and we would have to rush to you like last Friday night.

K. I have given you the President's views of the ceasefire agreement.

D. It is not we who force your confrontation with the Soviet Union. By its actions they have forced it.

K. If the Soviet Union did this to you or Egypt after a ceasefire agreement I would urge on the President the most drastic measures.

D. We did not do this without them fighting us after the ceasefire. You say it's immaterial. The note of Brezhnev is full of mistakes and you know it, Mr. Secretary.

K. I know only the basic situation is produced by bottling up of the Third Army, and I think you can make demands that no additional military equipment go into there.

D. Under what auspices?

K. UN personnel.

D. Including Soviet personnel?

K. That is one of the things that can be raised. That will be reasonable.

D. I will transmit it to the Prime Minister, of course, and get her reaction. Maybe she would want to send a note to the President. She has wanted to and I have been talking her out of it.

K. She can send a note to the President. It won't make the slightest difference. I will get the....It is the mildest possible reaction you will get in the bureaucracy. If everybody got...

D. I think what is at stake here is so important for us I cannot come.... what I have said to you.

K. If you will call me at 8:00 in the morning.

D. If the Prime Minister asks some more questions, can I still get you?

K. I am going home.

D. I will try not to call you.

K. But, of course, if it is important you can call me.

SL286

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Dinitz/Sec. Kissinger
Friday, Oct. 26, 4:15

D: You wanted me.

K: The Egyptians have asked for a SC meeting tonight. They have now made another appeal to us from Sadat and from New York -- El Zayyat through Waldheim in which they say the Third Army will never surrender no matter what you do and that they will take drastic measures if you continue blockading them. They don't care what line you go back to. They won't quibble about that and they are willing to talk about prisoner release and other matters. It seems to me you are going to come to a crossing point tonight of either making concrete proposals or. I tell you this as a friend, I have kept this from the President who is preparing for a Press Conference. I don't want him to say something you will regret. I have no doubt what he will do when it gets there. We also have a hot line message coming in from Moscow.

D: Can I tell you what the military situation is. I will not elaborate.

K: Our own information is that you did not start it.

D: Thank God.

K: But that does not make any difference. What produces the fighting is that they are desparate.

D: Absolutely correct. They are attempting to break out.

K: Why don't you let them break out and get out of there.

D: We would be willing to let them break out and go home but they are not trying to break out and run. They are shooting at our forces and...

K: Why can you not let them take the tanks with them. The Russians will replace them anyway.

D: We will not open up the pocket and release an army that came to destroy us. It has never happened in a history of war.

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K: Also it has never happened that a small country is producing a world war in this manner. There is a limit beyond which you cannot push the President. I have been trying to tell you that for a week.

D: We are not trying to push the President.

K: You play your game and you will see what happens.

D: The PM is sitting now on suggestions on what to do.

K: I am suggesting to you to make a constructive suggestion.

D: I understand and I asked you if you have any thing in mind.

K: I gave you what I have in mind.

D: About the food.

K: That while talks are going on you permit non-military supplies to go in there and perhaps you can establish the principle that no military supplies can come in from the road and you pull back from it.

D: One of the suggestions from the PM as I left the phone to come to you is that she thought she would send to you Gen. (Riva?) with a complete proposal of how to solve the situation.

K: That would take ten hours.

D: At least. She thought he could convey that would mean either swapping people, territories. Things that would solve the question. We cannot let them out without getting something in return.

K: That is right but you have to buy time for this discussion. We will be glad to propose that there will be immediate discussions between you and the Egyptians to solve this problem. We are willing to be cooperative but I tell you what will happen is another maximum Soviet demand and you cannot put the President in confrontation day after day.

D: We don't want to.

K: Always has happend that after ceasefire one country traps the army of another.

D: It is not exactly what we want to do. I will pass your urgent message to the PM.

K: I am telling you as personal advice. I guarantee if you want me to take it to the President you will get a much worse answer.

D: I am completely confident in accepting your advice. Believe me.

K: I have got to see the German Ambassador now and raise hell with him about your ships.

D: Yes. O.K. I will talk to the PM and I will tell her may be...

K: I think you have a bargaining situation and I think you can get something for it. There has to be a bargain.

D: How do we go about it?

K: By at least getting talks started on that narrow issue.

D: On the food.

K: By getting a certain standstill enough so they don't get so desparate you do not get constant fighting.

D: Our people say at least 2-3 days of food and water. We hear talk from the commander they say in 2-3 days the UN will get us out of here. That is the situation there. We must strike some sort of a bargain out of it.

K: Make a proposal.

D: All right so that is what I was ~~xxxxxx~~ trying to ask you. I will tell the PM that if she does not think...

K: But before 9:00 tonight make a proposal to confuse the issue. Or you will get a condemnation on you.

D: I will talk to her again.

END

50 40 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Dobrynin/Sec. Kissinger
Friday, Oct. 26, 1973
1:00 p.m.

K: Anatolly.

D: Hello, Henry, How are you?

K: Fine. We have a message from the British who said that they got it from Sadat. Are you using the British as a channel?

D: I know there is discussion with the British but I do not know the discussion. Yesterday he received the British Ambassador. What does it say?

K: That we should pass it on to the Israelis.

D; What is the message?

K: It has to do with the Israelis withdrawing certain distance, what the Egyptians are willing to do, etc.

D: I do not know of this message from Moscow at all. For your information we asked the British to see Sadat.

K: No. No. It was just that -- we have been asked by the British to pass on to the Israelis and I wanted to find out what you thought of it.

D: The British asked Sadat?

K: Sadat asked Gromyko and Gromyko gave it to the British.

D: The message addressed to the Israelis?

K: The British have asked us to pass it to the Israelis. I would have thought it faster if Gromyko had sent it to you.

D: He did not. I have no information on this. About Malik, what we discussed on the telephone -- he mentioned that these UN troops ~~xxx~~ or forces that there is more than 50% of NATO. He said exactly 113. He did not mention what was sent yesterday but what was sent today was 50%.

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2
Dobrynin
Oct. 28, 1:00

K: I am talking taking up your issue of this morning right now.

D: Scali just called the (?) and mentioned to him that the Americans are opposed to this.

K: I am reviewing that issue right now. Give me an hour and I will let you know in the afternoon.

D: o.k.

END

SL306

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON, October 26, 1973

11:25 p.m.

Scali/Kissinger

S. Hi Henry.

K. Hi John.

S. Did you hear my defense of you?

K. What were you defending me against?

S. They quoted you out of context.

K. Who did?

S. None other than your friend Malik who said you had admitted the Israelis violated the ceasefire in your press conference. In my right of reply I

K. What did he quote?

S. He said you said the ceasefire broke down and Israel made some territorial gains. In any event I thanked him for the tantalizing reference to the news conference because I had already sent the complete text to all other missions of the Security Council and I just said I wanted to ~~xxx~~ thank the Ambassador for exciting interest because I thought it was so fairminded. They will all read it and see you were more balanced than anything that has been said here. We had this meeting with him afterwards.

K. How did it go?

S. He insisted on the Poles. I retorted by offering Romania. I said it is Romania or none at all--no blocs, neither the Warsaw Pact nor NATO.

K. What did he say?

S. That is discrimination. That is like going back to the cold war. On the observer side I said we would send 50 or 20 or were willing to withdraw ours completely in return for none of yours. It hit him like a sledge hammer.

K. He also is pretty dumb.

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S. He said that he didn't understand this. We were trying to dictate to the Secretary General. He is furious because we won't accept Poland. We are trying to dictate to the Secretary General and that Poland is a great country.

K. Poland, with a long and distinguished history of affection for the Jewish people. They haven't had a pogram since the last Jew left.

S. He said he had very firm instructions on this.

K. Has anything changed in their attitude -- since the alert?

S. He has become more obnoxious.

K. More obnoxious since the alert? Are they beginning to hit us harder?

S. In the language they are using, yes. I gave a very reasoned answer and said we both had a responsibility at a time when there are charges and countercharges, none of which can be verified.

K. What is your view as to what we should do now?

S. We should stick firm on this offer we have made them.

K. I mean if the issue of withdrawal of the Israelis to the Oct. 22 line comes up.

S. I think unless we get the Isrealis to back up we are not going to have a friend in the house.

K. The British won't support us?

S. No. You see, we are in a unique position now because we got the non-aligned to go alone with us.

K. Do you expect a Security Council vote tomorrow?

S. We go into an informal session to consider the Secretary General's report. After that, there is to be a formal session. So if we are going to agree with the Russians on it they are going to have to come to us in advance, if not, we are going to have a problem. You see, the Secretary

General's report does not go into the makeup, terms of reference, size of forces or estimate of what it will cost for the first six months, which is 30 million bucks. I think there is now a widespread suspicion that the Israelis are stailling so they can get Suez City. The language used tonight was just awful. The questions being directed to are "Do you mean to say the U.S. is impotent to stop Israel?" I just replied we believe very sincerely in the ceasefire but I never answer that question. I just ignored it.

K. Thanks, John.

S. You will be in tomorrow? -- to look over the draft.

K. Oh, yes.

S. Are you going to take over any part of these negotiations with the Russians?

K. No. You are in charge of that negotiation -- unless Dobrynin appeals to me, you are in charge of negotiation.

S. They will probably report back and say I have been tough, and that we are trying to dictate to the SYG and who are we to say the Polish ..

K. Keep your relations friendly, if possible.

S. But if he keeps creaming us ..

K. Then you have to hit him

S. Since we have had these negotiations come up it made him look like a goddamn fool for ranting and raving. The non-aligned afterwards were delighted about my statesmanlike attitude on this.

K. You are having more fun than a UN Ambassador deserves.

S. Right. Good night.

SL282

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Senator Fulbright/Secretary Kissinger
October 26, 1973
3:00

K: I wanted to tell you how much your statement meant to me.

F: That thing was a gross distortion. After I made it on the floor, Mr. Humphries said he apologized because they did not carry the report as he sent it in. I asked him to send me a note about it and I intended to pass it on to you. I was trying to minimize the Jackson statement. I am not sure whether it was the Post or AP who picked out one aspect and gave a distorted view. I was not trying to criticize the alert at all. I was an exaggeration...

K: We agreed on that at lunch.

F: This morning in one paper... this is not what I wanted to say. Did you see what I said at noon?

K: Yes, I have it here.. statement by Senator Fulbright at the Senate.

F: I said it at noon. and I was going to send to you for my satisfaction.. I don't want you to think something funny... I am trying to help.

K: You have been helping.

F: I also have instructed my staff to start an agenda on the hearings designed to strengthen the concept of detente. Maybe we can get started when you get back from China.

K: Terrific. We can get the Senate moving ...

F: You will be at the meeting of the Foreign Affairs on..

K: I understand it is at 10:00.

F: God damn Mansfield..

K: If you want to shift it to Wednesday, that's fine. I had agreed to shift to Wednesday and then I got a message to shift it to Tuesday.

F: They first said.. to 2:00 on that and then Mike called and he changed the conference to Tuesday. I wouldn't let any conference stand in my way.

K: Whichever you prefer. I have two messages, shifting to Wednesday and then back to Tuesday.

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F: Well, my office did that without clearing with me. If Wednesday is better for you..

K: I will shift it to Wednesday and it is no trouble.

F: Do you want it on Wednesday?

K: If it is more convenient on Wednesday f;r you then

F; Well,

K: If it is easier on the Committee members, why don't we do it on Wednesday.

F;; Fine.

K: Why don't I tell Eagleburger to work it out. So, we'll do it on Wednesday.

F; Good. *Anything interesting?*

K: Alot of technical stuff, which I don't need to bother you with. The Egyptians have confirmed November 7 for my visit.

F: The Egyptians. That's soon.

K: Yeah, in about 10 days. There are also charges about violations, but the situation is calming down. and we have called off the alert. It won't be announced, just standing down.

F: I must say I get more and more impatient with Jackson

K: He has been ruthless.

F: We;ll see if we can't begin to educate them...

K: Good.

F: Thank you.

K: Thank you for your statement.

F: Yes. I am sorry about the other one.

END

SL274

TELCON

RELEASED IN FULL

Amb. Dinitz - Secretary Kissinger
October 26, 1973
11:30 a.m.
(missing first part)

K: No, no, I told you what I think the problem is. You don't have one man who can make foreign policy decisions.

D: That's correct.

K: If you and the ~~Prime~~ Minister could act like the President and I do...

D: Your'e right. That's what the Prime Minister has said on several occasions.

K: By the time you have the cabinet, each of which is knifing each other...

D: That's correct. Everybody having discourse and adding their suggestions. Absolutely right. One of the ills of the parliamentary system. And I don't think the British are any better.

K: English are putting out we have over reacted too. That's extremely dangerous.

D: Did you see the editorial in the Post, very good. In support of the President, in support of your press conference, for the Washington Post that's something. I am happy to see some result. .....Did you know they offered the Arabs....they ....cosponsored the resolution yesterday provided Americans agreed to withdraw non participation of permanent members in the forces....They are really worse than the Arabs.

K: They are worse.

D: Some thing else, Brezhnev made a statement in Moscow...

K: I have seen that.

D: Urgent and necessary measure required to ....cease fire, referred to personnel sent, linked with UN observers.

K: Yes, I saw it.

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SL272

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Robert Galvin/HAK
October 26, 1973/10:54 a.m.

K: Hello.

G: Doc Galvin Mr. Secretary.

K: How are you?

G: Fine thank you sir.

K: I wanted to talk to you on behalf of the President. As you know we are pulling Bob Ingersoll out of Japan a s the Assistant Secretary of State and therefore we are looking for an Ambassador for Japan which we consider one of our absolutely key posts and the President wondered and I strongly endorsed it, whether you would consider that position.

G: Well, that's a...

K: I can't really think of a more important Ambassadorial post we have.

G: That's an amazing invitation sir. I genuinely appreciate it. Let me take the subject under brief advisement. May I do that sir.

K: Please. But I really would like to tell you that we are very serious about our relations with Japan and about the decisive role the right individual could play there. Bob is doing a very patriotic thing in coming back from a position of much greater independence to being a bureaucrat but I needed him back here to help me run East Asia.

G: I think its a superb selection on your part on terms of Bob and I would be pleased to give it consideration.

K: He thinks you would be a superb selection as his successor.

G: When is he returning?

K: He'll be returning after my trip to China around the end of November and of course we'd have to get you confirmed and so forth and there can be a hiatus of a month. Because we'd like you there as quickly as possible.

G: I see.

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K: But if a month made a difference we could handle that.

G: May I ask you one procedural and structural question? Was Bob obliged to do anything with regard to the disposition of equity in his corporation which would be a matter of some concern to me as it relates to the equity that I hold in the corporation I'm with.

K: I'm almost certain not. I think its generally thought desirable to put ones holdings in a blind trust but not necessarily to dispose of them. But those restrictions are much more severe in the case of Defense Department personnel. You wouldn't really be in a position to influence contracts.

G: That's correct. I think this from a common sense standpoint should have no great effect.

K: I'm not sure. I can look into it and I'll get word to you this afternoon. But to my almost certain knowledge it does not require of disposing of stocks you hold.

G: Let us assume that while I'm going through my decision process.

K: Right

G: So at least let me have the weekend and I will be back in touch with your office with my first evaluation of the subject and than I may wish to visit with Bob personally. I could go to Tokyo for that purpose.

K: I'd be delighted.

G: And ultimately maybe at least a few private words with you to determine...

K: I think that would be important.

G: Thank you. I'll start at my evaluation. Now a private word. I thought your handling of the very difficult issues of yesterday from a public standpoint were excellent.

K: Aren't you nice.

G: You do fine work sir.

K: Thank you and I hope to have you as an associate very soon.

SL270

TELCON
Secy Schlesinger/Secy Kissinger
9:55 a.m., October 26, 1973

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Now, Jim, I'm a little bit concerned about the following. I have brought Defense in more under your stewardship than under any of your predecessors. In fact, never have we told anyone else about our messages, our strategy and so forth. Now I find that an exchange between Brezhnev and the President, which used to be kept in very secret channels, is in an alert order going to every commander around the world. And I find Jackson on television speaking about a Brezhnev -- about a Soviet note to us.

S: The Jackson thing must have come from elsewhere, Henry. The problem was -- and you're quite right and I was astonished --

K: I mean, the alert order says --

S: I know. On the alert order, I was amazed. First of all, we should not have had copies of that Brezhnev letter. Tom took one away and brought it back to the building and talked to the Chiefs about it during the JCS Conference. No that is an obvious mistake.

K: That's intolerable. These Brezhnev-Nixon exchanges we don't keep copies even in the State Department.

S: The Jackson thing I can't explain Henry. I think that came from the other side of the river ~~XXXXXX~~ quite bluntly.

K: You mean from State?

S: From somewhere over there because he announced this letter yesterday morning early. Now I just could...

K: It could only have come from Dinitz because I frankly didn't show-- there isn't one of my State Department people who's ever seen that letter.

S: When I saw that thing in the press clippings I said where the hell did Jackson get that. Was he at the meeting. Did they announce that letter at the meeting because it was a source of astonishment to me.

K: No, first of all he wasn't at the meeting and secondly as you...

S: I talked to Tom about the other thing but quite frankly...

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K: As you could see from my press conference I stayed miles from getting Brezhnev's name in there because the last thing I want is to have him publicly humiliated.

S: No, that's exactly right Henry. All I can say at this point is one that I agree entirely and two there will be no repetition.

K: I knew you would. OK. If you could, you know Tom writes every God damn thing down and then he had no right to take that letter with him.

S: That's right. Well, the problem was the thing should have been in one copy and passed around the table and left there.

K: That's what we're going to do in the future.

S: Right.

K: OK. You see what I'm trying to prevent.

S: You're quite right.

K: I'm not worried about this thing now but what I'm trying to prevent is people now think its all over. I am not at all sure. This could blow up right away again. Incidentally, just for your information, I've had a note from Sadat today saying they are working out a new comprehensive proposal for my visit.

S: Very good.

K: But he's also screaming about the Third Army.

S: We ought to do something about that Henry.

K: I have talked to the Israelis and said that we want them to let non-military supplies through.

S: They will do it.

K: I'll get an answer within two hours.

S: OK. Well, that's very good because in a way its an opportunity for us.

K: Exactly.

S: OK. Now as you probably know, _____ and Alcom went down last night at midnight.

K: That's fine.

S: In that respect we should not have said world wide but that's just between you and me. We should have left Thinkself(?) and Seacal(?) out anyhow.

K: I agree with you.

S: Now, I'm holding on the...

K: Why don't you start standing them down at noon today but do it in a way that the President can acknowledge it at his press conference tonight.

S: OK. I shall do that. Very good.

K: You know, you don't have to deny it.

S: Is it at 8:00 tonight.

K: 8 or 9. Oh, 7:30.

S: Very good. Bye,

SL271

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Cromer/HAK
October 26, 1973/10:42 a.m.

K: Hello.

C: Good morning, how are you?

K: OK rollie.

C: I do congratulate you on your press conference. A magnificent performance.

K: Aren't you nice.

C: I;m going to say this. Our Ambassador in Moscow was instructed to see Brezhnev yesterday and to make a couple of points which I will tell you about on the telephone which was firstly dispatched to the sensitive area of admitting U. N. truce observers can be monitored and we've provided an airlift for the people from Cyprus to Egypt for that. And ~~thirdly~~ thirdly, the sum resolutions of the problem of the Egyptian Third Army and we suggested that one possibility would be an immediate exchange of prisoners plus the lifting of the Egyptian blocade and the _____ mandate. And the Russians put this to the Egyptians and the Sadat came back with a reply to the Russians which they passed on to us which I will read out to you but I will also send it down to you. It reads as follows: "Egypt proceeds on the assumption that Israel, in accordance with with the Security Council resolution of 23 October wants immediately to begin withdrawing its forces to the lines they held on the 22 of October at 1800 hours. As soon as in the course of that operation, Israelis troops on the Western bank of the canal withdraw from the rear of the Third Army towards the Bitter Lakes, the blockade of the Straits of Babal mandate will be lifted and the mine fields installed there will be cleared. As soon as the Israeli troops complete their ~~XXX~~ withdrawla to the lines they held on the 22 of October, there will be an exchange of prisoners of war.

K: Very good.

C: So this is moving a little.

K: Can you send that to me. Send it to the State Department.

C: We'll sort of keep things moving so they don't bog down in the sand.

K: Good. Thank you bye.

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SL273

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Scowcroft/Sec. Kissinger
Friday, Oct. 26, 1973
11:30 a.m.

S: I want to make sure we have Jerry Warren squared away on this UN Force. What I propose to have him say is the SC took action yesterday with respect to the character and composition of the UN contingent to be used in the Middle East. The matter is now in the hands of the Sec. Gen. to implement and to work with...in anyway requested.

K: There is a difference between the observers and the force.

S: Right.

K: With respect to the observers it should be ~~xxkx~~ same requirements as applied to the force. We are willing to obtain request from the Sec. Gen. for a small number.

S: Right.

K: Provided that ~~the re xs~~ the distinction between the force and the observers is strictly maintained.

S: O.K. Thank you.

END

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SL275

TELECON
The President/Secretary Kissinger
October 26, 1973
11:58

RELEASED IN FULL

N: Hello Henry.

K: Mr. President.

N: What, ah, how are things going. Still the same?

K: Still about the same. Some back and forth on whether the Soviets and Americans can be in the observer force. We have taken the position that on the whole we prefer the observers be obtained as the same type of people as the military force. But if the Secretary-General requests Americans and Soviets we will accept. The Soviets have sent in 70 people they call observers. We are saying they can send anyone they want but they have no status as far as we are concerned, except for what the Secretary-General recognizes. You had another message from Sadat about the 3rd Army. Alot of technical stuff and needn't be brought to your attention. We should get the Egyptians to check this with the UN. We will pass it on to the Israelis.

N: I want it passed to the Israelis..strongly. Let's keep our side of the bargain.

K: When we can determine that the Israelis are doing something wrong we leaning on them very hard.

N: I understand.

K: The Egyptians have made a proposal and they have sent this message about a comprehensive proposal on my visit. And we have sent a warm message to Sadat from you saying you have instructed me to take a constructive and positive attitude..

N: Good, good. How about the reviews?...still getting positive reviews?

K: Oh, yes. The post was supportive of you on the editorial page, I haven't read the other. On the whole the news play was very positive.

N: Good, Henry.

K: Right, Mr. President

END

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SL269

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Dinitz
10/26/73; 9:38 a.m.

D: I understand you wanted me to call you, Dr. Kissinger.

K: That's right. Now we have our direct line.

D: Yeah.

K: We can yell at each other.

D: No, we should not do this.

K: I have a number of things and then I want to get to an important one.

D: Okay.

K: First, I hope that Jackson didn't get his information about what was in that Brezhnev letter from your Embassy.

D: Jackson was not in touch with us and none of our people were in touch with him for weeks now. And I can assure you no one in our Embassy except Shalev and myself knew about it.

K: Secondly, on every television I heard yesterday that Israeli intelligence was of the view that there had been no threat of Soviet intervention.

D: That I did not even hear.

K: I heard it from -- you know it was Israeli intelligence officials were not aware of any unusual activity.

D: That's ridiculous. I can tell you this, Mr. Secretary, two or three newspapermen called me yesterday, including Marilyn Berger, and I told them that that was a very serious threat and that how appreciative we were of the strong action by the United States.

K: Well, what I would like to stress to you, Mr. Ambassador, is this: If you could use whatever influence you have with the press here -- I don't give a damn for ourselves because the historical record will support us. But we are not out of the woods yet and if the Russians look at this and see that when there is a crisis we then get flyspecked by the press, they may try it again.

D: There is no doubt about . . .

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K: I mean if you look at the Czechoslovak evolution, they had a number of scares before they finally moved.

D: Of course, of course. . .

K: And I really think it is in your overwhelming interest . . .

D: Absolutely.

K: that you support first with your Senators and Congressmen and with the press our authority in this matter. It's the only threat we've got left.

D: No doubt. No doubt. We have done yesterday the same. We will do more of this today.

K: Because we really took enormous risks. You may not like what we do in the UN . . .

D: That's a different story . . .

K: But that is a question on tactics -- on strategy we took a fantastic risk.

D: Right. Right. Absolutely. No, I am in complete agreement with you. And yesterday _____ was done and we will do more of it today.

K: And I had convinced the President that if the Soviets had moved that we would have put forces into the Sinai.

D: Yeah, you mentioned this to me.

K: And, believe me, there was no one in the Government or in the Congress in favor of that.

D: Especially, probably not those Congressmen that, you know, that were at the White House now.

K; Well, not the leaders. They are the ones that the President has to see. So we always have to keep . . . Now, I have two important matters. One is, as you know, I am going to China.

D: Yes.

K: On the 10th.

D: Of November.

K: Yes. And I have offered the Egyptians that I will stop by in Cairo on the way there. You know they invited me urgently when I was in Tel Aviv and I turned it down.

D: Right.

K: And I am doing that as a means of keeping them quiet.

D: Right.

K: And they have accepted that. That's point one. Now point two . . .

D: That would be around the 9th then?

K: No, I will get there about the 7th or 8th.

D: I see.

K: Because I may stop in Tehran, too, on the way. We need some strategy with those Arabs that are not totally lost. I mean, of course, they. . .

D: Tehran and Cairo or and other countries or . . .

K: I haven't worked it out yet. Maybe an hour in Amman.

D: I see.

K: On the way. And I've got to look at a map on what Amman is on the way to.

D: It's a one-way street, Mr. Secretary.

K: Well, I don't think we will turn history in Amman.

D: No, I don't think so.

K: Perhaps you will drive me over from Jerusalem.

D: That's easy, we have an open bridge, you know.

K: I told you once when I went to the A_____ Bridge I thought if a man from the moon came and said there is a victorious army, there is a defeated army. There was the Jordanian looking like a world beater and the Israelis soldiers sitting there like a slob on a chair. He didn't get up when his general came up to . . .

D: I know the guys -- _____ in the university in Jerusalem.

K: Oh, really.

D: Yeah, during the _____.

K: I went there with General Narkiss and I tell you that private sitting on the bridge barely acknowledged Narkiss' existence.

D: . . . only a student. When they go without uniforms they expected Narkiss to salute him.

K: Whether he acknowledged his existence or not he certainly didn't think he needed to get up when the General came up to him.

D: That's the way it is.

K: Okay, but now, Mr. Ambassador, two things: one is Sadat sent us a rather hysterical message again.

D: This morning?

K: Yes, just right now.

D: On what?

K: Well first, he said he is working on a totally new comprehensive peace proposal which he may give me when I get there.

D: Uh-huh.

K: Well that at least wastes a little time and since I am then on the way to China nothing can happen until I get back.

D: Yeah.

K: I just don't want to do anything without telling you.

D: Sure.

K: Second, and I want to sit down with you and tell you what the General, my General,

D: Yes, I heard yesterday in your press conference that you had a very fruitful talk with Dobrynin about procedure, sites and methods for the new negotiations.

K: Yeah, I want to talk to you about that in a minute -- that's all baloney.

D: Uh-huh.

K: The trouble with you, Mr. Ambassador, is that you go straight ahead and I go in circles. If I can teach you people tactics --

D: Yeah.

K: Now the hysterical message from Sadat is: that their third army is surrounded and that you are trying to get them to surrender and that they will have to take unilateral measures regardless of consequences and that you are not permitting UN observers in there. All of this may be true, but we want to give them an answer. Let me make a suggestion. First of all, of course you want to check with your Government. My recommendation is that we can tell him that you would permit observers in there and just tell me where they should go and just don't say in general. Secondly, I would consider it a very good move if you would say you would let non-military supplies in there of some kind because it can then be used against them if they start an offensive.

D: Well, what I read in the morning, they have already started shooting.

K: Well, that may be but I think it is best to have a position that we can then later defend. And it is also a position which if a debate starts in the Security Council about what can move on these roads, we can then sustain having taken it previously and not being beaten into it.

D: Our -- I cabled, by the way, last night my Government asking them to think along these lines because I figured that's what would develop.

K: Could you get me an answer in an hour or so?

D: Yeah, I will try on these two points: on the observers and on the . . .

K: On the observers, what I want from you is a very specific answer where I can then tell Sadat we have been urgently in touch with Israeli Government and you will -- then observers should report to this and this place.

D: I have one point, if I may . . .

K: And secondly, any proposition at all we can make on humanitarian supplies -- you know food and so forth, that isn't humiliating.

D: Yeah.

K: I mean you can still screw it up on the road -- I mean let's make a particular proposal.

D: Right. I will check what can be done on the second one. We had a very disturbing concern in Israel over the fact that the Russians are sending 70 observers which 50 of them are officers -- they snuck into these _____ places I told Eagleburger last night. I don't know really quite now but sometime soon it is possible during the day if I can get an impression from you, Mr. Secretary, of how do you view this hope situation of the connection between the observers and the emergency force.

K: Well, I want to -- we won't accept 70 observers and we have already told Waldheim. We told the Russians two things: all observers have be part of the UN Observers. There won't be -- we don't hold still for separate observers. And secondly all observers -- that number of 70 is not acceptable for us for the UN force.

D: They are there already, you know.

K: Yeah, but you know, they haven't any status. We can't prevent the Russians from sending people into Cairo. Then if they send 70 officers we can't protest it.

D: Yeah, I understand.

K: What we can do -- they asked us to send 70 of own and join them. We told them we won't send 70 of our own. Two, we won't join them. Three, we won't have any separate U.S. -Soviet arrangement -- it has to be part of the UN. And fourth, 70 is too many. Now we have an arrangement with Waldheim that he won't take more than 20 of from each of the superpowers.

D: These 20 of each, how will they be related to the force.

K: They won't be related to the force at all. They will be part of the observer group. We will not permit any Soviet or American personnel in the force and we will insist on an absolute distinction between the observers and the force.

D: Yes, that is important because the Prime Minister thinks that is one way to infiltrate into the force.

K: We won't have them in the force in any...

D: Fine, I will get busy on these two problems.

K: Will you get back to me? Really since I don't believe the Crisis is over would you please make sure that we can get the necessary press support.

D: Yes, I will get...

K: At least that they don't--I mean Marvin Kalb, people like that, ought to be controllable.

D: That's a friend, Marvin Kalb, he speaks of you as the best friend in the world.

K: He isn't attacking me. But when they make all these insinuations that this was done for Watergate reasons they are weakening for the future.

D: As I told you two newspaper men called me and one of them was Marilyn Berger and I worked on the telephone for about half an hour to convince her, and I think she took out all the references. She was going to write the story that the President needed this for Watergate and I said....

K: Well, they are saying two things, the President needed it for Watergate and the second is that the President has lost his judgment. Now the fact of the matter is you know XXX who did this.

D: Of course. On her I think I corrected the story and I asked, also issued instructions to all our counselors along these lines but I will try to do what else I can today.

K: Good thank you but get me an answer on the other business.

D: Ok.

SL281

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin - Secretary Kissinger
October 26, 1973
3:00 p.m.

K: Anatoly, we have instructed Scali to work out with Malik in when they meet at 4:00

D: Today?

K: Yes, some participation from the Soviet sphere, or whatever you want to call it,

D: Good, meet today? Fine. Thank you very much. Will notify Gromyko.

K: They can settle what country.

D: That point, it is my guess _____

K: I don't worry about it....

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SL279

TELECON
Ambassador Scali/Secretary Kissinger
October 26; 1973
2:35

RELEASED IN FULL

S: I talked with the Secretary General and I think I have his position properly..for a twenty man Soviet and twenty man US observer corp.

K: Yes, but they are not separate.

S: Right. They are part of the regular observers. No special priviledges and with in the structure. I also talked about Romania..

K: Let me get an answer for you on that.

S: He said he was surprised Takoa didn't buy it immediately. I said I would talk with Takoa. Meantime I have had a shouting call from Malik, who says I am dictating to the Secretary General and trying to keep the Soviet bloc out.

K: He..to me through Dobrynin. I told Dobrynin I would let him know this afternoon. I am trying to get an answer by this afternoon.

S: Malik insists on coming over here by 4:00 today.

K: Let me see if I can get back to you.

S: I need some guidance because..

K: As long as integrate into UNSO, we must do something.

S: Question is how.

K: I will call you before 4:00.

S: OK, good.

K: Thank you;, John.

END

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SL277

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Dobrynin/Sec. Kissinger
Friday, Oct. 26, 1973
1:00 p.m.

K: Anatoliy.

D: Hello, Henry, How are you?

K: Fine. We have a message from the British who said that they got it from Sadat. Are you using the British as a channel?

D: I know there is discussion with the British but I do not know the discussion. Yesterday he received the British Ambassador. What does it say?

K: That we should pass o it on to the Israelis.

D; What is the message?

K: It has to do with the Israelis withdrawing certain distance, what the Egyptians are willing to do, etc.

D: I do not know of this message from Moscow at all. For your information we asked the British to see Sadat.

K: No. No. It was just that -- we have been asked by the British to pass on to the Israelis and I wanted to find out what you thought of it.

D: The British asked Sadat?

K: Sadat asked Gromyko and Gromyko gave it to the British.

K: The message addressed to the Israelis?

K: The British have asked us to pass it to the Israelis. I would have thought it faster if Gromyko had sent it to you.

D: He did not. I have no information on this. About Malik, what we discussed on the telephone -- he mentioned that these UN troops xxx or forces that there is more than 50% of NATOS. He said exactly 118. He did not mention what was sent yesterday but what was sent today was 50%.

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K: I am taking taking up your issue of this morning right now.

D: Scali just called the (?) and mentioned to him that the Americans are opposed to this.

K: I am reviewi ng that issue right now. Give me an hour and I will let you know in the afternoon.

D: o.k.

END

S4278

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Dinitz - Secretary Kissinger
October 26, 1973
1:17 p.m.

D: Food and Water .....

K: It is my strong advice to enable us to say something, we can say we have achieved....enable us to pay less later.

D: You recommend food and water.

K: You offered to let food and water through .....could cause very serious consequences with Russians.

D: I want to ask you about something that has been on my mind, not by Government's mind. Suppose we offer to return all the people free without equiment, wouldn't take presoners, let them have food and water and let them return home safely if they wanted, open the road.

K: In my view the best thing to offer food and water, non-military supplies.

D: OK, I will pass that on. That also will not solve the problem, though. Will delay confrontation.we are going to have with Egypt.

K: You will wind up in my judgment, we will end up on the wrong side of the confrontation. It would be a whole hell of a lot better to establish the principle of limited supply now.

D: I'm not negating this,

K: In addition, and to offer that anybody who wants leave will be permitted to leave the Egyptians will consider that insulting.

D: We don't want to insult Egypt, but there must be a solution to the problem, we don't want to allow them to become fighting forces again.

K: I understand, eventual solution will be to open the road to non-military supplies.

D: Yes, I understand.

K: You will get under irresistable pressure if you keep it up.

D: Not keeping it up, we started with nonmilitary, humanitarian things, and I think the possibilitiy....

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K: My personal advice, you understand its not an official position yet, but it is my usual tactic of anticipating in order to gain time.

D: As I said last night.

K: You will not be permitted to capture that army. I am certain.

D: Its not first priority. We would rather have them go home.

K: I don't think that will be possible either. Unless you withdraw your forces.

D: Well. That comes back to your suggestion, that we suggested to you that night.

K: You won't _____in the North.

D: Don't want both sides of the canal in the North.

K: I frankly think you will make a mistake if you push into a total confrontation.

D: We're not trying for a confrontation, just want to find the best way to solve it.

K: Well, I have given you my views, it would be helpful if we could get an answer in the early part of the afternoon. Oh, something I have meant to tell you earlier and have neglected to twice, what I talked with Dobrynin about the conference was very minor, whether the site would be in New York or Geneva. that the site would not be in New York, but Geneva which is what the Foreign Minister told me. Why he wanted that I don't know.

D: I will find out.

K: I think it has some remoteness from here and from the UN and that American and Soviet person of appropriate rank would sit in on the first few sessions and that's as much as we discussed.

D: OK, I will pass it on.

K: No substantive discussion whatever.

D: Fine.

K: Do tell them because the President has been bugging me to do it.

SL280

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Scali/Sec. Kissinger
Friday, Oct. 26, 1973
2:55 p.m.

K: You can go ahead with Romania.

S: I can?

K: Yes.

S: With Malik?

K: Yes.

S: All right.

K: O.K.

S: How about...

K: I will tell Dobrynin that you and Malik will work out some member of the Warsaw Bloc but I will not mention the country.

S: How about the 20-20 deal? Do you want me to work that out?

K: Yes.

S: We have just heard a report and we are trying to confirm, that the Egyptians have asked for another meeting of the SC. We are trying to confirm.

K: I don't know about that.

END

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SL276

TELCON
Lord Cromer - Secretary Kissinger
October 26, 1973
12:15 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

C: Hello Henry. Did you get my note?

K: Yes.

C: Do you feel you can pass it on?

K: I shall pass it on, if you agree.

C: If you please. Hope you will be able to urge the Israelis this is a good idea.

K: We will talk to them in that sense.

C: Can I tell _____ you are doing that?

K: You can tell them I will pass it on with our view that they do something constructive. I don't want to endorse every last word in it.

C: Did you see that the Israelis have deferred their elections until Dec. 31.

K: No, I haven't seen it.

C: I got the message from Tel Aviv. It was 11 Dec. but now they've put it off until the 31st.

K: We may have to start the process before that.

C: That's what I was thinking.

K: Now, Rollie, I understand the British press is commenting that White hall believes we have over reacted.

C: Actually, the press comments I have seen have been pretty good. I don't get the impression Whitehall does think that.

K: It concerns me because we believe ....it may be next time in Europe... if we don't react....

C: I'm sure we don't think you over reacted. Press comment has really been rather good. "Thank God for the Americans" was one headline, the Sun also for American and the Yorkshire Post, the Times was a bit

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wishy washy, but on the whole, it was very good.

K: Wish we could say that for ours.

C: Yes.

SL297

TELECON
Scowcroft/Kissinger
October 26, 1973
8:15 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K. Well my friend, are you still with me?

S. Yes, I'm still with you.

K. How did Dobrynin react to all this?

S. He thought it was unfortunate and they were in Moscow--of course, this is his personal opinion--very angry over the way we had manufactured something out of nothing and had gone into a full alert. If we had a problem we should have gone to them instead of being so tramatic. ...Al said the President came over wrong and what he was trying to say was to stress his close personal relationship with Brezhnev. He said he was glad that Al called and glad that he explained this. We must preserve this relationship. You know, I think his protestations---

K. That is nonsense. You called him twice to please do not take unilateral action while we were drafting the note....All he had to say is we will never take unilateral action. You are getting too excited. He had three opportunities to say give us an answer tomorrow morning.

S. Or that this is just a note, what are you getting so excited about. What happened tonight wasn't good. (laughter)

K. (laughter) Really.

S. Just in case you didn't notice.

K. O'k. Thank you.

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SL292

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Dinitz/Kissinger
October 26, 1973
7:10 p.m.

D... The situation in which they would be happy to go with negotiations.

K. I will pass it on, Mr. Ambassador. But you are addressing the wrong problem.... You heard the President has announced there is no confrontation, os if there is a confrontation tonight we will not get him into it again.

D. If they want anything they will.....we are prepared.

K. None of that will do us any good.

D. I will pass that onl

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SL294

TELECON
Haig/Kissinger
October 26, 1973
7:55 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K. The crazy bastard really made a mess with the Russians.

H. What?

K. Didn't you listen to his press statement. First we had information of massive movement of Soviet forces. That is a lie. Second, this was the worst crisis since the Cuban missile crisis. True, but why rub their faces in it. Third, Brezhnev and I exchanged brutal messages. That has never been acknowledged before. Four, Brezhnev respects me because I was the man who bombed Viet-Nam on ____18 and mined the harbors on May 18.

H. I don't think that is a third of the problem. He just let fly. He got all he had about the Middle East from you. I assumed you had cleared that. I was surprised.

K. Compare it with my press conference when I said there was no confrontation with the Russians....He has turned it into a massive Soviet backdown. Brezhnev is known to his Politburo as a man with a special relationship with Nixon and he is being publicly humiliated.

H. How about the rest of it. Disaster.

K. Yes, a disaster of something that is already a disaster. We are getting a hot line message tonight. Would you call Dobrynin. It doesn't do me any good to call him. You better call in the name of the President and say he wanted to stress his close personal relationship with the President. In a replay on television it may look like he is taunting Brezhnev. He wants him to know he places the greatest stress on the personal relationship. This is inadvertent and will be correeted. This guy will not take this. This guy over there is a maniac also.

H. I will take care of him. The rest is just as bad. We are off to the races.

K. I don't know what significance the other answers have. He just looked awful.

H. He took on the press like I have never heard.

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K. They treated him in an unbelievable way.

H. I will get to Dobrynin right away. If you talk to him tonight, take it easy. He is right on the verge.

K. The UN observers. Everything is nuts. There was no reason to make a special....

H. They understand. They are having trouble with their leader also.

K. They cannot stand public humiliation.

H. I will get back to you.

SL296

TELECON
Haig/Kissinger
October 26, 1973
8:13 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

H. I am with the President. We noticed you are the only one who hasn't called.

K. No, no. We were trying to get through. I think it was very effective.

H. Stu Alsop who was at dinner in Georgetown said that most of the guests were in a state of stunned admiration.

K. Yes, he called me too. It was quite a tour de force. The hot line is active.

H. Are they sending a message to us?

K. Yes, that is probably related to local conditions.

H. Right.

K. Which was one reason I wanted to wait until I had the report. Please express my feelings. It was a great tour de force.

H. O'k Henry.

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SL295

TELECON
Haig/Kissinger
October 26, 1973
8:13 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

H. Henry, I have had a good talk with Dobrynin. He is bitching more about yesterday than tonight. He said it was the alert and publication of it that really got them.

K. Why did the god damn thing get published?

H. I don't know. We have done this countless times with no wimper from anybody.

K. Do you remember in November 1972 we were on worldwide alert for three weeks prior to the November 9 speech. Do you remember that?

H. I do. I think I did some good. I had Brent listen so he can give you a detailed report. They were very upset. Mostly about the exchange of notes and the five hour delay. He said the note was not intended to be mean.

K. What do you mean the five hour delay. If it was serious we had to get ready before we answered.

H. That is what he complained about. That thing tonight. How could they describe it...I have to go the boss is calling me. We are off to the races. We are getting great reaction, believe it or not.

K. Don't tell him that or he will do it again. You know what he did. He made Brezhnev a Khruschev in case you are interested to know.

H. I have to go. He is mad.

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RELEASED IN FULL

SL293

TELECON
Stuart Alsop/Kissinger
October 26, 1973
7:25 p.m.

A. I am looking at your Chief and I am....

K. I am having heart attacks when he is talking about the Middle East.

A. He is over-selling that.

K. Miss Maginnis is here and we are going out for dinner and wondered whether you and Tish would like to join us.

A. We would love to but we are going to the Waldens with the Bradens. Why don't you give them a ring and join us.

K. I don't know them.

A. You know the Bradens.

K. Just because I know their two guests a perfect stranger can't call up and invite himself.

A. Where are you going?

K. We may go to the Bagatelle restaurant. I am having such a heart attack about his challenge to the Soviet Union which I do not believe. We did not have certain information they were sending in massive forces.

A. You think he is going too far in that respect?

K. We faced them down.

A. Yes, and the last thing you want to do is say you did. Funny, I didn't get the impression that he was dancing on the grave, but maybe they are. Let's get together soon.

K. I would like that.

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SL290

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Colby/Kissinger
October 26, 1973
6:55 p.m.

K. Bill.

C. Yes, sir.

K. We have been alerted for two hours on the hot line that a message is coming in which is odd procedure. We are getting so paranoid I just wonder whether that is an indication of a fait accompli. Have you picked up anything?

C. Those down near Egypt apparently moved out. They have been reasonably quiet. There is only the Sadat thing. He is really getting very upset. You saw his message.

K. You mean his message to me?

C. Yes, I don't blame him. It is quite a jam. Let me run a check and call you right back.

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SL268

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Amb. Dobrynin/HAK
Oct. 26, 1973; 9:32 a.m.

D: You called me yesterday.

K: I just called you to make sure you wouldn't go to sleep early.

D: No, I was until 1:00 o'clock with your deputies.

K: I know. Can I give you one piece of advice?

D: Of course.

K: He has little influence with me.

D: It doesn't matter. He invites me and I am going.

K: I am glad you went. It is good for you. I didn't know whether I should have Scowcroft call you every hour during last night, too.

D: No, he was calling me. I went to bed and asked Vorontsov to receive this every hour on the hour during the operation - not to do anything.

K: OK. What I called you about was to tell you it isn't all that important, that we have had no contact with Jackson whatsoever and he's been operating entirely on his own.

D: Uh, huh.

K: In the inflammatory statements he's been making.

D: Well, he doesn't see in the future very much. What he is doing is make it on special items is my impression. Only he is acting like directions to do. There is not in combination of what he is doing. In his own, issued just in his own behalf which is all well known. So for me it was nothing new in his statement.

K: Right.

D: And, Henry, in connection with this United Nations Forces, Gromyko sent a telegram yesterday late, but in connection with this thing, you know, the United Nations is serious about sending UN forces...

K: Hold on a second. Hello, yeah, go ahead.

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It was decision about

D: / In connection with the Security Council/sending UN ~~security~~ forces in the Middle East. And judgment will tell you that we can't see the importance of the composition of these forces, the United Nations force, is an important element, so we believe that these forces would be composed of the contingents from the, as you call it, communist and socialist countries and that this termination couldn't be justified in this particular case. We mention this because amongst other measures of relief, it is not quite clear whether to do so as if the American representatives are observant against inclusion in this personnel from the socialist countries.

K: No, we want to exclude countries that belong to existing military alliances.

D: In this case...

K: Regardless of social system.

D: Yes, but, the question is, in this case...

K: We don't insist that any members from Thailand.

D: No, I understand, but this rather looks from our side.

K: Not at all. Well do you consider Sweden as being on our side?

D: Well it was _____ whether Sweden alone, but the question around representation of two different kinds of areas too, not on just representation from other areas...

K: Why don't we let them argue about that in New York.

D: Yes, but it's important for them to know, to get some instructions, because otherwise they will argue for another recourse. They will say they don't know how many it will take.

K: Well our view was that they should be drawn in the first instance from maybe some of the forces on Cyprus.

D: Yeah, I understand.

K: Because I like to have Swedes in warm climates.

D: Yes, I understand. On immediate basis.

K: And our basic view was that they shouldn't contain people that belong to existing military alliances, which would have excluded Canadians.

D: I understand.

K: But, I understand your point of view and I'll look into it.

D: Okay.

K: And then we can consider what else to do.

D: All right.

K: I think we should now both try to quiet this thing down.

D: Yeah.

K: And, you know, I didn't go to Moscow in order to produce a crisis between the Soviet Union and the United States. That wasn't the purpose of the trip.

D: Well, it looked as if...

K: I mean the way things are developing now I would have been better off never going there and letting the Israelis continue military operations.

D: Well, Henry, whenever you have the time, maybe I'll. Then I'll tell him my own point of view. But it's nothing really new for what is great importance. What was done was done. The other question was his special interest in terms of anything else onto this. All right?

K; Okay, fine.

D: Okay. Bye, bye, Henry.

SL287

TELECON
Dobrynin/Kissinger
October 26, 1973
Before 6:30 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

D. Hello.

K. Anatoly, we were told a couple of hours ago that a hot line message was coming.

D. It could be. I don't have any information. They don't usually take more than 2 or 3 minutes to pass by hot line.

K. There is a meeting at 9:00 of the Security Council.

D. You get the news from your Embassy?

K. I don't know who we go the information from. If it is important whatever judgments we should eventually make on this we would try to avoid another one.

D. I know the President makes a speech today and I just have routine telegrams. I don't have a single telegram that is on a top issue except one issue about UN Socialist countries. I cannot answer your question. They sometimes send me a flash.

K. Let me find out where we got the information from and I will call you back.

D. O'k.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 27 APR 2004 200102979

nlr SL 284

TELCON
Mr. Sisco/Sec. Kissinger
Friday, Oct. 26, 1973, 4:00 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: (The Egyptians have asked) Waldheim to help them with the Third Army. I think we have to do something.

S: Larry just showed me the message prepared to go to the Egyptians. Let's send that off and see what happens. As I said earlier this morning I think that we have got to be satisifed that they are really doing what they say they are doing and I don't know how we do that.

K: There are two problems. One is that and secondly, is for the Israelis to do something on that @##$% line.

S: You mean by way of pulling back.

K: Yes.

S: I felt that the trade off was that they would get those observers there and there would be some pull back. As I say I don't feel like we are going to get the Israelis to do this in the next 24 hours but it is worth trying.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 27 APR 2004 200102979

SL267

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
The President
10/26/73; 9:16 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

P: Hello.

K: Mr. President.

P: How are things looking this morning?

K: They look fairly quiet. There is a fire fight going on along the Suez Canal.

P: Well, I mean how do things look between us and the Soviets.

K: Between us and the Soviets they look quiet. They are totally quiet.

P: Yeah.

K: And, the . . .

P: And the general reception to what has happened is -- has been adequately played or . . .

K: I think it has been adequately played. They are grudgingly saying that it was necessary and that it was well done. Reston has a shitty column today saying it was probably necessary but maybe we over reacted.

P: You should have laid on him a little harder, Henry.

K: Mr. President, if a Soviet paratroop division had beein in there, they would have said it was . . .

P: Reston, you have got to remember that when he calls you have to assume he is an enemy -- huh?

K: Exactly.

P: Enemy in the terms of posed war policies and so forth.

K: Mr. President, when one analyzes how it has played, it was basically, considering that most of the reporters are our opponents -- I think it was basically played extremely postively.

P: In other words it was played in a way that showed that well we had a little bit of a crisis but it was tied a little bit to the Watergate thing and all the rest.

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K: The tied it to Watergate but they it is clear that . . .

P: Wanted to get across that this was not a Watergate . . .

K: No, no, we got across that it isn't a Watergate related -- most all of them did. There is just a little nibbling around the edges of this thing which you expect from them. After all when you were in China before Watergate they were looking for things wrong there, too.

P: With regard to this, will you take the time to prepare a little statement for me for an opener tonight.

K: Right.

P: What do you have? Anything you can think of that is . . .

K: Well, I think that you can say . . .

P: What I mean is something new. I don't want -- I am not going to read it. I just want some talking points.

K: I think you can say -- I don't know whether I would announce that the alert is no longer in effect. They will ask that as a question and you can acknowledge it.

P: Yes, of course, of course.

K: But I think we can put down some basic principles on the Middle East.

P: Yeah, put down two or three things as to what has happened.

K: Right.

P: How working with the Soviets has been constructive and we must continue to and we've got to avoid it and now is the time for a permanent settlement and so forth.

K: Right. Right. I'd be constructive but not too specific on the settlement.

P: Oh, God, I don't intend to be specific. I won't say anything about borders or anything like that. But put down what you can in the way of talking points, will you please.

K: Absolutely, Mr. President.

P: And send those over to me as soon as you can.

K: Right, within the next hour.

P: Fine. You are feeling all right, are you?

K: I feel fine. I had a good night's sleep, Mr. President.

P: Fine, fine. Well, you did a fine job, Henry.

K: Well, you made the tough decision.

P: Bye.

SL283

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
The President - Secretary Kissinger
October 26, 1973
3:45 p.m.

N: Yah.

K: Mr. President.

N: Henry, I can't make out something your staff sent over here with regard to sending Soviet observers. I understand we did receive a message from Brezhnev.

K: Mr. President, the situation is the following. We don't want to get sucked into a separate UN observer force.

N: I understand, the point that I am making is this. The Secretary General would say.....

K: The Secretary General should suggest,...should be willing to contribute to an augmented.

N: My point is suppose he doesn't want to, what do we say with regard to the Soviets sending.....

K: For your information, we are working out this afternoon a situation where the Secretary General will request 20 American and Soviet observers, so the question you raise will be hypothetical, Mr. President. As you say, there are two points to be made:

N: I understand and there should not be a separate US force...

K: Also should be no self-appointed forces of any one nation. We believe there will be small numbers of Soviet and US personnel requested.

N: I have reason to believe that will be done.

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SL285

TELCON
The President/Sec. Kissinger
Friday, Oct. 26, 1973
4:05 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Mr. President.

N: It is necessary to be somewhat precise on this now. What can we say that the United States will participate in providing observers if requested by the Sec. Gen. I don't want to be behind the news. I would like to be ahead of it.

K: If requested by the Sec. Gen.

N: Fine. The Soviet Union is sending unilaterally. Are we going to object?

K: They cannot do anything until the Sec. Gen. asks for them.

N: Henry, I am getting at this. It is already in the news. To the effect that Soviet Union is sending observers and has asked us to.

K: We have responded to that -- We have to avoid, Mr. President, -- they are pouring people in there and calling them observers and they have to be observed.

N: I am trying to see what we say tonight.

K: The US is -- we think a small number of US observers -- we are prepared if the Sec. Gen. asks for them and we have every reason to believe this is what will happen.

N: This is being discussed now and we think it will be ~~worked~~ worked out this way. And that can be said.

K: Yes Mr. President.

N: Thanks, Henry.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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DATE/CASE ID: 25 MAY 2004 200102979

SL288

TELECON
The President/Kissinger
October 26, 1973
6:30 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K. Mr. President.

N. Have we had any further developments with the UN or Secretary General requesting us to participate in---

K. Not yet.

N. In the one case it is a peace-keeping force and in the other case an observer force.

K. We will under no circumstances approve the peace-keeping force. That is what the Security Council ordered.

N. They agreed to that...

K. On the observer force we have not yet been asked but we can see that we have reason to believe we will be asked.

N. And the Soviets indicate they so desire. Is it sent in already?

K. They send 70 people but we should not praise them because of that.

N. No, No. O'k I will try to dance around it.

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SL289

TELECON
Dobrynin/Kissinger
October 26, 1973
6:45 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K. Anatoly, we understand it was alerted from your end, just on the hot line.

D. It could be that fighting going on in the southern part of the Suez Canal. That is my guess.

K. For your information we are urging Israel very much to make some sort of offer to the Egyptians on this.

D. Is the Security Council already in session?

K. No, at 9:00 tonight.

D. If we have anything, of course I will be in touch.

K. Good, I would appreciate it.

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DATE/CASE ID: 27 APR 2004 200102979

SL314

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Dinitz/ Secretary Kissinger
October 27, 1973
11:45

K: I would like to get information from you.

D: Shalev is getting all the details on the telephone now. Within ten minutes or so we should have the full picture.

K: If this comes off it can gain for you — 46 hours.

D: That is the whole purpose.

K: I could not be more thrilled — maybe everything will be all right.

D: In fifteen minutes I will have the full picture and call you back.

K: Thank you.

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DATE/CASE ID: 27 APR 2004 200102979

RELEASED IN FULL SL326

TELECON
Dinitz/Kissinger
October 27, 1973
1:15 p.m.

K. I just heard from Egypt. They want a midnight meeting.

D. At midnight. It is better for us. We discussed 11:00. I will suggest midnight.

K. They also want to move the convoy at midnight.

D. Yes, the convoy and meeting.

K. The Egyptians also told us that there are some UN truce observers you are keeping out of Suez City. Could you let them in too?

D. I will check on that. Of course, I have no authority to say that.

K. If you could for once be positive quickly. I have requests to stop the airlift, to have U.S. forces do the supplying. Our Government is going crazy.

D. If you only saw what I am going through here on this end.

K. Get me a very quick answer, will you.

D. Yes.

K. Midnight, that is the major thing.

D. There are two things, the meeting and the observers.

K. Also the convoy.

D. Yes, the meeting, convoy and Suez observers.

K. Yes.

D. Thanks.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 28 APR 2004 200102979

RELEASED IN FULL

SL324

TELECON
Schlesinger/Kissinger
October 27, 1973
1:00 p.m.

S. How are we doing on the 3rd Army question.

K. .....We have a posture now for getting this thing on the way. We can't land troops in the Trucial States and resupply the 3rd Army.

S. Of course not.

K. We should get these two things going. The convoy will go through tonight and the meeting will take place.

S. Splendid.

K. The reason we don't want Major Generals running lose over there is not to get the pot stirred up. Can we settle it now?

S. Sure, the important thing is the 3rd Army.

K. No, getting the ceasefire straightened away is the most important. If the Israelis and Egyptians get something worked out on the 3rd Army that is ....We have no interest in the 3rd Army.....

S. We have some interest in the 3rd Army. It is our help arranging the ceasefire and they were captured after that, which compromises somewhat our position in being the peace maker in the area.

K. You can be sure I have talked at great lengths with them. We have spent the whole night. I have been on the phone all morning with Zayyat and Ismail and the Egyptians are extremely pleased with what we are doing.

S. Good piece of work.

K. Do you think a convoy can travel on that road at night?

S. We will have to check. My own belief is yes they can handle it.

K. Give me your judgment.

S. Did you indicate to the Israelis you would cut off their air lift if they did not acquiesce?

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K. I said that we would be very tough but did not indicate what we would do.

S. In any event I think if they run convoys in that problem is settled.

K. We did not talk about the airlift. I said we would vote at the Security Council against them.

S. If they prevent these guys from getting water and food it is criminal.

K. 10:00 tonight is three hours away.

S. Good, in any event if they fail to do it we should think about cutting off the airlift. It is a way of making clear our point of view.

K. I think it is one of the things we should consider at that point.

S. You mention the Trucial States. Around about the end of the year we could be in some real problems.

K. We may have to do this. I would like to use my trip...

S. ....disagree more at diplomacy....

K. If that happens we should consider it.

S. There probably is an 80 percent chance we can pull it off. We have to think about what happens if you can't. Any other problems.

K. No.

RELEASED IN FULL

SL322

TELCON
Ambassador Dinitz/ Secretary Kissinger
October 27, 1973
12:55

K: We have made an arrangement — not acceptable saying all right for 6:00 a.m. We have just talked to the Egyptians — they tell me and I tend to believe them they were not permitted to pass through kilos 85 — your people on the ground did not have instructions. We told the Egyptians to meet at 10 o'clock tonight Israeli time at the agreed place and they have accepted it. Also a further meeting and convoy. To put off 7 more hours we see no reason.

D: Frankly, technically we must see if it can be worked out. What I am going through is not less than what you are going through.

K: I said we were doing it in his interest at the agreed place at 10:00 p.m. for the convoy. Whether it can deliver is another question.

D: I will talk to the Prime Minister right away.

K: You must come back with a positive answer. Please let me know right away as soon as you check.

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RELEASED IN FULL

SL323

TELECON
El Zayyat/Kissinger
October 27, 1973
12:55 p.m.

K. I have just talked to the Prime Minister of Israel.

Z. Yes.

K. And here is what will happen if it is agreeable to you. If your representatives appear at the agreed place at 6:00 a.m. tomorrow morning Cairo time and if your convoy appears at 6:00 a.m. at whatever place it is ordered to go through, the convoy will be passed through and the Israeli representative will be there. I give you the assurances that the American Government stands behind this arrangement and if anything else goes wrong we will take a very definite stand. They claim your people did not show up.

Z. Our people did not show up. They were prevented from doing so. I talked to Mr. _____ and told him about this. He said the reason our people were not at K 110 was because at K 85 the Israeli forces said they had no information about this arrangement and prevented them.

K. Would you like to do it at night?

Z. Certainly. We think they want to wait until morning---

K. Lets give it a reasonable time. What time is it in Cairo?

Z. It is six hours different. In Cairo it is 10 minutes to 7:00. If they can make it at 9:00.

K. Two hours is too short. I am afraid of communications breakdown.

Z. Yes, 10:00 this evening Cairo time.

K. I understand. We have given you our word and we will stand behind it. When the U.S. makes a promise we keep it.

Z. I appreciate it.

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K. 10:00 tonight then.

Z. We thought they would try to stall until tomorrow morning and from your conversation with the Prime Minister of Israel this seems to be true. They are trying to do it tomorrow morning.

K. I will request 10:00 on behalf of the President of the United States.

RELEASED IN FULL
SL325

TELECON
Schlesinger/Kissinger
October 27, 1973
1:10 p.m.

S. Henry, we have just had a cable from Tel Aviv from our DAO that you should be aware of immediately. The 3rd Army has built two bridges across the Canal and the Israelis plan to attack them. Is the convoy coming from Cairo or Tel Aviv?

K. Cairo.

S. R_____ indicated that the IDF will attack both from the ground and the air.

K. I will tell you I made it clear to them in the strongest possible terms that we are backing this stand. I will get on the horn with Dinitz again.

S. Well, good. Just put that into your hopper.

K. Good.

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DATE/CASE ID: 25 MAY 2004 200102979

SL327
pt

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Schlesinger/Kissinger
October 27, 1973
1:35 p.m.

S. Hello, Henry. That is a hard surface road. We took pictures on the 13th.

K. And it could be travelled at night?

S. Even if it has been hit, it has hard shoulders.

K. Good. The Egyptians asked to make it midnight. They moved ti back two hours which is 6:00 our time. I have told Israel that on pain of the most drastic sanctions it better happen.

S. Good. Bye.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 25 MAY 2004 200102979

NK
SL315

TELECON
Scali/Kissinger
October 27, 1973
11:53 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K. The Soviets are making a big deal out of the observers and claim you are blocking it.

S. Yes.

K. I think we need to get some American observers there. It is the only face saver they are getting out of this debacle.

S. All right. We are engaged in the Security Council debate right now which Malik is turning from a discussion of the Secretary General's report on UNEF to an immediate demand that Israel pull back from Suez City. A contingent of 50 Fins have gone in and more will go in. He has asked that a question be put to Dayan that they meet on the road. Why not pull back? It is in....

K. You know about the Egyptian-Israeli meeting?

S. I know that. I have been told I can't say a word about it.

K/ I think you should say to the best of your knowledge they are meeting to implement the military positions and that the....for the Security Council to pass anything now. You don't know if the meeting has actually taken place but is in the process of being arranged. It is a closed meeting.

S. Yes. It would relieve lots of pressure if I could say that. I was told not to mention it.

K. I am telling you now you can say it.

S. Let me get back on the question of the observers.

K. Can't you get a recess and tell Malik we will let 15 or 20 observers go?

S. I told him that and he gave me no answer.

K. Let me tell Dobrynin that if Malik comes to you, you will accept that.

S. 15 or 20? That is what I told him last night. I can say that?

K. Yes.

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SO 44 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Dobrynin/Kissinger
October 27, 1973
11:24 a.m.

D. Thank you. Scowcroft sent me a copy of what you sent. I received what we sent to you just after your talk with me. By the way, in your letter which you sent to Brezhnev in answer you quoted sentences in his letter of....you remember.

K. Yes.

D. Perhaps when I dictated to you it was my sound but a little bit different. I don't think it makes that big of difference. It was not adhere. I said act here without delay.

K. That makes a big difference.

D. I don't think so.

K. Adhere means we have to agree with what you said. While to act here leaves it open to joint action.

D. You will say that you acted pro_____. This adhere speaks about a Security Council resolution. So, in any case---

K. We had the impression that you were planning a military move. We did not invent this. Someday soon we have to discuss this. We had no reason to meet until 4:00 in the morning.

D. This is the point. On this, I think, one thing was really a big blunder on your side, maybe it was deliberate. For six hours you are just telling us every hour to wait, there will be a reply. I am sure if you had just mentioned to me that the President feels it was necessary to make an alert...blow up our relations. We don't want to do it, please send an urgent message to the Chairman. We will be forced to do it if we must. I am sure it would have received a reply that nothing....

K. That was a blunder.

D. Seven hours you were telling us and then we receive a letter that didn't say a word about the alert. It was widely publicized.

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K. Whether you ever believe it or not it is not important now. I am telling you it was not...we were convinced you were planning something unilateral. We were as outrated. We thought the tone in that letter....

D. You were pretty sure we would do it. If you were so sure, you could have waited one hour to get some additional information from Brezhnev. But you didn't want to have it.

K. That isn't true. I was very tough. Don't pressure us. I sent you two or three messages to please don't do anything unilateral.

D. Exactly.

K. You could have said what makes you think we will do anything unilateral. We have no intention of taking action.

D. What you said was to wait for a reply. I sent four telegrams to Moscow--this was a unique situation--to wait for a reply from the President. What did they receive? This is not....Someday in Moscow...much more easy to discuss.

K. We very truly thought you were threatening us out of the....

D. Exactly, you have it with us. Wait for the reply. By the way nothing was said. Then you are trying to make it look like it was a Cuban or Hanoi crisis.

K. Don't remind me of that. It was not well done.

D. It was done badly. It was unbelievable. He won't believe he compared it....More things are involved for both sides. There is no need to discuss this. What was done was done. We will now have to look forward. This message is oral to the President and to you in connection with Soviet/American observers. I was instructed to tell you in a written message...that the Secretary General would like to say that we...substance of yesterday's message from... about Soviet/American observers.

K. I know of one. You sent me on discussions.

D. We also...from the promise that the Soviet and American observers... will ask as a contingent of the observer force of the UN. We want to stress that we consider it very important that the American observers will start the dispatch of their forces, having in mind that it should give the USSR and US the possibility of getting authentic information.

We expect that the US on its part will also take necessary steps before the UN...The American said that...to Egypt front about of... and the President Nixon in his letter...that a number of the American officers should be there to oversee the ceasefire. On the same day we informed the President of the dispatch of 70 Soviet observers to...and sent them immediately to the line. It would mean that this understanding reached with us would be broken. We would hope that....

K. Don't you think the President answered it yesterday. We are prepared to send observers as soon as the Secretary General requests them and we have told him he should request them.

D. You should mention it to him again. He said that Scali...

K. I will get in touch with Scali immediately.

D. Waldheim is under the impression...

K. I thought they were talking about some number yesterday. Let me call Scali.

D. Send out U.S. observers and I will....

K. I will call you back within an hour. Why don't we get together on Monday and review just what went wrong.

D. What time would you like?

K. How about lunch.

D. I will try. Fulbright would like to have me for lunch. Maybe I could switch it on Tuesday.

K. I also have a lunch. It was either a deliberate...of thinking by you and of thinking by us or it was a horrible misunderstanding. I can assure you from our side it was not deliberate....

D. I will ask Fulbright to postpone Monday.

K. Too much is at stake for us to be angry with each other. Let's not have it longer. As a friend---

D. For two days I was mad. I know that anger in Moscow is still very high.

*

K. As a friend, one thing about yesterday evening that can only be explained in terms of emotional stress over a domestic situation.

D. I understand.

K. This was not well chosen and not deliberate. General Haig called you immediately.

D. I know.

K. We are in a difficult period between the two of us now. If you had no intention of acting unilaterally our letter was a mistake. I should have warned you but I was outraged.

D. ...I simply asked you if you could tell me 15 hours. That is all right with me. You really think that I was pressing you to get an answer. I simply asked you the usual question--when I could expect an answer, sometime today, sometime tomorrow. You immediately qualified that as a pressure. That I usually do, did before, and will again.

K. O'k. Lunch at Monday at 1:00.

D. At State?

K. Yes, better food here.

RELEASED IN FULL

SL328

TELECON
Dnitz/Kissinger
October 27, 1973
1:55 p.m.

D.

K. ...the President which I have held up for an hour and a half because I don't want to retaliate.

D. The first point is that UN force in Suez City. They arrived with Egyptian liaison officers which was not according to the agreement. So after certain discussions they decided to proceed without them. We passed them and they came to the gates of the city. It was dark. They asked for permission to stay overnight at the gates of the city and enter at daybreak.

K. They told us you are--

D. I am telling you the last information from Dayan. Everybody is happy and there is agreement.

K. Can I tell the Egyptians that if the force wishes to enter you will allow it to enter?

D. From what I hear they are sleeping outside the city until morning and entering then.

K. It may be that is a misconception.

D. Then I will phone my people and say that they want to go in. It is not because we prevented them but because it is dark.

K. The allegation is you are planning--

D. I will get to the ceasefire business in a moment. There is no fighting now.

K. How about the convoy and meeting?

D. We are prepared in spite of all difficulties to hold the meeting at the same place. We have been in touch with the UN people and they have been in touch with the Egyptians. Arrangements are being worked out by the US, UN and Egyptians at exactly what time they will reach there. It would be ....impossible for us to fix exactly 12:00, maybe 12:15 or 11:45.

K. Fine.

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D. We are working now with General S_____ on all points and the Egyptians have already been in touch with the UN completing their arrangements. With regard to the convoy it will also be allowed to proceed in spite of all difficulties. Our one problem is if they come with Egyptian drivers we will ask them to change for the portion they go in Israel either to UN or Israeli drivers. Then they can change back to Egyptian drivers.

K. Can you explain the reasoning for this?

D. We have intelligence information that they willput intelligence officers instead of drivers. They have to go 70K inside our territory and you see all our placements and tanks.

K. I don't get into that--

D. No, I just wanted you to have this information.

K. Can't you tell them that now?

D. I am sure our people are telling them now to the UN.

K. I urge you, Mr. Ambassador, not to appear tricky and do not make this look like a delay or it will not be understandable.

D. I will phone them to make it in advance. About the ceasefire. Dayan said that he wants you to know that there is consistent shooting and attempts to build bridges 24 hours a day. My people have orders never to incite anything, only to return fire. Right now it is quiet on the front. Except an attempt to bring helicopters and back in with boats they are to only shoot on these things and not on the front. Could you also ask the Egyptians to keep the ceasefire because we are under very strict instructions.

K. I will urge the Egyptians to do that.

D. That is all the information we have.

K. I will communicate immediately with the Egyptians.

D. Fine.

RELEASED IN FULL

SL330

TELECON
Dinitz/Kissinger
October 27, 1973
2:13 p.m.

K. I have passed the information to Zayyat. He thinks they will accept UN drivers.

D. Yes, fine.

K. He says the Security Council passed a resolution that this force must enter Suez City tonight.

D. I have talked to my people. If they want to enter tonight, we will make arrangements.

K. As long as you made the offer you can't force them into the city. He also said they will give another...

D. I think everything is going to be well.

K. I frankly must tell you, as a friend. I have held this message from Sadat from the President. Now I will not send it to him.

D. ...all the pressure that I can take from...When there was bungling on our side that was the biggest shock.

K. Mr. Ambassador, we deserve a drink when all of this is quiet.

D. When I talked to the Prime Minister she said why don't you take Dr. Kissinger to dinner tonight after the convoy.

K. I can't do it tonight. We will do it when all of this comes out fine.

D. I feel this has come out all right.

K. Give her my warm regards.

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SL332

TELECON
Scowcroft/Kissinger
October 27, 1973
3:20 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K. ...American resupplying of the Egyptian 3rd Army and there will be no further discussion of it either.

S. All I am thinking about is we can't let that army go down the drain.

K. That depends. If it goes down the drain in the middle of negotiations with the Israelis...that we helped promote and which are set for tonight.

S. If the negotiations ever take place tonight---

K. It is set for midnight tonight. If you want to take the Defense Department position---

S. I am not taking Defense's position. What I am concerned about is we are running out of time.

K. The name of the game is not saving the 3rd Army but being the country that has delivered something which is what we are. We do not want to be in the insane positionof supplying the 3rd Army and taking the other side.

S. If we deliver on this. No, I agree.

K. Our objective is not to deliver supplies...If we deliver 10% that is 10% more than the Soviets did. I don't mind having that army starve awhile as long as it doesn't collapse.

S. What I am afraid is that it will.

K. Then maybe there will be an exchange of armies....I am going to let negotiations run for 24 hours before we make a move. We didn't start out to save the 3rd Army.

S. We can go down the tube with the 3rd Army.

K. I don't want any hysterical nonsense out of the Defense Department. This convoy is going to give them a new lease on life.

S. If it gets there.

K. It will get there. If not, we will scream at the Israelis until it gets there. We don't have to fly supplies yet.

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S. O'k. As I say I am only concerned that we don't have unlimited time.

K. We will have another screaming set of messages tomorrow and tomorrow we will deliver 25% more than the Soviets but not quite enough.

S. O'k.

SO 43 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Dobrynin-Kissinger
October 27, 1970
12:20 p.m.

D. The Security Council meeting, not official but closed, ... This is substance of version... they talked but Malik considered your reply of let's have 20 or 25. Malik said why should we. We want to send 70. ... It is quite all right with us. On the whole the figure on the observers--he counted 113 observers including your side--is not very much. Altogether the U.S. and Canada have more than 100-120... what he named. Scali did not answer this and Malik is waiting for a reply.

K. Let me tell you what our problem is. If you read the President's letter, he said to the General Secretary if you accept this idea we should get together and discuss numbers. The next thing you have sent 70 people in there.

D. We mentioned that to you.

K. The point is we never had a chance to express our view that 70 was the right number. If you agreed to the idea, then our representatives would get together immediately to work out modality. We think 70 is too large.

D. Out of 2000 people there?

K. Wait a moment.

D. ...after 2000 observers. I found that, I don't recall exactly. More than 100 of yours and we haven't a single Russian there. We went 70 to make a voice. You already have more than us. Just to make a point that you are tough. What are you trying to do with that point?

K. Let's not go in one week from cooperation to proving how tough we are.

D. What is your point? What are you asking now? To scale down 70 to 20 or you do not accept? We don't see any harm because you have a lot of people. You could match it. What is the difference, but that it should be the figures you gave us? What is the logic?

K. How about having 51, you have 23 and we have 25. You are stronger.

D. If you like, we can have 70 and you can send Scali and Somebody else. We don't mind.

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K. Let me...

D. Now, I think it is rather...argument about 70.

K. The problem now is the number.

D. ...then Scali proposed 20 instead of 70.

K. I will call you back in an hour.

SL333

TELECON
Haig/Kissinger
October 27, 1973
3:30 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K. Al, how are you?

H. Henry, O'k.

K. We got everything back on track again.

H. Yes, I saw Brent.

K. By tomorrow it may blow up again. The three meetings didn't come off because I think the Israelis pulled a fast one and didn't notify the UN troops. They think it was an oversight. I called Golda Meir and told her if their man wasn't there by 10:00 it was the end of us. The Egyptians asked for a two hour delay. It is now set for 12:00 their time and 6:00 p.m. our time.

H. Are they letting another convoy through?

K. One convoy and a negotiation. Then they can negotiate the other convoy.

H. That's great.

K. Our Defense Department, even Brent, want us to resupply the 3rd Army. Lets see how that negotiation goes.

H. I agree.

K. If the Egyptians are under pressure and if the Israelis can get a settlement, fine. If the Israelis overdo it we may have to go in and resupply.

H. It is going to be rather a permanent situation in any event.

K. ...the Egyptians go back east of the Canal and the Israelis west of the Canal which is a long range situation.

H. If Sadat isn't wiped out in the process.

K. Let's see how negotiations stand tomorrow.

H. They really brutalized me into thisthing tomorrow. The President did. He asked me to do it.

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K. I think you are making a mistake.

H. I don't relish it.

K. Everyone is delighted these negotiations are going to take place.

H. That is good.

K. I will give you an up-to-date report in the morning. What program are you on?

H. Issues and Answers at 12:00. Golda Meir is on the first half hour.

K. You are on the Middle East?

H. No, she is. They will be hitting me with Watergate.

K. Lets see how it is going to be.

H. I walked into a mine field. I will defer on any Middle East questions.

K. As of right now the thing is firmly on track.

H. O'k, Henry, that is great.

RELEASED IN FULL

SL331

TELECON
Dinitz/Kissinger
October 27, 1973
3:05 p.m.

D. I don't want to disturb you long. This isn't that important. I spoke to the Prime Minister after I spoke to you and this is what she asked me to reaffirm.

1. The City of Suez - The Finish commander himself who arrived at the gatway of the City of Suez decided on his own authority not to enter with his troops during the night because of danger. In the meantime, in addition to 50 people he received 200 more and they are camping outside of the gate. This was their own decision. We have no objections if he wants to enter the city but we will not help him to do this because we do not want to be responsible for the people.

K. Good.

D. 2) We took note of the statement of Zayyat on the Egyptian consent that drivers will be UN drivers, not Egyptian. We will inform this to General S_____.

K. Good.

D. 3) We took note that Egypt will issue new orders for observation of the ceasefire. We appreciate your intervention. We passed this message on to our Chief of Staff.

K. Good.

D. The situation itself is quiet and we hope it will remain that way. This is passed on as sort of humorous. The Prime Minister sends you her greetings and felicitations. She wants to meet with Sadat at 3:30 this evening on Kl11 1/2. If you receive a positive answer from Sadat....She understand your impossible task of getting the real truth when you get him to answer.

K. I am glad she still has a sense of humor.

D. Yes, I was beginning to lose mine myself.

K. We have navigated another difficult problem.

D. I am sure it will be all right.

K. We are over the worst today.

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D. I said to my wife this morning when I got home 'You know, this is the first night I am going to sleep quietly because I am beginning to see the ray of light." Then I woke up to this. I think we have it worked out now.

K. Yes.

SL329

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Schlesinger/Kissinger
October 27, 1973
2:10 p.m.

S. Hi.

K. 12 midnight is all set.

S. Superb.

K. Everything is ordered. All the Israelis insisted on was that Egyptians not drive the trucks themselves but that UN drivers were all right. That is all right with Egypt.

S. That is wonderful.

K. Now, I don't know what can screw up.

S. Give credit for this to the President. He needs it.

K. We are giving it all to the President.

S. Yes, I mean get it to the press.

K. All right.

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RELEASED IN FULL SL321

TELCON
Prime Minister Golda Meir/ Secretary Kissinger
October 27, 1973
12:40 p.m.

K: Hello, how are you?

GM: I just want to say to you that there is one thing you just cannot accept and that is that this was something deliberate.

K: What we did was to make all arrangements.

GM: Our man went to the point of destination — waited and when the group from Cairo did not arrive he went to the UN headquarters — 10 kilos away and asked him if we were expecting something and he attempted to get in touch with Cairo. Our man was on the spot from 3:00 to 5:30. It is true that someone from here should have gotten in touch but it was our assumption that from the Cairo side something went astray.

K: With all due respect we passed the message to Egypt and to request all conditions be accepted and you would be in touch with Zayyat to work out details. If that did not happen Egypt did not have any way of knowing. I just told them the set plan was accepted and you would work our details with the General. The fact is that your people did not make contact — they were waiting. You told us what to pass on to them — we did that. One person should have gotten in touch with the General — up to that point everything was worked out but from that point the Egyptians were waiting.

GM: Mr. Secretary, they got the message we accept.

K: What I have tried to explain to the Ambassador is totally irrelevant. We are faced with a situation here beyond any control.

GM: You have the message I sent.

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K: Yes, that is what we passed on to Egypt. They had every reason to believe it was all right. They called me at 12:00 to say nothing has happened — about 45 minutes ago. The UN man is at the check post. Egyptians had every reason to expect from our message that all would go well and now our own good word is involved. Zayyat was just telephoned that the Egyptian convoy was ready.

GM: But Mr. Secretary, we don't know about such — we don't see any convoy — what can be done now. An hour for early in the morning must be set and where is the convoy.

K: I will get in touch immediately with the Egyptians — 5:00 o'clock in the morning. I will be in touch with Dinitz and Zayyat. Let us make it 6:00 a.m. to make sure.

GM: 6:00 a.m. at the point on which was decided upon. I will also get in touch with the General right now.

K: Thank you Madam Prime Minister.

SL310

TELCON
Kissinger/Gen. Scowcroft
October 27, 1973
8:45 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

S. Read text of message to be sent to General Secretary -

QTE I am pleased to be able to report to you that, as the result of an offer of our good offices to the Israelis and Egyptians, the two warring sides have agreed to meet together today under UNTSO auspices. The purpose of the meeting will be to discuss the military aspects regarding implementing of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 338 and 339.

At our urging , the Government of Israel has agreed to permit a convoy of non-military supplies to pass through its lines, under United Nations and Red Cross auspices to reach the Egyptian Third Army today.

I fervently hope we will continue to work closely and cooperatively to the achievement of a true ceasefire; a ceasefire that will make it possible for the warring parties, with our joint help, to arrive at a just settlement and a lasting peace in the Middle East.

I will inform you immediately as further developments occur. UNQTE.

K. Add sentence from the first draft "hope we are well on the road, etc." and don't say "fervently".

S. Fine.

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SL313

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Dobrynin/Kissinger
October 27, 1973
11:24 a.m.

D. Thank you. Scowcroft sent me a copy of what you sent. I received what we sent to you just after your talk with me. By the way, in your letter which you sent to Brezhnev in answer you quoted sentences in his letter of....you remember.

K. Yes.

D. Perhaps when I dictated to you it was my sound but a little bit different. I don't think it makes that big of difference. It was not adhere. I said act here without delay.

K. That makes a big difference.

D. I don't think so.

K. Adhere means we have to agree with what you said. While to act here leaves it open to joint action.

D. You will say that you acted pro_____. This adhere speaks about a Security Council resolution. So, in any case---

K. We had the impression that you were planning a military move. We did not invent this. Someday soon we have to discuss this. We had no reason to meet until 4:00 in the morning.

D. This is the point. On this, I think, one thing was really a big blunder on your wide, maybe it was deliberate. For six hours you are just telling us every hour to wait, there will be a reply. I am sure if you had just mentioned to me that the President feels it was necessary to make an alert...blow up our relations. We don't want to do it, please send an urgent message to the Chairman. We will be forced to do it if we must. I am sure it would have received a reply that nothing....

K. That was a blunder.

D. Seven hours you were telling us and then we receive a letter that didn't say a word about the alert. It was widely publicized.

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K. Whether you ever believe it or not it is not important now. I am telling you it was not...we were convinced you were planning something unilateral. We were as outrated. We thought the tone in that letter....

D. You were pretty sure we would do it. If you were so sure, you could have waited one hour to get some additional information from Brezhnev. But you didn't want to have it.

K. That isn't true. I was very tough. Don't pressure us. I sent you two or three messages to please don't do anything unilateral.

D. Exactly.

K. You could have said what makes you think we will do anything unilateral. We have no intention of taking action.

D. What you said was to wait for a reply. I sent four telegrams to Moscow--this was a unique situation--to wait for a reply from the President. What did they receive? This is not....Someday in Moscow...much more easy to discuss.

K. We very truly thought you were threatening us out of the....

D. Exactly, you have it with us. Wait for the reply. By the way nothing was said. Then you are trying to make it look like it was a Cuban or Hanoi crisis.

K. Don't remind me of that. It was not well done.

D. It was done badly. It was unbelievable. He won't believe he compared it....More things are involved for both sides. There is no need to discuss this. What was done was done. We will now have to look forward. This message is oral to the President and to you in connection with Soviet/American observers. I was instructed to tell you in a written message...that the Secretary General would like to say that we...substance of yesterday's message from... about Soviet/American observers.

K. I know of one. You sent me on discussions.

D. We also...from the promise that the Soviet and American observers... will ask as a contingent of the observer force of the UN. We want to stress that we consider it very important that the American observers will start the dispatch of their forces, having in mind that it should give the USSR and US the possibility of getting authentic information.

We expect that the US on its part will also take necessary steps before the UN...The American said that...to Egypt front about of... and the President Nixon in his letter...that a number of the American officers should be there to oversee the ceasefire. On the same day we informed the President of the dispatch of 70 Soviet observers to...and sent them immediately to the line. It would mean that this understanding reached with us would be broken. We would hope that....

K. Don't you think the President answered it yesterday. We are prepared to send observers as soon as the Secretary General requests them and we have told him he should request them.

D. You should mention it to him again. He said that Scali...

K. I will get in touch with Scali immediately.

D. Waldheim is under the impression...

K. I thought they were talking about some number yesterday. Let me call Scali.

D. Send out U.S. observers and I will....

K. I will call you back within an hour. Why don't we get together on Monday and review just what went wrong.

D. What time would you like?

K. How about lunch.

D. I will try. Fulbright would like to have me for lunch. Maybe I could switch it on Tuesday.

K. I also have a lunch. It was either a deliberate...of thinking by you and of thinking by us or it was a horrible misunderstanding. I can assure you from our side it was not deliberate....

D. I will ask Fulbright to postpone Monday.

K. Too much is at stake for us to be angry with each other. Let's not have it fester. As a friend---

D. For two days I was mad. I know that anger in Moscow is still very high.

K. As a friend, one thing about yesterday evening that can only be explained in terms of emotional stress over a domestic situation.

D. I understand.

K. This was not well chosen and not deliberate. General Haig called you immediately.

D. I know.

K. We are in a difficult period between the two of us now. If you had no intention of acting unilaterally our letter was a mistake. I should have warned you but I was outraged.

D. ...I simply asked you if you could tell me 15 hours. That is all right with me. You really think that I was pressing you to get an answer. I simply asked you the usual question--when I could expect an answer, sometime today, sometime tomorrow. You immediately qualified that as a pressure. That I usually do, did before, and will again.

K. O'k. Lunch at Monday at 1:00.

D. At State?

K. Yes, better food here.

SL311

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Sen. Fulbright/Kissinger
October 27, 1973
10:00 a.m.

K. Hello, Mr. Chairman.

F. How are you this morning?

K. It has been another sleepless night. That is why I wanted to call you.

F. We are not having another one?

K. No, this one has had a happy outcome. All day yesterday we received messages from the Russians and the Egyptians. The basic problem is the Israelis have an Egyptian army bottled up by cutting their road after the ceasefire that was to last. This is the basic problem from which stems most of the fighting. It is hard to tell who is trying to break out and who is whittling them down. All day frantic appeals have come in....The Soviet note was not nearly as brutal as before. It was much more civil than Wednesday. We decided that we could not permit a situation to continue in which there was a danger of constant confrontation with the Soviet Union as a result of action taken after a ceasefire negotiated with the Soviet Union. We, therefore, decided that Israel would have to permit non-military supplies to reach the army. After receipt of the message by the hotline which more or less requested non-military supplies we told the Israelis if by 8:00 this morning they won't agree to this, we would join the majority of the Security Council in expressing the sense of humanity that something like this would have to be permitted and told him they would have to get in touch with the Egyptians and discuss the matter of implementation of the ceasefire. I told them we were in a position of being beseiged by Sadat and Brezhnev with claims of bad faith. They are ready for talks on that last subject but went into orbit on the first one. They claimed they would go public and say they were being raped by the super powers for the crime of being small. This consumed hours of time last evening. We held our position. At any rate at 4:00 this morning the Egyptians accepted direct talks with the Israelis on the Suez Canal to discuss the military problems that exist provided one convoy was permitted through today.

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This is the situation now. One non-military convoy is going through and the Egyptians and Israelis are meeting within the hour.

F. If you can make them meet and start talking it is a great accomplishment.

K. If the Egyptians complained to Brezhnev and the Israelis to us and we get together on the hot line, it is an insoluble problem. None of us know who to believe.

F. Right.

K. I think we can avoid an acrimonious Security Council debate to wait and see what the Egyptians and Israelis can work out.... This was a US-Israeli confrontation.

F. You have to come to that sooner or later.

K. They are in my opinion more nerve-racking than the Soviets. They are tougher and full of ingratitude.

F. They are all of that.

K. We faced them down. We want to bring....and they say their only crime is being punished for being small.

F. That is all you are going to get. "You are doing this in the interest of history and mankind. In their interest." I reread last night a Goldman piece from 1970. Have you read it?

K. I don't remember the content but it is a very balanced piece.

F. It is very supportive of your policy right now. Nobody is a better authority on the Zionist cause. He spent 50 years in the cause....what he advocates is a neutral Israel relying on its cultural and scientific accomplishments to hold the allegiance of the world.

K. The cause of Israel as a Middle East Sparta means they will go down by....

F. Have your men just let you read it. I think you will enjoy it. You can read it in 50 or 60 minutes. It is a very well balanced, sensible appraisal. If they rely on arms they will be destroyed by arms. He has respect for the intellectual and scientific qualities of the people and if that is the road they take, they will be respected.

K. We have now proved to Sadat that he will get more from our diplomacy than Russian blackmail because we have not gotten a.....now.

F. Turn it away from....arms at any time.

K. They are saying that we and the Egyptians are raping poor little Israel.

F. This is the first time that the Russians have voted for a peace-keeping thing in the UN if I am not mistaken.

K. Didn't they vote on the Congo?

F. No, they refused to vote for and refused to pay for it. Most of those cases they were not present as in--

K. Korea, or they abstained.

F. Or by the example in January on the Suez Canal. This is the first time they have voted for it. That Middle East thing was arranged by Hammarskjold outside of the Security Council. They didn't agree because the Security Council hadn't been involved. This is the first time.

K. I must say this, Mr. Chairman, whatever views one can have as a pragmatist for the UN I don't see how we could have gotten this through without them, even just as a forum or machanism.

F. Absolutely. I hope you will find occasion to emphasize that point.

K. I will do it before your committee as one of the places.

F. Good. Look you getter get some sleep. Don't go too far.

K. Right. I will keep you posted.

F. Good.

SL316

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Dobrynin/Kissinger
11:55 a.m.
October 27, 1973

D. Hello.

K. Anatoliy, I think that Malik and Scali are doing almost as badly as you and I.

D. I thought they were doing better than we do.

K. Scali tells me he told Malik yesterday that we are willing to send 20 observers and Malik never replied. So if you could call Malik and have him get with Scali.

D. Probably he thought....He didn't say anything. I will check with Malik right away on what is going on. We said around 70.

K. 70 is too much. Why not get started with a number and see how it is.

D. He has already talked with Malik? Probably he is checking with Moscow. I will find what really is happening. I don't have any information about this. I will call you back.

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SL 342

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Dinitz/Kissinger
October 27, 1973
11:14 a.m.

K. Now we heard from Shalif that nothing has been happening.

D. He is on the line with Is_____

K. Did you get in touch with General S_____ to arrange it.

D. Yes. ...

K. Give me....We are getting unmanageable pressure from this Government. You can give....if this thing doesn't come off.

D. Dr. Kissinger, our people are there.

K. What did you tell the Egyptians? I have to getoff now.

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SL320

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
General Haig/ Secretary Kissinger
October 27, 1973
12:28 p.m.

K: The press conference reached Moscow and Brezhnev asked Dobrynin if this could possibly be true. What happened Wednesday was compared to the bombing of Hanoi.

H: Oh no! How is Dobrynin's morale?

K: He thinks there should be direct confrontation between the two gentlemen but you know what happened over night. It was put to the Israelis that we couldn't tolerate them squeezing Egypt this way — put to the Egyptians that they should meet with the Israelis and work out details. The Israelis blew their stack and said they would go public and that they were being brutalized for the claim of being small. Four Israelis accepted this meeting permitting one convoy to go through. I thought all was settled but now the Israelis are sitting at the meeting place and the Egyptian convoy is sitting somewhere within Israel.

H: We cannot let the people starve.

K: You may help me to settle down those maniacs at Defense. He is now flapping all over the place — we cannot airlift supplies to Egypt.

H: One thing he did mention was putting troops in crucial states to get oil.

K: He is insane.

H: He thinks forces should be put in.

K: I do not think we can survive with these fellows in there at Defense — they are crazy.

H: I told him he should not come to you. He said we could not let people die in the desert and that the Israelis are lying to us and that we must be tougher.

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H: The big thing is to get the two parties to work it out.

K: That way it has a chance. If we go in it will start war again. I have asked him not to send a military mission to Israel. Schlesinger wants to check on whether the Israelis are lying — will you please help me with him.

H: I will do my best.

SL318

TELECON
Scowcroft/Kissinger
October 27, 1973
12:05 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

S. ...I don't know who it it.

K. I have just had a call from Zayyat saying the Israelis say they have no instructions to let a convoy through. Zayyat wants to call Cairo. Can you get someone to get in touch with his hotel and get a line cleared or put him through our nets?

S. We can put it through our switchboard.

K. We need it fast.

S. Yes, I will do it.

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RELEASED IN FULL

SL319

TELECON
Dobrynin/Kissinger
October 27, 1973
12:20 p. m.

D. The Security Council meeting, not official but closed, . . . This is substance of version. . . they talked but Malik considered your reply of let's have 20 or 25. Malik said why should we. We want to send 70. . . . 70 is quite all right with us. On the whole the figure on the observers--he counted 118 observers including your side--is not very much. Altogether the U. S. and Canada have more than 100-120. . . what he asked. Scali did not answer this and Malik is waiting for a reply.

K. Let me tell you what our problem is. If you read the President's letter, he said to the General Secretary if you accept this idea we should get together and discuss numbers. The next thing you have sent 70 people in there.

D. We mentioned that to you.

K. The point is we never had a chance to express our view that 70 was the right number. If you agreed to the idea, then our representatives would get together immediately to work out modality. We think 70 is too large.

D. Out of 2000 people there?

K. Wait a moment.

D. . . . after 2000 observers. Around that, I don't recall exactly. More than 100 of yours and we haven't a single Russian there. We went 70 to make a voice. You already have more than us. Just to make a point that you are tough. What are you trying to do with that point?

K. Let's not go in one week from cooperation to proving how tough we are.

D. What is your point? What are you asking now? To scale down 70 to 20 or you do not accept? We don't see any harm because you have a lot of people. You could match it. What is the difference, but that it should be the figures you gave us? What is the logic?

K. How about having 51, you have 26 and we have 25. You are stronger.

D. If you like, we can have 70 and you can send Scali and Somebody else. We don't mind.

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K. Let me...

D. Now, I think it is rather...argument about 70.

K. The problem now is the number.

D. ...then Scali proposed 20 instead of 70.

K. I will call you back in an hour.

SL317

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
El Zayyat/ Secretary Kissinger
October 27, 1973
12:04

K: How nice of you to call.

EZ: I want to thank you very much for your conversation. The problem is that it has not been implemented. I have seen a message from Israel — Cairo says they are resisting until they go into Suez.

K: No! I am told that as of this moment the Israelis are waiting kilos 110 on the canal and have been there since 3:00 and are prepared to permit the convoy to come through.

EZ: Our information is good information. This morning they were there waiting. The Israelis say they have no instructions.

K: That is impossible. Mr. Foreign Minister we will stand behind what we said to you . You send your convoy. The Israelis are waiting at kilos 110. Send your man there and we will work on it immediately. We are trying to help.

EZ: I will get in touch with my people right away.

K: I will get in touch with the others to call Dayan

EZ: Thank you very much.

K: I will have someone from my office call and help you get the call through immediately.

EZ: Thank you very much.

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SL334

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Minister El-Zayyat (Egypt)
10/28/73; 10:55 a.m.

K: Hello.

Z: Hell, Mr. Secretary.

K: Mr. Foreign Minister

Z: I am sorry to disturb you on Sunday

K: You cannot disturb me.

Z: Not very likely about meeting because I got news today that my wife's _____ passed away.

K: Oh, I'm sorry to hear that.

Z: And I have to leave today for the funeral.

K: You're going back to Cairo.

Z: Yes. However, I spoke with Ismail and I think he sent you cables today.

K: Yes, he did.

Z: So I'm leaving today, I'm sorry to --I hope I'll meet you in the future

K: Willyou be in Cairo when I get there?

Z: I think I will.

K: Well I guess I will see you there.

Z: All right, and thank you very, very much for all you help.

K: Well my really great regret that --at this news.

Z: Well, I have to go because--

K: Of course you have to go, no I mean express my condolences to your wife.

Z: I'm very sorry about this meeting.

K: Well we will do it some other time.

Z:QThank you very much.

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SL335

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Ambassador Dinitz
Secretary Kissinger
11:10 a.m. 10/28/73

K: Hello.

D: I understand you were concerned about my being in the office.

K: I don't see why I should collapse before you.

D: I agree with you. I don't think you should be in the office either.

K: I've already reserved two adjoining rooms for you and me.

D: (laughs) I see.

K: I wish you were prettier.

D: (Laughs) May I say the same about you.

K: You may but it will strain your relations.

[Both laugh heartily]

D: That's what I mean.

K: Well, we've had another message from the Egyptians, but it is not hysterical--they just say they want us to know that they are ready to meet again assoon as possible.

D: Yeh, I am expecting to get within the next few hours a few detailed account of all the meeting--what took place and then I think I will come and bring it to you or we will talk on the telephone, because until now I don't have the full story--

K: No, no, I don't give a damn what happened yesterday, I'm not without experience how to use negotiations

D: Yeh, that I know

K: And I don't give a damn whether you go there and play pinocle, but the but--the fact is if you can schedule a meeting, it means we can prevent a Security Council session.

D: I understand this and this is exactly what my accommadtion was and I know that we agreed in principle and now we are discussing what proposal and how to go about it, so I think that I will be able to have a more detailed description of the position and the--

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K: I don't give a damn about your position right now--that's the next phase.

D: I understand whatyou are saying.

K: What I am suggesting is that you just tell them you meet say tomorrow at three or God knows when

D: I understand and that's what I recommended. I will tell you probably what the difficulty is -- it is that they want another convoy. But

K: They didn;t say that to us.

D: I know, but this is my guess because I haven't gotten the description yet, as I said.

K Now the last time they made a condition for a convoy, this time they just said we are prepared to meet again assoon as possible, they didn't say anything about this.

D: I understand.

K: But even if you are worried about a convoy it is better to meet ~~whenix~~ while that convoy is still on the road.

D: I don't mind telling you--I sent a recommendation to my government--

K: I don't even say you should meet today--it's already gone, but I would really urge you to let me transmit to the Egyptians before the end of the day a proposal for a meeting tomorrow. That's what gets you through another day of Security Council things.

D: I understand. Believe me I will not fail to inform you the moment I succeed in doing this.

K: Cause if you can get that--we need some maneuvering room here in town if another crisis builds up tomorrow. The longer you can stay where you are, the less the issue of where you should return to arises.

D: Yeh. Right. I think I can get back to you shortly. I'm going to work on it.

K: Good, now you understand that I'm going to Egypt on my way to China.

D: Yeh

K: Probably the 7th.

D: And I understand also you were considering Jordan.

K: I'm considering Jordan, Teheran and also Saudi Arabia.

D: I see. Okay, Fine.

K: And then I would send--I would send you reports from each trip. But I would send Sisco back from Teheran while I go on to China. To brief you. I know you have such great confidente in him.

D: Yeh, yeh I--we are good friends, but I don't believe a word he says.

K: He'll be a little more truthful now, but at least he can give you a flavor and you can check it against the reports I'm sending you.

D: I appreciate it. No there is no problem for me to talk to Sisoc.

K: I'll send him back to Tel Aviv.

D: I see.

K: From Teheran.

D: So you start with Egypt and then you go to Jordan

K: Egypt, Jordan, Saudia Arabia, Teheran.

D: Then

K: Then I 'll send Sisco back from Teheran.

D: Which will be about the 9th or something -- no?

K: Right.
I'll send him to Tel Aviv.

D: I understand.

K: At the end of each day, we'll send you a brief report.

D: I understand. Good. So I'll have our people prepare themselves for the occasxion. I will be in touch with you as soon as we crystallize something politically on meeting.

K: Good I strongly recommend it. This is not our official/position, but it is certainly eases (?) me to handle our governmental position.

D: Good and I will be in the office in about 1-1/2 hrs as soon as I watch the two ball games. K: Good.

5046 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
October 29, 1973
5:55

D: Hello Henry.

K: Anatoly, before you start yelling at me..you know this shatters my..

D: I am going to the Tchaikovsky concert to hear the Leningrad Philharmonic

K: You didn't invite me.

D: I was invited by Flanigan. He has special tickets from the White House.

K: Well, sit in the second row so you won't be too conspicuous.

D: I will be quiet...

K: Now, Listen, our heroes at Defense have announced we are sending an aircraft carrier into the Indian Ocean in answer to ..in the Mediterranean. You will see this on the ticker. Within the next hour they will publish a retraction and say this is simply a routine mission.

D: Can you dalm them down. We are used to our military which is 100% under control.

K: Our is 90% under control.

D: Yes and the other 10% is on our side.

K: Look, for God's sake, don't be a sore winner. I am apologizing. I am getting a retraction. It is the best I can do.

D: I know that. They will publish a statement?

K: The Defense Department will publish a retraction and if thatdoes not get enough publicity, I will get Ziegler to do it from the White House tomorrc

D: I think that would be good. OK, I will listen quietly toTchaikovsky and not to your aircraft in the Indian Ocean.

K: No, no. ...and the Ziegler retraction at the White House.

D: Alright, see you tomorrow.

K: Tomorrow evening.

D: Thanks for your call.

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SO 45 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
October 29, 1973/9:20 a.m.
Dobrynin/HAK

K: Hello.

D: Hello Henry.

K: Anatol, I'm on the way to the House Foreign Affairs Committee..

D: Congratulations. What are they going to do with you?

K: They're going to confirm me again.

D: They have not given it up? Henry, about 1:00 today so it's settled.

K: Fine.

D: The second thing I would like to ask you the following question.

K: But I frankly don't think that Fulbright knows about it yet because he asked me yesterday for advise on what he should say to you.

D: He knows.

K: OK fine.

D: He knows because we mentioned to him that we are going to switch it. Yesterday I spoke with him. His wife called my wife so that was a confirmation again so he knows that there is really no problem. The question now what is really Henry. I received a message and I would like your assistance in this. Message from Brezhnev to President and Brezhnev asked me to deliver it personally to the President. I feel its rather important in general in the sense it was my impression yesterday there was a meeting rather important in Moscow and they would like so to speak to know his opinion right away about our relations which they feel are rather _____ now. And a rather a crisis of confidence which is more or less on the level of the Brezhnev and President. So as you know its very unpleasant talk for me because I spent so much time and energy to on the contrary to keep it up not down so I think it may be useful really for me to deliver the message. There are some contrary _____ but they are not important enought.

K: Can I see that message first. I think it will be helpful to both of us.

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D: OK. When I come I could talk to you.

K: You leave the message and I will then arrange a meeting late today or first thing in the morning.

D: Could you make it today Henry.

K: I will make it today.

D: This will be better.

K: I will make it today.

D: This is the point you see. When you mention to me then I will tell you. OK.

K: What do you mean when I mention to you.

D: When you are expecting to try to arrange it today. Yes.

K: Right. We'll discuss it at lunch. I'll do it late today.

D: Let's aim it on the second part or I will bring it to the lunch.

K: Bring it to the lunch and we'll have it about 4 or 5 oclock today.

D: OK.

SL347

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Flanigan/Sec. Kissinger
Monday, Oct. 29, 1973
3:10 p.m.

F: Henry, I know you have bigger things other than this worrying you. Is it possible at anytime to have half-hour for you and a couple of others to look at options on the Trade Bill?

K: I was calling you about that. At the Leadership meeting the other day, the President sort of implied that he would prefer to have the Trade Bill consideration in the House deferred until January.

F: Yes.

K: Carl Albert just called me.

F: Mills is calling him.

K: He said Mills is calling him and said if that happenes the whole Trade Bill will be lost. Therefore, Albert is asking me if he takes it up next week if we will object to that.

F: I think under current circumstances we have to object to it. That is what I want to talk to you about. The alternatives are: 1) To have the President say I am committed to an believe in normalization of our commercial relations with the Soviet Union but I hipe the House will vote affirmatively on this bill (will include prohibition on MFN credits.) I may veto it if I cannot cure the problem in the Senate. I would like to go forward with the Bill now so we can have a status quo.

K: He cannot say that.

F: He cannot veto it but he recognizes this is the only way to get a vote in the House now. The consequences are as follows: We don't get anything on the Trade Bill this year. The negotiations stop in Europe. We ~~mxkxss~~ miss the 75 deadline because you want get a Bill until Sept at the earliest if ever. We might lose the Bill because people are turning against it. By next year, the climant no doubt will change. We will lose trade negotiations and it will have some effect on trade negotiations. I would think losing, though economic, would hurt your declaration of principles.

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K: We cannot possible do this to the Soviets now after what we have been through with them the last few weeks.

F: We have been discussing with Brent about saying to the leadership on the Hill about dropping Title 4 so we don't bring this issue up now and go ahead without Title 4.

K: That we are willing to go along with.

F: There is no response to date in the Congress to that. I don't think the Jewish leadership is doing it.

K: I have been assured by the Jewish leadership we can tell Congress if they inquire of the Jewish leadership they will support it.

F: That won't do it. Supposing the President said if the bill comes down to me in this fashion I will veto it. I had rather have an opportunity to try and negotiate it between now and the time.

K: You know the Senate is not going to be any softer.

F: Then he can veto it then.

K: Then you have no bill anyway.

F: If you h and the ~~Soviets~~ Soviets are successful in the Middle East maybe we are going to lose this thing.

K: What do you mean.

F: Supposing with the help of the Soviets you get a permanent solution to the Middle East problem surely the Israeli will feel some obligation to help.

K: Baloney. They are going to come after the President, me and everything we stand for.

F: At the moment we cannot get the Title 4 dropped. If you tell me that you cannot allow this to come to a vote, I am not going to argue that point. I recognize that the Mid-East is more important than the Trade Bill.

SL356

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Major General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
October 29, 1973
5:33

K: Brent, I don't want to press you but can I have the announcement with the Israelis and Golda Meir which Dinnitz says he has delivered in your office?

S: I haven't got it.

K: Well, get it from Sonnenfeldt then.

S: It is on it's way.

END

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SL354

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Carl Albert - Secretary Kissinger
October 29, 1973
5:20 p.m.

K: Mr.Speaker, how are you?

A: Fine.

K: Our problem with respect to the question you put is this. If we can get the Jewish community to favor dropping title IV, then we would like to have the discussion now. If we cannot, do that, we would prefer to defer it because the President would be forced to veto any bill with the amendment as it now stands.

A: Are you in a position to make that statement publically?

K: When must we have an answer? Can you give me 24 hours, or 48?

A: O sure, no problem. 48.

K: 48 to convince the Jewish community.

A: That would be fine.

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SL352

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Bill Donaldson - Secretary Kissinger
October 29, 1973
4:30 p.m.

K: How are you.

D: I've staye d away from you. I know you've had your hands full.

K: That's putting it mildly.

D: I just called you now to sort of touch base with you. Your'e going to China, right?

K: Right?

D: I didn't know whether you wanted to see me before you went or not.

K: Why don't we aim for the end of next week. I think it would be useful.

D: It might be useful, I have been down there and....

K: Let's try for Friday or Saturday morning.

D: You'll let me know.

K: Right. If I don't call you by Wednesday, will you call me. It will mean we have screwed up here somehow.

D: I'll call you on Wednesday.

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RELEASED IN FULL 8L353

TELCON
Flanigan/Sec. Kissinger
Monday, Oct. 29, 1973
4:35 p.m.

F: I can't get that guy.

K: I promised the Speaker I would get back to him.

F: Tell him we are not yet ready.

K: One thing I will not be able to live with is a bill that includes credits with a threat of veto.

F: You mean a bill out of the House rather than from the Senate rather than a bill from Congress.

K: Right.

F: I have to tell you that is what you would get clear and simple.

K: We will have to delay until January.

F: Do we have to bite that bullet. If we can move Max it is conceivable we can get a bill without Title 4.

K: We can't get Max. Call Jacob Stein. Call him and tell me what he says.

F: Between now and then we will not change it.

K: I will call the Speaker but when can I let him know -- tell me when I can't let him know.

F: I don't know when we can turn it around.

K: Peter, we will not approve a bill we have to veto. And the Speaker is willing to delay it.

F: We hope we can get enough pressure brought on by the Community so they will drop Title 4. When they get that connection, we will let him know. In the interim we cannot schedule the bill.

END

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SL355

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Dinitz - Secretary Kissinger
October 29, 1973
5:30 p.m.

K: Mr. Ambassador, in deference to your wishes, we are willing to announce at 11:00 tomorrow.

D: Did you see the text?

K: No, I'm not cleared for that sort of information. I'll get it from Scowcroft.

D: Wouldn't pass it to you?

K: Not important enough. If it were the movement of left handed shoelaces for the 16th fleet they would give it to me.

D: I understand. OK.

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SL357

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Schlesinger - Secretary Kissinger
October 29, 1973
5:50 p.m.

S: What did he say?

K: He said in response to Soviet build-up we sent the task force into the Indian Ocean.

S: Christ!

K: We cannot have this. The Soviets are quivering as it is. I had a two hour screaming match with Dobrynin today.

S: God! Oh boy!

K: I thought you and I had agreed...

S: Henry, we had and I gave instructions to low-key this thing.

K: and to say it was routine and planned for a long time.

S: We will get a retraction.

K: Can we get him to take it back? Can you do it tonight?

S: Yes sir. Stupid! Incidentally the Minister of War is alleged to have resigned in Egypt. Don't know what that implies.

K: Can you do it tonight. Can I tell Dobrynin that?

S: Yes sire. Oh boy.

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SL350

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Dinitz - Secretary Kissinger
October 29, 1973
4:20 p.m.

K: Mr. Ambassador.

D: Yes, Mr. Secretary.

K: We will be ready to announce the Prime Minister's visit at 11:00 on Wednesday.

D: On Wednesday?

K: Yes, we will give you the time then, but it will probably be Thursday afternoon.

D: I was going to suggest, but as it is we will abide by it, uh, there is a cabinet meeting at 2:30 tomorrow. Naturally the Prime Minister will have to tell the cabinet. Until now nobody but two people know. If we could do it tomorrow it might prevent leakage from the cabinet meeting. Of course, she could swear them to secrecy, but with 16 people....dangerous. As it is, she could wait until Wednesday.
K: It would be safer. But, can she leave in time?

D: Of course. ....hold the cabinet meeting on Wednesday.

K: When would she have to leave?

D: She would have to leave to be here on time, on....Wednesday morning.

K: OK, let's leave it the way it is.

D: I have also a suggested draft of the announcement, but that we can leave.....

K: Why don't you send it over to the White House.

D: I'll send it in a closed envelope for you.

K: To General Scowcroft. Let me see if we can change it. I'll let you know.

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SL364

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Foreign Minister Rabassa - Secretary Kissinger
October 29, 1973
11:58 p.m.

K: How are you?

R: Fine. You are very busy, no?

K: Extremely vusy.

R: And tired, I imagine.

K: If you have a war with Guatemala, don't get me involved.

R: You are doing a great job as usual. We are very proud and satisfied. I'm in New York. I'm going to be here the whole week, ...need to see the charter. Can we meet for 20 minutes or so?

K: Definitely.

R: We could have lunch at the Embassy, or...

K: May I call you later and make the arrangements? Where are you staying?

R: At the Park Lane.

K: Only on the condition Corky comes with you, because she's prettier than you are.

R: Oh, yes.

K: We will work something out, -- maybe Friday. We will be in touch.

R: If you will put your secretary on I will give her the details.

Park Lane Hotel 212/371-4000, suite 3704 or 3703. If you can't reach me there you can reach me through the Permanent Mission - OR 9-6416, 17 or 18.

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SL361

TELECON
Haig/Kissinger
October 29, 1973
8:20 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K. Al, I just saw the Egyptian Foreign Minister and I am telling you when we get this thing going the Russians won't know what hit them. I told him it I get a note tomorrow from Moscow to do what you and I just discussed, the whole thing is off. He said of course not.

H. Great.

K. I think by the time Golda is here we may have a ceasefire deal that the President will accept. I am beginning to move them and talked about what is atainable here. He is going back to Cairo with it tonight, I am meeting with him again tomorrow and with the President on Wednesday. Of course, it may blow up in my face, but...

H. It's a cliff hanger.

K. He walked out in front of a bunch of newsmen and he said, "very constructive, very promising." I have also started working on the oil problem.

H. Good, I feel better. That is where we have to get something.

K. We will get it. As long as we keep him from getting over eager. It has to come slowly and they have to think....

H. Sure, I know.

K. He shouldn't give any bullshit about how much he loves Cairo and how much he wants to go there.

H. O'k.

K. If you can work on him. I will see you in the morning.

H. Good, Henry. That is fine news. Bye.

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SL359

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Scowcroft/Kissinger
October 29, 1973
6:02 p.m.

K. ...call from Dinitz. He claims he sent it three hours ago.

S. I will check on it.

K. It will be made at 11:00 tomorrow.

S. I didn't know anything before.

K. Now you know.

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RELEASED IN FULL SL360

TELECON
Dinitz/Kissinger
October 29, 1973
7:55 p.m.

K. Hello, Mr. Ambassador. I had, at his insistence, a meeting with Ismail Fahmi this afternoon.

D. What do you mean his insistence? That is what he is here for.

K. I didn't want to see him today. I wanted to see him tomorrow. He was very general and very eager to talk about a peace settlement. I said I will talk about it tomorrow. He was also very eager to talk about a ceasefire and supplies on the route. He made a special appeal and pressed to see if one more convoy could get through. I know you are very reluctant to do this. I have talked to....If you could offer only one more convoy, even if only 50 trucks.

D. The first convoy is not even finished unloading.

K. I can tell them tomorrow if you will let another through on Wednesday. Would you let me know tonight?

D. Tonight I cannot even get the Prime Minister. It is 2:00 in Israel.

K. I mean in the morning Israel time.

D. I don't know if you have received the information about our meeting today. We passed it on to Eagleburger and Scowcroft. I think we are moving ahead on the question of the wounded.

K. We made a very strong pitch on the prisoners.

D. Don't tell me you have a cold.

K. I have a soar throat.

D. That is not from Fahmi? Getting a cold in the vocal cords is the absolute domain of our Foreign Minister.

K. Make this as an urgent request of the President. If you can make it 100 fine, 70 fine.

D. I already made it 50 from you just a few minutes ago.

K. That was my own personal suggestion.

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D. I will pass on your request.

K. I must really urge you that if it doesn't happen, Fahmi is going to see the President on Wednesday. I am in a terrible hurry.

D. The idea that I have is that Israel take upon itself to establish the principle that in return for prisoners of war there be a permanent resupply and you get off our back on the road.

K. That supplies come out of Israel?

D. No, from wherever they come from. The way we do it is in return for our prisoners they do not have to haggle for every convoy.

K. I think this is an interesting idea. My mind works in the same direction. That is an interesting idea. Don't do it out of any sentimentality. It is with realization of what we are up against here.

D. I want to dispose of this and get quickly on with peace and you getting us to go back to the '67 lines.

K. Let's think of it in this direction.

D. Let's keep it between ourselves as a possible scenario between the Prime Minister and the President.

K. Exactly my view and I had the same idea today. If the President could tell Fahmi on Wednesday you agree to do this on Wednesday, it will keep him from promising more.

D. When is he to see the President?

K. On Wednesday, we have delayed it as long as possible.

D. If he stays another day maybe we can have negotiations.

K. You always make these indecent proposals.

D. But sometimes they are accepted.

SL362

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Dinitz - Secretary Kissinger
October 29, 1973
11:40 p.m.

K: Mr. Ambassador

D: How are you?

K: Fine. The President will be glad to see the Prime Minister Thursday morning.

D: That's fine. Now, that would be a regular visit, not a secret visit.

K: Regular.

D: Call it a working visit.

K: Yes. Also, I have asked Scowcroft to give you my views, I want you to understand they are my personal views, not...

D: Your views were immediately cabled to the Prime Minister as soon as they were received from Scowcroft.

K: I am acting in my capacity as adviser to Israel.

D: I understand. I am just worried that at the end of the month you will ask for a salary.

K: All I want you to do is survive.

D: Yes, well that is a mutual concern we both have.

K: I think, I have found that heros are not necessarily great diplomats, and conversely, great diplomats are not great heros.

D: That's true. One thing, and this is for your information only, the Prime Minister is visiting the front today, and as soon as she returns from the Canal she will cable you personally, personally, not...with her recommendations on what____

K: All I ask is that you read the Illiad. They screwed up diplomatically, both gods and heros.

D: I really think if we both approach it firmly and believe me Mr. Secretary I believe not all of the arrows are thrown on our part.

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K: I am assuming the Egyptians are maniacs.. I am facing an objective situation here. For your information, I had a personal message from the Shah. He is basically sympathetic with you, you know. If we attempt to get the Egyptians entirely across the Canal is saying Sadat should commit suicide. That's his judgment. Iwouldn't ask....

D: Well, it is a help to know what he thinks. We are weighing all the things. It is very useful that the Prime Minister will have a chance.

K: I am just trying to give you a sense of what I think is in the situation and not...I might be wrong. If today those two generals settle it differently, you will have my congratulations, we'll have two dinners.

D: Oh, I am going to gain weight.

K: AllI ask is that you don't inflict any more Israeli food on me. I don't understand how Israel could have forgotten to learn how to cook, after 2,000 years of Jewish mothers.

D: You see we were trying to lose the Jewish mother complex and lost the cooking with it.

SL358

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
October 29, 1973
5:55

D: Hello Henry.

K: Anatoly, before you start yelling at me..you know this shatters my..

D: I am going to the Tchaikovsky concert to hear the Leningrad Philharmonic.

K: You didn't invite me.

D: I was invited by Flanigan. He has special tickets from the White House.

K: Well, sit in the second row so you won't be too conspicuous.

D: I will be quiet...

K: Now, Listen, our heroes at Defense have announced we are sending an aircraft carrier into the Indian Ocean in answer to ..in the Mediterranean. You will see this on the ticker. Within the next hour they will publish a retraction and say this is simply a routine mission.

D: Can you dalm them down. We are used to our military which is 100% under control.

K: Our is 90% under control.

D: Yes and the other 10% is on our side.

K: Look, for God's sake, don't be a sore winner. I am apologizing. I am getting a retraction. It is the best I can do.

D: I know that. They will publish a statement?

K: The Defense Department will publish a retraction and if thatdoes not get enough publicity, I will get Ziegler to do it from the White House tomorrow.

D: I think that would be good. OK, I will listen quietly toTchaikovsky and not to your aircraft in the Indian Ocean.

K: No, no. ...and the Ziegler retraction at the White House.

D: Alright, see you tomorrow.

K: Tomorrow evening.

D: Thanks for your call.

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TELECON
Bella Abzug/Secretary Kissinger
October 29, 1973
4:23

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

A: I am alright. I realize things are very difficult right now.

K: That's alright.

A: I have received alot of concern with respect to the whole question of Israeli prisoners. In view of the fact that you will have a meeting with the delegation of Egyptians, I took the liberty of interrupting your schedule.

K: I always like to hear from you.

A: I appreciate that.

K: I mean it. There aren't too many real individuals in this world.

A: I just wo nder if any..

K: We have already sent message to the Egyptians on this subject. You can be sure I will raise this.

A: There are three points. The International Red Cross participation, the publication of a list and exchange of POWs.

K: These are the principle points.

A: I suppose if the...

K: I think we have the assurance of the Egyptians that in the meeting with the Israelis they will produce a list of wounded prisoners..this is some progress.

A: Tell me how does the situation look?

K: If we can get the cease-fire operative we have a good chance of diplomacy.

A: Is the cease-fire holding?

K: It is holding, but out bad luck is the armies are behind each other. They couldn't end up in a straight line. They have to be in a figure eight.

A: I see.

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K: But, the cease-fire is holding.

A: Good, and if it does that, it will make it more helpful for a peace. May I quote you with respect to the list of prisoners?

K: Yes. That's what they promised us they would do. Yes, you can do both.

A: I would like to because I am in the midst of..

K: You can tell them you talked to me.

A: Thank you. I am sure I will be speaking to you again.

K: A pleasure.

A: Nice to talk to you.

K: Nice to talke to you. Good bye.

END

SL342

TELECON
Deputy Secretary Clements/ Secretary Kissinger
October 29, 1973
12:41

RELEASED IN FULL

C: I am waiting for word from you. I tried to call you back but you..

K: I want to keep you posted and keep you up-to-date, but the newspapers can do that almost as well. ... meetings between the Egyptians and Israelis. they are meeting again today and I think it is still going on. ... Israelis are saying we did it by threatening the Soviets, which isn't true. We have had a friendly message from the Saudis.

C: Wonderful. I think your meeting with the oil industry was just great. You played it beautifully.

K: You were a terrific help. I will keep you posted. You have turned out to be right on the Saudi Arabians and I was not.

C: Well,

K: It is not often I say that.. and to a Texan.

C: Every so often even a blind hog will pick up an acorn.

K: What's really infuriating is that everything you do is.. deliberate.

C: Let me ask you quickly, on the... thing and the airlift. Jim has indicated he has talked with you.

K: I would like to keep the airlift going until I can stop it while I am out there.

C: I agree 100%.

K: No sense giving the thing away this week. Like to keep it going until I'm out in the area.

C: At roughly the same level.

K: Roughly..

C: I do need from you or Brent or someone on your staff more specific types of information on flow and source of information.

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K: My present intention is to keep the airlift going until the early part of next week and front load the sea lift.

C: We are doing that.

K: And then slow it down 3 weeks from now.

C: That will be fine.

K: I don't want to stop the airlift for nothing this week.

C: Well, until you tell me something different that's what we'll do.

K: OK.

END

SL344

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Haig/Sec. Kissinger
Monday, Oct. 29, 1973
2:55 p.m.

K: Al, how are you?

H: Fine.

K: Where are you.

H: In George's office. We have Sen. Saxbe in the other office.

K: The President wants to go up with Dobrynin to Camp Cavid today.

H: Today?

K: I think it is a grave mistake. I think he should do it tomorrow night. There are just not enough facts in yet. I have had lunch with Dobrynin and he would be more than agreeable to do tomorrow. I would like you to use your influence. Then we would have announced the Meir and other visits.

H: How was the letter.

K: Mild.

H: Good. O.K.

K: They will try to pressure him to pushing the Israelis back and tomorrow night we have a much better position to understand that.

H: You want me to hit him head on?

K: I will call him. I promised to call him or do you want to do it?

H: It does not make any difference.

K: Which do you think more likely to be affective?

H: I think -- he will do what you say.

K: Does he have anything tomorrow night?

H: No.

K: By tomorrow night we will have announced the meeting with the Egyptians. We will have announced the Golda Meir thing. O.K.?

H: Good, Henry. END

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Speaker Albert/Sec. Kissinger
Monday, Oct. 29, 1973
3:05 p.m.

A: Mr. Secretary.

K: Mr. Speaker. How nice to hear from you.

A: What I am calling you about is you will recall at our last meeting we put the trade bill off.

K: Yes, Mr. Speaker.

A: And we did not set a time. I got a call from Wilbur Mills saying we had better take it up next week or we will loose it. I told him that I was going to be governed -- that that was important -- but I was going to governed by what the Administration had to say about it as it effects our foreing policy.

K: Wilbur Mills thinks he would loose the entire Bill?

A: He said if we don't get it soon. That is what he told me. He thinks that either the President or you or somebody in the Administration should state that publicly to keep this thing from getting us into the situation where we cannot pass it up here -- say publicly that you prefer that it be kept off for a while or something along that line.

K: Yes.

A: I don't know whether you are prepared to make that kind of statement or not. He said we will lose members up here and he ~~has~~ apparently has a count on it. That is what he said to me. Would you all mind us putting it down for next week or week after next and announcing it now or would you send us a statement or the White House or Treasury Dept send us a statement.

K: Let me call you back within the hour.

A: That you would appreciate our keeping it off for the time being.

K: I will call you this afternoon.

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A: Sure.

K: Thank you, Mr. Speaker
END

SL345

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
The President - Secretary Kissinger
October 29, 1973
3:00 p.m.

K: Mr. President.

N: Yah.

K: I have just had a long session with Dobrynin. May I make a suggestion, I think tomorrow night may be the right time for going to Camp David if your schedule permits it.

N: Yah.

K: First, we will then know what happened at the meeting of the Egyptians and Israelis.

N: We don't have to go up there, as to whether we go...

K: No, I think it is a very, very, very good idea to go up there. It would be helpful, would help a great deal. I have talked to Al about it. He thinks we will know more tomorrow. We are concerned with the cease fire and that we will know tomorrow after the second meeting is finished. If your scheduled permitted, I think it would be a very good idea. By then we will have announce the Golda Mier visit...

N: Golda Mier and the Egyptian visit.

K: Yes, and you could be right in the middle of it, if you tell him he will run to the Egyptians with it.

N: Do we have to go to Camp David?

K: We can do it at the White House.

N: Let's just say we'll do it about 5 and leave it open.

K: Well, I have sort of mumbled about Camp David.

N: Fine, fine. We will do it, it will do alot of good.

K: You don't have to spend the whole evening with him.

N: I don't intend to.

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K: If you could just spend an hour with him and then I'll ...

N: OK. We'll do at 5:00, fine.

SL343

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Schlesinger - Secretary Kissinger
October 29, 1973
12:58 p.m.

K: I just talked to your deputy.

S: Oh, what about.

K: The air lift.

S: What was the conversation?

K: I talked to him, I called him on Saturday to inform him on what was happening, and he only got around to returning the call right now, so....That's how I got your deputy rather than you. What I would like to have happen is the airlift continuing into next week, so I can sell stopping it to the Arabs. And, I want the sea lift front loaded so I can sell a reduction of it to the Arabs. If you can sell the inevitable you can perform miracles every day.

S: If we continue it that long we've got to go down to 12 and 4, 12 C-141s and 4...

K: What are we at now 16 and 5?

S: 16 and 5, something like that and we are scraping the bottom. We diverted sea lift to keep the air lift going.

K: OK, you can do that.

S: It shouldn't make too much difference. Second problem, you're having lunch with George according to my....

K: No, I was, but I'm having lunch with Dobrynin.

S: Well, what I wanted to say was that you should buttress Geoerge, withstand George on the question of , take a hard line on offset.

K: I am totally on your side.

S: State and Defense are OK, but Treasury is being Hubert Humphrey like.

K: They are idiots, they don't understand.

S: They won't even accept money unless its in the US budget.

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K: They're insane. I'm totally on your side. I'll even recommend to the President that he overrule them if there's a show down.

S: Inyour lunch with Dobryning, I suggest he phase down their naval strength which is at about 92. Tell him we will withdraw when they do, or something. Counted the build-up ...in the 90s, at last .... Hancock has gone through the straits.

K: Play it low key...routine mission. Say every time there is a Middle East war we send the carrier to the Persian Gulf. No, don't do that.

S: OK.

K: No, I was kidding.

S: ...say it was dispatched as part of routine response.

K: Don't say routine response, say it was routine, that we planned to do this anyway at some point and used this occasion to do it.

S: Now, that will be arriving out in the Persian Gulf area approximately next Sunday.

K: Terrific, couldn't be better, and keep it there.

Now, you are seeing the German Ambassador. Don't let him up for air, no matter what protestations he makes. They have to learn that being obnoxious is not free. I've already had a letter from Brandt and I'm not letting him up for air. You are going over there next week?

S: We have canvassed the whole thing, I think we will.

K: I think you should. I will get in touch with you and send over what you should do....

SL B41

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
David Rockefeller/Secretary Kissinger
October 29, 1973
12:31

K: David, how are you?

R: Fine, I wanted to tell you how much I admire the way you have handled everything. Most extraordinary.

K: Aren't you nice.

R: Nothing short of miraculous.

K: Well, if we can hold it together at little longer, we can turn it into an asset.

R: I believe we can do that.

K: You're a good friend.

R: If anyone had any doubts about your peace prize, I think you should get a second one.

K: We still have to face what's ahead of us.

R: I am sure that's true. I want to say I had a number of good talks with the Japanese. And I believe the feelings of tension are reduced.

K: Our relations with the Japanese are on the upbeat.

R: I think so.

K: Our relations with the Egyptians are in trouble. I think this time it is largely their fault.

R: They have behaved badly.

K: ...the Egyptian Foreign Minister is coming here this week and I am seeing him for lunch tomorrow.

R: I think that's marvelous. If you really pull this off, their attitude will change.

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K: The Arabs have to be patient until after the election which is after December. If we press too hard we will bring the right-wingers into office. I think that's right..I am going to be hard with them.

R: I don't see how they can be anything but grateful.

K: Strangely enough, our relations with the Arabs are better than they were before..we get daily cables from Sadat..they are aware that the Russiand give them hardward; we give them political satisfaction.

R: Right, ..possibility of Japan. I really think the same thing applies here. I don't think I ought to.

K: I still have the other thing very much in mind, David.

R: I just think the other would be a logical first step. I was asked the question at a press conference in Tokyo. It took me aback.

K: That did not come from us.

R: All I could say was when he asked me had I been asked and if so what did I say and then what would I do if I were asked. I said I was happy where I am. I think..I don't think that would be the right thing.

K: If you were to take a position other than the one you might, I really wish you would take the one I discussed with you.

R: I hope you're pleased with Donaldson.

K: Oh, marvelous.

R: I think Bob has made a first rate reputation.

K: He couldn't be better.

R: He is excellent. You're doing extremely well. I gather from Nelson that you might be leaving soon. Any help I can be just let me know.

K: Let me get in touch with you later this week.

R: If you think it would be helpful for me to come down and see you before..

K: Let me see what I can possibly do..Many thanks, David..I don't know how much Nelson told you, but

R: He made clear to me that it was not to go beyond hand

K: I have no objection to your knowing it..

R: No, no. This was made clear. I don't know how much of it he told me but what he did tell me will not go beyond me.

K: David, I will be in touch with you later.this week.

R: Wonderful.

END

SL349

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Ziegler/Sec. Kissinger
Monday, Oct. 29, 1973
4:20 p.m.

K: Could we have Golda Meir announced tomorrow.. I think the Egyptians will mind it less and that way they will stand alone in an announcement on Wednesday which would please them.

Z: We will announce Doby and the Tourism guy.

K: He is ~~head~~ not Tourism.

Z: He is the Head of Tourism.

K: He is the Acting Foreign Minister.

Z: He is head of Tourism. I would never say that publicly but I think it is wonderful -- something about the Egyptian Government. You don't find that humorous -- you're too involved in high policy.

K: Who are you talking to?

Z: Garment just walked in.

K: Tell Garment that having him as defense counsel is like pleading guilty.

Z: Laughter and he repeats to Garment.
O.K. Henry

END

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Ziegler/Secretary Kissinger
October 29, 1973
4:15

Z: The President wanted me to callyou to talk about the announcement of meeting with Dobrynin tomorrow.

K: Not today, please not Today.

Z: We can announce it in the morning.

K: Yes. you will make three announcements. He is seeing theEgyptian acting Foreign Minister. on Wednesday.

Z: That's the Head of Tourism.

K: It is the acting Foreign Minister. The Head of Tourism is not particularly jazzy.

Z: I was just trying to identify him.

K: Then he is seeing Golda Meir on Thursday and that he is seeing Dobrynin in the evening tomorrow.

Z: OK.

K: It will make a nice package. the meetings are together with me in each case.

Z: Let's see, that's K I S S I N G E R.

K: And we will have some other announcements to make on Wednesday. Maybe we should announce Golda Meir on Wednesday v. together with my trip.

Z: OK.

K: Why don't you announce Golda Meir and my trip to Egypt at the White House at 11:00.

Z: 11:00 when?

K: On Wednesday and then at noon let us announce the other.

Z: In the morning, we will announce Dobrynin and the Egyptians ~~and~~ for/tomorrow

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and Wednesday. Well, we will announce Golda and your trip on Wednesday.

K: Yes, and we announce here my other three stops.

Z: Anything else.

K: That is all.

Z: Things working out OK?

K: Things here are working out..well and so complex that if they don't blow sky-high..the chances are two to one that they will work.

Z: Alrighty.

END

SL336

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Mr. Kissinger
Ambassador Dinitz
October 29, 1973
8:28 a.m.

K: Mr. Ambassador.

D: Morning, Mr. Secretary.

K: I hate to keep harrassing you everyday, but I just saw in every newspaper a report from Tel Aviv that said you let the convoy through because we threatened you that the Russians would intervene.

D: I saw this report last night in the wire.

K All I can say is you know there must be a limit to suicidal impulses. Do we want a public statement that the Americans are afraid of the Russians.

D: No, but you believe me that we didn't put out the statement. We really didn't put out the statement--I saw it last night on the wire from the UPI about three o'clock in the morning and I cabled it to Ismail and I said that this is a terrible interpretation, a terrible leak. And obviously it did not come --

K: It's suicide for you --it's an absolute disaster. Give the Russians the credit for it, it puts us in a possition of weakness, it encourages the Russians, it hurts us in the Arab world, it kills us with the Russians and it does you no good.

D: Of course. You are absolutely right. It was not a government inspired -

K: Okay, you know just for God sake tell your people to calm down, will you?

D: Yeh I'm

K: But the Israeli elections is not as important as the survival of Israel.

D: No I don't think that anything to do with the elctions. I think it was just the way the news media interprets things.

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K: Well it's close enough to the truth that somebody must have said something.

D: Well, I could imagine that in a government meeting, the Prime Minister never said this of course, but related some circumstances which she does very rarely and the leakage come out which somebody interpreted in this manner. I would imagine this is the way it worked.

K: All I'm asking you--there is no American interest in this--it makes our life with the Rusians that much harder.

D: It makes our position a little more

K: Exactly.
I'll get you an answer to your other problem I hope by the end of the morning.

D: Fine, thank you very much.

SL340

TELCON
The President/Sec. Kissinger
Monday, Oct. 29, 1973
11:55 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

N: How did you get along at the House?

K: Really very useful. Total support.

N: Foreign Affairs (Committee) or which one?

K: The Foreign Affairs Committee and really very strong support. No question. I really hit them about the crisis -- about questioning motives and I gave them a little sequence of what happened on Wednesday and they were really steamed up. It is not the most hostile committee we face but I would say there is 100% support in there.

N: They got the feeling that the President was on top of the dam thing.

K: Absolutely. I told them. I said this constant attack on domestic authority is going to have the most serious consequences for our foreign policy.

N: Yes. Naturally that is what you should say. I have to deny that publicly.

K: I can say it.

N: You should say it because it is totally true.

K: They were wailing a little bit about that but not in a hostile way. Morgan was very good about it.

N: What did he say?

K: He said he agreed and is very supportative. Zablocki was very good.

N: It is one of the great diplomatic triumphs of our whole administration. It may lay the foundation for things in the Middle East that now one thought possible.

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K: It helps with detente; those who were saying we were soft; the whole three weeks. The Egyptian For. Minister is coming. Mrs. Meir is coming. We will make it clear you are pushing here into a concilliatory action.

N: When can some of these dates be announced?

K: I think you should see the Egyptian For. Min. on Wednesday. He will only be here until Wednesday morning. We would announce Meir either tomorrow or Wednesday.

N: I would announce both the same date.

K: All right. We will announce both of them tomorrow.

N: From the White House.

K: Absolutely.

N: What about your visit?

K: That will be announced on Wednesday. It has been arranged with the Governments.

N: From here also. It should be very clear you are going from here -- not just foreign policy but on NSC.

K: Absolutely.

N: I will get Ziegler primed.

K: I am scheduling Dobrynin for 5:00 this afternoon.

N: If something comes up. I may be busy -- could we put it off until in the morning.

K: Sure.

N: Tell him it would be better for 5:00 or in the morning.

K: There would be an advantage for in the morning. I could go over it with you in some detail. It is quite an important meeting.

N: Of course. Let's tell him 10:00 in the morning.

K: All right. Then I could do a paper for you.

N: Come at 9:00 in the morning.

END

SL339

TELECON
Ambassador Dinnitz/Secretary Kissinger
October 29, 1973
11:45

RELEASED IN FULL

D: I forgot to ask you some important details. Do you have any idea when is the best time to announce it?

K: Maybe tomorrow.

D: Tomorrow, and should we draft something and bring it to you for your approval?

K: Yes...

D: We will bring a text for your approval. What time do you want it?

K: Let's say in the late morning.

D: With the President?

K: Yes. or in the afternoon.

D: Can we count the on breakfast with you?

K: Yes.

D: Would you rather have it in my house.

K: As opposed to where else.

D: Say in the hotel.

K: I think in my present position I shouldn't be entertaining ladies in a hotel.

D: (Laughter) Well, then, my house?

K: I would be glad to have it at your house or in the State Department.

D: Fine, then. In the State Department , with your permission.

K: Find, good bye.

END

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8L338

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Scowcroft/Sec. Kissinger
Monday, Oct. 29, 1973
10:45 a.m.

S; ...the interest section. I told State to do it.

K: State. That means it will be in every newspaper in the world. Whom did you tell it to?

S: To Pickering.

K: O.K. That's better.

S: Thursday a.m. is o.k. for Golda. He is going to be here. I don't have a specific time.

END

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SL337

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
October 29, 1973/9:20 a.m.
Dobrynin/HAK

K: Hello.

D: Hello Henry.

K: Anatol, I'm on the way to the House Foreign Affairs Committee..

D: Congratulations. What are they going to do with you?

K: They're going to confirm me again.

D: They have not given it up? Henry, about 1:00 today so it's settled.

K: Fine.

D: The second thing I would like to ask you the following question.

K: But I frankly don't think that Fulbright knows about it yet because he asked me yesterday for advise on what he should say to you.

D: He knows.

K: OK fine.

D: He knows because we mentioned to him that we are going to switch it. Yesterday I spoke with him. His wife called my wife so that was a confirmation again so he knows that there is really no problem. The question now what is really Henry. I received a message and I would like your assistance in this. Message from Brezhnev to President and Brezhnev asked me to deliver it personally to the President. I feel its rather important in general in the sense it was my impression yesterday there was a meeting rather important in Moscow and they would like so to speak to know his opinion right away about our relations which they feel are rather _____ now. And a rather a crisis of confidence which is more or less on the level of the Brezhnev and President. So as you know its very unpleasant talk for me because I spent so much time and energy to on the contrary to keep it up not down so I think it may be useful really for me to deliver the message. There are some contrary _____ but they are not important enought.

K: Can I see that message first. I think it will be helpful to both of us.

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D: OK. When I come I could talk to you.

K: You leave the message and I will then arrange a meeting late today or first thing in the morning.

D: Could you make it today Henry.

K: I will make it today.

D: This will be better.

K: I will make it today.

D: This is the point you see. When you mention to me then I will tell you. OK.

K: What do you mean when I mention to you.

D: When you are expecting to try to arrange it today. Yes.

K: Right. We'll discuss it at lunch. I'll do it late today.

D: Let's aim it on the second part or I will bring it to the lunch.

K: Bring it to the lunch and we'll have it about 4 or 5 oclock today.

D: OK.

SL371

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Scowcroft/Sec. Kissinger
Tuesday, Oct. 30, 1973
11:00 a.m.

K: The President now wants to meet half an hour earlier so we leave at 5:00. I know it is a terrific event.

S: I will change it to 5:00.

END

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 25 MAY 2004 200102979

5047 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Dobrynin/HAK
October 30, 1973/10:27 a.m.

D: Hello.

K: Hello Anatol.

D: Henry.

K: How are you?

D: Fine.

K: I understand you are agitating against us at the Concert.

D: I left in the second act.

K: Was that in protest. Well, listen, I'm having Zeigler ~~xxxx~~ say something at 11:00 about that fleet movement.

D: 11:00. I think that is fine because otherwise it goes on more and more.

K: No, he's saying it. He will say that it is a routine thing that is unrelated to any of this. On the MFN, what you have to understand, I can't explain all these maneuvers. Our basic intentiom is to get it taken out of the House bill.

D: Yes.

K: We have the biggest gap between the House and the Senate bill but it has nothing to do with the Middle East. I just want you to understand that.

D: I understand. But it is my understanding that the President said to the leaders of the Congress on last week that he is going to veto the whole bill, is that correct?

K: That is correct. Now if they include restrictions on credit to the Soviet Union, we'll veto the whole bill. Now just a minute. The President suggests if you don't mind, if you and I would go up to Camp David about 5:30.

D: From here yes.

K: Yes and then we will have a talk with him there. He has a meeting tonight but you and I can have dinner up there and then come back later tonight.

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*

D: OK but when will he be there.

K: From 6:00 to 7:00 - 7:30. You'll have a good talk with him then.

D: He'll be there too.

K: Yes.

D: I didn't understand.

K: He will be there but he has something to do afterwards.

D: That's alright with me.

K: So the three of us have a relaxed hour together and then you and I have dinner or if you want to come back right away it's up to you.

D: No, I would like to have dinner but come back. Alright.

K: Yes. Do you want to see a movie up there or....

D: No Henry. I will just have dinner and afterwards it will be 9 or 10 is alright with me.

K: We'll come back around 10.

D: OK.

K: You and I just have another talk up there. And we will announce that you are going up to Camp David just to calm the atmosphere a little bit.

D: OK.

K: Do you object.

D: No, what are you going to say?

K: We are going to say you are coming up there to receive an ultimatum and you will be kept as a hostage.

D: If you like.

K: No, what we'll say is the 3 of us will have a general review of the situation.

D: Ok. No problem. 5:30 where should I be?

*

K: We'll call you or maybe I'll come by and pick you up.

D: OK. Thank you very much.

SL369

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
President/HAK
October 30, 1973/10:25 a.m.

K: Hello. Mr. President.

P: Henry, would it be just as well if we move Meir up to 12:00 noon because I may have to work in the afternoon on something else or I may have

K: Absolutely.

P: So 12:00 noon would give you the morning with her.

K: No problem.

P: You don't have to testify there.

K: No, the only reason I suggested is to have an interval between the time I see her and I see you but I can do that by having breakfast with her. That would be over by 9:30.

P: Fine. 12:00 noon is a good time because it will also make more news that way. We want it to make some news. 3:00 I told Zeigler that for that and I told him that Dobrynim would be here tonight and I said just don't indicate what it is. Just say we're going to have a meeting and the way I understand it you just get the helicopter lined up and come up and arrive around 6:00 and have a chat. We'll treat him well. You are going to testify tomorrow huh.

K: 10:00.

P: Which Committee.

K: Foreign Relations Committee.

P: Public.

K: No, Executive Session but they leak like crazy anyway. I've got alot of television coverage from the Foreign Affairs Committee.

P: That's great.

K: I mean not for myself.

P: I personally think it's better to be public with the Foreign Relations Committee why don't you tell them.

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K: OK. They may have alot of ....

P: Alright. Let me tell you. Don't hide the light under the bushel.

K: Right Mr. President

SL370

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Dobrynin/HAK
October 30, 1973/10:27 a.m.

D: Hello.

K: Hello Anatol.

D: Henry.

K: How are you?

D: Fine.

K: I understand you are agitating against us at the Concert.

D: I left in the second act.

K: Was that in protest. Well, listen, I'm having Zeigler xxxx say something at 11:00 about that fleet movement.

D: 11:00. I think that is fine because otherwise it goes on more and more.

K: No, he's saying it. He will say that it is a routine thing that is unrelated to any of this. On the MFN, what you have to understand, I can't explain all these maneuvers. Our basic intention is to get it taken out of the House bill.

D: Yes.

K: We have the biggest gap between the House and the Senate bill but it has nothing to do with the Middle East. I just want you to understand that.

D: I understand. But it is my understanding that the President said to the leaders of the Congress on last week that he is going to veto the whole bill, is that correct?

K: That is correct. Now if they include restrictions on credit to the Soviet Union, we'll veto the whole bill. Now just a minute. The President suggests if you don't mind, if you and I would go up to Camp David about 5:30.

D: From here yes.

K: Yes and then we will have a talk with him there. He has a meeting tonight but you and I can have dinner up there and then come back later tonight.

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D: OK but when will he be there.

K: From 6:00 to 7:00 - 7:30. You'll have a good talk with him then.

D: He'll be there too.

K: Yes.

D: I didn't understand.

K: He will be there but he has something to do afterwards.

D: That's alright with me.

K: So the three of us have a relaxed hour together and then you and I have dinner or if you want to come back right away it's up to you.

D: No, I would like to have dinner but come back. Alright.

K: Yes. Do you want to see a movie up there or....

D: No Henry. I will just have dinner and afterwards it will be 9 or 10 is alright with me.

K: We'll come back around 10.

D: OK.

K: You and I just have another talk up there. And we will announce that you are going up to Camp David just to calm the atmosphere a little bit.

D: OK.

K: Do you object.

D: No, what are you going to say?

K: We are going to say you are coming up there to receive an ultimatum and you will be kept as a hostage.

D: If you like.

K: No, what we'll say is the 3 of us will have a general review of the situation.

D: Ok. No problem. 5:30 where should I be?

K: We'll call you or maybe I'll come by and pick you up.

D: OK. Thank you very much.

SL374

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Major General Scowcroft/The Secretary
October 30, 1973
12:30

S: They have just agreed to send an additional twenty to thirty trucks with general supplies plus an additional ten trucks with medical supplies.

K: Can I tell this to the Foreign Minister. Have they authorized.

S: They have already told the check-points that this is authorized. Apparently they haven't even finished with the first 100 and they will just add these on to the end of it.

K: OK.

END

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 25 MAY 2004 200102979

SL380

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Shultz/HAK
October 30, 1973/10:50 a.m.

K: Hello.

S: Hi Henry.

K: How are you George?

S: Alright. Say I have a little bit of information for you that I don't know quite how to evaluate and you may. Helmut Schmidt called me up yesterday from Bonn and said that he wanted to sended Poles, Poles is sort of the Paul ~~Faulker~~ VOLCKER of West Germany, here as soon as possible this week to spend an hour with me. I said well Paul Vaulker is in Paris right now and if you want to transact any business they are there and Paul has been, we have him scheduled to go see Schmidt tomorrow anyway and he said no, it has nothing to do with our international monetary negotiations but he clearly did not want to discuss what this was about on the telephone and just dropped it at that and sao I said, well, I'll be glad to see him. He has called since then and we have set up an appointment for Friday morning.

K: Good. Will you let me know immediately what he does want.

S: Yes, I'll let you know immediately. I know that I sent you over a toast that Schmidt gave particularly calling your attention to the last paragraph.

K: I saw that.

S: But Schmidt is very concerned about the Atlantic. He's very concerned about it and regards as highly important a strong U.S./Germany relationship.

K: Yes, but they are wrecking it.

S: Well, I'm just saying what Schmidt's, at least his apparent point of view is, as I have sensed it and it may very well be with regard to this in which case I would call your office right away and you might or might not want to talk with Poles.

K: I might well want to and I'm having lunch with you Thursday right.

S: I hope so.

K: I look forward to it. Bye.

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SL383

TELECON
Major General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
October 30, 1973
4:55

RELEASED IN FULL

K: After I gave.. my promise to Dobrynin last night and this morning, if they.. it will just hyper it

S: Well, tomorrow..

K: No. We can't do it tomorrow, it's senseless.

S: Well, you talked to Jerry and I thought .. and I talked to Jerry.

K: I want to understand what gave them the right to make a statement we didn't tell them to make. Keep them from putting it out now!

END

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SL 385

TELCON
Secretary Shultz - Secretary Kissinger
October 30, 1973
5:05

RELEASED IN FULL

S: I've gotten an invitation to go to a dinner for Golda Meir on Thursday night.

K: Good idea.

S: Well, I am going to be giving a talk out of town ....have a public to please. To get back in time...wondering if its worth going out of my way to do or not.

K: I think its a good idea.

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SL372

TELCON
The President - Secretary Kissinger
October 30, 1973
11:05

RELEASED IN FULL

N: Hi Henry. I wondered if you could move Dobrynin up. You could come up an hour earlier. What's your situation? I don't want to....just tell me if....

K: You mean have both of us come up earlier?

N: What I meant is just come and be here about 5 instead of 6. What's your situation, just tell me if its not good.

K: No, we can make it.

N: I can talk to you on the phone in the afternoon to get your read out and then you two can come right in when you get here, we can have an hour and then you can have dinner. Can you make it then?

K: I think 5:30 would be safer.

N: You mean be here at 5:30, leave there around 5:00, leave on the helicopter at 5:00? Then in the afternoon you can talk to me on the phone. I think I have got the background of what's wanted.

K: I might come over for 10 minutes.

N: Why don't you send me some talking points.

K: OK, the major thing though, is not to back off on what was done last week.

N: Say we can't have this kind of thing in the future. No sir.

K: No sir. and we both must learn from it or something like that.

N: Exactly. You tell him I have other plans for dinner. It's just as well not to be too cozy, don't you think?

K: Exactly.

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SL384

TELECON
Major General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
October 30, 1973
5:00

RELEASED IN FULL

S: They did get the word out on the MFN and he misunderstood you on the ... he thought it was to respond to a question... He said they did put it out again at Defense.

K: What do you mean?

S: He said they withdrew their previous statement and said what it was there for.

K: Now, just let him stay the hell out of it.

S: OK. He will call the wire services later and he can do it casually. He said he thought it was to just answer a question.

K: Is there any possible way he can answer a question when I am asking him to disavow the Defense Department?

S: I am just telling you what he told me.. but he did get out the MFN.

K: Well, you get it over to Dobrynin.. the relevant things.

S: OK.

END

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SL373

TELECON
Major General Scowcroft/Secretary
October 30, 1973
11:30

RELEASED IN FULL

S: He said that they are no less upset about the Kraft article.

K: Oh, nonsense.

S: He said they expect to have an answer very shortly.

K: How about the _____.

S: I beg your pardon, oh... excuse me, I am not up to you today. He said if you want to broaden attendance with the Prime Minister he will of course do what you wish. He strongly urges

K: I have just had it with him.

S: He says they had nothing to do with it. They did know about your timing and they knew about your presentation at the UN, that we had given them the text, and that they had said nothing about it one way or the other.

K: I may have her come to the State Department.

S: He says if you want to invite Rush and Sisco, he will be happy to but urges that you reconsider. I think he is antsy.

K: He will have a good time for two weeks when I am gond. Let him be in real contact with the world.

S: OK.

END

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DATE/CASE ID: 25 MAY 2004 200102979

SL379

TELCON
President/HAK
October 30, 1973/9:59 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Mr. President.

P: Henry, I wanted to ask, is Mrs. Meir going to be here Thursday?

K: Thursday Mr. President.

P: I didn't know/she was going to fly right over then. Fine. Alright then the Egyptian I made that 11:00 rather than 10:00. I didn't want it quite that early.

K: Right. In fact if it were the same to you could we do it early in the afternoon?

P: The Egyptians?

K: Yes. Say 3:00.

P: Sure.

K: Because I was going to testify in the morning. I can change it.

P: No, do your testimony. I don't even know who set the God damn thing in the morning. Who was it Steve or...

K: Well, I had probably asked for it and had forgotten that.

P: Fine, make it 3:00 in the afternoon then because its irrelevant to me.

K: Good Mr. President.

P: Now with regard to Mrs. Meir. What time do we want her.

K: It's up to you. Maybe also early in the afternoon.

P: You have to testify again huh?

K: No, but I thought the way it would work best is if I could talk to her first in the morning and explain our proposition to you and then come back to you and report.

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P: Yes, so we'll have plenty of time to think about it.

K: That's right.

P: Right. Why don't we say 3:00.

K: Good.

P: I agree because we've got to play...

K: That's going to be a pretty tough session.

P: Sure. We're going to be on a tightrope. Alright, that will take care of that. Both of those will be at 3:00.

K: Right.

P: Now, let me ask. What is the situation with regard to Dobrynin? What would you like to do on that.

K: Well Mr. President. It's entirely up to you. Were you staying in Camp David today.

P: I haven't decided but we can easily do it here if it would be useful.

K: I think the best might be if he and I came up but that's not spend the night, and came back around 9:30 - 10:00.

P: Spending the night is fine. There's no problem there because nobody else is here.

K: It would give me a chance to get started earlier in the morning.

P: Yes, I see your point. In other words you'd like to just come up have a meeting and have dinner and go back.

K: And perhaps he and I can sit in a cabin for an hour after wards and then come back.

P: Bring him back with you. Fine. What would you like to do. Would you like to. What would you suggest as a time on it?

K: It's entirely up to you.

P: No but I mean in other words, have him up here. Now I don't want to come with him. I mean I'll have you and him ride in a separate helicopter see.

K: Comeing back.

P: Both ways.

K: I thought you might be staying up there.

P: I may. That's my point. You'll have to bring him in a helicopter in any event which will leave me the freedom to either go back or stay.

K: Exactly Mr. President.

P: So you can go from the Pentagon strip or whatever but now, my point is when do you... Do you want to get up here to have a talk with me before

K: I think I should Mr. President.

P: Either that or....

K: I could ride up with him and we could put him in a cabin and then call for him when you and I are finished. That's no problem.

P: Unless I get back this afternoon for a little while. I may be back sometime this afternoon for a little while. Alright, what is the situation.

K: First of all with respect to Dobrynin Mr. President. He's running all over town claiming to be the injured party. Now I think they behaved inexcusably and we shouldn't let them up for air on that. I don't we gain anything by apologizing. We should say they made a threat. They poured forces, they put their forces on alert, their airborne forces, they sent a very tough letter and you had no choice but the problem is where we go from here. Now he's got two problems. One is what to do with the Egyptian third Army. The third is how we handle the negotiations. The negotiations are easy, that's all set up. The Egyptian Third Army we are going to settle directly with the Egyptians and the Israelis so we don't have to tell him that. What we have to avoid is that they get credit for everything we do. I am in the process of working something out with that Egyptian Foreign Minister which is if the Israelis play ball you may be able to announce after the visit with Golda Meir.

P: Having to do with the Third Army?

K: Having to do, speaking the proposal that I'm thinking of is like this and I've tried parts of it on the Foreign Minister yesterday and he seemed to be receptive. The Israelis let through nonmilitary supplies to the Third Army. Guaranteed, so that they don't have to apply every time and maybe even move off that road. The Egyptians release all Israeli prisoners and open the Straits of the Gulf of Suez from their blockade which they've put on. On that basis the Third Army wouldn't get any military supplies and couldn't become an offensive force. That's what the Israeli..... are seriously playing with them. Now if we can get Mrs. Meir to accept that then we would have settled that problem. Now is she wants more.

P: She _____ going to get it.

K: What she wants is for the withdrawal of all Egyptian forces from the East bank of the canal. That's out of the question.

P: Nope. She cannot get her way this time. Too late. She's going to find a very tough problem when she walks into my office this time. You know what I mean. There is not going to be any of this horsing around anymore. I'll be courteous but she cannot come in and in that arrogant way again and say well they all withdraw and this and that. She doesn't have the cards anymore Henry.

K: That's right. I agree with you.

P: Too bad but that's the way it is. Now with regard to the Dobrynin thing we'll leave it that you and he will come up. Do you think it would be well to have dinner with him.

K: I can have dinner with him alone if you'd rather not/

P: I'm just trying to figure what you want. I could have him come up and be here for a meeting but whatever you think is useful I could do. I'd just soon not bother with the dinner frankly but...

K: Then why don't you just have a good talk with him for an hour and he and I will have dinner at Laurel.

P: I'll just tell him I had some other plans.

K: I'll tell him you have plenty of other things to do.

P: Sure. What I may do. I may have to come back and then come back up but I'll come back separately a little early. I would say this. Perhaps we...

K: If you would rather not do Camp David at all we can do it in your...

P: No, I think, don't you think. Well, you thought Camp David was a good idea didn't you.

K: Right. Well, I just transmitted your original idea. It was better not to do it last night because, first of all I had to see the...

P: Well, let me say you thought it was a good...

K: But if it is in any sense inconvenient for you.

P: It isn't really particularly. It may be very convenient.

K: Because he has no right to come up there.

P: No, what I meant is that in terms of what would be useful on the diplomacy side. Well, let me put it this way. What we might do is to have you come up here and I'll be coming up earlier and you come in and we have an hours talk and then you and he could have dinner, sit around awhile and go back. I think it would mean alot to him and I think it would be mean alot to Brezhnev. It's a very small gesture. You see my point.

K: To have him up at Camp David.

P: Yes, don't you think so.

K: Yes.

P: Isn't that reason you thought well of the idea.

K: That's why I thought well of the idea.

P: I know we don't have to do it but my point is if it does.

K: If we pay some personal attention to him. The only thing is I'd be rather tough on what happened last week no matter what screaming he does.

P: I will. Don't worry. He gave me a hell of a problem.

K: They gave us a hell of a problem. They sent us a stinging note and we had every reason to suppose they were going to take unilateral action.

P: I know. Don't worry. We aren't going to mark off one inch.

K: ~~XXXXXX~~ We have this problem Mr. President. We are [redacted] in the driver's seat in the Middle East. For example, I've got the Egyptians yesterday. The Russians you know sent 70 observers in and were screaming at the Egyp tians that they had to take them. Well I worked out with the Foreign Minister yesterday that they are going to send 40 of them back. The Egyptians are going to do it on their own so we're not involved because 70 is just too many in a 300 man force.

P: Yeah. Good. Don't worry, I'll be very. . . . We'll take the line on Dobrynin. I know exactly what to do.

K: I would not get into too great specifics on the Third core.

P: No, that's our deal. No, my feeling is this. The Camp David exercise first is good P. R. It's look like something is going on that's a big daeal. Second, it's good from the stand point that Brezhnev will think we are giving him some attention (special). It doesn't cost us a damn thing and then we give them ~~XXXXXX~~ nothing on the hard side.

K: Exactly.

P: Basically, it's software. But I would suggest that unless you hear otherwise why don't you tell him that you will fly to Camp David to see me at 5:00 here. That gives you the whole day there. Or is that a bad time.

K: Maybe a little later.

P: Fine.

K: Togeth er with him.

P: Yeah, I could have the meeting with him from 5:00 to 6:00 and then you can have dinner or when do you want. . .

K: Would it be good if we left at 6:00. and we'd be up at 6:30 and then I'd spend half an hour with you. That's too close to dinner.

P: No, don't worry about that because I'll probably. . . I'll probably have a chance to talk to you earlier anyway.

K: I can do it at 5:00 if that's more convenient for you.

P: No, I just thought you were going to talk and have dinner and so forth you'd want to get back that's all. So, would you rather make it 5;30.

K: Good, we'll leave at 5:30.

P: Leave Washington at 5:30, see me at 6:00 and then we'll meet from 6 to7 but I;ll not have dinner. I'll have you have dinner with him.

K: I'll tell him you have some work.

P: I have other people. I have dinner plans, that's all. He doesn't need to know who it is.

K: Good. OK. Good Mr. President.

S4381

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Lord Cromer - Secretary Kissinger
October 30, 1973
4:30 p.m.

K: I just wanted to inform your government we will announce tomorrow that I am going to Cairo next week.

C: I see, tomorrow.

K: We will stop in Rabat, Amman and Saudi Arabia on the way to China.

C: Rabat, Amman and Saudi Arabia?

K: And Tehran.

C: I think that would be very constructive.

K: Egyptians are telling us astonishing things about what your people are doing in the Middle East.

C: What things?

K: That you were the ones who recommended that they didn't accept the resolution on the ceasefire.

C: I certainly find that amazing. I've read all the reports and....

K: They say the British and French are telling them not to accept the US- Soviet auspices.

C: Well, I don't know what the French are up to, but I know what we are up. Don't think we are talking to the Egytpians at all. What we want basically is the US, Russian and UN.

K: That's fine with us.

C: Basically what we want. I would have thought the French would come along with that. .....making other proposals I don't know who.

K: You know the Alliance has come to a bad pass when we even have to talk about rumors like this.

C: I'm coming to see you tomorrow morning, we'll talk about it then,

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K: What time is that set for?

C: 9:00. Is that all right?

K: Fine, would you pass on the information to Whitehall. Keep it confidential until we announce it..at about 12 our time tomorrow.

C: About 12:00. Right. First stop is Rabat on the 5th?

K: Rabat on the 5th, Cairo on the 6th and 7th. Amman on the 8th... and China on the 10th

C: Thank you very much forletting me know.

SL375

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Clements/Sec. Kissinger
Tuesday, Oct. 30, 1973
3:05 p.m.

K: I had some disputes with the Egyptians this morning. Where did the transport planes land in Israel. Do you have the exact list of airports?

C: Two standbys and only one which is the main ~~text~~ Tel Aviv airport. I will have to check this. It is my understanding that none of those planes landed anywhere except the main Tel Aviv airport.

K: Did any land in the Sinai?

C: They did not. That was a report that cameoutout of a damn newspaper I think and I think the source of it was in Cairo.

K: Did any of our Phantoms land anywhere else.

C: No sir.

K: They said Elarange (sp?)

C: I will have to double check.

K: Please let me know.

C: There is one plane that I know of that did not land where it was supposed to.

K: Where did the Phantoms land?

C: The main airport at Tel Aviv. One airplane had a wheel recovery problem and it landed in Turkey on an emergency basis.

K: That is not in the Sinai peninsula.

C: That is right. I will double check. If what I am telling you is wrong I will be back in touch with you.

K: Call me back any way.

C: I will do it.

END

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SL376

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELCON
Gen. Haig - Secretary Kissinger
October 30, 1973
3:20 p.m.

H: I am going to Camp David right now.

K: Good luck and have fun. (Let me go into another room and talk to you there.) Hello.

H: He's in a rush up there and he doesn't want to have dinner with Dobrynin. I guess he told you that.

K: Yes, I don't know why, but I understand.

H: He's bringing me up there for cover. You know Cox had a little problem today.

K: Oh?

H: He admitted before the Senate Judiciary Committee he had leaked to Ted Kennedy and Senator Hart the ITT thing, in agregious abrogation of his charter. did it in the excitement of the post-firing period. Hugh Scott really skewered him. Irvin and Baker verified publicly that the proposal was very just and fair.....after the Washington Post had really made an attack on my honesty. I told Eliot either he call the Washington Post and set them straight or I am going to unleash the facts, with corroboration of four others.....terrible thing. I've been more than fair with him. You know I have. He was going to call the Washington Post. I am going to call him when I get to Camp David If he hasn't, I am going to call the Post myself.

K: I haven't read the editorial.

H: It all came out of [redacted] John Moore. Where do we stand. Everything all right? B6

K: Well, it's tough going with the Egyptians. They're real rug merchants. But tell him he's got to hang tough with Dobrynin, not pull away from what he did last week, not talk about his good relations with Brezhnev. He's got to put it back on the track. And, Dobrynin's going to unleash like a wild man, say it was totally unprovoked.....and that's crap. And, we've read every communication we've ever had from them.

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H: Are you going to say up there tonight?

K: No, I'm going to go back. I have to testify tomorrow morning.

H: OK, well I'll see you up there.

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
10/30/73; 9:32 a.m.

K: Hello.

S: Henry, on this SALT business, do you really want to have those SALT guys running around here while you are away?

K: I said yesterday that I don't want them running around here.

S: Well they apparently interpreted something you said at the staff meeting this morning as meaning that you . . .

K: I didn't have a staff meeting this morning.

S: Well we've just been told . . .

K: I didn't have a staff meeting! I couldn't have said anything!

S: Well anyway we've just been told that you said you didn't care whether they were here or not and that they could go ahead with the recess . . .

K: I said a few days recess. . .

S: Well, that's what we thought just for the week, but not to have them all troop back here while you are gone lobbying for proposals.

K: That's right.

S: Well we better get Larry on the horn because apparently they have already told Johnson he can come back for what, three weeks, anytime he wants.

K: Well that didn't come from me.

S: Well. All right, can I call Larry and make sure he understands that.

K: Yeah. Although I don't give a damn basically because I am going to tell Johnson I don't want any proposals.

S: Well, it's not just Johnson. You are going to have Nitze back here, you are going to Ralph Earl back here, you are going to have General Rowny back here and by the time you get back from your trip we will have a rolling consensus.

K: Well, talk to Larry.

S: Okay.

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SL378

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Secretary Schlesinger
10/30/73; 9:11 a.m.

K: Hello.

S: Henry.

K: Yes, Jim.

S: Did you have any success with Dobrynin yesterday on the Med Fleet? They are up to 96 now and their naval infantry went through the Bosporus yesterday with the soldiers on deck kind of waving at the crowds and so on. It is not clear that they are proceeding in the desire to hold the God damned thing down.

K: That they are what?

S: That it is not clear that they are reciprocating in the desire to hold down things -- they are up to 96.

K: Yes. I mentioned it to him and he said and he said he would report it.

S: Well, they are reinforcing so I bring that to your attention.

K: Good. Incidentally, somebody told me that you seem to think that I talk to Kraft about the oil lobby in the Pentagon.

S: Well, it certainly struck me as a possibility.

K: Well, I haven't talked to that son-of-a-bitch in six months. Have you seen what he said about me? That I ran towns in Germany with the aid of Gestapo agents -- did that come from you?

S: It's news to me. Did you?

K: Of course not. I hadn't talked to Joe Kraft in months.

S: Okay. Very Good.

K: And the one thing -- I don't think anyone has ever heard me do is to discuss colleagues to the press -- directly or indirectly or through subordinates.

S: Yes. Well, very good. In any event we are somewhat concerned about the continuing buildup and you are aware of the skud and the _____ situation.

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K: Yeah.

S: Okay.

K: Right. Thank you.

S: You bet.

NL
SL377

TELCON
Clements/Sec. Kissinger
Tuesday, Oct. 30, 1973
3:50 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

C: Henry, jot this down please. On the airplanes -- Lod -- the name of the Tel Aviv air terminal. All of the airlift went into Lod. No question about that. On the F-4s 37 of those went into a fighter airplane field which is the airfield to protect Tel Aviv. It is called Hatzor. Thirty-seven went in there and that is 15 miles from Lod. It is beside it.

K: I know it. I have been there.

C: In addition to that 36 of the A-4s went into Eqran and that is 15 miles from Lod. These airfields are right there in the immediate vicinity of Tel Aviv and moved apart just enough to provide safety in the patterns. That is the whole story.

K: I will tell that to the Egyptians.

C: O.K., Henry.

END

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SL397

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
McCloskey/Kissinger
October 31, 1973
6:33 p.m.

K. You mean they are not going?

M. No.

K. Well, that wasn't my understanding of our conversation.

M. It Well, I am sorry. It was not my understanding and several times I said we had no additional space.

K. And I said we would cut the names down in some way.

M. Mr. Secretary, I don't see how we could have done that after notifying Time magazine it had already been chosen.

K. It was my understanding that something could be done.

M. The only way it could have been done was when you asked that three of the film crew be taken off the plane. It could have been done then but I came to you and said we were asking for a hell of a lot of trouble.

K. Now, my understanding was that I had explained my situation with Kay Graham and something could be done. Either to remove what seemed to be arbitrariness or to put them on.

M. There has never been an additional seat since then and to remove arbitrariness....to remove someone who had been told they were going.... and tell them they were in a drawing and that they have to take their chance.

K. In addition to your credibility, there is the problem of my relationships too.

M. I just think you were---

K. Even if I was wrong.

M. All right. Unless we are prepared to take someone off to put Newsweek on.

K. That we obviously cannot do.

M. If we now include them we are going to get hell from people.

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The White House already got in trouble from knocking off USIA to put on the New York Daily News....I thought I had calmed everybody down by saying there were other trips and they would all get to go next time. My impression now is that Newsweek has settled down to a degree.

K. Maybe because I had told Kay I would look into it. She is a formidable enemy to have.

M. Mr. Secretary, if she would become a formidable enemy on something like that...

K. It doesn't make any differences. That is no consolation.... if she shows she is a shit. She was a strong friend in very difficult period in early Watergate phase when she leashed her people against me.

M. Of course I have none of the antecedent. If you want this done instruct me. We will find some way to do it. It will mean bumping one of the officials. I must say I disagree with doing it.

K. You have disagreed for two weeks and I have not up to now interfered with your judgments. I am not sure at this late stage it would create more havoc. It was just a misunderstanding. I had assumed it was done.

M. I never did get a direct answer from you.

K. She and McNamara were behind me when it was very tough and I was thinking of leaving giving me a lot of moral support. She was a good friend. This is the first thing in five years she asked something of me.

M. She is putting your friendship on a narrow----

K. We don't know that and will never know.

M. We will if they don't go.

K. What will that prove?

M. Would you like me now to find some means to get them on.

K. Let me think about it at this stage.

M. On a separate matter about Newsweek. Truett has asked twice this week if you could see him. He is doing something on the Middle East.

K. I couldn't have agreed to see him. I haven't seen him since I came to State. I used to see him. That is independent of my relationship with Kay Graham.

M. My position has been I don't think you should see any newsmen alone. We disagree on that. I don't know what your relations with him are. He will want to bring van Voorst with him.

K. I see no need to see him.

M. We can decide in the morning on what to do about the magazine.

SL392

TELCON
The President/HAK
October 31, 1973/12:58 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

P: Hello.

K: Mr. President.

PL How did your mission go?

K: Very well. They all came bubbling out their supporting you on television. Fulbright supported the policy.

P: Did they support detente..

K: Well he supports detente also. I took it very low key. I said what was done was necessary. They are all for detente in that context.

P: Right. Incidentally I just talked to Timmons and I want you to arrange to have an Executive Session, and it won't take you too long, but to give House Armed Services and Senate Armed Services the same kind of treatment. Youknow what I mean. Those are our friends and they are entitled to have it. And that can be very helpful in some other directions.

K: Absolutely Mr. President.

P: What is your situation the rest of the week. You're going to be leaving when.

K: Next Monday.

P: Well, you could do one of these things. We could just even bring them down for Blair House sessions things like that. Or State Department sessions. You know, invite them over.

K: I think it should be a White House thing.

P: Of course, not State Department because this is basically there but if you could bring them to Blair House you'd invite them all down for a briefing.

K: Let me talk to Timmons to see how we can work it out.

P: Good. But it went well.

K: Extremely well.

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P: I saw your Egyptian briefing paper. I think I'm all set on that.

K: Right. I'll drop in 10 minutes before because he's got an urgent message from Sadat he's bringing in now.

P: Oh boy. Did the Israelis attack on them again?

K: No, I don't know what it is.

P: Well, Sadat seems to send messages regularly.

K: He has a high level of hysteria.

P: Poor guy. When you get some message to Brezhnev by this afternoon because...

K: Absolutely Mr. President

RELEASED IN FULL

nlk SL396

TELECON
Dobrynin/Kissinger
October 31, 1973
6:02 p.m.

K. Anatoly.

D. Henry, I have a request.

K. Which is what?

D. Could you give me part of your presentation today on Foreign Affairs. The Chairman, Fulbright, was talking about your brilliant representation and about the detente.

K. I made a very impassioned defense of detente.

D. He said you particularly mentioned about detente.

K. It was a closed session, but I will get you the extract.

D. No, no, I am joking. He mentioned he was very much impressed on your presentation on the detente issue.

K. I made very strong defense of detente.

D. He mentioned it. He is a fellow who is a rare one to say somebody brilliantly represented so I was impressed on the detente question.

K. Very good.

D. What about the...are you...

K. Before I get to the main subject let me say another thing. I saw in a Los Angeles paper today an article from Moscow.

D. It was by an American?

K. Yes, it was an Americanand was very close to what you said yesterday. It said the Soviet leadership was very angry with me.

D. Who was the author?

K. Seeg, and it said from now on Brezhnev would insist on protocol when he sees me.

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D. I think it is invention.

K. My suggestion is if this is inspired it is not all that helpful.

D. Henry, I can tell you this is not the way we are doing that kind of inspiration... You could easily check an American correspondent. It is very easy to be checked. He will immediately tell you and your embassy who mentioned it from our side. I doubt very much that they would tell an American correspondent about their grievances. He would make his own deductions. First there was an agreement and afterwards a confrontation. It doesn't take a very wise man to figure that out.

K. It had a lot of detail. You know, it sounded---I normally don't pay any attention but it sounded very plausible.

D. I don't believe...if they wanted some fellow not from America... Maybe some of the fellow said something, even I doubt this one quite frankly.

K. Well it sounded very plausible. It repeated many things that you said.

D. From...it is not only my point of view. I told you they feel the same, that is very clear Henry. I am telling you...

K. Look, I am not asking to be loved. I am saying we are in a very difficult situation. The two people who helped put the detente together is the President and me and there is no sense in attacking the two of us while we are trying to do this. Whatever mistakes were made last week were not unilateral. Mistakes were made on both sides. Although I can tell you, having to deal with Egyptians is enough to test anyone's nerves.

D. I'm not arguing about that. I think it is not worthwhile to argue. If you look in perspective at the big things we have done and have to do in the future, all of these things were very small but got out of proportion in sense of word which Brezhnev had given to them.

K. We now have the art of statesmanship. Now is for us to keep this thing together and to go back to the big things we did together rather than let it besplit completely. We did important things for three years and shouldn't let three days get in the way. On behalf of the President pass on his message to your leadership that he feels, that he attaches the greatest importance to continuation of what has been known as the detente policy and the greates importance to the confidence established between him and the General Secretary.

D. Yes, he said that he is going to write a letter.

K. He asked me to reiterate.

D. Will he write a letter?

K. Yes, he will write a letter but we haven't had a chance. It may be Friday. We have been preparing for the Egyptian and Israeli visits. It will be a very positive letter.

D. I understand, you need some time...I understand.

K. On your specific proposal, we are prepared to designate somebody to meet with somebody you designate to discuss how to implement Article 3 of Security Council Resolution 338.

D. Where?

K. They can meet in Geneva, or here, whatever you decide.

D. You are here.

K. Let them meet wherever. Should he go to Moscow? Eventually they can take a trip to the Middle East.

D. Why don't they begin with the Middle East?

K. We have another idea that hasn't been fully decided yet. We may upgrade the head of the Interest Section in Cairo and send a more senior person there with the agreement of Egypt and he could get together with whoever you have.

D. Just trying to develop ideas you mentioned...

K. We don't exclude a trip to the Middle East.

D. Just to give them something. I know for instance, Gromyko will hardly like the idea. When he is in charge, you are in charge. ...people in Cairo, just to put Atherton. I don't know, maybe I am wrong. That is my impression. Do something we ask you.....

K. Then let me raise this tomorrow with the Israelis.

D. I think it would be better. I mentioned to Gromyko and Brezhnev your discussions with....but thinking aloud, they are waiting for their reaction.

K. Let me raise it with the Israelis tomorrow.

D. Yesterday it was one thing, today another.

K. Let me see what the Israelis reaction will be.

D. They didn't react negatively, but they are waiting further because you said you haven't discussed anything...

K. I will give you a definitive answer tomorrow.

D. I will send to Brezhnev the message from the President, but on this particular issue I won't say anything until I here from you.

K. We have given strict instructions to this department to keep their mouths shut. Now it turns out you have over a hundred ships in the Mediterranean. If that keeps up we will be driven into--

D. How many have you?

K. Less than 50. Look, you used to have the same number of ships as we had and then it increased.

D. Is this a number game or a word game?

K. In the past your number was about a third of what you have now.

D. Are they military or commercial?

K. No, military. We don't object to commercial. These are submarines and others. You have double the submarines you normally have and nearly three times as many surface ships.

D. I will....just thinking aloud.

K. That is right. It would certainly be noticed if there was some reduction and would bereciprocated. You can tell them that.

D. I will tell them. What really they want up to now we didn;t... What about the second proposal?

K. What second proposal?

D. Using UN helicopters.

K. Let me discuss that with the Israelis. I understand.

D. All right. UN business not ours....I have a small matter that became apparent. We discussed with you about 36, or 32. Malik went there and the Swedish officials say they have 37. Could we finish this. Malik asked me today if we could settle on the 36 and forget about it.

K. Yes, we will settle on 36.

D. Could you get Scali these instructions.

K. Yes, I shall, You can tell Gromyko but don't tell Malik until I have told Scali which will be another hour.

D. I will wait two hours more. Our information is nothing, nothing really new....mentioned staying until Golda Mier is out.

K. There aren't going to be any spectacular results. I will see him again tomorrow.

D. How are things with Golda Mier? I hope you will tell....

K. We will tell you about it tomorrow, or Friday. She will be here today.

D. All right, Henry, the President said he is going to tell us.

K. We will tell you tomorrow.

D. O'k. Nothing else I guess, Henry.

K. That is all.

SL395

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Carl Albert - Secretary Kissinger
October 31, 1973
6:02 p.m.

K: Just wanted to tell you where we stand on that trade bill.

A: Right.

K: Our problem is we have not been able to get enough of an indication from the Jewish Community if they would support dropping Title IV. Our view on it is that if they would, we would want to have it voted on now.

A: Well, we can put it on or put it off.

K: I was wondering if we can do it the week of November 12.

A: We were going to do it next week, put we probably could do it then, let me talk to _____

K: Then let us ...

A: We'll try to put it on then.

K: If you could put it on the week of November 12, we would then take the liberty of letting you know next week.

A: Fine.

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SL 394

TELCON
Flanigan/HAK
October 31, 1973
4:38 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Well, I'll call him. You know I haven't had 30 seconds yet today.

F: I understand that. I don't know what I can do about it since you're the guy he called.

K: What do you want me to tell him.

F: I think you should tell him that you can't say yet whether we want this thing scheduled and on the assumption that it would go on the floor Monday the 12th could he give us say till Tuesday before asking us to make that decision.

K: Until next Tuesday.
F: Yes.
K: OK. Fine.

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SL393

TELCON
Ambassador Scali/HAK
October 31, 1973/1:28 p.m.x

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

S: Hi Henry. I'm about to go into a meeting with Malick who has just finished talking with Dobrynin. Malick insists that the meeting be held right now. I'm at the Security Council and its in recess. Before I go in and talk with him I want to know if the instructions I had are still the same.

K: Well, we told him we would agree to the largest number that any other single contingent has.

S: Same position then.

K: That is right. Now what is that number?

S: Well, the Swedes are authorized for 36 but they have only 32 so lets stay with 32.

K: Right. You know I wouldn't fall on my sword for those four.

S: I wouldn't either. I understand but I'm going to try to keep them to 32. Now how about the other?

K: That never even came up.

S: Romania is against the others.

K: That we never even raised with me.

S: OK. Well, he's already been into the Security Secretary General and beat the hell out of them for the fact that he's sending Canadians over there as truck drivers. He claims that when the Secretary General announced this on Saturday at the open meeting of the Security Council he didn't hear it. So he's trying to get the Secretary General to reverse that and Canadians out. Can you imagine.

K: Well, he's a pain in the --- .

S: This is the only thing here to discuss I need to know.

K: The only thing we discussed yesterday. He was screaming about 32 or 36 and so they came down to that.

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S: They have that.

K: Well, that's my impression.

S: Alright.

K: And I told him that's between Scali and Malick and stick to 32 but if you must go to 36 but don't go beyond it.

S: I most certainly will not.

K: OK.

SL388

TELCON
The President/HAK
October 31, 1973/8:45 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

P: Hello.

K: Mr. Prespdent.

P: With your Foreign Relations thing today. One thing I think is very important is that well of course you have to lay out the facts with regard to the Mid East and so forth. I think it was well with the way they leak and the way they like to play things that you emphasize the fact that the detente is breathing and strong and so forth and so. In other words, what really matters with these Russians is what we say to them privately and what we do to them. The public statements I think Dobrynin's point is well taken that, I mean it is a little rough for them to read all this crap you know and then they wonder well what the hell... do you see what I'm getting at?

K: Yeah.

P: I would play it in such a way that you aren't afterwards. They'll misquote you but if they quote that you are breathing fire about the Russians.

K: No, I'll play it in very low key with the Russians.

P: Yeah. Fine. How did you meeting go with him afterwards?

K: We mustn't forget they tried a big bluff last week and when they say about alert they had everything.

P: I understand.

K: But we had a very good meeting and I think we're substantially back on course now. See what they're trying to do is only we can really deliver the Israelis so they are constantly trying to get themselves into a position where they can claim by threatening us or by pressuring us by doing this or that they have made us do what we were going to do anyway but the meeting went very well and we parted very cordially.

P: You will get this message from me by 6:00 or 5:00 or whatever it is.

K: That's right. I thought I'd talk to you. When were you planning to come back?

P: I'm in Washington. I got back this morning.

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K: Oh, you are here now. Well, maybe I'll drop down to your officae now.

P: Are you in the building?

K: Yes.

P: Oh, come on over.

SL386

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Congressman Thomas Morgan
10/31/73; 8:38 a.m.

K: Hello.

M: Yes, Mr. Secretary.

K: Mr. Chairman, I just saw in the New York Times that some members of your Committee said that I said to the Committee that I was disgusted with NATO.

M: You were disguested with NATO?

K: I don't recall having made such a statement.

M: Well, I don't remember either.

K: You know, I pointed out some of the difficulties we had had but I certainly didn't say I was disgusted.

M: The quote didn't identify the member? I haven't seen the times yet.

K: No. No.

M: Well, gee, I will . . .

K: Well, I don't ask you to do anything. I just wanted to check my recollection. I will just deny this.

M: Oh, sure, because I will back you up.

K: Good.

M: Certainly will, because I didn't hear you say it.

K: Right.

M: Certainly will!

K: But I thought it was a good session and I appreciated your courtesies.

M: We will -- we were just talking yesterday, you know, we got through yesterday without anything, any leak whatsoever. I was talking to _____. I am surprised. I will look at the times right away and check it out. But, I will stick with you on it. Just deny it.

K: Good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

M. Okay, Mr. Chairman.

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SL387

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Larry Eagleburger
10/31/73; 8:34 a.m.

K: Hello.

E: Yes, sir.

K: Are you going to the Senate Committee?

E: I was planning on it, yes, sir.

K: Can you give me all the consultations we had with NATO before then.

E: Okay.

K: You know, Cromer, Jobert, meetings with the NATO Council, and so forth.

E: All right. I've asked for it by twelve.

K: I know, I know. It will take at least eight hours. There must be some Goddamned guy who has got it.

E: Sir, I will get it. I will have it.

K: Okay, fine.

E: Right.

K: Oh, did you cancel Montana?

E: Yes, yes, and we told them we would like another date suggested.

K: Good.

E: Okay.

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SL391

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Gov. Rockefeller/HAK
October 31, 1973/12:53 p.m.

K: Hello.

R: Henry.

K: Nelson, how are you?

R: How did the meeting with the Senators go?

K: Very well, I'm taming Fulbright. He stepped out with me and complimented me on the policy and ...

R: No kidding, good for you. Oh that is the best news because I was worried about his position.

K: No, I've got him under good control right now.

R: Marvelous. Now I got a call from the Israeli Ambassador saying that Golda Meir is coming over with, you knew of course, come to see you, you invited her but he wanted me to come down on Saturday to call on him.

K: I think it would be good.

R: You do.

K: Yeah.

R: I'm very fond of her.

K: No, I think that would be very good. Then maybe if I could talk to you for a half an hour before.

R: That would be marvelous. You are going to be here Saturday.

K: Yes I will.

R: I'll check out on time with your office and see when I could get down. Henry, we are facting very serious oil problems here in this state which is things are going to be worked out in the next month or so its not going to be so bad but if they're not we've got to do some drastic stuff. We'll continue anyhow to plan.

K: I think you should continue to plan. I am trying to get them worked out. Also trying to get Gov. Love here to do something but he's not our most energetic man.

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R: No he isn't I'm afraid and he didn't get off to a very good start on the hill either.

K: He's a nice guy but he's lethargic to a point that's ;not to be believed.

R: I guess that high altitude, you know when you come down out of thie high altitude unto the plains.

K: I'm told that at his last meeting he had 55 people.

R: You're kidding.

K: I don't see 55 people bureaucrats in a year.

R: Well it sounds to me like he's going the road of Pete Peterson.

K: Exactly.

R: Is there a legal opinion?

K: No yet. I will try to get it this afternoon.

R: Well, you may be right on that. You can't afford to take any chances.

K: Well, that's my real worry. Otherwise I would love to have him because I really need, I don't need a doctor, they want to send a doctor with me.

R: It's just exactly what he does is what one needs under pressure.

R:
K: That's right. /Maybe he could go incognito with a beard.

K: As an Arab. Anything I can do on my own I'm proud to be associated with him. It's just the association with an official trip that worries me.

R: I understand.

K: Nelson, I was wondering... I just don't think I ought to come up tomorrow night.

R: That's fine. I don't think you should either.

K: Because first of all the exhaustion of running back and forth on top of what I'm going to have next week.

R: No, then being with all these people, shaking hands, making speeches and so forth, unnecessary.

K: And secondly if I skip a Golda Meir dinner here in which I was supposed to make the toast, even though I have a good excuse, ...

R: You can't do that.

K: All the Senators will notice that I'm not there.

R: No, you can't do that Henry. So this is fine. If they'll accept it I'm delighted.

K: I'd be pround of it.

R: Will your office handle it.

K: I'll get my office to handle it.

R: Just have your office say that you can't be there that if they would like I would be delighted to receive it.

K: You're really a great friend. And let's try to have a good talk on Saturday morning. I'll give you our whole strategy so that you have some understanding.

R: Marvelous. Listen Henry, while you're on the phone ... are you going to be there in the afternoon?

K: Yes, I'll be there all afternoon but I'll be tied up until about 4:00 - 4:30.

R: You will.

K: Yes.

R: And what about the morning?

K: Tomorrow.

R: Saturday.

K: I'll be there all day.

R: You will

K: Yes.

R: They want me to come down Saturday. I was thinking of Friday afternoon but has she got a schedule for Friday afternoon?

K: I don't know. I don't think so.

R: Are you going to be there Friday afternoon?

K; Yes I will.

R: I'm going to see if I can get there Friday afternoon. I'll check and be out then and see you. You're not considering John Cooper for anything ~~KX~~ are you. He's very anxious as you know to go to Russia, Germany, go somewhere.

K: Russia I can't give him. The relations are too tense now.

R: That's what I was wondering.

K: Germany we might consider.

R: He's tremendous. He doesn't hear anything so that he probably wouldn't cause any trouble.

K: Yeah. I've got the President calling.

R: Take care.

SL390

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Amb. Robert McCloskey/HAK/JOE SISCO
October 31, 1973; 12:30 p.m.

McC: I got your word on the New York Times story, and I'll handle that. I've talked to one of the staff members who reaffirmed to me that Morgan will back it up.

K: Yeah, Morgan said that's correct.

McC: Now, in doing this, I'm certainly gonna be asked well what did you say about NATO.

K: Say I thought it was an Executive session. I expressed our general views, with which they are familiar.

McC: Okay. Anything new I should know about the Middle East?

K: Not that I know.

McC: Are you going to be seeing Mrs. Meir separately?

K: Yeah, I'm having breakfast with her tomorrow morning.

McC: Okay. One of the things I'm likely to be hit with today is atrocities against Israeli prisoners. I think George Vest has heard that Valeriani had some whiff of this from I don't know where. He hasn't done anything with it yet.

K: Well, I wouldn't get into that.

McC: Yeah, okay. I had done up a little bit more on Europe and I wondered what you think of it.

K: No, I think we should just get off now.

McC: Uh, huh. How about the point of consultation. Larry told me he was pulling together some material for you to use up there.

K: Say that our own records show that we've had some most extensive consultations.

McC: OK. I'll make a point...

K: And if necessary we'll put out every conversation we've had, but it wouldn't really...

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McC: I don't think we have to prove our virility.

K: Yeah, that's what I think.

McC: Isn't it true that the visit of Mrs. Meir was on their initiative?

K: Yes. But why go into that?

McC: I won't, but if people get into my office and start arguing about it.

K: I would not say that publicly.

McC: Yeah, Okay.

Joe Sisco is on the other line. He needs a word with you.

K: Okay.

S: Fahmi has just called and would like -- he's just had an urgent message from Sadat. He would like if possible to move up the 2 o'clock meeting by any period that you can, 15 minutes...

K: Well the earliest is 1:45.

S: All right, I'll call him back and tell him.

K: Well, now, wait a minute. Let me get you on something. Dobrynin yesterday proposed to the President that they and we send a high-level official to Cairo to help supervise the ceasefire. Now that again puts us into that special role on one side of the line. I am opposed to this. What I think thought we can do is to appoint somebody to begin talking with them about arranging the joint auspices. It's best thought that we don't always say no.

S: Well, I think that you could...the only one who can really talk to them sensibly in terms of the joint auspices, and you will have to find ways during the trip.

K: Joe, will you give me a one-sentence answer then, because the President is waiting. Who, you? How about Atherton?

S: Fine. We're both going to be on this trip. In the next day or two?

K: Whom did you think?

S: I didn't think either. What kind of timing are you talking about? Today? Tomorrow?

K: I'm talking about maybe announcing it Friday to begin operating a week from Monday. And I think I can't spare you.

S: Oh, you meant in terms of who would be the man named at Geneva. I misunderstood you. I thought you meant begin to consult with the Russians right now. Is that what you're talking about?

K: The man who would then maybe eventually wind up in Geneva. But just so that we can deflect this one proposal.

S: Well I had in mind myself and Atherton.

K: Both of you?

S: Well, or one of us. It depends on what level they're going to appoint.

K: Th ey will appoint whomever I...I thought we'd appoint Atherton and keep you here.

S: Well, it's up to you. If that's what you want to do, it's all right with me. But it's not something that ought to be decided in 5 minutes. I've got a memorandum for you in terms of outsiders and insiders.

K: So, I've got the problem of a Brezhnev letter to the President, of a Presidential insistence on answering it this afternoon, of a proposal of two men going to Cairo, which I'm trying to deflect. That does not have to be our final word. This has to be our preliminary exploration.

S: Well then why don't you tell them that you will name either ~~you~~ he or me and make your proposition as you've indicated.

K: Is that a possible proposition?

S: Certainly it's possible, for a period of time it is, yes. You and I can clarify this in three minutes alone.

K: Joe, if I had three minutes, I wanted to come to the Department to talk to you about this.

S: I'll come over there.

K: Joe, I've got a 12:45 meeting, for which I'm late.

I've got a 1:45 meeting with Fahmi. I don't see any possibility of talking to you.

S: Well, the other question is, do you want me there at 1:45?

K: Yes. Absolutely.

S: I'll get two minutes with you at 1:43.

K: If I'm back by 1:43.

S: Well, there's a problem in the Schlesinger meeting and I have to take 30 second more. That is, the letter to Hussein, as you know, we stopped because he was going to answer a letter to Hussein which was negative on the question of the military assistance. We are working out with the Pentagon a set of proposals so that you will be able to tell Hussein that we can do XY and Z. If Schlesinger shows you a letter which is a holding action letter which says we're looking at your request that's the kind of reply that ought to go so that you actually give the reply when you arrive in Amman.

K: Good, I agree with you.

S: And I'll be there at 1:40 so that if you want a few minutes with me, we can talk. / McC: One last thing, Mr. Secretary. Pompidou has proposed a Common Market summit.

K: Who?

McC: Pompidou, in a broadcast this morning. Would you have any reaction to that?

K: Well, that doesn't include us. No, we have no comment.

McC: Good, thank you sir.

K: Right.

SL401

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
November 1, 1973
3:30

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I called you to see if you were with any of our allies and secondly to make sure you are not corrupting any non-aligned.

D: Laughter.

K: What I would like to propose to you on this force.. the non-aligned have now proposed Ghana and Yugoslavia and also they have proposed that Canada and Poland should be on the back-up logistics force. We will accept Ghana. We cannot accept Yugoslavia. We can accept Poland and Canada as back-up, so you win two out of three and we recommend Romania instead of Yugoslavia.

D: In this case we will be against Romania.

K: We will be against Yugoslavia.

D: If it comes from the Warsaw pact.. anyway we don't want to put it on this basis. I am just telling you this off the record so to speak.

K: We will accept on Poland for the back-up.

D: What is back-up?

K: For logistics support.

D: Did Poland ask for logistics support?

K: That is my understanding.

D: You understand... was not ...from our side

K: If this compromise is accepted the only outstanding .. is Yugoslavia.

D: I know. I don't have anything specific.

K: I can instruct Scali to do this. I thought you might calm down Malik.

D: I did not know anything about Poland or logistics

K: This is not a new proposal by us. We are accepting an existing proposal. My understanding is the Poland and Canada... is the existing proposal.

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D: I understand, but I don't have this information and you are right.. I haven't heard anything. As of now, I will tell Ghana...

K: Ghana, we will accept.

D: In this combination..not acceptable to us.

K: Why are you so hard on one of your allies?.. member of the Warsaw Pact.

D: On this I know.·· We give you Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria..

K: We have taken Poland..the Bulgarians will head north against the Turks. That's the only country they can fight....

D: Well, Henry, as for Romania, I would like you to not insist on this.

K: We don't...only insist against Yugoslavia. This is all..I have.. There is only

D: I could

K: I have . I told you about Poland..is a concession. This is a sign of good will.

D: I am asking you..

K: I understand that it is the existing proposal we have up to now refused and are now accepting.

D: Quite all right and the question of as is. You will inform me

K; I am informing you. We will not accept Yugoslavia. We are not against.

D: But, this has nothing to do with Canada and Poland.

K: That was our recommendation for..

D: Let me put it this way. Canada and Poland is support.

K: Yes, but we will not accept to Poland..another country. We have made a concession with Ghana and Poland.

D: As you know, Canada and Poland on logistics. As for Ghana, I don't have anything, but you.. should not mention you're against Yugoslavia. As for Romania, you

K: Yes, but that I don't insist on. Maybe we should drop them both. .... How about Serbia, Montenegro.

D:

K: If you keep it up your allies will ask for Albania.

D: That you will accept.

K: We don't recognize Albania.

D: Neither do we. I will tell about our Canada and Poland.. on this you will bring in tomorrow.

K: On the other one, yes.

END

SL403

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Major General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
November 1, 1973
4:40

K: Brent, I think you ought to put the WSAG back on at 10 tomorrow.

S: I have.

K: Have you had a chance to talk to Dinnitz?

S: I have talked to him and he assures me they understand what a crucial role you play and I said it looked to me from reading Peter Rodman's notes.. and he said I can assure you that's not the way I feel and I will talk to the Prime Minister again.

K: That's not the point. It is what they are up against here.

S: I know. I told him that. I said when you get down to where decisions are made you will be up against... a difficult situation and you have been put there by one individual. He said he knows that. I said it doesn't look like that. He assured me he would talk it over with the Prime Minister.

K: Good. I have to talk with you about how to conduct yourself while I am gone. I am sure the Russians will try something.. to get hold of the President. It is essential they don't get anything I didn't give them.

S: I agree, right.

END

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S402

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Scali - Secretary Kissinger
November 1, 1973
4:20 p.m.

S: ...going to talk to Tekoah but I wanted to talk to you before I talk with him. I wanted to ask you whether or not you could conceivably change your mind on Indonesia. They are the most responsible people up here, the most responsible by far.

K: I don't see how we can hold this line. Why don't you talk to the Israelis, but we can't be beaten to death by the UN people while the Israelis are beating us to death, saying we are betraying them and we have so many fish to fry.

S: There will be of necessity about half a dozen vetos ....for special circumstances. AFricans need representation. If we skip the Indonesians, who are with the peace force in VietNam, and by all standards the most objective of the non-aligned....I can veto until the cows come home.

K: .....wait until you talk to Tekoah.

S: Just isn't going to seell because of .....If you can give me Indonesia because they are by far the most responsible. They have talked about the practical need to get along with both parties. Amb. Sani is the only guy we've gotten any support from, if you skip him and go only withNepal it just isn't going tofly.

S: We are being driven from one impossible position to another by tactical exigencies. It's absurd to have forces one of whose members is opposed to....

S: I can say that we will veto the composition of this force. ...Came up 40 times this morning in what was a violent closed door meeting; Indonesians only ones not in on this.

K: That's going to be our fate on alot of things.

S: Sure it is but I wonder if there isn't any give on Indonesia, since you know what they are like .

K: When do you have to know?

S: In the next 45 minutes.

K: OK, I'll have Eagleburger call you.

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SL400

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Mr. Bourghiba, Jr. of Tunisa
1:30 p.m. 11/1/73

K: How are you?

B: Hello, sir. I want to apologize for intruding like this.

K: That's all right.

B: But I was on my way from Turkey this day and I looked on the papers and I saw your trip which is being prepared and I will be very brief sir, I would like just to make a few points--

K: Yes, but you unfortunately called me out of a meeting and I have to be very brief if you forgive me.

B: Yes, I will be very brief sir. I have seen that your program has overlooked Tunisa.

K: Well, I was sending Secretary Neusome to Tunisa.

B: Yes sir, but if I may just add one word--the personality of President Bourghiba--your overflying Tunisa without stopping would be very badly interpreted.

K: All right, well let me see what I can do.

B: I beg your pardon?

K: Let me see what I can do.

B: You're very kind.

K: And we will be in touch.

B: One suggestion --a one hour stop would be more than anything.

K: All right. At the airport?

B: It would be terrible not stopping.

K: All right, I will see what we can do. And we will be in touch.

B: I'm sorry for intruding.

K: No, I appreciate it and I remember the pleasure of our conversation.

B: Thank you so much. Good night, sir. Thank you.

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SL 404

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Mininster Shalev - Secretary Kissinger
November 1, 1973
5:10 p.m.

K: Good idea for me and the Prime Minister to get together. I don't really think we need a confrontation right now.

S: No sir.

K: I think it would ah....be a good idea if you would....I would like to propose that you send Yarev over here to meet with me and Sisco and anybody else you want to send. Then, let him report back to the Prime Minister and then if she wants to see me in a calm atmosphere. ... I don't think it is helpful...I heard what she said to the Senators this morning. That is just not helping at all.

S: Mr. Secretary, may I say something.

K: You can say something , but I am just asking you to transmit .....

S: I wasn't present at all her meetings, but I was present to hear what the Prime Minister said to the Senate leadership at about 1:00, she spoke for about an hour and I don't think you would feel the way you do.....

K: Look, I had a call from one of the Senators present urging me to urge the President to ask to get the Foreign Minister over here. He said any further contact between you and the Prime Minister could have disastrous consequences. Now, he is a dear friend of yours. He maintained that he gained that impression from what she said this morning at the meeting and I really think Yarev and I or Yarev and Sisco could work something out and present it to the Prime Minister then bring her tomorrow morning if she still disagress.

S: Very good, but I would still very much like to know, like you to know what she said. She spoke of the friendly president and.... what you did for Israel in these weeks in sending out the airlift and....

K: Its not a question of gratitude, its a question of tough decisions next week which she cannot do from such a posture.

S: I don't think .....I will pass it on to Dinitz.

K: I'm not free before 8:00 - 8:30. Will you pass that on to...

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SO 48 *

TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin
Secretary Kissinger
1:35 p.m. 11/1/73

RELEASED IN FULL

D: Hello?

K: Anatol.

D: Oh hell, Henry. Good afternoon. This is I received a telegram from--in connection with we discussed with the President and _____--you remember the message of Brezhnev about this same thing--those people who represent our two and them--

K: Yeh, but we haven't really agreed to it yet.

D: No, no, no. I know. They are answering me to tell you on your remark. And you have to report back to the President and then you ask his final answer.

K: Right.

D: So the question really is to tell you they are positively looking to ideas which you expressed aloud that those people who could be appointed by both of our governments--Soviet Union and the United States to look about it--the ceasefire agreement on Israeli-Egypt front were at the same time represented their _____ of both governments during the negotiations on Middle East settlement in accordance with agreement which

K: One minute, Anatol. There must be a misunderstanding--we have never agreed to foreign special representatives to supervise the ceasefire--it is a UN responsibility.

D: You say that they may come there.

K: I said that we are prepared to appoint the people who would provide the auspices and who perhaps in the performance of their duties could do some traveling, but not for the ceasefire--but for the auspices.

D: No for the auspices we appoint a force which is nothing new--

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K: But the people who are providing the auspices can also do some traveling.

D: Yeh, I understand, but you remember--

K: We have not agreed to a ceasefire--to separate US-USSR ceasefire supervision Anatol.

D: But it was proposed you were saying that those people could come there --it was this way. We proposed--I'm just trying to recall how it was happened. This proposal would the people be sent there--and you said okay then they go there for a very brief time but then better to have the people then--or maybe it was a good idea you could have then to be represented on the auspices--under the auspices for that settlement. So it was in this way it presented in a proposal and so on.

K: Right.

D: So it is not exactly that you proposed to have auspices--it was to make a proposal on this to send them there and you said it could be developed in a different place. So I could make a reservation from what you said that you want not--

K: So far--Israel--I doubt whether Israel will agree to it, but I have presented it to them.

D: Yeh. That was in connection with your thinking--and as for our possible you remember ----American representative to Tel Aviv--this question could be considered originally when it will be the response of ------- So what will it now be for you really for you to report to the President and when he okays, will be ready immediately or not immediately--we will be ready to discuss in more concrete terms the practical sides of all this--

K: Okay.

D: I don't know how you--I am sure you will discuss problems with Israelis--but for my own information--could you tell something to us tomorrow let us say?

K: Yes. I hope to get you an answer tomorrow. Assuming we can get the Israelis to agree--one of the maddening things of this situation is that everyday we are being asked five more things we have to get them to agree to.

D: No, is this--for the last days we haven't said anything.

K: No, no you've been more restrained than your Egyptian allies.

D: Egyptians are you know--but on this it really matters that discuss with the President, so we would really like to have a reply.

K: We will reply tomorrow.

D: Okay, but take into consideration this particular answer which you give me right now.

K: Exactly. We'll take it very seriously.

D: And then second, this is from Gromyko saying once again about the composition of this United Nations Force on the Middle East. He is just asking me to tell you--to emphasize once again the importance adopted by the Security Council Resolution principle where fair geographic distribution. Because this described in the telegram saying he really could not give any good---for Waldheim. Waldheim is doing everything what he is told by Scale and of course we are going to press on Scali from now on but they hope that really he will understand the Security Council.

K: Well, I understand we now settled the two-observerquestion.

D: That is my impression, yes. But now it is about the troops and we are feeling that about Poland, Czechs and Bulgaria.

K: You want all three of them?

D: That was proposed, I don't know all of them or one of them. It's not my business, because I have my own things, but I know Waldheim said

K: But the principle we have tried to follow is that it should be composed of countries that are--have diplomatic relations with both sides.

D: And this is--that you couldn't give up any man from Africa because nobody else is left except South Africa and we couldn't go along those lines really, to be strictly observers, after all its Security Council decision. So I understand your point because they told you so.

K: It's not just what Israelis have told us, but there is a certain elemental fairness to have an emergency force which is supposed toqperate between the two sides. But--which is composed to a considerable extent of countries that have broken relations with one of the sides and therefore cannot be--cannot presume to be impartial.

D: Yeh. It is clear, but at the same time it could be done if just accepting what they are telling really--

K: If you had had my talks with the Prime Minister of Israel, you wouldn't suffer from the illusion that we are doing everything they are telling us.

D: No, no.

K: They are accusing of betraying them--

D: I don't know what you are telling but ------the pressure on you is very clear. I am sure she could do it along those lines. Public pressure. Really Henry Gromyko asked me to have you look into this matter and --

K: I will look into it.

D: What kind of answer I have to give Gromkyo because now he is pressing me on this

K: I'll have to talk to Scali--I'll call you later this afternoon.

D: Today.

K: Before the end of the day-

D: You report to me huh?

K: Yes.

D: Good, thank you very much.

SL398

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec. Packwood/Sec. Kissinger
Thursday, November 1, 1973
10:30 a.m.

P: Henry.

K: Yes. How are you?

P: Very good. This will take 30 seconds. When you go to China would it be possible for you as a favor for a constituent of mine to ask you, if it is possible to obtain a certain stamp.

K: Certainly.

P: You are leaving, when? You are going to Europe before going to China?

K: I am leaving on Monday.

P: We will get it in a letter describing the stamp. It may be impossible to get the stamp.

K: If you can get it to me today.

P: I will get it there one way or another.

K: Send it to my office at the State Department. I may not be able to get it.

P: I don't know either, but at least I have made the effort.

END

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SO 49 *

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
November 1, 1973
3:30

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I called you to see if you were with any of our allies and secondly to make sure you are not corrupting any non-aligned.

D: Laughter

K: What I would like to propose to you on this force.. the non-aligned have now proposed Ghana and Yugoslavia and also they have proposed that Canada and Poland should be on the back-up logistics force. We will accept Ghana. We cannot accept Yugoslavia. We can accept Poland and Canada as back-up, so you win two out of three and we recommend Romania instead of Yugoslavia.

D: In this case we will be against Romania.

K: We will be against Yugoslavia.

D: If it comes from the Warsaw pact.. anyway we don't want to put it on this basis. I am just telling you this off the record so to speak.

K: We will accept on Poland for the back-up.

D: What is back-up?

K: For logistics support.

D: Did Poland ask for logistics support?

K: That is my understanding.

D: You understand... was not ...from our side

K: If this compromise is accepted the only outstanding ..is Yugoslavia.

D: I know. I don't have anything specific.

K: I can instruct Scali to do this. I thought you might calm down Malik.

D: I did not know anything about Poland or logistics

K: This is not a new proposal by us. We are accepting an existing proposal. My understanding is the Poland and Canada...is the existing proposal

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D: I understand, but I don't have this information and you are right.. I haven't heard anything. As of now, I will tell Ghana...

K: Ghana, we will accept.

D: In this combination..not acceptable to us.

K: Why are you so hard on one of your allies?..member of the Warsaw Pact.

D: On this I know.·· We give you Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria..

K: We have taken Poland..the Bulgarians will head north against the Turks. That's the only country they can fight....

D: Well, Henry, as for Romania, I would like you to not insist on this.

K: We don't...only insist against Yugoslavia. This is all..I have. There is only

D: I could

K: I have . I told you about Poland..is a concession. This is a sign of good will.

D: I am asking you..

K: I understand that it is the existing proposal we have up to now refused and are now accepting.

D: Quite all right and the question of as is. You will inform me

K; I am informing you. We will not accept Yugoslavia. We are not against.

D: But, this has nothing to do with Canada and Poland.

K: That was our recommendation for..

D: Let me put it this way. Canada and Poland is support.

K: Yes, but we will not accept to Poland..another country. We have made a concession with Ghana and Poland.

D: As you know, Canada and Poland on logistics. As for Ghana, I don't have anything, but you.. should not mention you're against Yugoslavia. As for Romania, you

K: Yes, but that I don't insist on. Maybe we should drop them both. ....How about Serbia, Montenegro.

D:

K: If you keep it up your allies will ask for Albania.

D: That you will accept.

K: We don't recognize Albania.

D: Neigher do we. I will tell about our Canada and Poland..on this you will bring in tomorrow.

K: On the other one, yes.

END

SL399

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. McCloskey/Secretary Kissinger
November 1, 1973
11:12

K: I think on the Newsweek problem what I would like to do is to take them in on the China leg. We should have an extra seat by then.

M: I think we can work that out. I was hoping to see you briefly before you went back to the White House.

K: Well, I have someone with me right now, why don't you come up and wait and maybe you can ride over to the White House with me.

M: I'll be happy to.

K: There are some things I want to talk to you about.

END

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DATE/CASE ID: 28 APR 2004 200102979

SL405

TELECON
McClosekey/Kissinger
November 1, 1973
5:55 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K. I just had the Egyptian Ambassador in my office. He claims you said in your briefing that the Israelis refused to go back to the October 22 line but were discussing a permanent road.

M. No, that is not at all what I said. It was a long briefing.

K. But where did you get any information?

M. Can I find out exactly what I said first. When I have the transcript in front of me--

K. I had it here a minute ago and I lost it.

M. Can I call you back.

K. Please, call me back.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 28 APR 2004 200102979

RELEASED IN FULL SL408

TELECON
Dinitz/Kissinger
November 1, 1973
7:00 p.m.

D. Good evening, Mr. Secretary.

K. Mr. Ambassador, we have a rather urgent problem on MFN.

D. Yes.

K. I am trying to arrange that the House drop Title 4 altogether, get the Jackson Amendment through in the Senate, and decide in March when it goes to conference which way to play it. The Jewish Community is taking the position that they will tell their congressmen that for their own reasons they decided to drop Title 4. That is not good enough. They must actively help us get it dropped. I urge you actively to do that. You will have them all tonight. I think that if the Prime Minister will say something, not at dinner but---

D. I know what you mean.

K. We cannot drive the Soviets absolutely against the wall on every issue.

D. I didn't have a chance to talk to the Prime Minister about it yet but I will this evening. She will have a chance to see the Jewish leaders tomorrow.

K. Good. Will you let me know? I forgot she will be here tomorrow so she doesn't have to say anything tonight.

D. Yes, she will be here tomorrow and we will probably have another meeting.

K. Good.

D. I will see you tonight.

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DATE/CASE ID: 28 APR 2004 200102979

RELEASED IN FULL SL413

TELCON
Mr. Jameson - Secretary Kissinger
November 2, 1973
6:00 p.m.

K: What I wanted to tell you is the best thing you can do is keep everybody from taking panicky action while invoking the gravity of the situation. If we can alleviate the situation on this trip we will know that soon, if we cannot avoid it, if we can avoid the temptation of these people buttering up Saudi Arabia, saying the government is stupid, and that kind of thing.

J: We have a meeting here Monday. I've said the same thing before, but I'll repeat that to them.

K: If they have grave doubts about the government, if they think we are not doing enough, tell them we will continue to press, believe me we are doing everything we can. We have got to organize pressure to face the onslaught of the Israeli lobby.

J: I will prepare them before they go out.

K: I will talk with absolute frankness with King Faisal.

J: That's what he needs.

K: I will ask him what he would risk by easing the embargo for 6 months, he can always go back to it if the situation isn't any better. He can always go back to it.

J: If you could convince him of that, that would be a major step. I will take the line you suggested and we will be in touch with your office around the 15th.

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SL407

TELECON
Roger Davies/Kissinger
November 1, 1973
6:52 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K. A minor protocol question. I have to give the toast at the Israeli embassy tonight. To whom do I toast, the President or the Prime Minister?

D. I would think the President. He is the protocol____.

K. Even though he is not there?

D. She will toast the President of the United States and we should do the same. May I suggest, sir, that you toast the President of Israel and the gracious Prime Minister of Israel. I would do it double barrel, sir.

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RELEASED IN FULL SL406

TELECON
Ismail Fahmi/Kissinger
November 1, 1973
6:40 p.m.

K. Hello, Mr. Foreign Minister.

F. I am sorry to bother you again but I just got two cables here from my President, one discouraging and one hopeful. The first one informs me that today Israeli planes invaded our air space west of Cairo and then they fired on one of our rockets. They fired at that position with a direct rocket, one of your latests. They say it was one of the televised rockets.

K. O'k, I will have to look into that.

F. From a distance of 25 to 10K and then they had a direct hit. This is very serious. The second promising thing is that you remember when you talked about this Monday. I advised the President that we had to do something quiet about it. He responded that only for a week we together get along with things, you know, without infliction on the Egyptian President. On that particular point he is telling me that oil tankers with Liberian flag we let it go through at _____ without any interception from our part. This encourages both of us to try to achieve something substantial before I go back.

K. I appreciate that very much.

F. Now we have two indications, one very disturbing about flying and hitting about the ceasefire, and then there is this second promising one. I leave it up to you. If you can do anything to finalize what we agreed on before I go back to Cairo--

K. I think it will be next to impossible but will give me added incentive.

F. Will you let President Nixon know of these.

K. I will call him immediately in Key Biscayne.

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Nodis SL44

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Mr. Jameson - Secretary Kissinger
November 2, 1973
4:00 (approx)

J: How are you?

K: Fine, how are you. How would you like to deal with Israel for awhile and let me deal with the Saudis?

J: I have been in Europe calling on people and told them they have got to ah....take this very seriously.

K: I don't want them to get panicky.

J: There's an awful lot of material in the supply system, and on the water. But its going to catch up quickly. They are well aware of it.

K: If we can hold on quietly until I have had a chance to talk to Saudi Arabia. I'm not sure I can achieve anything. They are not easy people.....I'm going to be the first Jew accused of anti-semitism.

J; Well, I'm afraid that's right.

K. My problem is when to apply the pressure. What is now obtainable will immediately satisfy the Arabs but it doesn't get us very far down the road, I want to talk to Sadat and see if we can make a rational plan which can be carried out over a period of months. If we can get a plan, we can convince them and turn it over to Faisal.

J: We have got information the Saudis are trying to get off being the chief confronter of the US.

K: We have to get a political mechanism to let Faisal get out of the corner he has painted himself into. I think the best thing you could do is to keep evrybody calm.

J: Theonly country which has moved is Holland. They are in a terrible bind. Others, although they are aware of the problem, I'm sure are not going to moee within the next three-four months.

K: If we could, if you could keep people aware and keep them calm in terms of taking action for another 10 days, then I will be back here (on the 15th) and if you wanted to come down with your group we could discuss strategy. I would brief you on where we stand in relation to Arab nations. Right now the chances are only 50-50. We are certainly prepared to make a major effort. Theonly question is whether the domestic situation in the Arab countries is such that they could give us 6 months to get it organized, that's our problem.

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J: I understand Henry. We have to send a team out to Saudi Arabia. The first meeting is set for the 10th Its a long scheduled series of meetings, operational and board meeting in Saudi Arabia.

K: All right, but urge them, tell them to say something useful, stress my sincerity, the seriousness of the US government, the domestic situation we face, and that does not at all imply that.... oh, the President's calling me, I'll have to call you back.

RELEASED IN FULL

SL412

TELECON
Scali/Kissinger
November 2, 1973
4:36 p.m.

S. Dobrynin is going to be calling you. Malik called him from my office. He was in to discuss the Poland and Canada observer logistics...He says that is not enough and on the basis of your conversations with Dobrynin Yugoslavia is already being included.

K. That is a lie.

S. I told him that is not so. I have a complete record of the Dobrynin and Kissinger talks. At no point did the Secretary of State even agree to include Yugoslavia. We have left it that Dobrynin would get to you.

K. I never agreed to Yugoslavia and it is impossible to include them.

S. I wanted to tell you just so when he talks to you you make it as emphatic as possible. You have everybody sewed up and he just wanted to get that extra six inches. When he talked to Dobrynin he seemed to calm down a bit, but I am not sure.

K. All right. I will talk to Dobrynin.

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SL415

TELECON
Scowcroft/Kissinger
November 2, 1973
6:35 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K. Brent, does Sonnenfeldt understand we need that paper tonight?

S. Yes, I told him.

K. That doesn't produce it if he has a chance of showing what a big shot he is.

S. I talked to him at 5:00 and he said he would have it in an hour.

K. It is now 6:30 and you know it is not going to be good.

S. It should be, he has had time.

K. O'k.

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DATE/CASE ID: 25 MAY 2004 200102979

SL410

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Mr. Flanigan - Secretary Kissinger
November 2, 1973
2:35

F: Thank you for calling. I understand how it came out last night. Now, you are going to be leaving on Monday. Unless effective action is taken to remove from the calendar its going to come up anyway.

K: I have done exactly as I was told. We had it put on the calendar the week of the 12th, which gives us the option of taking it off next week.

F: Yes, but when does the option run out.

K: Tuesday, is what....

F: Thing is you ought to be here for it to be under your name. Its a question of making the decision of taking it off. How do you want us to proceed if you can't be here at that time. If you could do what ....

K: My view is if we cannot get title IV, then delay it.

F: Unless we are absolutely confident the vote will be against title IV, delay it.

K: Of course, George Shultz has a different view.

F: I understand Henry, I just don't want to say we let you down. Would you like to go to the President. He is going to have to weigh in if.

K: I would wish for you to represent my view.

F: I will do so, everybody knows it, possibility you, your view, in a vote, I would give, against Shultz' views and Pierce's views at that point in a majority situation, I'll be perfectlys frank with you, you are going to lose. If you feel very strongly you should go to the President.

K: Then you should go to the President. It's a question of having my views represented.

F: Good, very good.

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K: I just don't see how we can load this on the Soviets at this time.

F: Remember, though, an action by the House is not an action by the full Congress or the Senate.

K: Yes but we shouldn't play games, you know once the House has voted it.....in order to get us to go along with Title IV will be just as compelling in March. You won't have any luck getting the President to veto that bill.

F: I just hope you understand the broad international repercussions of not having a bill, which is what we would have.

K: I hope that goes to the President.

F: In our negotiations with the Hill, , if we can get Ullman of the Ways and Means committee in favor of dropping that title, need a lot of persuasion. If Ulman wanted to see you on Sunday,

K: Peter, I'm at the edge of my physical strength now. I mean I'm working 18 hours a day. I'm going on this trip, and I don't see how I'm going to get through. I must have Sunday.

F: Saturday as well.

K: Absolutely booked for 2/3 of Saturday now. There must be a surcease of this constant pressuring. What can I tell Ullman anyway.

F: I understand Henry, and you are stronger than most. But .....to defer on National Security grounds. And you are extremely pursuasive. You did a fantastic job in the Foreign Relations Committee. I agree there is a limited amount of Kissinger to use. If you can't do it, I understandd. They wanted to have you before the Committee very much on Monday. I told them you have an impossible schedule. But if the ways and means committee were strongly in favor now.

K: If it has to be, put it to me later in the day. Right now I have to get off the phone.

OK Henry

SL419

TELECON
Dinitz/Kissinger
November 2, 1973
7:34 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K. Mr. Ambassador, I will be glad, if it is convenient, to call on her about 10:00 tonight.

D. 10:00, at Blair House.

K. I will bring Sisco and somebody to take notes. I don't know who.

D. You don't want to see her alone?

K. I will be glad to talk to her alone first. It is up to her.

D. I will tell her that.

K. If she wants a longer talk alone, fine. But we have to get it down in some manageable form.

D. She has asked me to call Stenis and some of the others... The record of Stenis is incorrect.

K. That is unimportant and nobody else...I didn't know.

D. She simply did not say it.

K. He had the same impression as somebody else who was at the meeting.

D. About this point?

K. Not about this point. That needles were being stuck into us. That the tone was not friendly. Even if one cannot... the situation is too serious for us to play around like this, for us to argue who said what. A friend of mine from Jerusalem said a campaign was starting in Israel against me.

D. No.

K. Why would he call? I don't care about campaigns. We have very specific problems. We have to do various things, if not by me by somebody else. They will be done, in opposition to Israel or together with Israel. If you think it is easier from postures of hostility then they will have to be done that way.

D. Mr. Secretary, when all the understanding of the matter depends on what has to be done. I don't know what you have in mind.

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K. I have told you.

D. What you have in mind I have a distinctive feeling can be done.

K. I didn't make the toast at the dinner last night.

D. She felt that was a closed meeting.

K. Those of my colleagues that were at the meetings I chaired for three weeks could not believe what they heard. It was astonishing. I changed going to an award dinner I was getting in New York to going to the dinner. I didn't want a collision course.

D. I think that....and I have been doing everything in my power...

K. Let's see where we are on the immediate problem and work out ....Fifteen NATO ambassadors called on me about the same stories and about our energy situation. Those are facts of life. We can see if we can find common procedures and commence to see if this...If you can get rid of some of your principals in this election we can do better. You have that choice.

D. I don't quite follow you.

K. You can launder your own key people and see if that will _____what realities as is produced. We haven't made one single proposal on a long-term settlement and no agreements with anyone on long-term settlement. I have told you a hundred times that there was not going to be an American plan. There must be something. Maybe I shouldn't be so honest.

D. That can never be in our relationship. If we take the long-term settlement.

K. My impression is you are so concerned about the long-term settlement you will not take a short-term settlement. When we meet we will tell her exactly what I believe must be done and we will see if you can do it or not do it. If you will not and you believe it is impossible, we will have to see what the President will decide at that point.

D. Yes.

K. I have intended to develop the absolute minimum that has to be done. We cannot make a settlement with Brezhnev, go to Tel Aviv and come to the brink of war and go over that again in a week over a settlement you agreed with...

D. Well, we will have to meet and hope that...I will do everything in my power...

K. That is where we stand now. I will be there with Sisco at 10:00.

D. O'k.

RELEASED IN FULL

SL417

TELECON
Ambassador Kosciusko-Morizet/Kissinger
November 2, 1973
7:15 p.m.

K. Hello, Mr. Ambassador.

KM. I just received a message from Jobert with papers about this Copenhagen business. He asked me to convey these directly to you before you leave. I think it is important.

K. Of course.

KM. It is a good contribution to the importance of the text Tru_____ discussed and so on. What is the best way?

K. How about 10:00 tomorrow morning?

KM. About 10:00. All right.

K. Can it wait until then?

KM. Of course, of course, I hope I didn't embarrass you this afternoon.

K. No. I thought you were very constructive.

KM. I didn't want to...but asked acute and pressing questions.

K. I thought you were being very constructive, Mr. Ambassador.

KM. I will see you tomorrow at 10:00 at the State Department.

K. Good. I will look forward to it.

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SL418

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Scowcroft/Kissinger
November 2, 1973
7:32 p.m.

K. How about the papers I need for my breakfast meeting? Is it too early to send those?

S. No. They are on their way now. They are being carried over.

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SL416

TELECON
Dinitz/Kissinger
November 2, 1973
7:00 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

D. Sorry I was away when you called me. The Prime Minister was in a meeting with Secretary Schlesinger.

K. How did it go?

D. It was very formal and cordial, nothing of substance. They discussed the military requirements which he said depended on three things - funding, availability, and national policy. That was all. The Prime Minister thanked the United States Government. Mr. Shalev reported your conversation to the Prime Minister and she asked me to phone you and tell you something. I had the occasion to talk to General Scowcroft who related to something one of the senators said. It is absolutely not correct that the Prime Minister does not justify the alert.

K. She just said she didn't know any of the facts. They were in her possession. Senator Stenis came to the White House - and he is not a trouble-maker - to tell me he felt there was a whole series of charges in the Prime Minister's statements. That is her privilege but it doesn't help anything.

D. Of course not. She said just the opposite. That it was a great and important act.

K. I didn't pass it on to the President.

D. It was just a matter of a misunderstanding. She also said it again....The Prime Minister does not feel she can be in a position of having somebody else be required to represent her and would be very happy to talk at any time you called. She doesn't feel--

K. What do you feel we should talk about if we meet?

D. I frankly think the two of you should meet alone.

K. I don't think there is a basis for it. I think there are two possible ways. Either work out something we can do together of if not, we will do the best we can do alone after which we will work unilaterally. We have no choice.

D. I am suggesting myself, in addition to your real problem which are really the problems, there is the misunderstanding itself. In order to reach an understanding for the newt week as you call it I think the meeting is needed to understand the peace prospects. I am not here to force a meeting, Mr. Secretary. The Prime Minister cannot allow that others come by....

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K. How about getting Eban over here and we can be meeting at the Foreign Minister level.

D. I can suggest that. If I may, I would rather not repeat the suggestion to her. Unless you want to make it to me formally.

K. Well, what is her schedule?

D. She has a private dinner at our home. Just us. That can be cancelled.

K. I am not free really much before 9:30 or 10:00.

D. How do you suggest that we meet - at Blair House or at the White House or where? I would suggest that you two sit faced together. I think it is better this way.

K. After we sat together last evening, it didn't lead to anything.

D. So I understand from your people. It didn't work.

K. That is an understatement.

D. She had a good talk with the Governor.

K. He told me about it. He came to see me.

D. I felt after the Governor's meeting there are those problems that are genuine and those that are not. I think there is a tremendous amount of misunderstandings. It is not true she has said half the things that were said. I was present....

K. A lot of things happened yesterday before anyone reported anything, starting with the breakfast.

D. That was a moment when she was really concerned about a number of things. But these are not things she is talking and complaining to people about. She is talking to you.

K. Well, Mr. Ambassador, I think we both know what is happening. We can see it in the press and elsewhere but now the practical problem of how to....

D. I know that nothing comes from us that is for sure. Working half....to get the impression there is no pressure. On the practical problem that is my suggestion. I cannot say. If you feel it is better not to meet--

K. Is she saying she is not prepared to have Yariv meet with Sisco?

D. Yes, she is not prepared to have anyone else handle negotiations. That is why she is here.

K. Where are you now?

D. At Blair House.

K. I will have to call you back.

D. All right, Mr. Secretary.

SL414

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
David Landes/Secretary Kissinger
November 2, 1973
6:20

L: I know you are unable to see me tomorrow, but perhaps I can see you when you get back.

K: That definitely. You know I an on a seventeen hour day schedule.

L: I know. I don't know how you do it.

K: ..what concerns you.

L: It is hard to talk about on the phone. Let's say when I went to those countries in 1968, I needed to get into a decompression chanber when I returned before I could ...the impressions I had received and get my perspective. They are really very good, you know.

K: What do you mean?

L: You kn ow, Dale Carnegie's book, on winning friends and influencing people..they are very good.

K: But are you worried I may givesomething away because I am impressed?

L: It struck me. I think of myself as calm and...but I found them extraprdinarily effective. I recognize, as you must, it will be hard...the long haul will be hard.
K:
K: The long haul will be brutal. The only choice the Israelis have is whether they will give us a chance in breaking the deadlock. Weaning the Arabs away from the Soviets ...by having a chance..rather than having a unified Arab bloc against them, with Western Europe, the Japanese, the Soviets and most of the Arabs against us....pushing us into a confrontationin this country..such a wave of anti-Semitism, they will destroy everything. It is essential for the Jewish Community here and the Israelis to seize on a mutual program.

L: I couldn't agree more. I wanted to talk about that problem, about the kind of assurances that would accompany such a program, palatable and acceptable.

K: Well, look I can't do it at 10:00. May be I'll do it at 12:00.

L: Well, in that case I'll come down.

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K: What time?

L: I can re-book at the Watergate.

K: Let's say I'll do my damnest to see you.

L: OK, I'll come down.

END

SL409

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Shultz/HAK
November 2, 1973; 11:41 a.m.

S: (missed first few words) The story is like this. That he (Poehl) is here. The Embassy doesn't know it - on behalf of Brandt and Scheel and Schmidt. And the basic message is that they would like to cooperate with the U.S. in the Middle East, and they don't know...

K: Why do they come to you?

S: They don't know quite how.

K: Well, my question is, what's he doing seeing you if that's what he wants to do?

S: Well, I'm just describing the situation that arose out of Schmidt's call to me. I suppose Schmidt called me because I'm the person he's been dealing with. But at any rate they say that they have a great deal of sympathy for Israel's problem, they would like to be helpful, they don't quite know how. They would like the upper echelons of the Israeli community to know that they want to be helpful, but they feel it would be counterproductive for them in their problems with the Arab if they make it a big public thing. What exactly they would suggest is not clear although they, for example, think they might ~~xx~~ through the Bundesbank in effect make available a line of credit line, say, $200 million, or something like that on a basis where the time of repayment is not a big issue and interest payments could be made, and so forth, and in a sense have that credit flow via the United States to Israel. But that is a specific thing that is an example of an implementation of a general stance. I talked with him some and thanked him and said this is really, you know, not for me particularly. This is Mr. Kissinger's bailiwick and I'll call him and see where we go from there, but it sounds to me as though they are in a way responding to things that you said and they want to get themselves into a posture where Germany is collaborating with the U.S.

K: No, but do they want to talk to me, or do they want ~~me~~ to give you ~~xxx~~ a message?

S: They want to be in touch with the government here and I'm sure they would like to talk to you, and Poehl is here, he's available to come over there if you'd like to see him and sort of take this over, or if you would like to have some two or three people try to see what kinds of things in the light of this might be thought of, we can do that.

K: Well, that I would like, anyway. Well, let me see whether I can find a minute. I've got about an 18 hour schedule.

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S: Yeah, I'm sure you do.

K: And let me see what I can do.

S: My guess is that they came to me 'cause they thought I'd probably be easier to see than you.

K: No, no, look George, I don't have that sort of feeling. I just want to make sure they're not taking a cheap shot so that they can say domestically they made a great effort.

S: It may be that that's what they're doing, and I think you ought to... I believe it's very desirable that you talk to Poehl personally, if you can.

K: I'll do my best and I'll call you this afternoon. Now I had to cancel out of the offset agreement because I've got to do something about the Israelis, but -- out of this offset meeting -- but if you can accept Sonnenfeldt in my stead, we can go ahead with it -- Sonnenfeldt and Casey.

S: I have no trouble with that, as x long as we have you, in effect really represented there.

K: Okay.

S: Now, Casey called me about it and said it was off and should he cancel the whole thing, and I said, well, we've got to have Henry there. So as of now it's canceled, but it can get put back on again. But, can I suggest this to you, Henry - to the extent that what they're really thinking about is some financial proposition, probably Volcker here is the best person to work on it. The foreign policy aspects of this are dominant. I don't know how you might want to position that, but I suppose Sonnenfeldt must know pretty well your thinking on that. If it is possible, it might be worthwhile this morning to put Poehl, Volcker and Sonnenfeldt together and let Poehl say what he has to say to those two.

K: Why don't we do that.

S: And then they can crank around and see what they might think of. And then it it comes time when you can see Poehl, why there would be a little more substance to go on.

K: Okay, who don't we do that. I've got the President on the other line.

S: Shall I call Sonnenfeldt and tell him we want to do this?

K: Yes, please. S: All right. Thank you.

no dis

RELEASED IN FULL

SL426

TELCON
Amb. Dinitz - Secretary Kissinger
November 3, 1973
5:15 p.m.

D: Now we have got everybody so excited we will not be able to have a rational discussion. But, let's do it in two parts tonight which we hope will facilitate things. First what you can live with. You can give us your professional assessment of where that leaves us, then see how much we can take.-- see what we dan do. We shouldn't have it in a Wagnerian atmosphere as you mentioned because the President said he asked her to go back to her cabinet, or rather Haig did.....

K: That would be nice, but I'm not sure Egypt would accept my proposition. In fact, I rather doubt it, as long as it's an unacceptable proposition I wonder if it makes a hell of a lot of difference what .....

D: I will try to put it to her, what we thinkwe can live with, start with this.

K: And don't tell me you almost have to have Israel on the road on top of withdrawal.... As we discussed yesterday, Israel holds both sides of the roads, the UN does the inspecting, you would therefore see if weapons or.....I mean, what can they hide in the back of a two ton truck?

D: Well, our military experts say they can do that, their anti-tank missiles, for instance which they have used so effectively...

K: I'm telling you this suicidal impulse of the Israelis must be stopped. If you are not willing to open the roads, you will drive us into more .....if you can turn over the roads, then other things can be discussed, no chance -- you are not imposing unconditional surrender, your government is the only one .....

D: Well, this thing should be discussed between you and the Prime Minister.

K: the proposal of October 22 lines. I think you're wrong but that I can get into my head. OK. I just wanted to tell you the issues.

D: There is no misunderstanding about you are alone.

K: I understand that, this is not between you and me personally. If it were between you and me, somebody else could settle it.

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D: It's not between you and her, either.

K: No, not with me, the issue isn't with me. I am clear about that, don't worry.

D: Fine.

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SL421

TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin - Secretary Kissinger
November 3, 1973
11:35 a.m.

D: Hello.

K: Hello Anatoliy. How are you?

D: I'm having a vacation.

K: Vacation?

D: For two or three days its been quiet on the front. I am just trying to use it.

K: I understand our two combattant friends in New York have settled all their issues.

D: What do you mean, this one? on UN forces? .....I refused to call you. Scali said going to call you and

K: Scali said he was going to call me?

D: Anyway I sent a telegram what we discussed. Scali said no, I sent to Gromyko, Gromyko discussed....in Kissinger's words. I said I don't want to call, yesterday I told Malik. He said no, no, Scali refused to until Kissinger is called. I said I am not going to call Kissinger anymore. He gave me his word...

K: I am glad it came out this way really. Anatoliy, since the President -- we have a long letter for Brezhnev -- didn't want to send just a short one. It gives a general review of our relationship but it says very little about the Middle East. We will send it over this morning. You will see it has very positive, it is a very positive letter on our entire relationship -- how he visualizes its continuation.

D: Is there any answer on proposal me made, specifically the first one about representatives?

K: Let me tell you our view. Hold on a second, --- the President is calling me. I will have to call you back OK?

D: OK.

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SL425

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TELCON
Amb. Scali - Secretary Kissinger
Noo 3 [part 1
4:20 p.m.

S: I wanted to call before I talk with him. I wanted to ask whether or not you might conceivably change your mind on the Indonesians. They really are the best people up here. They are the most responsible by far.

K: I don't see how we can hold this line. Talk to the Israelis, but we can't be beaten to death by the UN people. The Israelis are beating us to death, betraying us and we have so many fish to fry.

S: _____special circumstances. Africans need representation. Indonesians in Viet Nam by all standardswere the most objective of the non-aligned. They have talked about the practical need to get along with both parties and Ambassador Sani is the only guy we've had any support from.

K: We can't drift from one impossible position to another by tactical exisgencies. Its absurd to have a force, one of who's membersis opposed to the others.

S:x All Ican say the votes on the composition of this force was held more than 40 times this morning.

K: That will be our fate on a lot of things.

S: Sure isn't any give on the Indonesians, since we know what they're like.

K: When do you have to know?

S: In the next 45 minutes.

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SL420

TELCON
Secretary General Waldheim - Secretary Kissinger
November 3, 1973
10:15 a.m.

K: Hello, Mr. Secretary General.

W: Good morning, Mr. Secretary of State. Well, before you are leaving I thought I should talk to you. I think what we got yesterday is the maximum we could get in the Security Council.

K: Right.

W: I wish to thank you for your cooperation in this regard because I know how difficult it was. I had a long talk with Mitchell Sharp and he is coming to see me again at 11:00. We may be able to settle the matter with the Canadians. The Canadians are quite ready to do the job. Of course, the main problem we have is the question of the cease fire lines. I'm sure you are familiar with it. The Russians and the non-aligned are pressing me very hard at this time in this regard. I instructed...

K: In what regard, Mr. Secretary General?

W: In regard to pushing the Israelis back to the 22nd lines.

K: Do you know where they were?

W: The Russians and the non-aligned asked me to instruct _____ to put the question directly to Dayan. _____ has requested Dayan to withdraw to the the 22nd of October lines. Dayan said immediately it was out of the question but he would forward the request to the Government. He could not decide it alone. The matter was left in suspense. The last information I got Dayan said they w ould have to wait until Mrs. Meir is back from Washington. This is what the Russians and non-aligned are pressing for very hard, ...trying very hard, but have to wait for return of Mrs. Meir. I don't know if you can tell me anything about this matter.

K: We are trying to see how we can work out practical arrangements. .....seem to be totally stymied ....for supply of third army. That's what we are putting emphasis on right now.

W: We are doing our best to be helpful. To carry supplies to the Third Army. The two military commanders are meeting regularly

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under UN auspices.....West of the Suez. These meetings take place in quite a good spirit.

K: Mr. Secretary General, why don't we arrange this, if the discussions make any progress, I will see you are kept informed. I realize you are not a free agent, but if one could avoid inflammatory UN debates it would help very much.

W: Certainly, I have done what I could to avoid this sort of thing. Most of the acrimonious debates took place in closed meeting. The confrontation between Malik and Scali took place in a closed meeting, and the public didn't really know about it..yesterday evening .

K: Good, that's very helpful.

W: I'll do my best to avoid such acrimonious confrontations. All in all things are quite good, the situation in the Security Council. Especially because the non-aligned countries are very interested in making progress, and they didn't like at all the acrimonious remarks of Malik.

K: Mr. Secretary General, very much appreciate your even handed....

W: All in all things are going very well. I am most grateful for cooperation from you.

K: I will call you when I get back and will keep you informed while I'm gone.

SL423

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Hal Saunders - Secretary Kissinger
November 3, 1973
11:50 a.m.

K; Have you seen the Egyptian proposal?

S: Is it the 10 point one?

K; Yes, that's it. Are you doing an analysis.

S: Yes, we are pulling together a complete analysis in addition to giving you negotiating ideas.

K: I have got to be able to negotiate this thing so I've got to be able to read it.

S: We've got it just about done. It's being done in parts to kind of speed things up. _____ has done part, he's done a lot of work on the first steps.

K: Canyou come up with alternatives.

S: .....disengagement phase, period of stabilization of cease fire.

K: We've got that so screwed up at this point even I don't understand it.

S: Exactly, that's what we're working on, to see if we can come up with alternatives.

K: My intention in this phase if to sound positive but obfuscate enough so they can't pin me down,....

S: We can think in these terms. One thing wrong with it, we need some kind of negotiation, something for the Israelis.

K: Need to get East Bank and West bank armies exchanged.

S: Right, that could be part of this step.

K: Well, I'm not going to worry about this at this point. Maybe they could keep second Army, and withdraw the Third Army.

S: I'llhave something for you early afternoon.

K: Your view, do they expect me to leave Egypt with a final settlement.

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S: No, I don't think so. You could talk them out of that, they've got to learn that....

K: First we have got to talk them out of the October 22 settlement.

S: That isn't going to be so easy.

K: Even if we turn the roads over to the UN, supposing there is never a solution to the lines. Why don't we get the roads turned over to the UN?

S: Get them turned over to the UN and start talking about the lines. Never accept the notion of going back to October 22.

K: And, release the prisoners at that point. The basic point is that the October 22 lines are important only if you assume Israel is going to stay on the West Bank a long time. If you assume they are not going to stay, it doesn't make much difference. If Egypt starts a Wagnerian fight on the October 22 issue and we use all our credit getting Israel back to that, then we won't have any credit for the next round.

S: The position I would take, play the Israelis.....

Kissinger

SL424

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin - Secretary Kissinger
November 3, 1973
12:20 p.m.

K; Sorry, I have been talking to the President, then I had to make another call. I had a rather lengthy talk with him. First, we will send over the letter for the General Secretary. Let's go to the proposal of joint Soviet-American cooperation. Here is our difficulty. I'm going to be going to Egypt next week. The purpose envisaged in our understanding has not even started yet, although we strongly favor it. What we going to do is to send a senior man as head of the interests Section in Cairo. We have no hesitation about announcing publicly that he is to work closely with your Ambassador there on the cease fire agreement.

D: What about cease fire, what is...?

K: Not on cease fire. Work in close cooperation on Security Council resolution issues.

D: Yes. What is actual situation, as it stands now? What is Israeli position and what is, as of now? on the Security Council I mean.

K: As of now we are having a monumental problem with Israel. You can get that from the newspapers. You can see how they are beginning to attack me.

D: What is their position, Henry? They want to have exchange...?

K: They want an exchange of prisoners, and they want an exchange of territories, West Bank for the East Bank.

D: As a whole. Egypt donesn't like the idea?

K: The Egyptians don't like it. There is something to be said for it, but Egypt won't accept it, we're not pressing them.

D: Israelis propose an exchange of prisoners and an exchange of territories. This is their position?

K: Right. We will get at minimum some arrangement for permanent supply of the Third Army.

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D: The corridor you mean?

K: That's one of the ideas McCloskey mentioned. I'll be goddamned if I know where he got it, I didn't give it to him; but as it turns

out it is a possibility.

D: I think these issues look, putting aside the resolution, October 22 without telling us, unacceptable...but I don't, might change their minds.

K: Let me finish the bilateral thing and then we'll go back to that. As soon as we get back I will designate somebody, Dean Rusk or Herb Brownell.

D: Yes, it should be a big man.

K: ...to represent us in the peace negotiations. We would be prepared to say the first thing he should do is go to Moscow to talk to your people to prepare some action.

D: Did you talk with Rusk or is it just an idea.

K: As a matter of fact, I have been trying to get Rusk on the phone but haven't been able to reach him. Those two people are who we have in mind. I may be able to tell you by the end of the day what reaction I get.

D: When are you leaving?

K: Monday morning at 9:00. To get back to the issues.

D: So where does it stand now?

K: We would like to get Israeli to accept the proposal with withdrawal . We are having monumental task. I sat up with Mrs. Meir until 1:30 last night. And, I can imagine prettier girls to sit up with.

D: Well, sometimes you have to sacrifice....

K: This is where we stand right now.

D: As of now, peace proposal to begin negotiations of exchange prisoners and territories and position is to solve the Israelis business? What is position of Egypt? When I spoke with them yesterday they said no, no, but what about today.

K: Their position is no.

D: Then what is your position?

K: Our position is to try to find some, at least interim, solution but we haven't made a formal proposition yet because we are trying

to see what we can get through a combination of negotiation and pressure on the Israelis.

D: As it looks now then, you do not have any decision?

K: The problem is that the Israelis have to have a cabinet meeting tomorrow. By Monday we hope to have the specifics. We will communicate them to you.

D: The general situation is what you just mentioned?

K: That is correct.

D: And maybe by Monday you will have more precise information. Suppose I call you on Monday at 8:00 a.m.

K: Well -- will you be home tomorrow?

D: I would like to go out, but could I call you.

K: What time will you be back in the evening?

D: Around 9:00 p.m.

K: Why don't we have a chat tomorrow evening.

D: Around 9:00 or 10:00, whatever you like.

K: Well, I don't mind coming by the Embassy, say around 9:15.

D: OK. I will be back. 9:15? Tomorrow, not today? Just want to be sure.

K: Yes.

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SL422

TELCON
The President - Secretary Kissinger
November 3, 1973
11:40 a.m.

K: Mr. President.

N: How are you getting along today?

K: I think these various maniacs are going to work me into a nervous breakdown. I sat up with Mrs. Meir last night until 2:00. I think we are making some pregress with her but whether enough to satisfy the Arabs I don't know.

N: You are making some progress?

K. Yes, some progress, whether or not, not as dangerous as the day before.

N: Al told me how rough it was up there.

K: It was brutal, she called yesterday and I refused to meet with her -- told her to send her representative. That shook her up a bit.

N: Well, that's the way these things are.

K: Didn't want to pull ...

N: We know its just a question of ...we are trying to balance several different parties here -- the Israelis, Egyptians, Syrians, Russians. Let alone the Europeans yapping at our heels and so on.

K: I think the Egyptians realize they are better off taking what they can get now. If they force an all out confrontation on the October 22 issue, then we can -- we can't have yet another confrontation three weeks later on the basic settlement issue.

N: Which is much more important.

K: A lot more important.

N: That's the point to make to them, which you naturally will.

K: Right.

N: It's a very solid point.

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K: Can make a very good case ....not just getting off the roads, say non-military supplies on the roads. Egyptians will just move the tanks and other stuff off the roads, give the road up to the Third Army and then they will be trapped....put the road operation under the UN, will to get off the roads, not willing to get off the cross country access. May be Egypt would be willing to buy this. Willing to put the UN on the roads.

N: Anyway, there's another day before you take off, Monday, right?

K: Drafted a very positive reply to the Soviets in principle. One problem, there's almost no way to do the joint mission which isn't going to lead to another explosion. I really don't see what useful purpose it serves. Israel let the Soviets in, the British and French are screaming their heads off and :US-Soviet mission, I don't see what good can come of it. Egyptians don't particularly want it, Fahmi told me that. After I get back I'll send Rusk or Brownell to the peace talks, with a Moscow first stop. In that context might be willing to have them take the trip.

N: Sound right. Its a good compromise, sending somebody of that importance. Sounds all right. Let's try that. Anything else of importance.

K: The French have come in on other matters. They now have a very constructive approach to the European Declaration thing. Our screaming at them really has had some rather good impact.

N: Henry, as I see it, let's face it, we can't start having Europeans, British taking a ....line on everything we try to do. As Dulles used to say maybe we have to make an agaonizing reappraisal of European views. We are saving their oil, after all, they need it more than we do.

K: No question.

N: OK, well good luck. Call if you need anything.

K: Iwill call tomorrow. There's a possibility the White House will be able to announce resumption of diplomatic relations within a month. Possibly announce jointly from Cairo and the White House, and we'll upgrade our Interests Section with more senior personnel for a month.

N: All right, Henry.

K: All right, Mr. President.

SL427

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
President/Kissinger
10:55 a.m. - Nov. 4, 1973

P: Hello.

K: Mr. President.

P: Hi, Henry. Did you get that word off to ~~Buckinger~~ Schlesinger?

K: Yes I have, Mr. President.

P: I think that's certainly a good shot to do. It gives us time to think during the day and put our minds to it. Don't be panicked by the New York Times calling for resignation.

K: Mr. President, I don't pay any attention to it.

P: You know, they don't really realize what that would do to the country. Even Jack Knight blasted that today. He said, my god, you know, he's been one of our severest critics but he says can you imagine Carl Albert, Jerry Ford, let alone Carl Albert, talking to Breshnev and Golda Meir and the wiley Chou En Lai? I just let you know we're going to stand firm, old boy.

K: Mr. President, that's what they've wanted since 1969.

P: Yep. Well, this is just four years plus one from November 3rd.

K: I remember it only too well.

P: And then we were about 65, now we're 25. But it's alright.

K: Well, it's gone in both directions and the only thing that can be done is...

P: I know this has been a tough one for you, this week, with all this jabbering and so forth, and I just, if there were some way we could reach you before you get there because you've got so little to take to Sadat, that's the problem.

K: That's the problem. Well, we, what would be even worse if she gave a little bit more and we still couldn't get that because she is so far away from....

P: In any event, the UN airlift is certainly alright as far as I'm concerned.

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K: Right. Well, I'm having a WASAG meeting in a little while and we'll work it out then.

P: Good. Alright, old boy.

K: Goodbye.

SL429

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Dinitz/Kissinger
1:18 p.m. - Nov. 4, 1973

K: Hello.

D: Mr. Secretary, good afternoon. I have heard you talked to the Prime Minister subsequent to our telephone conversation in the morning.

K: Where is she, has she left?

D: No, she's still in the Blair House. And I'm in the Blair House now too. And she wants me to call you and ask you the following question, and the reason she's asking the question is because when she reports to the Cabinet tomorrow she wants to be equipped with as much possibility of explaining to them the situation and then _____ as possible. And what she's asked me to ask you is, suppose we accept your formula on the 22nd of October. In other words that we accept it in principle and we discuss _____ whatever way you fight. And you, yourself, said the night before last that it has a ghost of a chance of being accepted. And suppose it is not accepted by the Egyptians? She asked what are we facing then in this country? I mean she is saying this just so she is able to tell the Cabinet the full [redacted] implications of either move.

K: Well, that's a good question. I'll call you back in an hour.

D: Alright. That's fine. I'll be here all the time.

K: Good. Thank you.

D: Thank you Mr. Secretary.

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TELCON
Lord Cromer/Kissinger
1:40 p.m. - Nov. 4, 1973

SL431

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K: Hello.

C: Henry, yes.

K: I have talked to our people on this fleet movement and they say they don't want anything particular from you that isn't entirely technical. What they want is to send an airplane to Diego Garcia to pick up mail.

C: Well, there's no problem about that whatsoever._____ into something much more than that.

K: Yeah, but their view quite honestly is that you're building it up, and there is nothing there.

C: Really, it was your Defense people that built it up and discussed with my Defense people. They got off the diplomatic net.

K: O.K. By all means see Rush. Rush will urge you to get in touch with Moorer. And Moorer is instructed that if any difficulty at all just to use alternative means.

C: No, there is no difficulty at all. This ~~is~~ has all sort of got out of control.

K: Because what they tell me all they want is a facility to pick up mail.

C: We've got that with the greatest of happiness.

K: And the only other thing they might conceivably ask for is if a British fleet shows up is to station some reconnaissance planes in Diego Garcia to follow them.

C: Well, fine. We are doing some refueling too, as you know, but I mean it's all perfectly alright. Well, thank you for letting me know. They are ~~very~~ unhappy, Henry, about the continuing grumblings coming out from here and the lack of confidentiality. You know after our meeting the other day with major ambassadors, which seemed to me to go very well, UPI within two hours had a thing on the tapes saying it had all been very bad tempered and disagreeable, etc.

K: Yeah, but where did that come from? Not us.

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C: They said it came from the State Department, but they were not at the State Department briefing.

K: But that is impossible.

C: Well, this is what happens. And you know when you very kindly said you'd see me before the major ambassadors?

K: Yes.

C: That got out to the press. And it got out before I came to see you. Well, I had a word with Dick Campbell and I said, look, obviously your people have handed it out and just to make sure that we tell the same story, my meeting with the Secretary has nothing to do with the Middle East. And he came back and said, we never put it out. But there are some benevolent influences around.

K: Let me talk to McCloskey about it.

C: I think McCloskey will say they didn't do anything, But there is somebody talking.

K: I don't know why they could have said it was bad-tempered, because I thought in fact the meeting went very well.

C: Well, so did I and that's what we put out. And as a point of fact I think we managed to do our best to kill the UPI story, but the sinister thing about the UPI story is that they were not at the State Department briefing.

K: Well, somebody must have said it to them.

C: Well, somebody must have said it. And I don't think it was one of my colleagues, because my colleagues I think are reasonably happy.

K: No, I think that's right.

C: But, you know, there are some bad things going on.

K: Well, you know that my complaints have been stated. They are not matters that we would pursue and we certainly have only an interest to improve our relationship not to....

C: Well absolutely. But you see the thing that is riling them in London is the failure of the original statute on this security resolution the first weekend. That is thought to have been officially inspired here. In fact, it was to some extent by McCloskey. But we don't think that should have come out to the public at all.

K: Yeah. I agree with you.

C: I think I have to put the formal point to Rush if I may.

K: Yes, by all means.

C: But between you and I, I think we are equally sinned against.

K: O.K.

C: Don't you?

K: I think so.

C: O.K. Can I give Brent a call later in the day about what the position is on your leaving?

K: Absolutely.

C: Yes, about Mrs. Meir and ....

K: Well, her position is a stalemate. I can tell you that. But we're trying to wear her down.

C: Yeah, well that's the only hope.

K: Yeah.

C: Well thank you for calling me.

K: Right. Bye.

SL432

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
November 16, 1973-5:58 p.m.
Amb. Scali/HAK

K: Hello.

S: Hello Henry. John

K: John, how are you.

S: Alright.

K: John I wanted to tell you - I'm back here you know. We had a message today from the Chinese saying that the Soviets are the trouble makers on that resolution and I don't know what the point of the message is except that they are not sure that they can deliver..

S: Christ.

K: And that they must be sure -- and they want to make sure that you and they stay in close touch.

S: We have been working hand and glove like brothers.

K: I know. They are not complaining. They are just explaining what the problem is.

S: Well, you know where that could have come from Henry?

K: Where.

S: From the messge that you had Larry deliver.

K: I had Larry deliver what message.

S: Ask Larry to remind you about it. On how the thing had been worked out.

K: Whom.

S: To Dobrynin.

K: Larry didn't deliver any messages to Dobrynin.

S: Well, I think he did.

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K: OK. Well, I've got to talk to him.

S: Because I think the moment they became aware and I think from that moment on they began trouble making.

K: Yeah. Even if that is so it's water under the bridge.

S: Indeed it is and there is no effort here to second guess an expoert on it. But the important point Henry Is that I think that the Chinese here all along have under-estimated the militancy of the Algerians on this and are not yet experienced enough to deal with the Algerians and and Algerians decide that they are going to bring along the hole and athe line with it and it's partly in expedious despite all of the good will and sincerity they have and readiness to stand up for the deal but this presents us with an exceedingly difficult as you may have noted from the last two cables that we have sent because our _____ and particularly the Koreans are dreadfully worried that the Chinese despite their good intent will not be able to deliver.

K: It looks that way now.

S: And we kept reassuring them that well, give the Chinese a chance.

K: In this message the Chinese are blaming it all on the Soviets.

S: Well, I don't doubt that at all. But if it's the Soviets, the Soviets are working very closely with the nonalign namely the Algerians and the rest.

K: No question.

S: And this makes whatever alternative strategy we persue that much more risky becaŭse.

K: Well, there was no way the Soviets could not learn about it was there.

S: But that's water over the bridge.

K: Well, how was that.

S: Because this was a deal we had cut very exclusively and secretly with the Chinese. On all sorts of honor that it would not be disclosed to anyone.

K: OK J$_o$hn, I just wanted you to know where the ghing stood.

S: Well, all I can say Henry is I am willing to try any avenue and of course we'll seek any alternative way of pulling this thing out

S: because I do think it is of critical importance.

K: Right I agree with you.

S: But it doesn't surprise me at all that the Russians are trying to screw us on this too.

K: OK.

S: Alright Henry. Welcome back and as I said in my messages to you you did more than any single man had a right to achieve and the world had the right to expect from.

K: Aren't you nice.

UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED IN FULL

SL435

TELCON
Ambassador Dinitz
Secretary Kissinger
11/17/73 11:12 a.m.

D. ....a mutual friend of ours.

K: Who's that?

D: Joe Alsop

K: I see.

D: And we were speaking of the fantastic effort you have put in the last few weeks.

K: Right. Well I hope to see you soon. I may have to go to Key Biscayne. But look I have an urgent immediate probelm.

D: Yeh.

K: I have been informed by the Egyptians that they will let those ships through and that orders have already been issued to that effect, so --they may ask them to identify themselves but they will let them through. They told me they have promised only to ease the blockade and what they probably mean by that is that they should identify themselves.

D: I see.

K: Now, they also said--they said I want to assure you that no _____ incident will happen, but they pleaded with me to avoid Israeli publicity.

D: The publicity business--I don't see any difficulty, but the question of identification, that is how conversations were concluded, I wasn't privy to all the details of the Sisco meeting, but is this part of the agreement that the--

K: It is not part of the agreement--they never said specifically what they would do. In my judgment that we can get ended in a little while. This is a facesaving device, but I would ask you now for Christsake you have achieved more than you had any right to given your behavior

D: What was wrong with our behavior this time?

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UNCLASSIFIED

K: Not this time? But before.

D: I see.

K: But for God sake really now don't ruin this thing now because I think you've got every demand now that you came here with

D: I'll pass it on to the Prime Minister of course because as I said --do you think it is going to be in regard to the first ship or every ship will have to be identified--or you don't know this.

K: My judgment is that the Egyptians are looking for a facesaving way by which they cannot be accused of lifting the blockade. It's like you putting six roadblocks on the Cairo Suez road and then remove them again. Now they must be given the same privilege as to be as obnoxious as you.

D: Hm huh. .....all blocks when we move them.

K: Well you put about three up one night and then you took them down again and

D: And the UN puts them in

K: Yeh, now all I'm saying my impression is that what the Egyptians are doing is maintaining the general principle, but not the practice --now they resume the practice, I think you should raise holy hell --if theydon't resume the practice --they didn't even say they would be asked to identify themselves, they said they may,

D: I'll pass it along right away, Dr. Kissinger. I have a question to ask you. The PM has asked me to have a talk with you as soon as possible with you -- when do you see?

K: Let me find out what I have to do in KeyBiscayne

D: You are leaving today?

K: I don't know yet. As soon as I know that

D: Yeh, because I was scheduled to go to New York tomorrow, but I'll cancel everything if I know that we can meet tomorrow or shall I wait until Monday?

K: I just can't be sure--I'll let you know later today. But what I'm really anxious for is the Egyptains have flatly told us they would let the ships through -- that they will or have issued instructions that they may ask the ships to identify themselves and said with the advance information I gave them, they don't anticipate any problem but they hope that the ah--they have great problems with African and Arab friends and so they plead with us to do our best to to keep you from avoiding --from publicity--

D: I will mention these two points

K: And on the identification my view is that this is something that cannot be maintained for any length of time, until after--as long as every ship goes through.

D: Hmhuh. Hmhuh. I'll now pass it on and I'll see what I will -- see the reaction of the PM. I hope that, you know, especially if you will realize that it is not a regular practice that is going to takepalce.

K: Listen, I cannot promise--whether it is a regular practice, all I'm telling you is, I hope you realize the thin ice you are skating on for Christ sake and every time we make a proposal to you you can't just say no.

D: We have not said no, Mr. Secretary, I'm just trying to pass information to the PM and hope that everything will be all right.

K: I'm--I mean I thought you might be pleased with this information --it didn't accur to me that it could present a problem in Israel. I may be suffering from a misapprehension here.

D: No, I did not say that it would present a problem--I was just trying to understand

K: What I'm telliing you is when I got your message I immediately went to the Egyptians without our strong support for it, they have not agreed to let the ships through to interpret easing (?) that every ship can go through, what I told you was to be moderate, now they haven't even asked for it, now they have said the ships can go through, they may be asked to identify themselves and they didn't even saythat will happen and they asked for no publicity--

D: I --maybe there is no problem at all, I'm just saying--I just want to be sure what I am passing you, Mr. Secretary, I didn't know--

K: Well right, It is not a formal Egyptian demand and I have intended to be helpful to you,

D: Well we appreciate it very much. K:Right.

SL437

TELCON
Amb. McCloskey
Secretary Kissinger
11:30 a.m. 11/17/73

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

M" I'm of one piece, thank you sir.
Mr. Secretary I've been looking at your schedule over here and Tuesday it seems to me is very tough for you to have a press conference.

K: Why is that?

M: I gather that your Senate Foreign Relations Committee appearance is on Tuesday morning

K: Yeh

M: And remember we talked about shooting your wad twice in one day

K: Yeh

M: The other thing is that they have the oil executive s on now for the afternoon and that I'm told is immovable.

K: Don't every tell me that is immovable

M: I didn't

K: Some goddamn bureaucrat who has his ego involved that is all it means.

M: (laughs)

K: That's my working definition of immovable.

M: All right your definitions are permitted to apply in this case.
The other alternatives would be Monday or Wednesday -- to insist on Tuesday would mean to change the -oil

K: What time are the oil executives?

M: 3:00 p.m. (3:00)

K: They will be moved ~~till~~ to 5:00 p.m. if I want to hold a press conference.
Don't you tellme that oil exeuctives--

M: I'm not telling you that--I said I was told that

K: By whom?

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M: Just up around your office

K: Yeh, well let's not be sickening about that, if I want to hold a press conference at 3:00, we'll have the oil executives at 4 or 5:00

M: Hm huh. Okay.

K: What do you think of Wednesday for a press conference

M: It's not--

K: Besides that am I not meeting with the Senate Arm Services Committee on Wednesday?

M: That I'm not sure of sir.

K: So I'd be shooting my wad twice in any case.

M: If the Armed Services Committee is on Wednesday Monday is another possibility--

K: But I may have to go to Key Biscayne on Monday

M: Oh, I see. Should we then count on Tuesday

K: I think it is our only possibility

M: We will start preparations then without any public confirmation

K: Right, if worse comes to worse, we'll shift it to Wednesday or Monday

M: Okay, Thank you sir,

K: Bye.

SL439

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Roy Atherton
Secretary Kissinger
11/17/73 2:00 p.m.

A: Yes sir

K: Roy

A: Yes sir

K: Hello?

A: Yes.

K: Why dd you say yes sir twice, just once--twice is two often

A: (laughs) I thought you hadn't heard me the first time.

K: Well I thought you were trying to convey you were standing at attention.

A: (laughts)

K: Roy would you make sure the Syrian Depty Fon Min or if failing that their Perm Rep is invited down here for Tuesday or Wednesday--Preferrably Wednesday.

A: All right.

K: I told Sisco yesterday, but I'm not sure that--

A: I'll check with him.

K: I don't care what Sisco says, he's coming down Tuesday or Wednesday

A: Yes, I just wanted to be sure not to double track if it's already been convey ed. Just for an office appointment with you.

K: That's right. Just to get them back into the game. And will you collect for me all the indications ~~xxxx~~ we have that the Syrians want to talk to us.

A: All right.

K: I think I saw something else in an intelligence report today. Will you do that too please?

A: Yes sir. K: I'll be over in an hour.

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Mr. Atherton
11/17/73 1:00 p.m.

K: Roy, haveyou seen these cables to which I referred?

A: I've got replies in the typewriter now.

K: Do you mind if I tell you what I want them to say. I don't want to interfere in any _____ functioning.

A: No, no. (laughing)

K: In every letter to Fahmi, I want first of all some guff that they can use to make them think they have a special relationship to me.

A: Right.

K: And put in some sentence what a great man I think Sadat is, I mean not just in those words, Secondly, in fact why not do a letter to Sadat now that I have returned thanking him for his courtesy and how impressed Iwas about his long-range view.

A: All right.

K: Now in these letter--I've got Hal Saunders here--you know he can work with you too. In this letter in which in effect says we should get the disengagement before the peace conference, you ought to tell him this was not at all my understanding, that my understanding was the peace conference would have disengagement was its first topic and that we can make our influence much more effective in a peace conference, than we by influencing military discussions at kilometer 101 and that this was exactly my understanding of what would happen--hello?

A: Yes, I am here.

K Moreover, it was our understanding that this was the basis on which we had only --Egypt, Syria and Lebanon in the first phase--can you do it in a way though so that if they surface this letter, the Israelis don't go up in arms

A: Yes.

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K: You see what I mean?

A: I do.

K: That could be the major thrust and say therefore, I believe we should get peace conference organized and in that framework we will use our influence

very constructively.

A And therefore you are waiting to hear his--

K: Exactly

A: On the other question.
All right sir.

K: Good, I'll be over at State in an hour or so.

A: I'll have them ready.

K: Thank you.

SL436

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger/Mr. Atherton
Page 1
11:15 a.m. 11/17/73

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Al, have you seen this Cherokee from Cairo?

A: Not I haven't

K: About letting the ships through?

A: No, sir.

K: And -- well will you take a look at it. Now I have already told Dinitz they may ask the ships to identify themselves, which of course when I mentioned to Dinitz, was national betrayal of Israeli interests, even though they are letting the ships through and they have already given orders to that effect, so --but we haven't given the suburbs of Cairo this week--they are in a particularly feisty mood

A: Ah huh.

K: So will you do a message to Keating so that you two would transmit this with our strong recommendation that they avoid publicity--

A: That they avoid publicity.

K: Yeh and to say this is another accomplishment

A: Okay

K: Have you seen the other stuff from Fahmi?

A: I haven't seen anything this morning.

K: Where the hell are you?

A: I was in the office, I just dropped by Joe's house to show a few things to him and I'm going right back --but I was there until 1/2 hr ago.

K: Okay, well will you get a look at that, and also is someone drafting that message to Saqquf

A" I'm working on that, yes. So I'll have one on Saqquf and one to Keating.

K And another one to Fahmi in which he asks for our support to the Israelis on the disengagement in the bilaterals and what you should say is I feel very strongly if we can move in the direction discussed with Sadat much more effectively within the framework of a peace conference.

A: Absolutely. Right.

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K: And that while we are willing to use our influence we will strongly urge him to stick to the schedule he and I worked out.

A: Yes.

K: Make it a warm letter, can you do all these things?

A: Yes, I will.

K: When will you have them?

A: I'm ah--

K: Because I don't want to be in the office all day--

A: I;ll work on them just as fast as I can.

K: What does that mean, that's my question.

A: Within the next couple of hours.

K: Are you coming--

A: I'm coming right back. In fifteen minutes.

SL433

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
General Haig/Sec. Kissinger
11/17/73 8:50 a.m.

HK..... be he said about that oil thing, it is totally contrary to my strategy and just about kills us. And he cannot repeat it, if he makes lifting of oil conditional on progress in the Middle East we are dead.

HJ. Yeh

HK My strategy has been and it has worked at least somewhat to tell the Arabs if they want progress, theybetter lift the oil.

H: Yeh. Exactly.

HK: The other one is exactly what the Arabs are saying to us and it gets us on the slope on which we cannot compete with the Soviets.

H: Yeh. Well I don't know what was said, I wasn't there. I think it was taken a little out of context

HK: No, no. He said as there is progress, we can hope that the oil will be lifted.

H: As it is lifted--

HK : It is now front page in every newspaper.

H: Yeh

HK: And it is exactly what I told Faysal we wouldn't do. Be blackmailed. And that is really terribly serious, Al.

H: Of course it is.

HK: Because we can't deliver fast enough.

H: They sure pulled a _____ since yesterday, didn't they?

K: (laughs) Do you think you could that across to him?

H: Yeh. But they have to ask some questions

K: If the question comes up, he should do it the other way. He should say, we are doing the best we can, for our reasons for the American national interests, but we will not be blackmailed. That the Arabs will pay attention to and if we are blackmailed, it will hurt our capacity to make progress.

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H: Yeh.

K: If he wants to say something useful, that he should say.

H: Yeh, that's a good One. Okay, I'll get him on that Henry.

K: I know you have no other problems, Al, so you go right to that now.

H: Yeh.

K: I know you were wondering what to take up today.

H: (laughs)

K: Okay, you and I will work together in a university.

H: That's right. Although I don't know which one will take me.

K: Listen, they'll take you before they take me.

H: All right, Henry.

K: Bye.

SL440

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
David Rockefeller
Secretary Kissinger
11/17/73 3:05 p.m.

R: Henry, Welcome back. Why a marvelous job, really.

K: Thank you.

R: You seem to go from one height to another. How you got those people together I don't know, but it looks as though you have.

K: Well, this is just the beginning.

R: I'm sure. But aren't you optimistic?

K: I think we have a chance now.
I think we have two months to see whether we can get a peace settlement.

R: It will take thatlong even to discuss it

K: To start it will be possible.

R: I certainly hope you succeed--much closer to that than in the last 7 years.

K: That is true.

R: How did the China part go?

K: Well--extremely well--much better than the press reported which is just as well. It turned out very well--it's hard to put in writing.

R: That is great. And how did you make out with the blocked funds?

K: I think we will get that solved within a month.

R: Marvelous.

K: The only handup now are two minor legal issues---

R: Henry, I saw that Don Burnham and his group are back--must have been there when you were, did you see them?

K They were there just before I was.

R: I see. Sounded from the paper this morning's paper that they have done pretty well.

K: They are very eager to work closely with us.

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R'' I know you are terribly busy, but I just wanted to say awfully glad you are back.

K: David, you've been a good friend and I understand you'll be here on the 5th or 6th of Dec.

R: Right. This little European group is very much hoping you will be able to join us.

K: What evening is that?

R: I think it was a little later than that--the 10th or 11
It should be on your calendar.

K: I am still hoping to do it. But I'll see you on one of those days.

R: I can't remember which day it is

K: Whichever day it is, I k look forward to it. And thank you for talking to Fahmi which was very helpful.

R: Good. I liked him.

K: He's a fine man.

R: I do congratulate you.

SL442

TELCON
Peter Lisagor/HAK
November 19, 1973/10:36 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello

L: Hello

K: Peter, how are you.

L: Fine, how are you Henry.

K: You're the one cynic I didn't have on my trip.

L: The one cynic. Were they all that cynical?

K: No. We had a good time.

L: It sounded like it. I wish I had been along. The party hierarchs - that is the Gridiron Club hierarchs - thinks that I have some special influence with you and I tried to disabuse them of it but I told them I would do this.

K: It is true.

L: I would call you and again reaffirm their invitation to you for their winter dinner which is December 8. They are very anxious to have you there. You know, it's a black tie. It's a small dinner and they are having some White House types. You've done it once before.

K: Is that just to attend or to speak?

L: I suspect they want you to speak but you know you would be the ranking member of the Administration who would be there so...

K: Peter, my problem is that the NATO meeting begins on the 9th.

L: I wasn't aware of that.

K: It begins on the 10th but I could conceivably go to the dinner and leave right afterwards.

L: Yes. They are very anxious to have you and of course I would be pleased as everybody would, if you could make it. It is quite informal and a good fun evening.

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K: I've been there.

L: You were there once before, I remember. I'm still quoting some of your remarks about Bismark and so on but I just wanted to reinforce their invitation. I think you have somewhere a formal invitation.

K: Let me tell you something. A friend of mine from the Rockefeller office wrote me a letter congratulating me for being appointed Secretary of State two months ago. He received a reply last week thanking him for his helpful suggestions on the Middle East crisis.

L: Yeah, I know.

K: Signed by the Asst. Secretary for Public Affairs. So where that damn thing is in the State Department I have no way of knowning.

L: But just put it down and if you can, everybody would love to have you and appreciate your being there.

K: December 8. It can't be the 7th.

L: No, it's set in concrete because it's a Saturday night and I guess for that reason they've made the arrangements for the hall and it's a small intimate thing.

K: I remember it very well and had alot of fun. Look, I'll do my best to make it.

L: Alright. I'll tell them that and if the President, whoever it is, I'm not sure, wants to do something more about getting something to you so you'll have it for.

K: I think I haven't got a formal invitation but that doesn't prove a thing.

L: I'll tell them to do that. Are you bearing up alright? You didn't realize it but they had a good couple of shots of you at the football game yesterday.

K: No, I didn't realize that.

L: Yes, you were eating peanuts. You've got to watch it you know.

K: I really have to be....

L: Where that camera is on you. Well it was a great trip from all accounts.

K: We had alot of fun and I think we did some good. OK. Peter thanks. Bye.

RELEASED IN FULL SL444

TELECON
Mr. Stoessel/Secretary Kissinger
November 19, 1973
5:10

K: ...that the Europeans have now proposed a bilateral declaration to the Japanese.

S: I saw that and also to the Canadians. The Danes went in to see them.

K: Did they give us any indication ahead of time?

S: Not specifically, no.

K: But they never formally informed us.

S: No. It has been..the idea floating around but they never formally informed

K: I think that should be mentioned as an example of totally inaccurate consultation..

S: We'll do that.

K: What do you think of it.

S: It is conceivable..the Japanese don't like it.

K: I don't know whether these goddamn declarations are worth it. Do you?

S: I am beginning to doubt it, but we have come so far to stop it would be bad. I think the Declaration on NATO is pretty good, though it... which gives us too much of a we and they..and what comes out of the EC will not be that bad. To stop it all with everything else might be too much.

K: We could just shelve it for a year.

S: So much depends on timing of the President's trip and how it might tie in with the declaration of NATO..you could have a ministerial for that and the President goes later..which may tie in with CSCE..

K: Well, let me think about it.

S: We'll be getting up some recommendations to you.

K: Why don't you think about what could be done?

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S: OK. we'll have some recommendations on the declaration of NATO

END

RELEASED IN FULL

SL443

TELECON
Marshall Wright/Secretary Kissinger
November 19, 1973
3:05

K: Is that Armed Services thing all set? It has become inconvenient.

W: For Wednesday at 10:00. I am sorry..has it become inconvenient now.

K: Yes.

W: They have already sent notices out and it would be inconvenient to..

K: The only reason is I wanted to give a press conference on Wednesday.

W: What about Wednesday afternoon?

K: Well, you know people want to get away and

W: I think attendance would be bad for our people in the afternoon.

K: Well, then I'll have to do it in the afternoon.

W: They would go up the wall if they were postponed for a press conference.

K: OK

END

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SL441

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
November 19, 1973/10:10 a.m.
Bill Timmons/HAK

K: Bill can you explain to me. What the hell this is about Sonnenfeldt. It's beyond my comprehension.

T: When did you plan to submit his thing.

K: In about two or three weeks.

T: The Congress would either like to confirm him and have us swear him in or not swear him for the Treasury post or withdraw him because Mansfield said it's not fair to single one out and therefore he's holding about 24 I think nominations up.

K: Who put him up to that. That does not sound like Mansfield.

T: No it is. We've talked to him. Brent has talked to him. Everybody has talked to him and that's what he wants to do. So our options is either to withdraw him now or go ahead and let him be confirmed. Frankly I see nothing wrong with having him confirmed by the Senate and not sworn in.

K: When is that going to happen.

T: As soon as we can get approval to go ahead that way. ____ doesn't want to do that of course. He says that's unfair to have him confirmed when they know full well he's not going to be sworn in. What's your preference on it? You'd prefer to have him just sit where he is. Right?

K: Until I nominate him but I've got three guys that I need in the Department that aren't being confirmed. /Is it clear though that if he is confirmed and not sownr. T:

K: It makes absolutely no difference to me. I just want to get my 3 guys through and it isn't any reflection on Hal not to confirm him now since the whole Senate gets a chance at confirming him anyway. The Committee has confirmed him. If the Senate has any doubts about him they can refuse him when he comes up through the State.

T: I think we can probably swing him this week probably get him confirmed because I believe that's the only way we'll clear out the other nominees we've got is to have Hal confirmed and Felch just won't swear him in for two weeks until you send him up as another nomination.

K: OK.

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T: I think we can work that. There was another problem connected with this in that one of the Senators had a hold on him but we can work that out I think.

K: Do you want to move on that today. So I can get my guys confirmed. If it's necessary I'll call Mansfield. I'm sure he'll do it.

T: I think he'll confirm him. I don't believe there is any problem on that but he's not going to let him just sit up there by himself and go ahead and move the other nominations.

K: Well, if you can say that I intend to appoint him to something in State I see no reason why he cannot pull him out.

T: He's been reluctant to do that Henry. For two weeks we've been arguing with him and you may want to call him and see if he'll do that.

K: Why don't you first give me a report.

T: OK.

K: Now secondly your various notes about the committeess I have to meet. Let me say this. Everybody knows that the President is very grandiose about signing me up. Everyone of these meetings takes a morning. I've got to run a department, do the NSC job and conduct all the negotiations and keep running around the world. It's just humanly impossible to do all these things. Now this week I'm meeting with athe Senate Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations, I think the Senate Armed Services Committee next week I'll meet with the House Foreign Affairs Committee and I'll be willing to meet with the Armed Services Committee but I can't be just thrown around. The curse of this Administration is that they drive everything into the g.d. ground.

T: I know. But rest assured that wasn't my idea. He hits me on that every damn time I see him.

K: But you know he is only thinking two days ahead. Just between you and me I fail to understand what he is doing with all these sessions with congressmen except building a trap for himself.

T: Well he's trying to restore the confidence in his office and while some of the press has been bad with some of the guys who go out and leak stuff but generally they have been very good this last wekk.

K: Have you. Were you there.

T: All of them. 9 of them he had and they're very positive we don't get much news story out of those just the guys that go out and leak bad things but

really and truly they have been....

K: That's his problem. I can just worry about my problem. My problem is that don't sign me up for these things. I'm here now for 3 weeks before I go on the road again.

T: Of course I have not gone to the hill and told the members. I've sent notes to you every time he asks me about it.

K: I'm not blaming you for it. He zaps me every time.

T: If you and are doing the Foreign Relations and Armed Services this week and are open to do the House Foreign Affairs and Armed Services later, like next week or within 10 days, I think that will cover his....

K: If the Committee asks me.....

T: Of course. OK.

K: Bye.

T3

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Hal Sonnenfeldt - Secretary Kissinger
November 20, 1973
4:10 p.m.

K: First, on the Japanese, are you familiar with the latest ....

S: No.

K: After refusing the Japanese in a tri-lateral effort, now they have sent a note to the Japanese inviting them to a bi-lateral declaration. Any effort that includes the U.S. would be so vague as to be meaningless, they say, while they themselves could have a very interesting bilateral _____. I'm very interested in what they mean about our participation would make it meaningless.

S: They have been saying that for some time.

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K: My point is ....

S: I understand what you're saying.

K: It's not a friendly note. To do that without consultation with us ....

S: They want to do it as the nine. _____

K: They are deliberately undercutting us in an effort to set up with the Russians in the Middle East and trying to get themselves involved.

S: That can be pretty quickly turned off by the Israelis can't it.

K: Yah.

S: My point is that there are benefits we would be losing.

K: If George Shultz were more disciplined he could say I can't say anything because you guys are so bloody minded.

S: Essentially not in our interests. There's a meeting in January. This is what we are preparing for. Flexible systems are what we have been working for essentially and what we want, and therefore something general is in our interests, we may have to sacrifice.

K: What do you think, I mean in the light of all the additional information?

S: We have got to measure the benefits ...what we get out of it without Europeans. My feeling we should _____ or at least postpone

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it indefinitely, ...

K: Well, not indefinitely.

S: Well, in physical terms it would be difficult to reconstitute this particular group before January. _____queasy about the effect on balance of payments. It's difficult to characterize and it gets to be very ramified. We might find it necessary to go back to the Europeans to get discipline in the monetary system We may find we have lost valuable time. I'm reluctant to drop this one. Although, Shultz can use the occasion to say some tough things to them.

K: He won't.

S: I don't know. It's pretty clear to him what your feelings are. Its a matter of programming them right.

K: Let's think about it.

S: Uh, did you make the arrangement with Mansfield on my nomination?

K: Not yet.

S: _____ says its all settled on the nominations. They will go forward on Dec. 10. That's a bad deal. It will give them a target to vote on it. They will go forward on everything except mine and mine will go on Dec. 10.

K: We'll pull it back before then.

(T4) *

TELCON
Sen. Javits/Sec. Kissinger
Tuesday, Nov. 20, 1973
4:20. p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Jack, I unfortunately cannot make it this afternoon.

J: O.K.

K: Next week is time enough.

J: It is time enough.

K: I wanted to talk to you about the problem we discussed the last time you were in here which is now not acute but which in fact they are pleased with what has been achieved as far as I can tell within the limits of the fact that if they get only 98 percent of what they ask for it is treason.

J: I understand.

K: Since we are going to get into some very tough spots say in the next 4 weeks to two months down the road, I wanted your judgment on how to handle it.

J: I could come Tuesday or Wednesday. Is breakfast a possibility?

K: Yes. Let's have breakfast on Wednesday. Do you want to come to State.

J: Wherever you like.

K: They serve better food here.

J: What time?

K: 8:15

J: If there is any change let me know.

END

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50 53 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
November 20, 1973
5:11 pm

K:.....NATO again?

D: On the contrary. I am trying to support you in the UN

K: That's good. Two things, Anatoyl. I cannot have lunch tomorrow because I am giving a press conference.

D: I noticed. You could be influenced by your talk with me. What about Friday?

K: Friday I can't make lunch, but we can meet during the day.

D: Alright.

K: What about Thursday?

D: Well,

K: That's Thanksgiving.

D: Are you working?

K: I probably will be working.

D: Are you free on Thursday?

K: Let me call you tomorrow, probably yes.

D: If you like, we can meet on Friday at 4 or 5.

K: Alright then, otherwise we will meet Friday during the day. The other thing is we got reports from the Europeans .. that the Syrians want the British and French to participate in the Conference.

D: This could be.

K: Under these auspices it will turn into a nightmare.

D: I understand. I know when we discussed just after you left Middle East with the Egyptians and Syrians , they said alright except the French

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will say the Syrians were not that precise...but prepared to say that we are toying with the idea of maybe four. I have no additional information.

K: The Egyptians are willing to go along and the Jordanians. The Israelis would not accept.

D: We didn't encourage..

K: I think it is essential that you use your influence with the Syrians.

D: May be could be more precise in joint action.

K: I am prepared to have a joint letter. I would like you to find out from the Syrians if they would accept a joint letter from you and me. The most effective would be if you and we wrote a letter to the Secretary-General.

D: Saying that we are..

K: That it is our understanding that all sides are prepared to accept. We have not asked the Israelis formally and we have not heard from the Egyptians.

D: I put this way. Let 's say in the middle of next week, on Tuesday or Wednesday

K: Let's say Wednesday.

D: OK, next Wednesday, we are prepared to send a joint letter to Waldheim and that it is our understanding they are prepared to accept.

K: Exactly.

D: And the Syrians..

K: Would you check about..

D: This is the point. I will check with Moscow if it is acceptable. Could you send me a little draft?

K: I will send.

D: If you could send a draft over by one of your messengers.

K: Tomorrow morning.

D: Tomorrow morning. OK, tomorrow you send your letter.

K: Exactly.

D: How is the cease-fire going?

K: By Middle East standards, reasonably well.

D: What about troops?

K: I think you and we could probably agree.. those two could never.

D: I hope now the Egyptians will give you..

K: These stories are not true. The Egyptians say they will do something in 24 hours and we never hear from them again.

D: OK, you send your letter in draft tomorrow.

K: OK

END

T1 *

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Rabin
11/20/73; 8:30 a.m.

(Missed the first part)

R: All right, I will try to be in touch with you.

K: Do you want to have breakfast on Saturday?

R: I would love to.

K: Good! Why don't we do that?

R: Fine. At what time?

K: Oh, I don't know whether any of our places are open at about 8:30. Let's say about 8:30 at the State Department unless I tell you to the contrary.

R: All right. I'll check with your office Friday morning.

K: Good. Where will you stay in case there is any -- in case all the offices are closed. Mine are usually not closed.

R: I don't know -- either the Embassy or one of the hotels. It is better that I will try to find out with you.

K: Call me through the White House switchboard. They will know how to find me.

R: Fine.

K: Good.

R: Well, I would love to see you.

K: Look forward to seeing you. A lot has happened since we saw each other.

R: And all the best.

K: Good. Look forward to seeing you.

R: Bye, bye.

K: Bye.

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T2 *

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Senator Scoop Jackson
11/20/73; 9:21 a.m.

K: Hello.

J: Henry.

K: Scoop.

J: You sound pretty good. You must have had quite a trip!

K: Yes, it really was something. Scoop, people here tell me that you are mad at me because I won't see you. I can't believe that.

J: Why that's nonsense. I had a call yesterday from the press who said had a met with Henry Kissinger and I said no.

K: Flanigan tells me you are willing to withdraw the Jackson Amendment if I only asked you to do it.

J: How many barrels of oil can you get me?

K: No, you would do that just because I asked you -- wouldn't you?

J: (Laughter) Sure.

K: I want you to do that on a day on which there wasn't much other news so that we could get a headline.

J: (Laughter) Listen, someone called yesterday and asked. . .

K: We could go to a Synagogue together and announce it there.

J: Absolutely. And I'll be the Rabbi -- you be the Cantor.

K: You are much better qualified tobe a Rabbi than I, that's for sure.

J: I am going to have my Bar Mitzvah later. Henry, listen . . .

K: Give you a Bar Mitzvah without being able to read Hebrew.

J: I'll do it in Yiddish. Henry, listen, someone called. I was on the Floor -- we had seventeen roll calls getting this emergency bill through. Someone called the office and asked if I had met with you and I said no I have not. And are you planning? and I said no, I don't have any immediate plans. Some press guy called and that must be the origin of it.

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K: No, no. This I didn't know about. But Peter Flanigan, to be honest, feels that I am killing the trade bill because I am insulting you by not being willing to accept the compromise you are dying to offer on the Jackson Amendment.

J: Peter is naive. It's totally nonsense.

K: That was my impression.

J: You and I can have some honest differences but there is nothing personal in any of it.

K: Oh, well . . .

J: We will have you over at the house soon.

K: Well, I am a great admirer of yours.

J: You know there is nothing in that. We have our minor disagreements but . .

K: You are not ready to offer a compromise on the Jackson Amendment, are you?

J: No. No. Listen, I am up to my eyeballs trying to get a few of these energy problems squared away.

K: Well, I would like to talk with you -- I mean I will be glad to include the Amendment but I think . . .

J: I would like to hear about your trip.

K: Well, that's what I think. We ought to have a review of the whole international situation.

J: Well, I would like to sit down and kick it around with you.

K: When -- what are your plans.

J: Well, I am going to get away Thanskgiving Day. My wife and I are just going down to Williamsburg for a couple of days just to rest up and do a little catch up on the reading. You know I haven't had a chance. It's been hell here.

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K: Well, if you do any reading you will be ahead of me to begin with.

J: I haven't looked at a book for so long.

K: The only way people get me to read books is to stamp Top Secret on every page.

J: (Laughter) What are your plans? Are you going to . . .

K: I'll stay here now. How about getting together next week sometime. Or over the weekend.

J: All right. Listen, I get back on Sunday. Could I do this, Henry: let me check my situation out and I will have my girl check with yours. Let's do it that way.

K: Good. And then I'd like to talk with you about the international aspects of the oil problem.

J: Well, I want to go over the whole picture with you and what our options are and a few things and I want to hear about especially your trip to China.

K: Well, that's another thing I want to talk with you about. The Chinese, after you have seen your colleagues visit there, have put a clamp on all Congressional visits. But they do want you! Seriously.

J: Really?

K: They are very anxious for you to come.

J: They know I am not the other guy, you know.

K: No, no, I am serious. The only two Senators they want to have come until late next summer is Mansfield to whom they have a long-standing commitment. But the one they are really eager to see is you. And . . .

J: And who?

K: And no one else. Just you.

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J: All right. Let me just see where we are and I will get back later in the day.

K: They really think you are the only Democrat that really understands international politics.

J: I really want to go over and . . .

K: Well, you ought to . . .

J: To talk and not just sightsee!

K: Look, I can arrange anything you want.

J: I know you can.[1]

K: I don't have to arrange it. But you will find that they are the only people that you can talk to in the world today who have an overall grasp of the situation.

J: Right. Listen, I will get back, Henry, and we will work out a mutual satisfactory time.

K: Good.

J: Okey-doke. Bye.

(T6) *

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Secretary-General Waldheim
11/21/73; 9:05 a.m.

(Missed the first part)

W: I hope you are not too tired.

K: No.

W: I know what such a trip does -- means. Dr. Kissinger, I have tried to keep you informed through my last letter but of course there are a number of developments which I think are important. As far as Syria is concerned, the things are not going too well. The Guyia mission -- he is back now -- did not really produce a breakthrough. They insist-he had a long talk with President Asad. They insist on the return to the 5th of October lines and a return of the 15,000 civilians. They would then exchange the prisoners. Send back those Israeli prisoners. But there is one _____ of hope. That is that they are negative on some sort of meetings. Perhaps even military meetings following the example on the Egyptian front. I don't know what that will produce. Unfortunately the Ambassador here is not -- I don't have the impression that he is really authorized to have negotiations on this subject. But both sides -- Mrs. Meir and President Assad insisted heavily on continuing to talk, especially Assad. Mrs. Meir -- they appreciate the fact that I send Guyia there and that we are trying to be helpful and repeatedly insisted to continue to talk. So I do not exclude that something will finally come out. So I thought I should let you know this.

K: Well, I appreciate this. I understand that you and I are going to get together in the next few days.

W: Well, I suggested that. I would be very happy to see you and to discuss more in detail the situation but I haven't got any information from your office when you would suggest that I come for insistence to Washington -- if it is easier for you or whether it is when you are here in New York. I leave it to you. You are very busy now and I can imagine it is not too easy for you to come.

K: No, I approved it yesterday.

W: Oh, I didn't know.

K: And I am sure we will be working it out within the next day.

W: Oh, very good. So I will get then the information from your Mission here.

K: Absolutely.

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W: Well, I hope you get the regular information I send to your mission here. I get quite interesting reports on the meetings on the road, Cairo-Suez 101. Our _____ people are sending me regular reports. Detailed reports and I hope the mission is sending all this to you because I instructed my people to give all the information he gets to your Ambassador. Unfortunately Scali, the poor man, is now very sick.

K: No, I do receive this and I appreciate it very much.

W: Well, it is of interest.

K: I know. And I appreciate all your cooperation.

W: We are keeping close contact with your mission -- Ambassador Bennett now -- and I hope . . . But I have one last problem, Mr. Secretary, and it is this. Malak is bothering me day and night.

K: We will absolutely not agree to this.

W: Yeah, yeah. I just wanted to know . . .

K: You know it is an absurdity on that basis. They are right back to their original 72.

W: Exactly. I think this seems to be their idea. To get the 72.

K: We will not agree to it.

W: Because he gives the impression that you would be inclined to, etc. so because yesterday he tried to reach me again and I . . .

K: It is absolutely not. I would like myself to be kept out of it personally. But you can assume that our delegation speaks totally for me.

W: Good. So, we speak -- stick to the sixth. (36th ?)

K: Absolutely.

W: I shall thengive him this answer.

K: Good. I shall see you soon.

W: Thank you very much. Good-bye, Mr. Secretary.

T8

TELCON
Guido Goldman - Secretary Kissinger
November 21, 1973
4:00 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I got your message about these Jewish leaders you thought I should see.

G: Klutznik is a central figure who would coordinate it, Gus Levy, Lazarus.

K: My question is if I talk to them will they turn up at the Israeli Embassy an hour later.

G: Absolutely not. Now, in addition I think there should be a couple of others from the academic community, like Ed Levy.

K: Who's Ed Levy?

G: Chancellor of the University of Chicago. Henry Rosovsky.

K: How about Dave Landers.

G: Sure, although don't want to get too many from Harvard. Anyway, they feel very much the same, there has to be an element

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K: Who's going to get them together?

G: Klutznik.

K: Well, I would love to see them if they asked for an appointment, but I would much prefer they ask than I ask for them.

G: Oh, no. you must not ask them.

K: You can be sure I will see them. I would like to do it next week. What I would like to do is see Klutznik alone for about 15 minutes, and then....

G: I will ask Klutznik to call you. Do you need any background on him.

K: Well, I have some, but....

G: Just briefly, he's been active in many Jewish organizations, he knows a great many people, he's a very wealthy self-made industrialist, he's a person a moderate, more moderate than my father.

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Can control him more than my father.

K: Well, I don't want to control him, I just want to tell him what the problem is.

G: He and I have talked about a much larger group which would be supportive of American policy and it may create a tremendous....

K: Are you coming with your father?

G: No, I can't get to Washington until later.

K: Why don't we shift the appointment so you can both come.

G: I will call. Also, If I could have 5 minutes alone with you I would like to explain the relationship with the Governor.

K: Don't worry about that.

G: I really can't do it.

K: I don't think you should.

G: Good Henry. See you next week.

T10

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/ Secretary Kissinger
November 22, 1973
3:54 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

D: Henry, I have just received telegram to check with you. I will tell you now. First, in Moscow noted that the President and you confirmed that you continue to adhere to understanding reached on the Middle East while you were in Moscow. From our side the Soviet Government has intentions to continue to do within the framework of that understanding.. Brezhnev asked you to tell the President.

K: I shall tell him this afternoon.

D: Secondly, as far as some rumors that the Soviet Union has tried to put French against Soviet or United States.. this is completely such nonsense.. no need to be regarded.. this kind of rumor.
Gromyko has asked me to c;nfirm that he is planning to take part in conference on Middle East and participate at the beginning.

K: How long?

D: Participate at the beginning stage. He didn't specify.

K: For your information, I am planning two days at the most.

D: You won't want a little bit more.

K: As much as I can give..

D: He is not planning to stay very long.

K: That was just for your information.

D: I will gladly check opinions with you on all the questions that rise in connection with conference.

K: Maybe he and I should have dinner the night before the opening.

D: Not a bad idea.

K: It would be a good symbolic gesture.

D: A good idea.

K: Why don't we suggest that.

D: I will check with Gromyko. Fourthly, as fas as place of conference

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D: our opinion is most...place is Geneva. Date should be agreed upon but for us the 17th and 18th of December is quite alright.

K: Good.

D: That's all.

K: Very constructive and helpful. I appreciate and we are in a...

D: You won't change your mind now.

K: No....with Dinitz on this.

D: On the paper on ICBM..where it says environmental coverings. What does that mean?

K: They put this covering on it to keep the sun out while they were constructing something, but we will take it out. You can take the word environmental out.

D: OK.

K: No problem, just a technical term.

D: OK

K: OK

END

5054 *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Dobrynin
11/22/73 10:32 a.m.

D: .....to make a movie, about our diplomacy--it will be a documentary more or less but in a very positive way.

K: Right.

D: And they asked me to check if it is possible to make a picture of just one minute maybe, you and me.

K: Certainly.

D: So the question really is, for instance, if -- and this is the man who worked for --he is a permanent here and at the same time worked for the Ministry of _____. Could you make--he asked me on a very short thing--if for instance I would come to you, then he would go out with me, he would just make a few short; is it possible?

K: Certainly. The only problem is--you know it doesn't bother me. I am only wearing sports clothes today--

D: I think it doesn't matter really.

K: And I just don't want you audiences to think that I treat you too casually.

D: (laughs) I think it will be all right.

K: Otherwise we will do it some other time.

D: But could you arrange it?

K: Certainly. Do you want to do it now?

D: I could wait for an answer for another time. Just want to --

K: No, I will definitely do it.

D: Okay, there is no need for me to press it now, but within let's say, next week we'll do it--will that be all right with you?

K: That will be fine.

D: Just to make it--he would like to make it for about 1 or 2 minutes really --because they would like to have it

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K: Good and we will do it next time we meet or today?

D: What you prefer--if you think it is better for the next time,

K: I'm just wondering what, you know, your audiences in Moscow will think

D: I really don't know, frankly, they probably expect Foreign Minister to be a little bit more formally dressed

K: Then let's do it next time--
We'll certainly meet next week, so let's do it then?

D: Okay, yes, we'll do it this way

K: Okay.
I'll see you at 11:00

D: Yes, thank you very much. Bye.

T11

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
November 22, 1973
3:09

RELEASED IN FULL

D: By some mysterious way I find you call.

K: We have had some intelligence information that substantial Egyptian military concentrations around Israeli bridgeheads on the West Bank and it would be a disaster if military operations start again.

D: West, yes. This is rumor.

K: I can not judge that.

D: You want me to pass this on to Msocow?

K: I think it is important that resumption os hostilities be prevented. We have told the Israelis we will not condone any attack by them.

D: Are they moving..or in a deadlock.

K: I think essentially in a deadlock. I don't think they can make a settlement in these talks.

D: Did you explain to Egyptians one hundred times..

K: Yes, 100 times. On Monday, Wednesday and Friday - yes. But on Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday, - I am not so sure.

D: What is your estimate?

K: My estimate is that they can be made to understand that they are bluffing. They can recognize..

D: Up to now, the Egyptians have mentioned to us..

K: I am not sure..we just know about the concessions. We don't know what they intend to do about it.

D: No, not soecifically.

K: Nothing serious...if they do we will..them you can be sure. We will not go along with any Israeli moves.

D: OK, Henry..goodbye.

K: OK

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/ Secretary Kissinger
November 22, 1973
2:35

.....

D: This is based on a good source that has proved itself in the past.

K: What is the information?

D: I have passed this to Scowcroft and it says there is a concentration of armour as well as cannons and complete readiness of infantry along the front... the military posture of the Syrian... with information that the Soviets are encouraging the Egyptians by telling them that they have a good chance to succeed.

K: What is your judgment?

D: They might try to force a military decisive move..

K: But, what is your judgment.

D: I don't have this... we are trying to avoid it.

K: I can't belive you would be surprised twice.

D: We are not.

K: No, no. I mean you won't let them..

D: I am saying this to you on my own. We are not trying to preempt. We will try to preserve the structure for negotiations.

K: I will get in touch with the Soviets.

D: I think that would be ... maybe with the Egyptians. The Syrians are also on the alert position. The Prime Minister asked me to bring this to your attention.

K: I will reach both of them.

D: I do have some information about kilometer 101 bit I will tell it to Scowcroft.

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K: Nothing important.

D: We have gone ... to say the UN can stay on our side...

K: I wish you would stop making proposals.

D: I agree.

K: You are wasting in this forum.

D: I agree. I am opposed to this. I have written several cables and will write again telling them this.

K: You will have to look for concessions ..

D: I will give the deta ls to Scowcroft or Eagleburger.

K: Thank you.

D: Will I hear from you again today?

K: Only if I have some word. You can assume that I will talk to the Soviet Ambassador today.

D: Fine.

END

T15

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Kay Graham - Secretary Kissinger
November 23, 1973
12:55 p.m.

K: How are you?

G: I'm fine. How are you?

K: I'm fine. Where are you?

G: I'm right here in my little office toiling away. Where are you?

K: Right here in my own office toiling away.

G: What can I help you with.

K: The trouble with you is that you are so suspicious. All I wanted is to ask you to come for lunch on Monday.

G: Oh, the answer is yes. I don't know where I am or what I'm doing, but....let me get to my desk.

Henry, that's glorious.

K: Would you like to come alone or would you like to bring Phil or Meg, or....

G: I'd like to bring Phil.

K: It would be more scandalous if you would come alone, but....

G: More fun if Phil and Meg come.

K: Now, don't -- you realize that my...I will be looking for a job if my leader finds out.

G: You mean not to tell reporters. Where do I come, C Street?

K: Come to C Street, and come up to the 7th floor. The dining room is on the 8th floor, but....

G: What time Henry. Meg and Phil, and you wouldn't want any Murry kind of types I gather.

K: I went through 10 days with Murray...

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G: You don't want Ben.

K: Oh, would you like to bring Ben. Fine.

G: All right. One more thing. What about Meg's sort of co-equal, Howard.

K: Howard who?

G: Howard Sonnet (sp?). You don't have to, I don't want to push it, but...

K: Sure, by all means, bring him too.

G: I don't want to push people on you, but.

K: No, the real reason I suggested Meg and Phil is once you invited me to your house and they were there.

G: That was because at the time you were not having anything to do with news people.

K: Well, they're not going to write about this?

G: Oh, no.

K: I have no particular ulterior motive, I mean no particular briefing I want to give.

G: I can come with just Meg and Phil alone if you think it would be nicer.

K: The only thing I don't want is a news story to come out of it. Ben and I have met. I like Ben.

G: Why don't you assume there will be 5 of us and I will let your secretary know if I am going to leave out the news people.

K: I am very fond of Ben.

G: Now, on a new question. Is there anything I can do to pleasure your weekend. Like, tonight Joe wanted me to have Lillian Hallman and -- he wanted me to give a dinner for Lillian and I guess Rabin or whatever Israeli Joe has handy.

I thought you might want to make some brownie points before you let them down.

K: That's not hard to do. If they only get 99% of what they asked for they feel betrayed.

G: And then I'm going to the farm.

K: I appreciate it, but I can't do it this weekend.

G: Fine, we'll try some other time. Are you getting any rest.

K: More than I had on the trip.

G: Did you ever catch up after the trip.

K: I did get a few days.....last Sunday.....

G: Did you get to put your head on the pillow.

K: I spend most of the day sleeping last Sunday.

G: You know there has to be a moment when you catch up, Henry. You are very nice and I appreciate it. We will see you at one.

T13

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin - Secretary Kissinger
November 23, 1973
11:00 a.m.

K: What is it?

D: Just a telegram saying....the instruction to Cairo...saying because the President is out of Cairo to meet with the Vice President, ...

K: OK. We will instruct our fellow the same way.

D: Hussein it said those who now in charge of country. In Cairo it said just meet with _____.

K: We will find out for you who'se in charge of the country. We will send a cable to ____?____. Will you slow Windesnev down a little bit?

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T14

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Deputy Secretary Rush - Secretary Kissinger
November 23, 1973
12:28 p.m.

R: On the Chile destroyer thing -- there's no question that we ought to give them the destroyers. The Problem is we now have a very good foreign aid security assistance bill. Marshall Wright feels and I feel that _____bill passes send the other down to the Senate.

K: When?

R: Two or three weeks. The key thing in Chile is that the services are having to spend money to keep the destroyers going.

K: The fact that we are going to then send them isn't going to be _____. I don't want our people to start building a back fire.

R: If we do it before it passes the Senate _____. Used on a fray as a means of....

K: Must we settle it right now. I've got somebody here....

R: No, no, but I understood you wanted to do it today.

K: I just want to have a hold on it removed. We can discuss that today.

R: OK. Right.

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T12

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
November 23, 1973

RELEASED IN FULL

(Missed the first part)

(Timing on the announcement on Stessel's appointment)

S: .....the announcement from here.

K: .....but then later that day before I make the announcement.

s: .... That's what has registered to me.

.....

S: I think we can arrange that one.

K: Will you let me know as soon as possible?

S: Yes

S: I think he thinks he will be named.

K: ....OK, thank you.

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T16

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
November 23, 1973
7:32PM

RELEASED IN FULL

(Missed the first half)

K: Because that happy group is now in Algiers.

D: We have not yet discussed this text with anyone - anyone outside. First we have to agree with you and between us and then we have to proceed with Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Israel, in this order. If you say this is all right for the text, we consider it approved mutually by you and we are open to your suggestion. I don't know, but maybe, for instance, in those capitals where we have Ambassadors together. They could do it together. Or it could come within an hour.

K: You could do Syria alone and we could do Israel alone.

D: He simply asked me to ask your suggestion. I think we could get the corrected text to you right away - within a half hour.

K: That sounds good to me. Send it to Scowcroft - and he can send it over to me with the machine.

D: Then you will give me final answer tomorrow.

K: Either tonight or in the morning.

D: I will have to leave soon. I will be here around 11:00 o'clock. I will be in touch with you tomorrow.

K: You're going out again.

D: (laughter)

K: But I'm sure the text will be fine.

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T22*

TEL ECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
November 24, 1973
8:34

RELEASED IN FULL

K: All we would say is the Soviet Union and US have now been informed. Otherwise we agree except for a footnote.

D: What footnote?

K: That at the same conference the Soviet Uniont will announce the destruction of its SS-9s. My proposal is to put all the new ones on the submarines, and that would sink all your submarines. You remember the proposal we made last year.

D: I remember the proposal you made last year.

K: Wait a minute, one other change -- on page 2. where that new phrase you added..and later by special appointment..Just with Ambassadorial rank." Take out "the." That's a minor thing. A good letter.

D: As we discussed yesterday..the same.

K: But otherwise, that's acceptable.

D: When shall we start the meeting?

K: I understand that the Foreign Minister isn't back in Egypt.

D: Well, that's alright.

K: Frankly, we have nobody to deal with in the Foreign Ministry except the Foreign Minister.

D: Alright, when do you think?

K: As soon as he is back.

D: You mean in Egypt?

K: That's what I mean, in Egypt. In other countries we don't care.

D: In Jordan and Egypt we will act together and in Syria and in Israel we are separate. I think it should be done in Egypt.

K: Yes. Why don't we say Wednesday. I think the whole happy crew will be back on Wednesday -- or Tuesday.

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D: Let's say Tuesday.

K: Alright, Tuesday. Except in Egypt.

D: Why?

K: Well, we don't know whom to go to except the Foreign Minister.

D: I'm sure the Acting Minister..

K: Whenever we ask for an appointment they tell us to wait.

D: I could check this because in this case the only thing..if you go to others and not Egypt, they will be last told and not a good idea.

K: You are right. Let me check in Egypt to find out whether we can present a letter.

D: Still, let's make it Tuesday. and whatever will be because, after all, our people could check. We could do it ourselves, too.

K: But you can't do it for us.

D: What difference would that make? Couldn't we make it this way. Send instructions to our Ambassador in Cairo and to your Ambassador. and let them decide the arrangement and how to do it.

K: Good idea. Let's do it Tuesday.

D: Tuesday, let's then act together. and we will send instructions to them...with understanding that it should be Syria, and you will do the same for Israel. Nothing else for time being.

K: Good idea. Nothing else. Thank you very much.

D: Good bye.

END

T17 *

TELECON
Schlesinger/Secretary Kissinger
November 24, 1973
11:18

RELEASED IN FULL

First part of conversation dealt with Verification Panel on SALT

S: Talk about this on the part..and we need a replacement sub and a long range missile modification program..forces..We don't need configuration of Trident which is off-design.. You should keep in mind that that is an area of potential bargaining.. You could get a hell of alot.

K: I agree with that but that we should put it in general negotiations.

S: Quite right. ..if you press details in that form they would take positions we can't give up.

K: We have to settle...this at one of our breakfast meetings and then you can instruct your peopleon Verification Panel that is to follow. Two other things, First I saw Cromer today and he said he gave you a written accoutn of that Security Council business.

S: He read a few paragraphs.

K: He may be formally correct but he is substantively incorrect.

S: He was not convincing..that was clear.

K: OK, just as long as you understand. Secondly, we have now agreed ...to present Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Israel on next Tuesday and Wednesday ask them to agree to a conference for the 17th and 18th.

S: Do you think we can get some motion from the Saudis...

K: I have had a message from Saqqaf. He says we need something concrete....at the least I think we have a chance. Thirdly, I have had a very good talk with Rabeen. I think I am ...him about.

S: He is sensible

K: in the direction we want to move.

S: You can't get him back as Ambassador instead of what..

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K: I told him they needed... I am fairly optimistic that in January we will make some progress of a substantive nature. The Egyptians forces cannot .. other side This if for your information.

S: Very good. Have you thought more of the ... to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait&

K: Let's get the peace talks set up first.

S: What about Hall. Do I take it that the Canadian possibility is set.

K: Does he want an ambassadorship?

S: He has to go... The Committee has raised questions about some ownership of stock and asked him to sell. He can't sell. .... he must leave by the end of the year.

K: I will tell you if I could find a way to get rid of my people over here in such a way..

S: Heh, heh, ... he is interested in the Argentine slot.

K: That's what I am thinking of.

S: We have to know by the end of the year... I take it that Sonnenfledt would not be available.

K: Right.

S: You were equivocal about Porter.

K: I haven't decided whether to keep him.

S: What about the Washington Post today.

K: That must have come from Sisco.

S: Yeah.

K: I was considering him but I hadn't told him, now..

S: He took a ... on that job.

K: I will have that settled by next week.

S: The issue of Porter?

K: Yes.

S: Very good.

END

T18 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Senator Sparkman/Secretary Kissinger
November 24, 1973
12:00

S: Hello, Henry.

K: How are you?

S: You are the jumpingest man I know of.

K: The what?

S: The most jupmingest man I know of. I don't know how you do it.

K: I have been back a whole week.

S: Anyhow, you were before that. I certainly glory in the work that you are doing. But, that's not what I called for. I read in the Post that you will, that you are getting ready to do some thing....I talked to you about this before..about Armistice Seldon.

K: Oh, yes.

S: Well, he especially would like to go to New Zealand.

K: Let me look into that. That may be possible.

S: I heard it was open.

K: I appreciate your calling this to my attention. As we are going over these lists and he was not on the list but I will put him on the list immediately.

S: Good. Keep of the good work and take care of yourself. I don't know how you do it.

K: Well, thank you Senator, you're very nice.

S: OK, good bye.

END

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T21

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Haig/Secretary Kissinger
November 24, 1973

K: Sorry to bother you but John _____of the New York Times has a story that I told an associate that I thought my phone had been tapped and Gerry Warren thinks I ought to call him up and get it turned off. First thing, that gives him an interview with the Secretary of State and I maybe said that at one time. I have had my press office deny it and Gerry Warren has denied it.

H: Well, I don't think we should give him a story.

K: Well

H: I think we should leave it here.

K: I may be said it.

H: I don't doubt it. You and I have joked about it privately and publicly.

K: And then he has his story, don't you agree.

H: I agree. There is another rumor around, that you are quoted as saying the President , if he keeps it up, in a few weeks will suffer from a nervous breakdown.

K: Absolutely not.

H: Bullshit

K: The opposite is true.

H: That's the newest one. That they are trying to push that he has a mental problem.

K: About the mental condition of the President I have never said a word. On the contrary I always say it is amazing what he has with stood... on the oil policy, any foreign policy implications.

H: No. A 5 minute run-down on decisions. I'll be sure and tell you if anything applies.

K: Good. You agree I shouldn't call K____.

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H: Yes.

END

T20

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Casey/Secretary Kissinger
November 24, 1973
4:00 pm

K: How are you?

C: Before you we nt off on your trip you said something about breakfast...how about tomorrow.

K: Jesus.

C: Do you have something better to do?

K: Well, where?

C: Come around to my place and I'll give you breakfast. At 2501 Mass Avenue around the corner from the Japanese Embassy.

K: How about if I call you tomorrow.

C: Sure call me in the morning and see how you feel. I'm at 232-2558.

K: OK. Well, I can get your number from the White House.

C: Yeah.

END

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T19

TELECON
Gerald Warren/Secretary Kissinger
November 24, 1973
3:35 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: On that story. My worry is if I call him... well, first I never said anything.

W: Let me tell you what I said. We have no evidence that Secretary Kissinger's phone has ever been tapped. They have a denial also from your press office... but your associate stands by it.

K: Who is that?

W: Beats me.. but if you told him you never made such a statement.

K: I could have said.. now you know the plumbers weren't working for me. ..or some other context. Saffire once called me up and said we now know your phone was tapped... My worry is if I call him up ...he can say.. I have the Secretary call be and said...

W: But the point is they said you know your phone is tapped and we have no information it was tapped. That's where the strong language should come in... you are quoted as saying that you were virtually certain your phone was tapped in early 1969.

K: I have no way of knowing...

W: We have said there is no evidence your phone has ever been tapped. The damaging one is whether they attributed to you that you know...

K: There are various phones and it is that point, there could have been a number of associates who were certain ... today, noone is sure and I don't think it was... I just hate for the Secretary of State to call that son of a bitch.

W: I hate to see this get out with no challenge.

K: I have had my press office deny it. What should I do?

W: I think you should call the son of a bitch, excuse me. And tell him you never said that.

K: I am not 100 per cent sure I never said it to someone, but it would have to have been a goddamn close associate.. that's my problem.

W: I suggest that you say there is no evidence

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K: But should I call.

W: It would be a hell of a lot stronger if you call.

K: Let me call Haig and see what he thinks, OK.

END

T23

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Gen. Scowcroft/Sec. Kissinger
Sunday, November 25, 1973, 12:50 p.m.

K: Two things: I am not sure that those two paragraphsyou cut out of the speech -- they are a little overstated on the foreign policy on page 2.

S: We can put them back in. It seems so narrowly focussed I did not seem to think we should bring foreign policy back in the thing.

K: Yes.

S: It is not a broad speech. It is very narrow. But if you would like them back in it is no problem.

K: If you said something while the resumption would reduce shortages we cannot plan the future on the caprices of far away governments -- something like this. That is why I announced...

S: Right.

K: He called me and he wants to send a special emissary to Saudi Arabia to get them to turn the oil on.

S: Oh?

K: He does that and he is in deep trouble with me. We cannot have this now.

S: Oh, no. That would be the worst possible thing to do.

K: Besides, aid will be refused. It will put us in the position of the supplicant.

S: Exactly the wrong thing to do. Where do you think he got that idea?

K: Probably from some of his oil friends. No sense worrying about it. He will calm down, don't you think?

S: I would hope so. Goodness. That would be a disastor.

K: Sisco came in and said he is resigning because I will not give him that job and he has been offered a college presidency.

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S: Is that right?

K: I suppose I could change his mind but what do you think?

S: In all honesty I would not. One thing I don't like on top of the others is blackmail.

K: I just don't consider him steady enough.

S: I don't either. I don't think he is the one for you.

K: I will let him go. I hate to let him go because he is an asset to the government.

S: I don't think he is the one for you in that no. 3 job.

K: That is the way I think. I think I am better off keeping Porter for a bit.

S: I think so for a time.

K: What worries me is if I go on trips and Sisco is here alone I would hate to think what he would do.

S: He would be out of hand and Rush cannot control him that is for sure.

K: O.K. Fine. Thank you.

S: You want that statement back in the speech.

K: The way I phrased it.

S: O.K. Fine.

END

T32

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Eagleburger/Secretary Kissinger
November 26, 1973
9:00 PM

K: Who wrote the speech of NATO Council?

E: Palmer did most of it with Win and myself.

K: In fact it's quite good.

K: Let's get together with Win and Palmer tomorrow.

.....

K: It's too tough even for me.

.....

E: I wrote first two pages.

H: This is too touch for the Perm Rep.

E: I will get Palmer and Win together tomorrow morning.

K: Alright.

E: O.K. Sir.

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T29

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELECON
FM Rabasa/Secretary Kissinger
November 26, 1973
12:03

R: ..you're wonderful trip around the world.

K: And congratulations to you on the spectacular way you handled the Bogota Conference.

R: As I told you Henry, no agressiveness. I used...in my speech, saying we are getting to speak with Dr. Kissinger not against Dr. Kissinger.

K: You were a major influence and would not have happened without you.

R: ...Vasquez appointment and the 8 point..

K: He is coming up on Friday and I am inviting him to lunch.

R: I would like to get together with you , when can we meet in Mexico?

K: In February.

R: ...for security reasons and I want to propose Cozumal..

K: I have never been there. I would love to

R: A beautiful place and for us Latin American Foreign Ministers, to get together one or two days before your arrival to talk over any programs beforehand. I wo uld like to send them over and then we can discuss these proposals and on the 3rd day get together with you... in the latter part of February.

K: The second part of February.

R: That is fine. I want it to be smooth and I will need time to adapt things physically and intellectually. I will make no type of official announcement.

K: Let's plan on it..

R: In principle , we are in agreement. It should be in second part of February.

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K: I have two other things. We are going to make the ambassadorial appointment.. the man you suggested.

R: Fine.. the man I suggested.

K: It won't be announced so don't you announce it. What do you think of the DCM, Dean. Would he be good as Ambassador to Peru.

R: He is a good man. [redacted] B6

K: I thought maybe over New Year's I would go to Acapulco from about the 29th to the 6th or 7th of January.

R: Fine. Let me put it down. December 29th to

K: Say the 7th of January.

R: I will contact them.

K: Marvelous. I have that in mind.. we have taken care of the airlines..

R: The main thing is he is a good man, but he doesn't .. anything.

K: You can be sure we will settle it in the 6 months.

R: Even Texas. I might ask you to give it back to us.

K: I knew you were going to start on that.

R: And then New Mexico. A state a year.

K: I'll give you Southern California right now.

R: We can have a meeting.

K: I'll call you at the end of this week and let you know what the ...program will be.

R: Thank you very much

END

T24 *

TELCON
November 26, 1973/9:27 a.m.
Rowland Evans/HAK

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello. Rollie how are you?

E: I'm alright.

K: You are now going from insolence to ultimatum.

E: Yes. I've been very high on you in the last two weeks, I've been praising you all over the place, saying what a great job you did with _____ but I'm beginning to have second thoughts and I want to talk to you. I went down to see my friend Stu Alsop the other day and he told me that he had to go to the hospital today for tests and then I find out out you cancelled lunch because you can't join us.

K: I didn't know we had a lunch.

E: I was told about it Friday. But you know it may be days and days before you can get XX us both together and I want to really see you Henry. Seriously. Do you see 20 minutes today sometime.

K: Well let me. Can you come over about 10:00 for about 10 minutes.

E: I can come over at 10 for 10 minutes. You have the 10 minutes now.

K: Listen Rollie. I've got about 15 hours with two sets of maniacs.

E: I got a full report of you last week here in Washington.

K: What am I doing last week.

E: I know what you're doing. I know how you've got plenty of time all this crap about overwork and its just nonsense.

K: I didn't say overworked but don'tworry about your clients in Saudi Arabia. We doing the thing.

E: That story was totally wrong wasn't it.

K: I didn't read it what is it.

E: They had Joe taking Porter's job. Didn't you see it in the paper.

K: Oh, Joe Sisco. There is no basis for that.

E: I know that whole story. I think it's a damn good out but not with _____

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K: Why not.

E: You know the story.

K: No, what is the story.

E: Now, you know it better than I do.

K: No, I don't. Tell me what it is.

E: I'll tell you when I get over there. You definitely can see me for 15 minutes.

K: 10 minutes.

E: Well, it's a long ....

K: OK. Come over about 10:00.

T25 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Congressman Buchanan/HAK
November 26, 1973/9:54 a.m.

K: Hello.

B: Mr. Secretary. John Buchanan. How are you sir?

K: OK. How are you.

B: Fine. First of all I want to tell you that you had some very fine work done in New York last week by, various folk in our mission, on this funding question for UNIF. I was just delighted with the wway we came out.

K: Good. I'm delighted.

B: Startlemyer (? (and his group and the political people, I think did rather excellent jobs because it looked so adverse at first in terms of resolutions that would have interjected political questions and assign the quilt to Israel and cut down the Arab share and all that you know, so I know good work is done around the world but I wanted you to know how well I think your team up there performed.

K: I appreciate that very much.

B: Secondly, Armasted Seldon I understand, has been recommended to you by Senator John Sparkman, and perhaps others, for an Ambassadorial post.

K: That is correct.

B: He was of course a member of Congress from my state.

K: I know him very well.

B: I think he would make an excellent man, as you know, he has served the President and the Administration before in the Defense Department. He is a democrat which perhaps would not hurt under the present circumstances. He also is very much a Nixon man and I think he has very fine qualifications for such a post. I understand he has a specific interest in New Zealand and if that should be available Mary Jane Seldon, as you probably know, is a very bright and attractive and charming lady. I think they would both be quite an asset to the country.

K: I'm glad to have your recommendation and it's at a timely point.

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B: Would you like me to follow through in writing.

K: I don't think it's necessary.

B: Very good. Well, I would highly.

K: But if you want to do it you're welcome to do it but it's not necessary.

B: Alright so now is there anything else that I might do that would be of help.

K: No, I already heard from Senator Sparkman and the recommendation of two people that I respect as much as you will weigh very heavily.

B: You are very kind doctor. I've long felt if we could just get you into the Middle East, we'd begin to see an end to our troubles and I think that is correct. I know it's just a beginning but it's a rather thrilling prospect I must say to be making some real headway at last.

K: I hope we can keep up the momentum.

B: Me too. Thank you sir.

T31

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Caryle Maw/Secretary Kissinger
November 26, 1973
5:44 pm

M: There are two organizations in that city that handle funds in various amounts. One is in Boston and one is in New York. In New York is the New York Community Trust. It is the best of the two and they would be happy to handle for you ...the purposes you have in mind. I would suggest you follow this out and you establish a fund in your name or in any name you wish for scholarships of children of Armed Services...in Viet-Nam. The decisions would be taken by a committee that would handle it at first and then they would hand it over...a group at Princeton...it is a recognized institution ....would direct the prize money on your behalf and others who would like to contribute. I suggest we call it the Henry Kissinger Fund or the Henry Kissinger Scholarship Fund. I am coming down tonight..

K: Good. I should set it up and then write the letter.

M: We set it up with one dollar and the it is done..

K: Let's talk about it after your swearing-in..it is much better than giving to the Viet-Nam thing.

M: I talked to a man up there, a Mr. Herbert West, he said he has met you. And they were very cooperative and willing to do anything they can...

K: You're very nice. We'll talk about it tomorrow. Can you get it done by the end of the week?

M: Fine.

END

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T30

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Schelsinger - Secretary Kissinger
November 26, 1973
2:50 p.m.

K: How are you Jim?

S: Fine, Henry. How are you?

K: Fine.

S: I've moved the lunch to Thursday, which is what you wanted.

K: That's fine. Your getting to be almost obsequious. Just remember I am two ranks above you in the cabinet. In the hierarchy you are no. 3, you have to try extra hard.

S: Henry, I am happy to see you any day but Tuesday. That luncheon has been set up for some time.

K: That's fine. I was just kidding, Jim. I have talked to Otto Passman on the Israeli thing. He needs a letter from you or me saying that this is an emergency before he marks up the bill.

S: That a good idea.

K: I would rather have you do it in order to have my name free....

S: Well, it would be more natural for you to do it.

K: I know it would be more natural for me, but it would be better for you to do it. Can you do it by 4:00 p.m?

S: 400?

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K: Coordinate with Ken Rush. I have told you we're sending a letter to Cairo, Damascus, Tel Aviv, Amman and _____.

S: Right. Did you bear down on Cromer in your conversation with him.

K: He told me he would explain it to you. He said you were an son of a bitch and he was all right.

S: Then you didn't talk about reciprocity and intelligence and all that.

K: Not intelligence, but did talk about reciprocity. And ah...I really told the French Ambassador that if he didn't restrain his people I would be goddamned _____ if he made one of his slighting remarks a bout the U.S.

T26 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
November 26, 1973/10:34 a.m.
Carl Maw/HAK

K: Hello. How are you Carl?

M: I'm just fine thank you Henry.

K: Carl, I know this isn't strictly your problem any more but on this business of turning over my Nobel Prize, which I've decided to do, I just don't see that I can accept money for making peace when so mmany people were killed.

M: Henry, I'm also worried about thepolitical aspects of turning it over to any Vietnam group. It'll become a political thing if you give some of it to the North, people will criticize...

K: No, I wouldn't give it to the North. What I thought I would do is to give it to, there is an institution for Vietnam orphans.

M: Well, the points which I haven't been able to explore as yet to day is how about turning it over to the Carnegie Foundation for Administration, of a Kissinger fund for world peace somehow in a program.

K: Another thing I thought of is to set up a scholarship fund for the sons of servicemen killed in Vietnam or missing in action, or for the children.

M: There again something like that but keeping it here in this country rather than getting over there involved. After all we are going to rehabilitate the North and if we draw a line between the North and the South its very awkard but if you limit it to american people...

K: Well, I have to do something though this week and I have to find some organization to give it to.

M: Is there anything wrong with the Carnegie fund that could administer it as a trust for either scholarships orfor the same purpose you received it for improving the peace of the world. Could I make it...that idea of having it in the hands of an American foundation.

K: That appeals to me. I would most like to give it to something that benefits the children of servicemen who were killed or missing in action there. That's not a political thing. No one can object to that.

K: No, they certainly could not to that and that I can find a place for you to give it in two or three telephone calls.

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K: Could you do that.

M: Yes. I think I might be... Yes. Let me make 2 or 3 phone calls and come back to you Henry.

K: And conceivably we could do it as a prize for contribution to peace but those things usually turn into such horrors.

M: It would have to be pretty specific.

K: And then the question arises, why didn't I keep it for the Nobel Foundation.

M: I think that is easily explained. It's a prize and you want it to go to the peaceful efforts or to help those who we lost in the struggles.

K: The children of those, that's easy.

M: Yeah. It can be a regular administered scholarship fund based on the merits.

K: Exactly. And of course, after a while, you know, it could go out of, you know they should be able to use up the capitol because those children will grow up over 20 years.

M: Yes, and that would give them an allowance so they can use capitaol and income for this purpose until this thing eased up.

K: Yeah.

M: I think _____ education has 2 or 3 such funds but I'd like to get it away from the political and into something that is totally private.

K: If you could make a suggestion to me so that we could... I have to write a letter by the end of this week.

M: Ok.

K: Many thanks Carl. I'll have the pleasure of swearing you in tomorrow.

M: Tomorrow at 4:15 I understand.

K: Terrific.

M: Look forward to it.

K: Good byle.

T27 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Bunker - Secretary Kissinger
November 26, 1973
10:50 a.m.

K: Ellsworth, how are you?

B: Fine, Henry. I'm about to start off. I'll let you know by the end of the week. I would like to do it if I am in shape to do it. I'll talk it over with Carol. I had one other thought. I noted in the press release about new positions that Bill Jordan was mentioned for Central America.

K: What press release?

B: Not press release, the account in the Washington Post. Bill Jordan was mentioned possibly going to Central American. I thought, you know he knows Torillos. He might be good there.

K: All right.

B: That was the one thought I had interms of negotiations, he is pretty familiar with the situation there. That was one thought I just wanted to leave with you.

K: All right. Good. Let me think about that.

B: I just wanted wanted to mention it in passing. It's not vitally important but it might help with the negotiations in some way. I'll be in touch with you by the end of the week.

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T 28

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
November 26, 1973
10:50

K: Anatoyl, I have just received a message from our Ambassador in Cairo.

D: What message?

K: I am trying to tell you. Apparently, Virgridov is instructed to deliver the letter to Sadat or someone Sadat designates.

D: Yes.

K: But Sadat is not there and our man thinks and Virgridov agress that they should delay submitting the letter til after Sadat returns.

D: They know what was said in our instructions to go Sadat or someone who is there...then we have to change all other embassies.

K: Both of our Ambassadors seem to agree that noone is in Cairo to deliver the letter to.

D: In Jordan they have to change...so in Egypt..2 days later. Do you think it is right?

K: I would wait everywhere til Thursday or Friday.

D: I will tell..

K: It makes no difference to me.

D: If they agree, both of them in Cairo let them do what is most fitting. Only question is Egypt later than the others, but if we can't reach anyone then alright with me....have the Ambassadors postpone, yes.

K: That is my impression.

D: Maybe we do this way. Let them do it with our Ambassadors. OK

K: How about the other plan.

D: They will go through.

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K: Tomorrow.

D: ...we send instructions. on 2 places..do everything together with you Ambassador and in Syria alone.

K: Apparently Virgridov said he has to deliver it to Sadat.

D: Sadat or some other official. . . . . Let's wait until they get back. . I am not sure time enough to intercept instructions to other places, for example in Syria and Amman. .

K: Is it possible for you to ask Moscow and let me know by this afternoon.

D: I don't know if I can get message back in time. It is 7:00 at night in Moscow. . .

K: Since it is at night in the Arab countries we can discuss. .

D: . . . maybe while they are their they can infrom Arabs. .

K: I am worried about what the Egyptians will do if the Egyptians have found out from the Syrians and Jordanians that we have approached the others and we haven't gotten to them in Cairo. . . there will be all hell to pay.

D: I will raise this with Moscow

K: Why don't you ask Gromyko. . we will do whatever you want. The second thins, Virgridov is saying unless we have disengagement before the conference , the conference cannot take place.

D: Who did he say this to?

K: To our Ambassador. Why don't you calm him down. They won't have disengagement before the 18th.

D: OK. I will send message right away and try to get answer.

END

T35

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Senator Fulbright/Secretary Kissinger
November 27, 1973
5:00 PM

(Missed the first part)

F: If we bring them around..... I saw McCormack awhile ago.....

K: But in foreign policy..... Exactly. If you can come 15 years you're that much ahead.

F: I think it's useless to come around.....

K: Mr. Chairman, I have one problem which has to be discussed with.....

F: Our concern is in the Arabs.

K: The trouble with Israel now is not material. How much they get..... They need us in case of war. It has enough.....

F: .....is still in your hands to persuade them to come around. That's the only thing.

K: But I think that is not going to ..... You were doing what I had hinted to you. I would just as soon get it moving now.

F: I am going to be away next week. I'll talk to the staff. We have a new director.....

K: He's a good man.

F: He's a real pro. He's a specialist on Latin America.

K: What's Carl going to do?

F: He's going to continue as a consultant for the next 6 months.

K: I saw Lowenstein. He's got till May until he has to move..... He has been on your staff at one point. He's the one you wanted to send to the Near East. I am not worried about it..... I will get the machines started by 6:00.....

F: I don't think so.

K: I will find out who he is. OK Mr. Chairman.

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T36

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Barry Goldwater/Secretary Kissinger
November 27, 1973
6:30 PM

K: I would like to have an opportunity.....

G: You had told me that it had been ..... I would like to visit with you. I am leaving for Iran Friday.

K: See if we can get together for 15 minutes.

G: Thursday I am getting briefed by Admiral ..... and getting debriefed by General Quinn.

.....

G: She wants to come back home now.

K: I always thought Sally was basically a sweet girl.

G: I'm very fond of her. Don't tell anybody but I think she is getting..... so she can do.....

K: What's your feeling about the Middle East problem?

G: I thought you explained it beautifully this morning. I have been thinking that sooner or later whether we like it or not that world is going to have to .....to those people. I think the way to explain, and this is understandable, I think our ally is very, very wrong. They will live to regret it.

K: .....

G: I don't worry too much about it.....

K: Come over at 6:00 - 6:15 tomorrow.

G: What time?

K: Say for 6:00 for 15 minutes to a half hour.

G: See you at 6:00.

K: O.K.

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T 38

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Haig/Secretary Kissinger
November 27, 1973
7:20 PM

K: How did Rosie do today?

H: I think she did fine. I think she has to go back again tomorrow.

K: Look, this .....is driving me crazy on the Dutch oil thing. I think we have to make some offer to help in an emergency, and I would like to announce.....that we have offered to help and want to send somebody to have discussions. Can you get me Presidential backing on this?

K: If we don't announce it before the ..... We are willing to help them out in an emergency. We will have to do something and it might hurt a bit.

H: I think that's right, that it's going to hurt.

K: We are talking about 30,000 gallons a day; we are short 3 million gallons. That's one-third of our shortage; that's one-tenth of what we use and if we don't show aid to the Arabs.....

H: That's what we're critizing them for.

K: Exactly.

K: Since the Dutch won't need it until March, I want to offer it now. If they don't need it till March, they don't have to use it until March.

H: Of course.

K: Thank you.

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5055 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin - Secretary Kissinger
November 27, 1973
4:55 p.m.

D: How are you, after having brifed all the people in Congress?

K: Anatoly, I'm going to get a bipartisan foreign policy if it kills me.

D: My impression is you have already got one, after your press conference, your meetings with Fulbright, etc.

K: I think we're getting them under control.

D: I think so. How are things going? I have telegram in connection with yesterday's conversation. I have full text of conversation between your Ambassador and our Ambassador.

K: Oh, good. I understand that they submitted the letter to Fawzi today.

D: Good idea.

K: Fawzi made a few objections.

D: I have not yet the telegram.

K: The Egyptians dont want us to be co-chairmen, just participate. But let's wait until you get instructions and then we'll settle it, OK?

D: OK.

K: They want the auspices to be under the Secretary General.

D: They want the Secretary General, I never heard this kind of ideas. We discussed auspices, not participants.

K: I think we should insist on the auspices, but not on the co-chairmen.

D: The auspices, never objected to this one to my knowledge.

K: I think our European friends may be in on this one.

D: I'll say I discussed with you along these lines, auspices in Moscow, then the co-chairmen doesn't really matter.

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K: I don't care about the co-chairmen, really. I don't know if Waldheim is bright enough to be chairman of anything.

D: I don't know if he is really going to be chairman, otherwise we're in trouble.

K: We would like to nominate Rogers as Ambassador. We haven't asked for a formal agreement. Could you get approval?

D: Am I to check in an official way, or....?

K: Officially, yes. We are asking for an agrement for him.

D: Agrement for him. Fine. I will do it right away.

K: If its not a problem.

D: No, no, no problem. When I get a reply we will follow regular procedures as usual.

K: Secondly, Anatoly, you remember we have an understanding about release of prisoners.

D: What prisoners?

K: Israelis that the Arabs hold.

D: In moscow when you were there.

K: The Syrians haven't even given a list and I'm afraid this is going to cause complications if they haven't at least given a list of prisoners

D: I understand the problem.

K: If you could do something we would appreciate it.

D: I will check with Moscow and then let you know. I have no information on that incident from Moscow. I will consult with them on what is your situation. I'll say I understand it would be helpful to do something along those lines.

K: Thank you.

D: I want to talk with you a little bit about our Ambassadors. I have [illegible] ...my impression simple ...[illegible]

sent on to me what he said without correcting it or anything, according to this he said, it was his impression the Egyptian side is not satisfied at all by fulfillment of Israelis of agreement, by point 2, he said his impression was that the Egyptian side is not satisfied.

K: Well, that's all right.

D: He mentioned in the telegram the Egyptians complained to him several times to the Ambassador, and his own impression was they are complaining. This would create obstacles....

K: One other thing, frankly. The Israelis keep telling us that there is extremely high readiness of Egyptian forces.

D: This could be. They make public.

K: No, no. We are telling the Israelis if there is any attack by Israel we will have to oppose them. We hope you will use your influence with the Egyptians to calm them down. We have told our Ambassador to tell the Egyptians.

K: No chance to discuss it yet.

D: No, because [redacted] Fahmi isn't back.

K: They mentioned to us too in the sense they are afraid of some trick by the Israelis and telling they should be prepared, publically said this. not just to us, from time to time tell us about things, but nothing in addition to my knowledge to what was said publicly. I will notify Moscow so they know ....Is there any change in the elections. Are the Israelis going to change the elections?

K: If the Israelis change the elections it will not affect our determination to proceed. If the election is not until the 31 then we should not go on substantive matters before then, but if they delay by three months then we will go into substance right away.

D: If we must wait so to speak 3 months, it will take a lot of....

K: We will not take that much time. Only delay which is acceptable is the last.

D: This is understandable. We do understand that in Moscow.

*

4.
Dobrynin/Kissinger
November 27, 1973
4:55 p.m.

K: Exactly, I think you and we are on a good course.

D: That is my impression too.

K: Both the President and I said so very strongly to the leaders this morning. We talked about Soviet-American detente and how it has proved itself in a crisis.

D: I think it is true and second it is a good thing to do. The summitry, the more open atmosphere will open broad horizons before us.

K: Right.

T37

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Casey/Secretary Kissinger
November 27, 1973
7:30 PM

C: Do you think we need a piece of paper at this point?

K: Did I sign anything?

C:.....

K: I haven't seen it.

C: I didn't think of this, that we would need a formal piece of paper..... Unless we have a piece of paper.

K: Let me see it and then I'll discuss it with you.

C: OK.

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5056 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
November 27, 1975
5:10 pm

K: On just one other thing. Where is that cable from Eilts, I am talking to some associate here....the Israelis also have some points..Do you think we can negotiate this thing by the end of 75, the latter.

D: Laughter.

K: Israel's want, I'll tell you frankly at some point we should just send the letter and tell them to go to hell. They want, a minor point, the United States and Soviet Union have now been informed by the parties concerned of their readiness to enter negotiations among the parties concerned under the auspices of the United States and USSR. They want to say between the parties concerned..something like that. They want to pick up the phraseology of 338.

D: A minor point, but I don't know how the Arabs. but along the lines of the resolution as for others, they don't object.

K: They have a number of bilateral points with us..without prejudice 2 possible participants at a subsequent stage by determination by the conference.

D: Clearly stated in your letter...settled without changeing.

K: I noticed I now have a longer telegram from Eilts and he tells me that Fawzi made these points as suggested

D: I am writing a telegram to instruct ..to tell them up to now never any question of auspices.

K: My strong view is we should not insist on co-chairmanship but insist on auspices.

D: Exactly.

K: If we don't insist on that all hell will break loce if it is under Waldheim.

D: Laughter, I know the Egyptians and you have never objected to my knowledge..

K: I feel that if you agree we will tell our Ambassador in Cairo that it has always been understood that the auspices would be the US and Soviet Union. You will stick to that?

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Dobrynin - 2 -

D: I will..on our position you have just mentioned and is our position you want feonfirmed.

K: As soon as I know Virgridov has been instructed that way I will instruct Eilts that way.

D: On my problem, I am sure tomorrow I will get reply.

END

T33*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
November 27, 1973/10:25 a.m.
Congressman Passman/HAK

K: Hello.

P: Mr. Secretary

K: Mr. Chairman.

P: I want to talk to you in the strictest of confidence. You requested 2 billion 2 for Israel, that's the budget request. We marked up our Bill yesterday. What I did. And the vote was 9 to 3. That was 1 billion 700 million in emergency funds and I earmarked 300 million in military sales from the January request which brought this u p to 2 billion. Then I proposed and it was accepted, 1 billion dollars, not more than 1 billion, could be in grants leaving you then the right to go down to zero. This was a very crucial thing because two members, they knew right away what could happen. I said, well now listen, we've got to give the Secretary of State and Administration some flexibility in this thing. Because, here is what I want to do. And you are the only man I am going to mention this to. Not another soul until, until about an hour before I report this to the full Committee. Here is why I want to do it in two pieces. Our military or defense bills passed the full Committee yes, we cut it 3 billion dollars and this hits the headlines of the front pages of the papers then we followed with of course these supplemental appropriations which was cut very substantially. Now if I had have moved this thing out at 2.2 you understand, we could have been in serious trouble. Now, here's what I want to do. I want, the chances are 99 to 1. I need a little leeway. I think that my skids are greased, I think I'm safe but when I get into the full Committee and report this Bill I'm going to say I am in receipt of a letter from the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense's letter, I have it now, "Top Secret," on top of my desk. That I am going to offer the motion in the full Committee to move it up to 2.2 you see.

K: Right.

P: If we had bought this off at 2.2 there had been so much opposition building up it could have been in trouble. Because there is a [redacted] hell of alot of money in this Bill for Israel and trying to word it and Morgan's Bill only passed by 5 votes. So I'm asking you, you're entitled to this information. My plans are to give you 2.2.

K: Well, you're a good friend.

P: Now, if you could, and I need this letter confidentially, it ought to be marked "Secret." Make a strong case for it, you understand, as you can and let me have a letter on it.

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K: Good. I'm at a meeting and won't be able to do it until this afternoon.

P: That's alright but make it very strong. That it is crucial, it is urgent that no less than 2.2. Just make it as strong as you want to and I'm going to give you 2.2.

K: Terrific.

P: And remember this, that Richard Nixon has the key to this storehouse anytime he wants to come in. That's I feel for the man, nothing he can do for me. Told him to make a good President and that's what he is doing. It's ourobligation to back you up because you're doing a great job for this country. The chances are 99 to 1 that I'm going to ask the motion in this Committee and bring this Bill onto the floor at 2.2.

K: Terrific.

P: And you're the only man I'm going to tell.

K: Mr. Chairman, many thanks and we won't forget it.

P: OK. Goodbye.

T39

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec. Schlesinger/Sec. Kissinger
Wednesday, November 28, 1973
10:15 a.m.

K: How are you?

S: A little tired but o.k. How does the world look out there.

K: I have had a very interesting message from Saudi Arabia saying Faisal would like to ease the boycott and is looking for an early occasion which will provide him the way when the peace conference is agreed to -- in the form of a presidential letter.

S: Very good. That bears on the subject I was going to discuss which is that it will take six or seven weeks anyhow to accumulate the Marines in the Indian Ocean.

K: Can I call you back this afternoon. I have to go to the Hill and I am late now. That information is just for you. It is a message from Prince Fahd.

S: Are we sure Faisal agrees?

K: He claims he is speaking for Faisal. I have never known him to go this far.

S: Very good. Fahd of course is more friendly with the United States than Faisal at the moment. O.K.

K: Goodbye.

END

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T41

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Secretary General Waldheim/Secretary Kissinger
November 28, 1973
7:35 PM

W: I have a problem .....a gentleman from Washington...a number of delegates asked me repeatedly about the role of the Secretary General in the Peace Conference, and of course I had a number of talks - private talks - with the Security Council members, and I couldn't convince them that it would .....formal meeting. During the last two days there have been press reports from Tel Aviv about an observer role.

K: That is nonsense.

W: I did tell them this. There are of course a number of aspects which I think should be clarified in order to avoid any uneasiness which exists, and again a report from Amman reporting about the dimension of the American and Soviet Ambassador in Amman speaking of the presence of the Secretary General at the Conference. I would be very grateful if you would look into this matter.

K: There's nothing to look into because there's no dispute about it. The Secretary General will participate as a full member.

W: I see.

K: Let me look into it and call you tomorrow. I'm already late for a meeting.

W: It's very kind of you to return my call. Would you be able to receive Brad Morse?

K: Next week - not this week. I might be in New York over the weekend and I could conceivably seem him on Saturday morning.

W: Whatever you prefer. Should he call you in New York?

K: Let him call tomorrow, and we'll find out when I can see him.

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T40

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Senator Mansfield/Secretary Kissinger
November 28, 1973
6:40 PM

(Missed the first sentence)

K: No, I can talk to you.

M: OK. .....

K: He has told me that any time I recommend ....if it's humanly possible, they will arrange.... I think the next move to make is a.....which is .....with my..... I think you will find him in a more ...frame of mind.

M: I'll get in touch with you later.

K: OK

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T42

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Robert MacNamara - Secretary Kissinger
November 29, 1973
4:40 p.m.

M: I just wanted to tell you I talked to Larry Lynn today and tell you briefly what I said. I said I despised Nixon more than he did. I told him the only place to do any good today is with you, with the situation as it, under the circumstances with a very weak executive there is no chance in hell he could do anything outside more important than he would be able to ~~t~~ with you. I told him it was a tremendous opportunity compared to whatever opportunities there might be outside here. I went on and on and on in that vein. And he said he would take my words seriously. I think the odds are about 50-50.

K: That's better than they were.

M: I hope so.

K: And he really could make a hell of a difference.

M: Exactly what I told him. One man does make a difference and dammit he could do the job.

K: We've got to build this place into a, little excitement.

M: Right, and I told him I thought it would be more exciting than anything he could find or anyplace he could contribute on the outside. He thought perhaps he could contribute more on the outside.

K: That's not true.

M: I know. Well I just wanted to tell you how it went. If you feel I could help by calling him again or so mething, don't hesitate to let me know.

K: That good to know.

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T43

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Schlosser/Secretary Kissinger
Novembe r 29, 1973
4:43 pm

S: I think about you all the time, we all do. Will you be available any time to be seen, do you expect to be in New York soon?

K: I was hoping to come up on Saturday or Sunday a bit.

S: Wonderful, is there a chance of dinner or lunch?

K: Maybe on Sunday. Can I call you tomorrow?

S: Call me any time you want.

rest of conversation was personal.

END

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CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 25X6
DECLASSIFY AFTER: HAK'S DEATH
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T44

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D)

TELCON
Gov. Rockefeller - Secretary Kissinger
November 29, 1973
5:10 p.m.

K: Nelson, how are you?

R: Just calling to send you wavelengths of support. I don't want to bother you but I want you to know that your friends are with you.

K: You can't bother me. Aren't you nice.

R: I just want you to know if you want to get away, you could come up here Saturday for dinner, we're going to get away to the country.

K: I can't to it Saturday night. Are you going to be around on Sunday, I am going to come up.

R: Sure. We've been thinking of you. It seems someboy is always inventing problems and they end up landing on your desk. The Israelis and Arabs are really _____.

K: We are beginning, they are beginning to crack, though.

R: That's terrific. You've got to be a genious.

K: We are getting to them. If we can keep our guys from panicking And taking counter-measures. [redacted] B1

R: Oh, youre great Henry.

K: It's a risky proposition to test, though.

R: I can't tell how much of this is being dreamed up, spitballs, in the Kremlin.

K: I don't think they are encouraging it, they may not be discouraging it, but When they're backed against the wall there's not a hell of a lot they can do to us. I'm just waiting til the peace conference is set up, then we'll be able to give them a run for their money. They're not as confident as they sound.

R: I have to think our European and Japanese friends are worried.

K: Our Europeans will be more worried after the NATO meeting.

R: Well, I just wanted to tell you we are with you, praying to God, burning candles for you...

K: Nelson, you are a good friend.

R: Well, its the truth.

K: I do hope to see you soon, I'll see you Monday night anyway. Can I get away by 10:30 or so? Do you want me to say anything?

R: Sure you can get away. I would like you to say a little bit about the old commission you ran and this one, in terms of how much more complex things are today. In the old days you could consider such things as health, education, etc, separately. Now....

K: Oh, sure. I will do that extemporaneously.

R: That's fantastic Henry, and what's more all but three people are coming.

K: Having worked with you before I know its fantastic but not surprising. Fewer would probably come if they knew what's ahead of them.

R: If you are going to be here, could we get you to come to dinner Sunday night. That would be marvelous. I would talk to you a little bit.

K: I'll call you on Saturday morning.

R: I'm going to be in Washington tomorrow on the transit price crisis.

K: Would you like to give me a call?

R: Sure, I'll call.

sdd

5058

RELEASED IN FULL

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TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin - Secretary Kissinger
November 30, 1973
2:55 p.m.

D: I wanted to tell you the reception last night was wonderful.

K: Aren't you nice.

D: Reall Henry, this kind of reception is so often nothing, I don't know if you take personal care about these things, but it was really ....what the Ambasadors mentioned to me they don't usually to tell me about..and i think is a good thing.

K: Thank you..

D: And the girl from ABC was wonderful.

K: Meg Osman.

D: I don't know if you really had dinner, but I thought that she is the nicest girl I ever met.

K: Well, don't get carried away.

D: [No, but you should keep her as a secret weapon.] Henry, I received a telegram from Moscow and asked me to tell you he fully agrees and he is in government, it should be Soviet-American auspices. The Secretary General of the UN, the UN itself, should be Soviet-American auspices. We do not disclude the possibility for the Secretary General or one of his representatives to preside.

K: OK. Neither do we.

D: And three, we are agreed to work with you in full as mentioned so we confirm we sent instructions to our Ambassador in Cairo to talk with Sadat and to talk with him in the context of the letter we proposed to you. And we would like if you do the same.

K: Yes, we will. I have one other matter, Anatoly, the Egyptians are raising with us about bringing about an Israeli withdrawal before they will come to the conference.

D: As a condition?

K: Well, almost.

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K: What I want you to know is this, you know what I am doing, I am systematically creating a congressional support. If I have got to start now to try to get a minor Israeli withdrawal it's going to create an uproar in this country and destroy the atmosphere for the peace conference. For the sake of the Egyptians, we all know what has to be done, the Israeli withdrawal cannot get it until the peace conference is open and whatever influences you have in Cairo...If they go to the Security Council asking for _____338 we probably will have to oppose it on grounds that it should be discussed at the peace conference.

D: Henry who raised the question with you.

K: You're old friend Fahmi.

D: Fahmi? When? When he turned back. They don't raise it with us yet is the reason I ask.

K: No, I know, I just wanted to alert you.

D: I promise....

K: I really think we are on a good course now.

D: We may not like the situation, not withdrawing, but realistically we agree with you.

K: Reality of the situation in the letter to them, you know what's going on, what's going to happen, but if we took concerted action in early January.

D: You mean action about...

K: Bring withdrwal into the Shal.

D: They have not changed their minds about the elections?

K: Even if they do we will not change the schedule.

D: So, I can mention to.

K: You can mention to Gromyko.

D: Actual withdrwal.

K: Well, I can't promise that, but I can promise we will work

actively for it, it will be a matter of weeks after that. I can't give you a date for withdrawal.

D: I know.

K: I can give you a date for a major American effort.

D: I will put it this way. You have nd yet settled your trip to Cairo?

K: No, I'll inform you....

D: When it's settled.

K: I may not do it, if this situation continues I may not go at all.

D: When do you go?

K: I'm supposed to go on the 9th. I have no fixed decision. We have not yet formally approached anyone.

D: Well, I will keep in touch about preparations for the conference. I will send a telegram, and....

K: Send a a telegram to your Ambassador to see Sadat

D: Our Ambassador has instructions to visit him.

K: Those instructions are that we insist on auspices but not on chairman, right/

D: Right. We do not disclude the possibility of chairman. OK Thank you.

5057 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
November 30, 1973/9:34 a.m.
HAK/Dobrynin

D: Yes?

K: I didn't call you.

D: No, excuse me I was told to call you.

K: It's always a joy to hear from you.

D: I must excuse myself.

K: No, it's alright. Have you had any word from your Arab friends?

D: Not yet because only yesterday Gromyko arrived.

K: Gromkyo arrived where.

D: In Moscow.

K: Oh he's back in Moscow.

D: Yes because according to the schedule as before he should be at _____.

K: Oh I see. OK. Let's have the word latter in the day.

D: And what about lunch. You come here.

K: Lunch on the 6th.

D: Have you decided to go to the Middle East Henry.

K: I have not yet. I will know by next week.

D: By next wek. Then we will be in touch, and the 6th for the luncheon.

K: Do you want to come to the State Dept.

D: It's no problem for me. Since you are so busy that is fine.

K: It's better for my waistline if you come to me.

D: Alright. Bye.

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T45 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
November 30, 1973/9:40 a.m.
Ambassador Ortona/HAK

K: Hello Mr. Ambassador.

O: Good morning sir.

K: You take your guests away from parties so quickly before I can talk to them.

O: I'd love to have you for lunch if you want to come. But I know the Secretary of State is so busy.

K: You don't give me much time to change anthing. No, I can't do it now because the Colombian....

O: I looked for you but you had already gone up to your speech and they couldn't call your attention to this lovely lady. Very sorry.

K: To have a corruptible Secretary of State who isn't being corrupted by the Italian Ambassador is a disgrace. But look, that isn't why I'm calling you. Can I get your view on a personal basis on, is my impression correct that Moro feels that he doesn't want to meet me lest he gets criticized by his nine.

O: No.

K: I mean, my life will not be unfullfilled without such a meeting but I just wondered what the reason is.

O: No. Unfortunately I could only talk to you for a few seconds yesterday. They have been sort of _____ by the _____, who have said to us that they are taking an initiative with all the countries of the nine to see whether there should be a long meeting with you _____. Moro said in order to fix in an appropriate moment my meeting with the Secretary. Wouldn't it be better to know when these other meetings are taking place.

K: As an old friend can you tell me, is there any sense in my meeting with the nine since I'm seeing...

O: I would say so

K: What's the sense of it?

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O: Well there is a deep expectation.

K: But they can have a long meeting with me in the NATO framework.

O: Yes, but it's a different situation. The nine have something and this is something else. What I think they want to do is to explore with you what is the best way to proceed in order to eliminate some of the misunderstandings in one thing and the other which are actually rather rampart within the nine and the U. S. This telegraph of Moro which I got yesterday morning also says I don't think that one hour would be enough because it appears that there is a communication to our government that you had foreseen an hour with the nine.

K: I have foreseen/absolutely nothing. Now, I can't be sure that some of the eager beaver Ambassadors I've got running lose in Europe aren't trying to make brownie points by arranging a meeting between me and the nine. I have not requested a meeting. I'm not reguesting a meeting, I have no reason for a meeting. If the nine want to see me and if they have an agenda I'm delighted to see them. My purposes are perfectly fulfilled to see this happy group of allies in one room in their individual capacities at NATO.

O: I see.

K: But if they also want to meet me as 9 and if they request it, I will certainly do it but I have no requests for a meeting no matter what is being put before you.

O: I tell you, as I talked to you last night just a few seconds I got the sense of what you were meaning when you said, no, I have no invitation and I _____ from dating my telegrams to Rome and I said, come out with some sort of formal invitation then you can have the Secretary of State meeting with the 9. But you don't come out with anything and if we go on like this just making references and illusions that's not enought and you know now what they are going to do but I conveyed this feeling to Rome last night. So I would think that if I could suggest that it would be good if you could see them but certainly you need an invitation and for that I've already cabled I can assure you.

K: The only reason I'm proposing the meeting with Moro is because we missed at the U. N.

O: You're perfectly right. If you want to know the truth and nothing but the truth I talked to Gaiav(?) off and on before seeing you and they said can you tell me what is the date Mr. Moro thinks the best and Gaiav(?) came out saying well why don't we wait to see what the 9 plus other states are going to do about the meeting among themselves. We can decide the best date then.

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K: I've got to go up to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to tell them about the state of the alliance. It will be a long session.

O: I wish I could be there as I know the Senator.

K: It will be constructive.

O: We trust you -- for the future -- you must be absolutely aware of our great trust. That you can be sure about.

K: We have no complaints what soever about what Italy has done.

O: Let's hope.

K: None what so ever.

O: Thank you very much but I want to dispense completely the story that Moro is reluctant to see you.

K: That's what I wanted to find out.

O: No.

K: Ok. Give my regards to your house guest.

O: Thank you very much.

K: The only complaint I have about the Italian government is the excessive concentration of its Ambassador on business.

O: Thank you. Goodbye.

T54

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Clarence Kelly - Secretary Kissinger
Dec 2 1974

K: I have been using the Secretary Service and we are talking about switching to the State Department. I wondered whether you could give me your opinion. I am not ....I am more prominent in the public eye as Secretarys usually are and....

K: If you will let me have a day or so, I will give you an opinion. What about your own.

K: My own, you mean opinion? I don'tknow, I've never seen the State Department security people operate. My abstract view is that given the fact that they have only the Secretary to protect and no one else, they haven't had as much .....their experience level must be lower. I don't want to prejudice it, though. I have kept the Secretary Service up tilnow, but ....

K: Let me have a day or possibly two, I will make some inquiries so I can give you a good opinion.

K: If you could do that I would abide by your opinion.

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T52

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
George Vest - Secretary Kissinger
December 3, 1973
2:49 p.m.

K: Did you have a chance to make the thing about the income tax?

V: I did indeed.

K: How did they react.

V: A number of them made notes. Idon't know what they may carry but there wasn't a crack of any kind whatsoever.

K: Good.

V: I had to blow up a little bit last week on this. It was poinsonous the way they were acting.

K: They understood this was not produced by the questions but....

V: No, no, I volunteered it absolutely.

K: But you made it clear that the decision was made before that.

V: Quite clear. I said it was your stated policy and procedure applied in the past for all situation before this for prizes you had received, etc.

K: Fine, thank you.

V: No, no question about that sir.

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T58

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

TELCON
GeneralScowcroft - Secretary Kissinger
12/3/73
5:35 p.m.

H: Just heard from the Saudis, it's coming over but I wanted to catch you before you left. Fahmi has agreed in principle that Fahad should visit prior to the 8th of December, [redacted] B1

K: Oh, tell him to come on. [redacted] B1

K: Tell him to come by the 6th OK?

H: Right.

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T57

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
December 3, 1973
5:07 PM

D: You're back.

K: Back from where? I have been back all day.

D: But you were in New York.

K: That's true.

D: Well, I received several telegrams from Moscow. It is alright from my government for Stoessel to be Ambassador to my country. It is official but I haven't announced.

K: Good. We will probably announce on Wednesday.

D: Secondly, on about the Middle East. Between our Ambassador and your representative....serious talk. I would like to tell you the following.

There are some complications in the Middle East. We shall agree that Middle East conference should be started without delay, as planned. We have expressed this already to Sadat and are expressing it today. What we are bothered by is this in connection with fulfillment of the Security Council resolution and agreement reached with your help. .....They believe in Cairo thatthe Government refused to implement Security Council resolution and arrangements made with your help. Moreover, Israel....in course of negotiations on military level... _____from their own proposals on November 24 in accordancewith point two of November 11. First they proposed to withdraw from West Bank but now on the 29th the Israeli representative says no. The first proposal is exempt from ..... The Egyptians are very angry and as....personally involved in working out point two...In moscow they hope U.S. will exercise implementation with that kind of arrangement.

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K: What kind of arrangement?

D: Well, point two...to move in some direction.

K: We are willing to do this as soon as conference starts.

D: But Egyptians are telling us that nothing has happened. Israel proposed to have a conference without doing anything on point two. Wait till peace conference. So we hope maybe you....expert influence. We agree with the Middle East conference should be started without

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delay and we mentioned firmly to Sadat, but take into account the anger felt by the Arabs and...position not observed by Israel... possibility of military operation and we share with you the concern that that is to happen...at the same time we feel this policy of Israel makes it difficult....we believe_____should do what is possible to encourage implementation of Security Council resolution and we hope this conference will commense....given time and....should really take place, but we want you to know our concerns.

K: Well,

D: What is your impression?

K: My frank opinion is that given the election we.....to have rapid movement before they... and we could .....at some point that really is over, you know that.

D: I know.

K: Let's talk about it again on Wednesday.

D: OK

K: It is only a question of a few weeks difference.

D: Could you arrange some movement.

K: I'll see what I can do. We are working closely as soon as conference starts. No sense in doing...unless there was going to be some progress.

D: That is the point...no movement. But there has got to be some movement. I will mention to Moscow that you will more or less...there will be some movement.

K: I am not sure from them but I am sure from us.

D: Yes.

K: I have to run off to New York.

D: Again?

K: There is a dinner Rockeferrer is giving tonight.

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D: Are you trying to elect him?

K: What could give you that...

D: Maybe you support him and when it comes to 76.

K: Why should I do something... I will probably be going to the Middle East.

D: We hear from Syrians they give you a positive reply.

K: It hasn't reached here yet. I am waiting to see Sisco maybe he has something. They give us a positive reply in principle but not the date.

D: They mention....received from Damascus.

K: Anaytoly, I must run.

D: You are going to Cairo and Damascus.

K: and to Amman and Tel Aviv and Beirut for an hour. I'll be back tonight, and I'll call you tomorrow.

T50

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Kliendienst/Secretary Kissinger
December 3, 1973
2:45 pm

K: I recently returned from the Algerian government, so I am now recognised as a foreign agent. ...to your graciousness to see those two Arab potentates in your office. One thing I know they would like is to have an informal meeting with the President..is that something you would recommend.

HAK: Not easily. We don't want to get into a position where we are blackmailed by the Arabs.

K : Do you think they would use that as an opportunity to.

HAK: Yes, but let's see what they are going to say to me.

K: Good. They'll be here all week. Let's see if they behave themselves with you.

HAK: It is not a question of that. It is a question of what they say.

K: What should I tell them?

HAK: You say there is a question as to whether the President will be able to see them

K: And then after you see them on Wednesday, you'll give me a ring.

HAK: yes.

END

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T49 *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Senator Scott/Secretary Kissinger
December 3, 1973
12:17 pm

S:...have just gotten back from touring the Arab countries and he is holding off a press conference til tomorrow afternoon. He would like to give you his impressions..he has visited with Faisal and most of the Arab countries. I think it would be good for you to talk with him

K: What senator?

S: Senator McClure of Idaho. He has just returned.

K: I'll call him this afternoon.

S: I;ll just put him on so you can meet him.

K: I don't have my schedule in front of me.

S: Well, let me put him on so you can meet him.

K: Hello Senator.

M: Hello, Mr. Secretary. I know how busy your calendar must be, but I wanted..

K: I would like to see you on Wednesday, that would be best for me because of the Ceausescu visit, but you wished to see me before your press conference, didn't you?

M: Yes, that would be most helpful.

K: Can we call your office and see if we can have 15 minutes sometime tomorrow?

M: Fine. I'll be available anytime and on a moment's notice.

END

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T53 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
December 3, 1973
2:52

S: I wanted to see where go in the light of what Waters has had to say and you have a thing from Schmidt that you can pick up.

K: I think we should give Schmidt a try. The French we do nothing with.

S: The issue with the French is..

K: On the basis of what... they responded as before.

S: They did on the Middle East and alot of nonsense..I dont' know what we did on the military side....to take stock of that part of the problem.

K: I want Jobert to take me on.

S: Yes. On the German side you need to consider if you want to use that channel and in what form. I haven't been able to get details on what Schmidt said to him..I don't think..

K: Why don't you do a letter to Schmidt and say the situation is serious and if he wants to come over I would be glad to discuss it with him....You saw how the British covered...

S: Yes.....and they're eager to talk to you. I don't know if there is a change in substance..

K: Well I couldn't..

S: No, no, but on the substantive side, nothing in this correspondence that changes.

K: ..Do a draft and I am thinking of announcing your appointment on Thursday.

S: OK...I don't mean to bug you on the Litchly thing, but

K: I told Larry that I am against it.

S: OK. The problem is in the Embassy..got involved but I can turn it off.

K: OK

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T55 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Foreign Minister Rabasa - Secretary Kissinger
December 3, 1973
4:15 p.m.

R: I wanted to talk with you to see if its suitable for you. I am thinking of making the meeting in Febrary, the 17th to the 24th, on the understanding that the 17th, a Sunday, the Foreign Ministers would arrive to discuss whatever they have to discuss and propose whatever they wish on the 18th, 19th and 20th and then if you could be so kind as to arrive for the 21st, 22nd and 23rd and go back to your business on the 24th.

K: OK.

R: We are not sure but we are now going to go ahead, but whether it will be Mexico City or Acapulco. Acapulco has problems.

K: It has problems?

R: Well, it has problems with water, there isn't enough water, and other things. We would have to make a big investment and it would be an unnatural thing.

K: Well, it's entirely up to you.

R: Thank you Henry. The only thing to be sure ...I am going to write the Foreign Ministers and the Ambassadors.it is all right for you to arrive the evening of the 20th and leave the 24th, or leave whenever you wish.

K: Are you telling me I have to leave right after....?

R: No, no, you can stay as long as you please, 1 month, 4 months....

K: Thank you, I am thinking of working with people I like.

R: Henry, I received the photo from McBride but the one I would like is the one taken when you were still here in Mexico. You know the one, we are sort of embracing.

K: I will get it for you.

R: So, I am going to officially say you have accepted to stay with us the 21st, 22nd and 23rd, leaving whenever you want. Thank you very much and a big embrasso. Please tell me exactly how you are arriving so I can be there to meet you. It will give me a fine excuse

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to pass New Year's eve in Acapulco. I'm not going to bother you, but....

K: You couldn't bother me. I am delighted.

R: I will be calling you.

sdd:12/4/73

TELCON
General Scowcroft - Secretary Kissinger
December 3, 1973
5:20 p.m.

S: _____strong veto signal in the letter to Albert.

K: This morning.

S: What concerns me is that it reduces Jackson's flexibility and the _____ will gripe about....

K: Oh, come on, come on. If you want to raileroad the bill through, go ahead and do it. The President said this morening, a strong veto signal Albert told me the only difference between now and January is that Ullman wants his name on it and he won't be chairman of the committee then and he wants his name on it.

S: Well, that's the first I have heard about Albert.

K: That's what he told me, I can't judge that, but you ask Shultz if the agreement this morning wasn't that there be a strong veto signal.

S: Nobody is putting pressure on us, I just wanted to see if we might be reducing our chances.

K: The only way you can get Jackson to comprosie is if he things there will be a veto, it may make a little harder to pass the bill, even that _____.

S: Halwouldlike to say something.

K: God dammit, we used to runthese things through without running itlike a Polish parliament. How about John Lehman, he seems to be getting into the act all the time now, too.

Sonnenfeldt: There are someohter considerations. The AFL wants the bill killed. If you tell them you are going to veto an unacceptable bill, they will get behind it. And the Russians, even if you mention their name in an invidious manner, we are committeed to the Russians, we are committed to use the veto.

K: Wehaven't commited ourselves to the Russians. We are committed to the Congress.

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S: But things have been said to the Russians.

K: They've been said already. Listen you will just have to hold the letter overnight. I have meetings I must attend and I have to get to the airport.

S: OK.

T51

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Mr. Kleindeinst - Secretary Kissinger
December 3, 1973
2:45 p.m.

K: I just want to read one paragraph....I'm going to give it tomorrow at the briefing. The last paragraph of my speech for the press briefing.... strong government leadership, first, second, continuing cooperation of the American people, and then talk about how they respond this way puts....never again be open to economic blackmail by any economic powe ragain.

K: I would say economic and political blackmail.

K: Well, I wasn't going to get into you baliwick, I wanted to save you the trouble of buying white gloves for me.

K: You know that now Will Donaldson is handling the energy thing for mehere.

K: Yes, of course, I talked to Willie this morning and we are going to get together very early.

K; I think you and I ought to talk before I go off to the European thing, too. If I canoffer them some cooperation on energy matters and I can say "look you freaks, you go alone and you are dead, you cooperate with us and here is what can come along further down the road."

K: Okay, let me do something about that. I will be prepared to bounce a few things off your head later on this week. I will meet with Bill Donaldson and.....

K: You know Bill I wasn't totally innocent on your appointment, but I was delighted tohear about it.

K: Aren't you nice, Henry. I will surely try to justify that, too.

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T48 *

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Joe Sisco
12/3/73; 8:17 a.m.

K: Hello, Joe.

S: Good morning, Henry.

K: How are you?

S: Fine, thank you. I am going to be on my way to the Hill because I am substituting for Ken Rush this morning who went off, as you know, on that delegation.

K: Yeah. I hope you make a strong case.

S: Well, I hope so. I've looked over all the testimony and so on.

K: Joe, have you seen the Gelb article in the NEW YORK TIMES?

S: No, I haven't.

K: Well, there is too much palavering in the Department and I am not Rogers.

S: Yeah. What does he have to say? I don't know Les Gelb.

K: That we are going to lean on Israel. That the settlement we made in Cairo had previously been worked out with Mrs. Meir.

S: Who does he know in the Department?

K: That is had been done between the President and Mrs. Meir, which is totally -- total crap to begin with.

S: Of course it is.

K: Yeah, but you know what that is going to do for us in Cairo. That I then went through a charade of defending the Israelis might not accept.

S: Certainly, it affects your credibility.

K: Well, I am going to hold Bureau Chiefs responsible from now on for leaks out of their shops. I cannot operate this way.

S: What sort of contacts does he have in the Department?

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K: I don't know.

S: Yeah. Well look, Henry, I was about to call you on my personal situation. And Jean is right here because we have been up, frankly all night. And we have concluded, Henry, that while I am very grateful for the offer but we can't accept it. We have a further talk with the doctor -- remember after my call on Saturday -- and we have concluded that from all points of view and particularly from the point of view of some of the considerations that I outlined to you a week ago, that we had better just go right on ~~it~~ stay with the decision. It's been a very difficult decision. The only reason I was willing to reconsider is because frankly of the challenge and excitement of working with you. But, we've thought it all over and there are just some very, very strong considerations that aren't reversible at the present time.

K: Well, I am sorry to hear that. Joe, can we talk this afternoon after your testimony?

S: Sure. Be glad to.

K: Let's talk about it.

S: All right. Good.

K: Thank you.

T65

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Bill Simons - Secretary Kissinger
December 4, 1973
6:20 p.m.

K: You were going to give me a few paragraphs on what to say to the Europeans.

S: I'm thinking about something that you can say that will have some impact for negotiating purposes.

K: It doesn't have to be for the immediate crisis, but for the longer term.

S: I thought I would bring it along about noon tomorrow when I come over to see Yamani, or should I stick it in an envelope and mark it eyes only for you.

K: I'm meeting Yamani at 2:30 which I would like you to sit in on. I may ask Bill to cancel the lunch, so I'll be first to talk to him.

S: Okay, I'll be there, and I'll do whatever you say, Henry.

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T60

RELEASED IN PART
B2

TELCON
Clarence Kelly - Secretary Kissinger
December 4, 1973
5:00 p.m.

Kelly: I have looked over the matter you talked with me about and I would like to review a few points with you. I find it is pretty well common knowledge that there is no actual authority for the Secret[redacted] Service to serve you in this capacity.

K: But that we could get done with the Congress.

Kelly: Yes, that can be done. The State Department does have the statutory provisions. The Secret Service does not have accessible to them some resources the State Department has but the Secret[redacted] Service has a great deal of expertise. I might also mention that the Secret[redacted] Service being used to guard you may on some future occasion give somewhat of a morale problem. I also find that possibly the Secret Service will be somewhat reluctant to continue without some indication that they are going to be a permanent part of your entourage.

K: Well, I am assuming that I could get these administrative things cleared away with the President if you advised me it was the better thing to do.

Kelly: What I said to General Haig when he called in September, did you know he called me?

K: Yes, I did know, but I never asked for his report since I decided to keep the Secret Service for awhile.

Kelly: What I would suggest is that you have a trial period to sort of integrate the two.

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K: The Secret Service won't do that.

Kelly: Will not do that? I understood that for the last week or two you had been trying...

K: They will do it as long as they are in charge . If they were put in charge the Secret Service wouldn't mind having the State Department with them, but finish your recommendation.

Kelly: I would suggest you do try to get them to integrate. That would get the State Department addition experience, and more importantly I think the crucial matter is that you may be able to become a little more confident in the State Department people. You have to make up your own mind what you want , and I do feel very definitely you are the person to be satisfied.

K: I have no clear criteria. Unless something goes wrong they all look successful.

Kelly: Well, it is a pretty good judge of performance how well they are doing the job. I understand the State people have been in the business of protecting the Secretary of State and frankly they both are very competent. I do think the crucial point is that you get the confidence in them by seeing them in operation. In the course of my many years in the business I have seen the Secret Service operate and they are very competent. And, overseas I understand the State people are very competent. You've really got sort of the best of both worlds almost in this combination. I was hopeful that you could possibly get the two of them to work together. With a team of [redacted] of the State people and still leave it in charge of the Secret Service. I do understand that, though I couldn't say absolutely, that the State people would work under this type of arrangement. And your feeling is the same as mine, that you must be comfortable. I would recommend to you that you try that and see how it works out. The morale problem is one that you should keep in mind, too. B2

K: In terms of competence you think the State Department is competent too.

Kelly: I do. I suggest you have a combination for awhile, give State an opportunity. I feel you have great confidence in the Secret Service isn't that true?

K: Yes, and I am used to them.

Kelly: I have had situations where I have had to had some people who might guard me, I know it is important to know they are competent. I think you will get that competence and if you saw some of these people work, talk with them a little bit, you might see great competence. The man who is in charge of the State Department security is a former FBI agent, his name is Gentile, and I have talked with him in the past and he knows what's going on.

K: Well, thank you, I appreciate the care you have taken.

K: I was really glad to be of service and I hope you won't hestiate to call on me again if I can do anything for you.

T59 1*
RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Senator Mansfield
12/4/73; 9:44 a.m.

K: Hello.

M: Good morning, Henry.

K: How are you, Senator?

M: Fine. How was the dinner last night?

K: Oh, it was very nice. Really very good.

M: What time did you get back this morning?

K: We got back after midnight.

M: Yeah.

K: And I liked your telegram.

M: I am sorry I couldn't make it but I got a cold, too.

K: I liked what you said -- whatever I won't tell you, you were sure Scott would. (Laughter)

M: As a tribute to your sagacity and to Scott's volubleness. (Laughter) Henry, what we were talking about the other day -- how about sometime in March?

K: Fine. That's a good time.

M: Could you ask Winston if he is free to come down at a time that is convenient to him today so that we could discuss a little in the way of details.

K: Absolutely.

M: Would he let me know?

K: I will tell him to call your office.

M: Okay.

K: I am at the White House right now waiting for the Ceausescu arrival.

M: Oh.

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K: But I will get Winston to call you.

M: And will you get the wheels going?

K: I will get it going.

M: Okay, boss.

K: Thank you, Senator.

M: Fine, Henry.

K: Bye.

T61

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
December 4, 1973
5:13 PM

D: Mr. Secretary, I'm sorry to disturb you, but there are two matters I should like to bring to your attention.

K: Yes?

D: The first is the situation on the ground. The tendency that we have been continuing...

K: I wouldn't say you're going to launch an attack.

D: We have information that two Egyptian destroyers left the Port of Aden. In light of this we have moved our boats that were ___ to pass through _____

K: I wouldn't have done it.

D: This is exactly the question, if you are recommending that we will continue_____

K: Look, I'm not insane--not the way things are leaking in Jerusalem and here.

D: One boat did pass--not with the Israeli flag, but B____sheba (sp?) We slowed down.

K: Slowed down? That's no expression. You're just making yourself look very nervous.

D: Only reason we do this--you know the reports are ominous, and as you know, this is the same source that predicted accurately the last encounter. And the other item that I have has to do with the conversation that you had with Mr. Shaleb last night.

K: That was just a suggestion.

D: I have some remarks on this I thought I should pass it to you, and I thought we maybe could see each other.

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K: It is out of the question today. I'm trying to find half an hour to work on a speech I have to give.

D: The suggestion is that we would be willing to accept the suggestion_____.

K: My honest judgment is you should have pushed the GD ship through.

D: We are prepared to make an inventory of all our proposals_____
K: Let me understand. You are prepared to go back 2 kilomaters?

D: No, we didn't say that. We are prepared for a unilateral withdrawal that would have to be marked on a map.

K: Can I get an idea? 200 yards -- a kilometer?

D: It all depends on the area. There would be places that might be even more than a kilometer.

K: That would be almost human.

D: I don't know why, Mr. Secretary, you are so sarcastic to me. We want to show it to you before we show it_____

K: I don't see holding a ship up for 3 days.

D: Because we were in a position in which we risked the life of people without knowing for sure.

K: I had the impression from Sadat that they all but said go through.

D: You told me after that we should go through._____

K: That's what Sisco told you Saturday. You will show me a mpa map tomorrow?

D: I think it should be ready in a day. They are already working on it.

K: And that might also even help us with the Saudis.

D: Are the Saudis interested?

K: They're interest in any move on the Peace Conference.

D: I was also asked to ask you, Mr. Secretary, in case we are sending the boats and the Egyptians...Can we on you to help us on boats in t he Indian Ocean?

K: I'll ask the President, but I'm not sure. But now that you've held it this long, why don't we talk tomorrow.

D: OK

T64

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
December 4, 1973
6:05 PM

K: _____after 6 weeks____. That's what I objected to. ____even when they think they understand it.

S: I can't ___ on both these things. That's the first ___I had anything to do with it.

K: The NATO speech, I want to hit them in the eyes. The Pilgrims speech I want to have a constructive statement. ___a thoughtful person and thoughtful government. __want to do something.____so the sympathetic European people, especially in England, _____.

S: On the NATO speech I don't see how you can make a far-reaching ____. ____on a speech which is basically a ___ speech.

K: The concern of American-European relations____.

S: That's fine, I think the whole truth ____. Well, I know. This is the first moment..... Mr. Secretary, I was told to keep my cotton-picking fingers of this speech.

K: Anytime the C___ ____of this _____. That's all we want to do __and a lot of other things.

S: OK, I'll get to work on it.

K: When can I get it?

S: Tomorrow morning and the Pilgrims speech the next day.

K: Fine.

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T63

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
December 4, 1973
Bill Donaldson - Secretary Kissinger
6:00 p.m.

K: I'm trying to put a speech to NATO together against everybody's wishes. I was going to get a couple of proposals from you or Simons on what we can propose on energy to the Europeans. My role is to get to the outer limit of what the bureaucracy can tolerate, what could they live with.

D: Well, what do you want to say.

K: What can be done cooperatively, I have no idea what it is, but in the short term probably nothing, but in the middle term or the long term. There must be something the procer nations can do to know where the supply and demand problems are. What can we tell the Europenans what are the advantages of concerted action.

D: Okay, I've got some definite thoughts on that.

K: Can I have it tomorrow?

D: Yah. While I've got you on the phone, you know Yamani is coming here tomorrow, I invited him to lunch. I was going to see him after your 12 o'clock meeting.

K: You'd better cancel it. Well, at least play it absolutely cool. There are lots of other things going on.

D: Did you see my memo yet.

K: No, they won't give it to me until 5 minutes before the meeting.

D: What I suggested is that you take. I invited Bill Simons too.

K: Well, go ahead and have the lunch, just don't make any propositions, don't give the impression of nervousness.

D: Absolutely, that's what my memo says to you.

K: Then Simons can sit in on the meeting with Yamani.

D: If you don't like what I said.

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K: I will eventually find it.

D: Pickering has it in his hands right now.

K: Well, as soon as Mrs. Pickering lets go of it.

D: I went up to New York and spent some time with Walt Levy. Do you have strong feelings about him coming on the trip?

K: I thought he was coming, but not on the plane.

D: I don't think he should be on the plane. I've got some reservations about him coming at all.

K: I don't particularly want him, but...

D: If you don't care, if you would leave it up to me I will take care of it.

K: Fine.

T62

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
December 4, 1973
5:30 PM

(Missed the first part)

S: I agree. I don't want to tell him off too strongly.

K: _____in the morning. Will I get talking points on this?

S: You'll be over here tomorrow.

K: Yes. OK

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T67

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Gerald Warren/Secretary Kissinger
December 5, 1973
1:12 pm

K: I am having a press conference tomorrow.

W: OK

K: But that won't conflict with the swearing-in.

W: I think it will be confirmed by tomorrow afternoon. They will confirm at 3:00 and the President will go up about 4:00.

K: I have to go too.

W: yes.

K: I don't see why the press conference would conflict.

W: I don't think so. It is an entirely different type of story. One is ceremonial and the other is substantive.

K: OK, we'll hold it for noon tomorrow. Can you hold your briefing at 11:00 tomorrow?

W: I will try.

K: I want you to make some announcements about my appointments so I can discuss them.

W: We'll do our best to be on time. We were planning to announce Casey tomorrow as President of Exim Bank

K: OK, well, why not wait until Friday...no, go ahead and announce it all tomorrow.

W: OK, fine.

END

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T66

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Paul Ziffren/Secretary Kissinger
December 5, 1973
1:09 pm

K: How are you?

Z: I am fine and I am glad you're bearing up.

K: Don't draw that conclusion yet.

Z: I have total confidence and total faith.

K: You're nice. I talked to Herb the other day about doing something with the Jewish Community because they are going to get tough.... I wonder how we should do it.

Z: He told you about the meeting in Sy Riffen(Sp?) 's office.

K: Yes.

Z: I have great confidence in them. He has good judgment and he is responsible.

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K: Do you want to come in here with him or alone?

Z: What I would like to do is to develop an overall program that would make some sense and then go over it with you before we do anything.

K: What is the program--what a settlement should be like.

Z: No, no. What we can do about the problem in this country. We're interested withint the Community to stop all the publicity about money going to Israel. Secondly, any talk about the Japanese boycott

K: We have a more fundamental problem about how to make the Jewish Community understand some sacrifices are going to be necessary.

Z: Right. We want to try to see how we can focus attention on the real developments rather than the Jews. You know about the bumper stickers that say we need oil.....Finn and some of the PR people are trying

K: OK, why don't you get in touch with me when you're ready?

Z: Right. ...we don't want to interfere with what you're doing.

K: But I am anxious to get some understanding in the Jewish Community about what I am doing before they start coming after me.

Z: I think that's important and I tried to lay a foundation in that meeting. I think it would be helpful if we had some idea

K: When do you think you'll be ready?

Z: In a couple of weeks.

K: That's alright. I'll be out of town. Why don't we try for between Christmas and New Year's.

Z: I will talk to Riffen and see if we can set a target date.

K: I think it is important that before the peace conference gets started we get together.

Z: Won't be much before the first of the year?

K: Right, that's why between Christmas and New Year's is ok.

Z: Alright, let me call Riffen and talk to him.

K: Many thanks and my best to Meg.

END

T68

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Senator Javits/Secretary Kissinger
December 5, 1973
7:45 PM

K: Jack, how are you.

J: Fine. Listen, I wanted to ask you if you thought it would be worthwhile to invest about 30 minutes to talk to Fisher. He's back from Israel. I know you're jammed.

K: It's worthwhile, but I'm literally at the end of my rope intterms of my schedule.

J: If you do see a break, tell your girl to call me.

K: Does he have a solution to every problem?

J: Haven't we all?

K: But you I take seriously.

J: Well, I think he would be worthwhile listening to for a few minutes if there's any break in the schedule. When do you actually leave?

K: Saturday.

J: He talked quite extensively to Ken Rush. Ken might reflect to you whatever Fisher told him. He's a very good link between the Israeli officials and ____.

K: Maybe he'll settle for 15 minutes.

J: I'll come with him and thereby guarantee 15 minutes.

K: I will call you tomorrow.

J: Marion is here and sends love.

K: Thank you.

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(T69)

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
December 5, 1973
7:53 PM

K: would you get Kleindienst off my back. In my judgment it is not in the national interest--even though he is getting a retainer from the Saudis.

S: Kleindienst is on your back?

K: Yes, he's also on Haig's back.

S: You're kidding.

K: I'm not kidding. I think it's what is so characteristic of this administration.

S: I'll call him. Have you talked to Haig?

K: I didn't get him.

S: I'll turn it off there, too.

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T71

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
December 5, 1973
8:18 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

D: Did you call me?

K: I'm calling you about a communication we have had from the Egyptians. Now they have accepted, and with 6 principles.

D: Six principles? What do you mean accepted.

K: They have made it formal - six principles. They like the figure six - it must be a holy number.

D: What are their principles?

K: I will send them over to you.

K: _____participation of Lebanese and Palestinians should be discussed.

D: Lebanon?

K: Lebanon is no problem. We don't give a damn whether Lebanon comes or not. I'll send you over the proposal. The second point: they want us to call a Security Council meeting to get the UN auspices, and we insist on doing it by letter.

D: as you proposed before.

K: Yes. If we do it with a Security Council meeting, there's no telling. I would like you to ___before I reply to Egypt. We have two____

D: There are really two points. On this we don't have any differences with you. I think we feel the same way. But I will check with Moscow.

K: So--we will not answer the Egyptians until we hear from you. I'll send it right over.

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T 72

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
December 5, 1973
8:25 PM

K: Anatol.

D: Yes.

K: I'm also sending you a copy of a draft letter which we have developed as a result of these six principles.

D: A draft of our joint letter? Or you just want to have a joint_____

K: No. This letter reflects what I have told you. This letter is a substitute of a Security Council meeting. It is what we would send if they agree. It takes into account the Egyptian point.

D: Joint letter.

K: That's right.

D: Still it's going through the same procedure as before - going to Secretary General and ____

K: Exactly the same procedure.

D: Joint draft.

K: In order to take into account the Egyptian points minus the two points we object to. I'm sure you will accept it. I see nothing in there that will give you problems. It is just I think the Egyptians are so hysterical that we should both come in with the same proposal. I'm sending it to you right away.

D: I will send it to Moscow as soon as I get it.

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T70

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

TELECON
Senator Fulbright/Secretary Kissinger
December 5, 1973
8:12c PM

K: We have sent a letter to Faisal - the President has - and I have asked my office to show it to you when you return so that you at least know what line we have taken with Faisal when you meet Yamani. [redacted] B1

The Egyptians have now formally accepted the Conference for December 18th, they have proposed UN auspices which is no problem to us. In fact, we prefer it. And there are a few really minor points that are impossible to explain on the phone -- how to get the Lebanese and Palestinians eventually connected with the Conference. So I think it's definitely on course.

F: I'm down in Oseola, Arkansas, and I've been trying to preach your doctrine.

K: I want to tell you again that working with you has been one of the most rewarding things.

F: Well, maybe we can do something useful.

K: I'm confident we can. What is your thought of Congressional participation at the Conference?

F: I believe it would not be very wise, but if later - when you get into substance - after you've been meeting for a day or two - and then we might for substantive things later get into it - that may be useful.

K: The first two days will be mostly formal speeches. You don't think we need to show Congressional backing at this stage?

F: You know whether Congressional backing...

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K: I just wondered if it would be good therapy for a few people to come over.

F: I think your judgment would suit me. You can judge that better than I. When are you leaving?

K: I'll leave Saturday. I'll be in touch with you from Europe. I will arrange as on the other trips that you get briefed regularly. There may be an uproar ar NATO. They may feel I'm being too rough, but I think I have to state the fundamentals.

F: I think they can take some of that. The main objective is still the one that occurs after the 18th.

K: No question, no question.

F: I'mvery happy to hear about the other. I assume Yamani's coming on the 12th. Is thatcorrect?

K: I don't know. [redacted] B1

F: How are you feeling?

K: I feel fine. Best to Mrs. Fulbright.

T77

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
December 6, 1973
9:25 PM

K: _____former Prime Minister.

S: Well, you know, I haven't heard anything further.

K: Who's arranging it, CIA?

S: Yes.

K: I have to see Dinitz tonight too.

S: You can't stay there all night. Well, would you rather see him tomorrow -- after the staff meeting?

K: Yes.

S: 9:00 am, maybe.

K: I think that would be best.

S: Yes.

K: Give him my apologies.

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T75

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
December 6, 1973
5:59 PM

K: Sisco refuses to accept me these days. Now what are we going to do? _____even harder on the Arabs with_____.

D: No, Unfortunately I didn't see this____. I can see the telegram today or in the morning. ____was given instructions___ambassadors and differences that particular____especially this one word in our instructions to our___the American side would like to have this finished for their information how to _____everything you said you should insist on this. This is what the Egyptians are saying. It is all right with us. The Americans don't want to have_____.

K: We cannot get the Israelis_____.

D: Just for my information___very strict and very clear instructions.

K: I think by the 17th we will have them all lined up.

D: What kind of trouble are we making now?

K: Lack of attention paid to them. He is now appearing____.

D: I thing we are very much____.

K: _____

D: Exactly. No we don't want trouble with him, as such. I think we will do you._____. This is not the question, the question is of Security Council's open session.

K: That I have already rejected. Also mandate. He tried to get to ___to mandate.

D: I think if you like, I am sure Mr. Gromyko____a nice letter.

K: I think after a two hour meeting with us the Syrians will____completely. I don't know what to do with the Syrians.

D: You're leaving tonight? So early?

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K: Why so early? That's a good question. B/ Because of a 6 hour time difference. It will get me in at 10:00.

D: 10:00?

K: Did you get in touch with Scowcroft?

D: Scowcroft is coming. How long are you going to stay in your office.

K: Only a couple of hours. I'll be at K. Grahams.

D: At her house?

K: At her house.

D: I can reach you there?

K: Certainly. Or you can reach me through the White House.

D: It is only 6:00. It's my expression____up to 10:00.

K: I'm counting on having a ____with ____on the day before.

D: No problem really. What do you want. I don't see any difficulties at all.

K: It makes no difference.

D: I am leaving_____.

K: I'll be glad to do it. Where was the dinner?

D: The last time it was with us here. Here in Washington.

K: That's right. I was at the Embassy.

D: We'll come to you.

K: The food would be better at your place. Well certainly, that way we won't get _____.

D: I could give it here at our Embassy. I understand the Israelis_____. After that you will go to Spain and Lisbon?

K: Those are courtesy visits for one day. I'm seeing Lee Duc To.

T76

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
December 6, 1973
10:02 PM

D: Henry, there are two points. The whole text is acceptable with two amendments. Do you have your text?

K: Let me get the text and I'll call you back.

10:04 PM

K: Yes, Anatol?

D: Two places - where it says "The U.S._____without mentioning under the auspices of the U.N.

K: Yes, I agree with you.

D: _____made it very clear that we will.

K: I agree.

D: There is no need really to.

K: Right.

D: And the second information about the question which you raised. The question about the question on timing.

K: Yes.

D: Remember? About participation of the Palestinians and Lebanese. Gromyko asked me to tell you that on this particular point Egyptians asked him - or President Sadat - very strongly to put here still timing in question.

K: We can't accept it.

D: So Gromyko put it this way. _____put in really what the Egyptians asked us to do but at the same time he said if you can you're going to discuss with them. If you are convinced, we will go along with you.

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D: Before or after the Middle East conference?

K: After the Middle East conference.

D: After the conference?

K: That's right. After the conference.

D: ____and we passed on the call completely, what was said to us. ___ figures I could give you today. For my information. ____what you told us. What are their real intentions? ___and they gave some____. I think it will not be easy for you.

K: Right. We just reviewed the argument. We will have about 1,000. They say we have 24,000.

D: Trying little by little to meet the _____. As a _____you should understand.

K: I understand. I suppose when I meet with Gromyko.

D: I think you have enought time. _____I should say I'm sure. He will____because I mentioned to him just yesterday, discussed about timing of visit. He will even send me_____.

K: That's fine.

D: Very unofficial. I'll be in touch with you as_____.

K: Wonderful. We're on a constructive course. They are very touchy before the election. We are determined to make progressnow. Not before the election. We definitely will do something.

D: Goodby and good luck.

K: But what are you going to say?

D: As of now, if the Egyptians_____. It is all right with us if you will press and they will come to us. But we are prepared_____. Gromyko would like you to make it clear that he is now in no position to reject it because the Egyptians specifically asked him. If you will convince them there is no problem.

K: OK, fine with us.

D: No problem with us._____ It's not really a big question which will_____.

K: Good.

D: Do you have anything else, Henry?

K: No, I mentioned to you about the prisoners.

D: I have reviewed it from my own information. I know how you feel about it. I did mention not the release but about the list of prisoners. This we make presentation to you. It was yesterday done.

K: OK.

D: So I think.

K: I'll send out our telegram. We will keep out text on the issue of the Palestinians, but we will take out the auspices of the UN.

D: For your own information, we are prepared to immediately accept it, but as of _____.

K: Right, OK.

5059 *
RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Dobrynin
12/6/73; 11:45 a.m.

(missed the very first part)

D: Thank you very much.

K: And secondly, I forget to mention yesterday on that Syrian problem of lists of POW's -- that's really very important.

D: We already make -- off the record, but don't quote us, we already made a representation to the Syrians.

K: Okay, good.

D: This I know because I have a copy.

K: Good. I will talk with you later.

D: Okay. You will be calling me back.

K: After my press conference. Bye.

D: Okay. Bye.

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T74

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
General Scowcroft - Secretary Kissinger
December 6, 1973
4:40 p.m.

(missing first part)
S: ___begging Larry to have an answer over here.

K: He arrived last night. Why wasn't I called, wasn't it called to my attention. He came the morning of the 4th, is there any reason I couldn't have been told that morning of the 5th.

S: No, no there isn't any. Well, the CIA hadn't seen him at that time.

K: Are they conducting our foreign policy?

S: They wanted to check to see if he really had anything to say. They met hikm, greeted him, ...

K: The memo says that he arrived last night. This was written on the 5th.

S: That's right.

K: So the CIA saw him the evening of the 4th, it is now the 6th.

S: On the 5th I said do you want to see him and you didn't do anything.

K: I didn't see it.

S: Yes you did, you checked off all the other items.

K: Well, I didn't focus on it. What's the sensitive group at the White House at 10:00? This just can't be. Now you've got the Chinese on the schedule.

S: Oh, I know what that is. Do you have to see the South Vietn Namese?

K: Yes. See if the Libyan can come to the White House at 10:00.

S: Right, tomorrow morning.

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K: Never again is this to be done this way. Maybe we can have him later tonight, around 10:00. It is unbelievable what is going on here.

T73

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
December 6, 1973
1:09 pm

.....first part of conversation missed.

D: You have done this already. That's good.

K: Are you starting procedures with the one kilometer disengagement

D: yes.

K: If we could produce anything at all.

D: I will have to show it to you -- we are working on the map.

K: ...is there any point of withdrawal.

D: Your trust and belief in us is overwhelming.

K: My trust in you is great but in your capacity to follow a complex strategy it is not as great.

D: But we are learning.

K: Not the greatest fault to have. I have just received the conversation between the Deputy Secretary and your Prime Minister..if you understood it, it eluded me.

D: I am willing to give you my comments.

K: I understand what she said, but I am not sure I followed the points of my associate.

D: I am with you on this aspect..he said it would be fine.

K: I know but I don't lie. I say what I believe is possible. Let me see if I can find some time and I'll call you back.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 6 NOV 2002 200102979

T85

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Vice President/Ford/Secretary Kissinger
December 7, 1973
7:45 PM

K: I called you last night.

F: I know you did, and I appreciate it. I'm afraid I couldn't return the call.

K: Oh - no response was needed. I just wanted to tell you how moved I was by your speech.

F: Well, you're awfully nice. It's pretty hard for me - I got emotional about it.

K: That's what made it a very human and significant experience.

F: Well, you're awfully nice to call. If I might, I'd like tossay that those breakfasts are terrific - just absolutely great.

K: Really?

F: And the speaker, George Mahan (sp), Tip O'Neill - the whole bunch. Whenever you invite them, they'll be there.

K: What do you think - once a month?

F: Once a month would be good, any more might get a little heavy for you. That one couldn't have developed a better rapport.

K: It was a good session, and I appreciated it very much.

F: Let me say also _____what checks were taken on the House fight. Republicans were about 100 to 15 for the rule in the Bill, and the Democrats were about 100 to 35. Now that indicates there are a lot of absentees or undecided.

K: That's fascinating. That was good.

F: Isn't it though. On the basis of that freport, Al (Ulman or Allman) is convinced they should go ahead, starting Monday.

K: I sent a letter up to remove any misunderstanding that may have arisen.

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F: Well, I didn't think it would be that good. I just hope they can keep that credit provision out of _____.

K: Do you think they could?

F: I don't know. I haven't got into that -- maybe over the weekend. I think maybe the President could sign the bill. Don't you?

K: One would think. I have asked Brent Scowcroft to keep you informed of my trip and to keep you posted, and if you have any questions, you can call him and until I get back that's the best way to handle it.

F: Incidentally, I don't know how it was arranged, but I'm supposed to see Moishe Dayan tomorrow morning at 9:00 in the EOB office. I think I know what to say. Is there anything new as of today?

K: As far as he's concerned about the Middle East, you can tell him we've managed to find some way of giving them more tanks and other equipment, and that more political movement is needed. That would be very important because of the situation in this country.

F: I'll do that. Is he way_____.

K: He's been pretty reasonable.

F: Is he with Golda Meir or is he_____.

K: He was a potential successor, but he got a bit discredited because of the way the war went. Now he's more loyal than he used to be. They know you're a friend, so anything that could be said to indicate that our commitment to their security remains total, but some political movement is necessary. It would really be useful.

F: Yes, they know I'm their friend, so maybe I can be more creditable with them. I'll sure try. You're awful damn nice to call.

K: Well, I was terribly moved.

F: Well, I got emotional.

K: But that's what made it very moving.

F: I'll do any damn thing for you or the President.

K: I'll see you when I get back.

F: Thank's Henry.

*

T88

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
General Scowcroft - Secretary Kissinger
December 7, 1973
11:45 a.m.

S: Yes, sir.

K: Can you look into A5Vs, whether we could deliver some by air. Also I think they really do need anti-tank weapons. I mean our forces aren't fighting right now, and, well, if Congress has its way they will never fight again.

S: Right. OK. I will look into that.

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T87

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
December 7, 1973
11:40 am

K: Brent, on that Vietnamese package that they submitted to us, does the Pentagon understand we want to move on it in a time frame relevant to this dry season?

S: I'll get it moving. I'll get on it. They are dragging their feet

K: Why are they dragging their feet?

S: Who knows?

K: Well, you tell them we want to get it moving and let me ..will you tell me this afternoon what is being done?

S: Sure, sure.

END

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 12 MAY 2004 200102979

T86

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
December 7, 1973
6:22 PM

S: I didn't know anything about it at all.

K: Will you get him to work. If he has to stay up at 6:00 in the morning. No one looks at my schedule!

S; I'll get him on it immediately.

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T84

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Deputy Secretary Clements/Secretary Kissinger
December 7, 1973
8:10 PM

C: When I was talking to you before, I forgot to mention one think for you to think about on your trip. I hate to bother you with it, but we'll talk about it when you get back. You know Bob Hill is leaving, and I hate like hell to lose him.

K: I agree.

C: That was one of the great decisions to let him come over there instead of letting him go to Pakistan. He's really been a great help.

K: I understand there was a conflict of interest.

C: Yeah - they told him to dispose of something like 10 stocks or otherwise he's have to resign. Under the circumstances - and his gains and losses - Henry, he'd take a $300,000 to $400,000 loss, and he couldn't do that -- that's what behind it. In the spirit of a replacement, I would like very much to give that job to Larry Eagleburger and have him come over and help me.

K: I can't spare him -- that's out of the question. It shows good judgment but I just can't spare him.

C: Henry, be thinking about it. If you think of someone else that would suit the job, and when you get back, we'll talk about it again.

K: Good.

C: I want you to know among other things this evidence of how I feel about Larry. Have a good trip. Really try to help me. Maybe there's someone in State who could do the kind of job that you'd want done in that department.

K: I agree. Let me give it some thought.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 18 MAY 2004 200102979

T78 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Joe Sisco/Sec. Kissinger
9:26 a.m. - 12/7/73

S: Hello.

K: Joe.

S: Yes, sir.

K: In that letter I showed it to the Israelis yesterday and they, of course, went into orbit about that sentence "The question of Palestine".

S: What if they had seen the other one that way the Egyptians wrote it, they would really go into orbit.

K: Yeh, I talked to the Russians. They say they cannot support that phrase "The question of . . ."but they will accept it.

S: I think you are going to have to force the Israelis to swallow it.

K: Do you think we can just get away with the question of other participants.

S: Fine with the Israelis but not the Egyptians since the Egyptians (got together) with the Syrians with regard to the formulation.

K: Then let the cable go as it stands.

S: There is one other thing -- if that cable goes that will help us a little bit. Roy and I have the reformulation of the memorandum but we are stuck on a paragraph or two -- the Israelis questioning U.S. auspices

K: Reformulate what we can accept.

S: I wanted to make sure it was consistent with this cable which you have just said to send out.

K: OK, Joe.

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T 79

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Deputy Secretary Clements/Secretary Kissinger
December 7, 1973
7:32 PM

C: I just wanted to call and wish you well on your trip. You've got every good wish I can possible give you. I'm sure you'll have a nice trip.

K: I hope so.

C: I had a great visit with _____in S____. I already talked to Dinitz and I had hoped that Ken might be there.

K: Ken who?

C: Ken Rush.

K: That was nice of you.

C: Any particular details you might want to mention ? I was delighted to have him.

K: Terrific.

C: The main thing_____with thoughts to continue to do what you've been doing. Just like you were saying. I came down____the fact that they were there_____. Say exactly the same thing to him. To put them into a position where there is lack of _____. As much as we would like to have that ___and I want to make that clear and it takes a first rate star to getting to work___.

K: What did he say. I understand he.....

C: They thought about that for a few minutes. There was a little____. He said he wanted to help you on the 6____. In about 15 minutes I get to go to the ____. I said I'll show you in that process I'm going to help you on the 6___. Our _____services about 100,000 barrels a day. _____until I return to Saudi Arabia. This must be on a very close basis. It must not be talked around. So, Henry, I would say that you use this in any way you want. It could be a part of your confidential discussions when you meet over there.

K: Terrific job, Bill. Can we offer them a bit of support?

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C: He was over at my office before he came to see you. I told him you and I agreed to talk about it, and the President mentioned to me.... let's understand each other when we talk about the tanks you need over there. 2, 3 or 5____that's really significant. _____That is not the problem, the problem is the _____. Now I left my office after that, Henry, and right after you.....

K: I'm getting him on to_____. Europeans are extremely interested.

C: We can give them some more tanks, Henry.

K: Why don't you do that.

C: It would be about 200 tanks.

K: I will see that you are kept informed.

T80

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
December 7, 1973
6:08 PM

D: Good evening, Mr. Secretary.

K: How many senators do you have there?

D: We had about 25 senators off and on.

K: Good.

D: It was a good session, very good.

K: I m not worried about that. You walked off with the map and papers you wanted me to take to the Egyptians.

D: Find out first about the 6 points.

K: As you say, ___will they agree to maintain the cease fire and the blockade if you do this.

D: That the ___is what should be done with the understanding, Mr. Secretary, that the Egyptians would _____first item discussed in Geneva.

K: That will not _____.

D: He wants to get assurance from you. Find out in Cairo.

K: I can only find out in Cairo if you give me this map and papers.

D: When are you leaving, Mr. Secretary?

K: Tomorrow morning, first thing.

D: Can I do it before you leave this evening, or tomorrow morning?

K: Yes, bring it by. Get in touch with Eagleburger. I can't have the map?

D: It's quite useless, from the discussions.

K: I'll get to this in return for an understanding that the blockade___will not be____again.

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D: The cease fire is maintained and you will inform us?

K: I'll inform you of this.

D: OK, that you'll inform us.

K: I will have to do that from Cairo.

D: Or when you come to Israel.

K: But either way.....

D: OK, I'll get in touch with Eagleburger.

K: OK, good.

D: Have a nice trip Mr. Secretary. Could you stop by for a few minutes?

K: I don't think so.

D: Maybe you can.....

K: If you didn't live a half hour away.

D: It's very close.

K: I've been there. It's a half hour.

D: From the State Department?

K: Yes. If at all possible I'll come out. If not, I'll see you in Israel.

D: ____so I won't have the ____with you.

K:_____

D: Right away. They didn't get in touch with me.

K: We didn't find any trouble with that.

D: No. They want to have assurance.

K: I told them to check with you and I told them also I would_____. I told them it would be a change for everybody.

*

D: We have somehow managed to _____.

K: The thing that ___me___might___in a very short time. It's totally out of the question.

D: The last 2 days the papers are ____and every paper put pressure, even out friend, Marvin Kalb.

K: That did not come from me. I will see if it came from here.

D: Mr. Secretary, if you remember____good report about____I said nothing more_____.

K: I will do my best.

D: I appreciate it very much.

T83

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
George Vest/Secretary Kissinger
December 7, 1973
10:20 PM

K: I wanted to check on the NATO speech. ____can be salvaged in the time that is now available. I wondered what if I give the same speech that I gave at the NATO Council.

V: Nothing, that's your own choice.

K: How much will be out by then?

V: Most of it. The normal procedure for anything you do or say____in which the effect of what you said will all come out in the text by the _____.

K: _____and the speech is what, background?

V: It will be out because___the ideas you've said will be out. The speech can be delivered anyway you want because the effect will be the same.

K: What if I change the text? What if there's a chance in the Pilgrims speech?

V: If you're saying it you_____and therefore every word would be looked at _____.

K: OK, many thanks George.

V: Yes sir.

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T81 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Secretary General Waldheim/Secretary Kissinger
December 7, 1973
4:19

K: I didn't get the message yesterday that ;you had called and I am sorry I did not return your call.

W: That's ok. I was informed by the major beligerant of the text of the draft agreement andI have to feel that

K: Wait, there is no draft agreement. We are discussing it with them.

W: I thought I should mention it to you and it was an Egyptian source. Today they requested a meeting with me..and I wanted to check with you.

K: I don't know what version they have shown you.

W: The text that says the conference will start on the 18th in Geneva then that two parties are seeking the Security Council to

K: No. We disagree with that. We do think there should be a Security Council meeting...it should be done on a consensus basis.

W: The non-aligned, and this is the other aspect, has had a meeting this morning and has prepared a draft text of Security Council resolution which will take.... and then express hope that the Secretary General will plan a useful role in the conference and so on. This is something they discussed this morning. I got the text confidentially and I thought it was important for you to know that they are working on this. They are _____ that they have nothing til now and in the afternoon at 5:00 they are coming to see me , the Chinese are coming to see me this morning and they are worried about the fact that the Council has not heard anything further and that the Council will not have enough time to study the matter.

K: In what way can the Council study the matter, it won't be the first time in history.

W: All in all they are really ready to cooperate and they are worried that they will be confronted at the last minute to take steps and they want to have enought time to develop the matter and give me a blanket message. They understand that it is in interest of cause to give the Secretary General a blanket good will message and to leave it to him . That is the best.

K: The difficulty is there isn't any agreed text and you have been shown an Egyptian proposal. We haven't accepted it.

W: I see. It says a co-sponsorship under the auspices of the US and USSR and they gave me the impression that this is an agreed text.

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K: That is not my impression.

W: I thought it important to tell you this and it is interesting to know the feeling in the Council. I just had a talk with Ceasescu and he expressed role of the UN.

K: Their solicitude is touching but they haven't expressed it before.

W: The members of the Council, not only the non-aligned, they want to _____ that it is called under UN asupices but that we just offer a roof.

K: What the French and British want is to be involved with no responsibilities.

W: I am glad you are clarifying the situation to me. What they said is they are afraid you will give us this information and they ....

K: That is not the intention. Thank you for being so meticulous in keeping me informed. I will let you know as soon as I have some more information.

W: May I say that

K: Mr. Secretary General I am surrounded by a bunch of busy bodies. There is no agreement. They are trying to protect me. If I come I will come for two days.

W: I did instruct my man in Geneva that he can take the necessary measures for having the meeting at the UN but he can't say this has been decided.

K: That is correct.

W: Well, thank you for calling back and I wish you a successful visit.

END

T82 B*

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
December 7, 1973
2:35 pm

....missed first part of conversation

K: I just don't see how I can ask for restoration in the cut of another Cabinet member's budget. ....The Israelis tell me, I don't know if it is true, that , do you know about this, that the ____about the Soviet equipment was

S: Oh, yes , that .

K: They say it is worse and the sound like desperate men. They are willing to cave on everything if they can have this equipment. Dayan said I was against..

S: It is not just that....we don't have [redacted] What they are talking about is advance weapons -- it is [redacted] B1 B1

K: I would think we ought to break our backs to give them equipment. They have to feel secure or it will be disastrous. and they claim this electronic equipment exists. I'll ask them to send their military ___to you. They are looking for [redacted] B1

S: I'm not familiar with that but I will look into it.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS, A/RPS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 25X6
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 31 DEC 2012
DATE/CASE ID: 12 MAY 2004 200102979

T94

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Dinitz/ Sec. Kissinger
Monday, Dec. 24, 1973, 4:30 p.m.

K: When are you leaving?

D: Five o'clock in the morning, but I can come early if it is easier for you.

K: (Laughter). How can you get a message back if I talk to you.

D: I can get it either by phone -- we have a direct coded phone or come to the Embassy and send a cable.

K: In other words you would have to see me very early.

D: I would have postponed but there is only one flight a day.

K: Where are you going?'

D: Jamaica.

K: For how long?

D: For five days.

K: When is your delegation coming.

D: Tuesday night of Wednesday morning.

K: Next week?

D: No.

K: I mean the one going to discuss this disengagement.

K: I am trying to work that out with you.

K: I am putting off my vacation so I can talk to them.

D: That is one of the things I wanted to discuss with you because Dayan himself wants to discuss it with you.

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2.
Dinitz
Dec. 24

K: In the mood I am in with Dayan I am not sure he is the man I want to see.

D: But Mr. Secretary...

K: He has gone to the President and said so. Clements...

D: He is lying. I will show you the text of Dayan's conversation with him and I was present. After we left Dayan and I we went to you, when we left the meeting with Clements. We left Sharer (sp?) and Gold at a meeting and I went even on the record and Clements said to Gold, if you had been more forthcoming on 101 it would be easier for us to give you the weapons but you are stubborn and not forthcoming and it is not easy for us. He said we had a meeting with Kissinger this morning and it seemed we reached agreement with him . Not said that we have advocated 101. I know Dayan did not say it and I checked on it after you talked with me. What happens is Clements is conducting a campaign that is designed to create bad feelings . He has leaked the story to Jack Anderson that you have called it ghetto mentality. This appeared in the Washington Post and I had to explain to the PM that Jack Anderson is whatever he is.

K: A total lie.

D: I know. I said it was Pentagon sources. He has taken Jackson people and there is a headline today in the evening paper in Israel that the Israelis are letting themselves -- they don't understand Kissinger's machination and representatives in Washington are falling in his trap or something like this. All instigated by, I know Jack Anderson's man, who is visiting Israel now--Dick Pearl. He is in constant collaboration with Clements. I was calling the Senator to tell him to tell them to shut-up. This is an election period in Israel. The Senator was in the West.

K: I can only tell you that I may not be able to save you but -- can you imagine what this conference could have been like.

D: I have no doubt and the PM has no doubt. It is very good.. We have a long road to go together.

K: And maybe a tragic one.

D: And Some of it will not be pleasant. I have no doubt about it. It is important for me.

K: I have to go home now and lie down for a couple of hours and I have my children here. Perhaps rather than doing it tomorrow morning we can do it tonight.

D: Anytime. I will be in the office all of the time.

K: I will have to call you on a regular line.

D: I got a call from Schlesinger and he told me some of the items and I thanked him very much.

K: Did he say he thought it all out?

D: He said he talked with the President and they had agreed to the following. Is that all right?

K: I don't want credit for it.

D: I was on the telephone with the PM after you had talked to me and I said I am waiting to hear from Schlesinger, that he would hear from you within an hour or so.

K: All right.

D: All the best.

END

T93

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Dean Brown - Secretary Kissinger
Dec. 24, 1973
4:30

B: Nice to have you back.

K: Thank you.

D: We felt so lost for awhile. Do you want me to do something about these Jordanians?

K: As long as you give them the feeling that something special was done. Can you do that?

B: But if they really want to talk to you can I say that....

K: Wednesday,....

B: Wednesday, just in case.

K: I also want to talk to you and Nat about appointments.

B: Good.

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5064 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin/Secy Kissinger
1:14 p.m., December 24, 1973

K: Hello, Anatol.

D: Oh, hello, Henry, how are you?

K: Okay.

D: How's about your cold? I was told that you are, I mean, in very bad shape. It was very bad cold. Is it so?

K: Yeah, I was really in bad shape. I'm getting better though.

D: Now it's better. I really would like just to say "Merry Christmas and a very guzuntite"(?) so to speak. The very best, I should say. Henry, do you intend to go -- to the place, you remember . .

K: Acapulco?

D: Yeah.

K: I haven't decided yet.

D: Because, I speak very privately, on this basis, I received a telegram from Brezhnev. He asked me or just to notify to come in the first [decade] of January. There will be a meeting in Moscow of top people around to look at ..... of 1974 so he asked me to be in the first [decade]. I refuse it yesterday. At the same time in this connection, I didn't know whether you will be here. If you will be here, I will definitely stay here and no questions. If you go, then maybe I will drop in for couple of days there if I will have a chance to speak with you in a very general, informal way.

K: Absolutely. Now I'm not sure -- How long will you be in Acapulco?

D: If I should be there for a couple of days, I should be back on the 2nd.

K: Oh, I wouldn't go before the 29th if I went.

D: Oh, not before 29th?

K: No.

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D: Oh, I see.

K: I will probably be here next week and go a week later.

D: So you will spend New Year here?

K: Probably.

D: Uh-huh. And so you will go there only in the beginning of next year, yeah?

K: Probably, yes.

D: Because if you are not going there, I will not go too. I mean, now. So you decided not to go, I mean, this part of it's clear, yeah?

K: It's more or less clear, yes.

D: When it will be clearer for you, more than less?

K: Well, it's practically clear.

D: It's practically clear?

K: Yes.

D: Because if you will be here, then I will definitely stay here. If you will go, you will go in the very beginning, yeah?

K: Right.

D: About this varies, depends on when you will be, but because after the New Year, I don't know exactly the time, but he said in the first ten days he will send me telegram precise date about the meeting so I will be there. But I think for this timing, 2 or 3 days before New Year, I will drop this idea and stay here just to be in touch with you in case, okay?

K: Okay. I've just talked to the President. He can see you Wednesday morning around 10 o'clock.

D: That's quite all right.

K: If that's convenient.

D: If it's convenient to him, it's quite all right.

K: Now if he goes to Key Biscayne, which he may do, in that case, he may want to see you tomorrow.

D: It's fine with me. Any time he -- because this is just 15 minutes, no more really.

K: Yeah. And it will be just the three of us, you, he and I.

D: Okay.

K: Unless you have a message that's critical of me.

D: Huh?

K: Unless you have something you want to deliver that's critical of me.

D: (laughter) No, nothing. Only high esteem, Henry.

K: Well, I worked together very happily with Gromyko. It was really very good.

D: Yeah. I received from him a message and he was in the same mood. I am receive a copy of what he send to Brezhnev.

K: No, he was really very good. And he tried to be cooperative. You know, it was harder for him, given your relations with Israel, than for me.

D: Yes. I haven't received yet a report of how his talks with ...

K: It went quite well.

D: Quite well, huh?

K: From what I hear from both sides.

D: Yeah. So I hope it will be -- it's rather good move, to begin really talking and then a little bit more.

K: Exactly.

D: It will help in many ways.

K: Exactly.

D: ....

K: No, I think we've made a good start.

D: Yeah, I think it's good. And, of course, you played a major role. (laughter)

K: Well, I think the spirit was set on my trip to Moscow and despite a temporary interruption we are back on course.

D: Well, I think this is true. There was no question, he has not yet send me about date. Was it fixed or not?

K: Yes, he mentioned it. We set around February 10th, between the 5th and 10th.

D: Because he said somewhere in February but he didn't mention any date.

K: I didn't give the exact date. I said I would let you know but it will be between the 5th and 10th of February.

D: That's fine. I think this is very convenient date.

K: I had proposed that you and I might have lunch on Wednesday, is that possible?

D: Of course. I am looking forward, Henry.

K: Good.

D: So on Wednesday, we will have 1 o'clock in State Department.

K: Right.

D: As to the President's, either tomorrow or day after tomorrow?

K: That's right.

D: You will let me know when, today or ?

K: Well, if you don't hear from me, it's 10 oclock on Wednesday.

D: So it will be 10 o'clock - _

K: Or I might call you tomorrow morning or were you going away?

D: No, I am staying here. I prefer to have a quiet Christmas at home. (laughter)

K: Right.

D: With Nina (?) and Kritrina (sp?). I have the girls to stay quietly.

K: Good.

D: Okay?

K: Bye.

D: Thank you very much, Henry. Bye, bye.

T90 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
December 24, 1973/1:]20 p.m.
Ambassador Dinitz/HAK

D: Hello

K: Mr. Ambassador

D: Mr. Secretary, how are you?

K: OK. I feel better. I talked to the President and you're going to have a call from Schlesinger very soon telling you that some equipment will start moving.

D: Wonderful. I appreciate it very much. Then Clements can tell everybody he has arranged it.

K: That's right.

D: You know that they are conducting a very organized campaign.

K: Who?

D: Pentagon and Clement. I saw it also through the press (the Israeli press) that they are saying that it was yourself and the State Department that delayed arrival of theequipment in the first week until finally the President overruled everybody.

K: Yes, but the fact is... You were with me every day.

D: Mr. Secretary, not only I know the fact, the Prime Minister knows the fact. I'm just trying to point out to you that this is an organized campaign that is going on and I'm doing everything in my power, when they approach me, to deny it. But the fact of the matter is they are lumping us together. They say I am your stooge and so on and I don't understand that. But that's not what I'm worried about. I just wanted your attention to the matter because obviously what Clement has told you with regard to what Dayan said is not correct. I checked the record. Dayan has never told him that you have asked to stop the 101. I have the full record. I can show it to you but they are doing it in order to win their own points on this. And they are trying to mobilize another Jackson on it too.

K: I noticed that. Well, I hope to see you tomorrow morning.

D: May I have a request to you Mr. Secretary? My family has left for 5 days. I was going to join them tomorrow but if is entirely possible that we see each other sometime this evening.

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K: Well let me call you later.

D: Alright because I will compromise.

K: No, don't do that. I'll call you later.

T91*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
F.M. Robasa/HAK
December 24, 1973/1:22 p.m.

K: Hello.

R: Hello Henry.

K: Amilio, how are you?

R: I followed you like Jules Verne--all around the world. All followed by success which I'm very glad for you and for your country and for myself as your friend.

K: You are a good friend.

R: Henry, your secretary called me the other day that you were planning to come here instead on the 29th, the 2nd of January.

K: About the 4th.

R: I told her you know you are completely welcome whenever you want although I would have more time if it had been the first date but you are welcome whenever you want Henry. I just want your confirmation what are your plans.

K: Can I call you say after Christmas. One problem is how to get down there because I don't like to travel in a military plane right now/ with the Energy Crisis you see.

R: I understand. I repeat you are always welcome but I hoped you could make it as your firsdt idea was though because we'll have a longer time to speak and to pass the new years -- I would like it very much, no but I would not molest you in any way.

K: I am anxious to talk to you at length.

R: I have some documents prepared for you for this future meeting. Also Henry, I wanted to tell you, why you don't invite when you come here in February, your father and mother. They can either stay with you or at our home and we would like very much to have them here. They can go to social meetings that we are arranging to have or they can stay at home or see what ever they want.

K: I may do that. That's a good idea.

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R: Please think about it and I would like to have them at home. We have plenty of space as my daughter is already married as you know and two of my sons are out of Mexico so they will have a nice place to stay. My boys will personally talk care of them and they can go to the social acts that they want and not go to the ones they don't want and we'll treat them very nice and as though they were members of the family.

K: Let's consider that.

R: Alright. Then, you are not decided on the date yet?

K: No. I will know on Wednesday.

R: The 26th. I repeat you are completely welcome at any date.

K: Can I call you on Wednesday.

R: Please do. I'll either be at my office or at my house.

K: AGood. I will call you on Wednesday.

R: OK. And I repeat. Whenever you wish and whatever your plans are it's alright but I do hope that if you can stay by the first date it would be better because we could talk more lengthy and I really would like to give you a new year hug here in Acaculpo.

K: I would like that very much.

R: But any date is suitable for us.

K: Wonderful.

R: OK Henry. My regards to your parents. Think about that idea and I'll expect your call on Wednesday.

K: Thank you. A big abrazo to you.

T92 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Marvin Kalb/HAK
December 24, 1973/1:27 p.m.

K: Hello.

MK: Mr. Secretary. How do you feel?

K: Yesterday I was sick as a dog but today I'm recovered.

MK: Good. I didn't figure that a cold could knock you out for more than 24 hours. Listen, I just wanted to check with you briefly on two points. New York is badgering me about your going down to Mexico and I remembered your saying on the plane....

K: I was going...I had a plan to go to Acapulco on Saturday but I almost certainly will cancel it. You know its 98% certain that I'll cancel it.

MK: Right. Secondly, there is a report from Geneva that says that the security people, including Aron had had word on to Palestinian groups coming on land and air sent to Geneva last Thursday to try to disrupt the entire proceedings and they apparently had it in for you and Refid and Waldheim. Had any of this ever got to you.

K: I have to have a [redacted] policy of not commenting on security things but I got alot of threats.

MK: There was alot of that stuff going around. I would think so when I arrived there and all these fellows were standing around with these incredible machineguns.

K: There was some basis for it.

MK: What are you going to be doing today. Work in the State Department.

K: I spent the monring with the President and I'm now on the way to the State Department to have lunch with Fulbright and then I'll work there in the afternoon.

MK: Is there anything special about the President's meetings?
K: No, just going over the situation.

MK: The whole middle East trip.
K: Yeah.
MK: OK Sir. I thank you very much.

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T95 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Joe Sisco/Kissinger
9:43 a.m. - Dec. 26, 1973

K: ... letters to Faisal and Sadat?

S: I've done a draft and it's in the typewriter now. I want to...

K: Wait a minute, what I want to add to those, now that they have increased production...

S: Right.

K: ... is to add a point that it is of course impossible for the United States to be in a discriminatory position. See what I mean?

S: Sure, sure, that's a good way to put it, too.

K: And with Sadat I would make clear that we are not in good conscience, that we will... . I would tell Sadat that Dayan is coming over next week. That, incidentally, that the Israelis meet with me should not get out.

S: Yeah.

K: I mean that we will complete our discussions with the Israelis next week. But say that the implementation cannot be separated from the embargo. You see what I mean?

S: Yeah, I've even been a little more direct, but let me go over it and... yeah, that's fine. Does it make any difference to you on this Jordanian Chief of Staff what it says?

K: Well now I don't understand how that Jordanian could be treated so stupidly. I mean why wasn't he told I had the flu? That was the reasonable thing thing to tell him and it was true.

S: Yeah, of course it was.

K: Who did that?

S: Well, I gather that he went off... I don't really know, you and I were on the plane, as to how all this was handled, you know.

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K: Well I told Rifai if he stayed here I'd see him and this I considered it important.

S: Yeah, but this guy refused to stay, you see. Remember, you did offer, according to the people that I know, and I'll check this all out this morning, that he was asked to stay on and he just didn't stay on. This guy is one of these prima donnas for one thing. So I'll go ahead and it doesn't make any difference to you whether it's Thursday or Friday, huh?

K: What?

S: As to when you see him.

K: No, just tell him we may not be able to make final decisions, but I would of course be happy to see him.

S: Yeah, well I just thought I'd pick up the telephone and have somebody locate him in London rather than send him a message and get him on back here.

K: Well, first send it via message and tell him I would be glad to have him come back. That we can't make final decisions but I would be glad to see him. That I had the flu and that I apologize.

S: Alright, and should we let him get Ben Shocker, or should we do it?

K: Who should do it?

S: Well, I would think that we let him get hold of...

K: What would be the best?

S: Sure, let him take over. After all, he works for him, not for us.

K: That's right. Let's do it that way.

S: And so let me just say I would appreciate it if you would ask Ben Shocker to come back and I'll see him just as soon as he gets back.

K: Right.

S: O.K. Good, thank you.

T 110

RELEASED IN FULL

Secretary Kissinger/Rabassa - December 26, 1973

K: Emilio, how are you?

R: Fine, Henry. Sorry to bother you, but I wonder

K: I definitely cannot come this weekend, but I may come next weekend. I will let you know my definite plan by Friday.

R: O.K. I'm going now to Acapulco. The number is 43053.

K: In Acapulco?

R: Yes. You will call me when?

K: Friday.

R: If I don't hear from you, then I'll call you. Thanks - the best to you.

K: And I look forward to working with you.

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T107

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Vest/Sec. Kissinger
Wednesday, December 26, 1973, 5:30 p.m.

V:.....where I say Soviet-American active interest and some discussion in the Middle East in the course of the day, I have had a great many calls and you will have a great many newsmen speculating that the Soviet-American will be SALT primarily.

K: Just don't comment on it.

V: That is what I wanted to know. I think they are picking SALT because you referred to it in one of your last backgrounders.

K: Yes. Did you get Kraft?

V: I have not gotten Kraft. I have gotten all others and I am calling him now.

K: What did the others have to say?

V: Both Bernie and Marilyn thought what they had drawn on was not embarrassing or difficult for you. I said not very helpful either. Marilyn I think is particularly disturbed. I think she is going back and trying to see what she has written. We have touched her on this one.

K: Did you tell her in addition that I thought the substance was smarl aleckly.

V: Yes. I said you were disappointed at the level of this particular kind of article. I think that is what upset her. She will probably have that on her mind the next time you see her -- very much.

K: O.K. Thank you.

END

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T105

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Haig/Secretary Kissinger
December 26, 1973
5:25

K: Al, I called you earlier because I had such an odd call.

H: What was it?

K: About every subject but the trip.

H: Is that so (laughter). This is the greatest game since the China trip.

K: Is he off?

H: He has left here but he is not off-the-ground yet.

K: I wondered if I had lost my mind.

H: He didn't tell you? He was ashamed to.

K: Well, he should be.

H: This is really something. We are going to get great reporting on this one.

K: Any newsmen on this one?

H: No.

K: Jesus Christ.

END

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T103

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Senator Jackson/Secretary Kissinger
4:45 PM
December 26, 1973

J: I forgot to mention to you about the trident budget. You know I went all out on that thing. From your standpoint we should have those.

K: I agree.

J: I spoke to Jim Schlesinger on the budget. And we put in some strong language in the Conference Report in the Senate asking the President to come back for a deficiency if necessary to cover the 240 million that was taken out of the budget.

K: Right. I was very unhappy about that.

J: It was done before I knew about it. The letter was sent up to the Chairman of both Committees, saying they would get along on 240. That was Clements. McClellen had that letter. What could we do.

K: He's an unguided missile. This one I happen to know about because I was apalled when I saw it. How can we reinstate it?

J: We can reinstate it by coming back, based on the directive in the Senate report, for the extra sub. I thing that should have been done.

K: Do you mind if I talk to Schlesinger about it?

J: No. I've spoken to him about it earlier. It's between you and Jim Schlesinger. I don't know what it does to the budget, but at this point.

K: But I'm for it since we may have to negotiate at SALT.

J: That's right. We cleared it with the Navy at the time. You've got a peg to hang it on so that my recommendation would be that you two get together. We ought to have that extra one in there.

K: OK. Good, Scoop. I will take it up with Jim tomorrow.

J: And then you'll have to take it up with the President.

K: Absolutely. Let me first talk to Jim.

J: If you two agree, I understand OMB say's it's going to be up to you two.

K: Good, Scoop, nice to talk to you.

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T102

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
The President/Kissinger
Wed., Dec. 26, 1973, 3:00 p.m.

N: Any late developments?

K: I saw Nelson.

N: He came by here and I had a good talk with him. I told him what I told you yesterday and in his own interest and for the interest of the country he had an obligation to support you and to do it publicly.

N: I wondered if you would do that.

K: I did that and he said he would. He said he would speak to you in the same sense and I said it is imperative for the country and I said it would not be worth governing if the President could be pushed out. I said in your own selfish interest it is essential which is not a minor consideration for him.

N: Right.

K: I have the impression that he has understood that and he said that he did it on Face the Nation the other day and he is going to look for opportunities to do it and when he does to send the comments to Ziegler so he could use them.

N: That is good.

K: Otherwise there is not too much...

N: Good.

K: of any consequence.

N: I am glad we got Dobrynin in.

K: I meant to tell you...

N: We did him pretty close together but well to show that we are on top of this.

K: I thought it was a masterful performance. I came to your office but Simon had already come in to tell you. I thought this was something that no one else could have done. You gave him just enough of the big picture without making any commitments.

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N: How did you like how I asked him how they were doing in China?

K: That that was beautiful. You did not say anything they could not report to the Chinese. He was in seventh heaven.

N: He has something to report now.

K: Exactly and we have to keep them quiet while going through the next phase of our Mid-East diplomacy.

N: And to keep them quiet while the attacks against us are being mounted. At the end he said Brezhnev had noted this and reiterated their full support. Very important.

K: Exactly. If our opponents could make the detente blow-up that is about all they would need.

N: That is true.

K: Not all they need but it would make them happier than anything else but that is not going to happen.

N: O.K. Fine, Fine, Henry. You are at State now?

K: Yes.

N: Is that the 7th or 8th floor?

K: The 7th.

N: Enjoy the 7th Floor.

K: I will bring over those letters this afternonn.

NN: Ya, ya, ya. I may have to step out but...

K: I can get them to you wherever you are,

N: I will be out this evening. Julie is sick and I have to go to her house.

END

T106

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Annenberg/Secretary Kissinger
5:25 PM
December 26, 1973

A: I want to tell you how very appreciative the Prime Minister and Sir Alec are because of the manner in which you have kept them fully apprised.

K: Well, I've made a major effort.

A: They're fully aware of it and fully appreciative. Henry, Bok Bob Anderson called me today, and he said he regrets it but he cannot consider it. And I told him I would relay that to you and to the President -- that I'm sure you would understand. Henry, I believe, considering the many problems that the President has, I will be willing to remain on the time being.

K: I think you should, Walter. I was very impressed by our conversations.

A: I honestly think I have things well in hand, and considering all the other problems, why should I add to the problems that you've got.

K: Thats what I think.

A: I'm going to have dinner with Len (?) Firestone Friday night. Can I ask him to give you a call?

K: We will be glad to give him Canada.

A: May I tell him that?

K: Sure.

A: Then I'll tell him this.

K: Terrific. Thank you, Walter.

A: Remember, if there's anything that I can do, any way I can be of help, regardless of what it may be, I'll be happy to do it.

K: You're a true friend.

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T96

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Senator Jackson/Secretary Kissinger
12:45 PM
December 26, 1973

J: Henry.

K: Scoop.

J: How are you? You had quite a trip.

K: It was a good trip, and I think we are getting that basic strategy working now.

J: Well, I hope that at least we get an agreement on the truce lines.

K: I think that we are going to get. You know that disassociates it from the ultimate_____and put some UN forces in between so they can't get the war starting again.

J: I'm concerned about the Suez. I wish that there could be a modification of the Treaty of Constantinople to demilitarize the Canal so that neither super-power could utilize the Canal for military movement.

K: That I sympathize with.

J: You see, we can't move our tankers. Those big tankers can't move through there, and of course we can't move our larger ships, and that's what really concerns me.

K: When are you going to be back here?

J: I'll be gone until the night of the 20th.

K: Oh, that long.

J: I'm going to California Friday. I'm going down to Palm Springs. I'm going to be in California for a week.

K: Maybe the President will go out there, and maybe I'll come out. Will your office know where to reach you?

J: Yes. I'll be at the home of my wife's father.

K: Maybe we could get together for half an hour.

K: One thing I wanted to ask you. Somebody told me..... What is the name of the maniacal staff members of yours -- not Parris -- Perle. Perle is running around Israel saying you're getting_____ _____towards me.

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J: I can't understand. Who said this?

K: I got it from Dinitz.

J: When was this?

K: Earlier in the week.

J: That's outrageous.

K: I just don't think we are in that much disagreement.

J: I don't understand that at all, Henry. You have met Richard Perle.

K: I've never met him.

J: Well, maybe you haven't met him. He's an extremely competent young man. He worked over at_____

K: Well, I know I was considering hiring him at one point.

J: I just don't understand. He gets worked up, of course, on Israeli matters.

K: How long was he there?

J: Only about five days, and then he's going to NATO. When was this?

K: It seems to have happened earlier this week.

J: I won't stand for anything like that.

K: There was a long article in an Israeli newspaper. They got it from Perle.

J: There's just no justification for that -- that I can assure you.

K: I would like to sit down with you and explain our strategy to break up that coalition (?) that now exists of the Europeans, the Arabs, and the oil companies. I think the Israelis are quite comfortable now.

J: I'd be delighted.

K: If I come out there, I'll try to find you.

J: I'll instruct my office.

K: OK, and a very Happy New York and all the best of luck to you.

J: One other thing. I just have a feeling_____a little oil out___. I'm not optimistic as others.

K: Highly unlikely.

J: They make more money by keeping it in the ground.

K: Our basic oil problem is not the embargo. It's their refusal to increase production.

J: I told the President a year ago.

K: There is a total lack of comprehension of what the issue is. The issue _____and supply is barely increasing.

J: The Saudis don't want to be sitting there with a stack of gold on their _____with the Egyptians right next door. They just can't afford to accumulate too much.

K: That is the basic problem - sucking up to the Arabs.....are totally wrong.

J: It's not in the cards. When I was in Saudi Arabia a year ago November, they told me, and Yamani and others, can you think of a better investment, Senator, than just keeping it in the ground. I haven't forgotten it.

K: I'll look forward to talking to you. Have a good New Year, and to your wife.

T104

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Foreign Minister Fahmy/Secretary Kissinger
4:50 PM
December 26, 1973

F: Hello.

K: Hello, Ismail.

F: I want to make it clear that we are going to talk on their behalf, but I will add one man to the_____.

K: But is he going to be identified as a Syrian?

F: His marks are Syrian.

K: I would strongly urge that you not raise this until next week. I think it's going to add up to a disaster this week and it may set everything back next week.

F: You think so?

K: That's my firm judgment. This week is extremely important.

F: Even if the man comes next week?

K: Next week there is one chance in five, this week there is none.

F: I'm sorry to bother you again.

K: Ismail, it's always a pleasure to talk to you.

F: OK. Thank you. Goodby.

END

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T99

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Foreign Minister Fahmy/Secretary Kissinger
December 26, 1973
3:05

K: Everything is going along fine.

F: How is your health?

K: I am much improved.

F: Tell me I have good news.

K: What is the news? You have good news? What is it?

F: The Syrians have accepted to send a military man to join the military committee.

K: I am not sure the Israelis will sit with him.

F: Why not? He will be in our delegation.

K: He will be part of your delegation?

F: He will be part of our delegation. This is a good step. If you can work on the Israelis and let me know. This is a good step to bring the Syrians to the conference.

K: Yes, but do we have to do it before the elections?

F: Why not?

K: They will never agree before the elections.

F: The next meeting is on Friday. When the Syrian man comes here I can convince him to come after the election.

K: That would be very desirable.

F: Can you do that tomorrow and let me know.

K: I will do my best. What would you discuss? Only Egyptian matters or Syrian matters....with Egyptians or with regard to Syrian.....

F: Both of them.

K: They won't do it without getting a prisoner list.

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F: We will discuss later on. We have a unified command....good formula to get the Israelis out from under the umbrella.....

K: If you can get them to provide a list then no problem.

F: Don't make a condition. Let's take one step at a time.

K: I think the Israelis might agree to the Syrian if it doesn't concern Syrian problems. They will not discuss Syrian problems.

F: They will if necessary.

K: If they get a prisoner list.

F: I will work on that but don't make it a condition.

K: Not for me to do that but I can guarantee the Israelis will do that.

F: If I have the list in my hand, I can guarantee the Syrians can_____.

K: I will be in touch with you. The problem is we have had it all set and you are complicating it.

F: I am not. This is a big step. I want to get the Syrian letter out formally.

K: Let me get in touch with the Israelis and I will call you back.

F: Work hard on them, Henry; and get in touch with me direct. Not through you man here.

K: OK.

END

T109

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D), 1.4(C), 1.4(D), B3, CIA

TELCON
Sisco/Sec. Kissinger
Wed., Dec. 26, 5:45 p.m.
[illegible]

K: Have you seen the intelligence report about what [redacted] are planning? B1

S: The intelligence man just left. They are checking out this source. It is not the same source that gave us the information in October or whenever it was.

K: It is not.

S: It is not. First they said it was. They want to check it out over night. I sent some suggestions to you through Denney and I will just tell you what they are. It can wait until in the morning. If we are concerned, [redacted] B1, B3

K: I have told Colby to do that.

S: [redacted] B1, B3

K: Colby I have already done. [redacted] B1, B3

S: Yes. Third, when we look at it in the morning, if we decide that it looks serious we should weigh in an you call Dobrynin and we should send [redacted] We will wait on the B1, B3
last two until in the morning. I will take care of [redacted] B1, B3

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET REASON: 25X1, 25X6
DECLASSIFY AFTER: INDEFINITE
DATE/CASE ID: 19 MAY 2004 200102979

T97

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON

Mr. Ziffren/Secretary Kissinger
December 26, 1973
1:20 pm

Z: How are you?

K: I am getting there.

Z: I can imagine, but it was a brilliant trip. On CBS there was a report -- it was very thorough and flattering on your trip. It was by Marvin Kalb.

K: He is a bright man.

Z: When are you going to have some time when Rifkin and I and some others might come down?

K: When do you want to come?

Z: How about, well could we make it the week of the 8th of January?

K: It is possible but I am thinking of going away for a week's vacation.

Z: When?

K: That week of the 4th or 5th.

Z: When would you be back?

K: About the 11th or 12th...you can't do it next week?

Z: Next week is difficult for us. If we could make it...

K: OK, I am most anxious to talk to a Jewish group I trust and let down my hair.

Z: I talked to Sey Rifkin about it and

K: We are in good shape with the Government of Israel but it is important to get an understanding now...it is not a question of _____ the line.

Z: Well, why don't we set it for Friday the 11th.

K: OK, unless I am away and then we'll do it the following week.

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Z: Aren't you going to be going back to Geneva.

K: Not necessarily.

Z: OK. Why don't we say the 11th. Can Bonnie let me know if you're not back?

K: yes.

Z; What time?

K: Let's say about 5:00.

Z: 5:00 on the 11th. And where?

K: At the State Department.

Z: OK.

K: How many?

Z: I thought we should keep it down to 5.

K: Good. And I can rely on their discretion.

Z: Absolutely. You know Sey Rifkin's background?

K: No.

Z: He is a senior partner.....but he was originally a partner with Senator Wagner and a federal judge for a few years. He is one of the few Jewsin America who everybody trusts and he is very highly regarded. .....pressure to put something together.

K: That's ma rvelous.

Z: I thought we would have three others so you can feel free to talk.

K: Alright. let's aim for the 11th. If anything comes up can I reach you next week?

Z: Oh sure. I will be in Los Angeles all week.

K: Good.

END

T100

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
FM Fahmy/Secretary Kissinger
December 26, 1973
3:05 pm

K: You realize we are giving about 5000 intelligence service material to send around the world.

F: How?

K: Talking on an open telephone. The Swiss are probably already selling it. ...what you discussed with me earlier, you remember?

F: yes.

K: First, to raise it before Monday would be suicide.

F: I will not put it into effect before Monday.

K: Let's not even raise it with the Israelis til Monday because they will say no. Secondly, we have this thing well organized..now that we have someone coming over next week. We are going on the course I discussed with you. I am afraid to discuss this new element..it would cause endless delay.

F: I got this from the President and he asked that I contact you right away..

K: I would wait at least until that group comes here next week and I can discuss it personally.

F: OK:

K: I know your predicament.

F: I don't think it will be a big change. He will be one of our party.

K: Well, if you are not going to identify him you can bring in anybody you want.

F: The man is not here. It may take him 2 or 3 days to come.

K: My strong advice is to wait til next week and my second advice is that we are doing very well along..you discussed.

F: But this is a breakthrough for the Syrians and you should ...

K: It would come better a little further down the road.

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*

F: When is Ambassador Bunker coming?

K: I'll let you know the first thing in the morning.

F: He was supposed to be here the 26th.

K: He will be there tomorrow or the next day.

F: I can't work with your man here.

K: I will do something about that.

F: What about the prisoners of war?

K: I have submitted it but I haven't got an answer yet.

F: I hope you can do something on the..you are leaving me alone and I am doing your job.

K: I know, but you are a better man than I.

F: OK. I will send what you tell me to the President and get his reaction.

K: Good, Ismail.

END

T98

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.5(D)

TELECON
Secretary Schlesinger/Secretary Kissinger
December 26, 1973
1:40

S: I've got our friend Sykes coming in at 2:00.

K: Who?

S: The Charge at the British Embassy and I wanted to talk to him about Diego Garcia [redacted] Anything else? B1

K: [redacted] make sure we get the Diego Garcia thing. What else you can tell him is that my talk with you went well but we are still concerned with their reaction to energy proposals and their general foot-dragging. B1

S: OK, very good. We have had no other feelers on Posiedon. I will ask him.

K: Right.

S: They are not unfriendly on defense issues. They have no reason to be.

K: The British?

S: yes.

K: But what we have to prevent is to let the Europeans milk us for thing they want and then pursuing totally antagonistic..in other fields.

S: Shall I tell him that?

K: Yes.

S: Shall do.

K: For your information. We are writing to Faisel affirming some of deals we made but also saying it is hard for us to understand that when they ask us to be evenhanded they are pursuing discriminatory policies.

S: Good. You make it more than hard to understand..if they expect you to be cooperative it must be a two-way street.

K: Right.

END

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 25X6
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T101

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Minister Shalev/Secretary Kissinger
3:40 PM
December 26, 1973

K: Your Ambassador yesterday told me he was going to let me know about Kabrid and Suez and a few other things.

S: Yes, I have a reply. I was trying to see General Scowcroft in about an hour's time.

K: You said yes to all three suggestions.

S: With to Kabrid, the Prime Minister recalled that we had actually offered to do this a month ago through you, if you will recall.

K: Yes, I remember.

S: And that all we ask for really is for the release of Masrafi (sp?) the Israeli agent they have in their custody, if that's the right word. We were also ready to accept an additional exchange with some agents for which they were going to give us some names, but they dropped the whole thing. To supply Kabrid and also to _____also the list of military items to be supplied to Suez. In exchange for that we ask for Masrafi, and we are also ready to release the agents. We also ask that you repeat their obligations on Bal_____but I thing this is_____.

K: How about those 56 prisoners?

S: The prisoners. As a result of customary Egyptian attacks on us. And first of all the legal aspect is that the fact they were captured after the ceasefire went into effect doesn't change the situation; the circumstances under which they were captured does. Only for your own personal information. We have information that the Egyptian General Staff has instructed the Egyptian soldiers to shoot at our soldiers whenever they're in sight, and actually it's not so much of a factor.

K: But the question is, are you going to release those prisoners?

S: In the sense of a violation of the ceasefire_____.

K: But what is your answer to the question?

S: At the momement our answer is that we are not going to release the prisoners. I have also been asked to point out that under the circumstances from an internal point of view to release Egyptiansprisoners at a time when we don't even have the names of our prisoners in Syria would be unacceptable to the Israeli public.

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K: One has nothing to do with the other.

S: Not in legal terms. In political terms this would be a very difficult thing for the government to explain to our people.

K: Who is going to talk with youaall when they've taken me off to an institution?

S: Some of them on subjects that we discussed at 101, perhaps Geneva is the proper place to discuss them.

K: I have another little problem for you which I'm sure is easy to solve. I have just had a call from the Egyptian Foreign Minister that a Syrian officer will be prepared to joing their Delegation to the military talks. Are you with me? Now what should I tell them?

S: Offhand, I wanted to be prepared to talk to the Syrians. I'm sure that we want him there even if he's part of the Egyptian Delegation if he will be identified as such. This is my reaction. I will of course ask the government, but I am sure this will be their reaction.

K: That's bbeen my instinct as well. On the previous three items I would have been tactically more flexible, but on this one I understand.

S: Of the previous three items, the item of Kabrid - there is a standing offer that hasn't been rescinded. It's a very generous offer. We want the release of Masrafi. There's another prisoner in Egyptian internment for 20 years - Levy. We would like to have him back. (a) To supply Kabrid, (b) to consider the list of items to be supplied to the town of Suez, and (c) to return to them certain Egyptian agents which they want but whom they have not named as yet.

K: But you're not prepared to give up those 56 prisoners.

S: This is not related to them.

K: OK. Will you let me know about the Syrian business. We are not recommending it, just passing it on.

S: Yes, I realize that. I will see General Scowcroft and give him all the details.

K: I would appreciated it.

END.

T111 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Len Garment/HAK
December 27, 1973/10:59 a.m.

G: Our friend from Detroit and he wanted to see you briefly before the other meeting.

K: He can see me briefly before the other meeting.

G: OK. Your press briefing is from 4 to 5.

K: No, probably from 3 to 4.

G: OK then there will be a chance to do that.

K: If I give a press briefing. I haven't definitely decided yet. What's old Safire up to. What the hell have I done to him.

G: I have somebody here so I have to be a little vagueish. What are you referring to.

K: Well, he ~~xxx~~ has a vicious article a week

G: You mean the one today. Well, he has to write.

K: But why does it have to be me all the time?

G: He knows you and is associated with you. Brush it aside.

K: OK.

G: I'll see you later on.

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T124

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Len Garment/Secretary Kissinger
December 27, 1973
6:33 PM

G: Henry, I think you ought to get those modern painting out of your office. That abstraction is too much - evocative of your style.

K: Not evocative of my style?

G: No - evocative of your style. I think you ought to put in some Beaunards (sp?) and move to the impressionists.

K: You mean I may be tipping my hand. Well, I happen to like them.

G: The next comment -- the meeting was, as usual, very skillfully conducted. I saw some of the mean later on the street, and they were duly appreciative.

K: Well, I'm trying to _____the SOB's.

G: It's a dilemma that requires the workings of a wizard.

K: Well, you know I may fail, but so far we've gotten more than the situation permits.

G: I can sense that.

K: I think the Israelis have suddenly begun to realize. So - you don't like these paintings.

G: I'm sick of modern art. It's symptomatic of the decline and fall of everything. You're a classical man with a classical style.

K: Well, I happen to like it.

G: I understand. I won't complain in the future.

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T123

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Ziffren/Secretary Kissinger
December 27, 1973

.....

K: I know who he is.

Z: He is the Chairman of the United Jewish Appeal in New York. He is a member of the UN Delegation. The other one is_____ and Maurice Abrams

K: Oh, yes I know him.

Z: The other one I was thinking of was Eugene Rostow. What do you think of him?

K: He is a little beligerant.

Z: That's what I thought. The other one, the fifth one could be either Elmer Winter or the Executive Director of the Jewish Committee -- which would you prefer?

K: I'll leave it up to you.

Z: Ok.

K: I would as soon not have Rostow.

Z: Ok, I had the same feeling as you did about him.

K: He thinks he ought to have my job. He thinks he knows how to conduct foreign policy better than I do.

Z: What about Fitch and Abrams?

K: Fine.

Z: Alright, well either Elmer Winter or the executive director of the American Jewish Committee -- the idea being all these people can be of help. Is the 11th still a good day for you?

K: Let's say the 10th.

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Z: That's a Thursday. By coincidence the Committee was going to be in New York for a dinner. Will you be back from your vacation by the 10th?

K: I probably won't get to go but I might go on the 11th.

Z: What time on the 10th? How about 2:00?

K: Let's say 2:30.

Z: If that is convenient for you we will firm it up right now.

K: Excellent. I may be out on the West Coast for a few days with the President and I would like to see you there.

Z: Good. I would love to talk to you about these things.

K: Will you be at home?

Z: Yes, the whole time.

K: I'll call you when I get out there.

END

T120

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Atherton/Secretary Kissinger
December 27, 1973
8:17 PM

K: Roy, Hussein has sent us a message that he would like to withdraw his forces from Syria in response to our asking him about Syrian intentions. What is your view? Should be encourage him or not?

A: My instinct is to let him play this the way he thinks best.

K: But he's asked for my opinion.

A: He wants us to advise him?

K: Yes.

A: Well, Assad has of course made the point that he's afriad if Hussein pulls out it will expose him to coups from the _____. I honestly don't know enough about the Syrian internal situation to give him advise. I wonder if it isn't best to say "Your Majesty, We think you're the best judge of what to do in the situation." If we advise him, we're in trouble. I don't think we know enough about the internal situation to give him sound advice.

K: OK. Thank you.

END

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 12 NOV 2002 200102979

T115

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Assistant Secretary Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
2:43 PM
December 27, 1973

K: Do you have the messages from Jidda?

S: The ones reporting the Yamani conference?

K: Yes.

S: Yes.

K: Well, I think it makes it essential we get the letter out. The President has approved it. He added something to it.

S: What those other letters and the incomings said, comes from the President. Do you still want to send it out to Akins or not?

K: No, because Akins' view is exactly like ours. Tell Akins to get the letter put in even if the King isn't available.

S: Wherever he may be.

K: How do we get the letter to Sadat? Give it to Ghorbal unless Fahmy is back.

S: Well, Fahmy is not back. Is the Sadat letter approved also?

K: Yes. It's this paragraph 6 that worries me.

S: In which letter?

K: Paragraph 6 in the Jidda cable. The one where Sadat says not lifting the boycott.

S: Let me have a look at that.

K: OK. Fine.

END

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
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T117

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
December 27, 1973
4:35 PM

S: I just wanted to tell you _____.

K: Was I all right?

S: I think it was a very very useful thing really. It was very positive. I'm just delighted with it. That's all I wanted to say. It was really good.

K: Many thanks. The President told me he was sending some changes to the letter.

S: I sent them over to Larry.

K: OK

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 12 MAY 2004 200102979

T121

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Colby/Secretary Kissinger
December 27, 1973
8:34 PM

K: Bill, on that matter we discussed earlier, my view is that if he can pull them out without triggering an attack, that would be the best way. But he's got to make that judgment.

C: OK. That's basically the point that the boys have made. The decision is fundamentally his as to what to do about it, but I think he's looking for a little hint and guidance from you as to what would be most helpful.

K: Yes.

C: Provided it doesn't trigger anything.

K: Right. Good.

C: You've sent the other message through?

K: Which one?

C: To the other people - about the Soviets.

K: Yes.

C: Because that would be most helpful.

K: OK. Good.

C: Thank you. See you tomorrow.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 19 MAY 2004 200102979

T113

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
President Nixon/Secretary Kissinger
December 27, 1973
2:30 PM

K: Mr. President.

N: Hello, Henry. How are you? Glad you are going to come out.

K: I am surprised at it all.

N: I did it deliberately so you did not have to lie for anybody. You have to enough for a good reason. This would have been for a bad reason. If there had been a break we could not have done it.

K: Exactly.

N: You could tell when I was hinting the other day when I said I might go to California. You looked a little amazed.

K: Quite candidly, I felt there was something -- I did not think the President of the U.S. should fly commercially. Have you seen the newspapers?

N: You know I don't read the newspappers.

K: You are on the front of the Times and the Post walking in the plane.

N: Good or bad?

K: Good. I am surprised. I expected them to say bad but they all say terrific.

N: I think it would be great if you would come out and bring your children. Can I get you a house or do you arrange that yourself?

K: I will talk to Major Brennan.

N: I will tell him.

K: I think Al has already talked to Brennan.

N: I got the two letters and I have dictated to Rose this morning something. I told her to pump it to Scowcroft and have it fixed up in proper language. It is some ideas I had. I didn't change the letters at all but I wanted to add a mountain top paragraph that I think will be helpful.

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K: We have had a letter from the Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister who says in effect the King is so unhappy about this decision if we make another appeal -- a decision to continue to boycott -- that maybe it will work.

N: In any event as soon as those letters are -- well you look them over. You are at State?

K: Yes.

N: Scowcroft will get them there and clean up the language.

K: And we will get them out tonight.

N: As far as I am concerned after he gets the language cleaned up they can go. I do not have to see them again. I dictated some general thoughts. He will know how to do it.

K: We will add these paragraphs.

N: A personal thought -- this and that. The kind of things I think would appeal to both of them. Look forward to seeing them and discussing with them personally. I can say that to both and that I want to discuss the problems of the world. That will mean I want to talk about the Russians. See my point?

K: We got a letter for you from Faisal full of exalted eulogies. Very, very warm and it would fit very well into that.

N: They all need warmth.

K: Right.

N: Now I think we have the game going fairly well. I think certainly Dobrynin will give a very positive.....

K: I just saw Dobrynin. He is slobbering all over us.

N: He should. To be frank, put yourself in their position. They should go along with this deal. We will not make it the other way.

K: They have no chance of delivering anything.

N: When I put in my excerpts, I said let me be very pragmatic. I said the US is the only nation that will be able to use the influence necessary to bring about progress in this area and we cannot do it under this type of pressure. You know what I mean. I think you will like it when you read it.

K: Good. Wonderful. That I am certain.

N: I don't know whether she (Rose Mary) got it there yet. I don't know how these machines work.

K: They work very fast. If I have any question...

N: I don't care about the grammar. It is the thought that I wanted to be included. When will you get here?

K: Saturday.

N: Saturday. I would come tomorrow.

K: We are working on things.

N: Anytime you want.

K: Right, Mr. President. I'm giving a press conference at 3:00.

N: I think you should say you talked with the President today for a half hour and that you're going to join him at the Western White House - you could say on Friday or Saturday - for further consultations with regard to the State of the Union and the Middle East developments.

K: Absolutely.

N: You want us to get together any dates for you?

K: I think I can handle that, but if I need help, I'll call you.

T116

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Haig/Secretary Kissinger
December 27, 1 973
2:45 pm

K: Al,

H: Yes, Henry.

K: I hope you realize I am outranking you.

H: I don't understand.

K: You had better get on the god damn phone first.

H: Laughter

K: None of the White House megalomania.

H: That was Muriel. She says she has been waiting for ye ars to get back at you.

K: I know, and just when I am getting fond of her. I'm just kidding. Vest tells me it is leaking about Rush leaving. I am giving a press conference at 3:00. If it is not going to happen, I could shoot it down then.

H: It is not.

K: Can I say nothing to it ?

H: Yes. And I will call him. I will tell him that.

K: That is the last time I will do a favor for this Administration.

H: Did you talk to the boss?

K: He is flying high.

H: That's right. Really upbeat.

K: How long will he be out there?

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H: He would not tell me.

K: There is a limit beyond which I can go with Nancy.

H: YOu don't even have to go.

*

K: No. he asked me to come out.

H: If you don't go out there he would understand.

K: If I took a Sunday evening plane I would be there Monday and Tuesday.

H: That would be fine.

K: He won't leave on Wednesday.

H:L No., well ok,

K: Then, I would be out there three days and leave Thursday or Friday.

H: So, you'll go out there on Sunday.

K: Sunday or may be Saturday night.

H: I am going at 4:30

K: So I can deny the Rush thing.

H: Well, give me time to get to him.

K: I'm giving a press conference at 3:00....I won't ask for it.

H: You'll back me up on the Middle East.

K: I told him that I had put in a reclamer. I told him he didn't want me to.. it is easier to double-cross me than the President.

H: He won't do that.

K: OK

END

T112

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D), B3, CIA

TELECON
Assistant Secretary Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
12:55 PM
December 27, 1973

(Missed first part)

K: That report we had yesterday.

S: Well, I'm awaiting the INR answer which was supposed to come at noon. I called about two hours ago to get it. [redacted] and I'm waiting for it. B1, B3

K: Well, tell them I want it at 2:00.

S: OK.

K: Have you seen the Fahmy letter? The letter Fahmy wrote to the President.

S: Yes, I saw it. I revised my letter in light of that.

K: Shouldn't we put a word of acknowledgement in it? Secondly, could you send our draft letter to Akins and give him a chance to look at it.

END

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CLASSIFICATION: SECRET REASON: 25X1, 25X6
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DATE/CASE ID: 24 MAY 2004 200102979

T122

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D), B3, CIA

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
December 27, 1973
8:35 PM

K: Anatol.

D: Hello, Henry.

K: You remember what I told you about [redacted] B1, B3

D: You told me many things about them.

K: That they may be contemplating an attack.

D: You mentioned that.

K: We have now some information which makes it look like this could be an accurate report.

D: Between the 31st and 4th? You have information that makes it more reliable? Would you like to tell me what it is or just in general terms?

K: Our information is that they're concentrating tank forces. You know it's up to you whether you want to do something. But it's obvious that if there is an attack, it's not going to have very pleasant consequences. I want you to know that we have told [redacted] about it so that they will not be surprised. B1, B3

D: They probably know, but I will send it just for information for Moscow, what you just mentioned to me. You're still saying the 31st?

K: That's our best information - 31st to 1st (sic).

D: I will check with them.

K: OK.

D: Thanks, Henry. You had today a press conference. It was a good one.

K: Well, it was very favorable towards you - about your role in Geneva.

D: I read it on the ticker. I have not finished it. OK. Henry.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET REASON: 25X1, 25X6
DECLASSIFY AFTER: INDEFINITE
DATE/CASE ID: 24 MAY 2004 200102979

T118

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

TELCON
Ziegler/Sec. Kissinger
Friday, Dec. 27, 1973
6:20 p.m.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS, A/RPS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 25X6
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 31 DEC 2012
DATE/CASE ID: 12 MAY 2004 200102979

Z: How did you do?

K: I think pretty well.

Z: The wires are moving, I think well.

K: I tried to give a summary of the year's events.

Z: Yes.

K: And I think I did it in a rather positive way.

Z: Did you say you were coming out?

K: I will probably come out on Sat. or Sun.

Z: O.K. I am keeping it very loose so no one knows exactly when you are coming if you are coming commercial.

K: The President said he wanted you to say I was coming out.

Z: I told them you were coming out but I will not say the day. I said sometime soon so if you fly commercial you should go low key and privately. We are not going to give the date or time or anything in terms of your departure.

K: When do you think he is coming back?

Z: He said he is staying through the first but we don't know.

K: I may come on Sunday and leave on Thursday whether or not he leaves.

Z: Don't tell anyone that . Don't let your office know.

K: I won't tell my office.

Z: I was just advised that the NY Times is moving an advisory to their clients which says they have negotiated for a manuscript that when published due to its sensitive nature -- a story of sensitive nature, so sensitive it must remain confidential at this time and when published will have world-wide repercussions and the manuscript itself was written by a prominent person and they say it could appear as early as Sat. in their advisory in a 3-part series. That is all I know. It may not be anything at all but there are

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two things that worry me in the advisory and that is the historic portion, sensitive nature and world-wide repercussion.

K: What would you think it could be?

Z: I don't know. I called Clifton Daniel. I told him that I was calling on an informal basis and said we had been informed of the advisory. I said there were two words in the advisory running at this time that concerned me. I said I recognized it might be a sales pitch on the part of the NY Times news service but UPI has also picked this up which is an extraordinary act for UPI to advise their subscribers of this particular series which they say th are going to run also and they are going to charge their clients additional money for it. I know it does not mean anything to you but in the newspaper business it is extraordinary . This is the way the Stalin daughter story broke.

K: Yes.

Z: I said to Clifton, "Look you know anything about it and he said no." I said we are both talking then from a point of no knowledge. I said it was an informal call but all I can say is I do know we are involved in a very delicate diplomatic period.

K: You can bet.

Z: To put it mildly and I said it seems to me if the NY Times is going to break a story of a sensitive and historic nature that will have world-wide repercussinns and as the advisory says would make headlines around the world, if it has anything with a potential effect on our diplomacy, that the NY Times should notify the Govt before it breaks, you see.

K: Yes, but they won't do it.

Z: I think it is a reasonable thing to raise, just to be on the record, don't you?

K: Absolutely.

Z: He is going to call me back in half and hour.

K: Will you let me know.

Z: Yes. Don't you think it reasonable to raise?

K: It is essential.

3.
Zigler
Dec. 27

Z: I am not over reacting to this?

K: No. I am worried.

Z: A manuscript of world-wide repercussions that is so sensitive that it must remain confidential. They could not break a story like that in all good consciousness. -- The things you are doing and the President, and particularly in the Middle East.

K: I would not bet on anything.

Z: See what I mean?

K: Yes. O.K.

Z: I will let you know.

K: Let me know will you even if he tells you that it is nothing.

Z: o.k.

END

6:25 p.m.
Dec. 27, 1973

Z: He checked and they apparently are keeping it tight. They responded in a way that they don't want us to respond to the response. They said nothing for us to be concerned about.

K: I see. Nothing to be concerned about. [redacted] B1

Z: I don't know; they said nothing for us to be worried about. Perhaps Marilyn Monroe.

K: They would not print that.

Z: They said we would be interested in reading it. He posed the question is it something the Govt should be aware of or should raise formally or initially. They said don't concern yourself. I said I would pass it only to you. They asked if we get asked or it is raised say nothing about it. I assured them that you would not say anything. They said not US action or nothing but don't repeat. I said they could count on that.

END

T114

RELEASED IN PART,
B6

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
2:43 PM
December 27, 1973

K: I have to go out to the West Coast.

S: So, you are going?

K: [redacted] B6

S:

K:

S:

K:

S:

K: Well, maybe I can delay till Sunday, and maybe she could come down tomorrow and stay till Sunday.

S: Yes. We'll need to talk about who, if anybody, you need.

K: Yes. Give it some thought.

S: OK.

END

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 07 JUN 2004 200102979

T127

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Joseph Alsop/Secretary Kissinger
December 28, 1973
12:15 pm

K: Did you really mean you would write something critical about me unless I come..

A: I was kidding, but I am writing...

K: I would be glad to at about 8:30 tonight.

A: Well, that's fine. We ~~WE~~ will have a quiet dinner here. Seriously, I feel very strongly about whether you...come or not.. but I would like to talk to you about it before I do write about it.

K: By all means.

A: I am terribly worried about it and I think we are fooling outselves.

K: I'll see you tonight at 8:30.

A: How about you and Nancy having supper before you take off on Sunday. I calledher to thank her for the Christmas present.

K: No one is supposed to know I'm going -- it is not out yet. I'll be leaving earlier on Sunday but maybe we can have lunch. Look, I have to run Joe to a meeting.

A: Ok, 8:30 then.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 12 NOV 2002 200102979

T126 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
December 28, 1973/11:48 a.m.
Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker/HAK

K: Hello.

B: Morning Henry.

K: Ellsworth, how are you?

B: Fine. Mike Steiner called me this morning and he said they have suspended the talks now until the 2nd of January.

K: I don't see much sense in me going over.

B: He said there wouldn't be anyone to talk to. So I've put it off if its alright with you.

K: That's fine.

B: Then I'll talk to you about whether you want me for Dayan talks. You said Dayan was coming next week.

K: Yes, I would like to have you here for that.

B: What time is he coming do you know.

K: I think the 3rd.

B: OK. Alright Henry fine. I'll just postpone it. I'll see you.

K: Good. Thank you.

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T125 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
December 28, 1973/11:43 a.m.
Max Fisher/HAK

K: Hello.

F: Yes Henry. It went very well.

K: You are doing a superb job. I was very ~~greatXeX~~ grateful.

F: I might point out to you when we get together some of the new answers to these things. The one fellow that asked the question how you could be supported is the one fellow that we can't trust too far.

K: Really.

F: Yes. I know all these characters. Anyway it was very well handled and I'm glad you didn't go too deeply into detail because I think you you have to crawl up on these things kind of gradually. They were very sober. They realize that there has to be accommodation out of meeting. I met with them after you left but I think we have to adopt some strategy so I'd like to take the advantage of the opportunity of coming and see you next week if you're going to be in Friday or Saturday next week.

K: How about let's say Saturday. Breakfast.

F: Saturday morning? What time?

K: Right. About 8:30 at the State Department.

F: 8:30. I'll see you next Saturday at 8:30 and I'll give you a little bit more of the background.

K: Look forward to it.

F: OK. Bye.

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T132 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Peter Rodman/Secretary Kissinger
December 29, 1973
1:18 PM

K: Peter, I've got your girlfriend here.

R: My girlfriend?

K: Nancy. Are you going to bring those books on the plane? And those classified things?

R: All of those. You can carry them if you want.

K: I don't want to carry them.

R: OK.

K: Wait a minute -- talk to Nancy.

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END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 19 MAY 2004 200102979

T130 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
The President/Secretary Kissinger
December 29, 1973
1:07 pm

K: Mr. President,

N: Hello Henry;. I'm just making my daily check. I noticed the Syrian build-up. I think that is mainly a bluff. The Israelis are ready and they would give them hell.

K: That's right, but the Syrians may force the Egyptians into the war. I talked to Dobrynin about it and they promised they would use strong pressure. The Washington Post has an editorial that is really treasonable. It describes our strategy with the Egyptians and it says the Egyptians are taking themselves out of the war and there will be half peace and half war and the end result is that the Israelis are making a big gain and the heat will be off the negotiations and that is partially true. ...they are out to get you..they know this will be another big win for you in foreign policy...but when this gets back to Cairo it will trigger an explosion...

N: We will win more...will show them and don't you get discouraged. The main thing you and I and Al are the strong guys and..

K: We are going to hold this together...not my reason....This is an attack on our institutions and it has nothing to do with you or Watergate.

N: Right...the Israelis..shameful.

K: The Israelis are not doing this one. They are with us on this.

N: I was referring to the earlier attack on you.

K: No question about it but they were trying to use the White House against other....of the State Department.

N: How about the rest of the world situation?

K: Good shape. We had heard from Moscow about how pleased they were with your talk -- a short note from Brezhnev..

N: A lot of good things are going on. What is the situation on your arrival? When do you get out here?

K: I will be out early evening or late afternoon on Sunday.

N: You have a good flight and the sun came out today so you'll have good weather.

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K: Good.

N: And plan to stay a couple of weeks.

END

T129

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
December 29, 1973
12:00

K: Anatol - how are you?

D: Happy New Year to you. Very best wishes not only in the New Year.

K: Happy New Year to you, and I feel the same way, and I look forward to working closely with you and your associates. I have two things - I just don't - can't be sure whether I can get to Acapulco next weekend.

D: That's all right. I have to go to Moscow. Maybe we will arrange something later.

K: That would be good. I have to go to the West Coast tomorrow, and I don't know how long I'll be with the President.

D: Better for you going there. Maybe after I return - and when you be back - maybe we have a chance to sit down.

K: Now, Anatol, one other thing. _____is pushing very hard in Geneva to go in to participate in these military talks, and I really think he is quite frankly making too much of a nuisance of himself. You and I have agreed - and Gromyko - we must make rapid progress. After we get this phase behind us, then we can be more active. This may give the Israelis another excuse _____.

D: I can't tell you, but I'm sure _____.

K: Our impression is frankly that Gromyko may have said to him to try _____. He doesn't have your deft hand.

D: What kind of _____? Because I have copies of his telegrams including his talks with Israelis on the same subject and his talks with the Egyptians and with your representative. You have there a fellow -- S_____?

K: Sterner, yes.

D: Who said? Egyptian first mentioned to him that they were in favor, then talked to Sterner who said they do not object, but it doesn't necessarily mean that they want it. They come back to me and say Americans say it is not so.

K: But you know that what the Egyptians say to you and to us is not necessarily the same.

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D: May I put it this way in the telegram to Gromyko? That _____than participate, at least as far as concerns the American position. This is - I forget the name of Israeli fellow. He mentioned to Ov____what you mentioned and he said _____.

K: I think when we get into the political phase of the questions.

D: Only for this disengagement.

K: We would act in strict accordance with what we wrote down in Moscow. It will have the participation of the Soviet Union and the U.S. at key points.

D: Because in my telegrams he didn't mention to me anything about a possibility of your meeting again in Geneva.

K: It was Gromyko's idea that at some important mement when the talks were completed that we might again have a meeting in Geneva.

D: There is nothing in the telegrams about this from him.

K: It was not a firm decision, but it was an idea to which I agreed.

D: As a possibility.

K: As a possibility.

D: By the way, I have received a telegram from him. "When will you see Kissinger next time?" He was a little bit surprised that you downgraded your man in European _____Conference.

K: Let me take a look at it. It was not intentional.

D: In the last discussion in Geneva.

K: Let me take a look at it. He is absolutely correct.

D: But now it's downgraded.

K: I'llltake a look at it.

D: Superficially speaking, he has now the impression as if you are downgrading.

K: I will leave tomorrow evening for the West Coast.

D: When will you be back?

K: Thursday, the third.

D: The very best to you.

T128

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Secretary Schlesinger/Secretary Kissinger
December 29, 1973
8:58 AM

K: Jim, I didn't talk to you yesterday about who gave that background on the oil thing to Marilyn Berger.

S: That was me. They should not have given it out. I assumed that they would abide by the ____rule.

K: The problem is that Akins is going into orbit.

S: What does he say?

K: He just calls attention to the really difficult situation if we talk that way. I'll send it over to you.

S: I read the article. I chewed out Fre___. We ought to have it very clear.

K: I don't think we should say anything about oil until we do something. I think we should avoid this kind of thing. I keep saying I don't know what they're going to do.

S: That was Kay Graham. She should not have used that material if she wants to speculate.

K: I frankly thought it was Clements.

S: That was me.

K: I've blown worse than that.

S: I guess I mentioned this to you before about some articles. But I detected some undercurrent towards you among those Washington Post reporters.

K: I have too.

S: They spend a lot of time trying to separate me from you.

K: Was it Marilyn?

S: No - a fellow named Sterner. I reflected on that last night. You're so damn high at the moment that they want to tear you down.

K: It's a combination. First, it's Dinitz, taking out insurance because most of those are Jews. Somewhere down the road I'm going to tackle them. Then they want to operate on the President against me. For about a month they were trying to say foreign policy will go on even if the President is forced to resign. On

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the trip I gave background every day identifying myself with the President. They must get me if they get the President.

S: This of detante and my being in a position of working with the (Arabs?) and you in the position of working with the (oil?) That's natural isn't it. That's in the nature of the position____.

K: Always in ____terms of time.

S: You may be spending more of it. But there was some undercurrent there, but Henry has a great sense of how things move. I gave him a little speech on you, I said, Henry bats about 800. That's a God-damed good batting average - twice what Ted Williams was ever able to achieve. Of course, Henry might be offended if it's anything less than a thousand or anything less than perfect. But you've got to remember that this guy is just remarkably good. His slugging average is even higher.

K: It's obvious they're trying to split you and me in the press conference.

S: I think that Kay Graham herself is sympathetic to yourself personally in a way the reporters are not.

K: That's definitely true. That's definitely the case.

S: You're the fellow in the top hat at the moment.

K: That's obvious. Have you seen the editorial in the Post today? It lays out our whole strategy with Egypt. If that hits Cairo, I don't know what they're going to do. _____that they're taking themselves out of the war. It's perceptive.

S: That subject never came up on Saturday.

K: I didn't assume that. I'm just pointing it out as an example of their destructive tendencies.

S: They asked me on Wednesday about whether you had received any promises from ____. I told them I didn't know, I said, ask Dr. Kissinger. I directed that one to you.

K: Good. I never confirm it or deny it. OK. Very good. Have a happy holiday.

S: Did you see that article yesterday in the Washington Post by Bernstein and Woodward (sp). Now that was really.....

K: They had two -- which one to you mean?

S: This is one that discussed H as being disenchanged. Who's the source of that?

K: It's a combination of Mel and Clawson.

S: Clawson is (creaming?) the President.

K: Yes. That's just between you and me. Al thinks so too.

S: OK. Good. Well, Marilyn Berger shouldn't have used that material.

K: If you yell about it, it gets worse.

S: We have all these complaints that A__ is writing about. Sultan points out the cost of U.S. weapons has increased. It remains badly timed even for them.

K: I would not budget an inch now. I believe we have to show our teeth a bit to the Arabs now.

END

T131*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Atherton/Secretary Kissinger
December 29, 1973
2:25 pm

K: Did you see the item about cancelling Saudi leaves?

A: Yes, I saw that.

K: What do you think?

A: I think there is a lot of nervousness in the air and it is about the unpredictability of the Syrians. I am not persuaded that the Syrians are bluffing. They may be coming to conclusion that they are left out and they may want to make their point. Hal Saunders and I were talking about it....maybe we should touch base with Sadat.

K: Why don't you do a message from me to him and say whatever..... I made on the front we would be prepared to do on the Syrian front..

A: I'll do it right now. Will you be there for a while?

K: If not, you can have it sent out to me later but call first.

A: yes, sir.

END

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T133 nlr1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
December 29, 1973
9:38 AM

K: Brent, how are you? Brent, despite your advice I'm going to take Bremmer. I talked to Haig about it and I think you're over doing it.

S: I may be.

K: In fact, I don't understand it.

S: Well, maybe I'm just an old woman. Do you want to take Peter too?

K: Yes. Peter can sit in my outer office and Bremmer on the other side.

S: Very good.

K: Anything else?

S: I have a few papers I'll send over to you this morning. Nothing urgent.

K: OK. Good.

END

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T136 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger - Bob Pierpoint
December 31, 1973
10:40 a.m.

P: I would like to do a little thing to say what your plans are here in your talks with the President.

K: What my plans are here?

P: What your plans are in terms of foreign policy.

K: Well, we are going to talk specifically about the Middle East. We will review the situation and see what the next moves will be. But it will also be a general foreign policy review. For instance, the energy proposal is more important even then it seemed then. We hope to get _____ Energy Action Group.

P: Why is it more important now?

K: Because we have almost all of the foreign exchange---it will have to go to energy. Now, for the U.S. it is not such a problem as for others.

P: So, you will see if you can cooperate with the oil-producing countries. Henry, let me ask you about the Israeli situation. It seems to me that the Labor Party will squeak through. I don't want to be premature but it seems that way. If that happens, I assume you think things will happen more quickly.

K: It was never expected that anything would happen while I was on my trip.

P: In other words, if I was to say that view on the present was optimistic....

K Well, you have to allow for the fact that it is a volatile area and someone can always do something. It looks hopeful.

P: Well OK. I'll put that out. Some good news is good sometimes. What about the Arab oil?

K: Well, that you will have to take on your own. Let me tell you something for your own information. We get our share of the 10% increase. Then, we get more from other countries. The 10% increase was very helpful to us. If they had just lifted the embargo it wouldn't have helped us. Now, if we can get the embargo listed, it will be easier.

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P: What are the chances?

K: Closely related and hopeful.

P: OK, the oil situation I will use on my own. Will you be around for awhile?

K: I will be here until Thursday.

P: Can you and Bob Toth and I get together for lunch?

K: That would be good. We could get several together.

P: OK, who would you like to have? Have you had a chance to get to know Tom Brokaw? I hate to suggest my opposition but he is a good guy. Also Dean Fischer is out here. When would you like to do it?

K: Let's aim for breakfast on Wednesday.

P: Where are you staying?

K: At a home. In which I am paying.

P: Shall we try to eat at the San Clemente Inn?

K: Fine. 8:15 a.m. Is that too early?

P: No, that is about right. We will invite about five or six people and let you know about it tomorrow.

K: Fine, wonderful.

P: All right, Henry. I'll be in touch. Bye.

K: Bye.

T134 *

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon

HAK/Amb. Hummel
31 Dec 73
11:50 a.m.

K: About that cable to Korea about the non-aggression treaty.

Hummel: Yes.

K: I take it you're not in the office.

H: No, sir, I'm at home.

K: Well, if you don't show the right dedication... Hello?

H: Yes, I'm listening.

K: I don't seem to be able to shake you. LOok, I myself think they ought to wait a few weeks until we can decide where we're going in general.

H: Alright, sir. Yes.

K: Don't you?

H: I thought it was a neat question and I didn't think that this would likely hurt the overall plan.

K: I wouldn't twist their arm to wait, but I'd at least put it before them.

h: Well, do we want to tell ~~them~~ promise them that we're going to come to them with a larger view? I guess we could. See, we'd have to give them some reason.

K: Yes. Let me see.

H: It might worry them if they think we're cooking up something. I guess it doesn't matter if they get a little concerned or worried.

K: No it ~~doesn't matter. You know~~ does matter. You know there must be some allies that don't get mad at us. Let me see.

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H: You see this fellow's logically from what you said to them ~~whenex~~ when you were there.

K: Well, when I was there they said to me that they were making a larger package.

H: No, what I mean is this particular non-aggression business fits into the framework that you encouraged them to use. Put some things on the table; keep the other side off balance.

K: Yeah, yeah. Why don't we ask Habib what he thinks.

H: All right.

K: Tell him my only concern is to start this prematurely while we are doing our own studies.

H: Yes.

K: But I don't think I would fall on my sword over it.

H: Yes, sir.

K: Okay?

H: All right, sir. Do you have any idea how long you're going to be there?

K: I'll be back Thursday.

H: All right. Shall one of us get back to you by phone tomorrow or the next day.

K: Yeah, why don't you.

H: Yes, all right. Fine.

K: Good. Thank you.

H: Right. Thank you.

T135*

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
31 Dec 73
HAK/Sisco
1:00 p.m.

K: Joe, I have edited that thing and I'll get it back to you. But I put it in the form of an oral message. What do you think?

S: Well I sent you a little message on that. Let me tell you, and Herman talked to us afterwards, after he talked to you. I continue to feel, first of all it doesn't make a whole lot of difference, but I continue to feel that the written message is better for this reason.

K: So he can show it.

S: It's so conciliatory, and whenever you've had a nasty letter you like to get a nice one that looks pretty good.

K: Yes, okay. Then I have to change my editing which I put into the third person. I'll get Rodman to do it. Thank you.

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T146

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
SECRETARY KISSINGER - PETER FLANIGAN
January 2, 1973
2:45 p.m.

K: Hello.

F: Hello, Henry.

K: How are you? Pete, I was talking with the President. You are looking for people for Japan for me.

F: That's correct.

K: And you mentioned the former head of Sears? Who are you talking about?

F: The former head is a fellow by the name of Gordon Metcalf. A very able guy. We thought that William--and his nickname is Mill Batten, who the President knows, is better.

K: OK.

F: He is a former head of JC Penney. You want to hear the rest of the list?

K: And can you get it over to Eagleburger so that he can LDX it out here?

F: Sure, it has already gone to Eagleburger. Now, Howard Clark, of Amer. Express---he's supposed to retire in a few years. Several of these men might be on the edge of retirement so they might be available.

K: Good.

F: Well, I'll read them to you quickly. In order of ability and the fact that they are close to retirement. Mill Batten, of JC Penney. A fellow by the name of Bob Ullman of National Cash Register, Gordon Metcalf of Sears, a wonderful fellow, Jim Binger of Honeywell, he's only 57. I doubt that he would be available. Bill Hewitt of Dear & Co. and Howard Clark. But the first three would be my recommendations.

K: OK. Good.

F: Good, Henry.

K: Now, Firestone won't take Canada. And I would like to give it to Bill Porter who is moving.

F: That's fine.

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K: And the President asked me just to call me to ask if you have a deserving non-contributing supporter but I hope you will say no.

F: I don't. Let' me ask you a question, though. Bill Porter is a very able diplomat and certainly knows his business. I have felt that we have missed the boat in Canada because we had that fellow you had been with the bank, whose name I forget and then we had Adolph Schmit, and this is ayoung, energetic nation. And it's a young, energetic government--Trudeau is young, John Turner is young--relatively young, and their sort of feisty in some ways. Certainly Turner is. Bill Porter, while he can be feisty, seems to me less sort of tough. Maybe I'm reading him wrong. I don't know him all that well. We really need to get close to those people and we certainly haven't with out last two appointments.

K: Well, whom do we have to be realistic. Porter is tough, all right. He is not the most sociable guy in the world. But he is tough.

F: But is he a bit prissy?

K: Prissy? No, I feel it biggest drawback is that he tends to get abrasive.

F: That doesn't bother me a bit up there.

K: No, prissy isn't his problem.

F: Well, then I can't think of an alternative.

K: OK, because it would help me if when I'm moving him it doesn't look as if I'm throwing him in the ash can.

F: Sure. No, I think he is an improvement on what we've got up there. I hope you are not thinking of Schmit for the OECD and I don't see why we owe Adolph Schmit anything.

K: Well the White House is pushing like crazy for him and I ran it past the President on that basis and he is willing to do it, but I don't have any interest in Adolph Schmidt.

F: The White House is pushing like crazy for him? I wonder who that can be. I've been talking with Jerry Jones and he denied it. He said you were.

K: Look, I'd be delighted to put a hold on Schmidt. Who do you want?

F: I'll find you some good people. I don't think he is good enough.

K: Look, I have no interest in Schmidt.

F: OK, I'll go to Jones and come back to you with 3 or 4 good people.

K: Good.

F: I will go along with Porter.

K: Fine, thank you.

F: Thanks.

K: Bye.

T 152 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Gen Scowcroft/Secy Kissinger
January 2, 1974

K: Brent, did we let the State Department know about that Dayan message?

S: Yeah.

K: And what did they say?

S: Oh, excuse me, I thought you meant the announcement.

K: The announcement, that's what I mean. So that they can cover it at their briefing. But I hope that we gave them different questions and answers.

S: Well, we gave them our questions and answers just for background.

K: The fact that I disapprove most of them, would that bother anybody?

S: I hadn't heard that. I didn't know that. I didn't know that.

K: Would you kindly reclaim them and get them made consistent?

S: Yes, I sure will. I will do it immediately.

K: I mean, they were not violently different but I gave it a slightly different focus.

S: I'll get on it immediately.

K: Thank you.

S: Right.

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T137 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Larry Eagleburger/Secy Kissinger
9:45 a.m., January 2, 1974

K: Larry, I wonder whether you should talk to Rush about Sisco.

E: I think that should be done, yes.

K: Would you do it?

E: Yeah.

K: And tell him also that I've all but cleared Porter for Canada.

E: Okay.

K: Now, what did you mean that Jerry Jones wants to make the announcement at the White House. You had no authority to discuss that with him. I've already settled that with Ziegler.

E: Well, there was a misinterpretation.

K: Jerry Jones is not giving me orders!

E: I know. There is a misinterpretation in my message. My message to you was I thought probably you would want it from the White House but I --

K: Yeah, I've already taken care of that.

E: Okay. That's all I wanted to know. Jerry Jones has not said anything about it.

K: Now, Catto is okay then.

E: As far as Jerry is concerned -- Jerry has checked his system, everything is fine. Jerry's suggestion is that the President might want to meet with both Catto and his wife. That's the only comment he had.

K: Well, since the President has not indicated their desire, do you think we can let it go?

E: Yeah.

K: Since we've met every demand of the President now.

E: Yes, sir. I'm simply a transmission belt.

K: Okay.

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E: Did you know that when Moshe Dayan saw Mr. Clements the last time he gave him a copy of a certain map? I learned that this morning. when I was in the Defense Department.

K: Of what map?

E: The disengagement map that he also gave you.

K: You mean that one kilometer map?

E: Yeah. Not only did they discuss it but he gave him the map.

K: Yeah, but if that's considered progress, what good is it? Well, what was the point of the conversation?

E: No, the only point I'm making --

K: No, I mean why did Schlesinger raise it?

E:: Schlesinger did not raise it with me. Bob Hill, whom I saw afterwards, said that Clements -- Well, he went through a long story, which I think you know about Clements really kicking over the traces after he heard from Dayan. It was just at that point that he said that he gave him a map and I pleaded ignorant to the whole thing but it was very clear it was the same map he gave you. And all I'm saying is Dayan apparently just bled his guts to Clements.

K: Well, then he's a bigger fool than I assumed.

E: I don't know where else Hill could have gotten all this.

K: Well, do you want to discuss that -- Well, I gave Schlesinger the story. He could have gotten it from Schlesinger.

E: Okay. Fine.

K: Would you tell that to Dinitz?

E: Yes, I will. I will.

K: Did Schlesinger offer you the ISA job?

E: Yeah. I said no. So then we spent the rest of the time talking about how it might be reorganized and made into an effective operation.

K: Well, I think it's an outrage for him though to approach -- You know, I had already talked to you.

E: Yeah, I know. But when he called, I didn't --

K: No, you had to go but I think it is an outrage that he invites staff members of mine to a meeting and offers them a job.

E: I think from what I gathered he's unhappy as hell about this Cooper business.

K: But Cooper is another staff member of mine!!!!

E: I know, I know.

K: I mean, we're living in a nuthouse!

E: I know that too. (laughter) Oh, boy. But I must say, he did not push hard. He said would you consider it? I said no, I would not; I think that message has already been transmitted. He said, fine, then let's talk about how the place might be reorganized. So he didn't push me hard at all.

K: Yeah.

E: Better get back here before everybody steals everything.

K: Before what?

E: I'm just kidding.

K: Listen, this is not our biggest problem. Okay, fine.

E: Okay, I'll take care of the Rush thing right away.

K: And call me to tell me what his comments are.

E: I will, sir.

T138 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Hal Sonnenfeldt/Secy Kissinger
9:50 a.m., January 2, 1974

K: Hal, how are you?

S: I'm fine. I just wanted to wish you a happy new year and tell you that I was back.

K: Oh, good.

S: At your disposal whenever you want me.

K: Good. We ll, we've got to swear you in next week.

S: Yeah. Well, that would be very nice. I look forward to that. They're hammering together some office which is some place on some floor up there if it's all right with you.

K: That's all right with me. In fact, I don't get into these things.

S: No, no, I think it will be fine.

K: Okay. Now, Hal, have you seen the letter that Heath wrote to the President.

S: No.

K: Well, would you draft a reply to it?

S: Yes. Does Brent have it here?

K: He must have it. Will you draft a reply and don't let him off too easily. He explains again how everything went beautifully and how
S: regrettable it is that they couldn't get anything about energy into the statement of the Nine. And I think we should just tell him we are getting sort of tired of being told it's regrettable, that things don't happen that are within their power to do. You know, I wouldn't put it that way.

S: Yeah.

K: Then Jobert wrote a long letter on the energy thing.

S: I saw that. I'm trying to make sense of it.

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K: Well, I think we can go ahead and make a proposal.

S: Well, have you got this package out there?

K: Yeah.

S: Of messages to heads of governments.

K: Yeah, I rather like it.

S: Yeah. I've only heard about it. I haven't had a chance to look at it. That seems to me is the thing for us to do -- is to just follow up on the thing. Otherwise, it will just languish.

K: Right. Well, I agree with that but I had some concern about the letter. It shouldn't be geared to the price rises, it should be put on its own merit.

S: Yeah. I think if it's geared to that and the boycott, it will scare people off.

K: No, I think it should be done on its own merit and the price rises should be used only as an example of the problem we face. So could you work with Donaldson to get that letter redrafted?

S: I will.

K: Good.

S: I've been catching up with the SALT stuff and I think the stuff we sent you to Geneva was something of a breakthrough and I take it that --

K: That what?

S: The SALT stuff we sent you to Geneva I think was something of a breakthrough and I think we can build on that now.

K: Right.

S: There's a Verification Panel meeting for next week I guess.

K: Right.

S: Okay.

K: Good, thank you.

T141 *

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
HAK/Eagleburger
2 Jan 1974
11:02 a.m.

(section missed)

K: I hope to God not, I'll be broke. [Laughter] You'll have massive charges of corruption. Okay. What time is the funeral?

E: It's at 10:30.

K: Well, then we better, what do we do with the Israelis? Maybe we should start at lunch and do it in the afternoon.

E: Okay.

K: How many are they bringing?

E: I don't know.

K: Will you find out?

E: Yup.

K: But I think I owe it to the foreign Service to go to that funeral.

E: I didn't know that you had known him personally. I think it makes good sense. Okay. I'll take care of that and I'll let you know how many are coming.

K: Good.

E: Okay. Bye

K: Bye

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T143 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Rush/Secy Kissinger
12:15 p.m., January 2, 1974

R: I just had a talk with Bill Porter and he has taken this very well. Whether he wants to go to Canada, he wants to talk over with Eleanor, his wife, tonight.

K: I think that's a good post.

R: I think it would be a wonderful post for him. And I certainly would like to see Bill get a good post. He deserves it. He seemed attracted to it, Henry, which is a bit contrary to what he had told me sometime earlier.

K: Yeah.

R: And I think he's going to take it.

K: Good.

R: Now, it would be a good thing -- If he does take it, he would very much like to have that announced at the same time that Joe's appointment is announced on Monday.

K: Well, can we get it cleared that fast?

R: I would hope so. Can you clear it with the President?

K: Well, I have it cleared with the President but don't we need an agrement?

R: We need the agrement. We need for security clearance.

K: Well, the hell with the security clearance.

R: Forget that. And we have to call Smith. Let me see what I can do about it

K: I'd be strongly in favor of it.

R: I would too. Let me see what I can do.

K: Good. And also I think I'm going to make Nat Davis Congressional.

R: Okay.

K: And probably Pickering then into Davis' job.

R: That would be all right.

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K: And then Springsteen into Pickering's job.

R: I think that would be fine.

K: But that we can discuss tomorrow.

R: I think all of those would be good.

K: Good. Wonderful.

R: Well, fine, Henry. I'll see you tomorrow.

K: Good. Thank you, Ken.

T144 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Norm Kempster, Wash-Star News
Secretary Kissinger
12:25 p.m., January 2, 1974

NK: Hello, this is Norm Kempster of the Washington-Star News.

HK: Yeah.

NK: I was wondering if there would be a chance to see Dr. Kissinger today.

HK: I am Mr. Kissinger.

NK: Oh, yes, indeed you are, sir.

HK: I'm holding a press conference tomorrow.

NK: Okay, I hadn't heard about that. That's fine.

HK: I think that will give you --

NK: Oh, sure, that will be more than adequate. I didn't realize that. What time, sir?

HK: At 10 or 11, I don't know.

NK: Okay, fine. Thank you very much. I'll see you tomorrow then.

HK: Good. Thank you.

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T145*

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
HAK/Eagleburger
2 Jan 1974
1:50 p.m.

K: Larry?

E: Yes, sir.

K: I know it's very unusual but this is Wednesday. Do you think you could get me a lunch schedule for next week? There would be a lot more excitement if we did it on Friday and Saturday.

E: All right, sir. I'll take a look at your schedule right away.

K: I'm sure it doesn't exist.

E: Okay.

K: But I think I ought to see McNamara for example next week.

E: Okay. Are there any others?

K: You know, just a little creativity. Within the next hour.

E: Okay, sir.

K: Good. Thank you.

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T149 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Larry Eagleburger/Secy Kissinger
Afternoon, January 2, 1974

K: Larry, can you hold up on the Schmidt appointment?

E: Yeah, I haven't sent it over yet anyway.

K: Okay. And almost certainly we'll make Porter Ambassador to Canada.

E: Fine. Do you want us to go ahead with Safer (sp?).

K: Now, he wants you to run one more check by Jerry Jones on Catto.

E: All right.

K: Can you do that tomorrow morning?

E: Sure. Just to find out whether he has any problems, is that it?

K: Yeah.

E: Okay. I'm sure he doesn't but I'll double-check it.

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T139 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELCON
Larry Eagleburger/Secy Kissinger
10:50 a.m., January 2, 1974

E: Sir, I've talked to George Bush. He is highly enthusiastic about Catto. Thinks he would do a first-class job. Okay.

K: Okay.

E: Said he pushed him earlier. Thinks he's ...

K: Well, so I will tell the President and we'll proceed.

E: All right.

K: So all we need then is Japan, right?

E: Yeah. I've talked to Peter Flanigan and he's going to get back ....

K: Well, the President doesn't want Walter Haas. He thinks he's too old.

E: I understand also that Haas is unpopular with Reagan.

K: Is not popular with whom?

E: Reagan. He's the guy from California.

K: Yeah. And he's Jewish.

E: (laughs) All right. We can send him to Jordan.

K: I'll tell you these guys are really infiltrating.

E: (laughs)

K: That means I need somebody for Jordan.

E: Yes, sir, it does. Did you get to talk about Bob Blake for Cambodia?

K: I told it to Haig. I thought it would be better if Haig floated that one. We can't send Blake to Jordan, can we?

E: No, I don't think so. Too tall.

K: That's true. What do we do with Dean? Can he do PM?

E: [redacted] B6

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K: What do you think about Pickering for the Inspector General?

E: The IGA job.

K: Yeah.

E: I think it's a waster of a lot of talent. I think he's Direc t or General . . .

K: No, no, that's what I meant -- Director General.

E: Director General by all means. I've just dictated a note to you, for when you get back, in which I say I think Pickering would give all the right signals to the Foreign Service.

K: Some of these guys have been complaining to Charles Bartlett.

E: I've also written you a note on that. Henry, these guys -- Don't let that bother you.

K: No, no. I know one of them who has complained is Funkhouser because he mentioned that to me.

E: Well, Funkhouser has gotten nothing out of this as far as I'm concerned.

B6

K: Where?

E:

B6

K: And I suspect Unger has complained too. Because he said others in that category.

E: But the answer is the Assistant Secretaries. If they can't make the morale better in their bureaus, it's their concern.

K: Well, but that's why I would like to get these new Assistant Secretaries in.

E: They will all be back by the middle of January. All of them.

K: And all sworn in?

E: No, they can't all be sworn in until Congress -- until the Senate approves them. All of those that have been confirmed, yes. They will all be sworn in. Buffum and Easum will have to have interim appointments.

K: You know that Sisco has decided to stay.

E: No.

K: Yeah. Well, you still think that's the right thing.

E: Yes, sir. I said I thought you ought to take another crack at Sisco.

K: Well, he's agreed.

E: Okay.

K: So I've now got to find something for Porter. Maybe Ambassador to Canada.

E: That's not a bad idea. Say, do you want me to go ahead and start putting papers together on Bill Hyland for I&R?

K: Yes.

E: It's not a Presidential appointment.

K: Yes. And then I want to move [redacted] -- I want to get this thing. B6
And I want to get [redacted] appointed next week too. B6

E: I assume I know the way .....

K: Don't you think?

E: I'd go on that; I'd go on [redacted] and -- B6

K: Yeah, but they're all interconnected.

E: Yeah, I know they are. And then Sisco will do the other. I think that's good. Powers of persuasion have always been known to be great.

T150 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger - Mr. Sisco
January 2, 1973 7:45
2:58 p.m.

K: Hello.

S: Hello.

K: Joe, what I think I should do is a brief reply to Fahmy.

S: That's what we're doing for you--a brief one.

K: I think he need it more than Sakaff.

S: Yeah, but not too much because if you begin to engage him substantially then it begins to carry it out---but it would be soothing, don't you think?

K: Well, we can do something that was similar to the Sakaff letter.

S: Right.

K: That explains my reasoning. But not too long.

S: Right. Along those lines. OK.

K: Now, secondly, I think we should keep open the possibility of Sakaff coming over here. It is pure domestic politics--so that we can give the President some credit.

S: We just tell Aiken to temporize on the thing.

K: Good.

S: All right. Thank you very much.

K: Good Joe. Bye.

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T147

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Jerry Warren/Secy Kissinger
3:20 p.m., January 2, 1973

W: I'm sorry to bother you but I wondered if you wanted to do this for film tomorrow morning, the TV cameras?

K: It's up to you. But I thought we'd do it very informally. No opening statement.

W: Right.

K: Don't you think?

W: I think that would be fine. Unless you have some point you want to make. I don't know what you and Ron have talked about but if you have a point you want to make in an opening statement, that would be fine. But as far as film is concerned --

K: Do you think I should make an opening statement?

W: I don't think it's necessary, Henry.

K: We'll just do it informally.

W: Right. When we do it informally, maybe we should just do it for sound radio and no cameras.

K: Why don't you let -- They might want cameras.

W: I think they will want cameras.

K: Well, why don't you do it?

W: Okay. It's entirely up to you as far as we are concerned.

K: Let's do it.

W: All right, well do it with cameras.

K: Good.

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T153 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Joe Sisco/Secy Kissinger
11:02 a.m., January 3, 1973

S: Mr. Secretary, we have gotten --

K: All I want you to know is I do appreciate the honor that you get on the phone first to me now.

S: That's what I tried to do this time.

K: I just don't want you to think I don't appreciate it.

S: I figured you would. I'll try to do better in the future. We've had another letter from Fahmi and this one is a complaint that the Israelis are not permitting the convoys to pass to the East side of the Canal. Now, I don't know whether this is the fact to the matter or not.

K: Well, why don't we take it up with Dayan tomorrow?

S: All right, we can. In the meantime if there's anything I can find out by way of facts from someone such as [Irvkot - sp?] for example, will know what the story is. And then we can answer the Egyptians after we've talked to Dayan.

K: Joe, I have edited that message to Akins to make a little stronger. I don't know whether you've got it already.

S: No, I haven't as yet. This is the one on the Saqqat thing -- I've got it in front of me as I sent it to you.

K: Yeah. Well, I want to add a sentence at the end saying that unless -- you know, I'm surrounded by maniacs here -- I don't know what they do with cables that I -- But the point is that at the end I think we should say to him explicitly -- there's no sense in his coming if his being here if not followed fairly soon by the lifting of the embargo.

S: Sure, sure.

K: So that he should plan his visit to precede the lifting of the embargo by a week or two.

S: And connected with it.

K: That's right.

S: Well, I'll have a look at the change. Anything that says, that's precisely the way we feel on this end on that one.

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K: I think that's the only way to do it.

S: Yeah.

K: Now, I like the approach of Akins to Faisal about the oil question and he ought to do that.

S: I see. The --

K: The bilateral deal.

S: The bilateral deal. Well, I've taken it up here this morning. I like it too. But what I've asked -- Apparently there are a lot of complications to this one.

K: Listen, anything that is touched by GB has complications.

S: (laughter) Well, that's with whom I spoke this morning.

K: One complication is that we're doing something. Now, what's the complication?

S: The question is: One, I think you've got to have the lawyers look at this to see whether it's possible to make this kind of bilateral agreement. But, secondly, can we really produce as a government to government on this kind of situation?

K: At this point, I'm not assuming.

S: Yeah.

K: If we don't, then we're going to turn it all over to the French, British and Japs.

S: Well, in any event, I've got a couple of people looking at it. As soon as I can --

K: Also talk to Donaldson. But I would like to authorize Akins by early next week to do this.

S: All right. I've asked that all the pros and cons be done for you on this --

K: Yeah, but as long as they all know that I'm going to be for it.

S: Yeah. All right.

K: It would take some overwhelming reasons to get me against it.

S: I've been for this idea for 2 years but I haven't been able to convince anybody.

K: Well, I'm convinced. And tomorrow evening a cable is going out.

S: Well, give it another day but I'll talk --

K: Tomorrow evening!

S: Yeah, okay. I'll talk to as many people as I can.

K: Well, talk to Donaldson. But by tomorrow evening I want it done.

S: Okay. Well, I'll pass this along to him.

K: Good.

S: Thank you.

SD/33 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELCON
Art Hartman
Sec. Kissinger
January 3, 1974
3:05 p.m.

K: I appreciated your letter yesterday very much.

AH: O.K.

K: I am delighted. B6

[redacted]

K: My theory is you give first rate people a big challenge and they do better.

AH: It has improved my health.

K: At least you are not frustrated.

AH: [illegible] Right.

K: Before blowing this up into another European-American crisis how about sending to the Embassies abroad for immediate transmittal to their Foreign Ministers a note saying the answer being played up in the American press [illegible] was an answer to a question in which Europeans were alledged to have said that we had sold them out for 18 months of peace. That I specifically pointed out these were not the views of any Foreign Minister and that I believed the cooperation from Europe on the oil question has been excellent and there is no problem at all on our side and I hope we do not turn this into another debate -- don't you think.

H: I was asked yesterday why the difference in tone between the Newsweek and Business Week interview. I said I thought perhaps the questions were different. I said I did not think there was a difference. You did mention the Europeans but it was retrospectively. That they did not catch that.

K: Do something fast.

H: Yes.

K: Should we call the Embassies here so they cannot run around there. What do you think?

H: I think if we get out a circular and tell them to go in....

K: O.K. Do it fast.

H: Yes.

K: Thank you. END

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T154 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Mr. Donaldson/Secy Kissinger
11:32 a.m., January 3, 1974

K: Bill, two things. One, Akins has sent in a cable about a possible bilateral approach to the Saudis. Have you seen it?

D: I've seen it, yeah.

K: Well, I'm in favor of at least opening the discussion. So will you work with Sisco on how to do it?

D: Yeah. You want to prepare a contingency thing or do you want him actually --

K: I want him to begin talking to Faisal. Nothing can come of it anyway very quickly. But I don't want us to be the only country that is not talking to him bilaterally.

D: Okay. We'll start to work on that. You want the pros and cons on that?

K: I want the pros and cons but I'll tell you right now which way I'm going to go unless the cons are overwhelming.

D: Okay.

K: We can't be the only ones insisting on multi-lateralism when no one else does it. We can always go to a multilateral solution. Opening the discussion isn't going to get us anywhere very quickly.

D: Okay. Sisco just mentioned that to me and I will try and put something together.that's positive but also, you know, includes everybody's negatives

K: Yeah, what are the negatives?

D: Well, I guess maybe it could upset the embargo lifting thing.

K: Why?

D: Well, if he thinks we're being squeezed so much that we've got to make a unilateral deal with them, maybe he thinks he ought to keep it on a little longer ...

K: Nonsense. That I don't believe.

D: Okay.

K: I think the embargo lifting has next to nothing to do with this; that depends entirely on the Israeli talks.

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D: Okay. It's not just the embargo but just the idea that, you know, finally now with all the pressure they put on, even the United States is now trying to make a deal with them. It just makes them feel that the whole strategy is brighter than maybe ..... I'm not questioning that we shouldn't have a contingency plan.

K: A contingency plan won't do us any good if we haven't opened the discussion.

D: Right. Okay. I guess I would want to haul out the contingency plan the minute we see that these other guys don't go along with us; in case they don't go along.

K: Yeah, but why is that better to open the discussion and then let it drag until the other guys don't go along with us?

D: I just think he might interpret it as a sign of weakness. Your judgment ...

K: Well, I'd like to see -- By the time the others have sewed up large chunks of this thing, it doesn't do us much good to open the discussion.

D: So far, you know, those deals are pretty small. I mean, 200 thousand barrels a day to the French is nothing. And the British haven't even ....

K: Well, we don't have to go that way. I think it will be a better pressure though if we have an option to go this way.

D: Right.

K: I have never seen the advantage in not getting yourself an option.

D: Right.

K: Secondly, I had a press conference this morning and I announced that the President was going to make an initiative next week.

D: Oh, you did.

K: Yeah.

D: Good. Well, that brings me to the second reason why I was going to call you. And, that is, first of all, I talked to both the Germans and the British Ambassadors. The British, you know, were very forthcoming and he said he would go back to them and he was all very friendly. The German guy was a little more guarded in the sense he felt they were in a sort of a special position now because they now share the EC thing.

K: Oh, bull!

D: And I told him, I said we weren't asking you to be forthcoming on some program you know nothing about but we're just -- you know, everybody else has said something and all we want you to do is say that you think the idea of everybody getting together is a good idea and the Kissinger proposal is one that merits a good hard look and that we know the details.

K: Yeah.

D: He came over here and I had a long conversation. But he was balking a little bit.

K: Well, the Europeans are almost impossible right now.

D: Yeah. Along that line, the British have sent out a cable to all their Embassies and have sent us a copy of the thing and the net of it is that they want their Embassies to go into the OPEC people before their meeting on Monday and tell them how bad we think the price rise is, you know, that they've got to do something about it, roll it back. And they've come to us and I guess they are going to all the other OECD countries and asking for some help on it. Basically, if you remember, we made kind of an eleventh hour attempt at this OPIC meeting.

K: Yeah. I would not do any more.

D: You would not do any more?

K: No. Our position is now clear.

D: Would you absolutelyh -- the only reason I'd do something would be to sort of forthcoming to the British.

K: No, we've made it pretty clear. We've made it clear to the Saudis, we've made it clear to Iran, made it clear to Venezuela.

D: Yeah.

K: Our views by now are known.

D: Okay.

K: Good. Thank you, Bill. I'll see you tomorrow..

T156

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Schlesinger - Secretary Kissinger
January 4, 1974
2:50 p.m.

K: I am going to send Dayan off in a few minutes. We have made some very ggood progress. We are not all the way, not yet, but 90% of the way. They are psycopathic, though that this be kept only to you. I have to meet with him again tomorrow. I am fairly optimistic, though. They want some assurances of longer term supplies so I thought you could.

S: Well, that's a political thing. You understand we have now committed 1.3 billion. After we pass 1.5 billion it has to be a Presidential determination.

K: Under these conditions we will be able to do that though. I think you could tell them its no problem and be willing to discuss a long term supply proposal with them.

S: This is what the administration wants?

K: Yes.

S: Okay. The P

K: The President wants to do this if they are helpful in the political thing. Moreover, if...I think we will have less trouble from the Arabs if we do it clearly related to getting them to make concessions. We wouldn't be delivering these things until they have delivered a part of it anyway. If they could see some positive tone as a result of their positive thinking.

S: We will give them positive tone. The things we will not be too positive about are the following: (1) There are certain advanced items we just don't have in our inventory. They are asking for C_____ which, you knowis still in R&D. This sophisticated stuff just isn't available. (2) We can do the A-4s, we can go ahead with Skyhawks and 50 million dollars worth of choppers they want.

K: I'd be pretty good on Skyhawks and choppers.

S: The A-4s and other advanced to a lesser extent, though.

K: They are getting walleye's aren't they.

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S: We have walleyes but what they want is the advanced walleyes, the extended long range walleyes. We just don't have those available.

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S: They seem to have gotten their requests from the manufacturers ~~xdex~~ dream board.

K: They do seem to be extremely well informed.

S: We'll be forthcoming.

K: I'll get back to you after talking to him again tomorrow.

S: Would you want to have somebody here for the meeting?

K: At the meeting. Is Brent going to be theere? No, no. I will take your word. You are nice to even suggest it, though. Thank you Jim.

S: OK Henry.

T 162

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Nat Davis/Secretary Kissinger
January 4, 1974
7:58 PM

K: I'm running into a little static at the White House. I forgot to clear you with Timmons. Would you mind going to see him in the morning. Would you call him tomorrow?

D: Certainly, I'll do my best to do what he wants. As long as it's what you want.

K: Make him think that you're taking him seriously and taking me seriously. That you're the President's man.

D: Yes sir.

K: If you'll call him in the morning, I'll appreciate it.

D: Call him about 9:00?

K: What?

D: Should I call him about 9:00 in the morning?

K: Yes.

D: Yes sir.

END.

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T161 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
George Vest/Secretary Kissinger
January 4, 1974
6:12 PM

K: What is that thing Donaldson is telling me.

V: The story they have is the President is following up on the energy action _____foreign minister meeting called tomorrow. That is the story he has.

K: Just when were in the progress of formulating our program. Where do you think he got it?

V: I'll see if I can find out any more.

END

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T163 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Marvin Kalb/Secretary Kissinger
January 4, 1974
6:42 PM

K: I have every reason to get you off the air, now.

MK: Get me off the air? On the morning news? I don't believe it.

K: What was the story?

MK: We both wanted to do the ___.

K: That's what I figured would happen.

MK: Wonderful conference I had with my boss. I'll be working all of next week. Give me two months off to work on my book.

K: I'll see you Sunday.

MK: Thank you so much. Goodby.

END

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
President Nixon/Secretary Kissinger
January 4, 1974
8:12 PM

N: Hello, Henry.

K: Mr. President. I just wanted to bring you up to date on the meeting with Dayan. We spoke about Israel___. We're 75% of the way at last. We made very good progress. Have _____to the depth of the zone. I haven't talked to the Israelis. The Israelis are willing to be at the West end and the Egyptians want them at the East end. That's a difficulty that _____. We're now talking about the same plan with just different numbers.

N: Good, Henry. That's very good.

K: I think we have a chance now of making some progress. I'll report to you after the meeting tomorrow.

N: You're meeting with him again?

K: Yes. So we know what's happening, when and where.

N: That's fine, Henry, just fine.

K: Every paper including the Star has a headline that you're in full control of Foreign policy.

N: Eventually, they have to write it.

K: We never could get it printed.

N: Why do you think they're printing it now. It's a curious thing, isn't it.

K: The Washington Post has a separate story on the first page, with a big headline "Kissinger says Nixon in full charge". The New York Times had a big print of it's story on the subject.

N: The main thing is that it's all working._____.

K: I think we can handle that.

N: I followed that one in those reports.

K: We think you should have it.

N: I know. I wouldn't bother you with it. You will let me know. I'm just thinking of you. It's still in the dry season. They hung on this long.

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K: We can already begin to _____if they got to the middle of May they could make it.

N: The make slow progress here. The energy _____.

K: We can get some other equipment in there and.....

N: Part 2 of the energy thing played well. A lot of people are asking, "What is the President planning".

K: I think we would make your proposal thing next week on the energy action group. We want those letters out so we can release them.

N: You got out just in time. It's going to rain here for the next few days.

K: I'll call you tomorrow to report to you.

N: You're feeling all right?

K: I feel fine, Mr. President. Those four days did me a world of good.

N: Now if we can find time to get you back out here. _____. Don't let them corrupt you again.

K: I'm going to a Chinese Restaurant with Nancy and let them corrupt me.

END

T160

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
January 4, 1974
6:02 PM

(Missed the first part)

K: They can wait a week, I'm not all that definite.

S: I told him to press on as fast as they can.

K: I talked to Fulbright.

S: I think one of the main ones is the FBI check.

K: He was just appointed as Director General when he had a full check.

S: With him, I don't know. I think a good part of the problem is Timmons. A lot of other things are _____.

K: They do nothing but push papers around. We can't make the announcement on M____.

S: Not necessarily. I don't know about Davis.

K: If I can't announce Davis, I can't announce the Assistant Secretary either.

S: That's true too. Let me check. Let me see.

K: I've had Abshire looking at it. I had everyone here looking at it.

S: I'm going to call Timmons.

K: As soon as I can I'm getting him on the phone.

S: There isn't any FBI problem on it.

K: And for ____, get him off my back.

S: I don't know if there's a problem with the Sisco, Porter thing. With Davis, I understand. Somebody said you wanted Dean on Monday.

K: No, not at all. But I did want Dean soon. What is the problem?

S: Schlesinger wants me to pull _____out now. _____.

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K: They say Dean is very good.

S: _____it may be at the end of the dry season.

K: I can't wait that long.

S: _____is more important than the country.

K: That's nonsense. You know L___ is running around Israel saying we don't _____.

S: It sounds like something he'd say. Did you mention it to Dayan?

K: See what you can do about the Davis thing.

S: OK.

END

T159 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Hyland/Secretary Kissinger
January 4, 1974
4:25

K: How are you?

H: I'm fine.

K: Have you made a decision on what you want?

H: I would still rather take the State Department job.

K: OK, then I'll appoint you on Monday.

H: When do you want me to come on?

K: After we get your security clearance -- in about 2 weeks.

H: Fine. It will be announced on Monday?

K: Does that surprise you?

H: Well, I have been getting strange phone calls from the Department of State.

K: About what?

H: Oh, my biography and security clearance.

K: We'll announce on Monday. I don't want you to administer that place. I want you to shape it.

H: Are you going to be at the White House tomorrow.

K: May be.

H: Well, if you have a couple minutes I would like to talk with you.

K: Why don't we aim for about 11:30

H: OK.

K: I'll need intelligence that is , that will give me a feeling for the Foreign press and what the mood is in the country.

H: We'll do that immediately.

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K: I have confidence in you and want to get you involved.

H: I have been looking over the organization and think we can give you exactly what you need in terms of ____information. I'll see you tomorrow.

K: Good, let's aim for it.

H: Good, thank you, I appreciate it.

K: Not at all. I am being selfish. I don't do these things as a favor.

END

5068 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Ambassador Dobrynin - Secretary Kissinger
January 4, 1974
3:46 p.m.

D: _____about the time of your arrival in Moscow. You remember we discussed with you about 7 through 10 ....one or two days, really.

K: Right. Let's definitely set it for that.

D: 7-10 of March?

K: Right. That is I think better from my point of view.

D: We think it will give more time to work on some major problems to be discussed at a summit meeting. It will give chance to discuss with you when we have a proper opportunity.

K: Let's do it on Monday or Tuesday.

D: Do you have a lunch date of shall we just talk....?

K: Well, let me see what my schedule is.

D: Okay. I'll call you on Monday to see.

K: Good. I am going to upgrade the representation at the European Security Council.

D: You are?

K: Yes.

D: Anything new on the Middle East after your conference with Dayan.?

K: Not yet. I'm going to meet with him again tomorrow morning. Can I call you? I think we are making some progress. Its not yet good, but it isn't as bad as I was afraid it might be.

D: _____. not very useful in the political area. Okay, Henry. I'll be in touch with you.

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T164*

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELECON
Bill Timmons/Secretary Kissinger
January 4, 1974
7:50 PM

K: Bill, how are you? Bill, I want to talk to you about the man I want to appoint as Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

T: I've some concern about him. I understand he's a career man.

K:

T: I don't know what Congressional background or experience he has.

K: He's probably the best Foreign Service officer I've got. He wants the job. He's extremely intellectual. Probably the best Foreign Service officer around. I think he would learn the job very well. If Marshall Wright could do it, for God sake.

T: [redacted] We're familiar with some of the career people. There's an awful lot of technicalities on who can ___ and who can't. I just question whether he can do the job properly. Naturally I hope to work closely with your Congressional guys.

B6

K: In that respect you would have no problem at all.

T: Of course I never heard of him. Jerry Jones called me today to clear him. I asked if he was career.

K: Only because I couldn't find anyone else. I spent 4 months looking for someone.

T: You're entitled to somebody that can get along with you.

K: I would say good. If I tell Nat Davis he's got to take his marching orders from you, there's no question that he'll do that.

T: All those guys on the Congressional ____try to do_____.

K: That I can guarantee you.

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T: I'd like to meet him. Have him or have Larry Eagleburger call me and come over for a cup of coffee.

K: Tonight or tomorrow morning?

T: Tomorrow morning would be best.

K: I'll have him give you a call.

T: OK, thanks.

K: OK, Bill.

END

T171 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Mr. Hummell/Sec. Kissinger
12:20 p.m. 1/6/74

K: Art, your maniacal Japaneseclients have gone off the reservation again. Tanaka has made a statement rejecting my criticism of their pro-Arab policy

H: Hm huh.

K: Now, when the hell did I criticize their pro-Arab policy.

H I don't know that you ever did.
Is this a news ticker?

K: Yeh. (end of tape0)

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T172

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Dean Rusk/Secretary Kissinger
January 6, 1974
12:45 PM

K: The President said he was going to call you back and he thought I was going to call you. It was decided that your view was probably the right one and not ask you to serve.

R: I got that view more strongly since there's a chance I'll be called as a witness.

K: I'm trying to keep the investigation confined to allegations of domestic spying. That would have presented no problem.

R: That's bound to get to me.

K: Then it will get into areas -- it isn't a question legality, it's how much of the thing they'll pull out.

R: You mentioned something immoral. Can you tell me what you referred to.

K: Some claims I made about Dominican Republic and attempts on Castro.

R: There's ~~nkk~~ no problem as far as I'm concerned. I explained a political assassination was contrary to the policy of the U.S.

K: I happen to believe it's against national interest. First to investigate matters like this, I think we won't have an intelligence agency left.

R: Some things should not be confused. The Director of the CIA ___ chairman of an intelligence committee and that included the FBI. I used to get every morning a whole series of rap ups. I have no doubt that some came out of the FBI material.

K: Some of the domestic files from CIA ~~and~~ are FBI reports.

R: You have a good many in the State Department files on State Department people. I think it's unwise from the Presidentts point of view to have me on. I'm certainly going to be a witness and it's better not to have one of the witnesses who might be pummeled very hard by the Congress to members of the panel.

K: That was our view. I still would like to get you together with the President.

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R: That fellow who resigned from the CIA. I never heard of the guy. One thing I suspect the panel might ask of the President and the Secretary of State and the Secretary ~~fx~~ of Defense -- we should have given more to the CIA. I never looked at the CIA budget. That was worked out by the Director and the Director of the Budget. My guess is that 3 key members of the NSC should look at those things.

K: It's clear that excessive ~~xxxxx~~ supervision hasn't been adequate. I never knew they had a domestic branch. I never heard of Angleton. He's saying I got him fired. I had no idea the guy existed.

R: Has the announcement of the members of the panel been made?

K: Yes.

R: At some point somebody should make it clear the President that all ~~/or~~ present and former members of the NSC will be available to the panel for any assistance. That would include all of us.

K: I see. I really think we should separate illegal activities and domestic activities and we should not have this an open season on covert activities.

R: There's a piece of paper lying around during the Truman administration which was a treaty between the CIA and the FBI regarding their respective jurisdictions.

K: When are you coming through here again?

R: Let me look and see what my present commitments are. I have to go and visit Lady Bird this week. I don't have anything schedules to come up January. I could come there ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ at the end of the (first) week in February on my way to Princeton.

K: Why don't you do that.

R: I'll get in touch with you.

K: OK. Do that.

R: My best to the President.

END

T170 *

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger/Joe Sisco
1/6/74 12:20 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Joe, I already got what I called about.

S: I sent it over a little after 11:30
Was it all right?

K: I had to change two paragraphs;if you don't get better than that Joe I'll--

S: Do you suppose I'm relaxing?

K: I think you are slipping a bit
No it's very good. I changed the end a little bit.

S: You noticed what I was trying to do--I thought I was being very subtle in that last paragraph.

K: No, no you did very well. I'm just spelling it out a little more.
What is your thinking now that you had a chance

S: I still think we've got to go and in view of the fact that Fahmi is leaving around Friday for Moscow I think we ought to be shooting for Wednesday myself

K:But I think Fahmi should put it off

S: That's a little embarrassing, but I bet he sends you back a message in the next 12 or 24 hours saying--of course we struck that sentence out, so he doesn't know we're

K: But I told Eilts to raise it when he gets there

S: And he won't get there until tomorrow night and won't see Fahmi until Tuesday so I think on Tuesday, we'll get a big scream from Fahmi that you do it right away.

K: Yeh, Okay. Bye.

S: Have a good day.

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T168 *

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Bill Timmons/HAK
11:31; 1/6/74

K: Bill.

T: Yes.

K: I thought you were going to see Nat Davis yesterday.

T: Well, I got tied up, Henry, and I scheduled a meeting with him at 9:00 in the morning on Monday.

K: O.K. Good, because I....

T: We're going to get together and have coffee and....

K: Because I would like, want to announce him tomorrow. I can slip today.

T: Well, I got tied up on something for....

K: That's alright.

T: On the West Coast and we chatted on the phone a bit and...

K: No, no, that's fine. But I want you to know that his strict instructions from me are going to be in the closest association with you and the reason I'm picking him is, I was thinking of him as Under Secretary to tell you how highly I thought of him. As Under Secretary for Political Affairs. And I wanted to pick my highest type fellow who's going to be good on substance. His instructions will be to get his strategy from you, but I will need your advice anyway because this isn't a field in which I know a hell of a lot.

T: Henry, have you done any consultations on the Hill about Nat?

K: Well, the only thing I've done is with Fulbright.

T: Uh huh. He's not curious about Aiken and Frelinghuysen and some of those, but they probably know of him if they don't know him personally.

K: Well, should I call them do you think?

T: Well, let's wait till tomorrow.

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K: Well, why don't we put it off until Tuesday, then, Bill.

T: O.K., I understand this is part of a package so you have to do them all....

K: Well, that's my problem, that I have somebody that I want to move out of the Executive Secretary's job to take his place, and then I have somebody out of another job into the Executive Secretary's place.

T: Yeah, a kind of dominoes.

K: That's right. So I have to hold up all the other appointments.

T: Well, I'll call you after I talk to him in the morning.

K: Now, Bill, I don't want to impose this on you, but if you want to call a few of these Congressmen yourself, just to show your relationship to it but also to give me a feel, I'd be glad to divide it up with you.

T: Yeah. The thing that worries me a little bit is that the Republicans that we have to count on when the crunch gets going on the Hill, rather than the Democrats, I'm afraid they are going to be a little reluctant because of Nat having served as Sergeant Shriver's deputy and got most of his promotions in Lyndon Johnson's White House, and I think he's going to be suspect to them, certainly in the early days.

K: Had he been Sergeant Shriver's deputy? No, he was on the staff of the Peace Corps.

T: Well, I haven't talked to Nat directly but I understand that he .... over to the Sergeant's deputy, now he might have had several deputies. At least I think that's going to give some of our Republicans some concern. Well, we'll chat after I talk to him in the morning.

K: Good. O.K.

T: Bye, bye.

K: Bye.

T169 *

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Sen. Javits/HAK
January 6, 1974 - 11:40 a.m.

K: Hello.

J: Good morning, Henry.

K: Jack, welcome home.

J: And a Happy New Year to you.

K: Happy New Year. Sorry I missed you in Acapulco.

J: What a shame. Everybody was expecting you. The Escadangs were devastated.

K: Well, I.... Why were they devastated? They could use their house.

J: I know, but they were all set to go elsewhere and they'd have been so honored with you.

K: Well, I'll be down eventually.

J: Well, Mary had talked about it and, you know, said what arrangements she was making. She was so proud that you would come down and use it. We missed you because we knew it would do you good.

K: Oh, it would have been great. But first I didn't feel well...

J: Oh you didn't?

K: No. I came back with the flu and....

J: Listen, you and I have to have a very special talk about your physical conditions. You know, in this respect I have the _____ to dictate to you.

K: I wish you would.

J: I'm very serious about it because you know I'm almost twenty years older than you are and I think I'm in a hell of a better shape than you are.

K: That's right.

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J: I'd like to, you know, talk to you about that because in the first place you'll have more fun out of life as you go along, and in the second place you're too good a man to run yourself down the drain unthinkingly. On that score, you know.

K: Well, I'd like to see you apart from getting advice on my physical condition.

J: Listen, I'm the maddest tennis player and athlete alive.

K: I know it. In fact, I'm told in Acapulco that you two are trying to time their visit so that you're not there because they don't mind playing with you in the morning but I understand you track them out on the tennis court in the middle of the day.

J: That's bad. (laughter) Oh, I'm not that bad.

K: I forget which Mexican told me that they were in awe of you because not only did you play every day, but you played in mid-day.

J: (laughter) That's wonderful.

Well, Henry, you've been doing lots of things. Have they been going well?

K: They've been going well. You know, we're sitting on a powder keg.

J: I know we are.

K: And in this phase now at last the Israelis have understood that we're saving them rather than destroying them.

J: Yes. And I think you've got a better relationship now with the people of the country and you know, that's very, very important.

K: You mean the Israelis or the Americans?

J: Well, the Americans. I think that's worked around very well. I think you stand well and I... Yeah, I really do, I think that there are always a few sign posts but politically my - as I smell the wind - it's very good as it stands now and especially as you begin to make a team of the Department, which is, I think the very, very big objective, one of those objectives which nobody will give you a medal for but which will make you a historic Secretary of State.

K: Well, I agree with you.

J: You know what I mean? If you stand on their shoulders, which they are

more than willing you should do, but those shoulders have to be stout and strong.

K: Well, you know, my problem has been that after I became Secretary I was immediately thrown into the Middle East crisis. But now I've got all my people appointed and Bill has been very good about confirming them. So I think within two weeks of the Congress coming back all my top people should be confirmed and then I have my own team in there.

J: Very good. I hear Sisco's staying.

K: Sisco is staying. We are going to announce him tomorrow or the day after, as Under Secretary. Do you think that's a good appointment?

J: Very good. I think especially with you he will draw enormous resource from the confidence you will vest in him. He's a man who flowers and blossoms if confidence is vested in him. And he gets very conspiratorial if it's drained away.

K: That's a very sharp observation. You are right.

J: You see, it works in reverse with Joe.

K: In fact, that was one hesitation I had about appointing him because I had just seen his conspiratorial side. But I have now recognized him, in his travels with me that if you work closely with him he is really very loyal. He

J: Not only is he loyal, but you know, he isn't kidding me. He's got damn good standing with the Arabs. And he's earned it, which is all O.K. You know what I mean? And he values it highly, too, which is good too.

K: Now, Jack, I'm thinking of appointing somebody in charge of Congressional relations who's a bit of an off-beat appointment. It's Nat Davis. I don't know whether you know him.

J: I know a little bit about him.

K: He was our Ambassador in Chile. He's the youngest career minister we've got. He was in the Peace Corps with Shriver and when our Ambassador to Guatemala was killed when LBJ was President, he volunteered to go down there as Ambassador. I've had him back here as Director General of the Foreign Service. He's so good that if Sisco hadn't stayed I would have made him Under Secretary. But I thought it would be better to have somebody with substantive knowledge

He can always learn about the Congress but maybe I'm wrong there.

J: Can I be exposed to him?

K: Will you be exposed to him?

J: I say, can I be exposed to him?

K: Sure. Are you in town tomorrow?

J: I will be tomorrow.

K: Would you like to meet him?

J: Yeah. Shall I just call him, or will he call...?

K: I'll ask him to call you.

J: Alright. I'll see him late in the afternoon.

K: Good. Wonderful.

J: That's great. And, Henry, do we need to talk about anything?

K: Well, let's have breakfast. We don't need to talk except, I mean we don't need to talk on an emergency basis.

J: Well, is tomorrow morning agreeable to you, because I'm coming down tonight.

K: Is that the only day you're in town?

J: Well, I could be in town Tuesday morning but it would interfere with the doctor's appointment I have at Bethesda. I could rearrange that.

K: Because I have made an appointment which I could probably change.

J: Well, if you can change it, fine. But if you can't, if you have your office leave a message on this phone I'll do it Tuesday morning and rearrange my appointment at Bethesda.

K: O.K. Could you do it early, as we have staff meeting at 8:00.

J: Or even earlier.

K: Let's do it at 7:45.

J: Quarter of eight. Where? At your office?

K: Yeah.

J: I'll see you then.

K: Good.

J: Now if there is any problem just leave a message.

K: If you don't hear from me we will meet at 7:45.

J: Good. Marion sends love.

K: Send her mine.

J: Good and I'll see you tomorrow.

K: Good.

J: Great.

T167 *

Telcon
Bill Colby, CIA/Secy Kissinger
January 6, 1974; 11:25 a.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D), B3, CIA, B6

K: Hello, Bill, I wanted to talk to you about [redacted]. I would like to appoint him as head of INR. B6

C: Sounds fine.

K: And I don't assume this would give you any heartaches.

C: No, I think that would be great. He's a natural choice.

K: He knows you very well.

C: Yeah.

K: He knows the Agency very well .

C: I think it would be great.

K: Good.

C: Any others?

K: No.

C: Scowcroft is looking at one of our fellows to come down and help him on the Intelligence function for him.

K: Who is that?

B1

C: A fellow named [redacted] who has been working on [redacted] B3
He's a very good fellow.

K: Good.

C: I think Scowcroft is sort of considering whether he wants the job or not.

K: [redacted] is considering it. B3

C: No, Scowcroft.

K: Oh, Scowcroft is considering whether he wants the fellow.

C: Whether he wants to have the job or not, I think.

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K: Yeah.

C: But anyway, that's all right. And I have designs on one of your people.

K: Who?

C: [redacted] B6

K: My God, no. We've got him tied up in a new assignment. What do you want him for?

C: Well, I wanted to make him the Economic National Intelligence Officer. He would organize the whole community for us.

K: I've just had a brawl with Schlesinger on him.

C: Oh, really?

K: No, we're making him Joint Deputy to me and to Flanigan.

C: Scowcroft told me you were thinking of that.

K: Yeah.

C: Well, otherwise.

K: Well, I'm impressed that my associates share my judgment of my people.

C: [laughs] Well, he's first-class. I worked with him on Vietnam.

K: He is outstanding.

C: He has the brilliant capability of talking about economics without talking about economics - which I think is pretty critical.

K: Okay.

C: Well, I think that's great.

K: Nice to talk to you. Bye.

T175

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Ambassador Dobrynin - Secretary Kissinger
January 7, 1974
3:50 p.m.

D: Hello.

K: Hellow Anatoly, how are you.

D: Fine Henry. You are a very difficult man to reach.

K: I've had a very hectic day.

D: What you are doing?

K: Well, I've had a meeting on MBFR all morning.

D: Yes?

K: We concluded if you abolish all FS-9s that would withdraw only half your troops from Europe and we will give you MFN.

D: Let's discuss that, how about tomorrow?

K: Okay, I will call you first thing in the morning.

D: You will really call?

K: Okay, let's fix a time. Are you implying I don't, wouldn't see you.

D: No, no, Henry.

K: 5:00 ?

D: Tomorrow? 5:00 o'clock? Its quite all right with me.

K: Yes.

D: Is there anything new on the wonderful Middle East business?

K: I think I should have something tomorrow from the Israeli cabinet.

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D: Tomorrow?

K: At least to discuss.

D: Okay. 5:00 o'clock, at the State Department, yes?

K: If that's all right with you. When are you going back to Moscow?

D: I don't know, that's in suspense. I'm just waiting.

K: Do you have a message from me, or do you just want to....

D: No, they just asked me to discuss with you on Middle East business -- on the organizational ...side.

K: Okay. Let's discuss it.

D: 5:00?

K: Let's have a good -- I mean let's have an hour and just review the situation.

D: Okay, that would be nice really.

K: See you than.

D: 5:00 o'clock, thank you very much.

K: Bye.

T176 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
January 7, 1974
6:50 PM

K: I think you should call him or see him today and tell him to let me know____. In the discourse of my discussions in Cairo._____.

S: There's a very good chance that he's come in since. At the fifth meeting the Israelis did a very good job. I can do it in any event. I think they had a good deal of talks on this in J____24 hours ago.

K: Send me that report.

S: I'll send the report up to you.

K: OK, Good.

S: I think I'll call Ghorbal in the morning. I'll send the number of the report to you wright away.

K: Fine.

END

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T 173

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Dinitz - Secretary Kissinger
January 7, 1974
11:55 a.m.

(missing first part)
D: ....the speculation must be leakage from the government.

K: Of course it is leakage from the government.

D: Already this morning I have talked to people and in reading the papers. ....Told them to try to stop this because this could create speculartion in the international press.

K: Exactly, not to speak of San Clemente.

D: I know, I didn't want to tell them this, but this is what I had in mind.

K: Can you shut them up?

D: I think so. I have already ...I am doing something and I will try again. The point is the the speculation is already going on, it is difficult now to do something....not 100% helpful.

K: How late in the day can I see you?

D: At any time.

K: Good. I will be in touch.

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T174

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELCON
Haig/Sec. Kissinger
Monday, January 7, 1974
3:05 p.m.

K: We have got to have the Italian President come over. They already know it and it will be an uproar if he does not come. I think it will do the President some good.

H: I do to but he was really tough on it. I did not know it was already locked in.

K: They had already been told and they are trying to announce it and we told them it was difficult and they are offering us fifteen days later which does not solve the basic problem.

H: All right, I will go back in with all of the great pleasures I have.

K: Secondly, you know I want to appoint Nat Davis as the Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations and you know how highly I think of him. Timmons at first raised holy hell. He wants his guy Stan Anderson who we did not appoint once before because he is too young. He says he is withdrawing his opposition but he wants to register his complaint. He says Davis knows nothing about Congressional relations which is true. I want a top flight man there. He is probably one of the top five Foreign Service Officers. He was on every list we had for Under Secretary. I want the ablest guy we can find who will organize it. I think it is a big sacrifice for Davis to accept it. He can hirer some political people. I have no other suggestions.

H: I will talk to Timmons about it. He has not talked to me about it.

K: Could you get it overruled today so we could announce it tomorrow. Two other appointments are based on that. If I want to make a change in the Ex. Secretariat I want to move him into Davis' job as Director General.

H:. O.K.

K: It is not doing Davis a fovor but he is by far the best Foreign Service Officer I could possible move into that job. There is no political person. I don't think it is that hard to find out what goes on in Congress if the man is willing to do the work. Compare him to Marshall Wright for Christ's sake.

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H: Yes. [redacted] Not really. B6

K: Look. It is in my interest to have the strongest possible man in Congressional Relations.

H: I am sure I know what Timmon's problem is. He wants one of his own people.

K: Right.

H: And a political appointee and not an FSO. I don't know what he knows about Davis.

K: He met him and he is very impressed with him.

H: I will talk to him.

K: Call me back this afternoon so we can proceed.

H: Sure.

K: Also get me the Italian accepted will you.

H: I will do my best.

K: I know you have such a tractable guy out there.

H: If I get you an Italian it may cost you an Irishman.

K: That is too high a price. Are you in trouble too?

H: You mean still.

K: Did you get my memo yesterday.

H: Yes. It is very helpful but I have had no calls on it.

K: I may have to trigger it tomorrow. You had better get ready for that.

H: I can go with Leone today.

K: Leone and Davis. I have to make the announcement tomorrow. Tell him it will be announced in San Clemente.

H: O.K. Henry.

END

T 196

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
January 8, 1974
7:40 PM

(Missed the first part)

D: But I have the full text of the meeting. They understood very well there is no problem whatsoever. They were ready to discuss___.

K: That's on Monday.

D: No - even on Friday. They remarked several times they're interested.

K: At any rate they told the Russians that you proposed a 45 kilometer withdrawal.

D: That's ridiculous. That have never been even an informal proposal. That was when he was trying to understand the possibility of____.

K: Someday you have to explain that to me. What purpose___.

D: He thought he was playing with models. That is the answer.

K: As a diplomat,why should you play with models when you have no intention of using them.

D: I agree with you. That was why he was___he didn't know what harm it could do.

K: I told him about that plan of having UN forces move into the West Bank.

D: That's nonsense.

K: They gave that on January 1.

D: There is nothing in what happened on Friday that can ____.

K: I know it can, and it has. The only question is, now, one more cleverness and we are done for.

D: Ever since we had that meeting on Friday, everything has changed. I can understand quite__going in the other direction.

K: Just for my information, on whose authority did he do it?

D: He did it because Dayan was away, and he thought he would

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

go one step further. I agree with you that it could have been interpreted wrongly.

K: Dobrynin has no information of his own. He read me what the Egyptians told him. We went through this with the Yarov thing.

D: The Yarov thing was worse, but I agree with you. I have nothing to say to that.

K: No more leaks.

D: No more leaks. I just passed this information to ___ for our own personal___made the official announcement. I'm sorry about that.

K: That's alright. I just want to make absolutely sure that I didn't___.

D: OK.

END.

T199 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Haig/Secretary Kissinger
January 8, 1974
8:20 PM

K: Al, how are you? I have a minor problem. I've been thinking of Nat Davis as Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations. I've now had a better idea, which is, Governor Holton from Virginia wants the job.

H: That's great.

K: Timmons is beside himself. Holton had remember he sat next to me at a football game. I just took a chance and called him. He said he wanted to think about it over night. Chances are 4 out of 5 he'll take it.

H: We've been trying to find a place for him. He was talking about some cabinet level.

K: He wants to check with his wife.

H: That's the best news I have had here.

K: You take a load off my mind. I think it's a better solution.

H: I think the boss will be delighted.

K: I think it will give us some strength.

H: He got the horses end.

K: I'm sending out those 2 letters which will be released Thursday to get two more days of ____. You should announce it at San Clemente. That will give us a ____.

H: You'll give us a text?

K: Don't you think that would be best if I announce it.

H: That's exactly the way to do it.

K: He had not done anything any how. I think if the Israelis had been _____. We would really make it, but the hell with it.

H: I wish you luck.

K: What?

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H: I wish you luck.

K: If I pull this one off it will be unbelievable.

H: But all right by me.

K: I'm going to start with 2 battalions and end up with 5.

H: The worse part of it is I know you will.

K: OK. I'll proceed with Holton.

H: Absolutely.

END.

T198

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
David Abshire/Secretary Kissinger
January 8, 1974
7:50 PM

K: I think the chances are 4 out of 5 he'll do it.

A: Wonderful. That's marvelous.

K: All I have to do is handle my boy Davis. I don't think Davis was all that interested.

A: I think we got a little concerned_____.

K: The way he was treated by Timmons.

A: Henry, for the overall, I'm not concerned. I just think this is great. I think Nat would appreciate that. He's a good man. I think he would have done a good job.

K: He's a ____.

A: That just would be tremendous. I just ____ any little think I can do. I just think it's great.

K: Good. OK.

A: I would add a third deputy.

K: I'll get him to talk to you as soon as it's done.

A: I've got some ideas on that whole operation.

K: He would be much more__as with the policy than a Foreign Service officer.

A: He's got the advantage of not even being a formal Senater or Congressman, he's a governor. I just think that's tremendous.

K: Good, wonderful. Dave, many thanks.

A: I'll be in touch.

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T190

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Eagleburger/Secretary Kissinger
January 8, 1974
5:40 pm

K: Am I ever going to see you again?

E: I am going to the Doctor in about ten minutes but I plan to be in tomorrow.

K: I want your advice. There is massive opposition to Davis in the White House. That I can overcome. Rockefeller tells me that Governor Holton of Virginia might like this job and the White House just loves him and he looks good.

E: He is. He is a tough, independent guy

K: So what?

E: He is good but I don't know if that's what you want. He is tough, bright but very independent.

K: Good, but how independent can he be. My problem is if Davis goes wrong, they will kill him and blame every congressional problem on him.

E: Who is it, is it Timmons.

K: It is Timmons and Redding and he was in Peace Corps with Shriver.

E: Well, it is wrong, but.

K: Do you think Davis will be upset if I cancel it.

E: No. If nothing else he is a good soldier.

K: And iI thought we could give Pickering Jordan.

E: That would be good.

K: Pickering is certainly not Jewish.

E: I have given up guessing any more. ...

K: Well, I know I am not.

E: Well, if Holton will take it you are getting a first rate top level guy with whom you'll have problems you wouldn't have with Nat. I know Holton and I have great respect for him.

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K: My experience is I have never had problems with strong men.

E: I will say this, if Holton won't take it

K: If Holton won't take it I will stick with Davis.

E: OK, I don't know when he is available.

K: Well he is available now. I might go to the Middle East, leaving Thursday night. I don't suppose you would want to go along?

E: I'll be glad to go along. Anything you want.

K: I'll kill you on the next one.

E: Laughter, Well, I'll be glad to go. I'll be in in the morning.

END

T182

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
January 8, 1974
1:00 pm

S: George Gowon just called and said Al would get to you and on the Davis thing they haven't done any of the Hill clearances yet and we had better hold off.

K: OK. But that means we hold them all up.

S: We can go with Sisco and Porter and Mailliard on the OAS.

K: OK but that means I can't move Pickering .. and when are they going to do the Hill [redacted]

S: I'll get them on it.

K: They should have no illusions that I will stand for the usual maneuvering.

S: Timmons, maybe but not with Al.

K: They have had the past two weeks.

S: Al is on board.

K: Well, you get Timmons to get it done.

S: Yes, I'll call him right now.

K: How about the other matter?

S: He will take it up and he is going in to see the President very shortly.

K: Did you explain the Russian problem?

S: I did.

K: OK.

END

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T187

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
January 8, 1974
5:18 PM

(Missed the first part)

S: Well, I don't think there's any real danger at the moment.

K: Did you call Ghorbal?

S: I made it a point you asked me to make____. He's really not being kept informed.

K: I had the impression that Fahmy is going to leave anyway.

S: That's not bad as he's not____. This telegram will be up to you in a few minutes.

K: Good, because after 6:00 I will be tied up. Thank you.

END.

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T184*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Gen. Scowcroft - Secretary Kissinger
January 8, 1974
2:25 p.m.

K: Have you talked to Timmons.

S: He's in conference, I'm waiting to see him. I talked to Jerry Jones though. He is starting consultations which he might as well anyway.

K: Whom is he consulting with.

S: Congressional leadership peple, Republican leadership, Jerry says he has already started to make calls.

K: Does he think we can announce it tomorrow.

S: That depends on how hard it is to track people down.

K: Have you heard from Haig about this trip?

S: No, I've not heard from Haig.

K: You know, here we are on the verge of breaking this thing. The Secretary of State is invited to Aswan and instead of throwing our hats in the air, we're dancing around.

S: What they're seized with is whether or not to release the milk and the ITT papers.

K: Of course, those are matters of great importance.

S: Well, that's where our priorities have gone.

K: You know, very well if they were national interest concentration we would be in touch with Fahmi. There is no earthly reasons to hesitate

S: Of course.

K: If he refuses it I will certainly leave.

S: It certainly goes counter to everything he is pushing for. It would confirm a great deal of what you have said. I will bug him

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again. He said , you know when you and I talked he expected to go in in about 30 minutes.

K: My question is also whether I should call some of these Congressional leaders myself.

S: Uh, let me check. I will see.

K: Will you let me know?

S: Yes.

T189

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
David Abshire/Secretary Kissinger
January 8, 1974
5:25 PM

K: I just learned that Governor Holton from Virginia may be interested and I wonder would he be suitable for this position.

A: I don't know Governor Holton. He has a good reputation. He has the advantage of not having served in the Senate or House. If he would take it.

K: I could just stop Davis. Wouldn't he be disappointed if he stayed in his present position a bit.

A: Holton is one of the bright lights.

K: Would you make a few inquiries and let me know?

A: Be happy to. I'll be back in touch.

K: Tonight or first thing in the morning. Do it in the morning.

K: I'll be in touch.

END.

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T186

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
January 8, 1974
4:05 pm

.....First part of conversation was missed.

D: She did it again? Did she say it again?

K: I saw it on a ticker. I am not arguing with your private position but..

D: I understand and you remember..I didn't realize she said it again and I will ask her not to say this. It doesn't help.

K: That is right. You are giving the Syrians a pretext to put you in the position where you are the cause of the failure of them to lift the embargo...Everyone knows they are crazy.

D: I will check on this right away and make sure that..

K: Good, I will try to see you later today or how about tomorrow morning, or do you have a Bar Mitzvah to go to.

D: (Laughter) So help me God, I have but I can come later.

K: What time?

D: Did you know I had a Bar Mitzvah or did you guess?

K: I just figured you did something religious oneeaa month and it was about time.

D: (Laughter)

K: Well, you bug me and I bug you.

D: The Bar Mitzvah, it is at 11:00 in the morning. I can come in the early afternoon.

K: Can you come before it? I'll call you tonight.

D: Fine, 9:00 is alright.

K: I noticed when I don't keep constant pressure on you your government gets overly self-confident.

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D: I addressed a group of people and was asked the question if it was a good for the Secretary of State to be Jewish.. And I answered that that was the kind of thing a diplomat should ask a Rabbi and not a Rabbi ask a diplomat.

K: It is purely academic.

D: Any news from the Syrians.

K: No, but they haven't turned us down yet.

D: Good. I had a call from Eban asking me what..

K: I said you would leave Kenetra as soon as the first Red Cross was started.

D: It is a good thing I am used to your sense of humor or I would have blown my job right away.

K: No, I translated what you told me literally, I mean the sequence of events.

D: I indicated to Eban who asked me anything new on the Syrian front.

K: I have the Egyptians and Saudis working on them and the Saudis are visiting them today.

D: The Saudis are visiting the Syrians?

K: This is why the statement was so particularly well-timed..your Prime Minister, did she ever express appreciation for the number of prisoners...

D: She did. I was waiting to talk to you when we meet.

K: OK.

D: I didn't want to pass it to anyone else. We have kept it in very close circles in Jerusalem.

K: Eagleburger wouldn't have believed it if you had told him. A friendly word from Jerusalem he would have discounted.

D: He is a very nice fellow.

K: Funny, he doesn't say the same things about you.

D: Well he is very friendly and helpful.

K: Actually, your relations here are very good, I regret to say that.

D: They are very understanding and I appreciate that..with a Secretary of State like you that is enough.

K: You are starting a new branch of diplomacy. Ambassadors are supposed to be deferential to Secretaries of State.

D: (Laughter)

K: OK, I'll see you tonight or first thing in the morning.

D: OK.

END

T195

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
David Abshire/Secretary Kissinger
January 8, 1974
7:36 PM

A: I think Governor Holton would have a brilliant appeal. Everything checks out. Civil rights appeals to liberals. He's a young 49 or 50. Getting Governor Holton in there would help you.

K: Let me call him.

A: I think it would be great. The problem would be getting him to take it. It just would be great in every way. What I would do is tell him you're going to build up the job. That you want to take him on some of your trips. Give him two top deputies. Pick two top deputies. I think a third deputy should be added to the bureau.

K: Let me talk to him.

A: I think it's great.

K: Good. Thank you David. I'll call you.

END.

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T197

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Governor Holton/Secretary Kissinger
January 8, 1974
7:45 PM

H: How are you Mr. Secretary?

K: How are you Governor? Governor I was going over some personnel problems here in the Department. I have been looking for months for an Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations and I took the liberty of thinking that perhaps you might be interested in such a position. It requires close association with me on details of foreign policy.

H: Dr. Kissinger, I could consider that very very _____. I would want to have you assure me that it would mean close association with you. I can't be a messenger boy at this stage.

K: If I wanted a messenger boy I could take a Junior Foreign Service officer. I know you want to be a man of your own ideas. Of course, to some extent, there is an element of messenger boy in the sense as to politics.

H: I don't mean to belittle it. I understand the messenger boy thing. I would be your man.

K: It would be essential for ____. The only way we can do _____. So that the Congress will listen to him as a man in his own right.

H: Would Congress know if I speak, I would be speaking for the Secretary?

K: Yes. You would be sitting in on staff meetings. You would, of course, take trips with me. I would do a number of Congressional briefings myself. So you would be my ___in all of that. What somebody of your stature would do for me. A lot of thinking entirely for myself. The only way you could take over___. To have you work closely with me.

H: You describe it as I would like to do it. I must discuss this first with my wife. She's very interested.

K: Can you call me tomorrow?

H: This is a great advantage if I want to do it.

K: I haven't discussed it with anyone else. You can see it's advantages if you want to do it.

H: Thank you very much. I'll call you tomorrow.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 19 MAY 2004 200102979

T192

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
January 8, 1974
6:07 PM

K: I just found out that Governor Holton of Virginia may be interested in the Congressional Relations job. I don't think [redacted] I could pull him off still. B6

S: I've heard rumors that Holton is very good.

K: You don't think I'll hurt his (Davis) feelings?

S: I don't think he's that eager to ____.

K: I talked to Timmons, he's enthusiastic. I wonder if I should call Holton.

S: Why not? It may be useful.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 20 MAY 2004 200102979

T178 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON

Sisco/Kissinger
10:10 a.m. 1/8/74

K: Will you read me that cable again.

S: Sure. Fahmi, after talking with Sadat in Aswan by telephone, says President welcomes your visit and suggests if at all possible you fly directly to Aswan Thursday morning, January 10. I suggested this might be a bit early, but Fahmi urged that you try to arrange to come at the time Sadat suggests --and now there is a full cable just coming in which elaborates on this and I'll be getting it in a few minutes.

K: Can you send both of those over immediately to the White House.

S: Sure I'll call Tom Pickering right away. I won't answer anything till I hear from you

K: Good, thank you.

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T177

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
January 8, 1974

S: On the Nat Davis thing. Jerry Jones is doing them. He thinks it is easier for him to make the contacts.

K: OK.

S: George Gowan called who talked with Al about the Presidential letters. Who can I work with at State on this? Who is handling it.

K: Donaldson. But they are only to announce the fact of the letters. Not release them.

S: Announce tomorrow.

K: That the President has sent letters to the following consuming countries and the members of the EC.... and the Secretary of State has invited the Secretary-General of the OECD, because he is on my level.

S: And the letters will be released Thursday morning and you and Simon are giving a joint-conference Thursday afternoon.

K: Yes, the letters released from San Clemente Thursday morning.

S: Dan Rather called and said CBS is doing a special on the Middle East alert and he wanted to see the Sit Room.

K: Do it but say you were sitting under the table taking notes because you are not a regular member and you were the only Christian in the room.

S: (Laughter) OK. I'll show him, but no pictures of course.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 17 MAY 2004 200102979

T191

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELECON
Schlesinger/Secretary Kissinger
January 8, 1974
6:05 pm

S: I am not going to a dinner this evening. I am playing it cool.

K: Who is giving the dinner?

S: Plimsoll, the Ambassador.

K: He didn't even ask me. I have been told he is one of the better ones and at the reception yesterday, he told me he wanted to help straighten out the relationship.

S: And here is his [redacted] Prime Minister saying the alert was B6

K: No, he pulled back from that.

S: Well, he is

K: He is [redacted] B6

S: Yes.

K: I would like him know that we are highly displeased.

S: OK.

K: Let me ..you noticed my briefer backed you up.

S: No, I'll ask Friedman about it.

K: Just stick with it . I may go to Egypt at the end of the week, in the process of pulling this across.

S: Damn good. You talked to the President about this?

K: Yes, he wants me to go.

S: Good. Good ti e of the year to go to Egypt.

K: Yes.

S: Take care.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 18 MAY 2004 200102979

T179 *

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Dean Rusk
Secretary Kissinger
1/8/74; 10:10 a.m.

R: How are you?

K: Okay, Dean

R: Hope you won't mind two very quick gratuitous remarks. One--have you been down to the 9:00 Wednesday morning session of the House of Representatives yet?

K: No, but I'm planning to do it.

R: That to me is a great opportunity to build up a constituency that could be very valuable to you. And in general, my experience has been with them that if you tell them that something should be held privately, the the record in the House is pretty good on that.

K: That's been my experience when I met with them--the leadership and with the foreign affairs committee which I've done severaltimes.

R: Well, I used to go down to that Wednesday morning meeting two or three times a session, but under the present circumstances in Washington these days, you might want to consider going maybe every six or eight weeks or so, because it is really a very important constituency to nurse and I just pass that along for what's it is worth.

K: I'll do it as soon as they get back.

R: Now the other point, I don;t want you to comment in any way on the phone certainly, but I heard on the radio news just a few minutes ago that the RSK Washington Post was saying that we had submarines within the 3 mile limit in the SUnion. I would hope if there is any possibility that sort of thing happened, it would be scrubbed and not run the risk of another U-2 incident. When suggestions like that came to me during the _____ I vetoed them because on the grounds that the President, the Secretary of State, arethe principal customers for that sort of information and we have less interest in the information to be derived than we had in the policy involved and methods used to get it.
Don't let another U-2 incident occur.

K: To the best of my information, Dean--but I'm looking into it, we are doing nothing that was not done in the previous administration as far as distances are concerned. But so any restrictions you put on, I think would still be valid. But I would like to talk to you about it.

R: I coming up next week for the Law of the Sea Conference advisory Committee.

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K: What day?

R: On the 9th, 10th and 11th.

K: What days of the week are they?

R: They are Thursday, Friday, Saturday.

K: Would you like to have lunch one of those days?

R: I'd be delighted.

K: May I call you today?

R: Yes.

K : Can I fix either of those days.

R: You can have any of those days.

K: I will call your office and tell which day I'm suggesting.

R: Thanks a lot.

K: Good I have to run to Chip Bohlen's funeral, this is why I'm so brief.

R: Ah yes. That was sad, but we all expected.

K: It was a mercy. His wife told me a week before that she was hoping it would be quick--he was suffering so.

R: Right. All the best Henry.

K: Thank you Chip--Dean.

T193

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
January 8, 1974
7:34 PM

K: Have we got those papers from Graham Martin about the Nort Vietnamese?

S: No, we don't.

K: Tell him we want the bloddy thing here.

S: OK.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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DATE/CASE ID: 17 MAY 2004 200102979

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger - General Haig
January 8, 1974
3:05 p.m.

K: How is he?

H: Everything is in good shape.

K: Who was the emissary?

H: I don't think there has been anything but the letter written.

K: By the President.

H: No returns of any kind, no communications of any kind. This was a friendly effort by a friend of Vieres (?) to point out that the six, the little six that is, were very much in favor of the lifting and felt that Faisal had attached conditions they regretted very much. _____if he came over here as a spokesman to see the boss and give him a ledge from which he could crawl back from his position.

K: That might be done. Let's see how the talks come out. What's your view on the other business?
H: What's your view on the other business/
H: All I really cared about _____come in from source _____ Rosebud.

K: Who's Rosebud?

H: Some friend of Nimeri.

K: His name is Nimeri, not Nierri, Nierri is in Tanzania. What did he say about the trip.

H: He said the sooner the better, soomer rather than later.

K: Really?

H: Yes.

K: Let me talk to Sisco about that.

H: I went through the exercise of the game plan we discussed about trying to bring both together before the ~~ex~~ "i"s were dotted and "t"s were crossed.

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K: He should make the announcement. Of course, we are dealing with the Middle East. It may not work that way.

H: He believes if you delay it, it will unravel

K: That's one of the problems. Let me get back on that. I will call you back on that.

H: OK. I think you outght to leave very, very quickly, Henry.

K: Right. Let me...OK, let me consult with some of the people here on that.

H: OK.

K: Al, on these ....the energy group, we are sending the letter out tonight. I don't think he wants to see it, its substantively what was in the speech.

H: Yes. I would send it out so Ziegler can talk about it.

K: OK, but we want to handle it....Ziegler can announce tomorrow morning that the letters are being delivered tomorrow. Then Ziegler can release the text of the letters Thursday morning. Let the governments have the texts of the letter for a day before we release it. We will send the text and not release it then. Simply have Ziegler announce it tomorrow that the letters have been sent to both the consumer and producing countries.

H: Release the consumers.

K: No, release both. I have decided that both Simons and I could brief together on...

H: Thursday.

K: Yes. After the letters have been released for awhile. I will be glad to do the briefing alone, but with Simons together that _____more clearly Presidential.

H: And that's the big thing. You ought to do that.

K: And that way he's got the whole thing free tomorrow. Say the letters have been send early and that will have the whole afternoon papers on the letters. We ought to do some briefing on it.

H: You would have to leave Thursday night.

K: Right.

H: OK. We're trying to get the milk and ITT thing out, it's all the more important now to get it out today.

K: I noticed they didn't run the story on the Joint Chiefs.

H: I don't think they want to ...it's troublesome for them.

K: Yes. OK, fine. Al, thank you. I'll be back to you.

T188*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Bill Timmons - Secretary Kissinger
January 8, 1974
5:25 p.m.

K: I've had another thought.

A: Oh?

K: How about Governor Holton of Virginia.

A: Superb. Yes. I'm glad I thought of that one. Have you had any communication with him?

K: I heard he was looking for a government job.

A: He would be great if he would take it. He may be shooting higher. But he's a fine person, he understand Congress, he's loyal.

K: Is he all right with the President?

A: Oh yes, he's great with the President. He was one of the original sponsors of the draft Nixon movement in '67. Lyn Holton is tops.

K: Davis.

A: Do you know him well?

K: Well, I know him and I like him.

A: He would be super. Also I don't know if you have thought of Jan MacDonald, he was 6 year, 3 terms, in the House. He was gerrymandered into a district with Jim Horn. Again, he doesn't know foreign policy too well but he really knows the Hill well. He's 40-41. He wouldn't have the rapport with you Nat has or Lyn would have, but he's a good prospect if you want to rething it.

K: OK, let me...it will be a little difficult with Davis. I'll have to find another place for the Executive Secretary.

A: He's a nice guy, but he really doesn't know where the bathroom is on the Hill.

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A: While you can do the big stuff, so much of our work is nitty gritty.

K: Do you think Holton would do that?

A: He probably would, I would have thought, ...he certainly would be flattered by a call from you. I know him quite well. He may want something bigger, like Secretary of State.
K: I've already got 8 guys on my staff looking for my job.

A: Oh, he would be loyal.

K: If I can't hold my job, for which I was confirmed in the Senate, I don't deserve it.

A: Nobody's a thret to you, Henry. He would be very good.

(T183) *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Joe Sisco - Secretary Kissinger
January 8, 1974
2:10 p.m.

K: You're official now aren't you.

S: I haven't heard yet. The announcement was to be made about 1:30 I think. I thank you.

K: I'm looking forward to working with you. I've always wanted a few Italians with me.

S: You've got one now.

K: I was having lunch with David Rockefeller. I suggested he might want to come in next Thursday.

S: Yes, he's coming down to see me.

K: Before he goes to the Middle East.

S: Where's he going?

K: Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and some trucial states. You know he has very high prestige there and if we could give him the right messages.

S: This Thursday?

K: No, a week from Thursday.

S: Oh, and go right after then. Okay. I'll just call up to your secretary and she can work something out for you.

K: Fine, good.

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T181 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Mr. Sisco/Mr. Kissinger
9:58 a.m. 1/8/74

K: Have we heard from Eilts?

S: Yes, we have and I thought this was what you might be calling on. Let me read it --it's only 4 sentences. Fahmi, after talking with Sadat, in _____ by telephone, says that the President welcomes your visit and suggests that if at all possible if you fly directly to Aswan Thursday morning, Janua ry 10--and Eilts merely xxxxxx said I suggested that this might be a bit early, but Fahmi urged that you try to arrange to come at the time Sadat suggests--and then Eilts merely says, full details of my meeting will be sent in a later cable. In other words, he wants you there in Aswan Thursday morning which would mean that we would have to leave tomorrow morning.'

K: Impossible.

S: Yeh.

K: I have a raging beast in San Clemente.
Okay.

S: There it is and let me know if you'd like me to do anything on that.

K: Thank you.

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T180 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON

General Haig/Mr. Kissinger
10:05 a.m. 1/8/74

K: Al, we haven't talked in a while.

H: (laughs)

K: I've got another problem now for you.

H: All right.

K: I got a message--I'll send you all the messages so that you can see there is no hanky panky--I had send Eilts to Cairo to say I'd be willing to come out if he wouldn;t link it to anything else and if there would be a rapid conclusion. And told him the Israelis had asked me to come.

H: Right.

K: So now we've got a message saying Sadat wants me to come immediately to Aswan under those conditions

H: Okay

K: Which means he is willing to settle fast. Now he wants me there Thursday morning, I don't think I can make that.

H: Yeh.

K: But I do believe that with all this fancy footwork going on, if we don't wrap this thing up fast, it will never happen.

H: That's what I think.

K: It is leaking all over Israel, it's just going to be too dangerous.

H: Okay, it is going to be a thrilling morning for everyone.

K: But you can tell him Al that I'm perfect willing to give him a terminal date for my tenure, and that I'm off his back then, but let's get this thing done --I'd be perfectly happy to resign as soon as this agreement is signed and then he can play with _____and anyone else he wants to

H: Do you think I could do the same thing? (laughs) I'll tell you what--if you get a date certain I'll get one.

K: Incidentally, I talked to Schlesinger this morning about bringing you back to the Pentagon--I'm serious.

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H: What did he say?

K: Well, it was a novel idea--he said if it is to be done, it better be done before you get used up.

H: That's right.

K: I did it in the context of what is needed to make the military responsive to political needs.

H Hm huh.

K: I was you know--we were going through the list of possible assets.

H: Yeh, yeh.
Little thin over there.

K: That's what we concluded.
But Al we better get an answer by noon on this.

H: All right Henry. You are going to send the cables out.

K: There is only the cable from Cairo.

H: Okay, I'll ~~xxxxxxxx~~ won't let him see that.

K: No, no, why not. That just says Sadat wants me.

H: Okay. Okay.

K: But the Israelis have asked for me to do it. I think it is the only way if you want it done within a week, that's the only way to get it done. Otherwise, you've got a six week negotiation with uncertain outcome.

H: That's right.

K: And tell him we will stage it so that the embargo lift--first of all that he will announce the settlement, not I and that the embargo lifting will be done by him. Anyway he can have my resignation. After last night, I don't think there is a basis for my continuing anyway.

H: Yeh, I don't know what the hell that's all about.

K: What ever it is all about--Al--it means he's been in separate communications with the foreign government in the middle of a crisis.

H: ---some first-class jerk called him in the ~~xxxxxx~~ night says _____ in the movie

K: No, it's been going on for a week Al and Rose told Scowcroft two weeks ago they were in touch with Numayri and to keep me out of it--or a month ago--Scowcroft told me about it at the time and I just thought it was some first-class jerk carrying things back and forth and I never thought anyone could take Numayri seriously--here is a guy who can't event try two _____assassins of an American ambassador.

H: Yeh, that's right. Henry, as soon as he gets circulating this morning, I;ll be to him.

K: Good, thank you.

T210

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Gen. Scowcroft/Sec. Kissinger
Wed., January 9, 1973 [74]
12:00 noon

S: Are you ready to have Al Haig mention Holton to the President.

K: It is all set.

S: I don't know if he has talked to the President about it.

K: I have talked to Haig.

S: I am behind.

K: Holton has accepted.

S: And Haig knows.

K: Yes.

S: Great.

END

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T212 *

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
January 9, 1974
5:25 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I am talking here to the Vice President and I think he ought to get a briefing along the lines of that briefing we had yesterday of the various missile types of the Soviet Union. So that when the SALT issue comes up he can start from a base of knowledge.

S: That would be useful.

K: Why don't you arrange that for him?

S: I will.

K: Get in touch with General Dunn. Let_____do the briefing. And have them use the charts they used at the Verification Panel Meeting.

S: I agree. I'll set it up.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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T213

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Vest/Secretary Kissinger
January 9, 1974
6:08 pm

.....

V: That's my fault.

K: But what can we do about that now?

V: We can

K: You know they will all write about

V: I'll be on the phone to several of them right now.

K: Would you do that? Just say he is a valued member to whom I want to give substantive assignments but he hasn't had too much diplomatic experience. That is the reason.

V: right.

END

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T211

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sen. Pell - Secretary Kissinger
January 9, 1974
2:40 p.m.

- - - -

P: I have two points which are somewhat related. First , the constitutive subcommittee on ocean, environment and scientific affairs is in the process of setting up, which was fainally enacted into law, is filling the Assistant Secretary job I wanted to put in a word for a fellow for his technical knowledge, background and such, Fitzhugh Green who is one of the candidates on the list. He worked for me setting up _____, worked for me in USIA, then ran for Congress in my state (did not win).

K: What's his name again.

P: Green. His background in oceans, worked with me , in envirinment he worked with Ruckleshaus, or whoever is running it now, and having run for Congress as a Republican, I wanted to make this push for him as you go over the different names.

P: I appreciate it very much. I haven't looked at his papers yet. I'm not really ready to make that appointment yet. I will do it in the next three or four weeks.

P; Well he's a first class man, of excellent character and he could do the job very well. The other point I'm calling about concerns the Senate resolution calling for some executive response in connection with environmental warfare treaty. The hang-up is not at State but over at Defense. I thought with your double hat (the NSC position as well as the other) there might be something that could be done to get a reaction from the administration to get it moving ahead.with the treaty. It has received the approval of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, there was an 80-12 vote in the Senate. The US could take the lead in a field where the determination would have pretty wide acceptance. The Defense reasons for holding it up are not known to me (maybe they have some hot new intelligence, but) but I thought you might be persuaded to take a look at this and perhaps help to get it moving ahead.

K: Let me take a look at it.

P: Thank you. I highly appreciate it. I do think this is an area that could give us a position in the world we have not had. Thank you and God blass you for being on the phone.
K: If there was a time you couldn't reach me at least on the phone then I should leave.

P: Thank you I appreciate what you say more than I can say.

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T209

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Dinitz - Secretary Kissinger
January 9, 1974
11:50 a.m.

K: Mr. Ambassador. I was lonely and I thought I would talk to you just to say we have had another day without any leaks from Israel.

D: There was no leak.

K: I know, I just called to tell you you haven't screwed anything up today. Just for the guidance of the press, we have said we are coming out at the suggestion of your government. So don't deny it, will you.

D: No, no. How are you going to present it, that the President....?

K: That the President has sent me to Egypt and Israel to work out more concrete proposals there...to be helpful.

D: Yes. I had a session this morning with your friend Marvin Kalb on his book and I was giving him the scenario of the airlift. When it will be published Schlesinger will not be happy. That's the talk....

K: Was it new to him?

D: Yes. The fact that five days after the war yet Schlesingersoffice tellme me there are five planes a day.

K: We couldn't figure out how to send half a plane.

D: We were talking about the phantoms, you remember.

K: I remember it very well, you came to my office right after that.

D: That was a dramatic night.

K: The Defense people have been told to behave themselves.

D: Good. Schlesinger had breakfast with you yesterday, right?

K: Monday or Tuesday.

D: Yesterday, right. It was a good breakfast I heard. I asked Scowcroft to keep a watchful eye on them. If they don't change policy by Thursday, and we get a good report. If they come again with a negative report, that would not be good.

*1

UNCLASSIFIED

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K: Can you come at the end of the day for a brief talk?

D: Of course. about 6:30? To the State Department. You never invite me anymore to the White House. Is it because you are ashamed of me?

K: You think that's a more important place? Well if you want to come there you could.

D: I was kidding.

K: I have a limited sense of humor.

D: That's not a fault anybody can accuse you of. Dayan said that about your sense of humor. The trouble is I told him half of the time when you are joking you are really serious.

K: Don't disillusion me.

T205/1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec. Gen. Waldheim/HAK
January 9, 1974 - 10:16 a.m.

W: This is Waldheim speaking.

K: Hello Mr. Secretary General. How are you?

W: My very best wishes for the new year.

K: Good wishes for the new year to you Mr. Secretary General.

W: I wish you good success, good health and good nerves.

K: The latter I need more than anything.

W: I understand that fully. Thank you very much for your kind letter. I answered it immediately.

K: I have received it and I'm very grateful to you. Mr. Secretary General, I called you to tell you we've been trying to get the Israelis to come up with a complete proposal. You are of course familiar that they put out models and they destroy them and they dance around. So the President has therefore asked me to go to Israel to force them, force them is the wrong word, but see whether I could get a concrete proposal.

W: Yes.

K: And if that succeeds we will then inform the Egyptians and then have it put up in Geneva. I just wanted you to know Mr. Secretary General that I will be just taking a quick trip to with a stop in Egypt and to Tel Aviv and then I'll come right back here. Of course we will keep you immediately informed.

W: I had the intention to ~~xxxxx~~ contact you from my side but I highly appreciate your calling me. I hope this trip will be successful and that we can overcome the difficulties. I had thought that it was more or less settled, this disengagement, of course not definitely. But I had a good feeling that this disengagement problem will be settled within the next few weeks, before the end of the month. Do you still feel that this is possible.

K: I still think this is possible but we were afraid from the way these talks were going in Geneva that they were talking themselves into a deadlock.

W: Yes. Well if you can ------ out there. I thought this was in connection with the fact that the Israeli government didn't want to make any final decision in this regard before the new government was..

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K: That may be the case. And I think it is going to make good progress.

W: About this misunderstanding apparently during the Dayan visit with you. You know that our people did not leak anything.

K: No, there was no misunderstanding. We just wanted to find out what your understanding was. There was no problem.

W: I'm glad to hear that. Because we were not quite sure. We had the impression that perhaps the Israelis thought that....

K: No, we just wanted -- I wanted to understand from your people because we were getting one report from the Israelis and a different report from the Egyptians.

W: About the models...

K: Yes, so we wanted to find out what your people thought.

W: No, they were very clear in regard to this and they only spoke of models yes?

K: Yes. Although frankly you know from a diplomatic point of view I've never heard a procedure where you put up a model...

W: There is apparently thought that the Israelis didn't want to put forward concrete proposals.

K: But you know it's dangerous to put up a model that you're not willing to accept.

W: No, I'm very glad that you have this approach. I think it is really necessary and high time now that they are coming out with concrete ....

K: Well, you see my concern Mr. S. G. is, if everybody waited for the elections. Now if we are all waiting for the cabinet it can be February and the President thought whether, if we could crystallize a proposal we will then have it negotiated in Geneva.

W: Exactly.

K: But Alternatively what I would do if we can get an agreement in principal on something I would write you a letter the way I did the 6 foreign agreements. And send it to you and then you could handle it the way you handled the other thing.

W: Fine. I would certainly appreciate this procedure very much indeed.

K: But in any event whatever we do it will involve you in an intregal way.

W: Well, I'm certainly at your disposal. When the moment comes I see that we can get together and whatever you think we can do in this regard we are certainly happy to do it.

K: Good.

W: What is your timetable. Do you think that we will return to Geneva towards the end of the month or beginning of February. What is your ideas on this regard.

K: It's possible but maybe the beginning of February = Middle of February maybe.

WL Middle of February.

K: That's what I would tend to think now.

W: I would certainly appreciate if you could let me know about this too.

K: I haven't any concrete ideas. It could be early February too. Frankly, I'd like to take a vacation the last week of January.

W: You deserve it highly.

K: So I hope you will see to it that they'll be no international crisis.

W: (laughter) I wish I could give you any guarantee in this regard but I really think you should take some leave after you return from the Middle East. I'm at your disposal and in case you should think that one of my collaboraters should go down to Washington to discuss one of the other aspects with your collaboraters, this is fine. Please just let me know and we'll contact your people directly.

K: And we of course appreciate his role very much.

W: He's a very fine man.

K: An excellent man.

W: Very good and he knows the problem very well.

K: He's been very good.

W: I'm glad you like him. And _____ in Geneva and I think he's agood liaison to your people.

K: Exactly. And of course we appreciate your role to Mr. S. G.

W: Thank you very much. I will certainly continue to do my best to be helpful.

K: Thank you and I will be in touch with you.

W: Thank you very much for your kind information.

K: Goodbye.

W: Goodbye Mr. Sec. of State.

T204 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Dinitz/HAK
1/9/74 - 9:59 a.m.

D: Hello.

K: Mr. Ambassador. I have missed hearing from you. Where were you all night?

D: I thought I would give you one evening a break.

K: OK. Had you been told that I'm definitely going.

D: Yes, you told me.

K: Well, we haven't had the confirmation yet from the Egyptians and we have it now.

D: I see. I was figuring that that was certain yesterday when you told me but...

K: So then he is going to announce it at noon today. Now please hold the position in Israel that you have not yet made a concrete proposal.

D: Yes.

K: Yes, but you linked it to my -- to there not being a concrete trip. But you see now that there is a concrete trip now maybe the other thing.

D: I already took care of it. The trip will become concrete by noon the proposal will not.

K: OK. But will you make that clear.

D: Right. I have already done so I reemphasize.

K: But I mean let them in Israel say they are now waiting for me in order -- before they can develop a concrete proposal. Do you think they can say that.

D: Yes. For the Secretary before developing a concrete proposal. In fact tomorrow I'm speaking to the .....

K: I don't -- but can they say that in Jerusalem.

D: They will and I will say it here too. I'm speaking to the National Democratic club tomorrow so... But they will say it today in Jerusalem.

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K: Good. Then my plan is then I will arrive in Jerusalem Saturday night and I haven't decided yet whether to leave Sunday night or Monday morning.

D: Well, I have said to tentatively schedule a Saturday night dinner session and meetings all during Sunday and if there need be then you'll stay overnight. We'll be very glad to have you.

K: Good. Where is it. In Jerusalem?

D: I didn't hear from them yet but I'm pretty sure that it will be Jerusalem. It's nicer anyhow.

K: It's nicer in Jerusalem?

D: Of course. In terms of more quiet, nicer atmosphere, nicer city too.

K: It is a lovely city. If I stay Sunday night you'll arrange an active night life for me.

D: That could be done. I'll tell them to keep Sunday night open and thenlwe can have dinner with Dayan and then maybe go out to the night spots.

K: But how would I get to Tel Aviv?

D: By car. It's 55 minutes drive. It's no problem.

K: Oh really.

D: Or by helicopter. 10 minutes only.

K: We can worry about that later. We can plan it because we can plan it in such a way that it looks... so something conrete came out of it.

D: Right. That I told them to plan the meeting Such that it will be a hard negotiating day. And then that we will have to also...

K: But let's talk about Syria while I'm there.

D: I will mention it to them.

K: You know I'm not eager to do it but it could serve a little bit maneuverir I mean we'll have to talk about it sooner or later anyway.

D: Right. OK. I will tell them that maybe they will prepare some talks

K: And what this engagement scheme might look like out there.

D: That's what I mean. But you have no plan of going to Syria this time.

K: Well I haven't -- frankly I thought I might leave it up to Sadat. If it helps him to be able to tell Asad that I'm going. I might go for a day and then of course I'd raise the prisoner issue.

D: Yes. Because I know that our people will not consider talking business to the Syrians before they make this move on the prisoners.

K: That's understood. That's clearly understood. And you will come under no pressure from us in that respect.

D: I understand. Good, so I will tell them about the possibility of jotting down some thoughts on the Syrian separation.

K: I think we ought to talk about it. It's going to come up. We have a day -- we don't really have a hell of alot to talk about in the other disengagement.

D: Right. We'll do this.

K: Good. And I'm bringing along Bunker, Sisco, Atherton and I'm bringing along the head of our legal department, somebody called Maw, who I'm grooming really to become more substantive.

D: Yes. I think I saw him once when Eban was here you brought him in.

K: Yes, he's outstanding. He was senior partner in Kreber, ____ & _____

D: Good so I'll inform them about this too that you're coming with... You are not taking Eagleburger with you.

K: Well, he's been sick.

D: Yes, he couldn't take the pace.

K: I'll take him if he absolutely wants to go but I would like him to get a rest.

D: And Peter is coming of course.

K: Of course Peter is coming.

D: Can't move without him.

K: Your source of information.

D: He's such a lovely boy. He's afraid to ask me even how the weather is. Maybe he would leak....

K: I have said he is the only person I know who went from boyhood to sainthood without the convening manhood.

D: That's excellent.

K: OK.

D: Fine, so you will be leaving by tomorrow night.

K: Midnight. When are you leaving.

D: I'm leaving tomorrow afternoon about 6:00. In fact I'm taking my daughter with me because....

K: Mr. Ambassador, for 6 hours I'll be without your supervision I may take a girl out. Is that alright.

D: Well, if it's alright with Nancy it's alright with me. I wouldn't say a thing.

K: OK. Well, I'll do anything else to assure you, for six hours I won't do anything serious.

D: Fine, I appreciate it.

K: Like my mother-in-law used to say to me. When I'm gone you'll appreciate me.

You know the story -- where one fellow says to the other

D: So you did huh? / You know I'm going to get married. He says, who is the lucky girl. He says their mother. [laughter] So you don's feel there would be need for us to meet.

K: No, we'll meet for half an hour.

T201 1*
RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Joe Sisco
Secretary Kissinger
1/9/74; 9:24 a.m.

K: Joe.

S: Mr. Secretary, there are several things we need to do this morning in connection with the visit.

K: Well, first of all, they sent me over here the cable on the administrative thing but they haven't given me the substantive cables. There must be a substantive cable.

S: Oh, there is. I will call Pickering and find out why you got only the administrative cable because there is the cable which says okay.

K: Well, wait a minute, here we are. No, no, that's my outgoing. They didn't give me the reply.

S: Well, I can read it to you if you like.

K: Well, could you.

Loutfi

S: Undersecretary [redacted] said he had a telephone call from Fahmi in Aswan indicating that President Sadat concurs in your coming on Friday directly to Aswan as suggested.

K: And do they understand that I am going to shuttle back and forth?

S: They do because you indicated that and I am assuming that Herman -- there is nothing in the cable that says this -- that Herman gave them a full picture. Herman then goes on to say that in answer to my query whether Fahmi still planned to depart for Moscow Saturday, Loutfi didn't know and he said he hasn't discussed this matter with Fahmi. Loutfi urged -- asked for the aircraft number and the flight and so on, which there was one other cable that went out.

K: You know the Koreans are flying out of Aswan.

S: Koreans?

K: North Korean fighters.

S: Military thing. Herman has sent one in saying the reporters have to be careful about photographs and that kind of thing. What I think needs to be done --)1) We are getting over to you a suggested announcement as well as some Q&A's because we think some questions will arise. Secondly I assume you cleared this with Dinitz in terms of making this announcement at noon. And if you have, can I send a brief cable telling Keating otherwise

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Joe Sisco
Secretary Kissinger
1/9/74; 9:24 a.m. 2

Keating will hear it over the radio.

K: Yes.

S: Third, I think you ought to call Waldheim sometime this morning to let him know what you are going to do.

K: Good idea.

S: And I am now preparing a very brief message -- one for Saqqquaf and Rifai just leetting them know before the announcement what you are going to do.

K: Good but you let Atherton draft the Saqquaf one because you are Under Secretary for Political Affairs of every country except Saudi Arabia.

S: All right. (Laughter) My job is being reduced already.

K: That's right. I just wanted you to know that.

S: By the end of this three-year stint, we'll add up and see how well or poorly I have done with Saudi Arabia.

K: You are giving me more time than I give myself.

S: Well, whatever. Life is short.

K: Will you take three weeks.

S: Three weeks or whatever. Now is there anything else that comes to your mind that we ought to . . .

K: No, can you get all of this stuff over here to the White House fast.

S: Yes. The announcement and the Q&A's I am sending up on the wire now to you.

K: Okay.

S: You will take care of the telephone call to Waldeheim.

K: Yes and I have to make a call to Dobrynin, too.

S: Yeah.

K: Now you know of course the Egyptians have briefed the Soviets that the Gur thing was a proposal.

S: Oh they have. This I didn't know.

K: Yes, because that's what Dobrynin told me yesterday. So I want to meet with you when I get over there say around 11:30 and Atherton, to plan just where the hell that leaves us all.

S: Well I don't believe that based on what we're getting from Herman that the Egyptians really believe this and you know I have a feeling this is another Russian ploy applying pressure.

K: That's right. Well the Russians then wanted to know what the Russians are confused about is where the line of disengagement is so I said that if I know the Israelis it's probably somewhere near Alexandria so when they said 45 kilometers.

[Laughter]

But it did confuse them. They said 45 kilometers is what Gur used so I said well, if I understood the Israelis at all that's between the main forces and if I understood the Israeli proposal it says that the Egyptian main forces should be way back of the Canal.

S: Sure.

K: Well we can play with this....

S: I think there is a problem as a result of what Gur has done but I have think you've made it crystal clear that the Israelis have not put anything on the table and particularly in that cable as you revised it last night -- my cable. You made this very very clear .

K: Do you think Herman presented that.

S: There isn't any doubt. Herman is the most precise guy in the world. You don't have to worry about that.

K: Alright. Get that stuff over here.

1*
T207

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger - Governor Rockefeller
January 9, 1974
11:25 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Will you stay out of my office from now on? You've upset the personnel structure of my whole office. I've just hired Gov. Holton.

R: Already? You're kidding.

K: He just accepted.

R: Oh, Henry, he's the most wonderful person. I'm so pleased it's happened.

K: So, I've got a governor on the political side.

R: I think that's the most exciting thing. I'm so delighted. Really.

K: Well, I called to tell you since I told you I wouldn't do it.

R: I don't know how you did it, and so fast.

K: You must have talked to him.

R: Well I did talk to him, but...he was being offered the head of that railroad, you know...

K: AmTrak.

R: Yes, and I told him I thought that was going to be a headache and couldn't begin to compare ....

K: I think he's going to be terrific.

R: Oh, yes. He's very bright. He's a brilliant guy.

K: After telling you I want to do it I thought about it and thought. I would try it. I had so much opposition by the political people from the other.

R: I have a feeling you won't regret that.

K: I'm sure I won't. Thank you for coming in, too.

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R: I'm so excited. I loved seeing you yesterday. I was keeping my fingers crossed.

K: I'm going off to Egypt tomorrow night. I'm going to Aswan to see Sadat then Israel and then back to Aswan. I'm going to shuttle back and forth until its done.

R: Marvelous. Thanks for everything, Henry.

K: Bye.

T206 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Gov. Linwood Holton/Kissinger
10:32 a.m. - 1/9/74

K: Hello.

H: Mr. Secretary, Governor Holton. You've got yourself a man.

K: Well, I am delighted that you are doing it. It means -- to tell you the truth, I already offered it to someone in the State Department - the best foreign service officer I have. I had offered it to a man whom I really made Under Secretary. It is going to be painful to me to tell him I wanted someone more politically astute.

H: Oh, I recognize that. I hope I didn't breach any confidence by talking to Governor Rockefeller last night.

K: Oh, no.

H: He told me he left your office thinking this was done and couldn't be undone.

K: Afterwards I thought about it and said why not go for the best man.

H: We are flattered. My family is one who discusses things like this and the children are delighted that you chose me.

K: I hadn't even told this to Nelson. When he left my office he had to think it was done and I couldn't do anything. Lin, here is the procedure. We have to go through a security check so it can't be announced for about a week. That doesn't make any difference to you, does it?

H: Not abit.

K: Also, I am going Thursday night to Egypt and Israel again and I ought to be back by the middle of next week. Then, with your approval, I ought to announce it next week or the following week. I want to be in the city when it is announced so I can make a personal comment on it.

H: That's all right. I finish this job on Saturday noon this week. There are a couple of details I need to mention. I am going to have a helluva problem adjusting to a salary when I have had all the other things. What is the salary?

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K: 42.5 or maybe less. I don't know for sure. It could be 38.5.

H: Will you do everything you can to get the highest possible salary.

K: I will get you the highest salary the law permits. But I think that is absolutely fixed by law.

H: But if you can get me the highest. One other thing is an appropriate time to tell Hugh Scott.

K: We are going to tell Hugh Scott. Give me a few days. I have got to handle that State Department fellow first.

H: I understand.

K: Certainly, we all have to tell Hugh Scott, but if you want to do it first that is fine.

H: He won't violate the confidence, will he?

K: (Laughs)

H: Or will he? He is my key man over there, I've got to tell him.

K: You have got to tell himbut wait until I get back here. I will talk to you again before . . . .

H: Thank you. I look forward very much to working with you. When do you think I would be coming up there?

K: Well, you have to be confirmed. I will put up your name on January 21st and I think they'll confirm you in a week and I will swear you in so by February 1st you ought to be aboard. I want you to get on top of that Congressional session fast.

H: I want to do that. I am very excited about it.

K: You can teach me a helluva lot about politics. Where are you now?

H: In Richmond. I will be in Roanoke in my home. I'm listed in the phone book but I don't remember my number.

K: Be sure my office knows where to reach you.

H: Right.

K: Good, and I will talk to you when I get back.

T203 1*
RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sisco/HAK
1/9/74 - 9:56 a.m.

K: Hello. Joe, shouldn't you -- I've called Cromer -- should you call the French and German Ambassadors.

S: I think so. I'll do that. I think that's enough. I don't think we have to tell anybody else.

K: The Japanese.

S: The Japanese. That's it. I'll take care of all three of these.

K: Will you take care of those. Call the Japanese first.

S: Alright.

K: Say it was just decided this morning. Has somebody told the Israelis?

[Sisco has already hung up so HAK calls Dinitz]

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T208

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Jerry Warren/Sec. Kissinger
Wednesday, Jan. 9, 1974
11:45 a.m.

K: Jerry, on this trip, can you say on background that it was at the specific request of the Israeli Govt and the Egyptian Govt.

W: Specific request of Israelis...

K: Yes. That I am coming over to work out the details of this game and of the Egyptians, but don't let them attribute it to anybody. Deep background. For their guidance. Can it be done?

W: I think so -- at specific request of Israeli Govt and at the invitation of the Egyptian Govt.

K: Right. If you want to explain why I am going.

W: Yes. To help work out the details.

K: And to see if we can get the process of this negotiation really underway. You understand if we can get some approaching of the positions we will then put it into Geneva. O.K.? You can also say we have talked to the Sec. Gen. of the UN.

W: O.K.

K: And we have also informed our allies and the Soviet Union.

W: O.K. Thank you.

K: Fine.

END

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T216 rel *

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
January 10, 1974
11:50 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

.....

D: It was a misquotation because not only Peter was there but every other newsmen got it.

K: What do you mean Peter was there? Does he accompany you to all your press conferences.

D: No, no. He was escorting me. He accompanied me up to your office. He was standing on the side. I know you would believe me even without Peter. I said we had invited Secretary Kissinger to come to Israel to help us formulate a proposal.

K: The statement was in the Times. It was excellent.

D: Yes and the Post and the ____. Oswald Johnson was the only one who ...

K: If you would confine your comments to Jewish newmen whom you could control.

D: I know, I know, but

K: This fellow is Oswald Johnson, who you don't control.

D: Yes, well he wanted to present the article this way. He said the mission, according to the Israelis was initiated by Nixon and Kissinger.

K: My recollection is that it was Dayan.

D: Yes. I said.

K: OK, fine. Will you to the extent that you are asked, now, don't bring it up, that would just call attention to it, to the extent that you can, would you put out the idea that it was done at your request.

D: Of course.

K: It is just for our domestic policies.

D: Of course.

K: Good. I just saw it this morning.

END

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T223

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
January 10, 1974
6:38 PM

(Missed the first part)

K: _____is to get a formal, definite proposal from Israel.

D: Maps so to speak.

K: With a map, so that we don't have to say this is a model or _____ about 45 kilometer withdrawals. _____where does it start. And then I will propose to have it put into Geneva.

D: As a proposal. Then you will go through your representative?

K: Well, I haven't really considered how to do it.

D: I understand. Matter of importance to make a proposal which could be announced.

K: I will take Bunker with me on this trip. I will not bring him back here. He will go to Geneva, and I will tell him to do nothing until I return.

D: Are you going yourself to Geneva?

K: No. I will only go to Cairo and Aswan.

D: I agree. I know - it's a nice place to meet. It serves American auspices.

K: Exactly. I have no intention of going to Geneva. If our friend in Amman has a heart attack, than I may jump over for an hour to the airport. I certainly will not go to Saudi Arabia and other major ____. I just don't want to mislead you. If I go to London for instance, Immight meet Douglas Holme at the airport. I will not stay in and other country.

D: You will be back by a week.

K: I'm certain I will be back by Tuesday night.

D: OK.

K: Well, you know, I can't negotiate this thing, it's too complicated. My major purpose is to stop the games.

D: To make a proposal and lay it down.

K: And it's too dangerous.

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D: It's too important to begin really with something. Really a push for them to go - otherwise for the first time they are sitting together.

K: Exactly.

D: _____I should think not only____but dangerous.

K: Exactly right. And that's why I.____. It's really a lousy assignment.

D: You mentioned to me on Thursday, maybe Israelis will give you some reply.

K: _____that she was still sick.

D: They cannot make any decision.

K: They will not give a decision until I get there.

D: _____reply which you mentioned to me.

K: Didn't you see the statement he made? He came to tell me they wouldn't make a decision until I get there. After our meeting on Tuesday, I called him. _____until she was well. He didn't ____. That's when I really decided we had to use strong measures.

D: But first you will go to Cairo.

K: I'm just going for a half-day.

D: And then to Israel.

K: Well, the last thoughts that he had _____.

D: He is puzzled.

K: Frankly, between you and me, I don't want to go to Dayan and run to Tel Aviv as if I were an errand boy. I don't have to talk with Dayan until I get their plan.

D: You know the position. There is nothing very much on this.

K: Anatol, as a chess player, you know my tactics, we want to _____right to Tel Aviv. I want to make them a little nervous.

D: It's a good tactic.

K: That's between you and me.

D: It's quite clear _____. I wish you the very best. Something should be done.

K: I couldn't agree more. Give my warm regards to your Foreign Minister.

D: _____waiting for the results.

K: You will be the first to know.

D: Through Scowcroft.

K: Through Scowcroft.

D: Very best, Henry.

END

T217

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
George Vest/Secretary Kissinger
January 10, 1974
5:10 PM

K: Can you get an advance edition of the Washington Post for on the plane? I understand there's a story in it.

V: I'll get on it.

K: Don't get on it now, it isn't out yet.

V: I'll make the arrangements.

END

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T221

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Secretary Kissinger/Senator Stennis
January 10, 1974, 8:12 p.m.

S: How are you?

K: O.K., Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I'm going off tonight to the Middle East, and I know the story about Admiral Moorer allegedly spying on me is going to hit the newspapers tomorrow.

S: Yes?

K: I just wanted you to know the _____ was handled by Ehrlichman except _____ comments which were made to me. It's ~~xxabsx~~ an absurd charge because Admiral Moorer was a close collaborator of mine. It was this yeoman who was leaking documents, as it turned out, to the newspapers. I have complete confidence in the Chairman. I have no independent knowledge of the allegations. On the face of it, they seem absurd to me.

S: I'm certainly glad that you called me - for you to tell me so directly. I'm glad to know it. I imagine they'll be calling me or Mr. Hebert.

K: I think the Chairman deserves your support, Mr. Chairman. They've attacked so many institutions that I don't know what's going to happen.

S: I don't either. Just between us. I might - I don't like - I might just announce rather early that I was going to go into it, take jurisdiction of it. Otherwise some other Committee might.

K: I'm speaking personally.

S: I want you to

K: On a personal basis, I think that would be a statesmanlike thing to do. I would rather for your committee than some of these that ~~xx~~ are out for publicity. You know the military. You understand what various things mean. In Executive Session I would be delighted to tell you everything I know, which isn't a great deal. Just for your information, _____ handled some of the most sensitive things for us - on the China thing, for instance. Why he would want to steal documents is beyond my comprehension.

S: And it's contrary to the pattern of the man.

K: It's contrary to the pattern of the man.

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S: Well. He called me about 30 minutes ago. Just called me to tell me the thing was coming out. He said he had talked to you briefly.

K: I just wanted you to know. I wouldn't bother you except that I'm going on this trip. I don't feel in foreign countries I should be holding press _____.

S: Well, it's quite helpful for me to have your call.

K: Speaking as friends, some of these people at the White House like Ehrlichman were very often doing these investigations to build up their own importance.

S: I agree.

K: And he may have given it a twist that any knowledgeable man would never put on it.

S: In the atmosphere that's been generated now, some people will believe anything regardless ____

K: I would think, Mr. Chairman - my knowledge isn't definitive. I'm taking it _____ on my knowledge of the Chairman as a man. To protect the integrity of the military would be a national service. I have no question about the Chairman.

S: I'm just -- that's very good indeed. I remember once you and I were in with the President. I asked about calling Moorer in on a military question. I know how closely you worked together.

K: Exactly.

S: I saw it in operation from time to time. If they call me in the morning, I'll say I don't believe a word of it.

K: You know, there's undoubtedly something to it, but not what they're saying. I wouldn't necessarily assume that no documents were taken, but I don't think the Chairman

S: No party to it at all concerning you.

K: Exactly. I think if you backed up the Chairman

S: Well, I wish you well now on the trip. Walter Cronkite carried a good statement about you tonight, and I've been feeling it every day - appreciating every day what you're doing.

K: You've been a good friend and supporter.

S: You're entitled to any encouragement and support I can give many times over.

K: I'll take the liberty of calling on you when I return.

S: You're doing a great job for our country. Best wishes. Good-bye.

K: Good-bye.

END

T222

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Secretary Kissinger/Congressman Hebert
January 10, 1974, 8:22 p.m.

K: I just want to check up how things are going in Louisiana.

H: In Louisiana we have beautiful weather and rotten weather.

K: You've got everything. The reason I called -- I've just been told there's a story breaking in the newspapers about alleged spying by the Joint Chiefs who were supposedly doing _____, and since I'll be in Egypt, I just wanted to say I have no information. It was something which was being conducted by Ehrlichman. It's absurd since the Chairman had access to all relevant information. And it's totally inconsistent with his basic pattern as a man anyway.

H: I agree with you.

K: While I'm gone, I'm not going to be making public statements on such a tawdry subject.

H: On the whole, the - and as far as the Committee is concerned, because it involves the military, I'm still affirmative.

K: I just don't think we ought to get the military dragged into this mess.

H: I'm not going to do it. I'm not going to take _____

K: _____ that I have confidence in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

H: I appreciate your call.

K: This is on a personal basis.

H: _____ I'm not going to get involved either. When are you leaving?

K: At midnight. Good, Mr. Chairman, see you when I get back.

H: Good luck to you.

K: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

END

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T214 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secy Schlesinger/Secy Kissinger
8:23 a.m., January 10, 1974

K: Jim, I am off tonight and I just wanted to make sure that when the Israelis come over today -- they're not seeing you but I understand they are coming over to see your military people.

S: I believe Wickham has got that straightened out but I'll check on that.

K: Right. I understand that they had a much friendlier message on the phone. But since that will be the last time they hear from Defense before I get there --

S: Right.

K: If we could be particularly forthcoming.

S: Right.

K: And this is the best time to wrap it all in together anyhow.

S: No question about that, Henry. I don't know how that got off the rails; I thought the signals were very clear throughout the system.

K: You know, I'm not saying this critically. I'm just wanting to make sure that there are no slips. The second problem is Vietnam military equipment. I feel that if we could get in some visible anti-tank weapons --

S: I've got them working on that now.

K: Good. Terrific.

S: Now, Henry, I remind you of your letters to Sadat and to Faisal in which we indicated that it would be difficult for us to be forthcoming while being discriminated against.

K: Right. The strategy that we are pursuing, if you agree, is we will get the agreement done. And then there will be not one Israeli moving back a yard until the embargo is lifted.

S: That's fine with me. Just as long as those fellows know who has got the muscle.

K: There will be no move of Israelis until the embargo is lifted.

S: Great. Now you're talking.

K: Okay.

S: Good piece of work. K: Thank you.

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T219

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
January 10, 1974
7:53 PM

K: _____energy meeting.

S: You mean for the big international one? I gather that all sorts of task forces are being set up in the Department.

K: Well, you know task forces are for the birds - they never produce anything.

S: Why don't I get together with Donaldson in the morning?

K: I want some think-pieces.

S: Maybe Winston and Bill and I should get together.

K: Of _____. Do you think Donaldson can make it?

S: Yes, I think so. I think you have to be patient. It's all very new and different for him. I think the French will be a problem. I think we'll have a meeting _____.

K: I think they'll be pigs when they get there.

S: I think they'll be like the Russians in the M___ meeting. Well, I hope you have a good safe trip.

K: Successful?

S: Give my love to my NATO friends.

K: I won't stop there. I'll send Sisco.

END

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T218

TELECON
George Vest/Secretary Kissinger
January 10, 1974
6:14 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: That I'm talking to the Egyptian Ambassador today. Or that I have.

V: That you have. Right, sir.

K: To talk about my forthcoming trip to Egypt.

V: Who was with you, sir?

K: Sisco and Anderson.

V: Fine. OK. I'll make sure, Anything else?

K: NO.

V: Did you get the memo I wrote sir, on a plummers story?

K: I haven't seen the memo yet.

V: I sent the memo earlier today.

K: I'll get the newspaper on the plane. _____building you up.

V: No problem with the Washington Post.

K: Why?

V: I'm picking up Marilyn Berger and copies of the Post on the way to the plane.

K: I don't know the story as yet, but I have a rough idea.

END

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T220

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
January 10, 1974
6:48 PM

S: He said we move Strausz-Hupe to Sweden. He wouldn't mind that, I don't think.

K: We don't have relations with Sweden. That has to wait a while.

S: Rush has to call Firestone before noon tomorrow.

K: I'll let Rush do it, but I don't want to assign something for Sweden until we talk to the Swedes.

S: The story is going to break tomorrow. Any guidance for me?

K: I haven't read the story. Keep me informed of what it says. My view is that I should say on the trip that I'm not going to make any comment while I'm in these negotiations. If forced into it, I'll say that the investigation was being conducted by Ehrlichman. Ehrlichman told me some of these allegations, which happens to be true.

S: Apparently that's where the story comes from. That's what Timmons says.

K: Those unbelievable SOB's. I don't know what twist they're going to five the story. I guess it's that we didn't tell them enough and therefore they had to spy on us. Is that the twist?

S: That's what I understand - Moorer spies on White House.

K: What can we say? My tendency would be to play it down. To say the usual bureaucratic stuff. I would not take on the military.

S: No, I don't think so. And that part probably could be denied, couldn't it? Any, well, I'm just concerned that while you're gone we don't make statements that don't fully protect you.

K: I will not hold still again with what they did on May 22nd with the National Security statement. Next time I'll take a public position. Check them out with me before they put it out.

S: Either no comment or it has to be cleared with you.

K: Well, I'll talk to you later.

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END

T224

1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger/Hugh Sidey
9:50 a.m. 1/21/74

S: What do you say, Henry!

K: Hugh, how are you.

S: Pretty good, What is up, heaven.

K: Hugh, I just walked into the office, I picked up Time and read that article on that alleged spying--you know these people spying on me.

S: Yeh. I haven't even seen it yet, you mean in our magazine?

K: Yeh.

S: Okay

K: And it says I ordered a wire tap on one of the suspects and it is totally absolutely wrong.

S: Well, I'm going to have to find out about it, Henry.

K: Believe me there is nothing to find out. I had nothing to do with any wire tap in any form directly or indirectly. They didn't criticize me for it, because they say the guy did it, and they are just putting it in as a sort of a throw away.

S: Yeh, but Henry didn't Laird testify publicly or somebody that there was a wire tap on one of his generals that you ordered--

K: First of all, Laird wouldn't know about it, secondly, the only wire tap they referred to, Laird testified that there was a wire tap on one of his generals--as it turns out, that I didn't know it either, but that was in that batch of wire taps that was made between 1969, May and 1970. Except for that original batch, I had absolutely nothing to do with any wire taps.

S: Yeh, yeh, well listen, I'll have to get into this Henry, because I just walked in--

K: You know I have testified name by name about the wire taps I knew anything about before the Senate committee--and the records on that Quersely (sp?) wire taps --that is one of the generals, that came about because he had access to the information that leaked, but that was two years before this event, the --a year and a half before this event

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S: And there was no such thing as this, okay

K There was no such thing as this and that particular inves tigation, I had absolutely nothing to do with it. I'm not saying it was wrong investigate leaks of secret documents

S: Q Yeh, but this instance was not the case--would you specify that other guy --that original one the Laird general--

K: That original one--the FBI records are confused who did what, my name doesn't show on them, it is not inconceivable that we sent over a list of everyone who had access--he was the head man who handled the liaison to the NSC

S: Yeh, okay.

K: And he handled all the documents that at that time had leaked, but that was for a month in 1969 that we are talking about here

S: Yeh, huh.

K: Nor was that in the office either. To my knowledge Laird doesn't know anything more about than what he has read in the newspapers.

S: No, that's my impression too--just our people talked to him about this thing and he said you know--he brought it up again and it had been testified to as a public matter, but this is just a matter of being--

K: I have testified before the Senate committee as to ~~w~~ every person ~~gk~~ that either I or my office had any knowledge of, all of which occurred in the period between May 1969 and May 1970 as a result of that original decision to look into the question of the original leaks in May 1970, I dissociated from this and I never had anything to do with any internal security matter from then on.

S: Yeh. Henry what the heck is all this anyway--you've probably have told Mullikan, but I 'm just curious

K: No, I haven't talked to Mullikan--you know it was--I'm calling you because you're the man I trust most

S: Well, we'll sure get in this and sure correct it

K: What it is, you may not believe, I never know any ~~oth~~ of the details that are now coming out--this was handled by Ehrlichman and I was told to stay the hell out of it--

K: I never knew there was a 42 page report of Dave Young until I read it in the NYTIMES, so I could never tell whether this was super-bureaucratic gamesmanship, or something a little more sinister

S: Hm huh. hm huh. What is your feeling now?

K: My feeling is that, you know, bureaucratic empires always go up by knowing things, it got out of control, I mean it may have started as bureaucratic gamesmanship and ~~h~~ it got out of control.

S: What was so sensitive about it though that it couldn't be revealed or is that something you weren't involved

K: I had absolutely nothing --I know ~~there~~ there is such a bazaar quality about anything that goes on now, I have never seen the report--to this day I haven't seen the report--either the Buzhardt or the other report so I don't know what is in it.

S: Yeh. I

K: The part that I know isn't all that sensitive--but that is off-the-record.

S: Sure, I realize that. Sure. Well, that is the thing that baffles us, at least one of the elements that baffles us, you know Senator Baker and Erwin, talk about that extreme national security matter, and if this is it, you know it is rather unusual, because I don't find anything, I find this embarrassing to some people, but sure not a sensitive issue. Unless there is more to it.

K: There may well be, I don't want to mislead you, if there is--

S: You know nothing more at this point'

K: I know no more than what has been published; I have never seen the list of documents to this day--to this day I haven't seen the list of documents that was allegedly stolen from me.

S: Okay, Henry.

K: And of course, it sort of drives me up a wall, when everytime, here now they have a picture in Time saying former Kissinger aide David Young,

S: Know.

K: He worked for Ehrlichman--he happened to get paid out of our payroll, because that's the way the WH works.

S: I understand that caption since--the documents came from your office and that.

KN What is said is a sort of a throw-away. I'm not complaining about the motive, but it is totally wrong, I'll have apress conference this week on my trip, and I hope somebody will ask me a question, because I will show them the record.

S: (laughs). Okay, good.
That's another hell of a job over there.

K: You know, it is a pity, it really was a moving thing to see the beginning of trust develop between people who've been fighting for 30 years.
And we are so absorbed in every other thing, that we can't ever focus on it.

S: Yeh, yeh. Well, it is still-no I think people are aware of it, it leaked through the edges here.

K: I haven't seen you since I went over to State, why don't you come over and have breakfast or lunch--

S: I'd love it--I'd been trying to penetrate over there, but it is a little more difficult that it was at the WH

K: I'll call you--

S: Will you call me?

K: Let' s do it this week--can we have breakfast

S: Okay--I'd like to. I'm going--I am in California today and Wednesday but I'm back Thursday and Friday.

K: Are you know in California?

S: No, I leave tonight--just got to talk out there till [redacted]--

K: Thursday and Friday you're back.

S: Yes.

K: Why don't we say breakfast on Friday?

S: Great.

K: Can you make it as early as 7:45?

S: Sure.

K: Good at my WH office.
See you then and you'll tell--shall I tell Henry Grunwald about this?

S: Henry, isn't editing anymore--John Elsen is the guy and I will call him. And if you are going on the record later on this week, why we'll get it straightened away--

K: Good.

S: Very good, Henry and thank you. Bye

K: Bye.

~~TOP SECRET~~

T230

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
January 21, 1974
5:45 PM

D: Hello?

K: Hello Anatol?

D: Yes, Henry.

K: Before I go to sleep I wanted to tell you I don't think I can make it on the 7th and 8th.

D: What is a good date for you?

K: Let me look that over and talk to you tomorrow.

D: Would it be earlier?

K: Earlier is certainly impossible. I would like to do it when I am in Moscow or if he wants to meet me before...

D: In Cuba?

K: No, if he wants to meet me before in Geneva or if he wants to come over here.

D: Before you go over there he won't want to....

K: Is it that urgent?

D: Urgent?...well, it is his proposal...

K: I don't think it's that urgent. Well, tell him I suggest we do it in March in Moscow.

D: Alright, and on the second point...have you have a chance to look at the oil problem?

K: The oil problem-....your participation in a larger conference.

D: Yes or on a bilateral basis.

K: On a bilateral basis I can tell you now, we'll be prepared to do this.

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D: In principle.

K: In principle, we welcome it. I haven't a chance to discuss that yet. You can tell him the bilateral_____.

D: You can tell me tomorrow. Have a nice | sleep.

END

S070 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Ambassador Dobrynin/HAK
January 21, 1974 12:15 p.m.

D: Hello!

K: Hello, Anatol, one other thing -- the --now that Scali is back, Scali and Malik are at it again, and they deserve each other. Now Malik has called for a Security Council meeting this afternoon on two obscure issues--one having to do with __pay___ of the UNEF Force

D: Yeh

K: And the other having to do with the commander--

D: Really, Henry, I didn't know myself, but I called Malik on Saturday and he claims if it is even now---this is rather a closed meeting

K: See, the thing that Scali is worried about is how can you equalize the pay for _____ and Sweden

D: I don't know anything really (ahhuh) about--

K: It ought to be paid at whatever their national level is.

D: Yeh, so what is now the question.

K: I don't think we are ready for communism yet in the UNEF.

D: [laughs] Well really I don't have--

K: Oh hell, Anatol --I have talked to you now, I have done my duty, I will not escalate it to a high level.

D: [laughs]

K: I will tell Scali to be constructive if you can get Malik a little not to to be constructive we'll be all right.

D: [laughs] I already spoke with him. Malik said earlier that 5 dozen calls --if he is complaining to the White House, then I'm calling him--it becomes a long chain of communications--he is really angry because of this. I will try to do it with Malik and you do it with Scali.

K: Okay.

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5069 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Ambassador Dobrynin/HAK
January 21, 1974/12:11 p.m.

K: Anatol

D: How are you? Welcome back. Well, well...

K: The Middle East. We'll gladly let you handle everything from now on.

D: (laughter) Well, You arrived today in the morning but because I have a telegram from Minister, today, that's why I decided to bother you.

K: Not at all.

D: The question is about he asked me to ask you about his proposal (Brezhnev) about meeting with him, Mr. Gromyko and you in Geneva 7th - 8th of February. This could wait until tomorrow but I haven't.....

K: I haven't had a chance to talk to the Presdient about it in detail. I think it is going to be technically very tough for me because we have that energy conference and I wanted to take a vacation that week.

D: Is that already an answer or...

K: Give me until tonight. It's almost certainly going to be that it's not a good idea.

D: I understand. I don't want to specifically press you this eveningbut if you could give me more...an answer really.

K: It looks as if this will be the answer.

D: But should I pass that on now or...

K: Can you wait until tonight?

D: But today yes.

K: Today. I just want to talk to the President once more about it.

D: OK Henry.

K: And then you and I. I have a meeting with Congressional leaders all morning. But I want you to know that the President said to these leaders and I said to these leaders that we maintain the position of joint work with the Soviet Union in that area. That the Soviet Union has vital interests and this is our position and we said that to all of these leaders.

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D: I understand. Tell me, maybe we will have a chance to meet with you *tomorrow.*

K: Yes, lets aim for that.

D: Which ever is more suitable for you.

K: When is the swearing in of?

D: It's 4:00.

K: Why don't we get together at 4:30.

D: After the swearing in. I think it will be the most proper time. But today please give me this final confirmation by the end of the day.

K: I will do it Anatol.

D: Best wishes once again. Bye.

T226

TELECON
Mr. Toth/Secretary Kissinger
January 21, 1974
8:00 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

T: Welcome back.

K: Thank you.

T: You really did a job. I heard they applauded you at the White House.

K: You're nice..

T: While you were away there have been a couple of stories on that issue we talked about before. There was a Kraft piece and a Timmish piece that uses the word perjury. I wanted to know if I could write a piece -- but not attribute it to you.

K: What would you say?

T: There are some questions being raised as to whether or not you had made final disclosure in your testimony..question goes to the final line where you said, let's see on page 51 -- "Nor did I know that that Young.." And the question has now been raised...the 4th plumber operation.

K: Look, Bob. You know I have hardly to tell you how outraged I am about this thing. We are talking off-the-record. Not only the humiliation while I was out of the country...but it is 180 degrees off center. I did not know YOung had a report. I did not know Young was conducting an investigation. The investigation was not under my....I knew John Erlichman was conducting an investigation but I was told to stay the hell out of it.

T: The President said that?

K: No, Erlichman told me..this is a total outrage.

T: But wasn't there a part you knew..

K: I knew one part of it. I knew the investigation of Wellender..I was called by Erlichman early in December..that he was investigating leaks to Anderson, and I was to stay the hell out and I would not be told the conclusions. I thought they were out to get me..Haig was told...Haig called me and I told him to tell Erlichman so Erlichman knew one of my staff men had been involved and I therefore got a report of that investigation. That is the only part of the investigation I knew anything about.

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T: Well, can I write this without attributing it to you?

K: Can I think about it?

T: Well, I'll write it up and then read it to you and you can decide.

K: Well, I am trying to decide if I should make a public statement.

T: I think maybe you should..I have talked to some liberal democrats... You're all we've got..it should put to rest all of these stories. Kraft has a different interest and Timmish we can write off but I think these things are going to keep re-occurring...In the context they thought you were the...

K: Now, speaking to you as a friend, if you really think about the 4th Plumbers operation....in the context that my staff was riddled with leakers...I was not trustworthy...

T: Well, I think it would be worthwhile to do it.

K: I'll think about it.

T: Will you call me back tomorrow or should I bother you.

K: I'll call you back tomorrow or at the latest the next day.

T: You won't give it to anyone else.

K: No.

END

T225

TELECON
Professor Ralph Bates/Secretary Kissinger
January 21, 1974
2:45 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I called you because, as you know, I was in Syria yesterday. While I was there I had the opportunity to take up the issue of your son with President Sadat...that your son will be released in the next week or 10 days.

B: Wonderful, Dr. Kissinger.

K: Don't tell that to the press.

B: No. Thank you so much. I've admired your work.

K: This is one of my.....

B: I've admired everything you've done.

K: You're very kind to say this. This was one of my most pleasant____.

B: I'll write you to thank you.

K: I'm certain that in a week to 10 days your son will be released.

B: That you very much.

END

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T 227

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
President Nixon/Secretary Kissinger
January 21, 1974
3:15 PM

K: Mr. President.

N: Henry. I heard you found a nice reception from your staff when you got back. They were applauding.

K: I'm having a staff meeting in a few minutes. I'll be talking to them then. But I don't expect enthusiasm from my staff.

P: Deep down they have respect.

K: They know it's a big thing.

N: The reason were having a NSC meeting is I think it's a good to pull all those people together___. I don't know what subject you want. Just make it an hour, Wednesday at 3:00.

K: That's fine Mr. President. I'll make a note to you tomorrow as to the ____. Maybe we can just have a review on the Middle East.

N: Or SALT.

K: Maybe SALT. Let's have SALT, Mr. President.

N: ____Middle East, they're just rehashing things. You can get running on that in the meantime. Get ready to get back on your time clock and just remember you've done a hell of a job. Keep fighting.

K: I am. No question about it, Mr. President.

END

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T229

TELECON
Secretary Kissinger/Professor Bates
January 21, 1974, 5:23 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: _____ will be released on Wednesday.

B: On Wednesday?

K: Yes.

B: This week?

K: Yes.

B: Oh, how wonderful. Absolutely wonderful. Thank you very much.

K: Well, I just thought you might want to have it.

B: I only want to say we realize the enormous burdens you've had just now.

K: Not at all. This is one of the more joyful things.

B: We know all the complications that you have to face. You have

K: Well, I'm delighted.

B: I'm terribly grateful. I shall write you, of course, in due course.

K: That isn't necessary, but I'd be delighted to hear from you any time.

END.

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T228

TELECON
Secretary Kissinger/Marshall Wright
January 21, 1974, 5:18 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: _____ Policy Committee - whatever it's called - on the 29th.

W: All right.

K: That can now stay as it is -- they don't have to switch it. I'm willing to meet with the Congressional leaders on the 30th ~~if~~ for

W: The House leadership.

K: Keep it there.

W: I don't think we will have any

K: I thought the 29th was their regular day. I have no reason to have it on the 29th.

W: The President has switched the State of the Union to the 30th.

K: But in the evening.

W: Let them make their own choice. I'll see if they've already sent out their notices.

K: Just let me know what they want. If they prefer it on their regular

W: _____ still on the 30th.

K: Let me know -- soonest.

END

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T241

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Bob Toth/Secretary Kissinger
January 22, 1974

K: In light of the way they're all handling this _____ I had no plan, I thought this would be a Middle East press conference.

T: I really just wanted to tell you how I felt.

K: I would prefer sympathy to what's happened now.

T: I think that's impossible now.

K: I don't mean from you. I mean in general. All I can tell you is I regret it. I meant to call you right after.

T: It's going to be a hard one to forget.

K: That's up to you Bob. I feel that there was no way I could duck the question. For whatever it's worth, I feel I owe you one, which doesn't change the present situation for you or me.

T: It was in your interest to do it today. I had it before. I had it from other people. I respected your confidence all the way through and I respected your promises.

K: I recognize this Bob. On the other hand I was faced with a situation where somebody asked a very circumstantial question. Had I refused to answer it would just be lying and _____.

T: You could have done it this afternoon, got it all out.

K: To refuse to answer it at a press conference____. You've been very decent about it Bob. Of course, I didn't have to talk to you about it on the West Coast.

T: There are others who know enough about the story. I knew about the interrogation of the Admiral which is what makes it difficult for you.

K: Makes it difficult for me? As far as I'm concerned, I don't give a God-damn. Here's a man who came to me with a _____which I was _____. Erlichman had Young take his statement and if you can make something out of it you all just go ahead and do it. Turn it into a God-damn _____. You know damn well I was a victim of spying and turn it into perjury. I'm sorry. I am truly sorry. You've always been decent to me. You've been utterly decent to me. I'm sorry. I was forced into a situation

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where I had to do it. I wasn't going to put it on the record. _____you can't explain it at a press conference.

T: The message didn't come through about _____.

K: It was the lousiest possible way to put it out. _____very circumstantial question being asked. I'll make a statement on that later this week. _____that something sinister is going on.

T: _____Stennis committee is going to call you or ____to call you.

K: It's fine with me. What the hell can I do? I can't tell them any more than what I've said so far.

T: I think it will work out in the end.

K: Any fair-minded person will have to come to a conclusion that I'm a victim of spying and a victim of the _____. Young's interrogation of this _____. I frankly forgot it. I wouldn't think this was done by an Erlichman staffman.

T: You explained that to me. You promised it was off the record. I could have broken it all__but I didn't.

K: Bob, you were one hell of a decent guy about this. If there's anyway I can make it up to you.

T: They already think I'm a dope.

K: You're a decent guy. Maybe a hell of a lot more than all this shit is going on now. You really think it's proper? I shouldn't have to worry about this stuff today. What is the_____.

T: That you were _____by the Senate committee.

K: Everything I said before the committee was in the context of the plummers. The only thing on everybody's mind at the time.

T: It's too bad the whole thing couldn't be put out at once. I have my ____but I was told I was wrong. And the only one who really knows _____.

K: Bob, all I want you to know is it's no consolation to me____, I couldn't get out of this. I have the highest regard for you. If you can find an appropriate way I can make it up to you, I'll do it, because you were decent and you bent over backwards to be decent. If you can look at my situation. It's a disgrace for the Secretary of State to have to do something in that context____was the only way this could have _____. Now that it's happened, it's happened. I don't know whether.....

T: I just got a lot of shit.

K: From who?

T: From my people. I've been up to see ____.

K: Is there anything I can do, can I call ____or somebody and tell him what happened? Seriously.

T: Maybe the next occasion you have to talk to him. I'm sure it hasn't got that high yet.

K: This is an example of what I consider extraordinary decent behavior. Do you want to think about it over night?

T: I think I'd rather just let it go.

K: OK. I'll certainly tell him on the next occasion I talk to him.

T: Good luck. Keep up the good work.

K: Why don't you think of something I can do, seriously. There's bound to be something in the next month or so. If you can think of some way or if I can get you advance information about something, I'll do it. That you can count on.

T: I'm kind of down, I don't sound very appreciative.

K: Why don't we get together next week sometime, in general.

T: Next week I'm on holiday. I'm taking the kids skiing. Maybe the following week.

K: We can talk about the energy conference before it takes place. Why don't we have the week after next. Why don't I give you a call when you get back.

T: OK.

END

T237

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
January 22, 1974
5:21 PM

S: _____stop for the period of visit and he will let me know immediately.

K: You will let Dobrynin know and only Dobrynin. That doesn't exclude me.

S: I understand.

K: You're the sneaky type. You're going to take my job, in a different way.

S: I'm happy.

K: You could be happier.

S: You don't get enough sleep for me.

5:25 PM

K: Everytime my back is turned you have a staff meeting.

S: Somebody's got to _____.

K: Stop these things as of the 26th, until Breshnev has left. I don't want to cut these things too fine. He's going to continue ____on the 28th.

S: I'll stop them on the 26th.

END

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T231 *
RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
George Vest
1/22/74; 9:44 a.m.

K: Hello.

V: Sir, George Vest. When you left me yesterday on the press conference you said keep it tentative and I wanted to confirm whether you would be doing it or not at 12:00.

K: What do you think? Should I do it today?

V: I think you should do it today, sir. The sooner the better.

K: Okay. Do I have have to make an opening statement or can I go right into questions?

V: I think you could go right into questions because the press this morning is so completely filled in on the Mid East and it leaves it to them to go on from there.

K: Okay, well let's set it.

V: Yes, sir.

K: Thank you.

V: Right.

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T239

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Jack Valenti/Secretary Kissinger
January 22, 1974
8:07 PM

V: I want to thank you very much for calling me back. You got me all excited. I want to ask you something. I want to get your comment. I'm having a meeting of all the presidents of the motion picture company. I want to put forth a proposal that we take all motion pictures and charge oil companies for them in ____. The only country ____is Iran. Most of that will go to Iran and we say "look you're chargin $11 a barrel for oil_____"

K: He hasn't _____.

V: ___out of Iran and most is going to be made_____. I wouldn't have to quote you. But somebody is going to ask me what our government is thinking about this_____.

K: I don't object to it. My projection is ____is going to _____.

V: _____ is saying "look we are American citizens, we think high prices of oil _____. We are not going to stand for it any more.

K: I have no objections to it. Can you get away with it. I don't think you can get away with it. There's no foreign policy problem.

V: I told these ____the shits to get the hell out of here.

K: Maybe he'll pay. He's ____.

V: I didn't want to come out and make a statement, that would cause you embarrassment.

K: I appreciate it very much, Jack.

(The rest of the conversation was personal.)

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T 233

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Secretary Kissinger/Ambassador Dinitz
January 22, 1974, 11:34 a.m.

K: Mr. Ambassador.

D: Good morning.

K: I did not tell Dayan that you could plant a question on the Suez Canal, and you are

D: I am sure you told him.

K: "BS". What the hell -- I'm not running Israeli domestic policy here. It's inappropriate to raise this.

D: There is a misunderstanding -- it's not in connection with the Canal.

K: Then what? What are you going to ask me?

D: You remember that Dayan said that the question of whether there should be an opening of the Canal or not from the Russian point of view

K: Excuse me. You are right. I apologize. What does "BS" mean in Hebrew?

D: We say in Hebrew "BS".

K: You are right. That I did say. I thought you were going to tell me that you were going on record

D: God forbid, not at all.

K: Don't say God forbid so often - I might think you are religious.

D: I would never have put you in that position.

K: Don't say that. You would try. You are smart enough to realize you couldn't put me in that position.

D: Not because I couldn't -- I wouldn't.

K: So the question is do I mind having the Canal opened?

D: From the point of view of the Russian fleet and the Indian Ocean.

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K: No, we can handle it. But I will say we can live without the Russian Fleet in the Indian Ocean. It's not a

D: Under the circumstances, it's preferable. That's what you discussed with Dayan.

K: The speech of the Prime Minister got very good play on TV.

D: A good speech.

K: May I say something, Mr. Ambassador? So long as you wrote the speech, let somebody else praise it.

D: No, I put in one part, but she wrote it.

K: We all know you're modest. But this way

D: Whatever I say, it's no good.

K: That is absolutely true.

D: I wrote a long cable to the Prime Minister yesterday about the Syrian move.

K: They have given us more conditions which I won't pass on to you because they will upset you. This would just make it worse after what they already proposed to you. But give us your counter-proposal. I really think the illusion of something happening is almost as important as something happening.

D: We'll wait now for the reaction after the Cabinet meeting on Sunday.

K: They have told me they will give you Leopoldville for Kinsha (sp?).

D: I don't think we want it -- it's got too many Russians.

K: But it has a refinery.

END

T234

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Secretary Kissinger/Mr. Atherton
January 22, 1974, 11:48 a.m.

K: Have we heard from Akins today?

A: I haven't seen anything. He was to have seen the King at the earliest 10:00 their time.

K: 4:00 our time.

A: 3:00 a.m. here. He did not have a firm appointment. He said it was the earliest it would be.

K: I'm thinking of a very tough statement. .... to the effect we could understand it at first, and it was becoming increasingly inappropriate that in the light of recent events it would be hard to reconcile a continuation of the embargo with friendship with the United States, and it would raise the most serious questions about whether we could continue our effort. What do you think?

A: In principle, I think we've got to begin to do this, but I'm reluctant until we get the King's word.

K: But if he doesn't, then you know...

A: If he doesn't, we have to do that. I think that doing it at noon today might be premature - might get his back up just when we may be getting over the hump. I feel we're going to get what we want, and we may hear in a day or two. Knowing the King's temperament,

K: Then I'll just stick to the inappropriate - increasingly so, and to a point that raises questions.

A: That I think you should do. Stop at that for today.

K: Thank you.

A: Yes, sir.

END

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T235

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Secretary Kissinger/Mr. Don Kendall
January 22, 1974, 3:50 p.m.

Kendall: Congratulations.

K: Thank you.

Kendall: Jesus Christ, you're getting to be the negotiator of the century.

K: Why don't you let me get you a few Pepsi Colas?

Kendall: Which one would you like to start with?

K: You take me up on these sarcastic remarks.

Kendall: You suggested before you left that I give you a call and we could work out a lunch date. I've got a few things to talk to you about.

K: Next week sometime?

Kendall: Yes.

K: I don't have my calendar in front of me. Can I have Mr. Campbell call you tomorrow? Is any day next week all right with you?

Kendall: Any day. I've got a luncheon on Thursday. I can cancel that.

K: Thursday I can't do anyway.

Kendall: I'm giving a luncheon on Monday. I can do it Tuesday, Wednesday or Friday.

K: O.K.

Kendall: Have you heard of the _____ signatures _____ for the Presidency? The reaction is unbelievable. We're getting 90% replies. The letters are from people all over the country - running $7.00 a letter - so you know the kind of people we're talking to - not big contributors. We hit them regular mail.

K: That's fascinating.

Kendall: Our agency, BBD&O, says they've never seen anything like it. When you get out of this Eastern group and Washington, you find real support. Rostow was very helpful - Dean of the Law School, etc. I got

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Jack Connors to sign it, who was former Secretary of Commerce, then Packard, etc. We've hit all the XX members of the Judiciary. Common Cause and Civil Liberties are just generating a lot of mail on the other side.

K: Don - I have got to run.

Kendall: O.K. I'll see you next week.

END

T232

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Caryle Maw/Secretary Kissinger
January 22, 1974
11:24 ~~p~~m

K: I ran into Joe Kraft yesterday and his lawyer is Cutler, and he says they developed in their investigation on the wiretapping on Kraft information that would be extremely helpful to me which Cutler would be prepared to pass on to you.

M: I'll get hold of it immediately.

K: It would be extremely interesting to me.

M: I'll get in touch.

END

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T236

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Secretary Kissinger/Mr. Atherton
January 22, 1974, 4:37 p.m.

K: Have we had any report from him?

A: We haven't had any report, sir.

K: Is he still there?

A: Yes, he's very much there.

K: I noticed you didn't put into the first paragraph of the cable, as I had wanted, that this came from both the President and me.

A: We put it in the talking points. I had understood

K: Yes, but the substance of it was approved by the President.

A: I see. I'm sorry. I misunderstood. I did put it into the first point.

K: _____ only that he expected____. I just don't want to wind up as the villain in this thing.

A: I'm sure he'll be reporting the minute he is back from his audience.

K: O.K.

END

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T238

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
January 22, 1974
6:01 PM

K: Mr. Ambassador.

D: I just wanted to tell you I got word of the ____ agreement. ___76 to 36. ____.

K: That means only the ____.

D: On only the left wing and the ___. I thought you would be happy to hear this.

K: If we're having trouble getting the embargo lifted would you be willing to hold up your withdrawal?

D: Sure.

K: You don't have to start withdrawal before Friday?

D: I don't think so.

K: Will you let me know?

D: I will check and you will let me know what you want us to do?

K: Yes.

END.

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T255

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
The President/Secretary Kissinger
January 23, 1974, 7:00 p.m.

N: Hello.

K: Mr. President.

N: Hi, Henry.

K: Mr. President, I just wanted to let you know that I have had a long cable from Saudi Arabia. I think there's still another part coming. If you write a letter tomorrow that, then, over the week-end we can work out so that you can announce it in your State of the Union address.

N: Letter to whom?

K: To Faisal.

N: Good. Good. This is the greatest thing we could possibly do. Apart from the damn embargo, it wouldn't amount to anything anymore.

K: All you have to do is give him reassurance.

N: Why don't you prepare a letter and bring it over tomorrow. I'll add a few scribbled notes.

K: We'll send it over tomorrow, Mr. President.

N: That's good news. How's your confidence? You're not getting discouraged?

K: Not at all. I thought you were in very good form this morning.

N: Well. I thought that our friend... Which meeting were you at?

K: I was at both.

N: I thought that Simon was a wipe-out.

K: A disaster.

N: I felt I had to say a few things. Didn't you?

K: You saved him.

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N: At the Cabinet meeting -- just running the GD thing. They're all so weak. What they need is leadership. What was your feeling?

K: Exactly. As you said, they're very weak. You certainly got it across to them.

N: It isn't my nature, as you know, to talk strongly and toughly like that. Maybe I ought to do a little more.

K: I think, Mr. President, if you continue to give the leadership, that that is all the people want.

N: We shall see. In any event, we'll continue to give the leadership. But that's good news. When will you have the letter ready? The meeting - it's NSC - is at 3:00 tomorrow.

K: I'll have it by then, sir.

N: One thing I do want to discuss there -- raised by the Southerners -- re the Reserves. The Regular Army and all that bunch. Moorer and the bunch want to cut them off. I want to save them because that's good politics. So take that line. You know what I mean.

K: Absolutely. That is my conviction anyhow.

N: Frankly, the Reserves saved Israel.

K: They've saved us in every crisis we've had.

N: Moorer and the Admirals are only interested in how many stars they've got. And kick the Guard. You know what I mean. All of our friends in Congress don't want us to do this. That should be for the Southerners _____ is why is it that, frankly, why is it that the National Security people - they didn't mention you by name - they mentioned Schlesinger - why is it you're fighting this battle simply to put the name into the _____ thing and to slash the Reserve program. I think they're wrong.

K: I'm fully behind you, Mr. President.

N: Let's hit it tomorrow. O.K.?

K: Right, Mr. President.

N: O.K. Thanks. That's good news.

END

T248 1*

TELECON
Mr. Kubisch/Secretary Kissinger
January 23, 1974
4:15 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: The schedule for that Mexican Foreign Ministers Conference -- what time do I have to be there?

Kubisch: You are expected to arrive on Wednesday, the 20th, late in the day and participate on Thursday, Friday and part of Saturday.

K: I have been trying to take a vacation and find a time to do it.

Kubisch: I know. What about going to the conference and staying on after that?

K: I can't because I have a speech to do on the 28th.

Kubisch: I had understood you were trying to go sometime in early February.

K: That I can't do either because I have to prepare for the energy conference.

Kubisch: You know you did offer to go to Panama on the 6th and 7th of February and on Tuesday the 5th we are having a seminar of all of the scholars and ex government officials and congressmen to discuss our Latin American policy just for a day.

K: Is it possible to move the Panama thing to the 7th and 8th?

Kubisch: I was going to suggest if you want to you can. They come back on Friday from an extensive trip. You could do it almost any day, any day next week if you wanted to.

K: No, no..let me do it on the 7th and 8th..let me think about it and I'll let you know.

END

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T259

TELECON
Secretary Kissinger/Mr. Atherton
January 23, 1974, 8:30 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: _____ It should be here long since, shouldn't it?

A: His meeting was at 3:00 our time, and we should have heard a couple of hours ago.

K: On the Akins draft letter, I would toughen it up a little bit. It's a little too obsequious.

A: That's my impression, too. I have something just coming out of the typewriter which I'll get up to you soon.

K: O.K.

END

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1*

T257

TELECON
Dan Davidson/Secretary Kissinger
January 23, 1974
8:18 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

D: My congratulations on your Middle East triumph. Is there any time I could see you in the next week or two?

K: Sure. What about?

D: I've got a bit of a problem I want to discuss with you.

K: I consider you and old friend. Could you call Dick Campbell?

D: Yes.

K: Very good.

D: I'll call him tomorrow.

K: Good.

END

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T258

TELECON
Secretary Kissinger/Mr. Donaldson
January 23, 1974, 8:26 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

D: Yes, Henry.

K: I was just returning your call.

D: We're chasing each other around. I was trying to find out what the story on Shultz was, and I got it.

K: Has that cable gone out?

D: Yes, it has.

K: Right. I'll see you tomorrow.

END.

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T260 1*

TELECON
Secretary Kissinger/Senator Jackson
January 23, 1974, 9:45 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: You are nice.

J: No. I came in just as you had been talking a little bit. That was nice of you to do it for Doc Morgan.

K: He is a great patriot.

J: He's a decent fellow.

K: He's a very decent guy.

J: What my concern was, it was my impression that it was proposed that there be this so-called moratorium.

K: That idea is kicking around all the time, but there's not a chance of its being adopted - in the sense of our proposing it.

J: There are certain computations to be made regarding the position of our forward bases - Polaris - which, together with the mothballed bombers, would give a figure equivalent in terms of the agreement of 1972. Of course this bothers me.

K: Well...

J: I think that considering the mood here, and everything that's with us now, there's been a great change up on the Hill. I just want to say to you that from a political point of view, by being firm and digging our heels in in a fight, we win. I think the chances for support for those things that you and I have always been interested in and concerned about are better

K: I've heard this idea of how you compute the forward bases - the submarines from forward bases. That's not going to be in our proposal. That will be in the think-pieces. It's too complicated to go into, even if I wanted to do it.

J: I mentioned to the President some time ago. Let's talk about equivalents at lower levels for both countries.

K: [redacted] Of course, Scoop. With MIRVs, unless you can get a handle on the MIRV problem, even the smallest problems -- the smaller the number, the more vulnerable it is.

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J: I don't believe that completely. You can handle MIRVs as long as you've got agreement on numbers. Forget about verification. You can't get it. You just have to deal with numbers and throw-aways.

K: You and I ought to get together soon and ~~si~~ discuss this. We have an NSC meeting tomorrow. Not one of these idea are in the presentation that I'm going to make to the President.

J: I'm glad to hear that.

K: We're not making any proposal tomorrow -- it's more in the form of a briefing. If you don't have some fairly elemental choices, you lose your pants. We're not going to come up with any of this fancy stuff.

J: Well, I'll see you.

K: Will you take the initiative?

J: Give me about a week.

K: Why don't we get together the week after next?

J: Fine, Henry.

END

1*

T256

TELECON
Max Fisher/Secretary Kissinger
January 23, 1974
8:15 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

(Missed the first sentence)

K: You're very nice.

F: By the way, as far as support here, it's coming along very well. I'm meeting with the President. When I get back, we'll have another one of those get togethers.

K: Why don't we do that. I think on the trip to Israel, there isn't too much worth stressing. I think we're in pretty good shape now.

F: OK. I have some other problems. I'll be there for five days.

K: We don't have any current problems.

F: That's good. I'll just give you background on what I found out when I get back. I talked to Dick Campbell about setting up a meeting in about ten days.

K: You're a good friend, you always have been. A good friend I think the President needs now.

D: Don't worry about that. I'll be there through thick or thin.

K: Anything you can do would certainly be appreciated. That's very generous.

D: We'll see you when we get back, Henry.

K: Fine.

END

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SD285

TELCON [illegible]
1/23/74 - 11:57 a.m.
Larry Eagleburger/Linwood Holton/HAK

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

E: Yes sir.

K: Have you finished reading this now?

E: Yes.

K: What is your view?

E: I am of a tentative view which I'm playing with here that the Congressional side is now too tough but I've got Lin with me and he just finished reading it. Do you want to talk to him to see what he says? I come away with the sense you've gotten a bit more pugnacious.

K: You do? Well thats because I took out those paragraphs of our transgressions.

E: It's less that than -- maybe that's it. But what I get now is a feeling you've got about 4 pages of telling them what they've done wrong in fairly tough terms but I've played with some and I'm not sure that Lin agrees with this either by the way.

K: Let me talk to Lin. [Holton comes on] What do you think?

H: I don't feel that it is too tough. I think that what's bothering Larry is the specific examples on page 33 where you talk about the trade agreement with the Soviet Union, impact and restrictions on aid to Turkey and the damage to the Western hemisphere.

K: But you know now the Buenos Aires [illegible] meeting is going to be cancelled.

E: Don't get me wrong. I think those have to stay. It's the pages after 33 that begin to bother me. I think the examples have to stay.

H: Okay. I misunderstood. But I think -- I got the impression it was those examples that made Larry think it was pugnacious. Those are necessary. I would not give them that little lecture over there on page 37 about morality and expediency because that I think opens up the allegations from them and that's what we've been saying that you want an opportunity to be immoral and if you want to put that thought in I would do it on a more positive balance of the choice between two good objectives like the human rights in Chile against overall stability in the Western hemisphere. But make it balance between two positives forces rather than talking about expediency as though that's something you're willing to go to if you have to.

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E: I think we could play with that. That I think we can handle.

H: Now, if you don't do that I don't think it's going to be too pugnacious.

K: We can take out that thing about public hearings on negotiations if we want to.

H: Well, you're suggesting there a problem that's very real of how do you get all these individuals who are so insistent that they're going to participate in foreign policy to be involved and yet be practical about whom you can contact.

K: That I agree with.

H: You've got to leave that in.

K: That has to stay in but on page 35 the top paragraph that we can do without. And we can make that confidentiality point as part of that page 38 one.

H: Right. I was concerned about the confidentiality being seen as a cloak for deception you must make it plain that you don't want to use it as a cloak for deception but I wouldn't say as a cloak for deception because it looks like. I just don't see what it adds.

K: Look. I've got the Turkish Foreign Minister on the phone. Would you ask McCloskey what he thinks.

E: He's got it. He's going to call me back and I'll get him right now and see see what he says.

K: Let me talk to the Turk and then I'll get you.

T262

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Secretary Kissinger/Mr. Atherton
January 23, 1974, 10:35 p.m.

K: _____ letter from Sadat?

A: Yes, I have.

K: I think it does make it possible now to respond.

A: I think we should send him a letter.

K: We have to tell him it's absolutely important. Tell him it will make it impossible for me to continue, but make it a letter from the President.

A: I agree.

A: I think he's had a problem. He's obviously saying what they want to here in the Gulf and then saying something else to us.

K: Although there's that puzzling phrase in there - that "I will be in contact with Saudi Arabia after my return to carry on what we have agreed on."

A: I think it's a natural Arab instinct to say what they want to hear.

K: We ought to get that off fairly quickly before they lock themselves in.

A: I agree. Would you like it tonight, Mr. Secretary?

K: The one to Sadat? What do you think?

A: I'd like to reflect on it.

K: Let's do it tomorrow, then. But it should be quite strong.

A: What about the one to Faisal?

K: That's all right.

A: Because I think that we ought to get it off very quickly and _____ to Sadat we can say that we have been in touch with Faisal. Let me do a draft.

K: Make it very strong, though, and say the President relied on the assurances -- that if this does not now work out, then it will really raise serious questions about our ability to have a confidential relationship.

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A: We can't possibly bring the Syrian factor in at this point.

K: _____ on a road without end. _____ say, as Dr. Kissinger has often told you, we cannot conduct our policy under pressure. We made a special exception due to the history that gave us reason to believe that the Arab complaints had a measure of justification. There's no longer justification.

A: I think Sadat knows this. He's trying to make points with the Gulf and with us at the same time.

K: Yes, I've seen his letter.

END

T242

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Senator Javits - Secretary Kissinger
January 23, 1974
12:50 p.m.

J: _____

K: Thank you Jack. I am so well organized I only now got the message you called on Monday.

J: Anyway, it was a triumph and I just wanted to call and tell you that and tell you hello, I'm glad you're back. Whenever you get a chance I'd love to talk to you. Are you going to be here for awhile?

K: Yes, I'll be here for several weeks.

J: I'm off to California, but I'll be here next week and anytime you'd like .....you're coming up to us on Thursday, right.

K: Whenever the 29th...

J: Thursday. If you want to have a word with me before then , of course you may feel you are adequately equipped.

K: How about Monday?

J: Sounds fine. I'll be back from California, I'm coming back on the Red Eye and I'll be there.

K: How about 7:45 breakfast at the White House.

J: Great.

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T261

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Len Garment/Secretary Kissinger
January 23, 1974
10:00 PM

G: A matter outside of your ordinary realm. It's a personnel problem. Al said that you know the personalities involved. Someone who knows the Government, who can write and talk well, who is very smart and ambitious and is prepared to be really nasty.

K: I may take the job. You just described me.

G: I thought of one person and Al said check with Henry, who knows him well. He meets the criteria.

K: Who?

G: Ed Korry.

K: That's not a bad idea.

G: He's running that UN organization right now.

K: He's really undisciplined.

G: That's what this thing needs.

K: That's not a bad idea.

G: I don't know him well, he's an enormous admirer of yours.

K: That shows good judgment.

G: He knows all the action here. I don't know what he is - Democrat or Republican.

K: He's a democrat. Not an uncritical one.

G: I remember he was very tough in Chile.

K: He was very good in Chile once he got his bearings.

G: His thinking is right. Would be ____about the American liberals.

K: I think it's a good idea.

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G: You think it's worth persuing? Talk about university presidents.

K: Why give the job to a Gentile?

G: He's not Jewish.

K: Of course he's Jewish.

G: I didn't know that. I asked somebody and he said he wasn't,

K: He tried to bring in a Jewish group from Israel.

G: I asked that question very explicitly. Do you know for sure he's Jewish? Buckley is very high on him. You think it's worth persuing?

K: Definitely.

G: Talking about Jewish groups, your leader call a little while ago. You banished him to Jerusalem.

K: He's determined to go there.

G: Will you be in tomorrow morning?

K: Yes.

END

T 243

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Ziffren / Sec. Kissinger
Wednesday, January 23, 1:00 p.m.
1974

K: Paul, How are you?

Z: Fine, but how are you?

K: Fine.

Z: I hope you have had some kind of rest -- my God, what a trip you have had.

K: I am getting back into the time zones.

Z: When are you going to get some rest.

K: I hope soon.

Z: You obviously are not going to go away on Friday as you expected.

K: No I am not.

Z: Do you know when you will be going away.

K: In about two weeks.

Z: I cannot tell you how worried we are about -- I don't know what you do, but thank God you do it. I talked to your office when I realized you would not be back until Monday. I knew you could not obviously meet with us this week. In the meantime, I thought I would also tell you that Elmer Winter has been very helpful in trying to get some movement on this Jackson Amendment. As a matter of fact I had occasion to talk to Jackson myself on something else and I needled him a little bit about being frozen into a position. We are trying to accomplish something and let's find out what and not sit back and make a bymbol out of something that has no substance. He said he wanted to talk to you about it more. In the meantime, on the 29th the American Jewish Committee is having a meeting out in Scotsdale where I think it is going to be one of the matters on the agenda. Moss will be out there and Winter has promised to talk to him.

K: I will tell you it is now absolutely -- if we want moderation on the Middle East policy by the Soviet Union we have to get the Jackson Amendment amended. We cannot keep the Soviets quet in the Middle East and humiliate them constantly.

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Z: I noted they cut off arms to Syria.

K: To Egypt.

Z: I thought Syria.

K: I think Egypt.

Z: In any event I have been trying to do what I could to get something going on there. One of the problems is that Richey Moss who is apparently a relatively open minded person is going to be succeeded at the end of February as head of this Conference on Soviet Jewry by Stanley Lowell(?). Do you know him?

K: No.

Z: He comes out of the American Jewish Congress. He is less open minded. I have been telling them to get something moving before then. In any event I did want you to know that there was a good result of the meeting with Winter and he has been very helpful and we had a good meeting in New Yark after meeting with you. Everyone sent their congratulations.and In terms of another meeting the question is what is most convenient to you.

K: Next week would be fine.

Z: The one problem with next week is Riffkin is on his vacation. He will not be back until the second of February which means the week of the fourth. That would be the following week.

K: Let's aim for that week.

Z: How is Friday, the 8th of that week.

K: All right. Let's aim for that.

Z: Do you think...

K: I will be here

Z: Friday, the 8th, all right.

K: Right.

Z: In the afternoon about 2:30.

K: Let's say 3:00.

Z: 3:00 on Friday, the 8th. We will go to work and get it set up.

K: Wonderful. I have to run now.

Z: Thank you, Henry.

END

T246

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Governor Holton - Secretary Kissinger
January 23, 1974
3:30 p.m.

H: I have enjoyedit. Been looking at a portrait of a mind. Very fascinating and I'm looking very much forward to my job.

K: Well, we're just going through the procedures. It should be straighted out in a few days. You know they have to do the formal investigations, there's no problem about them, it just takes 2-3 weeks.

H: Fine. I'll just go on and shoot some birds or something and wait to hear from you.

K: Good. Bye.

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T244 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
The President/Sec. Kissinger
Wed, January 23, 1974, 3:05 p.m.

K: Mr. President.

N: Anything new on the embargo front?

K: No, and I have been waiting for some word from Jidda and I cannot figure it out. We sent our Ambassador in there and I think we should send a letter to Sadat to point out to him that they had better not play around.

N: I don't know whether Sadat can do it. Should we send it to Faisal?

K: We have sent strong representation to Faisal. Our Ambassador had an apointment to see him. After we have heard from him, I think you might consider sending a letter.

N: All right. A letter to him and to Sadat. Maybe he cannot deliver.

K: If he cannot deliver, Mr. President, then we should make them pay for it. They will just drive us crazy if that happens. It has always been understood that the embargo would be lifted when disengagement took place. If that does not happen they will jac up the price until it becomes impossible. I don't think it will get to that point.

N: Maybe it is the usual bureaucratic elements, etc.

K: They have to bring along Libya and Iraq and that may be the big obstacle.

N: We have no contacts with either of those?

K: Not that would do any good.

N: Yep. O.K. Whatever you think. We will do.

K: Right, Mr. President.

N: Fine, Henry.

END

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T 245

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
January 23, 1974
3:10 pm

K: The Paracels has been sitting on my desk for 48 hours and now I understand all these cables from Graham Martin... we can't tolerate this.

S: I only know of one cable from Martin.

K: Can you get a suggestion for an answer for the one he sendt back channel to me and get it over in the next hour?

S: yes sir.

END

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T247

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Senator Scott/Secretary Kissinger
January 23, 1974
3:46 pm

S: The President was talking to me last Friday. We went over alot of things and one of them was he would like to do something about John Cooper and he said he wouldn't even make afnote of it, for me to take it up with Henry. It was his feeling not to do a permanent thing.

K: I have been wanting to appoint him as an Ambassador.

S: He thought as a special mission or a roving Ambassador or a series of special missions. John may be more interested in a permanent position but that's not what the President was talking about.

K: Let me talk to the President and find out what he is willing to do. And we'll find something.

S: He was thinking of not tying him down for a position of 5 years or a nine to five basis.

K: I have the highest regard for John.

S: I think if John had the personal rank of Ambassador for travelling around..

K: Let me see what we can do.

S: Alright.

K: And we'll do something.

END

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T253 1*

TELECON
Mr. Atherton/Secretary Kissinger
January 23, 1974
6:50 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: _____at least have it prepared. But I would go no further than what is in the agreement. You call his attention to the text of the agreement. We intend to get it lived up to.

A: Right.

K: You see ?

A: I think this overtakes the message to Sadat. Don't you?

K: Yes.

A: It sounds to me it will come out all right. I think Jim is quite right.

K: You ought to do a letter that does pin it down. He must know by next week so he can announce it at 9:30. Can you do that?

A: Yes sir.

END

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T 252

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Ron Ziegler - Secretary Kissinger
January 23, 1974
6:22 p.m.

K: ____the thing about the President...if the President leaves and Ford takes over I will stay. The Israeli thing.

Z: Ford's denied that. (laughter) Common Henry, you've got to be a little quicker than that.

K: I have denied it. I wanted you to know the Israelis have totally denied it and demanded that NBC retract. I think Jerry ought to say this tomorrow.

Z: Right. Okay. The Israeli government denied it?

K: The Israeli government and the Israeli Embassy has called it to the attention of people.

Z: Ford said he was going to get a whole new team.

K: Oh, Christ.

Z: I'm just kidding you. There's another report you are involved in tonight though.

K: What's that?

Z: One of the former Hughes men, Mayhew, said the President offered to send you to Las Vegas to talk to Hughes about atomic tests.

K: That's true.

Z: Oh, shit.

K: No, it's true.

Z: I denied it. That's too bad.

K: Yes, it's true.

Z: I said it was not true. Boy, that screws me. I shouldn't have done it that fast.

K: Why don't you just let it ride.

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Z: What if you are asked about it.

K: I will say there was some talk about it but it never amounted to anything. I won't be asked about it.

Z: Boy. I said Mayhew was wrongin the deposition he made this morning. Did he make an offer to Hughes?

K: Rebozo ma de it to Hughes.

Z: But you never did it, huh?

K: No.

Z: Ok.

T251

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
January 23, 1974
4:52 pm

K: Would you do a paper on that conversation of what he has in mind on the economic side with the goal

S: He didn't really say..I gave you in my memo what he said.

K: Where is that?

S: I gave that to Larry before your meeting..he was eliptical.

K: He is willing to come to the conference. Will you get a cable out to all of the people giving our delegation.

S: Fine. I sent you a memo and I suggest that Win and I do a paper on ways to do it if we want to go one way or another on the gold and the flow.

K: Good. When are you going to put forward your best efforts on the energy conference.

S: The best effort is going on. The question is what comes out.

K: We have to beat that system. Do you think Donaldson can do it?

S: Winston, Hartman and I are hopefully steering him in that direction. I think so.

K: Don't steer him, handle him.

END

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T249

TELECON
Senator Fulbright/Secretary Kissinger
January 23, 1974
4:25 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

F: Have you recovered? Do you feel alright?

K: I feel fine.

F: Get some sleep.

K: I am caught up.

F: Good.

K: I called you about the stories with regard to my testimony before your Committee.

F: What stories?

K: Yesterday when I was asked at the press conference, I explained all the circumstances as I knew them.

F: This is what you told me on Monday.

K: Yes, but then there is an aspect that I considered minor that the New York Times is playing up in a particular way... the investigation was conducted by John Erlichman and I never saw it or knew its results but there was an admiral in my office, head of liaison of the Joint Chiefs, who came to General Haig when I was out of town and said he thought that internal evidence indicated that the documents had been leaked from his office. I told Haig to send that Admiral to Erlichman since he was conducting the investigation and since I had been told to stay out of it and Erlichman turned this Admiral over to David Young who was questioning him and afterwards they let me hear the tape of that questioning as it related of thefts of documents from my office. The argument being made by one office is because I said to the Committee that I didn't know about it, the existence of the Plumbers or the activities of Young in_____with internal matters, that I mislead the Committee. The question was do I know anything about David Young's illegal activities of breaking and entering, conspiracy to burglarize or whatever. I was thinking entirely in the context of the P.umbers and I did not construe it... the fact that one of the staff members was questioning a man who I had sent there and was to keep a report.. by that question which I generated, I know nothing about David Young's activities, nor did I know about this investigation nor did I know he had written a report. What I have told you is the literal truth and I wanted you to know this.

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F: I have been so busy, I am getting ready for election. I did not read it.

K: If your Committee wanted me to I would be gal d to report this.

F: What I would like to do is to do whatever wo uld be helpful to you. I don't propose to be a party to trying to embarrass you.

K: I know but I don't want there to be a sense that I mislead the Committee.

F: Noone on the Committee has raised this with me. I noted that there are two telephone calls from Hirsh, they have asked me to call him but before I take a call I will take a look at the New York Times.

K: Today's times.

F: I'll take a look at it before I make the call.

K: You can read Murray Marder in the Post..has a fair account. Seymour Hirsch is trying to make a dark thing out of it, no other newspaper is. that I am familiar with.

F: He is calling me.

K: If you want me to I can send over what I actually said to the press.

F: Is that fuller than what was in the paper?

K: Yes.

F: Why don't you do that. I think I have been around enought to understand ho;w some of these things operate and I don't want to add fuel to this damn thing...are they seriously trying to embarrass you.

K: I don't think any other newspaper is and I don't know whether Hirsch is.

F: I have a little sense that some of our more radical community are not sure that what you are doing is in the interests of Israel.

K: I believe that that plays a role.

F: Between you and me, one of my constituients who used to be high in his praise of you is being standoffish and it makes me feel that they interpret what you're doing, which as you know I am in accord with, as against the interests of Israel. They're dead wrong.

K: ... They wo uld have been finished if they maintained defiance in the UN. They would have had ... votes which we would have had to join sooner or later.

F: You know I agree with you and I suspect some of these people do not understand what you're doing and they accept blandly what Dayan says as right for the security of Israel. And I think some of these people are trying to...

K: Why don't i send over the text of what I said.

F: OK.

K: I'll send you the relevant pages.

F: That's good.

K: I'll send it right over.

F: About the Committee, if you want me to bring it up I'll do it and if you do not, I will not.

K: Why don't we arrange it on Tuesday, the day before I testify before your Committee.

F: fine.

END

T250

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Ambassador Dinitz - Secretary Kissinger
January 23, 1974
4:45 p.m.

K: Have you seen the report of your two suicidal cabinet members?

D: Its a ridiculour thing. I have been on the telephone since last night. It's a ridiculous story. I have appealed to NBC in Israel to produce the facts or a denial of its own. (name) is known to be an irresponsible guy.

K: I am not that crazy.

D: I know. Last night I issued an official denial and I called the Post too, but they didn't use it.

K: Could you publish an official denial?

D: Of course, here in Washington we issued one last night but they didn't use it.

K: But in Jerusalem?

D: In Jerusalem too. I will ask them to publish it and send it again so we can use it too. I am sorry about it.

K: This is ridiculous.

D: Mr. Secretary, can I tell you something. I got a new cable from Golda about some violation that is happening in the zone on building installations for missiles on the eastern side of the Canal. They had started to build them before the signing....

K: and now they are continuing it?

D: They are continuing it. Today the Chief of Staff asked Gamasy to dismantle them but Gamasy said they coudn't because of the morale of the army, they had to continue to build because of the morale. Tomorrow the Chief of Staff will say to Gamasy we request all five installations, which include underground firing controls, should be discontinued or we will not stay in the timetable...

K: That's fair enough.

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D: We wanted you to know. The Prime Minister didn't want us to say anything to them before telling you. Also the Prime Minister wishes to inform them that we have communicated with you about this and asked you to use your influence because it is contrary to the spirit and letter of the thing....

K: Yes, of course. Well, I'm supposed to hear from them tonight.

D: We had the feeling if theyheard from you it will work, it is sort of a test case for them. If they hear it from you...

K: Let me see first what they are sending to me. They are probably,.....anyway don't worry about it.

D: I think if they get a reading from you they would be more ....

K: If we don't do it tomorrow let me know what happened at the meeting.

D: If you communicate with them, preferably tonight, it would be,....

K: The thing is I don't want to communicate with them until they ...until I hear from them.

D: OK.

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T267

TELECON
Mr. Donaldson/Secretary Kissinger
January 24, 1974
8:39 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

D: I want to ask you about the upcoming Church subcommittee on oil. They want to make public all of Jim Akins' testimony. There's a lot of stuff in that testimony that would do us some damage if released at this time.

K: Like what?

D: A lot of nasty remarks about different monarchs. A lot of hearsay stuff about deals with oil companies.

K: What do you suggest?

D: I suggest we get Stan Anderson up there tomorrow and have him edit out some stuff. They're willing to listen to him. To ask them to put Jack Erwin's testimony off the record, which would be damaging to the oil embargo. There's a lot of personal opinion in there by Akins, represented as Government opinion. I wouldn't care so much of that.

K: I agree with you, it should be done. It's good of you to ask and I agree.

D: Good.

END

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T265

TELECON
Secretary Kissinger/Ambassador Dobrynin
January 24, 1974, 6:45 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

D: Hello.

K: Anatol.

D: Hello, Henry.

K: I was at a meeting until now.

D: You are rather tired. You need a vacation.

K: I have a sore throat which won't go away.

D: The throat? I noticed when you _____. Well, Henry, I have two points which is just with you my idea -- not from Moscow. You are free to take it as you wish. Coming back to this meeting between you and Gromyko. You know I am just thinking. He was a little disappointed about it. You mentioned when we discussed with you there about - maybe if he really wants, he may come here. I would like once again to say you wouldn't feel in any way obliged from the remarks you made before. Just a gesture.

K: Let me talk to the President, and I'll call you tomorrow.

D: On this subject?

K: On this subject.

D: It does not come from Moscow. I just have a feeling that a meeting would be - maybe after he went to Cuba - only ~~xxlexx~~ 90 miles he will be - just use this occasion because he is very close.

K: Oh, he's in Cuba.

D: Not now, but when he will be - before or after. I would like to mention because he may refuse. You shouldn't be surprised because it's really my idea. For two days I was thinking. He may say no. He doesn't know anything about it. Just to develop the idea which you mentioned. If he wants something to talk with you, maybe say for one or two days. I really don't know at present. It is my idea. Rather to present it as something you

K: I will present it as my idea. Let me talk to the President about it.

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D: For yourself, I don't want to impose on you.

K: I'll have to look over my schedule. I am so far behind in everything.

D: More from the point of view just

K: Absolutely. I understand. If we can do it in, say, one day.

D: Stay for a day, so to speak.

K: I'm quite favorably ~~xxxxxxxx~~ inclined.

D: Especially where you mentioned to me that in case he should really think a little - this kind of suggestion.

K: Absolutely.

D: Please think it over. I wanted to tell you it's not from Moscow - it's my own idea. Please do not blame me. But I would

K: Good. I will let you know tomorrow, and I think the answer will be positive.

D: Not later than tomorrow because...

K: You'll know it tomorrow. Of course, I'd be glad to go to Havana to meet him. I haven't had any publicity for a ~~xxx~~ week.

D: Do you want to go? (laughter) The great interest - terrific idea for you.

K: Am I going to insult your Foreign Minister if I say I admire him enormously, but I enjoy Breshnev more.

D: In the presence of Breshnev, he will be flattered. Second, I blame myself - when you were in the str___, we discussed the - Embassy - invitation for tomorrow evening. You should blame me - I didn't invite you. I didn't want to send a formal invitation. I was waiting for when you come back to discuss this. If you can make it...

K: Tomorrow evening?

D: Tomorrow evening. Around 50 people. It mostly will be European Ambassadors from West and East - and State Department people - nobody else.

K: Tentatively, let me say yes. I will let you know tomorrow. I will do my best.

D: I understand. You are most welcome.

K: Right.

D: O.K., Henry. So I will wait to hear from you tomorrow. Good-bye, Henry.

K: Right. Good-bye.

END

T264 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Senator Symington
9:40 a.m. 1/24/74

S: How are you

K: I just called yesterday to find out how you were.

S: Well, you are very kind.
I'm almost recovered.

K: I'm delighted to hear that.

S: More important, how are you?

K: I'm fine--I am in good shape.

S: That is good. I am going to see you on Tuesday--aren't we?

K: Yeh, I'm going to be before the commitee on Tuesday--you asked me to testify before your committee--before your sub=committee and I am in principle willing to do this --I have a little trouble with the dates you propose--I am sure we can work that out.

S: Oh sure, well you know I think it is awfully important from your standpoint as well as everybody's that the true nature of the lethal force that is contained in nuclear weapons are known in general and that is behind what I would like to do. We found that we were building these weapons for example to use in Germany and that we have had no agreement with the Germans that we could use them and things like that and everything we dropped in WW II is 1/25 of 1% of what we have ready to drop tomorrow.

K: Oh no, you and I agreed that this would be a good thing to do

S: So it is no effort on our part if we would ascertain policy and get information out to the people.

K: Not only do I have no problem with it, I welcome it

S: Well, I knew that--we discussed it

K: Absolutely.

S: And you take care of yourself--you are an important man.

K: Well, Stuart you are a great friend. I look forward to working with you.

S: I look forward to seeing you Tuesday.

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T2606

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Secretary Kissinger/ Foreign Minister Rabasa
January 24, 1974, 8:15 p. m.

K: Emilio, how are you? How nice to hear from you.

R: Fine. You have _____ come over.

K: Well, I feel strongly about everything you've done.

R: I have explained to Miss Andrews that the President...

K: Well, I probably will not be able to come on the 1st. I will probably have to put it off until after our Mexico meeting. But I'm anxious to see you.

R: Can I meet you in Washington? Let's say the 4th.

K: When?

R: The 4th of February.

K: How about next week?

R: Let me see. Let me see, please. One moment, please.

K: Yes.

R: I have Canadian meeting next week - 28th and 29th. I can meet you the 31st.

K: I'm just looking over my schedule.

R: It would be better the 4th of February.

K: Since I'm holding up a lot of my own work until I can talk with you, I would like to have it as early as possible. You can't do it on the 28th?

R: No. I have Foreign Minister of Canada 28th and 29th here.

K: Right.

R: From Monday on up to the 5th.

K: How about the 30th?

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R: Fine.

K: Now, the only thing is...

R: I would prefer 31st because I don't know what time they're leaving.

K: I'll get Kubisch to call you in the morning.

R: The President is going to Austria, to Yugoslavia, to Rome, and to Germany, and I'll be with him on the trip. It is o.k. from the 31st up to the 4th included.

K: My problem is that I'm holding up a lot of my own work until I get your ideas -- also on procedures, etc.

R: That's what I want to speak to you about.

K: Should Kubisch come down earlier? But of course you'll be tied up the 28th and 29th.

R: That's the problem. I can have our Ambassador give the papers to Kubisch.

K: All right.

R: I will be with you the 31st, 1st, 2nd, 3rd or 4th.

K: Let's aim for the 31st.

R: Fine.

K: That's fine. Terrific.

R: I'll call my Ambassador to tell him to hand over the papers to Kubisch tomorrow, and I meet with you the 31st.

K: I look forward very much to seeing you next week.

R: Muchas abazos, Henry. Remember, we want your _____ in Mexico.

K: You are great.

R: A big abrazo, Henry.

END

T268

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger - Ambassador Dobrynin
January 25, 1974
3:30 p.m.

K: I never had a chance to get back to you this morning because I was on the phone the whole time.

D: I see, I understand.

K: Anway, if Gromyko would like to come here I would be more than delighted to see him.

D: I understand. _____

K: It's really entirely up to him.

D: I will pass it on. In connection with....I just...he said if he has a chance for a day so to speak it is also quite all right.

k: It might be easiest if he came on the trip.

D: Yes, in a way, on own invitation, he is so close why not use it. You have to understand he...

K: I understand...

D: Just thinking in terms of...

K: Of course, I am sure I can arrange a meeting with the President while he is here.

D: Good. Really.....

K: Anatoly, I don't think I can come this evening.

D: You couldn't?

K: No, if something changes can I let you know by 6:30 say?

D: Sure. We are going to show movies.

K: What movies are you showing. Tiger Shoot?

D: We are much more peaceful now. Anyway you are most welcome Henry. Let me know around 6:30 okay?

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K: Okay.

*

T271 1*

TELECON
Secretary Kissinger/Secretary Shultz
January 25, 1974, 7:00 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: George -- we put together some papers - to put it mildly, of uneven quality - just to get preparation started for the Energy meeting. We're going to have a group that will be meeting for about an hour a day on a regular basis. I was wondering whether you want to meet with that group. I'd like it very much if you would or whether you want to send Bennett.

S: I'm glad to invest time in it. I think Bennett is the more appropriate one.

K: Why don't you come to the first meeting and then decide?

S: When is it?

K: Monday. We'll work with your office to work out a time convenient for you. We will send you the papers this evening.

S: I'm about to leave.

K: We'll send them to your home.

S: There's nobody home.

K: Then where do you want them sent?

S: Why don't you send them to Treasury. By the Secretary's entrance there's a guard, and he can give them to me in the morning when I come in.

K: O.K.

END

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T269 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Secretary General Waldheim/Secretary Kissinger
January 25, 1974
4:00 pm

K: I am sorry not to have returned your call earlier.

W: Don't worry. Welcome back. I did not want to bother you earlier, but I wanted to tell you how happy I am and again congratulations.

K: Well, you have been as helpful as always.

W: Well, I have tried and I think perhaps here in the UN we are happy about the developments and I think you can count on our cooperation..... I was wondering if we could get together.

K: I agree with that. I think we should do that. There are two possibilities. Perhaps you might come down here next week some day or the other one is I might be in New York this weekend and I might be able to see you for a half hour. Are you free Sunday morning?

W: yes, when?

K: I won't know until tomorrow. Can I call you?

W: Yes. I would of course be available. I can see you at your hotel or you could come for a drink at my residence.

K: Fine. I might prefer Sunday morning but I don't want to interfere with anything.

W: No problem, if you prefer Sunday morning.

K: Well, we'll be in touch tomorrow.

W: Alright.

K: Good. Thank you very much. I look forward to it and I appreciate the way you have always been ready to cooperate.

W: I am looking forward to Sunday. I have a few points I think we should discuss.

K: Good.

END

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T270 1*

TELECON
William Simon/Secretary Kissinger
January 25, 1974
5:57 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

S: How are you? I might say you're looking well.

K: I'll probably go all at once. I keep meeting here daily with a group of my associates and Cooper on the energy conference. I think you should join these meetings if your schedule permits it.

S: I'll make my schedule permit it.

K: I'll send you the papers so you can read them over the weekend.

S: OK, good.

K: We plan to meet here daily to go over these papers and we agree it's an opportunity for the U.S. to show some leadership. I'm going to invite some Treasury representatives.

S: What kind ....like as far as my opening remarks, in the direction we're going.

K: SO we can submit them in three weeks.

S: Good, super.

K: Fine.

END

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T272 *

TELECON
Secretary Kissinger/Ambassador Dobrynin
January 25, 1974, 7:12 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

D: One thing - about tonight - which I really hope you could drop in by the end, and secondly, I have received a telegram from Moscow. They ask me to come to Moscow by the end of next week, so I will be there. I don't know - this trip of Gromyko's. By the end of next week to...

K: So, we'll have lunch together one day next week.

D: On _____

K: No, no. We must have lunch before you go. Either lunch or dinner.

D: Come here and we will have...

K: Absolutely. For how long will ~~he~~ you be gone?

D: For a month.

K: You're going home on vacation.

D: I hope. It's time for me for a vacation. As of now, they ask me for consultation. He already promised me.

K: We must have a good talk before you go.

D: _____ by the end of next week in Moscow. I will probably go next Saturday. As about today, if you could please drop in. I understand you are busy. If not -- it's your Ambassador.

[redacted] I understand.

K: I'll do what is humanly possible. When do your movies start?

D: The movies will be around 10:00.

K: I will do my best.

END

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T273 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Richardson/Secretary Kissinger
January 26, 1974
9:26

K: Elliot,

R: Hello, Henry. How are you?

K: My incumbency is reaching the ____ imperial phase of Rome.... If you're still free for lunch on Monday I would be happy to have lunch. I thought we mentioned something about it.

R: We did.

K: My staff thought you fit in better on Tuesday but I knew you would be out of town.

R: Fine.

K: I thought it might be nice.

R: I would enjoy it very much.

K: Do you want to come over here at 1:00?

R: Yes. Good. I look forward to seeing you.

K: Good.

END

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DATE/CASE ID: 19 NOV 2002 200102979

T274 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Vest/Secretary Kissinger
January 26, 1974

...

V: Larry suggested I call you on this blasted list of newsmen you had gone over.

K: But I talked to Larry and told him that I didn't think there was any point in my seeing that group.

V: I know. I thought that and I did a memo in which I put that.

K: But I got it today and that doesn't do my any good. It means I am seeing nobody next week in that line.

V: That's correct. As you said there is no particular value in that lunch.

K: Not in that group but if someone planned on a press group each week I might be able to do something.

V: Well, would you like me to try something.

K: No, that would be impossible it would look too frenzied.

V: Alright.

END

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T276 *

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
The President
1/28/74; 11:23 a.m.

P: Hello.

K: Mr. President.

P: Hi, Henry. Anything new today?

K: Yes, Mr. President. I was just going to call you. We have had word from Sadat that the oil embargo will be lifted in a way that you can announce it in your State of the Union Address. And we have had word from Jidda which is a little less -- can I have those cables, which is a little less precise but still precise enough to enable you to make a statement in which Faisal says he doesn't want his name mentioned but you can say you have been in touch with senior Arab leaders who are now in the process of engaging in the lifting of the embargo and let's see, let me get what he . . . You can say that you have been in direct contact with important Arab leaders who have called an urgent meeting of the Arabs to arrange the lifting of the oil boycott and that you have every reason to believe that this action will be taken in the very near future. That is a direct quote from Faisal that you are authorized to say.

P: That's a little bit . . .

K: No, we can jazz it up a little bit more.

P: Maybe jazz it up a bit.

K: It is a clear statement that the embargo will be lifted and. . . . .

P: I think the way you might _____ of it Henry, would be in terms of saying that I have been in touch with leaders -- Arab leaders -- and I can tell the Congress/not that I have have every reason to believe, that I have . . .

K: That you have been assured.

P: That I have received assurances that the embargo will in the very near future be lifted.

K: After certain legal formalities.

P: After certain formalities will in the very near future be lifted.

K: Right.

P: This means there will be no rationing. Work out some language like that, if you would, Henry.

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to

K: Right, Mr. President. We have/add a paragraph or so on the Middle East which has to go with it.

P: Oh, I see.

K: If that fits into the scheme of your speech.

P: Well, we are going to say something on the Middle East but I think what you mean. You mean about developments and what we are pumping to do or . . .

K: That's right. It's basically innocous but it is sacramental language.

P: Uh-huh.

K: You know 242 and . . .

P: Yeah, yeah, yeah. Well, we could even more it. We could put that paragraph in another section if we didn't want to put it right there. But we will.

K: That's where the Arabs would want it.

P: Yeah. We could just type the darn thing up in the briefest possible form, you know, and the most -- you know -- striking form.

K: Right. You will have it this afternoon, Mr. President.

P: That's plenty of time. plenty soon. Or tomorrow morning.

K: You will have it late this afternoon.

P: Fine, Henry, you have plenty of time to get something in. But as I said, what we say about 242 and the rest, make it brief.

K: Oh, very brief. The less the better from my point of view.

P: I know. But we have to say it because their . . .

K: And it's . . .

P: Right.

P: Anything else on your front?

K: No, otherwise things are . . .

P: You went up to New York over the weekend?

K: That's right I went up Saturday afternoon.

P: Was it restful?

K: It was very pleasant.

P: You didn't have to do a lot of work?

K: I saw Waldheim . . .

P: Oh!

K: The choice between seeing him up there or having him come down here and I thought he would be easier to get rid of up there.

P: [Laughter] Down here you would have to have him for dinner.

K: That's right.

P: Very good. Very good.

K: I don't know whether Haig had a chance to mention it to you -- the Russians wanted me to meet them in Geneva about the Middle East -- Gromyko did, and I have no interest in that. I proposed if he wanted to come here.

P: Then ~~XXXXXXX~~ he's coming here.

K: A week from today.

P: Sure. Fine.

K: I think you should see him.

P: Sure. By all means. By all means. Yes. He'll be coming here from Cuba.

K: That's right, which I think is a nice ticket . . .

P: Yeah. Sure. Yeah, I told them that's fine.

K: And the only other person I know . . .

P: The King of Jordan, yes, I'll see him.

K: Okay.

P: But this time I don't think I should give him a dinner, you know.

K: I'll be glad to give him the dinner.

P: Only because of the fact that I haven't given Mrs. Meir a dinner. You know what I mean? This time I should just see him and somebody else could give him the dinner.

K: I could easily give him the dinner.

P: Or let Ford give him the dinner.

K: That's even better. Let Ford give him the dinner.

P: Let Ford give the dinner.

K: I think that's excellent.

P: But I will be glad to see him, Henry. Good work.

K: Good, Mr. President.

P: And the King of Italy -- I mean the President of Italy a little later, if you don't mind.

K: No, no, no, that's in March sometime.

P: Yeah, Yeah. Let's hold that off.

K: Absolutely. Oh, no, that's in March.

P: All right, fine.

K: Right, Mr. President. I will have this worked out.

T275 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Dinitz/Secy Kissinger
10:56 a.m., January 28, 1974

D: Hello.

K: Mr. Ambassador

D: Good morning, Mr. Secretary. How are you?

K: Okay. I'm assuming the Cabinet decisions were too awful for you to communicate to me.

D: Not quite so. I waited for the pretext but in any event I have received _____ which is of two parts. The first part is saying that the Government of Israel's position about its preparedness to enter with Syria into negotiation regarding the separation of forces. The second part restates our position on the prisoners and says that as soon as we get the list, we will be very happy to enter into negotiation. That was the best that could have been done. In addition to it, I have a cable from the Prime Minister to you which I was just deciphering -- that is why I was waiting to call you back -- and this is a message to Sadat. I can read it to you over the telephone if you like and then send it to you if you like. I think the gist of it is important because she says: "Thank you very much for the message. I want you to know that we are ready to enter into disengagement talks with Syria at any moment. There is, however, one obstacle that must first overcome. The Syrian Government should as a minimum hand over to us the list of our prisoners of war and permit them to be visited by Red Cross Representatives. I meet often with the parents and wives of our POWs and find it most difficult to explain not only that their dear ones continue to be detained but also that their families on living in uncertainty as to their fate. We hold over 300 Syrian prisoners of war whose names we transmitted to the International Red Cross immediately after their capture. The POWs in Israel are, of course, being visited by Red Cross representatives. We are ready to carry out an exchange of POWs with Syria."

K: That means, in other words, she will not respond to that Syrian proposal.

D: What Syrian proposal?

K: That I left there.

D: Oh, the maps you mean?

K: Yeah.

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D: From what I understand, I don't even think the Cabinet -- I mean, the level of the Cabinet even discussed it. But on that I don't know. There was no reference to the Syrian proposal in the cable. But naturally, I mean, responding to Syrian proposal in a positive manner, Mr. Secretary, would --

K: I'm not asking -- I didn't expect you to respond in a positive manner.

D: No, no; I mean, responding to it would be formulating one of our own. Because just saying that is no good, that is --

K: No, no, but in other words, you have not accepted the idea of giving some ideas to me.

D: Right, right. That's exactly what I mean; from the cable. The Prime Minister says -- if I may read a few more lines: Please inform Dr. Kissinger in my neame that there are certain things that I really cannot do. This for instance applies to what you suggest (she says to me) in your cable 68 (which means that I said that maybe they could transfer to me proposals to you and delay the arrival of Dayan until we get response from Syrians). Remember what we discussed?

K: Yeah.

D: To this she said that I should tell you that she can't possibly do this. She's sorry she says but she hopes that you will understand that the reason today in which the government is not faced with the renewed demand of the ..... So I mean, --

K: Well, of course, you will have to make the judgment: (a) whether you will get the prisoners back, if there's a total stalemate; and (b) -- Well, let's see you've played roulette several times and won, maybe you can conduct foreign policy that way.

D: Well, I don't really think it is so. Mr. Secretary, really, if we can say for a minute --

K: No, no; I will transmit what you have said. And now we just have to wait what the various responses will be.

D: I had Joe Sisco calling me this morning, Mr. Secretary, and he asked me what was the Cabinet's reaction. ..... I did not refer to the Sadat message at all but I told him only the first part with regard to the government decided that we are ready to talk to the Syrians but reiterated our position on the --

K: Yeah.

D: So in case he --

K: Well, I don't give a damn what Sisco thinks.

D: No, no, I just thought that I should inform you that he called.

K: Yeah.

D: I have really passed all the exchanges of views between heads.

K: Well, all we can do now is see what happens.

D: We'll wait. In the meantime, they are continuing the shelling there in heavy manner thinking that they could force us into it, which is also bad. You know, because it creates an opposite reaction on this one. You know, they've been shelling heavy ...

K: Mr. Ambassador, you remind me of a man who has won the grand prize in the lottery and is now trying to spend it as fast as you can. You have about two months to wreck the Arab coalition. My judgment hasn't been all that wrong on strategy in the past.

D: No --

K: And I wouldn't give a nickel for all these maneuvers that are now going on, which are good tactics and which may only bring back a much more strategic situation. We've now got the Europeans out of the game; we've got the Russians out of the game. Any hint of stalemate will bring them back into the game prematurely.

D: Mr. Secretary, may I suggest something, I would say that --

K: But maybe there won't be a stalemate, maybe they'll deliver the prisoner list and in that case --

D: Maybe you can suggest to them that they should give it to you and you will hand it to us .... a proposal.

K: But you know damn well I couldn't take that responsibility.

D: Well, at least we know that they are alive. You know, I mean it's -- You know, I'm just thinking aloud without any such _____. Maybe they give it to you and then you give us the number. You know, without giving us the list and then we send you proposals for your view -- for your consideration. Then they want Dayan here and then they give the full list. You know, I'm trying to --

K: Well, all I can say is -- You know, I have a message today from the Head of Egyptian Intelligence pointing out the extreme complexity of the situation for them. If there is no progress on anything in Syria by the time the disengagement is completed, --

D: Yeah.

K: But, you know, you know the situation as well as I do.

D: I understand.

K: And it may work.

D: No, what I'm trying to do is say that maybe if there is some move on the part of Syria, we can -- I can influence my government to take a parallel move. But as it is, the position of the Syrian has been so very hard from the very beginning and hasn't bent one inch. And here we are trying --

K: Well, they've bent by making a proposal to Israel, which is more than they've ever done before.

D: But, Mr. Secretary, with all due respect, I mean, their big concession was that they are prepared to let us move. You know, I mean, it's almost like what you said to me that our separation of forces will be that we will advance towards Cairo. So here they made a big concession and say to Israel they are going to behave themselves; we are going to be prepared to let them move towards the Golan Heights.

K: That's a big concession for them to admit to talk to you at all. And the major thing we want from the Syrians is to be able to split -- I mean, one cannot -- Well, you know, you'll just get me mad again. It doesn't make a goddamn bit of difference as long as we can isolate the Syrians eventually.

D: I understand this.

K: And that we cannot do if all hell starts breaking loose again withint the next two months.

D: I understand that.

K: And so whether you withdraw 10 kilometers or 15 kilometers, if it -- once there is a disengagement agreement with the Syrians, they're pregnant. Whether ..... have negotiated with you. Then you can see what you can see what you can get from the Egyptians. And once

K: (cont'd) you've done that, you can sit forever. Because the Syrians by themselves can do nothing.

D: I understand. And that is the reason why we want to negotiate with them. It's not that I said to you since it's a unilateral move, we will not negotiate. But I'm saying that this is something that the Syrians should be interested in too. My own logic is that they should be interested in it too. They are not doing it in our favor.

K: The Syrians are above all interested in having a blowup between the Arabs and Israel because they believe basically only with the destruction of Israel can they get what they want.

D: I know.

K: In this respect they are quite different from the Egyptians. And if they could have prevented an Egyptian disengagement, they would have blocked any disengagement. They would rather have you 13 kilometers -- what brings pressure on them is the isolation produced by the Egyptian disengagement agreement.

D: Yeah.

K: And, therefore, what they will try heaven and earth to bring about is force the Egyptians to line up with them again.

D: That is correct.

K: And, therefore, to the extent that you give Sadat an alibi that negotiations are going on already, you are making it harder for them to do it. To the extent that there are no negotiations, sooner or later Sadat will have to support them.

D: I understand this. What I am saying, Mr. Secretary, this is precisely why we want to negotiate with them. But all what I am saying is that they too have some stake in addition to the things you said, which are absolutely correct. And they must debate to you and .....

K: Well, there are two things that are going to be different. One is I'm not going to come out to the Middle East. Secondly, Asad is *not* Sadat. But, look, I've made my points. I can't be --

D: Mr. Secretary, I've made it as eloquently as I could.

K: And, you know, we'll just have to see what happens now.

D: Yeah. Maybe they will reconsider and have some sort of a first move.

K: I doubt it seriously. But I may be wrong.

*

D: Well, we'll see, Mr. Secretary.

K: Good. Okay, thank you.

T277 *

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
January 28, 1974
2:40 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

D....after your meeting with the Secretary General

K: Absolutely.

D: I have already heard that you made a very _____ statement on the Hill today.

K: On the Hill?

D: You were on the Hill today, no?

K: No.

D: A mix-up, sometimes that happens.

K: On what subject?

D: On POWs.

K: On what?

D: POWs.

K: It may have been a formal statem ent in my name.

D: I see. So good to mention but you did not make it personally? I don't know if you eceived -- I got a copy from Moscow of Brezhnev's message to the President from the plane.

K: I have not received it.

D: (D. reads the letter) His Excellence, President of the United States. I am flying close to the shores of the United States of America I express best wishes to you and the relations between the Soviet Union will benefit further..I am confident that the relations between the US and the USSR will develop further on international peace. Best Wishes to Henry A. Kissinger."

K: I appreciate that.

D: I am sure you will get it.

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K: I must say the Secretary General has really shown unbelievable wisdom under great provocation. I am very serious.

D: When for you is it a good time to have lunch or do you prefer dinner? What do you think, maybe Thursday?

K: Thursday or Friday.

D: Which do you prefer.

K: Let's aim for dinner Friday.

D: Around 8:00.

K: Alright. Is that alright with you?

D: Yes. Only thing I have here is may be...

K: Come to the State Department.

D: We have a reception here. Not for me.

K: You come to the State Department. No problem.

D: No problem.

K: No.

D: Your White House asked us to organize cocktails for the White House Fellows. Not me but one of my counsellors. Alright for you to go through there..

K: No, let's do it here.

D: OK. Very nice of you to have me. Around 7:00.

K: Let's say 8:00.

D: 8:00, First of February.

K: Exactly, good.

D: Thank you very much , Henry.

END

T278

1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger - Senator Stennis
January 28, 1974
2:45 p.m.

K: Mr. Chairman, How are you?

S: I'm just fine how are you?

K: Just fine

S: I just want to take one minute of your time to see what you feel on the Kissinger-Mooré r matter.

K: Fine, but I hate to have it called the Kissinger-Moorer matter. It's not.....

S: Excuse me I just used it for ...to identify it. The newspapers have played it up that way, I suppose. We;ll have to talk to the Committee members about it more formally and I thought I ought to talk to you to see if you had any different situation on your mind. It may come up tomorrow at the Foreign Relations Committee. By the way I think Senator Fulbright, ...well, he doesn't think much of these allegations and all. But as a practical question about approaching this, I don't know whether the armed services committee...

K: Mr. Chairman, let me tell you my own personal view, just between you and me, looking at it from my own point of view I think the lousy thing is ...it was a lousy thing to have done but I don't think it warrants undermining the confidence in the military. That's my attitude, it has been my attitude all along. It shouldn't have been done, it shouldn't have been tolerated but I don't believe it was a 7 Days in May thing. I think it was sort of a cheap move to make a few points. I believe Moorer when he says he didn't focus on it. He had a lot of other things to do and given my relations with Moorer, he didn't need to do it....

S: But the practical thing is what are we going to do with it?

K: I have never seen the report David Young wrote. I don't know what the allegations are.

S: I haven't seen it either. I heard they had a report of it at the Pentagan too.

K: I haven't seen that either.

S: Well, I don't want to get into this plumbers group on this. I don't have any confidence in them.

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K: My personal judgment without having read the Young report.... Young was on my staff and he did not inspire me...

S: Didn't what?

K: He did not inspire me with confidence that what he did do would be very serious or balanced. I would never have imagined he would be given a responsible assignment like investigating the military. As I have said publicly, I don't know about his investigations. That doesn't change the fact that he was doing it, or apparently, according to Krogh, was developing some damaging information. I mean, here was a kid who was not doing very well working for me, thrown into the Erlichman atmosphere. He may just have tried to prove how good he was.

S: I don't know if we have to go through all of that. They can make anything appear to be true almost.

K: That's the trouble. There's nobody I would rather have investiage this than you, Mr. Chairman.

S: Well, if we don't take some, if we don't do something. What do you think of this? I would ask you and Admiral Moorer to each, separately write me a letter undertaking to tell how you feel about this matter, say anything you want to. It might just be that it would settle it, or two, wemight be able to settle it by asking the two of you to come before the Committee and subject yourselves to questions.

K: Yes, the only problem, Mr. Chairman, is that my own direct knowledge of this matter is extremely limited. It really is confined to listening to 12-15 minutes of a taped interrogation of Admiral Wellander. I would be glad to say that and what I know.

S: I am thinking of the ...of your saying you have no grievance, what you just said to me.

K: I would be happy to do that, Mr. Chairman.

S: It might just be that our Committee would be convinced that you and Moorer worked together, had no grievance against one another officially or personally and he was getting information anyway, then so far as you and Moorer were concerned it might satisfy the Committee although whether we should insist on the military proceeding with reference to the yeoman, etc. ....

K: That would be up to you. I have never felt any purpose would be served by diggning up the matter now in a period when every other national institution is being questioned.

S: In keeping with what you told me in the beginning, we have got to move in some way.

K: I will be glad to writeyou a letter stating what I know, and stating whatever it was could not be based on personal animosity, that we worked closely together, it strikes me as a bureaucratic gamesmanship, and it would not affect the confidential relations between Moorer and me. We have worked closely together.

S: I think that would be splendid. It might just satisfy the membership. If not, if somebody insisted on the rifht to ask question, you could come over and we could ask the questions. I called you first. I think I'll call Moorer now.

K: You are free to tell him about our conversation, tell him what I propose to say in my letter...

S: We are not cooking up anything here that would be final.

K: I understand.

S: We have to take it step by step.

K: Of course.

S: Is the Foreign Relations open or not tomorrow?

K: Executive session. I thought I would ....the allegations, say I wasn't content with them and take the initiative and say what I know. I don't know if that would be appropriate. In your judgment....

said you

S: Well you know the New York Times can falsify one thing with another. I've seen what Percy asked you, I believe it was Percy.

K: He asked if I knew about burglaries or other illegalities. I answered in that connection.

S: I saw ...he showed me the question and answers. I think I would cover that by my own volition. I think Fulbright would welcome it. About the leter...

K: I will wait until you have talked to Moorer and then if you request it I will do it.

S: Should I call your secretary or call you back?

K: Either way.

S: All right. Bye.

T281

1*

TELECON
Secretary Kissinger/General Scowcroft
January 28, 1974, 7:05 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

S: I'm looking at the papers themselves.

K: 6 of September 1972?

S: That's right.

K: On the classification project?

S: That's right.

K: ~~WKXX~~ Was that in 1972?

S: It's still going on. As a matter of fact, it's still going on.

K: Well, that's even better. So I had every reason to believe that during that whole period he was working on declassification.

S: Oh, sure. In fact, the memos you were getting from him...

K: But not until then.

S: There was a lot of work to be done before they got out.

K: When is the first memo of a meeting?

S: The first minutes I have here are in September of 1972, but I know there are some before that. There have to be. But they're the first ones I have. I'll find out where the other ones are because there have to be some before that. There were two press concerences -- one in March, one in May of '72.

K: O.K. Thank you.

END

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 17 MAY 2004 200102979

T279

TELCON
Kubisch/Sec. Kissinger
Monday, January 28, 1974
3:03 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Jack, I just found out from Larry that he has already talked to you about doing it all in one day.

JK: Right.

K: Don't you think that the best?

JK: Sure. It will be a very hard day for your but we can talk it out.

K: The hard part is riding in the plane with so many ARA people.

JK: You said you would be prepared to leave at 8:00 in the morning.

K: Yes, and they can still give the lunch.

JK:: You get there at 12:30 and you stay there until 4:10.

K: I am willing to stay until 6:00.

JK: It is a five hour and 20 minutes trip down with one hour time change.

K: Five hour trip down?

JK: Five hours and 20 minutes each way; block to block -- Andrews to Panama.

K: That happy news you never gave me.

JK: I did not know that myself.

K: Even so, if we leave at 5:00.

JK: If you leave at 5:00 it puts you in here at 11:20.

K: So what. Even 6:00 is all right with me.

JK: I think, actually, three or four hours there is adequate.

K: As long as we do it we should do it gracefully.

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Kubisch
Jan. 28, 1974

JK: They have agreed on Saturday from Thursday. No problem.

K: Do you think we should stick with the original 7-8 schedule.

JK: Up to you, Mr. Secretary. This one will work out all right. It just becomes an arduous day for you. If you go down the night before you get a good night's sleep and a shorter day. You can work going down and back on the plane.

K: And I can take a nap on the plane coming back.

JK: Right. I won't be going down with you. I will be meeting you there.

K: Can you be back by Thursday.

JK: Yes. I was going to meet you in Panama on Thursday night and spend time talking with you coming back.

K: Let's keep it open and I will see you at 5:00. We will decide it then.

END

T283

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
January 29, 1974
8:40 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

S: Yes sir.

K: Have you checked your files whether there's anything -- whether you've any minutes from Latina of earlier meetings?

S: No, I haven't found any yet in my files. There may be some in the general files. I'm sure the meetings went on and on throughout this whole period.

K: See if you can find some of the earlier ones.

S: Is first thing in the morning all right?

K: I've got to have it first thing in the morning.

S: I understand when you want it.

END

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 17 MAY 2004 200102979

T280

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Secretary Kissinger/Dan Rather
January 28, 1974, 5:30 p.m.

R: Well, the difficulty is that Marvin is off for a while, and Walter is insisting that we do a piece tonight on the Conference.

K: Which conference?

R: The oil-producing countries.

K: Consuming.

R: Oil-consuming -- with, hopefully, one on the producers later. He seems to feel -- on what he bases this, I'm not certain -- that the conference is as good as dead.

K: Absolutely not.

R: Well, because it's so important, I need some guidance.

K: We have -- The meeting is scheduled for the 11th. We are working on a program for it which I think is really shaping into... For your information, Heath is sending his Cabinet Secretary over here to coordinate their position with ours. The only problem now is France -- they're going to be isolated.

R: Would that include the Belgians?

K: The Belgians will certainly come. It's a technical problem because they haven't got a Cabinet. But there is no doubt whatever that the Conference will take place. They're all sending senior delegations. The British are sending Lord Carrington and Lord Hume. Everyone is sending their Foreign Minister. I haven't seen any of the papers of the other countries. We are making a major effort in coming up with some challenging approaches.

R: No danger that the Japanese will buckle?

K: They're sending Ohiro over here.

R: Yamani had this news conference.

K: That[redacted] I can't tell. I cannot imagine

R: But he did say if the purpose of the conference is to get a united front for pressure, then our _____ would be very negative.

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K: Realistically -- We are not advertising it as a united front for pressure. We want a united front for analyzing the problem -- such as consumer restraints, research and development -- that's not pressure. It's a common problem all industrialized nations have. This

R: This is the first in a series of steps to put something together.

K: Right.

R: That's very helpful to me.

K: You'd be way off base saying _____. I don't know whether the Japanese -- we have heard no word at all. Have you?

R: Quite the contrary. There's every indication - they're concerned about things and have every intention of coming. ~~Hopefully~~ They're hopeful it may lead to something.

K; Right.

R: I appreciate your taking the call, and I appreciate your help.

K: Not at all.

END

T 282

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
The President/Secretary Kissinger
January 28, 1974, 7:10 p.m.

N: Hello.

K: Mr. President.

N: Henry, how are you. I was wondering if you got that document up yet.

K: I sent it up a couple of hours ago. It may be caught in the system, Mr. President. It's just one paragraph, but all the information in it is requested by the Saudis.

N: What we want to do is to get the damned embargo lifted, and we want to say the things that will not be put out -- you know the point -- to make it appear like a helluva foreign policy achievment of this Administration. If you hadn't worked out the Israeli-Egyptian thing, we wouldn't be here.

K: That's absolutely true. I don't mean

N: When they start that crap, I say except for Henry Kissinger we wouldn't even have a chance to have the embargo lifted.

K: It wasn't that. It was what we did for four years.

N: You're good to say that.

K: No, but it's true.

N: Thank God you had the guts to stand up and do the right thing. If I can announce it in a subtle way -- what do you think I should say?

K: You should read what I gave you, but you certainly can add a paragraph of your own. Incidentally, in foreign policy, it's the credibility.

N: But the main thing I should say is that as a result of the conversations we have had in the last 48 hours, etc., etc., that the embargo will be lifted.

K: That you can say.

N: Secondly, I will say, as a result, I can now announce with full confidence to the American people there will be no rationing.

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K: That you can also say.

N: That will be the good news of this speech -- just that -- that's all we need.

K: What you cannot say is about production restriction will also be lifted -- but the public won't understand that, so there's no point.

N: You and I know it took four years to do it. Where are you now?

K: I'm in my office.

N: My God -- it's so late.

K: It's only 7 o'clock.

N: No, it's longer than that.

K: No, it's 7:15.

N: State Department or White House?

K: State Department. I was in the White House in the morning. What I usually do is spend the mornings at the White House and the afternoons at the State Department.

N: We've taken care of all your needs now? Let's see. We've taken care of Gromyko. We've taken care of the Italian - in March. Nobody else you have to worry about at the moment?

K: No, Mr. President.

N: Thank God. I was just thinking -- when I talked to my old friend Bill, I'd have to go into great _____, but with you we all know what the game is -- you do what's necessary. No more.

K: Exactly, Mr. President.

N: These are necessary.

K: These are necessary.

N: Fine. I'll do them. Incidentally, if dinners are necessary, I'll do them, but I prefer for you to have them.

K: I don't think that's necessary.

N: Also -- have Ford do them. Ford could do Hussein for us. Basically, Gromyko doesn't need - he doesn't expect a dinner.

K: I'm going to have dinner with Gromyko at the Soviet Embassy.

N: With Gromyko, I see him. He never expects dinner. For all the others, use Ford -- he loves to do it. He has the place for it.

K: I think it's an excellent idea. I'll check on that document.

N: Don't bother to check on it.

K: Right, Mr. President.

END

5071*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger - Amb. Dobrynin
January 29, 1974
3:50 p.m.

FB: _____

K: Its a new wiretap devise that translates immediately into English.

D: That's why you are in trouble. You can voluntarily.....

K: What do you want?

D: Diyou call me just now.

K: Why should I call the Russian Ambassador?

D: Well anyway I will take the opportunity to make two points. First, you remember I mentioned to you about Congress. I received from Moscow today andinvitation from our government to discuss in the future (at least in the next year or two), to be in communication with Congress, to send a delegation in general for discussions, a committee with Albert, Carl Albert, for instance, in this connection.

K: Very good. I will strongly support it.

D: I am going to visit them tomorrow but I heard from Moscow that I have to advise you about doing this. Second. Gromyko will be here on Sunday evening. He will leave on Tuesday. In any case all negotiations, discussions will go on on Monday.

K: That's right. You want to have dinner on Monday night?

D: I think that is a good idea, Henry. If you will organize it.

K: Do you want me to get a date for him.

D: That depends what kind. He is rather sophisticated man now you know.

K: How about Meg Osmer?

D: After Cuba she should be something special.

K: Well a blonde...they won't give him a blonde down there.

D: You're probably right. Monday night.

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K: And I'll give you the time for the President.

*

D: Good.

K: I'll see you Friday at the State Department.

D: 8:00 o clock?

K: 8:00 o'clock. Good.

EYES ONLY

FOR:

Please return to [illegible]
by Close of Business [illegible]

T284

TELCON
The President/Secretary Kissinger
January 29, 1974
1:25 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

N: How did you get along up there.

K: Very well.

N: Foreign Relations Committee.

K; Right.

N: I was talking to Brent Scowcroft -- you are back at the State Department?

K: That's right.

N: Because of the length of the thing, I have to boil down the section on the embargo. He is working on it but I would appreciate your helpf. I'll make all the points but I want to cut it as much as I can.

K: Right. I have it in front of me, Mr. President.

N: I don't have it in front of me. It is over with Price. I'll make any commitments that we need. But I don't want to put too much there. It is not only the length of it but the rhythm of the section. I move from that to the (part) on energy. If I have too many words it will destroy the thing.

K: I am looking through it. There are a few key phrases that have to stay in, like "this is only the first step" -- "the agreement on disengagement"...

N: On the disengagement -- we are talking about two different subjects. I know they are interlocking.

K: I see about three sentences...

N: What I am getting at is -- the embargo is what I am talking about. I know the disengagement.is locked to it but without the disengagement you could not have the embargo lifted. But I want to make it clear we support the disengagement and support the disengagement and support the additonal steps for permanent peace. Boil it down as much as you can, will you, please.

K: Absolutely.

N: Send it to me and I will take another look at it.

K: I will get it to you by 3:00.

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N: Good. Is everything else all right?

K: It went beautifully.

N: (Not clear)

K: You run the risk -- this is what the Saudi Arabians authorized. Kuwait may start climbing the wall but then we just have to crack them but Saudi Arabia authorized it. The text we have given you has been cleared in fact suggested by Saudi Arabia and has...

N: In the speech...

K: And has been approved by Sadat. It would be a hell of a risk for them if they disavowed you.

N: O.K. Fine. Thank you Henry.

K: I would take the chance.

END.

T286

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Otis Chandler - Secretary Kissinger
January 29, 1974
4:15 p.m.

K: Otis, how are you.

C: Fine, how are you?

K: OK.

C: Have you recovered a little bit.

K: Oh, yes, I'm in good shape.

C: Are you going to have any time to go to Acapulco.

K: That's what keeps me going, that possibility.

C: The reason I'm troubling you, I'll only take a minute of your time because I know how busy you must be, I'm calling for Mother. She has written to you about speaking to about 500 ladies at the music center here on the west coast. I thought now that things have calmed down a little bit you might be able to look ahead to February or April and give her some idea when you would be able to come out.

K: Let me review my calendar and get back to you by the end of the week.

C: Fine. How are things otherwise?

K: Well I'm getting back into the time zone. Things are going along, though. I think we're getting something started with Australia, I mean Syria.

C: Henry, you are the one bright spot in the newspaper every day. The rest of the news is not very good, but...

K: Otis you have been a very good friend, at all times.

C: Henry, anything you want, I'll be here.

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K: What you said, I won't forget what you said when you made the toast at the dinner for the Chinese.

UNCLASSIFIED

C: When are you going to come out to see us and have a little fun?

*1 K: You guys have made it impossible for the President to go to San Clemente. Think of me when you write those things.

1*

C: OK Henry. Get a little rest.

K: Thank you Otis.

T285

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Senator Mansfield/Secretary Kissinger
January 29, 1974
4:09 pm

K: How are you?

M: Fine. Good job this morning.

K: Thank you.

M: Secondly, are you going to bring up Marshall Wright with you tomorrow to the luncheon?

K: It is up to you.

M: That's fine. Do you want to bring Lord?

K: It is entirely up to you.

M: It is up to you, if you want him.

K: What are we going to discuss?

M: Anything. It is going to be on the Middle East and other wide-ranging issues.

K: Why don't I just bring Marshall Wright then.

M: OK. Next thing, will you contact the Chinese at your convenience and fint out what their problems are?

K: I think they are having domestic problems again. I think the imminence of your arrival causes that.

M: (Laughter) That is very likely.

K: I will do it today.

M: We;ll see you up here tomorrow at 12:30 in my office , in the leadership office in the Senate.

K: I look forward to it.

M: We;re delighted to have you

END

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T287

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt - Secretary Kissinger
January 29, 1974
5:05 p.m.

K: _____considering French forces, are they outside of that?

S: They are outside.

K: Then when we say they have got to be reduced by 700,000...

S: Oh, I thought you were talking about SALT. The French are outside of that.

K: 50,000 Frenchmen we claim as a bonus for ourselves. That's absurd.

S: That's in deference to the French.

K: I'm surprised the Soviets haven't raised that yet.

S: They haven't talked common ceiling at all.

K: We would give them a 50,000 bonus?

S: I don't know the result of that.

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T289 *

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Larry Eagleburger
1/30/74; 9:45 a.m.

K: Larry.

E: Yes, sir.

K: Make sure that what I told Campbell to send out on that Syrian message of last night gets impounded.

E: It has been. I checked this morning.

K: The outgoing as well as the incoming?

E: Both of them, yes, sir. They are both locked up.

K: Okay. And I don't want Pickering to panhandle it around the building.

E: He hasn't even got a copy himself. They are all in the safe.

K: Okay. And I am now going to create a committee of Scowcroft, you and Campbell to make my schedule. What is being done now is inhuman. Why you all had to schedule four meetings at Congress this week -- what it is about the Ways and Means Committee that couldn't wait until next week, no one will ever be able to explain to me. Why I have to go up to the Hill twice a day every day. I have the Panama Statement, the Latin American thing, and then I have not one hour to read one operational cable. I don't know what it means to be Secretary of State under these conditions.

E: Okay, sir, we will . . .

K: I am not in control of any Goddamn thing. I don't know what one operational thing that is going on it these days!

E: Okay, Sir. I will meet you on the Hill.

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T 288 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Gen. Scowcroft/Sec. Kissinger
Wednesday, January 30, 1974
9:35 a.m.

K: Have you seen the cable from Saudi Arabia?

S: Yes.

K: I don't think we should put anything in there that makes the President look silly.

S: You mean about assurances.

K: Yes. I don't know.

S: My inclination was to leave it the way we had it and if the assurances proved not accurate that gives us even more reason for sitting on our hands with respect to the Arabs.

K: No. No. But just a minute, we now have a letter. This was fine yesterday -- that was my view yesterday. I think it a revolting performance. If I was the President I would tell the Arabs to shove their oil and tell the Congress we will have rationing rather than submit and you would get the embargo lifted in three days but I am not President until this GD constitutional amendment.

S: Laughter.

K: As long as they are at it(anything) against being emperor?

S: Not as long as I can be your grand vizer.

K: I would take the language the Saudis gave me.

S: The only trouble is in a doesn't that make the President look silly by saying anything?

K: I would not say anything if I were him. My problem is if the Saudis get the word out that they urged us not to do it. We cannot claim that they tricked us if we go beyond what they authorized us to say. And then the President will be blamed for playing cheap politics which God forbid he would not do. My strong view is to put it in the language that they gave us.

S:. O.K.

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K: I think it safer. The public will understand it almost the same way and if that assurance is broken I would not -- calling an urgent meeting. I would say "to arrange a meeting". Do not say "discuss". Get it done immediately.

S: I will call Price.

K: Say it is done by our great friends the Arabs.

S: I will get it done right away.

K: I will be over in 10 minutes.

END

T298 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Secretary Kissinger/Ambassador Dinitz
January 30, 1974, 10:33 p.m.

D: I have just seen you at the Joint Session of Congress.

K: How did you like my speech?

D: I thought it was good, especially the part you wrote. I think he could have done without the last part.

K: _____ caused me about not listening to coercion.

D: No, Mr. Secretary, I was driving back from Congress with Vivian -- and I told her the sentence about we won't be coerced was put there by the Secretary.

K: Put by the Secretary is no expression. It took me a week until 3:00 this afternoon. Mr. Ambassador, I have been in close touch with the Egyptians about your obstinacy.

D: That's not the right

K: You people believe in the continued possibility of miracles.

D: No.

K: Let's not argue now. If the Egyptians produce for you the number of prisoners -- not the names, but the number -- would you then be willing to make some sort of proposal and with the understanding that when the negotiations start you get the list and the Red Cross?

D: Some proposition to you?

K: Which we would then pass on through the Egyptians to the Syrians.

D: Of course, I will pass it to Israel, but I would tell you what I would suggest as a matter that would be acceptable, I think. If we can say, as I am trying for the last two days to sell my Government, and I did not succeed

K: I don't want to argue. I'm just filled with despair as a friend and admirer of Israel.

D: Mr. Secretary, I will tell you what I have in mind, but the important thing is what I was trying to get Israel to do -- that they would authorize me to tell you that we are prepared to

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bring Dayan here - that you are authorized to inform the Syrians that Dayan would be coming with ~~exem~~ a complete proposal and talk ~~wth~~ with you. Once you give him the list, they should give you -- because Dayan is coming to receive the list. That is what my suggestion is. Which was not acceptable. I don't think it's games, but

K: What the Egyptians have said to me is that they think they might be able to get the number of prisoners -- a suggestion I made at Geneva.

D: You made it in Jerusalem.

K: In Geneva I discussed it with Eban and Everon (sp?).

D: I did not know that. This I will pass on.

K: I just would like to see the number. At least that gives you stability. Even if it's 10, it means that they cannot give you less than that.

D: Then for this number, what do we have to do -- pass to you the proposal?

K: We haven't been told at this point -- only a question of what you would do for the number. The Egyptians seem to be in despair about this themselves -- they're not trying to squeeze you. They've now said they think they can get the number -- what can we say to the Syrians?

D: Maybe we can say that for the moment we can have Dayan come here with a proposal and then before he presents it he will get a list -- maybe that can be worked out -- because, you see, the Prime Minister and Dayan did not want to come here not because they don't trust the Syrians but because they don't want to take the

K: Just a minute. That I understand. On the other hand, if they give you the number, that doesn't ease the mind of the people, but it gives a fl__.

D: I understand.

K: You at least can stop worrying about people getting murdered.

D: The question is how do we move on our part?

K: I'm just trying to find out what we can do to get the number. The Egyptians have said to me they think they can get the number, but obviously not -- they haven't said what you should do for the number.

D: Why don't I suggest to Israel

K: What they obviously seem to think -- will you give a proposal for the number -- because that's the context of the whole discussion -- how to get the negotiations started.

D: I am trying to think aloud.

K: How about the following -- and really, I have no authority to say this at all. Supposing we say to them Dayan comes over here and gives me the proposal. I will then certify that it is a rational proposal for discussion. If I say that, before I transmit it they have to give the list and permit Red Cross visits. You see what I mean?

D: Of course.

K: I don't pass it on.

D: Of course. Well, I'll pass this on.

K: But I don't know whether they'll accept that.

D: That I am pretty sure they will accept because I'm trying to make myself clear, Mr. Secretary, because I had long talks.

K: I understand your problem. Your problem is not to be in a position where you make a proposal, then they say "great" -- now make another one before you get the list. If they give me the number I give you the number, then you have gotten -- you've at least saved the lives of those whose number you have because they have to deliver them. Supposing Dayan comes over here, gives me the proposal -- not one like the Syrian -- which is a total insult

D: The Prime Minister did not even bring that up with the Cabinet. It would have leaked -- just too disgraceful.

K: You know, your information about my briefings is so accurate that I

D: Well, Symington has said a new romance has developed -- and he called me - Javits - to say if he heard you he has heard me.

K: Strategically, we are now in complete accord.

D: But I wanted so much to get across to you. We are not stubborn on this. But the prisoners will become pawns and hostages.

K: But now we have a little movement. Can you -- when you're not a Marxist, you can be very ingenious. Get your geniuses there -- seriously -- if you can get the number, you have something. I don't know whether I want to be in the position of passing on the merit. That worries me a bit.

D: Yes. May I correct it a bit and say this -- that you get the number, you pass us the number, then Dayan comes here, then he gives you the proposal but doesn't authorize you to transmit. Once he does it, before you pass it on, you get from the Syrians a promise for the Red Cross visits and then you pass them the proposal. What the people in Israel are afraid of is that once we will pass the proposal to you, then the Syrians will use our prisoners as a leverage on us.

K: I will have a proposal?

D: You will have a proposal which will bait them.

K: The only thing that I then require is that you make the _____ so that if I pass it on, I won't be totally discredited. Make it as serious

D: I think we will make a serious proposal, but it won't be anything like the Syrian proposal.

K: _____ limit of your endurance. I'm not even going to discuss the Syrian proposal. Not even a provision for a UNEF in Syria -- you need a UNEF. You couldn't have the Syrians within artillery range of the Galilee.

D: I tell you the truth. At this stage our concrete thinking on the matter -- because my Goverrmment doesn't even trust me.

K: I have a theory.

D: What?

K: My theory is that they don't have a proposal.

D: That could be -- but they will have. It may take about two weeks -- it won't be overnight. Well, we have to get the O.K. from the Government. I want to tell you the mood there is very very bad -- the families -- it's a Jewish state, let's face it.

K: Our families have been through this. This could now be transferred into some kind of movement.

D: I was thinking. You have added this element. I was vetoed on a ~~xxxxx~~ less liberal proposal. That Dayan would come -- that you would have the list in your possession -- and that was not accepted.

K: Maybe with a list at least they will not kill the people.

D: I will see. Mr. Secretary, I have two questions. What do they mean - the part about lifting the embargo?

K: That's the oil producers.

D: OPEC? Are there going to be conditions there?

K: We have already told them we won't accept additional conditions.

D: There there was so carefully the phrasing about 338 and 442. That was the 442 -- it did not exist in the agreement

K: This has been -- he's been wanting to do this for months.

D: Well, so long as it doesn't

K: I've tried to explain the situation to you. If I can keep control of the process because this -- I've always delivered what I said I would. You've got to keep me in charge of the process, and therefore I'm trying to avoid the consciousness of a stalemate penetrating throughout this government, and therefore I have keep this matter very close up to now.

D: The one item I - Misrafi

K: Misrafi and Levy -- they will be released when ~~when~~ your disengagement is....

D: As a matter of

K: I will raise it tomorrow.

D: You will let me know when you hear from them.

K: You can count on that.

D: And you will tomorrow raise it with Sadat.

K: And get me an answer tomorrow.

END

T290 *

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Art Hummel
1/30/74; 9:50 a.m.

K: Hello.

H: Good morning, sir.

K: Could you find out from the Japanese Ambassador who of course is _____ national characteristic of not being able to tell a lie what this story is about of their deal with the Saudis?

H: All right, sir, I will try.

K: What do you think? There must be something to it.

H: I honestly don't know sir. They have -- uh, I'll have to look in to it. While I have you on about the Japanese, you know that you promised Yasukawa (? to get back to him and the time is long past, with whether or not we would refuse to sign a bilateral if there is no trilateral. Do you remember this query? Ken Rush is going to see Yasukawa but doesn't have an answer on that point and there is no point in Ken Rush seeing him unless we can pin that down.

K: As I understand it the Japanese are threatening us to go ahead in bilateral talks.

H: No sir, they want to know whether we will hold firm and if so, how firm on insisting on a trilateral.

K: We will insist on a trilateral.

H: Will we refuse to sign a bilateral? That was Yasukawa's question to you.

K: Well, frankly, I haven't gotten a clear answer from the President yet.

H: Yes.

K: We will certainly go very far in pressing for a trilateral and I've said s o publicly.

H: Yes. All right. Go very far.

K: Just tell him, you know, that issue hasn't been raised yet but we have raise them in the closest context with each other.

H: Yasukawa's going to be disappointed. There isn't a clear-cut answer to that clear question.

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K: What do you think?

H: I don't honestly think we ought to promise to refuse to sign other things under such circumstances but I don't know how to formulate the reply to the Japanese.

K: Well, can you see whether we can formulate a very tough reply. I mean that we will go very far but stop just short of saying that we won't refuse. We will refuse?

H: Yes. All right, sir. We will go very far but we cannot say at this time whether we would.

K: Because we don't think that issue -- we hope this issue will not arise.

H: Yes.

K; Okay.

H: All right, sir.

K: Good.

H: And I'll get back to you about the Saudis.

K: Right.

H: Bye.

T294 1*

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
January 30, 1974
6:07 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

S: Brent has it on file over there.

K: Can you get it for me?

S: We have to have it sent over physically. Then let me call him.

K: Then let's get Hunt in about 7:30.

S: Alright.

END

6:09

S: He may want to bring Sachs with him, I don't know.

K: He can bring anyone he wants.

S: OK.

END

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T292 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger/George Vest
12:13 p.m. 1/30/74

V: George Vest here.

K: George, two things. We just have to connect everyday. I can't let you brief without my knowing what you are briefing on. That just cannot be.

V: Right. Right.

K: I'm not secure enough that way. Secondly, would you call the London Times Correspondent here and say I just read that Saltzburg article and they should know that the first time I changed my ~~itinerary~~ itinerary to stop in London at the specific request of Home while fear of meeting him at the airport hadn't even crossed my mind

V: Hm huh.

K: And the second time, I also changed my itinerary--though I took the initiative, but given the fact that I deprived myself of any sleep at night to do it, and I think it is goddamned ungracious of them.

V: Right.
Did you notice the Alsop story this morning, sir also--in the Post.

K: What did he say?

V: There is a complete misnomer in there--he deals with instance around the fact that there were to have been four--an announcement our of four capitals including Moscow saying that your party had originally given out that story and in the end Moscow declined to issue the announcement

K: Call him up and tell him it is a total lie.

V: Right I will do that

K: And can you call Sisco and tell him I am outraged at the Gwertzman story on the oil embargo--

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TELCON
Secy Kissinger/George Vest
[Cont'd from ...]

K: ... coming from him.

V: I'm sure from him.

K: Well, why?

V: I don't know. But I'm sure of that. And I will call him.

K: Well, why are you sure of it?

V: Because I've heard someone mention something.

K: Okay. Will you tell him that must stop?

V: Yes, I will do so.

T291 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Mr. Kissinger/Mr. Simon
10:15 a.m. 1/30/74

K: Hello

S: Hi, I had breakfast with Walter Levy this morning and he thinks it is extremely important that he have a brief meeting with you if you can fit it in. He is extraordinarily concerned and his contacts with _____ people and maybe he can shed some light.

K: Okay good.

S: He is over in Grendon (?) Groves office in the State Department right now.

K: Right, I will be tied up for a couple of hours and I will try to fit him in.

S: Super, I'll have him call your secretary.

K: Good.

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TELCON

Secretary Kissinger/Mr. Simon
12:13 p.m. 1/30/74

S: Henry, I am sorry to bother you--we have a major problem and that is the meeting with the Canadians tomorrow. Trudeau as you know offered a treaty and sent it to President Nixon which was a rather _____ thing to do--the present strategy in the State Department is to waffle that and say we are looking at that proposal and so on--I would propose we say this is great--let us proceed, let us do it--if it breaks down later, that's something else--but let's make the first step as far as the treaty on the McKinsey Valley Pipeline is concerned and I think this is what our relations have needed for a long time--but I'm no expert in the foreign policy area.

K: Let me get back to you by the end of the day.

S: That would be super because I'm meeting with Minister McDonald privately this evening and if I could wisper that in his ear tonight before the meeting tomorrow, we could really set the tone and really have a successful meeting tomorrow. He is an antagonistic bastard

K: Okay, let me see what I can do.

S: Super.

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T295

TELECON
George Vest/Secretary Kissinger
January 30, 1974
8:05 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Did you get to the London Times today?

V: I got to the London Times, one of their minor columnists. I explained the full background to make sure they were aware of the circumstances of your arrival under which you were coming to London. Fred Emery assured me he would do so. I got to Joe Alsop and explained the background of that particular information. He said thanks very much and that was that. I passed on your comment to Joe Sisco. However, in looking at the story - it was a story that was being carried in a number of other places as well - but that one had a high State Department source. The story itself was widely carried. If a may, may I see you before or after your Rabassa visit tomorrow.

K: I want to see you before you brief. Look, I've got to get going.

V: Yes sir.

END

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T297

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
January 30, 1974
10:15 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

S: Hello.

K: Brent.

S: Yes sir.

K: Do you have the line to the Soviet Ambassador switched off in my office.

S: Just a second. Apparently we do. You want him back on. I guess it's ringing over there and someone told the secretaries to switch it off.

K: It was shorting. The light would come on but nobody would be on it. It could be he was trying to call me.

S: Apparently it was ringing over there. It has been continually shorting as you know.

K: Yes.

S: You want it back on?

K: No. I just wanted to make sure I'm not missing a call from Dobrynin.

S: Of course, it's ringing back here, we can't turn it off.

K: What did you think of his speech.

S: I thought it was good.

K: I hoped he would get off foreign policy. He's going to invite an attack.

S: It was a very spirited delivery. He did well. I don't know how you got him to put in the particulars on the embargo.

K: You think it was all right?

S: I do, don't you?

K: Oh, yes. He's worried about it, said it made him nervous. _____

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S: Exactly the thing to do.

K: I agree.

S: Good strong statement.

K: OK.

END

T296

TELECON
The President/Secretary Kissinger
January 30, 1974, 10:03 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Mr. President, this was a great and courageous speech.

N: Well, it's nice of you to call. I looked at you a couple of times, and I gave Dobrynin a couple of looks, too.

K: I think it was very moving, Mr. President.

N: I thought it was necessary to add that little - the five minutes at the end. Otherwise they would have said I ignored the damned thing.

K: It was good that you did not include it in the formal text. In the formal text you laid out an agenda.

N: If I had ignored it completely, they would have said you were afraid to.

K: I wondered about how it would be handled.

N: Not in the formal speech at all, you know.

K: It was tremendous and moving.

N: We hope it helps, Henry. I coppered down that Arab part. The coercion bit bothers me, but Al said you thought it was important. It's a shot across the bow. We gotta let them know we don't have to have them.

K: You'll get more credit for having said it. Everyone understood what you were saying.

N: You notice how I did the Soviet part. I rewrote it. That military part - I struck it all out _____ -- strength for the sake of strength.

K: That came out extremely well. It was very, very powerful. I think you got out of the energy thing what you need. We got a message from the Saudis this morning in which they asked us to tone down what you said _____ stuck to the original.

N: I understand. This way we get two bites at the apple. Well, Henry, keep the faith.

K: No question about it.

END

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T301

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretar y Kissinger
January 31, 1974
4:55 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

S: I was going in your place with Casey to this meeting.

K: I hope you were forthcoming.

S: I was hung up with the Congressional thing.

K: The hell with the Congressional thing.

S: The next thing they are going to do is the next step in this long term agreement -- Petrosyants is coming here and as Kendall's guest in this Chamber of Commerce thing at the end of February and that will be the ti me to decide whether to give the Soviets an actual counter draft in this long-term agreement.

K: I am in favor of the draft.

S: We left it open but as long as you want to do it I'll tell Shultz that is the decision.

K: Good.

S: OK. In preparation for your Bahr meeting, a letter from Ron that he gave me to the President, which you'll see as a Bahr ploy. I am sending you another memo.

K: May I have it in time to address it before the meeting?

S: You'll have it.

K: My problem is everyone is working for himself and not for me. I get these things too late.

S: Well, it has been down there for two days.

K: God damn it, the practical result is..

S: I am not in your outer office staff. They are holding it for you.

K: Don't talk to me about things I have not seen

S: I want to alert you to the fact that Bahr is coming here , thinking he would be received by the President.

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K: That is out of the question.

S: Well, I am just writing you a note so you can butter him up a bit tomorrow.

END

T299

TELCON
Ron Ziegler/Sec. Kissinger
Thursday, January 31, 1974
3:00 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you Ron?

RZ: Fine.

K: You called me.

RZ: Yes. I wanted to dovetail with you on the meeting. I left it very loose.

K: Which meeting?

RZ: The oil Arab meeting. I handled it in the briefing by saying I was not going to discuss the details of contacts that the President has but that the President had indicated that this matter would be urgently addressed.

K: Correct.

Z: They said when is the meeting. I said we know of the Feb. 14th meeting but we were not told. None of the communications said when the meeting would take place. I said certainly no later than the 14th.

K: Correct.

Z: I said I could not rule out that they might do it before then but Id did not know.

K: I agree.

Z: Did you pin it to the 14th -- there is a bulletin.

K: That was coming out of the Ways and Means Committee. I said it was one meeting I knew was taking place. I had vest put out today exactly what you have said. We don't know whether it is the 14th or before but it would not be after.

Z: We are right on target.

END

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T300

TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin/Sec. Kissinger
Thursday, January 31, 1974
3:05 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

D: Henry, I am calling you about the communique. We are prepared to do it tomorrow or the day after if you like.

K: I will check and let you know.

D: I will give you approximately -- I will call you three minutes later.

K: Leave it with my secretary.

D: Then you will look at it -- not necessary for you to follow word for word. If you have suggestions let me know. When you decide to have it tomorrow or the day after let me know.

K: I will let you know by 4:30.

D: O.K. I will give you the text that Gromyko proposes to make public. For him it is all right tomorrow or day after.

END

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T302

TELCON
Ziegler/Sec. Kissinger
Thursday, January 31, 1974
4:18 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I wanted to check with you. I have arranged with Gromyko to come from Cuba to visit Washington.

Z: Hmmz Hmm.

K: On Monday.

Z: Hmm.

K: He will also see the President. Two questions -- should that be announced on Friday or Saturday.

Z: Saturday.

K: All right. Should we announce it at State or at the White House.

Z: Is he coming here to see you.

K: He is coming principally to see me but he will also see the President.

Z: Then why don't we announce it from here and say he is coming o to visit you and will be seeing the Presidnet.

K: There is an agreed text. Fine with me. I have no great ambition to have it announced here. Just wanted to check with you.

Z: O.K. Let's do it Saturday and we will announce it from here.

K: Good.

Z: Fine, Henry.

END

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T303

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
January 31, 1974
5:10 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Where were you?

D: I was on the Hill trying to help our mutual friend.

K: I spent one and a half hours trying to talk to the Ways and Means Committee today..

D: I was only with the Chairman.

K: I think we may turn this MFN thing around.

D: Really?

K: If we can... keep our course in the Middle East cooperative, without drama on either side..

D: We are..I am..

K: I am telling them it is enough and I am making headway.

D: I think it is good news.

K: It isn't a question of ..

D: No, it is a symbol.

K: We would like to make the announcement on Saturday.

D: Alright. 12:00 or when?

K: 11:00 our time.

D: That make it 6:00 in the evening...

K: You don't mind if we do it in english?

D: It is our translation.

K: There will be nothing else..no substantive change.

D: You don't object to it?

K: No. We will use, that is there will be no substantive change.

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K: It will just be more elegant english.

D: I will mention to them that we agree on it.

K: What we have will sould in Russian the same way.

D: So, it is set. I believe in your good english, Henry. So, I see you tomorrow at 8:00?

K: Yes.

D: I look forward to it.

K: Good.

END

T307

1*

TELECON
Secretary Kissinger/Ambassador Dinitz
January 31, 1974, 7:50 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

D: How are you?

K: O.K. You have, I take it, not had a response from Israel?

D: I did talk to Israel on the telephone at noon today, and the Prime Minister wanted me to tell you she'll make an answer in two or three days.

K: Jesus. For your information, I had a message from the Syrians today giving me the same hint that they gave to the Egyptians.

D: About the number?

K: Yes. And secondly, asking me whether I would be willing to engage myself if the negotiations lead to a release of the prisoners list. I sent them a note of your position the other day, and they said in what way is this different from your old position?

D: You mean?

K: The prisoners list. No number -- that I didn't give them. I ~~xxx~~ gave them your former proposal, and they said is that in any way different from what you have always said?

D: No.

K: And therefore I deduce from that -- give me anything that's different, and we will be able to do something.

D: That is why you have reason to believe... Last night

K: Last ~~xix~~ night we were just speculating. I think now we have a better than 50-50 chance that they give us the number in return for which you send Dayan. Dayan gives me a plan on which I will not move until I have in my hands a list and the Red Cross visits.

D: That's what I cabled. I think this will be discussed by her tomorrow. I hope maybe by Saturday I'll be able to give you an answer.

K: I would urge you to do it as soon as possible because if -- I have not told any of this to anybody -- I don't want the pro-Israeli mood to shift here, and I also think it's in your interest.

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D: But I think it is, too, in all of our interests that there would be a number _____ because of the Sadat situation. I don't know if you saw the Prime Minister's statement today about disengagement with Syria -- we don't want to stay in the area.

K: Will you do me a favor? Will you tell your GD people to shut up about what you may offer -- because the Syrians are not like the Egyptians. I wouldn't even have said you don't want to stay in the area.

D: Well, I will mention not to speak because I know in the status of forces agreements we will not be discussing anything beyond the line of the pre-67 war -- they want to have half the Golan Heights.

K: What I would recommend, though -- just for your consideration. Sadat seems to think that if Kinetra could be put under Syrian administration -- don't answer me now -- and from my conversations with Assad, I think you'd be better off if you could _____ two kilometers beyond the October 6 line - to the UN - not to them - but not let them come all the way forward.

D: Of course not. I passed to Israel your idea about the UNEF buffer zone -- what you told me yesterday. I think

K: Well, I think the Syrians would be happier without them.

D: In any event ~~what~~ what I think -- the thinking in Israel is that there would be nothing that would be going beyond the pre-Yom Kippur war and that the buffer zone will be beyond those lines, but I don't want to say this ~~here~~ because right now they are still discussing it. I'm not sure _____ is so happy Dayan is coming.

K: Have them both come.

D: Mr. Secretary, can I ask you something about your -- about Mr. Sisco. He was today at the Subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee on the Middle East, and I'm not criticizing...

K: Criticize him if you want to.

D: Well, I wonder if you have any information. He said that the number of Israeli prisoners in Syria is so small -- much less than the Israelis anticipate -- "When they hear the number, there will be such a hue and cry in Israel."

K: I know nothing. I assure you that it is one theory that

people have advanced, but we know nothing.

D: The other thing -- he told the Senators that the next move would be beyond the Mitla Pass.

K: He is a horse's ass.

D: This is -- the Senators asked me whether.

K: Look, Mr. Ambassador, I am already an hour late for something. It is -- I will have to get him under control.

D: Don't holler at him. I am having lunch with him tomorrow, and he will only be sour-pussed. I can handle Joe. I was concerned only

K: It was not at the Senate -- it was at the House.

D: At the House, the Subcommittee. Forget about what he said about the prisoners.

K: O.K., Mr. Ambassador, I have to go.

END

T305

TELECON
Secretary Kissinger/Gerry Warren
January 31, 1974, 7:35 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

W: This is Gerry Warren. Woodward and Bernstein are doing a long, rambling gossip piece for tomorrow saying that you and Haig tried unsuccessfully for six months to persuade the President to disassociate himself publicly from Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Colson in their legal defense. They say they have notes from John Andrews, the former speech-writer.

K: Well, I can't speak for Haig, but I can tell you I never discussed this matter with the President at all.

W: They're quoting comments from John Andrews.

K: John Andrews is a GD horse's ass. The only time I ever talked to John Andrews is when -- he called me once and said that -- before Haldeman and Ehrlichman were fired, or left -- was he wept on my shoulders about the misery of the situation. That is all.

W: He has notes which Woodward says he gave to them of a meeting that you attended on July 27 -- after Haldeman and Ehrlichman left -- in which you recommended that the President say in his August 15 speech that he had cleaned out the old people and gotten rid of them and that "I'm responsible for a climate of excessive warfare in the White House."

K: My problem is -- I consider that highly unlikely, but, you know, I don't have notes of every meeting I attend.

W: I understand. That's the one mention of you. The thrust of the story

K: I just don't remember that Andrews was at any meeting I ever attended, but I don't want to say that because you know these guys wandered in and out. What do you want me to do?

W: I don't know.

K: The only way I could have been involved at all WX -- was that in Camp David?

W: He did not say.

K: It was during that week I was at one or two meetings. I did not have anything basically to do with these discussions.

W: A week at Camp David?

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K: I was once up at Camp David for a day in which I was supposed to see the President and, in any event, saw him only for a half hour on foreign policy matters. July 27 I don't remember, frankly. But it is totally incorrect to say that I for six months attempted to do something because I essentially was out of these discussions. I may have been once called in to express a view, but the phrase that I did it for six months is certainly incorrect. But Haig would know this better than I.

W: Haig says this has never been his position.

K: This question was never put to me that way. But let me think about it and call you back.

END

1*

T306

TELECON
Secretary Kissinger/Secretary Schlesinger
January 31, 1974, 8:04 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I just heard that Rosenfeld has an article tomorrow of a split between you and me.

S: Rosenfeld?

K: Of the Washington Post -- on the ~~d~~ editorial page. I just want you to know I don't know Rosenfeld. He must have been in that group that you

S: The Overseas Press Club?

K: Yes. But that doesn't mean you said it.

S: Aside from seeing him at the Club that time, I've never spoken to him.

K: I don't even know what he looks like.

S: Don't worry much about that. I saw something that looked good on that -- the _____ article. Oh, well, it's a lot of crap.

K: It is crap. I've been knocking it down this week. I'll see you for breakfast tomorrow -- I just wanted you to know I've had this

S: It just adds to the spice around town. Stennis seems to have _____ on Diego Garcia. Two months ago he didn't say anything, but now he's

K: John Stennis? You want me to call him.

S: No. I think it would be premature.

K: We can get him to go along, I'm sure.

S: He was a little rambunctious -- his stomach problems -- he was more irritable than I've ever seen him. He's usually a courtly guy.

K: Let me see what I can do. I'll see you at breakfast. What time is that -- 8:00?

S: 8:00.

END

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DATE/CASE ID: 19 NOV 2002 200102979

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T304

TELECON
Secretary Kissinger/Robert McNamara
Thursday, January 31, 1974, 5:30 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Bob, I wondered whether you can give me a date when you can go to Egypt.

M: Well, what I need to know is what I should do there, but I can tell you roughly.

K: Let's have breakfast on Saturday on what you should do there. But can we in the meantime communicate a possible time to them?

M: I could be there -- it depends on what there schedule is -- but I could be there Saturday, February 23rd.

K: All right.

M: And I don't know how long

K: Maybe a couple of days?

M: I could probably be there part of Friday and Saturday and part of Sunday. Friday is probably a holiday in Egypt.

K: I will communicate with them. _____ to discuss a rational American development program, and I don't have the capability in this department to send an intelligent person there.

M: I'm not sure I'm the right person.

K: What they need now is understanding and seriousness. They don't need nit-pickers to go there and tell them what they can't do.

M: I can go there, Henry, but it's a little delicate to be talking from an American international bank point of view.

K: Can't you go there as my friend?

M: Definitely.

K: Thank you.

M: I'm perfectly prepared to do it that way. I'm supposed to be in New York Friday night late, so it would be difficult to get there early on Saturday.

K: Let's do it late Saturday morning.

M: 11:00. I'll be -- make it 11:30. I'll be in your office 11:30 Saturday morning.

END

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T308
E? Jan. 1974

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Roy Atherton

K: Hello.

A: Good morning, Mr. Secretary.

K: Roy, I need two things. One a letter to Sadat.

A: Yes, I am working on that.

K: From the President and then I would like a follow-up letter from me. Just a brief one, more personal which states that if it doesn't work now my own position will be impossible.

A: Right.

K: And I want them to know I would then put all future negotiations into normal diplomatic channels.

A: Okay. All right, sir.

K: But in the formal letter of the President, we better make absolutely sure that there is no linkage to Syria.

A: Yes, I am going to make that very explicit, because this is becoming disturbing. I don't know whether you say last night the report from our man in Abudabi who was briefed by the Egyptian Ambassador.

K: Yes. Exactly.

A: But I find this . . .

K: Well I have to testify so I won't be over before 12:30 but I will need it by then.

A: Well I will have it, sir. Have you seen Aiken's suggestion this morning?

K: Yes. That's all right together with your change.

A: All right, fine.

K: Thank you.

A: Thank you, sir.

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T309 *

Telcon
Gov. Holton/Kissinger
2/1/74: 10:28 a.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: Hello.

H: Good morning, Mr. Secretary.

K: How are you?

H: Just fine.

K: We finally got that investigation completed.

H: Am I cleared?

K: You've got many friends and several enemies in Virginia, to tell you the truth, which made it, we simply had to talk to about 100 people because they were getting, quite honestly, they were getting a lot of crap. But you have to expect that. But that part of it is cleared. Now if you give us a few days of consulting on the Hill, which will be by the middle of next week. Then we can announce it. But we shouldn't announce it without having talked to some of the leaders on the Hill.

H: [redacted] B6

K:

H:

K:

H: I know. Well, I was getting a little nervous about 3 weeks -- first time I ever spent 3 weeks doing nothing and I'm anxious to go back to work.

K: It's going to be taken care of within the week.

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H: Alright, that's fine. Thank you.

K: Good.

H: Is there anything you want to suggest to me about reading or studying?

K: As soon as we have the announcement made why don't you then come over to the Department and start working on it.

H: O. K. I'll do it. Thank you.

K: Terrific.

H: I'll hear from you.

K: Next week.

H: Fine. Bye.

K: Bye.

T320

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
George Vest/Secretary Kissinger
February 1, 1974
6:59 PM

V: Marilyn Berger took it up with her editor. For the moment they want her to write a story.

K: Is she going to use all of it?

V: She's coming to see me tomorrow morning to go over it with me. I don't know how far she's willing to go through with this. I'll see her tomorrow morning.

K: OK.

END

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T319

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
David Packard - Secretary Kissinger
February 1, 1974
6:50 p.m.

P: _____Let me say its just great.

K: Aren't you nice.

P: What I want to find out, Henry, is there any possibility you can come to our Business Council dinner on the 13th in Washington.

K: I am tentatively planning to do it.

P: Oh great. The thing is, as I suggested, I think this gang could help a little bit in various ways, and we'll be delighted.

K: I'm planning to do it.

P: While we're on the phone we haven't been able to break losse on the matter I talked to you about, the licenses with China. If you are going to be there on the 13th though rather than bother you now let's do it then.

K: Yes, let's do it on the 13th.

P: Thank you Henry. You're doing a great job, and ....carry on.

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T310

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Mansfield/Sec. Kissinger
Friday, Feb. 1, 1974
12:30 p.m.

...

M: This kind of day you have to feel a little better.

K: That's right. I wanted to ask you -- are you familiar with this meeting of the Western Hemisphere nations in Mexico.

M: Only that it is taking place.

K: From Feb. 20-23. We are really making a major effort to have it be a really new departure in Western Hemisphere relations. We were wondering if you, given your interest and the reputation you have there, might be willing to join the delegation for a day or two at least.

M: Put me down tentatively yes.

K: I mentioned it to Rabasa yesterday and he was really enthusiastic.

M: I am going to read to you in confidence and I will send you a copy of the speech I am making tonight -- after I say many kind words about you, I say "There is also the need for a new look at our relations with a Latin America that is changing rapidly. It may well be that in the excellent ties that we have maintained with Mexico ties which regular meetings of the congresses of the two countries play a major role there will be found a prototype to _____ with the other American republics."

K: I think you will find that what we are planning for that conference goes a big step towards what you would recommend.

M: Good. Good.

K: We have worked out an agenda and substantive program in cooperation with the Mexicans that if the other Latin American countries come along and we think they will it gives us hope to have real progress.

M: Good enough. This will be the 27th and 28th.

K: No. We arrive on the 20th and break up on the 23rd.

M: 20 to 23. O.K. that is on Wednesday.

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K: Wednesday through Saturday. I will ask the Speaker also and the Mexicans are inviting the equivalents in their legislative process.

M: Put my wife and I down, Henry.

K: Absolutely delighted.

M: Thank you very much.

END

T315

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
George Vest/Secretary Kissinger
February 1, 1974
5:00 PM

V: When I sent the message to you I didn't know what you had told them.

K: Tell her that some of it is correct and some of it are wild conclusions they put in there. I suppose it will just give her an incentive to keep at it.

V: I hope that in some of it doesn't object criticism in connection with what we're trying to do right now.

K: I frankly wonder whether there's any sense in talking to anybody if they publish this.

V: I wonder whether you could do it.

K: Apparently he had one more than they realized.

V: Your good friend F___ is a religious fanatic. It's times like this, it's mad.

K: Yes_____so we can play on against another. See whether we can moderate that statement.

V: The F__ one.

K: The Arabs no longer consider that reliable. We can not carry on without the airlift. It's a decision for ____. Tell her I don't mind, it makes me look good to the Arabs.

V: Let me get back to her now that I've talked to you.

K: OK.

END

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T 317

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sy Weiss - Secretary Kissinger
February 1, 1974
5:10 p.m.

W:....Diego Garcia.

K: What about it?

W: Do you have any guidance?

K: No, I have to hear from Sir John Hunt about what the Prime Minister is willing to do and that has to stay in my channel.

W: What other point, quickly, Jim is going up on Tuesday.

K: I hope to have it by then.

W: We told the British he is going up and there they are ready to have a parliamentary inquiring.

K: Well, it's up to them to give us an answer. I can't pick them up. I don't understand the problem. Sir John Hunt was going to get in touch with me.

W: They probably don't understand that. That answers my question.

K: Okay.

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T316

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Mr. Sisco - Secretary Kissinger
February 1, 1974
5:05 p.m.

K: Why don't we get a cable to the Saudis saying that we ar e going to have to stop the process if they don't lift the embargo. Or at least get it over to Aikins.

S: I was just thinking about this. There's no doubt that it would bring an end to our efforts. Let's try the latter for the moment. I can understand why you suggested this. I must say I am deeply disturbed on how slowly this thing is moving. I hope we don't reach that point though.

K: Why don't you tell Akins and tell him he should leave no doubt in their minds that I will sop my efforts.

S: I wonder if we should get it to Eilts as well.

S: Why don't I send it to Eilts without telling him to do anything with it.

K: Also tell him he should raise the _____ and _____ with Fahmi in his next meeting with him, which Sadat promised me by the end of the week.

S: It would be a nice gesture if he would do it, _____

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T 314

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin- Secretary Kissinger
February 1, 1974
4:57 p.m.

K: What do you propose as an agenda, schedule for the Foreign Minister. The President would like to see him in the afternoon. About three or four. We will let you know.

D: Three or four?

K: When should we meet then?

D: Well, in the morning. You could meet with him for an hour say about eleven and then maybe stay for lunch if you wouldn't mind. In the evening you will organize a dinner for him. Something along those lines.

K: What do you think? A social dinner, or...?

D: No, I think a very few people.

K: A working dinner.

D: Well, usually during dinner get a chance to talk very much. Yes, you may call it a working dinner officially.

K: If you think we should meet for lunch shouldn't we meet here at the State Department?

D: Maybe.

K: Why don't we do it the other way around? Why don't you come here at eleven and stay for lunch and then if you want to invite us for dinner?

D: Yes, that might be all right.

K: Or, if you would like we could go the other way, go to lunch at the Soviet Embassy if you would like.

D: I will check with him. and...

K: It's a little silly though to have him come here and then go to the Soviet Embassy.

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D: I understand.

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K: He will come here and we can organize the lunch.

D: I will check but may be even betterfrom the point of view of sequences. I will check with him. You mentioned Blair House he may be overwhelmed.by this idea. I don't know. For me it sounds very nice. Let's put it as of now that we will come to yours at elevan and lunch at yours and dinner at ours unless he has some other ideas. I think he will accept this though.

K: You will let us know tomorrow.

D: I will see you today at 8:00 right.

K: Yes I am looking forward to it.

D: Good.

T318

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
President Nixon/Secretary Kissinger
February 1, 1974
6:00 PM

K: I'll definitely do it, Mr. President, I'm just looking for sometime to do it.

N: I just want to make my own plans. You're going to Panama Thursday?

K: Yes.

N: Can you get back Thursday night?

K: I can get back Thursday.

N: Then come to Key Biscayne. I'll be there. You can stay there Friday, Saturday and Sunday and come back with me. We'll be ready for the energy commission.

K: Hussein is coming on Friday. We could probably change him.

N: Let him come to Key Biscayne and see me there. He likes Florida.

K: I'm sure he'll do that.

N: I was just thinking...

K: I could....

N: It seems to me that if you go down to Panama and come back Thursday night then you could come to Key Biscayne.

K: I would have to have some of my staff down there. I would have to work on my speech.

N: You could do it down there with your staff.

K: Why don't we plan on that. I think it would be very good.

N: It'll give me a week to get out of town. The only thing is shifting Hussein.

K: We could do that.

N: Fine.

K: OK, Mr. President.

END

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T311

NLK

TELCON
Speaker Carl Albert/Sec. Kissinger
Friday, Feb. 1, 1974
12:35 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Mr. Speaker.

A: Yes, sir.

K: How are you? I enjoyed the lunch very much yesterday. Mr. Speaker, I am calling you about a conference in Mexico City of the Foreign Ministers of the Western Hemisphere in which we are trying to bring about a new departure in Western Hemisphere relationships and it looks as if we are going to make very good progress there. Several of the countries and especially Mexico are putting on their delegations the Speaker of their assembly and also where they have a senate the senior member of the senate and we were wondering if you might consider an invitation to join our delegation. It would mean an enormous...

A: I would certainly like very much -- I would like to do so if it is at the right time.

K: Feb. 20 to 23.

A: Feb. 20 to 23. I don't have my appointments secretary here.

K: You don't have to answer this minute. If you could let us know in the course of the day or even early next week.

A: Right. I will get back in touch early next week. I would like to go. I am fairly well familiar with Mexico.

K: I told it to the Mexican Foreign Minister that I would like to invite you and he told me you speak good Spanish.

A: I speak it will enough to get by.

K: I said having heard you another night, I did not want to compete with you in a country where you could speak the language.

A: I am not that good. I can get by.

K: If you want to leave on Friday night that would be done. You would not have to stay until the end.

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A: I will have to get back in touch with you because of certain engagements I have. Can I do that?

K: Absolutely.

A: I have several appointments to get out on that have to do with helping members of Congress.

K: Of course. I would think if you could come for any part of it but if for just a part, it would be better in the beginning than the end.

A: Better in the beginning.

K: Better to go the middle.

A: The 20th and 21st than coming down (later).

K: But any part of it would be good. But there is a very solemn opening ceremony and it would be very nice if we could have you there.

A: I would like very much to do it if I can get away.

K: Mike Mansfield is coming.

A: He is.

K: Definitely going.

A: When is Mike going down. I will see what I can do.

K: On the 20th.

A: I will see what I can do and be back with you early next week.

END

T312

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec. Shultz/Sec. Kissinger
Friday, Feb. 1, 1974
12:45 p.m.

S: Hi, Henry.

K: I am glad you get on first now.

S: Oh, yea.

K: Do you have a cold.

S: Yes. Feel awful.

K: Have you called d'Estaing and Schmidt yet?

S: Yes. I have talked to them both. In neither case were they aware that I was going to be at the conference and that finance ministers were included. The result of that was that we got your Public Relations people to put out a public statement on the constitution of our delegation and I don't know whether the Ambassadors get that around are what but it looks as though these things are being bottled up in the foreign office. Giscard said he would let me know some time ~~ex~~ Monday or Tuesday. I guess it involves a meeting over there.

K: And Schmidt?

S: He said he was talking to Brent last night and that he would call me maybe over the weekend and tell me what he was going to do.

K: Tell him I too would like to talk to him.

S: He would like to come over and is looking for an excuse. I also told both of them that it could be that we could have some useful discussion on Giscard's favorite metal but we are getting ourselves in position on that and before we bother you I want to be sure that Burns and Volcker are on board.

K: And the question is also the timing.

S: Thank you.

END

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T313 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Senator Stennis - Secretary Kissinger
February 1, 1974
4:55 p.m.

S: I just want to take one minute to thank you. I'm glad you can testify next week. I think its important to ...that we can get you and get that behind us.

K: Absolutely, I agree with you.

S: I read you were going to Panama andall. The big matter on this question is why didn't they do something with this man. If you can, if you know why they didn't, I want to talk to you a little bit before you come up to testify.

K: Well, it was explained to me that in order to court martial him they would have to produce so many documents of a very high classification they decided not to do it.

S: I'll tell you, I think you can make a man understand a thing better some times by coming ...calling on him in his office.

K: Oh, I will be glad to come in and call on you

S: No, no, but before you testify I might just ask you to see Senator Hughes and tell him what that situation was. Tell him what documents there were. He's a very fine man, a very even man.

K: The only document I have any personal recollection of Mr. Chairman was one of my conversations with Chou En Lai.

S: Well, that would be very revealing.

K: That's enough not to have come out, I mean, that we didn't want published in a court martial.

S: I think that would come near to clearing things up and making it understood.

K: What I would have to say, Mr. Chairman, is (1) I was not part of the decision not to take disciplinary action, I was informed of the decision and of the general reason for it.

S: Well, all right. That's fine.

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K: And, I didn't think that was an unreasonable position.

S: All right. That will cover it in part. I'm going to tell them down at the White House they will have to have somebody explain it. If they don't it could give us a lot of trouble.

K: Iwill be glad to explain it from second hand knowledge.

S: All right, that will kick the ball off anyway.

T330

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Mr. Geyelin - Secretary Kissinger
February 2, 1974
2:23 p.m.

K: Somebody just handed me your note to Marilyn Berger which you said could be passed on to my top aide.

G: That was without my knowledge, I didn't intend...

K: Well, after I got through practically killing him...The first point, I agree with you. If I have something to say to you I will say it to you, not through an aide or Marilyn Berger. I didn't know this was happening. Another factor, when did I ever go to Kay? The only time I know of is when Maxine Chesire savaged me.

G: Henry, there was a case. I called you back about it. I had not intended that to be passed around the Department. I just wanted to convey ...

K: It wasn't passed around.

G: There was a case, though, when you talked to Kay. You were really sore about an editorial.

K: On the whole I have said to everybody that I think your editorials on foreign policy have been good. I may strongly disagree with them, but they do what they are supposed to do, raise important points of view. This one, though, was a low blow, a bit below the belt. You accused me of perjury.

G: I didn't consider that single sentence an accusation, it wasn't intended to be.

K: This business of using anonymous sources, saying Wayne Smith bugged office of Laird at my instruction, when nobody asked me about it.

G: They should have.

K: There I was on the trip being accused and totally defenseless.

G: I agree.

K: And I was in no position to answer it. I agree you never would have gotten to the bottom of Watergate if you had to identify all your sources, but the front page story in the Chicago Times said Kissinger had an aide bug

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Laird's office in retaliation, to which there is not one scintilla of truth. Its not even a distortion , I mean there's not one tiny shred of truth. I don't go around bugging people. It's hopeless to expalin right now I suppose. When calm is returned I think people will understand, though.

G: I got another message....Nick Thimmesh has been saying somebody from the State Department is saying Kissinger believes that the New York Times and the Washington Post have decided to make a concentrated decision to destroy him.

K: I don't know what State Department people are saying. I don't know who's talking to New York Times. I haven't.

G: Hav e you seen the ....

K: I will tell you now on this and I am happy to be quoted, the New York Times and the Washington Post have been decent and fair to me. I have no feeling whatever that the Washington Post is out to get me, Not only have they, within the limits of journalistic ethics, ...they have done their best not to get me. If you got evidence that would destroy me you would print it because of journalistc ethics. I've been annoyed by Sy Hersch items, but that's not the New York Times, that's Sy Hersh. I think we have a good adversary relationship that is necessary between the press and high officials. The problem is that you get these kids making statements who, to whomsitting in at a meeting is the greatest event in their lives while senior people are handling 30 things a day and never focus on the little things. The thing is those leaks weren't even NSC papers, they were DOD meetings, ...

G: Anyway that word is a strange one if we were accusing you of perjury, if we were going to accuse you we would find a better way than that.

K: What's so maddening about it is that if anyone was the victime it was me. It was certainly not a friendly action.

G: Henry, I think....

K: And the JCS was treated better than anyone else, really.

G: I don't know what your travel plans are but I would like to get together for another chat if we can, I think we are about due. I want to convey to you too that I am nct at all injured by what you say to Katherine.

K: Frankly, I don't remember when I did talk to Kay about an editorial.

G: You did, you told herein effect, and she was marvelous about it, and said would I call you. I did.

K: I forget what it was about.

G: It was in the middle of the war, you said we had been unfair.

K: On the whole thing I think our relationship during the war was one of respect. I gave up on the New York Times, but I read yours. every day.

G: By the way I was very shocked the other day to have Ellsworth Bunker call and say a recent editorial was the best on the subject he had ever read. I love Ellsworth but I don't think we were that close together. Can I talk to you one of these days.

K: Right. Let's have breakfast or lunch in the next two weeks.

G: You'll be here for 2 weeks?

K: At least two weeks.

G: Good.

T321

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
General Scowcroft - Secretary Kissinger
February 2, 1974
9:25 a.m.

K: I just wanted to check in with you, in case the President calls. Have you got anything beyond the morning report?

S: No, no traffic at all.

K: I think I probably have to go to the airport to meet Gromyko. He has met me so many times in Moscow.

S: I think it would be a good idea. It would be a nice gesture.

K: Could you ask Peter to pick up Nancy at the airport at 12:30?

S: Sure, glad to. Will do.

K: And if he can't maybe he would call Dick. Would you see if there is any doctor at the White House except Tkash. I'm telling you there is something wrong and these maniacs haven't found anything.

S: Really? Do you want one to come over?

K: Yes.

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T327

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
David Landes - Secretary Kissinger
February 2, 1974
12:55 p.m.

L: I talked to Lipsitz. He apparently had checked out various things about his report with her, including this business about "stalling" was the word Berger used. I called her back and she asked me whether I had talked to you and I said no I talked to Lipsitz and he was very upset about it and particularly about a couple of items and I said it seemd to me to be the reverse of the sense of the meeting. The business about delaying by going to Russia when the sense of the meeting was just the reverse of the feeling of some members of the group. I said Kissinger could have given the Israelis more time, but the matter was not in his hands, there was a Resolution in the UN, etc. etc., and I think this is a particularly pernicious one, knowing he is going into negotiations with Syria is it particularly bad if confidence is shaken. Expecially Syria should not be under attack from other Arab countries now and if there is any way we can.....You know, I know it was Lipset's report, as a matter of fact he sent it to me but I never even opened it, I had been at the meeting and Marty is very long winded, he goes on and on and....

K: Why did Marty do it?

L: I think its just the way he works. He doesn't go to any gmeeting without writing it down. What hadn't occurred to me was that he would circulate it outside the group. Anyway she said she had discussed it and it was most unfortunate...I mean if he tells each side, each side can negotiate for peace, the war had not worked out well for them, and if they do something separately for Israel, well it would be a great mistake, it could be pulled out of context and...

K: She's actually a very nice girl.

L: She said she had talked to Henry Kissinger and he wouldn't have talked to me if he didn't have some confidence in me, it's most unfortunate, she said she understood and I think I gave her something serious to think about.

K: Dave, at least now she can quote you if she wants to and balance things off to hereeditor. Dave I would love to see you if you can come down again. Next week isn't good but the week after would be ok.

L: OK, I will be in touch with your office.

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T329

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
General Haig - Secretary Kissinger
February 2, 1974
1:50 p.m.

H: He's OK. Tomorrow on the night of the 11th for the Foreign Ministers he will do that in lieu of speaking at the session. He will handle it there.

K: I think that way he can be a little more emotional. It should be a speech that can be released, maybe even televised.

H: I've got Brent working up something to publicize. He doesn't want to televise it. Also Gromyko. I have him on the schedule for noon or 3:00, whichever...

K: I prefer 3:00 because then I can brief him before when I see him at 11:00 and if it looks as if we can do anything.

H: That's fine. He was going to have a small staff meeting in the afternoon but if its more conveneient we'll ...its not that urgent.

K: Let's do it at 3:00 Then I can prepare Gromyko, find out what he has on his mind and I can brief the President.

H: For your own information, if he goes to Key Biscayne he will go to New York Thursday morning, leave New York about 1:30 and go straight to Key Biscayne. He wants Simons and Shultz down there that weekend for a big energy image, although it won't be that.

K: But I need Simons in Washington, there's a lot of energy things in Washington on Friday, suppose he came down Friday.

H: Sure, he's just coming down for the meeting.

K: That's my strong advice. It's hard for me to be in Key Biscayne but I know he would never forgive me.

H: He thinks you need it and I do too. If you come straight up from Panama.

K: If we came down Friday afternoon after the energy meeting was finaished, with Donaldson, that way it would really do some good. Then I can brief him on what we are planning and give him a run down on Friday. As long as he's keeping me prisoner down there I won't let him do it while the sun is out. Are you going to be there?

H: Yes.

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K: Maybe we can have dinner some night.

H: Great.

T328

RELEASED IN FULL

February 2, 1974
12:30 p.m.

TELECON
The Secretary/ Ron Ziegler

HAK: The President is seeing the Russians at 3 PM on Monday and I am seeing them at 11AM.

RZ: Why not have the little King see the President Saturday or Monday or we can have him come up here on the following Friday.

RZ: What is your view about down there?

HAK: We can do it in the afternoon in Florida after the sun goes down.

RZ: We can either do it down there or here on the following Friday.

HAK: I have work to do in Florida on Energy meeting. I just as soon do it Friday or Saturday afternoon. I don't think it helps the President to see the King down there.

HAK: Did you see that John Andrews has another article in NYT? How old is he?--22?.

RZ: Let's not worry about him.

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T326

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt - Secretary Kissinger
February 2, 1974
11:47 a.m

K: I never heard from Brent about the proposition.

S: Sykes called me last night saying why haven't you called us. I checked with Brent last night and nothing had arrived.

K: Would you call them.

S: Brent and I called last night and I thought Brent and I would sit down with Sykes and talk out the proposition.

K: Just make sure the proposition doesn't leak into the government.

S: Right. We will check with you and salt it away and then put back into the front channel that other thing we talked about.

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T331

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Ernst van Der Bugel - Secretary Kissinger
February 2, 1974
2:30 p.m.

V: Are you not well?

K: I am well. I am a little tired.

V: I am going to see Nancy Sunday night.

K: But the plane doesn't get back until after 10 p.m. Who is coming to see whom? Nancy is coming to see me.

V: Nancy is coming to see me. I hope to see you in March.

K: Can you explain to me what the Europeans want at this point? I don't understand the Gaulists. They are going to be out of reserves in six months.

V: You don't ask someone in the process of committing suicide.

K: I read every day in the European press how my policies are disadvantageous to them .

V: But you don't read the serious European press. Le Monde is not serious press. You would see they really say the Europeans are absolutely crazy.

K: I just saw a long article in the Financial Times.

V: The British are beyond repair. All that is left is the Germans. The only real question which is still left is whether some kind of arrangement is possible between the U.S., Germany, the Scandanavian countries and Benelux. There is still hope for the Germans, Helmudt Schmidt is after all one of the few level headed people left.

K: Ernst, one other problem, if I go to Migeve, the press will not be in the meeting room.

V: Oh, no. What we have arranged for your Henry, you would stay with Ed Maw in his Chalet.

K: That is fine for me but you cannot, I must travel with press. They have to be put somewhere. They must be able to photograph us, where the meeting takes place.

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V: But they cannot go inside.

K: We can tell them they will be briefed.

V: That's perfectly all right.

K: But that may keep them away.

K: I don't want them in the meeting. Even if it were possible I would be against it.

V: Yes, but because we are going to talk really about issues which we must discuss.

K: In that case, what is the date again.

V: A week after Easter, its the 19, 20, and 21 of April.

K: I will make a maximum effort.

V: We have also invited Winston Lord and Helmudt.

K: That's fine. That's excellent, but I really do want to discuss with Europeans about where we stand. Will you have a good group of Europeans?

V: Yes, very good. You never know with France because they have gone out of their mind. They will be pressured by the front populaire. That's not so nice either. Then Italy will go down the drain.

K: Italy is a disaster anyway. If there were strong leaders they could do alot.

V: Henry, both you and I understand. This is a sauf qui peut situation without anybody being saufed. Don't ask anybody who is committying suicide not to be suicidal.

K: Ernst, look, I look forward to seeing you in March. Let's plan it so we can definietly meet.

V: I will give you advance warning, if I may, through Nancy.

K: She's just coming in.

V: That's the most outrageious thing I've ever heard. Don't you trust her. K: You don't trust me, do you. you are a very old friend.

T332

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Mr. Donaldson - Secretary Kissinger
February 2, 1974
3:20 p.m.

K: _____What will happen at the conference, where it takes place, what the seating arrangements are. I want a total picture. There just cannot be any technical snafus.

D: Right.

K: Where is it taking place?

D: At the State Department.

K: That doesn't mean a goddamned thing.

D: In the main hall dowstairs.

K: Are they going to sit around a table.

D: We've been working on all that stuff and...

K: But Bill, the secret dream of the Department is to do everything and use me to ratify it. That's not my style. I must know it, and be able to do something.

D: Absolutely.

K: Secondly, can you find out statiscally if the Frenoh pay $11 a barrel, how long can they hold out at current prices, how many mirages would they have to sell a year to make up for it. Can that be done by tomorrow?

D: OK. I've been trying to get to you all day.

K: I don't know, didn't know you were trying to get to me today, Whom did you talk to?

D: I talked to Campbell.

K: Campbell doesn't even let the doctor get to me.

D: You got the word we went to Shultz about the meeting and he wanted to have Burns and Volker.

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K: I didn't say Shultz should be there. Does he want Burns and ...

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D: He thinks Burns should be invited, he thinks Burns and Volker should be invited.

K: Except I am brining so many junior people. Tell him he can bring Volker, but we have got to keep it down.

D: It seems to me there is a good reason to have Burns and so forth. There is also good reason after we get done with that stuff for a very small group to talk about...

K: I have a physical limitation. I can't do more than an hour tomorrow. Since I have been back I have worked 15 hours a day. I can't spend more than an hour, an hour and a half at the outside.

D: OK, I know what you are up against.

K: What is a very small group?

D: I was thinking about, you know, Win, Hal, myself and you.

K: OK, if possible, I will do it.

D: Yah, if possible let's try for 15 minutes.

K: OK, good.

T323

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Schlesinger - Secretary Kissinger
February 2, 1974
9:50 a.m.

S: Hi Henry. How are you?
K: Pretty good, how are you?

S: Fine. I wanted to tell you I think Fred Ikle's intentions were noble and everything, but....

K: I think it's a disaster.

S: Well, it doesn't help at this time. If you could get him to simmer down some on this thing. Some of the things he said were all right, but the headlines were bad. He doesn't make clear the difference is arms balances instead of arms stability.

K: The whole thing is a disaster.

S: Secondly, the thing on the collision course in the press....

K: What?

S: You remember, that you and I are on a ...were supposed to be on a collision course. I had a journalist in here the other day, Bruce Viosek (phonetic). He tells me he has heard some of this stuff coming out of State.

K: I can't believe it.

S: Let me tell you what I am thinking. You know these journalists can cover their tracks pretty well and I suspect some of those fellows in ACDA who don't like\the new themse, or what they think are the new themes, like Frank Perez (I don't know if he's ACDA or State) and also the hawks.....

K: But my position is your position we don't diverge.

S: I understand, Henry. But what is reputed to be your position is the problem. I think this may be low level stuff as I just mentioned.

K: Well, this morning I'm going to see McCloskey and I'm going to put a stop to this.

S: Good. Thirdly, I wonder about the Panama treaty you are going to be signing

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to be signing....

K: It's not a treaty, it is a list of principles, haven't you seen it. I am told the Defense Department signed off on it.

S: No, I haven't seen it. But I figure Bunker's a good man, I think he wouldn't give away the shop.

K: My understanding is that Defense is in agreement with us. Could you check on that?

S: Yes, I'll do that. Fourth. On the question of the Indian Ocean. The Kitty Hawk is due to go in on the 23rd or somewhere around there, so after the Kittly Hawk we would have a hiatus. From your comments the other day it sounded as though that would be satisfactory.

K: That's right.

S: I thought you might want it slightly before the Kitty Hawk.

K: No, it's all right. Don't change it. How long will the Kitty Hawk be in there? Make sure those maniacs in India are notified ahead of time.

S: Done.

K: I had a conversation finally with Dobrynin on the equal throw-weight idea. They don't like it, he said it means they can MIRV fewer missiles than we can. We figured out they can MIRV 60 big ones. At our throw-weight, do you believe that's true, 60?

S: That's the number that appears in the studies. Don't want to MIRV more than 60 at SS18 level. But they could do a hell of a lot more 16s ____if they devoted all their thro-weight to those, but that's ....

K: They say they would have only a lot of small warheads left. Also, its their judgment they are now ahead of us in MIRV technology.

S: I'm inclined to doubt that. They don't have the technology. If they MIRV SS16s they can have as many as we have, the 16s...

K: What does that mean?

S: The 16s are the small ones.

K: He said it could only be done by Brezhnev. I'm going to Moscow in March and he feels that's the time to do anything sensible.

T324

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger - General Scowcroft
February 2, 1974
10:50 a.m.

K: _____for him to publicly on strategies without checking with me.

S: I wanted to ask you about that. It was, I think it was unfortunate. I'd be a....happy to call him.

K: Tell him you are calling on my behalf as Assistant to the President and that it is unacceptable.

S: Glad to.

K: And when you do that tell him it is totally contrary to what we are trying to accomplish.

S: Right.

K: Under those circumstances how can we put the land-based MIRV plan first? Will you do that.

S: Yes I will call him right now. Incidentally on the doctor, Ward will be available right now he's with the President at the dentist. He will call Dick as soon as he gets back and come over to see you. I'll call Ikle right now.

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T322

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger - Dean Rusk
February 2, 1974
9:45 a.m.

R: I just wanted to speak to you about doing this film thing. It would really just take 5 minutes.

K: I will do it.

R: Your press people said you couldn't do it. They had the cameras set up and everything.

K: They should have checked with me. I didn't know they had the camera people set up and all that.

R: Well, they checked with somebody and they said come on up and then....

K: You have to remember Dean, I am in the imperial stage of my incumbency now. No, I agreed to do it. Can I do it Monday morning? I'm not dressed for it today. I don't think I want to do it in a sports coat. Of course, I'll do it, though, either today or Monday.

R: One other thing. Is Alec Home coming over for the energy thing,

K: Yes.

R: If you can have a private talk with him, he's a fellow I think you can ... who can be very helpful to you. I think he will come....

K: He's coming around I think, yes.

R: Okay, let me know if I can do anything.

K: Okay, thank you Dean. Bye.

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T325

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Mr. Sisco - Secretary Kissinger
February 2, 1974
11:45 a.m.

K: _____

S: If you promote a guy like that....

K: You are not promoted yet, they haven't approved it yet in the god damned committee.

S: If you promote a guy like me he is apt to be polite.

K: I think Akins is a nice guy, but you would think he could kindly acknowledge when he is given instructions and he doesn't carry it out. I mean Yamani ...

S: Okay, why don't I give him a little nudge about that. You know its hard getting around that damn place. I just assumed when he is given instructions he's the kind of guy who carries it out. I will give him a nudge.

K: Secondly, I want to give some thought to upgrading that fellow in Syria.

S: Do you really want to...

K: I want to think about it.

S: He's doing very well. He had a courtesy call with the Russians. He's beginning to show a little zeal, and I've done a little telegram I haven't sent out yet saying, you know, to take it easy you are just there to listen for awhile. I won't bother you with it, but I'll get it out.

K: Please.

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T 333

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Joe Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
February 3, 1974
12:25 PM

S: I got a call from the Jordanian Ambassador. He had been called by Rifai from London.

K: The problem is the President is determined to go to Key Biscayne. We've got to prepare for the energy conference. There's a physical limit to what can be done.

S: I think they're ___because I had to delay in responding and without it being said, there's probably a feeling that the President is not giving his dinner.

K: My God, they should realize at the same time the demands which are involved. If he wants to go to Key Biscayne for an hour, that is fine with us, but I can't see him alone. I can't go on anymore like this.

S: Sure, sure, in other words, if the President would be available for an hour.

K: He might, he's already got all the energy people coming on Friday. There's no sense in his going with all the people he's got coming down, and having to work for 10 hours a day.

S: You will be there too?

K: I have to go down Thursday night, on my way back from Panama.

S: From your point of view, going to Key Biscayne from Panama is just as easy.

K: That's not my problem, my problem is I'll not have a bilateral with him down there under any circumstances.

S: He would be limited to one hour with the President. Why don't we just sit on this today.

K: I can tell you what the answer is. Tell him the President can see him for an hour down there. That's all that can take place.

S: Let's talk it out later. _____direct with myslef in London. It's just as easy to talk to ____. I'll try to reach the Ambassador today. If I don't reach Rifai today, I'll call him first thing in the morning.

K: OK

END

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T337

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Haig/Secretary Kissinger
February 4, 1974
12:35

H: Do we have to do this slip job, because we have a lawyer meeting we have to get done too.

K: No, it was done for my own reasons, as it would give me an extra hour of rest.

H: Oh.

K: You don't have to do it.

H: Well, he feels he would need an hour and a half.

K: That's right.

H: Let me flip flop and we'll...

K: The later it is would be better for me.

H: Why don'w we schedule it for 4:30 and I'll come back and confirm with your girl.

K: I would like to see the President about fifteen minutes before the meeting. Can you do that?

H: Yes.

K: good.

END

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T334

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sisco/Sec. Kissinger
Monday, Feb. 4, 1974
11:25 a.m.

K: I want you to sit in on the Gromyko meeting.

S: Yes, Sir.

K: Where do we stand on this cables.

S: I sent you word that the one to Jidda has gone and Sadat's is being drafted.

K: Can I see the one to Jidda.

S: It is upstairs. I will bring it up to you.

K: We have to do one to Sadat.

S: We have to wait carefully and we are mulling this over. We can talk about this alone to decide if it is desirable to limit the first message only to the embargo.

K: We should give him the scenario of what can happen-- not that those_____Arabians are of any helpt to us.

S: We will have to talk about the scenario.

K: It will tell him in a way what he won't want to do.

S: I am trying to see if we can't find some kind of a formula that we might want to suggest and I am getting together with Roy.

K: No sense of your -- the Israelis have given us a formula.

S: But a non-starter. That is the problem.

K: Have you seen the one...

S: The essence of what you said namely that it would be simultaneous with the visit but it would require you to have in hand the actual list. I don't know how you are going to do that. I wish you would but in any event let me look at what has been presented. Perhaps we I can come up with something. I will try.

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Sisco
Feb. 4
2.

K: How are we going to get the Israelis to do it?

S: That is another question. Particularly since this is all we have been able to get out of two cabinet considerations.

K: I am not trying to have a showdown with the Israelis on procedures on how to get the talks started.

S: Of course not, when the other side is utterly impossible. You are in a weaker position with the Israelis as a result of this whole business of the last 48 hours. They will read the press like the others and know we are having trouble on this end with the embargo.

END

T338 *

TELCON
Mr. Atherton/Secy Kissinger
6:35 p.m., February 4, 1974

RELEASED IN FULL

K: .....

A: The short one?

K: Yeah.

A: We've just got a quick reply. I think all we need to do is reinstruct him to carry out systematically all of the instructions he has and --

K: And also he had another cable of what he was going to say, which I rather liked.

A: That he sent in?

K: Yeah.

A: Yes. And in our outgoing we told him that he should use those points with only one or two minor modifications.

K: Like what?

A: Well, for example, -- Let me think now -- He had in there one point that if we didn't carry out our commitments within three months -- within a few months, that they could then do what they wanted.

K: Yeah.

A: And we suggested he drop that.

K: Right.

A: But otherwise it seemed to me very good and we endorsed it. So that we've given him now the long one that went out this morning, the one previously that you cleared plus endorsing his points. And I don't think there's anything more we can tell him except to systematically go through all these with each his interlocking them.

K: What do you think? Do you think we're being too hard?

A: With the Saudis?

K: Yeah.

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A: No, sir. (laughs) No, I think we've got to -

K: Do you think they're going to cave?

A: I'm dubious frankly. I thought we had a better than 50-50 chance until I saw the King's letter. And with the King having taken this position in writing to the President, I just have my doubts about how quickly he's going to be turned around. But I think that we're doing all the things that we can.

K: Yeah. But what do I do next? I can't participate anymore.

A: I think we have to establish credibility. I would say that if the 14th comes and goes and the embargo is not lifted, that we then let it be seen that we're going to stand back for a while. I don't think this will disrupt the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement. It seems to me that they both have an interest that's got its own momentum now. The Syrians really have no choice but to stew in their juice a bit.

K: Okay.

A: I think Akins has got all the arguments he needs, Mr. Secretary --

K: But should we do a letter to Boumedienne?

A: Well, my recollection is that the last word was that he was not going to be a problem providing he didn't have to take the lead.

K: Yeah, but here is a case --

A: He won't get out in front I don't think.

K: But there is a cable that claims that he is supporting the Syrians.

A: Ah, that I haven't seen.

K: Yeah.

A: That I haven't seen.

K: That Asad called him, in the presence of a Saudi. Why don't we do a letter to Boumediene saying that we are near a fateful decision and we just want him to know what the consequences are, that he has my commitment; that we've kept every other promise, we'll keep this.

A: No, I see no harm and it might just help. We've certainly touched base with everybody else.

K: Okay.

A: All right, sir. Thank you.

T335

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
General Scowcroft - Secretary Kissinger
February 4, 1974
11:35 a.m.

K: Now I forgot what I wanted from you. Oh, we need to have the Hassan visit set up, they've been bugging the bejesus out of...

S: I've got it all....as suggested as soon as possible after the middle of May

K: Who does?

S: There was a cable in from Neuman.

K: Why don't you do that?

S: OK.

K: What did Haig want.

S: He was just down checking on the allocation on the 2.2 billion so we can get UNEF money going.

K: We may have to hold up on the Presidential determination.

S: I know, I think we have to. Between the two of them, I think mayge we should grind to a halt. They've got some bills coming up very shortly, around the 8th of Febrary some bills start to fall due.

K: We may just have to hold up on it.

S: You know, I have never seen anything like it.

K: They're swine.

S: I beg your pardon.

K: They are selfish swine.

S: This is the first time I have felt this way but this may be the time to squeeze a bit.

K: No question about it.

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T336

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Foreign Minister Rabassa - Secretary Kissinger
February 4, 1974
11:40 a.m.

R: How's Mr. Gromyko?

K: Well, he's just arriving.

R: Not as nice as your Mexican Foreign Minister.

K: That's the truth.

R: I'm just calling to say good bye, and to thank you for all your kindness and...

K: Not at all, have a very good trip.

R: Henry from the logistic point of view, the most important Mexican paper is the Excelsior, the Most important television man by the name of _____wolski and the most important magazine is called Siempre, that means always, Now, the man for the television has a correspondent here by the name of Ilando Sanchez. Would you mind, not on a different date on the same day, could you give him 15-20 minutes of your ti me so he could make something in view of the conference, then it will come out in the evening papers. From the Excelsior I will try to bring the top man, who is man called Shirz (phon.)

K: OK, I will do my best.

R: If you would just talk 15-20 minutes to television, the papers and the magazine.

K: I couldn't do it before the end of next week.

R: No, no, I will have our Ambassador call Kubisch or you, just sometime before the meeting. I will tryp to have the top man in the news media speak with you

K: Good, I will do it. Emilio you have saved the Latin American conference. You destroyed my bureau which will not survive it.

R: Henry in all history you will be the only Secretary of State who spent his time and _____ to Latin America.

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K: I am counting on you to help me at the conference.

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Rabassa Page Two.

R: I am going to be very careful to make sure everything comes out nice and comfortable, frank atmosphere.

K: Good.

R: Thank you, Henry, and goodbye.

T339

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt - Secretary Kissinger
February 5, 1974
3:50 p.m.

S: We have a problem of saying something to NATO about your talk with Gromyko. We have done a very anodyne message about it.

K: I thought you were going out to the airport.

S: We are, we're leaving in a few minutes. We obviously can't say what you said. I don't know if you want to see it. Would you like to see it?

K: OK, yes,

S: OK, we'll get it to you.

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T343

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Secretary Kissinger/Mr. Atherton
February 5, 1974, 7:45 p.m.

K: I think what you should add in the letter by the President is that when all the tactical matters are said and done what the continuation of the embargo amounts to is an expression of lack of confidence in the personal assurance of the President of the United States on innumberable occasions.

A: Good point.

K: And that is the most unacceptable part to us.

A: There's a good place for me to insert that. That's a good point.

K: Good.

END

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T341

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
President Nixon/Secretary Kissinger
February 5, 1974, 5:35 p.m.

K: Hello.

N: Hello.

K: Mr. President.

N: Henry, anything new today?

K: Well, we still have that hassle with the Saudis.

N: You don't think I should intervene by writing another letter to the fellow?

K: We're thinking of that. We're drafting a letter. He has himself locked in concrete.

N: He's really locked in concrete. Until Syria has disengagement, there'll be no lifting of the embargo.

K: It will take months. It took three months with the Egyptians. In January when you wrote him, he couldn't understand your urgency about when he would lift the embargo. We got the Egyptian disengagement the day after. He said he would lift it the next day. We even were worried that it might be premature for your State of the Union address. Then he comes with a new condition. In November he said _____ #242. You've done that three times. There's absolutely no assurance that if we do the Syrian thing they will do it. We are there on a roller-coaster. We have their solemn assurance in writing that they would lift the embargo. This is not our imagination.

N: Yes, I know.

K: Remember, in December, Prince _____ sent me a letter saying they would lift it. _____ conference table because of the issue of the POW's. Now that's going to take us two weeks to break.

N: I think I ought to send a letter _____ my solemn commitments on this.

K: I doubt, Mr. President, we should continue running around under these conditions.

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N: Yes. You mean you just leave the status quo?

K: Who else is going to get disengagement?

N: Nobody else can deliver it.

K: We can understand that they did it for a while, but now every time we promise something and deliver it then they ask for a new promise and a new delivery. We will send the draft of a letter over to you.

N: O.K. Take care of yourself. The Gromyko thing went all right?

K: Yes. Very well. Very well.

END

T340

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
George Vest - Secretary Kissinger
February 5, 1974
3:52 p.m.

V: Yes, sir.

K: George, all that dancing around about secret agreements. Can't you just say all provisions are in the U.S. proposals which the two sides have kept secret. There are no secret agreements, instead of dancing all over the goddamed place?

V: That there are none, Yes. Got it.

K: OK.

V: Right.

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T342

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Secretary Kissinger/Taft Schreiber
February 5, 1974, 7:01 p.m.

K: I'm o.k.

S: I know you're working your tail off.

K: That I certainly am.

S: We hear you're going to Russia - and Syria.

K: I'm going to Russia first.

S: Are you coming out this way?

K: I have no immediate plan.

S: The reason I called you - trying to do something for Len _____ input - when it's going to be submitted. None of us can do anything until we know the status.

K: I'll let you know in the very near future - as soon as I know.

S: We'll have his friends - a lot of your friends. If it's in the very near future, it could be any time.

K: Good.

S: Let me know, and

K: I'll let you know.

S: He won't be the star if you come.

K: (Laughter.)

END

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T350

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Secretary Kissinger/Mr. Atherton
February 6, 1974, 8:07 p.m.

K: We should send a message to Fahmy with respect to that one message I discussed with Sisco that -- you know what I mean -- about the Arabian

A: Yes.

K: That we have called Helms home, and he will get in touch with the Shah for us.

A: Right, sir.

K: Thank you.

END

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T 349

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

TELECON
The President/Secretary Kissinger
February 6, 1974, 7:46 p. m.

N: Hello.

K: Mr. President.

N: Hi, Henry.

K: I thought you might like to know that the [redacted] B1

[redacted]

N: That's not enough, of course.

K: I think the major problem is that the Russians are stirring up the Syrians and that the Iraqis and _____ are joining the group.

N: Under the circumstances what can the Saudis do? Will they

K: My impression is that they'll do something.

N: At least it's interesting, but the Egyptians doing their best doesn't do a GD bit unless something happens. We'll see, but at least ~~xtkx~~ it's better than nothing.

K: I think it's better than nothing. I think if we take a strong line here the public will understand what's happening.

N: The public isn't interested in debate -- they're interested in cars lined up at the gas stations. So we have to face that.

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K: I'll keep you closely informed.

N: When are you leaving - tonight?

K: First thing in the morning. And back tomorrow night.

N: My God -- what a day. Well, you'll have a good plane, so maybe you can have a rest. You delivered a letter to Scowcroft that he's supposed to show me in the morning?

K: Yes.

N: Well, I'll take a look at it. I'll see you Saturday. Have a good trip, and don't let them shoot you in Panama.

K: Right, Mr. President.

END

T346 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Joe Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
2/6/74 2:12 p.m.

K: Joe, have we heard from anybody?

S: No, we haven't heard anything.

K: Okay

S: I would say we would get word in the course of the afternoon later in the day.

K: Right, because I am off to congressional hearing just in case.

S: Well we will see, you I think will be back around 5:00 or so and we'll check with you when you get back.

K: Right, has there been--you are comfortable with the position we've taken.

S: Oh I sure am --Roy, I hope told you, that he and I talked before he came to see you, because we went over each one of those together.

K: You agree, that we have to take a tough line.

S: I agree with the tough line, but I also agree with what you have done particularly in that message to Aikens--now what I am thinking of what do we do if they really--if we are really stuck with this situation of where we got to try to make some little progress. My prognosis is, I told Roy this morning, I don't think we will get everything we want --I think we are probably going to get something out of this 14th meeting if that is the case, I think the question it poses is, do we continue our efforts--my inclination would be that as bad as it is, I would probably have no alternative.

K: You do it then

S: Henry, God bless you, let me tell you, I just came back this morning and just want you to know--I know it has been a tough week but this might bolster you a little bit--I had a full room of congressmen this morning at the Wednesday morning briefing--about 65 of them and let me tell you they were very, very laudatory of everything you are doing on this whether they are from the pro-Israeli lobby or the other side--you have got , Henry the goddamnest broadest support up there than you can imagine.

K: I let loose a real blast at a Harvard luncheon --in front of the press that they are not going to yield to blackmail.

S: I wish you hadn't done that--not so sure it would be so useful at this point, but never mind--see you later today.

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T345 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Herb Schlosser/Dr. Kissinger
12:28 p.m. 2/6/74

S: Hello, Henry. I will be very brief. I just wanted to tell you something. You remember a few years ago you said stay on the ladder at NBC?

K: Yeh.

S: Well I am moving up another rung.

K: You are going to fall off the top soon.

S: A I hope so. At any rate, the Board of Directors at NBC today, effective April 1, elected me President of the company.

K: Well isn't that terrific. (gleefully)

S: So, now I have the worries of the whole thing. I will be the President and chief operating officer, Julian Goodman becomes Chairman and chief executive officer and David Adams will be Vice Chairman of the Board and I just wanted to tell you--it might be in the paper and I wanted to tell you.

K: Herb, I couldn't be more thrilled and I couldn't be more pleased that you were nice enough to call me.

S: I did want you to know. I remember that car conversation when we were doing over that TV Dinner

K: I remember only too well.

S: And we discussed it.

K: Herb, I'm proud of you.

S: Thank you, coming from you that means a great deal.

K: And I hope to see you soon.

S: Fine, I hope so, take care now.

K: Bye

S: And I hope everything goes well for you because you carry the weight of the world. Okay, Henry.

K: Thank you.

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T344*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Ambassador Bruce/Secretary Kissinger
11:30 p.m. 2/6/74

B: Good morning, Mr. Secretary

K: David, how are you?

B: I'm fine.

K: It is a more comforting town knowing you are back.

B: You are very nice to say so--I'm glad to be here, actually .

K: Even though you have ignored me.

B: I send you messages of inquiries.

K: Have you?

B: I've got to see you tonight.

K: Oh really?

B: We are going to the country to that party.

K: At Joanie Braden's?

B: Hm huh.

K: Well, goddamnit, if there is going to be another star there, I won't show up.
David, I'm anxious to see you. I have had the flu as you may know.

B: Yeh, I heard that you did.

K: And there are many things I want to discuss with you.
And I also would like to discuss with you, the state of the country in addition to--as you know I get a lot of praise for great foreign policy but you and I know it is 90% bluff right now.

B: Well, I'm disturbed about it,

K: I don't mean the attacks on the--I mean the lack of substance that is here now for the conduct of foreign policy.

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B: You are frightfully busy--

K: How about lunch on Saturday.

B: I will be absolutely delighted.

K: Let's plan for lunch on Saturday

B: All right

K: And also I have a design to send you to Europe for a couple of weeks--would you be willing to do that?

B: Of course I would.

K: Travel around the capitals and see if you can talk some sense into these madmen?

K: I would make you a presidential emissary

B: Of course, I would.

K: You brought all of these guys up and let them tell you what it is they really want--I find it hard to understand what the hell

B: I don't think they know themselves.

K: Then let's find that out--

B: I think in your conversations next week on the energy crisis, you can ask them quite a few things.

K: But they will be all unpleasant

B: Yeh, I'm not very pleased with how things are going there.

K: Very displeased.

B: Then Saturday will be fine--I'll call your secretary about the time and where to meet

K: And I'll see you tonight--and your date.

B: I think we'll have some fun.

K: I'll see you and your date then--where is ~~Nancy~~ Vangie?

B: ~~Nancy~~ Vangie is arriving on Saturday--she is in Paris.

K Well we will keep it from her.

B: And my date is also going to be accompanied by her cousin (?(Mr. Alsop.

K: Okay, see you then.

T347

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

TELECON
Secretary Kissinger/ General Haig
February 6, 1974, 5:31 p. m.

K: I know the Egyptian Foreign Minister in the presence of our Ambassador called in the Saudis and gave them hell, and they're now pulling back.

H: Good.

K: Can you keep your leader from jumping too much, because I think they're in the process of pulling back. They said it was all a terrible misunderstanding -- they just couldn't guarantee anything yet. The

[redacted] B1

H: Good. When are you leaving?

K: Tomorrow morning. Are you going to that dinner at the Bradens tonight?

H: They wouldn't have me for dinner.

K: Well, if you see that nasty column, you know where it came from. O. K. Will you tell that to the President?

H: Yes, I will.

END

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 25X6
DECLASSIFY AFTER: HAK'S DEATH
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T 348

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

TELECON
Secretary Kissinger/ Ambassador Dinitz
February 6, 1974, 6:50 p. m.

K: Does Eban know about that scheme you have with Syria -- you know, [redacted] B1

D: He knows about the scheme because the Prime Minister

K: So we can tell Keating? O. K. Fine.

D: The Israeli press has given some of the

K: I've seen it, and I'm revolted.

D: The Prime Minister had to issue a statement from her office today denying that there is any deal. She would be under attack before anything materializes. The proposal stands, of course. Did you hear anything, Mr. Secretary?

K: No. We've heard some fairly friendly things from the Egyptians -- not about Syria, just on the embargo.

D: Positive things?

K: Just that they're continuing to work on the embargo. The Egyptians are really trying to do the right thing. I just don't see what they're getting out of their present position. They have not made one demand of Israel.

D: I think I can see what they're up to. It's not necessarily negative. I think they're trying to _____ with the United States. In the long run I think they are trying to weaken the Russian influence there.

K: That's in all our interests. I would like to see you fairly soon because I talked to Gromyko also about establishing relations with you.

D: I thought you were going to Panama tomorrow.

K: I am. Maybe Friday. I'll see you.

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D: Whenever you're ready. I passed to Eagleburger the Panamanian business.

K: Good.

D: Well, have a nice trip and a nice dinner tonight.

K: If you were not so obnoxious, I could hate your government more. I've been spied on before.

D: I'm not spied on. Shows we have similar friends.

K: Any Gentiles there tonight?

D: Governor Rockefeller will be there. I would never expose you to a dinner unless there were some Gentiles there.

END

T351

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Secretary Kissinger/Ambassador Dinitz
February 7, 1974, 8:07 p.m.

K: I have two pieces of information for you, neither of which I'm authorized to pass on to you but which on human grounds I do not think I can keep from you. The Syrians have transferred to me the number of prisoners. I'm supposed to hold it until they give me some further instructions, but after -- the number is 65.

D: Higher than I thought.

K: Much higher than I thought.

D: That's good news.

K: And the second is that the Egyptians have demobilized 73,000 men.

D: 73,000? That's also good news. I think we have demobilized 40,000 so far. We are in the process of doing some more.

K: The Saudis are running a major campaign here on the Syrian business, and you know how that will reach the President sooner or later.

D: I heard of some of this campaign. I have cabled the Prime Minister of our conversation, Mr. Secretary. I did not get any reaction today at all from Israel.

K: My honest opinion -- our intelligence indicates that Sadat is in some trouble with his army. My judgment is that if Sadat falls, you're losing the best chance to get peace that you've ever had. Compared to that, the mistakes after 67 would be minor, and I believe that progress in Syria is a step in that direction.

D: Did you hear anything new from the Russians on this subject?

K: I told them the importance of the prisoners. They're getting very concerned about being excluded, and I made general comments about acting in coordination with them, which means very little.

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D: The only thing I can think of, Mr. Secretary, is that I think this last proposal with all of the difficulties we have

K: I have transferred it to the Syrians.

D: I have a feeling there was

K: Well, by then I think you better get ready to move fast.

D: Yes. I think then there would not be any problem. But now I have just heard that Dayan might be coming anyway for the first of March for the Israel bonds.

K: Listen. I'm going on vacation on the 2nd of March. If you're willing to settle everything

D: Mr. Secretary, I think you are entitled to vacation -- you have postponed it for three times.

K: I don't often give you bad advice, but I think you have to change your basic attitude.

D: Actually, I do think we see eye to eye.

K: Not you personally.

D: No. Even the government with all its crazy problems. I had a little difficulty moving them.

K: Can you avoid getting that number leaked?

D: Yes. I will cable it only to the Prime Minister. How many of them are wounded -- did they tell you that?

K: Nothing.

D: Or their condition?

K: Nothing.

D: Well, I will pass it only to the Prime Minister.

K: It's a much larger number than I thought.

D: I thought anything over 50 would be good.

K: I did not think it would be that many.

D: That is encouraging news. I will pass it to her -- it's one of the nightmares she is going through every night.

K: And -- for God's sake, I'm telling it to her as a friend.

D: I will not even tell it to Eban. Even that suggestion I gave to you -- because the moment it gets to the Foreign Office -- it's like a sieve. Have you heard about the UP story from Israel? Ambassador Keating has presented a proposal of two stages -- first, getting the list, and then getting the visits of the Red Cross.

K: I must tell you as a friend -- when the President _____ with this, you will get under massive

D: I hope that when the President is made privy to it that he is at the same time getting the right explanation from you.

K: Do you think I'm eager to get a confrontation?

D: I know -- but there are other people who are. In the State of the Union he was careful to avoid your name when he said he got promises from the Arab leaders. Now he can't kid you about misleading him. In addition, I think the President did have some direct communication with Faisal. Then he owes nothing to him for the embarrassment.

K: Let's see what reply I'll get to my cable.

D: Have a nice dinner tomorrow at the Bradens.

K: Are you going?

D: No. That's one dinner that they didn't invite me to, but some of my friends will be there.

K: GD it, who?

D: Barbara Walter is going to be there.

K: Give me a few others.

D: You will know most of them.

K: Come on -- tell me.

D: I will -- tomorrow morning.

K: Tell me now.

D: The Bradens, Barbara Walter, maybe Walter Cronkite will be there. I did try - and maybe succeeded - to stop the thing _____ from that SOB - Marilyn.

K: Marilyn?

D: I called my friends, the professors. I called Marty Lipsett, who is decent.

K: He's insane.

D: Lipsett did it. Rita Hauser, too, which surprises me. When Marilyn called me to ask if you were going to Damascus tomorrow, I asked here, "Why are you taking half-baked stories which are out of context?" I told her she doesn't have the right information.

K: Is Marty Lipsett killing it.

D: Marty is working with all his friends to try to kill it.

K: It won't do ~~xkxy~~ anybody any good.

D: A conversation like this must XX be taken out of context when it gets reported.

K: I was trying to calm down some very excited people. I appreciate it. Now if you can calm down Joe Kraft before he gets me into prison.

D: I'm going to see him this week, and I'm going to talk sense to him. He's a neurotic.

K: He's a total maniac.

D: He goes around saying the Secretary of State has so charmed the Israeli Ambassador that he doesn't have an independent policy any more.

K: I wish it were true.

D: Well, it's right -- but how did he know about it?

K: I wish it were true. If Israel survives, you and I will have performed a miracle. At the end of October you were in desperate shape.

D: You weren't in such good shape either.

K: Me personally?

D: No -- the whole situation. If you have anything to tell me subsequent to the visit of Gromyko -- if it is of interest to us -- then maybe we should get together.

K: Good. Let's try that. Now I have to write a speech for Panama. I have ten speech-writers, and all they've come up with is that Panama is an isthmus.

D: Are you going there for negotiation?

K: Yes.

D: If you are interested, we know someone who wants to talk to you personally.

K: Well, I'm going on Thursday. Call Larry tomorrow.

D: I'll call Larry, and I'll tell him.

END

T352

*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Larry Eagleburger/Secretary Kissinger
2/8/74 9:13 a.m.

K: What do you think of a press conference today?

LE: I think that you ought to do it, but I think that I am not agreed with by most. You are going to get an awful lot on energy sir,

K: What is the advantage--what am I getting out of it?

E: Hopefully you can set the stage for Mexico City, hopefully, you

K: Mexico City, I can do after the energy conference

E: Hopefully you can put the energy conference in context, so that they don't expect the goddamn world to come out of it; that is my biggest concern. That you are going to be blamed if it doesn't come out with great glowing success--that is the thing I'm concerned about that I would hope you would do--
I admit there are dangers. My biggest concern is the press is going look for a defeat out

K: The press is going to look for a defeat out of this conference, no matter what we do

E: I know that--but I am saying to the extent you can cool that in advance--
The other answer is the backgrounder on the energy conference--maybe that will do it.

K: I just think that they will get into tapping again--the Radford case --they are going to get into blackmail

E: On energy, you mean

K: Well on the embargo--why the President said what he did.

E: I thought about it last night--I think it is a close call either way and if you think they are going to get into Radford--then I guess --I'm concerne about the conference--that is my biggest concern--maybe a backgrounder would handle it then.
But I think something needs to be done before that--conf.....[end tape]

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T353 *

TELCON
Mr. Atherton/Sec. Kissinger
9:45 a.m. 2/8/74

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I take it Joe isn't in yet

A: I think he is having snow problems--he called and is on his way

K: Right, where do we stand--have we heard from any of our various clients?

A: You have a reply in this a.m. from Boumediene

K: That I have seen--that was last night--
It seemed fairly conciliatory

A: I got some thoughts sir, how you might go back on this--which I am just dictating and we'll get up to you

K: Because that seemed to me to say anything the Syrians do is okay with us.

A: That's right. I think it would be useful to tell we got a proposal with Assad

K: Haven't we done that already?

A: Not with Boumediene
This would be a good opening to go back to him and pick that up, and we also ought to tell him--because he mentioned we caused problem by setting the date that we didn't set the date--we were told about an urgent meeting and that it was on that basis--

K: The think to tell him is we were given firm assurances that it would be done immediately after the disengagement agreement was signed so that the Fb. 14 date was an outside date which we were given--

A: That is the point we ought to make to him
But I've seen nothing in from any of the others since Jim's long report about his talk with Faisal. Saqqaf is in Damascus, as they told us he would

K: I Think they are going to yeild.

A: Today I am a little more hopeful.

K: If I were completely in charge, I'd tell them to shove their oil.
But that would give it to us for sure next month. I'm serious.

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K: Do we see any chance of my having a press conference today?

A: The only thing if you do sir, you will get a lot of questions about the luncheon comment the other day

K: I understandyou all had heart attacks

A: [laughs] Not exactly,

K: I think it does good

A: My question is whether --just the use of the word blackmail when we are trying to work on the quiet side with the Saudis and Faisal, gives an emotional and as you said romantic attitude

K: a But they are also pretty rough customers and they have to know we are taking it seriously

A: I think they got that message very clearly--the problem is giving them public challege, which they sometimes act preversely to

K: So far no one has peeped about--

A: No--you haven't had any feedback at all

K: I would like you to do a long message to Fahmi about the Soviet conversation

A: What should I tell him

K: Although there isn't a hell of a lot to say--say Gromyko complained--first of all I want to assure him that no matter what they may say to him, that we took the full responsibility for this diplomacy that we did not blame it on Egypt or on Fahmi personally.
Secondly, that what the Soviet's wanted from us is a veto over all our Middle East actions, prior notification of everything we were going to do xxxx in joint agreement. This we couldn't--just embellish it a bit and that wehad sabotaged the Geneva conference and also they wanted to be present at all meetings. I made the point what started out as a device to make it easier for Arabs and Israelis to talk, now became a US unilateral--a way by which we imposed ourselves. Then he insisted that we and the Soviets give a joint guarantee even if the parties didn't want it. Which I also refused. What I did agree was that we would coordinate our actions the word special role wasin there because they wanted us to use auspicious and co-chairmanship which we didn't want to mention --that there is no agreement and what I propose is that before either the Egyptians or we tell the Soviets anything, we agree what we are telling them, and call that coordination. See what I mean?

A: Yes.

K: But phrase it delicately, in case they show it to the Soviets.

A: Okay.
One question, sir, what you say the Soviets want a joint guarantee--was this in reference to after a settlement

K: Yes.
But they made it clear they wanted that guarantee whatever the parties thought.

A: Okay, I have that

K: And you might as well tell them that what--we have been in touch with Boumediene and give them a summary of that.

A: We will do that--

K: Can I have it this a.m.?

A: Yes, I'll do it right away.

T356 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Eagleburger/Vest/Kissinger
10:17 a.m. 2/8/74

E: Vest is here with me, McCloskey is stranded somewhere between here and home.
Let me put George on.

K: I've decided not to do it.

E: The biggest problem now is given the weather, we couldn't get camera crews in here.

K: I don't think we can get anything useful, because if I state very ambitious aims, then the conference is a failure, then if I state very modest aims, the Europeans will shout hurray, we agree completely and then the conference will be a success in public and a failure in substance, but if he wants a backgrounder, I'm willing to do that.

E: George is on the phone, what do you think?

V: Sir, I would recommend a backgrounder done by maybe McCloskey

E: What does he know about energy?

V: He had been sitting in on the conference arrangements --if not then I think we should do a backgrounder with you.

K: What time?

V: Are you tied up in the afternoon

K: I can change that--what would be a good time

V: Ideally--3:30 this afternoon

K: All right let's do it 3:30--whom would you invite?

V: American correspondents

K: All of them

V: American regulars--2 dozen-30

K: How can I get away with a backgrounder with them

V: This is why I originally said McCloskey, because it is [illegible] fo do a backgrounder for you and have it not be a maj[illegible] too significant

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K: What about this morning at 12:00

V: The problem is there is almost no one here

K: I don't know what to say

V: If we do it at noon--you can't exclude foreigners--they will be hanging around the rooms

K: But if you schedule a backgrounder at 3:30 for me--million people there

V: That is done individually by name and we telephone them personally

K: I don't think McCloskey knows it well enough to do it well--the nuances with the Europeans--Sonnenfeldt would be better

V: Why don't I set up a backgrounder for you at 3:30

K: Let me think for 1/2 hour.

T362

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Secretary Kissinger/Mr. McCloy
February 8, 1974, 9:40 p.m.

K: I'm sorry I couldn't get back to you, but you have no idea how swamped I am. In this weather it's probably going to be tough to get down here.

M: It's hard, but I can try. I can't get down tonight, I don't believe.

K: Not tonight. Maybe tomorrow afternoon for half an hour?

M: I'll make a real effort.

K: Give me a call in the morning. I just wanted to talk to you for five minutes. I have reached the point, Jack, where I believe we have to take the French on.

M: Jobert's Damascus speech was terrible.

K: If this keeps on, we're going to see Europe _____. First we get eight Europeans telling us it's a good idea, and the next thing you know they're _____. I don't want this energy conference turned into another adversarial _____. If this keeps up, I am really afraid what's going to happen. I propose to tell Scheel and _____ on Sunday that if there's going to be a confrontation on this conference, we'll have to do a basic reassessment of our position.

M; I think you're almost to the point where you have to take them on.

K: I wonder -- and I say this as a friend. The dislike of this Administration is so great among the Establishment people, are they going to back us up?

M: Some ot the Establishment -- there's a growing resentment against the French attitude, and I wouldn't think you'd have a backlash from that area.

K: Let me give you an example. First of all, at the NATO meeting, I wanted to meet with the Foreign Ministers of the Nine. It XX took three weeks of negotiation for a half-hour meeting. Unbelievable. But

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the next week at the European Summit four Arab oil Foreign Ministers showed up and were received like royalty. Now the Europeans _____ have a political directors meeting today and they have a political adjunct to this economic deal which they're going to vote on next Thursday at the Foreign Ministers' meeting of the Nine. _____ meeting is almost insulting. They have finally given Scheel the authority to brief me on this -- on Sunday, which is too late. Almost an adversarial relationship.

M: _____ suggestion in this memo. Helmut Schmidt is a bit at odds with Brandt. Helmut Schmidt is more favorably desposed to us. Very mad at the French; very mad at the British. What did you think of my suggestion that Doug Home

K: I liked it very much.

M: I don't know what the answer is.

K: I will do that on a personal basis.

M: I will give this thing some more thought. I'm quite aware that my approach may be quite naiive.

K: Well, it may be naiive, but it's exactly -- it's what I've been coming to.

M: I think we're at a very critical point because this can develop into a serious -- more serious thing -- if you don't confront it now.

K: That's what I feel. The reason I called you this morning is that _____ because I had come to the conclusion which you expressed in your memo, but I didn't want to get down

M: You can handle that perfectly well. The sentiment in Europe is that they're looking to the United States for reassertion of its leadership, and they do have a recognition of past history. But they got panicky over this last affair -- the energy affair -- and panicky over the French attitude. In everything you get out of Europe, the lowest common denominator is hostility.

K: And with provocation.

M: This is silly. I think you've got to remind them gently of past history. We've bailed them out a couple of times.

K: I'm thinking of saying to Jobert on Sunday night -- if he turns this into a confrontation, we will _____ hostility to France.

M: That Damascus speech was terrible. _____ I'll call you tomorrow.

K: Can you call me at the White House between 11:00 and 12:00?

M: All right, Henry.

K: Many thanks, Jack.

END

T361

TELECON
Secretary Kissinger/Ambassador Dinitz
February 8, 1974, 9:10 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you? How are you? Don't you answer when

D: I didn't hear you, I'm sorry. It must be disturbed by some bugging. I'm fine, Mr. Secretary, and I'm not at all upset that we can't meet tonight. In the meantime my wife invited some people for dinner.

K: I notice I'm not one of them.

D: It's very difficult to get you these days, Mr. Secretary, but was I right about the guest list?

K: I have never doubted the accuracy of your intelligence.

D: I did not know that Peter _____ would come down from New York. He said he can't let you just be in Washington without coming to debate you.

K: Do you want to come and have breakfast with me tomorrow?

D: Excellent.

K: 8:30?

D: 8:30. In the Department?

K: Yes -- or would 8:15 be better.

D: 8:15 is also fine. Is the Algerian Minister of Fuel in the city?

K: Yes. He just left. I have seen him.

D: Larry told me, but I thought he was kidding.

K: No, he is here. I told him we'd stop everything if they didn't lift the embargo. Now all I have to do is convince the President of this.

D: But I think the Saudis and Algerians are having second thoughts in the last 24 hours.

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K: I've put the fear of God into them.

D: I think you're playing it very smartly.

K: Well, wait till I come after you.

D: I think you're playing it smartly there, too.

K: _____ 100% of what they want. 98%?

D: _____ only 90% of our demands. I think you are playing it fine. There's a change of mood, and they got scared a bit.

K: The only thing is I hope you people are thinking constructively about what proposals to make when negotiations start.

D: I'd rather have the thinking ~~xxxxxxx~~ done as late as possible to avoid leakage.

K: Let Dayan produce what he did for Egypt, and we'll be in good shape.

D: That's a different situation.

K: Or somebody -- I don't know whoever did it.

D: Maybe it was done by the Chief of Staff.

K: I like the Chief of Staff.

D: He is a good man.

K: He is a very good man. I met a group of Jewish leaders today, headed by Rifkin.

D: That's the third one you are covering within two weeks.

K: I want them all to work on the MFN question.

D: I had breakfast with Senator Jackson this morning.

K: What's his mood?

D: O.K. I didn't tell him I'm seeing you. I think that something can be done. I think, Mr. Secretary, that if you would devote more time to him not only on this but briefing him every once in a while about what's happening in the Middle East -- he was totally under the wrong impression about what happened in the Middle East. But I feel that if he gets more attention, and I think he deserves it -- he's not a stupid Senator.

K: Absolutely not.

D: He has very high regard for you. _____ liberal friends. He was always of this opinion about the Russians. He doesn't feel

K: I like him very much.

D: Is it true what I heard on television tonight -- Russians will stop Iceland deliveries of oil. The State Department did not deny it.

K: It's nonsense. This State Department is a bunch of GD morons.

D: They should deny it.

K: Yes. Well, I'll see you tomorrow.

D: By the way, would you want me to come alone or bring Shalev?

K: If you want _____ note-taker

D: O.K., Mr. Secretary, so I'll bring him.

END

T 355 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
2/8/74 10:08 a.m.

K: Hal, where are you

S: I'm just in the office

K: I see. Now I was sent the EC Nine draft communique. Would it overstrain the department to make an analysis of it for me?

S: I didn't know that you got it. We sent them ours yesterday. To Soames . We will go to work right away, I didn't know we had it.

K: Can youse e to it that when something like that comes it, they would give me the courtesy of analysis automatically.

S: I didn't know--Did you read my message last night that we sent to the plane

K: About whom I should see?
And also that we have to put the arm on them. What does putting the arm on them mean?

S: We only discovered late night before last that they commission/was drafting a communique, so yesterday I got--our draft sent to Soames to tell him we don't want a confrontration, we expect them to exercise influence on the community drafting exercise.
Now that obviously has been too late. But I think from the way the British and Germans are talking that we have had here, and we are going to have a very rough time.

K: On what particular issue

S: The big issue comes down to the question of what kind of machinery follows --the whole tendency is to throw this into the OECD and humor us at most with saying something like--it isn't excluded and and there might be another meeting of this group, or something like that. So the question of the follow-on machinery to the conference or followion activity-=

K: What is their picture, why?

S: Their picture is that they are scared of the French. This is why I said in the message last night to you that we don't know whether they would risk a break with the French, but they certainly won't try unless confronted with a break with us.

K: What is the break with us?

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K: What is the break with us?

S: The break with us, I think, is to tell them look, if you don't want to--[end tape]

S: [begin tape]I think we have to talk about it more coherently, but I think that is where the issue comes--and you can probably get some generalities in the communique on general philosophy that is in there--but the _____ part, paragraph 15 or 20, I guess, in our draft communique--

K: I've read it, it is a good communique--

S: Is where the reall~~y~~ kicker comes and as far as I can tell you--... Sheel(?) you are really going to have to talk turkey with him and tell him if necessar to convene a caucus of his nine and tell them to change their position. Actually I think the mandate can be stretched not to be incompatible with the idea of some specific work after this conference , with another ministerial conference

K: Do you think I should have a press conference today?

S: Well

K: What do I say, if I state our goals too ambitiously, it will be a defeat If I don't state them ambitiously, then the Europeans will weasel off off it .

S: You stated them at the Harvard/Yale/Princeton thing the other day

K: And why do I have to state it again?

S: You don't have to. I think if ~~o~~you could avoid a press conference on other grounds today, I think there is nothing to be gai ned in any further public statement.

K: That is what I think. Have we sent my comment around.

S: To the Harvard thing

K: Have we told them to give it to the host or have we just done it for the edification of the goddamn ambassadors? Have we told them to give it to the host

S: I will have to look at the telegram--I can't honestly tell you.

K: My recollection is that we told them this is for them to draw on. Why that was done, I don't understand.

S: That is the why the State Department does things.

K: I am now in charge of the State Department, Hal, and for whatever limited time I may be there, but it is going to work the way I want it--

S: Sure, and I spend my entire day chasing down these things and telling people how to do it--it was incredible to get this damn communique sent to Soames yesterday--it took me half a day to get the damn thing out.
I'll have to dig the telegram out and see what we sent them. I can't see any benefit in your saying anything further publicly.

K: That is why I am afraid of. Because if I say very ambitious goals, then it will be a failure.
If I say very unambitious goals, then all the Europeans will shout hurray

S: I think it has to be done privately.

K: Now what is the business of the Brezhnev letter on EEO, did we get one too?

S: We didn't get a letter-we got on the 7th of Jan, an oral note which

K: But it is amazing that those sons-of-bitches will not even discuss that sortof thing in NATO anymore.

S: Evidentally the British, Germans and French got the same sort of thing --but now we have to dig ourselves out of that whole by -- did you see the telegram I drafted?

K: No.

S: There is a telegram that tells Rumsfeld to say that we did some time ago that we did get a routine oral note restating the Soviet position which didn't call for a response and we didn't respond to it, and anyway it is overtaken by your conversation with Gromyko on which we fully briefed them and which they were deliriously happy with. I think we have to do that to protect ourselves. Let me ask you--the Secretary Morton and others are interested in doing so work with the Poles on coal? classification and they want the Polish minister in charge of that over here. I've held the thing up until I had a chance to talk to you and see whether you ever gave the Soviets an oral reply to their oral note on energy --

K: Yeh, I talked to them, they are willing to talk them.

S: If he has donethat, I think we can go ahead with the Poles. I wasn't going to let it out of here, until I was clear that we had done something the Soviets. So we wouldn't offend them by going ahead with the Poles and not with them.

K: Yeh

S: So we will move on that.
Well I guess I better get this social schedule of yours started up, if you have approved it.

K: Yeh, it is all right.

S: We will make those calls and get these people lined up

K: Where do we have breakfast--State Department?

S: I think so.

K: Who sits in?

S: It is up to you. The meeting starts at 10:00

K: No, I'm not talking about that--who sits in?

S: I think it probably out to be Donaldson and

K: You better sit in with the Europeans

S: And myself and Hartman and then some people may have to leave

K: We' are talking about Sunday

S: But the pre-meeting starts at 10:00 on Sunday

K: Oh I see.

S: It is important to get Sheel beforehand?

K: Then let us meet at 8:30

S: I'll try , he is coming in very late

K: No, then let's do it 9:00 (?)

S: We gave P___le told the communique alsoand/them we expected the Germans to see to it that --

K: There is no way to give it to Soames without it's leaking to everybody

S: We didn't give the text to Soames--we told our guy to talk to him from it and give the points of it. And since Greenwald had left already for Washington, I called Rumsfeld and told him to tell Soames we are really serious about this--that it comes from you and we expect him to be helpful.

K: I'm coming over and would like to meet with you, Hartman and McCloskey.

S: Yeh

K: And I think we have to decide what our policy is with the Europeans. If they are going to do to us in this what they are doing in the Atlantic declarations, and I have every reason to believe they are, we better reconsider--

S: The question is how far we want to push it with the French

K: Let's not say it is the French, because the others are getting all the benefits of the French, plus the benefits of cowardice.

S: I understand that, but on the other hand, I think some of them would be willing to move more than they are

K: Why don't they move individually

S: Because they are committed to the community and they are scared to risk that, and I don't understand the French--I don't understand the French and I think if you can get over your quiet infatuation with Jobert, I think you ought to get him in and really read him the riot act. Tell him he has jeopardized the military stuff, we have spent five years, trying to get great sacrifice here within the government to straighten out our relations with the French --we have gone a long way with them and this just pulls the rug out.

K: When do I do it--before the conference?

S: No afterwards. Or some time during--it doesn't make all that difference because it is a pretty basic massage --and tell them there are so many babies you can throw off the sled to feed to domestic politics

K: Why don't I see him for 5 minutes before the conference and put him --

S: I'd have to find out when he is arriving actually--but I think you ought to take him in your back room

K: And tell him I want to tell him formally that we are ready to have a public confrontation with the French and that we are ready to end all oooperation and make every forum a contest between them and us and let's see where that leaves us.

S: Well, let me get to work on some of these things

K: I'll be in and I'd like to meet with you and Hartman and McCloskey

S: Okay.

T360

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Zahedi/Sec. Kissinger
Friday, Feb. 8, 1974
12:30 p.m.

Z: You have come back to Washington and you bring this snow.

K: If you keep making snotty remarks to a Sec. of State you will be in trouble.

Z: I have talked to His Majesty yesterday and mentioned about the talk we had night before last.

K: I hope you told him of my affection for him.

Z: Yes indeed. He was pleased to hear from you and he is looking forward to seeing you.

K: Good.

Z: That would be in the third week of March. March 21 is Persian National New Year when we have the ceremony in Iran. After that he would go to a place in the Persian Gulf -- a beautiful island which is like heaven. You should go there and he would love to see you there. You could have a swim together. You can land any kind of plane there. If you are going from the northern part you can land there and stay as long as you want. He would love to see you.

K: I would probably have a pretty big party with me.

Z: It is all right as long as you let me know how many you have. I would arrange for their stay. You would stay at the palace we have for the Crown Prince and I would arrange for the other people. Just let me know.

K: You could handle my usual travelling group?

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Z: Most happy to.

K: It is very generous of His Majesty and I might even make a break for a day and stay overnight or something.

Z: It would be wonderful. You are making so many trips and you are so tired. In that time of year really heaven in this new place. At the same time you would have a chance to see the Persian Gulf area from the plane. Since you will be there I could arrange for your company to be about a half-hour away from you so they would be on their own. They could have their fun themselves. Nobody else would be there in your talks unless you wish.

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of
K: I might even stay a couple of days and get one day/rest.

Z: I really suggest that. You should do it. You need it. You have been working very, very hard.

K: I do want to have an opportunity to have a long talk with His Majesty.

Z: There he would be very relaxed. You could swim, walk, sit and at the same time continue your talks during lunch, breakfast -- no body to bother you.

K: He is the only statesman of the area. I am certain he can explain the price problem to me and that we can work it out in a satisfactory way. I know his concern with world stability. I want to discuss with him the whole Middle East situation.

Z: I told him that and he is looking forward to that very much. I think it would be very good -- you would be coming from somewhere and at the same time you would brief him about those places.

K: Wonderful. As soon as I have my date set I will propose it. It will be around the 24th or 25th.

Z: Marvelous. As long as it is after the 21st.

K: It will not be then.

Z: Marvelous. I would be grateful -- no one knows so far except yourself and His Majesty.

K: Exactly. Let's keep it that way a few weeks.

Z: I would be very grateful if you could give me the approximate number of people you will have.

K: Is early in March time enough?

Z: Perfect.

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Zahedi
Feb. 8, 1974

K: Give His Majesty my very warm regards.

Z: I will be calling him in Zurich in about one hours time.

K: Thank you very much.

END

T357 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
David Rockefeller
10:32 a.m. 2/8/74

K: I'm so sorry we missed connection, but I felt so lousey on Monday

R: Oh I think you were wise, I hope you are feeling better.

K: I'm in good shape again.
To the distress of my staff.

R: I think you are amazing, because you didn't sound very well.

K: I felt lousey.

R: How was Panama

K: It was fine.

R: Did you make some headway

K: We did very well--had a tremendous public reception--you wouldn't be able to tell that from the press--but nevertheless it is true.

R: I'm out in Arkansas. And I haven't seen the --so I didn't know about that. I called because I am hoping that we perhaps could get together next week.

K: Are you coming to the business --

R: I am and this is what I was hoping in connection with that we could have a few moments.

K: Why don't we try tomeet afterwards or for breakfast the next morning.

R: Breakfast would be perfect--Thursday right?

K: Yeh, why not have breakfast Thursday morning--at the State Dept you get better food.

R: I'll be there any time you say

K: 8:00 ?

R: Whatever you say--available any time.

K: 8;00 at State.

R: I would like to discuss part of it with you in relation to the proposal which I must say has caused me considerable anguish.

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K: I had a word with Nelson about it the other day. He checked one view he had and--

R: How do you feel about that?

K: David, you know my affection for the family and for you. It is a somewhat precarious position, if I can be ohonest with you. From the national point of view, you would of course be a tremendous asset, but you'd be out on your own.

R: No doubt about that.

K: I wouldn't pay the slightest attention to what promises you are given when the shooting starts, you are going to be there all by yourself.

R: I'm sureof that.

K: Now that has advantages and liabilities, but it is a precarious position. In a funny way--that is not now possible, because you can't work with me ~~ok~~ having been offered this other thing.

R: Of course I

K: It would have been a safer relationship for both of us, because foreign affairs is still lightly insulated

R: Right, but in a way, it is conceivable that--

K: You and I would work closely together anyway.

R: I n some respects--I might be able to do--

K: You could do more and better.

R: But there--

K: Because you have a much power base.

R: That is right.

K: My basic view I think would be that the country is in such bad shape, and you can't really be diminished by stepping into a crisis, if it doesn't work it can't be a reflection on your and so much needs to be done that can only be done by senior cabinet officers that on balance I think you'd be performing a service by doing it.

R: So you feel I should. Do you feel that this constitutes a problem for Nelson

K: No, I don't see why.

R: I think it could prove--

K: I don't see why it could be a liability.

R: The things one has to do at this time are not going to be popular

K: But David, I think the man who has the guts to walk alone and do what is right, is going sweep the country. I think the worse mistake any politican can make right now is to try to do what is popular. Look at Jackson whom I don't even particularly respect, but whatever position he had is due to the fact that he stood for things that turned out to be plausible at least if not right, and I think that what the country wants is a man who is willing to look at the future and willing to take it there --they are going to be so sick and tired of all these machinations after 4 years of Vietnam and what will certainly now be four years of Watergate--that they will want integrity and direction--I don't see what you could do that could hurt.

R: I think I certainly will get attacked

K: Of course you'd be attacked--but I think that will even make you visible and if you go your way it will be humane and right and if necessary difficult. And of course, as far as I'm concerned, I would consider that you and I would be working in close--

R I have to say to you Henry that that is one of the major factors that makes me feel that I should do it.

K: I mean we could have a partnership between Treasury and State]end tape]

]begin tape]

K: ...those Treasury people--we've never had a Secretary of Treasury who had your international understanding--Doug Dillon (?) not since Doug Dillon--he would be in the same class.

R: Right. Henry, this was very helpful. The trip I must say was sensational from my point of view-

K: You saw Sadat

R: Had a marvelous visit with him--there are quite a lot of specific things and therefore in that particular part--if Joe Sisco or someone could come alone--because there may be some things you want to follow up on.

K: Well could we have private talk first--and then have Joe join us about 8:30

R: Good, could you do that, because the other part I just don't want you to have to worry about--there are number of little things that should be fairly important

K: Another thing I want to talk to you about--you know that all say you are the chairman of the establishment, it may not be exactly true, but that you are the chairman of the trilateral commission

R [laughs]

K: I really think we must take a look at our relation with ~~us~~ Europe. We are now seeing on the energy issue exactly as we did on the Atlantic declaration and nobody can say we are not consulting with them that we are not cooperating--we are offering them things for nothing. We want nothing from them except cooperative efforts.

R: I really think this may be one area where I could be helpful.

K: I tell you if this conference next week goes the way ~~Defense~~ the French are trying to steer it, and the other 8 have again caved to the French, then we have to reassess our policy. We cannot go on this way.

R: I am very disturbed by it.

K: Because in the energy field, we want nothing from them, except not to pursue ~~beggar~~ thy neighbor policies. They can do next to nothing for us. If the French bought all the oil that they need at present prices that wouldn't cut into our needs and they would be bankrupt in 15 months so there isn't anything that bothers us, but we would then be in 1947 after 25 years of effort.

R: I just cannot imagine why they are doing it. One reason I wantedto call you was that I saw Walter Levy at the Council and he is apparently working with Bill Donaldson--will be down there--he is not happy that the papers are being prepared and I thought you should know he is concerne about our position.

K: Our position is too soft in his view.

R: You might want to talk with him--he is really good.

K: He is outstanding--

R: He told me he was really rather unhappy with what was coming out--

K: Okay, let me talk to him today--

R: I think if you have a chance--at least fo find out the nature of his concern

K: Well let's have breakfast then on Thursday--we will talk about your personal plans first. How firm do you think that offer was? I've heard that George is staying until May 1

R: That's right. And I don't know whether that is--I assume this was an offer --I haven't seen the President

K: Not many people do

R: Obviously I'm not going to accept unless I talk with the President and he gives me the same coordinating authority that George has. I don't care about the ~~physical~~ assistant position, but I do care about coordinating

K: You can't get the coordinating authority unless you get the assistant positio I think you ought to get them both.

R: Coordinating for it is essential

K: It is ~~easy~~ easier to coordinate as assistant that as Cabinet member

R" Maybe that is so

K: It is impossible as cabinet member, no one will take your authority, believe me.

R: I see. Marshall Br_____ feels it is the other way

K: I know, but he is ~~wrong~~ wrong, he recommended that to me too and he was wrong.

R: I think in whatever way that is essential

K: The reason is I couldn't get to first base with Defense if there were another system. The fact that I am Secretary of State would get me nothing from Defense or CIA.

R: I think that I better--have you discussed with Al Haig since I saw him?

K: No, but I will this weekend

R: If you have a chance--you may be could find out--if there is a change

K: I have no reason to suppose there is a change--

R: If you could--he said he did not discuss with the presidnt the question of coordination and from my point of view that is really a must.

K: I agree completely. R: Thank you, Henry, and I'll see you Thurs. K: Goo

T358 *

TELCON
Bob McCloskey/Sec. Kissinger
2/8/74 10:45 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Bob, not being able to reach you, I've made a decision. I'm not going to give a press conference, because if I set very high goals, if we don't reach them, it will be a failure. If I say low goals, the Europeans would say hurray, we agree completely and then it will be a success xx in publicity and a failure in substance; what I think we can do is to have Sonnenfeldt give a backgrounder this pm. He's the only one who understands my thinking well enough to do it.

M: Sonnenfeldt? Where is that going to leave Donaldson.

K: He can sit in. I'm not in the business of making people feel good --I'm in the business of getting policy made.

M Hm huh.

K: Donaldson hasn't got the guts to stand before these guys, nor does he understand the political strategy. But you can think about it--I'll be in in 15 minutes

M Do you want me to hold on to my comments on your speech until you get here?

K: Yeh, I want that speech changed too.

M Hm huh

K: Although it is getting there, do you think?

M Conceptually, I think it is right on. I think they things they suggest are important. I don't think you can set for example a 90-day deadline in your opening remakrs for a task force. I think you have to say you proposed--

K: There are a lot of things like that which have to be changed

M: And I think--

K: But also the conceptual approach has to be done a little differently --but the body of it is in pretty good shape.

M: Okay, mine are here when you come over.

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T354 1*

TELCON
Dr. Kissinger/L. Eagleburger
10:07 a.m. 2/8/74

RELEASED IN FULL

E: Hello

K: I can't raise anybody with whom I discuss the question of the press conference. I don't suppose the press would be in now.

E: He is either here or in a ditch, let me check. McCloskey, did you talk to Bob?

K: I can't find him.

E: The problems obviously are the traffic and snow
Let me find who is here

K: I would be willing to do it, if necesaary, maybe it would be useful to put something out about the goddmn conference

EL I wouldn't say goddamn, I think it is brilliant idea. I get right back to you.

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DATE/CASE ID: 20 NOV 2002 200102979

T359

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
John McCloy/Sec. Kissinger
Thursday, February 8, 1974
11:10 a.m.

K: Jack.

M: Hello.

K: How are you?

M: O.K. How are you. Hope you are well.

K: I have had the flu but I am back on my feet.

M: Sorry to hear that. You have a lot on your plate for the next couple of weeks.

K: I certainly have and I just wanted to have a very brief chat with you.

M: Right. Do you want me to come down.

K: I don't know yet what my situation will be over the weekend. What is yours?

M: I was going up -- I have a weekend place in Connecticut but it is always easy to get away. I am just going up for the weekend -- Sat. and Sun. there.

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K: I will call you later.

M: I had a cala the other day from Shep Stone.

K: A good man. A fine man.

M: He is bubbling over because he has been bustling around the European scene. He says he has a lot of dope. He spent time in Bonn and in London and it is all sort of preparatory to the Feb. 11 business. I am having lunch with him today. He sent me a long letter. He says he has a lot of under-cover chatter he has heard from the second and third rounds of the Foreign Offices as to what the European attitude should be towards this thing. He says they are also in shambles. It is in ruins there -- the United Europe business. I might pick up something.

K: The basic problem we are having is that the French are doing in the energy field what they did in the Atlantic Declaration and everything else. This time no one can say we did not consult. No one can say we were not generous. We want nothing from them but the same as in the Marshall Plan -- cooperation on the structure. We are reaching the point now where we feel if it does not work we will have to take on the French in an all out confrontation. It will hurt the Community. We cannot have the Community organized against us as an anti-American

*1

M: That is what it is becoming. They take the least common denominator which is the French attitude.

K: They tell us we are sorry; we love you but we have to go with the French. We don't care if they love us or not if they have to go with the French what good does that do us. I cannot tell you on the phone but they are pursuing a more active anti-US policy in the Middle East than the Russians.

M: I gather that is right.

K: That is absurd. Before we do anything like this, I would like to talk to you.

M: Right.

K: Let's talk this afternoon.

M: You give me a ring this afternoon.

K: If I don't call you by 4:30, will you call me?

M: Fine. Through the White House?

K: Yes or 632-9630.

M: O.K.

K: Fine.

END

T364

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Atherton/Sec. Kissinger
~~January~~ 9, 1974
4:00 pm

K: These fellows who were in here..

A: The Mauris?

K: The Mauris. They feel that I ought to get something off to Jidda about that Marilyn Berger article.

A: We have something in the mill.

K: Do you agree with that?

A: Yes. They will hear about it and it will start suspicions going. I think it is a good idea..

K: I think we can turn it to advantage..say it is a campaign..the march on Washington..

A: I think it can work and it is the kind of think Faisal will be receptive to, given his view of the world.

K: Why didn't we have somebody present yesterday with the Algerians, when the issues was the oil embargo ?

A: I don't know. I thought it was taken care of. I had to go to a dinner..

K: I think NEA should have been represented.

A: I do too and I'll see to it that it doesn't happen again.

K: OK.

END

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DATE/CASE ID: 20 NOV 2002 200102979

T363 1-1*

TELECON
Mr. Ball/Secretary Kissinger
February 10, 1974
3:27 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

(Missed the first part)

B: He acts as a kind of financial advisor to the oil companies. He said he had talked with you of what was really on his mind. He asked me to get in touch with you. The general theme was a deep speech on the position of the Algerians and other Arabs on a better way of dealing with Faisel and Sadat. They were very resentful of the Europeans and that of the press, that Faisel and Sadat and the Algerians felt a kind of protector of the weakest of the countries, therefore we feel ___as acting on the embargo and the meting on the 14thth. Don't know positively what is going to come out. It looks like no positive action would be taken on the 14th or not until the second meeting on the 24th. He felt if in the meantime there had been no angry response or from the U.S. following ___the 14th changes had been made Syrian disengagement it was likely there would be an announcement coming out of the meeting on the 24th. He wanted to convey to you they were unhappy with the situation. That they felt you said a number of countries felt it disastrous rather than beneficial. That they could see why the Europeans themselves hoped they got something out of it themselves.

K: They'll say that after the Syrian one too.

B: I'm just passing this on without comment.

K: They told us exactly what you said. For two months I told them that the U.S. cannot act under pressure. He said to me this is ___we must be given something anything at all - just one kilometer__Israel would want anyway. We need the ___and we wish the embargo were being lifted. Nobody even mentioned the Syrian problem to us. In the past we felt very strongly. We, frankly, will not be able to announce plans for lifting the embargo. They were convinced, both Sadat and Faisel that the embargo would be lifted___anything ___ of Egyptian disengagement.

B: When I saw Sadat in Jidda he told me exactly that.

K: We were told on January 22 that it would be lifted the next day.

B: I met with Sadat the day before, and I got a totally different answer.

K: Then they said can we wait until the 14th and we said OK. The next thing I know is now they say the Syrian business is the major problem___going to start blackmailing us. I know you're not___it. I just wanted to explain to you why we're going to be difficult to deal with.

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B: I think this is part of the treatment.

K: We're going to help them get Syrian disengagement.

B: I just wanted to pass this along.

K: I appreciate it. He didn't make it that clear. Nothing can happen before the 24th. It won't be final.

B: The main thing was I think, he felt - his opinion to me was that it would create great problems. The Algerian was not in a position of having any particular line that somebody go along__they could deal with the U.S. ___obviously a good deal of resentment.

K: That I can't argue with. They're making this statement announcing they're having a summit on the 14th, the day before the oil conference. It may work out better.

B: The key of the thing in the Algerian point of view is they're _____.

K: That I believe would be serious. I think the Syrians are becoming more rational and our major problem for the next several days ___we'll have it. No doubt you'll prove it was our fault.

B: They no pay me Henry.

K: You know the French behavior. I used to think if Gromyko gave the speech in the Middle East he would ____the detante ended.

B: You're absolutely right.

K: And the others will not ___up.

B: The others will not __of general___ is a very unhappy one.

K: That's true. I appreciate it very much.

B: Thank you, Henry.

END

T 369

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Atherton/Secretary Kissinger
February 10, 1974
8:35 PM

K: The Europeans are still bugging us about the 21st. Have we told them.

A: We sent out a reply - they must have crossed. ____19th or the week of the 25th, would be our preference.

K: The other cables are all done?

A: They're all done. I left them with Larry.

K: How would you like to come in and redo them?

A: I'm standing by.

K: OK.

END

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T 370

TELECON
Secretary Shultz/Secretary Kissinger
February 10, 1974
8:18 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

(Missed the first sentence)

K: _____the offset thing.

S: That's right. I just want to give him a drink or something.

K: He wants to know why you had not put money in the budget for offset. You'll find him in a very receptive mood.

S: We're all ready for him.

K: We wanted to let him go but he won't leave. He'll be over in a few minutes.

Secretary Shultz - 8:20

K: He wants to know where you are.

S: I'm in the White House.

K: In the White House.

S: Is he really tired? Would he prefer to meet me for breakfast tomorrow morning?

K: I don't know. He wants something to eat and coffee.

S: I don't have anything to eat over here. I could cart him home and give him a turkey sandwich.

K: He'll be over in 10 minutes and you negotiation with him.

S: OK.

END

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T 368

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Marty Lipset/Secretary Kissinger
February 10, 1974
8:30 PM

L: _____Marilyn Berger piece. In terms of your thinking we were taling about it. One way to do something about it is to have somebody write a letter to the Post saying the story contains inaccuracies and the thing I felt was worse was the Faisel reference.

K: There are so many things in there are our destructing. The Faisel one does me no good. The 96 hours one doesn't do me any good.

L: The Faisel thing is ___to say you didn't say it. Don't you think that would be the best strategy at this point to write a letter.

K: It couldn't do any harm and it might do a little good. Enough of you would have to stick together in case of a dispute.

L: That wouldn't be a problem - anything you want us to say. Do you think we should also refer to the other ? The other was harder to make a kind of ___.

K: Don't get into that.

L: We will write a letter saying the story contains a number of inaccuracies. No point of getting involved - just give an example, mention the Faisel thing.

K: Yes.

L: She got me and I tried to convince her.

K: That was too tempting for her.

L: No point in Anthony Lewis _____Boston leaders. He was very excited about the whole thing - about this character. When I said we disagreed to what they're doing he had to say no. He agreed he wouldn't write a story.

K: Marty, these things happen. Once they're done there isn't much you can do about it.

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L: I'm sorry.

K: I understand, you didn't mean any harm. It doesn't help me with the Europeans either. Don't worry about it. If you want to write this letter it may do some good.

*

END

T367

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
February 10, 1974
2:50 PM

K: I just have to tell you, you cannot ask to keep the Soviets in the negotiations and _____.

D: I'll check on this with the Prime Minister.

K: We are heading into a very tough period, don't make it harder.

D: It is not our intention to make it harder. I didn't know the whole thing was done. I'll have to check and see what happened, Mr. Secretary. It's a big surprise to me.

K: Second, I have some better news for you, which is to be kept only for the Prime Minister. Can I have your assurance?

D: Sure, of course.

K: I have had a communication from A__ which makes it 99% certain he'll agree to your proposal. He asked how do we know we can produce a plan if he agrees. What I proposed to him is, he gets the list, you give the plan and I hold the plan and then you send somebody for further discussions. That's what has been ___ in that connection.

D: He gives the proposed list to you and a proposal about a visit. He gives you the list and the proposal for the visit and we give you the plan and the plan is communicated to them for whatever arrangements are being made.

K: My understanding is, I transmit the plan after the visit starts and then you send somebody over for further discussions.

D: That's what the Prime Minister had in mind.

K: I wanted you to know their position. I will guarantee them there will be a plan. I will get back to you, after I pass your plan to them, don't do anything else until the embargo is lifted.

D: You are attaching to the plan a condition from you to them.

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K: They can deal with you throughout ____. Up to now he hasn't ___. I'm going to say I just won't ___. I will say I think he guarantees there will be an Israeli plan. We will not accept the plan from the Israelis.

D: I see. You cannot stop before they lift the embargo.

K: That's going to work because they called a regional meeting. I already told Sadat, ___ and Faisel that I'm not going to do one more thing until the embargo is lifted. If we gave in on this, undoubtly they will change the lifting of the embargo for blackmail terms. I just don't what to hear from the Israelis ___.

D: I will not even tell about this embargo condition.

K: We cannot have ____ in Israel. Perhaps they will not accept the proposal.

D: Who will come?

K: The Syrians.

D: ___proposal?

K: Yes.

D: What I will do, the whole thing you told me just now, I will communicate only to the Prime Minister.

K: I'm sure the final answer is yes.

D: I will tell him two things, which he won't tell the cabinet. I will ask him not to tell the cabinet about the embargo conditions.

K: I can count on that?

D: Of course you can. The thing is good, then we can start the scenerio.

K: You don't have to hand over the plan to me until I have the list.

D: We will need your cooperation to ____.

K: I don't want you to ____.

D: We are with you on this. It is not our interest that the embargo will keep on as blackmail against us.

K: I think we will get it lifted. I must say the Marilyn Berger article did damage.

D: _____I said he didn't discuss Jewish matters and part of the information was ____.

K: I saw Ribonoff (phonetic) in the evening.

D: Last night?

K: Yes. He said I was stupid to see people like that.

D: He can't be talked into keeping his mouth shut.

K: Why didn't you suggest it to them?

D: Because Marilyn Berger doesn't take orders from me. He wanted to be sure he was part of the action. He said he had it in writing. He had the one L)___ report in writing.

K: Why a Jewish girl will do this is beyond me.

D: He said somebody called somebody at the Post of a high level, and asked him if the story could be kept quiet.

K: Who called, Mary or F__?

D: I think Marty did. He didn't call Marilyn, he called somebody else, somebody higher up.

K: It's already a big story in London.

D: I'm with you on this. It's a damaging thing all around and cannot remain.

K: That I've learned.

D: I wanted to tell you the rest so this should not continue.

K: OK.

D: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

END

T365

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Donaldson/SEcretary Kissinger
February 10, 1974
5:25 PM

K: I don't know when you could, I'm in the middle of redoing the speech.

D: Let me tell you two things. Number one: I think the whole business of subcommittees is nobody really ___it. The only problem are the finance ministers don't want to meet in a subgroup.

K: I don't think that's an important issue.

D: There is a solution to it, which would be if you brought into you Foreign Ministers meeting or let somebody come in with two people.

K: Fine. But do we have to settle that tonight?

D: I just didn't want to bring it up without telling you.

K: What's the other problem.

D: The other one, I think without a doubt is the only problemis the outgoing mechanism. No other problem except that.

K: It's the key problem. Who is making the issue.

D: Basically the English and the French and the __ in a very low-key way

K: We're just not going to have it

D: I think we should hang in there.

K: Did you use some of the outlines I made this morning?

D: Yes, I did. He held us up for two hours on the wording of the agenda.

K: What are the British doing, spreading it around?

D: The French were totally isolated. We really didn't face up to it.

K: OK. I better go back to my draft.

END

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T366

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Secretary Kissinger/Mr. Simon
February 10, 1974, 12:35 p.m.

S: I wanted to get to you before, but I guess I didn't, before you met with Mr. Sharp because I had a long talk with Don McDonald. Maybe you know all of this, but, to the bottom line, _____ Canada is going to cooperate in every way with us. They went so far as to say just give us the high sign when we can be helpful. He is concerned -- he just came back from Europe. _____ Project Independence confuses those people as far as our withdrawal from the world is concerned. They must be convinced that this is not true. I believe you've made a strong impression.

K: Good. That's my impression, too. I have to go now - to a luncheon for Mr. Ohira.

END

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T371

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Gen. Haig/Sec. Kissinger
Monday, February 11, 1974
3:40 p.m.

H: How is it going?

K: So far so good. It is going to come out alright. Nevertheless, the situation, and we should not kid ourselves is exactly as I described it and I hope he does not dribble overthem too much tonight.

H: I don't think he will. I told him he can't.

K: There is no confrontation. The French are isolated but we are not getting what should be happening -- a response of united action. They are all looking for ways of getting into talks with the Arabs/producers before they know what they want. The basic theory they are not willing to buy. We will get enough to make it look respectable. There is no strategic conception there.

H: Yes.

K: It will end respectably. We can claim it a success.

H: Right. Right. When will they be finished Henry.

K: Tomorrow night.

H: He is not going to speak formally tonight. He will just draw from the remarks that were given to him and keep it informal.

K: The situation is much better than the press reports it. That is totally nonsense. Every speaker this morning more or less supported us and the French are going to be difficult but it will turn out to be manageable within a basic long-term framework but it does not have what you need if you want to do -- not NATO of the 50s.

H: Right. Right.

K: The embargo is almost certainly going to be lifted this week or early next week.

H: Have you gotten that from the Saudis?

K: Yes. Not as a result of the letter but as a result of our threat of stopping all diplomatic efforts. The Syrians have accepted the Israeli

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procedure proposal and I have refused to transmit it to the Israelis until the embargo is lifted. I have told the Israelis informally. It is not an Israeli proposal. It is my compromise between the Israeli position and the insane Syrian position. It is so complicated that it is essentially crooked but each can claim -- there are about seven steps that have to be taken in a 72 hour period before the negotiations start but each can claim he has backed the other one down.

H: That can give lip service to the conditions for the embargo.

K: Now that the Syrians have accepted it and now that I have refused to do it until the embargo is lifted I think this will give them the vehicle.

H: Great.

K: Did you see the Evans-Novak column today. Is it true -- did the President have an emissary there?

H: Hell, no. I don't know where that came from. It is not right as you know. You know all that I know.

K: I don't exclude that he sent someone there.

H: If he did, he did not tell me. It is inconceivable.

K: It is inconceivable that I would not have picked it up somewhere along the line. Makes no difference. It looks like it will be lifted. Sadat has called a mini-summit of the Arabs for Wednesday prior to the oil meeting on Thursday.

H: Good.

K: Even Yahmani has said it is going to be lifted.

H: That is good.

K: It proves that the only thing these guys understand is toughness. When we were sucking around them, they kicked us in the teeth.

H: I think that is right.

K: You will tell this to our leader.

H: Yes I will be seeing him in a few minutes.

K: Tell him to stay steady. Be concilliatory but not groveling but not to believe the bullshit about the great cooperation they are extending.

H: O.K. You will be here tonight.

K: Yes. I will try to see him for a few minutes.

H: Good, Henry.

END

T372

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
February 11, 1974
5:35 PM

K: ____and some horses ass in the White House sent a message that there is to be no response to the President's speech tonight. Now, the Europeans have the President of the European Council of Ministers there who failed and he prepared a response. They say they don't want to pick the guy. The Europeans have already picked a guy and so has the conference.

S: I don't know where that information comes from. But the President does not intend to give a toast.

K: But he's going to say something.

S: Well, he's going to - yes he's going to say something.

K: Well let him wind it up with a toast and somebody's got to response for Christ's sake.

S: Al just came down and said the President does not want to have a toast.

K: Well go back to Al and tell him for Christ's sake they're all going to go back and consider it an insult. If somebody's can't reply for them.

S: You mean whether or not it's a toast.

K: Look, all he's got to do is to toast cooperation or friendship or something.

S: I already sent him a proposed toast to do that toast to the succes of the conference and the end of his remarks. And Al just came back down and said the President decided he doesn't want a toast, he's going to finish his remarks and say let's go have coffee. I didn't know you were interested. I'll go back to him.

K: I wasn't interested until Scheel came to mee all excited.

S: OK, well let me see if I can.....

K: It just isn't worth it - do you think it's worth it?

S: No. Let me see if I can turn it around.

K: If not, let me know. You know it's not the worse thing either. But any other problem?

S: No.

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K: Now it looks as if the embargo is off again. I mean, they're going to take it off.

S: It looks good today.

K: Yes.

S: Looks very good.

K: Yes.

S: Do it again. We're not there yet.

K: He'll think it is because of the letter he had. By the time he handed the letter we already had the reply.

S: That's right. I haven't pointed that out. OK, I'll get back to you.

K: All my team is mad at me because Jobert gave a really vicious speech.

S: Did he.

K: And I replied very gently.

S: Good.

K; I just figured I don't want to have those [redacted] CHARACTERS to go off and say he got my goat.

S: I agree with you.

K: Don't you.

S: Oh, absolutely.

K: In fact I didn't reply at all. He quoted a senator to criticize the President and I just said could he give us the name of the senator and let it go.

S: Good, I don't think you ought....

K: Right.

S: OK, I'll get back to you.

K: As soon as possible.

S: Right.

END

T374 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
David Frost/Sec. Kissinger
2/11/74 10:35 p.m.

K: David, how are you!

F: All the better for hearing you, how are you?

K: Fine, when did you get back?

F: I just got back yesterday--and I was here in the States all this week and I just wondered by any lucky chance whether you had a free meal either lunch for the two of us or dinner when I'd love to introduce you to a heavenly lady, or whatever.

K: Ah--

F: I know it's been a helluva week for you.

K: How much longer are you going to be here?

F: Until Sunday--we could meet in Washington either Friday or Saturday

K: Who is the young lady--

F: A lady who is absolutely----

K: Do I know her?

F: I don't know--she I suppose one of the couple of leading models in New York --a lady called Karen Graham who is absolutely glorious

K: No,

F: If you felt like a foursome for dinner or a twosome for lunch

K: David, today and tomorrow I have the energy conference and I may have to go to Key Biscayne with the President who is leaving on Wednesday--may I call you at that number tomorrow afternoon?

F: Lovely, super.

K: I would love to see you either for lunch or dinner

F: Whatever is best for you --it's been too long and I miss seeing you

K: I couldn't agree more--we will do it soon--I will call you tomorrow

F: Good--and may you have an enjoyable next couple days as is practically possible

K: That is wishing me a lot considering there is a bunch of maniacal Frenchmen here. F: Right. Bye Henry.

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T373

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
President Nixon/Secretary Kissinger
February 11, 1974
6:30 PM

K; Mr. President.

N: Hi, how are you, Henry.

K: I just want to bring you up to date on how that conference went.

N: Yes. Fine.

K: I gave the talk and Simon gave a very good talk. We just laid out the problem. Then Ohira, everybody gave talks supporting our position. Ohira was excellent. Schmidt spoke for Germany because Scheel had represented the European community. Schmidt was superlative, and if you have a chance to say something to him tonight you might mention that. Home was pretty good. Good you could say. And he was supported, well to make a long story short, everybody was good. Except Jobert, who was a bastard. He made a really vicious speech, in fact people were groaning, misquoting your State of the Union Address, quoting democratic Senators as to how bad our policy is, it was awful.

N: Yes. We'll just ignore that.

K: I think we should ignore it tonight. Where we will be tomorrow now is simply this; if the other eight Europeans stand up to Jobert we can have a good communique, if they don't stand up to him then I should think we should say the hell with it and that we met and we had a nice meeting. I don't think we should fake a great success because the Saudis have now come to us and offered us bilateral deals and we shouldn't bind ourselves so we can't get them to work with us. Incidentally I hardly dare tell you but we have ____ assurance.

N: Al told me, I got that.

K: And also the Egyptians are going to announce that restoration of diplomatic relations with us shortly after that.

N: That's good, well, I just hope the Europeans will stand up to this fellow, but who knows.

K: That's really where we stand at the conference.

N: Right.

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K: We have superlative support if you look at Time magazine they have a picture of Pompidou, you'll see that he's.....

N: Yes, I know.

K: He's just no longer functioning. It was a really disgraceful speech.

N: Well, we expected that, I guess.

K: Well, Mr. President, if anybody has been pro-French, it's been you.

N; God, yes.

K: What have we done to these people. If they did this to Kennedy, that's one thing, but I suppose French domestic politics, and if you look at French history.

N: Well, we'll see , they can change too. I don't know whether they will, but I hope.

K: Well if he dies, everyone thinks that Giscard is staying on as one of his possible successors. He would be much more cooperative.

N: Of yes, yes. He's a sensible man.

K: You've met him?

N: Yes, yes. Well, we'll do our best.

K: You might flatter Scheel a little bit. He'll probably sit next to you, because he's the ranking member.

N: Yes, I know.

K: He'll respond, he's been pretty good, he's a weakling.

N: I know.

K: But we need him to get that communique through.

N: Right, OK. I'll give him a little pat on the back. Thank you Henry and get a rest.

K: Right.

END

T 379

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger - The President
February 12, 1974

K: Hello.

N: Hi, Henry.

K: Oh, Mr. President, for God's sake, I didn't think they would put you on first...

N: That's all right, I just called because I've got to go out to....

K: No, no, I just asked them to put in a call to you. The matter stands now that every...

N: Everybody's on but the French, but the others can't go without the French.

K: No that isn't even clear yet, Mr. President.

N: Is there anything I can do, a word to Jobert, or.. anything, I don't know.

K: I've just had Jobert in here and we have just .. [redacted] And, he's just now offered me some possible compromises which I would like to discuss with Shultz and Burns and others who know how this machinery operates. The conference will almost certainly have to go into tomorrow.

B1

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 25X6
DECLASSIFY AFTER: INDEFINITE
DATE/CASE ID: 20 MAY 2004 200102979

N: Will the people stay?

K: Yes, except the British.

N: Yes, I was rather sorry I was hoping to have private chat with Home, not about this business but about their politics, but he wouldn't stay over tomorrow.

K: No, he has to get back because he has to campaign, but I've already told him your position.

N: Yes, I told him last night, good luck, good luck, that's about everything I could say, you know. But he knows?

*

K: Oh, yes.

N: Good.

K: But this, I think we'llcome out all right because the briefing that all these guys are giving is sotally in our support.

N: Good.

K: And its not us against Europe, it's France against us and that's not, that's not a disaster for us.

N: No sir.

K: And all of the Europeans, in fact what's happening now.

N: And the Japanese.

K: They are with us.

N: Right.

K: I had a meeting, I had a lunch confined to Ministers...

N: Yes.

K: and the Japanese , in that rather inexplicit way of theirs you know, nevertheless supported our main proposal.

N: Right.

K: So, the real question is..the thing we have to be careful about, if we accept the French compromise and have all the others feel we let them down. Basically the French compromise is the following: They don't want this conference to set up machinery that is semi-permanent because they don't want Washington to get the credit for having done it, I mean that's in the crudest way .

N: Right.

K: what the issue is, but they have now proposed to me that there be a conference held in a month in Paris under OECD which would set up the machinery and they would be willing to have a few machineries of a temporary nature set up between now and then. The difficulty is if they would promise their vote at that conference.

N: Yes.

K: The difficulty Mr. President is that if we get to that conference, they might promise us their vote on the big things and then drag us into guerilla warfare on oil instrumentation, and having in effect in the minds of the Europeans, caved this time, they will never hold firm again. At least this time we've got everybody. If the French get away with it this time, even though the compromise doesn't strike me as unmanageable...

N: I don't think it is unmanageable. but I...it looks like the French, like the tail wags the dog.
K: and the trouble is at that other conference if they really want to sabotage this effort, there are some people who think they could organize some votes against us. That I don't believe, but they wouldn't have to organize votes if they stand up against what we want we sort of have had it.

N: Right.

K: Also Pompidou might die, and, in the interval, and then no promise would mean anything. I m a little reluctant to ask you to authorize a change in our position at least until a little later in the evening.

N: Yes, well I've got to go over to Alic Longworth's birthday for about hour,

K: I know, I should go too.

N: But I'll be back at by six and available anytime.

K: Well there's nothing, the Europeans are caucusing now and we have a plenary at 5:30 so nothing can possibly happen until about seven or eight o'clock.

N: Well, I'll tell you one thing, with great subtelty but with unmistakeable clarity, they all understand that economics and security are linked. What I was telling them last night they damn well beter understand....

K: Have you...you have been told, of course, the tremendous play your remarks received.

N: Did they get quite a play.

K: Oh, yah. It was on every morning show, 5-10 minutes of television and it was the lead article in every paper, so...

N: Good. Well, good luck. if you're still talking to Jobert, love and kisses and all that crap. Thank you.

T375

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
General Scowcroft - Secretary Kissinger
February 12, 1974
7:45 p.m.

S: Yessir.

K: I thought maybe you were out too.

S: No, I'm here.

K: Everyone else seems to be. Have you noticed, I think we are going to crack that embargo.

S: Yes. It looks awfully good. I just saw the latest one in, and I think we are too. I think that's great.

K: And on the conference, I can't reach the President. Can you leave a note for him.

S: Do you want to talk with him.

K: He's at Trader Vic's.

S: Oh, I guess that wouldn't be good to talk to him there. Sure I can leave a note for him.

K: The Europeans have decided to go alone, not as the community. As a result they are now working on our communique. We will get a unanimous vote on all but one, on which there will be three negative votes. It looks very good. I think the French are going to cave overnight and come in with some zinger.

S: That's great.

K: We have broken the Community, just as I always thought I wanted to.

S: The thing is after having gotten them to agree at the Council, then to come in and go individual. I think its great.

K: I think its going to be a good lesson to the French not to monkey around with us.

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S: That's terrific, just terrific.

*1 K: The French tried out a compromise on me this afternoon which I rejected. My worry is that if we cave this time, the next time nobody will be with us.

S" That's the problem. Then the next time...

K: Actually, what they proposed would be quite tolerable if I trusted the sons of bitches.

S: Well and if the others go along, you've got to keep the faith with them.

K: Well, we've got to have the conference again tomorrow. We're meeting again at 10:00.

S: This SALT meeting ...maybe we ought to put it off completely.

K: Do it Thursday.

S: I think you've got to have time to think about it.

K: We've got to move it to Thursday.

S: Right. You haven't had time to focus on it.

K: What have these maniacs done. Why must I meet with the Republican House Committee.

S: That is one...

K: I understand meeting with the Republican policy committee, that I understand. Why must I meet with the House policy committee. It's exactly the same, why do I have to meet with the House.

S: You agreed to do it. This was a long time ago.

K: That Timmons has about as much sense, well I don't know how little sense he has, he has none.

S: This was before the Republican policy Committee every came up.

K: What's the sense of it.

S: Just to stroke the Republicans who are supporint....

K: I can't be in a partisan position.

S: You already talked to the Democrats.

K: I met with the Democratic policy Committee.

S: This is the equivalent

K: I can't be thrown into one goddamned thing after another. Wehn will we have the Verification Panel?

S: Well, we'll have to figure it out. When are you going to Key Biscayne.

K: Friday afternoon.

S: We've got that SRG Friday, maybe we could slip that.

K: Good, fine.

END
sdd

T376

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Larry Eagleburger/Secretary Kissinger
February 12, 1974
7:45 PM

K: Sisco told me he left a memo for me about the NEA position.

E: NEA position?

K: His replacement.

E: I haven't seen it. He may have left it with my girl after I left.

K: No, that was during the day.

E: I haven't seen it. I'll check there and get it into you right away.

END

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T385

TELECON
Winston Lord/Secretary Kissinger
February 13, 1974
7:40 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I want to thank you and your staff for all the help you gave me.

L: Thank you.

K: I know wherer a lot of the intellectual leadership came from. I know it's impossible to satisfy me.

L: I think we came out pretty well.

K: Actually our preparations were even better than the conference.

L: I appreciate you calling.

K: I have to explain _____wouldn't run all over the place making compromises at the staff meeting.

L: I would say you handled the bureauocracy of it beautifully.

K: When we're in that position ____we can only do the right thing. It doesn't make any difference any more.

L: We did the right thing on this conference.

K: That we did. _____we would have been ___up without anything. Are you at home??

L: No I'm here.

K: That Latin American speech has to be more hard. I think in Latin Americanit's position____.

L: I think we'll be ahead of the game.

K: I want to do it beffire next week.

L: We'll get into it 2 or 3 days before. We'll try to get it into better shape by Friday.

K: Yes, get it in better shape by Friday.

L: Thank you for calling.

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END

T383

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Bruce/Secretary Kissinger
February 13, 1974
5:05 PM

K: I just wanted to thank you for your help in these days.

B: No help at all. I thought your press conference went absolutely gloriously.

K: God will punish me for saying things about the French I don't feel.

B: When are you going to tell me what you want me to do.

K: To take a trip through England. It basically _____. We had a sort of victory.

B: I don't frankly think it will be all that useful. Can you get somebody to guide me on how to do it. Maybe H__.

K: H__ and Sonnenfeldt. The only question is the British election. Should you go before or after.

B: I don't think there's any point in going to England. Maybe I can see you sometime next week. Any time after Tuesday.

K: Good. Thank you, it was a joy to work with you.

B: My pleasure, I like artistry.

K: You're a good friend.

END

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*

T384

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
George Vest/Secretary Kissinger
February 13, 1974
7:20 PM

(Missed the first part)

V: _____Tripoli meeting.

K: Total nonsense.

V: I can say there's nothing to it whatsoever. That's what I want to say.

K: Is it already on the air?

V: It's already been done.

K: We made no request of any kind with respect to the Tripoli meeting. Why doesn't he check with you. Can you raise hell with him.

V: Yes sir.

END

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T 381 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELECON
Senator Scott/Secretary Kissinger
February 13, 1974
3:04 pm

K: How are you?

S: Thank you for calling back. [redacted] B6

K: For what ?

S: [redacted] B6

K: Alright. I will call him.

S: I know you must clearly delegate this thing.

K: I will call him.

S: The other thing. John Lodge has been in to see me and he is very dispirited. And he hopes there is some future for himself somewhere. I don't know the problem.

K: Let me talk to the President. I don't even know John Lodge.

S: He was an Ambassador and..

K: I know.

S: He is multilingual. Has fluent French and Spanish.

K: Let me see what I can do.

S: He is lonely. I did speak to the President about John Sherman Cooper.

K: That I have very much in mind.

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S: And I told the President the other night you would be talking to him at some point or other.

K: I have and we are thinking of some possibilities.

S: Needs a comment one way or the other . John's a good man. But the Friedland thing is the reason for my call. If you can help I would appreciate it.

K: I will call immediately. I look forward to seeing you on the trip to Mexico City.

S: It was nice of you to include me.

K: You're doing a tremendous public service.

S: Thank you.

END

T 380

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
The President/Sec. Kissinger
Wednesday, Feb. 13, 1974
11:55 a.m.

K: Mr. President.

N: Hi, Henry. How are you.

K: We are practically finished and we will have a good communique. Everybody accepted in effect our draft almost verbatim with France abstaining from three paragraphs.--the most operational paragraphs, but nevertheless, after the orgasm of our press for three days about that Titanic confrontation with Jobert he winds up having no votes and we have all of them. The communique is essentially the one we drafted. We got about, I would say, 90 percent of what we wanted.

N: Let's be sure we get a little credit for it. After all we worked these people hard, had them to dinner told them the facts of life.

K: Have you seen the Reston column today.

N: No. I have been to the hospital all morning. Just got in.

K: He is praising your remarks on Monday night.

N: Really.

K: The whole column is on your remarks.

N: Monday night?

K: On Monday night and supporting them.

N: Good, good. You have done a great job Henry and I know it has been pain and suffering and all the rest. I direct the doctor, Lukash, that -- he said you had not used that rubber -- and he will be over tonight to rub you down. But you use him everynight that you need him. A couple or three times a week.

K: I have a Business Council Dinner tonight and after that I would love to have it.

N: Business Council.

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K: Yes.

N: Well, fine, fine. The mainthing upbeat and things are going to work out; we are working on embargo and all of that.

*

K: ON the Embargo, Mr. President, I am confident that it will be lifted in a week.

N: Sounds that way from the thing I saw last night and this morning that you sent over here.

K: They are having a summit meet of Faisal, Boumedienne and Sadat today and tomorrow.

N: Incidentally, I got your message late last night about the conference and I think that is just the way to handle the French -- isolate them. They don't want to be isolated. The interesting thing is though that all the other countries would be willing, you know, to go along. The Europeans were supposed to have unanimous vote you remember. That is why I made the little crack that I made at the end of the dinner because our friend the Canadian had told me that we have to be unanimous. I said well you aren't going to do anything then. He was not mean about it.

K: Last week, Mr. President, the Community took a decision and today they have split apart on it eight to one. It is a lesson to everybody.

N: There is no confrontation with the Arabs, is there?

K: Absolutely none.

N: Make that point very clear will you in your -- when are you going to brief?

K: About 3:00.

N: Make it very clear that you and I have chatted, etc and that the President particularly pointed out that this was not by way of confrontation with the oil producing nations. On the contrary it is in their interests to have first a market they can count on and at a price that is reasonable -- whatever you want to say. And that we all want to do that. We look forward to working with them in the same cooperative spirit that we worked here and we look forward to working with them in their economic development -- apart from oil. All that old jazz.

K: We meet again at 12:30 and we are down to a very few minor paragraphs.

N: You might tell the conferees you have talked to me and I was very pleased with the results. Tell them this -- you might say that the President said -- I did not include this in my toast - - you can say in these days of summitry there is the tendency often to credit -- for the attention to go and the credit or discredit to go only to the heads of government or heads of state because we meet in various things, but that I have always said that the real credit goes to the ministers and that I consider the foreign ministers, the economic ministers, ministers of finance, etc and their colleagues that they are basically the artisans -- the peacemakers -- the peacebuilders -- without them there could be no success between meetings of heads of government and state and I particularly appreciate the hard work that they have gone to do to produce. Anything like -- something like that might be helpful.

K: Right, Mr. President. I will say this. And I am planning to come down to Key Biscayne on Friday night.

N: Only if you feel it will help you.

K: I would like to do it.

N: That will give you two days ~~tx~~ down there.

K: Goodbye, Mr. President.

END

T382 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Arthur Burns/Sec. Kissinger
Wednesday, Feb. 13, 1974
3:22 p.m.

B: Henry, I want to congratulate you. I think you came through in very fine shape. Have you had your press conference?

K: No. I am waiting for distribution of the communique.

B: I think you should speak from a platform of great confidence. I would not say anything about the French.

K: I will be very concilliatory. I will not say anything pro or con but in replying to questions I will be very concilliatory. In terms of the conference we won every single point.

B: Absolutely. The way Scheel fuzzed it up on the second conference, I think, is good. You cannot have a consumer/producer conference without the consumers talking first -- two weeks before, two days before or two hours ~~minutes~~ before.

K: I agree. I think we have come out perfectly.

B: I am very pleased.

K: I think it is good we let the Europeans do our fighting for us. We were not too eager in the early stages and we were firm when necessary.

B: I think they are hungry for your leadership.

K: I think politically it turned out a great success. They have now cancelled the Foreign Ministers meeting for tomorrow. There will be no Arab proposal tomorrow.

B: Have they. I am delighted. I talked to Donaldson 15 minutes ago and he did not know that.

K: They cancelled it this morning.

B: Fine.

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K: Now we are really -- there will be plenty of time. It was a good conference and your contributions, Arthur, were of great help. You are a wise man.

B: Nonsense.

K: No. You are a wise man. It was invaluable.

B: Henry, you should be very pleased.

K: The price of this of course is that every time I do a major thing, I will have to get you over here.

B: Ha. Ha. I will tell you, I think you -- you did your basic thinking and planning well Henry.

K: You helped tremendously.

B: Good luck, Henry.

K: Many thanks, Arthur.

END

T 387

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec. Butz/ Sec. Kissinger
Thursday, February 14, 1974
12:25 p.m.

B: I am in Oklahoma. You are getting good coverage on the energy conference. It is not as bad here as made out in the paper.

K: What do you mean -- we had a total success.

B: Comes out in the paper that way. I am planning a trip to Japan in April. They are our number one customer in agriculture. I think I am talking about a three week trip -- Europe, Brussels to confer with the EC and probably make a stop in Moscow and three or four other places. My staff feels there is an advantage if the Secretary of Agriculture could go into the Pepple's Republic of China.

K: I don't think you can go to Moscow and Peking on the same trip.

B: O.K. If you think it appropriate to go to Peking, I would probably not go to Moscow.

K: Let me look into it.

B: Our trade people have good liaison with Peking. We think they will be our biggest customer -- more than Russia.

K: We don't want to give it that high a profile, and they don't. Let us handle with them informally.--To see what their reaction is.

B: Alright. I'll wait to hear from you. I'll be in town the first of next week.

K: Let us make the contact.

B: Alright, Thank you, Henry.

END

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T390

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Lord/ Secretary Kissinger
February 14, 1974
5:14 p.m.

K: How are you doing on the speech.

S: Fine, it's half typed/ You should have it in half an hour.

K: You can send it to my house.

S: OK. You want it sent out there. Fine.

K: Because I am leaving.

S: You can meet at 10:00 then -- I'll have read it by then.

K: Good.

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T 386

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Ziegler/Sec. Kissinger
Thursday, Feb. 14, 1974
9:30 a.m.

Z: On the Japanese thing yesterday --

K: What Japanese thing?

Z: Your meeting with the Foreign Minister yesterday -- what came out of that meeting. Is Hirohito coming here for a visit.

K: We said that nothing had changed in the President's statement and that he is planning to visit and we will be discussing dates at some appropriate moment. Which is where it stood.

Z: Good.

K: Nothing new. It is exactly where it stood.

Z: I also understand ~~the~~ they also make something new about travel. -- Solzhenitsyn -- after your comments yesterday. I think we should say something although it should be very brief.

K: I would say nothing if you can avoid it.

Z: Not possible. I don't want the President to look totally aloof from the thing and the Lipset/press is after this.

K: They are after us no matter what we do.

Z: What would you suggest that we say about it that would not be --

K: Just say we have great human sympathy and we respect him as a writer. Be careful not to blow the Soviet relationship. The Lipp (?) press will be even more after us.

Z: If they pick up what you said -- that he would be welcome in the U.S.

K: Certainly he would be welcome. Be careful because the Russians take what the White House says terribly seriously.

Z: Right. Just a very few words -- the President has great human sympathy. It will not affect our day-to-day foreign policy. If asked, of course, he would be welcome.

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K: I would not say day-to-day foreign policy. I would say our basic line of our relations.

Z: Alright. On the oil conference. Anything there?

K: No. I would say the President believes we achieved exactly what we set out to do and we consider it a complete success which happens to be true.

Z: We were asked yesterday whether or not the President had asked the Arabs to postpone the Feb. 14 meeting.

K: Absolutely not. For your information, these maneuvers are a device to get the embargo lifted.

Z: I understand. I just wanted to know what line to plane on that. O.K.

K: I will be down tomorrow night

Z: We have said you were coming down.

K: I have heard it on the radio.

Z: And that you were coming down to ...

K Don't schedule me while the sun is up.

Z: I don't think you will have much to do. We will say you will talk about the Middle East, the conference...

K: And the Latin American Conference. You should associate him with that.

Z: Anything else?

K: That's all. Don't say anything else about the embargo. I know you would not, but you might just avoid any questions. We have been specifically asked not to make any governmental statements while they are meeting.

Z: I want you to stand in line in one of these gas stations. It might spur your enthusiasm to work some foreign policy miracles.

END

T388

NV

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
February 14. 1974
3:00 pm

K: Brent, Will you tell Ziegler to make no comment about the news ticker that the Saudi and Egyptian Foreign Ministers are coming over here until we get a little clearer picture. Say we have had a garbled report, and it is essential that we keep quiet.

S: Good. I'll call him right away.

END

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T 389

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger - General Haig
February 14, 1974
3:30 p.m.

K: Al, how are you?

H: OK, except for this double pneumonia I've got.

K: Oh, no. And that's terribly debilitating if its the same thing I have had.

H: Its awful. How are you doing?

H: I'm doing OK.

H: Did Brent tell you about that goddamned Philadelphia thing.

K: Yes. But let's not worry about that now.

H: Well, I assure you it was wrong.

K: It doesn't do any good to seem to be split. The difference, Al, is if I say it it looks generous, if you say it it looks as if I am being cut up.

H: The sons of bitches, nobody else heard it that way.

K: Al, I am calling about something else. That mini summit in Algiers is sending the Egyptian and Saudi Foreign Ministers over here.

H: Oh?

K: And we think it is going to be good news but we could ....we can't be sure. I have to stay here and wait for them and then I think I should bring them to Key Biscayne.

H: If its good news. That's fine.

K: If it is not good news, that's why I think I should greet them here with them arriving here. I'll stay here and wait for them and,.... what's the President's schedule.

H: He's going to leave here on Monday.

K: I mean, he isn't going over to Walkers Key. I'm assuming I can bring these guys down Saturday afternoon.

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H: I wish you could come down here so you get your rest.

K: And I wouldn't announce it at the St. Department but bring them down to the President and let him announce it with these two characters standing next to him.

H: Absolutely, good idea.

K: Let's not say the President is going to see them. We don't know what the news is yet.

H: We'll just stay cool until you assess it.

K: We'll just say we have reported to the President and he is aware they are coming. We will be in close touch. Because I don't know....the sons of bitches, they just sent a message, that Egyptian Foreign Minister, he thnks he's such a good friend, he just sent a message -- I am coming and bringing Saqaaf with me -- that's all. We don't know what he'll say, whether there are three more conditions, that they will do in in June or when.

H: Right.

K: So, its a good thing to have us see them anyway because we can talk to them about the energy conference. It will teach a good lesson to the Europeans about who's got muscle.

H: The conference was...you performed a miracle.

K: We got 99% of what we asked for. Keep the President's schedule free of Saturday afternoon.

H: OK.

I might bring them tomorrow night or on Saturday.

H: All right.

K: I will report immediately what they have to say. We've got no gurantee what they are going to say getting off the airplanes. I can't control that. but nothing will be said at the State Department.

H: Rifht. There is great sensitivity about how this is done.

K: I just think it is too dangerous to let them come without going ...without knowing what they've got. It might be a slap in the face.

H: Right. I think its the right way to do it exactly.

K: OK. I'm going to bring them down after we know what it is. You can decide how to handle the publicity. I would play it low key. We don't want to get into a position so they think they can slap it on again either.

H: All right, Henry. I'll wait to hear from you.

T391

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
The President - Secretary Kissinger
February 14, 1974
6:15 p.m.

K: Mr. President.

N: I just called to congratulate you. We got the cable on the plane and I showed it to George, he's off to the West Coast, and Ziegler was there and everybody thought it was terrific, it was really great.

K: Well, we got 98% of what we wanted.

N: As a matter of fact we isolated the French, at least we got them to come around some...

K: Totally, In addition to the communique, the fact of the matter is that it taught an important lesson to the European community.

N: The point is the European Community,=instead of having that silly unanimity rule, learned they can't gang up against us and we can use it now, we can use it on trade, security, with everything else.

K: Exactly.

N: Its an historic breaktrhough, people will see it later, Henry, and by God it was a hell of a thing.

K: Your speech on Monday night was terribly important.

N: It was a shot across the bow but nobody could really be mad at me.

K: Well, everyone got the point including Reston and You made the connection between the economic and the military...

N: That right..you can't separate the two.

K: Well, it really turned into a major success. I gave a press conference this afternoon.....

N: Oh, how did it go, Henry?

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K: Very, very good. You know they usually needle me and try to show.....

N: And they've been writing what a disaster the conference was going to be, and was, and then all of a sudden they have to write, I mean it must have, how were they, were they sheepish

*1

K: Oh, yah, they said how did you do it, what happened, are there any secret concessions you had to make. I said look how could you, there were 13 people there how could you make with 130 people in the room. And everyone, lot of questions about the isolation of France so I was very generous to the French and said of course they are old friends.

N: We understood, we said we needed them all, we understood that they'd all had reasons for going into business for themselves, but after all they had to realize, but...I think the line that its good short term politics but disastrous long term statesmanship. That's the thing we've got to keep hammering.

K: It taught us an important lesson if we really throw our weight around we can have our way. Another thing. We had a message from the Saudis, saying its 95% certain that they're going to get the embargo, that the embargo will be lifted. They're already in Algiers.

N: As of when, Henry?

K: I would guess by the end of next week.

N: Not this week huh?

K: Well I think the decision will be taken this week but we won't be able to talk about it because it will have to be ratified next week.

N: Yes. but the Saudis are totally positive?

K: But, oh yes, but the press is so much against it now, I means its talking it down so much that whether it happens this week or next week it will be a huge success.

N: Well, the main point is I got Simon at the fore and I really nailed him to the cross, I said now Bill I don't know what's going to happen I think we may get it sometime, I said first, OK there's going to be no rationing, second, I said I want those service stations filled up so we don't have those damn lines. Two or three weeks after it is lifted, he said, I will givethem 100% of their requirement. He's got oil running out of the ears.
K: That's going to, I think the embargo will be lifted within the next 2 weeks at the latest.

N: Then I could have a press conference right afterwards.

*1

K: Exactly, also, if you plan a press conference, Mr. President for

week of the 25th, that would turn out very good because we would be able to announce the resumption of relations with Egypt.

N: Yes, yes. a couple of brief things I mentioned to Al. First I talked to Finch about Japan, he doesn't want to be an ambassador anyplace so he's out, which is fine because he'd be a fine ambassador but we need him here. Second, I think that Hodgeson would be ahell of a good man if he'd take it, he was an excellent Secretary of Labor, and

K: No, no, I think its a good idea.

N: He's a businessman, and also he's totally our man, you know what I mean. Now, the other one is that I would like to do, don't know if he will take it but I want to offer it. I think we ought to offer London to Dave Packard. If Packard would take it you know maybe that would be....

K: Oh, that would be great.

N: Wouldn't that be superb.

K: That would be a great appointment.

N: And then you see as a senior ambassador over there, even more than Walter, he could help Straus-Hupe in NATO he could help with the European Community, he understands so much, and of course if would be great for the British.

K: I'm seeing him tonight at the Business Council should I run it past him.

N: Absolutely, I told Al, I said to be sure, as far as I'm concerned I'd like to have it offered to him. Tell you what you do, if you see him tell him the President has been trying to reach him or something like that and I want him to know I wanted him to do it.

K: Oh, yes I'll put it entirely

N: You could say that I called and that we, I think its such a terribly important post, He wouldn't have to go until first of May. Walter wants to stay through April, I think. And look, its the Court of St. James, Dave has got money running out of his ears, his wife's a big socialite, they've got a magnificent Embassy. He'd be one of the stars in the diadem, wouldn't he.

K: He would be ~~terrific.~~ terrific.

N: Why don't you tell him that, will you. Another thing I mentioned

I really would like to give John Cooper something, I don't know what, but....

K: I agree, I've been looking for something.

N: How about Egypt?

K: No, Mr. President we have to have a professionial in Egypt, because that's too hairy. The guy we've got there is the best man to send.

N: Well maybe we elevate him. You see John and his wife are great people and.

K: He couldn't handle Sadat. I'd rather give him East Germany.

N: East Germany? Are we going to recognize those bastards.

K: He's a great German Lover and , oh yah, everyone else has already

N: When do we do it.

K: Well, whenever the West Germans have completed it. We'll be the last ones to do it.

N: Fine. All right. I would like for you to give him a call as I mentioned it to him at Alice Longworth's party last night and I said John I want you to do something ...consider it...tell him this is an historic first and we want the best we can have and would he take East Germany. That would be a terrific thing, it would be a great signal to all of our list. John Cooper's loyal and will do what he's told.

K: Oh, yah. and its not all that complicated business.

N: Well if you'd give John Cooper a call and say I talked to you about it and say we talked about a post, East Germany will be open and would he be willing we want to hold it open to him.

K: Excellent.

N: I'll have Hodgeson, I want to do that one myself, he's done some wonderful things lately for us on the labor front, voluntarily, he's working for Lockheed you know. If he would take it that would give us a damn good man in Japan. Former Secretary of Labor, former senior Vice President of Lockheed, you know, he's a real pro. how's that sound to you.

K: It sounds excellent, outstanding.

N: Fine. You tell Dave Packard we want him to the Court of St. James, second I think old John Cooper would love it, Lorraine would love it love to be offered it anyway.

K: I'll call them tonight or tomorrow morning.

N: No hurry, you know what I mean, just so you do it, because I told him I was thinking of something. When do you go to the Business Council right now.

K: in about half an hour.

N: I told you to cut down your schedule, why the hell do you go over there?

K: I thought it would do the Administration some good.

N: Everything is helpful, but you know we don't want you falling apart. Now I told the fellow when I got my physical out there today that ...that guy that a masseur. He said he'd only done you once, and I said every time you want it. so tonight he'll be there if you want him. If you don't want him.

K: I've already arranged it Mr. President.

N: Does it help you?

K: I love it.

N: All right, fine, but you have got to be available for it. He comes in around 10 o'clock. Now look, he does Sgt. and chicken cols, why can't they do our Secretary of State.

K: Its terribly thoughtful Mr. President.

N: When do we see you then, Saturday?

K: Friday night.

N: OK All right. Henry, it was a great day wasn't it.

K: It turned out magnificently, its almost the communique we had submitted ourselves, almost word for word, it took about three days

of maneuvering, but we managed it. but your speech was, that really convinced them that we meant business.

N: Is that what they told you.

K: Oh, yes.

N: You see I was very subtle, as we said on the phone, I didn't hit them with a sledge hammer, but I got the point.

K: What was even more important is that a number of them came up to me without any prompting on my part and said they wanted to tell me that they would report to their governments that you were in marvelous shape, you know,

N: Oh, that I looked good.

K: Yes, that you looked good, you acted

N: I did it all without a note as you know, the fact I did it without a note I think impressed them.

K: Your whole demeanor your confident manner, your delivery,

N: Yes, they had to be convinced of that.

K: and the subtelty.

N: Good, take care of yourself, give my best to the Business Council and tell them By God, they have got to....take them onto the high road Henry, tell them we mustn't think of these miserable, parochial things, we got to think the peace of the world is in our hands, you know, and all of history will judge us for how we act in these next two or three years, you know that right/ What are we going to do, screw around with politics or are we going to do the big things? That's what this is all about, you know it and I know it.

K: Exactly.

N: OK, enjoy your rubdown.

T 393

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Bill Simons - Secretary Kissinger
February 14, 1974

S: Want to congratulate you on an absolutely superb job.

K: Well you're terrific. I think this was one of the best prepared conferences I've seen and you were a terrific help.

S: Well,

K: If I can keep you off television, you'll be a friend for life.

S: I will guarantee you I will make every effort to do that.

K: I thought it was great.

S: It was great because of your leadership, that's why and no other reason, I've enjoyed working with you and I look forward to the next step whatever that is, and pitching in with whatever we've got to make your job easy.

K: You were terrific Bill and its the first of many successes.

S: Are we going to establish the next effort fairly quickly?

K: We'll send out cables this Friday.

S: Super.

K: And I've already nominated you to be on the commission, on the committee, I don't know whether you'll accept but I said it at the press conference.

S: Fine.

K: Mr. Donalson and you will be the key members.

S: Good, that's perfect.

K: Where are you going to be, in Palm Beach, get a good rest.

S: Yah, I'm leaving right now, I'm out at the airport. I spoke to the managing editor of Newsweek about that aritcle that appeared yesterday, I spoke to him this afternoon, and I think he is much chastened.

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and I think he realizes he made a mistake, but I went into great detail
I also will have the answe r on the Aramco thing. I'll have it fully documented.

K: Good, can you let me know by early next week.

S: Oh, absolutely. I will have a full memo on that whole story.

K: Give my warmest regards to your wife.

S: Thanks a million.

K: Thank you Bill.

S: Okydaok.

K: By.

T 392 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
February 14, 1974
9:05 PM

K; Can you position Ziegler on the visit of those two Foreign Ministers?

S: OK.

K: He asked, will the President see him, it will be arranged arranged after they get here. Let's leave it open. We don't know what their message is.

S: That's what worries me. Let's keep them quiet.

K: I would like deferring to see them until Sunday afternoon. The trouble is if I see them Saturday night he will make me bring them down Sunday.

S: Trying to keep them up here from Saturday night untill he gets back is going to be tough.

K: If I see them Sunday afternoon _____.

S: That's possible.

K: Isn't it worth it or am I wrong.

S: The problem will be keeping him relaxed down there when he knows they're up here.

K: ____no machine.

S: No.

K: That's fine.

END

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T395 *

Telcon
Paul Ziffren/Kissinger
2/15/74 - 12:58 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

Z: Henry.

K: Yes, Paul, how are you?

Z: Well, I'm fine, but how are you?

K: I'm good.

Z: Are you holding up?

K: Oh, yeah, I'm managing.

Z: When are you going to take that vacation?

K: Well, the Arabs are kicking up again so God knows if I ever get a vacation.

Z: Well, God better see that you do get a vacation. Henry, I just wanted to report to you that we are moving along on this thing. There was a meeting in New York Tuesday with a number of people, and one of the stories that they got was the fact that at one meeting Jackson drew it up and said that he doesn't think that that group represented the Jewish community and if they wanted to take that position he was going to go over their head in that kind of business, so that what they decided to do is to try to work as quietly as possible on the people who are close to him in a way that does not make it look as good _____ _____ _____ trying to at least open his mind before he has a meeting with you which he still insists has got to be initiated by your calling him. But I don't think there's any sense in calling him until we get him in a proper frame of mind.

K: I'll call him fairly soon.

Z: Now, we've been doing some work with some other people. I was at a lunch yesterday with Fritz Mondale and I think we got Mondale pretty well turned around.

K: Oh good, that's important.

Z: Well, as a matter of fact, by the time I got through the conversation with him afterwards, He said, you know, I think Jackson is just using this for

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Presidential campaign purposes. You know, he turned around completely on it.

K: Terrific.

Z: Now the only trouble is that we don't want Jackson to think that this is going to be a part of the Presidential campaign against him, and so I would just as soon have Mondale not say anything to Jackson for the time being. I've been in touch with Sol Lenowitz and Sol is working on the thing and tomorrow we're supposed to get that speech from Fullman.

K: O. K.

Z: And we're going to try to get that thing circulated. So I wanted you to know that we're moving along on it. Sol is going to be in touch with (Cy ?) Simon and we're going to see if we can't create a climate that will make your talk with Jackson more productive.

K: Paul, you're a good friend.

Z: Well, I feel very strongly that not only is it a matter of _____, we've got to have some help, but also this is something that's got to be worked out, and anything that I can do you can depend upon me doing it. We really did as much work as I think we could do within this time limit. I talked to Cy yesterday and got him pushing and we'll just keep on pushing.

K: Good. Wonderful. And let's stay in touch.

Z: Alright. I thought that the Energy Conference really came out better than we had a right to expect.

K: Well, it came out very well, and the newspapers giving the impression that it wasn't succeeding actually helped that.

Z: Yeah. The report that I got was that Kissinger had worked his magic again. Keep on working your magic, but most important of all, please, take care of yourself, Henry.

K: Thank you.

Z: Good to talk to you.

K: Bye.

T 396

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
February 15, 1974
2:[illegible] pm

K: Have you talked to Haig?

S: Yes. I talked to him.

K: He told me to drop dead.

S: He said "oh God" . I said just relax. He is just droping by to debrief on the energy conference and talk about the Mexican conference and about the Middle East developments and I said I understand McClellan will be there too. I said you would be there about 9 or 10:00.

K: And you told him above all, I am not going to mention the Foreign Ministers. I think now it is fifty-fifty how this thing will go. I think it could turn out that Yamani is right.

S: Why would they come here.

K: Because they are ambarrassed. They may come here and say if I go to the Middle East they will help me settle it.

S: That is possible. I thought they may say we are going to lift the embargo but this is what we need to do it. Even being ambarrassed and negative will make it look worse for them.

K: OK.

S: Al is all primed.

K: OK, I'll see you over the weekend.

S: Try to get a little rest.

K: OK.

END

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T 397

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Senator Aiken/Secretary Kissinger
February 15, 1974
3:00 pm

K: I want to tell you with what enormous regret that I learned the news that you are not going to stand for reelection.

A: Well, they say the time go to is when they are asking you to stay.

K: I think that is right and from that point of view it is the right decision. From the point of view of the country and my personal point of view I regret it.

A: Well, we have had these things before and we live through it and I'll go home and do some of the things I have wanted to do for the past thirty years.

K: Wisdom is not in excessive supply in this town now.

A: That is an understatement. It is god-awful. We have almost eleven months to function.

K: I want you to know I think of you with affection and will be in close touch.

A: Thank you.

K: Give my best to your wife.

A: Thanks a lot.

END

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T 394 *

TELCON
Amb. Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
11:44 a.m., February 15, 1974

RELEASED IN FULL

D: Good morning, Dr. Kissinger.

K: I want to congratulate you, Mr. Ambassador.

D: What have I done now?

K: For 24 hours there has been no single outrageous statement out of Israel.

D: Yeah. If you think that was easy (laughter).

K: I just want you to know that I appreciate the cooperation.

D: Not only this but we were very angry at the Syrians and I prevented them from doing anything rash.

K: Now, you know, this guy's meeting for a summit.

D: Yeah.

K: You have to understand our sensitivity.

D: Yeah, I understand it. But I conveyed this to them because the Syrians were really going out of their mind the last 24 hours -- shooting civilians.

K: What I can't -- someday when you and I meet just as friends --

D: We always meet as friends.

K: No, I mean -- but then it isn't an official conversation.

D: Right.

K: Don't get presumptuous, we don't always meet as friends. (laughter)

D: (laughter) I can't even claim friendship anymore.

K: No, I didn't mean it. Now, what really worries me -- and this has nothing to do with any policy -- is this total absorption in domestic policy which your system imposes on you. Really in terms of the survival, I am sure that the Prime Minister doesn't wish it that way.

D: Now it's more than ever. It is really a very peculiar period which will end I hope when we have a new government.

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K: But what you need more than anything now is some wise leadership, which you in fact have -- not in your Foreign Ministry I don't believe.

D: No, I don't believe. But, Mr. Secretary, I can't agree with you more. You can't imagine how it disturbs my work. My every day work. And the Prime Minister suffers probably more than all of us.

K: But you know you're in mortal danger. You really are in mortal danger if you look at long-term trends.

D: Yeah.

K: And your people cannot focus on it except in terms of day to day tactics.

D: That is correct. But, as I say, I highly believe that this is a temporary situation because, as you know, it's from our point of view -- not mine ..

K: No, no, from your point of view. From our point of view, it's irritating.

D: Yeah.

K: But our survival won't get affected. It may hurt you here.

D: Yeah.

K: But it's from your point of view that I'm worried.

D: I agree with you. And I had a long discussion on this with the Prime Minister. She said may want to come over and help me form the governmen and you'll see what I have to face. She's facing an impossible leaders' block that is undermining the negotiation. Not for the conversions business this is nonsense. Because they insist on having a National Unity Cabinet. They want to be [equal ?] in the Cabinet. The Prime Minister realizes that if this happens, then we immobilize totally any ability of our political action for the next four years, which is suicide. On the other hand, they wouldn't enter into the Cabinet without it. So right now we are facing a choice of either having a 61 majority on _____ coalition or to go to new elections. That is the situation.

K: But why don't you go to new elections?

D: Because the Prime Minister wants -- because she believes that the party can fair much better.

K: Because I think you probably got all the negative votes -- you've got a lot of negative votes last time just as a protest to the war.

D: Right, right.

K: They've had their chance now.

D: That is their opinion. That's the voters opinion. But Dayan and Eban are reluctant to go to new elections. But we might have no choice. I mean, we might have no choice and we will do this. But this explains, Mr. Secretary, the [sensitivity ?]. I want to tell you normally we are not as bad as what appears now. Because this is really -- And on the other hand, their daily [coup] going to town, every day they are calling the government into parliament for a vote of non-confidence which means the government has to express .... They are spreading rumors that we are capitulating to the Americans and the Syrians on the prison-- You know, so this is the atmosphere in the country. They are talking about the issues which are laden with emotion. So it's very easy to rally people around in effect that you want the prisoners back. But I think the answer the Prime Minister gave in Parliament, and even Eban had a good answer yesterday in Parliament, explaining to them that nobody disputes that we want the prisoners back. The question is how wisely to do it.

K: Exactly. Well, I think actually on the prisoner issue -- Eagleburger gave you a briefing didn't he?

D: Yeah, yeah.

K: I was at a meeting. We are going to hear from the Syrians but we don't know what it is yet. All I know is that Boumediene told us that we would hear from the Syrians.

D: On the timed visit?

K: Well, about the prisoners in detail. But I think -- I gave you my judgment that the proposal you made will be accepted.

D: Yeah.

K: And we have not yet had the absolutely final word.

D: Yeah.

K: Now, but my strong opinion is that these two maniacal Arabs who are coming here want to take me out to the Middle East with them.

D: Right.

K: Because Boumediene has also written me that my appearance in the Middle East would have a soothing effect on the population-- on the situation.

D: Mr. Secretary, I can't resist it -- that anyone would believe that your visit has a soothing effect on anyone. (laughter)

K: I treat Arabs differently from the way I treat Jews. I sooth Arabs.

D: (laughter) No, I told Eagleburger my first -- naturally I pass it onto the Prime Minister. She has the cable by now and she is reading it. And I hope you have a reaction (today). But I told Larry what my first reaction is, and I am usually right on this, as long as we can separate the issues of the prisoners from your visit, I think we are preparing a very good ground for your visit.

K: Well, look, what I would like to do -- As long as you work out -- I can hold out on the prisoners by saying that there's no sense my coming until I get the prisoners.

D: Right.

K: And I have that Latin American Foreign Ministers meeting, which in fact makes it impossible for me to come.

D: Right.

K: But just for term planning, it is hard in the face of the embargo -- if they offer to lift the embargo, -- I mean, not to come then the week after this.

D: Yeah. You mean, after the Mexican thing?

K: Right. So just in terms of your own planning.

D: Yeah. No, that I understand. And I have said this to Larry, that -- Well, I was hoping they would not from your point of view, they wouldn't tie your visit to the embargo but of course whatever they will do that is between you and them. But we for us, just in case -- and also for you if I may, Mr. Secretary, no matter what explanations will be offered, if you go to the Middle East before they issue of the prisoner is resolved, everyone will interpret it that you are coming to put pressure on Israel in order to give up on the matter of the prisoners.

K: Unless I can demonstrate that you didn't give up on the matter of the prisoners.

D: That's right. That it is so.

K: Well, look, if your plan gets accepted --

D: Right. That means that we --

K: Look, there's no chance of my coming unless your plan is accepted.

D: Right, right.

K: In which case it is the opposite. In which case I got you your prisoners.

D: Right, right.

K: So I won't come without at least your plan being accepted.

D: Right. No, I understand this.

K: But that isn't the problem. The problem is this is in the context of your plan being accepted.

D: Yeah.

K: And then I would like you to get ready on the substance. I will not -- I have given you my word that I will not try to modify your plan. I've never broken my word.

D: Right. I have asked our people [redacted] secretly to get on substance already a week ago when you told me that --

K: That's not the problem [redacted] you face with me.

D: Yeah. No, I understand. No, but as I said to you, Mr. Secretary, after you talked to me that evening about the Syrians consent, which is about 99%, I've asked the Prime Minister that we begin to think on substance among ourselves first, you know. So that we be ready. And I think something is being done on it.

K: That's what I would strongly urge.

D: Yeah, I will emphasize it again.

K: That's your major problem. And don't spend time fighting me on the prisoner issue because I believe we will settle that in the sense that you gave.

D: Yeah.

K: And if we don't, that is not the issue between -- there is no issue between Israel and the United States.

D: I don't fight you at all.

K: No, no; don't get your Cabinet into the mood --

D: I ....

K: No, you won't. But tell your Cabinet not to get itself into the mood that if I come out there, it will concern the prisoners.

D: No, of course not.

K: If I come out there, it will concern Syrian-Israeli disengagement.

D: That is precisely so. And that would even please the Prime Minister more. Because, as you know, She didn't want to tie the two scenarios. because She thought that it is not good to do it. So, if, as I said, if our plan is accepted -- let's put it this way, you have in your hand the list of prisoners they promised for the visit which will start being executed before there is any dealings with the Syrians, either by us or by you, that could automatically. And then we can publicize it so the papers would not attack or would not connect your visit with the prisoners because that will be a solved issue as far as the scenario is concerned.

K: I can give you this assurance, if there are negotiations on the Israeli-Syrian disengagement, I can't work out the tactics now because I don't know what their proposition is --

D: Yeah.

K: It will be clearly demonstrated that your essential conditions for prisoners were fulfilled.

D: Yeah, yeah.

K: Now, if I go out, we have to modify the scenario in terms of the fact that I'm out there rather than here. I mean, I can't insist -- you know, we have to work out how to stage the fact that the negotiations will not start until [visit] starts.

D: Yeah.

K: But let's not spend time on that [redacted], Mr. Ambassador, because I assure you that is not the issue.

D: Yeah.

K: What you have to get ready for is the substance.

D: Yeah.

K: And I don't want to go out there until you've done more work on substance.

D: Yeah. Yeah, I understand what you're saying.

K: Okay. So I'll keep you informed.

D: Fine, I appreciate it.

K: Thank you.

D: And I would appreciate it, Mr. Secretary, if any new developments come --

K: I will keep you informed, Mr. Ambassador. Our relations are bad only when we have a margin for survival.

D: (laughter)

K: Under pressure we usually manage to get together.

D: That's right. The too quiet days which annoyed me to no end.

K: Ungratefully. (laughter)

D: And you don't even want to say that you will come to a private dinner that I'm holding.

K: I don't -- No, no; invite somebody -- keep it in honor of somebody else ....

D: Not anyone -- it's some friends of yours and mine together. And some Senators that I think would be good that, you know, -- I'm for instance trying to get Jackson and this atmosphere I think would be much --

K: If it isn't in my honor -- the only point is, I have not -- I have rejected a hundred invitations.

D: Of course, of course. It would not be in your honor at all. It would be a private dinner at the house. And there would be most of the people that you meet when you go some.... anyone of your other friends. And it is nothing to do with B- Barbara Walters, for instance, is anxious to see you. And that is as good occasion as any.

K: Okay. Do you mind though if I have one social engagement next week that I don't clear with you?

D: (laughter) If you insist, I don't know what good it does to you if I hear it from other people.

K: Okay.

D: (laughter) That is fine, Mr. Secretary.

K: I will talk a lot this week. And as soon as I've talked to the Arabs, I'll call you.

D: Okay.

K: Bye.

D: Bye, bye.

T401

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Dinitz - Secretary Kissinger
February 15, 1974
3:32 p.m.

D: I just talked to the Prime Minister since she read the cables I sent and she asked me to tell you with regard to the scenario on the basis of the most recent cables, the new one, from the Saudis, she doesn't feel we should conclude the scenario, between us, but wait and see ....

K: I agree. Let's not do that now...

D: And she wanted to assure you that she and the Minister of Defense and others are working on substance and there should be no worry for you even when you decide to come. She wanted to remind you again that the issue of the prisoners should be settled.

K: I told you I don't want to hear that again.

D: I'm just reporting Mr. Secretary. She was in a very good mood and she asked me to thank you for participating and that she appreciates your confidence. She wanted to assure you personally that she and her ministers will be mum for the next 36 or even 72 hours.

K: At least as long as the Arabs are here.

D: It might cause you some pleasure, but it will give her alot of pleasure and then maybe you can keep them there for a few weeks so that they would be silenced for a few weeks.

K: Give her my warm regards.

D: I will. I told her you were going to Little Rock, Arkansas. She hopes you are going with guards.

K: Tell her this is my insurance policy in case he wins.

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D: He has no chance.

K: Oh, really. Are there two candidates now?

D: Bump (?) is running. I heard the public opinion polls say there is less than a 30% in Arkansas who support Fulbright. O'Leary told me he heard Fulbright is in real trouble.

K: Hmmm. OK, I've got to run.

D: Yes, I know. Have a nice trip.

K: Oh, you want....no you don't want to hear ...I was going to give you another quote from Eban.

D: Oh, incidentally, that was an interview in the paper. Eban was taking a crack at Eban. Dayan said he thought there was a chance for peace and Eban said anybody who wants peace ought to have his head examined.

K: That's a hpapy group you've got.

D: Yes. All the best, Henry.

T399

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Gen. Haig/Sec. Kissinger
Friday, Feb. 15, 1974
3:05 p.m.

K: Two things. One, we have had another word now which makes it look dubious what these two characters are coming here for. One word from Yahmani, whom I consider the Sonnenfeldt of Saudi Arabia, indicates the word is no. Perhaps no one told him and he is trying to show off. My view is unless there is a clearcut unambiguous cutoff the President must not see them.

H: I agree. That is bad news. Sorry to hear that. What did he say?

K: They are adding more conditions. The Syrians are saying this is the only weapon they have left and they have to use it and that, of course, is not what we can accept. Then the Palestinians will want to use it.

H: That is right.

K: I will be down tonight.

H: Good, Henry. I am worried you are not getting any time at all to rest.

K: No. They obviously want me to go to the Middle East again and I am getting sort of fed up. I had hoped to have two days of rest.

H: You are going to have to do it.

K: You know I am stopping in Little Rock. I know your instincts are against it.

H: Only because you are losing time. It is up to you.

K: In terms of buttering up this guy it is worth it. I have McClellan coming to the airport. I think it is money in the bank.

H: Just a drag on you. I am just worred about your not getting any rest.

K: Yes. We have to do it.

H: Don't worry about the other. If we have it we have it, if we ain't, we aint.

K: If not, we have to be tough. When is the President coming back?

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H: He is coming back via Huntsville.

K: Late in the afternoon on Monday.

H: Right. All right, Henry.

K: He could see them late Monday.

H: Right.

K: I don't want them to go to Key Biscayne to tell you the truth.

H: I don't either. It is better not to.

K: See you later.

H: Right.

END

T400

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
February 15, 1974
3:25 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I noticed the cable has not yet gone that I wanted on the preparatory group. You guys are going to do what I want..

S: Mr. Secretary, I cleared that cable I don't know how long ago. I didn't believe you needed to clear off on it, but I don't know where it has gone.

K: Now I am leaving town and it can't go until I get back. I don't know where it stands.

S: If you want to know, I told Springsteen you didn't have to see it again.

The Secretary then terminated the conversation.

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T398

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Dinitz - Secretary Kissinger
Frebruary 15, 1974
3:00 p.m.

K: Can't there be a day when you people don't have to say something?

D: What did they say now?

K: Eban said he did not believe Sadat wanted peace.

D: Where di he say this.

K: In Tel Aviv, he said "I do not accept the definition that Sadat wants peace....." and if any of your colleagues want to take this on with its far reaching implications.....

D: Whom was he arguing with?

K: I don't care with shom, does he have to antagonize them....

D: I don't know what to say to you because, as....

K: Has Eban told you about the Saudis....

D: I know.

K: If this report is correct, and I hope it isn't, and this version of events reaches the President, you are going to have one hell of a time.

D: All right, I will try to find out what Eban was saying.

K: I don't want to make an official protest, but I don't want you to think your government is going to....

D: I'm sure it was taken out of context or something, but really, I will find out.

K: Why is it so hard ...this is not official now... can't your cabinet members shut up for awhile.

D: Maybe he's preparing himself for other things. I can't explain why my colleagues are doing this, but every Friday in Israel

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they have open sessions, everybody is going on radio and television.

K: I don't want to debate it with you. This morning I had indicated to you, remember, I indicated to you I thought you had gone soft because 24 hours had gone by without some tactless statement Why don't you recommend.

D: I will do this tomorrow.

K: Take one more crack at Sadat_____

D: The New York Times printed the same thing, _____that means tomorrow we will _____everybody has to prove to everybody else these days._____

K: I am going to Little Rock and Key Biscayne. I will give your best regards to....

D: Senator Fulbright will need your regards and help. Why are you going to Little Rock?

K: To brief him.

D: Yesterday I appeared on Martin Agronsky with O'Leary who was very funny and is a good friend.

K: O'Leary isn't badl

D: They asked why do you thin the Arabs are coming to Washington and I said I don't know I didn't know I hadn't had a chance to study it, I had just found out on the way over.

K: Why didn't you saw there were only 8 Jews and it takes 10 to make a semitic service.

D: They said why are they sopping in Paris and I said for refueling.

K: They told us they will not see the French.

D: O'Leary said they were probably going to Paris to congratulate the French for representing them so well in Washington at the last conference. On this other thing I will call, but its every Friday night, I don't know why but they have to say something.

K: Yes, but what about Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday...

D: Thursday they didn't say anything.

K: Let's see Thursday, not your're right.

D: Will say ~~xxx~~ tonight's cable, please until....

K: Until we get these Arabs. They are going to see the President, just for your own self-preservation.

D: Are they going to see the President? When I talked to Eagleburger he said don't exclude the fact Sadat is sending messages of doom and destruction so that wehn the two emissaries get here it will look like a compromise.

K: I don't believe that one message because we got a different one from Boumediemne.

D: I think I have got good news for you, not on the oil thing, but next week Mr. Secretary I will recommend to you that you meet with Jackson.

K: Oh, good.

D: I think there's a movement that will make him more seriously consider talking to you.

K: I will be ready.

D: But wait until I tell you next week so I will know exactly what he things at that time. I think he will be ready for a sensible compromise. I wasn't going to tell you but since you are beginning to think again that I am obnoxious....

K: No, no.....

SB12

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
DR. Kabanni/Sec. Kissinger
Monday, February 18, 1974
12:35 p.m.

K: How are you.

SK: Fine. Thank you very much.

K: In reflecting further on our conversation yesterday, it occurred to me that I should receive that material that you wanted to give me yesterday and then handle it from here according to the agreement or to the procedures that I have outlined to your leaders rather than burden you with the responsibility for it and I was wondering if you could come for a few minutes at 2:30 today, if that would be a convenient time or tomorrow morning whichever is convenient for you.

SK: I will call back to your secretary and I will arrange for an appointment.

K: Good. I had not fully understood the evolution of this understanding out of the meeting in Algeria.

SK: Very good.

K: Good and we will proceed along the lines I had outlined to your President.

SK: You are still going to Mexico on Wednesday.

K: Yes but I would proceed exactly as I told you yesterday. Nothing in that has changed.

SK: Very good. Goody-bye , Sir.

END

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SB 2

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
February 16, 1974
8:08 PM

K: I just had a call from Fahmy who had Kabbani with him, asking when tomorrow it would be convenient to receive Kabbani.

S: You said noon.

K: I said noon.

S: Alright. I don't believe it.

K: It's unreal.

S: I'll go over to the hotel to pick up Saqqaf.

K: Check with him first. Saqqaf is seeing the Syrians at 10:00.

S: At 10:00. I don't think I'll bother him tonight.

K: One of these guys have got to get out of town or we'll all lose our minds.

S: You better get out of town. Well, that's just fine. That takes care of it.

END

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SB1
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Foreign Minister Fahmy/Secretary Kissinger
February 16, 1974
8:00 PM

F: Where are you now?

K: I'm in my office.

F: Good. Tell me, my colleague our Kabbani would like to see you at your convenience. He is here tomorrow and what time.

K: If he could see me at 12:00....

F: It will be 12:00.

K: I will have somebody meet him at the Diplomatic entrance.

F: Good. It should be 12:00 exactly.

K: Yes.

END

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*

SB 4

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
General Scowcroft - Secretary Kissinger
February 17, 1974
3:10 p.m.

(missed first few seconds)
K: Do you know what the hell they're doing?

S: Yes, there is a group going out.

K: Let's just (a) make sure we pay for it, and (b) let's get these guys who we mined in VietNam (who didn't we mine in VietNam?).

S: That's right.

K: Tell Moorer its high priority and I want to have an answer in a few days.

S: I'll get him right on it.

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SB6

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Dinitz - Secretary Kissinger
February 17, 1974
5:05 p.m.

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K: What have your brats done now.

D: What?

K: Those brats in Jerusalem.

D: Nothing, its 11 o'clock at night they couldn't even if they want.

K: What did you call Eagleburger about.

D: Oh, no.

K: I figure when you call Eagleburger its bad news.

D: I called Eagleburger simply to get release to go to my dinner in New York. Didn't know whether I could leave town.

K: No, you can leave town. I still haven't seen the happy darlings as a group because they are so shaken up by what I told them yesterday they need new instructions.

D: Uh, huh. I heard on radio, CBS said you are receiving them in line. one by one, and only tomorrow will you receive them together.

K: That's right.

D: I got a lot of calls from the press asking me if Israel was made aware of the content of what the contents is and I said no.

K: You should say you are aware of the content.

D: No, no, of what is going on, you know. Content of the contact, I said no, I would speak to the _____ but we haven't had contact between us until you decide that you want.

K: No, no you can say that I have ...wish you would tell them that you have had full discussion with me.

D: I didn't want, you know.

K: No, no, no. That I don't mind you saying.

D: But I would say of an informative nature, not ....

K: That's right.

*

D: Maybe you'll have your state Department guy say, you know.

K: All right.

D: Its better. I can say that we met this morning for full discussion of an infomative nature.

K: You can say that. Otherwise though it leaves the wrong impression.

D: Okay, I will take care of ...I'll have my press....

K: Now, one thing that I find rather interesting is that the Saudi, I'm not drawing any profound conclusion from it, the Saudi is more moderate about Israel than I've ever heard him.

D: The Saudi?

K: Yes, nono, seriously. When he was alone. He said don't the Israelis recognize that they could be the leading country in the Middle East if they only had peace with us. He said of course the King is made uncomfortable about Palestine, but you know that , he put it all on the King. You know, he's in his 70's.
D: That's a very understatement for a Saudi to say he's uncomfortable about Palestine.

K: But I find it sufficiently startling to mention it to you.

D: No, no, I'm saying, I agree with you.

K: And I would not base Israeli policy on that but I think it is rather interesting information. He was very calm and also to say Israel could be the leading country in the Middle East I would have said 6 weeks ago that basically they are just behind Syria in trying to get it destroyed.

D: He said Israel could be the leading country in the Middle East?

K: If it only made peace. He said they always ran things in Egypt and elsewhere and we've never objected.

D: You mean the Jews?

K: The Jewd.

D: That's after Faisal told you the connection between Jadaism, anti-semitism and communism.

K: Exactly. I draw no conclusion from it, I'm just saying the mood is actually calmer than I've heard it.

D: Maybe its _____to have 102 points for the _____.

K: And they're are not, on the whole the Saudis are not all that complicated.

D: That's ture. The Syrians are more.

K: Oh, yes, Look the Syrians was in too and I just repeated again your position to him. He said they're very interested in disengagement and I said that's fine, you know what you have to do. I made your proposal again and he said he would transmit it.

D: So, I will not cable now anything on the conversation until you speak to them tomorrow. I've already sent what we said this morning.

K: Right. That I have more or less made as a proposal in response to their request. Also, I will go to Damscus first. You can tell her that. To me it makes no difference. I'll go whereever she says first.

D: No, no, I think its good for us.
K: Okay. And then I'll either come to Israel with the list and it starts or I'll come without the list and say it can't start. See what I mean.

D: Fine, fine. Yes. I see. That is why I thought it better for you to go through ....I think she would like this idea better. I will be in touch with you tomorrow Mr. Secretary.

K: I fear that is one of your more accurate statements.

D: As long as its not only one.

K: I've accused you of many things, I've never accused you of lying to me. Almost anything else....

D: By the way I was to see Scowcroft, as you know, you talked to him while I was there.

K: I wanted him to show it to you last week, sometime or yesterday, just so that you see what we are up against.

D: But I was happy at least to see that was what one of their other guys....

K: No, no, no. but throughout

D: Of these concerns

K: No, no. I grew out of the other man saying it at a meeting that this s hould happen.

D: I see

K: And this is the implementing memorandum.

D: I see at his request, that I didn't know.

K: One that's been requested.

D: Because I know that the one who wrote this is sufficiently out by himself to invent something like that.

K: No, in respone to a request, at a meeting a few weeks ago.

D: Maybe fore the separatéon of forces. I thought we were going to bring doom and destructions. But its not important, whatever it is it better is should have been .....Thank you Mr. Secretary and you are d telling the Department.

K: Yah, yah, fine.

D: Thank you.

SB3

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

TELECON
General Haig/Secretary Kissinger
February 17, 1974
1:00 pm

K: How are you?

H: Good. How did the meeting go?

K: It is coming along. I have stunned them totally by that approach. And I think we will get everything.

H: Good. Good.

K: I think he ought to see them because I think there is a chance they will lift it once they hoist this in, and I want to make sure he has seen them.

H: When?

K: Tuesday morning.

H: Fine.

K: They have come with a specific program which links the two together on the embargo. And , formally also that I be sent to the Middle East. And he could come out of the meeting and announce that he is sending me and then if it is lifted, he could tie it back to that conversation.

H: Yes, I agree.

K: I urge that he must be totally disciplined and aloof in that meeting. At this point, what has shaken them to the core is we are not asking them for anything. Do you think he can be gotten to do this and not promise anything?

H: Sure, I think so. In my last discussion with him -- if this is any criteria -- he is totally on board.

K: I saw these guys separately last night and separately this morning. And I'll see them together tomorrow.

H: That's good. Damn good. I know we could do this Tuesday morning.

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K: What time? 11:00?

H: Yes.

K: And then I would like to get them out of town so noone else can suck around them. Don't you think ?

H: Good. Yes I do.

K: I don't want a story out that they had a message for the President that I insisted on taking. So we have to let them deliver the message

H: Sure.

K: And just on the chance that they are caving -- and I rate it at fifty/fifty -- I think it is better that the President has seen them.

H: Yes and you are the best judge of their attitude.

K: Their attitude is that there is a chance again, but I don't want him to salivate.

H: He won't .

K: I had a good talk with the Saudi [redacted] If we hold it tough we'll do fine. B1

H: I agree with you. They are intrigued by that.

K: I don't think they will put it on again.

H: They have learned. How is everything else?

K: Don't tell me the weather is good down there.

H: Not bad, cooler, the sun is out.

K: You'll be back by tomorrow.

H: Yes, about 5:30 or 6:00.

K: We'll set the appointment for 11:00 on Thursday.

H: Good.

SB5

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELCON
Minister Fahmi - Secretary Kissinger
February 17, 1974
3:50 p.m.

K: Should you and Saqaaf come in formally, the two of you, tomorrow?

F: Yes.

K: How should we do that, just the three of us or with advisors?

F: Only the three of us.

K: Only the three of us, okay.

F: For the same reasons, we were talking about.

K: Okay. Now, should I give just a social lnch afterwards?

F: No, its not necessary.

K: But what if I want to give just a social lunch? Then I can have Bunker and his wife, Sisco and myself and you and Saqaaf.

F: I see, you mean you can indulge a little bit, in a social thing. At your place or what?

K: no, no, we could do it at the State Department or we could do it at some restaurant. Its a holiday tomorrow so it may be difficult.

F: OK.

K: Why don't we do it that way.

B6

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[redacted] B6

K: Ismail, you really....There's one subject we didn't discuss today which we really should discuss tomorrow, you and I alone at some point, that's your March 1 visitor, you know that whole complex of questions.

F: Yah, shouldn't worry about that.

K: I'm not worried, I just want to coordinate.

F: Good, just give me instructions what I'm supposed to do, and I'll do it.

K: Listen, you devel. I said coordinate. The first day I give you instructions I'm going to go the same way as your March 1 visitor. Unfortunately you are very proud.

F: I understand and you are really very considerate.

K: No, I think....you are so sarcastic, and you know how you can upset me this way. All right, so why don't you and Saqaaf come at 11:30 and right from there we have lunch.

F: Okay. It will be done.

K: And, we will see.

F: Good.

K: And we will arrange a meeting with the President for Tuesday morning.

F: At the State Department?

K: Tomorrow you come to the State Department and Tuesday you go and see the President.

F: Okay. Will you be present when I see the President, or....

K: Look, if you think I trust you with the President alone, you're mad. I'm going to be there.

*

F: But Saqaaf doesn't want you to be present when we talk to the President .

K: I don't believe it. It doesn't make any difference because Saqaaf , I haven't told you yet, can't be present when you talk to the President.

F: 11:30.

K: 11:30. Right, bye.

SB 13

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
February 18, 1974
2:30 PM

(Missed the first part)

K: Seems to be 200 T62 types are on the way. 150 T54 that have already arrived. 3 batteries of ___ have already arrived and 3 batteries of___ of the ___type and that's the modern type. The Radar system___B12 and B14. Can you have the Agency check this out? This seems to be reliable information.

S: I'll talk to Colby about it.

K: You haven't talked to him?

S: Not about this. I'll pass this on to him.

K: And M23 and X500.

S: X-500, I never heard of that.

K: There apparently are Libyan officers in Russian now for training. On the 1st of March Russian experts will arrive there. Have you seem Gromyko popping off in Paris. You should tell him I'm not pleased with that.

S: Strong support for Jobert.

K: Wait till you have something else to tell him before you call.

S: I will.

K: Good. Thank you.

END

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SB14

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Arthur Burns/Secretary Kissinger
February 18, 1974
2:55 PM

B: Henry, I've got a question. Last Fall I got an invitation from the Head of the State Bank in the Soviet Union, inviting me to visit and then Dobrynin talked to me about it. He sent his Counselor over.

K: I would go.

B: I'll tell you what the status was. I told them I would be glad to go, but not immediately. I would go sometime in the spring or summer. But my immediate question is about the timing. Now I understand that the President is going to go.

K: Yes, in June.

B: In June. Should my trip come bfore or after or does it make no difference.

K: I would believe before.

B: Maybe in May.

K: Yes.

B: Alright.

K: Because I think their relations are getting very shaky.

B: If I run into any problems, I'll let you know, and if you think of something let me know.

K: We'll talk plenty before you go.

B: Good.

K: Alright.

END

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RELEASED IN FULL SB 11

TELCON
Sen. Stennis/Sec. Kissinger
Monday, Feb. 18, 1974
11:30 a.m.

S: I hate to take any of your time but we promised the press you know we would put this testimony out. You have already sent it (testimony). I just want to refer to one page, Mr. Secretary, that asks you about the reports you know -- questinning you about the report. If I may read you a short question: Did you ever attempt to see the investigative report on that matter? Sec. Kissinger: No, I was told (you struck out I was told I would not be shown them.) Sen. Cannon: By whom? Sec. Kissinger: By Mr. Ehrlichmann. Let me put it this way (now you struck that out). We have got to trace this thing and one of the main things is why they did not do something about it. We are going to have to try to get these reports and I think that that could well be left in there.

K: I just did not want to trigger Ehrlichmann into another onslaught quite honestly.

S: We are going to have to go into that question.

K: I have no objection to your going into the question.

S: Your testimony -- I know there will be others that will say this and I hate to strike your testimony out. It is not classified in anyway and I don't see any gounds to strike it out really.

K: If that is what you think.

S: There are going to be other witnesses I think that will say that about him.

K: Yes.

S: As I see this matter, the fact that they did not do anything ~~about~~ about it is one of the major points. In fact, I think your and Moorer relations and attitude as for as the evidence shows is just ideal and no wrong doing or anything there but I myself am concerned about why they did not do more about this and I think that is what is on the public's mind.

K: Then why don't you leave it in.

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S: Alright. And I thank you very much. You are continuing to do a fine job and I will try to leave you alone but you call me if I can help.

K: Mr. Chairman, you could never bother me. You are always a source of strength.

S: You certainly have done a wonderful job and it seems like your work is standing up in the Middle East too.

K: I hope so and of course we have this group of men here now and I hope we are going to make some other progress.

S: Fine. That is wonderful. I will try not to bother you often.

K: Thank you.

END

UNCLASSIFIED

SB10
RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Senator Fulbright - Secretary Kissinger
February 18, 1974
10:10 a.m.

K: Mr. Chairman. How are you?

F: I'm fine. I just got back last night.

K: I called but you were not back yet. It was an interesting play, incidentally. It states alot of profound philosophical propositions in a bizarre way which is the only way you can be serious in the theatre these days I guess.

F: I think the visit was great success. I will get you the editorial, they did an excellent editorial.

K: In the Gazette?

F: Yes. The following Sunday.

K: I thought the questions were very friendly.

F: They were. I thought the press behaved extremely well.

K: And the coverage here, what little there was, was strictly substantive I called you last night to bring you up to date on where we stand with these two foreign ministers, and this has to be strictly for your information...

F: Sure.

K: They have had three propositions: (1) They are going...they will lift the embargo at the next meeting of the oil producers, but they don't want any discussion of it before. Having said this, of course, The Egyptian foreign Minister runs around town making enigmatic statements but that's their problem. Secondly, they want progress in , nevertheless on the Syrian side and thirdly, they want me to come ~~w~~ out quickly as a way of getting the talks started between Syria and Israel. Its a little bit absurd to have two foreign Ministers come collect a Jewish Secretary of State, but I can help them a little bit perhaps. They were going to stay here and cart me back to the Middle East with them, but I convinced Saqaaf I couldn't cancel the Mexico City meeting and couldn't go until next week but I probably will have to go out there next week. But there is a possibility we can settle it and not just get the talks started, of course we would have to work out the prisoner issue.

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F: You see, when you become indispensable ...an indispensable man, it becomes difficult to discharge your duties. That's the problem. Say one comment made by one of the more sophisticated members ....Len Williams ...he said "My god, it was a work of art. It was subtle as the Mona Lisa." But none of them wrote in such a fasion.

K: I have not seen any such comment.

F: It really went off well, it couldn't have been better.

K: Well I did it out of a very deep conviction.

F: I appreciate that and it was done so well, the timing, everything went off well.

K: The Press conference, too, due to the cooperation of your people down there, it was at a very high level.

F: I was really pleased with them. I thought there would be a few snide comments.

K: How does it look now with the Governor.

F: We think that many other things have deterred him, he keeps postponing and the longer he does that the less likely he is...he may decide not to run.

K: That would be good for the country.

F: That would be a very good thing. That's why I'm staying down there so much. I expect I will go back until he makes up his mind.

K: You did understand you you were invited to come along to Mexico. Our understanding was you really didn't have the time.

F: Right. I don't think it would be wise under the circumstances. Yes, I appreciate that but I don't think I should. So you really feel they will lift it, when about?

K: Probably about May 2 or 3 it looks like.

F: I think that's very good news because phsychologically it would be a trememdous lift on the situation. There's a great deal of hoarding and speculation that takes place, it would relieve the situation, they would quit hoarding and quit the speculation and that would be a tremendous thing. If we can keep from making mistakes. They must have reason to believe you can move the Syrians.

*

K: I think I can move the Syrians on the prisoner issue.

F: I still think the brig problem is Israel. We have to be very careful not to do anything they ....someplace there has to be some give.

K: I would like to get as much done without a flap so when we approach the broader issue.

F: The Jerusalem thing. I don't know what to day about it, I mean I don't want to cause you any trouble. The thing ought not to be ascepted as non-negotiable. It isn't strategic enough, its purely emotional, religious thing. I think I recall the original agreement in 48 the status was to be under the jurisdiction of the UN. I don't see how they can ignore that sort of charter of independence, or almost the equivalent, its their own constituation really. They...

K: They can't give up the claim to Jerusalem, its out of the question, for the Arabs I mean.

F: That's right. Well, anything I can do just let me know.

K: I'll be in touch before I leave.

F: When are you leaving.

K: About noon tomorrow, then I'll be back Saturday and then I'll leave for the Middle East. I'll call you tomorrow before I leave.

F: OK. Good luck.

SB 9

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
The President/Sec. Kissinger
Monday, Feb. 18, 1974
10:00 a.m.

N: Hi, Henry.

K: Mr. President, I just wanted to bring you up to date on where the matter stands with these foreign ministers.

N: Right.

K: I followed the strategy which you and I discussed the other day which amazed them because they had come here to haggle to see what we would pay for the embargo. Now I have the strong impression that they are going to lift it anyway and therefore I think you should see them.

N: Well, I told Haig if that is what you wanted to do we will do it.

K: But I think you should be very aloof and not offer anything to them. We've offered them everything there is to offer now and I don't think they need any additional reassurances and they are not really looking for that now.

N: What are they looking for then?

K: Well, I think they want to deliver to you the message they've got which is a little bit ambiguous but which I think, in practice -- I've told them that we can't accept any conditions. They were going to link it to Syrian disengagement. I said that under those conditions you can't meet them so they are now going to take that linkage out and they are just going to state it as a series of three unlinked propositions; that they have agreed to the principle of lifting the embargo, that they want progress on Syrian disengagement, they want me to come to the Middle East but they don't make those three things conditional on each other. Absolutely.

N: As far as the thing is concerned we will meet with them and talk to them a little.

K: I thought if you wanted to you could step out with them and say you are sending me back out to the Middle East.

N: Or we could say it while we are in the room. We will feel something out on that.

K: That is what they want and that is what they want to have announced anyway. It doesn't make any difference who does it. It just one way of emerging with something and then if they do lift the embargo it would be linked back to this meeting. They say any discussiong of lifting will

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them. They are going to try to have a meeting of the oil ministers within two weeks.

N: That is two weeks later than they are supposed to already.

K: That's right.

N: I wonder then if they say no discussion of the embargo if it is really worth having them and the fact that you are going to the Middle East is not going to -- you know -- we have been around that track before, Henry and it hasn't helped on the embargo. You see, my only interest is the embargo. That's the only thing the country is interested in. They don't give a damn what happens to Syria. That is our problem. I think we should see them but I don't know that we want to build up the fact that you are going out there if it cannot be in anyway linked to the embargo -- you see the problem we've got there.

K: Well, it can't be linked to the embargo, Mr. President, and I think the more we build up the embargo the less we are going to get it. The most effective thing I have found with them is when I told them Saturday night that we don't want to discuss it anymore.

N: Well, that may be effective in terms of their thinking. They want to have their cake and eating it too.

K: No, no. It was effective in getting it lifted.

N: I hope so. I think we will get out the announcement.

K: It doesn't have to be done then, Mr. President. I just thought--

N: It ought to be done right there. They will leak it out anyway right away.

K: If it happens within two weeks as they say it will then even though you can't announce it tomorrow it will be linked back to that meeting.

N: At least it will show some action. O.K., Henry, that is what we will do -- meet them about 11:00.

K: Right. Eleven o'clock and if I may I could come in half an hour before.

N: Sure, sure. Let Steve know when you want to come and I will keep it open. Good. Hope you are not wearing yourself out again.

K: You know these characters all wanted individual meetings rather than a joint meeting and I've got them again today.

N: Gosh. Try to get that rubdown artist over there. I have ordered him out there.

K: Fine.

END

SB 15
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Winston Lord/Secretary Kissinger
February 18, 1974
3:15 PM

K: What is the status on the speech, so I can make my plans.

L: I just don't have a feel yet, I'm working as fast as possible. It'll be sometime this evening. What time, I just don't know.

K: Will it be as early as 7:00?

L: Well, we could shoot for that. It depends if you want it as good. We could shoot....

K: No, I'd rather have it better.

L: It's a matter of whether I can break the back of this interdependence vs. hemisphere thing.

K: That's not a big intellectual problem. I just don't want the interdependence sound so much taht we can't talk about a special relationship with the Western Hemisphere. That's a question of three or four sentences, it doesn't require six pages.

L: OK.

K: Because there is a certain inconsistency in it.

L: Well, we'll shoot for 7:00.

K: I just want a paragraph or two.

L: Yes, Good. We'll shoot for 7:00.

K: The way it reads now is that it's all out local multilateral interdependence and I want it written in such a way that it doesn't hit you in the eye it's inconsistent with some other arrangement. But I don't want to argue that case which is very complicated.

L: Right. I understand. OK.

K: So that's just a question of tone and emphasis, it's not a question of a lot of writing. What needs a lot of writing is the end, it's the complete part. So that the problem appears clearer and the answers crisper.

L: Right.

*K: OK, Good.

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SB7 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Senator Mansfield - Secretary Kissinger
February 18, 1974
8:24 a.m.

K: I called you last night but you had already left for the theatre. I wanted to tell you, on a confidential basis, where we stand. It has to be very confidential, but these governments have made three decisions: (1) They are going to lift the embargo without conditions at the next meeting of the oil ministers in ...not for about two weeks though. (2) Because of the tough situation the Syrians have they want us to make some move to help them get enough movement so the Syrian President can vote for it. They would construe a visit by me to the area as sufficient movement as long as the talks get started. This will be decided by the President today. They have made a specific request that I come out.

M: Well, you can't avoid it.

K: It may get me into trouble in Montana.

M: No it won't. We will put you down for another date as soon as you can.

K: They will?

M: Oh, yes.

K: But I don't see how I can refuse it.

M: Oh, no. You can't. That certainly takes precedence.

K: Again, confidentially, there is a very good chance, I have talked to them, but there is no sense in coming out if we can't get a list of prisoners, then we can't get the talks started. I'll know that tomorrow morning...I'll tell you on the plane, but there's a very good chance we will get the prisoner list.

M: The big thing is Israel. Don't worry about Montana. We will keep you on the on-call list.

K: They don't want any mention. They say that all the time and then the people in the Executive branch start leaking all over the place, but they want it to look like their decision,....

M: Well, Fahmi indicated they had good news...

K: Well, these guys are blabbing so much since they've been here.

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M: As far as I am concerned, Henry, I haven't heard a thing. Henry, I talked to Kubish about having Valeo go with us to Mexico.

K: If there is any space, we will take him along. I know the plane is full but I will be able to bump off staff surely.

END.
sdd

SB 8

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sisco/Sec. Kissinger
9:20, Monday, February 18, 1974

K: Have we told the Arabs about that lunch.

S: Yes we have have arranged it.

K: And that it is a social lunch.

S: Right.

K: And that the Vice President has to leave early.

S: I did not know that. This is new to me.

K: I have invited him but he will leave about quarter to two.

S: When I pick them up I could tell them or I could call them.

K: Call them and tell them that he will be there with his wife and he will have to leave early.

S: Alright.

K: When are you coming in.

S: Fairly soon. I went into a line for an hour to get some gasoline this morning. I got up at 7:30. I will be in in about 20 minutes. Getting gasoline is a small problem if you are not Secretary of State. The line was around the block twice. Can you believe that?

K: Unbelievable. I note from an intelligence report that Faisal is saying he is fed up with our pressure on the oil embargo but I don't believe that.

S: While sitting in the line I was thinking about you yesterday and thinking it would be nice to get this shortage over. I will be in soon and I will call them first.

END

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SB17 *

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Dinitz
2/19/74; 1:00 p.m.

D: Mr. Secretary.

K: Would you mind leaving my staff members alone. It is bad enough that you have the press organized.

D: What's the press doing now?

K: They are doing nothing.

D: I have them well disciplined.

K: I want them to be well disciplined. Don't argue with me. . . . . I just saw a radio report that the Prime Minister is not going to continue. Is that ~~considerable~~/ conceivable?

D: I just talked to here on the telephone and to Dayan. They are having a meeting this evening with the Religious party. Last attempt to convince them to go to compromise. There was no indication, but after I saw the Reuters report too, I asked Shalev to call and he will report to me.

K: I just wanted you to know that as obnoxious as they are, they are by far the better group to deal with. I want you to convey my affection.

D: I have an affectionate message for you. It was too affectionate -- I didn't want to release it directly to you.

K: I will hear from the Syrians first thing in the morning. They will indicate their answer at 10:00 tonight but I have the impression it may be positive.

D: How was the meeting with the President?

K: I am not in a good position to talk with you.

D: Would I be able to see you some time today?

K: Don't be presumptuous.

D: I gave up a dinner to be with you. . . Mr. Shalev has just reported: Dayan has announced that he will not be a candidate in the future government because the Labor Party has not given him the support. The Prime Minister has not said anything. That doesn't mean anything -- that's politics. He has been under heavy attack in the past. I wouldn't draw any conclusions from this. If the Prime Minister proposed a Cabinet and asked him to stay . . .

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K: I will call you later. I have to write a speech on Latin America and even though Eban made a good recommendation I can't include it. Tell him I appreciate his thoughtful ideas.

D: Dayan called me on the guarded line and that's only the second time he called me on that line. He said that he wanted me to tell the Secretary that he greatly appreciates what you are doing.

K: But -- where is the but?

D: He didn't say any but. He just called me to say that. He said when you gave us the list he under the _____ _____ did not expect more than 69 people alive. When he got the number 65, he was sorry he could not rejoice with the people. We are not sentimental people. [illegible]

K: I will try to see you later today. We will arrange for 6:00.

D: I was invited to Blair House -- the Vice President -- between 6:30 - 7:30. That is the only time I cannot make it.

K: I will call you.

SB18

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
FM Saqqaf/Secretary Kissinger
February 19, 1974
3:14 pm

S: How are you?

K: Fine, Omar. You're leaving at 5:00?

S: Yes, I'm leaving in 40 minutes.

K: In forty minutes. I won't be able to see you off at the airport, Omar.

S: I don't expect that.

K: Because, well I normally would.

S: I hope....

K: The reason is I have to.. it was very well worth while.

S: I saw the press after leaving.

K: You did. Well, were you friendly or were you difficult?

S: They were very friendly and I was too.

K: Good.

S: Most of the story was on the friendship between Saudi Arabia and the United States. Anything from...

K: From where? You will send me word from there. Oh, I will get our consul there...

S: I don't know exactly what they wanted.

K: I will get our consul there , Omar, to get in touch with you

S: Thank you very much.

K: So you will know how to communicate with me.

S: That's fine.

K: And I look forward very much...

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S: Thank you for everything and I hope to see more of you.

K: Oh, I count on that. I have to prepare for the Latin American meeting. This is my problem.

S: I see.

K: But I'll see more of you and I hope you recover fully.

S: Anyhow, there is time, 2 weeks more makes no difference.

K: Well, I will see you in Riyadh.

S: I hope so. I'm going to Latin America. I'll be back before you get to Riyadh.

K: Oh, you are going to Latin America.

S: Yes, I'm going to Brasilia.

K: From la Hor?

S: Yes.

K: And you will be back in time?

S: Yes, I'll be back before you are there.

K: Well, you are an adventurous man.

S: Thank you very much. Everything was perfect and I can't say nothing except thank you very much.

K: I look forward to seeing you soon, Omar. Bye.

S: Thank you and my best regard to everyone.

K: Thank you, bye.

*

SB19
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Secretary Shultz/Secretary Kissinger
February 19, 1974
5:15 PM

S: The Trade Bill.

K: Yes.

S: The material on generalized preferences, as you know, is in there.

K: Yes.

S: Do we have the title four problem in there in addition to all the various things that have to do.....

K: You're a little premature. I knew you were going to come after me sooner or later.

S: You have to admit I've exercised great restraint but what we need is a commitment to testify.

K: Yes. That you will have.

S: Well, I understand that at this point we don't have one.

K: No, no. I have agreed to testify. We can't find the time.

S: Could you do it jointly with me next ...on March 4th.

K: No, because I'll be out of the....oh, March 4th. Look my problem is I'll just be coming back from a trip to the....well I don't whether I'll just be coming back. Yes, I'll just be coming back. But later that week I might be able to do it. I'd like to do it jointly with you.

S: Well, I have agreed to testify on the 4th, which is a Monday.

K: Monday, impossible. You could do it on the 7th.

S: I'll change my schedule around to suit yours.

K: Well, let's aim for the 7th.

S: If I negotiate this with Long and company then you'll....

K: I shall do it.

S: I might testify on the 4th if they want that for an opening hearing and I can come again with you on the 7th.

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K: The advantage of doing it together is that I wouldn't have to answer any economic questions.

S: Right. I could go on the 4th and come again with you on the 7th and if things come up that you would rather I handle.

K: What would make me most confortable is if I could just discuss the political side of it. The foreign policy side.

S: Right.

K: Your people again have done a superlative job on that Latin American thing.

S: Good.

K: I regret to say you guys really turn out good work.

S: Well, that's fine. Are you aware that I'll be going, or whoever is Secretary of the Treasury will be going, probably to the inter-American Development Bank meeting in early April.

K: Yes.

S: And so we can follow up on your thing.

K: Excellent.

S: The present trip plan is to go to Venezuela and Brazil each of which will have a new government on the way to Santiago where the meeting is being held.

K: You might consider adding a few countries.

S: Well that's about as many, if I do it, as I can do.

K: But at any rate you could follow up very effectively.

S: OK, well now will you tell somebody March 7th and I will proceed to nail that down with the committee.

K: I shall do that.

S: OK.

K: Goodby.

S: Thank you.

END

SB20
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Paul Volcker/Secretary Kissinger
February 19, 1974
5:55 PM

K: ___you do good work.

V: Enough of this blarney. Are you an Irishman?

K: No, it's true. You helped terrifcally on the Energy Conference and I think Hennesey's and your contribution are turning a C+ into B- paper.

V: Well, the question is should we stay over here, or what is your schedule? I'm over in the State Department at the moment.

K: Oh, you are. To meet with me?

V: Yes. Because they told me that's delayed.

K: Oh, Jesus. I'm not finished rewriting the speech yet. Why don't you stay another 15 minutes and we might just have a quick reviews It won't take very long.

V: OK.

K: I'll set it for 6:00.

V: OK.

K: Is that convenient, otherwise I don't really have so much world-shaking business. We could run through your stuff fairly quickly.

V: Well, the stuff we sent over to you has a few garbles in it when I read it. But that's not crucial. The language is garbled in some places. I don't know whether you've seen it.

K: Yes, I'm working from it. In fact, I'm putting your stuff on energy and science and technology and eventually developing assistance into the speech as it is.

V: Well, at the moment the sentences are a little bit garbled.

K: Take a look at what we have on development assistant in our last draft.

V: Well, that's what I was working from. It may not be the last draft it was probably redrafted, but I'll look at it. I'll stop around....

K: Take a look at the very last draft and see whether that meets your needs otherwise I'll put yours in.

V: OK.

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SB21

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Kubisch/Secretary Kissinger
February 19, 1974
7:18 PM

HAK: I'm leaving on Saturday. I'm no longer concerned when I can leave Saturday.

K: Good. It looks like instead of a dinner, Rabassa is having his reception.

HAK: That I cannot do. I must leave Saturday afternoon.

K: You don't have to leave as early as noon.

HAK: Don't press it too hard.

K: We're standing by hard with the Mexicans.

HAK: OK, Good.

END

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SB22*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Kubisch/Secretary Kissinger
February 19, 1974
9:20 PM

HAK: Jack let's cancel Calvani tomorrow.

K: OK.

HAK: You know we have that cable because of the dinner. Did you see that cable?

K: I guess I haven't caught up with that one yet. A couple have just been brought in to me. I was just going over the speech. The dinner is going to be tomorrow night then?

HAK: There is a dinner tomorrow night, which I will skip. But it makes it impossible to have a Calvani meeting. The reception is turning into a dinner.

K: Yes, I see. The one by the Mayor of Mexico City.

HAK: Yes. But then since the next two evenings are free we can schedule some bilaterals.

K: You mentioned you might

HAK: To Calvani and Chile. Well you just schedule three.

K: OK. We scheduled Calvani for Thursday.

HAK: Yes, on the ground of the meeting, of the dinner.

K: Right. OK. And if he says he wants to maintain it notwithstanding the dinner.

HAK; Then we'll maintain it.

K: We'll maintain it. OK. I'll pass the word to them at once.

HAK: You can schedule a few of them for Thursday night.

K: OK.

HAK: And Friday night. Say two or three.

K: Alright. One on Thursday night and Chilean and I'd like.....

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HAK: Well the Venezuelan is Calvani, isn't he.

K: Yes. If he doesn't want to maintain one on Wednesday, we can reschedule him for Thursday and the third one could best be the Jamaican. The Caribbean he could be our most troublesome one.

HAK: Chile we want.

K: Chile, Jamaica and Venezuela if it's postponed and if not some other third one.

HAK: OK, good. Thank you.

END

SB21

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Kubisch/Secretary Kissinger
February 19, 1974
7:18 PM

HAK: I'm leaving on Saturday. I'm no longer concerned when I can leave Saturday.

K: Good. It looks like instead of a dinner, Rabassa is having his reception.

HAK: That I cannot do. I must leave Saturday afternoon.

K: You don't have to leave as early as noon.

HAK: Don't press it too hard.

K: We're standing by hard with the Mexicans.

HAK: OK, Good.

END

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SB27

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON

Secretary Kissinger - Senator Javits
February 20, 1974

J: Mr. Secretary, how are you?

K: Just fine, and you?

J: Fine. Henry you are having fabulous successes. You're a man who's going to find it very hard to better his own batting average.

K: Know it. The next trick is to get the Syrians and Israelis together.

J: That's a trick worth doing. I'm calling about Charlotte Curtis.

K: She never called me.

J: Well she called your office but I think they were a little confused about what she wanted and I think she was a little confused too. I understood that you were willing to have it published.

K: Yes. Let me take a look at it again, to see how I edited it, but.... I'm distressed I wasn't told she called.

J: I want you to make her acquaintance.

K: I met her at your house, not knowing who she was.

J: That's right. She's going to take the page from Harrison Salsbury. I wanted to mention Salzman (?) to you. He's been over to the White House and they're going to send him to the State Department in order to look him over with an eye to doing something in State. Now, whom shall he see.

K: Well, he should see Ken Rush but I'll pass the word on to have a hard lookat him.

J: Remember our talk about Europe, Japan, etc. etc. A very interesting idea has come in from the field, from the Dutch Government. They are going to make it an item on the parliamentary agenda which consists of a report to the Council of 9, and do a Foreign Office White Paper commenting on it. The idea is to move into doing it in every parliamentary meeting of the 15.

K: We would support it.

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J: I'm going to talk to the guy who's the President of the organization and he's going to push it with the Chairman of each national delegation. It's a hell of a way to publicize the discussion of this set of ideas of what you ultimately will be following directly.

K: Yes. I must run to catch my plane to Mexico.

SB 26

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Joe Sisco - Secretary Kissinger
February 20, 1974
11:43 a.m.

K: Yes Joe.

S: Mr. Secretary are you aware that Waldheim is presently in West Africa.

K: When is he coming back.

S: It will be in a few days.

K: Have we heard from the Algerians in terms of timing.

S: Not yet.

K: It possibly means the answer will be no.

S: I would guess that its just...He may have even left town for the conference. We figured out it , that day should be right on the button for him. I suspect the ....from Algeria he has to go to Lahore but I wouldn't think its going to be "no" unless he's got something scheduled we don't know about.

K: Well, if we have trouble with them I will just stop in London overnight.

S: On the way out? Yah, sure.

K: Don't give me that sneer.

S: We will be in touch with you telephonically as soon as we here.

K: OK. Joe you know, you will make a pretty good officer some day.

S: ....I will be in touch.

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DATE/CASE ID: 3 DEC 2002 200102979

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SB25

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
February 20, 1974
11:36 am

K: Mr. Ambassador?

D: Good morning Mr. Secretary.

K: Mr. Ambassador, if Golda plays as rough with me as she plays when she forms a cabinet she... On Mizrachi, Fahmy syas if you will release all the prisoners by the time I come to Egypt, Mizrachi will be released.

D: If we release all the prisoners by the 28th, Mizrachi will be released within 24 hours.

K: Better tell them 48 hours.

D: 24 to 48 hours.

K: If you will confirm this he will sned a message immediately.

D: I will try to confirm wi thin the next half hour.

K: Now, I am breaking every confidence by telling you this, but I have the Syrian list but this only she can know and it will ruin everything if it leaks. It must look as if I am bringing it from Syria to Israel.

D: Is the number the same?

K: It is 65.

D: Does it include wo unded?

K: I have it in a sealed envelope in my office. They sent a special envoy with it. I was not supposed to receive it until I got there. And they have agreed to Red Cross visits a week from Thursday, after I announce the visits will start. She can announce it after I arrive in Israel.

D: She can announce it?

K: Yes, I won't announce it. I will say nothing to the press and when I get to Damascus I will say nothing. ....and she can make whatever announcement she wants.

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D: You can be sure. She is the only one who knows.

K: Good. Now you can rest at ease.

D: Wonderful. And I am very happy about the Mizrachi. And I will see if we can announce the... by the 28th of February.

K: Let's see who can you call about it because we will be gone. See if you can get it in the next 20 minutes.

D: I'll see if I can get it in the next 20 minutes.

K: Good.

END

*

SB28
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Cooper/Secretary Kissinger
February 20, 1974

K: I am sorry I couldn't get back to you yesterday. And I am on the way to the airport, but I am interested in seeing if there is an Embassy you might be interested in. I was thinking of East German. Why don't you mull this over and I'll call you next week.

C: I'll do that. And do you mind if I do a few notations about where I think I could be useful?

K: Fine, you know my admiration for you.

C: And you know mine for you. And you are leaving for Mexico and then you have to go to Syria?

K: Yes. I'll probably call you Sunday.

C: OK.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 13 MAY 2004 200102979

SB24

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Wednesday, Feb. 20, 1974
10:20 a.m.
Buffum/Sec. Kissinger

K: I had a message from the Iranians last night saying that we are not backing them at the UN.

B: I think he must misunderstand our state of play.

K: That we are siding with the Russians -- going neutral.

B: He has not properly understood the position of our delegation. I have been in touch with Scali continuously over this. They were reassuring the Iranian representative as late as 9:00 last night. We are completely with them. I think one comment made by our people earlier on gave them an erroneous impression that we would not stand with them on the resolution. That was clarified yesterday.

K: Would you call Zahedi and say you are calling at my request with respect to our conversation and you have been instructed to stay at least as close to the Iranians as you can as long as they stay out of Baghdad.

B: They are almost sure in New York that they have the votes to forestall ~~thi~~ any resolution they don't like.

K: And we helped them.

B: With our help. And we have told them to go ahead and support their efforts.

K: I would like to be a half step behind and still help them.

B: That is where we are.

K: I am prepared to be in step with them if that is the only way to prevent a discussion.

B: At the moment they are taking the lead and we are playing a supp orting role.

K: Good. Thank you.

END

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RELEASED IN FULL SB30*

TELCON
February 25, 1974 - 8:40 a.m.
Joe Califano/HAK

C: How are you.

K: I'm OK. I'm off to Syria

C: I gather that. I really appreciate the call. I called because my friend and client Paul Austin called me last night and he would like to start making some contacts in Cuba and he'd like to talk to you about it at some point. He doesn't want to do it if its contrary to anything we're doing and I realize you don't know when you'll be back.

K: I wouldn't mind talking to him. He'll keep it quiet won't he?

C: Oh, absolutely.

K: Good. Why don't you check with me after I'm back in about 10 days.

C: OK Henry.

K: And we'll just make it a very private conversation.

C: Yes. He would like that on his side too.

K: Good.

C: Because he wouldn't want his other competitors and you know.

K: Listen, I'll tell you one thing. I may not do anything for him but at least I don't have any personal objection to him.

C: Listen, good luck and really you are doing a magnificent job and if I can ever help just let me know.

K: Thanks.

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SB29 *

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Congressman Wayne Hayes
2/25/74; 8:20 a.m.

K: Hello.

H: Hi!

K: Wayne, you caught me just as I am going off to ~~the~~ Damascus.

H: I called you?

K: You called me last week.

H: Yeah, I called you last week but I just wanted to talk to you about this guy, Holton, and tellyou I had a talk with him and you know I briefed him on the facts of life and what kind of a job that was and I said if you want -- you know, I said I don't know who the hell told you I had a veto on it, but I don't. But, in any case, I said, if you know what you are getting in to . . .

K: No, I told him not that you had a veto but that one of his big jobs was to make sure that you were talked to regularly and that I considered you you a crucial member of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

H: Well, I don't want to be talked to ~~g~~ regularly by him -- you know -- and I don't want to be talked to regularly necessarily by anybody. If I got a problem I am not going to bother you with it because you are too busy but I will bother somebody that can get it done.

K: Well I will make damn sure that there is somebody, you know, that is regularly available -- you know, that is available for that purpose.

H: Yeah.

K: And I hope we can have that drink which my flu~~e~~ knocked out.

H: Well, I hope so, too. And good-luck out there. I don't think you will get very far with those Syrians.

K: No, that is going to be murder.

[redacted] B1

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DECLASSIFY AFTER: HAK'S DEATH
DATE/CASE ID: 12 MAY 2004 200102979

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Congressman Wayne Hayes
2/25/74; 8:20 a.m.

[redacted] B1

K: I will call you as soon as I get back and maybe we can have that drink then.

H: Well, good luck. And I hope you have some.

K: Thank you.

H: Okay, bye-bye.

SB35

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Atherton/Sec. Kissinger
March 5, 1974
9:03

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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K: Can I have a copy of that draft cable to the Syrians that we want the Defense Department to clear off on.

A: I have a copy in my safe.

K: I am seeing Schlesinger for breakfast.

A: Oh, will you be going by the office first.

K: No.

A: I can arrange to have one. Would you like it this evening?

K: No, I don't need it this evening. Could you have it in an envelope for me at Schlesinger's office say about 8:15 in the morning.

A: Absolutely or would you like me to drop it with the Secret Service at your house, I go right by there on the way to the office.

K: Why don't you do that.

A: I'll leave it with the Secret Service.

K: Well, what time are you riding to the office, though.

A: Well, I had planned to go a little early tomorrow. I thoight I would be there, what time is breakfast?

K: I am leaving home at a quarter to eight.

A: That's fine. I was planning to go in a little early tomorrow so I can drop it off.

K: Baloney, you weren't going to be in there ~~xxxx~~ at a quarter to eight.

A: I was planning to leave the house at 7:30.

K: Do you have it with you at home?

A: I don't have it with me but I'll arrange to get one tonight and either drop it off or give it to S/S to deliver to the Secret Service before you leave in the morning.

*

K: Good that would be wonderful. Many thanks, good bye.

SB34

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Amb. Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
March 5, 1974
6:15 pm

D: I did not want to disturb you but I got a call from the Prime Minister and she has decided to compose the government.

K: Terrific.

D: She is taking Dayan and ~~Paris~~ PERES back to their former positions.

K: She is playing chicken with me the way she has been playing with him.

D: No, she actually wanted him before but Dayan was not willing to go. I did a lot of work, I stayed an extra 24 hours. I worked on him, I worked on her. She was so sweet, when I said to her I need to congratulate you, so she said you should get the congratulations for what you did. She said call your friend right away.

K: Well, will you give her my warmest regards and tell her while she is totally impossible I would much rather work with her than with any five others together.

D: Right, especially now that you have met the rest.

K: No, no. Tell her that it is one of the best pieces of news that I have had. How about the R ligious Party?

D: They will probably come in now too. She is going to present it tomorrow afternoon but she wanted you to know about it.

K: All I need is for you to send Dayan here.

D: I think it is almost sure that he will come.

K: Good. Because I may go to the Soviet Union on the 18th.

D: Oh, already.

K: Yes, and in which case I would like him afterwards.

D: Afterwards, that is even better.

K: You see what I mean

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D: Sure, that would be better. I asked Eagleburger today what your time table is and he didn't know.

K: I'll tell you the Soviets are so nervous that I am afraid to cancel my visit.

D: No, no you shouldn't. I think it is a good idea. So in that case it will be around the 24th or something.

K: 22nd would be the best.

D: You will be coming after only two days.

K: No, I am getting there on the 17th and I'll be back here the night of the 21st.

D: Alright, so tentatively we can plan on the 22nd.

K: Yes.

D: fine , that is excellent. Sometime when you have some time may be we should get together, Mr. Secretary and you can tell me a little bit about Syria and it is also good for the press that we met because there is expectation that, you know, that there is a follow-up to your trip.

K: Right, well you know these talks are weird with the Syrians. They make you look good.

D: Thank God for our enemies.

K: Yes, we'll do it tomorrow probably or maybe later tonight.

D: Anytime, I am in the office.

K: Well, it keeps me from being over-confident to know that you are in town.

D: (Laughter) Mr. Secretary, the only reason I left town was because you were out of town.

K: I may harras you but I know you have been a very very good influence.

D: I was trying to do my best.

K: You have been a very good influence and when it looked as if she had

K: resigned, the thing that made me nearly as sad was to feel that you might be pulled out.

D: No, I probably wouldn't have but our policy wo uld have been bad.

K: I agree.

D: Thank you anyhow. So, if you can't come tonight, it is alright. I know you are tired and we can do it tomorrow sometime.

K: Good. Wonderful.

D: Fine, all the best.

END

SB37

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Sec. Kissinger
March 5, 1974

K: We are meeting with Schlesinger tomorrow, right?

S: Right, at 8:00

K: I'll have to testify afterwards, but I would have to testify the next day and I think I had better x get to him. I wanted to talk to him about commissions for Saudi Arabia.

S: Oh, good. OK. Do you need any supporting papers or anything.

K: No.

S: Good. I figured that was one of the things you would want to talke about.

K: OK.

S: OK, I'll be at yoir place tomorrow morning.

K: About a quarter to eight. Thank you.

S: OK, goodnight.

END

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SB 36
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Atherton/Secretary Kissinger
March 5, 1974
7:38

.....

A: If that hasn't reached you let me find out what happened. Because I cleared off on it some time ago. AF was doing a cover memo.

K: You don't want to put it together with that other stuff on Syria?

A: We thought they would be better handled separately.

K: Why, how often is he going to go in there?

A: It seems to me we better not mix the two up.

K: In Eilt's mind or in Sadat's mind?

A: In Sadat's mind. We did a separate one on Syria which...

K: Well, that too I asked to have changed.

A: Yes, I changed it. That was also sent up sometime ago. They should both be there. There were two separate messages, but let me check sir and see ~~xxxxxxx~~ where they got to. I cleared off on both of them some time ago.

K: Well, can you check.

A: I'll check right away.

END

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DATE/CASE ID: 4 DEC 2002 200102979

*

SB31 *

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

TELCON
Larry Eagleburger
Secretary Kissinger
8:25 a.m. 3/5/74

K: ....that Syrians planned to attack--did I or did I not tell you to get it turned over yesterday to the Israelis immediately?

L: You told me do it this morning sir

K: In the morning!! You have to interupt me at NATO headquarters to do it this morning?

L: I interupt you at NATO headquarters?

K: You showed me--

L: Oh, oh, I'm sorry--that! That was turned over immediately

K: By whom?

L: [redacted] B1

K: Okay, fine
Will you confirm that please

L: Yes, I will.

K: And will you ask Sisco to draft a messageSadat saying we have this information and we want him to know it

L: Right, sir.

K: Good.

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DECLASSIFY AFTER: INDEFINITE
DATE/CASE ID: 12 MAY 2004 200102979

SB33 *

TELCON
Vest/Sec. Kissinger
Tuesday, March 5, 1974
3:55 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Did the European decision thing come up.

V: Yes, sir. The question was not asked at the White House but came up here. I followed the line you gave me on the lack of consultation. No plans to veto. It raises some question in our mind the nature of consultation. We do reserve our rights and we are studying to see what this offering implies.

K: O.K.

V: I think it will probably be taken as a fairly sharp response.

K: It will?

V: I think so. The other thing which came up grew out of your briefing and I checked it back. That was the nature of the prospect of the oil embargon and the forthcoming oil ministers meeting.

K: Just don't say a GD thing.

V: I found in checking ...

K: I don't give a damn on what I said on background.

V: I struck that but I want to forewarn you that AP wrote a story on which overplays on the basis of the background. I have gotten hold of Schweid and said you did not say the things that he had written in that sotry and he is doing a correctiong.

K: Good. Thank you.

END

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SB32 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Hal Sonnenfeldt
Secretary Kissinger
3/5/74 9:06 a.m.

S: .....question of what we do about it is really the difference between being relaxed and letting it fall of its own weight or actively working against it. I never doubt it after what Home said that the British weren't going to stop it and then they were too weak to stop it anyway, I don't know what Sheel said to you in Bonn but I think to keep the French happy and to just show a movement, it was pretty inevitable that they should do it and getting together some people right now to do a paper for you, but I don't really--

K: I am determined not to accept it; it is not a question of whether the decision in itself can harm us, it is when the Secretary of State is in Brussels to brief NATO to be summoned to the EC and then to be informed of a decision that they have already taken and that it is already in the newspapers

S: Yeh, of course, I couldn't tell what Scheel might have said to you in Bonn on the thing

K: He lied--you know, he obviously said we would do a few minor things but we will never go to the Foreign Minister's meeting

S: There is some talk this was a surprising development, but I can't believe it--that these things happen out of no where.

K: And to take the decision with Britain absent and Italy having no government is inexcusable

S: I think obviously that puts you in a very awkward position and it is a stupid thing to do in this fashion and undoubtedly it was done as a means of repairing a relationship with the French. I don't think everybody has a hell of a lot of confidence that it amounts to a great deal and it does come down in the end to how much capital you want to spend to work against something like this.

K: I don't want to work against it, I want to use it as an excuse to show that this procedure will never be accepted again.

S: I think that on the most immediately related issue--the energy conference, the Europeans still seem to be under some general impression that they did us a favor in the way they conducted themselves in the conference, and I think that is where our tactics are going to have to be adjusted to more passive position

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K: I want us to be on a more passive course on the energy one; I do not want you to go over to that EC drafting next week, just tell them we are reassessing it, but above all, Wilson is seeing Annenberg at 5:00 today, should Annenberg mention this or should we let it go.

S: I really don't think Annenberg should mention it; I would like to discuss with you what we do with the British government, because I do think we have to pick up contact with him pretty quickly, actually it is a good thing to have Callahan in the foreign office--he is less volatile than ---

K: There is one thing they cannot do is to support the Common Market within the first three months of being in office against us.

S: I think --

K: They can do a lot, but that they cannot do.

S: I don't know what they were going to be able to do at all, other than try to settle the miners' strike, I don't see how they can go on for more than three months at most

K: I would like you to draft a letter to the Heads of the nine which is focused primarily on procedure

S: Okay, well we are going to meet at 12:00

K: I know, I want that letter drafted

S: Presidential letter

K: Yes.
Good, I will see you then.

SB43 [*]

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Admiral Zumwalt/Sec. Kissinger
March 6, 1974
4:36 p. m.

Z: Sorry to bother you.

K: Not at all.

Z: I wonder if it is possible to entice you to join a discussion on Saturday, March 23 among Erwin Miller, Shutls if he is going to be in town, and we hope to get Jim Schlesinger and four or five of my executive panel (Sonnenfeldt, Henry Rowen) on the discussion of the relationship between economic policy, military policy and foreign policy focussing on specific issues that we would get to you in advance.

K: What time of the day?

Z: We are shooting for about a 9:00 start and windup after lunch but we can tailor it if necessary.

K: I will make an effort. Can you send some papers over here?

Z: Yes. I will do it.

K: Good.

Z: We would be grateful.

K: Thank you.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
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SB46

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Hyland/Sec. Kissinger
March 6, 1974
6:20 p.m.

K: Have we had any reports of Russians airlifting to Syria.

H: I have not heard of any. I can check on it.

K: Right away will you and call me back.

H: Alright.

K: I have Senator Jackson here.

H: As of this morning we did not have any. I will call you right back.

K: He heard it from the press and it may not be true.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
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SB48

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Gen. Scowcroft/Sec. Kissinger
March 6, 1974
9:30 p.m.

K: Could you give me some information about increased numbers of of Russian experts in Damascus?

S: Larry has the memo. It is nothing he did not already have. A one pager from the Agency.

K: Would you mind sharing it with me?

S: I will tell him to get it into you.

K: Could you summarize it for me?

S: Yes. It says that there are Russian advisers who have been seen around Damascus in increased numbers and increased movement toward the front. Large amounts of supplies moving to front line units. Unusual troop movements. That is all.

K: What is the source?

S: Says we have now received the following additional information pertaining to the same subject. About the Soviet technicians, a Jordanian government employee reported a Syrian friend had noted this.

K: O.K. Have we given this to the Israelis?

S: Yes we have.

END

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
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SB44

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Mosbacher/Sec. Kissinger
March 6, 1974
4:40 p.m.

M: Henry, how are you?

K: O.K. How are you?

M: Which country are you in?

K: That is what I would like to know.

M: You are kind to call back and Pat sends her love to you. I should not tell you that.

K: I know. Very risky for you.

M: I hope you are tired enough so I am safe for awhile.

K: For twenty-four hours.

M: That's all.

K: Yes.

M: When are you coming to see us.

K: I hope soon.

M: The purpose of my call is I have been recently to Lisbon a number of times on personal business and one of my good friends -- I have met most of the fellows over there and one of them called me a little while ago and I am really just passing this along. He has asked and they did not want to do this through the Embassy specifically. The Present Secretary of State for Information a man by the name of _____ he may very well be the Foreign Minister in the not too distant future, according to my friend. He will be over here and in Washington between March 12 and 14 love the opportunity of calling on you and they asked if I would pass this along and I am doing just that.

K: Why don't you ask him to check my office when he comes here.

M: Would that be alright.

K: Sure

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M: I will have him call when he gets here.

K: Good. Hope to see you soon.

M: I hope so, Henry. One other thing, Bob Taylor used to be in charge of the President's Secret Service detail wanted to send his best to Reedy.

K: Is he working for you.

M: Yes, he is working for me up here.

K: Terrific. He is great.

M: He is a wonderful guy.

K: Give him my affection and regards.

M: I will be delighted to.

K: If you ever need a horse to raise for you I will be glad to try it.

M: Would you?

K: Sure.

M: What are you doing tomorrow afternoon? We fortunately get to see Nancy oncein in a while but we miss seeing you, Henry. You are doing a great job but we hope you can find a little time to come up for a weekend.

K: I shall.

M: O.K. Thanks a million.

END

SB42

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
The President/Sec. Kissinger
March 6, 1974
3:27 pm

K: Mr. President.

N: Hi Henry. Anything on the foreign policy front you want me to try to get out on board today. I don't think I'll be asked anything.

K: On the oil embargo, the way it stand now, just to let you know -- I wouldn't go beyond what we discussed yesterday. The Libyans don't want to hold it in Tripoli so Sadat has ~~decided to~~ invited them all to come to Cairo. Which at least givesus a fixed location. We have had a cable from the Saudis saying that the King after the meeting I had with him has now definitely decided to lift it, but even that I wouldn't bet my bottom dollar on given their volatility. But this time tit comes from the Foreign Minister which is higher than we have ever had it. We made a statement yesterday that we hadn't been consulted on that European thing.

N: Right,

K: And I think you should just stick with that because that is true. Should I say
N: ~~I think~~/that we take a dim view of it or not.

K: I think what you said yesterday...

N: Well, we might say that they are ~~obviously~~ obviously looking to their interests and we will of course look to ours.

K: Something like that. That would be fine. But otherwise, -- I am just leafing through my cables to see whether there is anything else that is likely to come up. On the European thing, they are obviously looking to their own interests; we have offered cooperative arrangements and it is up to them which way they want to go. If they look to their interests exclusively, then we'll look to ours. I would leave open the possibility of the cooperative.

N: Ok.

K: There is nothing else you don't know.

N: The meeting is tentatively schedule for the tenth, is that right?

K: It is tentatively scheduled now for the 11th but again I would not tie yourself to it because so many things can happen. I would just say

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that there is a meeting; it is their decision to make but we of course have indicated our view. Something like that.

N: As for as the Syrian thing is concerned we will simply say that it is a difficult problem that will be discussed further when the Syrians and Israelis come to Washington.

K: Yes, but you could say, Mr. President, that the United States will exert all its influence to bring about a just disengagement scheme between Syria and Israel. It would be well received in Syria.

N: Right.

K: And the Syrians have been actually in their public statements very restrained.

N: Alright. Fine Henry that is good. If you think of anything give me a call.

K: Right, Mr. President. All the best.

END.

SB47 *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sen. Jackson/Sec. Kissinger
March 6, 1974
4:55 p. m.

J: Henry! I am in the middle of the final debate here.

K: I won't keep you long. I can do it at 6:00 after all if you are willing to come.

J: Sure. We are voting at 5:00 and I should be there by 6:00. I am managing the bill and I cannot leave it.

K: I understand. What I thought is we would talk about a general review of the situation and next week we can talk about others.

J: Glad to and if some ofyour people and mine can get together on the Trade Bill and Salt.

K: Exactly. I think you and I should talk about the strategy we want to pursue. We will talk about it.

J: We won't take too much time.

K: I am relaxed. I have cancelled the other thing.

J: O.K.

END

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RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

SB 45

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
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DATE/CASE ID: 26 APR 2004 200102979

TELECON
Amb. Dinitz/Sec. Kissinger
March 6, 1974
4:47 pm

K: I thought you would be Minister of Foreign Affairs by now.

D: (laughter) I just finished getting the composition of the Cabinet and I think it is good.

K: Is Rabeen in it?

D: Rabeen will be Minister of Labor.

K: Good.

D: That is good for him. Peres will be Minister of Information and Dayan, Defense and Shapiro , Finance and _____is going to be Transportation.

K: Well, he can't do any damage there.

D: Not much and the rest is more or less the same. I think it is an excellent Cabinet.

K: Did the religious party join it.

D: They will decide tonight but I think they probably will. She presented it to the President tonight and she is going to present it to the Parliament on Sunday.

K: OK, do you want to come by here tonight around 8:30. for a half a hour.

D: Sure. I have some information that might be of interest to you [redacted] I tried to relate it to Eagleburger or Scowcroft but I couldn't get hold of both of them. One piece of information, Mr. Secretary is a political piece of information which might be of special interest to you. [redacted] B1 B1

K: Yes, but I don't think [redacted] will do that. B1

D: That I don't know, but we have [redacted] information to this effect [redacted] that I will try to pass to Scowcroft, which indicates that they are going at least through the motionsby refusing . . . B1 B1

* K: Well, for your information, we have talked to [redacted] and they B1

K: (cont.) are sending [redacted] to Syria to see whether they -- what they can find out. B1

D: Fine, I will give the details to Scowcroft or to Eagleburger, whichever calls me back first and then by the time I see you at 8:30 you will probably have the information. The Prime Minister said I should tell you that she is not asking you to talk to [redacted] she is leaving it up completely to you. B1 B1

K: I have talked to [redacted] I don't think it is sensible to talk to [redacted] B1 B1

D: Right, that's what she -- she was not sure.

K: But I'll discuss where I want to go. I will see Eban here and just let's leave the impression that he is here to discuss disengagement whether he is or not. And then Dayan can come the following week.

D: Well, I think the formula we can use with Eban is that he is coming to discuss the general political situation, including disengagement

K: That's right, but I would like to tell the Syrians that this is the first fruit of my labors.

D: Well, that is alright. It definitely is because you invited it.

K: You are obnoxious.

D: No I am not.

K: Ok, just for this you should come only at 9:00.

D: That is alright, anytime. 8:30 or nine?

K: Nine

D: We better hang up, Mr. Secretary or it will be midnight.

K: Ok.

D: By the way, ~~I was told~~ Did you have a good appearance on the Hill today.

K: Well, your troops will undoubtedly report.

D: They probably will. Were you asked about

D: (cont.) whether the British were given landing rights or not by George Wilson.

K: Yes.

D: Because he asked me this yesterday and I told him, I don't know. Why don't you ask the Secretary.

K: No, no, I straightened that out.

D; The Pentagon is doing a lot of lobbying.

K: Well, I straightened that out. I think I said nothing that will do you any damage.

D: Good. That would be a novelty, Mr. Secretary.

K: Oh, You liar. Some day you'll recognize who saved you. in all of this.

D: I recognize it already and the Prime Minister and Dayan recognize it .

K: I told everybody this morning that basically there is now agreement between Israel and the United States. We may disagree as to tactics or lines or something like that. I have told the press til I was blue in the face that the talks in Israel were extremely good. I also want you to ~~xxxx~~ be in a reasonable position in case the Syrians attack.

D: What the Prime Minister asked me to tell you is that we are making safety precautions on the field. ~~Xxxx~~ But that does not effect our evaluation of whether the war will start or not [redacted] B1

K: [redacted]
Ok, Ill see you at 9:00.

D; Mr. Secretary you are keeping the 1rth open for dinner with...

K: Oh, yes.

D: Good, thank you.

K: Bye.

SB38

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Scali/Sec. Kissinger
March 6, 1974
12:50 pm

S: Welcome back

K: Thank you.

S: You have been off in that part of the world so much lately, I wondered if you thought of setting up a State Department there?

K: (Laughter)

S: I just finished talking to Waldheim and he is very grateful for the information that has been provided to him on the middle East. But, he would appreciate it if you have got some new information or if he could have some direct contact with you before he has his news conference tomorrow morning at 11:00 am

K: On what subject?

S: On the Middle East. So that he can say, in answer to expected questions and complaints about how the United States allegedly has elbowed the UN aside in the Middle East and the UN is allegedly surrendering to the bilateral diplomacy. It just isn't so, that he is in constant contact with the American representative here and indeed with you directly. And he wants to make this point very strongly because apparently there is increasing grumbling along the sidelines by some of the non-aligned and others who are accusing him of not pursuing a UN role vigorously enough. So that if you can give him a call this afternoon.

K: Either I or Sisco will give him a call.

S: And thereby have additional amunition for him. I gave him the Egyptian/Israeli agreement that you negotiated, Sisco sent it by special messenger, so he has that and what he is interested in -- I have the feeling that he is under some pressure on this and he needs some additional information and he promises....

K: There is no additional information. Let's not be ridiculous. This is all.

S: I understand it is, Henry but he also wants the appearance of the consultation in addition to the information so that he in effect...

K: He is a

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S: It is strictly something to protect him so he can in turn take a position that the UN is performing a role.

K: Look, I may be in New York this weekend and I may invest a half hour in seeing that pest.

S: Well, that would be fine. I think you could reassure him no end and would add strength to his words when he talks as we want him to talk.

K: OK, Good John, Bye.

END

SB41

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Vest/Sec. Kissinger
March 6, 1974
2:55

K: Did you have a chance to say that about Syria

V: I have distributed it.

K: Did you say it?

V: I did not say it.

K: Couldn't you plant a question?

V: They did not bring it up. I have distributed it specially to all on a special flyer.

K: That way it doesn't get covered.

V: It will be.

K: Can't we plant a question

V: Yes, but sometimes they don't ask them or ask the one you want them to ask.

K: Well, get Sisco to sent it over to Cabbani.

V: That's right, I have that and I also want to call to your attention. .....

K: Will you do both.

V: Yes, I will do both.

END

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RELEASED IN FULL SB 39

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
March 6, 1974
1:07 pm

K: Did you talk to Vorontsov?

S: Yes I did.

K: Was he pleased?

S: He seemed very very pleased. He said he would pass it right on. and get back to us with a recommendation.

K: And that I'll get there the evening of the 17th and I am not going anywhere from there.

S: That's right, that's what I told him. he said he had seen some items in the press and he thought over there and back was enough for one trip.

K: He had, huh.

S: The only place he was at all hesitant was on the press.

K: Well, I don't have to take them, I just want to know what their schemes are.

S: Well, I said that the press has gotten into the habit of expecting to go and that you are seeking their views and the only thing he said was well, you know I think that the General Secretary would not want to think that we would have to say anything at all necessarily every day and it may be confining to feel that we need to. So I said, well if you would just pass this on and we are seeking your views. But he was very pleased overall.

K: OK.

S: How did it go?

K: Oh, it was easy. They are not out to get me.

S: I told Larry, but I'll tell you while I have you. The Vice President would be very appreciative if you could spend about ten or fifteen minutes before Friday to give him a run down on the trip.

K: Absolutely, I'll do it tomorrow.

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S: Incidentally, he has been just fabulous about Hussein. He is now going to fly all night so he can give a speech in San Diego at 9:00 in the morning and still get back here to host that dinner.

K: He is terrific.

S: He really is. He scrubbed what his staff said was an absolutely must schedule on the next night so he can go to the reciprocal dinner. Just fantastic.

K: He is a terrific guy.

S: Really is. I'll work on it.

K: OK

END

SB 40

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Vest/Sec. Kissinger
March 6, 1974
2:45

K: If you get any question -- the German foreign office has now made a statement saying they discussed it with me -- just say we stand by our statement.

V: Right, ok sir.

K: We are not going into any ...

V: Ok, I will. They tried to raise the question of whether anybody had been in to call here and I stayed away from that as well.

K: Why?

V: Because I didn't have the facts at the time.

K: Yes, but why don't you have the facts.

V: I only learned afterwards that Von Staden had been in.

K: Yes, but that is the sort of thing you should get before...

V: I have since passed this on

K: But that makes it again too important. You should have said Von Staden was in because he was going back for a regular review.

V: Ok, sir. However, I think it is his officials who let it out that he was coming.

K: So, it is even less excusable that we didn't knowl

V: Ok, fine.

K: ok.

END

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SB53 *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sisco/Sec. Kissinger
March 7, 1974
4:30 p.m.

K: What do you think of that Syrian-Soviet communique?

S: I was concerned about one aspect more than the other. The second aspect where they have to say they have to be invoved in all of the stages. That did notbother me much because it was patterned after the Egyptian one. It bothered me about the link of disengagement and total withdrawal.

K: That the Soviets have always pushed. That is how they killed the interim agreement.

S: You and I agreed on the plan if the Syrians pull that out it will kill everybody.

K: Did you see the letter to me from Assad.

S: No.

K: It is curious. He wanted to remind me if Israel does not withdraw to an acceptable distance approximate to our idea of disengagement would result in a barrior to the return of the civilian population.

S: Not too bad. Perhaps he thought he should send you that message in light of what is being said in the communique. Did you talk to Dinitz and are they coming next week.

K: Eban is coming and I want Dayan the following week.

S: After you are back from Moscow. That will work out very well.

XXX END

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SB51

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
D/Sec. Clements/Sec. Kissinger
March 7, 1974
2:45 p.m.

K: ....if you beat at a German long enough you get your way.

C: Look out now, Henry. Congratulations on your trip.

K: We are going all out now with the Saudis. I worked it out with the King. We had to pick the right moment and we are going to send out a military mission and an economic mission and I thought you might want to go and head the military mission.

C: That is a very, very nice thought of yours and one that I am most grateful to you for it.

K: It may take us another three or four weeks to get it worked out. We don't want to seem over anxious. The King liked the idea and we are now exploring it.

C: You said military and economic. I think that is marvelous and I am proud for your to get it done. I know how hard you worked on it. You worked your ass off.

K: We had to do it at the right moment.

C: Did you come away from the Saudi situation with a good feeling.

K: Oh, yes. I think they learned a good lesson on the embargo. They may put it on again but never again with the other Arab states.

C: Where their freedom of movement is restricted.

K: Right but I don't think they will put it on again.

C: I hope not and I sincerely hope that between these visits you have been able to come up with Faisal with a good solid feel and working relationship with the man.

K: I have a good one with Faisal and a superb one with Fahd.

C: That may be even more important.

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Clements
March 7, 1974'

K: We will keep you posted but keep it quiet.

C: I will and I am most grateful to you. It is great for you to take the time out as busy as your schedule is and I appreciate it.

K: You were pushing me in this direction and we had to pick the right time but I think we have it now.

C: Marvelous and I will help in anyway I can. You know that.

K; Thanks.

END

SB49 [*]

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Jack Kubisch
3/7/74 9:21 a.m.

K: You know Shultz is going with that Brazilian thing today. Did you have any chance to get to Barboza yesterday?

JK: no, I haven't talked to him. But I sent the telegram to you

K: You may have sent it to me, but it never got to me, and the fact is now it is going to happen

JK: We can send it as a flash right now--it is a messsge from you to Barboza telling--

K: But when I say that something is going to happen in 24 hours, who the hell holds this stuff up.

JK: I understood you to say Mr. Secretary to wait 24 hours to give you a chance to talk tb Shultz again and he did not change his mind, you would send the message.

K: All right, well see what you can do; he is doing it now.

JK: All right, so we should send the message immediately

K: Right.

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SB 50

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Hartman/Sec. Kissinger
March 7, 1974
12:45 pm

K: How did Von Staden go?

H: It went very well. Hal and I both were there and I went overthe thing in great detail with him and I stressed the seriousness of it.

K: But they mislead us.

H: Before it seemed to us that they were patting us on the head and saying nothing much has been happening on the Foreign Ministers meeting and then the next day there we are, it's all in the press and announced as an integral part of the program and I told him about your being called out there to hear this from him and the annoyance and the bad way that it easily got portrayed and then I quoted from the La Monde article and that said you parachuted in there to torpedo it and I went over the whole...

K: Of course it is a little bit absurd that the nine foreign Ministers were in Brussels and I have to brief the NATO Ambassadors and they won't ask me to meet with them. That in itself is a symptom of what is wrong with our relationship.

H: Yes. Well we went over the whole thing and our reasons, both substantively and procedurally for making it a very regrettable and indeed serious development and that he should well understand and he should stress to the people back there how seriously we take this and that this is really the guts of what we have been talking about since we started on this Declaration and that to get the word that this is the problem. How do we deal with each other on a confident basis and enable ourselves to exchange enough information so that when decisions are made they are at least made in the full knowledge of what the other fellow thinks. That has not been possible up to now, and it is ridculous to continue to talk about words if the facts of the situation come no where near those words and he took it all in very carefully.

K: And you made clear to him you are not coming there for..

H: Yes, I told him that we had sent a message to the Chancellor and to look at the Declaration again and that we were not going to go there until we had reviewed our situation and how we are going to get at this problem, but we are going to the NATO consultations

K: Good.

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H: So I think that went very well and I think he'll be helpful back there because he said to us some things also about French behavior and that Europe really did have to make a choice and that this couldn't go on.

K: I think we are going to force the French to head in.

H: Well, I think so too and I think the most important xx thing we should do now is to keep this on the concrete issuesx level, that is that we have now put our finger on the real substantive problems between us and it is not a personalized thing, it isn't pique with Jobert, this is the gut issue of our relationship with Europe.

K: And they are going to be put into one impossible position after another if they drift along.

H: Right.

K: Incidentally, I don't think we should have the energy coordinating group in Brussels. I don't care where the hell it is.

H: Well, let's keep the next meeting there. One of the things we are...

K: No, No. But I don't want after that, to meet in Brussels.

H: Oh, well Bill is coming back I guess tonight and we'll discuss tactics

K: Well, is any serious person going to be with him? You are going to be over there so you can sit there with him. I want either you or Hal to sit in with him.

H: OK, well we'll see how that fits now. We'll probably go through London on our way to Brussels and the Brussels thing now will be on the 14th. That's the same day Bill should be there.

K: Good, well he just doesn't have the old fighting spirit.

H: Well, we'll see what we can work out. That probably will fit then for us to be there part of the time.

K: OK, good,thank you.

END

SB52

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Sec. Kissinger
March 7, 1974
4:30

K: I am glad you are back in your office.

S: I was wondering what kind of a dig I was going to get.

K: No, no. I am always glad to have you at the office. Will you ask Vorontsov is Dobrynin is going to come back

S: Would you like to encourage him to come back?

K: Yes. Why don't you put it that if he comes back, he can ride over with me. They'll love him in Tel Aviv.

S: (Laughter) Ok.

END

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SB55

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Senator Jackson/Secretary Kissinger
March 7, 1974
7:05 PM

K: I just wanted to let you know there was some concern. You thought I was trying to pressure you. The intent was the objective.

J: I had a press inquiry that there is going to be a compromise.

K: I was asked by Senator Nelson whether there's an all or nothing proposal. I said I would be more than willing to discuss reformation of the people who were concerned with the amendment as well as some of the objectives we were seeking...not make any ___ of the outcome. I know you made a statement today.

J: It was only in response to the inquiry and the inquiry was that we understand you're going to work out a compromise. We're going to have talks.

K: If you read the transcript, I said I would be willing to discuss a compromise and in another place I said I'm prepared to have discussions in general with Senator Jackson.

J: That's fine.

K: I don't object to what you may have said, I just wanted you to understand I did not intend.....

J: You understand my situation - I got a call from the press.

K: My idea _____if you can work something out.

J: Abe spoke to me today - we'll all have dinner - he'll be calling you sometime, in the next week.

K: I may be going to the Soviet Union on the 17th if we could do it before that. If the press asks you about that statement....

J: I'm not going to say anything. If they ask, I'll say there's a misunderstanding.

K: We won't say anything about it.

J: I'll have to have the ground rules.

K: We have no intention of embarrassing it.

J: Good.

END

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SB56

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Kubisch/Secretary Kissinger
March 7, 1974
7:20 PM

(Missed the first part)

K: I do have this problem in Quito. I could go down there on Sunday and come back on Wednesday.

HAK: I just wondered about calling in Ambassadors without discussing it with anybody.

K: It would be a natural thing to call them in and tell them about our plans. I can tell them if we invite them and tell them what the purpose is ___on the 17th and 18th.

HAK: The advantage of that is what?

K: First, it's faster. We can get it (cable) out right now. Second, it gets them coming in and gives me a chance to talk to them about this meeting. Third, it enables them to get a reaction from their capitol.

HAK: That is clear _____get a cable from me. First, I've got to___ I've no objection.

K: I can come back within mid-week.

HAK: I've going off next weekend, so you better come back.

K: What we can do is send a cable from you to key Foreign Ministers.

HAK: That would be good.

K: And give them the arrangements.

HAK: Good.

END

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SB54

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELCON
Rollie Evans/Sec. Kissinger
March 7, 1974
5:00 p.m.

E: Mr. Super Secretary.

K: What is it Rollie?

E: I want to congratulate you.

K: What did I do?

E: You got them talking. What have you done? What have you not done?

K: Actually for anyone knows the Arabs that was probably more of an achievement that did not get as much publicity.

E: I have been to Damascus and I know the players. They are the most difficult people to deal with in mankind.

K: I agree.

E: Much worse than the Iraqis.

K: I don't know about that but they are the most unbelievable bunch I have seen.

E: How are you?

K: What the hell do you want? I am fine.

E: Just don't be so impatient. Will you have breakfast next week. You cancelled the last one. You don't see the columnists anymore. I figure you have all of these regular reporters lined up and they are all afraid to write the truth because they are afraid of you.

K: And they will get bumped off the plane, and I know which car to put them in that is going to be blown up. How about Saturday?
E: I will be in Florida, going down with the President to Key Biscayne.

K: Are you kidding?

E: I will be going to Palm Beach and will be with the family.

K: Since I don't have access to upper class resorts. . .

E: Do you want to come down.

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K: No.

E: They probably wouldn't like it, Henry. How about Wednesday.

K: O.K.

E: Seriously.

K: O.K. That looks good. The White House 7:45.

E: You are not going to have someone call me on Tuesday at a dinner party and say Mr. Kissinger cannot make it.

K: No.

E: How is your sense of humor.

K: Great.

E: You sound so serious.

K: I have an appointment with the Vice President in five minutes and I am trying to figur how to get there without offending one of the senior columnists so he will not mention me unfavorable in his column.

E: You want to be sure he will reemploy you.

K: There will not be an impeachment.

E: I think there will be.

K: It won't succeed.

E: You mean he won't be convicted.

K: No.

E: I think that is right. I think the thing last night was a disaster. I will tell you about it Wednesday. You sound ominously grave.

Rollie Evans

K: When you are dealing with the Sec. of State there is a gap in status.

E: You are getting pompous.

K: ~~xKxx~~ One who goes three rounds with Assad can afford to admit it.

E: Your're right. I just got a message from Stu.
(Assad)
K: He/kissed me on the cheek.

E: Stu is in Arizona and he got a nosebleed on the way out but I heard it was alright. He has [redacted] with him. Joe is with him giving him blood and he is alright. He is having a good time. Getting a lot of sun and trying to put back some weight. B6

K: Terrific.

E: Wed. morning. He is coming back a week from Sunday and we are going to try to have a few people in for dinner with Stu and we want you present.

K: I would be honored. I have to go and see the Vice President now.

E: O.K.

END

SB59 [*]

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger/
Larry Eagleburger
10:54 a.m. 3/8/74

K Larry if you would kindly look at next weeks schedule--you will see that once again, the regional assistant secretaries are down exactly once--now I don't know whether you guys have time to provoke me, I've told you a 1000 times that that is the group that runs the foreign policy--they are on on Wednesday and that is all.

Secondly, any fool knows that--JCS Gold Room--I trust it is in the Pentagon?

E: Yes.

K: All right, if it is at three in the Pentagon, you know from the Pentagon there is no possible way I can be back at 4:00 for Max Fisher--no conceivable way--now it is Friday--these guys must have made their plans--has anybody told them yet--you know these are all serious people --kindly put them down for 5:30 -- and now this minute--so that at least you don't insult them in the way of setting it up . Now of course, the 6;00 appointment is no good. Okay, thank you.

E: Right.

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SB 57 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
George Vest
Secretary Kissinger
12:34 3/8/74

V: I have only one question which is a question that comes out of your remark that you have been meeting regularly with members of the Jewish community and the report from the National Conference on Soviet Jewry that they have not seen you for several months --you said regularly but

K: No, no just a minute--the National Conference on Soviet Jewry--

V: Is not the Jewish leaders--

K: Just say I have been maintaining my position

V: With members of the Jewish community

K: I have been meeting with the President's conference and other key leaders of the Jewish community--I didn't include every last member of them

V: Right, that is what I wanted to pin down--I've got nothing else

K: What are you going to do on the European thing if anything comes up

V: I would take exactly sir the line that had gone out in the telegram which we sent out yesterday--Ed Hartman and I had spoken of this yesterday--just a simple--rehearses the background and says we are now carefully studying the text and a meeting date will be fixed upon completion on the study

K: And you better make clear we received it officially only on Wednesday

V: Yes, that is the preceding part, sir--received it on Monday originally but then explanations on Tuesday March 5--which reached us on Wednesday and this is too serious a matter to be handled that quickly.

K: Don't say it is too serious--just say we won't be ready and if you have and opportunity--Reston has been briefed--that horses' ass --by Frenhh (?) we have never asked to be present at the ForMin 's meeting--that was not an issue at all--if it comes up--don't volunteer it

V: Right, I understand

K: Good, thank you.

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SB62

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Senator Stennis/Sec. Kissinger
March 8, 1974
3:50

S: I could not stand it any longer. I have been hearing so many compliments of your appearance here on the Hill.

K: Aren't you nice.

S: From all of the sources and all complimentary.

K: Aren't you nice.

S: Well, we all have a growing appreciation for your hard work and effectiveness.

K: I am touched by you.

S: I rejoice. It makes me feel good. There is a need for showing strength without going into the reasons.

K: I think we both know that.

S: And you are supplying that and that is just fine.

K: You have been a great supporter and a great patriot.

S: If I can back you in anyway I want to do it. Before you had come out here I had gotten through your....

K: I just saw it.

S: Your first obligation is before the other, but I hope you can come before our Committee. Our Committee would be stimulated if you could find the time. I don't want to overstrain you.

K: Oh damn it. You wanted me to come today.

S: No, no. Friday is not a good day anyway. I thought I would mention it if you could come.

K: As it turns out it wouldn't have worked. I had to meet with the Congressional leaders at the White House.

S: That's right.

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K: Any request by you will always be honored. Your Committee is one of the key ones. May I call you office on Monday?

S: Yes.

K: Because I am not sure when I have to go to the Soviet Union to prepare for the Summit. What day would be best for you?

S: Any day you can make it. We will shift around.

K: I will do my best to make it next week, Mr. Chairman.

S: We will shift around and Monday is not a good day.

K: Monday I can not do it but I will call your office Monday morning.

S: Fine, and I thank you very much and heartiest congratulations.

END

SB 64

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
March 8, 1974
6:05 PM

K: ___cable to Asad thanking him for his note and telling him Eban is going to come next Thursday to discuss these problems and that he will be followed by a senior official, probably Dayan, within another week.

S: Should I mention Dayan specifically?

K: Say it's probably going to be Dayan. At any rate it will be a senior military official.

S: So, I'll say probably Dayan. In the letter itself exactly say, probably Dayan.

K: Probably Dayan or another senior official. This will give him something to ease his mind. OK?

S: OK.

K: And say we understand his point and we will have to operate - you know just say something that we've understood him. But don't say that we can do it.

S: Sure. Ok.

K: OK?

S: OK.

END

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*

SB63

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Schlesinger/Sec. Kissinger
March 8, 1974
4:00 p.m.

K: How are you?

S: Pretty good. Long time no see. One of my people checked with Kraft on the allegation that the Shah made to the effect of the laziness of Paul and that Kraft denies ever having heard such a thing. A bum lead.

K: Good.

S: In the press department Jerry tells me that Getler has a story on the one thousand barrels a day going to Southern Cal out of Saudi Arabia.

K: Where.

S: Going to Standard Oil of Southern California for the fleet. It apparently comes out of industry sources. I think Jerry persuaded him not to mention the country or company. Just to indicate that we are having expanding ability to attract sales from abroad and mush it up that way. I thought you should know that. That seems to be leaking.

K: Yes. Our oil company excutives have a stupidity that would be criminal if it were not unintentional.

S: Right

K: It is hard to see how one can be so unintentionally stupid. I know it is unintentional.

S: I don't know if you want to warn Akins of it.

K: Perhaps I had better do it and tell him to calm down. It could not come at a worse moment before the oil meeting.

S: Do you want us to ask Getler to kill it. A

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K: At least to hold it until after the embargo is lifted. That would be a big help.

S: We will do what we can. Thirdly -- Iran. The Air Force has been pressing for a letter of offer of the 15.

K: Fine.

S: Fine with me except I want to be sure that we have the letter right and all of the details nailed down.

K: Wait for that. We are going to make an offer to the Shah similar to King Faisel's. Why don't we want and add it into those discussions.

S: I will delay as long as it is reasonable.

K: I am talking only about 10 days; at most two weeks.

S: That is easy to do. MacDonald Duck of the Air Force is trying to stir them up as much as possible. If they come back to you we are not trying to derail but trying to make sure it does not screw up our relations with the Shah.

K: Why should it?

S: The same problem I mentioned with the Saudis. If they discover three or four years from now...

K: That they can't fly the thing.

S: That they have been had. I want them to understand all the problems they are inheriting.

K: That is the plane that plays the national athem for each nation as it crosses the border -- automatically;and adds $800,000 to the cost of the thing.

S: I think you have the right airplane.

END

SB61 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sen. Edward Kennedy/Kissinger
3/8/74 - 2:45 p.m.

K: Hello.

TK: Oh, Henry ....

K: How are you?

TK: Fine, very well. I had just a couple of things. I had talked to the Soviet Ambassador about going to the Soviet Union in April.

K: Yes, they told me about it.

TK: And I just thought I'd mention it to you -- they extended an invitation to me and I decided....

K: I think it's a good idea.

TK: Fine. I just wanted to let you know I'd given it some thought and they extended an official invitation a week ago and I just sort of really decided yesterday. I had a fellow down talking to me, but I wanted to let you know....

K: Between you and, me, they asked me whether it would create any bad feelings here and I told them absolutely not.

TK: Right. Fine. Well, that's fine. One other thing, Henry, I have been appointed on the American delegation to attend this conference in Geneva. It's sponsored by the Swiss government and the ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross to update the Geneva Conventions, and this has been in the area that I have been interested in, the whole impact of warfare....

K: That Conference is going on now, isn't it?

TK: That's going on now. Now I was supposed to go over.... Mansfield appointed me as the Senate delegate and I was going over a week ago last Thursday and make the speech over there on Friday. And then my mother had gotten sick and, as a matter of fact they had some various procedural problems, in any event, and - about the seating of various delegations, and then they ran into similar

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kinds of problems until the middle of this week, and then because of the Senate votes it was impossible for me to go. Now I had a statement over there which I wanted just to insert it in the record on it and Joe Aldrich over there is giving us a hard time on it and I think that that ought to be, they can put it in whatever _____ they want to about it....

K: I'll get it done.

TK: I think they ought to just put it in. They wanted me to amend it some....

K: No, we will say that we don't support it, but you can do that.

TK: Right. Well, I think that's fine. Whatever kind of comment is... they could just say that the Senator planned to be here and if he were here he was going to make this statement and this represents his views and whatever way they want to....

K: Oh, I don't think we need to be worried about that.

TK: Oh, that will be fine.

K: Absolutely, and before you go to the Soviet Union if you want to come in and talk to me....

TK: I'd like it very much.

K: I would, you know, I'd bring you up to date....

TK: Thank you.

SB 58 [*]

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Larry Eagleburger
Secretary Kissinger
1:11 p.m. 3/8/74

K: I know that the committee hasn't approved that 10:30 meeting and therefore no one has been called yet--

E: 10:00 meeting and they have been called

K: Shultz hasn't--you have to move it to 10:30 and I want Bruce in

EL Bruce, Schlesinger, Shultz, Burns, Sonnenfeldt--don't you want Hartman

K: Of course Hartman--maybe McCloskey
Have Hartman and McCloskey in and I have just talked to Schlesinger

E: All right

K: Good fine.

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SB60 [*]

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
George Vest
Sec. Kissinger
1:09 p.m. 3/8/74

K: There is an article today by a Bill Anderson in the--

V: I have it sir

K: Would you call Bill Anderson and say we would appreciate it if he would check these things with us--

V: Right, this is the Nitse one right?

K: Yes, I have strongly supported Nitse, Schlesinger will confirm this ==that I do not consider him lazy and that whoever his sourse was for that story is an outrageous liar--

V: Right, I'll take care of it. As soon as I saw it, I realized the other things you have said
Anything else sir?

K: Just tell him I have questions about his judgment, not about his energy (?_ --no, that's a joke--

V: (laughs)

K: Tell him I have strongly supported him for this position and I think he is a distinguished appointment, and I supported him in the Congress --I've talked to Senators about him and I strongly supported him to Sec. Schlesinger

V: Right

K: And Schlesinger will confirm--and I have never vetoed any candidate which is also not true

V: I take care of that one too

K: Which also will be confirmed by Schlesinger

V: Good.

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SB 65

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Max Fisher/Secretary Kissinger
March 9, 1974
9:17 AM

K: What is that holiday on Monday evening?

F: I found out they don't activate it. I have three Rabbis.

K: Secondly, is it a bad day?

F: No, it's alright now. We're coming at 4:45.

K: Would you like to do it earlier in the day?

F: No, I had to call them twice already. Is it better for you earlier?

K: I don't see how you can ask four Rabbis to come.

F: It's all been straightened out.

K: But will they come?

F: They'll be there.

K: You don't think we should chance the time.

F: No, leave it as it is.

K: I understand this. I can't help it if I'm surrounded by Mormons. I have an appointment with the Joint Chiefs at 3:00. What I know of Jewish holidays it's best not to run people up against holidays.

F: Everything is under control now.

K: What if I'm late?

F: I wouldn't worry about it.

K: Would they have to leave?

F: They won't have to leave. I'm planning for 4:45; I know you won't be there until 5:00.

K: OK.

F: Now that you're calling, I think basically it's a good thing.

K: I would like to meet them.

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F: I don't like to waste your time. I hope you rely on my judgment.

K: It's a good time with the MFM coming up. Where are you?

F: I'm in Florida. We're enjoying the sunshine.

K: I never get invited.....

F: I'm trying to figure out how to go about this. After we go through discussions, I'd like to talk to you about it.

K: I'll bring it up.

F: One of the stories out of the New York Times was you would discuss it with various leaders.

K: Which happens to be true.

F: The question is, I don't know who you discussed this with.

K: I've been discussing it with you and every Jewish group that comes in here. I have been discussing it with them and I discussed it with you.

F: _____We met on three or four occasions. No question about that.

K: The last time I saw your group I discuss it and with all various Jewish people who've come in. That may not be legal.

F: What I've been doing is, I talked to Ribicoff a few weeks ago. I suggested we move ahead on this thing to see if we can get this thing resolved. That was my suggestion to him. I'm going to see Jackson and Ribicoff tomorrow in Palm Beach.

K: They have to make up their minds. They cannot stop the Soviets from ____MFM_____. That is not possible.

F: I'm a Republican not a Democrat. I'm speaking up for Abe Ribicoff. He brought Jackson down there. I talked to Abe about it. I said, tell him my feelings about this thing. They ought to face the gains that have been accomplished. The immigration figures from Russia are down about 50%. They went down in January and February and they're still down.

K: They're going to lose everything.

F: My feeling is how to figure out how to keep the gains.

K: We had a comment that the figures will be kept at about 36,000.

F: I think it's between 34,000 and 35,000. Will you bring up the MFM? One thing I'm insisting on, under no circumstances can you_____ and your office. I don't want to have these leaks.

K: I'm having a massive problem with these seven Jewish intellectuals. I never had any problem with you.

F: I'll let you know what progress I make with Jackson and Ribicoff.

K: You think Monday late afternoon is a good time?

F: If you have something else in mind.....

K: I just have an uneasy feeling if people want to go to synagogue, it's no time to have a meeting.

F: It's not a problem now.

K: Have you moved the holiday? I thought it was only a one-day holiday.

F: I thought it lasted a few days. You and I need an education on holidays. This new president is a very decent guy. I might like to see you to give you a briefing.

K: It's physically impossible. I'll just be coming in five minutes before the meeting. Maybe we can talk for five minutes.

F: I'll let you know of anything of interest.

K: OK, fine.

END

SB 68

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
George Vest/Secretary Kissinger
March 9, 1974
8:40 AM

K: Did you ever get to Bill Anderson yesterday?

V: I tried all afternoon and all evening. I've got it here and I'll try all weekend. There was no answer at all.

K: Not even at the Chicago Tribune?

V: No, I tried him personally. We have one lingering. Is Ambassador Bruce going to Europe?

K: Probably not.

V: I keep getting questions.

K: You can say no. You should stop talking about the President's trip to Europe. He may not do it.

V: I have another one as well. It's been lingering on your desk. I want to tell Sherman you can't do the Overseas Press Club so he can get someone else.

K: Right, OK.

END

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SB67

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
March 9, 1974
3:43 PM

(Missed the first sentence)

K: You know what I mean?

S: OK.

K: So that they're prepared for it. We're looking at the 25th and I'll let him know Monday or Tuesday whether that's possible.

S:

S: OK, but we may have to slip it.

K: By a week or so.

S: Right. OK, why don't I just tell him that.

K: Do you think that's desirable?

S: Well, I don't think it does any harm.

K: Then they won't think we're kicking them around.

S: That's right.

K: Do it on an informal basis.

S: Sure.

K: Good, thank you.

S: Right, I'll do that.

END

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SB66

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Joseph Sisco/Secretary Kissiner
March 9, 1974
2:28 PM

K: I was talking to Dick Helms. How long do you think it will clear that cable.

S: Well I though frankly all it would take me on Monday is a telephone call. I don't know that we have to clear it really, it's only a concept that were talking about.

K: As long as we can have it in his hands by Tuesday or Wednesday.

S: Sure, because you seen than we'll get these people participating and it's specifics they're really ....

K: No, no, I agree with you. But I have to talk to you how to set these exercises up organizationally. Not as a building, as a government.

S: Sure. I sent you a flock of thingsthat will be coming across your desk, we've been working on them all morning. There's all sorts of telgrams.

K: Like what.

S: Well, several things from Fahmy and so on. We put a lot of stuff together for you. Dick Campbell will have it all together for you whenever you can get to it.

K: Why hasn't Atherton been in this week?

S: He has been in.

K: He hasn't attended any staff meetings.

S: You know Rodger Davies is the senior deputy down there so Davies has been attending these staff meetings.

K: Oh, that's it. I better talk to Atherton.

S: That's the reason for it.

K: OK, thank you.

END

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SB69*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
The President
Secretary Kissinger
9:40 a.m. March 11, 1974

N: Hi, Henry.

K: Mr. President, I just wanted to bring you briefly up to date where we stand, on that oil embargo, because there have been so many stories around; most newspapers say this means the end of it. This is not true. We have now heard not only from the Egyptians, but also from the Algerians. I have had a message from Boumedienne which says he will definitely support lifting the embargo. And with that in the fold, I think it is going to work.

N: Yeh, I understand. Well the newspaper stories, they don't know what the hell is going on.

K: They don't know what is going on, but on television and so forth, they keep saying this is an indefinite postponement. For once now I believe it is going to work.

N: Yeh. What is the date set for--

K: Wednesday--in Tripoli, Mr. President

N: What does that mean indefinite. Why would they interpret it to mean indefinite

K Well they figure there will be another delay or no agreement.
they
N: That is the way/were going to have it too. But anyway what we can say about it are the results, but

K: At any rate, I thought you might like to--

N: Having heard from both the Egyptians and Algerians -- but at least the Egyptians said they were going to have the meeting for that purpose didn't they?

K: That's right, but for this purpose, Mr. President the Algerians are worth more to us than the Egyptians--because the Algerian oil minister is the head of that group, and secondly, the Algerians are known to be close th the Syrians and thirdly, they are radicals.

N: Of course. And they have indicated they are going to move to support it, are they?

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K: That is right. We got a message this morning. That is what I thought you might like to know.

N: That they would support the lifting?

K: That is right.

N: The Algerian Foreign Minister, Hm huh. Well we will wait until tomorrow. Okay. Nothing else to do.

K: No. There has been a report that Tito has died, but it is unconfirmed.

N: Hm huh. That will start a little action, won't it?

K: That might well start a civil war there

N: Think so?

K: Could happen, yes.

N: Yeh. The only thing is they have to hav e arms. Well I guess---

K: Well, they've got arms between themselves.

N: They just divid them all up huh?

K: Yeh.

N: Army, Navy, Air Force. Well anyway

K: Be mostly Slovaks against the Serbs

N: Right. Right Well we will keep our fingers crossed --the embargo--I think maybe it is going to come off this time.

K This is the closest we have come to anyway--

N: We have information that maybe the tv people don't have for once, okay?

K: Right, Mr. President. I'm impounding all these cables.

N Sure, sure. Good idea, good idea.

K: Good.

SB70*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON

Gen. Scowcroft/Sec. Kissinger

March 11, 1974, 11:45 a.m.

K: ....the only reason I had to cancell the Armed ServicesCommittee was that I did not want to testify twice in one day. I explain that and the end result is that I testify not at all. They are trying to put the Armed Services Committee back on and the result is that there will not be a decent attendance.

S: I don't think they should put it back on.

K: Why not?

S: For that reason.

K: I am telling that and how does it make the State Department with me look.

S: I really try to get in on it.

K: You have enough to do as it is.

S: 90 percent of the management. I will get with Larry and figure out a way I can review it.

K: I may combine these two operations. It is just not working right now.

S: It is not working well.

K: It is not working at all. I have 200 wives (Congressional) and they were put in an auditorium for 1200. We have plenty of auditoriums for 200 in this building. It is one self-seeking operation after another.

S: That was obviously a disaster.

K: I don't know what I said. I know I slammed the Europeans. That is the last thing that we need. That they get slammed and by me.

S: Is there anyway to recover it?

K: How can you.

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S: I don't know. It is awfully hard I agree. Vest and no one else told you.

K: Do you think I would have agreed to having the press there.

S: Of course you would not. It never entered my mind.

K: Never, as long as I have spoken have I had press present.

S: I know. You just don't do it that way and should not. It becomes worthless that way.

K: O.K. fine.

END

SB 71 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
President Nixon/Secretary Kissinger
March 11, 1974
5:50 PM

N: Hello.

K: Mr. President.

N: Hello, Henry. I didn't have anything, I was just checking in to see if there's anything new.

K: No, there isn't anything new and we've in general, we had some more confirming reports about the oil meeting and that seems to be in pretty good s hape. And as you know, Mr. President, we had approached the Saudis on bilateralism and their response has been so enthusiastic, in fact so wildly enthusiastic that I can't help but believe this must effect their decision at the embargo.

N: Yes. Well, that's the way we want to deal.

K: Absolutely.

N: Because that's the only way we can make our - that will probably effect them to they'd be willing to take some risks. What do we do. What will they get out of it they wouldn't get otherwise. More price, you mean?

K: What they're getting out of it is a military relationship and a long-term economic relationship.

N: Yes, that, of course.

K: And the commitment of the U.S. strategically to them against their enemies in Iraq and South Yemen and so forth.

N: Any internally as well.

K: That's right. That response has really been amazing.

N: The response - yes.

K: Yes.

N: Fine. You just met with the Chiefs on SALT I suppose.

K: I met with the Chiefs for 2 hours on SALT and detante in general, and that was a very good meeting.

N: Good. You get the Admiral alright?

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K: Ch yes. No, he's fine. They're basically dedicated men.

N: Sure.

K: Any I'm now meeting with a group of Jewish leaders on MFM.

N: Yes. Good luck. I won't hold you. I'll see you tomorrow.

K: Right, Mr. President.

END

SB81
RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
McCloskey/Sec. Kissinger
March 12, 1974, 4:05 p.m.

K: You know that Ted Koppel is doing -- they are doing a documentary and he wanted to come in for five minutes to fill me in at 4:30 on the embargo, with my veto. It will be used in June. Do you think I should do it?

M: Sure. I see no problem with it. There is a lock on that. They cannot use it.

K: I. O.K. I want you to get hold of this press area and shape it up. I cannot have another mistake like that. In fact I will throw them all out at the next mistake.

END

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SB 79
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Amb. Zahedi/Sec. Kissinger
March 12, 1974
2:50 pm

K: Hello,

Z: Mr. Secretary, forgive me that I bother you so much.

K: No, you can't bother me.

Z: Thank you sir. I have a letter from the Shah. He would be most happy and glad to see you and he would prefer if you can make it because he would like to enjoy the time with you in the Persian Gulf area if you can make it on the 27th. But of course he would understand if you won't be able to make it on the 20th of APril would be perfectly alright, but unfortunately he would be in Tehran and he insisted that if I could actually talk you into -- going on the 27th of March or the 28th. Any time in that period when he would be on the Island. So you can have a little rest.

K: Well, you are terribly nice and I will try to work it out but it doesn't look too promising.

Z: Also, one thing I would like to know just in case that you are going to the Islands. The people who would be with you are over 100 or they would be under 100.

K: They'll be less than a hundred.

Z: So there is no problem. So when do you think you would know whether you would go to the Islands.

K: By early next week.

Z: So you don't mind if I call you when I come back from Brazil.

K: It is always a pleasure to hear from you. Besides you know where I am at all times, you have got your intelligence service following me.

Z: (laughter) Alright, then I will pass this message to him. I'm leaving in one hour's time and when I come back I will be in touch with you to see if you can make it.

K: Good; give him my warm regards.

Z: I will do that.

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END

SB 78
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Admiral Zumwalt/Sec. Kissinger
March 12, 1974
2:49 pm

Z: Henry, I just wanted to give you my compliments on a magnificant job yesterday.

K: Aren't you nice.

Z: The post-mortem was so favorable your head would turn.

K: Aren't you nice, well it meant alot to me too.

Z: I think it is just the kind of shot in the arm we need over here from time to time.

K: Well, I think we should do it periodically.

Z: Good Henry, count on me.

K: Thank you, I appreciate this call.

Z: Certainly.

END

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SB 77
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Amb. Ramsbotham/Sec. Kissinger
March 12, 1974
2:47 pm

K: Hello.

R: Peter Ramsbotham here.

K: Howare you?

R: Thank you very much for ringing back. After the dinner last night and our talk, I sent a signal to our Foreign Ministry and I have had a reply this morning. He isvery anxious to see you ~~and~~ as soon as possible and very much welcomes the idea of the 28th of March.

K: Good, wonderful.

R: And he would like to offer you lunch there that day.

K: Fine.

R: And he suggests that talks could begin at 11:00 in the morning and continue after lunch if necessary.

K: Fine.

R: I said that you had up to 6:00 to...

K: Well, that will be flexible.

R: He agrees and he would like me to come back for that visit and may I at the same time accept with pleasure your offer of coming back on your plane.

K: Fine, marvelous. You know this is dependent on my setting up Moscow on the 25th.

R: I see.

K: But in all probability that is hos it is going to work out.

R: I see, I didn't know how certain that was.

K: Well, it is 95% firm.--and I will know that within 48 hours.

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R: Within 48 hours. Anyhow, our side of the program -- we are looking forward to it.

K: And you know I may flip again as to whether we can start at 11 or 12:00.

R: That's alright. I think there is actually Cabinet that morning, on Thursday morning so he 'll be making special provision for that.

K: GOod wonderful.

R: And he would like to also receive Sonnenfeldt and Hartman and that's all arranged. We are talking to them personally on that so I needn't bother you with it. All the arrangements are made and the senior Ministers will be there. I think they want to talk about Anglo-American relations and relations with Europe and discuss the Middle East and possible a follow-up to the Washington Energy Conference. This is on the 14th and 15th.

K:. Fine, well, they'll be prepared.

R: And may I in conclusion thank you very much for the mark of courtesy that you accored me last night. I very much appreciated it.

K: Not at all. We attach great importance to our relationship and I know you and I will work very intimately.

R: That is very nice again, Goodbye.

K: Goodbye.

END

*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Larry Eagleburger/Secretary Kissinger
March 12, 1974
7:35 PM

K: Larry.

E: Yes sir.

K: I haven't of course yet seen this thing by Manley that Flanagan has seen that's been kicking around everywhere.

E: The briefing paper has been in at least with Campbell since 1/2 hour after you called me. I talked to Shlaudeman and I read the paper, it is a very tough position. He talked with Flanagan, he did not accept his position. The paper was written in the State Department and it's been with Campbell since you talked to me.

K: Don't you think I should have been given the privilege of ask what I think? At any point? I still don't have it.

E: I'll have to check with Dick to see where it is.

END

7:43

K: Since there was of course discussion with Flanagan, I'm entitled to know what his views are. And they should be incorporated.

E: Alright sir.

K: Since it was raised at a staff meeting in the White House I want to know what it is I've rejected. If this is tougher than what Flanagan has done.

E: Alright sir.

END

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SB84 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Atherton/Secretary Kissinger
March 12, 1974
5:50 PM

K: Roy, do you know the name of that member of the Libyan Revolutionary Council who wants to come over here?

A: I don't have it in my head but I can get it to you in one minute.

K: Thank you.

END

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SB 85

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Dean Brown/Secretary Kissinger
March 12, 1974
6:07 PM

K: Dean, I've been talking this afternoon to the personal assistant to President Sadat and he tells me that we would be well advised to put an Ambassador to Abu Dhabi. Have we got a post there?

B: No sir. I'll tell you what we're doing on that. We are going up at this moment on the supplemento on which I'm testifying on Thursday and included in the supplemento is money to open up Abu Dhabi and three other mini posts down on the Gulf.

K: With separate Ambassadors?

B: Separate Ambassadors, sir.

K: Abu Dhabi.

B: Abu Dhabi, Qatar, Bahrain and Muscat, Oman. So we're all set on that. We're going to be talking too at our personnel meeting on Friday about these posts. I've already approached people on the Hill and told them on the Hill that we'd like to move ahead even though we don't have the money towards the appointment of these men.

K: What I would like to do - I would like to get somebody into Abu Dhabi as quickly as possible.

B: We can do that now, I've got permission of the Congress.

K: Oh, terrific.

B: No, I'm ahead of you on this one sir, for the first time.

K: Well, can I then tell the Egyptians we'll do it within the next six weeks?

B: You tell them that within the next six weeks, we'll have someone named. As a matter of fact if you're willing to meet with us on Friday, we'll have somebody named on Friday.

K: OK.

B: Good, sir.

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K: Thank you. Get me some recommendations.

B: We have some for you sir. Which we'll discuss with you.

K: Good.

B: Any the way, what I'm planning to do on these small posts is to send Class two and three officers.

K: Absolutely younger officers.

B: OK as long as you....

K: They have to be two and three.

B: I asked the system for names and they came up with the average grade of FSO-2, but the average age was 52 and I said the hell with that.

K: No, they should be in their low 40's.

B: Exactly, sir. OK, we'll think in the same way.

K: Terrific.

B: OK sir, bye.

K: Bye.

END

SB82

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sonnenfeldt/Sec. Kissinger
March 12, 1974, 4:08 p.m.

K: ..... to get what we want in this declaration -- what we think is essential could be achieved only at either the risk of another confrontation or at the cost of such clarity that it would be misleading and secondly, we say nothing about his not coming to Europe.

S: Damn it that must have gotten lost in the retyping because we did say something about his not coming to Europe.

K: We say nothing.

S: I will have to look at it because that was in the original telegram and we retyped the telegram and it must have been dropped out of it. It said -- what ever the phrase was--that Y under the circumstances I don't think I can accept your invitation. It is not appropriate to consider it. You want to say again what we would want or what we think would be essential in this view would either lead to further facilitating argument or what

K: Or else we would be forced to obscure the real problem by some meaningless formula.

S: Let me get it back.

K: Good. Thank you.

END

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ernst Van der Beugel/Secretary Kissinger
March 12, 1974
8:10 PM

VdB: Hi, my friend.

K: Hi Ernst. How are you?

VdB; Fine.

K: It took 45 minutes to find you and now I have to run off to a dinner for King Hussein. When can I call you tonight?

VdB: Henry, how is tomorrow morning? Tonight will be all right. When will we be back - 10:00. How long will the dinner be.

K: Until about 10:30.

VdB: 10:30, that's fine. Then I will be with Kitty.

K: OK, I'll call you around 10:30.

VdB: Alright, I'll be here at 10:30.

K: Good. What do you think of the behavior of your compatriots?

VdB: Of my compatriots? Everybody is crazy over there.

K: I'll tell you. They're going to force us into drastic measures.

VdB: Yes. But are my compatriots worse then the others or not.
K:
K: No, I meant the Europeans.

VdB: Of the Europeans.

K: No, no, in fact the Dutch are better than the others.

VdB: But they are totally irrelevant.

K: We're now going to ignore them.

VdB: But listen. They are totally irrelevant, don't get excited. Don't try to get them into declarations which are not worth the paper.

K: No, we're dropping the declarations now.

VdB: I think that would be a good thing to do. Drop the declaration and if you understand what I mean, go to Europe alone.

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K: Yes. That we canceled too.

VdB: Yes, because that would be disastrous.

K: Really.

VdB: Don't get too excited about it because this is primarily irrelevant. They are totally at a loss and it is totally irrelevant. The French attitude cannot be explained any more by political sciences but only by psychiatrists.

K: OK, I must run, I'll call you about 10:30.

VdB: Call me at 10:30.

K: 10:30 to 11:00.

VdB: Yes, I will be at Kitty's.

K: Good. Bye.

VdB: Bye.

END

SB72*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Larry Eagleburger
3/12/74 9:17 a.m.

K: I ran into Ben Bradlee yesterday evening and he tells me somebody from my office called about the lunch at the Washington Post and said how do you spell Kathryn Graham, who is Meg Greenfield, what is Murrey Marder doing at that luncheon, who is he; and Bradlee said, hell, told that girl he knows all these people better than we do. Now who would have done that?

E: I don't know, probably George's office, but let me check. Jane Roth knows them all, she wouldn't have done it. Either Vest's office or it is Campbell's secretary

K: Don't you think that is insane.

E: Of course, it is insane. I swear to God.

K: Now I find Harold Brown is on my schedule over here at 9:15 -- no one ever checked that with me.

E: Sir, we got that word late last night that it was set up over in the WH --we had gone home, no one here knows anything about it.

K: All I said to ah ---- what's his name

E: Burke?

K: To Brent--that I would be glad to see him for 5 minutes at some point

E: We got that word after you had gone out to drinks--none of us knew a thing about it and we assumed you had set it up over at the WH

K: Never discussed it--how is the European press playing?

E: We have three reports--four reports; the thoughest one is the British --3 or 4 quality dailies carried stories according to this-London Times carries it on page 4 captiod'Kissinger says the biggest US problem is dealing with its allies", etc.....reads from story. Guardian carries a story,'Kissinger Inveighs against European Self-Assertiveness" reads etc.....And Financial Times carries a shorter article by Paul Lewis, reads etc.....Rome nothing bad at all, the Netherlands nothing bad at all, Germany ah--

K The Germans will pick it up from the British

E: DPA dispatched thus far--they have only one story and it is strictly factual.

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E: Reads from DPA --that one is not a bad story

K: No the point is even a good story is a bad story

E: No no, I understand. The ones by the British press are the most difficult ones

K: And they are the ones that will hurt us more and more because that is where the other Europeans will take the lead from.

E: They are the only ones we have so far.

K: Well, between that , the Washington Post and a few other things we are in great shape. Has anything--well it doesn't make any difference --our retraction of that other story--

E: One of the DPA things--there is and so did the British, so they got it. They don't carry it in total, but refer to it.

K: But that isn't the issue--the issue is that the meeting I should never have held by a sort of viscious, incompetence has been turned into a disaster.

Okay fine.

E: All right sir

SB73*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
March 12, 1974/11:35 a.m.
Secretary Morton/HAK

M: I've gotten a call from Annenberg and Annenberg said he wanted to stay on until June the 30th and all that, which Huston has no problem with but Thruston(?) but has got coming over to the Derby which he runs as a head of the American purse, Princess Margaret and that'll be early in May. He feels with Annenberg knowing this and everybody knowing this, that the information is going to get out and he suggests that for everybody's sake maybe some announcement be made fairly soon so that the worry about a leak is not so evident and that we -- he begins to sort of get his house in order as far as getting ...

K: That's fine. What we would like to do though is wait a few weeks because Len Firestone wanted that job and we've got to get him announced for something else.

M: I don't think he knew that.

K: Because if he -- and we put him off with the argument that the job wasn't available.

M: Well, the only thing you've got. You've got a problem that when Thurston is going to be with the Princess and all that.

K: But that isn't until May.

M: That's right. So I guess we've got the rest of March and a piece of April. ~~Another~~ words, in 4 or 5 weeks.

K: That's right.

K: Let me tell him that.

K: Good. Fine

K: OK.

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SB76

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. James Wilson/ Secretary Kissinger
March 12, 1974
2:46 pm

W: Hello Henry, thank you very much for calling back. I am in Washington on one of my regular trips advising ~~very~~various parts of the Government on narcotics law enforcement and I wanted to simply check in with you to register a couple of impressions I have -- for what they are worth. Which you are probably already aware of. One is the extremely complex government attitude toward the growing Turkish problem and t; make sure that you felt comfortable that you had all the information you needed in deal ing with what I think is going to be a significant foriegn policy question over the short-term. How we respond to Turkish interest in going back to narcotics cultivation and what this implies by relation there and elsewhere and since I knew that the State Department had recently been stripped of (for good reason) most of their narcotics specialists because they weren't doing a damn thing -- I thought I would let you know of my interest and if I can be of any help in identifying people in the government who could assist you or if I can be of assistance myself...

K: Well, could you write down for me what you have in mind.

W: Certainly.

K: Because I frankly don't know enough even to know if I am getting enough advice.

W: Alright. Do you have a known time horizon by which time you have to think through some of these problems.

K: Next week is time enough.

W: Alright, let me get something to you over my signature to make sure it gets to your desk. The problem is, to put it in a nutshell, is the Turks are determined to go back into poppy/ opium production.

K: That I know.

W: The one thing the Communists and the right wing and farmers can agree on and the United States position is in disarray to a degree because some agencies want to denounce the Turks; others want to accommodate them and still others want to find the middle approach and I think programming a posture towards the Turkish Ambassador and doing things will find a ~~fuku~~ solution rather than leading to a confrontation -- are very important. And there is also an intense amount of lobbying

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W: going on in the Government now from domestic pharmaceutical manufactureers about this. I believe this is one of those matters for which there is a solution but I suspect that though you are very full these days with other matters on the foreign policy side, at least --where there could be a solution you may have to be involved personally to some degree.

K: Well if you could indicate to me what you think the solution is it would help.

W: Alright, fine. Very good, if you could use such a note I will get one to you.

K: Very much.

W: Fine, how are things generally with you.

K: A little hectic.

W: Well, keep it up, you are doing a great job.

K: You're nice.

W: Stay with it. Bye.

END

SB 75

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Atherton/Sec. Kissinger
March 12, 1974
2:45 pm

K: What is that..the Navy is thinking of a Port call in Alexandria.

A: I saw that message and I asked to get a hold of the Navy message that raised it.

K: Look, it is totally, absolutely out of the question.

A: I agree, and we are drafting something that would say that.

K: Ok.

A: I agree with that and we'll send it up for your clearance.

K: Good.

END

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SB74
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
FM Rabasa/Secretary Kissinger
March 12, 1974
2:25 pm

K: Emilio, how are you?

R: Henry, just to check, are you coming next Saturday?

K: No, I'll probably have to put it off again.

R: Is that definite, or do you want to think it over?

K: Can I call this afternoon?

R: Please do, Henry. You have all my phone numbers.

K: If I put it off it will be -- I'll have to put it off til the 30th.

R: Whatever time, just as long as you tell me 24 hours before, I can arrange things.

K: Good, Is it too hot~~?~~ on the 30th? Does it get too hot there? Z

R: No, no. It is a wonderful climate all year round. I suggest you give me a ~~xxx~~ call in the afternoon and tell me if you can make it on Saturday. We would love to have you here, if not, you call me and tell me when you want it and I'll arrange things again.

K: Wonderful.

R: Good, Henry and thank you for calling.

K: Thank you Emilio.

END

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
FM Rabasa/Sec. Kissinger
March 13, 1974
12:50 pm

K: Emilio,

R: Hi, Henry, good morning.

K: How are you?

R: I was thinking things over because I am so concerned as to the success of the Washington meeting and I more or less came to an idea. The major ~~and~~ of the international and local press has been favorable to the Tlateloco meeting and I want to congratulate you on the instructions you gave to Kubisch at the meeting in Quito. All the people there in Quito mentioned the Tlateloco dialogue and the President of Venezuela who just acame into power came in saying, or mentioned the Foreign Ministers' meeting in Mexico. So now we have something positive in our hands and we should do something to continue it. I have an idea but I wanted your reaction before I go through with it. On the one part, this is the spirit of Tlateloco and the other part, I think we have to come out with something concrete because if not we are going to be criticised, especially now at you because it is at your home and your backyard -- and then I learn that Senator Mansfield said in the Senate and was reporting of the meeting in Mexico that a new projection and a new idea should be given of Cuba. That is how it came out in Mexican papers this morning. S o Henry, thinking of you as my friend on the one hand and on the other, trying to see what positive steps to make forward -- I don't want your people to beat you to the punch back home. So I was thinking, but I want your reaction on this -- give it a thought and then call me back -- if Mexico proposed at the meeting in Washington that Cuba should be invited at the next meeting of Foreign Ministers, not to the OAS, and at least for you as President, which you will be at the Conference -- not to have an objection, just to be silent. Then I would go this weekend or next weekend to speak to Fidel Castro and tell him that one of the things that has hurt you more is that everytime we speak about you going into the OAS thatyou start screaming and saying horrible things about the United States. This comes out also because at one press conference that I had lately, I said that Mexico ~~was~~ would always support the admittance of Cuba to the OAS but that Mexico would not go hat in hand to ask Cuba because Castro always comes back with nasty answers. Well, this divides public opinion -- some applauded it, some didn't. I know that in Argentina, people were very happy at me saying these things which was a little distorted but there was some who were very happy. We are the first that have always had relations with Cuba -- we still maintain the relations wi th Cuba and so forth, but we will not go hat in hand because everytime we speak about this thing Cuba , Castro or somebody comes out and says we were

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R: (cont.) instruments of the United States and etc. etcetera. And that hurts my national pride. So I said we would not do this. Well, taking all these things into consideration and decide whatever you are thinking -- now that the famous economic block has been more or less retired to Argentina, etcetera, etcetera -- which is a very positive thing and which would also be worked through Washington -- what is your reaction if I put this there -- the majority of the countries will be for this proposal becuase I know they are happy with this thought and the only opposition would be Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia and Chile. Well, if the idea goes through - - a tremendous success for your meeting in Washington to have a new attitude towards Cuba.

K: But I have a massive problem with my President and Emilio, I actually have to run off now. Can I call you tomorrow?

R: Yes, give the idea thought. I want you not to reject when I propose it if we get together and I propose it. Just to abstain.

K: Yes, but that may be impossible in Washington.

R: Well, Mansfield is already speaking about new ideas.

K: Yes, but Mansfiedl is not the President.
I'll call you tomorrow.

R: Think the idea over please.

K: Right.

R: Goodbye Henry.

K: Bye.

END

SB88*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Joan Braden
3/13/74 9:08 a.m.

B ....to answer this question, but onceyou told me to wait until you had to chance to see about the State Dept. But I really have to negotiate on Thursday--I don't need a definite answer but I assume you have decided fhat for whatever reason that you just--

K: Well I talked to David about it too to see what his view was and he looked over the situation with me and ~~he said~~ we just couldn't come up with anything that wouldn't create massive problems.

B: He told me that I should do something about it, because he thought you needed me you know

K: No, I give you my word

B: Listen, don't be silly--

K: He had told me that--

B: The last thing he told me before you left was call Henry--I

K: I need you--there is no question about that--I asked him, we both agreed that Joanie would be atremendous asset

B: Let me just ask you one question--I'm not sure -- for one thing-- I'm not sure I even want it. There is no point in getting me into the ~~bureaucracy~~ bureaucracy

K: Well that is the problem

B: I could get a job more probably--

K: No, no I could get a job for you in this bureaucracy but you are no good to me there

B: But the point was--or even I might be able to get a job there--the point is there is no way that you could get me as an assistant to you where I could be helpful in dealing with people so that the things happening to you

K: Look --Joanie give me 3 or 4 more days because I have had one disaster after another this week
I have had a series of press disasters this week which would never have happened if a thoughtful person--

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B: If you put me some place as your assistant, I don't think you should worry about publicity--I will tell you what it is going to be--it will be a short article by Dandy Stroud--believe me I have a very, very good work record and nobody can say that you are hiring a girl who is a friend of your.

K: No, my problem will be over here at the WH

B: But whether you can hire me as an assistant to you where you don't have to bother--I have a very small ego--if I could help you ab id some of the things that I hear coming up, I would love to do it. If I can't, then I might as well go on--at the time I am willing to wait indefinitel y just--yo u know I would go ahead and negotiate and if you need me fine

K: No, no give me until the middle of next week.

B: I will give you indefinitely

K: No, no the middle of the next week

B: Thanks for calling me.

K: Right, Bye.

SB91

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
The President/Sec. Kissinger
March 13, 1974
4:30 pm

K: Mr. President,

N: Any report from our Arab friends?

K: I haven't had any report yet, no Mr. President.

N: I see it is 4:30, well they never get through til late.

K: No , they' are probably in the middle of a great

N: Pow wow.

K: Pow wow.

N: Right, but we think they are meeting.

K: Yes, well we know they are all in town. They were supposed to meet this morning and then it was put off til after lunch so they didn't start until about, oh, here that would make it about...

N: Well, they are still at it. Fine, fine. Good, nothing else of interest?

K: No, I testified before the Armed Serivices Committee this morning but that's a friendly group.

N: Yes.

K: The Senate Armed Services Committee.

N: Right, rightI spoke to the British Ambassador and he said he wanted to assure me that Harold Wilson felt that the British/American relationship was the cornerstone of their foreign policy.

K: Well, that is very helpful to us

chat

N: And that he is very anxious to ./and I of course told him I would see him. I couldn't while I was there but I am going to invite him in next week and have a little chate with him before he goes back.

K: That would be very very useful.

N: And I'll give him a good going over.

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K: Good, that would be very useful.

N: Harold is going to want to have some foreign policy -- some little things for his bonnet and he just may start swinging a little weight around.

K: Absolutely, Mr. President. I think that's the way to play it.

N: Right, right.

K: I'll call you as soon as I hear. We must hear within the next little while.

N: We may not, we'll see. Of course, I know you'll call. That's fine, don't worry about it -- we'll see what happens.

K: Right, Mr. President.

N: Ok, what did the Armes Services Committee ask you about.

K: Oh, they asked about SALT and the Middle East, Diego Garcia, Vietnam appropriations. Harold Hughes who was there made some positive noises.

N: Good, well he is leaving the Senate and he can afford to be positive now can't he.

K: Exactly.

N: Alright, thank you.

Conversation ended -- then the President called back.

N: I thought you would be interested -- the new Australian Prime Minister bent my ear a bit by saying that his Prime Minister wanted me to know that he felt the American/ PRC/ Soviet relationship was the key to any possibility of survival to them or for the world and he wanted to be supported totally.

K: That is why it is essential to maintain it no matter what the various newspapers here say. But that is very helpful considering the origin.

N: Yes, people were all talking up

K: That's very good. Thank you Mr. 'President.

N: Bye.

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Sec. Kissinger
March 13, 1974
4:35 pm

K: Did you talk to Vorontsov about my going?

S: Yes I did and he said about arriving on the 24th -- he said No, I assumed that that would be the case and he said I'll call him right away on the 28th departure and I'll get back to you and I'll do it today.

K: Good, and do they need a list of the newsmen and so forth?

S: I am sure they will, but you know as soon as we lock it in, why, we'll start all the normal procedures. But he didn't seem alarmed by saying that he would have to leave on the morning of the 28th.

K: Yes, but we will get that settled fairly soon.

S: Oh yes.

K: They have got me here on a schedule again ~~thxk~~ which I promise you is going to lead ~~xxxxx~~ to either a clean-up of this place or my leaving .

S: You mean the long-term schedule?

K: No, no. On today's schedule, for example. Just take a look at it.

S: Well, you know that 5:00 one, I just have no idea what that is..

K: Well, that had to be, but why ~~dxdx~~ the Tunisian FM has to be brought in today with all these other things. We'll have to discuss it some other time.

S: It is not on mine.

END

K: Can you get a message back to Sonnenfeldt -- say that he can brief them about my Moscow trip along the lines that he suggests and that he can tell them we will probably ~~xx~~ make the announcement Friday. And that it will be from the 25th to the 28th and we will have consultations with them afterwards. Probably by a member of our party. We can peel somebody off while I go to London. See what I mean.

S: Ok, right. That would be good.

K: Ok. END

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SB93

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Easum/Secretary Kissinger
March 13, 1974
6:25 PM

E: Yes, sir, Easum.

K: Yes, I think you should send a cable to the Algerians telling them that both the President and I will be delighted to see _____and look forward to it when he comes here.

E: OK.

K: And if we could have some idea when, it would help.

E: Good.

K: I don't think we can make it dependent on the other one.

E: Alright.

K: Good.

E: We'll do it.

END

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SB94

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
March 13, 1974
6:38 PM

D: I got hold of Eban. 11:30 is fine and he will stay for lunch, on Friday.

K: Good.

D: Is it all right with you.

K: Does it have to be kosher?

D: No, it just has to be good, Mr. Secretary.

K: It will be up to the standards of his house.

D: You do not want to commit yourself even on culminary matters.

K: Right.

D: Mr. Secretary, do you think we should have a telephone talk with each other sometime before his meeting.

K: Absolutely.

D: What time will it be convenient for you.

K: Let me - sometime in the morning.

D: Sometime in the morning. OK.

K: Are you having, at any rate is we miss we can still have it at your house.

D: Except that he will be there.

K: Yes. We'll do it tomorrow sometime, probably in the morning.

D: You're asking if I'm going to have what, Mr. Secretary?

K: You remember you owe me a visitor next week.

D: Oh, you mean for the talks. I wanted to ask you how does it square with your change of schedule.

K: I want him on Thursday.

D: What date is it.

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K: The 21st.

D: Oh, the 21st. And you will be going to Moscow afterwards?

K: Yes.

D: So, I'll let the government know the 21st is the date because I didn't know.

K: Yes, the 21st.

D: the 21st. OK, I will cable now maybe I'll have an answer by tomorrow.

K: Good. Terrific. And make it Dayan will you?

D: I am pressing for it.

K: It doesn't matter whether they send a clerk, the mere fact that you sent Dayan puts you in a stronger position.

D: Yes, I understand. [redacted] B1

K: [redacted] There's another thing which I'll tell you tomorrow.

D: Fine. OK, then I'm looking forward to talking to you tomorrow and then I'll see you in the evening.

K: Right.

END

SB 96

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
March 18, 1974
7:43PM

K: Make sure that this thing get to the President, the question and answer.

S: Right.

K: And he cannot - it must be flagged - he cannot deviate much from it.

S: No, I understand.

K: OK

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 26 MAY 2004 200102979

TELECON
Vice President Ford/Secretary Kissinger
March 14, 1974
5:48 PM

F: Hi, Henry.

K: Hello, Mr. Vice President.

F: How are you, Henry?

K: OK. I just called you because I've been harrassed by both the President and the press all day long about what I may or may not have said to you.

F: When?

K: About the embargo. You know you said this morning you had heard from me that it was being lifted. All I want you to know if I had said to the press all day long what they asked me, then all I know about the embargo is what I read on the press tickers because we haven't had any official word. And that I must have given you the general sense of an expectation.

F: I guess that's right, but then I read the paper this morning and I was on that 7:30 TV program, Henry.

K: No, I just want you to know that I didn't mean to pull away from you.

F: Right.

K: But I had no choice because then to say that we haven't had any official word because if I said anything else Faisal would hit the ceiling.

F: Right, I understand. As I recall what I said, I said apparently it had been lifted and that a final notification would probably come in several days on Sunday and then they asked me, did I have any previous notice and I said well I fuzzed it a bit, forgotten exactly what I said and then - did I say I talked with you last night about it?

K: Well, that's what the news ticker brought, but you might well have - actually I don't remember that we talked about it.

F: I don't think so either and my best recollection is, Henry I didn't say I talked to you about it last night.

K: Well to tell you the truth, all I saw was the news ticker and they may well have run together two separate statements.

F: And put it on the basis that you and I were together last night.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 04 MAY 2004 200102979

K: Well they didn't say I said it last night. They said you said - I said it would be lifted which I probably did say to you at some point.

F: That's right, but I suppose they made it more emphatic as a result of our being together last night.

K: Look, my concern now is not with what you said but so that when you see news reports that I said I had not given the clear impression that I didn't pull away from you.

F: Don't worry about that, Henry. I understand fully and you don't even have to call about those things.

K: I am determined to maintain some friendships in this town.

F: Well, it will be forever.

K: I know that.

F: OK, you're damn nice to call.

K: Thank you.

F: Don't worry about those little things, I understand what the damn press does.

K: Right.

F: Keep going.

K: Thank you.

F: Alright, Henry.

K: Bye.

F: Thanks for calling.

END

TELECON
General Haig/Secretary Kissinger
March 14, 1974
6:10 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Al.

H: Yes, Henry.

K: I just wanted to check, he has signed off on that letter?

H: Oh, Yes. I gave it to Brent when I called you.

K: OK, well, then we'll get it off by telegram.

H: Good.

K: That's right. He assumed you were sending it tonight.

K: Right. Now, I talked to Ford because I made too many statements disavowing him today.

H: Yes.

K: And he says it's ridiculous, he never even said this.

H: No, the questions said it.

K: He said we never even discussed it yesterday.

H: Right. I listen to the thing. It was, you've been close to Dr. Kissinger lately, something to that effect. What has happened on the embargo and he said well I understand, he informs me or something like that, that it's done.

K: Yes.

H: It was a very brief exchange. He sort of got led into it.

K: Yes.

H: His guy came over here, I said, look just don't worry about it. I'ts a minor problem Henry.

K: That's what I think.

H: Nobody's paying any god-damned attention to it.

K: I think it's not right to keep the Vice President from hosting that sort of a dinner. He changed all his travel plans. He didn't do any damage.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
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H: Oh, no. There was a bad statement on the society page from that jackass Hartman which he said they were suddenly ordered to do this then to change everything you know as though nobody knew what they were doing.

K: No .

H: That's what that was all about.

K: Oh, oh, I see. OK.

H: Everything is alright here, Henry. Status quo.

K: Good. OK, then we'll send the letter.

H: Yes, OK.

END

TELECON
Assistant Secretary Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
March 14, 1974
7:30 PM

S: Hello.

K: Joe, you know, there has to be somebody in NEA when I'm in the building, it just can't be that I've got to run all over the place looking for people.

S: Yes.

K: And it really happens too often since you're not there any more. Now we've got a cable from Fahmy which we've got to answer tonight in which he asks what he should say to - first of all he wants to know what reactions we've had from Algeria and I think we should send Eilts some of these cables from Algiers.

S: Yes. You mean on the embargo?

K: Yes.

S: Yes.

K: And secondly, on the two months thing we ought to say that's a very difficult thing for us partly it's a qquestion of dignity and secondly as a question of the end of those two months coinciding with the President's trip into the Middle East and we can hardly have the President go their looking as if he's opportuning for getting the thing extended.

S: Alright, why don't I - I'm getting into a clean tie - why don't I just come on back.

K: It's got to go tonight.

S: Yes. I'm just trying to figure out here - I can be a little late for this dinner. I'm just getting into a clean tie and I'll just go into the Department.

K: Well, wear a clean shirt while you're at it.

S: I think I ought to, don't you. May as well do both. Alright, I'll take care of it.

K: We'll get it out tonight?

S: What I'll do, I'll...

K: Isn't there a country director, these heros you talk about so much who can do it.

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S: Sure there is but (a) they're gone and (b) this has been one of the problems and that is we've kept them out of these things. And that's why we're so thin in that regard.

K: Atherton isn't here or I....

S: That's alright. What I'll do is come in right now, I'll get dressed here in about five minutes, and then I'll draft it and then bring a carbon right to the dinner and you can have a look at it.

K: OK, fine.

S: Good.

K: And you will indicate which of the Algeria cables - there were about two in which he said they were in favor of lifting the embargo.

S: I'll have to look them up and that may be a problem too, because I don't know whether - S/S is there in any event I can probably get them located.

K: One of them that's in my take now.

S: Yes.

K: But there were several during this week.

S: Yes, I'm aware of them, I read them all, but no where did I feel that we get a categoric response in those cables, of an affirmative character.

K: Well no, there was one where he said he was in favor of it now.

S: That was Humdhani (phonetic).

K: No, there's one today. You know this whole system in which I'm operating is...

S: I don't think you should have to worry about that. Just let me take that in hand and this can be gotten out tonight.

K: There is a cable today. Here we are. No that isn't the one. I saw something.

S: Just send that out to Dick Campbell and I'll....

K: No, it isn't in that bunch.

S: I'll stop by the office and see what we can do on it.

K: OK. END

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Gen. Scowcroft/Sec. Kissinger
March 14, 1974
12:48 p.m.

S: .... He said he had just heard and everything is just fine and the way you want it; and the way you ~~suggested~~ and I said since the delay we probably ought to announce it on Saturday. And he said, well, I think Friday is a much better day. with the press.. Besides you yesterday had indicated you'd be going on the 24th and we really ought to confirm it.

K: O.K. Fine. Well, why doesn't the President announce it then when he is out there.

S: They propose an 11:00 announcement -- simultaneously -- 6:00 there.

K: O.K. Then we had better announce it where? Can Ziegler announce it out there or you are going to have some Geddamned heart burn again.

S: I think Ziegler ought to announce it wherever he is. Don't you?

K: Yes.

S: Haig is with the President now. [redacted]

K: Sonnenfeldt has already brief Lunt so we have no choice, we've got to got But the French, I don't know -- there is a Cherokee cable you ought to look at. The French are becoming very conciliatory on the NATO declaration and the Germans have said they will never again sign anything without full consultation with the US.

S: See. You've done it again. Somehow I just knew you would. You know...

K: Do you think I should make that statement in the light of these conditions?

S: I'm not sure you should now if this is what's happening. Let's just let it ride. I think it is a good statement and it wouldn't do any harm in any case but if they are running...

K: O.K. Well, let me see. Good.

S: Right.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 04 MAY 2004 200102979

SB 104

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Atherton/Sec. Kissinger
March 14, 1974
2:15 p.m.

K: I think we had better make an announcement on the mine clearing. Everyone is straining at the leash.

A: I see no harm.

K: The point is we should do it together with the Egyptians.

A: Why don't we put in a telegram what we would propose saying and have Herman...

K: Can you do that?

A: Yes, and we will check it out to see if they want a joint announcement or prefer to do it or have us do it.

K: I wonder if Herman should go into see Fahmy on this story that they will lift it (embargo) for two months.

A: I can't believe that we are not going to be getting some communications.

K: I think that Fahmy should understand this will make a Presidential trip extremely difficult. We cannot go to the Middle East under blackmail.

A: We have no real authoritative information.

K: How about just getting that to him saying we have read these reports. We should explain that the President would be in the Middle East at the same time that the decision on the embargo has to be made and that might change the whole picture.

A: I see. See if we can smoke out what has been decided. We have had no authoritative counsel from anyone. I thought we would be getting messages from Fahmy and others.

K: I don't know what is happening. I think they decided to lift it but not to announce it until Sunday and they had a 6 to 3 vote on that.

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A: I think there may be some price tie-in and that may be the problem. They may have to make a deal -- the Algerians wanted the price kept up and maybe there was a deal they would lift the embargo if the Saudis agreed not to back the prices.

K: Does OPEC include Iran?

A: Yes. Venezuela, Nigeria and Indonesia.

K: We should join OPEC. O.K. Get that to Fahmy. Both of them.

A: Good.

K: Thank you.

END

SB103

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Dinitz/Sec. Kissinger
March 14, 1974
2:45 p.m.

D: Mr. Secretary.

K: Yes, Mr. Ambassador.

D: How are you?

K: Did I take you away from Marvin Kalb.

D: No, no., I am having lunch with the Foreign Min. We have already arrived at dessert so there is no...

K: At your home?

D: No, at the Hotel here at the Hilton. Two meals a day at my house a day is too hard for Vivian. Mr. Sec. if I may I thought just briefly to suggest to you what I think will be the topic that would be raised. On the Jordanian situation he is familiar with the meeting of the Prime Minister.

K: Is he there now.

D: No, he is not with me. I am in a telephone booth. Although I don't think he knows all the details that were suggested but in general the question of the corridor he knows about and the question of the Palestinian exile government he knows about. I think it will be helpful if you will also tell us a little bit about the visit of the King and what next.

K: Yes. But how much can I tell him.

D: Well, unless the King has said things that he hasn't said to the Prime Minister you can tell him everything but if the King said something, as you indicated to me, something special.

K: The King hasn't said anything but the Egyptians have had an emissary here and I thought you should know about that.

D: On the Jordanian business.

K: A little bit on the Jordanian business.

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D: I suggest the following then...

K: Which indicates that they may want to play with Hussein.

D: Let us do the following. Eban wants it too. At some point we will just remain the three of us. Because I am not only concerned about Eban but I am concerned about the staff you know -- maybe you tell him in general terms what the Egyptian wanted without any operative thing.

K: He will leak it.

D: Then don't say it at all then.

K: I will tell it to you.

D: Fine. Nevertheless he would want a few minutes alone.

K: We will see that the three of us (are alone). About Syria, are you going to bring somebody over next week.

D: This is what I wanted to tell you. It is my--between you and me personally, Mr. Sec.--it has been my recommendation to have Dayan all the time. I got Eban to agree with this. Golda will go along with it. The big objection we have is from Dayan and the objection of Dayan is based on two elements: a) he says he doesn't believe anything can come out of it because only you can convince Assad to accept anything reasonable and therefore a second or third rate officer that will be sent here will not be able to do anything.

K: Look, will you tell that prima donna, that is perfectly true. I am trying to gain time. I don't give a good God damn. I am not even going to give that officer the real plan but I have got to gain time and I've got to be able to prove that I can produce Dayan.

D: Mr. Sec., this is exactly what I said, even if nothing will emerge out of this conversation it is important to indicate to the Egyptians that we are doing for the Syrians what we have done for ...

K: Exactly. I want Dayan over here then I am going off to Moscow. Then I want the Syrian. Dayan can be out of the country by then. Dayan has absolutely nothing to do with the Syrian. Then I am going to give the Syrian triple talk.

D: I understand. I suggest that you mention to Eban this. Eban is with us on this. He agrees that Dayan should come and Golda I think will go along with it. The Government will decide on it Sunday. So Eban is impressed with the feeling that you want Dayan, he would be able to cable Golda that he found that it is a matter for you that would either make or break the future negotiations.

K: Secondly, Mr. Amb., I want you really to study some of these ideas carefully that you and I discussed. I know that they are terribly painful for you.

D: You mean on the Syrian situation. What do you think I have been doing. That is the second reason why Dayan doesn't want to come.

K: I know. That's the first reason -- not the second.

D: No, no, the second one because any govt now that will suggest anything beyond Oct. line would be dead duck tomorrow. But discuss it also with Eban. He is familiar with this idea.

K: I know ;but we are back at the old business. You have to consider it in terms of the other alternatives. We know now that the French and the Russians have made formal demarches in Syria not to settle with me.

D: Yes, that I also mentioned to you when I saw you because we knew the French were active in Damascus on this. But I think you are right in assuming that the Syrians had rather do business with you than with their other friend.

K: Yes, but they are under great pressure. Therefore, I have to have some action going.

D: We will discuss it. It is not a simple situation -- I don't want to go into now but we are also ...

K: Mr. Amb., I have learned one thing. The Israelis will do everything with bad grace but it will eventually be the right thing and it is better to do the right thing with bad grace than the wrong thing with good grace.

D: That is correct, but Mr. Sec., we also learned that things that you think are impossible can always be...

K: That is the wrong lesson you learned. That was the lesson you learned from the Egyptians. I said this to somebody. I said it this morning that the Israeli govt reminds me of a fellow who wins at roulette ten times in a row and now they think that is the normal event and they make their budget on that assumption.

D: Only if you are the croupier.

K: No, no. Really. Don't expect this. I give you my word. My assessment is that the minimum you have to settle for is what I gave you. I am really serious.

D: I know, and believe me I have passed this on. I just want you to know..

K: I have no indication that that will be accepted but if it will be rejected at least we can split the Arabs on it.

D: If you can be 100 percent sure it will be rejected it will be easier for me to sell it.

K: O.K. We will talk about it tomorrow.

D: The other subject he would want very much to talk to you about is the Russians. There is great concern in Israel over the role of the Russians and between you and me there has been some criticism that maybe you don't take to severely the Russian statements in Damascus, the Russian behavior vis-a-vis the whole Middle East development and he would want to hear from you how you evaluate the Russian role in the Middle East.

K: Very dangerous. What does he want me to do , be tougher publicly.

D: I don't know. He thinks that the Russians should be put in their place in a more vigorous manner but let him explain his position.

K: That's childish but look I've got to go to the Foreign Relations Cmte. What questions have you planted?

D: No, no. This time I let you off easily. But you said to the Jews that unless I call you seven times a week I don't earn my salary.

K: No., I said unless you call me seven timesa day.

D: No, weekly they said, and they have started a campaign to raise money to supplement my salary now.

K: I told the Jewish leaders that you have a quota -- that you were a stakhanovite.

SB 106

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sen. Javits/Sec. Kissinger
Thursday, March 14, 1974
12:45 pm

J: Yes, Henry.

K: I never got word about the session...

J: I told them to call you. They are going to have eleven Senators.

K: And that makes it worth while.

J: That makes it worth while.

K: O.K. Thank you.

J: I will see you later.

END.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 9 DEC 2002 200102979

SB 109 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Hal Sonnenfeldt (Brussels)
3/14/74 10:25 a.m.

K: Hello, when are you coming back?

S: Saturday

K: About these letters we were discussing the other day--have you had any second thoughts?

S: Yes, I'm just abut to send you a notice--there have been some quite welcomed developments in that general area although one can never tell how well they sit and our judgment is that that particular_____ reflected in that letter will reinforce that. I can get you this message in the next hour.

K: Can you do that because we have to decide whether to do that letter tomorrow or to hold it to the middle of next week. What is your judgment?

S: My judgment is that it ought to be done sooner rather than later, because I think if you hold this particular matter open, the incentive for these people to move or to continue moving in the direction that we want them to move may subside.

K: Okay get me your message immediately

S: Right

K: Thank you.

S: Henry, have you been talking to the British over there?

K No

S: I just asked Embassy London to send you a Daily Telegraph article which is uncanny.

K: Why, is it critical?

S: No, no. It is analytical and hits the nail on the head in so many respects, I just found it rather baffling.

K: I haven't talked to anybody.

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S: Well you look at it. I just asked Embassy London about 2-3 hours ago to send it full text to you.

K: I wouldn't talk without you Hal, you know that.

S: I know. You're a hero over here, by the way.

K: Where?

S: Here at NATO. The only thing they don't understand is why they are illegitimate.

K: Have you explained that to them?

S: I have tried to. But you haven't quite explained it to me.

K: I said this not in relation to--I said it in relation to the impact of nuclear war on a modern society

S: Oh hell.

K: And I said that nobody ever --will ever recover from that just as no European government that ended WWI ever recovered its legitimacy.

S: I see. I see. Okay. I should have read the transcript

K: It was never said in context with--of our struggle with the E--of our problem with the Europeans

S: I'll explain it. Let me get you this message right away.

K: Okay.

SB 107 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Barry Schweid/Secy Kissinger
10:40 a.m., March 14, 1974

K: . . . If you read all the news reports, you know exactly what we know. In other words, there's nothing to it.

S: There's nothing to --

K: Well, we don't know.

S: We don't know in other words.

K: You know, he must have misunderstood some passing remark I made to him at dinner last night at the Jordanian Embassy.

S: I see. On a lower level of importance, there's some confusion whether it will be in Tripoli or in Vienna Sunday.

K: That's right. [Laughter] I'm in exactly the same position you are, Barry.

S: All right, sir.

K: I've seen both of these reports. But the official announcement though said Vienna, didn't it? Let me see -- [flips through papers] -- yeah, the official announcement said Vienna.

S: There's a Libyan report --

K: Yeah, I've seen that.

S: Course I don't know what to make of it. It has Algeria asking for a two month lift.

K: Yeah, I've seen that. That's the only one of its kind I've seen. We have no official confirmation of anything. In fact, we have no official word.

S: I see. All right, sir. I appreciate it.

K: Okay. Bye.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 9 DEC 2002 200102979

SB98 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Congressman Wayne Hayes
Secretary Kissinger
9:29 a.m. 3/14/74

H: . . a copy of the agenda,

K: Yeh

H: And said if there was any specific thing you felt strongly about or wanted some input on to let me know, now I didn't know whether it would get up to you or not and knowing how those desk officers work I doubt if I would ever hear from it again, but I thought you ought to know about it--it is only a --4 items and it is one page, triple space so you can read it in--

K: For the meeting you have in Williamsburg

H: Yeh

K: Good, I'll take a look at it--

H If there is any specific thing you want expressed let me know and I'll see that it gets expressed.

K: Look I had another thought after you left yesterday, I was going to call you today; I understand you are on the standing committee of the NATO parlimentarians

H: That's right

K: And they were going to meet in Brussels this year

H: Yeh

K: I was wondering whether you thought it might be a good idea to bring them over here instead

H: Well, they were planning to come over here and because of financial problems they didn't, so they ~~xxxxxx~~ moved the standing committee meeting back to Brussels and the idea is now to bring the regular ___yearly committee meetings over here in May. And I'll push for that if you think it is a good idea

K: I think it is a good idea--does it have to be May--could it be early June?

H I don't see any reason why not

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K: Because the President may not be in town in May

H: Yeh, well I would prefer to have it in June myself because we are taking a delegation to France in May at the invitation of the French government and I'd prefer to have it third, 4th and 5th of June or something like that.

K: Yeh

H: So I'll see if I can't arrange that--we are going to meet over in Brussels on April 1 and 2

K: Well we believe that ah--we think it might be a good occasion for either the President or me to address a group and to revitalize some of the Atlantic ideas

H: Yeh, I think would be great if you want to do it

H:H We have a financial problem in the organization

K: Well I may be able to help you from the Rockefellers

H: Well if you -- I'll tell you the biggest help we need is to get a plane to bring them over here

K: Yeh

H If we could do that, I think it is definitely something that can be done

K: Let me take a look at it

H: We have done it before, but I haven't pushed for it lately
And if we could get a plane to bring them over, I think we'd be in the ballgame then

K: Well, let me take a look at that

H: Okay and we'll be together again later about then

K: Terrific. Good thank you.

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Schlesinger
Secretary Kissinger
3/14/74 9:10 a.m.'

S: Henry, how are you?

K: Okay, Jim.

S: So what do you want me to say to Hussein this morning? Basically?.

K: First, the President promised himsomething on the order of $100 - $70 million in grants and $30 million FMS credit

S: Okay

K: I just want you to be aware of that--

S: Do we have the fiscal latitude to do that?

K: No, he said we'll go to Congress on that. Now he wants $130 and even the President kept that open a little bit.

S: Right.

K: Now, Ithink you should tell him that we would prefer him to be the negotiator with the Israelis and that we are sympathetic to his disengagement ideas

S: What are they?

K Well he wants to have the Israelis pull out of the Jordan valley four kilometers

S: hm huh

K: I wouldn't tie myself to his specific plan but just to the idea that there should be disengagement on his side too.

S: Okay, now on air defense, what do we do?

K: Did he ask for air defense?

S: He has asked for air defense. That seems to be the biggest thing on his mind. I'm not sure it is the best thing for Jordan, but that seems to be the thing he is stressing.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 14 MAY 2004 200102979

K: I'd drag my feet a little bit on that.

S: Okay.
Very good. Now areyou planning an announcement on the minesweeping operation?

K: No, but at any rate it should be done--why don't we ask the Egyptians whether they plan--don't let it come out of Defense

S: No, we won't -- Friedheim is working with Vest or somebody over in State--we assumed that you or State might make the announcement

K: Well I don't think we should do it unless the Egyptians do it jointly with us

S: Okay, well I think you ought to announce it -- first of all, it is bound to leak out, you can't take all of those C5A's out of the United States

K: Yeh, okay, I agree with you. I didn't know that was being done, but I just x hadn't thought of it.

S: If you can talk to your Egyptian associates and get out a joint announcement, I think it'd be damn good

K: Good

S: Now, there does seem to be some complaint of a division between you and me coming out of state still

K: Impossible

S: There was some coming out of the Pentagon--I did what I could to turn it off

K: A lot is coming out--I met yesterday with the editorial board of the POST

S: I met yesterday with the editorial board of the NYTimes

K: And I made a passionate defense of our relationship which happens to be true

S:Q Yeh. Scotty Reston indicated he was getting some of this stuff and I think most of his sources come from State

K Well

S:

K: It is total nonsense

S: I told him bullshit--you ask Henry

K: On the contrary

S: But the reason I stress it is because--

K: Is Scotty in town--I thought he would be in NY this week

S: No, I was up in NY

K: Oh you saw him in NY

S: And I went over to talk to the businessmen on theCouncil of Foreign Relations

K: I will give him a call

S: Okay, that'd be helpful. Don't know where exactly he is getting this stuff, but it is obviously in the interest not only to the Press but to some of the people of the bureaucracy to cause this kind of division

K: Well, first of all it isn't true, secondly, the country can't afford it

S: You bet, you bet.

K: But above all, it is totally the opposite of the truth

S: Right, Okay

K: Good Jim

S: Okay.

SB 108 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

Amb. McCloskey/HAK
3/14/74 - 10L36 a.m.

K: Bob.

M: Good morning.

K: Bob, I think that maybe I should step into the press room today for five minutes and sort of apologize in a light-hearted way about what I said about legitimacy. And just say now look gentlemen. Get it on the ground that when I'm with women my usual balance deserts and say I didn't know the press was there. It was said in a totally different context in so far as it could be misunderstood and it could be I regret. ....

M: That's what you need to say.

K: I regret having made that remark which does not reflect my view of the government. There is a basic problem. We've stated it and lets now get back to discussing this problem. But it is not a personality issue between me and the Europeans.

M: MMMM. I think that's called for and I think that will retrieve it a good deal.

K: Now, I can't get over there though much before 12:45. Can we hold the briefing as late as that.

M: Yes. Indeed.

K: Alright. Why don't you schedule it for 12:45.

M: I ll take care of it.

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SB99 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Tom Jarriell
Secretary Kissinger
10:08 a.m. 3/14/74

J: Good morning, Dr. Kissinger?

K: Yes.

J: Tom Jarriell, how are you sir?

K: Okay

J: I'm wondering about the Jerry Ford's comment this morning--he said he had talked to you about the oil embargo

K: We are talking on background

J: Yes, sir

K: He must have misunderstood because there--we have had no official word--frankly you know as much as we do, because all we have is news tickers -- if you draw exactly your own conclusions you are right up with our knowledge of the situation--

J: You have had nothing through diplomatic channels

K: No, and I think the Vice President must have misunderstood some remarks I made about the general trend

J: Right
But he wasn't speaking on direct communication from the Libyan Tripoli

K: Absolutely not and we will straighten that out with him

J: Would you have something on your schedule today where Ted or somebody can be talking with you or--or do you know if you have any appearances that you will be mentioning --

K I don't think so--

J: Don't look for any today?

K: No, no we will not make an announcement on the oil embargo today--if that is the thrust of your question

J: That is what I am wondering.

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K: There is no possibility of any WH or State Dept announcement on the oil embargo today

J"[illegible] Fine, thank you.

K: Right.

TELECON
The President/Sec. Kissinger
March 15, 1974
11:00

K: Mr. President

N: Henry, it is quite important, tell me in just a moment because I have some people waiting for me and I have to leave, but what should I say, as I will be asked about this embargo because of the Ford statement, your statement and then of course the leak out of Sadat about 2 months etcetera, etcetera, etcetera. What is your suggestion?

K: My suggestion is that the reports we have is that we have had no official report..

N: I know, I know, that is a duck you can take -- it is one I can't take. I can say simply that I am not going to comment on this because we have had no reports -- which of course isn't true, alright second point.

K: No, it isn't untrue, because we haven't had an official report, but you could say our impression is that they have decided to lift the embargo.

N: I should say that, that they have decided and then when they lift it for two months... suppose Henry, the more likely question will be, of course, is suppose, Mr. President, the report is true that they lift the embargo but only for two months with a condition -- what is your reaction. What do you say to that.

K: We have made a strong complaint to the Egyptians about this.

N: Privately, what do I say publicly, that's what I am asking.

K: I would say lifting it for two months really doesn't solve the basis problem very substantially. Or I would say this, ~~that~~ we move at the pace which is best suited to bring about a settlement regardless of the embargo and if they think they can affect us by it, that is not the right way of doing it. And I would handle it that way.

N: Ok.

K: But frankly....

N: We are not going to look at a gift horse in the mouth, we're going to take the two months at least and it will be awful hard for them to impose it again.

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K: If they have to reimpose it they'll never reimpose it. If it lapses after two months then it is a different problem and I haven't seen what it is they have actually decided. But if you show too much receptivity they'll vote it they might not do the two months thing.

N: ...show too much receptivity at all. That's what I am talking about. I am simply saying -- I am thinking of sort of kicking them about it -- about the two months.

K: I think the best way to say it is that we are moving at the pace that we think is most appropriate and that putting ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ a deadline on the embargo won't affect our actions. Won;t speed up our actions. And that will give some argument to those who want to lift it unconditionally.

N: Are there any that do, Henry.

K: Yes.

N: Still.

K: Definitely. We had definite word.

N: ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ Has the decision been made that it is two months lifting, isn't that what we are talking about.

K: Yes, but we don't know whether that two months, Mr. President, means they'll review the situation after two months, which would be meaningless because they'll never agree on reimposing it; or whether they mean, it means that after two months, they have to take a new decision to lift it again. If it is just a review after two months, Mr. President, it would be a facesaving nothing.

N: That's right, I get your point. Fine. I got the word, don't bother with Buchanan's call when it comes, ok?

K: Right.

N: Fine, I am all set, anything else?

K: No, there is nothing else.

N: You got the letter off to Brandt.

K: Yes, he must have it by now.

N: Nothing..

K: Nothing in the paper -- that won't leak on their side.

N: Well, I'll cover that in answer to a question I think I am not going to make a big thing by announcing it.

K: No, I wouldn't do it.

N: I'll get a question on it so I'll low-key it.

K: Right, I would low-key it and keep it in that general framework.

N: Yes, not get into a position of announcing it in a big way -- well, we have cancelled our trip to Europe -- we have never had a trip to Europe.

K: Exactly, I wouldn't put it on the basis of cancel, I would just say...

N: We;ll just say that we will take it when the situation is ready

K: And when the Declarations are ready.

N: They are not ready yet. The one on NATO is going along satisfactorily the one on the other is unsatisfactory because they have , the nine have taken a position at times that seems to be opposed to that of the United States. We , of course, do not ..it is a consultative process, you know what I mean.

K: Exactly, exactly the line and until we have that worked out there is nothing to sign.

N: And I am going to say too that this is all part of the same situation. The Europeans cannot expect cooperation on the security front where the American role is indispensible to their survival and confrontation ~~xx~~ and at times even hostility on the economic front.

K: And political front. That I think would be excellent. And I think they are beginning to cave. We had word today that Brandt has given orders that there has to be full consultation with us no matter what the Nine do.

N: Right, right, Ok, Henry, I'll hit them even harder than you did --for the ladies.

K: Ok, all the best END

SB 114

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
March 15, 1974
4:14 PM

K: Brent, would you get a message to the President's plane to tell him I thought his performance was absolutely spectacular.

S: Yes.

K: I really think he was good.

S: I think he was good too. Is he in the air now?

K: Yes. He was a little rough on the Europeans then I would have liked him to be.

S: Well, that's alright.

K: But I tell you, we're winning. Have you seen the cables?

S: No, I haven't.

K: The Germans have now proposed to setting up a consultative group.

S: That follows Scheel's comments, never again would we go without consulting. That's good.

K: I tell you before the Europeans tackle us again they're going to think three times.

S: Your Congressional wives speech is going to turn into a great coo.

K: And they're all going to run to Jobert now and tell him, now shut up.

S: That's right.

K: You've now got the Americans so inflamed.

S: That's right. No question about it. I think it's just great. I think it's alright for the President to be a little tougher than you.

K: It's good for me, I don't know whether it's good - no but any sign of strength is good.

S: I agree, I certainly agree. I'll get word to him right away.

K: Yes, good. Thank you.

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S: Right.
END

SB113

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
George Vest/Secretary Kissinger
March 15, 1974
2:35 PM

K: George?

V: Yes sir.

K: Can you get from the tapes down there what Eban said about the Syrian disengagement?

V: Right.

K: Because I would like to send that to the Syrians.

V: I will get it sir, right away.

K: Good, thank you.

V: OK.

END

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SB 112

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
McCloskey/Sec. Kissinger
March 15, 1974
11:05 a.m.

K: Bob, what do you think the public reactions would be if I took my children to Moscow with me. I have not seen them in six months.

M: I don't see any particular reaction at all. I think it would be perfectly understood and no problem.

K: You do?

M: I cannot imagine what the problem would be if any.

K: I literally have not seen them.

M: No. There are two?

K: Yes.

M: I see no reason not to do it. When are you leaving?

K: Saturday night.

M: I would go ahead and do it.

END

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SB 115

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Senator Javits/Secretary Kissinger
March 15, 1974
7:58 PM

K: Jack, how are you.

J: OK. I wondered how you made out this morning with our two friends.

K: Well, first of all I told them I thought it was a good idea to have you participate and they said they would talk to you next week.

J: Right.

K: And, in fact, they said you had already called them too.

J: That's right. I told you that.

K: Yes. I'd forgotten that.

J: I told you I told them I want to see them.

K: I hadn't focused on that. Secondly, they talked about some pretty excessive numbers it seems to me. They want a hundrednthousand. Ribicoff would, I think, settle for less. And some end of harrassment which we can handle if isn't taking two weeks, three four. I mean the demands. So , I didn't really argue because I don't think this is now the time. I have to see what I can get and then they haue to see whether theyre willing to take that.

J: Right. Well, the more I thought about the forumulation , the better I like it.

K: What formulation?

J: I mean, the idea of some kind of shorr tether in return for commitments which are acceptable.

K: Yes.

J: So, I'll see them next week.

K: Godd.

J: You're going to be around for a little bit.

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K: I'll be around up until a week from tomorrow.

J: Good. By the way, how about that meeting yesterday. Did it go to your satisfaction?

K: I thought it was very good. I was very pleased with it.

J: Good.

K: How about you.

J: I felt very good about it and they were obviously satisfied.

K: I think it's really a committee that can be very helpful.

J: Yes. I really think it is too. Of course, what happens to Fulbright is going to be a major qestion.

K: Yes.

J: Henry, one other thing I meant to ask about and omitted,that was your view on where Italy stands. The reason I ask is I'm very good friends with - you are you met her here with

K: Yes.

J: And she is very very deeply concerned and might even contemplate for office there if she knew more about what was going on.

K: Where Italy stands in what way?

J: She just wondered what we in the United States thought about it's present posture. My own opinion which I've given her was that for the moment this government would be let alone as more or less as a caretaker government. I didn't see any radical effort to unseat it or throw it out or create some new situation in Italy momentarily, probably not more than a matter of months.

K: You know in the issues that concern us in Atlantic relations they're sort of wishy washy, they want to get along with everybody, they don't have a very clearly defined policy.

J: They're probably very weak, that's their reason.

K: That's right. I'm not saying it critically.

J: So it really does count for too much at the moment.

K: No.

J: Do we see - do we think this government is likely to carry on for awhile?

K: It's probably the only one they can form under the present circumstances. This government is essentially the same as the preceding one.

*

J: Right. If somebody thinks they can get something out of making a move they are very likely to just let it be.

K: That's my impression.

J: That was exactly mine. Henry, you did leave it with Wayne Hayes that he would come back to you with what he was going to do on these parliamentarians.

K: I left it with him that he would make an effort to do it and I had the impression he'd come back to me.

J: I see, ok, well' I'll talk to him next week.

K: I think it would be a good idea.

J: Yes. Are you possibly be in town for perhaps a small brunch on Sunday.

K: This week?

J: Yes.

K: No.

J: Next week?

K: Next week, if I come into town I d be in town only Friday and Saturday.

J: Only Friday and Saturday. Alright, well let me know and we'll see how you feel and what we might do.

K: I'd love to do it.

J: Alright.

K: Give my love to Marian and get some rest this weekend. For the first I've seen you look a little tired.

J: I will. I really will. I'll play a little tennis and I'll rest.

K: Good.

J: Fine, Henry, talk to you next week.

K: Thank you.

END

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
March 15, 1974
9:50 PM

S: Hi, this is Brent.

K: I'll be damned if a remember now why I've called you.

S: I'm sorry I took the afternoon off.

K: Oh, I got a note from Sie Weiss who is, of course, crazy. Saying that the Defense Department doesn't feel it's be ordered to do any mine clearing. In Egypt. That can't be right.

S: In the sense of having a piece of paper.

K: Will you make sure that they understand they are do to it though.

S: Sure. They may eventually insist on a piece of paper.

K: Then we'll get them a piece of paper.

S: We have to sort out who is going to pay for it, and all of that. It seems to me it's got to be Defense.

K: What did you think of our blood curdling ~~President~~ precedent? I thought it was good.

S: It was good. It was a little stronger than it had to be, but it was good.

K: It was better that he moved to the right of me.

S: I couldn't agree more.

K: It will clear the air in Europe because they now know it isn't a personal fight between me and Jobert.

S: Exactly.

K: And they're going to cave.

S: Oh, I think they will.

K: The only problem now is not to accept their first proposition.

S: No, that's right. I think we're in good shape not to do that now.

K: Yes.

S: What started out as maybe a disastrous week, turned into very good.

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K: Yes.

S: Definitely. Really I think we're in good shape now.

K: OK.

S: Don't stay there all night.

K: I'm going to leave in about 15 minutes, I'm going to sign some correspondence.

S: Good.

K: Good, thank you.

END

TELECON
Foreign Minister Rabassa/Secretary Kissinger
March 15, 1974
8:46 PM

R: Hello, Henry. Good evening.

K: How are you Emilio?

R: Fine and you?

K: OK.

R: I received your very nice letter in which you told me you wrote a letter to the President saying that the organization was alright here.

K: It was superb it wasn't just alright.

R: Thank you. What have you thought of what I told you the other day.

K: For reasons, I find I cann't discuss it on the telephone it would really have a very bad reaction here with our President.

R: OK.

K: That doesn't mean I'd object to the principles, if it happens later on. As long as it isn't announced here.

R: OK, Henry. I have to go to see this person anyhow for bilateral thing that we have. What I'm going to tell him coming out of my own....

Conversation cut off.

R: We were cut off Henry.

K: Yes.

R: Look, I was telling you anyhow, not this weekend, but next weekend, I'm going over there to speak to this man. We have some bilateral thing that I want to arrange. I'm also going to tell him that I don't think or his foreign minister or anyone when we have this meeting, brings anything in their favor when they start speaking their mouth off. That this of course would be a way in the future in Washington, that they would concur to our meeting. I repeat I'm speaking just for myself and for my country.

K: You can certainly give your own impressions of my own views.

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R: Exactly. I don't think the best way to arrange things by him or foreign ministers barking everytime there's an attempt for some admittance of them to the OES. In the other hand, in some near future can be utilized in another country for their admittance this we would discuss with you me. I think there's much good policy and diplomacy just then speaking their heads without any results. This I am going to tell.

K: Right, and you can also tell them that anything you want to say -he wants to say to you, I'd be interested to hear.

R: Fine, that I will do Henry. Passing on another thing, of a bilateral nature I read in the paper here that an assistant to Jack Kubisch spoke about the possibility of money for the _____must be paid.

K: Impossible.

R: Yes, I know. I want to explain. I had my Ambassador call him directly and he said that what happened is the executive branch, you, logically presents this as a bill apart and they put it with two other bills that are for domestic purposes. That was what he said and that the Foreign Senate Committee that he thought it more logical how the executives have presented it, which is right. The only thing that we have in mind, I don't want even to think of.

K: I will personally testify for it.

R: OK, thank you. Last thing Henry, my President, just give it a thought, _____with a long time with our delegation, was thinking of sending a group of major investors in here so they can go and see all parts of the country, how they can ___in the shares and explain that contrary to general commands or attacks, we do want foreign investment, but according to certain standards, that is to have it in a sporting mind. If you can arrange a group of that kind, would help us very much in many ways, Henry.

K: OK, I'll do my best. I'll see you - I'll be in Acapulco without fail on the 30th.

R: OK. Now the 30th.

K: Definite.

R: How long are you going to stay?

K: About ten days.

R: Fine, you deserve it.

K: Wonderful. I hope you come down to see me for a day or so.

R: OK. Bye.

END

SB 117

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Joseph Alsop/Secretary Kissinger
March 15, 1974
9:30 PM

A: Hello, Henry, how are you?

K: OK, Joe. You called earlier this week, and I've been unbelievably tied up.

A: I know you were and I didn't bother you again. I'll see you on Tuesday. How are things looking?

K: They're fine.

A: I'm Jewish, I must say this castrated government of ours has more direction and more authority then any other in the West.

K: That's right. You know the President today canceled his trip to Europe.

A: Oh, did he. Why was that.

K: Because of the European behavior.

A: Which European behavior?

K: Their approach to the Arabs.

A: Oh, yes.

K: No, they thought that he was so eager to come they could do anything.

A: Is this a new approach to the Arabs or just an old one.

K: No, the one we've been screaming at them about for the last ten days.

A; What did they do, Henry? I'm was in Arizona,

K: They have offered across the board economic, finanacial, technical, bilateral common market Arab deal culminating in a foreign ministers conference between all Arabs and all Europeans.

A: Did they go as far as t hat?

K: Yes.

A: Who is behind that, Jobert?

K: Yes.

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A: Who should I talk to about it.

K: When Sonnenfeldt comes back he's in Europe right now. He'll be back tomorrow.

A: He will?

K: Yes.

A: I'll call him and say that you said for me to talk about it. I've written about gardens from my first return from vacation.

K: How was your vacation?

A: Well, it was awful, Henry. Because the doctor thought Stu ought to get away from this God-dmaned claustraphobia, we went out to Arizona. The blood separation was badly done and we were too far away and the dryness gave him nose bleeds anyway. We just had a gastly time.

K: How is he now, that he's back.

A: Well, he's so-so. I hope he'll be well enough. You may well see him on Tuesday night.

K: That would be good.

A: He's like a skelton and you keep thinking it's a long stage of a long saga. The wonderful consolation of it was Tish (phonetic) and he and I were together for a week under quite difficult circumstances and his boy's wife came for a couple of days. It was very cozy. We never had any arguments. It was very hard.

K: Nancy will be down this weekend.

A: She will.

K: You doing anything for dinner tomorrow night?

A: No. Not a damn thing. Oh yes I am, I'm going to Billy Grahm's wedding dinner.

K: Billy Graham?

A: Yes. What are you doing for supper on Sunday?

K: You know, Nancy has to leave.

A: Well, we can easily have a little pasta and have it at 6:30.

K: OK, let's say between 6:30 and 7:00. Nancy and I will come by.

A: OK.

K: Good, look forward to seeing you.

END

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Sec. Kissinger
March 15, 1974
10:27 am

K: Hellp Brent.

S: Good morning.

K: Brent, what do you think of this idea? I haven't seen my children in ages -- what would you think of my taking them to Russia with me? I know it is not very....

S: I think you would get bad press.

K: You do?

S: It probably would look as if you not as serious.

K: But I haven't seen them.

S: You should -- could you take them on vacation?

K: Well, when? I can't take them on my vacation, I'll never get a rest.

S: Well, that's true. Well, that's my quick answer -- that it might not look right.

K: Ok, is the President gone?

S: Yes, he is gone. He left last evening.

K: Let's see how it is going to be.

S: I think he is supposed to be on at 2:00.

K: Ok, thank you.

END

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SB 122

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Gen. Scowcroft/ Sec. Kissinger
March 16, 1974
4:20 p.m.

K: Do a back channel to Eilts and tell him to tell Fahmy that his request has been taken care of and will be implemented. You don't have to send a separate one to Helms.

S: O, K.

K: Remember we have that back channel

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SB 125

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sonnenfeldt/Sec. Kissinger
March 16, 1974
5:05 p.m.

K: I have to pick up Nancy. I will call you later. Did you have a good trip?

S: Yes. I have to give you credit. I think you've got them on the run but I think we've got to hold still now.

K: That's what we are going to do. Look, the President wants to send a letter to Brezhnev on Monday. Will you draft one?

S: What does he want to tell them -- I mean what in general.

K: Just a quick review of our relations and that he means to continue on dtente and the usual crude and that he is sending me with a good you know -- but don't limit my freedom of action too much .

S: I would never do that.

K: I'll call you in about an hour.

S: You certainly had him programmed yesterday. He learned his lesson too well.

K: That's true. I didn't want him to go this far.

S: At least no one can say...

K: What I had him programmed to say was essentially what was in the letter to Brandt but he went far beyond that.

S: Did you cut out that one sentence for a purpose. Because the thrust of the letter still is to not scrap the thing at least to postpone it indefinitely -- the EC nine thing.

K: I took that out because it seemed to me to leave open that it might continue.

S: I thought you took it out because it was to definitive -- shut it off to definitively. Because I told the British to all intents and purposes we were holding it in abeyance.

K: That's correct. You took the correct line.

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S: And they were relieved. Because they don't like it for other reasons. I will wait for your call.

K: Good.

END

SB 124

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Stabler/Kissinger
March 16, 1974
4:58 p.m.

S: Yes., Mr. Secretary. Concerns.

K: I have two contradictory concerns. One is I don't want this discussion to be sent in 10,000 copies all over the world.

S: No, what I had planned to do was to do a very brief resume of what at least some of the NATO -- at least our NATO capitals might know what happend.

K: What would you say?

S: I would simply say that he asked specifically these two questions and that you had indicated that there might be three options to consider; we had no further intention of making proposals. If they had something to say that was useful let them say it.

K: Right.

S: Just put it that way.

K: That gets me to my second point. I don't want our Embassies to encourage the Europeans into putting pressure on us to finish, especially the EEC declaration.

S: Oh, no. I think we would simply add in this thing -- that this is the way it was put -- if the matter was raised it could be simply put in exactly this form but that we weren't asking, or pressing or in any way suggesting that they make any proposals. It is entirely up to them.

K: O.K.

S: I think we ought to take the position that...

K: Do you agree with this incidentally. What is your personal view?

S: My personal view is that if they -- yes -- if they come up with a worthwhile proposal then we ought to be more than willing to at least meet them half-way on the thing, so they don't get any feeling that we are totally now deaf and completely deaf to any suggestions they may have to make.

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K: Yes.

S: I think if we are completely deaf to it then this frankly plays back into the French hands who would say well they weren't really interested anyway

K: Yes.

S: That we ought not to perhaps specifically or positively encourage but we certainly not at this stage of this game discourage.

K: Yes, but what I want to avoid is that come in next week some meaningless EEC Nine paragraph and say now sign please.

S: I think that would be made clear in that you had said today very clearly and this would be the point that I would like our missions to have and that is it has got to be something that is not just meaningless words but a specific proposal.

K: And that we consider the EC Nine Declaration as it now stands to unbalanced for us to accept.

S: Yes.

K: That has to be made clear.

S: Yes. I will make that even clearer than what I have just written.

K: O.K. Fine.

S: One other thing while I have you. You've seen Don Rumsfeld's message. But it seems to me that is an absolutely non-starter. This idea that we go into a NATO Declaration of 14.

K: Well, if we go on that course of strengthening the NATO Declaration -- well he will get our cable .

S: He will get our cable.

K: Which will say the third option is that if we go on the NATO alone it must be strengthened.

S: Yes but it is quite clear that it has to be the fifteen.

K: That is clear.

S: He suggested we do it on the 14.

K: No, no. I guess he gets to the 14 in case the French don't cooperate.

S: What he is saying is that if we abandon the EC ~~new~~ nine declaration let us try to go ahead with the 15. The French might not be willing because if add this thing on consultation they won't like it. If that's the case then and Lunt has even suggested this perhaps we ought to do it on the basis of 14.

K: Let's not worry about that.

S: I think that is just a non-starter.

K: Well, that is not likely to happen.

S: I don't think it is either.

K: But you should say if we go the route of the NATO Declaration alone that then we would like additional paragraph on consultation.

S: Yes, that is in of course what you said to Von Staden so that should be in there.

K: Right.

S: I will send something up to you shortly on it.

K: Good. Thank you.

S: Bye.

END

SB123

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Sec. Kissinger
March 16, 1974
4:40

K: Brent, would you run past Vorontsov, this idea of taking my two children to Russia. I just ~~kadx~~ don't see why people should object. I'm not getting anything out of it. I haven't seen them in six months.

S: Sure, I'll run it by him.

K: Tell him I am not sure yet that I want to do it, but I haven't seen them and it is their vacation period.

S: Sure. I don't imagine that they'll say no. I can't conceive that they would.

K: Well, see what they say. Also, can you find out from him whether we meet in Sovidobo or in Moscow?

S: Sure.

K: That would be important to know.

S: I hadn't thought of that. If you are out in... You would either have to take them to Sovidobo or there wouldn't be much point in their going.

K: Oh no, they have to be with me wherever I am. But you know they have helicopters there, they could run into Moscow during the day and come back. And they might enjoy a day there -- there is a swimming pool and plenty of guards.

S: Sure.

K: You want to talk to Vorontsov about this. Tell him that if he can let me know Monday I would appreciate it and tell him that it is a personal request. I have been there and I haven't seen my kids.

S: Sure, you haven't seen them in a long time and it is their vacation and you would like to get their reaction on a personal basis.

K: Right, ok.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 05 MAY 2004 200102979

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Haig/Sec. Kissinger
March 16, 1974
3:25 pm

H: Yes, Henry.

K: Do you want to hear something?

H: Yeah.

K: Fahmy, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, (this is from our Ambassador) asked to call on me at 11:00 today. He handed me the following statement. "Information from most reliable source has reached us to the effect that the Secretary of State, in his briefing of the European Foreign Ministers, expressed the feeling that the utmost that could be achieved by the United States alone in the Middle East has been carried out and that henceforth we must bring the Soviet Union to participate in all future sets. This is what Dr. Kissinger intends to coordinate with the Soviets." Fahmy said this information had been passed to the Egyptians by a European state. He did not identify that state. Fahmy observed that if the statement is a correct reading of the Secretary's briefing to the Europeans Foreign Ministers, it is totally inconsistent with exchanges Egyptians have had with us and will require a revision of Egyptian policy and so on and so forth. Isn't that revolting?

H: Yes. I should say it is. That is unbelievable.

K: You know that is what I am talking about.

H: Well, have you been in touch with them?

K: I am sending a flash, a rocket back. But I just wanted you to know what we are up against. You know I couldn't have said anything like this.

H: Of course not.

K: But that isn't what I am calling you about. I am calling you about something the President said this morning which rather disturbed me. He was in a rather sour mood again.

H: Yes, that is conceivable.

K: Why is that.

H: When did you talk to him.

K: About 11:00

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H: Oh, he shouldn't have been too bad then. He got sour after I finished my noon to two session.

K: What was that about?

H: Well, you know you have to bite the boa here.

K: Well, he said after he is through with the Europeans, he is now going to go after the Israelis and he has been just waiting for an opportunity to lay into them. You know, he asked me how things were going and I said well, they are going on schedule but it will take some weeks to get the Israelis ready to do this. Now, I tell you if he goes publicly after the Israelis, he might as well start a war.

H: Henry, don't be concerned about that. He is just unwinding.

K: That's what the Syrians..we cannot, that is our policy, our strength consists in the fact that we are moving the Israelis.

H: Listen, I was told to get the football at 2:30.

K: What do you mean?

H: His black nuclear bag.

K: For what.

H: He is going to drop it on the Hill. What I am saying is don't take him too seriously.

K: Yes, but make sure he doesn't do it in ~~Houston~~ Houston.

H: Oh, God no. No way.

K: I tell you, it would be a disaster. We are not doing bad, we are on schedule.

H: Yes, I think we are doing fine.

K: Well, what do you think of these fucking Europeans? In Brussels they are screaming, but I guarantee you they are all going to head in now.

H: Well, that is great.

K: We'll be alright after another week.

H: They can't be right and I think the French wi ll get isolated.

K: That's wh at I think.

H: It is really something.

K: Isn't that amazing?

H: Yes, yes.

K: Ok, talk to you soon, have a good evening.

H: Right.

END

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Colby/Secretary Kissinger
March 16, 1974
3:07 pm

K: Bill, I am talking to Jerry Schecter of Time which is doing a cover on me and he is under the impression that I ordered the abolishing of the National Estimate.....

C: Absolutely not.

K: Board and in any event, whether I ordered it or not, that my views were such that they produced the -- a tendency to give us...

C: Absolutely not.

K: I don't want you to talk to him while I am here, but could you talk to him at some point soon and tell him exactly what the hell happened, because my recollection is that I didn't even know it was being done until ~~x~~ I read it in the papers.

C: I know it. It had nothing to do with you at all. I am going off to Europe tonight, unfortunately. If I could get him sometime this afternoon.

K: Let me check with him -- he is here in my office (Aside: Colby is leaving for Europe tonight -- you want to talk to him at some point) Can he call you, say within another hour or so.

C: Sure.

K: Ok, he'll call you.

C: Alright, fine. Thanks very much.

K: Thanks, bye.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 02 JUN 2004 200102979

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

SB 119

TELECON
Secretary Shultz/Sec. Kissinger
Marvh 16, 1974
11:38 am

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, M. GRAFELD, DAS, A/RPS, ACTIN
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 25X6
DECLASSIFY AFTER: HAK'S DEATH
DATE/CASE ID: 03 MAY 2004 200102979

S: Hi Henry.

K: George, I understand you are not going to see Schmidt now?

S: As far as I know he is coming to the office at 11:00 on Monday.

K: Oh he is.

S: But the German Ambassador called this morning and he seems to be puzzled as to whether Schmidt is going to show up or not.

K: That's what I got because Schmidt was supposed to come and see me too.

S: Well, the German Ambassador is the one through whom the appointment was made and I have heard nothigg to the contrary.

[redacted] B1

S: Well, we have this offset negotiations..

K: But I would go to the aboslute limit of what we can do plus ten percent.

S: Well, he has written a ~~response~~ response to the letter that I wrote him in which we softened our position considerably. But his letter gives us no quarter, at least in our preliminary readiggs. Volcker and Casey are working on it this morning and I haven't heard their, how they come out; but I sort of read it and got a general reaction. At some point, I suppose we might have to say well alright, if this is what you can do we'll take it to the Congress, but the Congress may not buy it. I don't think the Congress would buy...

K: All I would urge you, George, I haven't looked at the details -- if you could go to the really absolute limit of what is conceivable.

S: Right, I will.

[redacted] B1

S: Well, we wi ll wo rk on it and go over it wi t h you.

K: Good.

S: So that you know wh ere we are coming out.

K: Good.

S: Have you heard about the IDA , the opening of testimony again next we ek? On the 21st.

K: Yes.

S: Will you be able to make an appearance?

K: I don't know, but I'll send a letter.

S: I think if you could do that or if you could simply come to the hearings, make a brief statement and leave -- that wo uld be helpful. Just to show t he flag. I'll carry the testimony and I'll be there all morning.

K: Let me look at my schedule and see wh at I can do, but I'll certainly ~~xk~~ wr ite a letter.

S: Ok.

K: Good, George.

S: Very good.

END

SB126 *

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger/Joe Sisco
Sunday, March 17, 1974; 12:55 p.m.

K: Joe, I haven't got that cable yet and now I want to leave, and I don't want to be bothered at home.

S: Oh, for God's sakes.

K: It shouldn't take three hours to do a para...

S: Hell, I dictated it 15 minutes after you and I talked. Let me call the Ops Center.

K: Well, I am now leaving. It's too late. Where the hell could it be?

S: Well, let me call the Operations Center and see where it could be.

K: Okay.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 26 MAY 2004 200102979

SB 136

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Vest/Sec. Kissinger
March 18, 1974
5:03 pm

K: Jackson is climbing the walls because somebody put out the figure of a 100,000 that he asked for.

V: Ooops.

K: And, absolutd y not to confirm it, just say we have no comment on these purely speculative stories.

V: Ok.

K: CWill you make sure we stick to that.

V: I will and I will call right away to make sure we do.

K: Good, thank you.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 10 DEC 2002 200102979

SB 137

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Sec. Kissinger
March 18, 1974
5:04

K: I am going to send over in another hour the draft letter to Brezhnev.

S: Ok.

K: And, we have to get some questions and answers to him on Europe. I hope he doesn't blow it all tomorrow.

S: Right, Ok. They are working on them over here now. Do you want me to send them over to you as soon as they get them.

K: Yes.

S: Ok. I'll have them over to you.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 05 MAY 2004 200102979

SB 138

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Amb. Dobrynin/Sec. Kissinger
March 18, 1974
5:13 pm

K: How are you?

D: I am fine. I would like to see you tomorrow.

K: How about Wednesday for lunch?

D: That is alright, 1:00?

K: 1:00.

D: Ok. As for children, they are welcome in Moscow.

K: I haven't decided to do it. You see the trouble is, it is their vacation.

D: That is alright because Brezhnev asked me to tell you that your children are welcome in Moscow. So all the attention will be taken and we will take care to show them what is worthwhile to see. So it is no trouble at all.

K: They will probably come back as Communists.

D: Well, we will try to do our best.

K: Are we going to meet in Zavidovo or in Moscow.

D: As of now it stands in Zavidovo.

K: Good.

D: This is,, he thinks it is better to be quiet there, as you know.

K: No, I like it.

D: Unless there is last minute change, which I don't think. It will be Zavidovo.

K: Do you think it is time enough to meet on Wednesday. It is the first time I have really a good stretch of time available, lunch on Wednesday.

D: Ok, it is quite alright, if you don't have anything tomorrow -- if tomorrow you are busy.

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K: Let me look at my calendar again.

D: And then you'll call back.

K: I'll call back.

D: You know, just to see you to discuss where we stand in connection with the meeting.

K: Tomorrow, you mean.

D: Yes.

K: Well, we'll try for a half hour tomorrow and we have lunch anyway on Wednesday.

D: Lunch day after tomorrow.

K: So we will try,...how are you, you seem to have a cold.

D: No, quite alright. Simply, I just arrived today so it is rather busy after ..it was a long way to go.

K: Are you coming back with me on my plane?

D: Yes, if you don't mine.

K: No, because that way if your anti-aircraft shoots us down they get you too.

D: (Laughter) No, no. Thank you very much, I will come with you. Brezhnev set aside all this week for thinking..he is preparing to meet with you.

K: Good, I think it is an important meeting.

D: Right, he decided to go to Zavidovo to look in a quiet way for himself

K: Well, I look forward to it.

D: So, please let me know about tomorrow and we fix on 1:00 Wednesday.

K: Teriffic. No we will definitely find a brief period tomorrow.

D: And on Wednesday we will have a quiet discussion, Ok? How do you feel Henry?

K: I feel fine. If the Middle East situation goes on much longer, I'll kill somebody, but that...

D: Well, now you have an interim for about a month..so you are in a safe position. Ok, let me know about tomorrow when it will be.

K: Good, yes definitely. Good to know you are back in town.

D: Well, thank you very much, it is good to hear your voice again.

K: I have missed you.

D: Both ways.

K: Good.

D: Thank you very much.

K: See you soon.

END

SB 135

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Senator Jackson/Sec. Kissinger
March 18, 1974
4:58

J: Henry,

K: Scoop, how are you?

J: Well, I am a little disturbed.

K: What happened.

J: Let me tell you. I have not called these people yet, but Marilyn Berger has the figure of 100,000 that we discussed.

K: Not from me.

J: Well, I am just telling you and Gwertzman from the Times has it.

K: No one on my staff even has it. Ribicoff had it.

J: I checked with him .

K: Dinitz had it and Max Fisher had it.

J: Max fisher had it, why would he have it?

K: He called me with it.

J: He called you with it? Where did he get it?

K : I don't know.

J: Dinitz got it?

K: Dinitz had it too.

J: Well, I don't know..

K: Look, it is totally against my interests to have that figure out. It reduces your flexibility totally.

J: Well, it just blows the whole thing.

K: Well, let's not say it blows the whole thing

J: Well, for all practical purposes.

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K: Scoop, my assessment was that you gave me this figure to toughen me up and that it was not your absolutely last word. You don't have to comment on it. I had no possible interest to get that figure out. I didn't want to nail you to a figure.

J: No, I understand. But, I haven't called back to Marilyn Berger - I am going to do it now. But I am just going to no comment

K: Look, from our side, I will say that alot of figures have been discussed and we just are not going to comment on anything. And you can absolutely count on it -- on our not confirming it.

J: Right, right.

K: And I will have George Vest say tomorrow, explicitly at the press briefing that we discussed alot of things and any figure -- there was no final figure.

J: Right. Well, there are two main concerns which I have said publicly and that relates to numbers and harrassment.

K: That's right.

J: Those are the two key things.

K : Scoop, I thought I understood you very well the other day. And I have two objectives -- one to come up with something that you can support and secondly to let you take the leadership in it when it comes out.

J: Well, ..

K: I don't want to set up a scorecard on who got what.

J: The important thing is to accomplish something. I want to be cooperative.

K: Scoop, I have no complaint about our relationship on this and it is totally against my interest to put that figure out because it locks you in and as you know I consider it unrealistic. I have no reason at all to put it out.

J: Right. I wonder how in the world those two guys, Fisher and Dinitz -- well, anyway, I wanted to check with you before I called....

K: Well, if you take the position that no firm figures were discussed, I will support it.

J: Right, I am just going to tell them that I have no comment.

K: That's what we will do.

J: Ok, Henry.

K: Thank you Scoop.

END

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
March 18, 1974
8:00 PM

K: On the way to Moscow, instead of stopping in Copenhagen, stop in Bonn and see Scheel at the airport. It will drive the French right up the wall.

S: It would.

K: I think we have the Germans so scared now and we want them on our side.

S: I think you're right. That would mean you would have to stop in the Benelux.

K: I have to stop somewhere for refueling.

S: I don't see anything wrong with it.

K: Can you find out what this does to the schedule?

S: Yes. We would have to let the Russians know so they can get their escort there.

K: And how much it would delay it?

S: Sure. I'll find out.

K: OK, and if necessary we leave an hour earlier. Second problem is, since I'll be in New York this weekend, do you think I have to come back or do you think they can pick me up there. Give me your frank opinion, I don't mind coming back.

S: No, I think honestly it would be slightly better coming back, because there would be a lot of press.

K: OK.

S: I think it can be done the other way, but it will highlight your being in New York and that sort of thing. There will be a lot of press interest in this.

K: OK, well then I'll come back. I think I can use military transportation, now that the thing is lifted.

S: Oh, I think you have to. Yes, I definitely would. As I understand, that's all it takes - they were going to lift that as soon as the embargo was lifted anyway. I would use military. I definitely would.

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K: Yes.

S: It's just not safe for you to be doing anything else anyway.

K: Right.

S: Are you going to have Dick set that one up for you? Or you want me to.

K: No, you - I have not talked to Dick about it.

S: OK. When do you want to go.

K: Friday afternoon. And come back Saturday night. I could bring my children down with me then.

S: Sure.

K: Look into the transportation situation. We have, in any event, to stop for refueling somewhere.

S: No, that's right.

K: I guess Copenhagen is a little easier.

S: It's a little easier. It's the shortest way.

K: How much time can it add to it?

S: I think the only thing it adds is a slight loop from Bonn back up to the Baltic Sea, that's all. I doubt if it's a half hour.

K: Will you try to get the President for April 17.

S: I've already approached him on that.

K: What do they say?

S: Parker, he think it's just a great idea. He's all excited about it.

K: OK, fine.

S: I'll let you know in the morning on the Bonn thing.

K: Then I'll discuss it with Sonnenfeldt and see what he thinks.

S: OK. Good.

K: Good.

END

SB 140

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
President Nixon/Secretary Kissinger
March 18, 1974
6:28 PM

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 05 MAY 2004 200102979

K: Mr. President.

N: Hello, Henry.

K: We finally got the official text. What happened is basically it is lifted unconditionally by the majority. With the previsal that they would discuss it again on June 1. Which doesn't mean it goes back on June 1, it just means they will discuss it again on June 1.

N: Right.

K: The Algerians may say they agree to lift it only until June 1, so they make it conditional.

N: We don't care, we don't get any from them anyway.

K: That's right. I got a message from Sadat and he said he will help me get the thing concluded by the end of April, which is also my plan. The Syrian disengagement, so then there won't be any problem, anyway.

N: Well, of course, there must follow not only the disengagement, as you know, but....

K: Mr. President, with all respect, we don't have to linger to any permanent settlement at this point. The major thing we need now is the disengagement. If we talk too much about permanent settlement, when I was there the last time I talked to Sadat, he isn't ready to discuss that. That will get us back into Geneva. We should be very careful in making promises on that.

N: This is one thing we're going to do though, Henry. That's understand that. There is going to be a permanent settlement.
K
K: Of course, Mr. President. If we get into a forum where all of these issues get discussed together, we'll get killed.

N: I agree, but we don't want to leave any illusions here with our friends here that this is it, you know, and the Israelis think that they can just dig in and this is it.

K: No, no...

N: Because then this same thing will come up to haunt us next Fall.

K: No, the strategy That I see now, but which we shouldn't announce publicly, is that after the Syrian disengagement we should get a settlement between

Egypt and Israel and then we've broken the back of it. Then we can work on....

N: I agree. Palestine and Jerusalem last.

K: It's one step at a time. That's our advantage over the Russians. The Russians are trying.....

N: What about the note to Brezhnev, did we decide?

K: That's coming - that should be waiting for you.

N: It's still a good idea.

K: It's an excellent idea, Mr. President. I made just general review by you of the issues for the summit.

N: Good. And you have incidentally made it clear to everybody in the Department that there is to be no comment on this thing.

K: Absolutely.

N: And Simon should just really be ...

K: Haig and I called Simon.

N: Don't say a word, I'll say something tomorrow night. I must say it categorically but I won't go too far. I can't do it in a half-assed way. You see what I mean.

K: We both called Simon, Mr. President.

N: We'll the advantage out of this and if later on it would be a disadvantage we'll take it. It's fine. It's good news. Good news to get it done this far.

K: On the other one, I - there's no question that after the Syrian disengagement we have to go to a permanent settlement.

N: Yes. Looking at the trip thing now, that's the other thing I want to raise with you.

K: My recommendation would be for you - the Egyptians are recommending that around May 20 would be best for them. We can announce it early in April. We can have a few others ahead of the Egyptians. I would recommend that you start in Egypt.

N: Put Egypt first.

K: Yes. Because you'd get a tremendous reception. He could smooth the way for you and go to Morocco last. That way you'll have two tremendous receptions. You could go to Morocco first.

N: Morocco will be good. It should be Egypt first, they're the hard one.

K: If you go to Egypt first, you'll get a tremendous reception. You'll get a good one in Sudan and Saudi Arabia. You'll get a great one in Amman. What you get in Damascus, only the devil knows.

N: That's right.

K: Then Israel you'll get a good reception.

N: Maybe.

K: No, you'll get an excellent reception.

N: The point that I make is that - I might be asked about that - I doubt it, but if I am, I'll say we have a number of invitations we have under consideration.

K: And now that the embargo lifted, we can explore them more fully.

N: We're looking at them, right. On the European thing, you want to stay about where we are.

K: Mr. President, it is going so well, the French Ambassador today made a public statement praising you, but you should stay tough. We've put the steam in the kettle and we're going to get everything. I think you should say you've made your comments. The Atlantic relationship is of course, the corner stone and now it is up to the Europeans. We have for a year expressed our views and when the Europeans have reacted, we will meet them more than halfway. If they ask you about a trip to Europe I think you should say let's wait how the discussions go. They will be on their knees begging you to come before too much time is over and when you come now you'll come as the strong man.

N: What I was going to ask though was on the trip to Europe, we put in terms that having laid down what we did, can we say the matters are now under discussion.

K: On the trip to Europe...

N: No, no, not the trip. The matters of issue.

K: The issues are now being under discussion.

N: The matters are now under discussions, we hope to work them out.

K: It's up to the Europeans and we will certainly be conciliatory in working them out, or something like that. I would not let them off and say they have already met our demands.

N: They haven't, no.

K: But this is turning into a smash. The French Ambassador today held a public press conference in which he said they're are no serious differences with the United States. France respects respects the U.S. as a great ally. Things we've been begging them to do for a year.

N: OK, Henry, thank you.

K: Right, Mr. President.

END

SB 139

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
March 18, 1974
6:25 PM

S: The President just called. And asked about the news on the ambargo and I told him we had Vienna and he asked if you would call him. I think what he wants to ask is whether or not in his statement tomorrow night he should sort of hint that maybe you'll be going to the Middle East. He said now that the European trip is off maybe we should start to lead in that direction.

K: Yes, OK. He wantssme to call him.

S: He wants you to call him.

K: Right, OK.

S: OK.

END

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 05 MAY 2004 200102979

SB 127*

RELEASED IN PART
B6

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger:Stephen Graubard
Sunday, March 18, 1974; a.m.

G: Hello.

K: Hello, Steve.

G: Hi, Henry, how are you?

K: OK.

G: Good, any chance?

K: No, I don't think so.

G: Really. You're just too busy.

K: Yeah.

G: Okay. Are you likely to be here next weekend, Henry.

K: Well, that's what I have my doubts about. I might go to New York for a day, and then I'm going to the Soviet Union.

G: Are you? And then you're there for a week - or longer?

K: For about a week. And then I'm planning to go on vacation.

G: You are? Well that I'm pleased by. For a week or two?

K: For about ten days.

G: Good. Somewhere warm?

K: Yes, to Mexico.

G: How nice. Do you have a few minutes to talk?

K: Yeah, a few minutes.

G: Well, how are you reacting to life?

K: Well, you know, the Europeans have managed now to turn it into an uproar.

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G: Were you unhappy about the remarks made the other day by the President. Would you rather he hadn't said what he did?

K: Yes.

G: I felt that it was unnecessary. I mean, it serves no purpose.

K: It's sort of unfortunate, because what I said wasn't planned. And it gave the Europeans an opportunity to totally confuse the issue.

G: Yeah, it was very unfortunate.

K: I mean I spoke to a group of wives in an informal way and those morons in the State Department had the press in there without telling me.

G: Well what actually, I mean, I never could get it out what you in fact said to them. What did he mean by.....

K: I said nothing of any consequence, but by the time they got through distorting it, it was hopeless. I wasn't even talking about Europe. I was talking about a nuclear war, and I said, let's not kid ourselves, no government is going to survive the catastrophe of a nuclear war. No European government that ended World War I ever recovered its legitimacy. That's absolutely true.

G: Yeah, fantastic. Well that's interesting. I read the thing and I couldn't imagine what you had said.

K: What I had talked about was the impact of a huge catastrophe caused by governments on its population. It had nothing to do with the current crisis. It wasn't set in that context.

G: Of course. Well, again, when it comes out of context it's a meaningless phrase. I mean, it just doesn't mean anything. And nobody has understood it.

K: And in that context it's one hundred percent right.

G: Yeah, well, Henry, what exactly, what do you see. I mean, is it just ~~[illegible]~~ leave things alone there?

K: We're not going to make another move.

G: Well, this is what I feel very strongly. Has Bruce been going around importuning people?

K: No.

G: That never took off.

K: No, we canceled that.

G: I see. Is it because there was just no point.

K: There was no point. We knew what the facts were. I mean, everyone knows what it is.

G: Yeah, and is the severance in the British government at all helpful or even more problematical?

K: Well, in the short term it's helpful. In the long term it will be more problematical.

G: Yeah. And the Germans are just continuing to say, we don't know what the argument is about.

K: That's right. They're waffling all over the place.

G: Yeah. And why essentially? Just too worried about the French, or just a feeling let's not rock this boat as well as so many others?

K: I think that and the emotional need of the French. The French are beyond my understanding. DeGaulle I understood.

G: Yeah. Well the other day at the West European Studies this man Bahr who used to be the head of the French Delegation to the Common Market was there. He began to talk about the difference in generations and about the fact that the new generation doesn't understand things. So, when it came to questions, I mean the whole thing was an unbelievable performance. For example, among other things, he lashed out at the Dutch in response to a question. I think the question either from Kimmelberger or Leonchev. In a fashion, you cannot imagine the _____ "[speaks in French.]" On and on this way. But then I asked him, I mean, he went on and on talking about difference in generations. I said you sound positively _____. I said after all, this is all that he's talking about. But what would you have to do if you were an American to prove that the object is not simply to dominate you.

G: He said you would have to behave differently than you are now behaving.

K: Like what?

G: This is the next question. This is all in French. I said, "[French]", and again talking about the oil thing in terms of no planning. You know, I reminded him of all the things... Some day, Henry, I must show you however this Bill Bundy letter, and I'm sure you've heard from Nancy the end of that thing, where he said the crisis is over, as I told you, and France is now -- you know, that's how the whole thing ended.

K: Yes, that's what he told me too.

G: Unbelievable.

K: He wanted to get me to say that he shouldn't print it. And I said, no, I thought this was just putting a bandaid over a cancer.

G: Now what is his game here, Henry? Is he anxious not to have anything in there that would upset the Europeans? Is he anxious not to have anything in there...

K: He is anxious not to have anything in there that supports the Administration.

G: That's right. That is what I... I mean this is what Dan Bell and Irving Kristol and others said. But someday I must show you a letter from him that is theoretically a letter of criticism. I mean, this is not the last one. In the end he simply said, it's all over, as I told you, I mean, there is no problem anymore.

K: Yeah. What are you going to do with his article.

G: Well, this is the thing, Henry. There's nothing to do. I made a change in the beginning and sent it to the Times. The Times felt that their Laquer(?) piece is rather like it, which in a sense it is. But what I now feel, and this is one of the many things I want to talk to you about, I really feel that what I have in this article is the basis for a very important longer article. Where do you public it in this country. What is a serious journal? Again, you don't have the time to read this foreign policy, but it's just unbelievable crud.

K: You know I would have to say we are practically being...you know, we had a good foreign policy going and they are now killing it.

G: Yeah. But what can be done?

K: They are moving to the right of us on detente.

G: Absolutely. This is the thing.

K: I mean the very people who were accusing us of being warmongers, insensitive, immoral, and 5 thousand other things, now think we are not tough enough on the Russians.

G: Absolutely, but this is what it's all about.

K: The people who thought we were too tough on the North Vietnamese say we are too soft on the Russians.

G: That's right. But, Henry, how do you get anywhere in this country - how do you get any of these things said?

K: I think we are heading into a third republic state. We are going to become ungovernable. The press is going to be our parliament.

G: What can be done?

K: I don't know.

G: But this is it.

K: You know, they're not going to rest until they've torn me down.

G: Well, again, and you know some people imagine that I write this way because of a personal relation with you. It has nothing to do with you.

K: I know a clash with Europe won't do it because the Europeans are going to collapse on us before it's done. They haven't got the nerve to continue it.

G: Again, who is going to collapse first there?

K: The Germans, the Dutch. You know, we're going to kill the Davignon committee and nobody's going to make a decision anymore without checking with us.

G: Yeah, but the bigger thing, Henry, is that there is one kind of theme that is coming through from the left all the way over to the right. I mean not all the way over to the right, whatever the right is, but it is one kind of opinion and you cannot get another thing said. And again one thinks of trying to start something new, but what do you do - you can't start a new newspaper, you can't start a new journal. It would take years to build it up. But there is simply no outlet for a certain kind of opinion. What you just said about whether it's Third Republic or not, that's another matter.

K: Well, and they're moving with amazing uniformity. You know, last year the Democrats were hitting us for a $60 billion Defense budget. This year $95 billion isn't enough. Last year if you explained high manpower costs they'd sneer at you. This year I had Cy Vance and MacBundy in the other day and ~~they said~~ and I said, look, our budget is higher in detente. Oh, but that doesn't mean anything. Manpower is such a big slice of it and inflation.

G: Yeah.

K: Which is true, but they wouldn't have said that last year.

G: Yeah. You know it really was, Henry, and not for just one policy or something else...

K: But then you know, the suicidal...[end of tape]. ....but they systematically go after me.

G: But their illusion is this is why you have to look at least at this Brzyzinski thing. Because after all what Brzyzinski is telling you is, in a sense what it really is, it is a kind of...

[redacted] B6

G: Yes, but you see the only thing that I think can save this. May I just give you this to reflect on - you've probably reflected. I keep going around with these people and saying one thing. If you think there are going to be Democrats in the White House in '77, you are really mistaken. You aren't gonna make it. Not one of you are gonna be there. And, incidentally, I said it to someone yesterday, here in Washington, and, you know, I could almost see the man blanch. They have just taken it for granted that they're gonna be heirs to all this - it's simply a matter of waiting the thing out. It is by no means certain, Henry.

K: No, no, I think that Gerry Ford could probably beat anyone except Jackson.

G: I think he could beat Jackson. Incidentally, I don't think Jackson can get it without ~~suffering~~ such a struggle, including the killing-off of Chappaquidic, which isn't gonna be all that easy, because Chappaquidic is gonna stay in long enough for him to ruin the chances of a fair number of other people. What I am really worried about is that there is the illusion. I mean what you have in Brzyzinski is the illusion that in '77 he'll come back because he is the head of a trilateral commission that believes in a thing called Western Europe and also believes in a thing called Japan and these bad relations will be restored.

K: Well, first, our relations with Japan aren't bad. Secondly, if last year proved anything it's precisely the attempt to restore bad -- whatever I tried to do other than what the trilateral commission says it is trying to do. That's exactly the mistake we made. But when you listen to the establishment we always go wrong. That's right, if we hadn't lifted a finger with Europe nothing would have happened.

G: Yeah.

K: How is he going to establish good relations with Europe, precisely how? What ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ concrete steps would he take? I don't think he's gonna get into office, but supposing he did. How would he do it?

G: I have no idea. He has no idea. But it is a new kind of nostalgia, a nostalgia for something which again never existed.

K: Look, Kennedy tried, it, Johnson tried it, Nixon tried it. Isn't it probable that there's something organic he re?

G: Yeah, yeah, but also, Henry, what has got to be seen is these people still think that it is if they had any sympathy for us, which they lack, it is in respect to a recalcitrant France. It is France that is impossible. And the failure to see that it is a much deeper thing - that it is Europe in the terms - I continue to feel that what I wrote in that article is essentially right. You cannot understand it unless you understand a place called England, a place called Germany.

K: That's right.

G: You cannot understand this phenomenon.

K: Well, I think we'll let them stew in their own juice now. I'm sorry frankly that it reached these public proportions. I think if last week hadn't happened and we had just slowly disengaged from Europe and let them stew in their own juice it would have brought them back better than this public brawling. I wouldn't have had the President say what he said.

G: I didn't feel you did. I just knew you hadn't.

K: And you know I wouldn't have said publicly what I said. Although what I said wasn't so bad, if you read it.

G: Well, but this is it, you see, I only read it out of context.

K: What I said, two things that were taken deadly out of context. I said the big problem in this world is to create a cooperative world structure. There is a paradox that we know how to regulate relations with our enemies but we have not managed yet to create a cooperative structure with our friends - which happens to be true. That was one quote they played with. The other one was the legitimacy one which I put in a totally different section and which dealt with a different subject.

G: Yeah, well, Henry, again I don't want to quote my own article, but I think the thing really is to let the thing simply be. I think there should be no more talk about any visit.

K: No, no, that's out.

G: I think there's no need for it. And I think just play the whole thing down and see what happens. But what I still worry about is what is going on in this country, which again, nobody is writing about.

K: No I think the better strategy would have been just to let it die without an uproar.

G:] Yeah, but now that the uproar has happened, Henry, do you still not think that one should just forget it?

K:] I think one should just forget it, but you know now the trouble is the Europeans are gonna make an overture and that's gonna keep it up and up and up. They're gonna try to rescue these declarations now.

G:] Really?

K: Yeah.

G: Because they still think that that's what the issue is about.

K: That's right.

G: Who is there there, Henry, that you really do feel understands? Does Giscard not understand what's going on?

K: That I can't tell.

G: I mean they speak with one voice, with the master's voice.

K: Well, I don't know who's doing the speaking. You see, what makes us think they're nuts is whenever I see Jobert alone he tells me he disagrees with Pompidou.

G: Yeah. But it certainly doesn't sound that way.

K: No, but it isn't true that we have ever had any controversy. That's French pu blicity.

G: Yeah, very interesting. Well I am going over for about - I'm leaving a week Friday - for various things in connection with a book of essays that I've edited that is coming out in Italy, and things, and I really frankly to answer your question about what I want to do with the article, I would like to make it into something better, but I frankly don't know - you know, better in the sense of not fleshing it out and dealing much more with the real difficulties of some of these x mysteries(?) But once you did, I have no idea in this country at this moment where to put it. I have no idea who to offer it to.

K: Yeah, I agree. Harper and so forth wouldn't do it?

G: Who reads Harper?

K: Yeah.

G: Who reads The Atlantic?

K: Well, that's true.

G: I mean, The Atlantic wouldn't do it. Harper's might, but who reads it? So this is really, I think this is the most serious matter that exists, that there is this kind of nostalgia for moments when we were able to get on with our allies and when we were fairly tough with the Russians. Again, what you say about detente is absolutely true.

K: But look, they're not going to maintain their toughness. Do you think that Hinster(?) would be tough with the Russians for two years once he got into office?

G: But, Henry, he's never going to get in. I feel this so intensely and so certainly ... that would mess things up.

K: Yeah, well that I'm sure of too. Besides he couldn't stay in even if he got it.

G: It's never gonna happen. But it is the creation of a myth that is going to survive until the 1976 election.

K: I know.

G: And I think this myth - we're aware of that this myth has to be taken apart. And when his doctors say, look, I mean again the Europeans are constantly talking about detente. Who in God's name pushed detente with real ardor if not the Europeans. And the British seemed the _____ ones among them.

K: Okay, Steve - I know, I know, when Heath came into it all over here and the minute ~~the~~ detente ended the Europeans would be in Moscow. Okay, I've got to run.

G: Henry, bless you, and you don't think you'll be here at all next weekend.

K: I'm not sure yet.

G: Well, I'll just try to get to you from time to time, but this is not the man to do it through. Can I call Eagleburger?

K: Call Eagleburger.

G: And just say that you told me to.

K: Yes.

G: Okay, thanks. Goodbye, Henry.

K: Goodbye.

SB 129 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Zahedi/Secy Kissinger
10:00 a.m., March 18, 1974

K: Hello.

Z: Good.morning, Mr. Secretary.

K: Mr. Ambassador, how are you?

Z: How are you? I hope you have a lovely day in the beginning of the week.

K: How was Brasilia?

Z: Marvelous. It couldn't have been better.

K: Good.

Z: The weather was very nice. And Mrs. Nixon actually took the show. It was a very, very good idea. I think everybody was _____ her, not only the Brazilian people but also different Delegates. They were very happy to see her.

K: Good.

Z: She did a beautiful job.

K: Always does.

Z: She does really indeed. Now since I have been allowed to call you for a _____ again, I got a printed message from him through my sister.

K: Yes.

Z: He is wondering whether the time which they've been insisting that he woul d have you as his guest -- His Majesty -- in that first island --

K: That unfortunately will not work out.

Z: It would not?

K: No. I am very touched and I would have loved to do it but I will come at the end of April without fail.

Z: At the end of April?

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K: Yes.

Z: Because the reason he wanted to know -- I think _____ had already told that you go to see him so if you can't go, then he'll arrange for thim to go to the island.

K: Right. I will visit him at the end of April wherever he is -- probably in Tehran.

Z: I think by that time he will be in Tehran but anyway I will bring it to your attention close to that time where he would be . . .

K: Well, tell him I really look forward very much to seeing him.

Z: All right, I shall do that. Didyou about that message?

K: Yes, that's coming this week.

Z: It's going this week?

K: Yes.

Z: Thank you very much. Well, I'm very grateful to you. When I come to New York, I will be in touch with you.

K: When you come to where?

Z: I'm now in New York.

K: Oh, you're in New York.

Z: Yes, I arrived last night from Brazil and I have to be here for the _____ students tonight. They have about 2800 of them. I have to talk with them.

K: All of them revolutionaries.

Z: Oh, no [laughter] . . . and one of your students is here in New York - he's coming with me to Washington. _____ who is my brother-in-law (he's the owner of the paper), so if you would be here in the beginning of April and if you give us the honor, we'll have a little dinner. And also if you have time, I think he would be very grateful if you would receive him for a few minutes. One of our biggest papers in Tehran.

K: Beginning of April I won't be there.

Z: You won't be here.

K: But still if you work something out -- You know, call my office.

Z: I shall do that.

K: Good, Mr. Ambassador. Good to know you're back in the country and that I'm back under supervision.

Z: Thank you very much.

K: Bye.

Z: Bye, bye.

SB128*

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Senator Fulbright
3/18/74; 9:41 a.m.

K: Hello.

F: Good morning.

K: Mr. Chairman, how are you?

F: Mr. Secretary. Fine, how are you?

K: I just called you primarily to tell you I was thinking of you and wishing you well.

F: Well, thank you very much. I guess you know I _____ the Governor.

K: Yep. I saw it with unhappiness if I may say so.

F: Yes, it's got to be tough I'm afraid. He's down to the point of general unhappiness with Washington. The same old thing.

K: Yes.

F: It's not easy.

K: I bet.

F: If/confronted suddenly we all have all kinds of problems with getting headquarters and raising money and all that goes with it. You know.

K: Oh, really.

F: Oh, sure. You know that is a major problem. And so, there it goes.

K: Well, I want you to know that as far as -- I will _____ as close to a partisan position as I dare.

F: Well, I know you have to be very careful in your own statements.

K: But I am telling all the newsmen what I think of this -- for whatever good that does.

F: Well, it all adds up, you know.

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Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Senator Fulbright
3/18/74; 9:41 a.m.

K; I have been telling a group of newsmen the other day that I genuinely felt that it was in the national interest that you return here. So I just want you to know that I really think that it is important.

F: Well, I appreciate that very much and I think these things are very subtle but I think they mean something to thoughtful people. So I think that is a very, very good way to do it.

K: Now I don't know, Mr. Chairman, how you want to be kept informed. I haven't bothered you because of your preoccupations. But, are you coming to Washington at any point -- or how should we do it?

F: Well, I -- we are so preoccupied now with trying to get people together -- organization and find ways and means to raise enough money to open the headequarters and employ some of the people that need to be employed in this kind of a campaign right away but I do want to come back -- I need to come back for various personal and public reasons. I instructed the staff before left to negotiate with your staff about the possibility of few days hearings on that matter we talked about the last time.

K: Yes. You still want that?

F: Well, I think it would be useful to you and I ought to come back -- it would give me a reason to come back for various things -- you know.

K: Well, if you think it is useful, I will do it.

F: There is a question of . . .

K: My schedule is absolutely murderous from now on.

F: What?

K: My schedule is absolutely murderous because I am going to the Soviet Union.

F: When?

K: On Monday -- on Saturday.

F: Oh, how long will you be there. ~~and then I was planning to go on vacation.~~

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Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Senator Fulbright
3/18/74; 9:41 a.m.

K: And then I was planning to go on vacation.

F: Oh, I see. Well, I told Holt to talk to Eagleburger.

K: Look, if you want it we will find some time to do it in April.

F: That's all right. I just thought when ever was convenient for you and you remember what it was about.

K: Oh, very well.

F: And it's only a day or two -- certainly one day with you, I guess and then a day or two with somebody else.

K: Well, we will do our best. It might be better to do it after my return.

F: That's right. Oh, I think so. I wasn't thinking of it before. After you return -- you know this is on this general problem -- program of detente and I thought it would serve both your purposes and I think it would be wise to call attention to it from my point of view, too.

K; Well, we will do it. You can count on it.

F: That would probably be the middle of April.

K: Right.

F: Well, how are things going? What is your estimate of what is going to happen on the oil problem.

K: I think it is going to be lifted within the next two weeks -- maybe today maybe next week at the meeting of the Foreing Ministers.

F: Yeah. This is just for my information -- I won't quote you at all -- does that mean there is a possibility of a settling down,of oil reaching a more economic level?

K: My guess is that it would lead to a decline in prices.

F: It ought too.

K: If they lift the embargo and if they increase production.

F: Yeah.

K: Both of which is likely to happen that's almost certain to depress the prices.

F: Uh-huh.

K: The other day they had an auction in Kuwait even at present levels and they couldn't get more than nine dollars a barrel.

F: Uh-huh. That's coming back to some reasonable level.

K: So we think it is likely to come down to about seven.

F: That sounds good to me.

K: Now on the Syrian thing, Mr. Chairman, we are moving rather slowly deliberately because we wanted it to be -- there has got to be a lot of work done in the Syrian domestic structure and a hell of a lot of work on the Israelis.

F: Uh-huh. Well, so long as it is moving and in the right direction that's what . . .

K: No, it is definitely moving.

F: Are you feeling all right?

K: I feel fine.

F: Is Congress doing all right? Is the Commitee acting all right?

K: We had a very good session with the Committee last week. Unfortunately we missed you but it was Sparkman -- he conducted it unobtrusively and it worked very weel. I think it is one of the best things -- the relationship between the Committee and the Executive and you have had a tremendous role in shaping that.

F: Well, I think it would be very helpful to have those -- I would hope they are good meetings. I know they always are when you are there and I will look forward to ϕ it. I ought to get back for a little refresher anyway.

K: Good and look, when you come back why don't we have some visible appearances together if you think that would do any good.

F: All right. That would be fine.

K: If you thought -- you know I leave it entirely up to you.

F: Okay. Have you ever heard anything more about the matter we talked about from the community . . .

K: I've used my influence and I have even talked to Javits about it. And he told me he had talked to a few people.

F: Uh-huh.

K: But I don't think they are all out to get you but I may be wrong.

F: We keep hearing diverse views, you know, some of it not stemming from New York but from Memphis but anyway that is a matter that you won't be getting involved in. I just thought if you heard it by the way.

K: Oh, from Memphis?

F: Yeah. But you don't . . .

K: I haven't heard that.

F: I am not suggessting you do anything about it.

K: I am in no position to . . .

F: Just in the course of conversation.

K: Well, if I hear anything I will call you.

F: Good. Thank you very much for calling.

K: Warmest regards to Betty.

F: Betty is sitting here and says to give you her best.

K: Thank you.

F: Take care.

K: Same to you and I will be rooting for you.

F: Thank you very much.

K: Bye.

SB 130*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Strausz-Hupe/HAK
3/18/74 - 10:10 a.m.

K: Hello. How are you?

SH: How are you Henry? I have now gotten Eleanor to agree that we can go to Stockholm.

K: Oh marvelous.

SH: Stockholm is possible. She is prepared to follow me there.

K: Terrifid.

SH: I hope that will expand. I therefore accept your assignment.

K: Many thanks.

SZH: I do so principally because I wish to serve you and the President.

K: I know that and I know you are a dedicated man and we will proceed and I will also keep in mind the other matter that you and I discussed.

SH: That of course has weighed very heavily on my decision because I do hope and it is tentative of my hope Henry, to serve on in a mission. Especially the one we discussed. Of course it has weighed very heavily on my decision and I hope that I would not serve in the next assignment too long. It's what I hope and that in the not too far future it is possible for me to assume this other mission. Or at least one of them. Furthermore, I ask you to consider the following. Since I wish Eleanor to procede from here by the most comfortable and shortest means possible, I would like her to remain in the Brussels residence until after I've taken charge in Stockholm. Do you think that is possible Henry?

K: Let me see what I can do.

SH: I would appreciate it because I think it would be a great hardship. If that could possibly be arranged, I would be very grateful.

K: Right. And I will let you know about that.

SH: Well Henry, I hope that this is agreeable to you.

K: I am delighted and it is a patriotic decision as is in character with you.

SH: I thank you very much Henry. I deeply appreciate what you just said.

K: And we'll stay in close touch.

SH: Many thanks.

K: Bye Robert.

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SB134

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Sec. Kissinger
March 18, 1974
4:18

S: I talked to Jerry Warren. He had already called this guy in. He says that doesn't even remotely resemble what he said and he said he hopes he has gotten him all turned around on it.

K: yes, but can we now shut-up?

S: That's what I told him. We now shut-up.

K: I don't want him to say anymore.

S: That's what I told him. Let's just let it ride now, we have said everything there is to say on the subject.

K: That's right.

S: But he said that is not at all...

K: But, tomorrow, just say no matter what..we have had our statement now and we will not continue the public discussion.

S: Exactly, right.

K: Ok, good.

END

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SB 133 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Gen. Haig/Sec. Kissinger
March 18, 1974
1:13 p.m.

H: Have you talked to our friend?

K: The President?

H: Yes.

K: About the embargo?

H: Right. And we are not saying anything here.

K: And we are not saying anything here.

H: Is he going to make a statement.

K: He wants to make it tomorrow in Houston but first let's confirm exactly what it is they have done.

H: The character of it?

K: Yes.

H: Alright. I had better call Simon and tell him to be sure and keep shut-up.

K: You had better get everybody -- I am getting everybody in this building shut-up. If you get Simon shut-up. Al, let's please not give this the impression of enormous significance because if we do, we are going to put ourselves into a position where they can blackmail us by putting it back on. I mean let's not put it on the level of the China breakthrough.

H: (Laughter). Yep, be hard to do.

K: I'm serious.

H: Yes.

K: O.K.

H: Alright.

K: Bye.

END

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DATE/CASE ID: 05 MAY 2004 200102979

SB 131

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
The President/Sec. Kissinger
March 18, 1974
1:10 p.m.

K: Mr. President. We have just had a flash news ticker item that the embargo has been lifted. We have not had it confirmed yet.

N: That's good.

K: Apparently, without conditions. We will say nothing here.

N: You keep the lid on totally. If and when anything is said I will say it in Houston tomorrow. Gives me a day to think about it.

K: The news will come out today.

N: I don't care about the news coming out but I mean as to what it means to us ; what we now do, rationing and that crap.

K: We will say nothing here. I thought you might like to hear it.

N: Good. Great.
K: Right Mr. President.
END

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SB 132

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
The President/Sec. Kissinger
March 18, 1974
12:55 p.m.

K: Mr. President

N: Hi, Henry.

K: I just want you to know we've had a message from Sadat saying that he has advance information that they are going to lift the embargo with a review scheduled in June. That doesn't mean a thing, Mr. President.

N: That's fine.

K: Because if it is just a review...

N: We will have -- by that time we will have made some progress and that will also leave it open for me to make that trip before then.

K: Exactly.

N: I hope this is true. When will we know it.

K: We have had another report that we might know it by the end of the day today and that is also what Sadat indicated -- by the end of the day in Europe and this might well be by 3:00 here.

N: O.K. You give me a ring. Good luck.

K: I will give you a ring immediately.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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SB 146

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Senator Hugh Scott/Secretary Kissinger
March 19, 1974
6:40 PM

K: Hugh, how are you?

S: Fine. Thank you for being available. We had an interesting little coffee session for the last hour with Eban. I thought it would be useful for you to know the sort of going attitude which was expressed to him unanimously by Symington, Humphrey , Sparkman and myself, all of us vest the feeling that Jackson was being intransigent. The word was used several times.

K: Terrific.

S: And it was worrying us and in one way or another, each in his own way, they developed the thought that - well Humphrey said, we've got to get something, more from the Russians then we're getting. Everybody hoped that you would gain two things. A progression above the 30 to 36 thousand which was Eban's argument rather than a lowering and some assurances of an end of harrassment in special cases involved. It should be conditioned on a reformulation of the Jackson amendment, in such form as you could work with it. And the word reformulation was used a lot. The point is that all four of these, the people, three of them Democrat said that they were' becoming increasingly uneasy for fear that the failure of the trade agreement would be hung on them, the Senators. Of course they met on the people who pushed the Jackson agreement. I told them of the possibility of defection from the signatories. I said there are not many but I overheard some talking about that. Eban interposed no objection except that he's bargaining for those two points.

K: Yes.

S: There was an agreement that they hoped very much you could get it but there was also an understanding that it should be conditioned on - you could accept it be conditioned on a reformulation. Some of them thought, the Democrats, that they ought to have private talks with Scoop and ask him not to make it impossible for them to work something out.

K: That sounds very good. I'm very grateful to you.

S: I thought you'd need the information.

K: Ch, I need it very much.

S: You know that now Symington, Humphrey and Sparkman approached properly when you get back, we'll all be willing to work on a reformulation

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provided they could say that the Russians have made some substantial - have given some substantial evidence of goodwill on their part.

K: I will discuss this with Dobrynin tomorrow.

S: It would be interesting, wouldn't it?

K: That....

S: The Ambassador was there - Dinitz as well as Albrigor (phonetic).

K: Good.

S: OK.

K: Thank you very much.

S: Not at all, Henry. Bye.

END

SB 144 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Paul Ziffren/Secretary Kissinger
March 19, 1974
6:23 PM

Z: I wanted to call and tell you that was quite a coup!

K: What?

Z: The embargo being lifted.

K: Aren't you nice.

Z: I don't know how you pull these thing out of the hat.

K: You're a great friend.

Z: I understand you had a meeting or two with Jackson. The thing is beginning to show some movement. I talked to a number of other Senators including Adlai Stevenson and to Jack Harvey, who is close to Stevenson. The Los Angeles Times had an editorial on Jackson.

K: I don't have it.

Z: I'll send it to you.

K: I would appreciate it.

Z: I'm trying to get them to publish Schullman's speech.

K: I caught your fine hand on a number of them. Guido (?) called me the other day.

Z: Wherever I can, I've been trying to gain some movement on the other thing. It's beginning to have some effect.

K: I have to see what I can come back with from the Soviet Union.

Z: In any event, I just wanted you to know I'm doing what I can and we're all proud of you.

K: If you keep up this work, we'll be proud of you.

Z: I'll keep us with whatever I can, you can be sure of that.

K: Well, you've been marvelous. How's Mickey?

Z: Mickey is wonderful and sends her love.

K: Hope to see you all soon.
END

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SB 149

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Vest/Sec. Kissinger
March 19, 1974,
1:15 p.m.

K: Could we do the press conference Thursday at 11:00.

V: Certainly

K: Because the British Ambassador is speaking at 12:30 and he pleaded with me.

V: I will announce it today.

END

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SB 142 *

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
George Vest
3/19/74; 10:44 a.m.

K: George.

V: Yes, sir.

K: Did you see that the London Sunday Times has a long quote from a briefing I gave on the plane on a background basis which they must have gotten from one of those tapes.

V: Yep.

K: What do you mean yep, what are you doing about it?

V: I've got that and ASP has the tape -- has some of the quotes from your tape as well. Which means that really the tapes are not private and they are not being respected. And it raises the question whether you wwant to go on with tapes because they are not being controlled by the owners.

K: Yes. We can't go on with tapes.

V: I have already gone to the record of the New York Times and it means that Bernie Gwertzman's tapes are picked up by other New York Times writers and they begin to quote from them. We had that with David Binder and I raised that with him. So I think the real answer is, sir, if we have tapes they are not going to be properly controlled. They are not controlling them well.

K: Well, we won't permit it anymore.

V: I think that is the answer. If you want control -- when we go back in your office they can hear what you are saying in the plane but tapes are used and misused and there is no question about it. I have a whole documentary practically episode on that.

K: Now again, I, of course, don't know what I said in that briefing.

V: Well, I have both records in tape, sir, throughout each time I sat in with you.

K: Is that briefing bad if it gets to the French. I mean it has gotten to the French.

V: It's gotten to the French because the briefing was the last briefing on your way back from overseas in which you commented on the French rather heavily and that tape and the comments had reached, I found out has since reached AP and deSegonzac. DeSegonzac has treated it rather well.

K: Can I see that tape.

V: I'll get that sir.

K: Good. Thank you.

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SB 145

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Secretary Shultz/Secretary Kissinger
March 19, 1974
5:28 PM

S: Helmut and I worked out an agreement in principle.

K: Don't give me that Helmut business, you've sold us out again.

S: Well, I was just doing it on your account. You told me to.

K: (laughter).

S: But I think it's something we can sell. Casey agrees on it and he will follow up and try to....

K: What are the major...

S: There is one sticking point that Helmut said he would have to check with Brent on but from the way he described that, I don't think he'll have any trouble. The tricks of the matter was the loan and the amount of money per year that the concessionary aspects of the loan would generate. Basically what we've got is about $150 million per year. Which is quite a lot.

K: Yes.

S: The problem was jockeying around these numbers and getting them fixed so that he can describe them in a way that fits his political circumstances and we can describe them in another way which fits ours and we both understand that and arranging these terms so that they will yield us the money that we need. I put in this call while he was still here so he could speak to you but he had to go, but he sends you his regards and says he appreciates the chance to talk with you today.

K: That sounds terrific, it really sounds very good.

S: He continues to be anxious to have a meeting of our little group in Bonn.

K: I'm for it. I strongly urge him to do it.

S: I gave him what dates I can although it would stretch me a lot to do it.

K: Now George, as long as I've got you on the phone. You mentioned the other day you might stay until July 1. I don't know what these characters are thinking of a replacement for you. Do you know?

S: I think they expect the name Bill Simon, but I don't know.

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K: I personally believe that given all the domestic uproar we're going to have, it would be better if you could stay until July 1.

S: Well, I'm not particularly anxious to, there is the only rationale for it really is the fact that there is this Russian meeting and there is the C-20.

K: Exactly.

S: Meeting to finish off. If Helmut said - he inferred to me that you and he had talked about that. He has pressured me some to stay. Why don't you take it up with the President or Haig or somebody.

K: OK. I just didn't want to do it without having talked to you.

S: I think we're in business with this offset thing, and I think Schmidt will again be able to present himself as a person who knows how to work things out.

K: Terrific.

S: OK.

K: Thank you. Congratulations.

END

SB 147

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
March 19, 1974
7:50 PM

K: Are you still here?

S: Yes.

K: Why don't you come up in five minutes.

END

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SB 148

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Sec. Kissinger
March 19, 1974
12:07 pm

K: What do you think of stopping in Bonn rather than in Copenhagen on the way to Moscow and see whether Scheel wants to meet me at the airport for an hour?

S: Well, it can't hurt. I think we ought to clear up whatever misunderstandings there are, at least on the facts. Although they have a full diet now of our position if you clear this most recent telegram that should be up there on the guidance we talked about yesterday.

K: That should have gone out last night, Hal. That's when I wanted it out. I am not running a god damn bureaucratic fudge factory.

S: I forwarded [redacted] it to you just as quickly as I got it.

K: Which was when.

S: This morning and I had to redo part of it. You've got it there now.

K: yes, but now that means today is lost.

S: In any event, I am sorry about that. I didn't write it, so I moved it as quickly as I got it. In any event, I don't think it can hurt to offer to keep communications open. You do have to get your Russian friends there, then.

K: Or does it look too eager?

S: Of course, it could also depend on what they say to us in the meantime.

K: Well, we haven't got much time. If we do it we should do it this weekend, we should offer it now.

S: Well, the more I think about it, really, the more I think maybe not. I think maybe enough has been said.

K: Ask Hartman and call me back in about fifteen minutes, will you.

END

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SB 143*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sen. Cranston/Sec. Kissinger
March 19, 1974
2:15 p.m.

K: How are you?

C: Very good, How are you?

K: O.K.

C: I appreciate your calling. I am one of the sponsors of the Jackson Amendment. I have been troubled by it all the time. I know it has given you some problems. I see you have been negotiating with the people who are the toughest to negotiate with.

K: That is the truth.

C: I would be delighted if you are interested to chat with you about what compromise might be acceptable and see if I could be of help.

K: That is very nice of you. Should we do it after I have been in the Soviet Union.

C: That is probably the best.

K: I will be in a better position to know what is obtainable.

C: I would like it to be a private meeting with you because it is somewhat risky for me but I want to do it because I know it is important.

K: That is real generous of you and I guarantee you we will have a drink here quietly and no one will know about it.

C: I am quietly exploring the waters up here and I think it is possible to figure out something and I will devote every effort.

K: I appreciate that very much and I will call you when I get back from the Soviet Union.

C: Thank you very much.

K: Bye.

end

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SB 150

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
March 19, 1974
4:17 pm

K: How are you doing on the letter to Brezhnev?

S: The President did not sign it before he left.

K: Is it typed up in form for him to sign ?

S: Oh, yes.

K: When is he coming back?

S: He is coming back tomorrow, so we'll get it signed.

K: Good.

END

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 05 MAY 2004 200102979

SB 157

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
March 20, 1974
6:40 PM

K: Are you going to get me an answer tomorrow morning on this.

S: Yes indeed. I've just finished it.

K: What's your view?

S: It's interesting there are several permutations and combinations that you can go with this thing. Some of them would be quite defensible and not bad from our stand point. I think the main thing for us is to hold ours to our present level of deployment because obviously the higher we want to go the higher they'll want to go.

K: No, but I told them something like 5 to 3.

S: There are all kinds of funny combinations which don't make the throw away thing look too bad you wouldn't put it in those terms. For example, we would have 50% and they would have 20% of there - 50% of our light(?) missiles and they would have 20 of their medium. That would also make it possible...

K: But can we express it in numbers? Rather than in percentages.

S: We're going to give you several...

K: I don't want it in percentages.

S: I want to give you several ways of expressing it, there will be verification problems if we're not careful. We have to do it by fields or we have to do it by what we already know has been converted to be compatible with SS-19's and SS-18's. We've got to keep that in mind and....

K: That is not at all...all we need is a number for now. Then we can get into the verification problem.

S: I'm sure I'll be giving you more than you want, but I want you to have the whole problem when you talk.

K: I don't want to talk, he wants a paper I can give him because Brezhnev has the whole gang of them in Zavidovo.

S: Then I'll give you two things. I'll give you a paper also.

K: He didn't think it would be good for him to send the paper back I gave him.

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S: OK, that was another question I meant to ask you. But you gave it to him anyway. I'll give you a piece of paper that has fixed numbers in it, but I'll also give you an analytical memo that tells you how we got there.

K: Right. Well what are the numbers. Can you share them with me.

S: 240 is one of them.

K: Look 240 and ... 240 19's?

S: That's right.

K: They'll never accept that.

S: Another set of numbers is 64 18's which is what they've already got converted and 120 or maybe 180 19's. That takes you way out of wack on throw weight.

K; How far does it throw you out of wack on throw weight.

S: Well, 2.1 to 1.5 or something like that.

K: They say that the throw weight penalizes them for their backward technology.

S: Yes. To try and do it on the basis of war heads gets to be extremely difficult.

K: Because each of their war heads is bigger.

S: Megatonage in any case is way out of wack because of the size of their missiles. I guess the conclusions is you really have to do it in tubes.

K: What do you mean?

S: You have to do it on launchers rather than war heads. We'll give you what the war head figures so that you know. But I don't think you can express it in terms of war heads.

K: We would have more warheads if it's 1500 to 240...

S: In that time frame we would have more merve(?) war heads on any variation you can think of.

K: They'll never accept any of this. OK.

S: Al least we have an opening.

K: Right, thank you.

END

SB 154 1*

TELECON
Secretary Shultz/Secretary Kissinger
March 20, 1974
4:30 PM

RELEASED IN PART
B6

S: First on the subject of MFN, I'm more or less aware of what you've been doing and it sounds very constructive to me. I have the feeling that it is a pretty urgent issue.

K; I've talked to.....

S: Subject you could bring up on this Russian trip.

K: I've already raised it.

S: You have.

K: With Dobrynin.

S: OK, very good. Second, do you have any thoughts on how to handle this Cuban question. As I gather the President is taking a hard line on it. What do we do, start putting people in jail. The Canadians have just gone ahead. They're furious of course. Or shall we just wait a little bit.

K: I wouldn't take any action yet. He's got to yield on the Argentine case.

S: He's got both these cases and they're both tough.

K: He approved the Argentine case and he disapproved the Canadian case. That doesn't make any sense. So I've sent the Argentine case back into him.

S: OK, we'll wait in hopes that maybe he'll change his mind on that. Third, and this is sort of on a personal level. John Dunlap has a friend who is the head of the Central Planning Office in Saudi Arabia.

K: Oh yes, Nazir.

S: Hisham Nazir.

K: I know him.

S: Dunlap has worked with Nazir over the years.

K: [redacted] B6

S: Well, alright. [redacted] B6

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K: No. I just want you to know I know him.

S: Alright. You know him well. He has written to Dunlap asking John questions about how to organize manpower things and on an earlier occasion he wrote asking if John would come over and give him some help.

K: Yes.

S: I took that up in the earlier case with Brent Scowcroft and got back the message to say no, not until the embargo is lifted. John then got a call from somebody in the State Department, in effect saying, who the hell you think you are. That offended him.

K: Wait a minute now, why would somebody in the State Department call him at all.

S: I don't know. I'm just saying, in light of that, he brought this letter to me and he said, I'm wiling to do what the government wants but I'm not willing to get myself all screwed up. But if there is something I can usefully do here, this is a contact, this is a person that trusts me.

K: I think he could be useful.

S: Yes, so do I. I just wanted to let you know this.

K: I think the world of John Dunlap.

S: All around in the State Department.

K: I'll get them to shut up, it's an unbelievable place. I tell you, your one guy - Hennessey does better work than all my Latin Americanists put together. He came to a meeting yesterday and he was terrific again.

S: Good.

K: He's got some good ideas for you on that trip.

S: Well, we're trying. I told him after you and I talked that we should try to think about this trip as an extension of your efforts in Mexico City.

K: He's done it beautifully from what he's told me.

S: Good. Well, I just put that into the back of your mind on Dunlap.

K: Look, we are trying to start a big bilateral discussion with the Saudis. As soon as I get an answer on that from them, he should be one of the people going.

S: Why don't you put him down on the list of people that meets on that subject and then he can come on some things. I would also suggest to you that you put Eberle down on that.

K: Alright.

S: There are a lot of things involving our trade relationships around the world for which this has implications.

K: Right. I can tell you there's nothing I don't think that Dunlap is qualified for.

S: Dunlap is extraordinarily talented. He's also totally reliable.

K: And unselfish.

S: And unselfish. He's a very very good man.

K: Frankly, in my mind he would be a good possibility to replace you. I don't know how much he knows about financial things.

S: He knows plenty. He learns, he understands things. Anyway, I think it would be good to involve him in this effort. Next item, and I'm sort of on two sides of this issue. Yesterday Schmidt, after we got through with our negotiations, made a comment about the energy conference along the lines that he hoped we wouldn't let it drop because he felt some momentum was gotten up and he said if you have problems like the Foreign Ministers taking that initiative. He said I was distressed by that and he said if I had known ahead of time that they were going to do that I could have headed it off, and would have. At the same time he says he hopes that we don't drop the initiative because then it will set him back and others because it will just be described as a gimick of some kind that we used for either domestic purposes or some other purpose, but it wasn't really something to be taken seriously.

K: We won't drop it.

S: I think as I know you agree, he's worth paying attention to.

K: He's our key man.

S: I think that we need to think that over and in that connection it seems to me we need to have some way of making it public, that we are having these discussions with the Saudis and the Iranians, or we will. So that they don't seem to be an act of bad faith, assuming we're carrying on in the energy conference. That is to set it properly. That's not easy to do, I know, but it seems.....

K: When they are scheduled we can do it, but so far we don't really have a formal agreement yet.

S: Right. I think it is important to give attention to how that information is put forward so it doesn't seem contradictory to other things.

K: Exactly.

S: Finally on my list, there is a subject that's been under discussion for some time on international investment flows in the CECD. Casey has been handling it in the State Department. The subject has been, and I guess mainly because the State Department seems to be our representative in the OECD. Right now the subject is in danger of sort of falling between the stools. It's something we have felt, was of course, to discuss and with Casey gone, his thrust disappears and anyway I think there is probably more expertise on this subject in a fellow like Denham (phonetic) than you find over there. I would like to suggest to you that you consider having some different form of representation in the CECD and perhaps let Denham handle it or somebody else handle it.

K: In principle I'm in favor of that, but these things, they always bleed so much over here. Let me raise that here.

S: You've got to do something about it because there is a meeting scheduled that may get postponed or we may have to ask for a postponement because we're not really ready with a strong person to put forward there.

K: Right. I'll try to get to it tomorrow.

S: OK, now finally I have a suggestion for you for your Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.

K: Who?

S: The name is Alan Greenspan (phonetic).

K: Oh yes. I know him.

S: You know him?

K: Yes.

S: I think he's a very talented fellow. I don't know whether he could be gotten to do it, but he's smart as he can be. He fits your description of wanting somebody who is analytically able and is experienced and savvy. He's more of an analyst then he is an operator but he has enough of the operational, not to be sort of brittle. He is a very good analyst and knowledgeable fellow.

*

K: OK. Let me look at it.

S: OK.

K: He's very bright - I know that.

S: Good. OK, that's my list, sir.

K: Thank you very much, George.

S: Yes. Bye.

END

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
March 20, 1974
6:55 PM

K: Find out how we're going on the Saudi business.

S: Saqqaf is scheduled to arrive on the 21st.

K: I think we're moving along badly.

S: We've been asked to present....

K: I understand all that. When are the Europeans coming?

S: That is one of the subject he's going to ask you about.

K: We have to get some sort of how we're going to answer it.

S: What I'm putting up to you tomorrow. We've got a _____the European aspect of this thing. When it becomes known that we're persuing this matter. We don't want to put ourselves into a position of where the Europeans are going to accuse us of going around end. What I want to put up to you are two or three possibilities to how to handle the consultation process and whatever we say.

K: But not until the mission is clear.

S: No, but I think you have to do it really in the context of the mission hopefully.

K: Yes. OK.

S: How's Gina?

K: She's great.

S: I thought I was your friend and here I've never met this girl.

K: I don't want to get you too excited.

S: I probably get excited, even though it's seven o'clock and it's been a long day already. OK, thanks very much.

K: Bye.

END

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 13 MAY 2004 200102979

SB151 *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Joe Sisco/Kissinger
3/20/74 - 11:22 a.m.

S: They're inviting you to come to Norway in June and asking you whether you would want to deliver a Nobel lecture, and since it was that personal, I thought you were in the building, he really wanted to see you by himself. I was just really going to ask whether you had permitted for me to take him into your office, but I gather you are at the White House.

K: No, I'll be over, so you can bring him in.

S: Will you be coming over....

K: In about 15 minutes.

S: That's great.

K: Now would you stop ~~again~~ bugging the Egyptians ~~from~~ on that one year or six months business. I don't think it's worth it.

S: No, I'm not bugging them at all. The difficulty is that we've gotten two signals. We don't really care one way or another.

K: That's my point.

S: Sure. We're not really bugging them. We're just trying to be sure which position it is and we'll buy whatever it is. Six months or a year.

K: O.K. Will you make that clear?

S: Sure.

K: Good. Thank you.

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SB 153

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ron Ziegler/Secretary Kissinger
March 20, 1974
4:27 PM

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 05 MAY 2004 200102979

Z: Henry.

K: Hi, Ron.

Z: Well we're back.

K: Good. Still advising the President on my views?

Z: What do you mean?

K: I'm pulling your leg.

Z: I let you know where I was last night. The reason I'm calling, did you see the UPI wire.

K: No.

Z: On the Europe thing.

K: No.

Z: I think it plays fine.

K: You have to take my word for it, the French have already put on their radio, it's a two page thing that the President pulled back. That he was forced by public opinion to pull back, that he's corroborated the French point of view. That we need the weapons. That we need our tropp there and therefore - you see the Europeans don't mind our yelling at them as long as we don't pull our troops out.

Z: Right. I wasn't aware of the French thing.

K: No, no. It was great until he got into Mansfield.

Z: Yes. You might want to take a look at the UPI thing. I just read it on the airplane when I got back and it's says, President Nixon warned the Western Europe last night that they are contributing to a new sense of isolation in U.S. and risking there own defense reddiness, by refusing to co-operate in the political and economic field.

K: I have seen nothing American that was in any sense bothersome.

Z: I understand. I was in a little bit awkward position last night.

K: I thought you behaved well.

*

Z: OK.

K: Good thank you.

Z: Anything else?

K: No.

Z: You're going tomorrow aren't you?

K: No, Saturday night.

Z: I mean your press conference.

K: Yes, at 11:00.

Z: At 11:00.

K: Yes.

Z: OK.

K: Good.

Z: Thanks, Henry.

K: Thank you.

Z: Bye.

END

SB 155

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Haig/Secretary Kissinger
March 20, 1974
6:10 PM

H: Henry.

K: Hello Al.

H: How are you doing?

K: OK.

H: Good. I'm returning your call.

K: Oh, you're returning my call. That wasn't all that important. The French of course picked up exactly what I was afraid they would. They're putting it all over their radio and television.

H: Sure they did.

K: Have you seen it?

H: No, but I knew it was inevitable.

K: They say, one, he was very friendly to France, so there is no problem with France. Two, he confirmed what they've always said that we've no alternative but to keep our troops there. Third, so what's all the screaming about.

H: The way to handle that is, is that's not what he said.

K: Exactly. That's the line we're taking. I'm stopping in Bonn on the way to Russia, just for an hour.

H: You're not going to kiss and make up are you.

K: Al, I don't know what you guys think. I want to isolate the French, I'm going to be brutal.

H: Good.

K: It took me two months to get this show down started, I'm not going to pull off.

H: I'm only kidding you. You're losing you're sense of humor.

K: Well, you sound like Ziegler. He's been giving me strategic advice.

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H: Listen, I had some long-haired guy come in here today. He was the creepiest looking fellow I've even seen. He's doing a piece on you.

K: What's his name?

H: Berlin.

K: Oh, yes.

H: My God, the questions he asked.

K: Like what?

H: I don't know whether he's out to screw you or not.

K: I'm sure he is. He's NY Post. Like what?

H: You were using devious methods in the bureaucracy. You were paranoiac. Whether you had scars of your youth. He just went on and on and on. I think I handled him alright.

K: What did you say, no I have scars of my adulthood.

H: I told him you once told me acute paranoia in Washington would be diagnosdd as excess complacency. I said I agreed with that.

K: So, he'll say we were both paranoid.

H: Yes.

K: That's all you're going to achieve with that sort of a smark alecky remark.

H: I think I went through your organizational stuff. He wanted me to say you are an organizational disastor. I said that's anything but true. I said it precisely the opposite. I said he doesn't like to deal those things. He'd rather deal with substance. But when he wants to do it and has to do it, he does it very well. I said I don't know anybody who does it any better.

K: After all, you know, we've kep the foreign policy and defense policy going for five years in a disastrous situation.

H: That's right.

K: I don't know what the test is.

H: He apparently talked to everyone of our ever defective staff group over there. The earlier boys.

*

K: Yes.

H: I always say people who haven't been really close or have responsibilities or carried them out successfully have a lot of ___of things that they'll say about Henry or me or the President or anybody. I didn't know whether you knew this guy was doing this.

K: I know he's doing it. He's trying to get to see me. Maybe I ought to see him.

H: I think you should. He's not dumb.

K: How is our leader doing.

H: He's fine. He's dead tired. I just went over there, he was crawling.

K: He's got to crack that NSC group because Schlesinger is playing is usual game.

H: Let's be damn sure that we have a paper in there for him that isn't too long and too complex.

K: I'm going to be over in the morning and I can go over some of this with him. OK, Al.

H: Alright, Henry.

END

SB 152 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
March 20, 1974
4:06 PM

K: On this paper to the President - what is the paper that goes to the President, so he understands what they're talking about.

S: It's Tab B.

K: There is nothing in there that explains to him what the issues are. He's going to be flying absolutely blind.

S: Do you want a lot of details for him?

K: He needs enough to know what the players are saying and that he should come out with a very firm position.

S: OK. So we should describe enough about what DOD may be doing and so he knows what to do.

K: That's right. His own statement should be a lot tougher than what's in there.

S: Alright. I'll get right on it.

K: OK.

END

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DATE/CASE ID: 05 MAY 2004 200102979

SB166 [*]
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
March 21, 1974
6:30 PM

S: Yes, Mr. Secretary.

K: Joe, I see that we've shot out something on multilateral aid to LDCs to Saudi Arabia.

S: We have?

K: I'm just concerned that we are overloading that system.

S: I'm not aware - what are you referring to.

K: There's a cable to the Ambassador telling him what ideas we should put forward on what aid the Saudis can give to the LDCs. Now God-damn it, we've got other problems.

S: Let me look at that because I don't recall that cable. I'll look it up and see what the situation. We've had some bad news today. Akens has a bad back and has been moved to Germany, so we've got to now consider who is going to see Saqqaf on that other matter.

K: Well maybe Eilts.

S: Well, it's very difficult to send your Egyptian Ambassador to Saudi Arabia for that purpose. Let me give that some thought.

K: But I don't want that free wheeling, we've got to get the free wheeling a little bit under control, Joe. I'd like to keep control of the strategy.

S: I think we're right within the strategy. But let me look at this cable.

K: We may or may not be, but I've got to be told what goes on in general terms.

S: May I say something to you?

K: What?

S: On your press conference today.

K: What?

S: It was really quite a stroke. For awhile there I was afraid you were beginning to lump in all the Europeans at one time, but I thought once you really got started you made the distinctions very well, but the philosophy was fantastic.

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K: Aren't you nice.

S: No, really. It was a first-rate job. You don't need it from an amateur. It really ought to have a tremendous impact.

K: I appreciate this.

S: I almost called you a little earlier, but you tied up on other things.

K: Now, if Akens is out of there, well whom are you thinking of sending?

S: Well, I don't know whether we'll send anybody, but the number two man is a very very good man. A very bright fellow by the name of Horan. But let me think this over because we've just gotten word today and I'll have some kind of recommendation on this thing tomorrow.

K: But can we take it easy now on overloading that system.

S: Yes, we certainly will. In fact there hasn't been a discussion with the Saudis ever since that first batch, which is about ten days ago, because Akens has held o ff waiting for Saqqaf's return. Therefore we're in a position to fully control it.

K: Good.

S: Yes. OK.

K: Right.

S: Thank you.

END

SB 169 [*]

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/ Secretary Kissinger
March 21, 1974
9:35 PM

S: Yes sir.

K: Brent, did we ever pass on the message to Sadat about his brother?

S: Yes.

K: Did we ever get a response?

S: No, nothing. I passed it on Sunday to Eilts.

K: Why don't you query Eilts about what Sadat's reaction was.

S: OK, I will.

K: OK.

END

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SB 170 [*]
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
George Vest/Secretary Kissinger
March 21, 1974
10:15 PM

V: Yes sir.

K: You called me.

V: I got word already from Dick Campbell that you said to check the White House on this ABC interview tomorrow with you and the President.

K: You stay out of it. ABC is to do it. You stay out of it.

V: That is exactly what I passed on to ABC.

K: Yes.

V: And they are doing that themselves.

K: OK, good.

V: That's the way I left it.

K: Good. Not an interview is it?

V: No, sir. Just to photograph the two of you.

K: OK.

V: And I have passed that on to Ted Kopel and he is doing it with the people over there.

K: Good, fine.

END

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SB 168 [*]

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Casey/Secretary Kissinger
March 21, 1974
7:02 PM

K: How does it feel to be President of something?

C: Not bad.

K: Good.

C: I had a good day Tuesday and cleaned up the off set agreement.

K: I wanted to congratulate you on it, you did very well.

C: We got about 85% of the troop stationing costs and we got enough to meet the tax and 100% of the loans are OK.

K: The only trouble is, I appreciated you too late.

C: I thought it might be useful to have a ten minute chat about this East/West trade business. I'm going to have to testify on the authorization bill probably the week after next and I got an opinion from the Attorney General authorizing the - supporting our practices.

K: Yes, I saw that.

C: I intend to announce it tomorrow.

K: You should return to the old practices.

C: I intend to announce tomorrow that we'll approve the trade eenter and the other loans and resume the old practice, open up the doors. We'll have an East/West Trade Commission meeting on Monday. We'll probably talk about the fertilizer and the _____. My own view is that we should not rock the boat with those deals until the thing got settled fundamentally. Try to push those a month or two forward and run the risk the magnitude will make the Congress say we're trying to jam them through before they close the door down. I think is too much of a risk and sowing the atmosphere....

K: You should proceed at the regular rate.

C: Yes. That's right. That's what we intend to do.

K: That's what I think you should do.

C: Yes.

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K: OK, Bill, let's see whether we can get ten minutes maybe Saturday morning.

C: Alright, fine. Give me a call of the time.

K: Terrific. Where is your office?

C: Right diagonally across from the White House on Lafayette Square. Ver mont Avenue. Got the best view in town.

K: Good.

C: Look down at the White House.

K: Right.

C: OK, I'll see you. When are you leaving.

K: When am I leaving - Saturday night.

C: Saturday night.

K: Yes.

C: OK, fine.

K: Thank you.

C: Bye.

END

SB 165
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Atherton/ Secretary Kissinger
March 21, 1974
1:04 PM

K: I have that cable here from Eilts about the UN. One, this is the sort of issue in which the State Dept. specializes, but I think it is just a waste of time for us to have made so much fuss over it.

A: I'm not sure I know which one it is.

K: Cairo 1454. Well I have seen two or three Sisco cables as if my life depended on that gd thing. About the one year extension.

A: Yes. I'll have to look at this one. I don't think I have seen it.

K: Look will you get across to Eilts that I discussed it with Sadat and he had agreed. But I am not going to make a huge issue of it. All we want is their reaction.

A: All right

K: Good

A: Thank you.

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SB 167 [*]

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
March 21, 1974
6:36 PM

K: Joe.

S: Yes, Mr. Secretary.

K: I'm seeing Dobrynin, is there anything you have figured out we could do?

S: I send you a memo and what's in it is this.

K: Where would the God-damned memo be, would you think?

S: I think it's probably - why don't I just get Dick to send it right into you right now rather than I - let me say just thing as to how I feel you ought to handle the Moscow thing generally. You know, Henry, I think you've got to talk very straight to them. They may be unhappy but from their point of view this is a situation which is not very bad and I think you've got to say to them, look, we're not going out of our way not to cooperate with you in the Middle East. But the reality is that you're unacceptable to one side and we're going to try and find ways in which we and you will keep together. We're not going out of our way to exclude you here and we will touch base with you, not concretely what I've suggested to you or litle nuggets. One, I think you could commit yourself to a Geneva ceremonial exercise to put the stamp of approval on both the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement as well as the Syrian one.

K: Once they're done.

S: Yes, once they're done. Secondly, at that Geneva conference you could also commit yourself that you are willing to talk generally at that conference in terms of where you go from here. In other words, kind of a non-commital sort of general discussion at that particular reconvening of the Geneva conference. Third, you could make a commitment that you will consult informally with them at least once more substantively before any Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement is achieved. And fourth, that if there is an opportunity where you feel that their direct intervention, particularly with the Syrians, would be helpful. That you would bear this in mind. These are all mouses that I've come up with. Henry, I don't think you need to give very much to the Russians on this, regardless of how delicate it is. I think they might be irritated, but from their point of view they could live with this situation.

K: OK, good.

S: It's in a piece of paper.

K: Thank you.

END

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SB 159 *

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger/Robert McCloskey
Thursday, March 21, 1974; 9:17 a.m.

K: Hello.

McC: Good morning, Mr. Secretary. You'll find in that briefing book a somewhat long proposed voluntary statement on Indochina. Re-writing it.

K: Yes.

McC: This is the result of a meeting the other day with Ken Rush and others on the need for having something on the record, particularly by you...

K: Yes, but I'm not sure this is the place to do it.

McC: I see.

K: I'll take a look at it, but this may just trigger a Vietnam debate which I am not sure is in our interest right now.

McC: Okay. I'll go ahead and re-do it and we can talk about it when you get back.

K: Yeah. You think we should have it?

McC: I thought we should. I agreed to it and I agreed to recommend it to you.

K: Yeah, but you know, there is the basic sentence in the Department, "when in trouble make it a Secretary's statement whether it makes sense or not." You know, I know it would be good on the record, but do we really want a debate on Vietnam right now?

McC: Well, I pointed out there is a risk that you will now focus a lot more attention on Indochina than there has been. It's kind of been a benign subject, at least until Graham Martin's unfortunate telegram.

K: Yeah.

McC: But the point is that they need something to go after to get the money with.

K: Well, I'll be glad to write letters. I just don't think a public debate is desirable right now.

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McC: I agree with that, and I said on the first bounce you'd probably get some adverse criticism.

K: I mean why shouldn't I use my influence with Senators by either calling them or writing them.

McC: Well, fir st, I suppose people thought that you may not have the time to do as much individually as would have to be done and that having a little anchor out in the wind in the form of a statement would give other people the wherewithal to make points with individual Congressmen.

K: Well, let me think about it.

McC: Yes, sir. Anything else you need?

K: No, I'll be over in about an hour, I hope, if the President lets me go.

McC: Yes sir.

K: Good.

SB 158 *

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
3/21/74: 9:12 a.m.

K: Hal.

S: Yes, sir.

K: Shultz tells me that the State Department has instructed Casey that after there is a favorable ruling to say that these are the -- we approved the loans that had already been done and to say that this is all until there is a clarification of Congressional intent. I don't know who is setting State Department policy, but this is not State Department policy.

S: Of course it is not. I'll find out immediately because Casey was . . .

K: Casey is to say that there is no change. We will approve the loans that have already been . . .

S: I don't know that he needs to say anything, other than we are going to resume business as before.

K: Exactly.

S: I'll find out who told him that. I'll call Casey anyhow and make sure that . . .

K: Well find out who told him that and I want that fellow ~~fired~~ rebuked.

S: Okay. You have a paper on SALT.

K: Yeah, now, that is not possible because Dobrynin told me not to raise the issue of fields which they have never heard of and now I am not in this business for Lodal's concept. The numbers -- you can give them the numbers without the fields. You can then -- when they accept the numbers, work it out in fields.

S: All right. You understand that the business of the fields is not just an idle concept. It is the cleanest way to get at the verification problems.

K: Hal, I cannot stand constant, stupid harassment. I know it is the cleanest way to get at the verification problem. I know all that bullshit. I wasn't born yesterday. I am saying that the first time the Soviets are introduced to the idea, the first thing that they have to agree to is the numbers.

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S: Now would you like to put in then a sentence that says, of course this has to be done in a way to permit verification by national means . . .

K: You can put in the fields as an illustration but it cannot be done -- you have to give them a ratio. Now what the -- what Dobrynin says they can probably live with -- at any rate when I said yesterday the ratio has to be five to three I'd, you know . . .

S: We tried to come as close to that as possible.

K: Dobrynin said they can apparently live with a ratio. I don't know what that ratio is. Secondly, a set ceiling for large missiles that no more than X or ___ could be the largest missiles and finally that the number of warheads could -- had to be -- could not be unbalanced.

S: This makes them relatively equal at the launching.

K: That's right but there are a number of their schemes which you showed me that actually by giving equal warheads they would have to cut down their numbers.

S: That's right.

K: There is a number of them that where the equal warheads thing works in our favor towards lower numbers.

S: Yeah.

K: Now can you redo it in that sense?

S: Well, I will give you another one in the next couple of hours.

K: Okay.

S: All right.

SB161/r [*]

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ron Ziegler/Secretary Kissinger
March 21, 1974
12:35PM

Z: Hi Henry.

K: Ron, how are you.

Z: How did it go?

K: I think it went well.

Z: I guess you called me beforehand, and I am returning your call.

K: Oh, what the hell did I want? I did want something and now I have forgotten it.

Z: Did you want me to give your press conference for you?

K: No. What the hell did I want? No, that isn't, it will come to me later. But I want to make sure Ron that you don't start weaseling on the troup question. The President really hurt us by what he said--oh he hurt himself. Just leave it where it is. Just don't pull away; don't reassure the Europeans about the troop issue any further.

Z: All right.

K: Just say we have nothing to add to what the President has said.

Z: I understand that.

K: I today have said all these statements are perfectly consistent--that he was describing reality. OK.

Z: Good, OK.

K: Thank you.

Z: OK Henry.

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TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
March 21, 1974
12:15PM (Missed first part)

K: But now on can it be...

S: Yes it can.

K: Has the time changed?

S: Not yet.

K: Are they still in there?

S: Yes. He has a meeting at 2:30 with Butz, so I think we can get it slipped easily enough. There needs to be time for you to discuss it. I think you were very good.

K: Oh, did you hear it?

S: Yes.

K: I didn't know they had it over there.

S: They piped it through. I think it was very good balance.

K: Well, I hope it had taken some of the steam out of what he said the other day.

S: No, I think so. It's not strident but firm.

K: But it remained strong, I hope.

S: Oh, yes. No, in fact, you came out just right on two things--the troop thing and the factual relationship--were very good.

K: O.K. Thank you.

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SB 162

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Dinitz/Sec. Kissinger
March 21, 1974
12:44 p.m.

K: What the hell did I want. Let me call you this afternoon.

D: O.K. I just had a talk with the Prime Minister and we talked about somethings I want to raise with you.

K: I have a number of problems.

D: Do you want me to come over to you.

K: Let me see what my schedule is .

END

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SB 163 NLK *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/ Secretary Kissinger
12:55 PM, March 21, 1974

K: Have we changed the date yet?

S: He is still over there.

K: How will I know now?

S: I'll get some way to pass on a note to Haig, and get an answer right away. If you have gone, I will get word to you at lunch.

K: Fine:

K: (Inaudible--something about private channel).

K: Those new talking points are still not what I want.

S: Is there something else I can do?

K: No, because there is just no explanation. There is no distinction between land based and sea based MIRV.

S: No there is not, but did you want to get into that?

K: No, because if you take the land based one the disparity will be unbelievable.

S: This is still focussed of course on the throw away thing. I don't see how you can do that in a meeting.

K: Well, OK. Let me know where we'll be, will you?

S: All Right.

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SB 183

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Jerry Schecter/Secretary Kissinger
March 22, 1974
7:25 PM

S: Henry.

K: Yes, Jerry. How are you.

S: Al Haig says the President thinks you're a unique national asset. Is that true?

K: You're trying to ruin me.

S: Henry, I'm sorry to trouble you, but on these things I like to get back to you and we're going all around the world on this thing and so there are some criticisms that have come back. A couple of them I think you ought to address yourself it, if you would. One in particular is that people say that if they - if we look at your style, it seems that it's easiest for you to deal with authoritarian heads of states then it is to deal with democratic leaders.

K: Yes, I've heard that.

S: How does that grip you? How should we deal with that.

K: Let me, not for quotation, let me tell you my view on this. It is the big - first of all, of course our initial negotiations had to be with the authoritarian government because this is where the danger of war was.

S: Right.

K: Secondly, it is always somewhat more complex to deal with allies then with enemies because the style of negotiation has to be different.

S: That's right, more complex.

K: It has nothing to do with democracies and authoritarian governments. Thirdly, in this phase there is a problem of the western democracys which has been noted. In which, not because they are democracies but because they are now all facing really the legacy of world war II in the sense they are just getting back to conducting their own foreign policy. The governments are in a complicated position and for that reason there have been some difficults over the past year in dealing with them but not because they're democracies, but because of a problem that all western countries have. But nevertheless, when this is worked out I think we'll come out stronger for it. I actually believe that the events of the last two weeks with respect to Europe are going to leave us all in a much stronger position, because for once we're talking about essentials.

S: What do you mean by secular prbblems - we'll have difficulty dealing with them because it's a secular problem of all western countries. That's a little...

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K: The problem of the western countries right now is, that the nature of authority in all of them is in the process of redefinition. The nature of their national purposes is in redefinition is because all of them are going through domestic crises, including we. That on top of that to relate to other countries becomes a much more complex task. Now wether I'm better suited for one then the other I think others should comment it. But it's sort of a ~~XXXX~~ ___ statement.

S: OK.

K: You can, of course, quote me saying that anyone who criticizes me cannot be in good faith. I comment on all of this with that provisal.

S: OK. Can I use any of this.

K: Why don't you distill a quote out of this and call me back.

S: Alright. OK.

K: You can use some of it.

S: Well, sure.

K: You've been - Mulliken read back the quotes and they were all fair. We won't disagree.

S: Yes, alright.

K: You got any other criticisms.

S: I want to save somefor Monday morning.

K: Is my father going to cut you foff after this cover?

S: No, I don't think so. It's a nice cover. It's sort of a cartoon cover.

K: No, I dnn't mean the cover.

S: I'm trying to use a Kissinger Technique of a comic poise in serious negotiation. No, I think's if anything it's too auditory. But it can't be right?

K: It's hard to imagine.

S: I think it's alright. Listen, one thing I did on my own, I'd just like to run by you. On the question of survivability of the President. I say that the cover says, let's put it this way, if this questionis raised that you're going to say the institutions, you might say, that the institutions in this country are strong

no matter what happens and the U.S. is going to be mistaked to think the U.S. can't respond and everybody should look to the long term interests.

K: You better not put that into my mouth.

S: No, no.

K: Why don't you say that might be in character.

S; Right, that's what I did say. OK, fine. Very delicate. Let me work around..

K: Please on that point you know in terms of my utilities, you put that in any way can be brought to the President as having been a strike to me.

S: No it's not.

K: Good.

S: OK.

K: Will you call me back.

S: Yes sir.

K: Good, thank you.

END

SB 182 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Atherton/Secretary Kissinger
March 22, 1974
6:45 PM

K: You can point out that the Israelis have now given me formal assurance that nothing will be done.

A: I'll have it up very shortly.

K: There are a few other things. Second, that they agree to the ____returning but S____ has disagreed because they shot at him once and if the Egyptians can work it out with S_____ the Israelis will be preparedd to discuss it.

A: OK. I'm surprised the Israelis agreed.

K: Third, we'll they've already agreed to the rangers(?) going back. And Fourth, they are emploring the Egyptians to give them some assurance that they artillery pieces would be withdrawn, because that is going to blow up into a big debate in Israeli which they don't want to have to conduct. Can you add that to it.

A: Yes, I'll add that.

K: Good, tand let's get that off tonight.

A: I'll have them all up to you.

K: And fifth, they are asking for some consideration of their - they have some talk about looking for abodies.

A: I think we've done that one. This is the request they be able to use heavy equipment ___on the lst of March.

K: I guess.

A: I think we've already done that one, but I'll double check.

K: Oh, here it is, yes, I've got it here.

A: Alright sir. I'll do the others right away.

K: Right.

END

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SB 181

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
John Mulliken/Secretary Kissinger
March 22, 1974
4:45 PM

M: Hello, Mr. Secretary. John Mulliken. Hi.

K: How are you.

M: Fine. I've got these quotes here - can I run through them with you?

K: Sure.

M: OK. Starting out here. On the Watergate, I would like to be remembered for what I did here, not for being part of a conspiracy.

K: Well now, this depends entirely on the context in which this is put in.

M: You want the whole paragraph?

K: Yes.

M: Kissinger , his sensitive criticism but also his determine not to let it get in the way of his goals. He's determined not to be hurt by, in any way, by Watergate. Then comes the quote.

K: OK. In that context it's alright.

M: Now we go on in the same paragraph. He told Time diplomatic editor, Gerald Schecter, last week. That's the end of the sentence. In other words, you told him that. New sentence. As for detante, he insists that quote, it is not a love affair, but rather a process by which the interests of both Moscow and Washington, can be exposed and in some way reconsiled, enquote.

K: Good.

M: OK?

K: OK.

M: I don't think you said, I think I said that and they picked it up. As for the criticism of his personal diplomacy, he simply points out to the achievements and asks whether any other approach would have gained more, quote, Our records still looks good, he says, quote, my relations with China are solid, Vietnam has held up better than I thought in the face of Congressional restriction. In Europe we will come out of the latest blowup much stronger, because we will bring issues that have been tangled back into some political focus, enqoute.

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K: If we would just leave out the phrase, our records still look good. That looks sort of self serving.

M: Yes.

K: Why don't you just say, he apparently believes or he believes the record still looks good.

M: OK.

K: You see what I mean?

M: I see it. Now, we're talking earlier - this is another sentence - another paragraph rather. About various types of negotiations. I'll read the whole paragraph if you like, maybe that makes more sense to you. It's short.

K: Go ahead.

M: Once specifically, in so far as some Asians are concerned, is Kissinger's close identification with the present PT(?) regime. The Secretary considers the Chinese the best negotiations he has seen. Quote, they said what they mean and they stick to it, while the Russians are tough and the French difficult but with style enquote. And then it goes on to talk about ...

K: Can you take out the while?

M: The while.

K: Just say the Russians are tough.

M: Yes, sure.

K: You see then it's no contrast.

M: They had brutal in there, I had to take that out. Yes sure, OK. That's fine. Now what we need are two quotes that we don't have. One is a quote about Sadat. We have a very full quote about Sadat being nice about you and great stateman, strategist, etc. The main thing I have on Sadat, I don't know why we only have that, is that he's a man who can give orders and is in charge. This is in a discussion with the difficults in Damascus and in Jerusalem. Is there something you'd like to say.

K: No you can say Sadat is a man of vision. Who said of course, and stuck to it against enormous difficulty.

M: That's good. OK, that's fine. In the Middle East, Jerry, who is moving

about at the moment, remembers only one word that you - we would like to say something about the Middle East situation. In line with Europe and Moscow and the record generally, and he only remembers you saying is murderous. I don't think we can use that, although I'm sure it's very accurate.

K: Complex?

M: Complex. Anything a little fuller? In the Middle East you're still complex. Is that alright?

K: Yes.

M: Good.

K: Complex and potentially explosive.

M: Yes, OK. That's fine. I think if you'll clear all that. There's one thing I'm sure it wouldn't bother you. One of your quotes, it's not a serious quote, if you want to here it, I'll be glad to - it's a joke quote on the plane.

K: What is it?

M: It has to do with you saying, I haven't got it right in front of me, basically, never have I known more secrets, never had more influence and no one has tried to seduce me with beautiful women - it kills me.

K: It's alright.

M: It's the ____of the plane idea. If you don't like it we can remove it. I hope you don't. When you talked to Sadat do you address him as Mr. President?

K: Yes. He addresses me as Henry.

M: As Henry. OK.

K: I'm sure he would let me addresseby his first name, but I always have a hesitation with Presidents.

M: Yes. You told me that one of your students who is current Prime Minister of Turkey is that name Taku (phonetic)?

K: No, Ecevit.

M: E-c-e-v-i-t.

K: Incidentally, I gave you the wrong name for the Foreign Minister of Norway.

Who is a student of mine, not the Prime Minister.

M: No, you gave me the Foreign Minister.

K: Ok, good.

M: But I don't know where they got the name Taku. If it's Ecevit and he's Prime?

K: Prine Minister.

M: Well, I'll have to straigten that out. We have it, now we're talking background we have it that Mr. Hodgeson is possibily not your personal choice for the Ambassadorship of Tokyo.

K: I approved him.

M: A big uproar took place in Tokyo which our people found about because it was Lockheed and all that thing.

K: Oh really, I didn't know.

M: They thought they were going to force them to buy Lockheeds.

K: Oh, God, that's ridiculous.

M: That is ridiculous. I think we can get around that. It's not a bad cover. Can I ask you some other points if you have five seconds more.

K: Sure.

M: We're just saying that your children live in Belmont, Mass.

K: Yes. If you want I can give you something since it won't appear until Monday that you may or may not want to use. It's entirely up to you. I'm not eager to get abused, but I don't want you to feel you were scooped or anything.

M: Yes.

K: I'm taking my children to Moscow with me.

M: I'd like to use that.

K: It's their vacation and I haven't seen them in four months and I wouldn't have a chance to see them for another four months if I didn't taken them.

M: Oh yes, we'd like to use that, it's very nice. Thank you. You have taken them to the Kennedy center in the Presidential box.

K: Yes.

M: I have seen you at the Redskins games. He never worked for you, did he, Brezinski (phonetic)?

K: No.

M: He left with the Johnson administration.

K: That's right.

M: I'm down to the last question. I don't think you have to answer it, but I have to ask it. Alright? You have mentioned your weight before. Do you have any particular weight you would like to suggestion or just let me knock that out. Do you have any perimeters? That you prefer?

K: I prefer it around 175, but I'm far from that today.

M: I see. Alright. OK. I couldn't say 175 to 200 and not get disbarred from the State Department.

K: It isn't 200.

M: It isn't 200.

K: It's closer to 185.

M: OK. I can't think of anything else that I can't bother Dick Campbell with. You usually eat your dinner if you're eating in the State Department, in your office don't you.

K: That's right.

M: And your breakfast and lunch you go to the dining room.

K: My breakfast I usually eat at the White House.

M: At the White House, of course.

K: And lunch usually in the dining room.

M: Right. Alright. I think that's all. You're not going up to New York tonight.

K: No I'm not.

M: You mentioned something about having a number up there tomorrow and all that.

K: No.

M: Well that's all I can see and thank you very much, very kind.

K: You're very courteous to check all this.

M: Not at all.

END

SB186 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
March 22, 1974
9:55 PM

S: Yes sir.

K: Did you ever talk to Whickem(phonetic) about his boss.

S: Yes I talked to him.

K: Are they quieted down.

S: He said, he told him what I said and he said he didn't really answer. He said, he's been in a funny mood all day and he said - well I talked to him twice, earlier this morning and passed it on then I talked to him later this afternoon and he said it's been a bad day and he said it even could be the fact that Ducket (phonetic) didn't include the backfire bomber in his briefing charts, so he must have said something to Whickem about that, otherwise there was no way Whickem would know. He said, I really don't know what's gotten after him.

K: [redacted] B6

S: Oh, he is.

K: Don't you think?

S: Oh yes, there's no question about it. Very much so. That's what gets him hung up on some of these things.

K: yes.

S: Maybe he's upset because he - I'd say he caved almost completely in terms of pulling the rug out from under previous defense positions.

K: That's what I think.

S: Maybe he's upset about doing that. I don't know.

K: You think I should call him tomorrow?

S: You might just call him to say - did he seems upset with you when you talked with him after the meeting.

K: He seems very preoccupied.

S: You might just call him to you know, sort of to say goodby.

K: OK.

S: OK. END

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SB 179 *

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
March 22, 1974
4:35 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

S: I think it's important with the Frenchman, if you're still going to see him, to be as hard as nails with this guy.

K: I'm going to be very alouf. I'm not going to be very communicative.

S: Yes. I think it's important from all the kind of gap that I got to take the focus away from the method of consultation and to emphasize how the consultation issue arose in the first place.

K: Yes.

S: Which is not a question of methodology in the first place, but a question of general orientation.

K: Which is what?

S: That the consultation methods that they were employing reflected their view of what the European decision making process should be and what results it should yield.

K: And that it's a basically hostile direction.

S: That's right. A pattern was developing in that direction. We know that this is largely French, we can't quite acoount for it. Although we know it isn't entirely French. I wouldn't mind even saying that to the French. I think it's true, they had support from the British.

K: Yes.

S: At least from the British. And from various of the Eurocrats. It's very clear how defensive they are when you talk to them now. Anyway, I think with the French above all of us is the time to hold the line.

K: No, no. That you can be sure. Eurocrats are defensive, why?

S: They keep saying that they give you all these identify arguments and above ten at the table and after all we gave you those things privately and you knew about everything we were doing. That's all.

K: I'm telling them also we object violently to the substance of the policy.

S: Well, of course. It's party because of the substance of the policy that they chose the kind of consultative methods, because they know that they were going

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to have problems with us. That's a method that's adapted to adversary.situation.

K: Yes. OK.

S: OK.

K: Good, thank you.

S: Yes.

END

SB 185 [*]

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
March 22, 1974
9:35 PM

K: In that Thatch (?) series could you make sure my conversation this afternoon gets picked up.

S: Sure.

K: I'd be interested to see what his report is.

S: I'll watch for it.

K: Good. thank you.

S: Right.

END

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SB 187 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
March 22, 1974
10:23 PM

K: Have we heard on that dinner?

S: It looks very good. The President looked over the schedule but he has not made any commitment, but he apparently is in favor. Would you want him to make a speech too if he were going down to Atlanta.

K: Well, he would have to make a speech, yes.

S: I mean besides the dinner.

K: Oh, no, if he does the dinner, he might drop by at the CAS, you know, just for five minutes.

S: Just to drop by. Apparently, it looks very good.

K: At most, drop by.

S: But nothing really would be required. Even though it's technically a differnt form.

K: Actually if he gives the dinner in Washington, he doesn't have to do anything there. Why did we put in for both?

S: No. We haven't. He may be in Atlanta on the 19th. That's the only thing.

K: I would lean towards his not doing much. If he wants to come in of course he can come in. Then just to drop by.

S: Good.

K: OK.

END

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SB 184 [*]

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Jerry Schecter/Secretary Kissinger
March 22, 1974
8:12 PM

S: I tried to put some commas in here, but how does this strike you.

K: I've got ten guys in the other room going over my Soviet trip. When you try to put that security conference, I summed up one proposition, I said is that correct, and they said it's a caricature, but it's correct so I said where is it a caricature, so we now have just agreed it wasn't a caricature.

S: I hope this isn't a caricature of your profound lecture. Our initial negotiations were directed to authoritarian governments because that was where we faced the danger the war. Negotiations with allies in this phase of the development of western democracy are more complex in this phase of the development of western democracies. The west is only now receiving from the legacy of World War II a nation are just beginning to conduct their own foreign policies and redefine their goals. Events of the last two weeks will leave us all stronger because we are now dealing with essentials.

K: Yes. Where you say, are more complex, can you add, but in the long run even more important.

S: Sure. OK.

K: OK, Jerry.

S: Thank you very much.

K: You're coming with me aren't you.

S: Yes sir. I hear you're taking David and Elizabeth.

K: You know I haven't seen them in four months and it's their vacation.

S: It should be fun for them.

K: They're out of their minds.

S: It's a great idea because - you'll have to let them see the Kremlin and all that sort.

K: Oh, yes, that's all done.

S: That's great.

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K: We'll go to Zavidovo only for an evening. Most of the talks will be in Moscow.

S; Oh, they will.

K: Yes.

S: I see, great.

K: In Bonn we have two hours so Mrs. Scheel is taking to the _____Cathedral and to an old restaurant.

S: That's great.

K: I think they're going to have a ball.

S: You have to have a little fun. At least for them. That's great.

K: OK

S: Thanks. See you tomorrow.

END

SB 180 [*]

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Roy Atherton/Secretary Kissinger
March 22, 1974
5:07 PM

K: Message from Fahmi about the Israeli attack on Sunday.

A: I've seen it sir, yes.

K: I think we should get a flash back to Eilts saying I've talked to the Israelis and I've insisted this not take place. And we haven't had a reply yet.

A: Right, I'll do it.

K: Good, thank you.

END

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SB 1741*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Hal Sonnenfeldt/HAK
March 22, 1974/9:50 a.m.

K: Hal. I wanted an expanded version of the NATO declaration to be given to Ramsbotom before he leaves.

S: You have it you know if its in agreement with you.

K: Now, just don't tell me I've got it. The facat that Campbell has it doesn't mean I've got it.

S: It was sent to you yesterday morning. Because I thought you wanted to look at it.

K: That's right. I haven't seen it.

S: Well, its there waiting for you.

K: Then will you kindly arrange with Campbell that it be given to me.

S: Yes. It's all there on a spread ;sheet to show where the changes are and it can even be given to Ramsbothom that way.

K: I'm not eager that we do it that way.

S: Which ever way you...

K: Secondly, there is a back channel here at the White House from Rumsfield which you should take a look at in which _____ claims its a misunderstanding. Now I want Rumsfeld to get in touch with Dobinyou(?) and say it was not a misunderstanding.

S: What is this?

K: March 4th. We have to toughen up our Ambassadors. Then Hilenbrand was wailing with the Germans again.

S: Let me look at the deMony(?) thing. I think we better do a little message to Alex Johnson if you agree telling him roughly what is happening.

K: No. I do not agree. What is happening do you think.

S: That there was an NSC meeting in which there was a discussion about were you going and that .. its really a question of how much you want to get him into the.

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K: I do not want to get him into the thing.

S: What happened at the NSC meeting will in some way seep back to him.

K: Well do a very vague one.

S: That's what I had in mind. I gather he sent in a very plaintiff response to your other one.

K: I haven't seen it.

S: OK. I'll make sure the NATO declaration is there for you when you get back.

K: Fine. Thank you.

SB 172-E*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
David Rockefeller/HAK
9:31 a.m./3/22/74

K: Hello.

R: Henry Hello. Thank you so much for calling back. There were just two things I wanted to mention to you. (1) There has been no one in the OECD Ambassadorship for a long time.

K: No, we are appointing somebody within the next week.

R: Oh you are because I had a suggestion that might make sense namely Dewey Dane.

K: Who is it.

R: Dewey Dane was Governor -- was one of the Governors of the Federal Reserve Board and was not reappointed I think largely because he had been appointed originally by President Kennedy but he had been in the Federal Reserve for 35 years and I think he is one of the most experienced people in this field.

K: We pretty much have somebody already.

R: OK. Then you won't need him. The other thing is the Dartmouth Conference is meeting in the Soviet at the end of April. I wonder whether it might be good for the steering committee of three or four people to have a brief word with you after you come back from the Soviet and before we go because it is -- the way things are going it might be helpful.

K: I favor that.

R: Would you. Could we set that up.

K: Could you set it up with Eagleburger or Campbell. I just don't have my calender here.

R: I don't mean with you. I mean with them. If you approve of the idea.

K: Certainly. I do approve of the idea.

R: Incidentally, I thought that Jim Callaghan's talk was encouraging.

K: Very good yes.

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R: I was pleased about that.

K: The only thing is we must... I mean the British, the present British government is not the major problem. But we must not let them up for air too fast.

R: No. I think that is true but it was helpful.

K: It was helpful yes.

R: How do you think things are shaping up for the trip?

K: In the Soviet Union?

R: Yes.

K: I can't fully judge yet. It's a difficult period in our relations.

R: It certainly is. But I'm certainly delighted about the embargo and it seems to me on that score things are a little better, don't ;you think.

K: Oh yes. I think if we now can get the Israelis to move a little on the Syrian front that's our biggest problem.

R: Absolutely. I had a good talk with Hussein and I thought that he certainly is of course 100%.

K: He's a fine man and the Israelis are crazy not to deal better with them.

R: I think so too but aren't the Egyptians doing better.

K: The Egyptians are getting ready to see him.

R: That's good. Well Henry, good luck on the trip if I don't see you before.

K: Thank you David. Are you going to be at Builderburg? XXXXXXXX

R: Yes I am is there any chance you are?

K: Well, the only day. You see we have that OAS meeting which I had forgotten about. So that the only day I could really come would be on the Sunday and I don't know whether most people would be leaving then.

R: Well, they won't if you're there. Nelson is coming for the first time.

K: Oh marvelous.

R: I'm taking him over.

K: Isn't that great.

R: Well if you can make it -- it would be important because this meeting is of course what its all about so far as Europe and AtlanticAlliance is...

K: Somebody told me Fred Berkstone is doing the American paper.

R: I don't know.

K: I oould hardly believe that he would give a fair account of the governmental postion. Fond as I am of him.

R: Yes. I don't know.

K: Well, that doesn't make any difference. I'm -- well, I could invision arriving Saturday night.

R: If you could do that it would be enormously helpful. It really would. I think you could make a great difference.

K: Could you look into that for me.

R: I mean.

K: What do I do. You don't have to do it.

R: Sure. I mean you're invited.

K: No, I am invited. The only question is whether enough people will stay

R: There is no question Henry. If you're thered you can be sure they will. I'll get word to them right away and I think if we send word out you can count on it.

K: Good. Then let me aim to be there on the 21st.

R: Perfect. That's great. Well, I hope to see you before.

s

K: That would be marvelous. Fine.

SB 173 [*]

TELCON
Larry Eagleburger/HAK
March 22, 1974 - 9:45 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

E: Right sir.

K: Have you found out about this?

E: The oil executives? Yes. Hopefully they can come at 6:00 tonight if not they can probably make it at 10:00 tomorrow and I've had Dick just call over and ask whether tomorrow is OK if we can't do it at 6:00 tonight.

K: Well, I'd rather do it at 10:00 tomorrow anyway.

E: You would? OK. Let me see what we can do.

K: But tell them it is no emergency meeting.

E: I understand that. That's been done.

K: But how did that happen?

E: Dick tells me that when he talked to you last week you said no you didn't want to do it so he and Win Lord then dropped it.

K: Look. They scheduled it for Tuesday. I said I didn't want to do it that day. I said I wanted to do it later. . that week.

E: He said you didn't.

K: Look, why would I turn to McCloy and say I want to do it, please get them together and then never reply.

E: I'm not arguing the point but Dick Campbell thought you did not want to proceed.

K: And then it just disappears. Now who is talking now to McCloy who is after all not a nobody.

E: Win Lord has been talking to Jamison who apparently is the fellow who dealt with you on the subject in the ;first place he knows what its all about. Win Lord is the one that is doing it now.

K: But will you make clear to them this is not an emergency.

E: That has already been done but I will do it again.

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K: OK now, another thing. Could some thoughtful person plan something for my children and not just have some idiot do it on this trip?

E: OK. In Moscow you mean.

K: Well in Moscow we have three days. But say in Bonn for 3 hours. What's being done for them.

E: I'll have to check with.....

K: You know I said Cathedral in Cologne so I am sure now they have a committee of eight studying the Cathedral in Cologne so I but that is only 15 minutes away and we have three hours. They've never been in Germany.

E: I'll talk to Bonnie.

K: Bonnie doesn't know Germany.

E: No, I know. I'll talk to Bonnie to find out what has been done and I'll get into it myself.

K: But if they could see the Rhine or something. I know the Germans would kill themselves if somebody will just make an effort. If there is some old German town nearby with some of these wooden houses you know.

E: I'll do it myself.

K: And also for London for the way back. With some humanity.

E: I'm lots of things Mr. Secretary. Im not in humane. No, I'll do it myself.

K: Alright.

E: I think I know enough about both places.

K: OK. Well now of course its Friday again and we've managed to blow that whole week. This should have been done earlier this week automatically. As soon as it was known. Let's see whether we can get something done.

E: I'll do it right now.

SB 175 1*
RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec. Gen. Waldheim/Kissinger
3/22/74 - 10:03 am

W: Hello.

K: Mr. Secretary-General, how are you?

W: Well, I'm fine. I was quite tired when I returned from Africa, but I'm fine again. I'm sure you are very busy with your trip to Moscow and I've only to wish you the best success...

K: Aren't you nice.

W: I hope everything goes well. I congratulate you on your press conference. I saw part of it and I read carefully what you said. I think that this trip to Moscow will be very helpful because I do have the feeling that our friends there are getting a little worried and I think your trip couldn't be better timed.

K: Well I think, too, it is at a good time.

W: Mr. Secretary, I have a few points which I wanted to mention to you. First of all, things are going quite well here; we have things under control. The Security Council this year is easier to handle than last year because of the new composition of the non-permanent members. They are more... they are not as... actually, I'll put it this way, in asking for a meeting for _____ we had informal consultation a few days ago, as you know, on the request of Malek and the Russians, and the three main items which were mentioned, the ceiling of 7,000 troops per unit, Malek is worried that I could go beyond 7,000. I calmed him down. I told him that this is not my intention, that 7,000 will be enough. Of course, if we had a new situation in Syria, for instance, it could be that we need more, but as far as I see it, if there will be no new situation we could even handle a possible Syrian bumperstorm (?) with the troops over there. In other words, we could dispense without any problems, two or three battalions which are now in the reserve in the tidal area to Syria in case the U.S. would succeed and that there is a similar solution that we had on the Egyptian front.

K: O.K.

W: So he was very satisfied with this. Then there was the question of the mandate for units in Egypt. He created the impression that each unit that they didn't ask for the mandate to police the_____. I told him that in my report to the Council last October, it is said that one

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of the purposes of units is to avoid the outbreak of new fighting, and in my opinion this covers the mandate so he accepted this, too. The third point was the discrimination. You know the Russians continuously complain as do some of the non-aligned countries that the Israelis do not permit contingents from countries which have no diplomatic relations with them. I mentioned the matter to Abba Eban with whom I had breakfast a few days ago and I hope that sooner or later the Israelis will give up their opposition against this contingent. For the time being I continue to avoid sending those contingents to the Israeli security zone, but I don't know how long I can maintain this practice.

K: Yes. Well, of course, I think the Israelis have some merit on their side here.

W: Well, physologically it is understandable. On the other hand, the mandate for the force is very clear and it says that they should move freely, wherever they want to move and it is a little complicated for us. I always try to do it in a pragmatic way, and it worked until now, but I thought I should mention it to you in case you have the possibility to the Israelis so that sooner or later we can get the agreements. But all countries can move freely in the buffer zone.

K: Right.

W: Now, there's one problem which seems to me extremely important, and also in connection with your trip to Moscow. I discussed this with Bill _____ when he was here, the possibility, and in fact, I don't know whether you, yourself, have discussed it with your people in the State Department, to try to get a commentation of the mandates per unit for one year, not for another half-year. The reason is very clear. I think _____ and of course _____, but suppose the others who are trying to be helpful will be in the fall. But my feeling is that it could be that just at the moment when we have to again prolong the mandates per unit in October, that the situation will be _____ and it could be that we could then have probably _____ So I wonder whether we couldn't try to get ....

K: Well, for your information, I've had an informal talk with Sadat and I think he would agree to it.

W: Oh, good. I feel it is important that the Russians also agree, that they don't ....

K: Let me talk to Gromyko about it when I'm in Russia.

W: That's what I thought would be helpful because it's good to know that the Egyptians are in favor. That will certainly help very much. But I think _____ of very importance in this regard. It would also be helpful to me and to my people here because for plenty of reasons.

K: Exactly.

W: To facilitate our planning.

K: Exactly. Well, I will do my best.

W: Thank you very much. Now, the last thing is the special session, Mr. Secretary. I just wanted to tell you that now of course there is very hectic activity here amongst the delegations. The current trend is to make sure that we do not have confrontation here, but cooperation. I stress this in all my statements and I have the feeling that the great majority is all in favor of having a good cooperation amongst all delegations, but we heard rumors. Unfortunately they are _____ and the Ambassador is not back yet from _____ that the _____ are still thinking of some sort of confrontation. Now this would be the worst, of course, that could happen. I still hope that the whole session will go in a constructive way....

K: When is your opening session?

W: On the 9th of April.

K: Is that when the opening speeches are, or is that....

W: Well, the 9th will be only the procedural opening. The President _____. The idea is to have three committees and three sub-committees. The President (precedent) will probably be the same as last year. Ambassador _____ from Ecuador _____. You know him?

K: Yeah.

W: And so I don't expect too much trouble in this regard so that the real _____ starts on the 10th, and then the idea is to have three weeks special session.

K: I haven't decided yet whether I will come up, or how to do it.

W: I would, of course, be very happy if you could make it and could come personally to make a statement and to _____ the people here. It will be on a high level. The _____ ideas that it should be on a ministerial level. We have an idea that a great number of foreign ministers will come, a few prime ministers, and even a few heads of state. When I was in Africa they told me that a number of heads of state intend to come. But no formal invitation. The only formal information I have is that the President of Zambia is coming personally. Otherwise it will be the foreign ministers, finance ministers and....

K: But _____ is coming, isn't he?

W: But this is what we expect but we haven't got the formal information. The Ambassador is still in _____. He's expected to be back in the next few days.

K: Right. I will try to come. I'm going to be on vacation so I may not be there for the opening day.

W: Well this is not absolutely necessary. I am glad to hear that you have decided to take a few days' rest. You really deserve it. I remember you wanted to earlier, but it didn't work.

K: That's right.

W: So please don't worry about this. The important thing is that you are coming. If you come a little later I think it doesn't matter, but it would of course be highly appreciated if you could come personally. The debate will last, at any rate, a couple of weeks.

K: Well I will try to come during the second week of the debate.

W: That would be perfect. That is excellent.

K: Good. Mr. Secretary-General I will see you then, if not before.

W: Well, at any rate, if you are in New York I hope we can get together and discuss a few other things.

K: Absolutely. I wouldn't come to New York without seeing you.

W: You're very kind. Again, my very best wishes for your trip to Moscow.

K: Bye.

W: Goodbye, Mr. Secretary.

SB171 [*]

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Ron Ziegler/HAK
March 22, 1974/9:27 a.m.

K: Hello.

Z: Hi Henry.

K: Ron, yes?

Z: On this ABC thing.

K: I have no interest in it. You know, its entirely up to you.

Z: I mentioned it to the President and he said fine to have film taken he said but he didn't feel that -- he thought that the matters you would talk about were too sensitive to really have them include on sound.

K: I agree completely.

Z: And he said I don't want to act when it comes to you know Moscow and foreign policy,

K: I couldn't agree more.

Z: So I think I'll call Obwess(?) and say if you want a little film fine or if you want to delay this until Henry gets back and they're talking about it in those terms fine but the President said I don't mind doing this but you know I just don't like to act when it comes to foreign policy and I said I think Henry would feel that same way.

K: I didn't realize they want it soon.

Z: Right. OK fine. We're tracking then and we may do some pictures if not we'll do them later.

K: It's entirely up to you.

Z: OK Henry. Thank you.

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SB 178

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Amb. Dinitz/Sec. Kissinger
4:20 pm
March 22, 1974

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K: Mr. Ambassador

D: Yes, Mr. Secretary.

K: Have you dried your tears?

D: Have I dried my tears? No. When I am with the General I am laugheing. I keep my tears for other places.

K: Ok, now listen. Two things, one -- we have had an urgent message from Sadat saying he has information that Israel is planning a major strike on Sunday against the Syrians.

D: A major strike on Sunday against the Syrians?

K: And that he wants us to know that this would have serious repercussions on everything we have done up to now.

D: I hear it for the first time. Naturally, we will check on it right away.

K: well, Would you please add my urgent request not to do it, especially when I am on the way to Moscow.

D: I can tell you Mr. Secretary, 99% I am sure it is nonsense. But I am going to check on it because I have been in constant communication with Israel today and I don't think anything of this sort is planned.

K: Well, they are also busy making press statements that they can't plan military operations.

D: That they can't plan.

K: I am going to tell Sadat that El Lazar is now becoming a press star.

D: No actually, I saw the full statement. It wasn't as, I mean the tone was much more minor -- but on this question that you told me I will check immeidately. I am sure there is nothing. Would you like me to phone you later with regard.

K: Yes, I have one other matter which is just follow-up on what we discussed. But I will discuss that with you later, I don't want to take away time from important people.

D: Ok, Bye. END

SB 176 *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. McCloy/Sec. Kissinger
March 22, 1974
12:48

K: How are you?

M: I was talking to Winston Lord when you came on the phone. I told him that these fellows are sort of scattered to the four winds when they had gotten a sort of informal word from ~~X~~ Ken Jamison that there was very little likelihood of meeting this week, but I can ~~ek~~ get Ken Jamison who is down in the Bahamas now, but he is one the way back.

K: No, no. Don't get anybody back it was just stupid of my associates. I told them I couldn't do it Tuesday, but I would do it before the end of the week.

M: Well, I think your Assistants were trying to protect you. a good bit.

K: Yes, but Jack, you know that is one of the problems in these jobs that you get protected.

M: I know, what I want to be sure, Henry, is that when they come down they ~~w~~ are well-equipped to tell you in a short period of time just what their thinking is. That means that I can get them together before they did come down -- it is going to be pretty hard to do that before 10:00 tomorrow morning.

K: No, no, there is no sense doing it but it is sort of a pity because I am going to the Soviet Union now, I don't need it there and then I'll be back for a day and then I am going on vacation, then I'll be...

M: You ought to go on vacation and if it is anything of any substance we can take it up with Rush or something else.

K: No you can't.

M: I know it is not going to be like dealing with you but I don't want to do anything half-baked tomorrow.

K: No, no, let's forget about tomorrow. That just can't be under these circumstances.

M: Ok. Then we'll be back at you. There are alot of things I would like to ~~k~~ have them tell you about their reading of that whole area.

K: How about a week from today?

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M: Anything like that would be fine but I don't want to harrass you.

K: No, no you don't harrass me. But I will be more tired a week from today because I will be just back from a long trip.

M: Don't have it on your mind.

K: It isn't a question of being on my mind, it is a question that sinee we are thinking of doing some of these bilateral things that I told you.

M: Yes, yes there is alot of that going on now.

K: But I want to understan d first of all what it is that others are doing bilaterally. And it doesn't do me anygood if you tell it to Rush .

M: Let me go to work on that this coming week and put something together. And then I'll be in touch with...

K: What I want to understand from them is first, what bilateral things are being done by others. Secondly, what bilateral things we should do.

M: What bilaterals we should be doing.

K: That's right, becuase we are quite willing to do it.

M: Ok, what else?

K: Those are the major things.

M: Those are the main things and I think they hav e some ideas as to what you can do to help and I think third and fourth, they would like to report to you their reading of what is going on in connection with the cha cha they hear in the area in regards to the settlement.
That might be helpful to you.

K: I would appreciate that. But can they keep their mouths shut?

M: What's that?

K: They can keep quiet , can't they?

M: They can what?

K: They can be discreet.

M Oh, definitely. You don't need to worry. I can guarantee that.

*

K: They are not like Jewish intellectuals.

M: They are not like Congressmen's wives. I can guarantee that.

K: No, the Congressmen's wives were fine. It was the press

M: It was the press. I had some fascinating talks, by the way, In Paris over the weekend.

K:: Oh you did.

M: I saw tsome members of the Chamber and I saw some people that came over from London and I got alot of reading. You know those little remarks you made had a profound effect and I think they did good.

K: I think the net impact turned out to be good, although I didn't plan them.

M: Yes, it came out pretty well. The attitude in Paris was very interesting, but I will tell you about that when I see you.

K: Well, I look forward then -- you tell your associates that if I am not at my best it is because it is the end of along trip. But let's aim for a week from today.

M: Ok, I'll tell them that.

K: Thank you. Bye.

END

SB 177

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Amb. Dinitz/Sec. Kissinger
March 22, 1974
2:35 pm

First part of conversation was missed.

K: An Israeli command spokesman said that Egyptians had moved more guns into the restricted zone despite inspection by UN observers and had stationed artilery in regi ons forbidden by the terms of the January pact. Why?

D: I am sorry. I don't have any answer for you Mr. Secretary . I know that I got a statement that in case the thing was publicized we would say the following.

K: That was perfect.

D: Yes, and you know it was a little change from what we agreed yesterday.

K: No, no that I don't know what you agreed. What were you going to say.

D: When I saw you last night, you suggested that we would say that we are studying the situation to the extent that there wer e violations.

K: That was fine. I liked that.

D: Israel did not accept exactly this formulation. And said that if the thing would be published by Newsweek or someone else, they would say, in answer to a question, no missiles were involved in the matter because there is a great concern in Israel about missiles. We have information that the Egyptians are holding somewhat lighter artillery than was agreed. The Chief of Staff talked with [redacted] Silvaso; the matter is under investigation and we are confident it will be rectified. Which is better than what you read me.

K: Although, why did you have to say that much.

D: The only element that we could use was the artillery because of the concern in Israel is themissiles and [redacted] nobodyis concerned in Israel about fa few more pieces of artillery. What they are concerned is the missils. Because of the implications of it. So that is why, the story would have been published .

K: But please keep the debate down with Egypt. Egypt cannot act for you on Syria if you keep attacking Egypt.

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D: But Mr. Secretary, not on ly am I in complete agreement with you, but that was the reason why the Prime Minister and Dayan both okayed to me that that was what would be done. Why _____made the statement in his name I cannot explain. I don't know. I am so sorry.

K: Is there any Chief of Staff who doesn't run for Cabinet in Israel.

D: He did not run for Cabinet. He is basically a very decent fellow.

K: No, acutally, he is one of my favorites.

D: I am going to cable and ask them to go down and speak to him.

K: Good, I have one or two other things whic I will call you about later. One is tha t Sadt, we got a report -- he made no comment on that information you gave him.

D: Also not on our ability to continue to look for the corpses.

K: He made no comment either way. He just nd ed it. But if you do this other thing I am sure I can get ....

D: I have a number of items which I want to take with you subsequent to our conversation yesterday. We will do it when you call. Except that I will be at 4:00 with Scowcroft, Mr. Secretary.
K:
K: I thought you were going to a Bar Mitsvah again.

D: No, no. So, if you will be looking for me, I will be from 4 to 5:00 at Scowcroft and the rest of the time in the office.

K: Are you trying to impress me.

D: Iam trying to drop names Mr. Secretary.

K: I noticed that. Ok.
good
D: I will give you one piece of news though. The question of the stray Egyptians will be settled Silvaso is informed about it.

K: But that you should have xxxxx done through us.

D: The thing is when I passed my request through you, by that time they had already agree to give it to Silvaso. So my cable from Sisco came a few hours late. But in any event, since many arrangements need to be ma de, I asked

D: (cont.) our people to mention that this is done as a result of a request from youl.

K: Ok, good.

D: So, I'll wait for...

K:: Now, are you going to let me get off the telephone or are you goint to go babbling on.

D: Yes, Mr. Secretary.

K: (Laughter) Ok, Mr. Ambassador.

END

SB 198

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Secretary Schlesinger/Secretary Kissinger
March 23, 1974
3:40 P.M.

S: Hello Henry.

K: Jim, I just wanted to call you before I left and really only have one item of business but in general the situation is the way we left it and if anything comes up I will see to it that you get informed through Scowcroft.

S: Right. Incidentally, Henry, I heard that the MBFR meeting was not a thing of joy and enlightenment.

K: No.

S: I wanted to

K: It was a sorta disaster.

S: I wanted to remind you that the discrepancy between US and Soviet Union forces is just based on 15% cut on both sides.

K: Oh, no that I did not object to. What I objected to was you know if you take out the Soviet tank army with equipment for 29,000 Americans without equipment it is a little hard to sell.

S: Well, I think you are going to have to sweeten it up with tragment(?)

K: Exactly. As long as that is understood. And what we may have to do is

S: See we have those 7,000 weapons in Europe some of which we don't know what the hell we would do with.

K: Another problem, Jim, we ought to consider is that when you begin analyzing these equipment ceilings you don't really know whom they work for because if you take out their men they probably have to take some of their equipment with them and if you put a ceiling on theirs and a ceiling on ours you breed another disparity.

S: I think the best. It sounds right, I'd have to look at it more closely.

K: I don't expect to get into that in any detail in Moscow. The only thing that may come up in Moscow, but this is simply a guess, I have no knowledge of this, is they may resurrect again the idea of five to eight percent cut which would work out to about 12 for us and 29 for them.

S: That's all right.

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K: And in a way since we are not held to taking forces out.

S: Listen I think we can get that kind of stuff out of our headquarters and what not.

K: Exactly. It might even be a better way of doing it.

S: Yea. We have positioned ourselves in negotiations far better than the Russians have in that regard, we've got more fat.

K: Jim, one final thing.

S: Maybe that's a disadvantage being so combat heavy.

K: I have the impression of some foot dragging by the Navy on that mine clearance and Ebare(sp?) has now raised a number of questions.

S: Well Ebare(?)

K: Which I think the Navy put him up to.

S: I don't think the Navy put them up to that. Ebare(?) we misses a bet there, and I don't know whose fault it is. At the time that State made that announcement we should have informed him previously.

K: Oh sure.

S: And a lot of that stuff I think is just a resentment of the bureaucratic situation. Now he is raising two questions. One question is, how can we send our sons to die on foreign soil. And the other question is, who the hell is going to fund this. Now on the funding side I think we will have to find a way of getting it out of the AID budget.

K: Oh, Jim, the President is calling me on the other line.
I will call you right back.

S: Righto.

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
March 23, 1974
1:25 PM

D: Solve the problem I think.

K: It may or may not. In either event I think you should not draw any consequences until we have had a chance to work with Egyptians.

D: No. I wouldn't

K: I am confident when Sadat's personal emmissary was over here and I told him we suspected violations. And he said there is no problem, we will take care of it.

D. Yes. Well that is all what we want Mr. Secretary. We don't want any confrontation.

K: Well let me know by 6 pm what I should tell the President, if any thing. But you can tell the Prime Minister that we are flying weather permiting on Tuesday.

D: OK. And you will let the Egyptians know.

K: I am sending a message now. I'll say we are taking the unusual step of letting them know so that they can take the step.

D. Fine, I appreciate it Mr Secretary.

K: OK

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SB196

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
HHumphrey/Secretary Kissinger
March 23, 1974
1:53 PM

K: Hello
H: Henry.

K: Hubert, how are you?
H: Fine, my friend.

K: I am going off to Moscow tonight. But I wanted to talk with you about one matter which I know you disagree with some of the thinking here. Which has to do with some use of some developments loans for Viet Nam.

H: Yea.

K: The problem is that the oil bill alone for Viet Nam has risen by a $125 million as a result of the rise in prices and that almost all their difficulties are caused by world inflationary treasures.

H: I had a talk yesterday with Gen. Van Dong and the Ambassador that was in here.

K: Right.

H: And I do understand that problem, Henry, but here is what I was worried about, Henry. In fact, I am not adversed trying to help as much as possible in these matters, but the problem that I see and I had Gail Magee in here; We got worried if you start to transfer it just stirs up such ungodly troubles over here as all of my colleagues, I don't know whether we would be able to get another bill out that is all.

K: Yes.

H: As I told Mr. Parker, you can do it this year, you got the authority to do it, the law is clear, you can do it.

K: Right

H: But right away just between us you will have Frank Church, Ted Kennedy, and Cranston and Abourezk and all these fellows jumping up and raising hell, and the Chairman of the Committee and Mansfield and all of them.

K: Yes.

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H: And I just got to worry about whether the short term gain was worth the long term risk.

K: Well, that is a point I understand very well. I have two problems I don't expect you to give us the go ahead but some of our people here are worried if we do do it as a last resort that your willingness to manage the AID Bill would be affective and that of course would be very bad blow to us.

H: Henry, I am not a petulant young man about stuff like that. I want to work with you. I mean I am a soldier in the ranks in things I believe in and I know we have some obligations there. I am not going to jump.

K: After all the agony we went through, all of us and you perhaps more than anyone, to let it all slide down now because of what is not a huge sumethat's what bothers us.

H: Now you have got a $54 million request in here for economic to try to get that sub up to the organization.

K: Right.

H: Now, uh,

K: Of course, if we got that we would not have to do the loan.

H: I think that its my judgment that we can get most of that over here. That's if we really work at it, because it isn't a large enough sum of money and it was authorized. You know we did authorize it, and we authorized it with a pretty good majority, better majority than we did with appropriations.

K: Well, why don't I do this Hubert. Let's hold off a few more weeks to see how that supplemental goes.

H: Right.

K: And then if we get absolutely against it then we may have to do the loan.

H: I understand that.

K: And you and I am not asking for your public support at that time but for your sympathy that we have to do it despite of your preference.

H: Well, now let me assure you of this. If you have to do it, which I know that, that is something that you will have to weigh very carefully because the only reason I told Parker that I looked with opposition on it was because I was worried about fiscal 75 because I thought we had things colled down on SEA, but they are still at it. It's got us like we're on heroin. You know. It is unbelievable around here that we get hooked on this.

K: Then they are going to crank it up again.

H: Yes, they are trying to crank it up again. If you got to do it, just have your man, just tell us when you got to do it and I'll, I'm not going to raise any hell about it. I am not going to join the pack.

K: That is really all we can ask for.

H: But I would like us to pursue the course of the supplemental if we can and see if we can do it the regular way.

K: Well, why don't we hold off for 2 or 3 weeks.

H: Yes.

K: And see what the situation is then.

H: I had a heart to heart talk with the Deputy Prime Minister here and told him exactly what was being said around here in terms of Congress of you know what it is, but I have to be very honest with you, I think you are wasting ammunition. You have to be frugal and you have got not to over react. And you have to show some progress in your country in economic development, even though it is minor you have got to be able to show it, of course they don't get any good press here, it is impossible.

K: It is awful. Because they are really working hard and they are caught by the world economic situation. Look India is taking a beating. Every country is caught by these high raw material prices.

H: Of course, and this is the worse problem we have right now. All right Henry.

K: Good Hubert, when I get back from the Soviet Union I would like to sit down with you on SALT at some point because I know you have always been interested in this problem.

H: I have been. You know what, just before you go, let me say this, I talked the other day here with some of our people on this Jackson amendment business. I wish we would get that damn thing off the MFN and MFN ought to be done really on the basis of a rather normal thing and if we got any argument with him it ought to be on credits. You know a banker has a right to say before you get my money, we would like to talk with you about certain things. But on MFN it seems to me that that is a normalized relationship that this world in this year of 1974 requires. And I think that means more to the Soviets in many ways than even the money. Because there are other places to get money. I see they ..

H: got a billion dollar plant from Germany coming up.

K: Yea. Of course, the credits they already got, so if they were cut off that too would be taken unfriendly--as an unfriendly jesture.

H: Well, we are not going to let that happen but

K: But I think we could come to an understanding with the Congress about the rate of lending.

H: Yes:

K: And that it won't go beyond a certain point unless there are certain things that the Soviet Union does.

H: Yes, I think people understand that. They really I mean a banker will say to you like to they say to PANAM and PENN Central and a few others unless you do certain things in management we are not going to continue the money.

K: Well let's see what they are going to come up with on the immigration issue when I am there.

H: Well, good luck to you, my dear friend.

K: Thank you Hubert, and I look forward to seeing you. How is your health?

H: Oh listen, I am feeling just great and I am so grateful I can't tell you. I really do. And I want to help you in any way I can.

K: Well, you know your admirers are all praying for you.

H: I know that. Well you do so much, I really worry about you just between us. The Lord blessed you with all kinds of strength and vitality.

K: Well, I was very fortunate that way.

H: Good luck on this journey friend.

K: Thank you.

H: You bet, Henry.
K: Bye

SB195

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
March 23, 1974
130 PM

D: Hello.

K: Anatoliy

D: Ch yes, Henry, how are you?

K: Ok

D: Eleven o'clock?

K: Eleven o'clock.

D: Henry, I have list of where your children to go and how.

K: I saw something from our Embassy. It sounded very good to me.

D: Yes, because I received it yesterday from Gromyko and this is the whole list. And if you and they want something to add there is no problem.

K: I notice you have me down for ballet again but I know I will never get there.

D: The ballet is up to you to make a decision. There is no problem. Anything you would like to see.

K: No, No, you had me down on my schedule for a ballet., but I don't think I'll ever see it.

D: Well when you were there as a matter of fact three evenings or four

K: Well the first it is very difficult. So three..

D: Well maybe some good performances.

K: Anatoliy, I had two minor things, one on. I don't know whether you can help with this. My ex-wife is a little worried about too many pictures being taken of my children with all these terrorists and kidnappers around. If your people at the airport could discourage pictures of my children, I would appreciate it.

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D: Only the problem is with your Americans correspondents there so you would like, or you may do it in a different way. There is no problem with us because if we have some photographs we will just give it to you without showing.

K: Sure. That doesn't bother me.

D: It is more from American side, but if you don't mind we could do it this way for instance if you go out, they will stay in longer for say three minutes later. -- Not to come with you.

K: Exactly.

D: Then they will take separate car by our security men where you will stay.

K: I think that is better.

D: Then there is no problem. One of our men will come from our Foreign Ministry and pick them up and the security car will bring them to your residence.

K: There is no ceremony is there?

D: No.

D: So in this case I could arrange they arrive you come down and meet see your children and someone will come to airplane and bring them to you.

K: Don't you think that is better.

D: I leave it up to you. Yes I think it is better. You shake hands and someone will accompany and then they will come.

K: Should I make a few remarks when I arrive?

D: Your own people may ask you. We will not press you to make or not to make. But it is really for you and your pressmen.
There will be no forward statement but you'll stop half a minute to chat with them.

K: Right. OK. Good.

D: What else?

K: That is all. On the press band. I don't think we can have a moratorium But we would be prepared to discuss a threshold.

D: About....

K: Whether I have not really I cannot proceed without having seen that study which is not yet completed.

D: I see.

K: Let's put that in abeyance for the time being.

D: Yes. Could you get it during stay in Moscow?

K: I'll try.

D: If not, it goes on another page and on this troops deduction is an idea not to go into details because you will..

K: Well, what we discussed the other day say anything between 5 and 10 % US/USSR we would be willing to discuss.

D: Just as initial step, but with understanding.

K: But with a link to a second step which would include national forces.

D: OK, so long as those lines we discussed. He may... annoying negotiations maybe as I mentioned to you just a number of troops which you put there along figures I mentioned toyou privately, but those are the same we understand and agreed. Half year and other half from there.

K: Well that is more difficult.

D: Why you don't won't to have any.

K: No, but because we have never discussed that with any of our allies.

D: Oh, I see.

K: As soon as you can discuss it.

D: CK this doesn't make issue really in this meeting.

K: We will have chance to talk on the plane.

D: OK, so at eleven o'clock.

K: Eleven O'clock.

D: Yes

K: Right

D: Fine

K: Bye

D: Thank you very much.

SB 193*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
March 23, 1974
1:17 PM

K: Brent.

S: Yes sir.

K: Brent, do you know when we are flying that reconnaissance thing?

S: The 26th, if the weather is right, that is Tuesday.

K: Can you find out whether we can make sure that we are going to fly it on the 26th and whether we can get the films back by the 27th? If we can let the Israelis have the problem with their parliament, and in fact if we could fly it on the 25th it would be that much better.

S: I don't think. I'll check I don't think we can. It takes that much time.

K: All right. Will you make sure it flys on the 26th and that we get a read out on the artillery piece s ~~xxth~~ right away.

S: OK

K: And hopefully on the 27th early.

S: Sure. I think I can probably get a read out on that specific thing.

K: OK . Thank you.

S: Sure.

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SB 200

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON

Secretary Schlesinger/Secretary Kissinger
March 23, 1974
3:52 PM

K: Hello

S: Hello, Henry.

K: Jim, On this, I agree that was a stupidity on Ebair(sp?). The reason Sadat wants us to do it, he can get it from the Russians and from the British.

S: I know, but there are two things that have to be done. First, the foreign policy (inaudible)

K: OK I'll do it when I get back.

S: And secondly, I could do it.

K: Or you do it, if you want to.

S: I could do it in part for you, but I can't substitute entirely, I think your personal ways

K: I'll call him Friday.

S: Secondly, we want the Navy to go up there and explain the nature of that operation and that there is really very little risk. Virtually no risks at all to US personnel.

K: Both would be good.

S: And the Navy is perfectly happy to do this. The Navy is fully supported by the operation. I'm not sure the Navy would want the ..... to come out of its hide.

K: About $10 million for Christ's sake.

S: It is fully suppert of the operation. I think we can show [redacted] Getty around.

K: Good.

S: Now what else is there? We are having real problems on the massive increase and that's in trouble. I trust we will be able to get an agreement with the Thais that we are studying the reduction.

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K: I have signed off on that thing on that paper and that should be coming over to you on Monday.

S: Yea. But the stuff for the negotiations. They are making an announcement that we are starting negotiations.

K: That's fine.

S: And with that I think I can generate support.

K: Look, I have

S: ....We are in trouble on that. The Mehone Committee is taking a very tough attitude on it and they have been willing to go with a $200 million increase and that's all and that leaves us short of what we need let alone short of what we asked for.

K: What did we ask for?

S: I am going to try to get Mehone off that and get Stennis to weigh in. But it is very helpful to me if I can say well look fellows we are trying to adjust our problem in SEA where we have got excess resources we are going to reduce them as we plan to do in Thailand, but on the other hand on the Vietnamese side , because we have taken our forces out we need additional money to support the Vietnamese.

K: Absolutely, you can do that. And I will strongly back. And if you want me to call Mehong I'll do it.

S: No, I don't think that is necessary. I may call you in at a later date. Now the other thing is that John Stennis and some others have taken a very tough attitude on Diego Garcia.

K: Stennis I talked to him the other day and he told me he was going to come around.

S: OK. That one is going to be very tricky to put through.

K: The thing they are all having trouble with is why it has to be in the supplemental.

S: The answer to that is quite clear. Because we want to get an additional 6 month head start prior to the time they reopen the Canal.

K: Yea. Well

S: OK, Henry.

K: Well, OK, Jim and I'll be in close touch.

S: Have a good trip and I think that there is some possibilities if you think about it of holding up the option on MBFR or SALT and that you want to have some movement on one or the other. I'm not sure how they feel about MBFR, but some ways that may be a more promising area and shows a sense of diplomatic momentous.

K: Well, I'm not dying to get you know to ram SALT through. Let's see what happens.

S: Yea:

K: Do you think Zumwalt wants me to raise home porting in Odessa? I think that is a more reliable place to homeport than is Athens. OK Jim.

S: CK

K: Bye

S: Bye, Bye.

SB 97*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
McGeorge Bundy/Secretary Kissinger
March 23, 1974
2:23PM

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 12 DEC 2002 200102979

K: Mac, how are you.

B: You're on your way aren't you?

K: I'm on my way this evening, but since all my letters are written by others I wanted you to hear from me personally how much I appreciated your letters.

B: Well, you are nice to take the time with all you've got on

K: No, I thought it was extremely thoughtful. What you said about George Ball also crossed my mind.

B: I found myself snickering to McCloy about it so I thought I would share it with you.

K: But I agree with your basic point. I think now that a shot has been fired across the bow we can all...

B: I think it worked better than I was afraid it would, you know I think you have other people to do work for you now.

K: That's right. I think now no European government it going to vote on something that effects our interest without getting it to us one way or another.

B: That's right.

K: I have had incidentally, I've had the, our own records checked on what we were told when. We were told some of these things, but in such a peculiarly inconclusive way.

B: They may have been. It is absolutely characteristic of the Germans. They are doing it now with the French. You can see they are not being as firm in conveying what they would like of the French as they are conveying to us what they would like to convey to the French.

K: Yes. But, I think we can cool the confrontation.

B: I think you already have.

K: Exactly.

B: I think it is four or five days better off than when I was scribbling that.

K: But I appreciated it very much. What I would like to consider working out at some point in the near future is how I can get you gentlemen down here and

get you read into some things so that it is more a consultation.

B: I think that the way to do that is, is not to put so much of your own time in it. If you wanted to delegate somebody that you had confidence in, then people, could come in and out as they were able to get to Washington and...

K: Let me work that out when I get back from the Soviet Union, because on the two big issues which are going to be SALT II and the MidEast we'll need every scrap of public support we can get and every bit of advice we can get.

B: I think both are going to be edgy and I think on the Middle East in particular there is a need not to be longly given the climate of opinion here.

K: And that's going to be, you know that is going to get nastier and nastier.

B: I saw Eban in the airplane coming back the same day we were down there, because he had been seeing you. And he said something cryptic about what a difficult day it had been and I could see that you had begun the educational process.

K: Well, I am trying to avoid a head on confrontation for as long as possible.

B: Well, you are absolutely right. First place you would break up the government and then it would be your fault.

K: Exactly. Exactly. But on Syria for example, they have just got to give up a slice of the Golan Heights. It won't be

B: Told _____ Berlin about that who understands them better than almost anybody I know and he thinks they will, when they really.

K: I think they will too. It they can figure out how to stick us with the blame for it.

B: And if they can decide if Counatry(phonetic)? doesn't really matter, I don't know if that is the one that doesn't really matter or not. But all they have to do is find a piece of property that they, that their generals can most easily part with and you have a bargain going.

K: That is what I think. That is what I hope any way, but even if we don't get a bargain going, I will then be able to split the Egyptians away from the Syrians.

B: You can get the Egyptians away from the Syrians, but I'm sure how far you can get them from the Saudis, which is why I worry about Jerusalem.

K: On Jerusalem something has to happen. Jerusalem, on Jerusalem the Saudis will not give up.

B: Exactly right.

K: I hope the next move after Syria can be a major settlement with Egypt.

B: Well if Sadat will go. It depends a little bit how far he can go and still say he is keeping the solid front that he always talks about.

K: As long

B: He probably knows better than we do.

K: As long as we don't call it peace I think it can go quite a distance.

B: Yea. Well that gets theological with the Israelis.

K: That's right. But I think the Israelis are so..if the Israelis had any sense they would offer the 67 porters to Egypt. And get them out of the war, because for that they could get anything.

B: I'm sure that is right. That is what you said to us the other day and on reflection I am convinced of it. It's the government that is not capable of thinking for itself though it is much the same proposition that applies there that you applied to the Soviets in the context of SALT.

K: Yea.

B: You have to give them the menu because it is just an act against nature for them to design it.

K: But if they are not willing to give up all the territory, then maybe they should settle for not getting all the peas.

B: Well. They will do much better the other way around and their own does know that but, but.

K: They would do a lot better the other way around because whether they get those 10 or 15 miles.. makes no difference in history.

B: None.

Bundy/Kissinger
3/23/74

K: An Som Mosaisic has become irrelevant because they can close Bai Ba Monday(?)

B: Absolutely. All clear. You know a lot of them have begun to say it. I think you are right to negotiate with Dayan because at least you can say that kind of thing to him.

K: He is the only one of them who really has some strategic grasp. But he may not last through that report of the investigating committee.

B: Well, that is the trouble. How long will you be gone?

K: I'll be back Thursday night.

B: _____says you look forward to boar hunting.

K: Inhuman. And I tell you the last time I participated in that sport, where I refuseded to shoot, but when you sit up in that stand, it makes you doubt that prudence pays because they put out the food and about 80 boars arrive simultaneously and there was one extraordinarily cautious and looked behind every tree arrived late, searched the ground before he put his foot down and it of course got it. I'll call you when I get back.

B: OK Have a good trip.

K: Thank you Mac and thank you for your letter.

B: Right.

K: Bye

B: Bye

SB 189

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
G. Hauge/Secretary Kissinger
March 23, 1974
10:00 a.m.

K: I am calling you about the Under Secretary position for Economic Affairs in the Department and as you know Casey has left to become head of the EXIM Bank. And one of my big problems is to get a better relationship between political and economic objectives. And we haven't ever really been organized well in the State Dept. to do this. And with Shultz leaving it becomes even more important. I was wondering if whether by any wild chance one might be able to induce you to take this?

H: Well, I think it would be an exceedingly wild chance Henry. I am in the midst here of a very considerable operation. I have been Chairman for about 2 1/2 years. I have got about four plus some to go.

K: Four years to go.?

H: For some years to go for retirement. I turned 60 years old Henry. I am getting to be an ancient of days. And so, I am pretty well ruted in here I think for the duration.

K: Well I am sorry to hear that.

H: I took over when Mr. McNeal retired and I have got a good young president, but he isn't ready to take over yet by any means. He is 41 years olds, he is best president in the business. But you know how it is this is a small operation compared to some of those down there but.

K: I know, but it is an important one.

H: And not a simple one to operate.

K: That I am certain of.

H: But Henry I certainly will put my mind to this immediately to see if I have any thoughts. being useful to you.

K: But could you? It almost has to be somebody who knows something about Washington, don't you think.

H: Yes, indeed.

K: There are a lot of bright businessmen one knows, but they couldn't really do it.

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H: And in addition I think somebody who can cope with Treasury.

K: Exactly.

H: The State Department hasn't been able to do that for a long.

K: And deservedly so, because it hasn't since Dillon they haven't really had anyone here.

H: Precisely. Henry, I will turn my mind to this and are you leaving shortly.

K: I am leaving tonight, but you can call Ken kRush.

H: I'll call Ken Rush. I know him very well.

K: I would appreciate it. very much.

H: Right to Henry. All the best.

K: Bye.

SB 190

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
March 23, 1974
12:34 PM

K: Hello

S: Yes sir.

K: If the Fahmy letter has been cleared I have not seen it.

S: Well there is one I read in the pink this morning, Mr. Secretary. Let me recheck it again.

K: Can you get it sent in here.

S: Sure, right a way.

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SB 192

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
March 23, 1974
1:00 PM

D: Hello

K: Communications from your Government which Eagleburger has handed to me. Let me make a number of points: First of all, I am sending it back to you, I refuse to accept it, and you can tell them that.

D: This is not the communications that I was suppose to hand to you.

K: At any rate. Just tell them I have refused to accept the first part of it in any form in which it has been communicated. Secondly, if you think if it is in your interest to bring this matter to a head while I am in Moscow, you go right ahead and do it.

D: But we don't think it is in our interest to bring it to a head.

K: Thirdly, if Dayan doesn't come, I'll withdraw from the negotiation and state publicly what has happened and you do what you want. And then we will put somebody else in charge here. We have now communicated to other Governments that Dayan is coming. Your behavior is outrageous and frivblous and you know dam well we have told Sadat they should be removed by the time we fly our next plane. You know very well that he has told us the tanks would be removed and has not refused to withdraw the artillery. I have communicated with Fahmy yesterday so it is entirely up to you, if you want to play domesticate politics you go ahead and do it, but I think and you just communicate this to the Prime Minister, I don't care to debate it. I cannot accept this communication in any of its points. We are talking about 72 lousy artillery pieces which we have told you we would get removed and if you can't understand why we wanted to get to Sadat personally for the first time we flew a mission and why it was so desireable to do if after the embargo had been lifted then and why we wanted to have the military photographer interpreter there who could explain it to him.

D: We understand this.

K: So then the first part of your thing is just totally unacceptable but if you don't like our reconnaissance you do your own reconnaissance, we would be delighted to stop it.

D: Can I say something Mr. Secretary.

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K: YOu can say something but I don't want to debate it.

D: I would not say it for the sake of debate of an argument. . I think your reply to me now is based on the wrong assumption. It is assumed that we don't come or that we are looking for a reason not to come. The fact of the matter is so the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense are very anxious to carry these negotiations and for DAyan to come. The point is that we are asking your help in moving

K: You have my help. I sent a cable last night in which I made essentially the points you asked me to except I didn't make them conditional and I still don't believe I 've told you for months not to ~~length~~ Syria and Egypt together.

D: We are not lengthing Syria and Egypt together, but you will have to understand Mr. Secretary the situation in Isareal there is now questioning these violations and a question of creditability of the government.

K: If by the time you get ready to settle it, there is still violations then you have a point. If at a time when you have been assured by the U. S. Government one, that the tanks would be withdrawn; two, that we are in active discussion with the Egyptians about the artillery being withdrawn; three, when you have the backing of the Government to get it withdrawn, but when we are pleading with you not to make an issue of it with the Egyptians, who are under attack from the Soviets alreay.

D: Yes, but this is not the question we are making an issue with the Egyptians. We are really appealing to you to help us.

K: That we are doing. I have already done it last night and if after the next flight they are still there then we have a real problem. I have in any case told them to remove it as quickly as possible.

D: Isn't it possible Mr. Secretary they can remove it by Tuesday when the .... expects

K: Maybe it is. I am not saying it isn't. The method we used was the right one. The method you using is wasting a lot prestige for nothing.
D: We are not using any method, but we are under attack and we are only communicating with you. We have not communicated with public ly on any of these methods. We are trying to bring the situation, to rectify the situation so that everything can proceed, this is our only interest. We have no interest in...

K: I told you, you could say that we have told you that by the next time. Well you can't use the reconnaissance publicly.

D: I called the Prime Minister after our conversation last night.

K: Well at any rate, I sent message to the Egyptians last night. No we have made all the points you wanted us to make.

D: Can I say to the Prime Minister that you have asked the Egyptians to remove the artillery and that you last night sent message to the Egyptians asking them to remove the artillery and rectify the violations as quickly as possible?

K: Yes, but that is the second time we have done it.

D: It is the second time you have done it and the...

K: And they have never refused to do.

D: And they have not refused to do it. And...

K: I have no question that they will do it. Why should they want to cheap with 72 artillery pieces?

D: I don't understand it either. That is why Dayan says that he thinks that a strong plea by you would be responded by them. He doesn't think it is a major method for them to move these..

K: We have made a strong plea. Now I will not tell this to the President until 6 p.m. tonight, when I talk to him. Now if you want to get me a reaction from Israel, you can do it up until then.

D: I will communicate to the Prime Minister and Dayan.

K: But I must say two things, one, it cannot be in your interest to have a public confrontation with Sadat.

D: Mr. Secretary.. this is the one point.

K: Secondly, you cannot want to emphasize violations while I am in Moscow for god's sakes.

D: That is why we want to solve the thing before you go. I mean if we have this assurance that you have done all what you could.

K: You have the assurance, you can tell them that we have personally intervened with the Egyptians. However, it isn't helpful to have all of this in your gd knitze(?) Well then it will be on every Moscow radio station

to the Middle East.

D: But that is not up to us, Mr. Secretary. When the opposition tables a motion for the agenda as they did, We can't stop it. I can assure you we are intereted in a debate or in foreign affairs security because that is the last thing in the world we are interested, and this is not a threat., Dayan ask me to tell you; tell the Secretary we are not threating him, we are not using c___ leverage. But it would be physically impossible for me if I have to debate and give evidence and the thing is not rectified. They say the Minister of Defense of the country does not leave when the agreement is violated and believe me Mr. Secretary

K: But look I am holding this thing together against all probability here. If he doesn't come, I'm going on vacation. If the Middle East explodes in a nuclear war, I've canceled too many visits. If haveasked the Syrians to come here on April 11. If this whole scenario which has been designed in order to give you the maximum amount of time falls apart and you make the Egyptians who are trying to help us ... for this, then I can't do any more.

D: But is it so difficult for them to do this before Tuesday? Then everything is set in motion again. I mean really if surely.

K: I don't know whether it is that difficult for them because I can't go to Sadat every other day. I now have to go to Fahmy. Fahmy is much tougher on these things than Sadat.

D: I understand. But if you have asked for Sadat to do this then he owes you an answer.

K: What I asked Sadat was, thinking that we were dealing with rational people, that by the next time our planes would fly, 6 or 7 days, I expected that they would not find these things there. I didn't ask him to reply to it, because I wanted to do it in a face saving way so that the next time we could report they weren't there. I have attempted precisely to avoid having him to back down. This is exactly my strategy.

D: I understand.

K: Now when we are flying next I don't know but it will certainly be next week.

D: I understand this but this is, we are also .. rectify this out of the..

K: And therefore, I know we are flying next week sometime because I have just approved it. I don't know the exact date on which we are flying. But it will take two days to get the pictures after that.

D: Maybe if you fly on Tuesday and then we can get the pictures by Thursday and then he can leave on Thursday and be here on Friday. I am simply trying to find a way out of a situation that is really impossible. Not that we are looking for it, Mr. Secretary after all, we really have meticulously done everything in the agreement.

K: Yes, but I am confident that if the Egyptians violate the agreement they won't do it with 72 artillery pieces and you know it too.

D: That is correct and that is ..

K: And therefore, we are not talking about anything but a technical violation which I am sure will be rectified if you do it in our way and if you put Israel on war footing over there then keep the defense minister there and fake a great crisis.

D: No we are..

K: When you have Syria to worry about then you can go right ahead and do it.

D: Mr. Secretary, but you surely believe me that it is not to our interest either to make a crisis out of this or to put The Secretary of the country in a war or delay coming of the Secretary of Defense nor of which is to our interest and not only you and I understand it but Golda and Dayan understand it. What we want is a way that all these things would not happen. If the thing is out in the public It has all been kept secret, that is a differenct situation. But since the thing is all in the public, we are trying to find a way in which the Minister can come as scheduled which the Egyptians will rectify the situation and in which we can rectify the Syrian situation. I mean this is precisely what to do. The Prime Minister says we gave credit here, continue to give credit and with Sadat. We really want to do this and I said to Larry Dayan told me on the telephone he hadn't even thought about our second line defense after we would lose Sinai because we don't want to make it a permanent line. And as a result of it wait for nobility there. I mean, I passed it on to Larry as a kick of information. And this just shows to what phase we are meeting. Now we have a very serious public situation to face and this is not of our making. And this other question Mr. Secretary you tell me you can't be concerned with gd domestic politics, it is not domestic.

K: Oh, come on if you can't explain that you have been asked by the U.S. Government to that all we are talking about are 72 artillery pieces and that you want to wait ~~xxdx~~ until another inspection after which you will of course pay the different thing. Really if the public (Israeli) is so stupid not to understand that then ~~wex~~ I think we are in bad trouble. For all I know they may be gone by next Tuesday. We didn't ask him. We avoided what you are forcing us into.

D: Well we are not really forcing you into any Mr. Secretary.

K: Well, look, it is up to you. The fact is , his not coming will become known just as I will being leaving Moscow, which is going to be tough enough as it is.

D: No, No, I don't think we should face a situation .. It is best for us ... We are trying..

K: I regret that I have already put in ., I have sent a long cable to Fahmy yesterday after our discussion explaining to him that 6 batteries is 36 pieces not 72 and I said it would be unfortunate in deed if this matter were to cast a cloud over the excellent record so far metitously observed at the disengagement agreement. Then at the end I said you should tell Fahmy that the Israelis have just contacted me with an urgently that the artillery fleet in excess of 36 piece be withdrawn in order.. prevent this discussion from becoming a major political issue in Israeli with all the unfortunate repercussions and complications that cause for what we are seeking to accomplish together in preparing the atmosphere and way for the ongoing peace effort with Syria. So I have made the...

D: That is correct Mr. Secretary. The only thing that maybe I can suggest is that if this things can be achieved before the session of the UN that would remove the whole issue from the public line and would facilitate the whole operation. I mean this is only one point that ... can make ~~AKXW~~ because I think that will allow us to

K: I will make that point today. It is a grave mistake. It is a grave mistake you are forcing us into and you

D: Why, Mr. Secretary?

K: It is a mistake because I am certain the next time we fly the gd things won't be there. I know Sadat; he isn't going to risk his relations with us for 72 artillery pieces. You are now forcing us to force them to back down in writing.

D: They don't to put it down in writing.

K: I cannot ask our Ambassador to see Sadat three times a week. Therefore, it has to go through channels, therefore, there will be a written recored of it.

D: Suppose you make reconnaisance Tuesday then send it

K: I don't know when our reconnaisance is flying. I am going to find that out.

D: I am just trying to find a way ... There is no need to make a crisis. It is no good to any of us. Iam trying to convey and be as honest as I can

K: Look I know you were honest about. Look, I won't tell the President until about six o'clock, if there is anything you want to modify fine, or otherwise I will have to send a piece of paper to him in a synopsis form.

D: (inaudible) Well I be talking again with my Minister.

K: I would not recommend however that we be in a position when he is worried about what the Israelis do while I am out of town. I do not think that is any bodby's interest.

D: No, definitely not. (Inaudible) And Dayan said to me to tell the Secretary what we are doing is a today we have another causlty Except for his diplomatic effort we would have never reacted the way we did.
K: That I believe. Look we have this immediate problem in which your proposition is unacceptable. Now is we can. First part. If we had wanted to gx cover up for it we could have done it easily and the second part is unacceptable.

D: Was not in a document questioning relationship between . It was a description of the situation . Which authorizes us to to ask you to help us rectify it.

K: That we. I have read you what I said.

D: I understand.

K: I will now send another one.

D: That is the only thing--if you can possibly send reconnaisance.

K: I'll find out when the gd reconnaisance is.
OK Thank you.

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
March 23, 1974
3:35 PM

K: But this is Saturday.

D: I know but it is almost in our minds, the Russians, we are ... Saturday and Sunday. So it is Friday and Saturday in Russia, they are not working. Henry I just received a telegram with a text of letterf from Brezhnev to the President. This is an answer to his letter which you mentioned tomme, you remember.

K: Yes.

D: I will read it and then it is rather short and then would you like me to take it on the plane or just send it within half an hour to your office.

K: Send it in half and hour to Scowcroft.

D: To Scowcroft, yes.

K: Yes.

D: I will just read it just for you to know.
Dear Mr. President: Thank you for your message of March 21 which I have read with great interest. First of all, I would like to tell you Mr. President, that I highly appreciate and ..... your ..... of the historic importance of what we have already managed to do in the last year, in improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. I agree with you that our forth coming meeting can and I would say should demonstrate that the relations are mutually beneficial cooperation between our two people are really becoming a permanent factor for the general peace. General peace this ais a goal worthy to work for. It is concrete situation listed in your letter undoubtedly may ...consideration and I am confident that exists ample opportunity to provide both sides demonstrate necessary elimination realistic ... approach to come to a mutually acceptable agreement which would give appropriate importance to our new meeting. We will thoroughly discuss .....the situation with your Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger, proceeding from then the sayings that he will have as before all necessary powers or... from you .....

K: What?

K: You devil, you are up to it again.

D: Well, as before necessary powers from you for reaching some ... agreements.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 26 MAY 2004 200102979

TELECON
Dobrynin/Kissinger
3/23/74 3:35 PM

K: I know you.

D: Please accept, Mr. President, my best wishes to you.....
March 25 ..... matters to you ... with reservations.
Thank you.

K: ...

D: OK

K: Anatoliy, incidentally for your information, the M. Goldman is running around town saying that you told him Moscow has lost confidence in me.

D: oh,

K: And that the only person that, that you are the only person left to have any confidence in me.
In the present it is Washington that helps me so it doesn't, I'm not a affected.

D: No, no, it is nonsense. Are you serious

K: That 's what he said, I don't believe it, but that is what he said.

D: How does he know?

K: Because he said, he saw you.

D: Yes , but we did not discuss you at all.

K: Well

D: In no way.

K: No, no

D: He knows I would be the last person to say kinds of things.

K: Exactly.

D: You know me for many years.

K: Anatolivy.

D: ... I would tell you personally but never to anybody else.

K: Look, I know that. You don't have to convince me. I just wanted to tell you.

D: He is real .....My impression he hasn't really been an admirer

K: Oh, yes. He doesn't mean any harm.

D: No, no.

K: He just likes to be important.

D: This I would agree with you. And when I will see you, I should say something else to discuss , but it is not specifically important

K: I will see you tonight.

D: Yes at eleven. I hope you will .. but not at 1 AM or 2 AM.

K: No, no I will be on time.

D: I hope you will go to a nightclub before.

K: Absolutely. No, my children will be here.

D: Oh, yes. .... OK

K: See you then.

D: Bye, Bye

K: Bye

SB 191

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
March 23, 1974

K: That isn't the letter I wanted. I wanted a friendly letter you know telling him that we would , we are under great preassure from the Soviets, but that no matter what noises he hears from Moscow, [illegible] to believe only what I tell him. You see what I mean.

S: Yes. All right. We will get that to you.

K: And that we are staying on the course we had indicated.

S: Around the course.

K: You understand.

S: Yes, I understand what you are saying.

K: Good Thank you.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 10 DEC 2002 200102979

SB 188

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Miss Peer/Secretary Kissinger
March 23, 1974
9:20 A.M.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 10 DEC 2002 200102979

K: Hello.

P: Good morning, Mr. Secretary.

K: How are you?

P: This is very heroic of you when you are just about to leave, and I will make it very fast.

K; I am leaving later in the day.

P: Yes, I know, but I really do appreciate it because it is terrible helpful to the story and it is very gracious of you. The cover we are doing is a very long profile which means both professional and sorta personal look at Barbara. The first thing I would be interested in knowing, is how you evaluate her as a journalist--how tough an interviewer is she?

K: I think she is very persistent interviewer, and quite tough. She has a great ability to get to the heart of the question and not to quit.

P: Has she ever asked you on television a question that you really did not wish to answer?

K: Yes.

P: Which one?

K: I don't won't to tell you. No but several times.

P: She several times what?

K: She several times asked me questions that I really didn't want to answer.
P: But you did.

K: Well I, Yes, because she wouldn't let me get away any evasion.

P: Is she, taking the last interview for example when you about a year ago, I am told privately that you had said privately to people at CBS. Barbara told me this and said it was all right to pursue it with you, that her questions were tougher than Marvin Kalb's. Is this anything I can use newsworthy?

K: No. I don't want to make individuals...

P: No I can appreciate that. One of the problems of the story is trying to ...

*

her

K: Well/questions, incidentally on what basis are we talking here?

P: On the record.

K: Well then will you read back to me whatever quotes you are going to use?

P: Yes, I will. Would you like for me to start right now?

K: No, let's get through and you can then tell me what quotes you are going to use. Her questions were more personal.

P: Than what?

K: Than some of the other interviews that I have had.

P: Do you as the interviewee consider that a good or bad thing?

K: I am very fond of Barbara, so I, its, I don't say, you know it makes it a different interview.

P: In what sense?

K: Because it's more personal.

P: It is my thesis in writing the piece is that this is one of the reasons she gets particularly in her long interviews with people some of the news that she does get because it is a human interview as well as a news interview. Would you share that?

K: I think that, yea, that makes sense.

P: How do you see Barbara as a woman?

K: She is a very good hearted, warm person and she has been very good friend.

P: Are there any particular examples when she has gone out of her way to be ... kind or do something for you.

K: She has always been a good friend.

K: I think I have said as much as I am going to say.

Peer/Kissinger
3/23/74 9:20 AM

P: Let me just ask you two last questions. I don't know you if in you busy life in the White House and State have had time to read the longer pieces that have been written about Barbara.

K: No.

P: A lot of them have been very one dimensional sorta Sammy gleb Walters what makes her run. What do you think the people at large who don't know her don't understand about this woman? or don't appreciate.

K: Well, I think she is an exceptionally warm-hearted person and a with a great capacity for friendship and not at all a pushey aggressive girl.

P: You say this even after an interview?

K: Even after an interview.

P: Uh, let's see.

K: OK, I've got to run.

P: One last question. You have been renowned in Washington for your success and power obviously, and the fact that in Washington as we all know, power makes, tends to make a man very attractive and sorta sexy. Do you think it does in a woman? Is success or success in power do they enhance a woman's attractions.

K: Not to me. I don't think so.
I mean, certainly not power. I don't think that has anything to do with it. Certainly not in my relation with here. That is her power.

P: Mr. Secretary, thank you very much. Do you want me to read back what I have taken down?
K:
K: Well, would you call me and just read me the quotes you want to use after you have taken it down?

P: OK. I don't think there is, certainly the calibre I can well appreciate that it is ...

K: Look, why don't you call me back and just check the quotes.

P: OK,

K: Good. Thank you.

P: Thank you so much. Have a good trip

SB 201 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
George Vest/Secretary Kissinger
March 29, 1974
3:26 PM

(Missed first part)

K: ___their negativism continues.

V: I think so, sir. I think they are built in negative, that's my sense of it from their talks - from talking to them before and after. I think the biggest part of it they derive from your own briefing to them from Moscow to London. At least that's the way they interpret it.

K: That's amazing. Was that so negative?

V: They draw that conclusion from it.

K: But you were there, weren't you?

V: I did not draw it that worthy of that total/degree (negative) of negativism. If you try to push it further I think it will have a rebound rather than, you know go and make it any further.

K: I wasn't aware I was so negative.

V: There were terms like unacceptable, failure and so on. They were used in a limited context. The problem for them is they take that context and make it a broader one than it was in fact, indeed the fact.

K: OK, thank you.

V: Right, sir.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 12 DEC 2002 200102979

TELECON
Secretary Schlesinger /Secretary Kissinger
March 29, 1974
3:10 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

S: Hi, Henry.

K: Jim, how are you?

S: Oh, pretty good. How are you?

K: Well....

S: A little I assume.

K: Yes, but the major problem isn't that. The major problem is that we have nothing left to offer the Soviets and therefore detente is just in bad shape

S: You mean on the MFM and equivalent?

K: Yes. I mean SALT isn't all that surprising to me and the press is building it into a crisis.

S: Who is building it into a crisis.

K: Well the press is building into a crisis.

S: Oh, the press is. They were after me.

K: Into a failure. You know, given our proposal we haven't got - you know when you listen to the Soviet version, our proposal looks pretty silly.

S: Why is that?

K: Their version is that what we're saying is we're starting off with 6,000 warheads which we're banking volarisis (sp), on poseidon. They're giving us per boat, then we're banking all the air delivered RV's and then we want to restrict their ICBM's on a ratio that's unfavorable to them in the overall.

S: I think that conceptually that has some merit, on the other hand as you stressed, you just can't do with SCBM's what you can with IC's.

K: But then I said, you know, you'll be able to destroy our ICBM's and he said, yes and leave you with 9,000 warheads to hit every village in the Soviet Union. It's not an absurd arugment.

S: No, it's not, except our preference isn't necessarily to hit every village.

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K: I agree. All I'm saying is, when you hear their version - I think we would like an agreement. Their proposal now is 1100 to 1,00 MERV missiles. No sublimits but they will tell us what the sublimits are. I will ask - you're not free for breakfast are you.

S: Henry, I'm going to take a little rest if you don't mind. I'm going off to Bermuda for two days.

K: OK, I just want a little work donw while I'm gone, I'll have some of my people do it. Maybe they could get together with yours so that it doesn't leak out.

S: Sure. Just have them call Paul.

K: Whether any sublimits are conceivable that we could live with. Always keeping in mind what the situation will be without an agreement.

S: Right. OK. How's everything else?

K: Otherwise, things are going along OK.

S: Did somebody shape your senior State Department official conferences on the aircraft? I'd like to know what you say.

K: What I said was...

S: I'm just asking if there is a transcript.

K: But I can tell you what I said. I said some progress was made but not enough to constitute a breakthrough and we now have to analyse it.

S: Well, I guess I was quite consistant with that when they asked me about it yesterday.

K: That's all I did say.

S: OK. Good. Now on the question of Suez. There's a very delicate situation, as you know Herbert was opposed to that. I went up to see him, I guess after you left, and he has now backed off and he indicates that he is willing to support the operation as long as we give him a way of crawling back off the limb, which we think we've given him. He says it is improper, illegal for the DCD to fund this directly. So the position that I've taken is that the administration will seek from the operation in other ways. You can either look around in the aid budget or if you don't have it in the aid budget send a supplemental to the Hill or indicate that you're going to have a supplemental to the Hill. If the supplement doesn't fly then of course we will have done the work already.

K: My nightmare is that with the Egyptians going so far out on a limb for us, if we now get the same problem with the Egyptians that we did with the Soviets.

S: No, I agree with that. I agree with your nightmare and I think the way to do that is to proceed - the only way that we're going to be able to launch the C-141s, which we would like to be prepared to do essentially today, issue the execute order, is that is Herbert, Stennis and Mahon are satisfied that the administration is not intending to use DOD funding for this, after we've launched and executed, then you can go back to the drawing board, if you can't raise the money some other way. At this point with them raising those questions and Herbert being very stoney about it, Stennis I think probably could be talked around, not Herbert.

K: Do you think the Navy has put Herbert up to this?

S: No, I do not. I think the Navy wants to do this and I think they regard this as useful to the Navy's image in the world, sort of an all purpose service and so on. I took Zimwalt (phonetic) up to the Hill with me and he was quite useful in bringing Herbert around on the concept that we are not sending American boys to die on foreign soil, which was the line that Herbert initially started off with. As long as the indication to the Hill is the administration will seek to do this outside of the DOD budget if we ultimately fail in that regard after we have executed the operation then that's a new ball game. But I don't think we can start the ball game if we say now that the DOD is going to eat it, in fact, I know damn well we can't.

K: OK, good.

S: S: Is there some other things on the back of my mind that is a problem area? No, I can't of it at the moment. I shall be in Bermuda, you can get me at the Naval Station there, if by any chance you need me. Bill Clemmens will be available.

K: Good. I'll be on vacation myself.

S: Oh, good. Where are you going.

K: Acapulco.

S: How long?

K: About a week.

S: You taking off on Sunday?

K: Saturday.

S: OK, good.

K: I'll see you then when I get back.

S: Is there any other area we haven't - oh, Henry, get your people to take a look at the Soviet-Iranian border. The Soviets have conducted some maneuvers up

there, that are kind of odd and unusual and they're putting some pressure up there on the Iranians.

K: OK.

S: I believe that the watch committee is kind of, said, let's not stir anyone up about that, but I think that you ought to be informed on that because it looks like either a little muscling in the political area and it's obviously related to their threats that the Iranians should stop supporting the _____. That could be a problem.

K: OK, let me take a look at that.

S: OK.

K: Good.

S: Bye. Welcome home.

K: Thank you.

END

SB 205 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Senator Adlai Stevenson/Secretary Kissinger
March 29, 1974
7:25 PM

S: Hello, Mr. Secretary.

K: How are you?

S: I'm fine and I know you're tired and busy.

K: That's all right.

S: Thank you for returning my call. The economic - the import control legislation and also the Eximbank legislation is in a subcommittee that I'm the - the subcommitte is banking this committee and I'm the Chairman of it. Both the Export control administration act and the Exim legislation expires at the end of this fiscal year, June 30. We held some hearings and we're planning a resumption of the hearings next week. What we want to focus on at this time are the foreign policy implications for both export controls and export credits. That of course raises the Jackson amendment but it's an example of a larger question, GAC opinion that a number of proposals one way or another, or bartering food principally for other commodities. The general purpose is to get into the foreign policy implications of export policies and we're starting with some administration witnesses, Casey is going to come up but I would hope at some point we might come in on you to testify in this phase of the hearings.

K: My trouble is I'll be on vacation next. How long are these hearings going to run?

S: They'll run through the month and maybe into May.

K: I don't think I'll be able to do it before May if that's still time.

S: No, that might be better. I'm in no position to say, but we'll be continuing certainly in early May.

K: I'll be on vacation and then there's that special assembly in N. Y. which brings so many foreign ministers here. Then we have an CAS meeting in Atlanta. If you would let me wait until May I would appreciate it.

S: By all means, it will suit your convenience. I do think you and you almost alone could speak authoritatively on this aspect. At some point hope very much.

K: As long as I have you on the phone, I wouldn't havebothered with it, the newspaper today all have stories about a failure of the SALT negoations in Moscow and that's totally wrong.

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S: Oh, really.

K: They picked out a phrase I used two weeks ago saying it was time for a conceptual breakthrough, so they asked me was there a breakthrough, I said no, there wasn't a breakthrough there was progress, but they only heard no breakthrough. Today the Soviets papers all printed what I believe to be correct that there is a chance of coming to an agreement this year.

S: I haven't seen today's stories.

K: I just say this so that in your own considerations of credits you don't do it in the context of a failing detente.

S: I don't want to do anything at this point. I have no position myself and I would hope - what I really want to do is ventilate the issue and get started on it because we're under time restraints now and I don't know where you stand with the Jackson but from a little what I've heard there's no a great deal of progress on that in connection with the Trade Bill, in Congress whether there will even be a Trade Bill. In the meantime the Exim Bank is getting up closer and closer to it's ceiling and we're approaching the June 30 date. I would hope without polarizing the issue but handling it in a responsible way we can begin to ventilate this thing and Jackson amendment is just a part. Begin to move towards some kind of a compromise. I'm complete sympathetic with the motion for using export controls and credits ffor political purposes.

K: Oh, no. So do I. That doesn't bother me.

S: That doesn't bother me one bit.

K: There's no disagreement by me, with us on that.

S: They're arguing the other side. They say withhold the credits for political purpose. Others, some of them in the Jewish communicate. Marshall Shullman coming out and say give them to Kissinger for political purposes. That's the - that in a very large sense is the question, I think we ought to start ventilating it. Seriously and with no dispostion on my part. I suspect on the part of the others, the banking committee, to reach any premature decisions. We do have one immediate problem, I don't know to what extent this enters in your problems, but that GAC opinion, notwithstanding the Attorney General, does raise the validity of exim credits and guarantees into the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. I don't know what the attitude of the export is and the banks are. I thought they would have serious doubts about exposing themselves, until that question gets resolved. Either it gets resolved by the Congress or in the courts. Nothing I can do about that one at the moment.

K: Let me aim for testifying in early May.

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S: OK.

K: Good, nice to talk to you.

S: We'll be back in touch with your office with more specifics and if possible a date.

K: Good.

S: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

K: Bye.

END

SB 203 *

TELECON
George Vest/Secretary Kissinger
March 29, 1974
7:45 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

(Missed first part)

V: ____Moscow. He has the report that the Soviets complained that Gromyko tried to get in tough with you while you both were in the Middle East and did not get an explanation.

K: Total nonsense.

V: He got that from Soviet sources.

K: Tell them it it total absolute nonsense.

V: OK.

K: That Gromyko made no effort to get in touch with me. I think they're all going crazy. Tell him for me it was a successful meeting.

V: I did that, just a moment ago.

K: He doesn't believe.

V: He seemed to be taking the point and thinking about it. I will tell him from you as well.

K: OK.

V: On this one, our position is that Gromyko did not make an effort to get in touch with you.

K: None what so ever. Is he at home?

V: I have his phone number.

K: Why don't you give me his phone number.

V: His phone number is 362-9040. If you're going to call him I won't.

K: OK.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 13 MAY 2004 200102979

SB 202 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Robert McNamara/Secretary Kissinger
March 29, 1974
4:07 PM

K: Bob?

M: Hi, Henry, how are you?

K: OK.

M: Welcome home.

K: Now that you're through being my recruiting agent, how would you like to be a speech writer.

M: Well, that's beyond my capacity but I know you've got to do something at the UN, is that what you're thinking about.

K: Yes, and we have a draft which is a great term paper. I wanted you to - the speechwriter is just sitting here - I don't want you to think I'm talking behind his back. I would appreciate it Bob if you would just - we're sending it over to you - Joe Sisco is. If you don't - I'm obviously not asking to re-write it - but what other things do you think need saying.

M: Yes.

K: What I would like to do at this speech is to say, look, there is a problem of development but for God's sake don't let's discuss it in terms of a confrontation between the developed and developing nations, but in terms of the complete issues that confront us. In which on major points there is a communitive interest and where there isn't a communitive interest you certainly can't extort it from us.

M: I think that's a good theme to put forward.

K: That doesn't come through in the speech but if you could jot down just the issues which from your perspective seem to be the dominant ones. I can't compete with the demagoguery of ____ and Jobert. I have to have a rational and careful approach.

M: OK, send it over and - I just walked into the office, I've been away for the week.

K: You take - we don't need a reaction this afternoon. We can have it by Tuesday or Wednesday of next week.

M: OK, I'll definitely do it. It's a hell of a mess, I can tell you that.

K: That's why I'd like to say something that's not the usual baloney. We have in that whole speech, you will see, not one reference in any meaningful way to these

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accumulating surpluses of ____that you've been concerned with.

M: I was in Algeria this week on Monday and Tuesday and I spent two hours with ____.

K: He's an impressive guy.

M: He's a very impressive guy. He's hard, tough , intelligent. He fought 8 years from '54 to '62 and he bears the scars, psychologically and otherwise. They have absolutely no plan. At least they had none then for the UN session.

K: Yes, that's right. I don't think they have one now. That's why actually I think we have an opportunity, we can get ourselves to say something sensible.

M: Well, send it on over and I'll receive it and I'll get something back to you.

K: Many thanks.

M: OK, Henry. Nice to have you back.

K: Thank you.

END

SB 206 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Jerry Schecter/Secretary Kissinger
March 29, 1974
8:00 PM

K: Hello.

S: Henry.

K: Jerry.

S: Hi. Did you see the Star tonight?

K: Yes.

S: There's a wonderful cartoon.

K: I tell you this reporting from this trip is the weirdest I've ever seen. There must have been something wrong with my briefing. Have you seen that Moscow has now denied these stories and both have said there is a possibility of achieving an agreement.

S: Then you used us right.

K: I didn't use you. I tried to tell you guys the truth, which is no break through, but progress. Nobody seemed to hear the latter part. Really, let me tell you for your own guidance. You will not look bad if you do not howl with the pack. I'm not telling you there will be an agreement by June, right now, I'd say the chances are 50/50. They made a proposal which if it is suitably clarified, could be the basis of an agreement. If we don't get the required clarifications then it cannot an agreement in June. But it is a definite movement. For the first time we're talking about the same thing. I don't give a damn whether one week says it's bad, in fact it's slightly helpful with the Soviets. The truth is literally what I said but you guys were so focused on the break through that when I said no break through, you didn't h ear there was progress.

S: I guess so. Everybody's - the other thing is that you've, you went on such an upswing that everybody I think over reacted because of that. You know what I mean. The fact at least everytime you go someplace....

K: Jerry, take out the communique from every previous pre-summit meeting. Compare it and make up you own mind. I wanted to tell you about that thing George Vest mentioned to me. It is total nonsense. Gromyko did not get in touch with me on the whole trip through the Middle East.

S: He was obviously expecting to meet you.

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K: Jerry. That anybody can say now. There was no communication to me from the Soviets at all during that trip. There was a communication by me to them before I went on the trip saying I would be available for consultations by their Ambassadors, in every place I visited, that was before I knew he would be in Damascus. I never received a reply to that.

S: Why should they say that he brought Sukhodrev along with him because he was expecting to see you.

K: Jerry. Don't you think the way to have done that would be send me a message saying he was prepared to meet me. I'm telling you we received no message of any kind from him, from the Embassy, we received no Soviet message of any kind about his travel.

S: Did you see any Soviet Ambassadors?

K: No, because they never replied to my message.

S: In Moscow they were saying Gromyko got a lot of heat from Brezhnev because he's done so well in the Middle East.

K: That is conceivable. But this may be his way of covering himself.

S: In other words, what's confusing to me why did he bring Sukhodrev with him. The timing of your visits were so close. They're saying you never consulted with them. You never explained why you didn't see him.

K: That is true since I didn't know he wanted to see me. Today we announced my trip to the Middle East. We sent a letter to Gromyko. A personal letter from me explaining how the trip had come about and saying I hoped he would instruct his Ambassadors in each capitol to be available for consultation because would get in touch with them if he agreed. Then a never heard from him again.

S: The next thing was you heard he was coming to the Middle East.

K: The next thing I heard he was coming.

S: I picked up some stuff around town here about possible compromises on MFN, like no natural gas - postponing the natural gas deal but they would, the Russians, would make some progress on the hardship list and maybe increase the numbers.

K: I don't want to go into that.

S: Well, I have to go into it. I just wondered if...

K: I wouldn't speculate on any hard and fast deal toomuch because it's a more fluent situation than that.

S: But if I raised those things as possibilities would that be an embarrassment?

K: The gas deals, I haven't heard that discussed at all. The thing you have to keep in mind, Jerry, there's a sort of lemming suicidal impulse right now. People throw away what we've got as if it's nothing. Three years of peace with the Russians isn't nothing. That's my big worry. Our domestic uproar is so confusing people that they don't look at it.

S: I must say that the crescendo is getting louder. The other thing, for example, I heard today that the date for the meeting would probably be the end of May or early June because otherwise it wouldn't be feasible from the go.

K: The date will be as we announce it, as we told you.

S: Which is what, end of June?

K: Not before that.

S: Last ten days of June.

K: In that general area.

S: In other words, the end of June.

K: In that general area.

S: They told me that you'd probably go down to the Black Sea.

K: Who told you that.

S: The Russians.

K: That's one of the possibilities, on that there hasn't been a decision.

S: I'm sure you know this but if you don't I think it's interesting. The reason that was given to me that it would be easier for Brezhnev to go down there and see the President one on one. And as he did in Moscow again, then he has to worry about the other two guys because it's a more formal situation. Where if he meets with the President at ___it's easier for him to be number one down there.

K: And if he's lucky, I may not be there.

S: Now, I'm not going to sleep tonight. You shouldn't make jokes like that.

K: No, he may keep me in Moscow.

S: I meant ___Kosygin, not you.

K: I know what you meant. OK. On this Gromyko visit, believe me there's nothing to do. All he had to do was suggest it and we would have worked something out.

S: I need some kind of quote for the story can I say no break through but progress.

K: You can say it, no break through, but definite progress.

S: OK. Can we say - I thought the fairest estimate that you gave that says, no break through - you said it was inclusive.

K: Yes. I tried to be fair. That is true. It is inconclusive means that there is a chance, but no guarantee.

S: Why don't we say that, there's a chance but no guarantee. That's nice.

K: You can use that.

S: That puts the ball in the other court, nicely, I think. Are you going tomorrow.

K: Almost certainly.

S: How is Dayan?

K: It was alright.

S: I heard he was - he didn't come with much.

K: You know you guys are conducting my negotiations now.

S: We spend so much time with you...

K: I am quite confident we will work that thing - that we will come up with a reasonable position. Always compared it with the trend. I am perfectly relaxed. It was a good meeting.

S: OK. good. Have fun down there. We'll see you when you get back. You really deserve a rest. I think you did a hell of a job on this thing. Obviously you don't need me to say this, but I wouldn't be too upset by the reaction. I don't think it's - it looks awful but you can already see the Russians are upset. The thing that fascinates me is that they were really unsure of themselves this time. This time they're in a different kind of league then they've been in before. Normally they just go in and bully people and now they really have to think about what they want and where they're going to go and I think it's driving them to distraction.

K: It isn't that they didn't try to bully me.

S: No, I'm sure of that. I think obviously they want to buy some time but I think...

K: Look, basically given all the problems we are having, it was a damn good meeting it really way. None of us who was there compared it unfavorably with last year's in Zavidovo.

S: Right. Good.

K: OK.

S: Thank you.

END

SB 212 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
March 30, 1974
12:45 PM

K: Hello?

D: Dr. Kissinger.

K: Mr. Ambassador. Look I'm writing a letter to the Prime Minister of some of my thoughts which I thought I'll have Sisco give to you on Tuesday, so that it gets there about the time Dayan does. What do you think?

D: Dayan told me about this and I think it cannot hurt. In fact, I think it's a good idea.

K: I'm not pressing her. She doesn't have to do anything for a few weeks.

D: Right. No, I understand. I think its - and I relied that you put it in such a manner that in which it explains the motivation, though it does not....

K: Why don't I tell Sisco to go over it with you and you edit it.

D: That would be highly irregular, Mr. Secretary. Especially to do it with Sisco. But I'm willing - maybe Eagleburger shows it to me and then I will tell Eagleburger if I think something should be changed. But that should remain only between us.

K: I thought I'd tell it to Marilyn Berger.

D: Marilyn Berger grabbed me in the corridor before we left and she asked me if it's true that the Secretary's getting married today. I said that was one of the bilateral issues that wasn't discussed.

K: She is an absolute pain in the neck.

D: Are you, Mr. Secretary?

K: Listen, if you don't know, it can't be true.

D: I'm not sure anymore. I think my information is slipping.

K: You know that these things wouldn't ever happen without you.

D: I wanted to tell you but whatever you decide to do, Mr. Secretary, my blessing goes with you. I really mean it.

K: Thank you. I hope you don't mind my teasing you. It is really a sign of great affection.

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D: I really appreciate it, it's mutual, I can assure you, Mr. Secretary.

K: I know that. You've been a friend beyond the call of duty.

D: I like you as a human being and I think you're doing a great job for the free world. That is my main thesis about you.

K: The crowd is gaining on me, you know it.

D: You say what I did with the Soviet press for you, Mr. Secretary.

K: I know. I didn't know you had a gang there. Actually I found that very interesting.

D: I think they realized that they undermining their own cause by this. They don't want to weaken the President, they don't certainly want to weaken your position.

K: No, my position they'd love to weaken.

D: I don't think so, Mr. Secretary. I had a very interesting luncheon with the editors of the U.S. News and World Report the other day - while you were in Moscow. We were discussing this question of detente and I was trying to convince them that ____because of their interest in perpetrating the President's position. I really believe it. I think the biggest catastrophe that can happen to them is if there's a change here, because when there is going to be a change, it will also be a radical change toward Soviet detente. They know it, so therefore - I mean I don't say that they.....

K: I'm not sure that's true.

D: I think it is. I think they are very much interested in keeping the....

K: Why should Ford change his policy?

D: Because they don't know. It's a new element, it will take ____another two years to study him and all his friends and all his motivations. They don't know what power base he will have around him.

K: It's an element of uncertai nty.

D: They know that in any event Congress will be stronger ~~on the fort~~ because he comes from there and he is dependent on them. They know that Congress is not particularly sympathetic to them, so all these considerations, I think, indicate to them. Besides they have great respect for your ability and ...

K: Since they now know that ability is not working for them ...

D: Well, I think they still think that they can best advance detente under you then under anyone else. I don't mean it critically, I mean I think that you are trying to get the best things for America out of detente. That is obvious, but I think that they would see new mobility to advance than anybody else. I know, and they realize that they instructions you came with on SALT were not sufficient. They know, I presume they even surmized that if it were up to you individually you would gone further.

K: No, not much. A little.

D: More than I would say on material things.

K: I think we're not pursuing an insane course which will lead...

D: to confrontation in the front.

K: No, that eventually too, but at first it will lead to Soviet military superiority because we're not going to increase our budget enough to - but that's a different problem, we can discuss it some other time. OK.

D: Dayan flew to New York and I'm joining him this evening and he will be coming bac for meet the press. I think their meeting was good, the meeting today. It put him into a better frame of mind. And he is now afraid that by Monday it will not all be toppled down while the Secretary is going to be in Acapulco. I said, I think that the Secretary will see to it before he leaves that he closes all the avenues so that nobody will run away with the show.

K: No question.

D: And he explained to me what you told him that we have to give the credit to Schlesinger that you don't want to...

K: That's why I maneuver in such a way.

D: Yes, I understand. When you come back and we will have one of those personal talks, I will tell you some of the things that are happening town. I don't want you ever to misunderstand me, Mr. Secretary. I'm not saying it to you in order to play into the Departmental game. I don't play those games. Not with you anyhow, but I think you ought to know what is going around town and his talks with Congressman and his talks with professors. I'm not saying he s talking against you, but he's building it on constituency. He's building a constituency which is based on the ___line then the one you take. He does not speak against you except on specific issues. He's speaking about the need for stronger American and for a less compromising America. He has attraction to these circles because he is intellectual, he's the only one in that Administration that...

K: Particularly since it works against the Administration.

D: Well, yes, but that is a secondard... Yes, that is why it is attractive to some element, sure.

K: OK, I'll see you when I get back.

D: Fine, have a nice vacation, Mr. Secretary.

K: Thank you.
D: Bye.

END

SB 211 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Frank Mankiewicz/Secretary Kissinger
March 30, 1974
12:00 noon

K: Frank, how are you?

M: Well, other than recovering from the flu, but otherwise I'm fine. Are you going to Syria or Acapulco?

K: I'm going to Acapulco.

M: I thought this morning, Holly said she thought you were going to Syrian and then somebody came over and said that Francie Bremer says that you're going to Acapulco

K: That is right.

M: Then I figured she knowsbest. I had a couple of things I wanted to raise with you. One before you went down to the Latin American meeting, but I don't know whether you've done anything with it or not, concerning a fellow Chon Chol. Ever heard of him?

K: NO.

M: Well, he was the Chilean Agricultural Minister. You know, an agricultural economist, but apparently a very high class intellectual academic fellow and in jail. It struck me from what I heard about it and the kind of people who were calling about it, that it would be an awfully effective thing if somehow we could put some pressure just in respect to him, because it would look awful good and he's a kind of a Galbraith (?).

K: Do I have his name here.

M: Chon Chol. C-h either a-n or o-n. C-h-o-l.

K: OK, we're making a representation about somebody else, so I'll include it.

M: The first name is Jacque. As near as I can figure out, he's pure academic and very respected here. You know, in a non-political sort of agricultural agronomist fellow. I'm sure he probably isn't thatpure if he served , but I'm also sure it would look awful good if something could be done. How long are you going to be gone down there.

K: About a week.

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M: Well, when you get back, let's talk because I may be going on my visit. To the Caribbean.

K: Oh. OK, good. Will you call me when I'm back?

M: Yes, I'll call you when you get back.

K: And I hope you feel better soon.

M: Well, I'll be alright. Also maybe we can get together then on a date for our seminar sometime.

K: May would be possible. April is impossible.

M: Well, why don't you get your people to think about a date in May.

K: OK.

M: Talk to - oh who is it we've been talking to? Miss...

K: Andrews?

M: No.

K: Rothe?

M: Yes.

K: OK.

M: Or Eagleburger.

K: Eagleburger would be the best, but I think they can't pick a date until I'm back because - not until I've talk to Syria and it's fallen into place there.

M: Yes. The way you're going it will fall into place. Just a quick nudge. I tell you there's nothing like it. I even like the setback.

K: The setback isn't actually so bad compared to what the papers said.

M: That's right. I can see that coming along too.

K: It is coming along. Actually the papers got carried away. I told them there wasn't a breakthrough, but I did say there was progress.

M: They want a miracle a day.

K: But they're now so used to homeruns that they won't settle for doubles.

M: That's right. Exactly.

K: Frankly given the situation with the Chiefs, I couldn't get a homerun, but I couldn't have - but I would have tried to avoid hitting one if I could have had one.

M: I must say I think those guys - they want only the superlative. I thought if even you read between the failure lines you see success. I'm sure the stories aren't very well written anyway.

K: No, they over wrote them.

M: I'll tell you who's not fooled by the failures is F. Edward Herbert, if I read the paper correctly.

K: Who?

M: Did you see that story - Herbert who is the House Armed Service...

K: Oh yes, did he pop off?

M: Oh, yes. He's setting up a separate subcommittee.

K: Oh, on disarmament.

M: To study these terrible disarmament agreements that you're about reach.

K: No, he isn't fooled. We have no interest in high profile right now.

M: Well, he doesn't see you as failing, I'll tell you that. I think it's all just fine. But I'll call you when you get back.

K: Good, wonderful.

M: And we'll talk to Eagleburger on a May date.

K: Good. I want to talk to you at any rate about where the liberal Democrats are goingin foreign policy. I think they're killing themselves.

M: Well, I want to talk to you about that, because where they're going is in a very strong __position.

K: Well, that's alright. That they have a right to do.

M: But you've got to undercut that somehow.

K: But what they're also doing is in a hard line position.

M: The way to head that off is on the human rights area. You can't let this become a confrontation between , you know, with them on the human rights question. I thought you had won that day and I hope I can tel l you this, that was the ___day. Terrible. You can't get into that position again.

K: I'll tell you the truth. I wasn't prepared for the questions.

M: That was obvious.

K: Whic is another stupidity.

M: You should have waited. Waited till you saw the statement and so forth.

K: I agree with you.

M: Let's talk about that question because I think that can be blunted and then you can let the liberal democrats go where they want. If they want to be hardmind Richard Nixon 1950 anti-Communist, that's fine. Because they're not going any where with it.

K: OK. Hope to see you soon Frank.

M: Yes. Bye.

END

TELECON
General Haig/Secretary Kissinger
March 30, 1974
10:05 AM

RELEASED IN FULL

H: Yes, Henry.

K: Al, I'm meeting with Dayan today and you know on that Syrian things what needs to be done. But one of their problems is that we've been dragging our feet on the arms supply. He's the only man who understands in Israel what needs to be done. So I think it's important he come back from here with some understanding of his position. One of his problems is the Soviet have put about 800 tanks into Syria since the war. We've only replaced 225 out of the 600 they lost. He feels he must have tanks which the army says they don't have, except by taking them from unit. I think that we just have to do that. And the same with ACPs.

H: How many of those do they need?

K: 500.

H: OK.

K: I'm going to have Brent work with Schlesinger but I would like to you, if you would, if we have anyproblem, I would like Dayan when he sees Schlesinger on Monday afternoon to be told he's getting this. So that he can go back to Israel as the man who produced it. That will then help us in the subsequent talks.

H: OK. Do you want me to wait until Brent tells me the way in or to move anyway. I can do it either way.

K: What do you think?

H: Maybe it's better not to undercut Brent, let him just start and if he finds there's a problem.

K: OK, I'll have Brent work it this weekend and get in touch with you if there's any problem. And you might just say the President is interested in Dayan having something to take home with him.

H: Exactly. I understand the picture, Henry, we'll just put the arm on him. It has to be done. We can fool with it.

K: Have you seen that the Soviets have now put out a statement denying these press reports.

H: No, I didn't.

K: The Soviets have put out a statement saying it is totally wrong to say it was a failure and that an agreement by June is quite possible.

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H: That's great. These damn press people are really something.

K: Put out a very laudatory article in the ____ and another one in another leading journal.

H: That's good. When are you leaving.

K: 3 or 4 this afternoon. OK, Al.

H: OK, Henry, you're in our thoughts today.

K: Many thanks.

H: Bye.

END

SB 207*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
March 30, 1974
9:23 AM

S: Good morning, Sir.

K: We have a cable here the SCB Russians apparently have tol d the Syrians that there's no hope of leaving the Golan Heights. That that's the conviction they got from our talks.

S: I saw that this morning and we should kill that very very categorically.

K: Well, do a message to Asad will you. Just say we just had a report that they may have gained this impression, I want them to know the issue of Golan Heights was never raised and no discussions of frontiers ever took place and our position is exactly what I told him.

S: OK, I'll do that.

K: OK?

S: Yes.

END

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SB 209 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Secretary Schlesinger/Secretary Kissinger
March 30, 1974
10:42 AM

K: How's Bermuda?

S: Very rainy.

K: Is it rainy. How is your moral?

S: Splendid.

K: That it can rain there that is why I go to Mexico, always you can be sure of good weather.

S: Yes.

K: Jim, this isn't a good line on which to talk, but you are seeing Dayan on Monday.

S: That's the plan.

K: Right. We are going over, with him the various disengagement schemes. He's really been the man who on the Egyptian disengagement and on the Syrian one has been the one who has carried the intellectual ball. I would be very useful if he could come back with some positive news on some of his concern. I don't have the list here in front of me so I don't want to go over individual items with you. If Brent could work with somebody, whom should he work with over the weekend.

S: He could work with John Whickem on that.

K: OK, I'll have him work with Whicken and I talked to the President about it yesterday, again not on items but as a general idea and he is sympathetic. too. So can Brent work with Whickem and if you could in your conduct when you see him, do it from that point of view it would be very helpful.

S: You want to give him something?

K: Yes, definitely.

S: You know the cobra is something they been insisting on .

K: If you feel you could spring a few of those that might be a good gesture and it might also help in other context.

S: The problem is that the others will reach for the cobra.

K: Yes, but wouldn't that be a good way of doing it?

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S: If you give the cobra to them you have to give it to the Jordanians, you may have to give it to the Jordanians, just elevated the capabilities. I don't know whether that's a worrysome point or not.

K: Why don't you raise that with him.

S: Right.

K: I don't want to go into individual weapons now, I'm more talking about the general attitude.

S: But you want to be forthcoming.

K: Exactly.

S: No problem, we can go as far as you want.

K: Let me - Brent has the list - let me go over the list with Brent. Let him talk to Whickem. I just wanted you to know my attitude.

S: OK. The Israelis are being fairly cooperative then.

K: Frankly it will have to go through a process and again frankly we are counting very much on Dayan's support in this process.

S: OK. Very good.

K: The more he can be strengthened the better it will be.

S: OK, we shall attempt to strengthen him.

K: Good. Many thanks. Have a good rest.

S: Bye.

END

SB 210 *

TELECON
Mr. Rush/Secretary Kissinger
March 30, 1974
11:45 AM

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

R: Hello, Henry.

K: Hi, Ken, how are you?

R: I'm fine thanks.

K: I'm sorry we couldn't get together this morning and now I'm off for a vacation.

R: I know you are, you certainly deserve one, Henry and you should have. I think you have received most of the things I had in mind.

K: You had to go home. There wasn't any mixup about getting together today.

R: No. I just finished up everything and so I can home.

K: Did they tell you - you know, there's no reason for you to have stayed.

R: I wanted to, I had some things I wanted to do.

K: You wanted to go home.

R: No, I had some things I wanted to do in the office.

K: They did tell you I was going to see you right after Dayan.

R: No, they didn't. No one told me that.

K: Alright, never mind.

R: I thought you'd probably be with Dayan toomuch.

K: NO.

R: When do you leave, Henry - at 1:00?

K: Yes - there's no sense for you to come in, it isn't that important. Did you make clear to Kosciusko-Morizet that we infact did have evidence along the line that these articles said?

R: Yes we did. As a matter of fact, Henry, I played golf with him and with Mel Laird and with Jim Hutson just after you had seen him and he was telling me about h is talk with you. I said we did have evidence, Jacques, some of your Ambassadors had been urging the Arabic countries, I won't tell you which ones, not to lift the boycott. He said well that can't be. I said, well it is, that's the evidence we had.

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I said obviously it's indirect evidence, but we have the evidence. Then he came officially to giv e me the demarche. When I called him back in as you requested, I told him this over again that we did have indirect evidence to that effect. He denied it, he said that would be stupid of us. He said obviously that would mean a continued curtailment of production and that in turn would mean we would not - the price would stay high and it would hurt our economy very seriously. I said I don't know about that but certainly your Ambassadors are reputed to urge the continuance of the boycott and I assume they don't do anything that Jobert doesn't tell them to.

K: Basically it wasn't so much that they urged them the continuation of the boycott b ut they told them after the boycott was lifted they would see we'd go back to our pro-Israeli policy.

R: That was the point. I told them that was the reason that they urge the continuation of the boycott because the boycott was the only thing that kept us from going....

K: Some people say that - I've heard one story that said that Morizet said that I p ut out that story and that you didn't contradict him. Is there anything to that?

R: No, I told him that the thing was unauthorized. In essence I told him what you told me to. He told me that he - I knew nothing of his talk with you on Friday. He told me at the golf game the next day on Saturday afternoon, that he was sure that you had been the one who gave Marilyn Berger her information. I said what makes you think that? He said, well I just assumed that. When I called him in...

K: I never even saw the Marilyn Berger article.

R: That was the one that came out - she made it low key. That came out before the Evans and Novak article. Evans and Novak came out in the morning, that I saw Morizet - that was the day after you had seen Morizet. He said he thought Evans and Novak had received the information from you. I said I'm sure that was not the case. He then - I then told him on that second meeting, because I didn't know where that article in the AEP(?) had come from, that I had been in touch with you and I was authorized to see that anything in connection with the State Department, except an official saying anything attributed to the State Department, except what our official spokesman said , was unauthorized. He just accepted that, or at least he said nothing about it.

K: There's not much we can do about it, but basically I think we ought to freeze our relations with these guys for the time being.

R: I think frankly, Henry, they have somewhat been encouraged, the fact they have been treated so well as they got worse and worse. They think they can carry on what India did with you. The more we did for India, the worse they got. I think they feel the same way.

K: Yes.

R: Henry, coming to another subject, we have, I think, got to put it up to Bill Donaldson. Either to devote his time to security assistance or to energy. The security assistance thing is - thank God we're putting George Vest in now to take Sy Weiss' place. Sy is not moving in. I talked to both of them, I talk three talks now to Donaldson.

K: Well, what does Donaldson say?

R: He said he's getting on top of it. I'd tell him about the personnel problem - he's getting on top of it. I asked him to come back and report to me, and I'm just not getting the reports back. I've just decided he's so completely wrapped up in energy that's he's not going to be able to get on top of security assistance.

K: Basically, he ought to be able to do them both.

R: He's certainly wrapped completely around energy now. With George Vest in, PM is supposed to be, in essence, the staff for the Under Secretary for Security Assistance. We'll see how that goes, but I'm very sceptical that Bill can handle both jobs. At least he's not doing it now and he's been in there for 6 months.

K: He ought to be told he must.

R: I've told him three times now. I'll tell him again next week. I think I'll call him again and tell him he may have to make a choice. See what his reaction is. I don't think he quite has the capacity to spread himself over those two bigs jobs. I think he's so deeply in on security - on energy. He's traveling too, quite a bit on it. The security assistance thing, we just have to take up ourselves that Joe is helping out on the Middle East. Did Joe see you, by the way, about Jordan.

K: Not yet.

R: On the 12 million five for Jordan, I just sent it back into Joe. On the 12 million five, Henry, both AID and Holton think, they in essence told the committees, that the Vietnam was the mass supplemental we were coming in on. They think it will have a very bad reaction in the Congress on the whole thing if we go back in for an extra supplemental of 12 and a half for Jordan. That the thing to do is to include the Jordanian 12 and a half next year. That Jordan's cash position is very strong now and they don't need the cash and that we might jeopardize even Vietnam if we got back in additional supplemental request on Jordan. They've had a very bad reaction in the Congress on Vietnam but I hope we'll get that through. I'm inclined to think we ought to let Jordan go into the '75 budget at 12 and a half million. Is that alright?

K: Yes.

R: Good. Now I left with Larry a new group of names for the Under Secretary for

Economic Affairs. If you want me to I can get busy on some of these.

K: Let me check those names and I'll leave my recommendations with you.

R: Good. I've got one last thing. I talked to Jim Schlesinger again. Jim insists he talked to you three times or four, about Bill Porter continuing as the negotiator for the Icelandic negotiation. I told him it's just imposible, I think.

K: I tought at that time it was only one more session.

R: I was think about this. They don't want Joe to do it, that's the point. I mentioned Bob McCloskey. He said maybe that would be a good out. What we could do is get Joe and Bob both in on the thing. I'm afraid Joe is going to take a beating from them if anything goes wrong because they haven't wanted him, you see.

K: Why don't you explain that to Joe.

R: And sort of dilute it between Joe and McCloskey. I thought also to suggest to make Jim happy, I might for this one session to bring Bill Porter down from Canada and let him sit in on this last one negotiating session. To wash himself out. What would you think of that?

K: OK, good. I think that's a good idea.

R: That will satisfy Jim to a certain degree and then push it on over.

K: Good.

R: [redacted] B1

[redacted] B1

K: OK, well then let McCloskey handle it after the next meeting.

R: Good, well thanks a lot Henry.

K: Thank you.

R: Hope you have a good vacation, you certainly deserve it.

K: Thank you.

R: Bye.

END

SB 219

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Senator Fulbright/Sec. Kissinger
April 10, 1974
1:05 pm

K: Mr. Chairman

F: Oh, how are you?

K: OK, how are you?

F: Well, welcome home. How are you.

K: I'm fine. I heard you were in town and I just got back and I wanted to say hello to you. How are things going/

F: Well, pretty well. I came just for the vote, I have to go back tonight. Are you coming up this afternoon?

K: Yes, but I understand you won't xxb be able to be there.

F: Well, I'm goi ng to anyway.

K: Oh, you will be there.

F: For the first hour.

K: That would be marvelous.

F: I put off, I was going to go but I decided since it was a coincidence you were coming and it was all arranged, I will wait and go a little later. I don't have to go til 7.

K: Oh, would you like us to do something on television. afterwards?

F: Sure.

K: Because I'll be through at 6, I leave the Committee at 6. I don't want to keep you there but I just wondered if that might be something we should do.

F: Sure, either that or do you reckon we could do it before or after. I guess after is best.

K: After is usually a little better.

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F: Yes.

K: And what I ~~m~~ intended to do Mr. Chairman, if you agree, is to talk about detente and SALT and my Moscow trip because there is really an unconsciencable thing going on. It was not a failure. We went along as well as we have in any previous meeting.

F: Yes.

K: And it is being played now as if there is a failure of detente and also what I wanted to do before the Committee is to put some of the SALT facts before them.

F: Good.

K: If you think that is appropriate.

F: I sure do.

K: Because the myth is now being spread that SALTI was such a diasaster.

F: I know, you know how that stems from.

K: I know, and if you agree with me I would like to do that before the Committee and with you being there it really makes it worthwhile.

F: Good, fine.

K: Then I'll have the great pleasure of seeing you. And I just wanted to let you know again that I am hoping very much...

F: This is very much a coincidence. I didn't know you were coming today. You know they had that very controversial vote yesterday on the filibuster so I came up and by coincidence I stayed over until today.

K: I hope things are going to go well in Arkansas.

F: Well, one never knows. I think they are going reasonably well. I certainly am working hard at it.

K: That I understand.

F: Yes, it is a day and night business.

K: Well, they took on a tiger when they took you on, I know that.

F: Well, we have given them a good run for their money anyway. I am delighted about you. I gave your bride my best.

K:" We got your telegram and we appreciated it very much.

F: Well, now I think you're fortified with some brains and I think you'll do even better.

K: (Laughter) See you this afternoon.

END

SB 218

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Dinitz/Sec. Kissinger
April 10, 1974
3:45 p.m.

K: Mr. Ambassador

D: Mr. Secretary. Welcome back. I am with Mrs. Meir on the other line. Can I call you back in a few minutes.

K: I am going to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Do you think it is for real?

D: I have her on the line now, Mr. Secretary. It seems to me it is for real.

K: Well tell her -- the one thing that has to be understood in Israel. It is my judgment as your friend -- not as a Secretary of State, now -- that if this thing blows up and leads to another war the outcome is going to be an imposed settlement with a 67 frontier.

D: I understand. I will tell it to her Mr. Secretary.

K: And tell her -- first of all give her my affectionate regards. Tell her that it is my belief that she is really essential.

D: I will do this. Can I call you when you come back from the Senate.

K: Yes.

D: I will do this. Thank you.

K: Right.

END

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SB 221

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
April 10, 1974
12:20

K: Brent, I still don't have the material. I still have yet to see one paper for the God damn meeting this afternoon.

S: It is on its way by special courier.

K: And I still have to see the talking points for Boumediene. Why the hell should I go away for ten days if they are going to be this way.

S: Well, the charts are on their way.

END

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SB 220

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sen. Javits/Sec. Kissinger
April 10, 1974
12:57 p.m.

K: Jack, how are you. We were so pleased with your telegram or with your message. It was very cute.

J: We are so thrilled. I missed your call just before you left. I didn't realize that you would be gone quite so long and on such a great event.

K: You are marvelous.

J: It couldn't be nicer and we are thrilled. You were at the Escondons?

K: Yes.

J: Did you see them at all.

K: Yes, we saw them several times.

J: How very nice. Are they all right?

K: They are fine and very nice.
It was
J:/Beautiful?

K: Yes. Couldn't have been nicer.

J: I am delighted for you. It makes everything else pale into very small print.

K: I wouldn't say that.

J: It does. Henry, I have lots of questions but I'll only ask you the most urgent one. One you are appearing at 4:00. I gather you would like your appearance confined to Moscow?

K: Not absolutely. Maybe in the first round.

J: O.K. That will be fine. How much time can you give them.

K: Two hours if necessary.

J: I think you should tell what you have just told me to Sparkman.

K: O.K.

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J: Fulbright will be gone; have you talked to Bill?

K: No.

J: I think it would be nice if you gave him a ring.

K: I will do that.

J: He is probably on his way back to the office now.

K: He is in town.

J: Yes, but he is going in a couple of hours.

K: I will call him immediately.

J: He was just here. He didn't even show up to vote this morning because he is anxious to get out.

K: I will call him this minute.

J: The other things I wanted to ask you is this. I was going to go to Europe on next Wed. night but I found that I couldn't see anybody there. I wanted to see Wilson and his team and Brandt and everybody is going to be away. The only thing going on in Europe is the Bilderberg which by the way both Nelson and David are going to.

K: Yes.

J: You know that.

K: Yes I do.

J: So I cancelled out of that and had an invitation from Jack Kubisch to participate in the Latin American --

K: That would be nice if you would do it.

J: When you say that immediately throws me. I really have no interest in doing anything that isn't ... very purposefully.

K: It would be very, very useful.

J: Are you going to take a hand in it yourself.

K: I will be there every minute of it.

*

3.
Javits;

J: If somebody would instruct me. Jack wants to come up. I assume he will brief me on what you are trying to do.

K: Exactly.

J: The other thing I wanted to ask you is this. We want to fix a little attention because it was so prescient on this report on the Committee of Nine. You remember that.

K: Of course, I endorsed it.

J: Suppose, if I can get Wayne Hays to do it, I know you talked to him. If he and I joined in a letter to the State Department saying, will you give us your comment on this document and we will then cause it to be published as a Committee print.

K: I will give it a personal endorsement.

J: I think it would mean, really in analysis, probably another way of declaring our present stand on Europe.

K: I would be delighted to do that.

J: You see what I mean.

K: Absolutely.

J: The other thing that can be done is this. Max Vanderstall is going to put out a white paper on it. I thought we could print it as a Congressional document or if the State Dept. considered it more appropriate it could do what it wished with it.

K: Let me think about that. Let me see if we have some mechanism of doing it.

J: The last thing is there have been considerably stirrings here about the Jackson Amendment and at your earliest convenience I should get some idea from you as to your present stance. Joe Sisco is coming up for breakfast and he will brief me to whatever extent he wishes to. But in the final analysis because this thing is really engendering a lot of interest among Jewish organizations, I should have a better idea as to where it stands at this time. Are you proposing to have any near term meeting again with Jackson.

K: No, I would not have such a meeting without talking to you first.

*

J: Alright, and then do I gather that you told them that when you did have a meeting you wanted me present.

K: I haven't formally done that yet, what do you think?

J: I think you should.

K: Ok, I shall.

J: But, I don't think that's as nearly as important for the reasons I'll be able to give you.

K: Jack, are you going to be in town next week?

J: I'll be in town whenever you want, I mean I'll make it my business to be.

K: Well, how about having breakfast Tuesday or Wednesday next week and then we can review that whole situation.

J: Good, my office will work it out.

K: Good, wonderful. And let's have it at State.

J: At State.

K: We'll eat better here.

J: I'm for that.

K: Good.

J: I'll see you later and I am delighted and love to Nancy.

K: Thank you, hope to see you both soon.

J: Oh listen, you'll see me Saturday night, I'm coming to..

K: Oh, marvelous, teriffic.

J: I'm trying to get Marion to do it too.

K: Good., Bye.

END

SB 215 ltr 1*

TELECON
General Haig/Secretary Kissinger
April 10, 1974
8:58 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

H: Hello.

K: Al, Dobrynin said that they really want something on SALT and that their proposal was not a final position and that they're willing to play with the numbers and also that while they don't want sublimits they're willing to have indications. Could we work something out that makes some sense.

H: We're looking at 5 or 6 different premeditations and combinations within the general numbers that they produced, but it willtake a few more days to do it, but that's exactly what we're doing.

K: What is our threat. We will be fully merved anyway.

H: The US figure, give or take a few, by 1980 is no particulard problem if we can any kind of handle on their figure, it would be alright toobecause they could probably not reach it, by 1980.

K: I'm not - I would just.

H: We're looking...

K: Excuse me, I've a call from Dinitz. He's at a basketball game.

H: That's exactly what we're doing right now. Did you see that note that I...

K: Yes. He said it would just confuse the issue there. I have to take that call now.

END

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SB 213 12*

TELECON
Foreign Minister Fahmy/Secretary Kissinger
April 10, 1974
8:12 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you Ismail?

F: How are you Henry?

K: How nice to know you're in the country.

F: Congratulations.

K: Thank you.

F: How is Mrs. Kissinger?

K: Well, as well as can be expected under the circumstances.

F: You are terrible. Tell me, how come you don't want to see me?

K: Because I'm tired of Egyptians.

F: You are busy with Gromyko.

K: No, when can you come down?

F: What do you mean come down. Sisco said that I'm undesirable.

K: Nonsense. I had invited you for tonight and I was told you couldn't come.

F: Who said so? I was ready to come this afternoon.

K: I proposed 6:30 today and I was told you couldn't come.

F: This is not true. I was ready to come at 6:30.

K: Oh, the God-damned fools.

F: Yes, because I need to discuss things urgently with you.

K: So do I with you. Can you come for breakfast on Friday?

F: Yes, and I come on breakfast.

K: Come breakfast on Friday.

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F: Good. I'll call you tomorrow.

K: Good.

F: And, by the way, you got President Sadat's latest message through Eilts?

K: On what subject?

F: About the Syrian...

K: Yes, and we're in touch with him.

F: I hope that you can use your influence.

K: Absolutely.

F: Especially now, you know.

K: Oh, Ismail, I fully understand it. So you call me tomorrow morning. I expected you at 6:30.

F: What do you mean tomorrow. Tomorrow is Thursday.

K: No, I hear from you tomorrow and we will have breakfast on Friday.

F: Good. I'll arrive in the afternoon around 6:00 or something like that.

K: Good. I have to have a dinner with Boumediene. Unfortunately tomorrow.

F: I shall not tell him this.

K: At any rate this gives me a chance to see you before I see the Syrians.

F: Good and this, by the way, this green sport shirt which you wearing in Time magazine or Newsweek awful.

K: Looked awful? Now you're dressing me.

F: Mrs. Kissinger was charming.

K: Mrs. Kissinger looked charming?

F: Yes.

K: Good, well she looks forward to seeing you. She's coming to Egypt with me next time.

F: Certainly, you had an invitation.

K: Yes, I was very touched by the President's message.

F: You should thank me.

K: Of course. I really look forward to seeing you Ismail.

F: OK, I'll give you a call tomorrow.

K: Good, wonderful.

F: My regards to Mrs. Kissinger

K: Thank you, bye.

END

SB 214 1*

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
April 10, 1974
8:50 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Is the President back ?

S: Yes, he's back.

K: When did he get back?

S: He came back about 6:00.

K: I like his intense communication. with me.

S: He hasn't called at all.

K: How did his trip go?

S: I gather it went pretty well from what Al said. He got a warm reception, good crowds. But I gather the St. Clair response on providing additional materials was received very badly on the Hill.

K: Oh, really.

S: That's what Al said. He didn't give me any details but apparently he's concerned about it. That was the sentence right after I said, how did the trip go? He said it went fine but then when right into the problems on the Hill. I guess they're quite concerned. I sent you over a Gromyko talker a few minutes ago.

K: Who did it? Sonnenfeldt?

S: Well, it was a combined effort. Sonnenfeldt, Clift, Lodal, you know different pieces.

K: What they have to do is to review all the items that he handled.

S: They're all in there.

K: Because that's what he intends to review. Including the Middle East.

S: The only things that are not in there the one on environment and the Mediterranean thing.

K: How about the test ban.

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S: The test ban is in there.

K: OK. Should I call Haig?

S: I don't think it's necessary.

K: Why not?

S: He maybe already have gone. You want me to check.

K: No, I'll find out. OK.

S: OK, very good.

K: I'll see you - do I have an appointment with the President at 10:45?

S: Yes.

K: OK.

S: I won't see you before then tomorrow.

K: No.

END

TELECON
William Hyland/Secretary Kissinger
April 10, 1974
7:40 PM

H: Mr. Secretary?

K: Yes.

H: How are you?

K: OK.

H: Good.

K: Bill, on this Soviet proposal have you ever done any work - analytical work, so that the BS finally stops, of what we could make of it if we wanted to.

H: I've got it started here and it's almost finished, but it's not quite in shape.

K: It seems to me we could proceed, I mean, they said no sublimits, but they said information. Now supposing we don't debate what is information, what is sublimits, I suspect that one of their problems is that they don't want to follow the same mix as we do.

H: That's right.

K: You see what I mean.

H: They've got a mix of their own.

K: They undoubtedly have a mix of their own. Can we suggest something to them that is rational from their point of view and yet within some program that we have sensed they might do anyway. You see what I mean?

H: Yes.

K: And within the limit of what we might do anyway.

H: You remember a did a little memo before the Moscow....

K: No, you're prediction of the program turned out to be quite correct.

H: I've got that refined and including a more detailed look at the SLBMs part.

K: And what's your estimate of that?

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H: Well, I think, on the basis of what we know, it's going to be about 150, but it's going to be very late in that...

K: Which is consistent with what they told us.

H: Yes. But there's a little room - our problem is the one that you raised, that is, they may only intend to do 150. We're up against this problem of verification.

K: On the other hand if there is no agreement, there is some number we're willing to live with without an agreement.

H: Yes, but without an agreement the numbers are going to go well beyond that.

K: For us?

H: For them. I mean they'll just keep building. That's the essential point. That's the one I'm trying to get at now.

K: But what you should do in your analysis is - there must be some ratio we're willing to live with in the absence of an agreement. Right?

H: Right.

K: Because that's how it's going to work out defacto. Instead of comparing the ideal against the real, let's compare the real under two circumstances.

H: With an agreement and without.

K: Exactly.

H: Right.

K: When can I have that to study? Can I have some of this tomorrow?

H: Yes. Can you wait until tomorrow afternoon?

K: Yes.

H: There's one other thing that I think we have to do, which I think is going to be neglected. That is this whole question of exchanges of notification of information.

K: Like what?

H: I think there's a lot in that, because even though we say we have to count every SLBM, the fact is you can't bring in a submarine, redo it's fire control system. Put in new missiles and turn it out like sausages.

K: Well, that's what I think.

H: This is quite an elaborate process and unless it's done under total cover, we're going to see it and we're going to be able to count it.

K: Exactly.

H: But nobody's working - I just discovered today no one is....

K: Yes, but is anybody working on these SALT proposals now?

H: Yes, we just had a meeting.

K: Who is we?

H: Well, the State Department people had a meeting.

K: Yes, but how about the French. What are they doing?

H: They're working under the Lodal thing now. Lodal's people told them quite a bit. Now there's several papers going.

K: Why did Lodal's people...

more

H: I have know idea what motivated all of this, but a greal deal came out then I thought we were going to talk about. Anyway the numbers are available to almost everyone and some notion of what went on is available. This is probably OK and people are going to have to work with real figures.

K: Yes, but when are we going to get their analysis?

H: Probably by the beginning of the week - beginning of the next week.

K: OK, can you find out for me?

H: That's what was agreed upon today, but we can speed it up.

K: Speed it up.

H: All of this is going to be coming together at once, but the Defense's position is already fairly...

K: Which is what?

H: Which is that none of it can be verified, so it's all phoney.

*

K: And therefore what?

H: And therefore, you know the - but this is at a fairly low level. I think we're going to find that this proposal can be worked. The question is whether the levels will be anything near what we can ___.

K: But that's what I would like you to look at.

H: Yes. We'll have....

K: What can we imagine that's not insane from the Soviet point of view?

H: Well, I think of a breakdown....

K: There's no sense telling the Soviet they can have 700 SLBM's when they haven't even begun to test it.

H: Right. And when they probably won't do nearly that many.

K: That's what I mean. We don't even see the submarines that can carry them.

H: No, I think we've got a fairly good handle on what their probable program is now.

K: OK, you better do a paper for me.

H: OK, I'll get it up to you tomorrow afternoon.

K: OK, good.

END

SB 222 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Sec. Kissinger
April 12, 1974
9:05

K: I have been talking to Fahmy. I told you to send a message to Brandt, didn't I.

S: Yes, we have one there.

K: Ok. What do you mean you have one there?

S: We drafted it and it is ready and I didn't know what kind of timing but it is ready.

K: It has got to go today.

S: Right, well then we'll just get it to you right now.

K: Wait a minute. It shouldn't be just a general message. It should explain to him the difficulty of the Egyptian situation and that the Egyptians are counting on some economic support from Germany.

S: I have got that in but not quite as strong -- I ought to strengthen it then.

K: Make it very strong and say that it is my judgment that on the one h and the Federal Republic has an unusual opportunity if he makes an offer before being asked. And secondly, that there will be a profound dis appointment in Cairo, in my judgment if it doesn't happen. So my very strong advice is to make some generous proposal.

S: Alright, I'll stress this Henry, because what I have is not that strong.

K: And explain to him my judgment of the complexity of the Egyptian position. But not too much anti-Soviet because they are too much afraid of the Soviets themselves in Bonn.

S: Why don't we put it in terms of the delicacy of their position.

K: And tell Brandt if I can do anything -- this is a message to go to Bahr for Brandt.

S: Oh, this you didn't say, Bahr for Brandt, Ok. And it is in the other channel you told me.

K: Yes, but can we get it this morning.

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S: Oh sure.

K: Or else we'll waste the whole weekend again.

S: Oh no it has been ready, it is just that you were tied up all day yesterday.

K: I know, Ok.

END

SB 224 i*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Gen. Scowcroft/Sec. Kissinger
April 12, 1974
9.25 am

K: .... which items are possible?

S: Just a second, let me get it. Defense says there are no problems for are sensors for tank detection, sensors to avoid radar detection,

K: How about the helicopters.

S: No. Those we haven't given anybody. March 46 torpedoes and our personnel cluster bombs. That's all that they say there are no problems on.

K: Where they say there is a problem, what are they willing to do??

S: Most of the others, they say, the problem is the possibility of technical compromise.

K: We are talking now about Kuwait buying the Goddamned stuff.

S: That's right. They are afraid of where they might end up.

K: They will end up in Egypt.

S: I know, and what might happen to them there. You know, who might have access to them. That's the basis of their objection to most everything else.

K: Well, how about the toe missiles? They must be certainly compromised already. You tell Wickam I want him to go over the list again by next Monday. And to remember that they are still part of the US Government.

S: O.K. If we resolve that...

K: That, they are part of the Government.

S: (Laughter)

K: You tell Wickam now to stop playing games on every Goddam proposition that we make to him and that by Monday, I want him to stretch it as far as it can be stretched and let us know how to do it.

S: O.K.

K: Thank you.
END

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
The President/Sec. Kissinger
9:14 a.m., April 12, 1974

N: Hello.

K: Mr. President.

N: How are our Algerian friends?

K: I thought that was a spectacular day yesterday, Mr. President.

N: They are a little bit, shall we say provencial but...

K: But they are very influential in the Arab world.

N: Very influential and they are just like the Chinese. Puritanical as hell. You notice they smoke but they didn't drink.

K: Yes. Boumediene said to me on the way out, he said just tell your President that whatever his contemporaries are doing to him, history within one mandate (meaning one term of office) will record him as one of the greatest peace makers in history.

N: That's nice of him.

K: You made a tremendous impact on him.

N: We had a good talk. I thought that in the evening what he wanted to do was make a little speech. That is why I let him do it. That let everybody hear it and then keep it a little light. I think sometimes these guys are so humorless,

K: On the other hand, the human touch for them is enormously important. I had mentioned to them in the afternoon your plans of going to the Middle East.

N: They hit me with it.

K: I told them you had no specific plan to go to Algeria but then I am glad they did hit you with it. I think myself now the way this present schedule is, we may have to lean on the Israelis a little bit. If we can get the disengagement done in the first few days of May then -- I think very much you ought to go in the last week of May or first week in June.

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N: Depending of course upon this House thing. We have to see what is happening there. If They've left us off the hook by that time or got us on, we've got to do one or the other.

K: Do you think they can do it that fast.

N: I don't know. I haven't the slightest idea. They probably want to drag it on. I don't know. Doesn't make any difference.

K: I think in any event, when the disengagement with Syria is done -- which I hope to be able to know in two at most three weeks then the trip by you to the Middle East would be an enormous event. And one that is...

N: Before Russia.

K: I think it must be before Russia; and it would be politically of the first magnitude in the Middle East. I have been talking to the Egyptian Foreign Minister and he says they need it. They just don't want it, they need it as a symbol of their new orientation. Conceivably we could do it after Russia but if you do it before Russia, the Russians would be extremely miffed.

N: I know, but they would get over it.

K: My own guess, Mr. President, is...

N: They travel in the Middle East. Why can't we?

K: Exactly. My guess is that around May 25th would be a good time.

N: Let me think of it in terms of planning. Henry, with regard to Gromyko, we see him at 11:00. I have just gone around the track with Podgornyy and there is not much. How long do we have to take with this fellow again?

K: I guess an hour and a half or hour and fifteen minutes. I've got the Egyptian For. Min. here in my office. I am in the back office. I will come over about 10:30 if you agree.

N: I am pretty tight this morning. Come over about 20 minutes till, will you?

K: O.K. The major problem is he will want to go over all the bilaterals. That's easy. The major thing he will hit you with is Soviet participation in the Middle East.

N: Right. I know that. Podgornyy hit me with it too and I said you would consult etc.

K: You can't go much beyond that.

N: I know that . I told him there were some places we . . . have influence and some places you have.

K: The Egyptians are violently opposed to it. The Syrians are opposed to it. And the Israelis are opposed to it. It is the one thing they have all agreed on.

N: What do you say to him then.

K: I think we should say after the Syrian disengagement we are prepared to go back to Geneva and to agree that everything is done through Geneva.

N: You noticed how Boumediene picked up immediately on my line that look you're not going to have a permanent settlement with a lot of governments sitting around in Geneva. I said you have got to have some private talks between things. He said that is the practical way it is done. I said of course we have this public forum. He got the point, didn't he.

K: Mr. President, I know these Arabs.

N: You have spent more time with them than anybody else.

K: This was a spectacular success yesterday. I told you what the For. Min. said to me after the morning. In the afternoon, and after the evening, first Boumediene said to me on the way out, then Boutiflika took me aside.

N: Who is Boutiflika.

K: The For. Min. He said we've got to get the President to Algeria. He said get disengagement done fast so that we can do it.

N: Good.

K: It is not only to have a junket, Mr. President. It will be a political event in the Middle East of the first magnitude.

N: Of course it is. And We've done it. I'll see you then about 20 mins. to 11:00. Make it a quarter till. You and I know this subject so well I will do a dance around the son of a gun.

K: We don't have to talk about it.

N: I would like to have him nbt drag the thing on because I am going to Florida about 2:00 and I need some time with Haig.

K: Of course.

N: O.K.

K: Right, Mr. President.

END

SB 227 i*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Kubisch/Sec. Kissinger
April 12, 1974
10:15 a.m.

K: Jack, these letters are still not what I want.

JK: I'm sorry.

K: What I want is to say clearly what it is we expect. When you say we can settle some things that were left pending in Mexico that leaves it open to everything. It depends on his understanding of what was left pending in Mexico.

to

JK: You want/name specifically what...

K: I think what we should say is: Since this meeting takes place so short a time after Mexico, we do not believe that any major results can occur. What we can do is reconfirm the spirit. Set up working groups for the preparation for the next meeting and perhaps if you want that scientific and technical thing or whatever and secondly, once you have established that you should say it would be unfortunate if the meeting in Washington with the American press in the present state of our situation would focus on the divisive aspect because that would destroy that new spirit. And we have to say that clearly. Can we do that?

JK: Sure. I guess I was not clear in my own mind what you wanted.

K: Can we get that done today please.

JK: Oh, yes.

K: Good. Thank you.

END.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 12 DEC 2002 200102979

SB 238 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Jack Kubisch/Secretary Kissinger
April 12, 1974
8:50 PM

K: What do you make of that cable?

JK: I've read it. I don't think that Rample used a representative of the Latin Americans. As you know Guyana is not a member of the OAS, it's very logical for the rest of them to come. I know he's got a problem because of his third world is gone but I can't Brazil, Argentina, Mexico and some of the others would s hare this. However, but I would like as your authorization to get back in touch with Ferguson and Sh[illegible] (?) in New York and also we can penetrate here because the Peruvian and Argentine and ot hers are arriving tomorrow evening. I'll find out what they're cooking up.

K: Why don't you call Rabasa.

JK: OK. I'll do that.

K: The limit would just be a total disastor if they did any stunt like that in Washington.

JK: What I'm thinking of -- you know they're going to have a meeting Tuesday afternoon at the Argentine Embassy -- and I imagine that ____ is thinking of trying to get them to say, OK, we are here and we're prepared to meet with the United States, but we want everyone to understand what we said and did in New York is in no way compromised by our country. Something like this. I imagine he's the one who is offering to try and promote it. I'll find out from the Latins what's going on if you have no objections.

K: No. Thank you.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 12 DEC 2002 200102979

SB234 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
George Vest/Secretary Kissinger
April 12, 1974
5:10 PM

(Missed first sentence)

K: ____for their guidance. The meeting with Boumediene was very constructive and very useful.

V: Right.

K: Tell it to Kalb and company before they all go way off.

V: OK. Anything else?

K: No.

END:

5:12 PM - Vest

(Missed first sentence)

V: Right, got that sir.

K: Not for attribution.

V: Right, I got that.

K: And you can do that fast.

V: Yes, right now.

K: Good.

V: OK, sir.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 12 DEC 2002 200102979

SB 237*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
April 12, 1974
8:46 PM

K: Brent, have we heard from Key Biscayne?

S: Yes. On the dinner, Al said it looks good. That he'll will agree to the dinner.

K: On Wednesday.

S: Yes, he said he prefers Thursday and I said Wednesday is much better because they'll be wanting...

K: No, we can't keep them here on Thursday.

S: So he said he'd be working on Wednesday, but he said it looks good for that.

K: How about -- and he's not giving the speech.

S: And he's not giving the speech.

K: I guess he's in retirement again.

S: I don't know what turned all that around.

K: He doesn't want to have a press conference.

S: Oh, is that what was going to be -- oh, that's right. And he signed the real treaty paper.

K: OK.

S: The revision of it.

K: Otherwise is everything sane?

S: Otherwise everything is sane and quiet. I don't know how long he's going to stay down there but they canceled the Monday staff meeting. At least through Monday I guess.

K: Oh, Thursday would be better probably because he doesn't want to come back on Wednesday.

S: Oh, maybe. You think he would stay that long.

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K: Well, I think we ought to lock one of the dates.

S: He said he would get back to me tomorrow on it.

K: We can hold them another night.

S: But Wednesday would be preferable.

K: Oh, yes, because they couldn't be quite as obnoxious as they are or which they're planning to be.

S: Are you going to try to talk to him about -- well I don't know if you'll have a chance -- about the Canadian locomotive thing?

K: We've got to get it settled by this week.

S: We realy do. And I think you're talking to him is the only way to do it.

K: Yes, but I didn't want to do it before he went to Key Biscayne and into the clutches of Rebozo.

S: No, that's a good point.

K: OK.

END

SB 233 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
April 12, 1974
5:07 PM

S: Yes sir.

K: Have we heard from the President about his Atlanta trip?

S: No, we haven't heard. I thought the thing was all settled, apparently now it's all up in the air again about which one he's going to do.

K: Yes. Well, will you tell him we really have to answer. I would prefer him giving a dinner. It would be easier from me if he didn't.

S: You would have to do the speech then, wouldn't you.

K: Yes. I have to know. Can you find out from Haig?

S: Sure. They ought to be down there about now. I'll see if I can get it. You prefer the dinner?

K: Right. And I've got Mansfield to retract it.

S: Good. I'll just tell Jerry Warren then to just do nothing.

K: Right.

S: OK.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 14 MAY 2004 200102979

SB 235 *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Jack Kubisch/Secretary Kissinger
April 12, 1974
6:00 PM

K: Have you seen that cable from _____which indicates that the Latin Americans are furious with us about that Latin American Foreign Ministers meeting and they're looking for some demonstration of independence?

JK: Furious for what reason?

K: I don't know. My point Jack is, I cannot afford a God-damn ~~disas~~ disastor here and I'm not interested in a revival meeting. Maybe we should cancel the God-damn thing.

JK: I don't know what he's referring to.

K: Why don't you look at that cable.

JK: OK.

K: It's only for me. Take a look at it and then just have somebody go up ~~th~~ there and tell these guys I'm delighted to cancel the meeting. I've got more important things to do.

JK: I think that would be a disastor.

K: Right now the whole ~~th~~ God-damn thing is heading into a disastor.

JK: I think the ~~real~~ real problem was when a couple of weeks ago when I was stressing hard for a _____ and getting things all worked out before they arrived in line with our conversation and they were resisting it. When you saw that and I saw it you told me to ease off. They're ~~feeling~~ feeling much better about the thing now. I'll come and read the cable.

K: OK.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 12 DEC 2002 200102979

SB 229 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec. Schlesinger/Sec. Kissinger
April 12, 1974
10:20 a.m.

K: Jim, how are you.

S: Pretty good. How are you.

K: Thank you very much for your note.

S: Well, I tell you, Henry. I knew about that wedding well in advance because my yeoman service told me about it.

K: Who is your yeoman service.

S: I have a yeoman in your office. Don't you know about that.

K: Oh, sure.

S: But I did not want to give it away. Those fellows do yeoman work. Congratulations and all that kind of thing. Did you have a good recess.

K: Yes. I had a good rest.

S: Now there are two are three problems which are minor but could become larger. One of them is in Egypt. I don't know whether your people have brought you up to date on that. But this fellow Murphy who came in with the low bid obviously does not have the resources to carry out the excavation operation and he is going to be trying to put the bite on the Navy. I had while you were away great trouble holding John McClellan on the line just for the US Navy's present participation in the thing. And as you know we have previously had problems with Hebert and Mahon. That has got to be very carefully watched and those fellows have got to be kept in line. Eilts over there in Cairo has been making commitments according to the cables that I saw a couple or three days ago with regard to what could be done to help out Murphy. We are going to get ourselves very tangled up. You had better caution Eilts on what he says to the Egyptians about Murphy.

K: All right. But you know we are getting ourselves into one hell of a fix here. The Egyptians are being squeezed by the Russians.

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S: The substantative problems are mighty clear to me but some how or other we are going to have to have a way of helping them which is direct and is supported by the Congress.

K: I agree.

S: Because the chaps up there on the Armed Services Committee and Appropriations Committee that deal with our budget just regard it as inconsistent with the law for the Department of Defense to be doing little favors for the Egyptians out of the monies appropriated for US defense.

K: Yes.

S: McClellan was very hard to bring around on this one. I spent about an hour with him. And as you know Hebert was a bear.

K: Yep.

S: That is one area we are having trouble and Eilts should not make commitments.

K: I have to check into that. I am not familiar that he is making commitments.

S: I saw a telegram the other day. Now that is a very delicate operation and it should be handled through coordination between State and ourselves.

K: I agree.

S: The second problem is Diego Garcia. I believe that Gov. Holton needs a little bit more instruction but he has not been much of help on that. State papers refer to that as a Pentagon proposal and it may or may not be a Pentagon proposal.

K: No, no. We support it completely.

S: Can you get with some of the senior people up there otherwise it is all...

K: What is it you want us to do?

UNCLASSIFIED

S: Let me get back through Larry Eagleburger with a set of proposals. Basically if you can turn around Mansfield.

K: That I don't think I can do because I ran into him at a dinner last night where he hit me on it. I supported it but I don't think I can turn him around but I can maybe neutralize him a bit.

S: That's the main thing, if you can get these fellows just to be a little quiet. I don't think the opposition up there is as deep seated and across the board as one might think. It is just that there are some noisy people who are opposed to it. The Armed Services Committee deferred it to the 75 budget without prejudice but the House has put the money in and I think Tower and Jackson will help us out when it goes to conference.

K: Good. If you can make a specific proposal I am fully behind it. I am not aware of the fact -- I must say that whenever Holton talks to me -- when I went up to the For. Relations Committee he urged me to get strongly behind it.

S: Well, good, good.

K: Whatever mistakes have occurred were inadvertent. There might be things on which we disagree and in which they do to Diego Garcia what your guys are doing to me on SALT.

S: Now stop that. What are my guys doing to you on SALT.

K: All this stuff that they put out that I am for a softer position and Defense is just as happy that it isn't working so and so forth.

S: Are you referring to an article by Marder last weekend. I thought that came out of State.

K: Absolutely not. It couldn't come from State.

S: The tone, as I read that article, was that the reason that the thing fell apart was that the President listened to the Pentagon rather than to you.

K: But that isn't true either.

S: I know it's not true.

UNCLASSIFIED

K: Because the proposal is exactly what I recommended.

S: Look there are fellows up there on the Hill that are continually attempting to invegle me into saying something unfavorable about SALT I. In trying to get us into a dustup. As a matter of fact at the National Press Club yesterday they -- somebody pulled the same thing and I continue, needless to say, as I have for three years now, two years now, said that SALT I was a good deal.

K: Forget now what your guys are saying about SALT but it wouldn't be inconceivable that some of our guys are sniping at Diego Garcia, but I don't have the impression that Holton is one of them.

S: No, I don't think - I think Holton is a good man. But he's a little unfamiliar with the tactic and you might get him to sit down with Dave Abshire and give him a few pointers and also to get a plan on some of these things.

K: OK. And also if your legislative people will will tell me what I can do I am fully in support of Diego Garcia. I would like to talk to you, Jim, about SALT. Whether there is anything we can do with the Soviet proposal. Dobrynin came in now and said, you know, indicated there might be some flexibility about numbers, either by letting us go up a bit, if we need higher numbers, or I think, they might even accept a bigger ratio on MIRV missiles. What we have to do is compare it with what they can do without an agreement and what we're willing to do if there is no agreement.

S: Right.

K: I continue to believe the worse outcome would be if we stick with our program and they go all out.

S: Yes. That would be a very bad outcome.

K: At the figure of 1100, that's roughly our program for MIRV missiles.

S: Yes.

K: I think 1142 is our program by 1980 if I understand it. So then the question is, since we're not giving anything up, of our current program, do we intend to have a larger program. If we don't intend to have a prospect of getting a larger program, is the limit that is set for them somewhat lower than they would do anyway or what are we giving up. You see that's what I would like

UNCLASSIFIED

to analyze. I don't know the answer.

S: Right. Well, let's get a little analysis.

K: And maybe you and I could get together next week.

S: Well, you know I'm leaving on Tuesday to go over to Germany.

K: For how long?

S: I'll be there the balance of the week. I want to see if we can strengthen the NATO position in the North__ region.

K: I strongly favored it.

S: As you know, every time we look at that it looks as if the Americans and Germans can hold in the South, speaking conventionally. The North__ region is kind of full of holes. The British particularly are very ___. The Germans are improving markedly on this and I wanted to throw our influence in behind the North__ region because there's not much point in holding in the South if you're going to collapse in the North. And also I'd review the troops and tell them what a great job they're doing and all those things.

K: I think it's important. Well then we may have to meet shortly after you get back because I'll be leaving for the Middle East shortly after that. I have to run to a Gromyko meeting.

S: I promised our friend Dayan 200 tanks and 500 APCs. But we're now holding them up pending clarification of what the hell is going on there politically.

K: And also hold up a bit on the Syrian business.

S: OK.

K: Good thank you.

END

SB 228 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Winston Lord/Secretary Kissinger
April 12, 1974
10:12 PM

K: When you talk at the beginning about that ____economy, I think you should talk about the world having become global, one by the thrust of human aspirations and secondly by the requirements of science. Where the compartmentalization leads to a total and needless duplication of effort and lack of knowledge. Then the commodity thing is also not particularly well expressed. I don't disagree with it. I mean, what was it about the lack of knowledge that bothered us?

L: You mean in particular to raw materials?

K: Yes. I think if you put it into the context that it just ____for a long period than that can only be done by a correct understanding of needs and resources. You see what I mean -- rather than have it just sound like a sort of college paper. OK. I will leave a few pages which are marked -- not too well. I don't so much disagree with it, it just doesn't have any level. OK. Thank you.

L: Right.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 12 DEC 2002 200102979

SB 2301*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
George Vest/Secretary Kissinger
April 12, 1974
10:35 AM

(Missed first part)

V: _____ mentioned SALT and a number of them interpreted what you said and are writing, or proposed to write, that you have said there will be no SALT agreement this year.

K: There will be a permanent SALT agreement. Which is what I said before. But it is possible there will be a SALT agreement. I wasn't making any great news.

V: That's why I called you right away because they were jumping.

K: It is exactly the situation we described earlier. There will not be a comprehensive agreement this year but it still remains to be seen whether we can get a substantial part of it.

V: Right, I get the picture.

K: OK.

V: I'll get to them right away.

K: Good, thank you.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 12 DEC 2002 200102979

SB 232*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sen. Mansfield/Sec. Kissinger
April 12, 1974,
4:45 p.m.

M: Afternoon, Henry.

K: How are you.

M: Not so good. I was asked by Reuters and UPI about the President's going to Moscow. I said he was going and I said he was also going to the security meeting at Helsinki in May. That is what he told me and I thought he wanted me to get out the information -- that he in effect authorized me without saying it. I don't say much when I come out of these meetings. I said he was going to Helsinki in May and would go to Moscow sometime he thought the middle of June.

K: Frankly, he had that a little bit screwed up. I have done something unintentional to embarrass you. When I saw Gromyko off someone asked me if he was going to Helsinki in May and I said absolutely not.

M: The Manchester Guardian called up and said there is not meeting in Helsinki in May, that there is a meeting in Geneva to wind it up. There is no Helsinki meeting.

K: What do you want me to do to counteract the bad reporting coming out of the press of your meeting and his going to Moscow. I need an explanation.

M: I will say he was considering going to it when concluded and I assumed he meant Helsinki but I was mistaken.

K: The fact is if it is concluded it will be at Helsinki.

M: When concluded it will be in Helsinki.

K: Right. If you say he is considering going to it whenever it is concluded then you will be on safe ground. It is not yet definitely decided.

M: I said he was going. He was pretty positive. I don't want to embarrass him. He has enough troubles as it is.

K: That would be a little embarrassing with our European Allies because we have not told them yet. M: As I recall it now he was considering going to Helsinki for the final meeting of the security conference which would be held in Helsinki. It was my mistake when I said he was going next month. I misunderstood him. That will clear it up.

K: Exactly.

M: Fine. Thanks.
END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 14 MAY 2004 200102979

*

TELCON
Gen. Scowcroft, Sec. Kissinger
4:50 p.m., April 12, 1974

Gen. Scowcroft's secretary took the following message:

"Just pass a note in to him and tell him that Mansfield will issue a clarifying statement."

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
April 12, 1974
4:35 PM

(Missed first part)

to have
S: /two tickers now by Mike Mansfield saying the President told him he plans to visit Helsinki next month.

K: Impossible.

S: I know, but we've got to answer it now.

K: I've already said it isn't possible.

S: How are we going to respond to these particular ones?

K: I've already said it publicly. They asked me, is the President going to Helsinki next month and I said no.

S: Oh, you said today.

K: Yes.

S: Oh, great.

K: When I saw Gromyko off.

S: Oh, OK. Good. Then we can just refer to that.

K: Say look. Are you looking at my schedule? Have you seen what this maniac is doing to me day after day?

S: Well, this week it's just been terrible.

K: I know but I have that United Nations speech. I haven't even had a chance to look at it yet.

S: Yes, that's right. I must say things get on - no, I don't know anything about it. I presume you order them, like Famhy this morning; van der Stoel tomorrow morning.

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K: That I ordered, but I don't order Moynihan and....

S: Where that came from, I don't have a clue. But it's a disastor, there's no question about it. It really is. I'll try to get next week's under some control.

K: OK, fine. Thank you.

END

SB 241*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Win Lord/Sec. Kissinger
April 13, 1974
4:30 p.m.

K: Win, have we heard from Volcker.

L: Yes. He is pleased and in fact everyone thinks it is much better. His only substantive problem is on the food where we say we hope to increase our food assistance he thinks that is sort of ambiguous and he doesn't know whether we are promising more than we can deliver but all we are saying is that we will strive to increase it and he just thinks it is sort of ambiguous but he couldn't come up with any better wording himself but otherwise he had some stylistic suggestions that's all. Shultz and Cooper all feel it is much better.

K: O.K. Cooper does also.

L: Yes. He likes the tone now. I have also given you a memo on the major initiatives.

K: I have here. O.K. fine.

L: We will be here to go over it.

K: Right. I don't know whether there will be all that much need to go over it. All right. Let me work on it for a bit.

L: Good.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 12 DEC 2002 200102979

SB 239 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Paul Volcker/Sec. Kissinger
April 13, 1974, 10:25

V: Yes, sir.

K: Did you get the cigars I sent you yesterday?

V: I didn't notice any.

K: I sent you some cigars through the Sec. of the Treasury but he probably is going to take credit for it himself.

V: That's right. Thank you.

K: We've got another draft which we sent to you. I was wondering whether we could have your skeptical comments by about 3:00 which is when I would start working on it.

V: Where did you send it?

K: Do you want it sent to your home?

V: Better send it to my home -- well you can send it to my office and I will be down there in two hours maybe.

K: Well, where is your home?

V: 2936 Cleveland Ave.

K: O.K. We will send a copy out there.

V: O.K.

K: Thank you, Paul. Can you give us your views about 2:30.

V: I will do so.

K: Thank you.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 10 MAY 2004 200102979

SB 243*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sisco/Sec. Kissinger
April 14, 1974
2:50 p.m.

K: You were not planning anything tonight were you, Joe.

S: Not a thing.

K: I am talking to our Syrian friend and he thinks in view of the return of Asad it would be a good idea if we sent Asad a little more than I have. He will not go back until Tuesday night. Especially about the Soviet conversation including the one today. That is to say we should send to Syria the substance of what I said to the General yesterday together with the conversation today in which I agreed that I would meet Gromyko in Geneva prior to going to the Middle East. I want Asad to understand that I will have nothing to discuss with Gromyko then because I will not have any new ideas -- Gromyko then proposed we would meet in Damascus and I told him this was a matter I would have to think about in order to get Asad's view, but my own personal view is that of course it is entirely up to the President that I did not see any particular usefulness that could come out of it. Do you think we could draft something and get it off to Syria tonight.

S: Sure.

K: If your wife has not left you after 23 years she never will.

S: 27 years.

K: It is more than I would put up with you.

S: It is the last portion that is not covered in the message.

K: Right and you might expand it a little more -- what you have in the message

S: O.K.

K: Thank you.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 17 MAY 2004 200102979

SB 242 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Scowcroft/Sec. Kissinger
April 14, 1974
20:20 p.m.

S: Yes, sir.

K: Where are you?

S: In the office.

K: Oh, if I had known that I would have called you. Have we heard about the Goddamned party.

S: We haven't heard anything further. I think it is -- you know, it is a matter of the day. And I guess it is a little hard to get to him down there now. But I don't think there is any question about it taking place, I just think it is -- and I don't know what the difference between Wednesday and Thursday is as far as he is concerned -- why he seems to prefer Thursday. I know you need to know.

K: O.K. I hope you have seen that cable from Algiers that these guys used the fact that we said -- that the White House said he was there as the leader of the Third World all over the Third World-- Boumediene.

S: No, I've not seen that.

K: Who had that bright idea to put that out.

S: I okayed it. I didn't put it in but I okáyed it.

K: That is the sort of thing that really should be checked.

S: I guess so. The argument was that that was the principal reason that he was coming to the United States. But you are absolutely right. It should not have been there.

K: It is not so crucial. O.K.

S: I'm going to hit him again in the morning on that.

K: O.K. Good, thank you.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 14 MAY 2004 200102979

SB 245 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sisco/Sec. Kissinger
April 14, 1974
~~12~~:10 p.m.

K: Joe.

S: Yes.

~~Yes~~
K: I hope you have a good explanation for your wife.

S: I will tell you. I just went out and I hope you've done the same thing now that you're a married man. I went out and took an hour off and bought her a little plant for Easter.

K: I just hope you remembered that she knows you left about two hours agos.

S: No, but I left about 45 mins. ago.

K: Look, Jim Callaghan called me and I told him we were not going to make a statement condemning the Israeli raid on Lebanon.

S: We certainly aren't.

K: O.K.

S: We didn't bother you. The Lebanese are thinking in terms of calling a Council meeting on Monday afternoon. The Israelis told me this afternoon that we were able to convey to the Lebanese a conviction that if they keep the border quiet -- that is the Lebanese -- the Israelis will keep it quiet. In other words the Israelis have done all they are going to do. I communicated that to the Lebanese. Now whether that is going to be enough for them to not call a meeting of the Security Council or not we will have to wait and see. I doubt it. I think the Israelis have been very restrained in this raid.

K: O.K. Because I promised Callaghan that we wouldn't do anything and that I would call him again Monday morning.

S: That's very good and we can talk about it again on Monday -- to have a look at it from New York. We shouldn't do a thing, Mr. Secretary.

K: O.K.

S: We tried quietly of course to prevent this Council meeting from being called and the Lebanese haven't made a final decision and I suspect they will think about it a little bit more over the weekend, but the Israelis, I just say, have been very restrained on this one.

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K: Have you done that letter to Callaghan.

S: I've been over it. You didn't ask me to do it but I've been over it about an hour ago and it is in your office. I think somebody else did it -- EUR or someone. It is a summary on Fahmy, your talks etc. And you have also the Asad letter there.

K: Gromyko, the shit, excuse me, as soon as I said to him that I would meet him in Geneva that of course he lapped up. Now he wants to meet me in Damascus if I go to Damascus.

S: (Laughter) It is becoming positively shameful on his part the way he is doing this.

K: It is one of the dumbest performances I've ever seen.

S: He really said this to you very directly.

K: Yes, so I said I would have to think about it . Now I will tell this -- what is that Syrians name.

S: Shahibi. You had better get the real pronunciation from the interpreter. He is outside standing by.

K: I will just tell him, Look it is that same baloney again. I have no interest in it. I can't refuse it if Asad wants it.

S: I think Geneva is reasonable and I think he ought to be satisifed with that. How did that go.

K: It was entirely social except for the end. And I told him I would meet him in Geneva on the way, second I will be willing to have Geneva reopened after the Syrian disengagement is done. And third I will be willing to make a statement that we will pursue coordinated policies as a result of the Geneva meeting.

S: That's fair and he lapped all of that up I am sure. He has something to take back with him.

K: It is a pathetic performance.

S: It certainly is -- very pathetic.

K: You know, I forgot to take Fahmy down. Do you think his feelings were hurt.

S: I'm sure not. I was there, I could every well have done it. He is fine. He seemed to be in very fine fettle this morning. I think you are treating him very well. You will be having dinner with him on Monday night and I think he is very pleased.

K: O.K. Has he gone back?

S: Yes. He has gone to NY. He left by train this afternoon at 4:00 I think.

K: So he isn't there yet.

S: No, he would get there 7:30 or 8:00.

K: So, you are coming tomorrow nigt.

S: That's right.

K: O.K.

S: O.K. Thank you very much.

END

SB 246 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
John Dunlop/Secretary Kissinger
April 14, 1974
6:14 PM

D: Hello, Henry.

K: How are you? Look, Brent Scowcroft talked to you earlier this week and in the meantime I've been so scheduled with visiting Foreign Ministersthat I've never had a chance to follow it up. I just wanted you to know that I am extremely interested in this.

D: That's very generous of you. What I told him was this....

K: Would you like to talk to me about this at some point?

D: Well, what I said to him was this. I -- it represents somewhat of you would recognize a little bend in the course of my normal range of activities, interests and so forth. I would like to think over the weekend, I said to ~~me~~ him about it, and then I would be back to him and if it seemed fruitful, I would like to talk to you.

K: Right. The way you should think about it is that I need somebody to whom I can essentially turn over the economic affairs.

D: Well, it's damn interesting. There's no question about it.

K: Subjec t to only my overall foreign policy direction. And with George Shultz leaving there's really no one here that can provide this combination of wisdom and knowledge.

D: As I said, it's an extraordinarily interesting range of ideas. It's a little bit -- of course the areas where I have operated ~~Exx~~ I've known all the institutions and the characters and the personalities for 30 years and moving into an area where I know less than that, is one of the things I will personally need to think about.

K: On the other hand you have been watching. Any businessman or outsider I'd bring in wouldn't even know where to begin.

D: Well, that's true. Well, let me do this, let me think about it and I'll be back to him and then if it seems useful as I.....

K: I just want you to know that if you do decide....

D: I appreciate very much your calling me about it and I will take it very seriously.

K: Good, wonderful.

END

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SB 244 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sisco/Sec. Kissinger
April 14, 1974
8:15 p.m.

K: One thing Fahmy wants is that I see the Syrian, I mean the Libyan that you were supposed to see.

S: Yes, because on that let me tell you what has arisen. I think that would be fine. Can we set that up for next week.

K: Yes, set it up for Tuesday.

S: Because one ~~other~~ of the complications that has come up is that I think Marwan -- who has been in New York, I didn't know that -- has been talking to this fellow and I think he feels as if he hasn't had very much attention. But also, he feels he has a catagoric commitment on airplanes and all kinds of things and you know we are not very clear just what kind of commitments he thinks he has. I think the fact that you would be willing to see him and talk to him about...

K: He has a commitment from us on the radar -- I don't mean a commitment. We got Sadat's view.

S: That was our view on the radar, but this man is talking about airplanes and all sorts of things I gather.

K: Fahmy wants us to give them the C-130s they have already paid for.

S: This is apparently what he -- he feels that he has a commitment of somekind on the C-130. I am told this by Don Easum.

K: What do you think of that.

S: I myself would rather start on the radar and move slowly on this and I think it is important for you to sound him out and see how this fellow sounds.

K: I think I will give him the radar and say we will have to see what happens on the airplanes but it is definitely in the ballpark.

S: I will have Don Easum get a hold him and say you would like to see him on Tuesday.

K: Do you think that Don Easum could avoid telling him that I am the obstacle to the airplanes. This is what he has done.

S: No, I'm sure he has not. But I am sure we can get across.

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K: No, no, but that is what Fahmy said the guy told him. That he had been told by Easum.

S: No, no. Easum has not even talked to this fellow. Easum has not talked to him at all. I spoke with Easum about two hours ago and I know that he has not talked to him. I think it is Marwan. You know there is a little interplay going on between Fahmy and Marwan, Henry, that we've got to watch. Fahmy is trying to put him in his place and Marwan, of course, is playing around the edges.

K: Like you and me.

S: Ours is not serious. There's no competition. I don't know in there case.

K: Where is that Goddamned article that describes you as a yes man. I've yet to see it.

S: Last Sunday's Washington Post. You're not missing anything.
K: I want to protest it.

S: I wish you would. We'd like that.

K: O.K.

S: Thank you.

K: Bye.

END

SB 248 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
The President/Kissinger
9:20 a.m. - 4/15/74

K: Mr. President. I missed you last night.

P: I only called to wish you a Happy Easter.

K: Thank you. I am in New York today to speak to the UN. It is not going to shake the world.

P: We seem to have a little problem on the Lebanon border but that was inevitable.

K: Both sides are guilty there. I had a good talk with the Chinese last night. You know the highest ranking official ever was here. They fully reaffirmed our policy and he went on and on about your visit. And he strongly reaffirmed the course that was outlined.

P: Did they give you any indication of the problems?

K: I have the feeling Chou is on the way out. They didn't mention him once during the evening. And everytime I brought him up they changed the conversation to Mao. Now as I think back, I had over three hours with Mao and Chou didn't say a word.

P: Mao (?)____ has killed off his people like Stalin.

K: That's right. That's the second man he's killed off. To be number 2 man is suicide. That conversation with me was his way of putting his own stamp on the thing so that they could get rid of Chou without hurting the relationship with the US.

P: Why do you think they want to get rid of him?

K: Domestic politics. I think it's a tragedy. I think it's a clash between Chou and Madame Mao. This guy yesterday talked as if he were in charge. He didn't say he was in charge but talked with great assurance.

P: We didn't meet him?

K: No, he was purged in the Cultural Revolution and just rehabilitated after you were there.

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P: Anything else of interest except your UN speech?

K: Ten o'clock.

P. Ten. Well, I wish you all the best.

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
The President/Sec. Kissinger
April 16, 1974
3:00 p.m.

N: Hello.

K: Mr. President.

N: How did your speech go over.

K: I think it went over very well.

N: Good, good.

K: I said some pretty tough things about forming cartels of producers and they did not go up the wall. On the whole, the reaction, actually, was better than even the NY Times reported because it just breaks their heart to say anything positive. I quoted some things that you said in 69 when you appeared before the UN about the need to dedicate ourselves to deeds and not just to retoric.

N: I guess we are going to have the For. Ministers dinner tomorrow night

K: That's right, Mr. President.

N: 8:00., Blk. Tie.

K: No. They were told not to bring blk. tie so they aren't ready for it.

N: We still make it 8:00.

K: 8:00 will be fine.

N: And women are coming.

K: Yes.

N: That's good. That will be good because Mrs. Nixon just having taken this trip, she ought to be there.

K: I think it would be essential for her to be there.

N: I just plan to speak briefly.

K: If you want me to, I will send over a few suggestions, but you usually do these things so well.

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N: Yes. We will just make it a warm, sympathetic kind of a thing.

K: That's right. The major point with them is to give them the sense that they've moved to the center of our attention, historic relationships.

N: Right. I had told Al to have the people prepare me a thousand words. Maybe I will just read it, or I don't know. Do you think I should do that or do you want me to just wing it.

K: Why don't we draft something and let you see it and then you can decide.

You could certainly read it.

N: If we read it, we could make copies and pass it around so they wouldn't have to translate it.

K: I think there would be a lot of advantages.

N: Would they have a response?

K: I suggested that one of them respond. And they will let me know tomorrow morning.

N: It won't be Sevilla Sacasa will it.

K: Oh, no. God no. It will be a Foreign Minister -- maybe the Brazilian, maybe the Argentinian.

N: There response should also be in the same way. They should read it. What I am thinking of is so it won't be a long dreary time in translating and everything. Maybe we could just have a thousand words written that I could read and I would ad lib a couple of things at the end and that's that. And then hand it out to them. I don't know. That's a possibility. You see if talk and translate and they talk and translate we are looking at about an hour and a half at least. While they like speeches, we don't like them that well.

K: Yes.

N: Basically, what you want more is just a friendly gesture don't you.

K: What is most important is the warm gesture. Another thing we could do. I don't know how the room will be set up -- whether it will be round tables or a long table. Because if it were round tables one could have

an interpreter at each table.

N: It sort of has a bad feeling when you hear that mumbling all the time.

K: Yes. That is true.

N: I don't like that but we could still use round tables. I think the round tables make it more...

K: It is a more intimate evening.

N: Also we avoid then the protocol.

K: Exactly.

N: I will determine on the reading tomorrow.

K: We will have something for you tomorrow morning.

N: That's good. I had a little call from Mansfield reporting on his dinner with the Chinese. He says the Chinese are very supportive and friendly about the President and about you etc.

K: Oh, they are all out.

N: And they asked about his coming there and he said well, tell me. They said go see Wong Chen. I said, fine Mike, go see Wong Chen, we are all for it.

K: Absolutely.

N: I think it is an indication that they want to warm things up a bit.

K: No question.

N: Another thing that is probably true too is that every time we sort of start to make a move towards our Soviet friends, they sort of move a little towards us.

K: Exactly. That's what these idiots can't understand. That our China policy--what our critics don't understand our China policy absolutely depends on our Russian policy. The reverse would also be true. If we moved away from the Russians, then the Chinese then would be free.

N: Well, we are coming along and just remember if we have been able to take the heat of this last year and accomplish what we have we sure as the dickens are going to be able to take it a little while longer.

K: Mr. President, I believe that the public opinion is on the verge of turning if we can just --if there were just one unambiguous event like a House vote in your favor or something like this.

N: It is hard to get those people to ever come to a point because of politics, but we will see. We have some things that maybe will be interesting next week. The main this is that is very interesting both in terms of our foreign policy and even in my travels in Ohio and Michigan there is an undercurrent of support there that is just ready to break loose. What do you think?

K: That is my absolute conviction -- that is my firm conviction.

N: In foreign policy it never has left us.

K: In foreign policy the liberals are sort of trying to create the impression now that there is something wrong with our foreign policy. Our foreign policy is in great shape. What can they point to.

N: That is one of the reasons that the trip was hard for them to swallow.

K: Exactly. And why the summit is hard for them to swallow. If they were sure it would be a failure, they would want you to go. It's because they know damn well it will be a success. That it's a guaranteed success that they don't want you to go. And they can piss on SALT, we will have enough other agreements. The average person doesn't know what SALT stands for.

N: And on SALT WE WILL/HAVE SOMETHING.

K: We will certainly have something in the field of arsm.

N: And that's all you need.

K: Something on the ABM...

N: Everything has to be step-by-step.

K: Exactly.
N: Fine Henry. See you tomorrow.

K: Right, Mr. President.
N: Bye.
K: Bye.

SB 251*

TELECON
Congressman Otto Passman/Secretary Kissinger
April 16, 1974
5:00 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

P. Mr. Secretary.

K: Mr. Chairman, you called me last when when I was in the middle of some frenzy and I never had a chance to return you call.

P: The only purpose in calling, I realize that unless we can find some money for Vietnam, those people could get in trouble. Let Parker to go ahead and take 60 million dollars out of the development loan fund and leave it to me to fight it out for him. You're familar with it, aren't you?

K: Yes, I'm familar with it.

P: And course those people on the other side here are going to cut your throat anyway and last year they cut it to 3 and I moved it back to 450. If they need that extra money the 49 million I put in my supplemental I pulled that through. He says he must have 60 million dollars more and I said go ahead and take it out of the developmental loan account. But the way I was reading the record he was just a little bit afraid to do that. What's your views?

K: I'm sympathetic to it. But let me ~~XX~~ check it with my associates and call you back.

P: I'll tell you this. He's out of the country anyway but I want to back this President up and I know that he requested, recently had intended request, I think 119, he cut it to 114 and I asked him to find 60 elsewhere so I feel the responsiblity to help you get the money.

K: I'm very sympathetic to it.

P: I'll be back in Washington Monday.

K: Why don't we talk on the phone then.

P. That's fine, if you don't mind.

K: Terrific. Thank you, have a good rest.

P: Thank you. Bye.

END

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SB 254 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
April 16, 1974
8:10 PM

K: Hello.

S: Henry.

K: Yes.

S: Dobrynin called Hartman a little while ago and told him that they had gone back to their German source on the Berlin matter and that it had been confirmed and that the source was Bahr (?). This now raises the question of what we do about this because it changes the situation completely as far as....
go to
K: I'd have Hillenbrand/Scheel.

S: Scheel. That's right. That's really the choice, is either Hillenbrand to Scheel or calling Staden in here. I don't see any point you're communicating with Bahr (?) on this. I think they should decide that among themselves. Although Idon't think we should tell Scheel who the [redacted] Soviets say their source is.

K: No.

S: You know, we get mouse-trapped in this thing if the Russians claim they have this on authority.

K: No, just say this is our information, is it correct, and what should [redacted] we tell the Russians. Say Gromyko raised it, I said I couldn't believe it, he then said he would check their source, they [redacted] checked their source and they didn't tell us who it was but they say they have reason to believe he's responsible.

S: And I think we have to tell the Germans in any demarche that this completely changes the situation - if correct - this would completely change the basis on which we've been operating in our defense of the German decision.

K: Why?

S: Well, because we've [redacted] taken the position that the Germans did this and we agreed since it was not illegal. If the Germans [redacted] now say that they've always been willing to withdraw if we veto it, first of all this is the agreed position between the four Western powers.

K: Well, I would just say you no doubt understand the implication of this - I wouldn't [redacted] spell them out to him.

S: OK, we'll do that first thing in the morning.
END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 13 DEC 2002 200102979

SB 255 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
April 16, 1974
8:28 PM

K: Brent, he's got to see Fahmy on Thursday afternoon, you know.

S: Oh yes. I think we can make that ~~xxx~~ alright.

K: Can I find out soon.

S: Sure. Probably not before morning.

K: Good.

S: But we'll make that one alright.

K Good.

S: Right.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 17 MAY 2004 200102979

SB 253:*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Winston Lord/Secretary Kissinger
April 16, 1974
5:15 PM

L: Yes, sir.

K: I just wanted to tell you I thought that Latin American speech came out fairly well -- not the Latin American one, the other one.

L: I thought it was better then we thought it was and I think it's gotten good reactions and the fact that it went well in the N.Y. Times. I think it's shows you thoughtly addressed this major problem which, you know, you have been given credit to having thoughtfully addressed. Now we have to make sure it's followed up. I thought we maybe ought to get a memo out to people like Enders and Buffum and make sure the various proposals get attention.

K: Right. OK. I just want you to know that -- will you tell the others who helped you.

L: I certainly will. I appreciate and I'll pass that on.

K: Good, thank you.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 13 DEC 2002 200102979

SB 249*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Gen. Scowcroft/Sec. Kissinger
April 16, 1974,
10:35 a.m.

K: How about the dinner for tomorrow.

S: The dinner is all set for tomorrow.

K: Business suit.

S: Business suit, at 7:30.

K: I'm surprised he doesn't do it at 6:00. Including wives.

S: Including wives.

K: That includes my wife.

S: That includes your wife. It will be a big dinner. Over 100 of them are Latin Americans.

K: How can it be that many Latin Americans?

S: By the time you get the delegations, the OAS ambassadors, plus whatever wives there are it comes out to something like 100.

K: But why did we have to have the OAS ambassadors.

S: Gee, I don't know. I just followed the instructions of the Dept. of State.

K: The Dept. of State is a bunch of horses asses. Wouldn't it have been better to get another guest list?

S: I assumed this was with your blessing.

K: You know that they wouldn't check with me, those bastards.

S: We can still cut out the OAS ambassadors. I don't think any of the invitations have actually gone.

K: O.K. Well, let me talk to them.

S: O.K.

END

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DATE/CASE ID: 17 MAY 2004 200102979

SB 266 i*

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D), B6

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Foreign Minister Fahmy
4/17/74; 10:42 p.m.

F: How are you?

K: Okay, how are you?

F: Hmm -- did you finish your dinner?

K: Just about finished it. Yes.

F: Henry, I wanted to talk to you now before tomorrow about the Security Council.

K: Yes.

F: I am giving you my thoughts only and it is up to you to decide what you want to do. I think it is much better that Scali works hard too that at the very end to not veto or be forced to do so, you know. Because if this is going to take place then it should be a very bad thing to have a bad effect on the Syrian business, you know. This is what I am saying now.

K: Yeh, but if we vote for an anti-Israeli resolution it will also have a terrible effect.

F: Yeh, but you see, I thought that saying -- that he should work very hard and if he can'tdo it you have to send somebody to help him you know so that at the very end you have a tough resolution that you can support -- especially the Russians would be very happy at this moment you know to prove that they are supporting the Lebanonese and you are not supporting them -- and if you can succeed to have a resolution for which you and the Russians support. . .

K: But how can we do that?

F: Either paragraph or so water down to make it a little bit more balanced.

K: Yes.

F: It is not difficult.

K: And will the Lebanonese accept it?

F: Oh yes, the Foreign Minister is there and he is ready to do it. I spoke to him and I spoke to Ora -- their representative you know. At any rate my advice is that the best thing is that you will vote for a resolution which is going to be passed. It has to be balanced you know and then for that you will be able to vote for it.

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K: Well if it is balanced, we will vote for it.

F: But I mean your people should try to work hard -- even if they need time -- they should work for it. And last if you cannot support it then abstain on it. But the worse thing is to veto it.

K: Yeh.

F: This would ve very -- I mean -- very bad. It won't help even your trip you know.

K: But if we vote for a bad one, it won't help my trip either -- the major problem -- I'm not kidding you. I have not yet got Israeli approval for what we are discussing.

F: I agree, but you see the point -- you see the Russians now are making so much propaganda even in Lebanon itself even inside in these papers you know.

K: Yeh.

F: I don't want you to vote in a way which either embarrasses the Israelis or the Lebanonese or the Syrians or you. This is the main point.

K: Okay, I'll look into it the first thing in the morning.

F: Yeh, the best solution is if you can reach an agreement on a resolution which you can support [redacted] B1
[redacted] B1

K: Yeh. Yeh.

F: If it is not possible, then have the _____ abstain. To veto any resolution now it will be a calamity.

K: Well let me do my best. I'll have to look at where the resolution stands now.

F: And I will speak to -- I spoke already to the Lebanonese FonMin -- Ora the Permanent Representative -- so they are receptive to make it balanced now. But even if they give you information that there was a small group from the non-allied which were -- was invested to conduct the other members, you know. Maybe that they will at the very beginning start with an extreme draft but the French can work on it, the British . . .

K: The French won't work on it.

F: [redacted] -- and by the way I am not sure about this story but apparently Jobert gave a statement to the LaMonde and he was accusing us directly because of our new relations. B1

K: Of what?

F: Our new relations . . .

K: No he didn't do it quite that much . . .

F: I'm checking with our ambassador there.

K: Well I've seen it but it wasn't very good.

F: [redacted] B1

K: We minimized what was done -- he said the Egyptian disengagement wasn't much of an achievement.

F: Yes, but apparently he said that you know the Egyptian government or the Egyptian state must bear the responsibility or something like that, I don't know -- [redacted] B1

K: Yeh.

F: So Think about it very seriously.

K: I will think about it and I willdo something first thing in the morning. And the appointment with the President was tentatively set for 11:30 in the morning, but frankly I am going to try to move it to the afternoon. Because I have my foreign ministers from Latin America here and I hate to leave them.

F: The Latin Ministers and then me -- now I am jealous.

K: Well you have no reason -- well after what I saw of you and _____ I have to take some alternatives.

F: Okay. But don't put it very late in the afternoon so I want to go back as soon as possible.

K: No, I won't put it beyond 3:00.

F: Thiswill be fine and by the way, please work hard on this draft.

K: I'll do it first thing in the morning.

F: Even if you need to send Sisco incognito like that, it's maybe a good thing.

[redacted] B6

K: Right.

F: Okay.

K: Right.

F: Bye, thank you.

SB 265 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
President Nixon/Secretary Kissinger
April 17, 1974
8:28 PM

K: Mr. President.

N: Yes, hi.

K: I'm sorry to disturb you. We have one matter with this Latin American meeting and the one that's happening at the OAS. As you know, there are a number of American subsidiaries in Argentina and the Argentines has passed a law according to which if they don't sell to Cuba they're going to be nationalized.

N: I see.

K: And you had already approved in February that under those conditions we can make a special exception and we can't really take the position that American companies in Argentina cannot obey Argentine law. If you had approved that and I held up the implementation of it because the Brazilian government at that time was changing and they had some doubts about it, now the Brazilian Government has come to us and have indicated that they favor our going ahead and if we could go ahead within the next day on this then Argentina would not introduce a resolution in Atlanta which would have the effect of lifting the sanctions altogether throughout the Western Hemisphere.

N: It's a dead loser as far as anything here is concerned to indicate any backing down in regard to ____ it will raise a hell of a storm.

K: Well, we're not backing down with Cuba. The position we're taking -- we're not lifting any.....

N: Well just don't make any announcement on it, just do it.

K: OK.

N: Just do it very very very quietly. Don't make a big thing out of it.

K: No, we wouldn't announce at it, we'd just let the Argentines do it in a low key way.

N: Alright, fine. OK, Henry.

K: Right, Mr. President.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 17 MAY 2004 200102979

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Gen. Scowcroft/Sec. Kissinger
April 17, 1974
10:20 a.m.

S: Yes, sir.

K: We must get that appointment with Fahmy.

S: I understand that.

K: Can we do that -- I don't know when to do it. I'd like to do it at a time that our bloody Foreign Ministers are out of town. 4:30 in the afternoon -- that's probably too late to make the evening news.

S: Yes, it really has to be about ...

K: How about 2:30.

S: 2:30, let me try that.

K: Can you?

S: I will see...

K: We don't need a long time. Tell him half an hour is all we need. In fact that is all that is required.

S: Alright. I will shoot for 30 minutes at 2:30.

K: This toast is alright.

S: No barn burner.

K: Actually -- Latin America it will be -- not bad. These guys are the biggest gasers you've ever seen.

S: O.K. Good.

K. O.K.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 17 MAY 2004 200102979

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Gen. Scowcroft/Sec. Kissinger
April 17, 1974
10:10 a.m.

K: Can't I have five minutes with the President.

S: Al is with him to ask him now.

K: All I need is five minutes.

S: I know, and I think the answer is yes. But you know the mood over here is not very good this morning. I think the answer is going to be yes but I don't have ...

K: What did they think was going to happen. Did you have any question.

S: No. I don't even know whether it is that but he is not in the cheerest mood. I'm sorry but he just would not answer last night and he is in with him now.

K: Ok. I will be over in 10 minutes. We are dealing with a nut house here. Do you want to come to that lunch, or do you want to come to any part of the Latin American ministers conference.

S: Not unless you think I should.

K: No, I would just like to have you get a little exposure to some of these guys.

S: Well, I will come to the dinner.

K: Oh, are you invited to that? That's a little more above your level.

S: I understand that.

K: O.K. I will see you shortly. How many dozens of people going to sit in on that meeting with Schuetz.

S: How many do you want with you.

K: Who is scheduled now.

S: Just you.

K: Well, that's insane of course.

S: Well, you need a notetaker and with your meeting I think it is Sonnenfeldt and a State Dept. notetaker.

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K: O.K. fine. That's what I meant, in my meeting.

END

SB 256 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
April 17, 1974
9:25 a.m.

(Missed first part.)

The Secretary referred to the Gwertzman article in the NY Times. He had obviously been given many details (included in the article) of the different positions taken by the Middle East countries. Fahmy was unhappy about the article.

S: I will check with NEA and let you know.

K: I've got to get this stopped, Joe. We cannot have it.-- What encourages Kissinger to proceed.--The moderate Egyptian position compared to the tough Syrian position. If we want to overthrow Sadat, this is a good way of doing it.

S: I would agree and all I can say to you is that I have not talked to him and I will see what I can do to find out who has.

K: I may have to remove Atherton if I can't get any attention in these Bureaus, I've got to be brutal.

S: Let me look into it and give you an aswer.
Do you have 30 more seconds; I was about to call you. We have a good balanced resolution. The British have worked one out in New York. We have also worked one out over night. Will you give me the authority to just go ahead and work this out and I can assure you that it is very balanced.

K: But mention it to the Israelis.

S: Sure. Of course we will. Because I think we might be able to come out all right at the end of the line.

K: If you discuss it with the Israelis.

S: All right. Good, thank you.

END

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SB 258*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Fahmy/Sec. Kissinger
April 17, 1974
10: 15 a.m.

K: Hello.

F: Good morning, Henry.

K: Ismail, how are you.

F: How are you.

K: O.K.

F: Humm.

K: I wanted to check with you about your appointment with the President.

F: Yes.

K: Would it be convenient for you to do it also, I'll say Monday next week.

F: Monday, next week?

K: Yes.

F: I can't stay. I'm leaving on Friday.

K: Oh, you are. All right, then we will do it tomorrow.

F: I'm coming tonight and if it is possible...

K: We have the Latin American Foreign Ministers here and it is hard for me to leave them. That's my problem.

F: I'll see him for 15 minutes, you know.

K: You and he cannot talk for 15 minutes. You will be fighting with each other as always.

F: Oh, no.

K: No, no. We will arrange it for tomorrow afternoon.

F: If you please, thank you very much.

K: Good.

F: O.K. Bye, bye. END

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SB 260 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Len Garment/Secy Kissinger
4/17/74 - 11:23 a.m.

G: Hi, Henry, how are you?

K: Okay.

G: They may already be resolved, but I have a fairly strong feeling that it will be helpful to go for the bundle on the aid to --

K: Oh, come on. Look, tell the Israelis to lay off. They know -- they're again going through one of their suicidal periods.

G: Well, that may be, but these have happened only occasionally that I've gotten a very strong sense of their being in that kind of a state.

K: There's no chance of our giving them the whole thing now before Syrian disengagement. I mean, we also have the Arabs to consider. What should we give them $1.5 billion for? I have worked something out with Dinitz which we're going to do this week, and then we'll do the rest afterwards. We've got our Arab position, too, to worry about.

G: Um-humm. You say, why do it? I think it's --

K: I'm telling you, if you want to do something, you tell the Israelis to be helpful on Syria because I'm going to withdraw from the negotiations if they're not going to do it. And then let them see how they can stand the whole world in international forums.

G: Well, can they -- I understand that, Henry, and I've only partially cause to make this presentation --

K: Yeah, but look at our position. Here we are with a war going on on the Golan Heights with no progress whatever on disengagement, you want the President to announce he's giving a $1.5 billion credit to Israel? Do you think the President will approve this? He hasn't even approved $500 million yet.

G: Well, I think he should.

K: Why?

G: Because I think it would be a message of consistency in strength.

K: Well, he will do it --

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G: . . . some people that are not persuaded by anything because of their own fanaticism and there are others who will get the message that there is some consistency no matter what's going on on the homefront. And I think that the Israelis do have some intuition of a tragic destiny that may be multiplied by their congenital hysteria and I think at this time that kind of resolution of this particular problem would have a great meaning.

K: Well, he will get what I worked out with Dinitz.

G: And that is agreeable . . .

K: This is agreeable with Dinitz.

G: All right. But I wanted you to know the feeling I had based upon some of the discussions against a backdrop of 5 years of intimate requests. This one just seemed very real. And I think that they do need that help and that it would be important . . .

K: But we need a little help too.

G: . . . know that. But I think that they --

K: They need help on MFN and we need help on the negotiations.

G: All right. But I don't think you want to have echoes of 1969 and early 70 when there was a great feeling of distrust there about what was happening here. I think that would be very extremely dangerous.

K: No.

G: [Because they have] disarray at this point over in Israel.

K: Well, look, they have gotten everything from us all along and that isn't going to change. It's simply a question of timing. But even that isn't a major problem because he will get the major part.

G: Um-humm.

K: What you should tell him is that it is important that we make some progress on the Syrian disengagement or there's going to be --

G: . . . I think they'd be much stronger in their ability to do that if they had a very clear cut and very symbolic vote of support and there's nothing that would be more concrete than this particular decision at this time. . . .

K: Well, they're getting something very significant this week.

G: Okay, Henry.

K: Good.

G: Thank you.

K: Bye.

SB 267 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
4/17/74/10:50 p.m.
Joe Sisco/HAK

K: Hello Joe. Sorry to bother you at home but I've just had a call from Fahmy about this resolution.

S: This is the one in New York?

K: Yes.

S: And what is his comment.

K: He thinks we could get a balanced resolution if we worked on it. And he thinks we should work very hard on it and he'd use his influence.

S: Yes, that's what we asked him to do.

K: Because he is just afraid of a veto.

S: Well, lets see where we are in terms of -- how far they got -- I don't have a report from Scali this evening because today was a day of discussions and let's look at it the first thing. They had a balanced resolution with the British but how far they got and what the reaction is we don't have a report yet.

K: You're not going to get me into a position of a _____ with either the Israelis or the Egyptians without my getting a crack at it.

S: Oh, I should say not. I hope you're not going to get into a dustup either way.

K: OK

S: No, we're going to keep you abreast believe me. No I think we look at it in a more _____ where we are. We'll give you a report and see what needs to be done. How did Fahmy feel about it. Just made this expression of you or....

K: I beg your pardon.

S: How did Fahmy feel about the thing. He really thinks we can achieve this.

K: He thinks we can achieve it but he wasn't confident, you know. He thought it was more easily -- you shouldn't -- we shouldn't be confused if the first drafts are very tough.

S: Of course we've already seen one tough draft and we're going to be very patient and if its a long process we are in no hurry.

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K: Right.

S: Well, we'll give you a reading when we've had a reading from New York in terms of the reactions. I know you're very busy tomorrow but we'll squeeze something in.

K: Right. Bye.

SB 263 *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Winston Lord/Secretary Kissinger
April 17, 1974
6:52 PM

L: Yes sir.

K: I must have another text very soon.

L: We're shooting for tonight. I don't know ____ to call.

K: OK. I hope you have understood that thing is a disaster.

L: We got your point.

K: I think we could make some mileage. I would use some of the stuff from _____. What difference does it make. To lap us the same stuff time and time again.

L: OK, I don't think we want to go too much on the ~~XXXXXX~~ too long but we're expanding it.

K: I'd go a little on the ____ because the American press never covered ___. I wouldn't say exactly the same thing.

L: That's a good point. The same is true on the Panama thing, they didn't cover that too much either. So at least it will be fresh to our ~~people~~. people.

K: That's right. To them you can put in the form of a summary. OK?

L: Right.

END

Lord - 6:53

K: Win, just make sure I get it by the end of the White House dinner so I can read it again.

L: OK.

K: And have it over at the White House in my office.

L: Fine.

END

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SB 2621*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
April 17, 1974
5:25 PM

K: How are we doing on Fahmy?

S: I can't find out. He has just left talking with the President and he must be with ~~with~~ Fred Bissart (phonetic) but he was going to raise....

K: Look, he has got to be there's no choice.

S: I don't think there's any question.

K: Yes, but I've got to tell him to come down. I'll just tell him to come down.

S: I just don't think there's any question about it.

K: I'll just have him and say, OK down how are we doing on this Argentine business.

S: I sent you over....

K: Yes, but I haven't got the time now.

S: OK.

K: I haven't got the time to sign it. I thought you were going to send it in.

S: I thought you were going to call ~~or~~ him or talk with him. I'm sorry.

K: Well, I've got an appointment with him, haven't I?

S: No, but he's alone now in the EOB.

K: OK, fine. Let me call him.

S: OK.

END

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Gen. Scowcroft/Sec. Kissinger
April 17, 1974
3:25 p.m.

K: Where do ~~you~~ we stand with -- what was I going to say. -- Where do we stand with the Israeli money.

S: With the Israeli money?

K: Yea, the one billion bucks -- make sure it happens this week.

S: O.K. The paper right now is in your Department. I'll get it over here.

K: Look, it's got to happen this week. I do not give a Goddamn what those sons of bitches are doing.

S: No problem. I'll have it over here on your desk tomorrow.

K: O.K. What's happening to that Argentine case. I can get -- the Argentians have agreed to make this deal with me. That if we let them announce this thing from here tomorrow they will then not press for an end to sanctions for an end of sanctions against Cuba at the OAS for which they developed a very cute formula. You see they were going to introduce a resolution resolved that the sanctions continue. That would require a 2/3s vote which isn't available. You see rather than say resolved that they be ended which also required a 2/3s vote, they were going to say ~~that~~ resolved that they continue.

S: I see it and then they would not be able to get the 2/3s vote on it.

K: That's it. Can you talk to Haig. All we are doing is implementing something he has already approved.

S: We can implement the Argentine one, it is the Canadian one that is the problem.

K: But talk to Haig. Have I got a chance to see him.

S: Are you prepared to see him this evening.

K: About 6:00

S: Let me try that.

K: Or at least talk to him on the phone.

S: O.K.

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K: What's the mood.

S: Not real good, I gather.

K: Were you there with the German.

S: Yes. Oh, he was fine there. Just a little nonsense for about 10 minutes. He was fine with that.

K: O.K. Listen, you know we are getting more request from people he told to come and call on him.

S: I know we are. You know what it was. It was this doggone reception and it was just diplomatic chatter was what it was. But they all took it seriously.

K: What is what you tend to do when you deal with the President of the U.S. O.K.

S: O.K. I will see about 6:00.

K: Tell him I may be at a meeting. And how about Fahmy.

S: Fahmy, I think we are going to be o.k. It may have to be 3:30 rather than 2:30.

K: Then I would prefer 4:30 because I will be in the middle of a meeting.

S: O.K. Either 2:30 or 4:30.

K: Let him know then that it is all set. Can we do that.

S: I can't yet.

K: You tell him it is essential. That considering that Sadat has always seen me.

S: I understand. I just don't think there is a problem, but I don't have a firm commitment yet.

K: O.K. Thank you.

END

SB 264 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Roy Atherton/Secretary Kissinger
April 17, 1974
7:10 PM

K: Roy, will you make sure Fahmy is called and told we don't have an exact time for his meeting with the President tomorrow afternoon, but he should come on down anyway.

A: Yes sir, he's coming. He's coming by train.

K: OK.

A: In fact, I thought I'd go out to the railroad station.

K: Excellent, very nice.

A: I'll tell him that when I see him.

K: Have we found out who talked to Gwertzman?

A: No sir. I told Joe I haven't since he came back from the Middle East trip.

K: But it has to be someone who was at the meeting.

A: Some xk of it, it sounds to me, could have come from the parties themselves. Except the part that Fahmy's upset about. No, I'm xxxxxkpuzzled. I notice he wrote the story out of New York. I've checked with my people and I'm persuaded that none of them have talked -- they don't normally work with this.

K: OK. Well, we'll talk later.

A: Alright, xxxx sir.

K: Thank you.

END

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UNCLASSIFIED

SB 273A*
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Lord/Secretary Kissinger
April 18, 1974

me
K: Will you collect for the Tlatlaco speech, the Panama speech, my talking points for this meeting, the back-up material for this meeting,

L: Right.

K: So that I can start and the various drafts that we have had. So, if necessary I can start working before 7.

L: Ok.

K: Good.

END

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UNCLASSIFIED

SB 274 *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
April 18, 1974
5:20 PM

(Missed first part)

S: It's pretty useless and I'm in about ~~m~~ 15 minutes as soon as I get out of a meeting, because I'm trying to take care of also this Max Fisher thing and I think I can get it straightened out for you.

K: There's nothing to be straightened out, just somebody call Fisher for Christ's sake. This is the 3rd day now that I've asked for it.

S: I've already done that. That's how I'm straightening it out. Look, never mind worrying you about that, we'll have a reaction to this resolution for you, what do you owe Fahmy, a comment?

K: Well, I owe him a comment, I'm not going to proceed with it, which I won't.

S: Of course, you can't proceed.

K: Well then, let's tell him what needs to be done to it.

S: That's ~~what~~ what we're looking at.

K: How about the Lebanese thing?

S: See, what we're looking at....

K: What about the ____cable, for Christ's sake, now.

S: Well, we wrote you a little memorandum saying to you...

K: What.

S: Excuse me, Mr. Secretary, please, you asked me a question....

K: Somebody has to organize my office. You may have written me a memo but it hasn't come to me.

S: Alright. Let me tell you what we're telling you orally. We think going to ___is very bad. We recommend strongly against it.

K: That's Buffum's view.

S: Yes and mine.

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K: Why's that?

S: Because of that fact that (a) we've got a good cooperative relationship with this lawyer and secondly, he will resent it, it will be counter-productive and third, the relationship between the Foreign Minister and the President is, that the President will defer to this Foreign Minister the man on the ~~scene~~. After tomorrow.....

K: OK, fine.

S: If you're not satisfied then, we might be able to do it a little bit later one.

K: OK, fine.

S: On this you want us to tell you how you think - we think - you ought to react to Fahmy and you ~~don't~~ need to call him tonight, is that the way it...

K: Well, yes.

S: ~~Okay~~ Alright. If you'll give me about an hour I'll be back at you.

K: Good, ~~thanks~~ thank you.

END

UNCLASSIFIED

SB 273 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Fahmi/Sec. Kissinger
April 18, 1974
1:35 p.m.

F: Hello, Henry.

K: Ismail, I wanted you to know that I just had a telegram fromDamascus in which -- you know I had informed him of the Soviet proposal to meet in Damascus possibly. I said I would meet him in Geneva, but on that occasion, Gromyko proposed that we meet in Damascus. Asad said if we both agreed that's all right with him. But that puts me into an impossible position.

F: You shouldn't have sent this proposal to Asad.

K: I shouldn't?

F: No. Then you have to tell him back that as long as you are going to meet him in Geneva there is no need for meeting in Damascus. In my own way, I will speak to the President, I will send him a message now.

K: Good.

F: But you should reply, you know, as long as you are going to meet him in Geneva that there is no need that you meet him in Damascus. This may complicate things.

K: Yes.

F: O.K.

K: Right.

F: And (ask) the President to contact us.

K: I tell you it will be impossible. The Israelis will do nothing.

F:: Yes, but you shouldn't tell us of _____.

K: But I was afraid the Russians would.

F: Yes, but then, if the Russians would contact him then he will contact you what's your reaction and then you would tell him that you would not (dream) of it. And he should keep it for himself. You shouldn't worry but you have to send him back an answer that as long as you are going to meet him in Geneva that there is no need for him. This may complicate things. Then I will ask the President to contact Asad.

K: Good. That's what I will do. Thank you Ismail. Goodbye. END

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SB 277*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Joe Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
April 18, 1974
6:10 PM

S: Mr. Secretary, we've looked at the Fahmy draft, it's worse than the ___draft. It's shameful he would even hand you something like this.

K: Now, just stop raving.

S: Alright. My recommendation is that you go back to him by saying that there is a draft ~~now that~~ now that is being discussed that has broad support and you'd be glad to make it available to him and it would be this draft that you just looked at a few ~~minutes ago~~ minutes ago.

K: But who has that -- who's supporting it. The French are supporting it?

S: Yes. That's what we're told.

K: I can't believe it.

S: Well, I can't believe it, but you know one has to believe ones reports. We're told by the British, the British are aboard and the French, the Australians and the Austrians.

K: That makes it five.

S: And us is five. You see.

K: So we can ~~block~~ block anything anyway.

S: If they stay together, but the French won't stay together. I think there will be further negotiation ~~in~~ and what you will find is as soon as some of these other ____get at this, the British will tend to stick pretty well, but I can tell you the rest are like soft [illegible] spaghetti and the French will be absolutely pro-Arab.

K: Not being an Italian soft spaghetti, can you put it into ____ to him?

S: Say, I loved that soup you served Sunday night, it was very good. I loved it.

K: That was quite good. What did you think of our CHINESE friends?

S: I'll tell you, I thanks you the other night and I thank you again. To me that was one of the most fascinating conversations I've ever been in. You gave them an opening for example, for the Prime Minister, they didn't pick it up. It was clear that there were ~~a~~ certain special words that they expressed to you

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and you expressed to them where it was -- I found the whole conversation very reassuring.

K: I do too, but you know, Joe, these guys are about ten notches below Chou and I had the impression that he's had it.

S: Yes, I'm afraid so. I heard what you said and you're able judge this. I have no judgment, not having experienced it before. But if that's the case, then it's lost group. For example, if now they continue to refer in everyone of those points, you remember what Mao said to you.

K: No, that's alright. That's guaranteed continuity. That's why they did that.

S: Right. So that was alright. It's just a failure to mention , is that what you're really....

K: Yes. Quoting Mao was bad.

S: On this matter, what do you want to do. Do you want to call Fahmy?

K: Yes.

S: Now, I have one other very quick thing to take up with you. Yamani has called and wants to talk to you. Let me tell you what the problem is. On Monday five oil executives are going to testify before the Jackson committee. It relates to the very private deal which the Saudi Arabians made with us in assuring that our defense people got their oil for our fleet. Yamani is worried that the Jackson committee will make this public. DOD we are told, talked to the Jackson people some weeks ago and at that time they received an assurance from the Jackson committee, Feldman and the other people that are involved, that they would not make this public. Now the recommendation that I have is this. Yamani wants to talk to you (a) would you authorize me to call him on your behalf to say to him that the Secretary is aware of his concerns and that we will do everything in our power to keep this matter from being aired in the committee publicly, although obviously we can't guarantee it.

K: Absolutely.

S: And then secondly, will you authorize, I don't know who would be the best person either me or someone else, to call the council staff, Mr. Feldman, and to remind him that they've given this committment and this is very important from the point of view of our national interest.

K: Absolutely.

S: OK, I'll proceed on that basis.

*

K: Now, OK, you're getting that schedule done for me.

S: Yes and we owe you an Assad letter as well and a couple of ~~xxxxxx~~ hundred things. You really have gotten a little work out of me today.

K: Joe, that's why you stayed.

S: You ought to get me a raise you know. I only make $40,000, I'm broke.

K: Is it in my power, incidentally?

S: No, there's no ~~xx~~ way. As you said two months ago, there isn't a thing you can do for me and I'm here just for the love of it.

K: Yes.

S: So you be nice to ~~xxxx~~ me.

K: Right.

S: OK.

END

SB 276*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Sec. Kissinger
April 18, 1974
5:48 PM

K: Joe, I have Peter Ramsbotham here with me and he tells me things are going well at the Security Council. That we are canvassing a double hundred nations. Is he living in the same world I am.

S: I don't know what he is talking about. Let me take a reading in New York, but we are right where we know we have been in terms of that draft.

K: No, that was this morning. As I understood it the Europeans came up with something that is totally unacceptable.

S: Well, that is what I showed you this morning, but I think our British friends have had, and I want to check this with Scali, some further discussions with the Europeans and I think what he means is that we gather the Europeans are coming along very nicely. Hold on a second, here is the draft that is coming right now. I understand it, I haven't looked at it, that the Europeans apparently have accepted something which the British have put forward which looks pretty good. I haven't looked at it but I'll give you a reading. It is practically our text, Mr. Secretary, so it is going pretty well. Here I have just read it, I'll be glad to bring it in to you. Would you like to look at it.

K: Sure.

S: We'll bring it right in.

END

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SB 275 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Arthur Burns/Secretary Kissinger
April 18, 1974
5:22 PM

(missed first part)

K: I'll tell you, the problem is, if there is no Syrian disengagement, then the war will start again, then the French and the Soviets will be able to tell the Arabs they told them so all along. The U.S. will be totally discredited, because if we can't -- the issue is whether Israel with withdraw say, 5 to 8 kilometers into the Golan Heights. If we can't get that, then of course how can we claim we can get anything. You see what I mean?

B: Yes.

K: Whether they're willing to give up the town of ___. Now, of course, if Israel had any sense, the Syrians have made a proposal which isn't really all that outrageous and if they gave the Syrians -- if I were Prime Minister in ~~x~~ Israel I would give the Syrians 2/3 of what they've asked for and that would run the Russians out of there, but that's beyond Israel's capacity, even to imagine. So I'm not arguing on that. But if they could ~~gx~~ grudgingly give 5 to ~~x~~ 8 kilometers, then at least we can prevent an outbreak. If I fail, the only one who's faced them up to now, is I. I mean, it's a personal thing. If I fail, I'm out of the negotiation, if I'm out of the negotation, they'll be thrown into international forums. Do you believe that this country in the ~~fact~~ face of another ~~xxxx~~ energy crisis will mount an airlift? I doubt it. So, it's a very serious matter. Portugal wouldn't give us the Azores again.

B: I'll have a talk with Dinitz.

K: I think basically he agrees with me. In fact I know he agrees with me. Don't give him the feeling I'm unhappy with him or with Golda, it's the political situation. Because I have ~~gxxx~~ great admiration for him -- really I like him very much.

B; No, I'll be sure of that alright.

K: OK, good. Thank you Arthur.

B: Good luck.

END

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SB 278 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
April 18, 1974
6:53 PM

D: Hello?

K: Anatol?

D: Hello, Henry. How are you?

K: OK.

D: Henry, I would like to check with you two points about your trip and suggestion to me from 28 and 29.

K: No, 28.

D: 28 and 29 I was told.

K: 29 yes, Monday.

D: Yes.

K: I would come ~~itx~~ in about 9:00 in the evening so we could meet that evening.

D: Oh, I see and then Monday you could have another talks, yes?

K: We could have most of the day together Monday.

D: Most of the day.

K: Yes

D: Fine. The next question, you remember when you disccused ____he was with you alone and he asked you the _____of meeting there or you're not quite now. I mean___and the second meeting during the trip.

K: Well, he said that that was a different proposition from the Geneva one and I'd like to discuss that with~~inx~~ him in ~~Xeneva~~ Geneva .

D: While there.

K: Yes.

D: Fine. You are going to visit Israel, Egypt and Syria?

K: Probably. I'll let you know if there are any additional ones. I will almost

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go to Jordan. I w always do.

D: Jordan. So it will be four countries.

K: Yes.

D: What's you schedule. Egypt.

K: Egypt will be the first. Then Israel, then Syrian.

D: I think this is alright. What about SALT, Henry.

K: We have a meeting next Tuesday.

D: Would you tell me something then aroudn Wednesday or Thursday?

K: I will do my best.

D: You will be back from this Latin American on Sunday.

K: Yes. Do you x want to have lunch on Monday.

D: I would like to.

K: Monday or Tuesday -- which do you prefer?

D: What is more convenient for you.

K: We'll call you in the morning.

D: On Monday.

K: Tomorrow.

D: OK, thank you very much, Henry.

K: Good. Bye.

END

SB 279 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Jack Kubisch/Secretary Kissinger
April 18, 1974
9:30 PM

K: Jack, how are you?

JK: Just landed in Atlanta. I'm at the airport.

K: Oh, God. It wasn't that urgent. I just wanted to find out how your press conference went.

JK: The press conference, I think, went very well. I talked for about 10 minutes at the outset on the record reviewing the background as to how the meetings originated and the background of Mexico and in Washington and then went through the communique, the highlightes and expressed the view that you were highly gratified by the results and the constructive attitude and indicated what the results have been of the meetings and then went on -- and then read the announcement -- a 2 sentence announcement towards the end.

K: That was probably a mistake.

JK: Probably a mistake?

K: Yes, We should have saved that for another day.

JK: Possibly. Over-shadowed the other.

K: Don't you think?

JK: It's possible. But the problem was that it was already leaking all over the place.

K: Was it.

JK: In any case, it gave us the initiative because news was going to leak it over night, it was better for us to get our two sentences out at least.

K: Yes.

JK: But then there was 30 or 40 minutes of questions and I felt very interested and they went very well. I thought everyone seemed quite pleased that in effect, I think we've handled as well, as far as the press is concerned. They were expecting less and so we're somewhat pleased by things going better than they had intended to be. Rabasa was on the plane coming down. He said he thought it was a most successful conference.

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Far more than anyone had anticipated.

K: Actually it turned out to be pretty good.

JK: I've got my fingers crossed. If we just don't get some kind of backlash on these damn automobiles____and Argentina and so on. It just depends on how the press plays it.

K: Yes.

JK: And I just don't know how they will. For example, David Binder of the N. Y. Times said, well now if you are going to ~~issence~~ license these companies, don't you really expect that the policy will now collapse. I said absolutely not, there's no reason to assume it will collapse. The fact is, we're treating these as an exception. He said how can you refuse anybody. I said, here you have -- he said you seemm to have made these concessions to the Argentine government under duress____, I said that's not true at all. There's been no question on U. S. Government from the Argentine ~~Government~~ Government, we've been really caught between the desire to have good relations with are Argentina.

K: Well, the basic point is how can we insist American Companies don't have to obey foreign laws.

JK: Yes. It's just an absurd posture and unsustainable position for us to be in. Really I think that these last two days have gone better since we had any reason to ~~xxxx~~ anticipate. We'll just have to see how the damn press plays it tomorrow. But thus far__lead into the meetings and the press yesterday.....

K: No, I think the conference itself will -- we're coming out superbly.

JK: I agree.

K: I'm just wondering now whether that Argentine thing~~x~~ is going to kill it.

JK: I don't think so. I think people who try and see wheels within wheels may think that you use this as a trump card to play to insure cooperation from the Argentines and the Mexicans and others who are prepared to press for a lot more on Cuba. I don't know, we'll just have to see how they play it. Dudley Thompson was on the ~~plane~~ plane coming down and several others Venezuelan. They were all really, I won't say ___, but they were really ~~quite~~ quite pleased. Very happy with the outcome.

K: Because they like to jocular way the meetings were conducted.

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JK: Well that's what Dudley Thompson said. He said really the secret to the success, he felt, was your own personal -- your personality and the fact that when everything starts to get a little tense and a little formalistic, you would make some kind of remark that would relax the tension. I feel very good -- I feel like someone who's gone through about 2/3 of a difficult passage and I'm just keeping my fingers crossed and watching things.

K: If it was leaking anyway, we had no choice, unless the only other things we could have done was told ___we couldn't make a decision until Friday.

JK: Yes. It was just....

K: I don't know whether that would have worked.

JK: I have a feeling that there are really two stories that came out of tonight, or that came out of the meeting today. The wind up of the meeting and this license thing. They may play these two stories. I certainly did not relate them in any way. I said the matter never came up during the course of the conference.

K: Did you take questions on the conference first.

JK: Yes, Oh, yes.

K: And then you went into the license thing.

JK: That's right.

K: OK, well, we did what we could. OK. Many thanks, Jack. I yell and scream at your group but so far you've always come through.

JK: Thank you for everything.

K: See you soon.

JK: OK. Bye.

END

SB269 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
McCloskey/HAK
April 18, 1974 - 8:58 a.m.

K: About Mrs. Kissinger's day.

M: Are there any specific things I should know about today? I want to be sure that its done right and what I would recommend is that pictures be permitted at Blair House where she is having lunch.

K: Right.

M: And not say anything about the Smithsoneian trip unless it becomes learned

K: It's up to you.

M: Alright. I'd like to speak to you at some point about her programming.

K: That's what I wanted to do. Why don't you just assume you're in charge of developing a program. Could you?

M: Yes indeed.

K: You'll have a hell of alot of requests and I don't know what to do with them.

M: You know this young woman in the press office don't you, who you see around with the photographers. Now she is very, very good.

K: Yes, but somebody has to tell her what the policy is.

M: OK. I'd like to introduce her to Mrs. Kissinger if I may at some point.

K: Good. OK. Thank you.

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RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
HAK/Joseph Sisco
April 18, 1974; 12:41 p.m.

K: Joe, can you send the other resolution over here.

S: Sure.

K: So that the President can see it?

S: The one that we didn't like?

K: Yes.

S: Yes, I'll get it right over to you.

K: So then we know what the basis...

S: It's not to be shown to Fahmy, however, because he hasn't seen that. That was what the British came out of the European.

K: Oh, no. What is the nonaligned one?

S: Well, the nonaligned one came in about 48 hours ago. Why don't I get that one over to you right away.

K: That's the one - let's not get these two confused by getting the European resolution in.

S: That's right. No, no, I'll get that one for you because I know it's utterly impossible and will demonstrate the point that you made. I can LDX that to you right away if you like.

K: Good. And we are not going to have any - there's to be no discussion that this was even discussed with Fahmy.

S: Well we can do that too.

K: Absolutely. That's essential.

S: Yeah.

K: So at the press briefing just say that the President and Fahmy had a general review of the situation and the Lebanese issue didn't come up.

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S: In our press briefing here.

K: Well, if it comes up.

S: Well, I don't think anybody in our press even knows that I've seen you on this matter. Certainly I haven't mentioned it to anybody so how would, you know. The question could come up, however, and I'd better just tell them right away that you just had a general discussion about the Lebanese thing.

K: Fahmy is to be kept out of the Security Council discussion altogether.

S: Altogether.

K: Right.

S: All right.

K: One idea which I think is a very good one. You should send a message to Franji urging him to instruct his Foreign Minister to cooperate closely with us. And what we should do is to send a message saying, look, please keep in mind we must get maximum pressure from Jewish groups and so forth on the Israelis - I mean, put it more elegantly so that it doesn't leak. With respect to Syrian disengagement.

S: Do you mind, if I can sell Bill Buffum on this as to whether that gambit of going to Franji at this moment while we have talked to the Foreign Minister is apt to explode in our face or not. He knows this Foreign Minister very well and he knows the relationship between them.

K: OK, but draft something to me to look at.

S: All right. I'll get this resolution to you right away.

K: Good. Over at the White House.

SB 272 i*

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
HAK/Joe Sisco
April 18, 1974; 12:45 p.m.

K: Hello.

S: Yes, sir.

K: I don't think we should circulate a draft even informally, even for discussion.

S: Well, we're not at this point. You see, what we're doing is put a stop to everything ~~and~~ pending discussions tomorrow.

K: Exactly, good.

S: That's what we're trying to do.

K: Good.

S: Bear in mind that there's been discussion of this draft yesterday based on what we had instructed our British and American delegations.

K: Now, secondly, I would like you to call Ramsbotham.

S: Right.

K: And tell him I consider it essential that the British make an absolute maximum effort, not just a token effort to get a decent draft. And a really maximum effort. Explain to him that I am meeting with the leaders of the Jewish community here next week. And if we are forced to veto, then we lose the Arabs. If we abstain, I might just as well quit.

S: Sure, well, let me say this - I will do this, but on the whole the British were very good yesterday, I want you to know.

K: Yes, good isn't enough. Theyve got to be massive.

S: I know what you mean. OK, I'll do it.

K: But tell him I appreciate everything he has done.

S: Sure, sure.

K: Should I call Callaghan?

S: No, I don't think so at this point. You may need some help at some later stage, you'll like to.

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K: But tell him we want a really all-out British effort.

S: OK.

K: Thank you, Joe.

SB 270 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Kubisch/HAK
April 18, 1974 - 9:09 a.m.

AHK: How are we doing on this G.D. thing.

K: Have you seen the draft yet?

HAK: Yes. It isn't all that bad.

K: I don't think so either. I must say we did a little rewritting after they left about 2:30 this morning.

HAK: I don't see -- on the subject of trade, "the Foreign Ministers attach special importance" to the status quo.

K: That needs to be clarified. That commitment is at a standstill. We'll clarify that as soon as they get here.

HAK: You can't say that. Because that has all the wrong connotations. Then we should have a paragraph or two which gives a little lift to the G.D. thing.

K: Christ, you know we had it and we argued about it. They want to keep the rhetoric out. They want to make it just a statement of the facts of what was discussed and what the agreement was consensus of. We have some sentences in the beginning and the end but very little.

HAK: But that makes it a catalog of things they are asking of us.

K: What I'll try and do if you agree is try and weed some phrasing in and around, or if you want, we could, we had a paragraph in on about between one and two and....

HAK: Also, I don't know whether that economic coercion paragraph is doing us much good.

K: As a matter of fact, let me tell you we rewrote the second sentence of it after the Ecuadoriansleft because they are the ones that had it in there and they had a sentence in there that they -- the foreign ministers -- the Latin American foreign ministers expressed their concern to you about the consideration being given in the U.S. Congress to. They were going to restrict imports, etc. They also expressed concern over proposals that would tend to restrict acc ess. The whole theme of that, even the title of that article is a problem for us.

HAK: That is right and that is what should be pointed out in it.

K: Yes.

HAK: That's exactly right. XXXXX

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K: If we could make it a more balanced thing. The way we've got it now is that all forms of economic coercion from relations among the countries of the Americas. You know, we're subject to economic coercion in a sense at times too. It might be a charter of rights and duties, etc., by the time you get some balance both ways. That is what we were seeking to turn it to that. We don't favor economic coercion measures against us either. On the Panama thing, let me tell you that there was a disagreement privately between me and the Panamanian representatives on one point. The other two paragraphs stated the second paragraph is excellent. The first paragraph he wants to put in he said his Minister is insisting that they put in the first paragraph that the Latin American Foreign Ministers expressed their solidarity with Panama in exasperation as they had done in Bogota. I said, look, we went through that in Mexico. We wouldn't accept it there. The United States can't sign -- the Secretary of State can't sign that and I said we just can't do it, and to issue such a statement here in Washington, I said do you want a treaty or don't you.

AHK: They can do it separately if they want to.

K: On the other hand I do remember your comment at one point yesterday when we were talking about the 30 some Senators.

HAK: But not as part of a communique I signed.

K: Yes. The thing is, would you, if I can work this, would you be willing to have something in there that shows that they are pressuring you hard and they have solidarity with Panama.

HAK: Yes.

K: It is balanced so that it doesn't look like you are giving away the whole ballgame. You know if they are just thrilled with the way things are going on the negotiation with Panama then we must be giving everything away so there ought to be a little criticism of us or a little pressure on us in it, do you think so?

HAK: Yes, that doesn't bother me that they say I took note of their concern for progress.

K: OK.

HAK: That doesn't bother me so much but nowlook, I have the problem that the President wants to see the Egyptian Foreign Minister at 11:30 this morning and I have no way of not being there.

K: How about this. Why don't we have our meeting and then at 11:15 or something you call a recess for the drafting committee to do a redraft of the communique and then.....

HAK: And begin again when, at 2:30

K: Whenever you wish. We've got a buffet lunch available for all the delegates. They can just come and go, serve themselves. You can come or not as you please.

HAK: And then we meet again at 2:30.

K: That would be for the wrap-up. What we could do at 10. Have the discussion of the panorama of U.S. - Latin relations and that's when the Cuba thing is going to come up. Then consider the communique as it stands now, try and get a decision on these couple of items, whether it is going to be working groups or not, then you do a review of the international situation if time permits and call upon the drafting committee to go back and do a redraft and resubmit it to the ministers at 2:30. How about that.

HAK: OK. Good.

K: I'll see you at 10.

HAK: Good. Goodbye.

SB 268 *

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

Telcon
HAK/Mr. Maw
April 18, 1974; 8:28 a.m.

K: Hello.

M: Good morning, Henry.

K: Carl, I can't find Kubisch.

M: He should be there any minute. We left there about...well, I got home around 3 o'clock. You have downstairs a draft in four languages which is almost acceptable. It's not going to say much,

[redacted] B1

K: What is the main sense?

M: What they really wanted to put in the communique was all that trash that was in their paper.

K: Yeah.

M: And they wanted to use the communique as something for home consumption and political things like...

K: Of course there were a few points in that paper we wouldn't mind having in there.

M: And we think we sorted them out and they're there. Now Jack is probably down in that conference room. He was going to be there by 8:30 to meet the people who couldn't be there last night and go over with them what we did.

K: Yes, but can I see a draft?

M: Yes, tell them that it's down in the conference room.

K: Well, I'm in the White House right now.

M: I'll have it...how long will you be at the White House?

K: Oh, another hour.

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DECLASSIFY AFTER: HAK'S DEATH
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M: Do you want it brought over there to you?

K: Well, I'd like to know what we're doing.

M: Well, I'll have it sent over there to the White House to you. And the _____ is on the way. It will be on your desk when you get to State.

K: Yeah, OK.

M: I think it's within reason. We did another hour on it this morning.

K: Yeah, but, I just don't like communiques to be completed without any consultation whatsoever with me.

M: It won't be. That's why it's where it is. And none of your foreign ministers' associates have yet seen it either.

K: Yeah, but I don't give a damn about that. If they don't control their bureaucracies that's their problem.

M: Oh, I see. Well, Henry, it's there on the first floor, and I'll have somebody start right over with it.

K: OK.

M: Right.

SB 281 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
FM Fahmy/Secretary Kissinger
April 19, 1974
10:45 AM

K: Ismail, how are you? I'm just talking to the Lebanese.

F: You called me yester day night?

K: Yes. I wanted to tell you that your resolution, really we can't go along with. I think that is too unbalanced and it will get us into...

F: This is too unbalanced?

K: Yes.

F: _____resolution much stronger than this, on the Lebanese issue too, before and 3/4 of this from the European and from the American talks.

K: Well, there's now a European draft which we...'

F: A new one?

K: A new one which has 4 or 5 of (it has Australia), France agrees with it too which we would like to go along with.

F: Yes. But I mean there are some parts of that thing which I mean the non-aligned will not be able to support and then (Moscow) really will be forced to propose another version which will get the necessary votes. The point is, you see, if the Lebanese accept the European than you have no problem. If they accept anything, you see.

K: Yes.

F: It's up to them. The minute they tell the non-aligned or the Europeans or anybody that they are ready to accept any version, then this is the key for the whole thing. OK?

K: Well, let me see what I can do. I have the Egyptian Foreign Minister here now -- the Lebanese Foreign Minister. The Egyptian Foreign Minister is a pain in the neck, he's in N.Y.

F: You see, the main thing for them is, in my opinion, they will get a draft which you can support. This is in their interest.

K: I agree completely. Incidentally, I wanted to tell you something yesterday but that I wouldn't....

F: I'm here in the hotel, you know.

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K: In New York?

F: Yes.

K: I'll send it by cable.

F: OK.

K: Because there are too many switchboards.

F: OK. Send it by cable to Cairo.

K: Yes, to Cairo. You're leaving today, aren't you?

F: I'm arriving tomorrow.

K: I'll have it for you by tomorrow.

F: OK, thank you very much.

K: It's just a point for you and for your President. Just a point of information about some Soviet activity here.

F: OK. Thank you very much.

K: The President was very pleased with his meeting with you.

F: Well, I was very pleased and honored and the President, I got a cable from him, he's very satisfied.

K: And you know we are receiving Ghorbal today.

F: Yes, thank you very much. You are going to meet Schlesinger?

K: Sunday, when he comes back.

F: And we're looking for you and Nancy, OK.

K: Terrific. Thank you.

F: Thank you for everything, Henry.

K: Ismail, you're a good friend in addition to everything else.

END

SB 280*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
JOE SISCO/HAK
4/19/74 - 9:12

K: Joe, why does it take 5 days to get a memo over here on assistance to Israel?

S: Well, I don't really know other than the whole bureaucratic thing that you've got so damned many people involved in.

K: Well, but, that's what I want to end.

S: Alright. I don't...

K: Now, it was important to me to get this determination made before the Congress came back and all hell broke loose. And that was worth more to me than whether every G.D. SFO7 could sign off on something on which the decision was never going to be made at any level other than the President.

S: It got there, I think, yesterday, if I recall or.....

K: Well it got there last night and I had asked for it Monday morning and all we needed was a two page memorandum on which I told them what I wanted.

S: Well Brent called me late last night and he tells me there is a problem with this which.....

K: That's the second issue.

S: And the problem is in the Defense Department, I am told, that they feel that first of all, the instructions that I understood were given, they weren't given to me directly, was that you wanted for 1 billion dollars and then you leave the rest untouched. The problem is that apparently the bills have gone around that amount and therefore there is need to make a determination in terms of the overall amount so if you make the rest of the amount foreign military sales, that will mean that the Israelis I am told have to begin to pay on that because its a matter of credit. Now is that what you and Dinitz worked out. I'm not very clear what you and Dinitz worked out in this regard Mr. Secretary.

K: What we worked out was what I ordered which was 1 billion now and 1.2 later. Now this I did in part so that I could sell it to the Arabs.

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S: Well when you say 1.2 later you mean.....

K: That then we would give them the other 500 million in grant in the effect after the Syrian disengagement when the Arabs could understand it.

S: But the 1.2 in the meantime you would just call as [illegible] credit.

K: Well but....

S: Once its credit you can always shift it back to...

K: We would call it credit and then shift it back.

S: Well see this was what didn't come through and I don't think the memo quite says this and thats just the point and thats what Brent and I talked about late, late last night.

K: But we are now in the situation Joe, due to the G.D. bureaucracy of the State Department. These memos always get written in some three hour period. Its a very brief memo. Had that memo been done Tuesday when I requested it we would have flushed out this problem on Tuesday. I want this done before the Congress comes back and all hell [illegible] breaks loose in Congress. So that we are reacting to the Congress.

S: Well, this I understand and I think as I say, part of it is some confusion in the instruction and part of it is what I would agreeable and it is not defensable is.....

K: Yes, but if there is confusion in the instruction all they have to do ask me what I mean.

S: I understand Mr. Secretary. I'm not justifying, I'm trying to explain.

K: Joe, you are the number 3 guy in the Department now. Why must it take five days to get a simple G.D. memo which is not controversial since orders had been issued what we wanted.

S: Not controversial here Mr. Secretary but you've got other agencies that are involved in this.

K: And why can it not be done in one day, that's what I want to know.

S: There is no excuse.

K: If I had done it in the W.H. I guarantee it would have been done in 2 hours.

S: I have no excuse.

K: OK. Well you know it wasn't. I would like to get the people who did this called on the carpet and told to straighten out.

S: In any event I've already called George Newman this morning after brent talked to this has got to be revised somewhat to reflect what you've just said here.

K: But by that time it will happen just before I go to the Middle East. It will look like blackmail. It will happen just when the Congress is coming back and screaming its head off. In other words, the Department has again brought about the exactly the opposite of what I wantd.

S: Why don't we get this altered in the next hour which can be done in the next hour Mr. Secretary and then go from here.

K: If I then can get to the President who is raving around here on his own reasons.

S: I will try to give you a better answer as to why it got delayed. I don't honestly know.

K: Good. Thank you.

SB 282*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Donaldson/Secretary Kissinger
April 19, 1974
12:25 PM

K: I had been hoping to be able to see you before I went off, but I just wanted to ask you to hold up a decision until we have a chance to talk, which can be anytime next week. But I cannot talk to you until I get back from Atlanta.

D: Right. I'm supposed to lead our delegation of the executive committee session of the OECD, you know, we meet Sunday night. Is there any....

K: When would you be back?

D: I don't get from that until Thursday. Any chance of chatting with you this weekend?

K: I won't be back from Atlanta until Sunday afternoon, then I have to look at some houses and I just -- Bill, I know how it looks to you but you have to look at my problem. I've been working 15 to 18 hours a day and many things that bother you are in no sense directed at you. I could almost certainly see you Monday, or I'll see you as soon as you get back on Thursday.

D: OK, well let me -- you know the -- my only problem is that if I don't -- you know I leave everybody holding the bag and I don't go to the OECD.

K: Well, why don't you go to the OECD and why don't you not make a final dedsion. These early things always take awhile to shake down and you're in a little bit the same spot/I was in when I worked for Kennedy when things ought to be in a certain position and it really depends on the necessities that can be structured. Let's have breakfast Friday morning.

D: Alright, fine.

K: We'll have breakfast Friday. Don't do any thing/irrevocable until we can talk.

D: Alright, fine.

K: Good trip. Bye.

END

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5073 *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
April 22, 1974
7:10 PM

D: Hello, Henry.

K: How are you Anatol?

D: Thank you very much. How are you?

K: I am fine.

D: Are you going to listen to the concert given by Frank Sinatra?

K: That's my intention. Do you want to come along?

D: I intend to go.

K: I have tickets, come with me.

D: Really? No. They promised to give me two, for me and ___.

K: Well, I've got plenty of tickets.

D: Well, we'll check tomorrow, OK.

K: OK. You can come with me. I'll have the Mexican Foreign Minister with me and you can subvert him.

D: Well, thank you very much. We'll check tomorrow with you, OK.

K: I'm longing to know whether I'll see your Foreign Minister.

D: Well, I will give you tomorrow. All the answers. OK?

K: You have the answers already?

D: Positive.

K: Good.

D: Well, positive reaction. It's positive for all the way.

K: OK, good. And look we are going to try to work it -- we will proceed constructively. We'll discuss it tomorrow.

D: Yes. I feel a positive reply for you.

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*

K: Good.

D: I simply didn't want to bother...

K: No, so I can proceed with my schedule. That's all I need to know today.

D: Yes, definitely.

K: And I have a new proposal for you on SALT.

D: Tomorrow, yes.

K: You can put an unlimited number of merves on submarines.

D: You mean on the Mexican submarines.

K: Mexicans, any submarine, even your own.

D: Your are meeting with the Foreign Minister of Mexico so I thought you even got the privilege to have unlimited on the Mexican submarines.

K: Well, that too, yes. Now you've given me a new idea. I think our joint chief will like that.

D: _____will know in what regards some talks with you two years ago.

K: OK, Anatol, see you at 1:00 tomorrow.

D: Yes, 1:00 tomorrow.

K: Good.

D: Bye.

END

TELCON
Amb. Annenberg/HAK
4/22/74 - 9:26 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

A: Henry, how are you?

K: Alright.

A: Again, I wish you every possible happiness. As I said to you in the note, I earnestly pray that you'll have as much happiness in your life as I have with my wife.

K: I appreciate that very much.

A: Henry, last week Robert O. Anderson was here for a few days -- he was up to see me -- and indicated that if the Morton situation were not set solid, he indeed would very much like to be considered once again.

K: Let me raise that to the President.

A: As you know he is a tremendous situation. I know I don't have to underscore for you what a superb representative he would be.

K: Outstanding.

A: I don't mean to say that the Senator would not do good but I've known Bob Anderson intimately for 20 years and he is absolutely one of the outstanding citizens in our country.

K: No question about it.

A: So there you are.

K: I'll talk to the President today.

A: Bob is going on to Paris, May I have your permission to give him a call indicating that I've spoken to you and that you will approach the subject with the President.

K: Absolutely.

A: Fine.

K: The only problem is I don't know how far the President has gone with Wood

A: I recognize that. I mean if it is thoroughly well set there isn't anything we can do about it.

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K: Exactly.

A: Now one further suggestion. I had indicated that I wanted leave as of June 30th. I now feel that it would be fitting for me to continue until I hold the formal July 4th Celebration at the residence where I -- where it is customary, you know, to have all the diplomats.

K: Absoutely.

A: I'm afraid were I to leave on the 30th, there would be no way of handling the official July 4th.

K: Why don't you make it July 15th or July 30th. Whenever you wish.

A: Let us target say about July 5th or 10th. I mean something like that.

K: OK.

A: Alright. Will you pass that on to Kenneth Rush.

K: Absolutely.

A: My people feel here it is obligatory that we continue the July 4th celebration.

K: Why don't we do it July 15th.

A: Alright. July 15th. And I'll give Bob Anderson a call at the Ritz in Paris and tell him that I have relayed the subject matter with you and at the earliest opportunity you would approach the President but that we -- of course, we have to understand that it could be too late.

K: Exactly right.

A: All the best Henry.

K: Bye.

SB 290 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
April 22, 1974
7:10 PM

D: Hello, Henry.

K: How are you Anatol?

D: Thank you very much. How are you?

K: I am fine.

D: Are you going to listen to the concert given by Frank Sinatra?

K: That's my intention. Do you want to come along?

D: I intend to go.

K: I have tickets, come with me.

D: Really? No. They promised to give me two, for me and ___.

K: Well, I've got plenty of tickets.

D: Well, we'll check tomorrow, OK.

K: OK. You can come with me. I'll have the Mexican Foreign Minister with me and you can subvert him.

D: Well, thank you very much. We'll check tomorrow with you, OK.

K: I'm longing to know whether I'll see your Foreign Minister.

D: Well, I will give you tomorrow. All the answers. OK?

K: You have the answers already?

D: Positive.

K: Good.

D: Well, positive reaction. It's positive for all the way.

K: OK, good. And look we are going to try to work it -- we will proceed constructively. We'll discuss it tomorrow.

D: Yes. I feel a positive reply for you.

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K: Good.

D: I simply didn't want to bother...

K: No, so I can proceed with my schedule. That's all I need to know today.

D: Yes, definitely.

K: And I have a new proposal for you on SALT.

D: Tomorrow, yes.

K: You can put an unlimited number of MIRVs on submarines.

D: You mean on the Mexican submarines.

K: Mexicans, any submarine, even your own.

D: Your are meeting with the Foreign Minister of Mexico so I thought you even got the privilege to have unlimited on the Mexican submarines.

K: Well, that too, yes. Now you've given me a new idea. I think our Joint Chief will like that.

D: _____will know in what regards some talks with you two years ago.

K: OK, Anatol, see you at 1:00 tomorrow.

D: Yes, 1:00 tomorrow.

K: Good.

D: Bye.

END

SB 292 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
April 22, 1974
10:00 PM

(Missed first part)

K: _____over a folder for Schlesinger.

S: Right.

K: And you'll pick me up at a quarter to 8.

S: Right.

K: Good. [redacted] Thank you.

S: OK.

END

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SB 291 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
UN Secretary General Waldheim/Secretary Kissinger
April 22, 1974
7:20 PM

K: Hello, Mr. Secretary General.

W: Good evening, Mr. Secretary. I apologize for ringing you up so late.

K: Not at all. It's always a pleasure to hear from you.

W: You are very kind. You know that your statement here got an excellent reaction.

K: I've been very pleased.

W: Highly appreciated. This time I'm not bothering you with the Middle East but I ring you up because of a rather difficult situation here regarding the special session. The problem is that we have three aspects. One is the declaration of principles. For your information, I think this will work, that we can adopt these declarations on a consensus basis. They are difficulties but I think they can be overcome. Then there is the problem of action. The latest information is that the developing countries, those in the non-aligned group and the group of 77 are determined to push ahead with the document which the 77 had worked out sometime ago already. We hope that it will be possible to have it adopted by consensus, but and this is the dangerous thing, but failing that/to press for a vote. Now if they press for a vote they would get the necessary number of votes.

K: But it wouldn't be implemented.

W: But it cannot be implemented. It would be another paper without any real value. And it serves the problem. The third aspect which is the main reason why I thought I should ring you up. I have been contacted last Saturday or Friday by the Ambassador of -- by the Foreign Ministerof Guyana, who flew with you, as I remember you discussed it when you had lunch here, he had told me that he was flying with you to Washington and the Foreign Ministerd of Sudan. They both came as well as the Finance Minister of Iran, asking me to help them in setting up, as a sort of ___of this assemble, a special fund for the most affected developing countries. And they complained a little about the fact that the U.S. delegation, after your statement, was not really active. He had avoided discussion of the problem with the other delegations. In other words, they were very reserved and kept back with their own opinion. Some of the delegates said well, we had expected it after this very constructive....

K: Well, let me take a look at.....I will bok into that and see what the problem is. Basically, I'm sympathetic.

W: Yes. Mr. Secretary, my complete request is this. We want a sort of complete ____of this session, which will be over in one week, set up a special

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fund which should get money from the Iranians. They have already told me that they have 150 million ready, the check could be given to us immediately. Venezuela and perhaps Algeria and Libya, whereas Saudi Arabia and Kuwait say, well we have already pledged to the Islamic fund and to the Arab fund so why should we pay to another new fund. But these religious funds, he said, want to pull them in this committee. They don't cover countries like Guyana, India, Sri Lanka, etc, therefore it would be logical to have a fund which could be, of course, administered by the World Bank. I talked to McNamara, he would be very happy to help us with his machinery and his.....

K: Can I call you about this tomorrow after I have seen what we can do? Basically, I'm sympathetic.

W: That is very kind. I have a meeting tomorrow with donor countries and this petroleum producing countries so I hope that it will be possible that perhaps the USA could help us in this regard and make a contribution to such a fund because that would be very encouraging to the others.

K: I'll try to call you in the morning.

W: That is very kind and thank you very much for your [redacted] understanding.

K: Not at all. It's a pleasure to talk to you.

W: Goodbye.

K: Bye.

END

SB 288 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Senator Mansfield/Secretary Kissinger
April 22, 1974
6:17 PM

M: Yes, Henry.

K: I just wanted you to know I had a talk with Huang Chen just now and I have the impression that your trip to China is again on. He asked whether we had any objection and I told him on the contrary we were strongly in favor of it. He said he would then talk dates with you when you see him at lunch, whenever that is.

M: Next week.

K: Next week.

M: Fine.

K: But I just wanted you to have that word.

M: Now listen, I was going to get up a written report to you and I still will because I went through it. But I made a courtesy call on Vice Premier (Teng?) for a half hour the day after you did and then Chou, Huan Hua and Huang Hua came out to Mrs. Englehart's for dinner that night. They had a good time.

K: Wonderful.

M: And at that time the Vice Premier extended an invitation twice and he said to see Huan Chen, so what you said makes it look better.

K: Good. I have the impression that they're very eager to get relations visably back on track. I mean, they were never off track.

M: No, the thing I emphasized again was that our policy was irreversable; that it was set and was going to continue because I remembered what you had said to me previously. It was beginning to sound like a phonograph record.

K: I'm not complaining.

M: Well, listen, will Nancy call Maureen tomorrow?

K: She'll call her tomorrow, yes. She's in NY today and she'll call her tomorrow.

M: Good, enough. OK, Henry.

K: Wonderful, thank you, bye.

END

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
April 22, 1974
6:55 PM

K: I'm talking to the British Ambassador who is worried that once more he's bringing me news that I haven't already had from you. Now, he wanted to know where we stood, whether there was anything we should settle while I'm here.

S: Did you get my little note on where it stood?

K: Where it stood was...

S: This is the council.

K: Yes, that there's an Australian and British draft.

S: Well, here's what it is.

K: Have we heard from the Lebanese, was his question.

S: Well, we've heard from the Lebanese, it's not beyond what I reported to you over the weekend, but what the British are doing they're seeking the co-sponsorship of Australia and Austria. My latest report as of an hour, an hour and a half ago is that on the whole, the Lebanese have been holding firm.

K: The Lebanese have been holding firm.

S: Yes, so far.

K: Meaning they'll support that draft.

S: That's what they told us. Now you see, Mr. Secretary, also what I wrote in this little note to you, remember that when this resolution goes beyond, the British, Austria and Australia, some of the mice will begin to get at it. I'm really worried about the Russians on this one.

K: I've told him that already.

S: But so far, so good.

K: I've told him that you expressed some doubt about the staying power.

S: Well, I repeated in the cable to you in Atlanta, my soft spaghetti___.

K: In other words, it's still exactly the same as your last note to me.

S: That's correct.

K: That's what I wanted. Thank you.. END

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Admiral Moorer/HAK
4/22/74 - 10:33 a.m.

K: Hello Tom.

M: Good morning and the most important thing I have to say since this is the first time we've been in town together for sometime is congratulations on your wedding and certainly I wish you and Nancy all the happiness in the world which you deserve so much.

K: Thank you. I appreciate it.

M: Well. Secondly, I think -- I've talked to Joe and Ken but sometime before you leave on Sunday, it might be useful if I could talk to you for a few minutes relative to the trip I just finished.

K: Absolutely.

M: And in the meantime I'm making you up a paper which with some point ...

K: What places did you visit.

M: Iran, Bahrein and Kuwait.

K: Did the Saudis send anyone out to your carrier?

M: No they refused the invitation. They said that -- but they were given the invitation and we made arrangements with Oman to send them through but -- I don't know whether the Ambassador over there really wanted me to come over or not so I never did get to Saudi Arabia.

K: Yes.

M: But anyway I had a most successful visit Bahrein -- particularly Kuwait where everybody said that they were going to be hostile. They weren't. They just couldn't have been more hospitable beginning with the Crown Prince who acts as the executive and right on down through the Minister of Defense and all.

K: Yes, I'd like to see you because I am planning to go to Kuwait.

M: I know you are and so I'm going to write you up a paper but any time you say, night or day, I'll come over.

K: Good. I'll call you within a day.

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SB 284 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Senator Mansfield/HAK
4/22/74 - 9:50 a.m.

K: Hello.

M: Good morning Henry.

K: How are you.

M: Fine. And you?

K: OK,

M: Bearing up.

K: Yes, we are getting along OK.

M: Good listen. Maureen would like to give a lunch for Mrs. Kissinger up here some time convenient to her.

K: Isn't that nice.

M: So, could you talk to her sometime and tell her what dates could be convenient beginning next week.

K: Absolutely.

M: She'd like to have Mrs. Scott and people like that in. It would be sort of a chance to meet the leadership and hopefully you can have some of the house leaders over too.

K: I know that Nancy would really be delighted. It's such a thoughtful idea.

M: Well.

K: She's going to the Middle East with me next week so it may have to wait until she gets back.

M: Just give us some dates Henry and lets see if we can work out something.

K: Good. I'll ask Nancy to call Maureen when she gets back from New York tomorrow.

M: OK. Fine Henry.

K: Many thanks. Bye.

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SB 286 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Nelson Rockefeller/Secretary Kissinger
April 22, 1974
12:30 PM

K: _____hear from you.

N: Back into our old areas, your old area, which was Europe.

K: Oh, you just came back, of course.

N: I just got back with David Golderberg and we were in Paris on Saturday and went to see you great... friend, the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

K: I hope you were reasonably tougher.

N: We had a lot of fun with him.

K: He's very bright.

N: Pretty good sense of humor if you kid him.

K: He's ... very bright.

N: That's ... what my impression was, he was talking about the United States ought to walk with the feet of gazelle not with those of elephants. I said, well, Mr. Minister it seems to me there are elephants in other countries besides the United States. Ah, he said, but they're smaller elephants. David's very good with these people. ... We went through a tense period but came out. But I'm terribly anxious to come down and give you some impressions sometime. I was at the meetings with your two men, Mr. Lord and ....

K: How did they behave?

N: Well, the lightening rod is definitely, what's his name - your counselor. Sonnenfeldt.

K: Was he tough?

N: Well, he was and he was tough and he's very articulate, of course, he's very brilliant.

K: Very bright.

N: But he wasn't about to let go of the fight.

K: Well, that's good. That's what his instructions were.

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N: Well, that's what he said.

K: No, ~~there's~~ that's absolutely what the Europeans want from us, is that we now tell them all is well and there is no problem and that just isn't true. There is a massive problem and if we don't deal with it now we'll have to deal with it under much worse circumstances three or four years from now.

N: That's right. No question in my mind and the question is how to get that kind of cooperation in dealing with it. What one of them very cleverly said, this is an editor of a newspaper, very attractive, very bright, articulate guy.

K: What's his name?

N: I can't think right now. He's a good looking guy and he said, well he understood bombing Haiphong just before you went to the Soviet because he said that worked very well. He said he wasn't sure that bombing before discussions with European allies necessarily was the best way to get cooperation. But the only problem with this is that these Germans are very clever but they are petrified of being isolated.

K: But, Nelson, that's the only thing we've got going for us.

N: Well, I understand.

K: We tried for a year dealing with them in another way, then they just keep delaying decision and they give the French everything -- they give the French half of what they want and they give us 10 percent of what we want and it creates confusion and objective gain for the French policy.

N: Exactly. Well, let me say this, I'm going to be in Washington on Wednesday for a Water Commission meeting and I wonder whether at any time Wednesday there might be a chance of getting 15 minutes with you.

K: Absolutely.

N: I made notes and I talked...

K: I don't have my schedule, can I call you this afternoon.

N: Sure. I'm going to be there -- my meeting is at two to say four or five, but before that, lunch or in the morning.

K: Let me see whether I can arrange lunch.

N: Anytime.

K: And, if not, afterwards. Is that possible, for a drink?

N: Sure. Either way.

K: Good.

N: I think I've got some interesting little insights and so forth, plus some channels. I'd just like to give them to you and I don't like to do it over the phone.

K: No, and I'm anxious to talk to you about that situation anyway.

N: Excellent.

K: Wonderful.

N: I'm thrilled, Henry and I look forward -- just let me know whenever it's convenient for you and I'll drop by.

K: Right. I'll call in the afternoon.

N: Please give my regards to Mrs. Kissinger.

K: She's with you.

N: She is. Oh, she's up here.

K: Yes.

N: God, she ought to be in this meeting. I'll call her right away. OK.

K: OK. Bye.

END

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Haig/Secretary Kissinger
April 22, 1974
4;35 PM

K: Al, sorry to bother you, but I have Nick Thimmesch coming in this minute and he told Larry that he wants to talk to me about my not supporting the President. I want to be able to tell him that my public position [illegible] is worked out closely with you and the President and has your full approval.

H: Always. He's always hit me on the same thing Henry and I've never done anything but told him that you've always done -- you've always been fully supported. Now you know, he's hung up on that because he apparently was the receptacle of the Scali-Colson business a year ago.

K: Oh, yes.

H: You know, that's the point you have to have in your call when you talk to him so you don't lose any credibility. As I've talked to him at least 3 times since I've been here. He always raises that, I also deal with it the same way I know you would.

K: I just want to be able to say that I can say this and ~~look at~~ get support.

H: Absolutely.

K: Good.

H: OK, Henry.

K: Sorry to get you out of the meeting.

H: That's alright.

K: Bye.

END

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
William Colby/Secretary Kissinger
April 23, 1974
7:45 PM

K: Bill.

C: Yes, sir.

K: Where are you.

C: I'm home.

K: Good. Like to see your staff visably occupied. Look, I have to meet with the congressional leaders tomorrow. This should have been done earlier, but we didn't. I need the figures. Now, not matter how inaccurate they are on what foreign assistance North Vietnam is getting, both civilian and approximate dollar values. And the same for Cambodia, which is even mushier. Now I know your figures are mushy but the figures are going to better than anything I can invent and I think the most presuasive argument we can make in this town is to proof how world Communismm xx is uniting, that we will not have detente in Vietnam.

C: We'll give you military and civilian separately and then totalled for X North Vietnam.

K: But can I have it by 7:00 in the morning?

C: Sure. OK.

K: Scowcroft's office.

C: Alright.

K: Gives me also a good check on when he gets in.

C: I'll have them at the sitroom.

K: Have them in the sitroom, broken down into quantities because if the dollar value is hard to g figure and if you can gkx give me some idea how it compares to what we put into South Vietnam. Well, kxxp hopefully it will prove that more is going into North Vietnam.

C: No, it won't.

K: No sense having an intelligence system if it comes up with such confusion.

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C: No, you know....

K: Go back to the drawing board.

C: OK, I'll see what I can do on that.

K: Want if you include traditional Vietnam which has a slice of South China. How does it look then. Give me the best figures you have. Good. Thank you, Bill.

C: Bye.

END

SB 301 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
April 23, 1974
10:10 PM

K: Brent, I'd like you to do a back channel for Eilts to Fahmy and tell him to destroy the -- tell him if Fahmy now wanted to say that he ~~x~~ would not negotiate with the ~~x~~ Israelis prior to Syrian disengagement. If he would say that publicly now this would be a good time.

S: OK.

K: If he would now say publicly what he told me he wanted to say in NY. I would not object.

S: OK.

K: You see what I mean.

S: Right.

K: OK.

S: I'll get it right off to him.

K: Right. Bye.

END

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
April 23, 1974

D: I received a telegram from Gromyko. He asked me to clear with you a sub-communique about his and your meeting in Geneva. He proposed to publish this short announcement. A meeting between Gromyko and Kissinger. An agreement has been xxxxxx reached that Gromyko, a member of the Politburo and USSR Minister for Foreign Relations and Dr. Kissinger, U.S. Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs will meet in Geneva on April 28 and 29. During the meeting an exchange of opinions will be continued on a number of issues in connection with the forthcoming visit of President Nixon to the Soviet Union.

K: Right.

D: That's all.

K: You don't want to mention the Middle East?

D: If you like.

K: No, it's up to you.

D: No, he proposes ____ because it implies xxx it's included in the Middle East after you may make, just put in general.

K: No, I accept this.

D: xxxxx OK?

K: Good. What time should we/publish it ?

D: 25th or 26th, which is more convenience for you. 10:00 AM Washington time. 25th is Thursday, 26th, Friday.

K: Let's do it on Thursday.

D: Thursday, 10:00 AM Washington time.

K: For us noon is a little better.

D: Noon better. Then it will be 12:00. Our time it will be 7:00.

K: Yes.

D: OK, I think it could be done, really. At noon, Washington time on the 25th.

K: I will try to send something over to you this evening.

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D: OK.

K: Right. Today or tomorrow ~~xxxxx~~ morning, but I'll call you within the hour.

D: OK.

K: Thank you.

D: Thank you, Henry.

END

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
April 23, 1974
10:04 PM

D: Hello.

K: Anatol?

D: Yes.

K: How are you?

D: And the same to you. You are not sleeping yet?

K: I've got a ~~xxxx~~ paper for you if you want it tonight.

D: OK. Could you send it to me?

K: Yes, I'll send it over.

D: With your man.

K: Yes. You mind if he's black.

D: I think it's quite alright.

K: I give you two options in this paper and you understanding this is thinking out loud.

D: I understand.

K: I think of the two versions I give you this is just for your oral explanation. The one going to 1983 is probably easier to manage here than the one going to 1980.

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D: 83, yes?

K: Yes. Maybe easier to manage than the one going to 80.

D: I understand.

K: But you know, we say 82, 83 but just think of it in those terms.

D: Yes. I would really like my minister to try to check it ~~xxxx~~ as a way of thinking.

K: Yes. We can play with the numbers if the concept becomes ~~xxxxxxx~~ accepted and the only other thing I want to say is this is what I would be willing to put

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myself behind, but it is not 1,000 percent certain that it can in fact pervail. My records from prevailing isn't all that bad either.

D: I understand.

K: But I want your people to understand what they're looking at.

D: I understand.

K: OK, I'll send it over right away.

D: OK, Henry, thank you very much.

K: Bye.

END

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
April 23, 1974
8:30

RELEASED IN FULL

K: On this trip of Agnew's to Saudi Arabia, we are staying the hell out of that. Just tell Aikins not to worry.

S: Alright, just stay out of it.

K: Yes.

S: And leave it up to....

K: He's going as a private person.

S: Alright I'll tell him that.

K: Don't you think?

S: Well, actually I think we're going to have to put together a circular tomorrow because there are so many posts where we say basically that he's a private citizen and we want to stay out of it and let them decide and to render at least the...

K: No, I don't object to that, but I don't see how it effects my visit in the slightest.

S: Well, I don't either. I would hate like hell to have him there while you're there, however.

K: Yes. I mean that should be discreetly handled.

S: Alright, I'll put something together on that.

K: Also you have to get that Joe Kraft matter worked out.

S: Well, the way we're going -- what we're putting up to you is as follows; and we'll let Aikins know, we're just going to get him on the plane.

K: No, he should check it with Saqqaf.

S: Saqqaf, I think, would rather not hear it, but I think we better tell Aikins and give him an opportunity to get back at Saqqaf once more.

K: I think so.

S: Because you wouldn't want a donnybrook right there.

K: Exactly.

S: Let's do that in the morning as well. K: Thank you. END

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DATE/CASE ID: 17 MAY 2004 200102979

SB 300 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
April 23, 1974
8:35 PM

(Missed first part)

D: I've finished now, so if you want I can stop over.

K: Well, will you -- have we got anything to talk about other than the security council?

D: That's up to you to tell me it will all be straightened out, we don't.....

K: No, no. I told you, if you want to come by for 15 minutes.

D: OK. I'll stop by.

K: Good.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 30 DEC 2002 200102979

SB 294 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
April 23, 1974
4:45 PM

K: Have you got Cairo 2501? Well, get it anyway.

S: I'll find it, what does it deal with.

K: Brandt's visit. Will you get a cable off to Brandt to see -- to tell him I'd very much appreciated a readout before I go on Sunday.

S: There was a fairly good announcement this morning in the Post which I hope was meaningful. They made positive noices of added economic....

K: Well, look at 2501. But I would appreciated if he could let me have any comment before I go to...

S: Sure I'll do that.

K: Good. Because I'll be asked about it. And tell him I'll try to stop by in Bonn on the way back.

S: You'll try to stop by on the way back.

K: OK, good. Thank you.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 16 DEC 2002 200102979

S074 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
April 23, 1974

D: I received a telegram from Gromyko. He asked me to clear with you a sub-communique about his and your meeting in Geneva. He proposed to publish this short announcement. A meeting between Gromyko and Kissinger. An agreement has been ~~xxxxxx~~ reached that Gromyko, a member of the Politburo and USSR Minister for Foreign Relations and Dr. Kissinger, U.S. Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs will meet in Geneva on April 28 and 29. During the meeting an exchange of opinions will be continued on a number of issues in connection with the forthcoming visit of President Nixon to the Soviet Union.

K: Right.

D: That's all.

K: You don't want to mention the Middle East?

D: If you like.

K: No, it's up to you.

D: No, he proposes_____because it implies ~~xxxx~~ it's included in the Middle East after you may make, just put in general.

K: No, I accept this.

D: ~~XXXXX~~ OK?

K: Good. What time should ~~he~~/we publish it ?

D: 25th or 26th, which is more convenience for you. 10:00 AM Washington time. 25th is Thursday, 26th, Friday.

K: Let's do it on Thursday.

D: Thursday, 10:00 AM Washington time.

K: For us noon is a little better.

D: Noon better. Then it will be 12:00. Our time it will be 7:00.

K: Yes.

D: OK, I think it could be done, really. At noon, Washington time on the 25th.

K: I will try to send something over to you this evening.

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D: OK.

K: Right. Today or tomorrow ~~xxxxx~~ morning, but I'll call you within the hour.

D: OK.

K: Thank you.

D: Thank you, Henry.

END

Original page is skewed.

5075 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
April 23, 1974
10:04 PM

D: Hello.

K: Anatol?

D: Yes.

K: How are you?

D: And the same to you. You are not sleeping yet?

K: I've got a ~~paper~~ paper for you if you want it tonight.

D: OK. Could you send it to me?

K: Yes, I'll send it over.

D: With your man.

K: Yes. You mind if he's black.

D: I think it's quite alright.

K: I give you two options in this paper and you understanding this is thinking out loud.

D: I understand.

K: I think of the two versions I give you this is just for your oral explanation. The one going to 1983 is probably easier to manage here than the one going to 1980.

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D: 83, yes?

K: Yes. Maybe easier to manage than the one going to 80.

D: I understand.

K: But you know, we say 82, 83 but just think of it in those terms.

D: Yes. I would really like my minister to try to check it ~~xxxx~~ as a way of thinking.

K: Yes. We can play with the numbers if the concept becomes ~~xxxxxxx~~ accepted and the only other thing I want to say is this is what I would be willing to put

myself behind, but it is not 1,000 percent certain that it can in fact pervail. My records from prevailing isn't all that bad either.

D: I understand.

K: But I want your people to understand what they're looking at.

D: I understand.

K: OK, I'll send it over right away.

D: OK, Henry, thank you very much.

K: Bye.

END

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
April 23, 1974
8:40 PM

(Missed the first part)

D: _____dinner for Sunday___of the Kennedy Center, something very unimportant.

K: And you will be....

D: I'll be home at 9:00.

K: You'll be home at 9:00. You know I get lonely when I don't know where you are.

D: You're very kind. I feel the same about you, Mr. Secretary. I haven't heard from you in two days and all things were happening in the UN.

K: Because they didn't make you Prime Minister, I've sort of lost interest in you.

D: Well, I don't think that Rabin will make it anyhow.

K: You don't think he'll make it?

D: No, I don't think he will be able to compose a ____.

K: But won't he then leave the party?

D: That is possible. But then when new elections come, many things can happen. I might even go back there.

K: No, I don't want that. But didn't Eagleburger keep you posted. I've been in meetings all day.

D: Eagleburger called me about 1/2 hour ago and said that you would want to talk to me later._____which I thought was really a very sad message.

K: Well, I know that but that's the situation which I've been trying to explain to you since Friday.

D: I understand this, Mr. Secretary, but here is a situation in which the Friday draft resolution which was inbalanced has ~~xxxx~~ now been corrected to be really outrageous. I mean there is not even a mention of _____. There is no mention of terrorism at all. You know, it's all acts of violence and it's like Moses who condemned murder in the 10 Commendments. Never mind what Eban cabled me

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to talk to you, this is not the crucial thing. The point is, I'm very much concerned about a major reaction this ____ and then I get word from the UN that the British are against it, the Austrians are against, the Australians are against it so the US should be the one to push it in.

K: We are certainly not pushing it, that cannot be true.

D: But the fact is,....

K: Look if we can get 5 negative votes, if Austria, Australian and the British are willing to vote against it, we are gladly going to join them.

D: Yes, but the point is, you are not only not going to vote against it but you are going to.....

K: If any of them are going to abstain with us, we are going to abstain with them. What we cannot -- I am not under the impression that we're pushing this.

D: No, you are not pushing it, but the fact of the matter is and Joe Sisco will confirm it to you, if you need any confirmation, that the British and Austrians and Australians think that this is one sided and they've said to you and as well as to us.

K: They haven't said it to us.

D: Yes, they did.

K: Well, I'll have to look into that.

D: They did and we know this. I don't give a damn about the UN resolution, I mean, you know my opinion of this, but I am only concerned with the reaction and it's not necessary. I mean, the Lebanese have done a vicious act of murder or the terrorists. I don't need to go into the details. The fact that they will go out of the resolution of the UN with clean bill of health, this is really an unheard of situation. I mean, for what's it worth. The whole thing is worth nothing if you didn't have any resolution. If you can bring it to the point where there will be no resolution week after that.

K: No, that we've already tried. OK. Look will you call me when you leave the Kennedy Center.

D; I'll call you maybe as soon as I get home, about 9:00.

K: Well, I was going to say maybe you should drop by here for 15 minutes.

D: OK, we can do this. I'll come about 9:00 to your office.

K: Don't do it because I may not be here.

D: So, I'll call you before I go and if are you/there, I'll come.

K: That is right.

D: I did have a very nice evening last night with Gov. Rockefeller.

K: You did?

D: Yes. Very pleasant evening. I was in NY and I came especially to see him.

K: Good. Well, he's a great supporter.

D: Yes and he's a very nice man. He talked so highly about you and I found it so difficult to contridict.

K: I'm having lunch with him tomorrow. If I here of any -- if he comes with what happens to the 500 million in grant.

D: No, not a word about it. We talked about you, about Nancy, about the critical choices he's working on. We talked about what you're trying to do in the Middle. He expressed great affection for Mrs. Meir. He wanted me to take a personal letter from him to Golda and we have a very lovely talk. In effect he said to me, if they ever kick you out of this job I'd like you to work with me. And I said, we'll be one big happy family.

K: He'd like her to work with him.

D: Me.

K: Like you to work with him?

D: Yes. He said he wants me to work on this critical choices business.

K: She's become a six symbol.

D: Who is this.

K: Your Prime Minister.

D: Against Rabin she's a sex symbol. It's all relevant, Mr. Secretary.

K: OK, give me a call when you're ready to come over.
END

SB 295 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Hummel/Secretary Kissinger
April 23, 1974
5:50 PM

(Missed the first part)

K: Not while I was there.

H: Oh, I'm sorry. This was told to Dick Soloman as he was escorting him down. That was the way it happened.

K: OK, but that's not something we can tell the press yet.

H: No sir, no. Dick Soloman and the White House are working that end of it and very quietly.

K: Good. OK. Thank you.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 17 MAY 2004 200102979

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Jerry Schecter/Secretary Kissinger
April 23, 1974
4:35 PM

S: Hi, Henry, how are you?

K: Jerry, how are you?

S: Say, I haven't had a chance to congratulate you. That's terrific. I'm never going to joke with you again now.

K: I give you a great scoop and you blow it.

S: Well, you know, that's what happens when you try to realize that you're human. And try to let you have a little personal life. Everybody asked me why I wasn't in Acapulco and told them, well, I think I better let Henry take care of this one himself.

K: Were you going to offer technical assistance..

S: I don't think you need any. At any rate, I think it's really great news and I'm really delighted.

K: That message I got about what you want to do, I think you got that (Reston) article totally wrong. First of all, it's totally untrue that Bruce has requested to return and I have a long cable from him in which he denies it, is outraged by the story and claims that he's very happy.

S: If you believe that he'll tell you another one.

K: No, I believe it. I talked to him about before he left. Secondly, the fact of the matter is, our China policy is absolutely on course now. Whatever of problems of Chou maybe, the policy is totally on course.

S: What does that mean?

K: What it means is, that it is exactly on the course that it was outlined last November, that exchange programs will be starting again very soon and that all the signals are positive and that the conversation with (Teng) was an extremely positive conversation -- really designed for reassurance. This is on the background

S: What about -- what do you mean starting soon?

K: Well, starting within the next month or so.

S: I see. I gather you also been seeing other Chinese too?

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K: I saw the Ambassador yesterday.

S: How did that go?

K: Very well. I mean, it's all part of the same pattern.

S: Well, OK, but I mean the general thrust is, you know....

K: Whatever Chou's problems may be, they have to do with domestic not foreign policy. And even that I'm not in a clear position to say.

S: In other words, my reading -- around town here the thrust was, well Henry's kind of put the ___on Chou's neck. Now it seems to me...

K: Totally wrong.

S: That wrong. Well, my reading of that was, for goodness sakes that's not right. He's taken the pressure off Chou and said, you know, after all Mao's the one who made the ~~policy~~ policy.

K: Exactly.

S: And that's the way you should read it.

K: It should be read as a reaffirmation of the existing policy regardless of who is technically -- whose name is associated with it and it is a reaffirmation with Mao's backing. And that is the ~~xxx~~ correct way. You're interpretation is absolutely the correct one. It was one of the most positive conversations we've had with the Chinese. I mean, you can't use this but just for your information.

S: The one with (Teng).

K: Yes. The other was really just a continuation of the first.

S: Is there any specific that I can point that? Quite frankly, there's a lot of disenchantment. It's very difficult to have a dialog with these people. If they're isolated, they've isolated themselves here in Washington. The academic community feels that this kind of ___the people involved and...

K: Yes, but Jerry, this is sort of the existing melee in the country in which one can't bear the thought, you know, in which the thought that this thing may be working you know, this is being said about the Soviets, it's said about everything.

S: But also, you know I mean, a policy gets support from people who are involved aside from you. This is ~~the~~ a sort of consensus that came out of the Asian Scholars Meeting up in Cambrigde a couple of weeks ago.

K: But the Asians got -- it has to do with their general attitude towards the Administration too.

S: Yes, but I think it's more than that.

K: The Chinese never looked at the policy with us on sentimental ~~xxxx~~ grounds, they looked at it on practical grounds. They never did it for understanding ~~xx~~ in the abstract. In terms of that, it's working quite well. There was ~~akkax~~ hiatus of a few months in which nothing was happening, one way or the other. I mean, it wasn't going backward but it was sort of an hiatus, but it's now picking up again.

S: I don't see how. In other words, you say it's picking up but what can you point to specifically.

K: Well, I think ~~xxxxxxxxxxx~~ you will see...

S: I mean, Teng's visit certainly is a specific thing.

K: And you will see that the exchange programs will be picking up again.

S: In what areas can you just give me...

K: Well, in all areas. I'd say ~~xxxxxxxxxxx~~ were foreseen, but I cannot talk about things that haven't been announced yet.

S: Come on, that's why I called you.

K: I can give you my judgment if you wait a week or two, you'll see it announced.

S: I see.

K: OK.

S: Well, thank you very much.

K: OK, Jerry.

S: We'll be in touch. Bye.

K: Good, bye.

END

5076 *

RELEASED IN FULL

As original - poor quality.

TELECON:
Ambassador Dobrynin/Sec. Kissinger
April 24, 1974
11:55 am

D: Hello, good morning Henry.

K: Good morning to you.

D: In connection with the submarines and SALT things. I would like to check with you -- I sent already what you sent but, there are some things that I would like to attempt to add because there are some explanations in my opinion that are needed. First, this is my own statistics. Am I correct in understanding that what is really now you are proposing -- not the only MIRV limitations as it was before because up to now we were discussing without modifying the terms of the Protocol Interim Agreement but was saying of a MIRV limitation, now it looks though that you propose in both ways for 80 or 83 double change or rather double bonus, if I may use this phrase. It means that not only _____ will be agreed upon between us on the MIRV but at the same time to change or modify the terms of an interim agreement. Is it so?

K: By thirty missiles.

D: Yes but it doesn't matter. I was speaking not for now, but in matters of principle because you change the principle really, if I understand correctly.

K: It arises out of the technical problem, Anatoly. The number of missiles on a boat.

D: I know, for me it is more of a political now; because up to now it was clear-cut situation.

K: No, no. A slight modification of the extension of the Interim Agreement. Until 77 we would leave the agreement as it is.

D: Yes, but it is according to the existing agreement.

K: From 74 to 77 the Interim Agreement would stay as it is.

D: Until 77,

K: That's right.

D: But it needs to be changed.

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K: No no, but we are not asking that it be changed retroactively. For the extension period we want an increase of 30 missiles.

D: Yes, so really your proposal now is...

K: No, I would like you to tell me that Soviet survival depends on 30 American missiles, it would make me feel very good.

D: No, no no, Henry. But first I would like to know from a political point of view.--what is changing now.

K: What is changing is that we would like 30 more missiles for the extension. No more submarines, but 30 more missiles.

D: So this is a new element yes?

K: It is a new element which arose when..

D: No, I understand. Up to now it was very clear-cut in Brezhnev's mind..but now it is changed in the Protocol itself - ok.

K: In the Protocol from 77 on -- from 77 onward.

D: Yes, I understand, but it was up to now, the whole discussion was.. without changing the Protocol. And second, you mentioned about the number of _____is 44, you mean 41?

K: No 44, but we would get rid of the Trident. We would just carry out the Agreement.

D: There is some agreement about 41.

K: Well, that's a dide agreement that lapses in 77 anyway.

D: I know, but you mean that this agreement should not be carried on after 77.

K: No, after 77 we fulfill literally what is in the written agreement which is 44 and 710 and we can reach the 710 by trading in old missiles.

D: But there was an understanding.

*

K: That understanding would lapse after 77.

D: It will lapse?

K: After 77.

D: It will continue?

K: Lapse.

D: Not 44 but 41.

K: It will be 44.

D: 44.

K: Yes.

D: So this is the second change, not 41 but 44.

K: Right, but that is how we get the three Tridents.

D: I am aware of that. I understand. How you come to the number of Tridents by 40 or 43, I tried to calculate by the number of missiles and I couldn't come to the 740 -- where do you get that? What composition of the 740?

K: What figure did you arrive at?

D: It depends what kind of a submarine you are going to have. How many Tridents and how many..because it is a different kind of combination. If you take by 83, then 10 Tridents, then you will have 31 and then 736, but you are saying 740.

K: Then we would have 4 missiles -- 3 standing on the deck of some submarine. You figured it out correctly.

D: It should be 736.

K: Well, if you drive us to that point, we will yield. We will give you 4 missile

D: I want to know the real combination. -- because this question they will ask you. Are you thinking by 83 it will be 41 or 44?

K: [illegible]

K: That's a very good question, Anatoyl. It could be either. This is something we would have to discuss.

D: 41 or 44.

*

K: We would like 44 but of the ones that carry MIRVs, you know, on the calculation you made there might then be 3 submarines that don't have MIRVs of the old type.

D: I understand, but..I am concerned about this figure of 740 -- how you arrived at this.

K: The figure 740 is roughly -- is arrived at the way you calculated it one way. Another way you can arrive at the figure 740 is to calculate, is to take 656 plus 96.

D: What figure?

K: 656 plus 96.

D: 652?

K: 656 we are entitled to now under the present agreement. 656 is what we have now, you add 4 Polariss, no 4 Tridents to it. That gets you 662, and that gets you to..

D: If you have four Tridents with 44 -- then 736.

K: That's right.

D: It gives you 756.

K: Four Tridents to 656, no.

D: No, if you have four Tridents and take the figure of 44 the it gives 736.

K: That's right.

D: But still it is not 740.

K: No, I agree with you. I put in 740 to have a little maneuvering room since I know that your leader always likes to have something conceded to him.

D: I am sure they will ask me tomorrow.

K: Or, you tell your military intelligence that maybe we have a submarine now that has 25 missiles.

K: If you came to this figure of 740, it is 40 plus four or it stems from your idea...

K: Look, it gives us a number of combinations. It can be 40 plus four; it can be 31 plus 10. We can compose it in different ways.

D: I see, but still...

K: All of which amount to about 733.

D: 736 it will be in this case. To sum up --

K: I think they should send an Ambassador who doesn't analyse things and just transmits them.

D: Well, Henry, to sum up, one it is definitely a change, second, about the, [redacted]...

K: Look, it is a minimal change.

D: No, nno, it changes the basic political approach. It changes now even the Protocol.

K: I thought I had made it clear that we wanted.

D: What?

K: I had made clear to Brezhnev that we wanted three Trident submarines added to the Agreement otherwise I wouldn't have had to raise it because under the Agreement we can..

D: By 80?

K: By 80. To reach 77 in 80. We don't want them now.

D: Yes, but is it correct to say that it will be by 80; by 80 it will be really in a sense what you mentioned -- but withing 41 or 44?

K: Within 44.

D: So you change here too.

K: Yes.

*

D: Even by 80.

K: Correct.

D: By 80 it will be 42 plus 3. Ok, I will send it. I don't see any chance it will be accepted but for your talks with Gromyko it will be interesting.

K: You would do me a great favor if you would reject it. It would protect my political future here much better if you reject it. If you analyze it we would trade in the 54 Tridents; we would trade in old missiles for theTridents.

D: Yes, I know.

K: So the total number of missiles is only increasing in effect by 26.

D: Yes,

K: And I cannot quite believe that Soviet security hangs by such a narrow thread.

D: No, but what you discuss with Brezhnev...so if you are proposing to change the numbers from 41 to 44.

K: But, look, if you accept the numbers I gave to Brezhnev on MIRVs -- 370 for 550, or something like that.

D: Yes,

K: If you accept the throw-weight relationship, then we can modify the ; then we are in a different proposition. Then we can extend the numbers of the Interim Agreement.

D: Henry, the only difference -- but a big one is between what we discussed in Moscow and now. It says if you change -- you make it now instead of 100 , 250 -- right?

K: Right.

D: And at the same time you add 3 more submarines from the basic agreement -- that is the second change, right?

K: The second change from your proposal. We never accepted your proposal.

D: On what?

*

K: I mean we are not ugh our counter-proposal makes those changes in your proposal. On the other hand we are accepting a much better ratio on MIRVs than the one we proposed to you.

D: Yes.

K: We proposed to you something like two to one and now we are excepting five to four.

D: I understand. I don't argue about this one. What is the essence of your proposal?

K: The essence of our proposal is that we are moving toward your MIRV proposal and in return for that xxx we are modifying the Interim Agreement.

D: Yes. This is the point. But even modified by 80. Yes.

K: Yes.

D: But is this 74 or 736.

K: Oh.

D: I am not bargaining, but it..
No, no
K: If you want to put down 736 right.

D: Because in this case I could use ...

K: Yes, yes 736 you are right.

D: In this case I could

K: No, no, Anatolly you figured it out correctly, unfortunately.

D: OK so I will put this down with this understanding that K...
It will be 3 submarines.

K: Exactly and look I can tell you privately that if you accept the 82 or 83 we would work out a deployment schedule for Trident but it is less than 10.

D: For the deployment of what?

K: Of the Trident boats. Under the figures we gave you, we could have 10 Tridents by 83.

*

D: Ten it looks slowly, but

K: But we could have it if we wanted to, but we would be willing to make an understanding with you or on the deployment schedule considerably lower than 10.

D: Than 10.

K: Yes

D: .. deployment.

K: Yes, that is the significance of the last paragraph of what I gave you. Something around five.

D: By 83

K: Yes. You know it might be fixed, but I just wanted to give you a feeling plus or minus one. Now you understand you are dealing with my personal views here.

D: Yes. OK, Sir I understand that what you said was in estimation. Right?

K: Good.

D: OK Henry.

K: Bye

D: Thank you very much.

SB 306 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Mankiewiecz/Sec. Kissinger
April 24, 1974
2:32 p.m.

M: I had no idea when I last spoke to you that you were sort of-way down the aisle. I asked if you were going to Acapulco or Syria and you thought I had gone out of my mind. Very well done. I congratulate you. She always struck me as a marvelous woman. I am a great admirer.

K: We have got to get together soon.

M: I have two matters to tell you. One is the trip that I told you about is now on.

K: Wait a minute now -- what trip was that?

M: To the Caribbean.

K: I must have blanked out ~~on~~ on that.

M: I told you that I might be doing a television interview with....

K: Yes, yes, I know exactly -- of course. Good. Then I want to see you.

M: Yes. Well it's a .....

K: When?

M: Well, it's six weeks away.

K: Well, let's do it when I get back from the Middle East.

M: When you get back -- early in May?

K: Yes.

M: I'm going to England on the 17th of May so maybe sometime in between there, or even after the 1st of June. It will be late in June.

K: I must see you before you do that.

M: I think there might be something useful in that. I'm delighted to hear about the Chilean. You're leaving at the end of this week and coming back....

K: I'm leaving on Sunday.

M: Do you think before you leave you could get us a tentative date. I'm told...

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K: Let me look it over.

M: ...that our seminar file is in your action file. We've been talking to Eagleburger and to Gompert. If you could just give them a tentative date before you go that would be good.

K: Good.

M: Now you mentioned one other things once which I think would be very useful in light of a lot of things that have happened, which is, you suggested that Holly and I should put on a very discrete evening with critics of a kind that you're not likely to meet.

K: I would like that.

M: ...in your normal travels. Nothing public or anything like it. Responsible concerned people who are not members of the foreign relations committee, or even members of the Senate but who have some influence. Are you still interested in that?

K: Yes, I am, very much.

M: Maybe we could try to work that out -- May I think is probably too quick, but maybe after the 1st of June.

K: Why don't you and I talk as soon as I get back.

M: Alright. But we'll have to do that, we'll talk sometime between the 5th and the17th of May.

K: Right. I don't think I'll be back until the 10th.

M: Alright, whenever it is.

K: We'll talk in that period and then we'll set that evening.

M: And then if you could tell Larry or somebody, if you can pick a date after the 10th, anytime in the rest of May for this seminar thing. That will be fine. And then we'll talk about the other thing when we talk, because it looks very serious and I think it's not without significance.

K: It is of significance because it fits in with other things.

M: Exactly. The time cable strikes me as an interesting one and of course I will say not a word to anyone.

K: And the NY Times with it's great acumen has missed the whole point of what we did with Cuba at the OAS.

M: Really? I haven't seen the Times.

K: Well, they have an editorial complaining.

M: Complaining that you didn't do anything.

K: That the Latin's know what we're doing.

M: Of course they do. I got that from the AP. If you know how to read and if you know how Latin's talk, it was quite obvious. I wasn't surprised when this other thing came along. I think we can make all kinds of ground.

K: Exactly. What you're doing may fit really very nicely into it.

M: I hope that you will not mention it to anybody.

K: Look, it's against my interest.

M: Where it could get back to them. Above all, we certainly don't want them to think....

K: No, no. What you can do is to give your impressions. I don't want you to be a messenger.

M: But in any event, you don't know that I'm going or at least you're not treating it very seriously because otherwise they get the impression that I seem to be but that I'm indeed some kind of ....

K: No, I'm not going to talk to anybody about it.

M: Good.

K: There's no need for me to talk to anybody.

M: But file the information away that that happened a day or two ago, it should effect your thinking about other things, perhaps.

K: Exactly. No, I don't consider it an accident.

M: I don't either. Just put it into your file and I think it's significant, if you want to know, that this was the only one accepted.

K: What channels did they use? I mean, they didn't use the Soviets, that's all I....

M: No, they used their own UN mission.

K: OK, well that's fine.

M: And simultaneously did not accept major networks, all of which had been asking for the same thing.

K: That's intelligence.

M: In other words, they want exposure, but.....

K: But from somebody with political sophistacation.

M: Exactly.

K: Very intelligent.

M: And whom they have reason to believe, you know, if not friendly, at least open.

K: Exactly.

M: So, it all sort of fits together and I'm.....

K: Look, as soon as you hear that I'm back, will you call me.

M: Yes, I will.

K: Good, Frank.

M: I will and if you could give them a date, we'd set something up for late May on the other thing.

K: Right.

M: Alright, Thank you, Henry and congratulations.

K: Thank you, Frank.

END

SB 302 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Max Fisher/HAK
4/24/74 - 10:17 a,m.

K: Max, how are you.

F: Fine, how are you? Congratulations to you.

K: Thank you.

F: Hey buddy, I'm glad to see you got ten days of rest.

K: Well, I'll need it when I go to the Middle East next week.

F: I'm brining in the Wider group including some of the Soviets Jewish people tomorrow. And I just thought I'd check with you. What you might want to accomplish or what you had in mind so we could just check signals.

K: On the Soviet Jewish people do you think I should see them with that other group or do you think....

F: I'dd tell you what you do. You're going to be meeting I understand with Jackson on Froday. I would do this Henry if I could suggest this. Bring the subject up at how its intertwinded with the whole Middle East situation.

K: The reason I wanted them in was really not so much the Jackson thing. I first wanted to explain to them what I'm going to be doing in the Middle East.

F: I know that.

K: Now, can I trust the group you're bringing in?

F: Yes, you've been able to trust them so far.

K: Including the Soviet Jewish one.

F: I'm only bringing in one in and that is Stanley Llowll. I'm going to talk with him before he comes in and lay down the ground rules on it.

K: Because I would like to be fairly frank.

F: I tell you this.

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K: Look, you've never let me down. Your group has never let me down.

F: I've had to be pretty..... But that one of the reasons -- you know I have some control over these fellows. If they don't think they can get an appointment any time they want to. I have to exercise some degree of discipline with them. Now, what we'll do tomorrow. I'll go over that with them beforehand and then about a few minutes before you come in the meeting you call me and I'll give you the low-down on the whole thing.

K: Good. wonderful.

F: I think you can be very frank with them. You're going to have to see what problems you face and that and then I think you'll probably want to relate how that relates to the whole Russian situation.

K: That's what I thought I would do,

F: I think this is important. Now as long as Sanley Lowell is going to be there. He is coming in that group. You see I've been trying to break down this business. These people in the Soviet group are very, very radical and that's the reason I've just kind of have never wanted them in except that its just their leader. Knowing the politics of things. But now that this fellow is here I'll have a visit with him beforehand and then what we'll do is if you'll just call me in a few minutes before the meeting I'll give you the low-down on the whole thing.

K: Good, and you will guarantee their usual discretion.

F: So far over the years have I ever let you down.

K: You've never let me down.

F: We can't afford to let you down.

K: Well, you're a great friend.

F: Tell, me, how are things going. Pretty rough.

K: It's a difficult period but I think we can manage.

F: Good. Well fine, I know that you have and I've been trying to do my best to keep things in control. By the way, when Jack was here we had a good visit.

K: He told me.

F: Let me say this to you Henry. I xxxx have my contacts in the overseas where I'm able to talk to anyone of the party members directly. You know I have that ddvantage because of my relationship over there.

and I can tell you this. No matter what takes place -- my own appraisal of it as of this moment is that you're going to be dealing with the same people that you've dealt with for the next few months.

K: That's my guess too.

F: And I think that no matter who it is -- I've talked with the members of La Cod even, no matter who it is going to be the policy on the disengagemen dituation. There isn't going to be much disagreement with. Now in terms of negotiation -- the frame of mind on that. That's something else but the fundamental policy is the same. Anytime you want to know the sort of the background on what the different parties think you can feel free to call me because I'm in touch with them because of my relationship with the Jewish agency over there.

K: Right. Well, we'll stay in close touch.

F: I'll see you tomorrow.

SB 304 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Senator Cranston/Secretary Kissinger
April 24, 1974
11:30 AM

(Missed first part)

C: As you know, the tax bill seemingly is hung up for different reasons. The Energy Bill is in ahead of that and there's some feeling that it's a controverisal...

K: Which bill - the Trade Bill.

C: The trade bill. That may not be moving anywhere and we may have no particular chance to do anything. A halfway measure is possible in terms of the export-import legislation which has to get through by June 30, so that will be coming to _____to extend the export-import matter. Jackson added credits to his amendment so that we can quite appropriate put in whatever modification of the Jackson amendment we might like to or seek to do that on that bill.

K: That would then take....

C: Not cover most favored nations.

K: No, but it would take care of the credits.

C: It would take care of the credit and would show the Senate position.

K: That would be helpful.

C: That would be one step. Now there's one other alternative. The Finance Committee is going to report 3 tax bills out in the next week or so. If we wanted we could try to amend one of them with our version of the Jackson thing and just do it rather ____if we have the capacity, which I think we have and ____the matter right then by adding on the Jackson languages modified which would cover most favor nations and cover the export-import credit matter. That would go to the proper committtee in the House so that we wouldn't have jurisdicional problems over there. The question is whether it's worth trying to move that swiftly or whether we should test the waters on export-import legislation.

K: My instinct is the latter but I'm not expert on legislative.

C: If we showed the Senate will on that, we, of course, will have not have vehicle to grant the most favored nation status to Soviet Union and the question is how long....

K: My impresion is, that if we could get a quick show of preserving the credits that this would help us a hell of a lot.

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C: That may be the rightest and most orderly way to go then.

K: But I would be prepared to consider the other alternative. I'm having breakfast with Jackson, Ribicoff and Javits on Friday and maybe we should talk after that.

C: Fine. In connection with that business, the general feeling among people I've talked to here is that Jackson and Ribicoff are in ____and even if we confront them with it, the likelihood of beating them --they're going to fight like hell and try to beat us. Whereas Javits might be detached from them and I've had a preliminaary meeting with Bill Hildebrand who's Scott's key man up there. Scott is generally sympathetic to our view point and what I'm trying to put together next week, is early in the week, a meeting with Scott Mansfield and myself and Javits to bring him into our plans and see if...

K: I think Javits can be detached. Ribicoff talks to me as if he could be detached but that may be tactical.

C: I think it's conceivable if he -- I'm sure he's aware of the re-thinking going on in the Jewish community...

K: Jackson I agree is in _____.

C: I presume the meeting you'll have wouldn't come to any conclusions. Wouldn't leave us free to move these people, or try to move them.

K: I'm certain -- I do not expect we reach any conclusion. But I thought if I could have a sense of ____I could make a better judgment after that.

C: That would be very useful. I will not be able to have this meeting until next week so if I could talk to you before you take off again, after you've talked to those 3.

K: Absolutely. I'll talk to you Friday morning, right afterwards.

C: Let me ask you two more questions. One on Sparkman, do you happen to know his feelings. If we're going to do this in the banking committee, he's one I haven't talked to you.

K: No, my instinct is, he would be in strong support of your position.

C: I think that he would be also. Now one other thing. The amendment - this is the final thing I've got -- on the amendment that we're working on, I've worked with Nelson and Himes a revision and it comes down in clear essentials to this, first, we propose that if most favored nation is granted our credits by the President there would be under the reorganization act a 90 day period in

which one House of Congress could object to ___and thereafter the most favored nation thing would be subject k approval or disapproval each two years so that Congress would have that right to take a look every two years and the ____governing what we should take into account woul include the following section D and this is really the meat of the ____. When considering such a resolution of disapproval, the Congress shall take into account whether such country is evidencing resonable progress and or is not retregressing from the observance of principles of human rights set forth in Section 402 which is ____including the principle of ___.

K: Was the problem you have in addition with this, which we haven't raised this China.

C:. Yes, I know. That's another little problem.

K: We don't want to get ourselves into discriminatory box with China, but maybe we can get Mansfield to introduce a special legislation for them.

C: He is going to. So that would cover that. Is that language I read to you sound reasonable?

K: That sounds possible. Now let me ask you, when you say, does it mean every two years the thing continues unless the Senate disapproves this.

C: That's right, yes.

K: It doesn't have a permanent ____for it.

C: It should be renewable for additional periods in the language we've got in now. Each not to exceed to 2 years subject to the provisions...

K: So, there has to be a positive vote or it lapses.

C: The Congress would just have to reject if it wanted. It would have the opportunity to object every 2 years.

K: That I would prefer.

C: That's the way it is.

K: The other thing on credits. Are you requiring that every credit no matter what the size be put before the....

C: That would be a different matter that is not in this portion of the bill.

K: That is not in there.

C: No, I believe that the banking committee will have some...

K: You know, I have no ~~box~~ objection to saying any credit above a certain amount should lay over for 90 days.

C: That's what we will do.

K: ~~GOOOOK~~ Good. Well, I appreciated very much what you're doing.

C: Well, ~~thaaax~~ thank you very much.

K: I'll call you Friday.

C: Very good.

K: Thank you.

END

SB 305 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
John Dunlap/Secretary Kissinger
April 24, 1974
12:17 PM

K: How are you?

D: Fine.

K: I just wanted to check with you what your reflections ....

D: Yes. I gather you're leaving town, anyway.

K: On Sunday, yes.

D: I had wanted to talk with George about it and he's been away, as you know, I must say it is a very challenging situation.

K: As long as you're willing -- if you're moving in that direction I can wait till I get back.

D: When are you going to be back - a week?

K: About 10 days or two weeks.

D: That's too damn long, isn't it. Well, why don't I do this, I wanted to have a good heart to heart talk with George about it and he's coming back Monday, as you know, Sunday, no Monday morning. And I thought I would talk with him and then be back in tough with you.

K: If you can reach me on the trip, then we could start the....

D: I will be back to you by Wednesday -- I need one chat with George. That's really what I need.

K: Do I correctly understand that you're leaning in that direction.

D: Well, I'm willing to say to you I certainly -- it represents a major change in my ~~work~~ world, as you know. Because it's not the area of my -- I mentioned this to you the other day.

K: Look, I have to learn it and I don't know anything about ecnomics and I really think that in all these top policy jobs, it's really, if you know how to get the experts into evaluation, then.....

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D: I appreciate the point. I'm just saying it represents some change in my expertise, if I can put it that way. What I -- therefore it is extraordinarily challenging and I had wanted to talk with George. I will be in tough with you by the Tuesday or Tuesday night on your trip directly or with George.

K: Terrific.

D: It should hang you up, but I do want to talk with him.

K: Well, let's leave it at that.

D: I'll be back to you then.

K: Right.

D: Thank you.

END

SB 310 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
William Simon/Secretary Kissinger
April 24, 1974
6:13 PM

S: Hi, Henry.

K: Hello, Mr. Secretary-designate.

S: How are you, sir.

K: OK.

S: I wanted to talk to you just briefly about lesser developed nations and aid programs and everything that's being suggested. We have no real domestic plan. Iran has one, Saudi Arabia has one, everybody's coming up with a different idea. What I'd like to suggest is that the State Department and the Treasury Department get together and I'll just have Volker and (Denite) get together with whomever you please, to get together a United States Government posture on aid for the lesser developed nations as far as the oil problem is concerned.

K: On these bilateral things.

S: Well, it perhaps could be a topic and this is just one suggesting, for the producer-comsumer meeting. Maybe that is the proper form to handle lesser developed nations.

K: I, ll have Sisco, Donaldson xxxx, Enders on my side.

S: OK, and I'll have Volker and Xxxx Denite.

K: Good. But we should include in this also these various bilateral deals.

S: Sure.

K: I think it's a good idea.

S: Great, well I'll get it going right now because I think it's xxxxxxxx important before we get in a corner.

K: Right.

S: Wonderful. Thanks, Henry.

K: Bye.

END

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SB 307 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sisco/Sec. Kissinger
April 24, 1974
3:57

K: Will you let Sadat know what the response from Asad was?

S: Yes, we will.

K: Just so that we close the circle.

S: A good response wasn't it.

K: I tell you how to lose friends.

S: Isn't that fantastic. These guys must be so heavy handed.

K: It is not to be believed.

S: I would never have believed it if I were in the outside and someone told me this I'd just blink and say it's beyond this world.

K: Why don't you first tell Asad, send a message to Asad thanking him, telling him that this is exactly how we will proceed and not to pay attention to anything else that will be told to him. That may be told to him.

S: Right.

K: And second, tell Sadat how we will proceed and add this gives us an opportunity for a full discussion before any decisions need to be made.

S: Yes. On the Security Council, I think we've made a bit of progress. The British now, we got to the Foreign Minister through Ramsbotham -- I'm doing it all on this end because John can't really do any good in N. Y. And now they're going to Israel and saying to Eban we're ready to go ahead and co-sponsor this now but with this change and we want to be sure this is OK with you. In other words, they're checking with the Israelis themselves, which is a very good thing.

K: Good.

S: And I'm seeing Dinitz in a few minutes.

K: Then call Dinitz and tell him thatthis was done at our pressure.

S: He's coming in right now because I need to take up with him those couple of little things, very, very low key that I sent you a wire out over the weekend, but the first thing I'll tell him is precisely what I've just told you

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because we just got the word and this was done persuant to your instructions last night, because I've been in touch with Dinitz this morning.

K: Excellent.

S: OK

K: Good. Thank you.

END

SB 308 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
April 24, 1974
5:55 PM

S: The situation in NY is moving very rapidly and I wanted to describe it to you and get some guidance and make a recommendation to you on how to handle it. The meeting is about to convene. We've been able to delay it for a couple of hours but no more than that. I gather the Lebanese Foreign Minister needs to get back to Lebanon. The expected scenario is as follows: One that the original non-aligned text which was very bad from our point of view will be submittted by someone. Secondly, the unamended draft, the draft you looked at over the weekend will somehow get to the table. I'm not quite sure you will the sponsor be. Now, Scali needs guidance and the guidance that should be given in my judgment is as follows. The presumption, by the way, is that of these two xxxxx resolutions, the one that you looked at over the weekend would have priority in the voting. Scali should be told to arrange for someone to submit the amendment to paragraph two and if he can't get anybody, to submit that amendment, he should do it himself, to that paragraph. Then to get the British and the others to vote for this resolution with the thing xxx in it. Vote for the amendment, if the amendment carries, they vote for the resolution. If the amendment fails to carry, we abstain on the resolution. That would be my recommendation. And to get as many of the others -- it would pass you understand, but I think on that basis we would probably have -- I want to confirm this -- we would probably have the British, perhaps the Austrians and perhaps the Australians at least abstaining with us. Which is not bad.

K: But would it carry then?

S: It would carry. My judgment is that it would carry. This is thex resolution, you know, the one I'm talking about.

K: That we negotiated with the Lebanese.

S: That's correct.

K: But how will it makes us look with the Lebanese?

S: Well, they won't be entirely happy, they would obviously prefer an affirmative note, but on the other hand, we will have supported the amendment and xx that will be the basis for really our abstention.

K: OK.

S: That's my recommendation and I haven't had a chance to check it either with Roy or with ....

K: Now, I had a message from Callaghan.

S: Yes, I just ready it.

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K: Right.

S: And Ra msbotham has just called me 5 minutes ago.

K: Right. Which makes it very clear where we stand.

S: You know, if however, we find....

K: In fact, he doesn't want to go as far -- he would vote for it.

S: Vote for the resolution?

K: Yes.

S: With the amendment.

K: No. He would vote for it without the amendment.

S: Well, let me see that. Because if that's what they would do, then we've got to be together on this.

K: He wants the French to put forward...

S: Yes, but I'm just getting the last page here. Well, if they are going to vote affirmatively and if the Australians and the Austrians are going to vote affirmatively, even if that amendment is not adopted, then I think we're in difficulty abstaining.

K: That's what I think. So I think Scali's instructions ought to be that -- at any rate we ought to be for the amendment and if necessary put it forward outselve.

S: Right.

K: If the amendment -- if Britain and Austria or even Britain alone abstains, then we should abstain with it.

S: Sure.

K: If they do not abstain, then we should vote for it and make a public statement saying that we interpret paragraph to mean that it is directly relevant to the....

S: As is evident by our support of the amendment.

K: Right.

S: I've got it. I think that's sounder.

K: Good. Thank you. END

SB 313 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
April 24, 1974 [illegible]
12:04 PM

S: I could only make two assumptions, either our Ambassador has lost his mind or there is somekind of a back channel message.

K: There is no back channel message.

S: Well then he's lost his mind.

K: You know, there's a back....

S: I would be at least as angry as you are. I think you're being ~~xx~~ terribly restrained. What the hell would urge this guy to even raise this in this way. What do you think I ought to do, slap him down or .....

K: Just tell him to stay the hell out of that without authorization and tell ~~xxxx~~ Saqqaf we have no question that we're invited, the King told me when I was there.

S: As far as you're ~~xxxxxxx~~ concerned the invitation's been rendered.

K: That's right, we don't need a special letter.

S: Alright, I'll do something very quickly.

K: Also, I've drafted a reply -- we couldn't get you this morning. I ~~xxxx~~ thought your letter -- that message to Sadat was a little ambiguous. It made it almost sound ~~xx~~ as if I had to decided to meet Gromyko in Damascus.

S: Oh really. Did you think that. You saw the ~~x~~ incoming.

K: I've asked Larry to come -- to go down and show you what I think we should say.

S: You notice, by the way, that you're even getting resistance from the Egyptians on the scenario that you ~~x~~ outlined, really, at least from Fahmy.

K: Yes.

S: They sure as hell don't want that guy around even while you're in Cairo. Alright, I'll do something on this.

K: Alright. Bye.

END

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SB 309 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
April 24, 1974
6:33 PM

K: Do you know what John Hunts wants on Friday.

S: I'm trying to guess. It apparently concerns with the super antelop matter but exactly what it is I don't know.

K: Well, how the hell can I make a decision if I don't know what's going on.

S: I'm trying to get together for you everything that bears on it.

K: Well, why don't you ask Ramsbotham whatkx it's all about.

S: I have tried and I'm not sure he knows, kxxkkx but I will ask him now again. My guess is -- well I'll ask him.

K: Will you also tell Ramsbotham we're very eager to get the Diego Garcia concluded.

S: Yes, You know what happened yesterday in the Senate.

K: I know. We still want it concluded.

S: Yes. OK, I'll call him.

K: And also I'd like the Hunt appointment in the morning.

S: Well, I better check that with -- have you told you schedule makers -- well I'll talk with them.

K: Oh, about 11:00 or 11:30.

S: Yes. OK.

K: Thank you.

END

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SB 318 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Senator Kennedy/Secretary Kissinger
April 25, 1974
6:55 PM

HAK: Hello?

K: Henry, how are you?

HAK: I tell you, you keep up this detenting, I'm going to get Jackson after you.

K: I was over there, you wouldn't have believed how wonderful I was to you over there.

HAK: I thought you were very good. REally, I have no complaint.

K: I'd like you to take a look of the talks, I think there would be very little in there that you wouldn't agree with. I think....

HAK: Well, I've seen....

K: Public statements and the private conversations.

HAK: Really, Ted, I think that you really behaved in a most responsible way and very constructive for the US national interests, as I see.

K: ~~You're~~ Your people were very good.

HAK: I've seen some of the reporting cables.

K: They've been very helpful. I was particularly impressed with the Ambassador down in Romania. A younger fellow down there.

HAK: Yes. He's one of the young fellows we put in there.

K: I thought very impressive. I had verbatim notes on that Brezhnev, which I'd be glad to let you see. We gave a briefing here, the Ambassador's representative over there. If you had a minute on the phone I could fill you in while talking to you or I can come by and see you, whatever ~~is~~ is ~~easier~~ easier. I know you're getting ready for a trip.

HAK: Well, when are you ~~free~~ free?

K: I was going out of the city tomorrow, I'll probably be back here on Saturday afternnon.

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HAK: Well, we could get together briefly on Saturday or I could -- yes I think it might be best ~~is~~ if Saturday....

K: If I could check in with you on Saturday morning and find out what you're....

HAK: Good. Would you do that.

K: If it gets ~~to~~ tight I could chat with you over the phone if it doesn't work out.

HAK: Good. Wonderful.

K: OK.

HAK: Again, I really think you did a very constructive job.

K: I hope so. I think, as you well know, there's -- from successful negotiations is very good opportunities and I think you've got up your sleeve ~~for~~ some still very difficult problems but I think there's still an awful lot that can be achieved.

HAK: That's what I think and that's why we're so eager to keep this process going.

K: Yes, and it's just terribly important. I mean, there's nothing more important.

HAK: Well, I agree with you completely. I would like to talk to you, not just about your trip but about the over all international situation.

K: If I could in the middle of the morning, if that's alright, in your office at the Department.

HAK: At the Department.

HAK: I have a meeting at the White House from 9 to 11. From 11 on I'll be in the Department.

~~HAK~~. Fine, OK. Thanks, very much, Henry.

HAK: Good. Bye.

END

SB 315 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON McCloskey
Bob Anderson/Secretary Kissinger
April 25, 1974
~~5~~ 4:40 PM

K: Did John King today mention the Security Council resolution?

M: I think he's coming up here to see me in a few minutes.

K: I hope to God he did, I need it desperately.

M: Alright, let me -- can I come right back to you.

K: Yes.

END

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DATE/CASE ID: 17 DEC 2002 200102979

SB 317 *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Art Hartman/Secretary Kissinger
April 25, 1974
5:00 PM

K: Arthur, I wonder whether I should talk to Sheerer or whatever his name is, in Geneva on Monday.

H: It would be very good if you could.

K: Why don't you do it. I've just checked off your memo, I go for option B with a preference for B2 to be decided in mid-May.

H: Alright, Good.

K: I'd like to talk to him and also it will give the impression to Gromyko that I'm taking it ~~seriously~~ seriously.

H: Yes. Oh, that would be very good.

K: So, will give that some publicity.

H: Good.

K: Have we got any other negotiators in Geneva?

H: Just, well no, Alex isn't back there. No I don't believe we have any.

K: Well, Sheerer I should see anyhow.

H: Yes.

K: Good.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 17 DEC 2002 200102979

SB 316*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. McCloskey/Secretary Kissinger
April 25, 1974
4:50 PM

(Missed first part)

M: __transfer it straight up.

K: So that I can refer to it.

M: Yes, sir.

K: Good, thank you.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 17 DEC 2002 200102979

SB 314*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
April 25, 1974
4:30 PM

K: DoI have to talk . to Fulbright or is it enough to talk with Sparkman.

S: I think it would be enough to talk to Sparkman since he's acting now. Unless he feels he can't do it, then maybe if he feels he has to, he could talk to Fulbright.

K: I would prefer to do it that way.

S: I would think that would be better.

K: Good.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 17 MAY 2004 200102979

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
April 25, 1974
12:01 PM

K: Joe, have you seen a cable here from Aikins that he asked the Saudis to extend an invitation to the President for a visit.

S: No, I haven't.

K: Look, we've just got to get more discipline into this.

S: Is there such a cable?

K: Yes, there is such a cable.

S: Well, let me see what it is.

K: Well, there's nothing to see what it is, Joe. You've got to get these guys in line.

S: He would have done this totally on his own responsibility.

K: Yes, but there is too much flapping around. These guys have to learn that they are serving the God-damn United States and not themselves. No one has asked him to discuss this.

S: He certainly hasn't.

K: What are we going to do with an invitation if the President isn't coming?

S: That's a good question.

K: There was never any question that the President would be welcome there.

S: I'm sorry to hear this, Mr. Secretary and I have no answer and no explanation.

K: Well, take a look at it.

S: Alright, I will.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 17 MAY 2004 200102979

SB 311 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Elliot Richardson/Secretary Kissinger
April 25, 1974
11:45 AM

R: Henry.

K: How nice to hear from you.

R: Nice to hear your voice. What an exciting life you've been having lately.

K: Oh, that part of it. My personal life, yes.

R: Well, the whole thing. I follow it like housewives follow a soap opera.

K: Aren't you nice.

R: I was prompted to call you now, rather than any of the other times I might have done it, by the fact that I happened to get a call from Brad Moore who says that Barbara Jackson is in NY and very anxious for a few minutes with you.

K: Well, I'm going to the Middle East on Sunday. If it can wait till after I get back, certainly.

R: When will you be back?

K: By the 10th of May.

R: And you obviously can't do it before that.

K: Not really.

R: OK, well, what it's about ~~it~~ is the very critical problem of smaller countries that are being caught in a horrible price squeeze on raw material.

K: No, I'm very interested in that.

R: Well, you know her better than I do. I think she's an impressive woman.

K: Yes.

R: Whatever ideas she had would be worth a little while. Maybe just somebody she could see in the meanwhile there. Anyway, that's what it was about.

K: Yes. Let me think, because Sisco would be the other one, but he's going with me.

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R: Well, I hope thiangs go well on the trip.

K: Well, it's the water shed, if we bring off the Syrian disengagement, we're over the hump for a year.

R: Yes, that would be terrific. I think I can guess the significance of it for Sadat and so on.

K: Exactly.

R: Well, good luck, Henry. I'd love to see you sometime.

K: No, as soon as I'm back let's have lunch.

R: Will you call me.?

K: Yes, but if I don't will you call me.

R: Alright, I will. Congratulations. Nancy for me.

K: Thank you. It is always reassuring for me if someone congratulates her. Everyone congratulates me.

R: I think you deserve an incidental congratulation too, Henry.

K: I do.

R: I think it's marvelous.

K: Hope to see you very soon.

R: I hope so too. Thank you. Bye.

K: Bye.

END

SB 323 *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Kubisch/Secretary Kissinger
April 26, 1974
12:25 PM

K: Jack, two things. I saw Rabasa yesterday, he told me about his conversation with you. I just want you to know if he's mad at you that's his problem. If I'm mad at you, I'll tell you, I don't tell you through Rabasa.

JK: I know that.

K: You know, he isn't running the Department yet.

JK: I know. He said he wanted to clear the air with me because we've been friends.

K: No, he complained bitterly to me about you, but what he complained about was your carrying out my instructions. What he complained mostly about was your ___the short communique which was my instruction to you.

JK: And at hearing so forcibly all night long to the long one that we've worked out.

K: Yes, but that's fine. It worked out perfectly. We wouldn't have gotten the end result if we hadn't proceeded this way.

JK: I know. I think he just wanted to apologize or clear the air. He really was very.....

K: I just wanted you to know that when he said he was mad at ____, that didn't reflect my view. The second thing is, he mentioned to me, I don't know whether he's mentioned to you, and also the ____, that they would be willing - - they wanted to give asylum to ___and Almeida and they would undertake a promise not to engage in political activities. They want us to pass that on to the Chilean Government. Do you see any reason why we shouldn't?

JK: No, as a matter of fact the Chilean Ambassador is coming in this afternoon to discuss this arms question with me.

K: Well, would you raise that with him?

JK: I will and I can tell him as I told you earlier that there are job opportunities, teaching opportunities available for these two in the US.

K: Well, I wouldn't get into that because in the US they'll be pains in the neck.

JK: In any case, he said that after their trial it looks like they're going to be expelled or deported.

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K: Well, let them go to Mexico where Rabasa has promised -- why do we want them.

JK: I agree.

K: Tell them that Rabasa has promised it to me and we would see to it that he'd carry out his promise.

JK: OK. After we do that, do you want to send a message to Rabasa...

K: That we've done it.

JK: That we've done it. To ___too?

K: Yes.

JK: Anything else?

K: How are we doing on the ____.

JK: We're waiting for an answer from Ax Agriculture. I've got a draft letter just waiting for a clearance from Agriculture .

K: Tell Agriculture I've got to have an answer this afternoon.

JK: We have told them that. If we need your help, I've sent you a note, we may ask you to call somebody, but I think we can get it sorted.

K: Good. Thank you.

END

SB 319 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. President/Sec. Kissinger
April 26, 1974
10:40 am

K: Mr. President

N:L Hello, Henry. On the Portugese thing, let's be sure that we have a man over there that is close to that new junta and you know the Portugese are like the Brazilians for obvious reasons, they just like to do things constitutionally and , but don't shove them in the direction for doing something for Africa, the hell with it.

K: No, no, but I think that is one of the reasons for the...

N: you understand if they do it is for them, but I just don't want us pushing them around.

K: Actually, we have been helpful to them. We have been helpful to the old government within the constaains of our Congressional limitations.

N: Second point, Lebanon.

K: Oh that came out well.

N: Good.

K: We passed resolution for which we voted.

N: Did it make little news summary. That I figured that meant it was all right.

K: XX That's right. The Jewish community is sorta xxxxxxxxx mumbling that I had them in yesterday and I told them

N: Tell them what the hell was our choice.

K: I told th;m they should give us credit that it isn't a question of our voting for this resolution it was our taking an impossible resolution, and making it a possible one and having made their formal complaint they are all right.

N: Good. Make any points with them? on MFN or anything like that?

K: Yes. Although our overwhelming problem xxx now isn't MFN its the credits which they are also not the Jews which Jackson is trying to cut off.

N: Oh, credits to the Russians.

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DATE/CASE ID: 17 MAY 2004 200102979

President/Kissinger

K: Yes.

N. Well, look by God we just can't allow thatx.

K: On MFN I think got the

N: On the credits who are we working on?

K: Well I had Brent, Brent said

N: Well, even Mansfield would help us on that, I think.

K: Well, I think on the xxxxx credits we may be able to work out a formula. Because there the Jewish community hasn't committed itself. and I don't think they are going to commit themselves.

N: They would be out of their minds.

K: And

N: Just tell them we need the credits in order to keep the Russians from playing xxxxxxxxx mischief role in ME. That is what it is really about. You know it and I know it.

K: Of course. Absolutely.

N: Right.

K: So

N: Do they want us to have a stroke at the Russians or not have stroke that's it. Do they want us to be able to get out Jews from Russia or not get them out.

K: Exactly.

N: And by God if they just turn the credits off that xx would be the straw that broke the camel's back.

K: No question that would be worse than MFN.

N: Right.

K; Actually Jackson is [redacted] irresponsible [redacted]

N: We all know that.

President/Kissinger

N: You're leaving Sunday?

K: I'm leaving Sunday, Mr. President.

N: God bless you and good luck.

K: Well

N: Hope it works out and in meantime. If I do take a trip, I think the sooner the quicker.

K: I agree.

N: What do you think about 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 or what?

K: I would say any time from the 25th on.

N; It will be the 25th, OK.

K: And I'll set it while I am out there. As soon as

N: Get indications from everybody.

K: That's right. And as soon and then we can announce it within a few days of my return.

N: The quicker the better that we can announce it too, Henry.

K: Right Mr. President.

N: All right. Fine. You feeling all right?

K: I am feeling fine. I am having a press conference in about 20 minutes.

N: Oh, fine, fine.

K: But it is mostly about foreign aid

N: Give'em my love. And incidentally be sure you hit the fact. Let's talk very candidly, the investment in Egypt and the investment in Viet Nam and the investment in peace that's all.

K: Exactly.

N: Peace that is all we are talking about. It is no give away, it is no donor thing or anything like that. It isn't something to get us involved, it is a way to keep out of war in the ME. To keep

*

out of war in Viet Nam and that is to make it possible it is the Nixon doctrine in both places. Hit that ~~xxxxxx~~ hard.

K: Right.

N: All right.

K: Right, Mr. President.

SB 320 *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Sec. Kissinger
April 26, 1974
10:20 am

K: Look, I have a press conference at 11:00, what is the problem.

S: No, no, it is clear that if the Russians give you everything you want on emigration they are going to be hit on the Credits anyway and they know it, so they have no incentive to give you anything on emigration.

K: No, but they have an incentive to give me something on credits.

S: Well, but the credit thing they can't control because Scoop is going to , you know, if they get this amendment through, it means they can veto any credit of any kind of quanity on any ground they want, even if the Russians behave perfectly on emigration, they can veto it on national security grounds. So the Russian incentive to give you something on emigration with this thing hanging over their heads is much less since they have no guarantee that they'll get major credits. And that's Scoop operation on this. He doesn't give a damn about the Trade Bill any more, because he'll get you on the other thing. The only reason I intervened is you know, I have to testify in your behalf before the Stevenson Committee on Thursday.

K: Well, you say we're against it, it depends how the Amendment is written.

S: Well, I think we have to say in public that this is something..

K: Look, I have got to prepare for the press conference.

S: Alright.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 17 DEC 2002 200102979

SB 322 *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Congressman Doc Morgan/Secretary Kissinger
April 26, 1974
12:15 PM

K: Mr. Chairman, how are you?

M: Very good. I'm just trying to get some votes.

K: Are you down below 80% already?

M: Oh, yes - I'm slipping. We've got to work for this thing.

K: I don't have to tell you that I'm -- that we're all pulling for you. I'm calling you about the Cambodian(drawdown) authority. We were given 250 million dollars last year, but the conference report indicated that the congressional hope was not to draw down more than 200 million for Cambodia. Now we're in a position where we will actually run out of ammunition if we don't use the extra 50 million. Legally we have a right to do it but we didn't want to do it without consultation in view of this conference report and we wonder what you attitude would be.

M: Well, Mr. Secretary, if it's an emergency like that, I'm for using the 250.

K: It is an emergency.

M: No problem with me, Mr. Secretary.

K: Thank you. When I come back from my trip would you think it would be appropriate to meet with your Committee and just brief them on it.

M: I think it would be wonderful.

K: We'll schedule it as soon as I return.

M: OK.

K: Right, Bye.

END

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SB 324 *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Senator Sparkman/Secretary Kissinger
April 26, 1974
12:35 PM

K: Senator, how are you? I'm seeing you this afternoon. I'm calling you, I don't know whether that's the right procedure and you can pass it as acting chairman of the committee because we have this problem. Last year the Congress gave us 250 million dollars of drawndown authority for Cambodia but at the same time the conference report pointed out that they would hope that we don't exercise more than 200 million. As it turns out we are in an emergency in Cambodia where if we don't use the other 50 million we literally have to suspend delivery of ammunition. I've talked to Chairman Morgan about this and he feels that under those conditions he would go along with it. There's no legal objection to it, but the intent of the conference committee was clearly expressed in a strong hope that we wouldn't go beyond 200 million.

S: Yes, well my feeling would be that is a wish that was expressed but it has no binding effect and if it's needed, I think it's possible to do and do it.

K: OK. Can I mention that to our people?

S: Yes.

K: Right. This is the right.....

S: You realize there are some on our committee that probably wouldn't agree.

K: No, I know that. Can I tell you personally that I'm relieved you are acting chairman.

S: Well, thanks. It really keeps me busy trying to run two committees.

K: Yes, I understand.

S: well, I enjoy it.

K: It's a great ___to us.

S: That is my view point and....

K: So, we'll proceed on that basis.

S: Fine.

K: Thank you.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 8 JAN 2003 200102979

SB 321 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TEELCON
General Scowcroft/Sec. Kissinger
April 26, 1974
10:45

K: Brent, could you ask Peter to type up what I said as my opening statement to the Jewish leaders by noon, so that I can have it for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this afternoon.

S: Sure, I'll get right on it.

K: Do you have any ideas on what I should raise in my press conference. Also, did you send over here what I said to the Senate, or at the briefing the other morning.

S: Yes, yes I did.

K: Who's got it?

S: Larry has it.

K: Good, I'll get it.

S: END

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SB 330 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Peter Flanigan/Sec. Kissinger
April 26, 1974

F: I heard of your meeting with the Jewish leaders.

K: With the Jewish leaders, oh...

F: And their feeling that it would take some time -- before you tell me that, could you tell me how you did with Jackson.

K: Very inconclusively, and above all they all implored me not to go running around because it would kill everything. I wouldn't have enough to run around with.

F: What did they mean -- run around to other senators.

K: That's right.

F: The question is.....

K: I mean to run around quoting them about their attitudes.

F: Oh, I see. Well, tell me this, then, what do you think we ought to do?

K: My impression is that after a lot of tough talk at the meeting Javits didn't give much. I had the impression that Jackson was a little bit more receptive. He didn't insist on a ~~xxxxxx~~ hundred thousands any more.

F: Would he go towards a formula as you suggested?

K: Well, he said I should take a run at the Soviets about ending harrassment, which is what I'm going to do with Gromyko.

F: You got the feeling that there's enough give so that it's better to stay on this track then to try another track.

K: No, I think if you try another track, that's fine with me. Like What?

F: Well, I have a feeling there's -- that they made a real plea not to have this put on the Ex-im ~~xxxx~~ bank. bill. If it were put on the Exim Bank Bill it came off this bill we could have a bill that wouldn't do us any good but it wouldn't get us MFM but it would stop credit. I think they're afraid they'll lose their support on the other -- from the other Senators on Exim because the other senators constituents want loans. Another approach is to come up with a position that is significantly different then our original ~~x~~ position but

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not what Jackson wants and then see how many senators who are very unhappy at being on his amendment. How many of them will say, well that' meets my requirement, I'd not have to stick with you Scoop.

K: Well, I have the impression that we might work out something on the Exim Bill. He wasn't so strong on the Exim Bill.

F: Well, but did that assume that there was nothing in the bill. Or assuming there was a Jackson ___in this bill.

K: I had the impression he'd keep the Jackson __also in the bill.

F: Well then we haven't gotten anywhere.

K: Exactly.

F: I wonder if he isn't afraid -- he must be knowing that his senatorial support is erroding and a lot of these guys didn't mean to kill the Trade Bill and they're beginning to [redacted] see that that's what he's doing and they're beginning to suspect he's doing it really at that behest of Labor and a deal to keep Labor support for his candidacy. So, there aren't [redacted] 78 guys up there who want him to be President. Most of them want to be [redacted] President themselves.

K: I think what he really wants is to kill the Trade Bill for this year.

F: That's right, for the Labor people. Because know full well that once you get a veto through Congress, we're never going to get that thing out of the Ways and Means Committee again. It's' 77 for you get another swing at a Trade Bill and that [redacted] means no trade negotiations. The argument that we shouldn't go running around is probably a good one, surely a good one if we can make head way with him on the other hand are we being had for his purposes and he's just giving us a little in [redacted] order to kill the bill. I presume you are as anxious for foreign policy reasons as I am for international economic reasons to get a bill.

K: Oh, I'm very anxious.

F: I would guess that we have about 15-20 days in which to get some movement here or we're going to lose the bill just because of the [redacted] Finance Comittee's timing because I have to admit there's [redacted] not what you'd call a great deal of enthusiasm in the Senate or in that Committee for this piece of legislation so [redacted] they'd happily go on to other things. Do you think we can bring it to a [redacted] head in that period of time?

K: I think what we should do is to move very ___. The first thing, I think is impossible. I think we can try to bring it to a head as soon as I return.

Because then either we will have had a success in which case I'll proceed _____ might help alot. Well, if we've had a failure then it would effect everything anyway. I think we can gamble on success.

F: When do you hope to see Gomyko?

K: Monday.

F: Good. Is this something he can deal with?

K: Well, if -- look if he would give me anything at all, it would help. OK.

F: Then we will just think ~~xxxx~~ of alternative courses, put it in our back pocket until you come back and whenever it is, that's beginning the week after next, and make a real reappraisal right then.

K: Exactly.

F: Good luck, Henry.

END

SB 329 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
William Simon/Secretary Kissinger
April 26, 1974
3:45 PM

S: Hi, Henry.

K: How are you Secretary Designate? Are they ever going to confirm you?

S: Well, Russel Long came back from Louisiana Monday night and he called me, my hearings were Wednesday morning and they have an executive session, I ~~xx~~ was reported out unanimously this morning and it will be voted on, he tells me, Monday.

K: I see. Some of us had to hang in there for two weeks.

S: That's right.

K: Bill, on that rescheduling exercise that Shultz is so interested in.

S: That rescheduling?

K: Yes. He wants Treasury to head the study and a lot of my guys were bleeding. Let me make this suggestion to you. I would agree to Treasury chairing the study if you do it within the framework of the ___, which you're chairing anyway. You see what I mean?

S: Sure.

K: As long as we handle the actual negotiations, once there is a policy, which is the existing procedure anyway.

S: It is, that's the way it's done now.

K: Yes.

S: I see no reason why we shouldn't do it that way.

K: OK, why don't we work it out that way. I don't mind your chairing the study and chairing the policy body, I think it is sort of demoralizing for my people not to handle the ~~xxxxx~~ negotiations, that they have been handling.

S: I'm just thinking about -- you're talking about that rescheduling.

K: That rescheduling.

S: Has the Treasury traditionally handled that rescheduling with Chile. And all the rest.

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K: I'm not sure. To me this is -- no I think State handles the negotiation, or at least that's what my guys tell me.

S: Alright, unless you hear back from me, that's going to be just fine.

K: At any rate, if State heads the negotiation, there will be a Treasury representative on it.

S: Sure. Alright, as I say, unless I give you a buzz in a very little while, that will be fine.

K: Good.

S: Thank you. Bye.

END

SB 325 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
April 26, 1974
12:40 PM

K: ____to Sparkman and Morgan and they both approve our drawing down 50 million.

S: Great. That's very good.

K: Probably makes an irreversible enemy out of Fulbright. I just think the danger of calling him in Arkansas and turning me down, is too great.

S: No, I agree.

K: I called his office, he wasn't in town.

S: I think you've done the right thing then. Did Sparkman say anything about....

K: Now, let's get a little money into Arkansas for ____, because I can't afford having a ____Fulbright again. OK, Brent.

S: Good. Thanks.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 17 MAY 2004 200102979

SB 326 *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
April 26, 1974
3:05 PM

K: I think ____will be the following arrangement. If we could put the re-scheduling study into the ____text, which is after all ___by Treasury, we would go along with it as long as actual negotiations are handled by State. Can you agree on that?

S: Sure, as far as I'm concerned, I don't care what we do as long as we get a study, but I will have to talk to George about that on Monday and tell him that's what you said.

K: Good.

S: Thank you. Bye.

END

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SB 327*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
General Scowcroft/Sec. Kissinger
April 26, 1974
3:25 PM

K: Brent, there is a group of Russian parlimentarians over here. They are handled by a fellow called Pomoraniof (sp) who is Secretary of the Central Committee, which is a position that Brezhnev had at one point and Dobrynin just called me and said they would appreciate it if the President received them.

S: o.k.

K: I think it is essential either the 8th or 9th of May and I told them to work with you on this.

S: Sure. I don't see any problem. He is usually very good about meeting with the Russians.

K: I know his heavy schedule doesn't permit planning the summit.

S: I think we can work that out.

K: O.K. Good.

S: I will get in touch with them.

K: Good, thank you.

S: O.K.

END

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 17 MAY 2004 200102979

SB 328 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Rush/Secretary Kissinger
April 26, 1974
3:50 PM

R: I had a call from Roy Ash.

K: Yes.

R: While you were away about the end of March/at a Cabinet meeting the President brought up the subject that there should be some initiative and he would be coming to the cabinet officers for them, some initiative that he might take himself. He also went into the concept of the goals of the Department, you know the Roy Ash talk, that sort of thing. Roy said he was talking to the President this morning and the President wants -- he called me because he said he assumed you were so busy you wouldn't be able to get around to it. The President wants by May 1 from each Department, and keep it out of the bureacracy, a list of 3 suggestions, 3 concepts, new initiative, new ideas, new thrust of some kind, that the President could do as President. Now he said that he's sending a paper over on this, but he said -- I said will ours should be in the international __ and he said, no, if you have some ideas as Weinburgers department, he would like to have those too. He wants something that -- he just wants to get ideas and he wants 33 ideas from....

K: Oh, Jesus Christ. I've gone through this for about 6 years.

R: I just wanted you to know about it.

K: I don't want anything to go to the President from the Department that I don't see.

R: Right. I've got Win Lord working on this thing and we can get something up -- well we'll have to have it by May 1 -- we'll cable over to you just what we have. Now, as I say, it might not be anything in international field at all.

K: If it's out of the international field I'm not much concerned. But if it is, I want to see it. Ken, as long as I've got you on the phone, on two things. You think well of this fellow Goldberg that Holson is bugging me about?

R: Yes, as a matter of fact, I'm the one who suggested him. The reason I did was I knew him very well in Bonn. We thought very highly of him.

K: OK, then I'll go along with it.

R: He's an excellent man.

K: I heard that he wasn't very good, but if you like him, that's good enough for me.

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R: He was very good there and I tried to keep him in the Foreign Service, as a matter of fact. He's not in the Foreign Service I tried to keep him -- but there was a 20% payroll cut. We had to let him go, he's time was up.

K: Secondly, Ken, this we really shouldn't talk about on the phone. Everyone once in a while, not very often, people come to me and say you're not happy, or there's this and that problem, I'm assuming that if you are not happy, you will let me know.

R: I will let you know.

K: And unless I hear it from you, there's nothing to it.

R: Unless you hear anything about me from me, ignore it.

K: That's my view.

R: Exactly. And I expect the same thing from you.

K: Exactly right. I have no problem and I think you're taking over a lot of things that make my life a hell of a lot easier. Of course, you know, all you have to do is look over my schedule, any meeting you want to join , it's up to you.

R: Good, Henry. I appreciate that very much. I have been trying to keep things away from you as much as I could, that you didn't really need to be involved in.

K: Exactly. And I'm aware of that, and I appreciate it.

R: One other thing, I was talking to this morning the Somali Ambassador came in. This was an official invitation from him to visit Somali if and when I make my efforts. I said, well I assume from this that your country wants to improve relations with our country and he said that is the case. He said we would like -- he was talking to his President when he was there just two weeks ago.

K: I don't think that's a bad idea.

R: I don't either. It's an open ended invitation. He said -- I said I assume you want to improve relations with us as we do with you and he said, yes, we do and he said the President told me that he wants us to know, President Nixon and you that they do want to improve relations and that they've -- they would take any steps necessary along that end. I said, well, in that connection, we have been quite disturbed by the uprest in Ethiopia and I assume that your country is

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still ___ that you told me about when I saw you before you went to Somali. He said ~~that~~ that the President ~~x~~ had told the Ethiopian Prime Minister and also had told the ~~xxxxxxx~~emperor that they would not in any way interfere in Ethipia, there would be no hostilities of any kind and that they hoped very much that everything would be stabilized in Ethiopia and they would come out of this in good shape and that they hoped emperor would stay in power.

K: Ken, I unfortunately have a 4:00 meeting in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Can I call you tonight, I have one other question I want to ask you about Bill Donaldson.

R: Yes. Good.

K: I'll call you when I get back around 7:00. Will you be at home?

R: I will either be here or at home.

K: Good. If you go anywhere else, would you leave your number with the White House operator?

R: Yes, I will, Henry.

K: Thank you.

R: Bye. I have to go out this evening, but I'll leave my number.

K: I'll call you before 8:00, I'm sure.

R: Good. I'll be home until then.

K: Bye.

END

SB 333 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Senator Cranston/Secretary Kissinger
3:20
Saturday, April 27, 1974

K: Hello.

C: Greetings.

K: How are you? Sorry I couldn't get back to you earlier.

C: Quite all right. I was curious if you could tell me anything about the Jackson/Ribicoff situation.

K: Well the Jackson/Ribicoff situation seems to me what Jackson really wants, is to kill the Trade Bill for this year. I think he is softening up a little bit though--Jackson. He is now shifting from numbers to harrassment. On the other thing though is that we have got to get something done on the credits.

C: Yes.

K: And my own view would be of the two options you gave if you could help with the credits, that is the most urgent.

C: So we should just

K: I'm afraid if you put in a revision of Jackson and the credits you are going to start one hell of a brawl.

C: Yea.

K: Don't you think.

C: It is quite possible. Unless we could come at Jackson from two sides. I think the only way we can do it without a terrible brawl is to have a number of Jewish leaders approach him and urgent compromise and at the same the Senate leaders approach him and say we are prepared to seek to do it and we think we can swing it. In that way it might be possible, but it is probably wiser to just do nothing until we get the trade the Export-Import Bill through.

K: That is what I would think. Can all of this wait until I get back or would you like to trigger it earlier?

C: When do you get back?

K: About the 10th of May.

C: No it can wait. Because we don't go to markup until around May 23 on

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the Export Import in subcommittee, so we can wait till then before we do anything.

K: Right. Now if you have to get in touch with me about this. You can call Larry Eagleburger, my State Department office, and he knows how to get me quickly.

C: All right, fine. Let me ask you a couple of other quick things on the Jewish Leadership group was there any discussion when they met with you of the...

K: They seem to me to be very receptive to a compromise.

C: They do.

K: And I talked separately to the head of the Soviet you know whatever that is for the immigration of Soviet Jews.

C: National Conference on Soviet Jewry.

K: Right. And he actually is a much more balanced fellow than Mark was or at any rate seems more ready to listen to me.

C: What is his name?

K: Lodal. I can get you his name.

C: Lodal, he is the head of it.

K: He is the head of it. Well he is looking for something that he can sell his constituents. But he himself is not an active force. He is looking for something he can sell to his constituents.

C: Yea. Adali Stevenson, who is Chairman of the subcommittee that I'm on in the Banking, has the impression that the Jewish community would just assume let the Export-Import credits go through without a big fuss.

K: That is my distinct impression.

C: Now, the question is what will Jackson will allow. His man Pearl is meeting with Stevenson's staff people Monday.

K: Yea, but you know Pearl is a bloody fanatic.

C: I know he is. He is a wild man. He is meeting with Stevenson's people Monday to tell them what Jackson/Ribicoff want on Export-Import. It is apparently as not as stiff as the Jackson Amendment, but he has

sorta indicated that if they don't accept what he wants then Jackson will offer the Jackson amendment on the Export-Import thing. We'll try to compromise.

K: So he, I think what he wants is the minimum is the Congressional veto on every loan. That has, Casey tells me a number of commercial problems in that while that loan is on the table the competitors would all know what the bidding is.

C: Yea. Well, we will try to avoid that except at some figure Unfortunately they are talking fairly low figures like 25 million

K: Yea. I mean if the figure is high enough we can live with it.

C: What is your idea of an acceptable figure?

K: Oh, God, a few hundred million.

C: Yea. I doubt that we can get one at that level, but

K: But what they have to consider, well I don't have to convince you. We just cannot get a moderate Soviet policy in the Middle East and systematic cutoff all the fruits of detente. That isn't possible.

C: Yea. I fully understand that and I think there is a good number who do. Well we'll work

K: I can say my impression in talking with the Jewish community was that all except the head of the Soviet group would positively favor a compromise and even he in private talks was more flexible than I have ever seen that group to be.

C: Really. That is very encouraging. Well what I will be trying to arrange is to hit Jackson from the two sides if necessary from the Jewish community on the one hand and the Senators on the other hand. To try to orchestrate so that it sorta happens about the same moment, if we need to do that at this point. But I will focus on the credits and let the other stuff sorta slide.

K: I greatly appreciate this.

C: If we can help on the SALT thing why there is a number of us who want to. We don't

K: Well, I have talked to Muskie about this yesterday and we may get together a group just one evening at the Department and let our hair down and explain the figures, because I tell you of all the demoniac things that I have heard this one is the worse.

C: Well I agree.

K: Just for your information privately I had the chiefs in at a meeting this morning. I said all right gentleman, what is it that you would do if there were no interim agreement? And there isn't one bloody thing they can tell you.

C: Except ... everything they can think of.

K: Yea. But even that they can't really think of.

C: Actually I'm more interested in that than the other. I see the Jackson thing is a way to get toward the SALT so I will do anything I can to help.

K: Well, I'll get you involved in that.

C: Fine.

K: Many thanks.

C: Great success to you over there on your trip.

K: Thank you very much. Bye

C: Thank you. Bye.

SB 331 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
William Casey/Secretary Kissinger
2:40 PM
Saturday, April 27, 1974

K: Hello

C: Hello, Henry.

K: Bill.

C: How are you?

K: OK

C: Good. I had a talk xxxx last week with Stevenson and Jackson.

K: Yea.

C: I had to go up and testify Tuesday on theEX-IM authorization and I just thought I would touch base with you to see if you had any guidance for me. They've been talking together about getting the EX-IM Bill out quite clean. With respect to Soviets and European transactions except for requirement that to be a Presidential finding with respect to any loan over some amount yet to be determined. Maybea $100 million maybe a quarter of a million dollars. And also a requirement that specifixx loans perhaps energy related and those of a large magnitude to gain a 100 million or whatever. The ... on the table up there is 30 to 60 days with an opportunity on the part of Congress to veto. Now xx it is my view that we could live with the Presidential finding requirement although I don't think that should be placed on the President but the requirement that you lay burden the whole xxx transaction out so that the sponsorer could be jilted at the altar and his competitors would know all about it and xx zero in on him I think would just x put us out of business.

K: Yep.

C: Now I'm going to say that, lay it out in my testimony.

K: Well I wouldn't have anobjection to the veto by Congress if the sum were high enough, if we could lick that problem, that technical problem of the xxxxxxxx competition.

C: Well it is not only the problem of competition it also puts the Congress in a position of perhaps administering a specific review slap in face to one of our trading parties and one of the countries we are trying to do business withand they really shouldn't put themselves in that position. It is a stupid thing for them to do.

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Casey/Kissinger

K: Look, I don't want it. I like it better than the Jackson amendment to the Trade Bill.

C: Yea. I think that is right. I'm not sure however that the fact that they let EXIM Bank.

K: Well, why don't you stick to this position. If we want to compromise we can always do it later.

C: Yea. Do you have anything else that would help me deal with this.

K: No, no, we have to get the credits for the Soviets. I mean if that ability is lost we are just in horrible shape.

C: When are you leaving? You leaving tomorrow?

K: First thing yea.

C: Have a good trip.

C
K: Thank you.

C: Would you like to, uh me to send over the personal points of my testimony? In case you have any reactions.

K: Oh, I would appreciate that. Yes.

C: What is the latest ~~xxx~~ time I can get it to you today?

K: Any time. Six o'clock, as late as five or six ~~xxx~~ o'clock.

C: OK, ~~xxx~~ I'll ship it over.

K: Thank you. Are you enjoying your job?

C: Yea. It is fun.

K: Good.

C: I'll see you.

K: Bye, Bill.

C: Bye.

SB 334*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
3:35
Saturday, April 27, 1974

K: We will just do Assad as we did last week telling him essentially what you have told us as our own view. That the method is not consistent. Secondly, I wanted to tell you I have a message from Keating about the behavior of your press vis-a-vis the Aid program and I want you to know that everyone here is, if I sent this to the President then you're going to see some things which will be extremely unpleasant. I am not going to send it to the President, but there has got to be a limit to the insolence of your press and they must be given some positive guidance. You know damn well you got everything you wanted.

D: You mean in regard to our aid in regard to.

K: With the regard they have, apparently they are writing profound articles that the aid to Egypt ~~xx~~ is inadequate quote aid to Israel. And the Lebanon vote all mean that the U.S. is shifting to the Arabs. Now no one can be so stupid as to believe that our aid to Egypt is serving any other interest except Israel.

D: Mr. Secretary, I can assure you that these were not motivated by this Embassy.

K: Your press in Israel ~~xx~~ for Christ's sake. I am not talking about the American press.

D: They got

K: And when I say for Christ's sake to you you know I mean it.

D: I know.

K: That I'm appealing to a co-religionist.

D: Mr. Secretary, I want to distinguish between ...the vote in the UN this week...American press

K: I realize it would be condemned and that was the price we had to pay.

D: Fine, but that is one element. On this I have not quarrel on this. They follow the New York Times with the cartoon of babies being thrown out of the UN windows and with a sign underneath ..... This is one complication. With regard to our aid, I am not aware of any .... with regarad to Egyptian aid and I am not trying to justify I don't know what your Embassy reported.

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The military aid there is to my knowlege no great criticism to economic aid. In fact on the National television set that ... US and Arab countries strengtheing relations of our countries.

K: Well military aid want happen before next Wednesday to Egypt so can we cool it until I get there.

D: I have said that there are no plans at the present time to have any military aid to Egypt.

K: Because it takes us a certain amount of time to build the SS-11 silos that is that Soviet one, I mean the minute men silos we are going to give them.

D: Yes, Mr. Secretary.

K: So you got a 6-months lead time before we do that.

D: I know very well how long it takes to get American military aid

K: But you know what the Israelis should get into their heads as I told you the other day, even if we replaced every damn ~~pxdxxxx~~ piece of Russian equipment with American equipment, which is not going to happen before next Thursday.

D: Wednesday, sir.

K: Or Wednesday, Now you are assuming it is going to happen by Thursday. You'd still be better off because it is unlikely that we would mount an airlift to Egypt during the war. I will tell you this if we mount an airlift to Egypt during the war ~~x~~ we will get more European bases than we will if we mount one to Israel.

D: Well, I am not sure about this, but maybe you are right. But the point.

K: No, No, but my point is this isn't going to happen on the question of military supplies, if it arises it would be in the context of a substantial egraded ~~association~~ dissociation from the Soviet Union and substantial greater progress toward peace with Israel. So this is not an issue we should now spend our time on.

D: Right, I agree with you. I think.

K: If that is an issue, we can perhaps discuss in Israel even though it's even premature for discussion in Israel.

D: I think with the Prime Minister you should discuss this.

K: I will be glad to discuss it with the Prime Minister, but there is nothing active going on at this moment, nor in the defense of the Egyptians do I have to say have they even made a request. When they make a request and we deal with them at Israel speed you know we have months of debate before we crystalize it.

D: Mr. Secretary, I am aware of this and I

K: But I foresee the earliest time that this problem can arise completely ~~xxxx~~ towards the late fall of this year in my own ~~xx~~ estimate but I just don't see this thing any substantial amount of military aid. We may at some point give some token saying if the Russian pressure gets too great but even that when I say we may be discussing an abstract theory.

D: Yes, I understand this and I report exactly this way to my Government after I talked to you the other night. So there is no misunderstanding on this. But I want to tell you that the price is not the scientific institution.

K: No, no, but the press is not unresponsive to your Government.

D: Well, yes it is. And you must understand, Mr. Secretary, I am telling ;you the truth . It is a combination of things together that make the press suspicious when you have in one week.

K: Listen.

D: No, I'm not justifying, I am trying, if I may be so bold to help you understand the mood. This is my job, it is my function to do this. And the mood ~~xk~~ is that the combine military ~~xdx~~ aid to Saudi and prospects of military aid to Egypt --prospects I say, plus aid economic aid to the Arab countriesfor the first time in Egypt in a long time plus the vote in the UN ~~XXXXXXXX~~ and they come with and plus the fact that our voting assistance was not what we wanted. Everyone of these things can be explained . We did not government promote it. The totality of the picture with the say in shooting.

K: I understand this. But what you have to understand is something else Because you have to explain both sides. Whatever our inadequacies whatever maneuvering we have to do, I believe firmly that we have contributed greatly to the security and survival of Israel in an almost impossible situation.

D: I don't think the people argue this.

K: No, that is not your fault that you are in such a difficult situation. Secondly, the forthcoming negotiation is apt to be the most difficult and in many ways the most decisive we have had, because after that one whether you negotiate Jordan or with Egypt you are not dealing with countries that can themselves start a hollow course in the Middle East or likely to do it. So in this sense it is extremely decisive. Thirdly, if we get the proper kind of settlement, our chances of doing to the Soviets and Syrians about 70% of what we have done to them in Egypt is not bad. All of this is directly relevant to the security of Israel. Conversely if we fail, the U.S. ~~by~~ this is not a threat of what I am going to do, but the U.S. by the logic of events it is going to be out of that negotiating game and it goes one way or the other into international forums where what happens in the Lebanese case will be compounded. This is the dilemma that I'm putting to you as an Israeliand as a friend.

D: I understand it.

K: And therefore, it is no sense threatening ~~x~~ me with not making concessions. You are not making them to me. And when Rabin said, you are not responsible for Rabin, but when Rabin said you are willing to make a few concessions ~~x~~ to your friends, but finally you have to protect your own security. You don't have to make any concessions to your friends.

D: Yes, I understand it, Mr. Secretary.

K: I know how much you admire Rabin.

D: Yes, but the Jews came out before .... That I am not blaming you for. I want to say something else. We are quite aware of general situation. It is in fact, ~~thexix~~ The Prime Minister in a message was very careful not to plague the negotiations, in fact, I added to Eagleburger orally that that means we want to negotiate and that we want you to come. And normally if we didn't realize the totality of the strategic interest in what you are trying to accomplish the normality would have been Mr. Secretary thank you very much for your good offer, but under these circumstances, with these wild men, the Syrians, we cannot negotiate. If they pacify the area we will discuss it. That would have been normal reaction if we did not have the Government that was fully afraid of what the strategic involvement of the situation and your good intentions about it. So I mean I want.

K: But it is not really any more at this point my good intentions that matters so much, because it is the objective strategic situation.

D: No, it matters to us tremendously what these motivating factors behind you and your operations.

K: Yea, but even if my intentions were less good.

D: If your intentions were less good, we would look for another man to do the job.

K: You're welcomed to that. That is what I would really want.

D: I know, but we are not going to let you off the hook so easily, but at the same time we ax I think the basic thing we have to do is make you aware of

K: I understand you. You passed your message to me. Now I am xxxx giving you some to give to her so that she can yell at you too, there is no sense you being yelled at only from one side.

D: That she has done even before your message.

K: And I just don't want xx Jerusalem to talk itself into a masada complex in a period of enormous complexity and danger.

S: Yes, yes, I know, but the Syrians must

K: The Syrians, I'm sending a message.

S: Mr. Secretary I did not ask you to beg the Syrians to be good children, you have done it before and I know.

K: And it actually worked for a week.

S: No, no, it didn't. There were a couple of day... I don't think there was any basic change init. It was more dictated by the situation. But be as it may what I am trying to say, is that you should start conditioning the Syrians in their minds that they are not going anywhere near what they expected.

K: That I listen, I have told them already a 100 times. That is not the issue. I have told them, I have told Boudienme, I have told Sadat that what they want is unattainable, and will not ax be supported by us in any sense.

S: I understand this. I am not dictating the crazy plan about half of the Golan Heights. I am saying that additional gesture should be good of them to accept our arrangements, xx because I am fearful would not be able to go beyond this.

K: Well, I tell you that is out of the question. That cannot be done. That youhave to, there is no possibility of either Sadat orBoumedienme supporting that and that I think ...

D: I mean after all, Mr. Secretary ....

K: Well look, frankly I can't argue that. I tell you it would lead to ...a louse up of the negotiations. And in that case

D: As you know Syrians and Russians...
I don't think disagreement...

K: Yea, but the fact of the matter is in this whole process it is basically in my judgment more in the interest of Israel because well I think a failure of this process will bring it all back into international forum.

D: That I agree with you.

K: You cannot get it on Dayan. There is no possibility of getting it on any thing close to what Dayan brought here. I have said so from the beginning. I have said so for months. It is my best judgment. Even what I have suggested, my judgment has a better than 50/50 chance of failing. Because I have never had even the slightest thing from the Syrians that they would accept less than the map I gave you.

D: I understand.... But what I am saying is this--if I may be as bold to suggest to you, I think if I were you, I would say to the Syrians that you behave ....

K: That I am willing to say to them.

D: This is not a tactical move, I know, Mr. Secretary....

K: I'm willing to sayit to them, but I am telling you you can't act on that basis.

D: Yes. ....
I think will be misleading you if I don't tell you what the mood is.

K: The mood may be what it is but you have to report to them my judgment and if I reach the conclusion that it is hopeless I have no choice except to go back home and then let nature take its course and see what else happens.

D: I understand this.

K: And that is what I am going to do.

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D: I can assure you but..

K: I have ~~x~~ made no secret of my firm conviction and I consider what I have asked of Israel is the absolute minimum of what is dueable and has been designed to be the absolute minimum. And It is not what anyone else has suggested, but I will see you in Israel and we will all have a merry time.

D: Yea.

K: Because you will surprise me with your flexibility.

D: That has always been your problem that you were taken by surprise. Maybe the Syrians will surprise you.

K: I will tell you this, in my view if your settlements weren't there and if you were capable in your Government of making ~~x~~ more than I had proposed and more than I will propose, we would have an 85% chance of driving the Russians out of Syria and I think this would do you more good than all this horsing around.

D: I understand Mr. Secretary.

K: But I don't have to worry because we would even discuss this I am just giving you my personal opinion.

D: Well I don't know. There has been all sorts of denial in your press conferences and I understand ...Soviets .. I'll help you and so what. Not everyone is so sophisticated to understand this when you say that the Soviets are not going to help actually.. you know what I mean. ...

K: I have got to keep the Soviets quiet while I am doing this.

D: I understand this.

K: The problem of the Jewish in Israel right now is whether when they are in mortal danger they have enough understanding and self-discipline to survive.

D: I think Mr. Secretary.

K: Now they have not proved that they can do that to me yet.

D: Well, Mr. Secretary, I beg to differ with you. I think the Jews . I think both the military situation.

K: That isn't the issue. The issue is that if you want to pick a word up out of my press conference.

D: No, no I'm not doing this. I am telling you this is the sorta thing that people read and they are not pleased and we cannot make them agree with all the negotiations and this is not Israel you have people in America who believe this way too. This is part of the problem we have with the ...

K: Yes, but we went through this and I am sorta sick and tired of it because this is done by people who sell out in every part of the world except a narrow strip on the Mediterranean and you can't sell that in America. And at any rate I have given you our views now and I'll see you on Wednesday in Israel. Now seriously.

D: Yes. I am leaving on Monday. I'll be there on Tuesday and I will be waiting for you. on Thursday.

K: Good

D: Have a good trip and a safe trip.

K: I understand you don't have a lunch.

D: I don't have a lunch when?

K: On Monday.

D: Yea he called me and told me that he got a message from Gromyko.

K: Yes, I am having lunch with him on Monday.

D: I'm thinking to join you in Geneva. but if you prefer to join him than me that is a matter of taste.

K: Well let Larry know what he said when you see him.
Well you won't see him.
Well you don't ~~k~~ need it.
OK. Bye.

D: Best regards to Mrs. Kissinger. Bye

K: Thank you.

SB 3321*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
David Rockefeller/Secretary Kissinger
3:02
Saturday, April 27, 1974

K: Hello.

R: Henry.

K: David, how are you?

R: How nice of you to call back and I apoligize...
I just wanted to point out to you a couple of things.

K: Yes.

R: As you heard from Nelson about Bilderberg.

K: Yes I have.

R: You probably also heard from Hal.

K: Right.

R: So I don't think I need to fill you in on that.

K: I think I have a pretty good feel.

R: He and Nelson made a great impression.

K: Wonderful.

R: It was very useful having him along and he defended the President very well against George Ball.

K: You know, we have a report today from Dabenyour(sp?) saying a lot of Americans at Bilderberg and also Americans from Bilderberg traveling through Europe were saying that this Administration is determine to destroy our Atlantic relations. You know, I don't understand what good it does to an American to do this.

R: Well, I can't imagine why they would.

K: It is not true but even if it were true.

R: I'd say that Hal did present a hard line.

K: Yea, but that's our line.

R: Well, OK. But I mean this is part of the problem we have

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Rockefeller/Kissinger

K: Yes, but his hard line as I understood it was we will support European unity if Europe supports our Atlantic relationships, but not in the abstract.

R: Well, you know, it is unfortunately just a bad climate. It really is at the moment, and I think a new administration in France could certainly help.

K: Yea, but I doubt that they will.

R: I think might

K: Shiscar might, yea.

R: And Nelson said he had given you the statement by this young French fellow Pierre de Monteblanc. (sp?)

K: Yes.

R: And I thought it was a little encouraging that he had said something quite different from what Jobert has been sayingand the fact that Jobert said it. They are feelers. I don't feel totally discouraged but I do think it is not in a good shape at the moment.

K: Yea. But largely the result European actions.

R: I think that is probably true but its just not a good atmosphere I'm shocked about thought if what you say about the other Americans going around saying.

K: Yea.

R: And I don't the explanation.

K: What actions of ours have contributed to it?

R: You know, they are sorta snide remarks and retaliation and so on.

K: Well, what snide remarks?

R: Well I suppose one the sorta example was the sad fact of the report on your talking to the ladies.

K: Ch, but God, that happened at the end of a year's process.

R: I agree, but I am just sayingthis is

K: But that couldn't have caused anything, because the damage by that time had been done.

R: Right, it is an example of the sorta thing they ~~think~~ to pick on .

K: Yea. But that is a symptom that is not a cause.

R: No, no, it isn't a cause. I don't know. I think they are having trouble among themselves and therefore they are looking for outside excuses.

K: I mean that talk to the ladies was a disaster, because I didn't know the press was there and it wasn't a well consider statement.

R: That's right. Well, you know, I can understand, but I think

K: At any rate that couldn't have been the cause because that was the end of a year of trying to get them to agree to something rational.

R: Yea, well, they are very difficult. I have no question about that. But I think it is clear that they need a lot of sorta tender loving care just to give them when they behave the way they do.

K: Yea.

R: And I fully agree on that. I did want to say a word on the Soviets. I think the Darmouth meeting went much the best than any we have had. And I have been sick in the sense that it was much less recrimination and much less polemic than there has been at the others. and much more willingness to discuss in a rational fashion the nature of our problems and a willingness to discuss how we can deal with them. And in a way, strangely enough: almost more than in Bilderberg.

K: Oh, really.

R: It was surprising. Of course I would write it up in three groups. One on political side which I think is a little more fireworks and I wasn't involved in that. Then there was one on science and environment and that went very well. And ours was on trade and economic relations And we brought up a whole series of rather concrete suggestions that would make possible a more effective cooperation. Excepting the fact that the wouldn't accept ownership in the Soviet Union by anyone, that was the most difficult. We said well how about leasing and we described what this country could do with equipment and also with plants and this be a possibility. And then we discussed the possibility of joint ventures in third countries and instead of just saying this is the end, they said, well, we would like to study it and it was agreed in the end that new US/USSR Council would be asked to set up a task force to see what might be done in this area.

R: And I think that is encouraging because if we could do something along those lines, it would be very positive and their whole approach is this, theysense a good delegation. Richard Lee who is Administer of Food sat in with us for one whole day & the Deputy Minister of Agriculture and theVice Chairman of the state Bank so that it was really a good discussion. And then that was followed up by ... I did go to see Kosygin in Moscow and had an hour and a half with him. I think he would have gone on a lot longer, but we were half hour late for lunch as it was. And he brought up an interesting idea and that is and he really wanted me to take this up with you and he said how about US and Soviets xxxx participating in the construction of nuclear power plants in third countries. In other words this is a variation of the idea we had advanced only doing it in a different way and then we saw Deviseonne(sp?) and he is pretty clearly I think and put the idea in his head but he would really like to do this and I think it is an interesting idea.

K: It is certainly one we would be prepared to look at.

R: You see the idea would be that they would provide certain elements of the plant and we in others.

K: Yea.

R: But I would think this has interesting possibilities. So far as the joint ventures are concerned it seemed xxx to me that the ideal place to do it would be in India. Where they are already strong, where the Indians need enormous amounts of capital and I'm not sure it might not be an interesting idea. Not now speaking of necessary power plants but something else. And they were at least willing to discuss it.

K: Now are they going to approach us on this? Or how is itgoing?

R: Well, I mean, what he is going to do is to send me through Dobrynin a memorandum but I thought maybe it was useful to you fo have it in the back of your mind when you are over there seeing them. It seemed tome a positive approach and the whole meeting with Kosygin was much more xxxxxxx friendly, much less barring and much less jives than I have ever had it before.

K: Well I think they are still eage to continue the detente, but what's going in this country with Congress isn't very encouraging.

R: No, although Hugh Scott was there you know. He gave them a moderately optimistic view on MFN.

K: Good. I hope he knows what he is talking about.

SB 335*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Max Fisher/Secretary Kissinger
3:55
Saturday, April 27, 1974

F: A. the meeting was very very worthwhile.

K: Good.

F: Good expression and helpful ...
Two, I talked to ... I passed along to him my feeling that this is a very acute timein history. I felt he ought to realize this.
I also passed along comments of ...

K: Right.

F: And I think it would advantageous if if could bx done.
Sometimes to spend a few moments

K: With whom? Rabin?

F: Surpetra.

K: OK.

F: Here is the man behind the throne and he could have been Prime Minister. He has the same sorta feelings that now is the time to hit;... But if by chance it could be arranged for you to spend a few moments, I suggest that you ought to do that. I think it would be very worth while.

K: Good.

F: And on the last thing, the Russian thing, the meeting yesterday a few people like Arthur Hurtchberg, and Congress and a few other organizations are ready to make a move, but I think the report of the gesture, Jackson visit. I understand he had a very goodd one.

K: Yea.

F: And I think we are making a little progress

K: Terrific.

F: Beyond that, good luck to you. You have a tough thing, but I wanted to get to them. I wanted to talk to them directly overseas on this thing. And let me say this, time to time, see I talk to all those people directly over there, I have no problems at all getting points of view.

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K: Look if I hear of anything that needs to done, I'll take the liberty of letting you know.

F: Don't worry about this, just any time at all.

K: Right.

F: Good luck to you. You looked a little uptight yesterday and I know you have a difficult time.

K: I looked uptight when? When I met with your leader?

F: You looked a little harrassed. Look you got a tough thing, my friend you got all the cares in the world.

K: OK , Thank you

F: My sympathies, my feelings. You just feel that any thing I can do, I'm in that corner.

K: Thank you very much Max.

F: OK. Good luck.

K: Bye.

1975 1*
SF-26

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Larry Eagleburger
4/28/74 (75) 11:06 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Larry?

E: Yes, sir.

K: We are going to this emergency evacuation, will you tell Phil Habib?

E: Yep, right away.

K: Did you have anything else.

E: No, I was just wanting to check on whether that was what would happen

K: Yep.

E: Okay, I'll call him right away.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 4 FEB 2003 200102979

SB 337*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Joseph Kraft/Secretary Kissinger
May 31, 1974
7:45 PM

K: Hello.

JK: Henry, congratulations.

K: Thank you, Joe.

JK: You must be very gratified.

K: It's the most nerve-racking negotiation I've every been involved in.

JK: Yes, I can imagine. Thank you very much for calling. I'm wrapping up a New Yorker letter from Damascus and I wondered if there was something you could tell me about the way Asad handled the negotiation. What he (inaudible) at, what his basic conception seemed to me, what he was worried about.

K: Well, you're not going to attribute it to me.

JK: No. I will not attribute...

K: The difference between him and -- first of all, I think he's a man of superb intelligence, great sense of humor and really quite attractive, and I found him to be a man of his word. His problem in contrast to Sadat was that Sadat had made up his mind where he was going to go before he entered negotiations, while Asad seemed to be feeling his way during the negotiations. And to him it was a really tramatic experience to go through the process of recognizing and to call Israel for even -- if only for purposes of negotations. And at every stage of the process he had to bring along his domestic consensus sometimes by bringing people in for me to repeat to them the same arguments I'd already made to him. Sometimes by simply having them sit in. He had two problems, one of course was theline where the disengagement would take place, the second was how to reconcile thinning out UN and so forth _____ conception of sovereignty.

JK: I see. What was the fight about Quenitra at the beginning about whether civilians could come into Quenitra.

K: There was no fight ever about whether civilians could come into Quenitra. At first the Israelis drew the lines around Quenitra and in such a way that Israeli military forces would in fact -- well, at first, Israelis wanted to keep half of Quenitra for themselves.

JK: I see, they wanted to keep the western half.

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K: And then the major problem was whether he could put xxx civilians into a town that in effect had Israeli military outposts at every corner except one road. That's really what the issue was.

JK: I see.

K: Never any prohibition against ____.

JK: I see and you solved it by putting the Israelis out of the town but in the joining area.

K: By putting the Israelis out of town into a joining area, your creating a xxxxxxxxxx demilitarized Israeli zone for a kilometer and a half beyond Quenitra.

JK: Any indication what the Palestinians are going -- how they're going to react?

K: Well, that was another problem he had very much on his mind. I think there's a chance that they will not react too violently.

JK: Yes. So far they haven't at any rate. OK, well, look, thank you very much.

K: One point you had in one of your xxxxxxx columns to which I took exception is, you know, was we didn't get the war started, the war go itself started in the Golan Heights.

JK: It was xxxxxxxxxx crudly written on my part.

K: It was not anything we had any control over and it wasn't something we deliberatelyx used. The problem was that without these negotiations it would have escalated into a much more extensive war.

JK: Well look, it was rather crud but I also feel that without that fighting he couldn't have brought it off.

K: That may be true but it wasn't a plan -- you know, it wasn't that -- there was no way of moving this thing to a negotiation faster given the Israeli domestic crisis and given the fact that we had to get these people to put something on paper to which they were committed before we started so it isn't we xxxxxxxx deliberately let this thing build up. We couldn't start much before we did.

JK: OK, I have written Bob McCloskey a note trying to explain that. I was a little surprised at his letter about that kind of relationship with me, but basically I just don't think you could have done it or that the Syrians could have....

K: Joe I did not agree -- I didn't disagree with your analysis xx of the dynamics of the negotiations. I objected to the phrase that I unleashed the dogs of war.

And also I objected to the idea that all of this was being done to arrange a Presidential trip to the Middle East. That may be the result but that was not the intention.

JK: I didn't say that. I mean I don't remember what I said, but.....

K: But basically I thought 4/5 of the analysis was extremely acute. I mean the analysis of the dynamics was extremely acute.

JK: CK.

K: Yes, you had been in Damascus.

JK: Yes, I spent a lot of time in Damascus. I sort of know a lot of about -- I think the _____.

K: Then you know that this was a tramatic experience for ___.

JK: Absolutely. She was coming down from a romantic linquistic_____ or he was brining his people down from that romantic linquistic _____heaven to the pragmatic dirt of a national state.

K: Exactly. And so it was a tremendously emotional negotiation because you could see what he was going through.

JK: And he had to haggle at every step of the way. You know, what strikes me about this that the last part of the agreement where he establishes almost no connection between this step and the end step. That really surprised me.

K: That's right. No, it was a -- in his way he had a much tougher role than Sadat and he showed again in the wierd Syrian way, equal of not even greater wisdom. I mean to get it this far, now what he'll do in the next stage, God only knows.

JK: Yes, but his capacity for making mischief is much smaller.

K: Much smaller. He's lost his extreme radical creditial.

JK: Yes. Alright, I think it's a very, you know, really extremely good outcome.

K: Good, Joe, nice to talk to you.

JK: Nice to chat, my best to Nancy.

K: Thank you and we'll see you when -- you're going off on a trip?

JK: I'm going to the Governors conference now and I don't think I'll go to the Mid East trip. I expect to go to Moscow. Will you be going to Moscow before the President.

K: No, there won't be time.

JK: God. I'll be going on that. Is it clear where he's going to be going? Apart from Moscow itself.

K: No. I have to talk to Dobrynin soon.

JK: I take it you've seen the Shultz article.

K: What Shultz article.

JK: (inaudible)

K: No.

JK: Nobody called it to your attention?

K: NO.

JK: It's in the current issue of Foreign Policy. I don't want to load you down with something but you at least ought to get somebody to look at it, it's going to break on your head and ....

K: What's he saying?

JK: I think it makes -- I'm not sure I can give a good characterization. It purports to be an account of peace making in Indochina and may be its surrounding by more ___ than the fact, but the ___ suggested there was a good deal of double dealing.

K: Double dealing with whom?

JK: With both -- well, let me be very very. If you wanted a worse ___you would say that you duped everybody, you duped the Cambodians, the South Vietnamese, the North Vietnamese, and President Nixon.

K: I duped -- no let's start with the last one. How did I dupe President Nixon.

JK: Look, I can't argue this case at all and I don't know enough about it even to make -- but two colleagues of mine had called me if I had seen it

and they are writing articles about it. You certainly ought to get somebody to brief you on it.

K: I'll get it. It's quite an achievement.

JK: It's not anything to worry about. I really don't -- but I think you ought.....

K: To do such a _____is an amazing achievement.

JK: That's right.

K: OK, Joe, I'll get it.

JK: One other question has come up. It came up to me in connection with something I saw Rockefeller about. Do you -- did you notice in the transcripts something that had -- that you told the President which Rockefeller told you which Coin told him.

K: I saw that and I don't what the hell they're talking about. Did Rockefeller know.

JK: He didn't know what they were talking about and that you had a pretty good memory and would know.

K: I have no idea what they were talking about. I've seen that transcript.

JK: Well, it's -- there are two possibility that came to my mind but none of them very clear. One that -- the most likely it seems to me is that Hoover told Coin who told Rockefeller who told you that there had been bugging of the 1968 campaign by the Democrats. That strikes me as the most likely. The other possibility has to do with how the story of the bugging of -- how the story of the 1969 -70 bugging got out.

K: No. That certainly not. That could not be the case. The first, conceivably. You know, in analysing, leaving aside anything that may be said about me, in analysing these transcripts you have to understand that they are necessarily the truth. They are the impression the various actors wanted to create about various events. They weren't necessarily.....

JK: It's very clear to me in the two I mentioned that they are totally ___. That they are in fact coaching for various specific purposes and to regard these as an expression of the truth is -- well, it's even an act of irony I would say.

K: Exactly. OK.

JK: Take care have a nice weekend.

END

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
William Simon/Secretary Kissinger
May 31, 1974
5:25 PM

S: Henry, my warmest congratulations. You are truly a great man.

K: Aren't you nice. You're a good friend.

S: Well, so are you. I'd love to get together with you and I know how God-damned busy you are. We got some critical negotiations coming up, not only with the Saudis, which is secondary, I was out at the CIA to talk a little bit today about what their Saudi, Iranian, etc., and some strategy that sort of.....

K: Well, how about noon on Monday?

S: Let me take a look at my schedule. I was thinking if you have any time over the weekend, I could do it, I know. I got a lunch with the International Monetary Reform group on Monday, starting at 12:00 noon. Our negotiations with C-20's start. Are you going to be in tomorrow?

K: I'm pretty tied up. Can I call you in the morning?

S: Of course, I'll be here all day tomorrow and I'll also be available Sunday.

K: Sunday, I'm going to take off if hell freezes over.

S: Good, for you.

K: But we will get together....

S: One way or the other, we can do it early or late or I'll just accommodate my schedule any way I can, but it's all the former Secretaries of Treasury and bank presidents and what have you that come in to advise us on monetary reform and I just have to make this one. The main issue I want to talk to you about is gold and interwoven in the entire gold issue is Chisgard (phonetic), ~~Helmut Schmidt~~ Giscard Helmut Schmidt, which immediately transends to your area.

K: No, we've got to talk soon. I'll call you tomorrow.

S: Super. Thank you, Henry, I'm just thrilled and I'm just so proud that I ~~work~~ work for you and I can't tell you.

K: You've been a terrific friend.

S: I'll continue to be, you can count on that.

K: I'll see you soon.
END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 26 APR 2004 200102979

SA 1 *

TELECON
John Dunlap/Secretary Kissinger
June 1, 1974
10:27 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

D: Fine.

K: I have assumed from you silence that may be you were not as interested in the economic job as I was hoping you'd be. I wanted to take ~~another~~ another run at you anyway.

D: Since we last talked, what happened was I though t (inaudible) I didn't think I should take a job for less than two or three years and that seemed ~~difficult~~ difficult. In the meantime, Haig talked to me at length about various aspects of the matter which became Rush's business and then currently Bill is talking to me on hard terms about a short term as deputy secretary of Treasury. So I find myself in a somewhat corner, I'm being very candid.

K: Yes, I appreciate that.

D: And on the ~~grounds~~ grounds of maybe 7 or 8 months might be possible.

K: As deputy secretary of Treasury?

D: Deputy secretary.

K: Yes.

D: There's a number two spot there.

K: Yes, I know.

D: And I said to Haig, I said to Rush, Bill.....

K: I just wish those SOB's would tell me the truth sometime. Excuse me. Haig told me he tried to persuade you to take my job.

D: Well, look, Henry, I don't want to ~~k~~ get in the middle of this.

K: That's all right, let's not worry about that.

D: The truth is he strongly advised me against it. You know, no reason for me to play games.

K: No. On what grounds did he advise you?

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D: Well, I think he was trying to persuade me to do something else. That was the only thing I could -- now the -- so that has what was going on. I've told Haig, I told Rush, I told Bill that the matter that had the greatest intellectual challenge to me was, as I said to you when you and I talked about. The realx problem there is this time question and I think that was the reason and also because you were away and I didn't feel I should hold up anything more, that I got in touch with both him and, well, he got in tough with me on this other matter, Haig and then also Scowcroft and I told him that he could communicate with you and under those circumstances___.

K: That under what?

D: That under these circumstances of (A) the probablity and time I ought not to take such a job for less then two or three years and I was somewhat ___to commit myself to that point in view of my ___. That he should try and find somebody else.

K: You see, John, what I need is somebody in whom I can have enoughx confidence to turn over economic affairs to and given the particularlx structure in Washington right now, I really think State is in the best position to do it if it had the personnel. I just don't believe that these other organizations are going to be able to manage a coherent foreign policy or a coherent foreign economic policy. They can pick at it. Besides my relation with Simon are so good that particularly if you were here we could get almost anything done that needs to be done.

D: Well, my xx relations with Bill are very good.

K: That's what I mean. And Simon isn't disposed to xxxx make jurisdictional dispute.

D: No, he is not. He and I work very wel l together and have for years.

K: And you would be overwhelmingly my first choice and it isn't a subject, you know, I would want to be able to say what I want to accomplish in a foreign policy sense. But how that would get translated into economic policy, except in the most general way, I would leave to the man I put into that job. I haven't made another move until I had a chance to talk to you.

D: Well, I've been very candid with you on what's happened since you've been away.

K: I wouldn't worry about what Haig says. I think once you were over here it would work out very good.

D: Oh, I'm sure. Well, Bill had a run at me yesterday afternoon before I left, _____Rush was talking to him yesterday about his problems _____and then I

came back up here at the x end of the day.

K: I don't believe that I could in good conscience tell you that 7 to 8 months.....

D: Is the job, that's the problem.

K: Would do the job here. What the Department needs is somebody to reorganize its whole ecnomic aparatas and to establishex a xxxxxx relationship with the xxx other economic agencies, that's other then just a negotiating relationship.

D: Absolutely. I know that.

K: You know, I would like to lure you here and then figure you wouldn't want to leave in 7 months. Frankly, I don't believe you could leave as deputy secretary of Treasury in 7 months.

D: That's a very candid____.

K: I think you could do it in a year and a half if Harvard were extended for a year.

D: Let me do this, I have got to take the weekend to really get my own self in order on this matter. I find myself in somewhat in a peculiar position with all that's going on.

K: Of course.

D: I would have prefered to be candid with you, to stay and work on some domestic inflation problems. ____if the Congressx had extended that legislation but they did not. That I was prepared to do for 8 months to a year. That sort of thing. With that -- that's was interested mewhen I was down there, you know,....

K: But I think you could do a major job here.

D: That's nice of you to say so and you certainly deserve all the help you can get. Let me do this, I need a little -- let me give you a ring on Monday.

K: xxx Would you do that? When you think about it, really think of it in terms of that sometimes the best jobs to move into are those in which you can build everything from xxx scratch.

D: I'm well aware of that.

K: I think what the country nedds most, given in the foreign policy xxxxx field isn't really the sort of diplomacy I do now which in a funny way is transatory, but to build into the area of xxxxxxxx economic policy xxxx where if you look

ten, fifteen years ahead...

D: I couldn't agree with you more.

K: ...we're going to have our most massive problems.

D: I left a memo with Rush about his job in which I indicated that that is somewhat of the same thing _____real problems. Just as it is in the domestic side, on the inflation side, you're not going to solve this thing except over ten or 20 years in developing institutions that are much less inflationary than the present time. Well, let me be in touch with you on Monday.

K: John, think about it and I would really consider a great privilege to be able to work with you.

D: Quite the contrary.

K: You could consider that you'd have substantial carte blanch here.

D: Nothing would please me more than to work in the job.

K: Give it some thought.

D: I will give it a good deal of powerful thought, sir.

K: Thank you, John.

D: Bye.

END

SA2 *

TELECON
Senator Mike Mansfield/Secretary Kissinger
June 1, 1974
11:39 AM

RELEASED IN FULL

M: Henry.

K: How are you?

M: How are you? I'm out in Montana.

K: I know you are and I really just wanted to call you to tell you how touched I was by ;your note ~~yesterday~~ yesterday.

M: Well, I appreciate it. I said if you ~~hadn't~~ hadn't come back with the dove pulled out of the hat I'd been at the airport to meet you.

K: That's what really moved me. When are you going to be back.

M: I'll be back late Monday night. I've got to give a commencement address at the -- at my old school, the school of _____which is now the Montana College of Science and Technology on Tomorrow.

K: May we call you office. I wonder ~~whether~~ whether we could have breakfast or get together at the end of the day sometime.

M: You pick the day.

K: I'll call your office.

M: OK. Take care of yourself, Henry and get some sleep and my best to your wife.

K: Thank you and thank you really for -- it was such a touching thought.

M: Thank you for what you've done, Henry. We all appreciate it. Take care.

K: Bye.

M: Bye.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 10 FEB 2003 200102979

SA4 1*

TELECON
Senator Fulbright/Secretary Kissinger
June 2, 1974
12:48PM

RELEASED IN FULL

F: Henry, how are you.

K: How are you Mr. Chairman?

F: Fine. I just read you very fine letter. You are very nice.

K: And I want to tell you that I am heartbroken about the outcome.

F: Well, I was associated with you know what. They call it the mess in Washington among other things.

K: There is one consolation when the outcome takes this form you can't blame yourself that you have left anything undone.

F: No. It was so one-sided that the courage portray was just too powerful to overcome.

K: Exactly. And it makes you wonder whethere all incumbents may not be in trouble. this year.

F: This fellow is unusually good. He has all that Billy Graham has plus a lot. He is a very clever man. He could be good and he could be one of those fellows who could be dangerous too. Becaude he is without any inhibitions that are associated with normal contact. He is a driving ambitious fellow.

K: Well, it is a great loss for the country. But I want to talke to you when you come back to see how we can work together even after you retire from the Senate.

F: Well, I will be glad to, I am planning to come back Thursday. And I believe you are scheduled to have a meeting on Friday.

K: That is right. It is not your favorit subject, so if you wanted to take the weekend off, I wouldn't mind.

F: CK

K: No, I'm joking.

F: I thought about that at the time.

K: No, No.

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(Inaudible)

F: Between now and the first of the year is to help you on your detente and overall policy. I must say I think you did a great job in the Middle East. You know that.

K: Well, now we come to the hard part on the Middle East. I do want to talk to you as soon as you are back about where we go from here and of course on the detente policy maybe we can have those hearings you talked about before the elections.

F: I am ready anytime you are. Anything I can do, I'm ready to do it you know.

K: You will be a major source in foreign policy no matter where you are:

F: And I will be uninhibited in whatever I can show to help you in this whole area.

K: Well, I look forward to working closely with you and I want you to know that I was very sad by the outcome.

F: I appreciate that very much. You did all you could possibly do in which you did in the period. It was good but I don't think anything we could have done ..

K: When you have an outcome like this as I said the consolation is that it makes absolutely no difference. You campaigned as hard as any one could, your firends helped you, but this is one of those things beyond human endeavor.

F: I think that is true.

K: That is absolutely true and it has nothing to do with individuals either.

F: I think that is right.
I'll be back and will be glad to work with you. We welcome any suggestions you have about the hearings and whenever you are free to do it well I'll be free to do it.

K: Terrific. And we will work as closely togetheras before.

F: Of course.

K: I am a little tired now.

F: I would think so

k: It is catching up with me.

F: How is Nancy?

K: She is fine. But she did get a little tired on this trip, but she didn't make every shuttle.

F: Well, it was a terrific strain.
Take a few days off and go out again.

K: Mr. Chairman, and I will see you at the end of the week.

F: Thank you for calling.

K: Regards to Betty.

F: Thank you very much.

K: Bye.

F: Bye.

SA 3 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
The President/Secretary Kissinger
June 2, 1974
12:10 P.M.

P: Hello, Henry.

K: Mr. President

P: I just called to see if you got a good night's sleep.

K: I'm catching up, but it is beginning to be noticeable.

P: Everything seems to be on course at the moment.

K: Yes we have had answers from all of the countries and the schedule is now all set for you.

P: Al is working on it with the advance men now. And so that is good.

K: Right.

P: The countries seemed to be pleased about we're ~~s~~ coming.

K: Oh, most eager.

P: I think we will even get a good reception in Jerusalem. Don't you?

K: I think you will get a very good reception in Jerusalem. They know what is good for them.

.....

K: But it will add two days to your trip. If you want to go to Algiers

P: I think it is important that we not do Algiera now having seen him here. I would say to him however what I would like to do is to get a message to Algeria/Morocco. Morocco is coming here, ... is coming here. It is best for later time to ~~xxxx~~ travel to the North African countries. I want to be fair to them. I think it is important in announcing this that our Ambassadors be informed. That the President has in mind a later time in year. How does that sound to you.

K: Good.

P: And I think we could do it. I mean after the Russian trip some time bounce through those countries.

K: What is your thought, Mr. President, about stopping in Europe?

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P: Well, you mean after Russia or the Middle East.

K: No, no, not after the Middle East. Either before or after Russia.

P: After Russia or before?

K: We will have NATO declaration which will be ready to sign and if you were going to ~~k~~ stop we could arrange some kind of summit meeting in which it gets signed.

P: Well, would your point be that we do that before we go Moscow or after?

K: I frankly would have a slight preference before.

P: That sorta cuts down our preparation plan. But that is OK. Could we do it in Brussels or London?

K: No, it would have to be in Brussels.

P: Yea.

K: This doesn't preclude your stopping in London on the way back.

P: Yea.

P: I am thinking of stopping in London or France. You know what I mean. But we could do with France, we should give Giscard D Estaing an early ~~skadx~~ point you know before the next one.

K: Yea.

P: But I don't know. Provided it was just a pure business meeting, I don't want to stop and have two or three days horsing around with those people.

K: No, no it would only take about day or day and a half. Either on the way to or on the way back.

P: On the way to, I just don't know. I just wonder if things we have to talk to the Russians about that we just arent going to want to answer a lot of questions. You know or discuss.

K: On the other hand afterwards you have to explained ~~xxkx~~ what you did.

P: Well they have to be briefed.

P: What is the effect on the Russians if we stop before the meeting?

K: Well, they won't be crazy about it either before or afterward.

P: I understand.

K: I don't think it makes a lot of difference whether it is before or afterward.

P: My own inclination is that if we do it at all and coming back from Russia we could come back with only a rest stop and then back. Because I think we want the Russian thing to over-ride.

K: That would be my view. That is why I am slightly in favor of doing it on the way over. On the other hand signing the declaration can be a fairly solemn ceremony. And it is a good document.

P: But not thinking, Henry, in terms of a day or day and a half or anything like that.

K: You know, you don't need a rest stop on the way back from Russia. It is only a 10 hour flight.

P: That's true.

P: Although I may want to say something when I get off the plane. I don't know. On, now it doesn't make any difference. Do you think maybe we could stop in London on the way back?

K: The trouble is you stop in one capital and not in the others.

P: But I mean not stop in the capital now, is there some base in Northern Scotland or something like that.

K: Oh yea, but you would still have to see Wilson.

P: Yea, but that is still a problem, stop there the others are angry. So Iceland is out. You can't think of any other place that we could stop. I kinda like the idea of just stopping and getting some sleep even for six hours and getting on the plane and coming home.

K: Europe is only three hours from Russia.

K: That is the problem and you still have 7 1/2 hours to go there.

P: And it is out of the way if you stop in the Azores unless you were at the South of Russai. Suppose you were down at the Black Sea, Henry, is there any place we could stop at on the way back. Could we stop at that delightful place in Morocco not in Rabat or Casablanca.

K: You mean Malicas(sp?) for example oh sure you can do that.

[redacted]

P: And then go on.
That is a long flight.

K: An hour more or maybe an hour and a half.

P: Stopping on the way over for the NATO thing is not bothering me. I think it is all right.

P: Tomorrow you will sit down and have a talk with Dobrynin.

K: Naturally.

P: And you will have in mind not only this but be sure to put front and center that it is on the European conferences as a trade off on the MBFR thing. Will you do that?

K: Absolutely.

P: Now, when do you want me to step in with you. You remember the meeting I had with them three months ago and you said well we got the thing on the road again. Well, I am ready to go at any time. I'll look ... in the eye and even see...

K: Well, Mr. President, let's just see what the issues are. It is a little premature Mr. President. First we will have to see what the Russians are willing to accept.

P: Yea. Al was even ssaying that their defense department was even raising hell about the underground nuclear test. That is so ridiculous I don't know.

K: They are sabotaging everything right now.

P: Well they are trying to, but they are not going to. You know what I mean. They have tried to before.

SA11

1*

TELECON
Golda Meir/Secretary Kissinger
June 3, 1974
6:45 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

M: Fine thank you. How are you?

K: Alright. I just wanted to call you now that you are a private citizen to tell you that our interest in you is as great as it always was.

M: Henry, did you get some rest?

K: I got some rest this weekend, yes.

M: That's good.

K: How do you feel?

M: Wonderful. I feel so light-hearted and light headed. It's a good feeling. Some worry.

K: I can imagine.

M: But, hope for the best.

K: Well, I cannot tell you how much I appreciated our working together this last month. It was really inspiring.

M: You know this evening I was talking to my children and some friends. The thing in Geneva went off so beautifully. It was beyond anything I could ever imagine.

K: We're getting some telegrams now from the Syrians which are, you know, at least shows some interest in a more rational dialogue.

M: Everything went off smoothly. There was one problem, I suppose you know about, _____which we solved immediately and no problems at all.

K: Really.

M: I was scared as who ~~xxxx~~knows what will happen.

K: I expected they would treat you the way they treated me. And that it would go on for days endlessly.

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M: Yes. But look how kind they are to us. It's because they don't speak to us, I guess. But really everything we hoped that ___the day after tomorrow and Thursday we get our men back.

K: That would be wonderful.

M: I saw the wounded ones yesterday.

K: Did you? How are they?

M: Pretty good but they have problems. It's better than we thought they would be.

K: I think it is wonderful that you had an opportunity to do this as your last act.

M: There isn't a day that, actually several times during the day, that somebody doesn't mention you. And everybody's still wondering. No explanations explain really how it happened and how you could do it. Everybody's very satisfied.

K: Well, let's all pray that it works out well and I really want you to know that all of us who were there think of you with so much affection.

M: Tell me, how's Nancy?

K: She's fine.

M: When are you coming?

K: To Israel?

M: Yes.

K: Oh, I'm coming with the President, whenever he's coming. I forget the date. 16th?

M: The 16th I think.

K: 16th, yes. And I'm sure you'll be present at some affairs.

M: Oh, I suppose. They can't forget me so quickly.

K: It is unavoidable.

M: Oh, I'm sure. I thought that I would ask the Foreign Office whoever is making the arrangements that if only for a few minutes I would come to the hotel to pay a courtesy call.

K: Oh, absolutely. He would want that.

M: I should do it and I'll gladly do it.

K: I hope you pay me a courtesy call.

M: What?

K: I hope you pay a courtesy call on the Secretary of State. As a matter of fact, I'll come to wherever you are.

M: OK. That's no problem.

K: I don't stand on protocol.

M: ____stay up late at night. So there's no problem.

K: I look forward very much to seeing you in about two weeks.

M: I too. I spoke to Simcha this evening. He called me.

K: Yes.

M: He'll come a day or two earlier.

K: Right.

M: You....

K: I'll tell Simcha what's needed.

M: I appreciated very much that you called.

K: Not at all.

M: I look forward to seeing you.

K: I look forward to seeing you soon.

M: All the best and my love to Nancy.

K: Thank you. Bye.

END

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SA 10

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Gen. Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
Monday, June 3, 1974
4:30 PM

K: Are they attending a meeting at the White House?

S: If they are, I don't know anything about it.
What kind of a meeting?

K: That is what I would like to know.

S: Me too. I don't know anything about it.

K: Are they planning the Soviet trip without me?

S: (Laughter) No, I don't know anything about it. I will find out.

K: OK.

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SA7 1*

TELECON
Winston Lord/Secretary Kissinger
June 3, 1974
12:15 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Win?

L: Yes.

K: To go through these things, on the phrase, of the parties, that meant that Australians....

L: That's right. Third countries would be included in the prisoner thing.

K: The return of Vietnamese civilian personnel, that just pledged our best effort.

L: Maximum influence, sir. To get the majority out in 60 days and all in 90 days.

K: Yes, but that was always known.

L: The only one that's a problem is C, that's the only one.

K: Are you the ___for....

L: I never understood it at the time. Few articles the word (inaudible) was used. And they wanted to be sure that meant all the parties. Of course it does.

K: The relationship between the international commission on control received the national conference. What did that....

L: That was to leave open the possibility that we could at the international conference set it up so that the ICCS reported to the international conference.

K: Regarding Laos and Cambodia?

L: That was the long one which included the exchange of messages on that.

K: Alright, that was one of their assurances.

L: That's right. What it said in effect was, cease fire within 60 days then when we slipped we moved it within 15 days. It said all prisoners out 60 days after the cease fire. It said there were no captive Americans in Cambodia. and the DRV said they've used their maximum influence on the Camobians.

K: We have no problem with any of these.

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L: Except C, which is a problem.

K: Why is it a problem?

L: So that we ~~xx~~ get them/all out within a year.

K: But also it's a statement of intention.

L: We agreed to do it. I don't remember the exact ~~xxxx~~ language. It looks pretty (inaudible) in writing as I remember it.

K: But all of these were unsigned? Isn't that right?

L: That's right.

K: And not initialed.

L: I don't have the files here, but I'm 99 % sure they were not. Just typed up and exchanged.

K: That's exactly right. That's my recollection. OK, fine.

END

SA9

1*

TELECON

Mr. McNamara/Secretary Kissinger
Monday, June 3, 1974
4:35 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I'm meeting with Cooper on Wednesday.

Mc: Good, I'll call him right now.

K: He is worried about having responsibility. That is not the problem.

Mc: He is going to have more than he can handle.

K: Exactly. That is not the problem. A. I can't do it and B. and I have to have confidence in the people.

Mc: I couldn't agree with you more.

K: The problem is jurisdiction of assignment.

Mc: I can understand that Henry, and I 'll talk to him about that. You needn't xxxxx worrry about that problem.

K: It is not a problem.

Mc: The problem of getting something done in this Government is a hell of a complicated problem. Part of it, his real problem, Henry, is going to be to find an answer to these things. Assuming that he had a completely free hand and could be a dictator of the xxxxd world.

K: He can assume that he has a free hand on this economic side. I just want to have enought in put on the foreign policy side.

Mc: I have no hesitancy/xxxxxxxx in telling him that. I'll call him right away.

K: Good , many thanks.

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SA 6

TELECON
John Dunlop/Secretary Kissinger
June 3, 1974
12:07 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello?

D: Yes, Henry.

K: John, how are you?

D: How are you. Did you get my note?

K: No.

D: I sent you a note a while ago saying I think I better go back to the University. I knew you would be very busy and I was trying to minimize your telephone time. Let me read to you what I said to you because I had thought about it a little bit. I said, I reflected hard and prayerfully again over the weekend on the flattering opportunity to work directly with you over the next several years. There is no more important economic challenge than to help design economic institutions and policies, here and internationally, to deal with the new political and strategic world that the President and you are creating. For a variety of personal and professional reasons, however, I have resolutely decided to return to the University now.

K: You know, I can't tell you how much I regret that.

D: That you would be even interested is flattering beyond measure.

K: Well, you strick me as a man who doesn't change his mind.

D: That is correct, Dr.

K: ___dream of every Harvard faculty members to get the dean working for him someday.

D: As a matter of fact, you have made me sufficiently interested about this problem that I'm going go do some work on it. Maybe I'll want to come and talk to you when I've done a little work on it.

K: Good.

D: The problem that I defined in that note to you, just now. What are the economic institutions here and internationally to deal with the kind of political world and strategic world which you and the President have been creating for us.

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K: That's exactly the problem. That's exactly what I need done. You think that if you won't do it -- that ~~xxxxxxxx~~ Dick Cooper could do this?

D: He would be pretty good at it. I know him very well and I have high regards for him.

K: He lacks wisdom in my judgment.

D: He has not had the kind, if I may say so, operating experience which I have had although he was ___but didn't like it apparently and got out of it. Although most of my operating experience was with those glorious fellows who even at times matched some of your Arabs friends, my building trade friends. I call them the local Arabs.

K: Well, ~~xxxx~~ John, I think you would have been the ideal man for this job.

D; I know you're very busy. Someday I'm going to put my ideas down on paper because you have challenged me about it and I'll be back with you.

K: Terrific.

D: Fine.

K: Good.

D: Thank you.

END

SA 8

TELECON
Professor Cooper/Secretary Kissinger
Monday, June 3, 1974
4:10 P.M.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello

C: Hello

K: Dick, how are you.

C: Fine.

K: I wanted to talke to you. I have been giving some thought to some of the discussions we had at lunch the other day.

K: Hello. We have a very poor connection.
And as you know, I have this position open here as Under Secretary and I was wondering whethere you might be interested in that.

C: That is a very hard question. In some sense yes and in some sense no. That's my own sorting out that I have to do.

K: Yea.

C: Can I give it some thought?

K: Certainly.

C: And get back to you.

K: Look.

C: Or do you think it would be useful to talk about it.

K: Well we can do either.

C: I am going to be in Washington, in any case on Wednesday and Thursday morning of this week. Your schedule I know is just terribly.

K: Let's talk about it then and oh, God, my schedule is never sane. How about six o'clock?

C: On Wednesday?

K: Yea.

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C: That's fine.

K: Good. Let's say 6 o'clock on Wednesday.

C: O.K. I'll check with your office before then just to double check it. But I plan to be there.

K: Good.
Let me tell you what I have in mind. What I need. First of all, some of the things you mentioned the other day, but secondly what I need ~~is~~ is the relationship between foreign policy and foreign economicpolicy so it cannot be simply a purely economic exercise.

C: I understand.

K: On the other hand, at this point the connection between these two is such an ~~intricate connection and~~ intricate one and I think one would have a great opportunity in the two years ~~a~~ that are left in this Administration. To try to get it headed in the right way.

C: Well, let me give it some thought and I'll see you on Wednesday.

K: You know, as far as I am concerned I haven't enough ~~confidence~~ competence in economic matters to give detail supervision What I would like to know is that the main lines follow the foreign policy. Except for that the ~~economic~~ economic under secretary would have a substanially free hand.

C: Well, that is one of the issues I would want to talk about. You are productive enough to be aware of the fact that your reputation for delegation is not a strong one.

K: Well, that depends among the people who have left not the ones who have stayed.

C: I see that is a fair point.

K: You know there is people who have worked closely with me and in whom I have confidence have a lot delegated to them. There is no conceivable way in which I can run economic policy. So if I don't delegate it, it doesn't happen. Let's talk about that on Wednesday.

C: All right.

K: Do you think you could let me have an answer by the end of this week.

C: Yes. I'll try to do that.

1*

SA 5

TELECON
Mr. Clayton Fritchie/Secretary Kissinger
Monday, June 3, 1974
10:50 AM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

F: Good morning Mr. President.

Laughter.

K: Clayton how are you?

F: In connection with our conversation with the Jackson amendment the other ~~day~~ night. Couple further thoughts. How , Have you given very much personal attention to Russell Long?

K: No.

F: He is Chairman of the Finance Committee and that is where everything is lodged now. And he is very old friend of mine and he is and he is susceptible to personal attention. Almost everything he has done in his life is done on that kind of basis. And he is strictly a quid pro quo guy. And as you know he has tremendous power up there. And other senators look to him very strongly and then number three on that Finance Committee is Gaylord Nelson. Who Russell looks up to him more than any other Senator and I had a long talk with Gayloard just about a week ago on this subject and he is very sympathetic to your position. He can do wonders with Russell.

K: ~~Yeaxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ Yea. Him I have talked to and

F: He is a marvelous senators and all the other senators think highly of him. But I tell you a little private session with Russell, drink or lunch or something like that I think would be well worth the effort. There are two other guys on that committee who were co-sponsors with Jackson. But whom I have second thoughts and one is Mondale and the other is Benson of kTexas and they are both highly respected by the other senators.

K: Well, let me look into that because both of those are good ideas.

F: Vance Harkie as you know is taking the lead on ~~xxxxx~~ going back to Hyde Terrace, but he last week, while you were away, gave a little private dinner for the Russian political delegation. And I was quite surprised in view of the position ix he has taken up to now. Also, I went to the dinner and he was critical of State Dept. for not giving this group enough attention. I don't know if there is any merit to that or not. He seemed to think you should have been giving dinner instead of him.

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F: Any case, I don't know if you know that fellow or not, but he too

K: What dinner was that again.

F: Last week Vance gave a dinner at the Georgetown Club for this group of 8 or 9 Russian politicians who came over.

K: Ch, oh. well I was away.

F: Yes. But I was surprised to see how friendly he was considering the fact that he has been making things difficult on the Trade Reform Act. So maybe he may be worth a little attention.

K: What do you think of Cranston?

F: Ch, highest. Absolutely.

K: Cause he has offered to help and I just wanted to

F: Absolutely. He is just fine. He doesn't carry the weight with the other senators that Gaylord does you know or Mondale. But he is very well respected man and he is a man of great character. I have highest regarad for him.

K: I like him personally.

F: He is intelligent man too.

K: I just didn't know whether he could deliver anything.

F: I don't know. He sure would be worth having, but I don't think he could deliver like Gaylord or Russell, of course Russell could do anything. He is the real power house and everything depends on what that Committee does on the Jackson amendment.

K: Yea.

F: IBut if you had Nelson. The reason Gaylord is so important here not only because he is third or fourth ranking, but Russell really does consult him on everything. I know them both well.

K: I'm having breakfast with Jackson.

F: Good luck. I think maybe in the ~~kx~~ light of last weeks publicity h he may be a little more amenable.

K: I was just going to say . I think if he is going to. This is not his best week to take me on.

F: No, no, it couldn't be better time for you.
But he is pretty cocky right now, but I think maybe. Of course Stu is pretty good at sensing movement of things up on the hill and he must have noticed that some of his sponsors are getting uneasy. And that's why he may be amenable to some kind of formula that could work out a compromise here.

K: Yea.

F: I think it is worth pursuing any way. That is all for today.

K: Clayton, you've been a good friend and I appreciate it.

F: Keep on.

K K: See you soon.

F: Bye.

K: Bye.

SA 12 *

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Amb. McCloskey
6/4/74; 9:13 a.m.

K: Hello.

M: Good morning.

K: Yes.

M: Your friend Khaddam scooped us this morning.

K: I don't know what he is talking about.

M: Yeah, neither do we. [redacted] But since you will be out of pocket all morning we will need some guidance as to how to handle it.

K: Say that this is the general intention but just tell the truth. This is the general intention but the specifics haven't been worked out yet.

M: Uh-huh.

K: Don't you think?

M: I think we can't do anything less.

K: Say it is true that we have agreed on that in principle and we are in touch with them now about the specifics.

M: All right.

K: Okay?

M: Yeah. And I will just have to say timing has not been agreed upon.

K: No, but it is a question of a short period. And then get Sisco to send an urgent cable to Scotes to find out -- to say we think we ought to announce it when the President is there but if they want to announce it before we would like to know.

M: All right. He is right here I will tell him that.

K: Okay.

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SA14

TELECON
Bob Toth/Secretary Kissinger
June 4, 1974
5:38 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

T: You must be exhausted.

K: Yes.

T: I'm in the process of doing a ~~xxxx~~ piece, trying to put a little ~~xxx~~ bit of a human ~~x~~ flesh on this mission. I've read both Bernie Gwertzman and Marilyn Berger's pieces about the three times where you were ready to pack up and leave. But I was just wondering how it affected you personnally. I'm kind of intrigued by, we got a cable ~~xxxxxx~~ from our guy on the ~~xxx~~ spot who mentioned the ___calling you Nixon's Jewboy and things like that. Do you really have a kind of personal involvement in this because of this ____alleges.

K: I'd rather not talk about that. I think you can figure most of it out yourself.

T: Yes. I gather, you know, there were real ups and downs on it but from what I understand of the cables you sent back that it was relatively matter of fact....

K: My cables just ~~xxx~~ described the negotiating situation each day.

T: Without getting into being down or up or anything like that.

K: Exactly. You know, they occasionally gave an assessment of the prospect.

T: I understand that the worse you ever ~~xxxxxx~~ complained was that there was shortsidedness on the part of both sides after the initial breakthrough when you started the quiveling process. I guess that was about the worse of it. Well, that's about all. I was~~x~~ hoping to be able to, I know you're very busy, to come by and talk to you about your pe~~x~~sonal impressions of t~~xx~~ the whole thing, but....

K: Well, you know I'm unbelievably busy with the President's trip.

T: Yes. Can you sum it up for me. I mean, it must have been the hardest negotiations you were every involved in, physically, as well as.....

K: Well, it was the most difficult, it was the most emotional and, you know, it was from every point of view -- this is not for quotation.

T: OK.

K: The most complex and the most difficult ~~xxxxxxx~~ negotiation.

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T: The other thing is, that the after the Mid East trip I hope to be able to get a chance to talk to you. I'm going to the Soviet Union for a couple of years.

K: Well, probably the best time to talk to me is after the Soviet trip, because there won't be all that ~~much~~ much intervals between the Soviet trip and the Mideast trip.

T: So, sometime in July, I guess.

K: Yes.

T: I'm going August 1.

K: I'll definitely see you before you go because I have always appreciated your work.

T: Thank you.

K: I'm serious about that. So I'll definitely -- in fact, let's have lunch in July.

T: OK. You want me to call ~~Eagle~~ Eagleburger?

K: Yes, or Bremer.

T: Or..."

K: Jerry Bremer.

T: Jerry Bremer.

K: Yes.

T: Alright. Good luck on the Moscow thing.

K: ~~Thank~~ Thank you.

T: It's going to be kind of rough.

K: Well, this is not an easy period in anything, but it's not going to be all that rough, either.

T: Tell Brezhnev not to say anything about Sonnenfeldt's health, will you. I mean, he keeps me out on the tennis courts just to keep up with Brezhnev's word about how young he looks.

K: OK, Bob.

T: OK, bye. END

SA 12a *

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Amb. McCloskey (& Joe Sisco)
6/4/74; 9:13 a.m.

S: Good morning.

K: Joe?

S: Yes, sir.

K: You better find out -- I've got to run to one of my fifty committees -- get a cable off to Scotes and find out what the Syrians have in mind -- whether they want to announce it before the President gets there.

S: I see.

K: Or when he is there.

S: When you say announce it you mean the --

K: Resumption.

S: The resumption in view of this report. All right, I will find that out. One other quick thing -- can I send a cable to Atherton merely telling him what really I said to him over the phone: that _____ you have taken up that matter with the Israelis.

K: Yes.

S: My point is do you think the Israelis are going to do anything?

K: I don't know. I have urged it.

S: All right.

K: Good. Thank you.

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SA13

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Ron Ziegler/Secy Kissinger
3:40 p.m., June 4, 1974

Z: Hi, Henry. How did you do today?

K: I think I did okay. Don't pay attention to that Star story. I didn't say Syria would get $100 million for economic aid. I said that figure is available for Syria among others in case certain ~~xxxxxxx~~ conditions were met we would consider requests against that figure.

Z: Yeah. That's the same point you made in the Leadership Meeting.

K: Exactly.

Z: You said there was available money which if relations developed that would be available for discussion. Right?

K: Exactly.

Z: Okay. Are you going to have your press conference Thursday?

K: Yeah.

Z: Okay. Well, you can clean that up then I guess.

K: Right. I was asked today as I came out of the hearings about the President's trip.

Z: No, I seen it -- it plays well.

K: Good.

Z: The reason I'm calling and I'm sorry to bother you on a minor point like this but poor Jerry Warren is almost in tears. We followed the guidance that ~~xx~~ we got from NSC and the State Department on restoration of relations with Syria today, which was basically a no comment and we have nothing to add to what Dr. Kissinger said in that regard as he left Syria.

K: Yes.

Z: Well, 45 minutes later the State Department issued a written statement saying that we were going to renew relations with Syria. Now it's a little minor thing that I can straighten out and this is really a pro forma call . . . It makes the White House look like a fool.

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K: I did not -- But they couldn't have put out a written statement.

Z: Yeah. Following the news conference in Damascus by the Syrian Foreign Minister saying that diplomatic relations will be restored. The Department said in a written statement we have seen --

K: Inexcusable! Absolutely inexcusable! I told them in answer to questions that they could say that in principle there has been agreement on it but there has been no decision whatsoever.

Z: Um-humm. Well, it makes Jerry look like a fool and it makes the White House look like . . because what we have said is we have nothing to add to the comments that the Secretary of Statemmade as he left Syria. And when you left Syria, you said, yes, there is progress in our relationship that could mature into -- you know . .

K: I didn't know they put out a written statement. I'm going to raise hell!

Z: Well, I don't call you for that. I'm calling you really for Jerry because he was just --

K: Well, you tell Jerry it's unbelievable!

Z: Yeah.

K: And I apologize to him.

Z: No, that's not necessary either but I just wanted to raise it with you. So if you could make reference to it there that, you know, they should not put Jerry in that type of position in the future.

K: They shouldn't put out written statements without my concurrence and they shouldn't say things different from the White House.

J: Okay, Henry.

K: Okay.

[End of conversation.]

SA 21 1*

TELECON
Hal Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
Wednesday, June 5, 1974
6:18 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

S..ABM matter and discovered that two days ago the JCS had sent a memo to Schlesinger opposing the whole thing after that. Moorer had agreed to it.

K: On what grounds?

S: On grounds that we are ahead and shouldn't give up when we are ahead, if the Soviets are protecting the ABMs as well as their national ..

K: But, what are we giving up?

S: We're giving up nothing; the whole thing is just crazy. And that we must not give up our [redacted] ARVND and that it contradicts our unilateral ..

K: But who's giving up ARVND?

S: Nobody, but that it contradicts our unilateral statement that we would get out of the ABM treaty if the Soviets, you know, don't live up--behave on the offensive side, it doesn't do that either. Anyway, this is, Schlesinger has that. I don't know whether he will cognizance it, but it's just another of these gd.

K: Well, look, it I want that thing approved this week.

S: Yeah. Well, it's in the machine now.

K: Good. Ok, Thank you.

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SA23

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TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
Wednesday, June 5, 1974

RELEASED IN FULL

K: We just found out that our leader is getting an even /... higher decoration.

S: Oh really.

K: The highest Egyptian one. Sadat is a statesman isn't he.

K: And I don't see how we can say / I can't accept it.

S: I think you should. Under those circumstances I think that is ~~fine~~ fine.

K: I ~~x~~ tell you the Russians are going to go out of their cotton picking minds. Can you imagine this.

S: It is sorta mind boggling.

K: Okay.

S: That's great. I'm pleased. I'm pleased for you.

K: I don't care about the decoration.

S: I do. You know.

K: My life's ambition is not Egyptian decoration.

S: No, but it is still nice.
~~XXXXXX~~ It really is.

K: Okay.

S: Good,thanks.

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SA 22

TELCON
Hal Saunders/Secretary Kissinger
Wednesday, June 5, 1974
8:53 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

S: Yes, Sir.

K: Your basic memo is--these talking points are an outrage and you'd better get these people in and if they have to work through all night, they're going to work all night.

S: Which talking points are these?

K: By country.

S: The country ones?

K: He needs a better explanation of what the issues are. Now, I know you can do it because you've done it in your basic memo. Joint Cooperation Commission--four lines--he doesn't even know what it is. Nuclear Power Plant--three lines--he doesn't even know what it is. .... of Economic Aid--that's bs, with all due respect.

S: OK.

K: It's got to be much more constructive; it's got to give him a list of what has already been done; of what issues are likely to arise; and give him a page on each issue. And the same in Syria. How the hell can he go through four hours of meetings with these guys and not know a gd thing about it? And he's going to Florida tomorrow night to study these things.

S: Is the basic memo...

K: Look, the basic memo is fine.

S: OK.

K: These memos are an outrage, and they are not going to be written like this while I'm Secretary of State.

S: OK. It's the talking point memos that need to be beefed up. Right?

K: They need to be beefed up; they ought to be made more thoughtful. Who did them--some FSO 8?

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S: The Country desk; I spend my time on the cover memos . .

K: Which cover memos?

S: In each country book -- the issue talking papers, which are appended, I assume that's what you're talking about.

K: They are an outrage.

S: OK. Let me get at them, then.

K: I have no problem but where it says points to make and points to avoid-- it just isn't worthy of him. You know, when I went to China with him with a lousy gd NSC staff, we gave him four whole books. Here I've been negotiating with a gd Middle East leaders for weeks, and we give him what, 40 pages?

S: It's tried to stress the points to avoid in that memo to the President that need to be strengthened.

K: That's right.

S: Plus the attachments, or is it in the memo to the President that you're concerned about? Not the backup.

K: I'm..basically, the whole thing is no good. But, the original memos are bearable. But the talking points are impossible.

S: You mean the attached papers.

K: Well, I don't know what you mean, the attached papers. And look, you have now been in the NSC for ages. You know what papers the President reads, and what he doesn't read.

S: Right.

K: What he gd well doesn't read is something that says memorandum for the President, your talk in Saudi Arabia and then my signature 20 pages later. Because unless he sees my signature on top, he won't know who the hell wrote it. I mean since the days of Adam it's been done this way in the Department.

S: Ok. That's State Department format.

K: I don't give a damn. It is no longer State Department format; it has now been changed. They can go back to it after I leave.

S: Ok. Let me get my hands on these things and then see what we can do.

K: They are going to be ready by the time the President goes to Key Biscayne, or they'll be new country directors. And he's going to Key Biscayne after lunch tomorrow. I mean your basic memo is superb, so we know it can be done.

S: Right.

K: Ok.

S: Right.

K: Thank you.

SA20 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
June 5, 1974
2:12 PM

S: There's another message in from Stoessel that the Soviet's are pressing for a recess.

K: OK.

S: You want to let him ~~xxxxx~~ do it.

K: Well, if the Soviet's are pressing for it, what can we do?

S: Only if you want to call Dobrynin and see if that's really what they want.

K: Hold it until later, I've got to go to a luncheon.

S: OK.

END

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5081 *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
June 5, 1974
10:43 AM

D: Henry, I was just trying for you --- I wasn't really.

K: There's almost no sense tapping you anymore if you don't pick it up. I wanted you to know I had breakfast this morning with Jackson, Javits and Ribicoff. You know, it's a little premature, but I think we will be successful.

D: Along what lines?

K: Along the lines we discussed yesterday.

D: For trade?

K: For trade and credits.

D: Along what lines?

K: Well, the 45,000.

D: 45?

K: Well, the number...

D: Ch, you mean about this...

K: Jewish question.

D: Yes.

K: I'll tell you what I think I will do.

D: Yes.

K: I will write Jackson a letter of my understanding of what will happen. I will show that to you first and then he may acknowledge it.

D: Ch, I see.

K: Then that would be the basis of a solution.

D: What kind of solution?

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K: WEll, they will -- he will modify his amendments.

D: He mentioned to you _____.

K: Well, he will modify his amendments so that MFM is possible and credits will not be restricted. You know with a review maybe every year.

D: I understand. When we meet next time you are gd ng to show me this letter.

K: I will not send the letter without discussing it with you.

D: OK. In one way or the other it's better to get rid of all these issues.

K: One other thing that I thought about on the SALT discussion we had yesterday. We have no interest in making you sign something that's embarrasing for you. I'm trying to figure out some way of expressing this in a way that the differential in numbers. If we expressed it for example in terms of each side will stop deployment as of a certain date or deploy up to "X" percent of its total force. You see what I mean? Whichever number is higher.

D: To total existence.

K: Supposing we said, each side will stop deployment of MIRV missiles as of and let's say March 1, 1975, let me just think out loud. That would stop our program at 1100. Or deploy up to "X" percent of its total force in MIRV missiles, which ever number is higher.

D: "X" percent on what date?

K: Well, through 1979. You see if we said whatever number you and we agree on, supposing it's 750, we could express that as a percentage of your total force.

D: Of total force, you mean on missiles?

K: Yes. You see in that way there wouldn't be any -- the agreement wouldn't look as if any differential were put in. If each side has the right to do the same thing.

D: I understand. _____.

K: No, you won't have any....

D: Mention to you about what we have now.

K: No, but you have the choice either to stop on March 1975 or to build up to 30 or 40 percent or whatever the number is we agree on, of your total force.

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Which ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ ever number is higher. We would stop in March 1975. Or whenever we have 1100. You would go up to the percentage because in March '75 you won't have anything yet.

D: This is exactly the point.

K: I want to find a formula which sounds equivalent.

D: OK. I think you would like to have ~~the~~ in this case your ~~xxxx~~ careful consideration_____.

K: No, but what you can tell him ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ today is this, they will not have to sign an agreement which expresses a diferential in number. We can state it in such a way that even if a differential ~~x~~ results it will not be expressed in an embarrassing manner.

D: Henry, you understand ____for me_____as for my government. You understand what I mean?

K: No, but I'm trying to explain it to you.

D: I understand.

K: But what you tell your government is your problem.

D: My problem is _____if you just explain what you are proposing. ___not a change in ~~xxxxxx~~ substance.

K: OK, I will give you a formulation. I'll get Sonnenfeldt to send it over this afternoon.

D: OK.

D: Yesterday you gave me only one page -- there was no second.

K: There is no number two.

D: So I guess you ___.

K: No, the reserve position -- there is no reserve position.

D: Alright. Sonnenfeldt will send it to us.

K: Yes.

D: On Friday, we will discuss.
K: YES. END

RELEASED IN FULL SA15

TELECON
Mr. McNamara/Secretary Kissinger
June 5, 1974
9:25 AM

M: Henry, I'll just take a second. I talked to (inaudible) a half hour on the telephone. He was certainly less than enthusiastic and he had several different points, one of them he was concerned about the Donaldson example. I said -- he wanted to talk to Donaldson -- I said, hell I can't stop him from talking to Donaldson but I can tell you more about Donaldson then Donaldson himself can. (A) he xxxx is a person with considerable potential, (B), he came down here without absolutely no experience in Government, no knowledge of how to deal with governmental problems and people (inaudible) departments. (C) he had no experience in or understanding of international economics and yet by a force of circumstances through nobody's fault, he was thrown immediately into a problem that requires some xxxxxxx knowledge of international economics and particularly a knowledge of handle himself within a government and among government.

K: Exactly. His (inaudible) complaint was not that I didn't(delegate) him but (inaudible) responsiblity that he couldn't see me (inaudible).

M: In any case that problem I think I perhaps was able to able to clear out of his mind -- he'll still come down to talk to Donaldson, but I think I drew a clear difference Donaldson, on one hand and Cooper on the other. I said, you've got exactly the strength that in Donaldson were xxxxxxxxxx weaknesses, so put that out of your mind. Secondly, he xx said, x well, he didn't think he would operate from a subcabinet level with cabinet offers. I said, you mean to say you xxxx don't think you have the competence that exceeds that of Simon, Flanigan, two or three others (inaudible) that are involved in this thing and that you couldn't hold you own in an intellectual xx debate with them. Well, he said, they would have the power and I wouldn't have any. I said, in the first place, you're speaking with experience and a record that everybody in the government understands (inaud) Secondly, you're speaking with Henry Kissinger's backing (inaudible) he's the most powerful xxxxx person in the government. So it's perfectly absurd to say that you wouldn't have any influence. It was this thing running through the whole discussion that obviously was his basic concern, Henry. He feels he'll come down here and accomplish nothing. Either because you won't listen or his position will be weak or that he won't be able .....

K: His position will be very strong, in fact, if I back him he can't xxxxx lose.

M: This is exactly my point, Henry and he xx said well, he said the coarse relation now between national and international economic xxxxx affairs that you can't put them in compartments. xx I said I understand that and I'm xx certain that when domestic policy that has implications implications xxxxx are discussed you would be a participant in those disuussions. He was quite right on that point.

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K: You know you must not press it as a theoretical point.

M: I understand that Henry.

K: This is no longer a very formal structure. So anything I want to get into no one is going to keep me out of.

M: This is exactly the point I made to him Henry. Get down here, use your knowledge, your experience, your creative thoughts and get to work and by the foree of your argument do exactly in the field and particular Henry's backing and do exactly what he's done in the international political field. As I say we talked on and on and I go on the say I converted him. He sure was cold.

K: Yes. We'll I'm going to see him tonight.

M: Well, I knew you were, that's why I called.

K: Many thank.

M: Right. Bye.

END

SA 18

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
Wednesday, June 5, 1974
11:45 a.m.

K: I was talking to McCloskey and Anderson here and they say they never issued a statement about Syrian establishment of diplomatic relations yesterday.

S: Well, where did it come from?

K: Well, they said nothing like this was done fromthe State Department Press office. Now we're checking around whether one of the bureaus may have, NEA may have done it on its own.

S: Well, I'll be darn. Well, let me find out what...

K: And I didn't see it in any newspaper.

S: Let me find out what happened. It was-my recollection is that ..

K: Look, the only guidance I gave ~~xx~~ was the one Ziegler heard

S: Oh, no, no question about it..

K: XXto McCloskey in themorning, and then it turned out there was no briefing yesterday, and they didn't issue anything.

S: Well, the work I got was that there was no briefing yesterday, so they handed out this statement, but let me find out.

K: ...since there was no briefing, you handed out a statement. Nonsense.

S: Let me find out exactly what..

K: ok.

S: ~~xxxx~~ Thank you.

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SA 17
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Hal Saunders/Secretary Kissinger
June 5, 1974
11:10 AM

K: About that nuclear agreement with Egypt, I've got Ghorbal here.

S: Yes.

K: He says it awaits my approval. That can't be possible.

S: I'm not sure exactly where that is. I'll.....

K: ~~Anyway~~ AT any rate can you process it before he goes back?

S: Yes, I'll get it up to you.

K: OK. It's at the AEC I'm told. ~~I~~ know I agreed to it in principle a few days ago.

S: I just haven't seen the exact status of it. I'll find out....

K: I know I agreed to it in principle a few days ago, but I don't know whether I agreed to all this paper work.

S: OK, let me find out where it is.

K: Will you let me know?

S: Yes.

Saunders - 11:20

K: I talked to Ghorbal about what could come out of that visit and he thinks maybe a statement of principals of our relations between Egypt and the U.S. which we've done with other countries and that isn't a bad idea.

S: That ~~s~~ sounds interesting.

K: I told him to get together with you.

S: OK.

K: Will you also work out that negotiating senario?

S: Which is that?

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K: Between Egypt and Israel which I asked you about.

S: Oh, yes. I have that in draft.

K: But that I don't need until we get on the trip actually.

S: Well, I have a draft and I'll get it for you in the next 24 hours.

K: OK. Good. Thank you. You'll work with Ghorbal.

S: I will. That's an interesting idea.

K: Will you also think up for me what we can do in other countries.

S: Yes. OK.

K: I mean with Syria we don't need a statement of principles but we could agree on diplomatic relations and so forth.

S: No, I'll take care of that. This will be something for you then. We don't have to get it in the briefing books.

K: No.

S: OK.

K: And send words to Eilts that I'm exploring that here. And he should explore it with Fahmy.

S: OK.

K: And did we send word to Scotes yesterday to explore with ___about the restoration?

S: I think Joe sent a telegram.

K: OK, now send one to Scotes saying we're thinking perhaps about announcing it when the President's there. We think that would be a very suitable occasion.

S: OK.

K: And he should discuss it with Asad.

S: Right.

K: Good, thank you. END

SA19

1*

TELECON
Foreign Minister Rabasa/Secretary Kissinger
Wednesday, June 5, 1974
1:09 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

R: Hello Henry, Good Morning.

K: Emilo, I am sorry I am sorry I couldn't call you back.

R: I know you are all tied up.
Henry, ~~x~~ can I visit you Saturday?

K: I still haven't had a chance to clear my calendar. Let me call you before the end of the day. How much time would we need?

R: Half an hour. My idea is this Henry, I would take two people from Mexico who would speak with the people you are sending here. A man I think is called Maw that is Legal Advisor and then Trevos(?sp phonetic)

K: I will find half an half you can count on Saturday. I will let you know what time.

R: When I can go?

K: Yea. But it probably be more than half an hour.

R: I hope so

K: I am really unbelieveably busy right now.

R: I understand Henry. Then I think these two people will make contact with your people Friday.

K: Good.

R: After they have spoken then you can let me know what hour on Saturday we can meet.

K: Right.

R: I am leaving tomorrow.

K: Good.

R: Thanks a million. I am very sorry to be insistent at this point. Monday the whole thing starts and I have to clear things with you completely.

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K: Good.

R: Then I will be there tomorrow; Friday the two teams will meet and Saturday you have time decison. I will meet with you.

K: Right.

R: Thanks a million and My best to Nancy.

K: Thank you, Bye.

SA 24

1*

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
June 6, 1974
11:20 AM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: ____you draft a very conciliatory reply?

S: Yes, I've asked NEA to do that because....

K: Not NEA, NEA means that it's going to leak.

S: Well...

K: ~~jk~~ At most, Atherton.

S: Well, that's what I'm talking about. Because it think it's a hell of a good move and we ought to build down it.

K: That's right. What I would like to do is to say we'd be prepared say to invite him to come to that Security Council fellow to come to Washington after my trip.

S: That's it. I think that's a very good move and you could have a chat with him and then.....

K: Say we hope he comes to Washington, when in June.

S: Yes, well, I'll work something out for your....

K: And secondly, if they have any ~~xxxxx~~ ideas of initiative we might take, we'd be glad to consider them.

S: Sure.

K: We're going to drive those out of the Russian orbit to ~~xxxxx~~ before I'm through.

S: There are a few phrases in the that telegram where he began to reiterate that they were nobody's stooges.

K: Exactly.

S: Which sounded a little familiar to you, I'm sure, and ~~xxxx~~ to me.

K: Yes. OK.

S: I think it's very good.

K: OK. Thank you.
END

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SA 34 1*

TELECON
Len Garment/Secretary Kissinger
June 6, 1974
6:13 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

(Missed first part)

G: ____involving you in this, but they are having a fair for Mrs. Nixon on Sunday, and Rudy called and said would I get after the Israeli Embassy and so forth and have people from the Embassy in New York and my advice to Rudy was not to press the Egyptians or the Israelis on this.

K: Absolutely not, are they crazy.

G: OK, I told them, I said, don't do it. It's too complicated and it's political and there are other nations like Lebanon and Syrian....

K: It's impossible.

G: I just wanted to check it with you and that's all I wanted to talk to you about.

K: Is it true that you're moving out of your house so that ___will give me one?

G: You don't want my -- that house that we're leaving is not one that's fit for -- Nancy couldn't walk through the doorways. They were build for tiny people of pre-revolutionary era.

K: Well, I don't want that house, I want the one in town here.

G: The one in town. I'll go to work on him but only if you can get me a confession in Syria.

K: Of course.

G: Did you see Rabbi Millers press conference was really quite brilliant.

K: Yes, he was good.

G: Did you get a copy of that?

K: No.

G: On the question of the Jackson amendment, and so on. He found no dispairity between your position and Sen. Jackson's position and their position. Alright, that's all. K: Good, thank you. END

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5078 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
June 6, 1974
6:18 PM

D: Hello?

K: Anatol.

D: Hello, Henry. I just wanted -- itsk not very urgent, but maybe you will get an answer tomorrow. This is about the schedule for the President's trip to Moscow. You remember we discussed?

K: Yes.

This is the schedule that that ____after negotiations inMoscow on the 27th and 28th. It will be Thursday and Friday. The President will spend Saturday and Sunday, it will be 29th and 30th in the Crimea. After that on July 1, it will be Monday, on his ~~xxx~~ way back from Crimea to Moscow, he could stay for a few hours in Volgagrad. There is only one small problem, in this case the President's plane, which would accompany him as usual would fly directly from Crimea to Moscow. The airport in Volgagrad is not fit for the planes of Boeing 707 type. If for the above mentioned reason, this suggestion would prove for the President's ___unacceptable because of this Boeing 707, then it would be possible on the way back __from Crimea to Moscow to stop for a few hours in Minsk, it is a very good and interesting city. He wasn't there.

K: Yes, that's an ~~xxxx~~interesting idea.

D: ~~Wxx~~So, we propose this way, or we could do it this way: he will fly to Minsk not from Crimea to Moscow but at the end of the day of July 2, after the completion of negotiations in Moscow and with the final departure from Minsk on July 3, there are two ~~possibility~~ possibilities. If he chooses Minsk, then we could do it, either he will go when he will go on July 1 from.....

K: I think he will probably prefer to conclude the trip in Moscow.

D: And to go directly from Moscow to home, yes?

K: Right.

D: In this case it will be these two choices, either he will go to Volgagrad but in this case Boeing 707 will stop ~~because~~ because he will use our smaller ~~xxxxxx~~ planes there.

K: Alright.

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D: Or ~~[illegible]~~ if he prefers to go to Minsk than its alright with us with Boeing he could go from Crimea to Minsk then from Minsk to Moscow and then he will depart from Moscow.

K: Let me discuss it with him and I'll let you know tomorrow.

D: This way I'm just giving you the forecast and you can tell me tomorrow what he prefers.

K: Good.

D: I read in a ticker he might fly to ___or just speculation?

K: Nonsense. Totally out of the question.

D: In this case, we have to look about the flight over the territory there. OK. _____Star City, there is no problem for us, one of his days in Moscow definitely, ~~x~~ if he wishes so, we will organize this one.

K: Right.

D: No problem.

K: ~~x~~ Good, wonderful.

D: OK.

K: Thank you Anatol.

D: That's all.

K: Bye.

END

1*

SA 35

TELECON
Robert McCloskey/Secretary Kissinger
June 6, 1974
6:40 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello?

M: Yes, sir.

K: Bob, I just wondered whether you had any reactions from the press?

M: I've only taken one call so far. I have others lined up. The one I've taken so far is Valerioni (phonetic) who said, the conversation went like this, "Was he pissed?" I said, well, look, he was obviously very disappointed, coming back from another successful peaceful negotiation to have to face that kind of thing is a press briefing where all the policy issues were ___. He said, I guessed that much and that was as far as it went. I haven't returned the other calls yet. But John King is here and he said that the regulars downstairs were, you know, they felt a sense of gloom around the place when that line of questioning developed. The guy who asked the question about a lawyer is apparently some new youngster from, what John described, is from the Underground Press. We're getting his name and all that. Now the networks are leading on the President. Have you seen any of it?

K: No, what did he do?

M: The Grand Jury has named him as, how do that put it?

K: Unindicted co-conspirator?

M: Unindicted co-conspirator.

K: Well they haven't named him, that was a long time ago. That was just leaked yesterday.

M: Well, its now confirmed and its -- and St. Clair was shown a few minutes ago arguing that the Grand Jury only acts on prosecution statements, heresay, bits and pieces. Now you're coming up on NBC.

K: OK.

M: Don't lose spirit.

K: NO, I just wanted to -- OK, thank you.

END

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 18 JUN 2004 200102979

5077*
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
June 6, 1974
11:25 AM

D: Hello?

K: Anatol I have to run to a meeting but I have a cable here saying that your delegation has asked for a week's recess in the test ban talks.

D: I could be, I haven't yet...

K: I don't think it's such a good idea.

D: No? Why?

K: Well, because I think we ought to keep our people working.

D: There.

K: Yes.

D: Well, I think we could do it if you feel it's really a good idea, I'm sure I could do it with....

K: Well, I just think if they come back and then all our people start working on them here.

D: I see.

K: I don't object to it. I just wanted to make sure we didn't encourage it.

D: No, I understand your point, OK.

K: If you really want to we will have a break, but....

D: But I understand what you said (inaudible)

K: Exactly.

D: I think it's a good point.

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K: OK.

D: Yesterday was a very good speech by President. It was very good, I think

K: Good.

D: Tomorrow you will let me know, definitely?

SA 32 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Senator Scott/Secretary Kissinger
Thursday, June 6, 1974
5:48 PM

K: Hello,

S: Hello, Henry.

K: Hugh, how are you.

S: Fine. I won't keep you, I just just inquire whether you feel you are making any progress with Jackson.

K: Yes, I think I did make a little progress yesterday and we are going to see what we can do early next week.

S: On some possible language, is that the way you are moving.

K: That's right.

S: Well, I sure hope you can.

K: I am even more worried about the Stevenson thing.

S: Which is, which Stevenson?

K: Well, the restrictions on credit.

S: Oh, on credits, of course, well we will do our best for that. My junior colleague is against us on that too.

K: Oh, really.

S: Yea. Can't do anything with him because he has been going around making speeches about it. ~~Robin~~ Putting it in his news stories. We'll see what we can do, we will watch him.

K: Right, I would appreciate it very much.

S: We'll see what we can do.

K: And I will keep you closely informed.

S: Yes, I think if you can find language for Scoop, That would help us in the other one too. Let me know Henry.

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SA 26

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TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
June 6, 1974
11:18 AM

RELEASED IN FULL

S: Hi, this is Brent, Henry. I just talked to Schlesinger. Was as sweet as sugar. He said he called because Mahon had called him upset because Goldwater had spoken out against any aid to Syria and he said that Mahon said that if we couldn't get the President's supporters in line how in the hell could he expect Mahon to do something. So I said I'd take care of that.

K: Will you call Goldwater and make clear to him we are not asking for a hundred million we said it comes out of that fund.

S: Sure. I hadn't seen what Goldwater had even said. I told him I'd take care of that and then he said what's the President want. I said the President is concerned about SALT coming up on the summit and we're not getting anywhere and I said that's what he wants to talk to you about. He said who's going in (inaudible) I said I don't know. And he said what was your mood and I said that you were very upset and he said, well, I never look back, he said, I'm ready to talk with him. He said, I'm just tired of all these (inaudible) about the Department, we're doing our best. I think you two need to talk and he said, well, I had breakfast by myself this morning. I said, well, Al Haig told me that you were going to call Henry last night. He said, oh, no, when I hung up, Al said, well, Henry's on the phone, or Henry's calling and he said, well, tell him breakfast is still on. Anyway, he couldn't have been more conciliatory.

K: Yes, but that doesn't change the basic situation.

S: No, but all it indicates maybe if you really run at him hard he really backs down.

K: Yes.

S: So that was the conversation.

K: OK.

END

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1*

SA27

TELECON
Mr. Sonnelfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
June 6, 1974
12:45 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

S: Yes, sir.

K: You didn't understand what I wanted. What I wanted to say is, each side will MERV the number of missiles that it has on dated "X", whatever that is when we have completed our program. Or 33 or 35 percent of it's force, whichever number is higher. You see what I mean?

S: I know what you mean. We tried it and...

K: Well, look, we can stop on a certain date having 1100.

S: That would have to be June.

K: Alright, then say June. They can go up to 35 percent, because they won't have 35 percent in June, but it doesn't look then as if they had settled for an inferiority.

S: That I understand, the -- well, whichever is higher, that 7 percent is to protect the trident business.

K: What 7 percent?

S: The permissionto add on 7 percent.

K: Well? Then you better make it 10 percent, but what I want is something that expresses that SALT in a way they don't have to explain to their party members why they've accepted an inferior position. When we said we are accepting a freeze as of a certain date, we accepted lower numbers, but we didn't put it in those terms.

S: Let me try it again, Henry. I tried to express it in a way that would leave out the numbers. Obviously they're going to make their calculations and find out what the numbers are.

K: Of course they know what the numbers are.

S: Let me just try another version.

K: OK, good.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 10 FEB 2003 200102979

SA 29
RELEASED IN FULL

*

TELECON
President Nixon/Secretary Kissinger
June 6, 1974
4:40 PM

N: I just thought you'd be pleased to know I got Ron and the boys working on the schedule. Ron told me he thought your news conference played very well. He said the only thing he was mad about was theway they asked you all these questions about wire tapping. Let me say, don't ever be worried about that and frankly if they ever hit me with wire ~~x tapxix~~ tapping I'm going to say you're God-damned and some of you are going to be wire taped, you ought to be. You know? It's disgusting.

K: The disgusting thing is I didn't want to both you ~~xxixix~~ with it before. The whole world applauds what is being done. These SOB's turn ~~xx~~ it in as if I'd been engaged in a criminal activity.

N: But wire taping, Henry, all the wire taping we did was totally ~~xgx~~ legal, you ~~xx~~ would understand that. Every damn one was approved either by Mitchell or Hoover. Everyone. Some of them turned up some very important evidence, as you well know.

K: That is right.

N: And also there was three times as much under Bobby Kennedy as there was from us.

K: Well, I didn't want to go into that.

N: I understand, but nevertheless, we don't need to be apologetic about it.

K: Well, I just refused to ~~xxxxx~~ answer any questions .

N: Right. That's good. Anyway, you did fine, don't worry. OK.

K: Right.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 28 JUN 2004 200102979

SA 30 1*
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Cyrus Vance/Secretary Kissinger
June 6, 1974
5:08 PM

~~xxx~~
V: Hi, Henry.

K: Cy, how are you?

V: I'm fine. Again, congratulations to you.

K: Aren't you nice.

V: Superb job.

K: Well, you're very nice. Cy I had a number of things, I ~~xxxxx~~ should say three things: One, I wanted to get that group together for a rather long session on the Middle East sometime, because we've got to do that on a bipartisan basis.

V: I couldn't agree more.

K: When we get into the sticky part. Second is, I never got any concrete reactions to the various SALT's presentations we made to you.

V: I said, I couldn't carry in my mind all the stuff in that file, Henry, and the general thrust of what was being said, I told, I've forgotten who I talked to, I guess I talked to....

K: Sonnenfeldt?

V: Yes, Hal and I told him the general thrust I thought made ~~xxxxx~~ sense but some of the options there were probably not for real, but we ought to show what all the alternatives might be. If you want, I can take a more specific look at some of that stuff.

K: I'll tell you what worries me, Cy, as a friend, in the last two years of an administration, even forgetting Watergate, one really has to think about handing over to ones successors, whoever they may be, and I m ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ afraid some of the trends among the Democrats is going to build the Democratic party into the same whole they were in at the ~~xx~~ beginning of the Kennedy administration.

V: I share that view. I think that's ~~xxxxx~~ alright.

K: I think it would be an absolute disastor, it cannot be in the interest~~x~~ of a possible successor to want to inherit and confrontation with the Soviet Union.

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V: I agree.

K: And, you know, what's happening now, is that the chiefs and the conservatives in the Congress are systamatically closing off all ___options.

V: Yes.

K: And I'm really deeply concerned about this. Not for this administration because we can get through the next two years just on ___.

V: If I can help in any way on this I will because I said the other day when we last met, I think your emphasis on MERV is the thing to get at is absolutely correct.

K: All this baloney about reduction, you reduce 200 missiles over ten years while your warheads grow by 8,000, what the hell have you achieved.

V: I'm in agreement. I've got no disagreement with that, but if I can help with any of these guys, you just let me know who you want me to talk to.

K: Good. Cy, but the last problem, is the following. I don't know whether Dick Cooper has yet talked to you.

V: No, he has not.

K: I've offered him the position of Under Secretary for Economic Affairs.

V: Right.

K: And he's a little bit worried that it might hurt him with the Democrats if they come in and asked me whether he could talke to you.

V: You can tell him the answer is no, it definitely will not.

K: I really think we have to use this department now to provide a focus for things which people can believe on a bipartisan basis.

V: I agree and anything I can do to help on that I will and you can count on me to do that.

K: I know I can and would you talk to Dick.

V: Yes, I'll call Dick. Is he in New Haven?

K: He was in Washington this morning and he told me he was going to call you today or tomorrow.

V: Alright, if I don't hear from him tomorrow, I will call him Henry.

K: I think it would be very nice..

V: Alright, I'd be delighted. ~~Mx~~ Now do you want something more out of me on that SALT thing.

K: No as long as I know the general direction, is alright. When we come down on something specific. I'll check it with you again.

V: That would be great.

K: Good, Cy.

V: Wonderful to talk to you.

K: Nice to talk to you.

V: Right.

K: Bye.

END

RELEASED IN FULL SA 28

1*

TELECON
Zon Ziegler/Secretary Kissinger
June 6, 1974
12:48 PM

Z: _____and so forth, but I didn't want to talk to (Vorontsov) without talking to you.

K: OK.

Z: You see no problem with ~~kaix~~ that.

K: As long as you say no.

Z: No, I understand that, but I didn't know if that had significance to it. I just wanted to get guidance from you. I'll just proceed as we talked about.

K: Look, they want a (inaudible) man along for political purposes.

Z: No, I understand that.

K: And just turn it down. They'll ~~x~~ blame me for it, they won't blame you for it.

Z: That's not the point, I just wanted to make sure I didn't screw you up.

K: You just tell Vorontsov no.

Z: Alright.

K: Thank you.

Z: Bye.

END

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DATE/CASE ID: 18 JUN 2004 200102979

RELEASED IN FULL (SA 31)

TELECON
Senator Javits/Secretary Kissinger
Thursday, June 6, 1974
5:33 PM

J: Hello

K; Jack how are ~~yoo~~ you.

J: OK

K: Two questions: One official and one personal. On the official one first, some people are recommending Graham Martin as deputy here. What do you think that would do in the Committe if we did that.

J: Let me talk to you about it tonight when I see you.

K: OK.

J: Give me a minute tonight and I'll tell you. I'll also think it over a minute which I wanted to do.

K: Good. The second thing, all this wiretap stuff we went through last year is coming again now before the Judiciary Committee and I took quite a beatening before a press conference today. I wondered what your advise wyould be as to ~~Mike Stand~~ my stand.

J: I think that you ought to ask the Chairman to first include in the records, the whole record, which has already been made before Foreign Relations on that matter. And including the ~~sanitized~~ sanitized record. And then after members have had opportunity to consider that whole body of records, you will be very pleased to answer ~~i~~ any residual questions, but in fairness to youwhat has already occurred ~~w~~ should be the basis so that you don't go over the same ground all over again.

K: You mean with the Judiciary Com.

J: Right

K: I think they got it already.

J: I mean it is one thing to have it, it is another thing to postulate the ~~this~~ proposition, but in fairnes to you they oughtto

K: You see the whole thing is starting all over again. Did I recommend it. Did I read these reports. Now they are leaking out that I read all the reports. And it took me 8 hours before your Committee to explain it. And if I get into a press debate about it. I am just

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going to look like a Watergate thing. Or am I wrong there.

J: I think the basis, I just suggested would be a way to limit the thing only to what is ~~kx~~ legitimately either new or different. Let me talk to you about that a little later too.

K: Okay.

J: You'll be there tonight.

K: I'll be there, but I have to go out for a dinner for Fahd.

J: What time will ~~kx~~ you have to leave?

K: About a quarter to eight.

J: Well I'll be there ~~x~~ early.

K: Good.

J: Listen Henry, Marion and I thought you and Nancy would like to come to dinner at Pearl's on Sunday night. Are you going to be there--New York.

K: Unfortunately, we are not going to be in New York.

J: You're not going to stay that long.

K: No. We are not going to go up at all.

J: Oh, you're not.

K: But we would love to do it on one of our early weekends.

J: One of your trips. I'll talk to you later

K: Thank you, Jack.

K: Goodbye

SA 37 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ron Ziegler/The Secretary
Friday, June 7 [1974]
1:30

Z: To say that I thought you were very ~~xxxxx~~ gutsy yesterday.

K: Aren't you nice.

Z: Very proud of you. You know what is like to have the SOB screaming in the room, but you were really gutsy in it. And just let me tell you in ~~xxxxxxx~~ my view the impact was that in a way was very ....

K: Really.

Z: Of course, for heavens sake, the Secretary of State who has just returned from the Middle East. You know following movement of historic ~~xxx~~ proportions the trip to hold his first press conference to have maniacs like that screaming ~~xxxx~~ stuff like that. Just is not tolerated by people. I think I know what I am talking about on that, but on any event.

K: But they won't rest now until they have made me a Watergate figure.

Z: Well, no they won't. You watch. You could tell how it was played today. I wouldn't concern yourself with that. I thought you handled it well and it was very gutsy of you.

K: I appreciate it Ron.

K:

Z: Okay.

K: Bye

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1*

SA 44

TELECON
Adlai Stevenson/Secretary Kissinger
June 6, 1974
4:00

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you, Senator?

S: I should ask how are you.

K: I hope you realize that as a result of my putting in a call to you I've already had a half hour discussion on the Law of the Sea. This man in our department who handles the Law of the Sea is also called Stevenson. Since my secretary cannot imagine that I wouldn't prefer a State Department person to you.

S: I can't imagine that either.

K: When he started on the Law of the Sea I couldn't imagine what had possessed you.

S: Well, I won't start on the Law of the Sea, Mr. Secretary, is there something else I should start on.

K: I think we both know the subject. I wanted to talk to you about that bill on the credits.

S: Well, I can give you a thumb nail xxxx sketch if you like of where we stand.

K: Yes.

S: I'm sure I don't have to tell you that it is very difficult business at the moment of trying to put together a position that will command the majority in the Senate. We are embattled on both sides, just now, organized labor is up in arms and there's a great deal of x opposition xxxxxx growing x on the right. So what I have tried to do starting with negotiations with Scoop Jackson is to come to terms on a proposal that will probably make nobody xxxx completely satisfied but might head off far greater xxxxx problems, dangers on the floor. I haven't gotten much beyond Jackson at the moment but he is where it stands. We would continue the authority for the Exim Bank. Four years is requested, we'd make it three with one year for continued credits in the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries except Yugoslavia and Romania. This takes the precedent we have in the legislation. Then impose a subceiling on -- within an overall authorization that would come out pretty close to 30 billion dollars. A subceiling for additional credits in the Soviet Union and that is somewhat tentatively is $300 million, which is slightly in excess of the rate at which they've been granted during this first year.

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K: You mean $300 million a year?

S: $300 million before you have to come back to Congress for further authorization. There would be two parts. One year authorization, or credits in the Soviet Union and separately a $300 million additional subceiling; that's $300 million in addition to what is already or would be outstanding as of the effective days. [redacted] You would have I think outstanding $270 -$280 million. So you'd be up pretty close to $300 million. Then because of the...

K: And on top of that there's a $300 million?

S: That's the overall for the bank, worldwide. Overall for the Bank is $30 billion but within the overall authorization would be a subauthorization for credits in the Soviet Union and all Communist countries except Yugoslavia and Romania. And that is a subceiling which would be the outstanding credits of somewhere in the neighborhood of $270 million plus $300 million.

K: So at no time could there be more than $600 million outstanding.

S: Thereabouts--until you get further authorization from the Congress. Now there's one other, well there are a couple of others, but there's one other point which I think would be of particular interest to you. The concern here is not just with the credits in the Soviet Union; it's very largely with the whole through the notion of 3% or 7% loans anywhere in the world at a time when prime rate is up 7 1/2 % at home and with no so much the routine commercial transactions as the so-called projects, the developments loans and the danger that they will involve us politically and in unforeseen consequences will have adverse impacts on US labor or the tentative position of US businesses. Some of them are just ad hoc situations that are rankling here. $150 million financing of say cotton for example to Japan. So to respond to that concern not so much about the routine commercial transactions, but about the big ones and the big ones that lead to the development of production facilities abroad, competition for our manufacturers, adverse impact on labor and so on. We would also require that any guarantee in excess of $50 million, any single transaction in excess of $50 million be accompanied by this in anywhere in the world, you don't single out the Soviet Union, the only time the Soviet Union gets singled out is next to that subauthorization, that subceiling which I mentioned. Anywhere in the world there's a credit proposed to be authored by the bank of more than $50 million, it would have to be accompanied by a Presidential finding that it's in the national interest with some specific attention to the competitive consequences, the labor impact, short supply situations, maybe a couple of other areas now. That in the past at least wouldn't pick up more than 11 or 12 deals a year. Those 11 or 12 deals or whatever they are in the future would after the Presidential finding be subject to a Congressional veto if one-third of the members of either house signed a petition, brought the issue to a vote and the credit was disapproved.

K: Within what time period?

S: I think it's 30 days after the Presidential finding; I'm afraid I'm a little vague on that. I think we were figuring a total of 60 days; 30 days for the Presidential finding and then 30 days after the Presidential finding after which the Congress would have to act. Now that sums up in a rather general way I think where we stand at the moment with Jackson; it may be 60 days for the Congress; I'm afraid I just can't remember.

K: Would your position change any if we were making some progress with Jackson on his own amendment?

S: We, I don't know which amendment of his you..

K: The Jackson Vanicky.

S: Yeah. I don't think Jackson'Vanick amendment has anything to do with this.

K: I agree with you.

S: And, I don't know where you stand with him. He's been quite willing from the beginning to leave it out of the exim bank legislation and I think I know his reasons. But this proposal to..I started work at this originally in the hopes that it could be a way of side-tracking Jackson-Vanick but in the interim the concern has been growing greatly in the Congress with not only those of the Soviet Union..well just with loans. Partly because of the very largely because of the 6 - 7% interest rates as opposed to the high rates abroad, but also with ad hoc situations--it's cotton in Japan or it's drilling equipment for Iran or the sale of Boeings to Japan--oh, one of a kind of commodities they have to buy anyway and a growing feeling that we better start exercising a little oversight here and not just give this bank/$30 billion dollar blank check. For a veriety of reasons, some of which are political but most of which have plenty to do with Jackson-Vanik.

K: That ceiling of $300 million in addition to what's already outstanding applies only to the Soviet Union?

S: Yes.

K: You didn't lump Poland in with it?

S: That I'm quite sure, I wish I could, I'm 99% sure and I'd have to doublecheck just to give you a 100% answer. That applies just to the Soviet Union. I'm trying to think what it is that should bring in the Eastern Europeans. Yes.

I'll tell you what it was. Here's where I've got my notes now in front of me. The one-year authorization. I said there was a one-year authorizationa nd a subceiling. The subceiling of what's outstanding plus $300 million would apply just to the Soviet Union. The one-year authorozation as opposed to the three-year authorization for all other countries, would apply to the Soviet Union to all Communist countries, except Romania and Yugoslavia.

K: So you'd have to authorize it again next year.

S: Yes.

K: Then what's the sense of putting a ceiling on it? Oh to keep us from going crazy this year.

S: Well, it wasn't .. there are those concerns but there was also the feeling, At least I've had the feeling, that maybe this would be helpful to you. I saw some testimony of yours, I think it was in the Senate Finance Committee, and in response to a question by Senator Nelson which seemed to indicate how you felt, you didn't commit yourself, but you indicated that it might not be unhelpful to you if you were in the position of having to say that either because of the one year or because of the $300, I think he was talking about one year, I don't think he mentioned the subceiling, if you were in a position to say that you had to satisfy the Congress.

K: Now tell me, is this $300 million credits that can be extended or the amount of money that can actually be made available?

S: I'm not sure, frankly, we've addressed ourselves to that distinction. If you wanted to..

K: You'd be (inaudible) in terms of what would be drawn.

S: Yes. Well, I think we might too.

K: Because in that case we could probably give slightly more credit because not all of them would be made available in that year.

S: But you'd be in a difficult position; you'd have to assume that you could get the authorization for the subsequent increasement. I don't know how the bank would like that. I think we could go either way on that and none of this is set in concrete.

K: Let me talk to Bill Casey about that, may I?

S: By all means. Do you have any initial reactions to the package, without committing yourself. I'm getting under the gun, here.

K: Well, Casey, of course, doesn't want that $50 million for the whole world; he just wants it -- if it has to be applied, applied to the Communistxx countries. I can see your reasoning in not wanting to be that discriminatory.

S: Well the considerations are the same and also I didn't want to single out the Soviet Union any more than necessary.

K: Well it's not as badxk as I was afraid it would be.

S: Well I'm afraid it could be worse, it could get worse than this unless we put together a package and really get some support.

K: Let me think about it; it doesn't look unmanageable.

S: Well, that's encouraging.

K: Can I call you over the weekend?

S: By all means, no--Sunday I will be in Illinois. I'll be back late.

K: Will you be here tomorrow?

S: I will be xx here tomorrow--in and out of my house.

K: Good, I'll try to call you tomorrow.

S: Ok.

K: Thank you.

S: Thank you.

END

SA 46

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
June 7, 1974
4:33 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Brent do we have a scheduled of what would be required to get back here in time for the Ottawa dinner?

S: In time for the Ottawa dinner. Which will be when, no I can get you one very shortly.

K: About 8:00. It's beyond the capacity of my office here.

S: 8:00 PM, Ottawa time, for the dinner.

K: So I would have to get in about 6:30.

S: Be in by, say, 6:00. I'll get it to you very shortly.

K: And also do you happen to know what clothes we need on the trip. I've got about 10,00 muscle bound idiots over here.

S: I don't yet....

K: They're writing book on the subject, which I get Sunday night.

S: You mean in terms of black tie and so on?

K: Right.

S: I'll find that out. I don't have that right yet.

K: Good, thank you.

END

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SA 45 1*
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Haig/Secretary Kissinger
June 7, 1974
4:20 PM

H: Yes, Henry.

K: Al, I had arranged while I was in Saltzburg to drop over to ___Garden and see the German Foreign Minister.

H: Yes.

K: Whom I had to cancel out three times and who's been dying to see me. I'm assuming it isn't going to cause any heartburn.

H: Well, I don't think so, I hope not. I wouldn't see how it could. We've got a full day with nothing to do.

K: I have arranged for Schmidt and Wilson to meet him in Brussels on the 26th. On the way to Moscow.

H: Right. OK.

K: And to sign the NATO declaration there.

H: Let me run this ~~xxxx~~ by him tomorrow.

K: Well, it's practically prozen, you can run it by him....

H: I mean in a sense of....

K: Don't give him any options.

H: That's right. Packing it up, you know, I mean he has to know, he can know it in the midst of our going over the ~~xx~~ schedule. I'll just routinely....

K: Just put in on the Germans.

H: Yes, exactly. And the purpose is, therefore, to be sure we have a good ~~Brussels Brussels Brussels~~ Brussels thing too.

K: Exactly. And that we couldn't get Schmidt there because then ~~there~~ there wouldn't have been a Brussels thing.

H: Right, exactly. OK. Fine Henry.

K: OK. END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 18 JUN 2004 200102979

SA 43 1*

TELECON
Senator Sparkman/Secretary Kissinger
June 7, 1974
3:56 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

S: I want to welcome you back.

K: ~~xxThankxyou~~ Thank you. I hope the reports I read our correct that you're going to take the Chairmanship.

S: I look forward to it.

K: I look forward to working very closely with you.

S: The same here and I want to commend you on the tremendous job you did over there. Are you rested? I don't see how you can be.

K: I m getting there.

S: I apologize for calling you about this but a bunch of people who operate in my state asked me to do it. I understood that they have asked for an appointment with you. I don't know whether it's any special time or not. They're a bunch of aluminum ~~xxpaxx~~ companies. There's a man named John Harper, representing Alcoa; Richard Reynolds, representing Reynolds metal company, Cornell Feyer, representing Kaiser Aluminum Company, John Place, representing Anaconda Copper Company and then two companies which I don't have the names of the representati ves is Alcan, I think that's a Canadian Aluminum Company and then the Revere, I think is a copper company. All of these operate in my state, I believe, but anyhow they asked me to call and just recomme that they be given an appointment with you for which I understood they applied. I know nothing about, I won't make it clear, I know nothing about what they want, but I presume it has to do with trade.

K: I would suspect maybe bauxite.

S: Oh, maybe.

K: That's what I would suspect.

S: That's probably what it is. And as I say, I know nothing about, they ~~xx~~ didn't tell me, but they did tell me that they had asked for a chance to sit down and talk with you and he asked me if I would put in a word for them and that's all I'm doing.

K: OK. I appreciate~~xx~~this and I will do my very best to see them.

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1*

S: Fine. Let me say I had a call a couple of days ago, no, it was just yesterday, I believe, from, I believe he was an NBC man or maybe a newpaper,

K: ~~Alex~~ (Valerioni).

S: Yes. And he wanted to quiz me about my and ~~Casey~~ Casey's checking into you, remember that?

K: Oh, yes.

S: I suppose, I don't know, it's a matter of wire tapping. I told him the whole thing was on the record and it is, there in the Committee, that we had gone into it ~~both~~ thoroughly, we had seen the transcript of ~~that~~ the FBI papers and that we found that you had nothing to do with anybody's wire tapping and I explained to him just what you did to us that Hoover asked you for a list of names of those who were privy to the secrets of the NSC and that you gave us, when you were connected with the ~~NSC~~ NSC, and that you gave him those names. You did not know what he wanted it for or anything else. So, he seemed satisfied. I don't know whether it can out or anything or not. I wanted you to know about it.

K: I appreciate it, when was this, today?

S: No, it was about two days ago.

K: I appreciate this very much.

S: He seemed satisfied. I told him that Casey and I went into it thoroughly and we were convinced you ~~had~~ at no time had anything to do with anybody's wire tapping and didn't even know about them.

K: Well, I appreciate this.

S: OK.

K: ~~Thank~~ Thank you,

S: Fine, it's good to talk with you and continuing good luck.

K: Thank you.

END

SA 38 1*

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
Friday, June 7, 1974
2:42PM

RELEASED IN FULL

D: Mr. Secretary.

K: ~~K~~ Our direct line seems to be out.

D: Oh, I didn't know this.
I ~~guess~~ guess some of our ~~friends~~ friends are working on it.

K: I guess so.

D: Mr. Secretary, the reason I ..... you was that I ~~had~~ had fixed a meeting with my friend that I told ~~you~~ you about. He called me yesterday. Our friend without whom we cannot have an arrangment in the Middle East.

K: Oh, When?

D: He called me ~~yesterday~~ yesterday and today I ok'd for ~~him~~ him a meeting on Wednesday at 4 pm. for tea at his Embassy.

K: Oh good, and no longer lunch.

D: Know he wanted lunch on Monday but I couldn't do it because I would be at the National Press Club.
So I suggesated Wednesday, and Wed., he is busy for lunch. ~~S~~
So we had tea, I think it iis better.

K: Good

D: The less I eat the better off I am

K: You keep me informed.

D: Yes. You will be away already,

K: But you will see ~~i~~ me in ~~Israel~~ Israel.

D: Yes. I will see ~~you~~ you in Israel and I will let you know.

K: Good. Wonderful. I will see you tomorrow.

D: I am looking forward to it.

K: Good. Bye.

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DATE/CASE ID: 10 FEB 2003 200102979

SA 39 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Henry Brandon/Secretary Kissinger
Friday, June 7, 1974
2:45PM

K: Hello.

B: Henry.

K: How areyou? How nice to hear from your.

B: Well I haven't been able to congratulate you yet in person, but what I wanted to say is that you ~~should not~~ shouldn't let mean little people who think that nothing else exists but Watergate exists in the world interfere with your mood and do them the honor of letting them upset you.

K: Aren't you nice. You really are very nice.

B: I was really outraged

K: Well it was not a ..

B: You know in this week. Henry I know that you have a lot to do, but when you come back I hope we'll get together.
K:
K: I would love to see you and Muffie and it is really terribly sweet of you to call.

B: Well that is all that I want to say, we are very concerned, Muffie and I.

K: Well you are..

B: Good luck on the next trip.

K: Thank you.

B: All right.

K: Bye.

B: Bye, Bye.

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SA41 1*

TELECON
Secretary Simon/Secretary Kissinger
Friday, June 7, 1974
3:00PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How did things go ?

S: I thought they went absolutely super. I was sorrry that you couldn't make the luncheon out at my house, it was great, we ate out in the terrace and they ate it up. But we really filled their plate with more than they could handle.

K: That is much better than the opposite.

S: Absolutely. And they are going back with a great enthusiasm. I guess most of them go back tomorrow morning. Alanie is going to move out to my house tomorrow and spend the weekend with me.

K: Oh, terrific. Amonie satisfied?

S: Oh perfectly and so is Nasar. It really is super. And I even sold them on the idea of investing in their funds and they want to do it outside the context of this. They want to do it direct, Treasury to their Fiance people, which suits us perfectly.

K; Good.

S: So everything is just perfect. They got so excited this morning at one point in the meeting that they are sending their chief petroleum economist over here next week and he is going to stay as long as possible. I was giving him all this business on the nationalization of profits. Why they wanted to get into oil prices, oil supply and demand.

K: Well that was what I was hoping.

S: We had quite a discussion on that.

K: I was hoping they would come to that on their own.

S. And they did, and I gave them the whole pitch. Then Amonie and I rode out to my hhouse together with Akins and with gave it to them some more. We really had just a grand time, and I think it is a great succes Henry.

K: Good. Well that is my impression too from the dinners and everything else.

S: I just wanted to give you this before you met with Prince Fahd.

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K: Thank you.

S: So you can have little meat the xxxxxxx commique won't tell everything. But we have more cooperative xxxxxxx efforts coming and I'm serious

K: I think commique is good enought.

S: I have even read it yet. I'm so many definitive directions that I think you will be pleased. It is going to make your job easier and that is what we tried to do.

K: Thank you very much. Appreciate it.

S: Great, Henry.

K: Bye.

S: Bye.

1*

SA 40

TELECON
JackStevenson/Secretary Kissinger
Friday, June 7, 1974
2:45 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

S: Yes sir.

K: How are you Senator?

S: Fine, thank you very much. Thank you very much for calling. I had hoped I would have a chance to see you before the Law of the Sea Conference starts the 20th. But I guess in view of your schedule, that would be very difficult for you.

K: Well, ugh, I am going away with the President again, and I am practically drowning in work.

S: Sure. Well I think bascially the main points that I wanted to make were that I think that whatever our instructions, I think that you have received or will be receiving recommendations in that respect from ....there certainly maybe some situations some in particular areas where we will meet to go somewhat further in the hopes of getting to near an agreement this summer if possible.

K: But could you sum these issues up in a memo for me.

S: Yes. They are and I will and it may be in the course of the summer the most practical thing for me to do is come home and talk to you at that point when the situation is clearer than it is now.

K: Good, but I would appreciate a summary memo now of everything.

S: Certainly, we will do that.

K: Good.

S: And the other point I did want to make very briefly is that we are now working very closely with the Soviets, who have been most cooperative I was in Moscow 10 days ago and it maybe that this will come up xxx in the course of your trip, but I think it would be very helpful if you could indicate. We appreciated this way.

K: Yes, but you would have to xx tell me what the issues xxxxx are, I can't just give a general endorsement.

S: Sure, sure. All right we will get that to you in a memo too.

K: Good I would appreciate.

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SA 42

1*

TELECON
Ronald Reagan/Secretary Kissinger
June 7, 1974
3:30 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

R: Congratulations.

K: Thank you Ron. How nice to hear from you.

R: Well, I wanted to do if for a long time. What kind of ~~xxx~~ breakfast cereal do you eat?

K: Why?

R: That sounds like a back-breaking schedule that is just inhuman.

K: That's true.

R: That ~~xxx~~ must have been really something.

K: Oh, it was exhausting.

R: Well, it was a very wonderful thing, I can tell you that. And I also had to call to ask you about something. I've put it off calling knowing you must when you come home of literally have to go into a de-compression chamber. But I had a call from a ~~xxxxxxxx~~ prominent gentleman out here with Pacific lighting - a Jack Miller. And they're deeply involved with Indonesia. When I was there when that natural gas thing was signed in Jakarta on that last trip and he wanted to know if I could call and ask if he could call your office and if he could make an appointment. It has to do with our country and natural gas and Indonesia. I did gather when I was out there at the signing where the Japanese got the....

~~Yesx~~ K: Yes.

R: The American businessmen who were there expressed to me that with some of our agencies in Washington, part of our problems were excessive red tape. Now I don't know whether that's what he wants to talk about.

K: I don't question that.

R: But I don't know whether that's what he wants to talk about or not , but would it be alright if I told Jack Miller it would be alright that he could call in regard to see you?

K: I can't do it before the middle of July. I'm going off with the President tomorrow.

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R: Oh, well I'll tell him that sometime after the Middle of July.

K: Right.

R: If your secretary will just remember the name Jack Miller.

K: Right.

R: Alright, but....

K: How are things going with you?

R: Well, fine, I think. Same old battle out here.

K: I can' imagine.

R: But we were all thrilled by that, Henry, that was a very wonderful thing.

K: Well, you're a good friend. Let me know when you come east.

R: I sure will. Hell of a way to treat a new bride.

K: That is the truth.

R: OK, well Nancy gives your best.

K: Thank you, give her my best regards.

R: I sure will. Alright.

K: Bye.

END

*

SA 47

TELECON
Hal Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger.
Friday, June 7, 1974
4:49 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: ..which, which would our position be?

S: Kiev

K: Well, all right. But they have proposed Odessa.

S: Well, we really want Kiev .

K: I know, but if we can't get Kiev do we then not have any?

S: If we absolutely can't get Kiev I guess we can take Odessa, but we really Kiev.

K: Would you mind explaining to me why?

S: Because there's no business in Odessa that is of any consequences, and Kiev is really is a place where there's utility in having it.

K: Ok. Hold on a second, Larry. Ok, now what is this business about Portuguese access?

S: Atomic information?

K: Yes.

S: You had wanted a harder option than we gave you, but you wanted to take a deep breath after you came back.

K: Well, I just think that semiCommunist governments, why should we open it up?

S: Well, that's very much my feeling, I must say.

K: Well then let's do that.

S: Ok.

K: Good.
S: All right.
K: Thank you.
END

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
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SA53 1*

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
June 7, 1974
6:35 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hal, one other thing on that CSCE matter. Sheerer (phonetic) claimed he had no instructions. Which maybe ~~xxxx~~ true. Now I've cleared the instructions you've given me here, but I wanted to make ~~xxxx~~ to make it a little clearer that he can talk to the NATO caucus and support it, but he also ought to suppose it at the conference.

S: Well, he'll be alone.

K: First he has to talk to the NATO caucus.

S: Well, that's what we promised to do and that's what he'll be instructed to ~~xx~~ go ahead and do now.

K: Good. But in the sense of producing an agreement.

S: Yes. As soon as that goes out, he'll do that. He wasn't instructed because...

K: Yes, but he supposed to take an active role in getting agreement.

S: Yes, he wasn't instructed because ....

K: And he will do that within a day or two of getting his instructions.

S: In the NATO caucus?

K: Yes.

S: He'll start doing it there.

K: And he will inform then the Soviet person there of where we stand.

S: He'll keep them informed.

K: OK, good, thank you.

END

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RELEASED IN FULL (SA52) 1*

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
June 7, 1974
7:57 PM

K: Brent, I have a number of things. The Soviets need the composition of the advance party as quickly as possible.

S: OK.

K: Secondly, makes sure that Haig gets me an answer on the Volgagrad against Minsk problem that I discussed with him yesterday.

S: Alright.

K: In neither case is there a question of overnight. It would be on the way back from the Crimea.

S: OK.

K: In the case of Volgagrad which is the former Stalingrad, there is no airfield big enough to handle the 707 but we're not flying the 707 anyway, we'll be on the Soviet plane. But they like the 707 to trail along.

S: Yes, they do, for communications and other people and so on.

K: OK, well, Minsk has an airfield big enough. We could compromise on ___ maybe.

S: Both of them, they'll enjoy it.

K: _____they have everything.

S: When do they want the advance party?

K: I understand they're going there on the 19th.

S: Well, that's what I understood.

K: I think it doesn't give a hell of a lot of time for planning.

S: No, it doesn't. As a matter of fact what they were going to do is sort of send the advance party reconstitute it when they finish in the Middle East right on the the Soviet Union.

But you think the Soviet Union is still ___if we could give them the names of the people who are coming and little details like this and an arrival time.

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S: Of course. Sure.

K: Can we do it tomorrow?

S: Oh, I think so.

K: Or Monday, or as later as Monday.

S: Right.

K: OK. Finally, can you check with Peter whether he was present when I discuss with Gromyko the Jewish emigration question.

S: OK.

K: And what his records show about numbers.

S: OK.

K: OK, good. Thank you. Can you call me back on that.

S: Sure.

END

SA 36 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Gov. Rockefeller/Secretary Kissinger
Friday, June 7, 1974
2:32PM

K: Yes

R: Nelson. I took the liberty of calling back because after lunch I got Claire Luce aside to talk to her about that ~~yesterday's question~~ yesterday's press conference to see if she reacted the way I did. She is a 100% in the same reaction namely to ~~xxxx~~ defend our need as a nation to protect our security is a must. So she was totally in ~~xgxx~~ agreement but from the point of national security and from your own posture, and I just thought I would let you know that because she is a pretty shrewdwoman.

K: I appreciate that . Well

R: That's all I have.

K: Well, it was as always very good to see you. Muskie asked me about it this morning at my hearing.

R: He did?

K: Yes and in a nice way so I could make a rather strong statement saying it was legal, it was ~~legal~~ legally conducted and not only legally but properly and it concerned only national security.

R: And was that in an open hearing?

K: In an open hearing.

R: It was? I just think the posture of you defending the need for protection of our security, is a very powerful one. Okay, I just wanted to be sure having taken ~~x~~ sure a strong position this morning that I had a reaction of someone who is public relations reaction who I trust and hers are awfully smart .

K: Well I appreciate it.

R: You're great.

K: Thank you Nelson, it was great to see you.

R: Well, thanks so much.

K: Bye.

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SA 48 i*

TELECON
Joe Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
June 7, 1974
6:15 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

(Missed first part)

K: Some specific proposal, some specific ~~thxxkxx~~ things we can give to the Egyptians.

S: Yes, Hal was ~~x~~ doing a ~~xxx~~ paper on this.

Fahmy

K: No, he was doing principles, but have you seen that/cable of what they expect?

S: My hair stood on end when I read it.

K: Yes, but is there any complete we can do?

S: Well, let me review it and we'll give you the best we can.

K: Good and will you talk to Parker and is ther something in the ___fields we can do?

S: Yes, we'll give you the best we can of everything because I saw that and it really....

K: Well, you know.....

S: This is Fahmy, of course, but we'll have something for you in the course of the morning to look at.

K: We haven't heard yet from...

S: From the Syrians.

K: Have ___delivered it?

S: Well, I sent out a ~~xxbbe~~ cable 3 hours ago saying we would like a prompt reply. I just ~~x~~ did it on my own because....

K: No, that was right. Thank you, Joe.

S: OK.

END

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SA 49 1*

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
June 7, 1974
6:19 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

(Missed first part)

K: What 10%.

S: In the SALT matter.

K: Yes.

S: Brings our numbers up to what they've already conceded to us. A little bit over so it's just comestics.

K: OK.

S: OK.

K: Good, thank you.

Sonnenfeldt - 6:31 PM

S: Yes, sir.

K: Where the text of the ABM treaty for the Soviets?

S: That has just come out of the Verification Panel working group and Aldridge has it for another look. I have a copy of it here.

K: It is going to the Soviets tomorrow. I don't give a damn what Aldridge says, I've just had enough of this.

S: You also have a problem with Defense on it.

K: No, only with the Joint Chiefs, not with Defense. What's the problem?

S: The Joint Chiefs, you know, and OSB is wobbly on this. You've talked to Schlesinger about it and our...

K: I talked to Schlesinger about it and we insist on it. You just send it over to the Soviets. The President has insisted.

S: OK. Can you say something to them about the fact that this may not be exactly final?

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K: Well, what is unfinal?

S: Well, the lawyers may pick it apart. That's why Aldridge has it now. I ll get it back from Aldrige with any changes but if he has some major change it has to be looked at again.

K: Can Aldridge -- there's always a one hour period in which they work is ~~done~~ done. Can Aldridge spend that hour tomorrow morning.

S: He's doing it right now.

K: Alright, then you send it in tomorrow. Send it to Dobrynin tomorrow.

S: I'll get it over to Dobrynin, OK.

K: Now also Dobrynin has sent -- brought in the Russian text of a Communique he's giving us the English text tomorrow.

S: OK.

K: I'll take a copy with me, but I may make some comments tomorrow, but can you and Vorontsoz work on it while we're gone?

S: Yes.

K: Good.

END

(SAS1) 1*

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
Friday, June 7, 1974
6:55 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: ...About the Jewish immigration in Geneva, were you there?

S: No.

K: Or was Peter there?

S: I certainly was not there when any of the details you've discussed the other day were discussed. I don't know that anybody was there because it may have been when you had a ~~break~~ time with them.

K: Well, let me see whether Peter was there. Ok. Thank you.

END

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SA57 1*

TELECON
Hal Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
June 8, 1974; Saturday
5:43 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello?

S: Ah, yes. I just wanted to read you the sentence I want to try out on Dobrynin on the 45,000. Fourth, we have reason to believe that the number of persons permitted to emigrate will rise to as many as 45,000 a year.

K: No, that the amplication of these criteria may well...

S: Ok. Then maybe I should stick it at the end.

K: Yeah. Maybe that.

S: We'll may well lead to a rise in the number to as many as 45,000.

K: Good.

S: Ok. Good.

K: Bye.

END

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SA 54

1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger.
Saturday, June 8, 1974
9:10 AM

.....

K: Send me on a card ~~x~~ when I have to be at the airport, do I need special tags for my bags and stuff like that and also send some tags over because these people ....
With not telling me anything just pouring me on an airplane.

S: I ~~xxxxxx~~ think it is intended that you leave from the South lawn with the President.

K: Well I would like to do that, but no one has told me a GD thing When is the plane leaving?

S: ~~XXX~~ 8:55. I think it is 8:30 from the South lawn, but I will get it over to you very shortly.

K: Can you do that.? Fine

S: I have a little information about your breakfast this morning. Something he plans to ask you, I think.

K: What is it, I am going there now.

S: It is on the military procurement authorization bill, it is an amendment that Jackson put on giving the Defense Department a veto over export licensing.

K: ....

S: Mansfield is going to want your help. He posed it yesterday.

K:... Don't you think it is outrageous.

S: It is outrageous.
What he is probably going to ask for is a letter from you expressing your views.

K: I will be glad to do it. ~~XXXXX~~

S: Okay.

K: You know, I will be willing to listen to their views, but they have no right to veto. They are ~~x~~ not a separate government.

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S: Oh no, there is no question about it.

K: Okay, I have to go upstairs.

SA 56 1*

TELECON
Max Fisher/Secretary Kissinger
Saturday, June 8, 1974
5:20 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

F: Henry, Max Fisher

K: Yes, how are you?

F: How are you today?

K: Little bit harrassed.

F: ...Congress talks about wiretapping. They should be patting you on the back and telling you what a job you are doing.

K: The Congress isn't so bad, it is the Press.

F: I know that. That is the GDest thing. By the way I didn't have an opportunity to tell you, you did one fantastic job over there in the negotiations.

K: Aren't you nice.

F: Everyone over there, says it is just a miracle that you pulled that thing off. They are tremendously happy about it.

K: Aren't you nice.

F: I know ____didn't have an opportunity to adequately tell you about it, but that is the ~~text~~ feeling ~~ac~~ all around. In fact, even sent you a sermon from the biggest synagogue. They are even talking about you in the synagogue.

K: Isn't that nice.

F: Henry, we have put some pressure on Jackson, as much as we can without letting him know....Several of the organizations have gone on record on reformulation.

K: Wonderful.

F: I don't know what is going to happen, we have a character over there by the name of Pearl.

K: I know.

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F: But I think there is really nothing to be done.
No use meeting with this meeting. I did that more for the record than anything else. Asking for the meeting.

K: Oh, what do you mean at the meeting.

F: Remember the other day I asked you for a ~~xxxxxx~~ meeting with Lowell and Myself and Miller.

K: Yes. Frankly I just don't see how I can do it.

F: I don't want you. I did this ~~xx~~ just for the record.

K: I will be glad to do it when I come back, from the trip.

F: No, you hear what I said, I did it for the record there.
When you get back will be ~~x~~ plenty of time.

K: Good.

F: But I thought we have been doing some background, I checked with several people that we had the American Jewish Committee talking to them , American Jewish Congress, Phil Klotnick and a few others. Phil is going to be Financial Manager of Jackson. We have talked to a few of them and I hope you can come out with something. I am going over to Israel Wednesday. I'll be there for both series of meetings if anything needs to be done further, wish you would let me know. You'll be gone anyway.

K: I'll be gone.

F: I know that. We'll I'll be over there the same ~~xxxxx~~ time you are.

K: Well let me know maybe we will have a chance to talk.

F: All right. We can possibly do that, because the same people will be over there at that time.
And I'll be there, I have to be there as head of the Jewish Agency.
You moved all my 300 people out of the King David Hotel

K: Is that so?

F: Yes. I say this on this thing, you haven't made any further moves on that yet have you at all.

K: No.

F: All right. Fine, when ever you are ready too.

K: No, because I am still trying to get a letter to Jackson cleared by the Russians. I don't want to write a letter to Jackson that the Russians then disavow.

F: Yea, well when you are, andyou need a little help and push on that you let me know and we will do whatever we can. By the way the meeting the other day, I wrote you a note on it, it was a very good meeting and it was very helpful as far as the community was concerned. Your briefings have been very, very important in creating confidence you know in the community. XXX I think it is important.

K: It is crucial and you all have been very helpful.

F: Well, I think it is good for the country and for Israel.

K: Thank you Max.

F: OK and I'll see you over in Israel my friend.

K: Good, look forward to it.

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SA58

TELECON
Hal Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
Saturday, June 8, 1974
11:05 AM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

S: Hi, Henry.

K: On that NATO blarney, you know everyone and his Grandmother gives me his own schedule.

S: I'm just sending you now a little memo because of this message to you from Souvanguard.

K: Yes, I think I should have break fast with Souvangyard.

S: Yes. There is another problem, though. And that has to do with the Brussels Summit.

K: What about it?

S: You have a message from Souvanguard, which they unfortunately gave to Irwin in France.

K: Yes, I've seen it.

S: Well. The question is what we do next. I think we should not [redacted] after Giscard. He obviously [redacted] doesn't want to go to Brussels.

K: All right. Then let's let their Prime Minister go.

S: Well, this hasn't been suggested. What I would like to do if you agree is to get the French Ambassador off the golf course where he is and tell him that we have this message which indicates an interest in a signature in Brussels, but we wondered just what they meant by that. I don't know that we should suggest Ferrog.

K: Let's just tell him that Schmidt and Wilson are coming.

S: Well.

K: We, of course, won't press them, but we think they should have an appropriate level official there.

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S: No, right. I would draft up a message to Rumsfeld telling him to get together with Luns privately to work out a scenario for organizing this. I held that up last night before talking with you so I could talk with you. But I think we probably ought to do that and just tell them that Giscard has indicated that he wouldn't come and we don't know yet what the French further French...

K: I wish to proceed in any event.

S: I understand that. I just wanted to be sure that that's what you wanted to do.

K: That's - ok. good.

S: Now on this Soviet communique. It's a workable draft. It's got problems on, as you might expect, CSCE, chemicals and a couple of other things.

K: What does it say about the Middle East?

S: I'll have to look, Henry. I've -- I think it's in the ballpark. I'm just giving you a little memo, Hyland's looking at it, and then I would like to suggest is to do an amendment draft using theirs as a basis and just getting together with Voronstov starting Monday to go over it, paragraph by paragraph and keep you informed out there if we encounter problems. We'll just have to bracket and leave open some of the things are clearly open, until we know a little more.

K: Ok. Now they're taking my reasoning away again. I've got somebody waiting.

S: Ok.

END

SA59

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TELECON
The President/Secretary Kissinger
Saturday, June 8, 1974
~~XMXX~~
11:15 AM

RELEASED IN FULL

P: Hello

K: Mr. President

P: ~~X~~ I thought you would like to know I sent ....
The briefing material is very good.

K: I worked on it--covering memo.

P: The Covering memoranda is what I have ~~been~~ been reading of course.
.... It is very helpful and we will be able to talk about it on the way of course.

K: I'll put some of the conversations with Assad and Sadat on the plane just to give you a feel for these men. A lot of it is technical stuff, that you wouldn't want to read.

P: I talked to Bob Hill who had said the Chinese Ambassador in Argentina had told him, apparently he is a loose talker that Chou EnLai was on the way out because of his physical condition. So whatever that is worth.

K: This is our impression , but it is also our impression that their relation with the US is still in good shape.

P: I wonder if there is anything to be said for your having some sort of little bow toward the Chinese before we go to the Soviet Union.

K: I already did that Mr. President,

P: I was thinking I would call him
Local call between the visits.

K: That might be a good idea.

P: Just to talk to him let him know well, it is for them and for the Soviets. So that they know.

K: No, that might be a good idea. ~~Have a little chat with him.~~

P: The other thing is that I wonder if . k Well I don't think anything will come of it, if true, Bruce might reinstitute obviously if would come to UN ~~or~~ I don't know whether he would or wouldn't but for a meeting at Camp David or one in San Clemente. Obviously he won't come to Washington.

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K: I'll raise that, but I don't think they will ever accept that.

P: I agree, they won't , but I think it is a nice ~~jes~~ gesture to raise it in quiet polite, sorta in low key subtle way.

K: I think if you see the Ambassador you ought to do it.

P: Fine. I'll put that on the talking points.

K: No I think that would ....

P: ... for the Ambassador

K: After the Mid-East trip. And you know Mr. President we have arranged for the signing of the NATO declaration in Brussels on your way to Moscow.

P: Provided that it will be ready.

K: It will be ready. We will complete it in Ottawa and we will initial it in Ottawa which just means it is completed and then it will be signed in Brussels and we have already got Schmidt and Wilson agreeing to come there. Which means that most of the heads of governments will come. Giscard can't come right now. But he will probably send his Prime Minister.

P: Well, the others are Prime Ministers so what the heck. It is perfectly all right.

K: That's right.

P: The Italians would come in a minute.

K: Of course, and this is not, Mr. President, I would not take this as a hostile move from Giscard.

P: No, no. I just wonder if it is too hostile to the Russians.

K: No.

P: Well they know the darn thing has been on the platter for a long time.

K: No, no., this is not a hostile thing. And it ~~a~~ actually says friendly things about detente and the declaration. It is better that way Mr. President than do it on the way back.

P: If we do M____on the way back which I prefer much to Stalingrad. I don't want to go to Stalingrad for a number of reasons, but basically if we get M____we could fly directly from M-__back I think.

K: The way we are doing it Mr. President, unless you want to change it we can do it either way. We thought we would do M____on the way back from the Kremmer to Moscow and then fly back from Moscow which you can also do directly. M____is only a 100 miles closer and probably .... no at all closer.

P: Either one. Fine.

K: I think it is better to depart from Moscow.

P: I agree.

K: Because then they will all come to the airport.

P: We can maybe have some final communique signed.

K: That is the point Mr. President, we could issue the communique the morning of your departure this way and then M____wouldn't be a let down.

P: Right. I get. it. Sounds better.
Everything else all right. Fine. How are you feeling?

K: I feel fine.

P: Getting a little rest?

K: A little bit.

P: Not much. I understand you are going over to see the German Foreign Minister in Austria.

K: Well, I am going over to Germany to see him. He has been wanting to see me. I canceled a meeting with him three times and now he proposed this one.

P: Yes, I understand.

K: And since Schmidt is going to come to Brussels and he'll do us more good in Brussels.

P: That's fine. OK K: Right Mr. President

5079 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
A. Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
June 8, 1974; Saturday
3:55 p.m.

D: Hello?

K: Yes, Ana...

D: Yes, one question. I noticed on a ticker that General Scowcroft goes with you too.

K: Yes.

D: Who am I supposed to contact? In the White House everything should go through Sonnenfeldt.
K: You better do it through Sonnenfeldt or through Col. Kennedy at the White House if it's very sensitive.

D: Col. Kennedy, I know him, yes. He was before? Yes?

K: Yes.

D: So we are supposed to check with him now?

K: Yes. Now Anatoli, I have two other things which I had forgotten to mention. One is, well the second I better keep for a personal conversation. It's not that time urgent. The other one is the Kiev versus Odessa. It seems to have it if we trade NY for Odessa, it really looks again as if we get the worst of the arrangement.

D: I could rather have you work then for your consideration there are some of your people there who but really, in our case, we do have people working in..this is pure organizational thing because our mission at the United Nations doesn't want to be engaged (inaudible) himself. We will think of all the things we can get other (inaudible) here in the course of whether [illegible] calling for Department 24 hours. Because you already have people in this city. So it would be excellent if you could arrange it, but until you do it completely avoid, in this case Odessa, where you know, you could have a big wood area.

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K: The only other countries that I can tell that have consulates there are Bulgaria and India.

D: I think there are some others too.

K: No. Cuba and India-Cuba and Bulgaria, that's it.

D: That's good company.

K: That's a little boring then for our man.

D: Yes, well, I understand. Would you like something else? Something Else?

K: Well, would you look into it?

D: Well, let's look at one mutually. Ok?

K: Ok.

D: Have you had a chance to look at this communique yet?

K: I haven't got an answer but I will get it.

D: Then we will get back, yes?

K: I hope so.

D: Ok. Soon. We will wait it. If the other thing comes--if some urgency comes up, I will go through Kennedy to you, right?

K: Right.

D: Through him.

K: Yes.

D: Ok. Good. Thank you.

K: Goodbye bye.

D: Bye-bye (inaudible) and good luck.

K: Thank you. Don't overdo it.

D: I hope you won't surprise us with some big agreement in the Middle East.

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K: No, believe me, believe me. There's no agreement planned.

D: Because we kept telling ~~from~~ information in Egypt your plans claim the second stage of ...

K: Absolute nonsense. Believe me.

D: No?

K: Look, we are not playing games like that. There will be no agreement announced, you know. Maybe some technical cooperation or something like that. I mean nothing of any fundamental significance.

D: I mean on a technical (inaudible)

K: Well, ~~technical~~ even that we are not planning; but, you know, if they're looking around for something maybe some agreement on some minor technical issue. But there will be no second stage agreement; there will be nothing of that kind.

D: The reason is we heard there is something cooking.

K: There's nothing you can cook here. If there is, they're not doing it with me.

D: That's the Russian view. If you affirm me. Because we heard something that a ....

K: Anatoli, really, why should I lie to you on something you'll know in a week? fair enough,

D: No, no, no. We'll wait/because I didn't ask you if the issue were you.

K: I give you the absolute assurance that~~total~~ assurance that there will be no second stage agreement or no announcement having anything to do with the Middle East peace negotiations.

D: Would you make a communique or would the announcement , what kind of public documents, I mean.

K: Probably a communique, but no treaty, no. It will not be a, you know it may be visible, but it's not a big event.

D: I understand. It's rather difficult to expect you to do something in 3 days.

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K: Impossible.

D: What you have already accomplished, so if, I prefer you not disappoint but this way I'm talking to you.

K: Look.

D: (Inaudible)

K: Anatol, you can give the absolute assurance to Gromyko that nothing of any significance of that kind will be announced.

D: I understand. I thank you.

K: Bye.

D: Ok. Bye-bye.

END

5082 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
Saturday, June 8, 1974

D: Hello

K: Anatolyn

D: You are working from the very beginning. I thought you were already signing something.....

K: Histbric document.

D: Well, landmark or some other very nice word as you say

K: I called it historic or it is historic

D: Of course I take it for granted. No question about it.

K: We would like to go to Mensch(Sp?)

D: Okay Mensch with understanding that it would be from ____

K: From Greme yes.

D: Greme and Moscow And going from Moscow

K: Right. Exactly

D: As for the composition of the group on Monday, I will check with Scowcroft. And ...

K: As for communique I have looked it over and I have you know, no overwhelming problems with it.

D: That is my impression too.

K: You know there are xxxxxxxx phrases in the Middle East section for example about how to describe the Palestinians and things like that, but I don't think we need to discuss that now.

D: No, no, I understand. So we will proceed in general .... is acceptable.

K: As a basis it is acceptable. But that does not keep me .

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D: No, No, I understand the issues, but because some session you have.. So we will take it and begin on Monday.

K: I just had it before me now they have taken it away from me again. Hold on a second.

D: Okay.

K: Hello, I had a happy life before I had this bureaucracy. I even got work done.

D: Well I think you are trying to get rid of them. By not appointing your Assistant Secretary. Finally you will be ...

K: You know there are things for example we cannot accept the reference to the nuclear testing as an objective to be comprehensive and universal, but we can accept comprehensive. But you know, there are a lot of minor things, you know the rights and interests of all states and people in the area including the Arab people of Palestine. You know phrases like that and at the end you say frank atmosphere and fruitful result. Frank usually means there was a lot of disagreement You can say constructive, friendly.

D: In understand

K: But this is the sort of thing, it is not worth; substantially it is agreeable.

D:.....
Go back and we will sit down with you together.

K: Right. Now Anatolyy, I have the transcript of my conversation here with Gromyko. Actually from Geneva.

D: You mentioned to him 40, 45,000.

K: Let me just read you what I have. I said the General Secretary said to me and to Kennedy that everybody without a security clearance can go. Gromyko said we told you. Then I siad if it were possible for me to say this, and Gromyko says you can say this. Then if I could get an estimate of what this means in numbers, Gromyko says, what we would you say. I said last year it was 35,000. Gromyko says right. Then I said, if I could say 40 to 45,000, Gromyko said for what period? I said for a year, Gromyko said what year, I said for the whole year as a yardstick. Gromyko said approximately as a trend that is all right. Then I said, what I will say is my estimate is based on all my conversations this means 40 to 45,000. Gromyko says yes you will be

justified. Yes the General Secretary even made a joke the other day that perhaps we should start a campaign for the Jews to go, and that is what he said.

D: What I have hear
I will translate how it was written by him. Dr. Kissinger raised three points. The first point, he said that you said you would like to say that the Soviet ~~xxxxx~~ authority do not have in mind or in view to prevent or to limit immigration from the Soviet Union deliberately and that taking into consideration the statistics or figures which already have about immigration for the last three years, it would be assumed that the level of immigration for 1974 will be some where in the limits or 40-45,000. This is what you said.
I answered to Mr. Kissinger that we do not have a objection against his qualifications which he intends to make, but made clear that this does not mean of course to take on ourselves strick ~~xxx~~ obligations to fulfill exactly those figures, because the number of people who would like to immigrate from the Soviet Union would be less, and Dr. Kissinger should take it into ...himself.

K: Well, what are we going to do now?

D: I was just telling you to ask Gromyko. Maybe he has k some additions.

K: Well, can I have Sonnenfeldt get in touch with you to work out that letter?

D: Of course.

K: Because I really think we can achieve a solution and it would also solve the credit problem.

D: Understand. Well I am just waiting now to reply to him, because this telegam you mentioned to me. If I do not receive it today, when I receive it , I will give Sonnenfeldt text. Okay?

K: Right.

D: Maybe I will receive it today. I don't know yet.

K: If you hear, let me know.

D: Yes, I will let you know about it. But this is exactly what I read from his .

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K: Well, and I have read you what.

D: In your case you just have a minute.
In my case I only have official summaries—
His summaries .....
.....But this is what I have here on my own
.....
Well let's do it as you propose.
I sent telegram to Gromyko ~~xxx~~ asking him on this one.

K: Well, the sooner the better so we can work something out with Jackson.

D: I understand.

K: Because that other Bill goes ~~xxx~~ through before the end of the month.

D: I understand.

K: Good.

D: Okay.

K: Bye.

D: What about communique....

K: Exactly.

D: And now what about IBM business.

K: Hasn't that been sent to you? It will be sent to you this weekend You can count on it.

D: One question. I just received a telegram. This is a message from Mr. Brezhnev to the President. About the need to speed up the work of the European conference. It is saying that maybe in order put this up ---send to Geneva on a last part of the second stage is going on now. To present a little more higher rank than it is . They will have authority to take decisions ...on this part.

K: Whom are you thinking of?

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there is a possibility of me saying

D: He didn't specify, but in the end he mentioned Dr Kissinger, Brezhnev's letter to Mr. Schmidt and to Mr. Wilson .

K: Okay.

D: It didn't define exactly but the idea is so please look what can be done ....later on.

K: I'll communicate with you about it or I'll get Sonnenfeldt to todo it.

D: Okay, transmit usual way. and then send to you, okay.

K: Excellent.
Thank you Anatolyv

SA 62 1*

TELCON
Senator Fulbright/Secretary Kissinger
6:00 p.m., June 20, 1974

RELEASED IN FULL

k: Hello.

F: Yes.

K: Mr. Chairman, we've had an NSC meeting on SALT which would have gladdened your heart.

F: Really?

K: I tell you -- this is why I was late but I will be free in about 15 minutes.

F: Okay. She said she was going to call. Well, should I come to the office?

K: Would that be all right?

F: Sure.

K: Good. Let's meet at the State Department. I'm just leaving.

F: I'll do Whatever is most convenient for you. All right. I'll come in the regular -- diplomatic entrance.

K: Right. Are you going to drive yourself?

F: Yes. I'm at the office but I'll be on my way in just a few minutes.

K: Is it difficult to park there? Because otherwise --

F: It never is. I [redacted] park right in the driveway this time of the day.

K: Okay. If you have trouble, just drive into the basement.

F: Yeah. But this time of the day, there won't be any trouble.

K: Good. I'll see you then in about 20 minutes.

F: All I have to have is somebody to let me in.

K: I'll take care of it.

F: Okay. I'll be right along.

K: Right.

[End of Conversation]

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SA63

RELEASED IN FULL

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TELECON
Senator Javits/Secretary Kissinger
June 20, 1974
6:18 PM

K: How are you Jack?

J: OK. I called you to tell you Marion and I hope you will excuse us about Saturday night. She understands Nancy isn't coming and we had something to do which related to some of our children.

K: Sure, of course.

J: Is that alright? Nancy is not coming I gather.

K: Well, she's still laid up.

J: I see. Well, I'm really sorry and, you know, we would have set everything else aside if she were coming, but without that we just felt that we shouldn't preempt the kids.

K: I don't know whether that's a compliment to me.

J: I don't know. It's human and you're such a friend that I'm talking to you as a member of the family and not...

K: Of course, I understand.

J: The other thing I wanted to ask you was this, I understand you'll be in tomorrow, I'll be there, I gather you don't want any questions on the other matter until we have looked into it and you've gotten back.

K: It's up to you.

J: That's what Clifford suggested and it's entirely satisfactory with me.

K: Who's Clifford?

J: Clifford Case.

K: Oh. I will go along with whatever the Committee wants.

J: Well, what do you think about it yourself.

K: I think it's probably just as well.

J: The other thing is that Parker was here to consult me about his testimony in the morning and I suggested to him that he leave questions of the atomic

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power deal with Egypt and Israel to you, rather than trying to deal with them himself.

K: That's a good idea.

J: And I will be there to ___him harmless, in other words, I'll strongly back him in the fact that all he could tell us is hearsay and what he read in those papers, but you could tell us what animated you and what safeguards you have in mind and so on.

K: Right. I think that's fair enough.

J: That's better. OK. Henry, you tired, do you feel better?

K: Well, Jack, I didn't feel so badly. You know, that's one of the myths that is now being spread. I felt I couldn't let myself be bled to death one leak at a time while I was traveling through the Middle East.

J: Listen, the power of honest indignation is unbelievable and that's what you expressed.

K: After all I knew the documents, I had shown them to Sparkman and Case.

J: Of course.

K: And I knew that if they leaked one at a time there would be an editorial a day, maybe it was a mistake to hold the press conference.

J: No, you expressed an honest indignation of an honest man who was doing an enormous job and in danger of being messed up by ____.

K: You know, what really worries me, Jack, which I can say is this; with the President facing impeachment, what's been holding things together is my moral authority abroad and to some extent at home. If that's lost we may be really in trouble.

J: Absolutely right. Listen, it makes a lot of sense. I think we'll understand that and the virtue of having it in our committee is exactly that, that we do understand the whole picture.

K: Well, the committee has been fine and you've always been a good friend.

J: Well, that's the way we'll keep it. Now you go and how long will you be away?

K: About 10 days.

J: Now (Gil?) called me from the Times and said he's writing a story about these breakfast meetings you've had with Jackson, Ribicoff and myself, and he said he will not quote me because I've told him nothing. But he said he would like to talk to me after I read his story. I said, well, I 'll see when I read your story, but I didn't wanted you to....

K: Well, he has the figure of 45,000:

J: That's xxxx correct.

K: He tried to check it here and I refused to discuss it with him.

J: Same with me. I don't know xxxx where he got it but I guess he got a pretty good idea. I haven't offered anything, as you know, I've been very careful with this one because I feel very very sensitive. You and I ought to talk sometime too about the attitude to be taken on the Jackson/Stevenson amendment on the Exim Bank. Have you had that looked at?

K: Yes.

J: What does that look like to you?

K: Well, I think it's too restrictive.

J: Even the way the committee turned it out?

K: I understand there is another variation of it now.

J: Yes, the Committee turned out a variation which took the ceiling off 300 million.

K: Xxxx Yes.

J: I acquired a concurrent resolution of both Houses to negate anything. I gave the possibility of a two year instead of x a one year deal.

K: That looked better to me.

J: Very good. Jackson talked to me about it today and obviously will try to forge some kind of a common front to the original version. So I think obviously you can't meet with the three of us before you go, hopefully this Exim Bank thing will not come up until after the recess, but I think you ought to meet with us as soon as you can thereafter.

K: I will meet with you immediately xxx when I come back.

J: The last point I wanted to make is I'm going to Europe on the night of the 27th

hoping to see these four new governments. I'll be in Israel on the 4th of July and Hartman's coming over in the morning to brief me on the Europe business. So if there's anything that you think you'd like me to do I'm going to Britain, Germany, France and Israel and I'll be gone for 10 days.

K: I'll talk to you after the meeting tomorrow.

J: Good. Fine, Henry.

K: Good Jack.

J: Seeyou tomorrow.

K: Bye.

END

SA 61

TELCON
June 20, 1974 - 12:25 p.m.
HAK/Martin Peretz (New Republic)

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

P: Henry.

K: Marty, how are you?

P: How are you. God there are so many things that happened since we last spoke. Most importantly your marriage. The second most important I bought the "New Republic."

K: I heard about that. And I find it very reassuring. That doesn't mean that you're going to be kind to us but at least its an intelligent man in charge.

P: We had a rather interesting editorial board meeting -- between people saying that we should be alot kinder -- people who say we're kind enough. An argument about the press conference about that MIT kid. God he was an awful questioner. I was wondering whether at some point you might not be willing to have lunch with us.

K: Of course. Who is us?

P: The editorial board of the magazine. Stanley Cornell, Walter Pinkus, John Osborne.

K: You know, I think Osborne is the best writer in Washington on Washington affairs.

P: I think so too. So if you know someone in your office.

K: It will have to be after I come back from the Soviet Union.

P: OK. When is that?

K: About -- anytime after July 8. Why don't we set it up in that week?

P: OK fine. Who should I talk to.

K: Talk to Jerry Bremer.

P: Maybe it would be best rather than me call him could you ask him to call me.

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K: But if he doesn't it just means I've forgotten to do it.

P: OK. Bremer?

K: B-R-E-M-E-R.

P: OK. Good. Are things as good in the Middle East as they seem?

K: Well, you know things are good but precarious and it is a tremendous -- you know, it takes a tremendous balancing act. And just for your information, my concern in Saltzberg was how to hold this thing together if my moral authority gets undermined here.

P: Yes.

K: That is the problem I face.

P: I was very sympathetic with what you did and what you're going through. I mean there is a sort of debauch of morality in the country. Really, the most unseemly sources.

K: Well, no one has yet explained the following. I had all the documents that are now leaking and I submitted them to the Senate Foreign Relations committee. Why in the hell would I lie with documents -- you know, I knew what these documents said. I also know how J. Edgar Hoover keeps books. But that is --- let's not talk about that. And I don't think we should discuss that when we meet with the editorial board.

P: No, what we really want to do is talk about foreign policy.

K: That is what I would like to do. I think it is an excellent group. We'll do it the week of the 8th. I'll be back the night of the 8th. Let's aim for that Thursday.

P: Good. And I will talk to Mr. Bremer - I'll talk to him this afternoon -- I'll call him. It would be nice if you ever have a free minutes just chat idly.

K: That would be nice.

P: OK.

K: Good. Bye.

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TELECON
President Nixon/Secretary Kissinger
June 21, 1974
8:13 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

N: Hello?

K: Mr. President.

N: I understand you did very well before the committee. Hugh Scott was pleased at least.

K: Yes and he was very supportive.

N: Well, I called him beforehand and told him, look here we want you to tell a few of these people to stand up and he said he would. He did, did he?

K: Absolutely. And he asked a very helpful question. He said is everything already negotiated so that he's just going there to sign? Or is there a lot left to negotiate. I said, I wish there were a little less left to negotiate, because in most of the areas there are very big problems remainin I went through it with him. And then Fulbright stepped out and said he fully supports you.

N: Good. And you were able before and after to get the nuclear power plant thing.

K: That's right. I don't know whether they showed it on television but I.....

N: But Bo Ron -- I think they must have because he said you got out in time to be on if they were going to use it. I'm competent they must have used it.

K: Good.

N: Anyway, that's one out of the way.

K: I think we're going to have a very successful trip.

N: Well, the way it will work out is that, work out a communique that handles MERVE thing the way that you suggested. I think it's just about in the _____. And that leaves something left to be done.

K: That's right. I think that's just as well.

N: Yes. And find the areas of agreement on the other two items.

K: Exactly.

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N: Which are not insignificant, let's face it.

K: Well exactly, Mr. President, if we got a breakthrough on SALT which will get negotiated later on, that's not bad.

N: That's right. But I mean having the threshhold of the ABM thing, is an accomplishment of itself.

K: Of course. I don't find much nitpicking about the trip anymore.

N: Scott said the committee was pretty well set, they didn't badger you with other streneous matters.

K: No, I don't think this was the time to do it.

N: Good. The Committee was, in other words, pretty supportive all the way around, then.

K: The Committee was very good. It was a very good session.

N: That's good.

K: And it was all on the summit, a little bit on NATO and Fulbright, when he came out, made a very strong statement, the press tells me that others as they were coming out made good statements.

N: Well, we have to understand this little flap on the nuclear thing -- they have to find something to pick on so they -- and people just -- it's such a the trouble is such a darn mistery, you know, we have to remember Eisenhower talked about atoms for peace; way back there we were going to share it with the world and gave the same speech, and Kennedy was for it. That's what this is all about. How do you do it otherwise? Isn't that what it's about.

K: Exactly. It's the only way you can control relations in this period.

N: How about our Israeli friends. Are they still bombing?

K: No, they stopped it. We made a sharp protest and they sent us a message this afternoon -- this evening. In fact, Dinitz was just in here to tell me they had stopped it.

N: That's good. It should, in their own interest. We're not asking them to do something harmful for them. We're asking because if they go too far, we'll get one hell of a reaction here. People now are on the mountain top; they want a peaceful settlement in the east.

K: No question about it. I think they're coming on very strong.
END

SA68 *

TELECON
Senator Taft/Secretary Kissinger
June 21, 1974
11:02:

RELEASED IN FULL

T: Hello, Henry. How are you?

K: OK, how are you?

T: Oh, . . . listen I called because I understand you're going up before Foreign Relations this afternoon.

K: Yes.

T: And I think among other things there's one area that came up yesterday that I wasn't sure you had any report on and Symington is ~~quite~~ quite likely to ask you some questions about it. I thought I ought to background you just for a moment.

K: Good.

T: With us yesterday for the Armed Services Committee was Paul Nitze and I was the only republican present when he made most of his testimony. Thurmond came in later, but I don't think Thurmond ever got the gist. What he is saying in effect is that after SALT I there was an interpretation of protocol ~~xxxxx~~ entere into that was not communicated with regard to the G Class submarines and the 66 missiles on those SLBMs that they're not be in 950 limitation of SALT I. He says this was held back and not communicated and that the Russians first made it known sometime late in 1973.

K: Total nonsense.

T: Well, this is what he's saying. And I questioned him quite hard on it as to who told him, he wouldn't specify that it was you, he wouldn't specify who it was. He said it was a communication which he does not have a copy coming from the State Department confirming it after the Russians had made it known and. . . .

K: But the point was they were ___dismantel in order to reach 950 to ___ 209 submarines.

T: Right.

K: At the end of 9 missiles. We want to _____to ICBMs rather than G class submarine missiles which I have ~~xxxx~~ ranged at only 200 miles and which are becoming total ___anyway and none of which are on station right now and therefore we had agreed already in Moscow that they could not use B class submarine for replacement. We considered that a victory for us, not a set back.

T: He said that that would be the argument made for doing it and he didn't attempt to weigh the argument, he'd rather use it as a basis for saying that

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his position and the position of the delgation as negotiators has been made impossible because of that fact that there was two levels negotiations and if they're not kept informed by you and by State, I pointed out, for instance, that you were not Secretary of State at the time.

K: Yes, but I did do the negotiating.

T: Well, he said that he understood that you did and I tried to pin him down and to from whom he understood it.

K: No, but that's correct, I did do the negotiating. There was nothing secret about this.

T: Well, I got that impression too because later I had lunch yesterday with ____ and he said when he came on board in July of 1973 that it was well known and he knew all about it.

K: We considered this a great success.

T: Yes. Well, I just thought you ought to know that this came up and that the import of Nitzy's testimony is that there is double of a negotiation going on and this has made it impossible for the delegation to work toward any objective, satisfactory objective in SALT II. The other thing he mentioned is the...

K: Now on SALT II there was no double level of negotiation going on and that's one reason why didn't have a successful outcome.

T: He also cited, well he said that in 1972 that he and Smith had been told to drop the ABM thing and they ___for 48 more hours and during that time the Russians accepted it. I don't know if that's true either. He also mentioned Article 12 and...

K: What is article 12?

T: Article 12 is the instruction to the delegation not to -- with regard to the withdraw position in so far as our forces in Europe are concerned and that they the delegation according to him have been instructed not to negotiate in this area. I went ahead and asked him a further question. I asked him if the reason for that ___clearance on negotiating in the area was not the fact with a negotiated in it that we might get into very serious trouble with our allies unless there was complete coordination with....

K: Exactly.

T: He kind of agreed but said ___late with Brussels 30 times and so forth.

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and so on.

K: You know, it's inevitable that the negotiators think they would have done it better. I appreciate your telling me all this.

T: Well, I think you should have know about this and I was the only one there to tell you this.

K: Very nice of you, Bob.

T: Yes, sir. Good luck with it.

K: Bye.

END

SA67 *

RELEASED ~~IN FULL~~

TELECON
Ron Ziegler/Secretary Kissinger
June 21, 1974
11:00 AM

Z: I saw the colume this morning and I just wanted to call you.

K: OH.

Z: I didn't realize you had this ___with you...

K: Oh, that's nothing.

Z: Is that ~~xxxxx~~ exaggerated?

K: No, but I've had that sort of separate for two years.

Z: Well, I just wanted to say, make sure you get a little rest for heaven's sake.

K: Well, you're nice to call.

Z: No, I mean, that concerned me.

K: No, it's nothing. It's uncomfortable sometime. I don't even know where he knows it from.

Z: It was a good columø, don't you think.

K: I've just gone ~~thxx~~ through it and it had too much personal stuff in there.

Z: I mean over all it was good. You're ___this afternoon, aren't you?

K: Yes.

Z: OK.

K: And it doesn't concern my case.

Z: No, but I mean you'll step out afterwards and make some points. Don't you normally do that. I'm talking about (TD) tonight.

K: With Fulbright, yes.

Z: Good. You're planning on the press conference Monday, aren't you?

K: About 11:00.

Z: That would be good if you'd do it. So I'll count on that too?

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K: Yes, absolutely.

Z: I think it would be perfect to set the stage for Brussels and the Soviet Union and whatever else you want to hit.

K: Definitely.

Z: You're going to do it at 11:00.

K: ___at 11:00.

Z: OK.

K: Good, thank you.

END

SA70

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TELECON
General Haig/Secretary Kissinger
June 21, 1974
11:36 AM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Al, what is this stuff of Ehrlichman's of giving orders to the chiefs out of channels?

H: I saw that this morning. I don't know what the hell he's talking about, unless he's talking about you remember the President would have those tantrums on the bombing stuff.

K: But all of that went through Laird.

H: Sure it did. But you remember he would go through the ___occasionally and saying I'll deal just directly with the chiefs.

K: No order was ever issued that didn't go through Defense.

H: No, we'd never do it. Well, I can see why Ehrlichman might have the delusion

K: Well, that's a God-damn irresponsible thing to say.

H: He's really a ____. We're moving here today to quash his subpoena of the President, you and me.

K: OK.

H: That's what we'll do on that. How's Nancy incidentally?

K: Well, you know, it's a slow process.

H: Yes. Is she going to be able to go to that thing in New York?

K: No.

H: Listen, Henry, the question came up after the briefing yesterday from McClellen and a number of others, Stennis....

K: About public statement on the reactor?

H: Yes. That's point one and that's of less importance. Are you going to do this press conference Monday?

K: I'm going to do a press conference.

H: Good, OK. Well you could hit that.

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K: What is that, the reactor? What is the other thing.

H: The other one is more fundamental, it's the SALT business.

K: Yes, I'm going to have several forums for that.

H: OK, because what the President suggested, I just talked to him about it, Rush mentioned to him that some people have been very goosey about it .

K: No, I will hit that in the press conference.

H: You'll hit that?

K: You know, I can't go into the numbers but I'll go into the general.

H: You see Timmons is in here with me and he -- Stennis, McClellan, Goldwater, Tower and Dominic are the key guys who....

K: I'm going to testify on that before the Armed Services Committee, on Monday afternoon and they're going to hear all the figures.

H: Oh, OK. Well, why don't we do it that way, that's a better way. They were going to try to get you to have them for breakfast.

K: I'll be glad to do it, but why don't you see whether I'm going to testify before Jackson, see that they all come to that.

H: OK, let's do that and we'll tell them the schedule is so cramped that it would be better to do it this way.

K: Right.

H: OK. Everything else alright?

K: Everything else is fine. But I think the White House should say something about this Ehrlichman statement.

H: Yes, I've got to read and find out what the hell this is all about.

K: Because we can't have a statement around that orders were given on bombing out of channels.

H: No, that's crazy, it really is crazy. There were never any orders given to the chiefs that didn't go through there.

K: Exactly.

H: And where it happened it was a mistake and corrected at the time. You know it may have been an oversight.

K: Well the fact is, nothing ~~x~~ ever happened that Laird didn't know ~~xbxxkx~~ about.

H: No, that's right.

K: OK.

H: OK, Henry.

K: Good.

END

SA 72

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TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
June 21, 1974
12:07 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Brent, our advance party in Moscow claims that they have no instructions to go to the Crimea, that they want to go to the(Caucuses) and the Russians are in a panic.

S: Oh, that cannot be true, that's absurd. As a matter of fact I just sent them a cable.

K: OK, just get them straightened out, that I had agreed to the Crimea. Where in the Crimea I don't give a damn about.

S: What I heard was that they're claiming that you agreed to Yalta.

K: No. I didn't agree to anything in particular, but what Dobrynin now says is that Brezhnev wants him to stay at the place that he's got which happens to be in Yalta.

S: That's right.

K: Well, that's a PR question; to me it makes no difference.

S: Well, I think we ought to try to resist it, don't you?

K: Well, yes, but we can't shift it to the Caucuses.

S: Oh, of course not. That was never intended.

K: OK.

S: No, my cable would suggest ___ as an alternative.
the
K: OK. We can try crucifix in there. OK.

S: I'm talking to Dinitz now.

END

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SA 74 *

TELECON
Senator Kennedy/Secretary Kissinger
June 21, 1974
7:08 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Henry, how are you?

HAK: Ted, how are you?

K: Congratulations on your trip to the Middle East.

HAK: Thank you. I appreciated your letter.

K: Very, very fine. An outstanding accomplishment. You deserve all the gratitude of many millions of Americans.

HAK; You've been a very good friend.

K: I understand the meeting went well this afternoon. I came up here -- I'm up in Rhode Island now, the Foreign Relations Committee.

HAK: That was about the report on the Summit. We didn't talk about the other matter.

K: I wanted to just see on this CTB. I'm sure you probably talked about it at some length at the.....

HAK: We talked about the threshhold test ban and Humphrey and Muskie raised the CTB and I didn't oppose it very strongly.

K: Well, this would be the -- our count on it probably is that 48 that have indicated support and probably 8 or 9 that might lean our way. I think an awful lot about whether bringing this up....

HAK: Well, my view -- Oh, I was asked about that. My recommendation is to bring it up after the summit because if you bring it up before the summit and then the TDB doesn't go, people will say it was because the Soviet back was stiffened, hoping for something more sweeping. I don't think you forego any option by pressing it afterwards.

K: Well the point of course there before would be some indication, I would think, of support for whatever you were, you know, the negotiations that were taking place.

HAK: You mean that even if we don't get a CTB it would be an indication of support for some sort of test ban.

K: That's right.

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HAK: Well, from that point of view and I'll tell you we will have some Jackson ~~problem~~ problem on this one again. Can you phrase your resolution in such a way in which your preference is made clear? But you'd go along with something else as long as it moves it that direction?

K: I think if they had -- I mean, if there was some language that they had that I think even that was worked out before, I think, that could help us....

HAK: I'm not opposed to the resolution as long as it isn't used to ~~knock~~ knock off what's attainable.

K: Yes. I suppose the Defense Department will be opposed to it.

HAK; To the CTB?

K: Yes.

HAK: Totally. They're violently opposed to the threshhold test ban. Not violently, but substantially opposed to the threshhold. They'll be violently opposed to the complete test ban. That I can assure you.

K: The thinking in terms of the threshhold of moving towards a comprehensive and the treaty after that or is this just....

HAK: Well, I think it could certainly be -- we would not object to writing into a threshhold test ban if this is a step towards a complete test ban. And we're going to put into the communique, this is just for your information, the desirability of the complete test ban.

K: Well, but if you were asked about it, Henry, I mean, the only thing we don't want to get into a situation where.....

HAK: I was asked about it by Humphrey. Let me tell you -- Humphrey at the committee. I said that I would prefer it after the summit but then I didn't look at it from the point of view that you just raised. I would think that if you -- if this thing could be phrased in such a way that you maintain your position on the comprehensive but that you'd go along with something as an intermediate step or interim step then I wouldn't oppose it.

K: I'll talk to Hubert and Ed at the -- I'll try to get them over the weekend or the first of the week.

HAK: Good. I'll be here thru Monday evening.

K: Fine. OK. Thanks very much.

HAK; How's yourson ?

K: Oh, he's over in Ireland. I don't know whether that's the most dangerous. Somebody was telling me it would be better to be in the West Bank then be in Ireland these days. But I'm going over for the 4th of July break and we're camping out and that sort of thing for five days.

HAK: I still hope to meet ~~tox~~ him. Will you let me know when he gets back -- when you both are back in town?

K: Yes. He'll be over there now for about 2 1/2 or 3 weeks and then up to the Cape, but maybe in the Fall.

HAK: Let's do it in the Fall.

K: Good. OK, Henry. Thanks very very much.

HAK: Thanks for calling. Bye.

END

SA 77 *

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
June 21, 1974
8:37 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

S: Yes.

K: Another thing I find ~~unbelievably~~ unbelievable is that they gave the ~~OSD~~ OSTP memo on the test ban to Jackson.

S: I find that unbelievable too. I just had a long go around with Wickham and I said my goodness, you know, I said those are internal working documents before we have a government position. I find that ~~incomprehensible~~ incomprehensible.

K: What's his answer to that?

S: Well, his answer was, well, he said, it's the same as Schlesinger said in the NSC meeting. I said, sure, what that is that it's militarily disadvantageous but the President may want to overrule it on political grounds. That's just great. He said, well, that was the same as he testified and I said, again he shouldn't have testified to ~~tha~~ that before we have reached a position, you shouldn't do that and he said, well, they asked questions, what are we supposed to do. They're a duly constituted authority. You know, they're just unbelievable.

K: Have you told Haig this?

S: I haven't yet.

K: I wish you would.

S: He went home early tonight, he's got a sort throat or something. No, I plan to.

K: OK. Thank you.

S: Right.

END

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SA 78

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
June 21, 1974
7:40 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

S: Yes, Henry.

K: Brent, when we were in Israel there was a tentative agreement that ~~Paris~~ Peres would come here on Monday, for a preliminary talk with Schlesinger and me. What is your judgment of Schlesinger's frame of mind.

S: Not very good.

K: Should he wait until we get back from Russia?

S: I think so. That would be my impression. I would just be leary right now.

K: That's what worries me.

S: I think he's shaken up. I don't know what his frame of mind is, but I think it's not good.

K: He's shaken up by what?

S: Well, by, you know, his meeting with the President and meeting yesterday, I think he understands that the President was not happy with him yesterday.

K: Yes. It was one of the most outrageous performances I've ever seen.

S: It really was. As a matter of fact, when the President called about Julie and David, incidentally, they are not going.

K: Good. Thank God.

S: Oh, I agree. He said something about, what did you think of your Defense colleague yesterday and I told him I thought it was disgraceful. And then he went on a bit about the idiocy of the comments about his friends capability and what did they think of these negotiations were and so on and so forth. He was upset. I've let Wickham know and this morning that it was not a very good performance in my opinion. I just think he's uneasy. I mean, in a period of instability and I just don't know what he'd do. He might be fine.

K: Do you want to see whether he's free for breakfast tomorrow morning.

S: Schlesinger?

K: Yes.

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S: OK.

K: Don't you think we ought to ~~xxx~~ reestablish some contact.

S: I think it would be helpful if we can.

K: OK, let's see whether he's free for breakfast.

S: OK. What ~~xxxx~~ would be a good time for you?

K: 8:00.

S: 8:00. OK, over there?

K: Yes, but if it's good for his ego, I'll come to him.

S: OK. I ll call you right back.

K: OK.

END

RELEASED IN FULL SA 76 *

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
June 21, 1974
8:35 PM

K: _____about the long-term k military aid.

S: Yes.

K: What is the issue on that G class submarine. We never showed it to Defense?

S: I don't know whether we did or didn't. Larry was going to check with Sonnenfeldt, who would be the one, I think, who would know at that time. I think we showed it to everybody. Now whether we showed it to him before you negotiated or not, is probably the issue.

K: Yes.

S: But hell, it's favorable. So what difference does it make? It's to nail it down so that they could do something that would breach the agreement.

K: That's right.

S: But Larry was going to check with Hal because the only thing we would have over here on it is if there was anything in the files. Because nobody here was associated with it.

K: Yes.

S: Are you willing to go over there at 7:30?

K: Well, what else can we do?

S: OK.

K: Meet me at my house at 7:15.

S: Right.

K: OK.

S: OK and I'll bring that letter.

END

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
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SA 73 *

TELECON
Ron Ziegler/Secretary Kissinger
June 21, 1974
6:07 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

Z: Hello, Henry.

K: You called me.

Z: They said you called me. Well, that's alright. Carol Kilpartick says they're getting rumors from the Hill that you're resigning or obviously....

K: Who is this?

Z: Carol Kilpatrick of the Post.

K: Oh, nonsense.

Z: How did it go today?

K: Well, I just discussed the Summit and what's his name, Fulbright, stepped out before television and gave his total support.

Z: Good. Did you hit the nuclear thing?

K: Yes.

Z: Before you went in.

K: Yes.

Z: You did?

K: Yes, but not before cameras, they weren't set up.

Z: You're kidding. There were no cameras there.

K: Well, they ~~xxxx~~ were there when I came out.

Z: Did you hit it then?

K: Yes.

Z: You hit the nuclear thing both times?

K: Yes.

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Z: When did you come out?

K: About 5:30.

Z: That's perfect.

K: OK.

Z: So you hit the nuclear thing before camera.

K: Right.

Z: OK, Henry. Thanks a lot.

K: Right.

END

RELEASED IN FULL SA 79

TELECON
Mr. Maw/Secretary Kissinger
June 22, 1974
9:40 AM

K: Are you coming up with me to N.Y.

M: I understand so and I'm very happy, I hope so.

K: Good, well then we can talk about this testimony. I want the testimony written as quickly as possible.

M: Well, I'll have a draft.....

K: And I don't want it as a set of legal nit pick.

M: No it's going to be in the .....

K: Because I'm not a defendant.

M: It's going to be in the same words almost as you used before.

K: I want to use a combination of my testimony before in private session plus what I said in Salzburg, plus some additional explanations about how the White House operated in practice.

M: That's exactly the format we're trying to prepare.

K: Then at the end of it, I can say, now there's been a number of charges, you know.

M: Right.

K: And go through those.

M: I hope to bring something on the plane.

K: On Rabasa, I would like to have the Mexicans to have a sense of our being cooperative. Nobody gives a good God damn what's in this charter, no one will remember two minutes after it's signed, what it said.

M: Well, we have one problem there, the council of the Americas are sitting over our shoulders in are raising hell.

K: Who's the -- oh, that's the....

M: All the American investors in Latin America.

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K: But American businessmen are certified morons.

M: That could be but they're the ones whose xxxxx money is at stake.

K: You know as well as I do, that what they do will not depend on that God damn charter.

M: That's true, of course.

K: I don't want us to sign anything clearly disadvantagous, but I would not....

M: Rabasa had said that you had agreed at the dinner to something different then we'd talked about.

K: At the x dinner, I never x discussed anything.

M: That's all I need to know.

K: That is not true. At the dinner the issue of the charter never came up, I justtold him that I had told you to be cooperative.

M: I can handle it then.

K: But what I did think was that this sort of nit picking of _____, isn't xxxxxxxx xxxxx worth it.

M: It isn't. I don't know what the trouble is, but I said I would go kown there on Wednesday. And try to square it away.

K: OK, good.

M: I'll be in the office if you want me.

K: Good, thank xxx you.

END

5080 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
June 21, 1974
12:05 PM

(Missed first part)

D: If you don't mind.

K: Except I have the Spanish Foreign Minister waiting. You wouldn't want to undermine my relations.

D: Very quick matter. Exactly one minute.

K: Yes.

D: It's OK about/us about signing new things you proposed yesterday. You remember? About fulfillment about the ____. Maybe it will be signed in Moscow. Second, Mr. Gromyko asked me urgently to come to with you and check. Your first party which arrived to Moscow, they say that they do not nothing about Crimea.

K: They are fools. Of course we're going to the Crimea.

D: No, they say they have only Moscow and Minsk and they say they are going to ____.

K: Oh, they are.....

D: ___social practice is please check with ....

K: No.

D: And ask him to give...

K: No, they don't want to go to Yalta.

D: Well Yalta -- this is the Crimea.

K: Yes but they'd go anywhere else in the Crimea.

D: Where. Who goes to -- we discussed about Crimea about -- in Yalta there is a place where Brezhnev lived personally.

K: I see.

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D: So, this is the Crimea, really.

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K: I take care of it.

D: He asked you to give instructions to solve this.

K: Oh, they're crazy. OK.

D: OK, because they say they no nothing....

K: Anatol, I've got to run.

D: OK. So you will give me a call when you -- tomorrow or day after, OK.

K: You want to come over here tomorrow morning.

D: Tomorrow or day after ~~mx~~ tomorrow, what is better for you?

K: Why don't you come here about 9:00 tomorrow morning.

D: I think this is a good idea.

K: Good.

D: 9:00 ~~xx~~ in the morning.

K: Good. See you then.

END

SA 64

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
June 21, 1974
9:15 am

K: Brent, first, I think it is the highth of bad taste that -- to insist on using the President's car when we are dealing with the King of Belgium.

S: We are not.

K: No, I notice a cable today that we have agreed, that he has agreed to use our car.

S: The King has agreed to use.

K: Yes.

S: Well, we we sending one out that we would use his car.

K: No, apparently the King has already agreed. That's a proposition that should never be made.

S: The security people always make it as a matter of course.

K: Well, they more than make it because I got reports on every stop that they practically beat our hosts to death.

S: They always do that. Your security people do the same thing.

K: In my case, it is less important because it is not so much q question of prestige.

S: No, but I am telling you that is the way security people approach things and they have to be turned off.

K: I see a cable here that says the King has agreed to ride with the President in his car.

S: I still think we ought to turn it around, don't you.

K: Yes. Secondly, you know, it is not a big deal for me, but they ask that I accompany him. I'll be glad to accompany him -- the President to his call on the King.

S: Oh, yes. Don't you think you should?

K: Well, I think I should, it is not an earthshaking thing.

S: No, it is not a big deal because it is obviously just a courtesy call.

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K: The major advantage is the symbolism.

S: I agree.

K: Third, I notice that we are going to the Katin (sp?) Memorial in Minsk. Now, I don't know what that is but the Katin Forest is where 10,000 Polish officers were murdered by the Russians.

S: That's right.

K: Well, we can't go to it then,

S: I agree, but , well I'll find out what that is. It can't be that though, can it?-- or the Russians wouldn't propose that we go.

K: Why not, they would say the Germans did it. That was their position.
S:
S: That's true. That's one we ought to avoid in any case.

K: They are just cynical enough to do that.

S: That's true. Ok, let me look into that.

K: Finally, would you call Shalev and say you are calling at the request of the President who is disturbed beyond expression that the Israelis started retaliatory raids on Lebanon the day he left there and the day he agreed to a statement on terrorism. And have kept it up now for a week and that if they expect political support from us they cannot keep doing these things, and that we have now had the most violent protest from every Arab leader we visited. Did you see the cable from Sadat this morning.

S: No, I saw one from Fahmy.

K: Well from Fahmy on behalf of Sadat.

S: Yes.

K: And you just tell them to knock it off in no uncertain terms.

S: Right.

K: You know those guys are primitive.

S: I find it unbelievable. If anything is calculated to drive our friend here up the wall and it will look to him like an attempt to undercut his trip.

K: That's right, and you tell him in the sharpest possible terms -- I think it is better than if I get Sisco to do it.

S: No, I agree.

K: And then, I 'll have Sisco to do it also on my behalf.

S: OK, You want me to do it with Shalev -- or Dinitz isn't back yet.

K: Dinitz isn't back yet.

S: Yes, Ok, I'll do it right away.

K: Ok, but will you let me know and make it as tough as possible. And, let's look into this Katin thing.

S: Yes, I agree. I'll look into it. Are you still having that meeting at 9:30.

K: Yes.

S: Ok, I'll probably come over for that.

K: Good., bye.

END

RELEASED IN FULL (SA66) *

TELECON
Roland Evans/Secretary Kissinger
June 21, 1974
10:56 AM

E: Say, we're looking for a leg man in this office, just wanted you to know if things don't go well over there you've ~~x~~ got a job here, any time you want it.

K: ~~X~~ Well, I was hoping my contacts in this town would be used, especially by my friends.

E: Congratulations.

K: What did I do?

E: I don't know. You ~~xxx~~ must have done something, you got him back from the Middle East, safe. Without any major problems.

K: That's right.

E: You've got a problem now, though haven't you. This (Lebanese) thing. How much longer is that going to go on Henry?

K; It is not going to go on beyond today, believe me.

E: (We done with it then) (practically inaudible).

K: Yes.

E: Were you surprised at the ferocity of this assult?

K: Yes. We didn't know about it.

E: We didn't?

K: NO.

E: No, and no information. I've just been talking with the Israelis all morning on it and they, you know, it's a tough problem.

K: Yes.

E: But this isn't the way to solve it. I don't think. How are you?

K: I'm ~~fixxx~~ fine. How are things?

E: Tired?

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K: Not too bad.

E: Will we see you Saturday night?

K: Are you going to be up there?

E: Sure.

K: Of course.

E: What about Nancy?

K: She won't be able to make it, I'm afraid.

E: How sad. She was coming to dinner with us last week and had to had to cancel out.

K: Well, you know, that was too much of a strain, the prospect of being at the Evans.

E: How is she?

K: She's more used to being invited by ___then I am.

E: How is she?

K: She's getting better.

E: But she won't be there__.

K: I don't think so.

E: That's a shame. I don't suppose you'd have any time at all to see me, would you?

K: I doubt it.

E: I'm going with you to Moscow incidentally.

K: Oh, good.

E: And are you going with the President to Brussels?

K: Yes.

E: With him?

*

K: Yes.

E: You know ___happened there, any importance -- an importance ~~xxxx~~ speech.

K: Not particularly.

E: But we look at lot better, ~~xxxxx~~don't we, right now.

K: ~~H~~ Oh, much better. I may hold a press conference.

E: There?

K: Just along the foreign trip. I think it's now become standard.

E: Where would you have it. Over there you mean.

K: No. ___.

E: I know. You probably will have one though, exactly.

K: Not in Brussels. I may have one Monday before we leave.

E: When is the departure?

K: I think 10:00 on Tuesday.

E: Is~~x~~ that for both, the press and the President?

K: This I don't know. More or less the same. ~~F~~ Rollie, I've got to run.

E: Will I be able to have a chat with you over there, like we did?

K: Yes, certainly.

E: Is Winston going with you?

K: I don't think so.

E: You've got to run, I'll see you Saturday night.

K: Good.

E: Bye.

END

RELEASED IN FULL SA 65

TELECON
Mr. Simon/Sec. Kissinger
June 21, 1974
10:45 am

K: I'm sorry about Yamani yesterday, I was stuck with the President.

S: Yes, I know. He was, I think a little bit hurt, as Arabs get.

K: But, did you explain it to him.

S: Completely and I explained what the President is like when he starts to talk -- how it is impossible to break away and you know I went through the whole thing, and so did Tom Enders.

K: Well, I'll write him a letter

S: That would be super if you could do that.

K: Now, Bill, you were going to put countervailing duties on Argentina today, could you hold-up on that for a bit.

S: Well, we have got a legal problem on it and it is turning into a massive Congressional problem.

K: I know, but that's how we always pay our foreign policy prices.

S: Well, there again, if it wasn't law it would be ...

K: I know, that's what George told me and then we paid a horrendous price in Brazil. Isn't there a negotiating way you can get us a little time on?

S: We sent a team to Argentina and we were talking to them up here and they said send it on May 26 and we talked to the Argentine Embassy here in Washington and were convinced our team would be welcomed and furnished with full information you know and this is the delay tactic that Treasury has always employed, recognizing your problems. Our team got completely stonewalled

K: But the trouble is that since I didn't know this team was going down there I couldn't use ~~xxxkxxxxx~~ any political channel.

S: Actually, we went through the State Department on that and those guys got down there and they got....

K: Yes, but I didn't go to the Foreign Minister on this and I am just wondering if you could give it a month and send a team down there again.

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S: The Argentine Ambassador called over here and we've met with him a couple of times and what we have to do is really get some cooperation from them.

K: Yes, but I can't even attempt that if you make your announcement today.

S: See what happened, they came to see us last week and said that we will have a team here in Washington next week and we said good, if you'll do that then at least we can say there is motion and they called and said they can't give a response until the 17th. the Ambassador from Washington here, Buenos Aires, indicated that the Argentines couldn't possibley have a team in Washington with the necessary information this week and so you know it is just continued stonewalling. If I can get assurance.

K: But, my problem is I can't get to it. Can you give us a week?

S: Let me find out what their last conversation with them is. I would like to. Obviously, ____is making points on the side of being just as liberal as we can be. We've got these people, as you well know, up on the Hill, stirring up the Congressmen constantly.

K: I know, but how about giving us a week and letting me work on them.

S: You mean if they have a team here during that period of time.

K: Or, well, a promise of a team.-- quickly.

S: Well, there again, it is a violation of the law and they will drag my butt up to the Congress and you know, I would love to be able to defend myself if I can show them motion and good faith and damnit, we are focusing on this thing -- and you know, quiet them down.

K: Well, give us a week and the assurance of a team and you can at least decide in that period.

S: Ok, let me find out what McDonald 's last conversation with the Argentine Ambassador was and who do you want me to call over there and tell?

K: Call Eagleburger.

S: Ok, fine

K: Or Kubish.

SA 81 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Atherton/Secretary Kissinger
June 22, 1974
12:02 PM

A: _____the Presidential.

K: Look, the one from me is the operational one.

A: Right. I'm working on it Mr. Secretary.

K: Look, it's got to go today. We don't have to clear things with 12 people.

A: No, I'll get it right up to you, as soon as I can. Now what about the others. Do you want to send something off to ~~Sa~~ Asad?

K: Yes, but above all I want to get something to Sadat.

A: OK.

K: But I want it fast. It doesn't make any sense if we don't -- it's too late already. The only reason we can excuse it is to say, I've been traveling. What I want to get across to Sadat is that I began to talk to them in the sense of our discussions, but it requires a lot more detail work.

A: OK, sir. I'll get it up just as quickly as I can.

K: Meaning what?

A: Well, within the hour.

K: OK.

A: Right.

END

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SA 82

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TELECON
Senator Javits/Secretary Kissinger
June 22, 1974
1:24 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

(Missed first party)

J: Is she feeling better today?

K: Yes.

J: I'm glad. I say she's still not going?

K: No.

J: Well, I'm sorry. I hope you have a wonderful time. I'm sure he'll have a great party.

K: Thank you.

J: Listen, Henry, I wanted to ask you before you went off about two things. One, this Soviet Jewry thing, I don't know who leaked that figure but there it is. I suppose we had to anticipate that. It's too bad, I agree, but you're not dealing in the sense of ___that you and I would like. There's a certain amount of _____. Do you think it's going to ruin it.

K: Yes.

J: You really do.

K: It makes it very tough.

J: Even if you're theone who makes the declaration?

K: What declaration?

J: I mean, even if you're the one who makes the statement. You see we had arranged that it would not be them it would be you.

K: Yes, but they don't want to be in a position where they are publicly committed to a number.

J: Well, of course, they're not publicly committed to a number ...

K: Well, let's see what's going to happen. Let's just not confirm it.

J: Not confirm it.

K: Yes.

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J: Well, I think you have a right to insist on that. I think that if the matter is handled, you know, the one year basis which we discussed, I don't see really why he should complain about that.

K: Right.

J: I gathered from you yesterday that you're at some point, you have to cut loose from him.

K: I'm beginning to have serious doubts about Jackson. You know, what he's now put out about the SALT agreement is so mischievous and so wrong that I'm beginning to think he's just out for a confrontation.

J: And he just has to be taken on.

K: Yes.

J: Well, you're not going to make that decision until you get back.

K: Certainly not. And not without full consultation with you.

Gelb called me

J: Well, you're very kind. This bothered me very deeply, they called me / and said I just want to read you my story, he said, I know you won't say anything about it, so he told me what he was going to say and I said OK, and he said obviously you don't want to be quoted. I said, obviously I don't and that was the end of that. He didn't call me yesterday, Marilyn Berger called me but I told her nothing. Did she write anything this morning?

K: I haven't seen it.

J: Well, it's very unfortunate, I suppose it was too much to hope that it should be handled in the way that we hoped it would, but alright, I think the only thing to do is leave it this way.

K: Look Jack, I will do nothing in this area to change my course without you.

thing

J: OK. Now the other / wanted to ask you is about Europe. I had a talk with Hartman yesterday and I'm hoping to see Wilson, Smith, ___and governmen Of course now with this declaration it puts it on a much stronger frame, but I gather it's still a pretty ___operation. Is there anything specific or particular I should have in mind.

K: Jack can I call you, I was on the way to the hospital when you called me.

J: When can I call you?

K: Tomorrow afternoon. END

SA 80 *

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
June 22, 1974
10:09 AM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I am not in principle totally opposed to a separate protocol on environmental warfares.

S: I'm getting one up so we have it in our hip pocket.

K: OK. A statement.

S: Right.

K: And also, ~~xxxxx~~ limiting the use really implies to permit other uses.

S: Limiting the use for military purposes.

K: Yes. Why don't you get up a separate statement.

S: Yes.

K: Good.

S: Do you have everything that you need on this Jackson committee matter? I think the book is very good.

K: The ~~xxxx~~ book is good. I think I've got everything. I think they made a bad mistake because we're going to kill them on it.

S: I just don't understand Scoop. To go out and flatly ~~xxxxxx~~ assert what he must know is 180 degrees wrong. I just don't understand.

K: I'm going to kill him in the press conference.

S: Well, the other things are in the memo there that are a little more complicated

K: Good, I'll talk to you in a little while.

S: Yes, OK.

END

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SA 83

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Les Gelb/Secretary Kissinger
June 22, 1974
1:30 PM

G: Hi, Henry, how are YOU?

K: I'm running to the hospital, so I won't have much time to talk.

G: How is your wife ~~a~~ feeling?

K: Well, she's getting better but it will take another week or two.

G: The whole Kissinger family has been aggravated for weeks. You shouldn't be so aggravated. I've had a hell of a time getting to a number of your people to check stories I've been doing over the last few weeks. I think that's a ___ circumstance.

K: It's against my wishes. I'll tell Larry to be available to you. Les, I have very high regard for you. I want you to get -- and you ~~have~~ haven't been unfair. I have no complaints about you and you should have possibilities of access.

G: Because it's no secret to you that there are ~~pe~~ people in this town who have stories to tell contrary to your notions of reality and at every one of those occasions I've tried to call three or four people who I think...

K: Like who?

G: Larry is one of them. At any rate, I've called Sonnenfeldt for example on every story that concerns things that you are working on, he's never once returned ~~my~~ my calls.

K: That will not happen again.

G: You know some of these stories are perhaps not ~~even~~ even worth writing if I can details to show it's not so, but I can't operate as a fair journalist otherwise.

K: Les, you don't have to convince me. I'm with you and I will take steps today to stop it.

G: Fine. I appreciate that. Specifically I'm concerned about today is the excerpts from the Kalb book on the Middle East.

K: I haven't read that.

G: The magazine is ~~now~~ running a Middle East chapter tomorrow and they paint -- they over simplify a week long conflict between you and Schlesinger

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on Israeli resupply.

K: I think this -- look what I don't want to get into is debates on -- you know, you can't run a government if people are afraid to disagree with each other for fear that afterwards a story will be leaked. There were occasional differences in emphasis. There was not a basic clash between Schlesinger and me.

G; But that is how Marvin and Bernie paint this.

K: Well, I haven't read the chapter so I can't comment on it. But what I'm telling you is you had a story that I stopped the resupply. That was wrong. If there's another story that Schlesinger stopped the resupply, that's also wrong. He also has the President at a White House meeting on Saturday.

K: The President never attended a White House meeting.

G: That's what I thought. And he also has your telling Dinitz that the Pentagon has been the problem all week long.

K: Well, you know, I'm telling you what the facts are. I can't comment on every statement for obvious reasons. There were occasionally differences in ___in tempo and so forth, but not in basic policy.

G: Well, I think that's sufficient and I will put that.....

K: That is the major thing to get across, that there were differences in ___ sometimes in tempo not in basic policy.

G: Can I quote you on that?

K: Yes.

G: Because I have another quote here in fact from the Pentagon saying that this really was national policy for the better party of the week.

K: That's fine.

G: OK. I would hate to see you and Jim Schlesinger get into a disagreement.

K: No. I don't want it and it isn't fair.

G: Very good. Much appreciated.

K: Les, as long as you're on the phone, I don't know whether you're going to write anything on or whether the Times is going to write something on the G class issue. These additional missiles.

G: Right, I will be following up on that.

K: All I want to tell you is I will be putting out a formal statement. The story is totally absolutely without any foundation. The numbers in the interim agreement were never changed, directly, indirectly, secretly or openly and I will discuss it at the press conference in detail. But I don't think, you know, you can write what you want but it really -- you'd be going way off base and it's a really mischievous story.

G: Well, here again I called both Larry and Hal yesterday to try and check this before I even started writing.

K: Well, we will take care of this, it will not happen again. You're not mischievous because you have to write what you're given and you can't in the absence of overwhelming information but it truly is a mischievous enterprise and there's not even sometimes you take the wire tap thing and there is a basis in fact in interpretations___. Here there is no basis in fact at all.

G: Several people who ought to have known what the facts were told me this.

K: I think you will see after my press conference on Monday. That there is no basis in fact, whatever and that if it is said that they can modernize 70 missiles on G class submarines, then it is a deliberate lie.

G: That's a hell of a deliberate lie. It is mischievous in the worse sense.

K: There are enough disagreements in serious government and what really what people and maybe the press now that it has been projected into such a prominant role ought to consider if whether one can really afford to tear down public confidence in everything. This country's going to go on after 1976 and if the image is created that everything is done secretly, morally unacceptably where are we going to be?

G: It's hard in this situation in Washington today not to believe that every government officials isn't trying to pull your ear. It's very difficult.

K: That may be true, but the fact is that almost the only thing left doing or worth left doing is to maintain some ___of public morality.

G: But you know you have a better chance to deal with this then anybody in this administration.

K: And I will on that issue.

G: Larry and I had a conversation months ago in which I suggested to him that these things might be coming.

K: I'm not talking about wire tapping.

G: I'm talking about in general., including the wire tapping. My thought was that you ought to meet with someone like Sy Hersh, even though you have very strong feelings on it.

K: Sie Hersch is out to get me.

G: All, I'm saying, if you have a conversation with him, will you explain you notion of reality. Sie Hersch will print that and he will take that into account. He will be bound by it.

K: I will publish what I want. I will defend substance if in order to keep public office, I have to turn myself into a constance defense of my integrity, I won't keep public office.

G: I hate to hear you say that.

K: Well, it's what I expressed in Salzburg and that happens to be my view. I can be entitled to defend the substance of policy, but you cannot turn foreign policy into a criminal trial.

G: These kind of personal attacks and questions about secret agreements really are.....

K: No, that's different, that's substance. I consider that substance. The secret agreement that's fair enough. That will not effect my decision at all. That's a fair attack. You know it's an unjust attack, but it's fair.

G: Even on the wire tap.

K: Let's not get into the wire tap. I don't want to discuss it any further and that's not for publication.

G: Not only is it not for publication, I won't pass it on to anyone. Which is a different criteria for secrecy. I do wish you wife feels well and I do hope you stop thinking of leaving.

K: That last part I talked to you as a former associate.

G: No concern to worry about.

K: I will get you access. I will talk to Sonnenfeldt and Larry this afternoon.

G: Thank you. Bye.

SA86
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
June 24, 1974
7:50 PM

S: Yes sir.

K: Brent, what is your reading of what the Pentagon is going to do with the Israelis? They're going to give them the run around or they're going to agree to anything.

S: I think they're going to give them the runaround.

K: That's your judgment.

S: Well, you didn't really press him hard to make any definitative agreements.

K: OK, well, I'll call him tonight.

S: Any clear guidance you can give him, because you left it fairly well open.

K: OK.

S: It would help.

K: OK, I'll call him.

S: OK.

K: Good.;

END

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SA89 *

TELECON
Winston Lord/Secretary Kissinger
June 24, 1974
6:55 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Win, I want you to start with the Chinese. You can give them some of the xxx facts of the situation. I'm just xx jammed up too much. I will see them xx for 1/2 hour but that's all I can.

L: I think psychologically Henry, it's .....

K: Win, I will give them 1/2 xx hour and that's all I'm going to do. Period.

L: A half hour is all you need, but you really want me to start with xx them? I'll do what you want, Henry, but I think.....

K: I think that I'm been driven by a bunch of maniacs.

L: No, I would not....

K: Win, I can see them from 7:30 till shortly before 8:00 and that is all I'm going to do.

L: OK, well, we'll be .....

END

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SA 90

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
June 24, 1974
2:50 PM

S: Yes, Henry.

K: Brent, under these conditions we can go to the Khatyn Memorial.

S: Yes, OK.

K: In fact, it would be inpolite not to go.

S: No, I think it's an entirely thing.

K: Incidentally, would you tell that child Peter not to hang around my outer office with what I've asked him to do.

S: Yes, sure. I don't know what you mean, but I'll tell him.

K: And get those two newspapers to me. I'm pretty certain I know what I'm looking for.

S: Well, you saw the clipping, didn't you?

K: Which?

S: Didn't Peter give them to you? The clippings from those papers? For the 25th?

K: No. Is there anything?

S: Yes. There are three possible articles. There's one on the American leaks about the American position in the Paris Peace talks.

K: Yes, I saw that.

S: And then one about SALT.

K: Yes, that's only two. What's the third?

S: Well, the third one I don't think -- the third one is about ____. OK, but you do have those?

K: Yes, but has he looked into the Post?

S: Yes, I told him to look in both of them.

K: OK, let him look again. Let him bring me both of those papers.

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S: OK.

K: And let him get them to Larry and to no one sx else.

S: Right.

END

SA 87
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
June 24, 1974
7:34 PM

K: Would you make sure that Schlesinger also has the copy of the ___ missiles letter.

S: OK, that's your letter to -- your short letter to the Israelis, right?

K: Yes. OK.

S: OK. I'll get him a copy of that.

K: That will certainly leak.

S: I'm sure it will. I guess he ought to have it.

K: Yes.

S: OK, I'll make sure he gets a copy of it.

K: OK, good.

END

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SA 88
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
June 24, 1974
7:20 PM

K: _____from NEA along for this trip?

S: No, we don't.

K: Well, you'll be putting someone on as of this minute.

S: You really want somebody?

K: I have just said I really want somebody. It is certainly going to be a subject of conversation. Is Saunders along?

S: No.

K: Nor Atherton?

S: No.

K: Well, you put one of them on the list. It's inconceivable to have these discussions without somebody from NEA bureau.

S: Well, I thought you didn't want to encourage the discussions.

K: That's just like saying -- what do you think we can tell Brezhnev; I don't have someone from NEA along, therefore we won't discuss the Middle East.

S: Well, of course not. But you certainly wouldn't encourage having them. OK, I'll .....

K: Just put one on.

END

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SA85 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sen. Goldwater/Kissinger
6/26/74 - 7:45 a.m.

K: Hello.

G: Hello, Henry.

K: Barry, how are you?

G: Fine, thank you.

K: Barry, this discussion got so confused yesterday that I just wanted to make one point clear. I do not recognize that there was any loophole in this...

G: I agree with you.

K: understanding, If you look at the arsenal of Soviet weapons that they have now or under development you couldn't find one that they could claim is of the type that could be put on 3 class submarines.

G: That's true, Henry, but you have to remember that Senator Jackson is running for the Presidency and anything that he can grab to make a headline he is going to do. I don't think he got around the corner with you yesterday. The thing that's interesting to me is why if Paul Nitze knew this, or even thought it, why did he wait a year to bring it to anyone's attention?

K: Exactly, and why did the Chiefs.... You know, we sent this document over on June 20, 1973. Nobody said, good god, what have you done? The reason it came up was that we were drafting and implimenting protocol and sombody suggested to tighten up the language a little bit. So we did it.

G: I don't see anything wrong with it except that as you say, a Philadelphia lawyer who wanted to nitpick might be able to make something out of it. I tell you what, I would be very glad to make some remarks on that if you'd like me to.

K: I think it would help if you said that there wasn't a loophole and that this is just a political maneuver.

G: I think, well, I'll put something together. I'm going to be tied up most of this morning but I think I can dictate something real quickly.

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SA 84

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TELCON
Sen. Thurmond/Kissinger
8:00 a.m. - 6/26/74

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

T: Dr. Kissinger?

K: Senator!

T: How are you this morning?

K: O.K. I just wanted to tell you I appreciated your support, or at least the line you took at the hearing yesterday.

T: Well, fine. I tried to handle it in a way that would give you a chance to explain those things in a very simple way there, and I think you made it all clear to anybody who was openminded.

K: I hope you understood that we don't recognize that there was a loophole. I mean it is an absolute absurdity to claim that the Soviets would, there is no missile in the whole Soviet arsenal that would fit the description that Jackson claims is in there; nor have they developed one; nor would we have admitted it if they had.

T: Well Jackson, of course, is running for President. He has been a strong man on defense and things of that kind.

K: And I have strongly supported him in that.

T: Yes. At certain times.. I think he is running for President and anything he can use, of course he wants to do it. And if he could start a show of something here, you know, that would help him in his race, he thinks. I think you clarified it yesterday, and I think the members understand it.

K: O.K. Good, Senator.

T: I hope you have a fine trip.

K: And I hope to see you when I get back.

T: Fine. Well, good luck to you.

K: Goodbye.

T: Goodbye.

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SA 91
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
July 10, 1974
4:10 PM

S: Yes, sir.

K: Did Jerry Warren do what he was supposed to?

S: Jerry Warren did what he was suppose to. He had to do it after the briefing because they didn't -- the only thing on the whole briefing was Watergate.

K: But what does it mean he did it after.

S: He called people x in and he got the word out and it's on a ticker.

K: As a White House quote?

S: Yes. As a White House quote.

K: OK.

S: I've got it here. At the White House Deputy Press Secretary Jerold Warren said a possible Schlesinger-Grechko meeting was not discussed at President Nixon's Moscow summit and no such meeting is contemplated.

K: OK. Good.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 21 JUN 2004 200102979

SA 92

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
July 10, 1974
6:00 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

D: Mr. Secretary, welcome back to Washington.

K: How are YOU?

D: How are You?

K: I'm fine.

D: I understand you had a very brief and convincing appearance today.

K: I said no three times.

D: That's right. If I remember you correctly it sometimes took you much long longer to say yes then to say no.

K: That is true.

D: How is Nancy?

K: She's fine. Listen, I've had an hysterical call again from Rita Hauser.

D: Yes I know, she called me.

K: Now, do you agree with her?

D: I did not know what she said to you. I would have to.....

K: She says you and she are agreed that I'm in mortal danger.

D: No, no.

K: And that there are a lot of people ganging up on me.

D: I had a long talk with her yesterday. We sat for about an hour and half together and I analysed some of the situations as I did with Larry. Which I'm sure Larry told you.

K: Not yet.

D: Which is a realistic assessment I think of some of factors that are operating in the scene which I'd be more than glad to share it with you. But it's by no means a panic situation.

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K: No, that's my assessment too. I don't know what your assesment is, I think I've identified that fact.

D: It's more or less thing that we've have talked before but so many of them are coming to a head and I think they are manageable but we have to recognize that and I wanted to change some news with you.

K: Let's get together tomorrow sometime.

D: I will be in New York tomorrow because Larry told me that we would see each other on Friday. You think we could do it on Friday or shall I ....how is your schedule?

K: Maybe Friday. Friday would be alright, about 5:00.

D: 5:00 on Friday.

K: Or does that keep you away from synagogue.

D: No it doesn't keep me away from synagogue, I go only on Thursday, as you know.

K: But only when there's a bar mitzvah.

D: Right.

K: I think I've identified my problem areas.

D: I'm sure you did.

K: I'd be -- your judgment means a lot to me.

D: No, we will be able to talk and exchange views and maybe it will be helpful.

K: I know it will be helpful. You have extremely good judgment but basically my.....

D: ___my concerned, it doesn't come out of anything except very concerned, very .....

K: I consider you a close personal friend, you know this. So I don't talk to you as an ambassador. On the other hands sometimes it's best to be fatalistic.

D: Not unless it's absolutely necessary.

K: OK, well, I'll see you -- look your people in Jerusalem have lost their minds.

D: About what at now?

K: In general. I just don't like the tone. Now you take that Moscow communique, in the letter of invitation to Geneva, we said in the first stage we would discuss the Palestinians. We took out in the first stage. Less than.....

D: I think the reason the press reaction -- does not reflect the government's reaction on this.

K: I spent a whole night fighting this thing. Less than that we couldn't do on the basis of the record. Then to string together things we had already said.

D: I under stand. I will point out to you where are the points which concerned us, but obviously it was not any concern that even my phoning back Sisco and telling him what I think of him.

K: The future of the Palestinians will not be decided with such nonsense.

D: That's is correct. But you must understand why there is great sensitivity in the press.

K: But I must say the Rabin interview with Newsweek is unforgivably. It's senseless, it makes no sense.

D: I don't think he said anything new there but may be the tone was not.....

K: But why say it. What do we gain.

D: If you ask me why ___being interviewed by ___ any how.

K: We're talking as friends, but what the hell good did it do to anybody? You don't need it now, no one has asked anything.

D: I agree with you.

K: If I hear once more a piece of land for a piece of peace. You tell Alon if he says that, that's the end of our conversation. He can say anything else. He can say he wants Amman for a peace settlement.

D: I tell you when I was in Israel I told Rabin _____ and said what the hell do you have to give him any interview. Who is he an agent of ___and later a __of Sadat. Why do you have to interview. He said I'm not going in and give him an interview just background. So I guess one cannot resist a picture in Time magazine.

Peres

K: And then of course what/said with Javits.

D: That I have told Scowcroft is not correct. I have told Scowcroft but I don't know if you've had a chance to hear from him, but I told Scowcroft because he called my attention to it and I checked with Peres and Rabin. Peres did not refer at all to any letter of commitment on the President.

K: Yes, but he said there was a letter.

D: No, he did not. Peres denies it forthright in a cable and a telephone conversation and authorized me to tell it to you in his name. It is not. I think that your Ambassador is very frustrated and probably has some ___ about it or maybe Javits ___ something and immediately wanted to cable because he wanted to indicate to everyone that he did -- you know, that he's not kept informed. That was his motivation. He said to someone that he has learned five minutes in his conversation with me so when he was in Israel more than you people tell him in a year. So this is his attitude for frustrated Ambassador who.....

K: This I can't believe. There are a lot of things I believe.

D: No, but in___.

K: But that is physically impossible.

D: That is correct.

K: OK. I will see you Friday at 5:00.

D: See you Friday.

END

SA 93 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Larry Eagleburger/Secretary Kissinger
July 11, 1974
6:54 PM

E: Stennis finally returned my call and I explained your thought and he said he would send me a list of names tomorrow. But then he went on to say, you had done so well the other day at the leadership meeting, he'd like you to come up before the entire committee. I said that I'd pass that on to you.

K: What do you think?

E: I think it would be a great idea, you'd run into a problem with the House, you know if we're going...

K: No, that's alright. Well, tell him yes.

E: OK. The only thing I'm thinking is we've got to worry about Doc Morgan.

K: Let's put him on in the next two or three weeks.

E: Now that one other_____he said he was really concerned about these reports about you and Schlesinger and off record for your information, he had thought about asking you and Schlesinger up there at the same time.

K: No.

E: I know. I didn't say anything. I will call him back inthe morning and say that's really fine, but you'd rather just keep it to a briefing on the trip and think it would be better if you appeared alone.

K: Right. And just tell him I don't consider myself in confrontation with Schlesinger.

E: I already told him. He said, what did I think and I said, look I can tell him personally in my knowledge that no conflict between Schlesinger (inaudible). OK. I'll call him back.

K: Good.

E: And get it set up.

K: Right.

END

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 11 FEB 2003 200102979

SA 160 1*

TELCON - McCloseky, Ingersoll/HAK - 4:45 p.m. - 7/19/74

K: I thought you were going off Bob McCloskey.

I: But he is in my office.

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.5(C), 1.5(D)

M: Knowing you're still working I can't leave.

K: Yes, but I'm three hours behind you.

M: Anytime we're three hours ahead of you I'll figure we've gone pretty far.

K: In that message to Callaghan - one point that ought to be made is that it is of you two that to bring pressure to restore Makarois from the outside may well be a way of solidifying rather than weakening the Greek regime. Which I believe to be true. And that [redacted] report I've just seen from athens. It rationalizes that it will look to them as an outside pressure of somebody that is unacceptable to all of them of that Greek junta. Excuse me. Fulbright is calling me. I'll call you right back. B1

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 25X1
DECLASSIFY AFTER: INDEFINITE
DATE/CASE ID: 27 MAY 2004 200102979

SA 94 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Larry Eagleburger/Secretary Kissinger
July 11, 1974
7:40 PM

E: Yes sir.

K: Larry, I sent a letter out yesterday for Hal Sonnenfeldt to answer. This means I want the answer by tomorrow.

E: OK.

K: To Lord Kennet about this ~~Mx~~ Jackson episode. Can you make sure?

E: Yes.

K: Secondly, I find here a whole batch of letters to Senator Ross, to Otis Chandler. They are six weeks old, replying to letters they sent me. Now that just cannot be.

E: I'll check it with Bremer.

K: We're talking about Otis Chandler.

E: I ll check it with Bremer in the morning.

K: That's a good way to make an enemy.

E: No, I know. I agree.

K: I understand also from Nancy that David Bruce is very hurt that I never answered his cable explaining that he hadn't said what he had said.

E: I thought in fact we had answered it, but let me~~x~~ check.
~~Kx~~
K: But could ~~h~~ we please make sure that we do these things.

E: Yes.

K: Now finally this morning I ran into the President of the University of Rochester who said he's been ~~x~~ trying to offer ~~x~~ me an honorary degree for four weeks. He had a letter in here for six weeks, he's been trying to call you for three and he can't get through.

E: I replied to his letter on your behalf...

K: I don't want a honorary degree.

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E: I know. I replied to his letter several weeks ago saying you were out of town and we'd get an answer as soon as you got back.

K: For example, what it is that is holding up an answer to the Alfred E. Smith dinner?

E: Alfred Smith.

K: Alfred Smith dinner. That used to be considered something the Presidential candidates fight for. Now why do we not anser that? Or at least get me a recommendation. How many hundreds of people have to analyse that?

E: I intend to check that in the morning.

K: How about that award from the Carnegie thing that I gave you yesterday. I just want to know what the procedure is.

E: The procedure is that on those they go down to PA for a recommendation and they usually pull together in one and they apparently take too damn long. I'll have to sit down with George Springsteen and work up a system I guess.

K: I want both of these back up tomorrow and I want no letter held for more than three days.

E: OK. Alright I'll have it for you and the Sonnenfeldt thing.

K: OK.

(Remainder of conversation is personal)

END

SA 100

RELEASED ~~IN FULL~~

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
July 12, 1974
12:15 PM

K: Tell the Germans that Genscher could come on the 23rd. That I could then meet with them the morning of the 24th and if the President is still on the West Coast we could then go out to the West Coast the afternoon of the 24th and meet the President the morning of the 25th, then he can go on home the evening -- you know, ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ the afternoon of the .....

M: Was he supposed to bring his wife?

K: Look, preferably not. The fewer I have to deal with, the better.

M: I mean, you didn't suggest that to him.

K: Well, if you give him that schedule he's going to ~~xxxx~~ bring his wife.

M: OK.

K: Good. Can you do that?

M: Yes.

K: Thank you.

END

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 21 JUN 2004 200102979

RELEASED IN FULL SA99

TELECON
Bernard Kalb/Secretary Kissinger
July 12, 1974
12:20 PM

HAK: How are you?

K: Fine. Thank you very much, sir. I just wanted a moment if I could, I was going to try actually to stop by for a second before leaving for San Clemente to drop off a bound copy of the book, which we just have received.

HAK: Oh, terrific.

K: But Dr. Kissinger, my office called to ask me to look into the story in the Wall Street Journal which I assume you may have seen this morning.

HAK: No.

K: It's on the front page on the top, Nixon and Kissinger head toward a falling out.

HAK: Oh, baloney.

K: And he says the President fails to aid the Secretary of State on the wire tapping controversy; Kissinger would like a White House statement that he's telling the truth.

HAK: That's also nonsense.

K: All of that?

HAK: Yes. I'm certain the President will say what needs to be said before that is over and it's just not true.

K: Can I use some of this of what you're saying, nonsense of this whole report? I mean would it be alright if I were to quote you on this? Or just take it on background and so forth.

HAK: Take it on background. But you can make it very strong.

K: The whole story?

HAK: Yes. I mean, for example, somebody read me a part of it this morning. For example, he fails to inform me of a Japanese trip. He failed to inform me of a trip he isn't taking.

K: I see.

HAK: That was with respect to the story that he was going to Japan in

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August. The fact that a trip was being planned for 1974, I of course knew, because I had it in the communique when Tanaka was here.

K: Absolutely. Well, one of the things that when we were listening to the Salzburg news conferences, there was some speculation that maybe some of that might have been that the President might step forth and in effect reiterate the May 22 that he personally authorized the entire wiretap program.

HAK: I've expected that will be done before it's over. There is no dispute between the President and me and I'm sure the White House will confirm this.

K: They have. They told me that this morning.

HAK: There's not the slightest problem and I don't know how these stories get started.

K: So in effect, you're really guiding me away from that whole story and knock it down as best I can.

HAK: That is really -- and I'm not doing it to be cute. There just isn't anything to it.

K: Alright, I'll get down and I'll try to stop by Dr. Kissinger and drop of a copy of the book on the floor before we take off.

HAK: Good.

K: I'm most grateful for your ~~kkxx~~ help on this thing and to welcome back after a very very difficult job on this last round.

HAK: Thank you.

K: I hope you loved the soccer match.

HAK: I liked it very much.

K: OK, many thanks.

HAK: Bye.

END

SA 101 *

TELECON
Senator James Allen/Secretary Kissinger
July 12, 1974
4:55 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Senator, I've been out of town so much since you introduced your resolution in my support a few weeks ago, that I never had a chance to thank you.

A: You didn't have to do that.

K: Well, I wanted you to know that it was very much appreciated and it meant a great deal.

A: I was glad to do it. I felt that since so many of our agreements stood to fail on their trust and ~~xxxxx~~ confidence in you that the United States Senate should not have less confidence, so that was the theory on which I did it. I feel like it came at a pretty good time.

K: It came at a very good time and it was -- it ~~xxxxxx~~meant a great deal to me and I wanted you to know that.

A: Well, I was just delighted to do it and I feel like I have performed a service that you certainly were entitled to and you've done an outstanding job and I was certainly glad to lend my support to this statement.

K: Again, I want you to know how much I appreciated it.

A: Well, you're certainly welcome.

K: Hope to meet you.

A: I was delighted to do it.

K: Bye.

END

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 12 FEB 2003 200102979

SA 102
RELEASED IN FULL

*

TELECON
Secretary Weinberger/Secretary Kissinger
July 12, 1974
5:08 PM

W: ____classmate of mine and somebody you probably know - Francis Keppel, who used to be over here. I guess may still be at Harvard.

K: What's his name?

W: Keppel.

K: Oh, yes. I know.

W: Francis Keppel, he used to be commission of education.

K: Yes, I know him very well.

W: He's finishing a job really running a thing called General Learning which was a joint ~~xxxxxx~~ venture of Time and General ~~Xxx~~ Electric and has done a fine job of that.

K: No, he's a very able guy.

W: He is and he has some interest in public service again and to be perfectly frank, I tried out the President with him to see if I could get him to agree to have me put him on as Commission of Education again, which Frank was willing to do and the President indicated no enthusiasm for that idea but I do think he is extraordinarily able and his primary interest is in the ~~xxxxx~~g foreign international field, international monetary fund and international banking___and the State Department with perhaps international economic overtones or something of that kind.

K: What makes you think the President will want me to hire him?

W: I thought that perhaps that if ~~xxx~~/he were in an area in which the President is ___more interested and secondly which he would regard as less sensitive with your aspects of things like buffing, grants to ivy league institutions and things like that, that he might not regard that as so much more difficult. I don't know, I just think this is an extraordinarily able fellow and I have known him since ~~x~~ I was a first year freshman in college.

K: No, I know Keppel. He's very able. Let me see what I can do about it.

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W: It could be with one of the funds or with something else but I just wanted to put his name before you and I was sure you knew him so I thought rather than write the formal.....

K: No, this is much better.

W: .....letter I would just do it this way. But I wanted to be frank and let you know the past history of the thing. The President didn't say no you can't have him but he just said, gee I don't know if he'd really be very consistent with what we want to do and I think that would be misread in the community and stuff like that and after a while I got tired of pushing him. He is awfully good and in a different field he might not encounter that.

K: Good. Well let me -- I will definitely consider him.

W: Excellent. I cannot refrain from telling of my admiration for how you do all these things, Henry. It's really great. It's the one thing that we all got to crow about and hope to God you keep on doing it for a long time.

K: Cap you're a good friend.

W: Thank you sir.

K: Thank you, bye.

W: OK.

END

SA98 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Schecter/Secretary Kissinger
July 12, 1974
10:40 am

S: Hugh must have known you were trying to get me, he wouldn't let me get off the phone.

K: What does he want, to prove that the President is getting ready to fire me.

S: No, he said that diplomatic relations between the White House and the State Department were superb.

K: That's true.

K: I return his calls the same day now.

S: (Laughter) Well, you sound in pretty good shape. The reason I called is we are trying to do a piece about -- a sort of positioning things for your appearance.

K: My appearance won't be until the 23rd now.

S: I see. Are you pretty sanguine about how things..

K: Ch yes. Now that I have seen all the documents which I never had before. I think they more than support my case.

S: When you say all the documents, you mean the FBI stuff.

K: Yes, you see all I had seen is a 29-page summary. Now I have seen the documents on which the -- on what basis are we talking?

S: The usual.

K: No, I just don't think I ought to characterize my testimony before I give it, but I really...

S: Let me -- well, I can say on my own that you are confident.

K: Very very confident. And, in fact I don't think there is a problem.

S; What about this so-called difference about the fact that Hoover says in the memos, which I gather were drafted by Sullivan but signed by Hoover, saying that you were the initiator.

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K: I think that will all come out very clearly. The initiator of what, individual taps?

S: Yes.

K: It is a pure question of terminology. And I think I am going not to get into it. What I am going to do is to describe it. I really think it is a pure question of terminology. That the substance is as I described it.

S: Right, right. What about the thing on terminating the taps.

K: McCloskey now says, that he having reviewed the records -- if anything I overstated my role.

S: (Laughter) Well, it won't be the first time.

K: Listen, you bastard, you'll never get in here again. Look, everyone agrees that after May 1970, I didn't see any of these reports anymore. So what possible basis did I have for terminating it.

S: Yes,

K: Secondly, the records will show that a number of people that were tapped, I never got any reports on so I just couldn't have been the guy terminating them.

S: Right, well, who was resp onsible for that in the White House at thiat point.

K: You know I'll have to wait with my statement. But I don't know the answers to all of the questions.

S: Ok, it's just sort of speaking personally, I think that is one of the questions that should be answered in this whole thing because that is one of the questions that has been raised on this. The memo says, the FBI memo says, that on three separate occasions they asked for the taps to be terminated .

K: I frankly don't believe that.

S: Well, ...there may have been a little bureaucratic ass covering there, but you know, you're aware of what the problem is. The problem is that you then take a quantum jump from not terminating the taps to the idea that the information wasn't, didn't generate National Security information but was used for domestic political purposes, namely the fact that

S: Halperin and Lake were working for Muskie.

K: Loo,k at the time Halperin and Lake were working for Muskie, I wasn't getting any reports any more.

S: Ok.

K: So even if that were true, I wouldn't have known about it.

S: Now, what about the plumbers business and Wellender. Do you see that as a problem.

K: It is a harder problem to prove because I didn't do anything, so I have no records whatsoever to fall back on.

S: Yes.

K: I do not see it as a problem , no. I did not know about the Plumbers. I don't know how often I have to say that.

S: Now, for example, in your testimony, you have mentioned on two or three occasions people came to you for historical documents which you refused, but you also said that you didn't understand that that was an organized group.

K: No, no no. Nobody of the Plumbers ever came to me.

S: I see. I see.

K: That didn't come from the Plumbers.

S: Where did that come from, Colson?

K I think once it came from Colson and once it came from Erlichman. But that never came from any body from the Plumbers.

S: I see. Ok. Well, I get the feeling that resignation is fading into the background here, would that be correct.

K: It depends what decision the Committee makes.

S: Yes, but I sense that frankly, the worst that Erlichman and Colson have to offer seems to have just kind of floated away with the tide.

K: They don't have anything to offer.

S: That's right.

K: I mean they have innuendo. And with Colson, his own sick imagination. When Colson says I was at a meeting that he didn't himself attend, then what the hell do you have.

S: Yes, Yes.

K: No, I'm glad that we can have a comprehensive view of the thing. Ok, Jerry. You'ave been very decent through all of this.

S: That's because you deserve it.

K: Well, I don't know, but you have and I appreciate it.

S: Thanks, we'll be in touch.

K: Ok, bye.

END

Schecter called back: 10:42

S: Henry, Life magazine is going to start up again and they have a special report which is going to be one day in the life of America which the day is going to be September fifth and they are going to do a day in the life of the country and of course, they want me to do a piece on you and yourday. And, I was hoping we could get you to cooperate on that.

K: Of course,

S: Ok, wonderful.

K: It means you have to spend that day with me.

S: That's right.

K: I wish you were prettier.

S: (Laughter) Maybe your wife will like me.

K: Ok.

S: Thanks.
END

SA 104 *

TELECON
Larry Eagleburger/Secretary Kissinger
July 12, 1974
7:06 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Did you ever call Congressman Mahon?

E: No, I did not because I wanted to talk to you tomorrow morning.

K: There's nothing to talk about. I wish to do it.

E: Alright.

K: I am not appearing ~~before~~ the Senate ~~xxxxx~~ -- for the State Department, I'm appearing for other reasons.

E: No, I understand that.

K: I know there are a lot of things you guys got scheduled for me that don't do anybody any good.

E: I wanted to get some feel from you on those other two appearances.

K: I want the House on Thursday morning.

E: Good.

K: Then we can ~~xxxxx~~ move the verification panel.

E: OK. That's all I need and I'll call him.

K: And then I want a Senate Armed Services Committee next week.

E: Week after next.

K: Yes.

E: OK.

K: I also want Mahon in one of those social hours.

E: OK. Wasn't he supposed to give you some other names too?

K: He was going to arrange a meeting and he was going to be in touch with you.

E: OK. I'll call him in the morning.

K: Good.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 12 FEB 2003 200102979

SA 103

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TELECON
Mr. Kubisch/Secretary Kissinger
July 12, 1974
5:18 PM

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.5(D), B6

HAK: ____find that the Brazilian press is attacking me for rooting against them in soccer.

K: I saw that in this morning's New York Times. I'm absolutely mistyfied about it.

HAK: And also that they were offering me a sweat shirt. They must have some psychotics down there.

K: Well, there are plenty of those in Rio but...

HAK: I don't remember that any one offered me any sweat shirt. Why don't you issue a statement saying I would have been glad to root for them if they had ever left their half of the field. Why don't you have our Embassy put out a statement saying I rooted for them the two times they crossed mid-field.

K: OK.

HAK: No, I'm kidding.

K: No. But also in that same little piece in the N. Y. Times, they attribute some remark to Crimmins that you were going there in October. I can't imagine Crimmins saying anything like that.

HAK: Well, can you get this straightened out first in so far as it's possible get Crimmins to get across to them that I wasn't rooting for anybody. That secondly no one offered me a Brazilian sweat shirt and that I would be honored to wear one into my office. Tell them if the sweat shirt is under $50 I'll keep it.

K: Whether it's laundered or not.

HAK: No seriously, can you get him if it's possible [redacted] B1
to get that word out to the newspapers?

K: Yes. You weren't really rooting for anyone and no one offered you a Brazilian sweat shirt.

HAK: That's right.

K: OK.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, M. GRAFELD, DAS, A/RPS, ACTING
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 25X6
DECLASSIFY AFTER: HAK'S DEATH
DATE/CASE ID: 21 MAY 2003 200102979

HAK: Because had they done so it would have left such an indelible impression. In fact I even posed with Pelli (phonetic). [redacted] B6

K: Well, it's nice that you're indiscriminate in .....

HAK: OK. Well, will you get these guys in Brazilia to see what they can do in a low-key way?

K: Yes.

HAK: OK, good.

END

SA 95
RELEASED IN FULL

*

TELECON
Mr. Ziegler/Secretary Kissinger
July 12, 1974
9:55 am

Z: Hi Henry.

K: Ron, how are you?

Z: Good. Listen, I was just reading the Wall Street Journal here. And it has Nixon and Kissinger head toward a falling out. It is not a big thing. It is more of the crap.

K: What does it say?

Z: It says Nixon and Kissinger head toward a falling out. It is not a big thing. But down below it says talks of a possible Nixon trip to Japan or more visits to Europe -- but Kissinger hasn't been filled in on either idea.

K: Well it is total bullshit. They asked me on the plane about the President's trip to Japan in Auguat. I said I had never heard of it,

Z: Good.

K: But I do know it was in a Communique that he is going in '74.

Z: Good. I just want you to know that what I have said when they say Ziegler talks about a possible Nixon trip -- when that story broke, I don't know who broke it about August. I took exactly the same line you're taking. I said there is no problem . I know that Kissinger and the President have not talked about a specific date but as we said in the Communique, the President would like to visit Japan in '74. And has agreed in principle. And in terms of another trip to Europe, I say that there is nothing on the calander. So if you see that, I want you to know that we're not over here, and I'm not spreading around some Japanese trip. We were responding to that leak story. Ck?

K: Ck. Well, you know, whatever you can do to avoid any impression of a split between the President and say I think -- would be highly desirable from the President's viewpoint.

Z: Absolutely, that's why I am calling. Of course it would and that's what I am going to do. But I just wanted you to know first hand that if you read that or it is called to your attention that I am taking exactly the line you're taking.

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K: Well, why don't you call them and tell them.

Z: I am going to. I am going to. I am going to hit the guy over here today.

K: Ok, good.

Z: Ok, Henry.

K: Thank you.

END

5084 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Ambassador Dobrynin/SecretaryKissinger
July 12, 1974
10:09 am

D: Hello.

K: Anatoly.

D: Hello, Henry. I am really glad to hear your voice.

K: I am so busy doing your work in the European Security Conference and elsewhere that we're not in contact anymore.

D: Well, for a change I think it is useful. Really. To do something.. well, Henry have to thank you for the opportunity to meet on Monday because I go for a rather long vacation on Tuesday.

K: Ok, can we have lunch on Monday.

D: Yes, that is very good. Yes, and if you don't mind to look through on those agreements which have an understanding on what we are going to do from an organizational point of view. When we will begin it and..

K: Absolutely. And also I want to tell you what we have done on the European Security Conference, because I think we have got it in a very positive direction now, if you cooperate a little bit on Basket III.

D: Well, do you have any concrete suggestions. ? This is important.

K: I think we have broken the back on the Summit idea.

D: Already.

K: I think we are well on the way. But don't go around saying this.

D: No. no, no.

K: No, you won't, but sometimes your people in the lower regions are not as subtle as you are.

D: On this only Gromyko and myself are looking, otherwise he will keep this close to his heart. It is a project he likes very much. So, Henry, then...

K: And I also want to talk to you about SALT. Not that there is a wild urgency, but I really think before everybody goes crazy....

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 14 NOV 2002 200102979

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D: Henry, Brezhnev asked me if you could just a little bit more liberate these ideas of yours. Because he himself is going for a vacation. He will want to go for three days in Poland, in a few days. But then he will spend all his time ...

K: What did you do to my Egyptian friends ?

D: What did we do. We just give a chance to explore alldepths of their talks til October, so we hope they will explore it fully.

K: Well, now they are all upset and worried.

D: On the contrary, we give them a full chance to make a soul searching...

K: I will stop advising you when you people start getting clever, we'll be in deep trouble.

D: They decided really to give them a chance.

K: I need you clumsy.

D: You are going to stay here, not go on any vacation.

K: No, I think I need to show some of my opponents in this town that I did not survive for five and a half years by being a pushover.

D: I notice this, but I think what they are going is a crazy idea and a stupid one. Because no chance of...

K: Anatoyl, I am bound to win.

D: No, no. I amsure about it. That's why I am rather surprised by the stupidity of them to try it because it is a clear-tight case and..

K: No, no. Actually I want to stay in town. I just want to stay here for about four weeks to restore a little discipline.

D: This is important.

K: How long are you going to be gone.

D: I guess until the middle of September.

K: Well. Somebody told me you are going to become Foreign Minister. Is that true ?

*

D: Well, you know, not always are your sources of information the best ones.

K: Well, we'll have to take that wiretap off the Kremlin then.

D: Well, this is another story, or you have to fire those who are making them, there not good enough and get a better one.

K: Well, Anatoyl I would/very torn. On the one hand, I would like to see you in a higher position, on the other...

D: No, I [redacted] am not really eager. It is troublesome work. In a way, I may say, it is more difficult than yours.

K: Much more, much more.

D: In one way. A rather important one. In a sense, when you have to get a message...

K : You have fifteen, and you have a Politboro member who thinks he is an expert.

D: So this makes it much more difficult. In your case, it is easy, you have only one man.

K: No question, and I would also hate to lose a personal friend here. I don't know how it squares with Marxist idealogy to have personal friendships at the diplomatic level.

D: I think it is quite alright. I hope until next meeting here, until next summit I'll be here.

K: Oh, good.

D: These are my intentions. Ok, Henry.

K: Good.

D: And I'll see you on Monday at 1:00.

K: Are you going away for the weekend.

D: Probably yes. Probably will go to the big bay, this is my intention.

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K: Today?

D: No, tomorrow. Today, I will stay here.

K: And you'll be back on Sunday.

D: Yes.

K: Ok, well if I want to get a hold of you I can call you there.

D: Well, ok. It is alright with me, but I am sure you can wait until Monday.

K: It will wait Monday. See you for lunch on Monday.

D: Yes, thank you very much.

K: Good, bye.

END

SA 108

*

TELCON
Ted Koppel/Sec. Kissinger
July 15, 1974, 5:15 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

TK: I wanted to check with you personally and quickly and see if we could work out a convenient time for you to see your program.

HK: I would love to see it.

TK: Do you think you would be in town some time next week?

HK: Yes.

TK: We would like you and Nancy to come out and bring a few people. Walter wanted to come down. We will have a few people at the house and show it out there.

HK: How about Howard K. Smith.

TK: Absolutely. He would be one of the people. You think about it.

HK: Nancy was going to NY next week on Tuesday. Maybe I can get her to put it off until Wednesday and in which case I would suggest Tuesday night.

TK: I will call back tomorrow and check.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 12 FEB 2003 200102979

SA 111 *

TELECON
David Frost/Secretary Kissinger
July 15, 1974
6:05 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

(Missed first part)

F: I'm going to be in New York on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday of next week and was wondering if you would be free for lunch.

K: Let me see. I couldn't be so lucky if they would tell mewhat I'm doing next week. There is a chance on Tuesday, but I won't know -- when are you coming?

F: On Sunday. I could call Sunday or Monday. I will give you a call Monday morning.

K: Terrific.

F: It would be delicious to see you.

K: Good to see you.

F: I will give you a buzz. Everything seems to be turning out alright for you.

K: We're going through hysteria but it seems to be alright now.

F: That's marvelous.

K: OK, David.

F: I hope to see you this week, Henry.

K: That would be very good.

F: Greetings from London - God bless.

K: Goodby.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 12 FEB 2003 200102979

RELEASED IN FULL (SA 107)

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TELECON
Mr. Ziegler/Secretary Kissinger
July 15, 1974
5:00 pm

K: Hi Ron, how are you?

Z: Good, how are you? I wanted you to know that I took a jab at Jackson on three things. I was asked about the secret letter and I followed your guidance about leaking executive material and you had covered it in your press conference of June___ and what it was about and then I went on to say I had been asked to comment on other things. First the knowledge of the US Government on the Indian nuclear test before May 18 and I shot that down.

K: What? Oh, exactly.

Z: The fact that we had knowledge before the May 18 text. We didn't did we?

K: No idea whatsoever.

Z: And thirdly, I said the Senator said we are selling police equipment to the KGB.

K: That's crazy.

Z: I said there is a world trade fair going on and some private industry might have done something, but any relations to munitions falls under COCOM and existing regulations...These are 3 instances where the Senator has violated..without stating the facts. I also said you would be out on Thursday and then again for the signing of the Spanish Declaration.

K: Good.

Z: Fulbright has released the letter and I think we will release it out here.

K: CK. Many thanks

Z: Anything there?

K: No, I think every time Jackson puts his head up we ought to slap him back. That SOB is totally irresponsible.

Z: I agree. Ok, Henry. END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 21 JUN 2004 200102979

SA 105
RELEASED IN FULL
*

TELECON
William Clements/Secretary Kissinger
July 15, 1974
1:07 PM

K: How are you? I wanted to talk to you about one other things in connection with our conversation this morning. These statements that we're falling behind strategically will have a major effect on our foreign policy. pointed out to me that it made his position very tough. He wants to keep Defense's budget up. The Chinese Ambassador was in here and asked me what there was to Zumwalt's statements. He seemed to think Moorer made such statements.

C: I don't think he did. I know the statements. It's really not quoted properly and Tom did what he

K: When foreign governments make full inquiries then you have to worry.

C: I don't know what to think about it. You know, before, he was difficult to control.

K: Defense ought to take him on. If we take them on, the next time someone ought to say it's untrue.

C: I don't mind doing that. I will talk to Jim about that. Bud and I have had some arguments. I actually had in my hands his resignation and wouldn't accept it.

K: That guy is really totally irresponsible.

C: That's right. He's trying to (charge some sufficient interest). I don't know what it's

K: That you can be sure. When he came to the Pentagon -
He wanted to have an aircraft carries going to Santiago. I refused to let him do that.

C: I will do this and I will also mention this to George Brown. We are having a sandwich together now. We're continuing to talk about some of the same things we talked about this morning.

K: If you want to call Haig, it wouldn't be a bad idea.

C: I think I will do that but I didn't want to do it without your permission.

K: If you do it, do it in the same sense of what we talked about this morning.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 21 JUN 2004 200102979

C: I will say it's a result of a discussion you and I and George Brown were having.

K: OK. Thank you.

END

SA 106

*

TELECON
Ambassador Zahedi/Secretary Kissinger
July 15, 1974
4:23 PM

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: Mr. Ambassador, I call you about once every three months about our errant Secretary of the Treasury. Will you convey to his Imperial Majesty our affection, regard, mortification and needless to say _____. He denies having said it.

Z: Yes. Fortunately, I got it a few hours ago.

K: Where are you?

Z: In New York. I came to talk to a group. [redacted] B6

K: Well, you convey to his Imperial Majesty that every member of the cabinet, with the exception of the Secretary of Treasury and particularly the Secretary of State and the President, hold him in the highest esteem and we will put a stopto this.

Z: Alright. [redacted] as soon as B6 I come back. I would like to see you. I think you got my message a long time ago.

K: No, I didn't

Z: When you were gone. When I come back to see you, I will brief you about the bilateral thing.

K: I will take over the bilateral commission myself. I have told this to Ambassador ~~Hoksox~~ Helms.

Z: He is in Washington? I will send the mesaage now.

K: Send it and tell him that we considdr him one of the great leaders and we will convince our Secretary of Treasury that this sort of _____ is out of the question. I am not sure he said it. He denies saying it but whatever he did say I apolozie for.

Z: Thank you. You are very kind.

K: OK.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 24 FEB 2003 200102979

5085 *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Sec. Kissinger
July 15, 1974
5:30 pm

K: Anatoyl. We just got a message from Cyprus that your Counselor asked the British High Commissioner how the British would feel about the introduction of Soviet troops to restore order.

D: Troops?

K: I can't believe this.

D: I have no information. I have no telegram telling me this.. I doubt that very much.

K: I can't believe he would do this.

D: I doubt this and you don't have anything from your mission? your mission in Moscow?

K: In Moscow?

D: I mean in Moscow. They might have been in touch with them.

K: We have nothingfrom Moscow and nothing from Cyprus. Only that there is still fighting going on.

D: Who was it....

K: Your second man in the Embassy.

D: The second man come to the British...to me it sound unbelievable.

K: Me too. If you planned something like this you would talk to us.

D: Yes.

K: You know, we would not look on it with favor.

D: I know....

K: Let's see if it calms down. There are plenty of troops there.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 18 NOV 2002 200102979

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D: What is the latest report?

K: The latest report is they are still fighting.

D: What about Makarios?

K: I have a report from Israel. They say they heard him on the radio.

D: I know, but nothing from your Embassy. I will check with Moscow. I don't have anything at all.

K: I don't want to start a crisis to keep you here. I don't want anything to interfer with your vacation.

D: I know. I want to get away. I know this could come about only if Makarios asked for it and then it would have to be discussed. But if Makarios is not there we would not do it on our won. This I am sure. This is not done at all. Idoubt very much they do this on their own.

K: That is my view.

D: Ok Be in touch.

END

5086 *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
July 15, 1974
6:30 pm

D: Hello Henry. The Ambassador of Cyprus has just informed me that Makarios is alive and in UN troops, he is in another place.

K: I have seen that as an unofficial report.

D: This is what he mentioned to me. I don't know if it is official.

K: I'm glad you called. I was just getting ready to call you. I just had an unofficial report that he is in a town called Phados.

D: I heard.....

K: Well, we got the first letter the same. If that is true it puts a new complexion on the situation.

D: And it says he has asked the Secretary General to have Security Council tomorrow to discuss and according to this information the Ambassador has..in this area, where Makarios is, it is quiet, where the Archbishop is, but in Nicosia there is strong fighting. This is what he mentioned to me.

K: Let us see if we can keep our actions coordinated. The United States has no unilateral interests there. And we support the existing Constitution. Can we stay in touch with each other before we take any drastic moves.

D: I will send a telegram saying let's coordinate our actions.

K: We are in favor of the existing Constitutional arrangement. Let's check before doing anything. I will let you know if we plan anything. We don't plan to do anything until we get a report but we have made those demarches I told you about.

D: Ok, Henry.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 18 NOV 2002 200102979

SA 121 *

TELECON
Elliot Richardson/Secretary Kissinger
July 16, 1974
7:40 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: There was something I wanted to ask you. You mentioned somebody who was in ISA . Who was he - Rod somebody?

H: Roderick Hills.

K: He's being ___to me as Under Secretary for Economic Affairs.

R: He might be very good. He's a very good lawyer. He xxx was the Chairman of the Republic Corporation. I did a lot of checking on him at that time. He checked out very well. For the ISA job, I had to subordinate the international experience I would have like to have found in him. He's a very able guy.

K: You think he could handle that?

R: Yes, I think so. It's not entirely clear to me exactly how the job works. It didn't exist while I was there.

K: He's the counterpart of the Uxixe Under Secretary for Political Affairs.

R: I think he would do very well.

K: I met him today and liked him.

R: One thing that appealed to me and that is ISA is largely depended on his ability to work with others. I think he had the abilities that would make him effective in that. He had a certain amount of aggressiveness and poise and skill to build the job.

K: OK. Well, have a good trip.

R: One more thing. I meant to mention the name Clyde Ferguson.

K: Who's he? On that Negro. I think highly of him.

R: He's a good man.

K: I think xxy very highly of him.

R: Good.

K: Call me when you get back.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 22 JUN 2004 200102979

R: I enjoyed the luncheon with you very much.

K: The Soviets didn't introduce the resolution.

R: Good. Well, I enjoyed that conversation.

K: OK, bye.

END

5088 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
July 16, 1974
Noon

K: Anatol.

D: Henry, I received another telegram from Moscow and I read it to you. Well, it begins by asking me to tell you that the...reference is scurrilous. And to please be more careful in your approaches to such allegations. This is said by Mr. Gromyko.

K: No, no. We were just asking you.

D: I know, I know. This is nothing really. Just Brezhnev would like to get clear, but nothing really. Brezhnev believes that only the people themselves should decide...Dobrynin reads cable...they have staged a military coup against the local government. Justice demands for the Soviet Union and the United States and all countries to do more than.. to put an end to military intervention in the affairs of Cyprus. We believe the President along with the Secretary of State ...should take the line corresponding to the interests of the Cyprus people...and the most urgent task now is the adoption ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ by the Security Council of a decision as to the immediate withdrawal of military personnel and a stop to the intervention by Greece in the internal affairs of Cyprus. We are giving instructions to our Representative of the Security Council and would like to hope the United States representative will be given instructions to adhere to the same line.

K: Can you send that message to me?

D: Of course. To whom?

K: To Eagleburger.

D: Do you have anything?

K: All we know is Makarios has asked to be put in a UN base.

D: What about the Security Council?

K: We are taking the position that we want more information.

D: This line and nothing else?

K: No.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 11 MAY 2004 200102979

D: What about withdrawal?

K: I think today we are not going to support a resolution on anything.

D: On anything? You like to pass a summary of your position.

K: You can pass it now. We will oppose Enosis between Cyprus and Greece.

D: Yes, but as for immediate withdrawal, you are not prepared to do it today.

K: No.

D: Or any kind of resolution?

K: That is correct.

D: And if a resolution is introduced, what will you do?

K: I do know we will try to avoid taking a vote.

D: Oh. Well, what is your personal opinion, Henry?

K: I want to see what the situation is on the island.

D: Well, the situation can be helped if you and we would take a stand.

K: It depends if there is a government left there.

D: Well, Makarios is still there on a UN base.

K: Well, we are not prepared to do it today.

D: Not today.

K: No.

D: Well, that was a very helpful message but I will pass what you say.

END

SA 119

*

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
JUly 16, 1974
6:30 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

D: Fine, how are you? I called you back because I wanted to tell you that I talked to Shimon.

K: Yes, and he said he never said anything about promissory notes.

D: No, he did. I asked him about the xxx promissory note. He said a promissory note in Hebrew is (word) . It is an idiomatic expression. It means if somebody promises you something, then you expect them to fulfill that promise. It refers to the fullfillment of a promise. It has nothing at all to do with written notes. So, there was no allusion to the letter whatsoever. I asked him not to do this during Simon's meeting and I will send a cable to the Prime Minister and ask him not to allude to the letter in anyway whatsoever. Alright?

K: ok, good.

D: I will be in touch.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 12 FEB 2003 200102979

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 12 FEB 2003 200102979

SA 117

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Secretary General Waldheim/Secretary Kissinger
July 16, 1974
11:50 am

W: This is Waldheim speaki ng .

K: Yes, Mr. Secretary General.

W: Mr. Secretary, I am grateful for you returning my call. The reason is , you have probably heard from Buffum, that we have a serious development and I wanted to inform you of a cable that we have received. This would give a clear picture of the situation. I received from my special representative and Commander in Chief in Cyprus -- I don't know if you have been informed by Buffum.

K: I think Sisco has told me about it.

W: Makarios may request a meeting of the Security Council to discuss, what he terms, Greek military intervention in Cyprus. We know four members of the Greek Government are being treated for wounds received during the coup d etat in the last two days, so there was some involvement. I want you to know that we have these indications that the Greek military contingent is involved. And he also asked me to convey to you and others to help keep Cyprus independent and soverign. I sent a message to the government of Athens and ~~Ankara~~ Ankara stressing the importance of maintaining...

K: I notice the Greek Government has affirmed this.

W: Yes, the important thing is, well it is not so important, but that the Archbishop asked that the British send a helicopter to evacuate him to a British base on the island and the British High Commissioner accepted this on the condition that the Archbishop would accept evacuation to the United Kingdom and in the meantime, our commander in chief there has asked for protection, so Makarios refused to evacuate the ~~xxxx~~ island and I have now authorized our commander in chief to grant protection. Of ~~xxxxxx~~ course, that will cause problems in the future. This will be a problem.

K: Yes.

W: This is most important information which I got ~~xxx~~ this morning. I asked Rossides whether he will ask for a meeting of the Council. He did not...I consultated with the Presidentof the Council and we decided there should be a meeting at 3:00 this afternoon. The situation is very confused and all kinds of rumors around the world and I think it is important that the Council be informed.

K: I appreciate this very much and you information is later than ours.

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K: I talked with Callaghan who reports they were evacuating Makarios and that didn't sound right to me.

W: I agree. But for us it will be a problem if the new military government is in control and no President is sworn-in, then we have a problem of what to do with Makarios.

K: How about you and I talking tomorrow and exchanging information then.

W: Yes. I think it is important to avoid intervention by the Turks. Our information is that the Turks...will report that they will not provoke or do anything which could create deterioration of the situation, but this is the real danger.

K: We are dealing with the Turks today and I will keep you informed and I understand we are going to get together next week or soon.

W: Yes. I want to talk to you.

K: Very nice to talk to you and I appreciate your keeping me informed.

W: If I hear anything else I will let you know immediately.

END

5087 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
July 18, 1974
9:50 am

K: Anatoyl, how are you?

D: Fine, Henry.

K: Anaytol, we still don't have absolute confirmation that Makarios has survived but we suspect that he has.

D: Our information is that he has.

K: Fighting is still going on. We are having a meeting in 45 minutes and I'll call you again when it is over.

D: Good. There are reports that the British and Turks are planning to do something.

K: Turkey we know for sure isn't. And Britain isn't a strong enough government. What are they doing?

D: I don't know. I hear this on the radio. I have no information from Moscow.

K: If we hear anything we will let you know.

D: Good. So after the meeting you will call.

K: Yes, after the meeting. Will you send me that message.

D: Yes, to Scowcroft or..

K: No, Scowcroft is in San Clemente. Send it to Eagleburger.

D: I will tell Vorontsov to get in touch with him.

K: Good.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 11 MAY 2004 200102979

SA 113

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TELCON
Arthur Burns/ Sec. Kissinger
9:30 a.m., July 16, 1974

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

B: Morning, Henry.

K: Arthur, how are you?

B: All right. How are you?

K: Sorry we missed each other yesterday.

B: I got home to late to call you.

K: I called you yesterday about the possible assistance to Italy if that becomes necessary and I understand that one idea is to use the swap line and that you are a little reluctant to do it. I don't want to get into fiscal details which I don't fully understand. I just want to point out from a foreign policy point of view we cannot let Italy go down the drain. Whether that is the way to do it or some other way, I don't know.

B: I agree and I have been actively trying to get other countries to contribute to a package but what we can do through the swaplines is very limited. The amount could be large but it is a three month loan and that is not what they need.

K: Yes. My people tell me you would not approve more than $300 million.

B: As a start.

K: Yes. Look, on financial things I am not somebody--I cannot get into a debate on numbers. All I wanted to stress to you is to really give this -- if it arises -- very high priority.

B: I agree and I was active in getting the credit line extended. Also in a meeting with the finance ministers I went around and pushed the Germans and Japanese to contribute to a package for Italy. It is a loan of medium term duration and the swap line does not serve that purpose. That is the essential point.

K: If you can give any other thought to that problem I would appreciate it.

B: You bet I will.

K: O.k. Now let's see if we could get together sometime. Are you here next week.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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B: I expect to be .

K: How about 11:00 next Monday.

B: Fine Henry. I will check . my calendar. I think it is all right. I will call you if there is.

K: I would like to talk to you about the European financial situation and you know how we can gear it to foreign policy considerations.

B: Right. I'm eager to get together with you.

K: And certainly I would like to talk to you about the state of Washington. Look forward to seeing you.

END

SA 116

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Foreign Secretary Callaghan/Secretary Kissinger
July 16, 1974
10:15 am

K: Jim?

C: Henry.

K: Can you hear me now?

C: Yes, very well.

K: Good. I have your message and I wanted to tell you I am dictating an assessment of the situation as we see it and I will send it to you. We are going along with about two-thirds of what you have done in Athens. We have had approaches from the Soviets.

C: So have we.

K: We don't want to legitimize a situation where they...We will continue recognizing the existing government.

C: Well, Henry, hold on . There is a late development. Makarios has asked for permission to evacuate to our base area. We have done this and we are now thinkg of flying him to our carrier. So we'll have to go slow on legitimizing.

K: ~~XX~~ If that is the case, we don't want to have him leading an outside movement asn ask for Soviet help.

C: Right. What should we do with him? He may want to come here. Actually, he'll probably want to go to New York to talk...I am going into make a statement to the House of Commons. I am going to say he asked to be evacuated. And I will say my view is that Greece should ....the intervention and I will go on to say the Ambassador is informing the Greek Government that ~~if~~ the ~~Greek~~ government officials of the Cyprus National Guard will be replaced at the earlies moment.

K: Wait, I think we should stop short on that.

C: It would reduce tension in the area.

K: Once we know there is a clear ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ outcome, fine. But if there is a civil war we would be getting involved.

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C: How do you see it?

K: IF Makarios is leaving the Island I have to make a different assessment than if he is leading a civil war. My mai n concern is to keep outside powers out of this.

C: Yes.

K: We can go along with asking the Greek Government to state their intentions -- on the remaining Greek officials, we would come to it but n ot today.

C: Good. I think this wiould help keep things..

K: Once there is an outcome , then we can do something. We are not supporting Enosisand we have had a good reaction from the Turks to our actions here.

C: Good. We are in a different position, of co urse, because we are one of the guaranteeing powers.

K: I just want you to know our thinking is only different on that officer point and that on timing. We will make an assessmen t of this.

C: Good. Henry , will you give me your assessment of what to do with this guy?

K: Yes. I will. I'll be in touch with Peter on it.

C: Good.

END

*

SA 114

TELCON
Rowland Evans/ Sec. Kissinger
9:35 a.m., July 16, 1974

RELEASED IN FULL

E: I just got back last night and I have been reading this nonsense. I have to see you.

K: What nonsense?

E: I need to see you before you go to San Clemente. Can you give me 25 minutes.

K: I will only be their 48 hours.

E: I am going on vacation for a week.

K: What nonsense have you been reading.

E: A column by Braden.

K: He is a darling man but...

E: Nothing in that at all.

K: His perceptions are not as sharp as his wife's.

E: You are not kidding me.

K: I am not. I never heard of a quarrel with Simon. No quarrel. The Energy Conference was a success -- not a failure.

E: How about Nixon?

K: We achieved what we wanted and now the French are trying to join. Nixon is always a complex thing but nothing there. You and I chatted about that.

E: About the way it has always been. You are not going to quit or getting fired.

K: Getting fired is an absurdity.

E: Yes, sir.

K: Seriously.

E: I have many messages from Mr. Rabin. Many messages. Private. Not for telephone discussion.

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K: One wrong move...

E: When are you going to see me?

K: I will get Eagleburger to call you.

E: Sometime Wednesday afternoon.

K: We will do our best.

E: I am counting on it. It is very gib stuff. Everyone is talking about it. I have to get it from the horses mouth.

K: Don't be absurd ....my getting fired.

E: I am serious.

K: Look at it realistically. How could I get fired.

E: How is Nancy.

K: Fine.

E: We should get together for dinner. Will se go out?

K: Of course. As long as she does not have to pay for it.

E: Of course not. I am the rich boy. I would do the paying.

K: I am kidding. You want to have dinner tomorrow.

E: We are going to dinner with the British. When are you going out?

K: Thursday and Friday. Get back Saturday.

E: Tonight.

K: Probably cannot do it. I will call Nancy.

E: Get me half an hour before you leave.

END

SA 128

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
July 17, 1974
5:10 PM

K: I 've just talked to Callaghan and I think the situation is getting sufficiently complex that you should ~~dex~~ go.

S: I wasn't entirely frank with you. Let me say that I will do anything you want me to do.

K: I have decided you should go.

S: I am now dictating what I think should be the framework.

K: You are going to leave abouy 10:00?

S: No, I think around midnight. I need more time.

K: But that will only get you there at ~~12~~x noon.

S: Alright, I'll leave about 10:00. I have to get some people lined up to go. B1

K: [redacted]

S: This is the kind of pressure the Turks will apply.

K: They want to ___ a Turkish satellite. Makarios won't be a Turkish satellite if he won't be a Greek satellite. You better give the facts of life to Ecevit.

S: Alright.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 25X6
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 17 JUL 2014
DATE/CASE ID: 07 JUL 2004 200102979

5089 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
July 17, 1974
6:50 PM

D: I just wanted to say goodby to you.

K: Are you going home?

D: Why not?

K: That's good news. That means things are calming down.

D: Not really. My intention was to say goodby. No, I just received a telegram and I want to send it to you.

K: Let me hear the bad news.

D: Not really. You are going to San Clemente?

K: Yes, for a day, tomorrow night. I wanted to tell you we are sending Sisco to London to talk to the British and Turks about that situation. We are not going to support the Sampson regime.

D: This is good news. They are asking me to give you their statement of the Soviet Union in connection with the text of the statement of the government. I do not have it yet. When I get it, should I give it to Scowcroft? They are sending a text but it is a public statement.

K: How can you give it to Scowcroft? No, give it to Eagleburger.

D: Still leaning towards (Europe).

K: I think we should play this with restriction. We are not going to have (consultations) with Greek Colonels.

D: Really, my government asked me to tell you that they recognize that the United States is for the independence of Cyprus and you do not support Greek actions that are against the lawful government of Cyprus.

K: I think the first is correct. I would get carried away.

D: I understand. At some time they expressed that....not take any political steps to stop intervention.....that you do not do it from your side and they hope you representatives of the Security Council will.....

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K: He didn't say anything?

D: You didn't want to take any political steps to stop this interference. They would like to hope that you and the President will consider what we mentioned before and you will take the ____to support the lawful government in Cyprus headed by Makarios. This is what they express.

K: May I make this suggestion. Anatol, I think the course of events, if we all behave in a restrained manner, will lead in this direction, but if anyone behaves provocatively it will get mixed up in the whole East/West debate.

D: I understand.

K: We have no interest in changing the situation as it was on the island last (month). Our problem is how to position it so that the natural balances is not affected. This you can tell them.

D: So, I can say that you hope the course of events will lead to a little-by-little restoration.

K: Certainly. To a restoration of a constitutional government.

D: OK.

K: I don't want to make a decision on nomes but we have no fixed view on that.

D: OK. This I will mention to Moscow.

K: Tell them if they send messages to send the second draft, not the first, since you are not here to mediate. Give my warm regards to Brezhnev and Gromyko.

D: OK.

K: _____And I am planning to be there in October.

D: I sent a telegram yesterday to Brezhnev.

K: We ought to make some progress. Senator Fulbright is here and we are planning detente hearings August 8 when I'm going to testify. It couldn't happen at a better time.

D: I understand.

K: It turned out to be the best time for it. Well, have a good vacation and give my warm regards to everyone.

D: And ~~xxx~~ to Nancy please give my best wishes.

K: Thank you and I may call you once to ruin you in Moscow. Tell them to ~~xxx~~ get all the recording equipment ready.

D: Alright. (laughter).

K: Thank you.

END

SA 131

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Sir John Killie/Secretary Kissinger
July 17, 1974
7:45 PM

K: Sir, I didn't want to bother you personally but I'm calling on behalf of Jim Callaghan. Our Turk friends have just left us. There will be no agreed statement tonight. Callaghan put to them the suggestion of a meeting with Sisco or Ingersol. They are very happy to do that tomorrow morning. They don't want it to be a trilateral meeting. They would like to receive him at their own Embassy.

HAK: That's agreeable to us.

K: I wanted you to know that.

HAK: It's going to be Sisco and he should be thereabout 9:00 in the morning. We'll get word to you confirming it.

K: It would be helpful if someone informed our own Embassy of that information

HAK: I've given Ramsbotham some reflections I have on the situation.

K: I'll expect a cable from him.

HAK: You've received one?

K: No, I'll expect one.

HAK: Perhaps the Foreign Secretary would like to see it.

K: Thank you very much.

END

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 21 JUN 2004 200102979

SA 126 1*

TELECON
President Nixon/Secretary Kissinger
July 17, 1974
4:30 PM

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

K: Mr. President.

N: Hello, Henry. How are we getting along with our Greek friends?

K: The problem in Cyprus is the Europeans have taken a ~~xxxxxx~~ united position that Makarios ought to be brought back and they want us to bring pressure on the Greeks. My worry is that Makarios now has to lean on the Communists and Eastern bloc. All our evidences is that the opposition is in total control of the Islands~~x~~. My recommendation is that first, we get someone over there to ~~x~~ make our view clear and secondly, we work for a compromise in which neither Makarios or the other guy take over....They want us to ~~xxxx~~ rake the Greeks but if they get overthrown then that will ~~xxxxxx~~ jeopardize our whole position.

N: I know that. I can see that, but not much support from Europe?

K: No, but they know we are dragging our feet, but they don't ~~x~~ know exactly what we want.

N: Who are you going to send?

K: Either Ingersol or Sisco. Ingersoll has the advantage of taking orders well, but Sisco is more knowledgeable.

N: Whatever you decide, it's alright with me.

K: Sisco is necessary here to manage the ~~xxxx~~ thing on a day to day basis.

N: I see. What can he accomplish. Explain to them what we're trying to do.

K: The danger is this, if everyone runs to Makarios embracing him the legitimat head...and if the Soviets are the only ones to offer to help restore him, we have no basis for resisting it.

N: I see the danger. We have ~~x~~ no support.

K: We can not openly oppose Makarios but we can try to slow it down enough so that perhaps we can crystalize enough support for an internal solution. The Europeans are talking a tough game, but we have to defend their position.

N: We have to defend their game plan.

K: Exactly.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 25X6
DECLASSIFY AFTER: HAK'S DEATH
DATE/CASE ID: 01 JUN 2004 200102979

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K: If the ~~B~~ Greeks collapse, then the left wing could take over or a bunch of Greek colonelts who could thrown in with the Quadafi group.

N: It seems to me our course is to try to.....

K: That's is what I would propose, with your permission, to do.

N: I think it's a good try.

K: And if it fails, we can join the consensus.

N: That's right.

K: My analysis is if Makarios is brought back this way, he will have to kick the Greek officers off the island and then the Communists willbe the dominant force and to balance the Turks he will have to rely on the Eastern bloc. So the coup will have shifted the balance to the left.

N: I get it. Too bad he has to come back.

K: [redacted] B1

N: You have to go ahead. Use either man. You're much closer to it.

K: Right and I'll arrange for Ziegler to make the announcement. Sisco and Ingersol are the two who know our thinking best.

N: Ingersol is a good ~~x[redacted]x~~ calm man, if he ~~k~~nows are position.

K: That's the advantage of Ingersol. ~~&x~~ Well, I'll keep you informed.

~~&x~~
END

SA 122 1*

TELCON

Sisco/Sec. Kissinger
July 17, 1974, 12:45 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

S: We have a report that has just come in from the UK High Command saying that Makarios has been flown out ~~of~~ from Akrotiri. The UK representative in NY has a Reuters dispatch to this effect. I have asked John to follow it up. He is weighing in with Waldheim asking for a dely on the SC meeting on grounds of an unclear situation. He is calling the British there and I have called the British here to see if they could weigh in for a delay on that ground.

K: Good.

S: As yet, there is no evidence that the Russians have made any move. They are talking at the moment.

K: If Dobrynin tells me you can be sure it is going to happen.

S: Right. I am now on the wicket to make a major effort to delay.

K: Excellent Should I call Callaghan. Can't Ramsbotham do it.

S: I have a call into the British ~~ex~~ on this point. I will keep you appriased.

K: He is alive?

S: Yes. We have thought -- let's say the Russians go ahead at some point as they probably will. Bill and I have put our heads togheter and we think if we are absolutely certain that we are going to get caught in this kind of approach and as we bat this down in the Council people will accuse us of collusion with the Greeks. We think we should have an alternative proposition reaffirming the constitutional arrangements of Cyprus. Restrain keep the lid on. If the British take this kind of lead as an alternative --

K: I am willing to do this.

S: At the end of the line we will probably be confronted (with this). Bill and I have counted noses on the Council and you will find we will be at the end of the line -- let's not worry about it now -- isolated.

K: At that point I will consider voting with it. At that time I hope it is sufficiently clarified. If Makarios is out of the Island I don't care about the vote.

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S: (I will) keep that in mind. Don't want to go that far in New York at this juncture.

K: Don't get Scali shooting all over.

S: He is all right. Doing it step-by-step.

K: And calmly.

END

SA 123 1*

TELCON
Sen. Fulbright/ Sec. Kissinger
July 17, 12:55 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Mr. Chairman. How are you?

F: All kinds of excitement. I was calling you about this Greek situation. I am thinking about inviting the President of Cyprus down to a coffee. I understand he is coming to New York tonight.

K: Is he coming tonight.

F: That's what I understand.

K: Would you like to come by for a drink tonight and I will bring you up today--this would be independent of your having him for coffee.

F: As you know the Committee and I have not been sympathetic to the Greek Colonels -- you know that. I have drafted a letter to you. We had heard that we were being reluctant to take this to the UN. Is that correct?

K: No. What we want to do is first stop the possibility of Turkish intervention.

F: Are we prepared for an embargo on arms during the period.

K: It has not come up but we would not be unsympathetic to that -- particularly if it is accelerated into an international confrontation.

F: We talked about this in the Committee yesterday. Pell wanted to send a letter then but many of the members thought it was not clear enough then and we were not particularly impressed with that anyway. The purpose of this would be simply to show some concern on the part of the Committee which we have had for a long time. You are familiar with the history of this.

K: I don't object to a letter from the Committee. I would like to brief you apart from that. I am not using this to keep you from writing a letter. This is a totally different thing. If you on behalf of the Committee want to write a letter expressing your concern it would be appropriate.

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2.

F: I thought I would write a letter expressing concern. This is a long-standing view as you well know. We have voted on ~~xxxxxx~~ several times on the continuing supplying arms. Your friend Tom Dodd ran this fight a long time ago.

K: Dodd was before my time.

F: There is a long period of opposition in the Committee to the support of the dictatorship in Greece. This incident--I don't know that it is a very significant thing but we thought we should express this in this perhaps indirect way--simply by inviting him to the Committee to hear his story. We think that would have a salutary effect--if any at all-- it may go unnoticed.

K: It would not go unnoted.

F: The sentiments, as I read it of the Committee--we were just thinking of inviting him . We are not inviting him to the US . He will be at the UN. We are inviting him for coffee. This has been done ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ before but perhaps different circumstances.

K: Can you wait on that until tomorrow morning until we see a little clearer picture.

F: It would be too late to invite him for tomorrow afternoon. How about letting me know this afternoon.

at 6:30

K: All right. Independently, come by/and let me bring you up to date and you can have the letter delivered independently.

F. Fine.

END

SA 129

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ron Ziegler/Secretary Kissinger
July 17, 1974
5:57 PM

K: As you know we are sending Sisco and we've got to make the announcement.

Z: OK.

K: Can you x make it on the recommendation of the Secretary of State, the President has decided to send Under Secretary Sisco to London for talks with the British Foreign Minister and Turkish Prime Minister. He may go on to other capitols from there.

Z: Will he go to Cyprus.

K: No. Almost certainly not, but I have to keep that open. We haven't approached anyone else. He may go to Athens.

Z: We can do it that way.

K: We can do it from here if you want.

Z: When do you want to do it.

K: Any time in the next hour.

Z: Let me get it to Scowcroft and we'll do it out here.

K: Can you say on the recommendation of the Secretary of State so it doesn't look as if the President is feeding those arguments. You can say the President and I talked on the telephone about this this afternoon.

Z: Good. I'll do it right away.

K: And you'll let me know when you've done it?

Z: Where should Scowcroft get the word from?

K: From Eagleburger.

Z: OK.

END

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DATE/CASE ID: 21 JUN 2004 200102979

RELEASED IN FULL SA 124 *

TELECON
Foreign Secretary Callaghan/Secretary Kissinger
July 17, 1974
2:50 pm

K: Can you hear me?

C: I think so. I think if about seventeen people get off the line I could hear you better.

K: I was thinking of sending Joe Sisco or Bob Ingersoll to London so that you could get a more first hand impression of our thinking on Cyprus.

C: That would be very good.

K: Is Ecevit going to stay over night?

C: Probably will leave in the early morning. Makarios is leaving at 11:00 our time and will be with you at 1:35. He will then ask for a Security Council meeting on Friday.

K: Right.

C: So that gives you time.

K: I will try to get someone over tomorrow morning and then have hime go to Athens and ~~xxxxx~~ Ankara.

C: I think it would be very valuable. I would like that. I'll tell you our position and this is basically the European position -- all the countries in the Nine and NATO. We think the ideal solution would be to get Makarios back. ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ Whether we can do it by diplomatic means remains to be seen. Makarios asked for diplomatic activity to continue and the need for non-recognition of the new regime in Cyprus. When you look ahead for six months -- will the situation be more than or less tense? Our estimation is more -- that it would look to be more tense if we can't get Makarios back -- but the question is can we?

K: Some of our people are wondering if a compromise not be Clerides.

C: He couldn't hold it. But the compromise might be an election in 3 months with Makarios back on the Island.

K: But how will you get him back?

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C: What we would do? Well, hopefully you would exert your influence on the Greek Government about the national guard officers. The Turks under our guarantee Treaty may say to us what are you going to do and if action doesn't seem possible -- any of the three powers has the right to take action. I think we can take it that we can talk about unilateral action and if so then there has to be US pressure on Greece. How do you see it?

K: I see it similarly. But I am not sure about what we are embarking on when you say diplomatic action.

C: I think the Greek regime is a bit worried. _____ has called our man in Athens to see when tomorrow....and I think he is going to ask what we and the Turks are up to. We think there is a chance that if there is concerted diplomatic pressure they might calm down by withdrawing some of their ~~xxxx~~ officers. I am thinking about the Turks tomorrow or tonight. But, if you think six months ahead, my view is that it is better to have Makarios there than Sampson.

K: That is almost certainly true, I agree.

C: The problem is three to one or five to one chance it won't succeed, but it would be worthwhile to do...

K: Well, we want to avoid giving the Soviets an excuse to make what happens legitimate.

C: Yes. Again, looking six months ahead of Sampson -- If Sampson stays, he would be accused of running a Fascist regime and the Russians are stepping up their activity so I come back again to -- we may not succeed but it could be that we may crack the regime and get Sampson to withdraw.

K: Let me get somebody over to talk to you. We agree on the general approach. We are not too far apart on it.

C: Well, send somebody, but I don't think we can afford to lose much time to begin pressuring the Greeks.

K: He would be getting in there tomorrow morning.

C: Who will that be, Joe Sisco?

K: Joe Sisco or Ingersoll.

C: After he and I talk, he can talk to you and you can make up your mind.

K: Exactly.

C: Well, I think this should come quickly. If there is a feeling in the Greek Government that you are holding back, then what is happening in the EC will not be of much importance. You have heard about the EC demarche?

K: No.

C: The put out a statement saying they made a demarche to the Greek Government -- stronger than the terms I made publicly.

K: I didn't know that and it is good to know.

C: I didn't know it til lunch and the House of Commons is anti-Greek on both sides.

K: Good, well, I'll be in touch.

C: Alright. If anything comes out of the meeting with the Turks, I will give you a call. We have had a request -- that if they ...get out of us, they might act unilaterally.

K: You can tell them we are willing to exert ourselves with the Greek Government but I want to get our strategy more precise and also that we are not supporting Sampson.

C: I'll tell them and I will leave it to you to tell them about who is coming.

K: You can tell them that we are thinking seriously about it. Call me.

END

SA 141

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Lazor/ Sec. Kissinger
July 18, 4:35 p.m.

K: How are you Irving?

L: Very well. How are you? I follow everything as everybody in the world does. -- your problems and your caccomplishments and I cannot tell you how proud I am as everybody else is. In al l of the publications. As a matter of fact, I am very pleased for you. I know you have had a difficult time. I was very upset abou it. I felt quite frankly that -- about how deeply you felt about the accusations which were not predicated on anything you had to do with and in your position working as hard as you did and as much as what youtold me two years ago. You said you wished you would not have to face settling the Middle East but not only trying to pease the Israelis but to win the affection of Sadat and the Saudi Arabians and the others and trying to get them to settle in somewhat of a neat package is an accomplishment hailed by the world.

K: You know that holding affection is sometime harder than winning them.

L: I know, but in your particular case, the first step is you have to win them first and you did that. I was very very proud of you. I imagine I am joined by every American in the world. I was glad that Fulbright and others came to your defense and finally the President had to make the statement which at least cleared the air and I was very pleased for you. I called you just to say hello and to ask you if there is a possibility of your coming out here while the President is here.

K: In fact, I am trying to leave for the airport now to come out. Let's talk tomorrow morning on the West Coast.

L: How long will you be here?

K: A day and a half.

L: If you were here longer, we could organize a dinner. I will call you at the White House tomorrow.

K: Would you do that.

L; Would be glad to. God bless.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 21 JUN 2004 200102979

SA 132 1*
RELEASED ~~IN FULL~~

TELECON
Len Garment/Secretary Kissinger
July 18, 1974
10:35 AM

G: ....Fisher and his group.

K: ...there are about 8 country directors that have priority.

G: over who?

K: Over Fisher.

G: He doesn't particularly want to see you

K: I want to see him. I think I've got it on some sort of a schedule. Can I let you know.

G: What about the list I gave you? Any possibility of doing business with Dobrynin on the 17 prisoners?

K: I mentioned it to him.

G: A group of the wives and brothers, that's really taking a .. They were involved in the airplane highjacking and given 15 to 25 years. It would ~~xx~~ make a large impact without a lot of shouting and screaming . OK. How are you?

K: I'm fine.

G: That letter worked?

K: The letter worked beautifully. I think from what I got on the testimony.....

G: That we're home free.

K: That we're home free. I understand they're going to call David Young in.

G: The jury will stand up in the box and say not guilty.

K: I don't know what Young will say.

G: He's beyond belief. No one will believe him. I think it's over and done with.

K: OK.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 21 JUN 2004 200102979

SA 140

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Kubisch/Sec. Kissinger
July 18, 4:15 p.m.

K: Do you think our Amb. to Chile could be taught ~~not~~ that he is not to reform the Chilean Government.

JK: I think so. What are you referring to?

K: To that discussion on military equipment where he lectured them that we preferred democracies and they have to understand that.

JK: I think he can be taught that. I cannot explain why he made that particular point to them at this time. As a matter of fact I made a special point in a meeting with some of my people that the policy and posture toward that Government is well known-- a disciplined organization.

JK: Who has a disciplined organization.

JK: You have.

K: If so, it is not apparent to me in the newspapers. Anyway you can have one in ARA.

JK: I don't know why he lectured the people on that point.

K: I prefer them to Allende--old fashioned as it may be.

JK: I do to.

K: Let's see what we can do on military equipment for them. What is the obstacle?

JK: We face an imminent (problem in Congress)...will not give us discretion on military assistance. We are trying to walk the line to avoid having this amendment. There was a resolution on this last fall. We wanted to make military assistance...

K: We don't have to take it into account.

JK: We don't want to flaunt it in such a way they remove our discretion to do that and that they make it mandatory.

K: What are you telling me. In practice, How do we take this into account?

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1*

JK: We tell them we will make certain things available -- tanks aircraft. They have a long lead time. We will not publicize the fact that we have informed them of this. We have informed the Chileans. They know it.

K: But they don't care about that do they.

JK: That we keep it private? -- Not at all. They cooperate with us and understand the problem as well as we do. They don't want to see any legal restrictions on us to cooperate with them.

K: O.K.

END

SA 133 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Brown/Secretary Kissinger
July 18, 1974
10:38 AM

K: How are you? I wanted to check with you in view of the mobilization of the Soviet airborne___. How long would it take the 82nd to get ready.

B: About 2 hours.

K: It used to take two or three days. What sort of deployment do we have in mind.

B: One battalion is always ready.

K: Can you bring it to the WSAG meeting?

G: Sure.

K: OK. Thank you.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 12 FEB 2003 200102979

SA 134 DC CSE *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sonnenfeldt/Sec. Kissinger
July 18, 1974 10:45 a.m.

K: I am assuming you are working on the detente statement.

S: Yes.

K: I want a combination of Pacem In Terris speech and the finance Committee. A very thoughtful analysis of the strategic thing. I don't want to be the leader of the left wing. I want to get into the middle.

S: I have been making that point in these meetings with McCloskey and Laise.

K: I don't have to be very emotional about it. Very cool and analytical. Along the lines that the Foreign Relations Committee will like it because it is for being for detente.

S: It could be a real trap.

K: Could also be a good opportunity.

S: DBut you don't want to be driven to their position -- Fulbright's position on the defense budget.

K: Nor Schlesinger's. If I come out with a good tough position which is to the left of Zumwalt I can afford to be on the right of Fulbright.

S: Right Holton told me you wanted pieces for use by Les Arends and I used in a rough form some of the numbers in Lodal's chart. He seemed to think you had used that with the leadership.

K: I don't want that.

S: We will pull that back.

SK: You cannot send things to ~~the Hill with the~~ Congress without telling me. You gave him numbers?

S: I gave him the numbers of 72.

K: He just wanted a simple three pages that we are a tough administration.

S: S--T. I was told he wanted something on the military balance. I wanted to verify it with you but could not...

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K: Find out. The speech is on Saturday. Call Arend. I don't want him spouting warhead figures.

S: I think we should have a rational discussion.

K: He wants a simple speech that we are tough but flexible.

S: We will get it back.

K: O.K.

S: On this Jackson letter. Lets...

K: Let's discuss it some other time .

S: Fine.

END

SA 137 1*

TELECON
Ambassador Eberle/Secretary Kissinger
July 18, 1974
2:15 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

(Missed first part)

E:.....and what can I be working on in your absense?

K: We've got to try and reject that ____.

E: He gave quite a report to Ribicoff this morning.

K: Ribicoff was there.

E: Oh. ___came back through Ribicoff - it was optimistic.

K: There's a good chance.

E: The next ~~week~~ mark up meeting is the 29th. It they can be done before that it would be appreciated.

K: OK.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 12 FEB 2003 200102979

SA 136 1*

TELCON
Cy Vance/Kissinger
11:45 a.m. - 7/18/74

RELEASED IN FULL

(Missed first part of conversation)

K: The first thing is to keep the Soviets out of this thing and move into the Zurich framework. What we don't want is to get wound up as --- the British side is backing Makarios but we don't want to take any other measures and wind up with nothing.

V: You say you're planning now to go along with the British?

K: We are going along with the British in calling a meeting with the Greeks and Turks to find out how a constitutional government can be restored. There is no chance of our backing Sampson and Sampson will not be the ruler when all of this is over. But the only thing we want to do is tread carefully and not create total chaos before we see what emerges.

V: Good.

K: Frankly, what I think the best compromise would be to put Clerides in for a . . . . . and then bring Makarios back.

V: Clerides has a hope next for . . .

K: That is my thinking, but there is no possibility of our backing Sampson.

V: It gives me cause for concern. I would call and tell you what I read and my sincere concerns about this.

K: You should always call me about your concerns. I want you to know there is no possibility of our backing Sampson. The only thing is we are not moving against him yet until we see what our alternatives are.

V: I understand.

K: What we want to avoid is a situation where Makarios can go to the Security Council and ask for Soviet support because we backed him so completely we would like to sell our support of Makarios for (restraint). There is no chance of our backing Sampson.

V: That's good enough.

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K: I will let you know tomorrow. Sisco has met with the Turks and British.

V: I am sorry to bother you.

K: Nice to talk to you.

V: Bye, Henry.

SA 138

DC

LSE

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Hartman/Sec. Kissinger
Thursday, July 18, 2:44 p.m.

K: I had not seen the memo on various options on negotiations with E. Germany. On Balance I think we should go to Option B and if that does not work then we have gone one more round. That will delay things.

H: That would delay and we would have to resume in Berlin.

K: Three weeks.

H: Would make it much more difficult with the Coopers.

K: I don't give a damn about the Coopers. That three weeks could make a difference.

H: I think we can get what we can get even after three weeks now and perhaps something in terms of their standing still for the kind of statement. We are going to issue unilaterally.

K: I would like to avoid -- the President is calling me.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 22 JUN 2004 200102979

SA 139

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
President Nixon/Secretary Kissinger
July 18, 1974
2;48 PM

K: Mr. President.

H: Hello, Henry. Just checking in. So you decided on Sisco.

K: Yes. That was your instinct too, wasn't it.

N: I just sort of felt that.

K: I thought you were right.

N: You can control him.

K: It's better to have somebody who knows the subject. We're having trouble here with some of my guys who are leaking, and I m going to take care of them next week after this is over. The New York Times is coming after us.

N: About Makarios?

K: Yes. Some of the members of the House are starting to rumble.

N: We'll try not to commit ourselves here. I'll leave it up to you.

K: I just wanted you to knw. I'll take it from here.

N: We just _____ we want to try to avoid Cyprus.

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SA 183 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
DSec Ingersol
7/19/74 10:30 p.m.

K: Bob, I've just talked to Callaghan--they completely support our program now and they will make representations in that sense.

I: Very good.

K: I mean they support Clerides and they will urge negotiations. Tell that to Sisco--tell Sisco his major job is to get the Greeks and Turks to London.

I: Fine.

K: And calm down--and you do you calm down Sisco, I don't know, but that is your job. I mean can we send him a cable-- I sent him an encouraging cable--did that ever go to him?

I: No, that is the one we didn't send because we had already sent another one.

K: What do you mean?

I: Rembmber this afternoon--we decided that we wouldn't send that one because we already sent one--

K: I sent him a cable telling him he had done a good job--could that have gone?

I: No, it was the first paragraph of your cable--

K: I sent him a three line telegram, saying he had done a good job--that wasn't sent?

I: I didn't see it--I don't know

K: Ah--he --it went through a WH channel
Now, can somebody send him a cable and tell him we need his special skills and tired as he is, we want him to make one more effort and it is to get the Greeks and Turks to London--the British are fully aboard now, fully following the line we worked out?--they no longer want Makarios, they are going along with the Clerides thing and he has the support of Callaghan too. And to be steady and firm and we are sending Dr. Nidel out with pills.

I: All right, get it off right away--

K: Right Okay and you might tell Macomber where we stand with Callaghan and tell him to keep the heat on the Turks to accept an offer to go -- to talk

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K: We've got to think of UN action tomorrow--okay?

I: Fine

K: Thank you.

I: Right.

SA 176 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. McCloskey
Secretary Ingersoll
Secretary Kissinger
9:25 p.m. 7/19/74

I: Bob McCloskey is on also.

K: That is okay. I would like to speak ill of him, but I can't when he is on the line--

I We did reach Joe on the plane--he of course things have changed now with the bomb drop in Nicosia and artillery Kyrenia

K: Yeh

I: So to tell the Greeks not to fire, we don't think we can do much about that.

K No but could we avoid conducting all our busine ss on the open phone.

I: Sure

K What did you discuss with him now on the plane--

M: He called to ask whether he could have instructions that would assure the PM or FonMin would meet him at the airport

K: He must be out of his mind (god-damn bloody) Why?

M: He feels the sooner he can leave Athens the better it will be--he fears there may be some internal difficulty as he put it develop while he is on route and on the ground. And he thought if he could make his point--

K: Oh don't let's be absurd

M He ask for authority to go straight away from Athens to Rome or some place nearby--his first preference would be to return directly to Washington.

K: Oh no, he is going to stay out there--he is going to go to Athens like a good boy, he is going into the town of Athens and we are not sending instructions to have thePM and FonMin meet him at the airport, there have other people who have taken risks and Sisco is going to take a few risks.

M Okay, I toldhim I'd raise these questions with you.

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K: It is out of the question. However if his nerves aren't up to it, let him come home and I'll go out there.
How can we ask our Ambassador to stay in Athens while our UNSec is afraid to leave the goddamn airport.

I Do you want to send the same message except the first part about the--flying back

K: Yep. You tell Sisco to stop -- I don't want anyone to have any further substantive discussions on the telephone--the next time Sisco calls, he is to be told that he communicates by cable. Second he is to go into Athens, he is to darry out his mission, he is to stay there until he is told to leave.

I Okay.

K: And he will not be told to leave until we have a report so we can assess it If he can't take it, let him go on and W Ellsworth stays.

M: Okay, we'll take care of that. Say, Mr. Secretary, do you want to consider our issuing any kind of public statement at this time.

K: Yes, we should

end conversation.

SA 175

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Schlesinger/
Secretary Kissinger
9:10 p.m. 7/19/74

K: Jim, how are you

S: Okay. We have at the present time, reports of bombs falling in Kyrenia and Nicosia

K: Bombs falling ?

S: Yeh. There is no confirmation of Turkish landing as yet, but if they have not occurred as yet, they are expected momentarily. Now the Forrestal--

K: You consider that confirmed?

S: Yeh. We are getting that from the British I believe, but I can check on that.

Now the Forrestal Task Force is west of Crete at the present time and it might be desirable for us to start moving it down towards Cyprus.

K: I agree.

S: The amphibious forces moving towards Cyprus is steamed for about four hours and it is still about six hours away -- the British have an evacuation plan for themselves with a Caravan going toward the base and we would hook into it if the need arises, but nobody has indicated as yet the need is arising.

K: When bombs start falling, they may change their mind. Who do you think is doing it?

S: Turks--Turks took several F 100's off about 3 hours ago from one of their bases ~~and~~ in Turkey--they were loaded up.

K: You think they are getting the airfield?

S: My own guess is that they have a notion that before you land on a beach you are supposed to drop bombs and they are doing that.

K: Nicosia is not on a beach is it?

S: There is nothing in the manual of war that says you have to drop the bombs on the beaches.

K: The only reason I keep asking is because I have a message here from

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Ecevit--have you seen that?

S: Yws.

K: It says to pass to Schlesinger--Ecevit said so long as Greeks don't fire we won't.

S: I'm not sure he has control over everything--my own guess is that Sancherra andthe military have their own ideas about what to do when the baloon goes up. We shall try to check thru the reports that the bombs have impacted.

K: Good.

S:Q But the purpose of the call at the moment is that we probably ought to start moving that Task Force out from west of Crete.

K: I agree with you completely

S: Okay. You've got my number here at the NMCC--
Believe melam at the NMCC

K: Good, make suze the WH board knows where you are at all times.

Thank you Jim.

SA 174 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON - 8:57 pm 7/15/74
Conference Call
Secretary Kissinger
Secretary Ingersoll
Amb. McCloskey
Mr. Stabler

K: Bob--

I: Yes.

K: Are you on alone?

M Noooo, I'm on. Do you want me off.

K: No, no. I just wanted to know who else--was on whether Stabler was on--

M: No, no

K: Because I ah--wanted to get another cable done of more detailed instructions to Sisco--

M: Do you want Stabler on--

S: Yes, sir. I'm on.

K: Okay. You will do sometdetailed--now does Sisco understand what he is supposed to do?

M Mr. Secretary, I have to say that Sisco is in the air--they had to leave the airport and I am afraid I could not understand completely the reasons he was attempting to give me over a very bad connection--

K: And where is he going?

M: Athens.

I We will get the message you suggested for him to give the Turks to Macomber.

K: Okay, now Bob--you are going to take over this goddamn department till I come back.

I: Right.

K And nobody is going to move without your authority. And anybody who doesn't like it should hand in his resignation. I've just had it.

I: Probably some military problems--

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K: I don't give a damn all right. Send a message to Macomber. Of the same subjstance that Sisco was supposed to deliver. That message is that we otake a grave view of the situation, it could have themost serious consequences. That we are asking the Turks to keep in mind that it is easy to start these things--it is more difficult to end them. Our belief is that these must be restored as quickly as possible--our believe is that the only way now to restore constitutional government with any chance of success is the Clerities solution which Sisco outlined. Sisoo is on his way to Athens to present that and we are assuming that the Turkish government will agree to that, secondly, we are going to ask Britian to call for immediate negotiations of the ~~X~~_____ powers, probably in London, but conceivably on a British base in Cyprus. But we think London is better and we hope that the Turkisk government will accept that.

And you get Macomber in to see Ecevit with this message fastest. Read it to me before you send it out. Second we send detailed instructions to Sisco who may be a little tired after his exertions and explain to him what we have done in Turkey, wh y I believe the Clerities solution has not been rejected by Turkey if his reporting was correct , that they rejected it at first because they thought it was a way of keeping them from invading--now that they have invaded------ah (long pause)

Now the only other thing we have to keep in mind is to leave open the door to double enosis--but I think we better not start pushing that yet.

Okay can you get those two cables out--Point out that I interpret his reporting to mean that the Turks rejected the Clerities idea when they ~~thre~~ thought it was a way of keeping them out.

That I interpret what they said that they will aceept any President as a means of settling it. Now what is the judgment of the people about whether we should float the double enosis idea now?

I: Some people think that is probably the practical thing with the Turks in place.

K: I think we should go to that after trying the Clerities. It is too dangerous to come up with it now Because it will run into massive Soviet opposition. OKAY_let's get them drafted.

I: One to Macomber, one to Sisco--

K: The one to Macomber first.

S: The one to Tasca would be on its way--the one I read to you.

K: Then to Macomber, and then longer instruction to Sisco in Athens--quickly.

SA 172

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RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Mr. Stabler/Sec. Ingersoll
7/19/74 8:50 p.m.

S: Larry

K: Yeh

S: This telegram to Tasca is ready --I've written it--its ready to go,

K: Joe Sisco is going to Athens or I'm going to clean out the whole stinking department.

S: We know he is going to Athens, Mr. Secretary, that has been done, but you asked me to send a telegram to Tasca aswell which I have now written.

K: Okay, the first thing I want is to make sure thatSisco goes back in to the Turks and tells them what he is going to do. When he tells McCloskey that the Turks have already rejected the Clerities solution, I can only assume either that he misreported in this last cable or that his mind is still enthralled with the first conversation. In the first conversation they rejected the Clerities solution as a means of keeping them quiet. Now that they are in, they apparently have said they'll accept any government.

S: That's right.

K: That being the case, why does he say they have already rejected it?

S: I'm afraid I haven't talked to Bob since he has talked to Sisco, so I'm afraid I'm being on that.

K: Now could we also try to do this thing professionally and not discuss everything on an open phone to Turkey

I: Bob has been talking to Joe just to get him to go to Athens.

K: But in the process he has been told that the Clerities ideas has already been rejected by the Turks and therefore it is senseless for him to go to athens--therefore, everybody from Yugoslavia over knows what our plan is. I just haven't seen anything like this. I mean the Russians now know what our scheme is--everybody knows what we are going to try to do.

I: Bob is over in the Operations Center, I don't know what he said--

K: What he said was the Joe opposes going to Athens because the Turks have already rejected Clerities. From this I would have to assume that he discussed our plan with him--how else could he have gotten that intelligence.

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DECLASSIFY AFTER: 19 JUL 2014
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I: I didn't know he got it.

K: That is what Bob told me. Now can you please get some discipline in this bunch.

I: Sure. Get on em right away.

K: He eh--it's already done.
I'm just trying to tell you if you tip everything to the Russians, we might just as well call Gromyko on an open line and tell him.

I: Right.

S: Should we still tell Tasca to go ahead--

K Well, has somebody called Tasca?

I: We've been trying to get him--he hasn't been available.

K: What does that mean?

S: We've not been able to get through on the wire--meanwhile I've got the telegram --

K: Okay, you will send the telegram--

S: May I read it to you?

K: Yeh

S: Sisco has just reported that GOT has taken final decision to land forces on Cyprus--now information is that landing may be underway within the hour. He should immediately get in touch with PM Ioaniddes, and pass their message from Turkish government Turkish troops should not open fire .....you should urge Greek government to recognize direct confrontation between Greek and Turkish forces would hand to the Soviets the advantage they have been seeking in the ME, which would be disastrous for western interests, not for just ....., but over the years ahead. USG is prepared to support immediate negotiations with the parties concerned for the restoration of the constitutional situation in Cyprus, and we have in mind the possible succession of Clerities--we would support the return to the level of forces existing prior to the coup. Sisco will shortly arrive in Athens and if GOG agrees to proceed along the aobve lines, Sisco would return at once to Ankara to put these ideas to the Turks. You should tell GOG that we have tried our utmost to avoid Turkish intervention in the wake of the coup. Now that it has occured GOG must join

with us in seeking a negotiated settlement which wil preserve the legitimate rights of all concerned. We call upon the Greeks to exercise that degree of restraint in statesmanship without which the .....

K: [redacted] B1

M

I: Henry, may I interrupt a minute--Bob has Sisco on the phone, do you want him to go back into Ankara and talk to the Turks or do you want to give a message to the Turks?

K I want Sisco to go back into Ankara , talk to the Turks, he is then to go back to the airport and go immediately to Athens and he will get instructions there.

I: And have you told Bob what you want Joe to tell the T~~u~~rks

K: I've have told bob what I want him to tell the Turks, but I repeat it again: I want Bob --I want Sisco to tell the Turks that we take an extremely grave view that I believe they are jeopardizing ..... end conversation

UNCLASSIFIED

SA 179

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RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D)

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Secretary Schlesinger
9:45 p.m. 7/19/74

K: Jim, I just wanted to touch base with you on this Greek/Turkish situation.

S: Right.

K: I'm assuming that Clements and Brown represent your views exactly.

S: Well, I don't know that because I don't know exactly what they have been saying, but I think generally you are going in the right direction.

K: Q Good, that is what I wanted to check. Let must just sum up my thinking so that we can be sure that Defense and State are on the same line.

B1

S

K:

S:

K:

S:

K

S: I think you are handling it very well, Henry.

K: And this is why we are moving so slowly. Now the one thing I fear also is this:

B1

S: Right. Precisely.

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CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 25X6
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K: And therefore I am instructing Sisco to give a very tough warning to the Turks against intervention tonight.

S: [redacted] B1

K:

S: Hmmm. Hmmm.

K: The Turks right now are very happy with us because we came out so strongly against Ioannides.

S: [redacted] B1

K:

S: Precisely. When I say edgeaway, we had a letter of offer out to them on May 7th and my feeling on that is let's not finalize the contract until we know what the hell is going on.

K: I agree completely. And yesterday also

S: It cools things just a trace, but do it in a very slow--

K: I agree with, but we can wait a week or two on that can't we?

S: [redacted] B1

K:

S:

K: That I favor.

S: Okay, how do you like George Brown.

K: Outstanding.

S: Did you know him before?

K: Never met him. A brilliant appointment. I am really pleased with him.

S: He is a good man.

K: He is the most thoughtful chief that I've seen.

S:

K: You know Tom was a nice guy and alright for a combat situation. But George Brown is really outstanding.

S: Yeh, outstanding. Okay

K: So Jim I can assume you and I are together on this one.

S: You bet. Where ar you?

K: I'm in San Clemente. I am going to see the President in a few minutes.

S: Right, Henry.

K I'll tell him we talked.

:S Right. Bye.

SA 181

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TELCON (San Clemente)
President/Kissinger
10:06 p.m. - 7/19/74

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

K: Hello.

P: Hello, Henry.

K: Mr. President.

P: Apparently the battle is started, huh?

K: Yeh. They are apparently bombing Nicosia and firing on another town and we haven't had a Greek reaction yet. I've got Sisco going to Athens under protest because he thinks it might be a little dangerous for him there.

P: Oh.

K: But I figure if Tasca can stand it, he must be able to stand it.

P: Dangerous in the sense of anti-Americanism?

K: Yeh. That's all right, Mr. President, that's what they pay under-secretaries for.

P: God almighty, that's what they pay us all for.

K: That's right.

P: And with Tasca there I should think he could have some - if anybody could have any influence with the people. Thank God he's there; he's a tough guy.

K: He's a good fellow.

P: What does he report?

K: We haven't had anything from Athens yet - not one word.

P: You think this is the kind of a thing that requires - that they feel my presence in Washington -- that I have to get the hell back there for this thing?

K: Not yet, but if the Greeks attack the Turks, Mr. President, then I think you should go back to Washington. If it leads to a major war.

P: Yeh, and then what do we do there?

K: Not much but I think.

P: I have to be there.

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CLASSIFICATION: SECRET REASON: 25X1, 25X6
DECLASSIFY AFTER: INDEFINITE
DATE/CASE ID: 15 JUN 2004 200102979

N: That is all that matters is that you know we can do everything--I can do everything here that I could do in Washington.

K: You remember we had the same problem when the Mid East war started --you were in Key Biscayne and we advised strongly not to move.

N: In the Mid East we had basically interests that were -- well --

K: We didn't want to exacerbate the situation and there wasn't anything you could do in Washington that you couldn't do in Key Biscayne-- But let's see how the Greeks react, Mr. President. There is still a 10% chance that this thing will be settled by Monday.

N: How?

K: Well, if the Greeks accept Clerities as a solution and if they --and if the Greeks and Turks then meet in London, I think we could get a ceasefire

N: And you don't want to go to the UN because that'll get the Russians in it.

K: Well we can go to the UN in a few hours--its the middle night.

N: Oh, I know, I know.

K: But it won't contribute much--we can do it tomorrow morning.

N: Well as you know Henry, there is always a damn symbolism in the UN --you and I both know what a mine field it is, but I don't know.

K: The UN is going to meet again tomorrow morning, Mr President. They met on Cyprus today.

N: Yep. Security Council

K: Yeh. I think to call them in the middle of the night when neither of the parties involved--

N No, no, no. That's the point, I just -- it is --

K: I would wait until tomorrow morning on the UN

N: Just so we can avoid the appearance that we are not completely on top of it and I think we certainly are--now you are planning to go back tomorrow afternoon, w

K

K: That is right, Mr. President. That's night at there and that gives me a chance to get on top of it.

N Hell, you are on top of it here too.

K: What I mean is I'll be travelling while people are sleeping out there--in the Middle East

N True, true.
Thank God it isn't Syria and Israel ar something like that--that'd be worse wouldn't it?

K: Well before your term is over Mr. President, we'll have that privilege too.

N: I hope not.

K: I hope not, but I wouldn't lay odds on it.

N: That depends on our Israeli friends to a great extent--we are going to keep a very strong line there--anybody who gets arms from the US by golly to use it--this of course is the Cyrpus thing--an

K: [redacted] B1

N:

K:

N [redacted]

K:

N:

K

N

B1

K: The Greeks have only about 9,000 men on the island and the Turks and the Turks have probably .....over about 3,000or 4,000, 2,000 seaborne and about 2,000airborne, but the Turks are much better equipped and they can reinforce much faster.

N: They can, huh.

K: Yeh.

N: So what would the Greeks do--I'm just trying to--

K *Well, the Greeks will either negotiate or they will attack the Turks in Thrace.*

N: Gosh.

K: I don't exclude that they'll negotiate Mr. President. If Sisco hasn't lost his nerve completely, I think they can be gotten to negotiate.

N: God Sisco may lose his nerve, but Tasca won't. Don't underestimate what he can do. He will put the arm on him now,

K: No, ,no, I have already gotten instruction to him, Mr. President. And he has -- he is already working.

N: And they know too the penalty of failing to negotiate is a--they just rupture their situation with us--they break it right, don't they?

K: That is right. First.

N: That of course isn't much of an option for us--...consider what it does to NATO

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

UNCLASSIFIED

SA 177

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TELCON
Senator Humphrey
Secretary Kissinger
9:20 p.m. 7/19/74

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CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, M. GRAFELD, DAS, A/RPS, ACTING
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 25X6
DECLASSIFY AFTER: HAK'S DEATH
DATE/CASE ID: 02 JUN 2004 200102979

H: Hanry.

K: Hubert!
I called you earlier -- it is a little bit overtaken by events to tell you we had no intention of recognizing sampson--you wrote me a letter --

H: Yes, that is right. I understand.

K: But in the meantime the Turks have landed in Cyprus so it

H I heard that on the radio-- tonight.

K: So its no longer-our problem now is to find the way out of this. Before it all blows up.

H: Yes. It's a very nervous thing right now.

to

K: That's right. But I want you/know we have no intention of recognizing Sampson or never did.

H: Well, I read what you had in the -- and I haven't said anything particularly about it.

K: What was in the Times was totally wrong.

H: I gathered they might be

K: And there was nothing in the State Department people who said this I don't know what level they are certainly none of the people which I work hold that view.

H: Well, as you know, in the committee the other day we kind of held back on anything there so there wouldn't be any comment coming out of the Committee.

K: I have -- Fulbright is fully briefed on every detail.

H: I understand that.

K: [redacted] B1

UNCLASSIFIED

H: I guess that's right. I hope to God that they keep that thing under control.

K: Well, we're trying to bring about now what we've always tried to do -- a constitutional solution. And maybe find a compremise by which the next line in -- to Makarios takes over.

H: Yes, that seemed to me the most sensible thing if that is possible.

K: That is frankly what we tried to do all along.

H: Yes, I gather that--

K: But we couldn't tip our hand too early until we had line d up one of the parties.

H: Yes.

K: And once we had the T u rks lined up for that, we were going to bring pressure on the Greeks.

H: Ah ha.

K But we have Sisco going to Athens now to insist on that Clerities solution.

H: What can you do about these landings if anything?

K We are telling them to stop but they haven't take advice before, so I can guarantee they'll take it now

H: The news reports to the effect that the Soviets are kind of giving them a little shove--

K: The Soviets have been rather reckless--they urged them on earlier in the week--

H: Thank you Henry much--I felt that in the Committee , as you know, there was an effort made to be very very critical of the Greek government the other day, and we sort of side-tracked it for a while--I was just worried about that there might be some effort being made in some echelons of the department to recognize this group that came in--and that I thought would be premature and unnecessary

K: I ggree and it was never our attention. Claiborne Pell can confirm that I told him it was never our intention before the invasion--

H: All right friend.

K: Hubert when you write it is always taken seriously, as when you call.

H: Thank you sir, my best to you.

SA 166

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TELCON
HAK/PRESIDENT
7/19/74 - 8:00 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

K: Hello Mr. President

N: Hi Henry.

K: I was just checking ;the line had gone dead. Mr. President it looks as if the Turks are going to land in Cyprus within the hour if they haven't already landed there. At any rate they've told us they're going to land there. And that they have given instructions to their troops to avoid fire if the Greeks avoid firing. And so my recommendation, if you agree Mr. President, is the following. That we send -- we first of all are going to get in touch with Taska immediately and give him that message from the Turks about the firing. Secondly we're going to urge the Greeks to see whether they will accept the solution of the head of the national assembly Clerides. They'll never accept Makarios without going to war.

N: Yes.

K: And the Turks have already told us they will accept anybody and if they accept Clerides then actually we'll have come out very well. If they don't accept Clerides we're going to have a war between the Greeks and the Turks. We're also drafting letters from you to the Greek and Turkish leaders urging restraint on them but the first thing we've got to do is get the message to the Greeks. We'll get the message off -- your message off immediately. Immediately after that. And then maybe in a few hours we can ~~XXXXXX~~ consider the question of a Security Council meeting.

N: Good. Fine.

K: I'll keep you informed as soon as we know more. I've got a call into Callaghan to see that we can stay lined up with the British.

N: He ought to. We'll see. He'll support us. Why are the Turks going to such lengths.

K: They have a very tough domestic situation at this point. That is just the message that the Minister of Turkey has just told Sisco that they have a tough domestic situation and Ecevit is trying to appeal to them -- the nationalists. And....

N: Well, if it gets down to the Greeks and the Turks having at each other I mean if it does get to that we then have to go to the Security Council

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K: To the Security Council and NATO and we'll have to stop military supplies to both while they are fighting. There is no sense having an open pipeline to two NATO allies who are fighting each other.

N: That's alright. That's the way to play it.

K: Let's see first whether we can get -- if actually we get the Clerides solution this will be the best way to do it. B1

N:

K:

N:

K:



N: Yes.

K: Call Ingersolll. OK Mr. President. I'm sorry to.....

N: No, that's what I'm here for.

K: I'll call you as soon as I have some more news.

N: I guess there is no way we could have kept the Turks from doing this.

K: Mr. President, we had Sisco out there. We had Sisco talk to them in London. He talked to them again. The only way I suppose we could have done it was by being more threatening which we weren't We were maybe too pleading but frankly we didn't think they'd move this fast.

N: Well, threatening them now I suppose...

K: Now its too late. We did send them a very strong note about 8 hours ago telling them it would have very grave consequences.

N: Right. Well don't be concerned about the reaction. The libs and all that sort of thing.

K: The libs now have nothing to react to.

N: They're on the side of the Turks aren't they?

K: Well, they're against the Greeks.

N: That's my point. Where do you end up then. Who is their horse.

K: Well, we'll be on the side of the Turks by pushing for Clerides. The Greeks won't like that.

N: OK. Let's push for it all the way.

K: Right Mr. President.

SA 146 1*

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

TELCON
Conference Call
Secretary Kissinger
Robert McCloskey
Robert Ingersoll
Mr. Stabler

11:35 a.m. 7/19/74 7/15/74

K: What are we doing--why are you all at the Whte House?

ALL: Because! You asked for a WSAG meeting

K: Yeh, yeh, okay. What are we doing about that UN speech. I haven't seen a copy of it.

M Buffum is going to get it back out to you. Stabler and I read it, it looks okay. I thought it ought to convey a little more of the concerns that is reflected in the telegram you wanted sent Anakara.

K: That is right. That--but it is now 2:30

M: Last I talked to him Mr. Secretary 20 minutes ago it was still possible Scali would not have to speak this afternoon--that the council may agree to hear only Makarios and then carry over until tomorrow. ..... is to let me know just as soon as he has any change in that.

K: Right. Let me say a general thing. The management of a crisis like this depends on everybody being informed of our thinking that we want to take action. Mow I have a cable here from Sauvagnargnes.....which shows for example in para 4., is stabler on?

S: Yes, sir.

K: It says Sauvagnargnes proposes that Sisco go on to Ankara, now what does Irvine say to that profound remark, why doesn't he say that is exactly what he is doing?
Does he need instructions to be told this

S: He certainly shouldn't--he

K: Why didn't he say it/

S: It doesn't suggest he didn't, but he didn't--certainly doesn't ~~xxx~~ purport that he said so, no.

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K: There are only two possibilities--if he is reporting of it==he must either want to inform us of their thinking and think this will influence the decision--at any rate, I want Irwin to go back to Sauvagnargnes and tell him two things--I greatly appreciate his analysis, I agree with it and there were a number of things which weren't made clear in our original cable--one that we have made clear to Turkey that we would strongly ~~xx~~ oppose enosis, direct or creeping and that the Turks to us have expressed great appreciation for this.
Secondly, that we are going in the UN debate to indicate our objection to outside intervention and third as he knows Sisco has been sent to Ankara. Just want to do this to keep them happy.

Now is somebody keeping the British informed of what we are doing.

I I just talked to the minister--Ramsbothom was not available--but I got Sykes.
They have a long message from Callahan ~~xxxxx~~ to you in which they are delivering to me and we were just getting it over the phone when your call came in--

K: Is he rambunctious?

I No, pretty much the same position they had before saying they were going to ~~xxxxx~~ support Makarios at least at this time not knowing whether he could eventually be the head of the government, but until they found another solution, this was their position.

K: [redacted] B1

I: They said the only way this will happen is by putting pressureon the Greeks.

K: [redacted]

B1

I: Okay.

B1

K: [redacted] B1

And you might call the Turkish ambassador and make this clear to him. [redacted] And have we heard from the Germans? B1

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I: Nothing I have seen so far--

S: No, absolutely nothing at all

K: But could you gentlemen form a little group that keeps on top of this and not just reacts.

I: That is right. We talked to Fulbrigh and Morgan

K: How are they reacting?

M I spoke to Mansfield and Morgan. Mansfield was in fully support-- Morgan who I had to reach --

K: Of your position or my position?

M: Of your position and efforts

K: (laughs)

M: that we are making.

K: Good. I

K~~x~~ I: I talked to Fulbright and he was concerned with the way things were going and he commented very adversely on the colonels (?) in Greece.

K: You tell him we have no love for them.

I: I know. I told him we'd keep him informed.

K: The major theme is we can't have a war there right now and can only do one thing at a time.

I: We don't have anything from Joe from Athens, so we don't know what happened there.

K: Has he left?

I: Yes, He must be to Ankara now.

K: He must be taking over the government. Can we call Ankara and make sure the guy reports. And does he understand he is not to surface the Clerities thing until he gets instructions.

M We told him we'll send instructions on that from his two telegrams this morning--

K: You better pray that these were clear enough. I tell you there will be blood if he surfaced--the last thing I want is an American draft proposal--the last thing we need is an American proposal. We first have to get into the Turkish heads there must be an alternative solution. Once he has done that--then tell them we will support a alternative solution such as for example Clerities or something else they might think of. But until he has convinced them that there has to be an alternative, our introducing Clerities just makes us a.....

S: I have prepared as a result of an earlier conversation this morning the subsequent instructions

K: Listen Stabler, just because you have won me over with that cable last night, don;t press your luck. Okay, what are your instructions. I've even been saying nice things about you to Eagleburger. Which is the highest--almost like a declaration.

S: I'll have to return it. But may I--

K: What did you say--you are going to say nice things about me to Ealeburger

All: Laughter

K: That is the foreign service mentality.

S: Could we get on with your ~~xx~~ instructions? What I said, "the Secretary has considered the report of your conversations with Ecevit in London as well as your proposal to suggest a strategy contained in the message which you.... The Secretary does not want you to float the Clerities proposal until you have been absolutely sure that Ecevit understands that in our view the direction taken is presently pointed...would lead to ultimate disaster for Turkey. .....

K: Excuse me, I've got a call from Sauvagnargnes. Hold still and I'll call bac Iplaced the call to him to make sure he is happy.

S: Will you tell him these things?

K: I'll tell him those things, but send them anyway. And will you all stay where you can be reached

M: Should we start the WSAG
K: Yeh, and I'll call you out again.
M: Last thing, Mr. Secretary, there is a message coming in from Sisco
K: Good and the State Department at the WSAG will act firmly, right Not handwringingly?
I Yes, that is right.

SA 148

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RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.5(C), 1.5(D), B6

Friday, July 19, 1974
Secretary Kissinger - Ambassador Ingersoll
12:05 p.m.
San Clemente

K: Bob?
I: Yes, Henry.

K: Now, Bob, let's get something straight. You're now acting Secretary. You're going to shape up this rabble while I'm out of town.

I: All right.

K: And first of all, any press comments on this Claridies thing, we do not comment on on-going negotiations. Now you get Stabler and McCloskey under tight control, Bob, or I'm going to clean the whole bunch of them out.

I: OK.

K: This is a god-damn rabble house. Why do I not want to surface Claridies? We are going to be in the UN with an American-----Makarios when nobody supports it.

I: Well this bunch here did not do that. We don't know what has been done in Athens. But I can assure you that we have been following your instructions explicitly.

B1, B6

[redacted] But now what I want to understand is, I want these guys, my nightmare is that we are going to wind up totally isolated. And we will be committed. I wanted us to be in a position where others ware committed and we could go either way depending

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DATE/CASE ID: 21 MAY 2003 200102979

on the balance of forces. You know, it isn't that I've failed so often in these things.

I: Right.

K: I mean, that's where I want to come out. If I had surfaced an American plan on the second day on the Syrian-Israeli negotiation, I would have been home on the fifth day.

I: Right, I understand what you're saying.

K: Yeah, but are you going to take over now?
And will you be willing to give orders now? I don't care about their morale.

I: I'll give orders. Don't worry.

K: OK. Now, press comment. There is no American plan. We are discussing various ideas with these people designed to prevent a Greek-Turkish war, the ------ and restoration of constitutional rule.

I: OK.

K: These are our objectives.

I: All right, sir.

K: And I'm counting on you to keep this thing under control.
I may have to have a meeting on Sunday morning with you all if that is possible.

I: You're coming back tomorrow.

K: OK. Bye.

I: Bye.

SA 152

1*

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

TELCON
Senator Mansfield
Secretary Kissinger
7/19/74 1:15 p.m.

M: Yes , Henry.

K: Senator, I know they have already called you from the department.

M: Yeh, McCloskey did.

K: But I just wanted to tell you briefly where we stand now. We have gotten the Greeks to agree to send somebody to London on Monday.

M: Which Greek?

K: The Greek government. [redacted] B1
[redacted] B1

M: Hm huh.

K: And our strategy is we will definitely get that government on Cyprus removed.
The sampson government.

M: Yeh.

K: But before we start moving on that, we want to preveth at Turkish intervention and a Greek/Turkish war [redacted] B1

His constitutional successor is a man called Clerities who is head of the national assembly and we are trying to see whether we can get him established with the agreement of Greece and Turkey--once that is done he can call for elections in which Makarios can run in 6 most and that way we avoid both a Greek/Turkish war, poossible Soviet intervention and civil war on the islandx And the major thing we want to do now is prevent a blow-up and possi ble call for American military forces

M: You wouldn't get military forces, Henry.

K: That's what I mean. That being the situation. I wanted you to unde - stand why we are maneuvering as we are--it is easy to make a proclamation and one danger is if we can't get US forces since we also cannot get UK forces, if we go too far on the Makarios ... and he then calls for Soviet forces, we haven't got a leg to stand on.

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DECLASSIFY AFTER: 19 JUL 2014
DATE/CASE ID: 07 JUL 2004 200102979

TELCON
Senator Mansfield
(continued Page 2)

M But if it comes to that and you've no leg to stand on, then you are in great trouble--worse than Vietnam, I would think

K: If we try to get in.

M: Yes.

K: We will not get in. But knowing that we can't get in, we are trying to maneuver in such a way that a consitttional solution emerges.

M: That won't meet with Makarios' approval yet.

K: We don't know yet.

M: You are seeing him Monday, McCloskey said?

K: On monday, if he figures he can't get back any other way--it might meet with his approval.

M: That would be fine, but it is a delicate situation as you know more than me.

K: What is your view. B1

M:

K:

M:

K:

M

K: That is why I am seeing him.

K: *What I said to you isn't our public position.*

M: No, no, I haven't heard a thing.

K: Our public position is that I am seeing Makarios and if I can work out something with his approval, that would be the best solution.

M: But he is a pretty mercurial character

K: Yeh, he is tricky.

They all seem to wind up in my baliwick sooner or later

M: But you can't avoid it either.
Do your best Henry, we will watch.

K: Right, and I just wanted you to know (1) we won't intervene militarily second we will not support the Greek government --in fact we will oppose the greek government--but in such a way that they can pull back from their position without going to war

M: Good, it sounds good.

K And *third we won't make any other decisions until I've seen Makarios*

M: And fourth you will walk the tight wope.

K: Do the very best of our abilities.

M: Good luck, Henry. Take care.

K: Thank you.

SA 161

1*

TELCON
Fulbright/HAK
4:47 p.m. - 7/19/74

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

F: Mr. Secretary. How are you?

K: OK. I just wanted to bring you up date at where we stand. It isn't much different from what you were told this morning. But the Greeks have now agreed to send somebody to London on Monday.

F: To send somebody where?

K: To London. Which is what we had proposed and the British had supported. To talk about new constitutional arrangements which is a big step forward. And we're trying to keep the Turks from invading.

F: Well, I hope you do.

K: So that's where we are right now. You know I'm seeing Makarios on Monday?

F: What time?

K: Before your Committee. About 2:30

F: You're supposed to come to my Committee about 4:00.

K: I think that gives me an hour and 15 minutes with him.

F: What do you think he is going to say?

K: To me? I don't have a clear idea. We're not opposed to Makarios. We're opposed to getting ourselves into a position where we have to restore him by force.

F: I'm opposed to using force too but I don't want to support the Greeks. B1

K: [redacted]

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DECLASSIFY AFTER: 19 JUL 2014
DATE/CASE ID: 07 JUL 2004 200102979

F: That's good too.

K: That's again for your very private information.

F: That's what my Committee has been telling you for two or three years.

K: So we're bringing pressure on the Greeks but we're doing it so it isn't too publicly visible.

F: OK.

K: [redacted] B1

F: Well, I agree with that.

K: But as soon as we have -- well have a substantial -- don't believe the newspaper stories. There isn't any real difference between us and London. Sometimes a shade of tactics but in terms Callaghan has written me a long letter today of their views and I've just replied to him and told him that. You know, here and there there may be a shade in tactics but we're on substantially the same wicket.

F: That goods.

K: We'll keep a little more daylight between ourselves and Makarios than they do but we're in total agreement that the present group in Cyprus has to go.

F: Good. Well, that's just amazing. It's the main thing. B1

K: [redacted]

F: Sampson? Yes.

F: I think that's the main thing.

K: That you can be absolutely sure of. And on that we are in total agreement with the British.

F: Good. Well thank you very much for calling.

K: I'll call you tomorrow and bring you up to date again.

F: Fine.

K: Ok. Mr. Chairman. Bye.

SA 150

RELEASED IN PART
B6

Friday, July 19, 1974
San Clemente
Secretary Kissinger - Amb. McCloskey
12:45 p.m.

K: Hello?

M: We've got Welles Stables on and he will read to you the telegram--one to Sisco and the other to the French Foreign Minister

S: For Undersecretary Sisco: The has sent us a report ------ as well as your proposal ---strategy..... The Secretary wants you in your approach to Ecevit to demonstrate compassion and understanding for Turkish concerns. But at the same time make it clear that we---- not in Turkish interests because it would set in train ----precisely those events which in the end would be damaging to Turkey's long-term interest. Ecevit was also concerned that by the same token [redacted] we are totally opposed to ------ and have so informed the Greeks.

K: And that we will cooperate with the Turks to this end.

S: We are willing to work energetically with Turkey for a solution which will preserve consititutional arrangements while protecting the rights of the Turkish-Cypriot community. You should go through carefully with Ecevit our analysis of this, hopefully to lead him to understand we are not attempting to -------- the situation for to put forth a US plan but rather in our judgment [redacted] the Turkish, while it might seem to have advantages to Turkey in the short term, clearly has the most dangerous potentialities in the long term.

K: Good.

S: The Secretary recognizes it may be difficult to present such a case but our analysis is correct------- he considers it imperative that Ecevit be carefully led through this analysis . Basically the ~~text~~ package here is our hope that if Ecevit can be convinced that our analysis is correct, it is therefore a Makarios solution would be no better for Turkey than Sampson he will be --------- what an alternative solution might be. You should tell Ecevit that we are open to any ideas [redacted] he may have and then indicate that as an idea of yours there might be a --------.

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Do not suggest in any way that this is a American chief proposal but rather an idea on which he might want to reflect. Summarize briefly..

K: And say if he finds it useful he will report immediately to Washington and see whether we can.... and what our reaction is. Well, maybe we can put it a little stronger. Say that I asked him to feel him out on the.... just say it is something that I have not discussed with anybody but that I would like personally to get his reactions to and as soon as we have it we should report it. THat makes it a little less free-wheeling.

S: OK, to summarize briefly, we must not get ourselves in a situation where we are backing one solution and the UK and Turkey backing another and the Greeks another solution and the Soviets having the role of opting for Turkey if they so desire for Turkey. We must remain as flexible as possible and not get ahead of the ~~previous proposal~~ Carides proposal until we can bring the parties themselves to recognize that a compromise solution must be sought and that it is in their best interst. The Secretary does not wish you to commit yourself in any way to returning to Wash. at this time.

K: No, infact, I think he should go to London for the Monday meeting.

S: Well, you should be prepared to go to -------- London if desirable.

K: No, that's a damn good cable. Can you add one other thought to it, please. That one of our principle objectives is that not to have the Turks feel we let them down in this and therefore he should really make Ecevit understand that we are really talking to him as friends as allies.

S: Yes, we said we wanted him to approach it with compassion...

K: Yeah, I know, but say it again at the end.

S: Right.

K: And you better tell Joe that he should not surface his document.

S: Yes, right.

K: I mean, that is totally premature. Now, gentlemen, before I get another spade of stories, does anyone disagree with this? If anyone does, please let me know. There is no crime in disagreeing. There is a crime in taking it to the press.

I: We don't know where those stories came from--but certainly none of the people have been in on this.

K: I don't ming the disagreement if there is one.

I: No, I don't think there is one.

S: Mr. Secretary, I don't know how to convince you but---I wouldn't have any hesitations.

K: And, Bob, you agree?

M: Oh yes, Mr. Secrtary.

K: OK, fine. I'm not asking this for PR reasons, I'm asking it to make sure that we are all aboard. You might as well go ahead even if you disagree but I'd like at least to know.

I: Do you want to hear about the Souvaraguares cable?

K: Yes. I have talked to Souvaraguares incidently.

S: ... and therefore a compromise is the only way out. We are willing to press for such a compromise once it is clear what sort of compromise is desirable. You should also make the following two points------ Therefore a compromise is the only way out -------

K: And also you should tell them that we have told the Turks we will work with them on any solution on Cyprus that gives them guarantees in that respect. You know just a sentence about our cable.

S: Yes. And then finally during the Security Council ------ consideration you should make clear that we are opposed to all outside intervention from whatever quarter.

K: Including -----.

S: Yeah.

K: Now we better tell Erwin that we had a telephone call with Sauvargues, otherwise he'll look like a fool. Tell him the Secretary has made these points in capsule form to Sauvagnargues on the telephone but this is an extension of his remarks--or something like that.

I: Henry, we've set up a WSAG meeting for tomorrow morning at 10:00 a.m. To set up a working group to prepare a possible contingency plan and we thought we should not do anything on alert or anything like that. No evacuation plan.

K: I agree, but we should look them over.

I: We are, that is what we are preparing for tomorrow morning.

K: Good.

I: The other thing, I think I told you we got a message in from Callaghan which we are going to send to you as soon as it is delivered from the British.

K: You might talk Ramsbotham through what we are telling the Turks.

M: Anyone else that you want us to do this with?

K: No, Ramsbotham, and has somebody talked to the Secretary General--

[redacted] B6

M: No, not other than what you instructed Buffum this morning.

K: That's good enough. Has that been done?

M: I'll have to check. Anything else?

K: No.

M: Thank you.

K: Thank you, Bob.

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

UNCLASSIFIED

SA 164

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ~~STATE~~
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS, A/RPS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 25X6
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 19 JUL 2014
DATE/CASE ID: 08 JUL 2004 200102979

TELCON
Ingersoll/McCloskey/Stabler - HAK
July 19, 1974 - 7:30 p.m.

I: Another message that Sisco and McComber were called back to The Prime Ministers.

K: But that is just to tell them we refused.

I: There was a separate message Mr. Secretary which said that the ships had turned.

K: Oh really.

I: Yes.

S: They'd been in a 7 1/2 mile limit. Both forces had turned off and they've gone outside _____.

K: Really.

S: That occurred just before the message to Sisco.

K: Could it be that we do something right sometimes.

M: We'll have to wait and see.

I: Let me get that other message.

K: I've just shaken that over self-confidence of this Department. If Sisco gets a 48 hour dealy he'll be insufferable.

I: I'll say. We'll be willing to insufferable.

K: Maybe we should try Stabler as an alternative.

M: He's been doing alright on the messages today.

K: He's terrific on messages. Where are those two messages that he sent out.

S: Did you get the one to Callaghan.

K: A message to Callaghan. Has that actually been sent.

S: It was sent out to LDX several hours ago at the White House.

K: It went two hours ago to the W. H. Now will you find you out where these idiots have it. Did you tell them to clear the lines.

UNCLASSIFIED

I: An hour and a half ago.

K: Did you tell them it has high priority.

I: Yes. They were told to clear the lines.

K: Ok. Well, let's have a word.

M: This message I referred to reads both groups of Turkish ships have changed course according to reports London British sources Cyprus. Task force north of Ireland has just entered 12 mile limit when it turned. Forces now steaming north and is approximately 22 miles off course.

K: They may be heading for Salonisa.

I: That's a long way away.

K: Or Rotes. Listen gentlemen. I'm not that crazy yet.

I: You haven't looked at your map.

K: I know they are not heading for Salonika Bob. Now. Lets discuss what we do if they turn around again. Supposing they land. What do we do.

I: I think we should get our people heading for the Turkish base.

K: Get what people heading for what Turkish base.

M: We're talking about the Americans on Cyprus and moving them to one of the British sovereign bases on the Island.

K: Yes. but that is a minor problem. I mean that is important but that's easy. But what do we do in policy. Wells what do we do.

S: The only option that we have left open at that point is the most undesireable one we probably have to sort of join maybe in some sort of a _____ to call for the ceasation of hostilities and stand aby I think because it doesn't give a position but that is the only position one can take. You really can't accept a Turkish invasion because that's what .....

K: You're talking to fast. What would happen.

S: One thing we wanted to prevent was a Turkish invasion [redacted] B1

K: [redacted] B1

S:

K:

S:

K:

S:

K: Well, what has happened to the Callaghan message. You know these messages have taken hours to get here. The Situation Room says they haven't received it yet.

S: I'm just having a check made this very moment now to find out if it was delivered up here an hour and a half ago.

K: Where did you send it to.

S: The White House to be sent to you. The people over there were told it was coming.

K: He said they LDX'd it to the White House to send to us. Well, its partly overtaken by events anyway.

S: Yes, I know. Almost entirely. Unless he gets 48 hours delay.

K: But if we get the 48 hour delay we have then move with much greater speed.

M: Right. I think we have to get joined up by the British here Mr. Secretary

K: We have what?

M: To get joined up with the British.

K: That's clear. That's why I'm looking for the Callaghan message.

M: And I think now the pace of events overtake that message to Callaghan if it gets to you.

K: But I'd let it go anyway and then follow it with something else.

M: Unfortunately it doesn't go anywhere until it gets to you.

K: So far it doesn't seem to have even reached the White House yet. It's probably some desk officer who hasn't put his initials on it. Whom did you give it to State Operation.

S: It was given to the SS director here directly with instructions to LDX immediately over to the White House for transmission to San Clemente on a high priority basis.

K: OK. Well, let's not worry about that now. When will we know... We haven't heard from Sisco yet.

M: You have his one message.

K: No we haven't heard about his being called -- his result of the....

S: He was called in just a little while ago.

M: The time was 10:00.

S: The message from Ankara was dated 10:06 our time. 7:06 your time.

K: What time is that in Ankara

I: Plus 7. 5:00 a.m.

K: Assuming they gave him -- there are two possibilities either they are telling him they are going in anyway or they gave him 48 hours. Now if they're going in anyway we've got to get the fighting stopped -- we've got to tell the Greeks to stop fighting. Not to go to war. Then the question is how to do we accomplish that.

M: I think you have to start with Presidential messages for one thing.

K: Ok. Will you draft those. And we've got to do something about this G.D. communications here. Brent will you do something about this communication and tell them to get the Watergate traffic off the bloody lines.

K: I guess they're sending those six books out here by ... Well, we need a message to Turkey and to Greece. We need immediately -- a contingency message to the British. I guess we have a little time on that. When do you think we'll know from Joe?

S: I suspect we would know by another 45 minutes.

K: [redacted] E

M: Do you have the Callaghan message now.

K: I have no idea where it is but what I'm now trying to decide is have we found out where the Callaghan message is. It is here. But that is not the key issue here. The key issue is when we have 48 hours we ought to try to get the Greeks and the Turks. There are two possibilities. Either the Greeks and Turks meet in London or Joe goes on a quick shuttle.

S: Either the Greeks and do Turks do what?

K: Go to London. Or Joe goes back there now. If the -- if he has 48 hours we have to see what it is that the Turks want. If the Turks insist on bringing Makarios back I don't think that can be done in 48 hours.

S: I was thinking if he does get 48 hours we then ought to stay where he is and continue to find out exactly the perimeter. B1

K: [redacted]

I:

K:

I:

K:

I:

K:

I:

S: I don't ever see how you could get the Greeks to stand on that.

K: On Makarois. We agree on that. I'm just trying to go astep at at time. So the next thing is will the Greeks accept in principal a constitutional solution other than Makarois. That's what would have to be done -- that is how this would have to be phrased within the next 48 hours.

M: [redacted] B

K: [redacted]

I: [redacted]

K: [redacted]

I: [redacted]

K: Well, if that is true then if we got 48 hours we're not in bad shape. Let's see what it is. Get me a copy too. We've got a great organization here. Cables are distributed in this order - Eagleburger, Scowcroft and then me. Well, this is just what you've been telling us. This is about that change of direction. Well look, what we need is first of all to get my other cable off [redacted] to the British as if nothing had happened.

S: Are you ready to go on that.

K: They haven't found it yet because its probably being read by Zeigler at a briefing. In reply to Doar. And we may have sent him a St. Clair statement.

M: They're still trying to find phase three. We passed to the British those other two papers you wanted.

K: You have.

M: Yes.

K: Just for Callaghan

S: Yes.

K: I thought we were going to attach them to the letter but this is actually very helpful.

M: We refer to it in the letter.

K: No, no its fine. You did the right thing. OK. If we have 48 hours we will draft a note out here for the Soviets which we will send to you to deliver to Voronstov which we'll send through Kennedy maybe to Voronstov and Bob you can see a copy of it. Just tell him what we're planning to do. Because they may go for a Clerides solution. We want above all and Wells I want you to draft a note now to the British explaining why if its 48 hours the Makarois solution can no longer work.

S: I think there is some flexibility in Callaghan.

B1

K: [redacted] I mean in a more elegant way. Or they will have to try the Makarois solution without us. And give them our judgment why we think in 48 hours it cannot be done. Are you still on the line?

M: Yes.

K: I think we should also get in touch with Soumanyar and give him some of that thinking. As far as NATO is concerned we should wait until we get a tentative reaction.

SA 149

1*

TELCON -- CONFERENCE CALL
Secretary Kissinger [San Clemente]
Dep. Sec. Ingersoll, Amb. McCloskey,
Wells Stabler & Colonel Kennedy [Washington]

RELEASED IN FULL

2:30 p.m., July 19, 1974

HAK: Hello, what are we doing -- why are you all at the White House may I ask?

McC: . . for a WSAG meeting.

HAK: Yeah.

McC: Just about to begin.

HAK: About that UN speech, I haven't seen a copy of it.

McC: Buffum is to get it back out to you. Stabler and I read it, it looks okay. I thought it ought to convey a little bit more of the concern that is reflected in the telegram that you wanted sent and we sent to Ankara.

HAK: That is right. But it is now 2:30.

McC: Well, the last I talked to him, Mr. Secretary, -- 15 or 20 minutes ago -- it was still possible Scali would not have to speak this afternoon. But the Council may agree to hear *only* Makarios and then carry over until tomorrow. Buffum is to let me know just as soon as he has any change in that.

HAK: Right. Now, let me say one general thing, the management of a crisis depends on everybody being informed of our thinking that we want to take action. Now I have a cable here from Sauvagnargues which shows for example in paragraph 4 -- Is Stabler on?

S: Yes, sir.

HK: I mean, it says -- Sauvagnargues proposes that Sisco go on to Ankara. Now what does Irwin say to that profound remark? Why doesn't he say that's exactly what he's doing? Does he need instructions to be told this?

S: No, he certainly shouldn't. Because he's certainly aware that he would. It was announced in the public domain in any event.

HAK: Well, then why didn't he say it?

S: Well, I'll have to just check that and see. I mean, it doesn't suggest that he didn't. But it certainly doesn't report that he said so, no.

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HAK: Well, there are only two possibilities. If he's reporting it, he must either want to inform us of their thinking.

S: Yeah.

HAK: And think that this will influence a decision. Well, at any rate, I want him -- I want Irwin to go back to Sauvagnargues and tell Sauvagnargues two things: One, I greatly appreciate his analysis; I agree with it and there were a number of things which weren't made clear in our original cable. One is that we have made clear to Turkey that we would strongly oppose enosis direct or trekking (?) and that the Turk to us have expressed great appreciation for this.

S: Um-humm.

K: Secondly, that we are going in the UN debate to indicate our objection to outside intervention. And third, that, as he knows, Sisco has been sent to Ankara. Now I just want to do this to keep them happy.

I: Okay.

HAK: Now, is somebody keeping the British informed of what we're doing?

I: Bob has just talked to --

McC: I have just talked to the Minister -- Peter Ramsbotham was not available but I got Sykes. And they have a long message from Callaghan to you which they are delivering to me and we were just getting that over the phone when your call came in. We didn't quite complete it.

HAK: *Is he rambunctious?*

I: No, pretty much the same position they were in before, saying that they were going to support Makarios, at least at this time, not knowing whether he could eventually be the head of the government. But until they find another solution, this is their position.

HAK: Well, that's all right.

I: Sampson out of course. And they have to do something to make sure that the Turks didn't move in and that would be the removal of Sampson. They said the only way this is going to happen is to put pressure on the Greeks.

HAK: Well, then we are willing to bring pressure on the Greeks as soon as we know what the alternative is that emerges.

I: Right.

HAK: And you can tell Ramsbotham on my behalf to Callaghan that we are not in disagreement with them on this.

I: Okay.

HAK: I don't want the British to start leaking that they are fighting us on Greece. Tell them it is a tactical difference. That we don't want to move against Sampson until we know the alternatives and use him as a bargaining chip but we can assure them we don't want to have Sampson emerge out of it.

I: Right.

HAK: And you might call the Turkish Ambassador and make this clear to him.

I: Right.

HAK: Hopefully on a line that the Russians monitor . . . . make microwaves.

I: [Laughter]

HAK: And have we heard from the Germans?

McC: Nothing I've seen so far. Wells?

S: No, there's been absolutely nothing at all from the Germans.

HAK: But you gentlemen form a little group that keeps on top of this and not just react?

S: That's right. We talked to Fulbright and to Morgan and to --

McC: I spoke to Mansfield and Morgan. Mansfield was fully in support. Morgan who I had to reach at home in Pennsy --

HAK: . . . . my position.

McC: Of your position and the efforts that we're making.

HAK: Good.

I: I talked to Fulbright and he was just concerned over the way thin s were going. He commented very adversely against the Colonels in Greece.

HK: Well, you tell him we have no love for them.

I: [Laughter] I told him we would keep him informed.

HAK: The major thing theme is that we cannot have a war there right now.

I: Right.

HAK: And we can only do one thing at a time.

I: Right. We haven't heard anything from Joe from Athens so we don't know what happened there.

HAK: Has he left?

I: He's supposed to have to have left.

S: He must be in Ankara by now.

HAK: He's probably taking over the government.

[Laughter]

HAK: Well, can we call Ankara and make sure the guy reports?

I: Yep.

McC: Sure.

HAK: And does he understand he's not to surface the Clevides thing until we ~~xxxxx~~ give instructions?

McC: We told him that we will send him instructions on that from his two telegrams this morning --

HAK: You better pray that people are clear enough.

[Laughter]

HAK: I tell you there will be blood. If he surfaces this. The last thing I want is an American draft proposal. The last thing we need is an American draft proposal. The first thing he's got to do is to get into the Turkish heads that there must be an alternative solution.

I: Right.

HAK: Once he's done that, tell them we will support an alternative solution such as, for example, Clevides or something else they might think of. But until he's convinced them that there's got to be an alternative, our introducing Clevides jus t makes us a party.

S: Well, I have report as a result of any conversations this morning the subsequent instructions. There were done of course --

HAK: Well, just ~~But that's~~ because you won me over with that cable last night, don't press your luck.

S: I'm not pressing my luck. But I think you've got to --

HAK: What are your instructions?

S: Well, they are your instructions.

HAK: . . . nice things about you to Eagleburger.

S: Huh?

HAK: I've even said nice things about you to Eagleburger.

S: That's _____.

HAK: Which is the highest -- it's almost like a declaration.

S: [Laughs] I'll have to return it. Well, --

HAK: What did you say -- you're going to say nice things about me to Eagleburger?

[Laughter]

That's the ..... mentality. Go ahead.

S: Can we get on with your instructions?

HAK: Yeah.

S: So what I said is: The Secretary has considered the reports of your conversations with Ecevit in London as well as your proposals to suggest as _____ contained in the message which you saw. And the Secretary does not want you to float the Clevides proposal until you have made absolutely sure that Ecevit understands that in our view the direction in which Turkey is presently pointed would lead to ultimate disaster for Turkey. You should, therefore, in speaking with him in Ankara go through it in carefully analysis set forth in the message of yesterday. He must be made to understand --

HAK: I got a call from Sauvagnargues. Hold still and I'll call you back. I placed the call to Sauvagnargues just to make sure he's happy.

S: Will you tell him these things?

HAK: I'll tell him those things but send them anyway.

S: All right.

HAK: Will you all stay where you can be reached?

S: If you want us to. Shall we start the WSAG?

HAK: Yeah. Start the WSAG and I'll call you out again.

I: Okay.

McC: Last thing, Mr. Secretary, there is a message coming in now from Sisco.

K: Good.

McC: Okay.

HAK: And the State Department at the WSAG will act firmly right? Not hand wringingly?

I: That's right.

HAK: Thank you.

I: Okay.

SA 156

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TELCON
Dep Sec Ingersoll
Secretary Kissinger
3:40 p.m. 7/19/74

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I just got the speech of Scali's but I suppose it is too late since I also had a call from Ramsbotham congratulating me on the masterful way in which Scali sometimes referred to Makarios as President and sometimes as Archbishop

I don't consider that masterful, I consider it another example of total indiscipline.

I: I just heard it and I talked to Ramsbotham afterwards who called it to my attentio n.

K: Do you suppose our calling President Makarious is without significance?

I: No, I dont--it is rather significant--the first part of the--

K: Did we all agree on that--I Mean is everyone happy with this, I am not.

I: He started out with Archbishop--that is what we had in the text I don't know where he got the President Makarios.

K: Well, weill somebody call it to his attention? That he is to stick to archbishop Makarios

I: Right.

K: If we can interupt his great flights of policymaking. Did he give essentially this speech?

I: Yes. I didn't have the text in front of me, but one of the fellows there was looking at it and said it was essentially that.

K: With what changes?

I: Well, he adlibbed at one point and talked about a reference that the Soviets representative made that--I didn't hear the Soviet man, so I don't really know what he was saying, and it implied that there had been American appealing to the Soviets that we should have a policy similar to theirs. And he said we always permit our citizens to take opposite policies or anything they want.
Henry you heard the story in the Fin. Times was not filed because the reporter found out it wasn't true.

K: No, I have not heard that because it would have been interesting information.

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I We called Lewis and I--

K: That's all right. The next thing, Bob is the Callahan letter. I think it is basically a friendly letter and that basically we don't disagree with it, we are just differing about pace and how we get to this objective. Could Stabler do one of his masterpieces

I: To Callahan

K: A personal letter and reply, giving him our analysis of the situation again in a capsule and saying we agree--I've already called Ramsbotham just so that you know--is Stabler on?

I: I think I'm the only one on--I didn't know you wanted him

K: No, no that's all right. Tell him on A I don't disagree except I would do it with lower key, B I agree, C I believe that that is going on, D --that is premature--E we are willing to do once, we know what is acceptable to the parties or at least to the Turks, and F is becoming moot because of the eloquence of our great ambassador. Don't put it this way--F is now being debated. Does Scali understand that we would like to delay everything as long as possible.

I: I haven't been in touch, but I will find out and we could make sure he does--I'm sure he does.

K: Have you ever dealt with Scali? Will you tell Buffum that I'm holding him personally responsible for slowing Scali down

I: All right

K: Okay.

I: Essentially this is all right that Stabler can say except for this--

K: I want him to give our view and then say what this means to us is with respect to your letter the following--do it a little fuller than what I have just given you.

I: Right. We will draft it let you know in a bit.

K: Good. Today.

I: Right.

SA 158 1*

TELCON
Secretary Ingersoll
Secretary Kissinger
4:00 p.m. 7/19/74

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Bob, you'll regret the day you were sworn in.

I: Ahhh ha.

K: At any rate, it is proof for you--the people I don't trust, I don't work with.

I: Right.

K: Your predecessor had not complaints about/called too often. being

I: I don't mind a bit.

K: Look do you have that Clerities cable in front of you --

I: No, I don't--I'll get a copy though.

K: Let me tell you I would like it to be given on a confidential basis to Ramsbotham for Callahan
And to say this is pretty much an analysis of ours.

I: Do you want to incorporate in this reply that Stabler is making?

K: Yeh, why don't you say for your own personal use, I am sending you a cable.
Secondly, I would like an instruction sent to Davies that he should see Clerities if at all possible and tell him we are quite sympathetic to the considerations he advanced--or more tactfully at any rate under no circumstances should he resign his position.

I: All right.

K: Now the only thing that Stabler has to learn to become a really good friend is to draft faster.

I: He dfafts fast, it is a matter of getting it through the typewriter I think is our biggest trouble.

K: Can we get those two things off in the next hour--or fairly soon

I: You want them out there first, don't you?

K: Or read to me on the phone. Fine. Thank you.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 12 FEB 2003 200102979

SA 163

1*

RELEASED IN FULL

San Clemente
Friday, July 19, 1974
5:05 p.m.
Secretary Kissinger - Senator Pell

P: Hello, Henry.

K: Claiborne.

P: Greetings.

K: I just received your letter. I'm out on the west coast for a few days and I just wanted you to know that there is no intention of recognizing the Sampson regime and that it will not stay there. But we have to manuever in such a way that we don't trigger a Soviet intervention and that we don't get a Turkish-Greek war started. But, just for your information there is no intention or any prospect of recognizing the Sampson regime.

P: I'm delighted to hear that and I appreciate more than I can say your letting me know that. I think that will make the Committee feel more relaxed. As you probably know, Bill Fulbright is inviting Makarios.

K: That's all right. I knew that and had no objection. See what we are trying to avoid, just for your infomration again, we are trying to avoid the situation where we are nailing our flag to something which we then have to impose by military force. We would like to get the situation in which the Greek government accepts the removal of Sampson. We think if that happens that will also have a major effort of weakening the Greek government and doesn't put us in the position of an ineffectual grandstand play.

P: Right, but if you find that the --that you have to take a public position on this--

K: We will take a public position on this. And against----we are moving steadily. And, again just for your information and not to be repeated, we are already beginning to cut off military supplies.

P: Right. Well I'm delight and I thank you very much.

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K: But don't get that into the newspapers. You can tell the other signers of your letter that if you want to that I have talked to you, you know, McGovern, Humphrey and McGee and you can give them a little feel. At any rate, put their mind at ease that we are heading for the recognition of the Sampson regime.

P: That I will but I will wait to contact them until Monday when they will be back in town.

K: THat's fine with me.

P: I appreciate very much your calling.

K: Don't let some of these articles in the N Y Times affect you. The top echelon of the State Dept. is all the people and they are totally behind what is being done.

P: Then basically your position is parallel to that of the British.

K: That's right. There are minute tactical differences but--produced by the fact that they are a guarantor, but I talked to Callaghan at least once a day--I've just had an 8 page letter from him. I'm writing him one that is going off tonight and we are working in the greatest harmony.

P: That is good news indeed. What will you do though if you find that you just can't get rid --- that he stays and stays---.

K: Then we will have to do other things.

P: All right. I thank you very, very much.

K: But what we don't want to do is have the Soviets go in there in the name of the Security Council to enforce a Security Council decision.

P: Yeah.

K: But, we will not accept Sampson.

P: Then I hope in the course of ------- that will give us an opportunity to let the Greek people be aware of the fact that the ------ government, while we have no wish to interfere---that it is not our first choice in government.

K: Well I think that if it comes out the way I think there is a good chance of it coming out, the junta will be substantially discredited anyway.

P: Would you thinking go toward---------.

K: Well, you know, we are not at that point yet. I personally, I would lean toward

Caramonles?.

P: He seems to have a broader base. And some respectibility at home still.

K: That would be my view but you know one cannot be sure what willemerge there.

P: I had a long talk with the King on my way through London. He has matured a great deal. A few years ago he was a little cocky. Now he is a much more solid person. And I would say probably in the end that he would be used as a symbol----to keep his fingers clean in all these very different machinations that have been going on. He is in Eng. finishing up his degree, he moved into a smaller house and I think he would be-- we would be pleased with him if he went back.

K: Yeah, bw we would have no objection to that if that is how it developed.

P: Good, well I thank you very much.

K: You're welcome, Claiborne.

P: Very nice of you to call and good luck to you---

K: You can reassure your colleagues on Monday. I've already explained it to Fulbright and he is fully with us.

P: All right and I will do that myself.

K: Find, bye.

P: Bye.

SA 167

RELEASED IN FULL

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TELCON
Schlesinger/HAK
7/19/74 - 8:15 p.m.

K: Hello. Jim.

S: Yes Henry.

K: I just wanted to bring you up to date. You know the situation and I want you to know what my thinking is and see whether we're in step on it. My view is that -- you know the methods that the Turks have asked us to pass to the Greeks about not firing.

S: Right. They're landing.

K: They're landing and they have orders not to fire at the Greeks if the Greeks don't fire. So we're going to pass that message and we're also going to tell the Greeks that we think the best solution now is to have a negotiation as rapidly as possible looking for the return to constitutional government. And that we recommend the Clerides solution under these conditions. That's -- that means they have gotten rid of Makarios and they'll have to give up Sampson. And we'll send Sisco back from Ankara. Now we don't think this will really fly but at least its a slender threat.

S: My feeling is that the Turks at this stage are not going to settle for anything less than a piece of the island.

K: No, the Turks have said that they are willing to stabilize their forces and that they are willing to keep the existing structure and they will accept any president other than Sampson.

S: That's very generous of them. That's good. OK.....

K: If the turks want a piece of the island then in my view we have to work for double enesis and give the Greeks the other part of the island so my view is there are now two possible outcomes. Either double enesis or Clerides.

S: Completely. Henry. I had a call from Ingersoll a bit ago who wanted to move the Americans down to the British base.

K: I tell you. My bloody outfit. When they got a crisis the first thing they can think up is something trivial. What do you think. I'm not against it I just wish they'd do first things first.

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S: Well, my feeling on that is we can afford to wait and see what circumstances develop.

K: That is my feeling.

(uncompleted conversation)

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TELCON
Friday, July 19, 1974
8:15 p.m.
Secretary Schlesinger - Secretary Kissinger

K: That is my feeling.

S: And it shows a certain nervousness on the part of the US government.

K: Agree completely.

S: If there is a discreet withdrawal by car but the hint --the statement that I got-- was we ought to move in helicopters and start removing Americans.

K: Well, to tell you the splendid reporting system I have they told me that you had offered helicopters. And I was under the impression that you were the energizing party.

S: Oh hell, I heard about this about 15 minutes ago.

K: OK, I'll take care of this. Of -- if they convince me that we need it,

I assume we can appeal to you.

S: You bet, you bet.

K: But I agree with you that we should play that part cool.

S: We can move by car.

K: That is my strong feeling too. If we go in with helicopters no one will ever know what they are in there for.

S: That's right. And miserable as the circumstances are, we still want to keep a low profile.

K: So we will work either for double enoisis or for Clerities, whichever works out.

S: OK, bye.

K: Bye.

SA 165 *

TELCON
McCloskey/Stabler/Ingersoll-HAK
7/19/74 - 7:30 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: If they've gone to war on the other hand, we should have a presidential message to both Greece and Turkey asking them to stop in the name of greater interests. We'll do a message out here again to the Soviets. Maybe we can get Sonnenfeldt. We'll handle it. And then we appeal to the British to get the 2 parties to London as quicly as possible.

M: The flash in is that they have made the decision to attack.

K: So they're coming back in.

M: McClosely reads calbe.

K: Isn't that the old one. What's thetime.

M: 10:38 EDT.

K: Somebody has to teach me to read. What time is this G.D. message. We have 114 Zebra is where they turned around. What do you have.

M: A message from Sisco. Ecvit just informed me final Got decisionto land on Cyprus taken. Precise timing of landing of landing up to military leaders but we have impression is within the hour if it has not already taking place. Ecevit said so long as Greeks don't fire we won't. If Greeks are cooperative we can stabilize our forces and a certain number of places in Cyprus and then Turkey is ready to negotiate as to who will be present at the Cyprus under such circumstances Ecevit said Got does not [redacted] care. He assured us in response to my request that every effort would be made to avoid injury to American citizens and all civilians on the island. Ecevit asked that the y phone the Greeks to inform them of the above and to stress that there will be no Turk firing if Greeks refrain from same. Ecevit said he is [redacted] going to Army Headquarters to urge his commanders to "take chances" to avoid any gunfire if at all possible.

K: We don't need the 48 hour contingency plan. I

M: The other wire says the Turkish force north of Ireland has turned south again and ships are spread out in lines ten miles long and are now approximately 10 miles from coast.

K: Where could Scowcroft have gone at this particular moment in history. You think I could keep both of you sitting here while I discuss this.

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K: We didn't get the Callaghan message but it is now totally overtaken by events. Well, we better get -- where is Sisco now?

M: He is apparently still there but I would suppose he is leaving soon.

K: I think Sisco ought to go to Athens. That's where he can do most good.

M: What instructions should he have?

K: His instructions are to urge them not to fire and to start an -- we will support immediate negotiations looking for a consitutional solution and let him surface the Clerides solution.

K: I think we should give Taska the outline of the Clerides solution. First of all get a flash to Taska what Wheaton has to transmit to them. Secondly tell them we recommend that they not go war. That the consequences for everybody including themselves would be disastrous. And three, we continue to save the return to the consitutional arrangements including the level of military forces on the island as it was prior to the coup. I mean now the Turks have something to bargain with. Four, we think under these conditions, a comprehmise solution is necessary and we recommend -- and our idea is that perhaps Clerides can take over and if they agree we will put this to the Turks. And Sisco is coming to discuss it with them.

S: You think it would be useful for me to telephone Callaghan.

K: Yes.

S: And just tell him what we're doing and get him to weigh in right away.

K: Its night....never mind.

S: It's five hours.

K: It's alright. I'll call him if I can get my people to put in a call to Callaghan immediately and tell them to wake him up. And tell them to wake him up.

M: Mr. Secretary. How about our convening an immediate meeting of the Security Council and asking for.....

K: No, no. God no.

M: Telling them all to excerise restraint.

K: No. I don't want to get the Russians in yet. Let's first get somebody to Greece. We can call a meeting of the Security Council in another couple of hours if necessary.

M: It's scheduled at 11 tomorrow morning as it now stands.

K: Look to me the Security Coun cil is far down on the agenda. It will make no contribution, it will get the Russians involved and the best hope is Sisco now. But also tell Ervin what we are doing. Let him see Souvana. OK can you draft that message to Callaghan immediately.

M: Mr. Secretary. May I suggest that you XXX call Callaghan directly.

K: I'm calling Callaghan but I want a message drafted anyway.

M: Alright. I think we should get craking on what is necessary in Athens right away.

K: That's right. The first message that has to be done is the one to Taska.

S: The question is whether we telephone Taska and.....

K: Then the whole world will know.

S: The whole world is going to know shortly - the first landing you know.

K: But we don't want our solution known by the whole ;world.

S: That's true but I mean in terms ....

K: That ;you can do and you can say we are sending a -- it finally got here the letter to Callaghan. We got a great system here. Fischer got through with it. So I think the operative part - the message from the Turks you should call Taska about right away.

S: Do you want Presidential messages too.

K: That too. But the first thing now is to get instructions to Taska about how we think this thing can go. I think the Greeks have to understand it is now too late. Either stonewall it. They should not go to war and that we think this is the way it could go and if they're willing to do it Sisco is on the way and -- so call Taska -- somebody other than Stabler

K: Stabler draft the message to Taska and then read it to me immediately. Then we do the Presidential messages.

S: Alright.

K: Maybe Bob, you can call Taska. OK Thank you.

SA 159 1*

TELCON
Irving Lazar/HAK
7/19/74 - 4:40 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

L: Hello. Hi Henry.

K: Ok. How are you.

L: Very well thank you. When are you going back?

K: Tomorrow afternoon.

L: Would it do any good at all if I came out tomorrow around 11:00 or 12:00 and just sit and talk to you for a few minutes?

K: I'd better to you about that in the morning. Can I call you around 8:30?

L: Well, I'm usually not up. I'd rather call you.

K: OK.

L: I'll call you at 8:30 in the morning.

K: You'd have to get up around 8:30 if you wanted to come down by 11.

L: That's no big problem. I'd have a car and chauffeur drive me down. 2 hours.

K: Less than that. Well, we might talk for half an hour. That might be useful.

L: Yes. I'd be glad to do it - happy to do it and if you said to me now yes and even if you couldn't give me more than 15 or 20 minutes I'd understand obviously. Perfectly.

K: On that basis I could probable do it.

L: Let's make a date for me to be there at 11:00 and I'll make arrangements.

K: Let's make it at 11:30.

L: Perfect. I'll have my car fetch me and take me right down to the -- San Clemente. And should you leave word at the gate that I'm coming.

K: And you know how to get here?

L: Yes. I'll get back your Secretary and she'll give me the exact turn off.

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SA 157 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. McCloskey
Sec. Kissinger
7/19/74 3:40 p.m.

M: I've talked to Lewis of the Enancial Times. He explained to me that he first heard this from an American--I explained the realities of the situation and said nothing like that ever occurred. He then told me that by the time he talked to a second source, he realized it was exactly the right version. It happened that I had in front of me Callahan's letter to you today and I said you can't read a letter that the Secretary just received from Calahan and believe anything like this happened at any time let alone in the present situation --it turns out he did not write a story that Kissinger blew up at Callahan by the British insistence on supporting Makarios.K:We don't disagree with the British so much.

M: I don't think we do.

K: There is a slight tactical nuance? the Callahan letter I 'm not in much disagreement.

M: I've also talked to Marder, Binder, Dana Adam Schmidt --Baltimore Sun this p.m., I think I got the message thru of our serious disappointment at this line getting around that you working against the advice of your people and I went into this at some length with all of them--I think I got them persuaded. In the case of Binder, you'd be interested, that he said he began to understand this as far back as yesterday. I said it was too bad then that that didn't get conveyed to the editorial page. He told me that on his original story where on Wednesday he had the quotes from unnamed sources that that opinion was easy to come by, but now looking back on it realized that that is not an opinion that ~~xxxxxx~~ really counts and it doesn't involved the people who are mostly working closely with you.

It happens that Les Gelb is doing today;s Cyprus story and I had Anderson speak to him ; after Anderson listened to me talk to Marder. And my impression is that Gelb is on course and understands. The same thing with Marder and I just spent 15 minutes ~~xx~~ with Dana Adma Schmidt.

K: I wonder whether we should have Schlesinger get some of his people to call.

M We have--My confidence in them is not as strong as my confidence in some of our own people.

K: It can't be that desperate. Okay. Then we won't do it.

M: I wanted to tell you also I went in on my own and spoke to the members of the Task Force and told them if any of this represented any views

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the people in the Task Force, I'd like to have them say it to me. That I thought it was putting the Sec State in an intolerable position when he is accused of ignorning the advice of his people and he hasn't gotten any advice contrary to what he is doing. I went on at some greater length --and someone with me said he thought the message was put across. I also talked to Hartman: to keep his eye on that Task Force and see that it has some good strong leadership.

K: I think we will all learn from this crisis how to run a tighter ship.

M: For one who found myself arguing with you at times on behalf of the Foreign Service, I'm deeply disappointed with...

K: No, I understand this Bob and my concern is to make the FS a great institution. I m not fighting the FS. Because in the two years I've got left, I'd like to see that when I leave it will be proud of itself.

M: We had an inquiry in the press office this afternoon from John Finney who picked up some word the Soviet forces in So. Russia are on alert He went to the Pentagon and was given no comment and certainly got the same thing out of John King and our press office. I've asked Dick Kennedy to circulate from NSC that any inquiries should be ~~mark~~ met with no comment unless authorized guidance from the WH

K: Exactly right.

M: I guess that's all.

K: On the press that needs to be done is --two points that I--I just got the editorial from the Times--one did I do it against the advice of the State Dept. Two, we are not having any trouble with the British--we are in close touch with allies and more or less they agree with us--which ally is really unhappy with us.

M None that I know of-- except the Greeks

K: The Greeks are unhappy.

M: Although after all

K: On the whole we are doing fine--what we are trying to do is wokking. If we can keep the Turks from invading another 48 hours.

M: I hope you might find occasion in the next day or so to send a one line note to Joe how much you--how well you think he has done--

K: Okay--I'll send it now. But have we heard from him again?

HK: Do we know what he is doing.

M: He had--the last someone talked to him on the phone--he was awaiting the instructions--he must have them now. He did tell someone on the phone that he had heard in Ankara that Ecevit was going on the air sometime within the next couple of hours.

He didn't seem to --and we don't know--what to take from that--

K But did we deliver the original message--

M: Yes.

K: Did Joe do it or Macomber.

M: Macomber delivered the original message because Sisco had not yet arrived in Ankara--that was the instruction. I'm sorry.

K: Okay, so that have that--so he must be having thenext instructions.

M: Oh sure, I would think they are there by now.

K We sent them two hours ago didn't we?

M We sent them not quite that far back.

K: Okay. Thank you--are you going away.

M: No, I'll leave a number where I can be reached--

K: Good, we may all have to get together sunday morning--it depends what the situation is--

M: When are you coming in tomorrow?

K: About 8 or 9.

M: Do you want any of us to meet you?

K: I don't see any need for it.

M I'll talk to Eagleburger tomorrow.

K: Thereis no need for it really--Bob. I'm a pain in the neck, but I'm not petty.
Do what you planned to do in the evening.

M: Okay.

SA 154

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Amb. McCloskey
2:15 p.m. 7/19/74

M: Yes sir

K: Bob I have just talked to the British ambassador--just in general to tell him there were no disagreements of any major substance between us and he concurred and he says the British press has been fed stories from my darlings that I was furious with Calkhan and I blew my top at him

M: I had heard this this morning that he was attributing to someone of the Financial Times

K: That is right, but wx did we do anything ~~xxxxxx~~ Bob?

M: No, Mr. Secretary, since I talked to you I went in and spent 10 minute with the Task Force explaining to them that if any of those people in there had any differences they owe it to you to tell one of your advisors to tell you directly --but we can't have editorials of the major--

K:N No, did we tell-did somebody straighten the financial times? When we get a story in the morning and if I hadn't heard it from Ramsbotham, why didn't we call them and say it is totally total balderdash

M: First I was trying to find out the name of the guy at the ~~xxxxxxx~~ Financial Times who I had never heard of before.

K His name is Lewis.

M: I now know it and I haven't talked to him yet. I will. I have been talking to David Binder of the NY Times. Bob Ingersoll who is here now has talked to Johnny O.akes of the editorial page .... that had not been considered and when they had been--

K: First of all if the department wants to be the Polish Parliament they can do it. I don't even remember we received any recommendations.

M: That' s what I told them.

and

K: But even if we did~~xxx~~/reject them, that is what we are there for~~x~~ for God sake.

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M: I said we wouldn't necessarily agree with the, but we haven't even received them. And he is willing to print any kind of message we want to send him.

K: In a letter box.

M: I don't think it is worth doing.

K: That is not worth doing.

M: I was talking to Binder who gave me the sense that he was embarrased to see that editorial this morning because he said he became convinced yesterday and wished he had talked to me the day before--convinced that this is not the case.

K: But Bob we have two problems, one is a report filtered into the department that I was supposed to have blown my top to Callahan. If the Financial Times prints this it will become gospel truth and I'll never catch up with it. Now if by the sheerest accident I haven't talked to Ramsbotham I wouldn't even know about it. The opposite is true. We had the most amicable relationship. There isn't the slightest cross word, their position--the position Ramsbotham will take as signatories, they are in a different position from us but they are ~~xx~~ in close and intimate coordinatic

M : I understand.

K: You get a story of allied disagreements floating around and we will be in deep trouble. I talked to Mansfield and he said don't use force, we will not support it, don't support the Greeks and don't use any pressure. Now you tell me what policy that is.

M: A nonpolicy. I will talk to Lewis of the FTimes--

K I don't know if it is worth it at this late stage, because by now, whatever he has done he has filed.

M: I will find out.

K: Now whose resolution is this--(to someone in HAK's office)

M: Mr. Secretary--can I come back to the press--after--we have just received now your forSisco for the Secretary--that you sent to San Clemente--

K: Yeh, that really isn't necessary--after what you did
Has that already gone?

M: No, it just got here.

K I would hold it because your other cable takes care of it.

M: Okay.

K: What do you think?

M: I agree. I think the other one takes care of it.

K: The only thing is, if you redo it and say, you know, this is on top of the other one--and I just wanted to make sure that he heard also personally from me.

M: Well, we will send it but I honestly think--

K: No, I don't frankly think it is necessary. Where is the Callahan message?

M: It is pretty long--do you want me to read it to you?

K: No, but has it been sent to me.

M: Yes, to the WH

K Well has it been sent to me?

M: To you from the WH. It was delivered over there because we were waiting for it at the WSAG meeting and Kennedy was to send it to you from there.

K: Now, I just wonder whether there is any sense talking to Lewis. It is now past his filing deadline.

M: I'll get off the phone and get on it right now.

K: No, no, isn't it past his filing deadline--it is now--10:00 in London.

M: I t would be yes. It is possible that someone else here has already talked to him also. In the Eur Bureau.

K: Could somebody take control of this. When we get a story going in the department like this, by the time it gets established, if we want an artificial crisis, that once more we are troubled with our allies, if we had a functioning thing; someone would be putting out that we are in the closest contact with all our allies everyday. Which happens to be the truth. In NATO with the nine, with France, with Britain. That is what we should be putting out. We have been in touch, but we

have not been putting it out.

M: I think we will do it right now.

K: I don't think Bob can do it all but some of the leakers could put their energies on that.

M: Right.

K: Above all, if a paper as prestigious as the Financial Times puts out that I yelled at Callahan in which there isn't the slightest bit of truth, then other british papers will pick it up--then you are going to get the left wing of the labor party screaming.

M: In this case, at least this is not the kind of thing that would come out of the State Department--it had to come from the British source.

K Impossible, because he checked with the British.

M: Ramsbotham.

K: Lewis checked with Ramsbotham.

M: Saying he got it from the State Department.

K: He got it from an Amercan source. Why would the British put it out-it isn't true. There isn't the slightest bit of truth in it.

M: Mr. Secretary, the question I am sorry to be just catching up--apparently came up in the press briefing today and was denied. I have this man Lewis calling in now if you --

K: Why don't you talk to him and tell him it isn't not only not true it is theopposite of the true.

M: Right. Bob Ingersoll is still on.

K: Now what about the UN resolution--

M: Bill Buffum is here--here is Buffum.
Has Larry given you this resolution yet, Mr. Secretary, I dictated to him a few minutes ago?

K: It isn't as bad as I thought.

B: It really is the best we have seen so far. It also will coincide with our policy except for that reference to withdraw of excess troops, but I think there will be unanimous support for in the Council Mr. Secretary

K: Can it no longer be changed?

B: I don't believe so at this late stage. I would urge however that

K: If you say at this late stage--how did it get to this late stage without my gettting a crack at it.

B: Because they are nonaligned--they have been negotiating this text among themselves during the day--this is just emerged this afternoon from their own efforts--they gave us their earlier version night before last--the one I showed you yesterday.

K: And we never knew about anything they were doing. And we didn't know what they were doing?

B: They have been huddling on this throughout the day and this is the text they have finally produced--now we will urge that they not vote on this text this afternoon but if they should force a vote on this this evening, I wanted very much to have your judgment on it.

K: Except for the withdrawal of foreign military personnel we could live with it.

B: Indeed. That is the one sticking point and the question is I think, what --whether that is a serious enough consideration for you in view of the very good appeal to all states to exercise restraint. But we should stand aside on the text if everyone is supporting it.

K: No, but we should try to change it.

B: All right. We could make an effort, but I think this is probably the minimum requirement on withdrawal that most of the other members have settled for. Particularly since the British had been sponsoring this kind of language from the beginning.

K: But see if we can get it watered down--talk to the British first.

B: Will do. And has the revised text of the speech reached you yet, Mr. Secretary?

K: No. I also would prefer not to mention Makarios--but we dont' seem to be able to avoid that.

SA 168 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Friday, July 19, 1974
8:20 p.m.
Amb. McCloskey - Secretary Kissinger

K: Hello,

M: Hi, Mr. Secretary. I still have Joe on the phone and he is insisting that it is not wise to go to Athens.

K: On what grounds?

M: Well, we were only half way through our conversation when I found out you were trying to reach me.

K: I'm returning your call. Didn't you call me 10 minutes ago?

M: I was on the phone with you 10 minutes ago--along with the others.

K: But then I got a message that you had tried to reach me while I was talking to Secy. Schlesinger.

M: Well, I don't know. There must have been a garble somewhere. In any case, Sisco is on the line. I've talked to him. He is resisting or questioning that he should go to Athens. He says that the Clerities proposal has already been rejected by the Turks--

K: I thought he said he would accept any President.

M: This is the word I was getting from him when I got off the phone to take your call. He says it makes no sense for him to go to Athens now.

K: Well, look, I've got Callaghan calling. Tellhim that I read his cable about their saying they don't care who the president is under these conditions.

M: He asks then why we think the Turks, er the Greeks would accept this.

K: I don't know. That's what he's going there for!

M: All right.

K: But tell him to wait until I can get back to him. It would be a pleasure to talk to somebody who takes orders.
Let me talk to Callaghan.
M: OK.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 25 FEB 2003 200102979

SA 182

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Secretary Callahan (GB)
10:15 p.m. 7/19/72

K: Jim, how are you?

C: Henry, good morning, if that is not a contradiction in terms. How are you again, all right?

K: I'm doing fine.

C: Well, now look, as far as Sisco is concerned, have you told him to go to Athens?

K I've told him to go to Athens and under great protest he is on his way there.

C What is his objection to going, Henry?

K: His objection to going is that he thinks London is a more pleasant place and that Washington is even more pleasant.

C: Well, Yeh, I think that is right. What is he going to do when he gets there.

K: Then when he gets there he is going to urge the Greeks to negotiate that solution I discussed with you and to go accept any proposal you may make for Greek Turkish talks.

C: Very good. I think that he --I think we can talk a little more frankly now because I think we are on a secure line.
Aren't we?

K: Not that I can tell--

C: As far as I'm concerned I accept that assessment that you were good enough to send mefrom your Ambassador about conversation wi th Clerides. It seems to me that Clerides is a very sensible man.

K: That is what it looks like to me.

C: I think he has the thing summed up and as far as I'm concerned I wouldn't be putting it in shorthand, I'd be willing to follow exactly that line and the line that had been following before hand.

K: That was my impression and that's why when I got your letter, I had drafted a long reply which has now been overtaken by events--

C: I don't mind--I'll put it in the scrapbook.

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K: Do you want me to send it?

C: Yeh, sure why not.

K: I'll send it on, saying it is overtaken but for your scrapbook.

But I substantially agreed with it--

C: I wanted to put my thoughts on paper to you, but they are not so different from the way Clerides apparently is looking at things.

K: No, I thought we were all coming together in the same direction.

C: That's right. I think if Joe Sisco can persuade them to get rid of Sampson and to constitutionally get Clerides installed, then we've got the makings of a package to deal with the Turks, haven't we?

K: That is exactly my view.

C: Right. And I've got the Turkish ambassador waiting outside to see me now--I thought I would send a strong note through him to the Turkish government, calling on them to bring about the earliest possible ceaseifre to get the Greeks and Turks here

K: I agree with that completely--I was going to make that strong suggestion to you--you'll have too messy a situation on the island--much to messy

C: Yes, all right. Then I'll try to get them to come here and Joe Sisco can pressurize the Greeks to come here

K: Those ~~&~~ are Joe Sisco's instruttions.

C: Very good --

K: So may I tell Joe that you are fully backing him--

C: That we are on the same line

K: I will tell Joe this and I will tell him that you are--your people are going to talk in the same sense.

C: Very good. Very good.

K: And you should know that we have--

C: What about the Soviet Union, Henry

K: Should we tell them that we understand that you are going to task for talks--that we strongly support it and that we hope they encourage it

C: That's a good line.

K: Well, we will do that within thenext hour

C: How much detail--you've had more dealings with them than I've had. How much detail should I go into?

K: I wouldn't go into endless details, but I would tell him that we are

C: I missed you then-- say it again

K: To whom to the Soviets?

C: Yeh

K: I wouldn't go into all the details--I would tell them that--I would go into detail about the negotiating process, not about the solution.

C: Very good.

K: Otherwise they will hang behind another fellow and just thwart it.

C: This line is very bad--you keep disappearing completely

K: I would give them the solution--I would give them the process

C: Right, okay

K: And we will do the same

C: Very good

K: And I also wanted you to know that I have told the Turks ~~in~~ substantially what you are going to tell them--that we object to what they are doing and they must get into talks immediately

C: Yes, very goodthen-- I should think after Sisco's persuaded them to go to come to Lond, he'd better come on to London too, hadn't he

K: Ah--ahha--I think London he will want to go to. London, I won't have trouble persuading- Athens he is a little shakey about.

C: Okay, Henry, we'll keep in touch--what time is with you/

K: I'm all right, it is 10:30,

C: I don't want to wake you up during the night, do I, unless I've got to.

K: Well you should get even with me, since I woke you up at 4:30

C: [laughs] All right, Henry, I'll ring you if necessary

K: Jim, you call me anytime.

C: I'll call you anytime. Very good then, Thank you.

K: Bye.

SA 147 1*

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D), B3, CIA

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Robert McCloskey
Robert Ingersoll
Mr. Stabler
7/19/74 11:50 am.

K: [redacted] B1

S: [redacted]

I: The total of their mobilization so far appears to be two divisions. B1, B3

K: Then the point is the we have got to get instructions to Sisco on the Clerities matter. Now I want two things--Now I want two things for Sisco--one is I want him to explain to the Turks that a pro-Makarios intervention is not in their interests. But secondly, you have the Turks understand t' at we are not in favor of enosis hidden or direct so that we are not unsympathetic to their point of view. Thirdly, that we are willing to work with them energetically to bring about a constitutionaly solution that protects the Turkish minority and their strategic interests on the island. Because I don't want them to think we are going in there as pro-Greek. Four, we are willing to listen to any ideas they have. Five, one idea which has occurred to us is possibly having Clerities succeed and that is as far as we should go on Clerities. If they are interested in that we can see whether we can flush it out. You see what I mean? Then it is not the US, pushing its own idea.

of this

M Now you know there is a good deal/that is already in the message that Sisco should receive very shortly if he hasn't. Already. How a

K: How about humoring me and summing it up again, the way I ~~gave~~ gave it.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET REASON: 25X1, 25X6
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 19 JUL 2014 OR INDEFINITE
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K: Now I don't know what is in the message that you are talking about.

S: The message that was sent out this morning which I have here --should I read it again?

K: No, no that is the one you did this morning.

S: But in that one at your instructions we said you should reaffirm to Ecevit that we are totally opposed to enosis whether direct or creeping. That was in that one and that was the one about intervention--

K: But we didn't give the Clerities solution.

S: No we did not because that was in this other one

K: How about humoring me and and summing up our position again. That keeps Sisco from getting off on something else. And winding up with Clerities. I want some compassion shown to the Turks. I --we are going to wind up bulldozing both parties into a solution they don't want. The trick is to get at least one of them to want it.

I We will do a new telegram on this instruction--we've already made the point on enosis in the previous one but all the rest of it themm is

S: But I think sums up in this message--

K: Could you express to Sisco that the strategy to follow is to show compassion to the concerns of both sides so that --at least of the Turks so that we are not in a position where at the end of it the Turks will say we raped them--they said it in '67.

And that is why I want him to present our views of this in the most compassi nate light and convince them that military intervention has the wrong impact now because it strengthens the wrong forces. My personal view is that in '67 I wouldn't have been as opposed to their intervention as I am today. But that is a different matter.

I Okay sir, we'll do it.

K: Will you read it to me and get it off, because it is already 7:00 in Ankara --no it is 10:00

M: You understand he already has the one message.

K: Bob, I understand he has the message--I want him nevertheless in every message to understand the strategy . I want then from the base of that strategy--my nightmare is that his proclivity is to peddle a solution in the face of an unagreed view in which we will then become one of the parties to the dispute and we will have a Clerities faction , a Makarios faction and a Sampson faction and Clerities at that point has no support at all.

M: Understood. Get the point.

K: If we could convince the Turks that they should work with us for a new solution.

I: You mean some other solution?

K : Here we go.

M: No, I understand.

K: Here we go. July 19. Turkish news broadcasts reports by news agents that US Sisco has brought to Greece and Turkey and American plan for solving Cyprus crisis. According to their plan in which it is replacing current head of Cyprus regime with more moderate and influential person who could be Clerities. .....reads rest. Well gentlemen we have a disciplined outfit of which we can be proud.

I: Mr. Secretary, I was afraid you would see that.

K The worse thing we can have is an American plan at this moment. It isn't after all that I have failed for five years. It is that I have occasionally been right. Now can't this department carry out my instructions? That is where I want to come to. All it takes now is for Clerities to say he doesn't want it.

I We have a good cable from Roger Davies where talking with Clerities where he comesup with the same answer we do.

K: Who Clerities or Davies?

I: Clerities.

SA 143

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
CONFERENCE CALL
Secretary Kissinger/Robert McCloskey
Robert Ingersoll/Wells Stabler/William Buffum
7/19/74 9:30 a.m.

K: Hello, who is this?

M: This is McCloskey

K: Are the others on the line?

M: The others are on--our signal is not quite as clear because Buffum and Ingersoll are in their own offices.

K: Why is that.

M That is the way the call came in I guess.

S: We can go to the other office, if you like

M: Yes, do that we had a better connection this morning.

K: But I would like to get some action and -- do you think you could all assemble in the next two minutes.

All: Sure. Be right up.

K: Hello? Well, this isn't any better, let's just keep going. Is everybody together now?

M: Mr. Secretary: I'd like to take up the subject of the press briefing, if I may, first

K: Why

M: Because we're right against the deadline. Only two minutes.

K: Right.

M: We will annnunce the Makarious call on you and there will be a question as to whether he is being received as the President and Anderson would say, as we previously indicated, no question of recognition with respect to Cyprus has yet arisen.

K Well, in his case you've seen .... of recognition

M: No, change of recognition. It is an important distinction from what we have

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have been saying all week.

K: Until we change our recognition, the existing arrangement obviously continue.

M But I'm afraid we have changed it by what we said throughout the week implying that we are undecided as to which is the legal government and which one would we recognize, and I think and I'd like to recommend that we use the same formulation we have all week.

K: But I always thought we said this in relation to the Sampson government.

M: No, the questions were not always that specific.

K: I can't held responsible, you know for example, it wasn't I who instructed Anderson to say there was no outside influence.

M: That was a different matter, Mr. Secretary, and the context of the question on that point, was since Monday

K: If you say it this way, it means we no longer recognize Makarios.

M: No, it doesn't. It just leaves ambivalent.

K: Why can't we say, we don't have to make a formal decision on recognizing Makarios.

M: I'm afraid if we say that, we have made an important new diplomatic statement. I frankly think it is safer to leave it the way it has been--the fact that you are going to see Makarios.....

K: Now just a second, Bob. It makes a hell of a lot of difference whether when you are asked about Sampson who is in de facto control, whether you say the question of recognition hasn't arisen, or whether you say about it Makarios who happens to be the legal head of the government

S But because no question has yet arisen, it means obviously that we continue because nothing is before it--

K: Thatis fine with Sampson but if somebody says are you receiving him as President--can we just say ~~the question~~ the request was made by his Ambassador and he is being seen on that basis?

S We do say ....agreed to receive him at the .....request--do we want to say conveyed to his embassy in Washington--that might do it.

K: Yes, just say the request was made through the Cyprian Embassy

plus waffle it.

M: That is what we thought--

K: Bob if you say the question of recognition hasn't arisen, that is a clear step away from Makarios, because thatin effect says you may not recognize it.

M: Mr. Secretary, I'm sorry, I think I must disagree. I think that the answer implies more that we continue to recognize Makarios by saying that--by announcing that you received him--than it does the other way.

K: What is the question--is he being received as President?

M: Yeh. --that would be the natural question.

K: And we say what?

M As we previously said, no question of recognition with respect Cyprus has yet arisen. Now that was our formula for maintaining flexibility

K: Bob, I understand--I'm not as intelligent as the country directors, but after this week I learned something. My point is when you say in answer to, will you recognize the Sampson regime, if you say the question of recognition has not yet arisen, then you are distancing yourself from the Sampson regime. Are you receiving him as president and you answer, "The question of recognition hasn't arisen", you are saying something entirely different. Then you are distancing yourself from Makarios.

M: But the questions throughout the brief have not been specifically, do you recognize the Sampson government, the question is who do you recognize, that is why we have the answer, the "question of recognition has not arisen." It did not tie us specifically to one way ~~th~~ or the other. Now when you put together the answer today, that the announcement that you are going to receive Makarios, it means the situation in favor of Makarios. Without jeopardizing what you may want to do later on, if Makarios is completely and forever out of the picture.

K: I would prefer to say the question of recognition has not arisen when I am asked about Makarios. I would prefer to say almost anything else.

M: All right, then supposing we do this. ~~A~~nnounce that you have seen Makarios and any question of recognition, say we have nothing to add to what we said earlier this week.

K: We can say we've nothing to add to what we said earlier this week. That we can say. They say, then do you recognize Makarios, say his appointment was made through the Cypriot Embassy. Say anything other than

say yes.

M: All right. Second subject. There has been much made of the announcement by Greeek Ambassador in NATO yesterday that the Greek government is going to rotate the 650 offices in the National Guard

K: Yeh

M: The only thing we can think to say sensibly in response to a question for reaction would be the following: We have noticed this announcement and we hope that it may oontribute to an easement of tensions in the area

K: Say we have been urging all parties to exercise restraint and we hope that this may contribute to an easement of tension.
But I don't frankly think it will.

M: Neither do ~~it~~ I.

K: I don't think it has any significance.

M: Okay. Third subject, how nowif Anderson is asked to describe the objective of the Sisco mission ~~it~~ which you want to have down.

K: The objectives of the Sisco mission are--first to state the three objectives we have been stating since Monday--territorial integrity, independence and constitutional arrangements. To prevent a Greek/Turkish war, and and to find a solution acceptable to all of the parties concerned.

M: Good. Rather than our finding a solution...

K: And to encourage the parties to come up with a solution acceptable to all of them.

M: Right.

K: Now, may I get around to getting instructions to Sisco or would this be against State Department rules.

M: Mr. Secretary, just one more moment please--

K: Now just a second, one more moment for me please . Sisco is not to talk to anybody until he gets instructions. Is that clear?

M: We have sent a flash--

K: Is it clear that he has--is not to talk until he gets instructions?

M: We sent a flash message out right after I talked to you--the instructions were coming.

K: That doesn't mean he will not come back to us and say in the absence of instructions, I had no choice. You fellows better understand one thing-I am going to do this thing--as long as I am in charge the way I want it. And Bob Ingersoll , you will see to it that this department is going to do what is needed in this crisis and I do not give a good God-damn about the independence of emissaries and I want to make God-damn sure that Sisco knows he is not to talk until he gets instructions and if Ecevit climbs down a grease pole, that is going to happen.

M: Sisco has been told definitely and has acknowledged that he will see
S: nobody in Ankara until he receives instructions.

K: Okay, I just don't to get a cable being .... that since it is now 9:00 in Ankara and he has no instructions, he went ahead.

M: And he won't Mr. Secretary, we can say that confidently. And we have a telegram we would like to run over with you--

K: Now before you run anything over with me, I'm going to tell you what I want. But now let's go thru the press briefing.

M: There is a lot of reporting this morning that Turkish naval units are moving out of Southe astern Turkey for Cyprus

K: Yeh, I have the impression they are ... going intomorrow morning.

M: I think the only thing we should say so we don't raise any alarm--is we have seen the report, we have not seen any announcement...

K: No we are going to say --but we want to make clear we are opposed to any military intervention at this point--we are opposed to any military intervention and we hope very much all parties will exercise restraint --can do nothing to confirm this, but the US wants to make absolutely clear that diplomatic processes have not yet been exhausted. And we better say that at the briefing. Now where is Scowcroft. What has he has he got to do that is more important than this.

M: One other thing--Clements has told--called Bob Ingersoll and Bob do you want to describe it.

I He explained that the amphibious force that we talked about yesterday is about 100 miles or 10 hours no 20 hours steaming (?) time from Cyprus.

K: Yeh, I think they are going into tomorrow morning.

I He recommends we move that force half-way or 10 hours away or 50 miles away.

K: That is correct, I agree with it.

M: Do you want to run over the telegram now?

K: The first thing that--no, no I want to tell you what I want. Then you may run over a telegram with me. And not ~~w~~ one second before that. I want a telegram to Sisco that as soon as he arrives he is to tell Ecevit that we are extremely concerned about unconfirmed reports we have about Turkish military ~~inter~~ moves. He is instructed to point out to the Turkish government that the US would take the gravest view of turkish military move before all diplomatic processes are exhausted. That is point one. That he must do immediately, because I think we have been waffling and weeping around the place and we have not made clear that we are opposed to military intervention. Secondly, he is to say we are doing this in the Turkish interests, that Turkish intervention will not be the last move, it will be the first of a whole sequence of moves, that in our judgment something he never said, the government that will emerge out of this cannot be that a Greek Cypriot government will become a Turkish stooge. I mean you can put this in more elegant language. That therefore, if you look for support from --to the Soviet Union and to its own commmnist strength on the island--left wing strength on the island and therefore he can make this a message from me that part of it, as a freind as somebody who admires Ecevit , I want to warn him that what he is starting is a process in which he in which all can easily lose control. Now can we get that telegram out immediately. Then we will send him a longer ~~xx~~ one on the solution.

M: Okay.

K: Now what is it you fellows--could somebody go off and draft this now?

M: Yep.
Right away.

K: Now what is your telegram, what do you want to say.

M: What you have just given us would overtake what we have pursuant to your instructions this morning. Do you want to go over it--

K: No, why don't you send this telegram and then in 15 minutes call me again.

M: Thank you.

SA 145

RELEASED IN FULL

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TELCON
FonMin Sauvagnargues
Secretary Kissinger
7/19/74 · 11:45 a.m.

K: Hello: I thought I'd call you and tell you I have read the report of your conversation with our Ambassador

S: Yes.

K: And I just wanted you to know that I basically agree with you

S: I thank you, yes.

K We have sent Sisco to Ankara, as you know and I basically--can you hear m

S: Yes, I hear you

K: AND we basically agree with the strategy which you outlined, one reason--we have told the Greeks all week long that we would oppose enosis either direct or hidden. So I want you to know I am sendni g you a message what we have told the Greeks but I just wanted you to know tonight that the basic strategy you have described is one in which we are not in disagreement.

S: Thank you very much. I appreciate very much your message--you know, we have just seen Mr. Wilson and Callahan and I have seen reports of the Turkish ships .....Cyprus.

K: I noticed that--I think the major thing now is to prevent precipitant action

S: As a matter of fact Callahan did not seem too worried because he says they same thing as happened in '64 and '67 that the Turks ships that closed (?) before the island, but without taking action--

K: I wouldn't stake my position on that

S: Did you have the same information?
The Turks have already set their ....in motion?

K: We have that information and we are telling the Turks we think it would be unfortunate.....

S: Yes, do you think they are contemplating landing? in the next few days?

K: I hope not. I think it would be useful if you stated your views to the Turks, tonight on that matter.

S: Yeh, good, we'll do it.

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K: Thank you. I think it would be helpful. And we'll send you--and you can be sure we will keep you closely informed of whatever we do.

S: Thank you very much.

K: Nice to talk to you.

S: Thank you for calling. Goodbye.

K: Good bye.

SA 144

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Max Fisher/Secretary Kissinger
11:25 a.m. 7/19/74

F: Henry, how are you?

K: I've got a little crisis on here, so

F: Just take me a couple of minutes. First of all, we have been working on this Jackson thing--and you made great progress on this--Javits call me yesterday and I think if you are ready, but I don't think it ought to be until you are ready....it might be advisable for us to meet with the just the two people--remember--the head of the conference and --that is Stanley Lowell and Is Miller and myself

K: Yeh but on general grounds would like to meet with the whole group too.

F: You would, fine.

K: The reason for my meeting isn't just the soviet situation, I just haven't met with the Jewish leaders for a while, I don't mind in addition meeting them

F: I am thinking about this because on the Russian situation, we put all the backers of Jackson on top of his neck, some of his particularly most influential financial backers and I think he has come around a long ways 0-if you think it is ready, there are two things that can be done. We arrange a meeting with the group, but as a matter of strategy it would be very important at the same time to go thru the procedure of a 30-minute meeting with Miller and Lowell and then have them come into the other meeting. I think I recommend this henry/

K" Then let's aim for that.
But I hope they understand that I also have time problems.

F: I realize that--I know you have plenty of other problems. Secondly, I think that something that could be very, very significant in this whole thing would be this. When I was in Israel, I met with all wives and childrer --the prisoners of conscinece--the 17 prisoners who are in prison in Russi and the wives and children are in Israel. They are the ones who were involved in the highjacking 7 or 8 years ago....I met with them and it was a very teary scene because I had to give them an audience. But I think if something could be d one to ease that problem, it could be a trmendous psychological boost for the Russians.

K: Yeh, but the problem is this....Max, and even I am getting impatient with it. Every three months I am told there is one other thing the Russians have to do..They do it after which wx they say, fine, now do the next thing.

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F: (laughs) I can't argue with you--just think about this prisoner of conscience. I'm telling you what happend while you were over there and I met with them--now I just mentioned it to you, but I tell you this psycholically now if you feel you have made enough progress with Jackson, I think it would be important to have this meeting and you could cut the meeting short to meet with the three and go into this meeting and

K You worke with Jerry Bremer

F: Is he your man on that.
Jerry Bremer. And what we will do is allocate a half hour for one and half hour for the other.

K: Good.

F: We 'll find a time and date convenient to you.

K: Excellent.

F: I met with --do you think we made some progress with this

K: I think we have.

F: I met with his two big financial backers--in New York--Jackson you know is running for president and I just told him the facts on this thing--do you want me to apply any more pressure on that or do we have enough.

K: No, I'd keep up thepressure

F: All right. And we will try to do this in the next week.

K Exactly.

F: I'll be in touch.

SA 142

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Amb. McCloskey
7/19/74 am.

M: This would go flash immediately. Subject your instructions for meeting Ecevit

K: Now if Sisco isn't there to deliver it, Macomber should deliver it.

M: Okay. That's what it says, if Sisco not yet arrived, Macomber should see Ecevit immediately and deliver the following

1. We are extrmely concerned over insistent reports of turning Turkish military moves towards Cyprus.

K: Reports can't be insistent.
Repeated reports.

M: You should add that US would take the most serious view of any military move with respect to Cyprus before the diplomatic process has had an opportunity for the fullest play. 2. You should make Ecevit understand that Turkish intervention will be only the first in the sequence of moves

K: That in our judgment

M: Right ... sequence of moves which would be difficult if not impossible to control. Any government in Cyprus which would emerge at the end of this process would not better serve the Turkish interests because in order to attempt a counter-balance of Turkish dominance, ... government would inevitably look for support both internally and externally to communism. You should give Ecevit an assurance that we are totally opposed to enosis whether direct or creeping.

K: You should reaffirm our... right

M: Finally, you should tell Eeevit that as his friend and admirer, I must make clear my convictions that if he follows the course of military intervention, he will have started a process which will not only have serious adverse affects for Turkey in the long run, but will be extremely dangerous for the West as a whole.

K: Yeh. Ah--you took out great consequences at the beginning.

M: We will insert that back in.

K: And what I would like to get across in that last paragraph is not get the impression that this is a threat from us, but to say that he is going to start a series of events which out of the control of either the US and Turke which will have long-range disadvantageous consequences for Turkey, See

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So he doesn't read it asa US threat.

M: Right. Otherwise okay?

K: Yep.
Good cable.

M: Mr. Secretary, we think here that the group in the department that prepares evacuation plans ought to get into motion.

K: Exactly.
And also we ought to get some contingency plamning for what happens when the war breaks out

M: All right
How would you suggest we organize ourselves. With Defense?

K: Yeh.
Let Ingersoll call a meeting of Defense and NSC CIA--a WSAG meeting

M: This afternoon?

K: Yeh. And our briefer is saying we would take a grave view of mili

M Military intervention from any quarter.

K: Until diplomatic processes are exhausted.

M: Right.

K: Good. T

M: That's the language I gave them.

K Thank you, I'll be back to talk over the Clerities thing.

M: All right.

K: Hello--I mean don't give Fulbright any sense that we are against Makarios. Tell him the strategy I outlined to him is in full force, he need have no worry that we are going to back junta on the island and this is what we are doing, but wright now we have to prevent a war.

M: I'll call him right away.

SA 180

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TELCON (San Clemente)
Ingersoll/Kissinger/McCloskey/Stabler
9:55 p.m. - 7/19/74

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Bob.

I: Yes.

K: I was going to go back to my quarters and I was going to be out of touch for half an hour. I wanted to check how things are going.

I: We have these two wires. .

K: I got a call from a Mr. Sampson in your office.

I: Samuels?

K: Sampson is what they -- they want to know what I discussed with Callaghan. I told Callaghan, which I had already told you, to call the Greeks and Turks hopefully to London.

I: Right.

K: OK, what are the two cables?

I: The ones to Macomber and to Sisco. Do you want those read?

K: Yup.

I: Do you want them over the open phone or secure phone?

K: Well, this open phone isn't as bad as the other one. This will take them a while to analyze. Are they long?

I: They're about 2 pages.

K: I think we better do it by phone, don't you?

I: Here's the one to Sisco and that's the one we need the quickest.

"The Secretary desires that Sisco make immediate plans to go on to Athens.

K: Could it be a little louder?

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I: "He should not request to have the meeting at the airport. From the message we have just sent to Ankara you will see what we have done and told Macomber to tell Ecevit. We have done this because we feel we must keep him playing as long as possible with the notion of a constitutional solution to the Cyprus problem. Ecevit in all probability rejected the Clerites proposal at the outset because he saw it as a possible bar to Turkish military intervention. Now, however, that the Turks have intervened, he has told you that he has no special concerns about who may be President of Cyprus. Under these circumstances we believe that there is still a chance, even though it may be an outside one, to try once again the Clerites solution.

"You will also have seen the instructions passed to Tasca to weigh in with Iohdides to exercise restraint in the face of Turkish landings and to float Clerites' proposal.

"Secretary wishes you to reenforce the views which have been expressed by Tasca and to tell the Greeks that they must bear a share of the responsibility for what has happened.

K: A heavy share of the responsibility.

I: "We look to them to recognize that unless they are prepared to accept a change of territorial integrity in the structure of Cyprus they must join with us, with the British and the Turks in finding a constitutional solution to the Cyprus problem. As we see it, only if Clerites offers an acceptable alternative, we are prepared to support the proposal with the Turks.

"You are prepared to return at once to Ankara and pursue the matter further with the Turks if the Greek Government agrees with the Clerites' proposal.

"In the meantime we have asked the UK to call for immediate negotiations of the guarantor powers in London. And we hope, and assume, that the Greek Government will agree to attend such a negotiation." That's the one to Athens. The one to Ankara follows:

"Ask to see Ecevit at once. Give him the following message: I take extremely grave view of the Turkish military intervention on Cyprus which will have the most serious consequences, (chief of which is the position it will place) on free world security. We are deeply dissappointed the Turkish government did not heed our pleas to exercise restraint.

"Now that the step has been taken, however, the most urgent means must be found to restore peace and stability in the area.

"While a conflict is easy to start it is difficult to stop. Statesmanship of the highest order is required of all concerned.

"The United States for its part, is prepared to support a constitutional solution and a level of forces which existed before the coup. The only way in our view to restore constitutional government is through the legitimate succession of Clerides. No other solution is possible or acceptable to the Greeks.

"The Turkish has indicated that it has no special concerns as to who the Head of State should be and, therefore,

K: Don't say "The Turkish Government, say President Ecevit."

I: Pardon.

K: Or Prime Minister Ecevit.

I: Yes. "Prime Minister Ecevit has indicated that he has no special concern as to who the Head of State should be and therefore Sisco is on his way to Athens to propose to the Greeks the Clerides solution. We assume that in light of what the Prime Minister told Sisco in their last meeting the GOT will agree.

"We are proposing urgently to the UK that it call for immediate negotiations with the guarantor powers in London to seek the constitutional solution which will open the way for the restoration of stability in Cyprus and in the area.

"We urgently appeal to the Turkish Government to weigh most carefully the proposals we are making, for we are convinced that to do otherwise would be self-defeating in terms of Turkey's own interests."

K: OK. Good. Fine.

I: Do you want to talk about a public statement?

K: Have you got one? Hello? Hello? I have trouble hearing you.

I: Bob has something he wants to show you.

K: OK.

(Bob McCloskey comes on the line.)

M: Hello.

K: Yup.

M: "The United States deplores in the most strongest terms the military intervention by Turkish military forces in Cyprus. We particularly regret that Turkey took this action at a time an active diplomatic effort in which the United States was participating was underway.

"We are appealing to Turkey to order its forces in Cyprus to cease-fire and we are at the same time urging Greece to avoid aggravating the situation by any further military action."

K: Why do we have to make a statement?

M: We don't have to now.

K: What? Are we getting a lot of calls?

M: Not many, I'm surprised.

K: Well, I think what we should say is we regret the action. We also deplore the previous Greek actions that helped precipitate this crisis. Tell them that I've been in frequent touch -- I mean don't put that out as a statement, just have it said -- I'm in frequent touch with the President, I've been in touch with Callaghan and Sisco is in Athens and we are in touch with all of the interested governments.

M: What was Callaghan's reaction?

K: Callaghan agrees with our line and he is also thinking of calling a meeting. Make sure they don't take Callaghan off the line there. Somebody on that other flickering line. Here they come. Who is it? (Talks to someone who has come in the room.)

M: Callaghan is going to let you know about going?

K: He's going to let me know whether he wants to hold the talks in London or Cyprus, but I'm going to recommend London.

M: He's agreeable to coming to London?

K: Yeh. But let him announce that. Now Irwin ought to go and see Sovannah.

M: A message is bei ng done to him.

K: OK, why don't I check with you in about a half hour when I get to my residence.

M: All right.

(Stabler comes into the conversation.)

S: Henry, you've got a message to the Soviets out there.

K: To the what?

S: To the Soviets.

K: I know and I will let you know about that as soon as I've read it.

S: OK, you've got it. All right.

K: OK. Good. Anything else?

I: NO.

SA 151

RELEASED IN FULL

Friday, July 19, 1974
San Clemente
Secretary Kissinger - Amb. McCloskey
12:45 p.m.

K: Bob? I just want to talk to you alone but if you've got the others on there it is OK with me.

M: Which Bob do you want?

K: McCloskey.

M: He's on here. I'll get off.

K: No, you can stay on (Ingersoll). Just the two of you?

M: We can have it just the two of us. You want the two of us?

K: Well, what I wanted to mention briefly is that Dana Schmidt article now in the Christian Science Monitor about the disagreement in the State Dept. with our policy.

M: God damn it. Does he have a piece like that?

K: Yup.

M: I should have seen him the other day. He came and waited for me and I got too busy and never got to see him.

K: Well, it is a little odd that we've got a Department that can get things about itself that are against it--regardless of whether I am right or not. And the press doesn't seem to get any briefing about what we are doing. And I'm wondering if Hartman or somebody who can bring himself to do it can explain that the senior officials in the State Dept. are in agreement with each other---not that it makes a god-damn bit of difference.

I: I told to call John Oaks of the New York Times at noon to explain that to him after their editorial but I wasn't able to ~~xxx~~ reach him.

K: But the fact is that no press man has yet heard one word of support out of the State Dept. for US government policy. That is a little odd. Could somebody call Schmidt. I mean for example---it says, "US officials were critical of the

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decision to seek a postponement of the Security Council meeting for Monday until Friday, ostensibly to wait until all the facts were in. Well, the delay according to officials gave the insurgents time they needed to consolidate their position. Now then, on Monday we didn't even know Makarios was alive. Secondly, supposing there had been a meeting. How would we have unconsolidated their position? Thirdly, from Wednesday until today the delay was not at our request but at Makario's request.
We just a delay only until Tuesday when Makarios could get there.
Now I'm just wondering, can we do a little briefing of at least my point of view.

M: All right, sir. I'll do it.

K: I don't care so much for a defense for myself but I can't believe it is in the interest of the Department to appear as a rabble.

M: I quite agree with you.

K: And, furthermore, not one of these polisies was ever raised with me. Do you recall that this was ever raised?

M: No.

K: Was there one person who ever said to me, "let's have a meeting this afternoon?" And what would have been out position at that meeting?
Can we do something to keep this thing from developing into a rolling campaign?
Can we get some background, or should I do it from out here?

M: We'll do it here, sir.

K: Will you let me know what has been done on the Turkish intervention.
per your instructions
M: We have a telegram that we are typing up now/and that we will have back to you very shortly to read it to you.

K: I don't want instructions. I want a contingency plan.
I'm worried that if we don't get that------soon Joe won't have anything to talk about.

M: Have you seen his telegram from Athens? Can I read it to you? He saw your---------

K: Oh, here it is. It was just brought in. Well, of course, Joe's conception of his role is not my conception of his role. He is going empty handed---you

know, well, fine. But it is at least progress.

M: I think it is encouraging.

K: Oh yeah.

M: And then, I think armed with what has already has been bent and what will be sent--he ought to be on pretty sound ground for his conversations with the Turks.

K: Yeah, if we get it there in time.

I: We'll call you in a few minutes.

K: Yeah, but---Hartman is a sensible fellow. Can somebody talk tothe key reporters like Murray Marder, or should we get a backgrounder group together, what do you think?

M: Well, we could, given the time now, I think what I would do is to get after the Times and the Post and I'll get a hold of Schmidt and go over our thinking with them. Now I had to pull Marder back last night from a story in which he was saying that we were introducing ------- now he claims to have gottn the basis for this from the British and the Cypriots.

K: Well, just keep it confused. I thought for some reason that the Marder article wasn't bad.

M: Well, I pulled it back from it. He had already written it and he changed it after I talked to him. I'm sorry about Schmidt. He came and tried to see me yesterday morning but sI got busy and couldn't see him and he couldn't wait any longer.

K: Yeah, but the fact of the matter is that it isn't your fault. The fact is in the Department no one seems interested in depending our policy and everybody that has a gripe that he doesn't have the guts to tell me personally is going to the press with it. Theimpression that makes of the Department is a disaster.

M: Right. I regret to say that that's true and that is the kind of thing thatled to that terribly misleading editorial in the New York Times this morning. That's why I tried to call Oaks to correct the impression.

K: The fact is that it never seems to work. No one has yet---there is not one newsman who has heard one senior official in the Dept. who is supporting policy. I don't even want personal support.

Well, that's not entirely--

K: Well, who's heard it--from whom?

M: Well, Marder has heard it from me. Valeriani has heard it from me. I talked also to Pete Lisagor yesterday.

K: I had no sense that any of these meetings show any fundamental disagreement.

I: I think you are right. I gathered all the regional assistants together this morning to tell them that and to pass the word down in their departments.

M: I fell particularly bad about this because I'm the one who---

K: Well you have many other things to do.

M: But I'm talking about the people in the Department now who are airing their own opinions.

K: Well, if they had only told me their opinions.

M: It is a gutless thing for someone to have done.

K: But what we face now---this is going to turn into the god-damnest brawl ever. It will be like the India-Pakistan thing. And it won't stop unless someone get a hold of it. So if just a few of these key people could get it---

M: I'll take care of that.

K: Or, I'll hold a backgrounder out here. Though it is a little humiliating for a Cabinet member to say my subordinates agee with me and never disagreed with me when I was there.

I: We'll take care of it.

K: OK and get me that cable within the next 15 minutes or else Joe won't have anything to talk about.

I & M: OK, Bye.

SA 173

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TELCON
Hal Sonnenfeldt
Sec. Kissinger
8:50 p.m. 7/19/74

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello? Where are you?

K: Get yourself brought up to date and see what message we can send to the Soviets--I've told Ingersoll to bring you up to date and at least you are one professional--my .....is fighting right now whether Sisico should go to--

S: I know, I know it.

K: I don't mean what they are complaini g about Makarios--that's down the drain.

S: Any way do you want to do something with them after this thing happens or before?

K It has happened so we might as well send them a mesaage--
Give them some idea what we are working towards--tell them we are going to work for what I discussed with Dobrynin--namely a Clerities type solution.

S: Okay why don't I get something on the wire to you or read something to you.

K: Yeh, read something to me.

Thank you.

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Amb. McCloskey
7/19/74 8:45 p.m.

.....missed first part.

K: believe now that the step has been taken--we will support a constitutional solution and a return to a level of forcesprior to the signing. Our view of the constitutional solution is the Clerides solution. No other solution can possibly have a chance of being accepted by the Greek Government under the present condition. Sisco is going to Athens to put this to the Greek government and we are assuming that when Ecevit said they did not care who the President is that we have carte blanche to do this. Period. There is to be no debate--he is to inform them--there is to be no more lip from Sisco -- he is going back into Ankara, he's going back to the airport and he is going to Athens.....

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SA 169

RELEASED IN FULL

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TELCON
SAN CLEMENTE
7/19/74 - 8:22 p.m.
Callaghan/HAK

K: Hello.

C: Hello Henry.

K: Jim, how are you?

C: Not so good with the news.

K: That's it and I just wanted to check with you about where you think we should go now.

C: Yes. Can you speak a little louder Henry. I can't hear very well.

K: Good. I can hear you very well.

C: Good. So can I now. Well, what do we do now? Joe Sisco arrives here -- it is now half past four in the morning with us -- he'll arrive here in about an hour I think.

K: No, he hasn't left Ankara yet.

C: Oh, he's still there is he?

K: I was wondering whether/from Ankara to Athens? to send him To see whether we could get our compromise solution floated there now.

C: If you would send him to Athens.

K: Yes.

C: Well, that's a prospect.

K: What do you think?

C: I think that's an idea -- what would he put to Athens Henry?

K: Our pet idea. I don't want to say it on an open line. You know what I mean. Because I don't think your idea.

C: I don't think I'm in the picture on that.

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K: You know the one I've mentioned the compromise I mentioned to Clerides -- or I mean to.....

C: Yes. Well I think there is alot to be said for that. But it wouldn't be sufficient now would it. Would it be sufficient now to stop anything?

K: The Turks have told us they would accept anybody.

C: Have they. I see. And pull out.

K: No. But that would have to be the next phase.

C: I see.

K: Joe is eager to go to London but I don't see what he can do in London.

C: No. There is nothing he could do here. Very much at the moment. I was wondering whether we ought to invite them both there.

K: I think that you should do.

C: The alternative -- I wondered about this Henry -- is whether I would go to the sovereign base area and invite them both there.

K: That's another possibility.

C: I'd be closer to him there too. I'll think about that one.

K: Let me call Sisco and I think there is nothing he can do in London. Unless he has a friend there.

C: That's right. The Greeks have told us they will come here you know. You knew that did you?

K: I knew that and I thought that was good progresss.

C: So did I. But I think probably.....

K: I think the Turks have decided to go it before they went to London. Don't you?

C: Well I think they were divided myself and they assured me that they hadn't you know. They assured me hand on heart that if I were to give them helpful answers to their questions that they would use them for peaceful purposes and not as an excuse for going in.

K: Yes, but _____ strike me as having been helpful.

C: Well, that's what I thought but I still think they were divided and that when they got back. However this is all history.

K: What more could you have done.

C: What's that.

K: You couldn't have offered them anymore than you did.

C: Well. There you are. I'm just trying to turn the the thing over in my mind now. I was just thinking about where Sisco ought to be. Certainly not here. There is no point in that and there is nothing more he can do. I don't know anything about his mission to Turkey-- whether they told him anything or.

K: I will get all the cables we have to Ramsbotham within the next half hour and I will now in any case make sure you get Sisco's reporting cables.

C: I will get those then if you will authorize them and I can see what the story is. Then perhaps we could have another word.

K: Let's do that. I will get you all his reporting cables from Turkey and also from Greece. Then I will send him back to .....

C: My first reaction is subject to seeing that he should go to Greece. He's got to put alot of pressure on there and to do one of two things and you'll need that to make strong representations in Ankara before he leaves

K: To what effect?

C: I think we have to do that--we've got to put that on the record, anyway.

K: That's right.

C: And we'll do the same and I think I'd like about an hour to consider whether we should call them to London or not, or whether I ought to go to Cyprus itself--perhaps you could think about that, could you?

K I shall, and will you call me.

C: Yeh, I'll call you in about an hour then when I've had a chance to read it his cables. Do you think it would be better for me to invite them both to London or whether I should go out there and I'll think about it too and then as then stands at the moment Henry, I think I sooner he was in Athens than anywhere else.

K That's my view, --it is everybody's view execpt Sisco's.

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C: Ah of course, well poor Sisco!

K But he is going to come to Athens, believe me.

C: I think so, now what about the UN--have to think about that

K: Let's put that off for a couple of hours.

C: Soviet Union, what do we do there.

K: Was going to get in touch with them as soon as you and I had agreed--in oxther words, after the next hour and tell them what is going to happen and where we --

C: I think we ought to notify the SU too, but I'd like first to make up my mind roughly what I'm going to do.

K: We won't get in touch with them until I've talked to you again.

C: In about an hours time then?

K: Yes.

C: That's very good
All right Henry--as the Chinese say, may you live in interesting times.

K: We've achieved that anyway.

C: What is the time with you?

K: Oh I m in good shape , it is 8:30 in evening on the West Coast.

C: Well, it is 4:30 in the morning here. I feel in good shape now, but I shall feel ~~light headed~~ like hell in a few hours time. Okay.

K: Nice to talk to you.

C: Good bye old man.

K: Bye.

SA 170

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Friday, July 19, 1974
Secretary Kissinger - Amb. McCloskey
8:45 p.m.

M: Hello.

K: Hello, OK. Sisco is to go to Athens. Callaghan agrees.

M: OK.

K: Before he goes to Athens he is supposed back into the Turks and he is to tell them first of all that we object strongly to their actions, that it has strong consequences for everybody, we now believe that the Clerivites solution is the only one and that he has been instructed to Athens to propose it, and that we expect the Turks to go along with us. And we are interpreting that phase "go along with it".
Now is there anything else on his tortured mind?
Has he told you our whole plan on the telephone?

M: No.

K: What is his objection? Callaghan does not want him in London.

M. OK, that is dosn't know and no one could tell him that before now.

K: Well, what was he going to do in London? Will you tellme?

M: Mr. Secretary, I'm sorry. I don't know what he was going to do in London. I had to be interrupted twice while I was speaking with him.

K: What is his reason for not wanting to go to Athens?

M: He says there is no way the Greeks will accept the Clarities proposal that has already been rejected by the Turks furthermore.

M:

K: Then he has been writing out the cables. / But that is what he is saying to me over our rough connection.

K: As to who will be president under those circumstances, Ecevit said government is Turkey does not care. Now, what in the hell does that mean?

M: OK. I think I still have an open line to him. I'll go back to him and tell him he must go, he will have detailed instructions for him there and...

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K: Yeah, but before he goes we want him to go back into the Turks. By now what else have the Russians not picked up? What is there left to say? OK, we've said so much on the open line we might as well go ahead. But Sisco is going to Athens and he is going to stay there. Now has anyone talked to Tasca?

M: We have been trying to get a call into him also. Bob Ingersoll is trying to get that cal l through.

K: Yeah, but not before we have had an evacuation. OK, let's get to Tasca, but let's not do everything on an open line.

M: OK,

K: Fine . bye.

SA 187

RELEASED IN FULL

..ELCON
SAN CLEMENTE
Ingersoll/HAK
7/20/74 - 10:15 a.m.

K: Hello.

I: Yes. Henry. I Just talked to Sisco.

K: Yes.

I: He has delivered the message.

K: Yes?

I: Yes sir and he said that the military leaders are meeting in a short time and he will see ____ after that meeting the Prime Minister.

K: OK. Now the only question we have in our mind now is what message did he deliver since nobody yet has delivered the message he was ordered to I don't want him to break the record.

I: Well, Hartman has delivered your message.

K: By this point he probably went the other way. My instructions this morning which Scowcroft wrote down was to say. Hartman should express his personal opinion that having threatened aid cutoffs to Greece it would certainly come to Turkey if they did not accept a Sisco proposal. It was not to be an official U.S. government threat at that point. It was supposed to be Hartman's personal opinion. I will bet my bottom dollar he didn't do it that way.

I: I can't tell you.

K: Were you under any misapprehension of what I wanted.

I: No. I recall that. Henry. I tried to find out from Joe what he said and he said I hesitate to talk b you on the phone but there is a message coming to you on the wire in five minutes so we'll have it shortly.

K: Bob, you'd better think of whom we put in what places because I am going to make some massive changes after this crisis. Find out from Hartman whether he carried out his instructions or whether he had a better idea of how to present their threat to the Turks.

I: I'll find out.

K: OK. And get that message out to me fast and call it in.

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I: Which one?

K: The one from Sisco.

I: Oh yes. I will.

K: What does Sisco mean he hesitates to talk to us on the phone when he is already spilled his guts from end of the Mediterranean to the other.

I: Maybe somebody mentioned to him that he shouldn't.

K: OK.

SA188

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Ingersoll/Buffum - HAK
7/20/74 - 11:20 a.m.

K: Hello.

I: Henry. I'd like to have Bill Buffum outline to you what we have on the U.N. right now.

K: OK.

B: It has been proceeding at a very leisurely pace indeed Mr. Secretary. The Council has still not met at this 2:30 p.m.

K: It has not met.

B: It has not met. They have been negotiating in the corridors all morning long on our resolution. The Russians have been dragging their feet throughout the day trying to get everything they can from yesterday's text added to our text. And of course we've been stonewalling them.

K: Yes. Are the British and French with us?

B: They are generally although the French have been willing to accept the paragraph which would call for the withdrawal of all foreign military forces in excess of those envisaged in international agreement on the grounds that this now includes all excess Turks as well as Greeks. In other words those who landed yesterday.

K: Well that might not be a bad -- except the Turks won't like that.

B: No. Neither the Turks nor Greeks will like that. I said provisionally I did not think that accorded with your understanding with the French Foreign Minister and they are seeking further guidance from you.

K: Well I don't think the French Foreign Minister ever expressed himself to me on that.

B: That is not covered of course in the agreement of the points to be put to the 9.

K: That is correct.

B: So I thought that went beyond what you had agreed. And what we are trying to do at the moment is get the Council President to announce as a simple consensus of opinion a common desire that there should be a cease fire and negotiations among the parties. It is possible but not certain that the Peruvian President will do this. If he does not then our best choice I believe is to accept this modified draft as the French have worked it out.

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K: I agree. That is such a shocking sentence for me to say to my friends.

B: Well, we've held the hard line until we heard from you.

K: No, I agree. If we have to do it that way but make sure we've got the British and French with us when it happens.

B: Oh, they will definitely be with us. They are dragging us at this point.

K: OK. Well, that's not a bad position to be in.

B: Alright. Henry, Larry just said you want a WSAG at 9:00 in the morning. We have our group here when you get in at 9:00 tonight.

K: Is that when I'm getting in?

B: That's what he said.

K: Well, I'm leaving here at 2:00. Let's just meet at the Department a half an hour after I arrive whenever that is.

B: You probably won't be here before 10 or 10:30.

K: That's what I would guess but can we work that out -- I haven't worked it out.

B: I'll work it out with Larry.

K: OK now. Have we any idea what Sisco said to these guys.

I
B: I've not seen a wire in yet and he wouldn't tell me over the phone.

K: Well, I've never been wrong about Sisco yet and if he didn't tell you he didn't carry out his instructions.

B: He said he was sending a report very shortly thereafter but we haven't received yet.

K: But the point is it would have been easy enough for him to say that he carreid out the instructions.

I
B: I gathered that impression but he didn't say so in any exact words.

K: What, that he carried out the instructions? We'll give him a decoration.

I
B: We haven't received his cable. How was the press briefing?

K: I kept it very, very low key and my major concern was ~~XXXXX~~ to give the impression that we knew what we were doing. The questions were very friendly. You know they are lethergic out here.

B: The questions are friendly in California than they are in California.

K: Yes and the group out here hasn't been on top of all this excitment. You get the text. / Tell them that that airborne battallion in Europe has been I did alerted because I didn't want them to find it out afterwards. But I made it very clear we are in no posture of confrontation with the Soviet Union/ We are working cooperatively with them and so forth.

I: What one is this.

K: Well, that G. D. General Goodpath that just went ahead and alerted for 509th Air Force without telling anybody. And I didn't want it to come out of Europe because if I did not say it and it hit suddenly it would sound as if something new had happened. So I listed it. I said it is a normal precaution, there is no alert, there is no confrontation and so forth.

I: Alright. We'll make it all available back here.

K: They can use my name but not quotation.

B: Henry. I was not able to reach Fulbright but I talked to Mrs. Fulbright and he gave her pretty much the story and shes going to get to him sometime this afternoon.

K: OK. Did you call Mansfield.

I: I spoke to Mansfield. He was very pleased that we gave him a briefing. He didn't disagree with anything we're seeking to do. In fact he said it seemed to be the right thing to do.

B: I got the same reaction from John Roades. I got him over.

K: Somebody should call Alpert.

I: I've tried and we can't get him. I am trying to reach Morgan in Pennsylvania.

K: Good. Many thanks. I'll see you all tonight. I'll give you a call just before I leave.

SA 189

RELEASED IN FULL

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TELCON
Sat. July 20, 1974
Joseph Sisco- Secretary Kissinger
12:45 p.m.

/.....

S: And I am now awaiting word..... I'm awaiting word for another meeting. Could be this evening, hopefully tomorrow morning.

K: Now, Joe, you put that to him in tough terms.

S: I sent you two full reports.

K: Just so that I know the framework. The President is very strong on this.

S: We are doing everything we can. We have a military..... How long will you --- how long will you be flying--you will be flying now for the next four or five hours.

K: I will leave here in about 1/2 hour and then will be airborne for about five hours and then back in Washington. Assuming you can get all the people to London, Callaghan would like you to be there.

S: Well, if that is it, OK.

K: Yes, that's fine.

S: You know, another man who could stay with this thing is Buffum.

K: Yes, he is a good man. I like him.

S: And he is not so busy right now. OK, I will do everything I can on this end.

K: Make it clear that we are very serious.

be any on
S: There can't/mistake/that.

K: Joe, I want you to know we can't have a better man there. If I growl at you it is from affection.

S: Well, I appreciated your notes more than I can say.

K: I think that they had made their minds up before you got there.

.....

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S: OK, I am going to try to get some sleep. I haven't really had any sleep for the last four nights.

K: I know, Joe. Get some sleep now.

S: That is what I am going to try to do.

K: Thanks again, Joe. My appreciation and-- my confidence. And, incidently, my respect, Joe.

S: Well, I appreciate it.

K: OK, we'll probably be in touch after I'm in Washington.

S: Yes,

K: OK, bye.

S: bye.

SA 186

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
SAN CLEMENTE
Ingersoll/HAK
7/20/74 - 9:55 a.m.

K: Hello.

I: Yes Henry.

K: I wanted to check has Sisco or has he not delivered the message.

I: We haven't had any word from him.

K: Alright you call the Ambassador and you give him the message.

I: Hartman is calling him right now.

K: That isn't the message I want. You mean Hartman is going over there.

I: No, he's just calling him.

K: Hartman did not do it right.

I: He did not.

K: For what reason.

I: Because he has some concern about this man's connections and he thought that Joe should get to the top people and we have given those instructions and I talked to Joe and also sent a message.

K: I would like to raise this question with you Bob. When you or I give an order who the hell are these guys not to carry it out whatever their concern is.

I: I think they ought to raise it if they have it anyway at the time and not later.

K: I want to know whether Sisco has got an appointment. He is to demand an appointment. If he cannot get it within the next hour you are to call in the Turkish Ambassador. You are to tell him exactly what Sisco has been instructed to say and you are to do it in very firm KK language. I have just talked to the President. He is fully behind this and it is to be done by 2:00 your time and there can be no possible slip on it. I want a call put to Sisco I want to find out where it stands.

I: Are you going to call him or do you want me to.

K: You call him. No Bob I do not accept the proposition that subordinate State Department officials cannot carry out instructions. It is not acceptable to me.

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I: No. We'll carry it out immediately.

K: I'm not talking about you. But if Hartman has a concern let him raise it.

I: That's what I told him he should have done.

K: Did you tell him that?

I: Yes I did.

K: What does he say.

I: Well he just used this excuse that he thought the Turkish Ambassador was not the proper official to get it to the right people. I don't the backplay. I haven't had a chance to get into it.

K: I just cannot believe that if you tell the Ambassador of a country to do something -- that aid will be cut off that it won't get to the ~~right~~ right people.

I: That's what I would think.

K: Besides Hartman is Assistant Secretary. If he doesn't want to carry out my orders he has at least got to tell me.

I: Right.

K: Alright, you've got one hour to get the message delivered either in Ankara or in Washington.

SA 194

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
McCloskey/HAK - Buffum joined
7/20/74 - 1:45 p.m.

M: Mr. Kissinger. We got the press conference and its a great help back here. We're seeing that everyone gets it because I think the main story will be written out of here.

K: OK.

M: It looks good on the wires.

K: It does?

M: Yes. We've seen two takes so far. Now Bill Buffum -- one last check with you in New York the situation has changed. Mr. Secretary we read you that paragraph this morning.

K: Yes.

M: Demanding the withdrwal of personnel otherwise than those under the authority of the international agreement. The Cypriots have told the British that they would live with and not object to others supporting this text provided it adds the following phrase: Including those whose withdrawal was requested by the President of Cyprus Archbishop Makarios in his letter of July 2.

K: Well, I think we should fight that but let Scali get off it if we absolutely must.

M: The date of the Makarois letter is July 2 so that predates the coup de tat.

K: Yes, I know.

M: They've been negotiating this all day Mr. Secretary. This seems to be the final sticking point. The Russians of course have been giving Makarios support at every turn.

K: They have. I don't see how Makarios can now come back can you?

M: No, I think each hour becomes more and more remote.

K: My judgment is he has had it whoever else emerges.

B: But I was glad to hear you say out there that you're going to see him still on Monday.

K: Bob, as long as I've got you on the phone two other things. Can you make/the sure

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British get the reporting cable from Sisco quickly. I promised it to Callaghan. And secondly, what do you think about putting my statement on the record where I say we want to make it absolutely clear no one is going to fight with an open American supply line.

McC: I would leave it just as it is.

K: You would?

McC: I would. I think its there -- its attributed to you. The only difference is it is not literally in quotes.

K: OK.

McC: We understand then that Scali can live with this only if its -- or if its the subject of a bitter debate.

K: No. You should try to fight it in the corridors.

McC: He has been doing this all afternoon Mr. Secretary and the British have now produced this -- given this to us as their estimate of the final acceptable version.

B: After their talks with the Cyrpriots.

K: What's your view?

B: I think we have to live with it Mr. Secretary. The rest of the resolution is 99.9 % what we want. A ceasefire, support for the London conference.

K: Listen Buffum. When I get through with the Department we settle for nothing less than 100% of what we want.

B: I'm sorry I don't have it here Mr. Secretary. the . 1% we would have preferred to avoid.

K: I agree. OK. No I don't want a public debate on it.

M: Anything else?

K: No.

M: I'll see that the British gets the Sisco report right away.

K: OK. I may call the Turkish Ambassador and give him hell before I leave here.

M: Did Hartman clear up that other point?

K: Well in a sort of a half-assed way, yes. But I think they are stalling Sisco.

B: What you could do would be to call him and say....

K: And say we're getting very restless and I'm calling on behalf of the President.

B: And furthermore you just said this publicly and he ought to know it.

K: Right.

B: That'll rub it in abit.

K: Thank you.

SA 191

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
7/20/74 - 1:30 p.m.
Ingersoll/HAK

K: Hello Bob. I want to make sure the Greeks know what we're doing in Turkey so they don't get antsy.

I: Joe sent a wire from Ankara telling what he was doing the same time he sent the message to us and those both should be in your hands by now.

K: Well, is Tasca going going and telling it to the Greeks.

I: That's the suggestion, yes.

K: Is it an order -- you know in this free-wheeling rable I've got -- I'd like somebody -- tell Tasca to go in and tell the Greeks and urge them -- tell them we're doing our utmust to bring about a cease fire.

I: Alright. Fine.

K: Including the same consideration we've advanced to the Greeks.

I: Have you seen the Sisco wire. It's a good one.

K: No. It hasn't got out here yet. When did you send it.

I: Larry says its on the way. I just talked to him. We sent it about a half hour ago.

K: OK. I haven't got it yet.

I: Joe gets a medal.

K: Good. Thank you.

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SA 192

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
McCone/HAK
7/20/74 - 1:31 p.m.

K: Hello.

M: Henry.

K: John, we've had a hell of time getting together.

M: I don't like to impose on you.

K: You can't impose on me but I've had a war going on here.

M: Yes. Two things I wanted to tell you. In 1964 we had the same situation in Cyprus as you know and I was the one that got the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey to sit down and in Geneva with Dean Achieson that brought the situation that has prevailed for 10 years and I did it by meeting Aristotle Onnasis in Paris. He at that time had a gread deal of influence with Papandreou and he was selected because he had more influence than anybody else and I was selected because I knew him better than anybody else. So, after a couple of days of meetings in which he went to Athens and presented the matter to the entire Cabinet. We were able to bring about an agreement by the Greek Cabinet that they would send their foreign minister to Geneva and that resulted in papering over the thing which lasted for 10 years. I don't know whether any such approach is feasible at this time but that's the way it worked in a similar situation. I thought that might interest you.

K: Right. John, I appreciate this output. I've got the British Foreign Secretary on the line.

M: The other line if you just take one second. When we =- I think it is very important for this Committee, this advisory committee on Disarmament not to meet unless they meet with you at the first movement.

K: I've agreed to come to breakfast with them.

M: You can do that. Because otherwise, G. D. they go in every direction you know and what they need is an outline by you to the perimeters of theproblem and your ideas of which might be done and what might not be done and give them a sense of direction you see. OK. Well, you and I are thinking alot alike on that. If you can't be there then the meeting ought to be cancelled until you can be there.

K: I'm planning to be there.

M: Good. Good bye then.

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PAGES MISSING

SA 190A *

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K: What is your idea about this talks--in London or Cyprus. I think London. But tell me your view.

S: London I think is the only possibility--

K: Callahan thought he could go to the Cyrpus base.

S:Q I don't know how well that would go down --

K: Okay, I agree with you.

M: The history of holding talks on Cyprus about Cyprus is not a very--

K: I agree with you Bob. Okay--get them done and call me.

M: Right.

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SA 193

*

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

TELCON
Jim Callaghan/HAK
1:32 p.m. - 7/20/74

K: Jim, how are you.

C: Pretty good thank you. I'm at my best if you don't get me out of bed.

K: Well, I told the press today on a background basis that I got you out of bed at 4:00 in the morning but your moral was restored when you got me out of bed at 3:000.

C: I'll do the same for you.

K: I told them that you had -- left that distinct impression. So I hope you don't consider that an unfriendly remark.

C: It's not very good is it?

K: Well, I've got Sisco in Ankara now and I will get you the reporting cables. They say they will let him know first thing in the morning there time which -- what time is that?

C: That's about - - they're about two hours ahead of us.

K: That's about 10 hours from here. [redacted] B1

C: That's right. You know that the ceasefire is broken down in Nicosia do you.

K: No, I do not.

C: Well I think the communities are getting at each now Henry and that's the kind of worse thing that can happen. You get intercommunial violence of this sort and its far more difficult to stop than regular forces.

K: Well, what do you suggest.

C: I've got nothing to suggest at the moment. I'm just feeling a little depressed about it. I don't think that we're going to pull it off you know. What do you think Greece will do?

K: I think they may hold their fire for another 12 or 24 hours but not longer than that.

C: You think if you get a favorable response from the Turks that the Greeks would then consent to come.

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K: Yes.

C: Right.

K: Well, they'll have to be some adjustment I think of the military positions. We now have to do some token withdrawal or go into enclaves or something

C: [redacted] B1

K:

C:

K: On the other hand.....

C: He's going to work pretty hard if hes going to get anything from them of any significance. Is there anything I can do?

K: Well you've made strong representations haven't you?

C: My God we have yes.

K: What do they say to you.

C: What they say is its time we went and talked to the Greeks. That is the Greeks who are responsible. That they don't see why they should be put up against the wall by people who are supposed to be their friends. And much is the same strain. This was the Foreign Minister who then said that he would in any case put it to Ecevit and see what the response was. But our Ambassador got a feeling that things were going pretty badly.

K: Yes. Well....

C: Now, what do we do if it breaks down. If they won't come.

K: Well if they don't come I think we all have to cut off whatever military relations we have with them. With both of them.

C: I think that will be the only thing that will be instrumental in the short run if they really felt that would happen.

K: I have said publicly today that nobody is fighting a war there with an open American military supply line.

C: That is certainly a help isn't it. That's right.

K: I have said that.

C: [redacted] B1

K: No. The Turks are in a cocky mood. There is no question.

C: Of course. That's right. Well, let's wait for the 12 hours -- lets wait until first thing in the morning and I think we'd better then have an immediate word -- what time will that be with you then? That'll be about midnight again for you won't it first thing in the morning.

K: What do you consider first thing -- first thing in the morning in Turkey is midnight for me. Yes. / Roughly isn't it.

C:

C: I'll call you I think if I get some word.

K: Jim, you call me whenever you get some decisive word and the same for me.

C: Right then. Alright we'll do that. There is a bit of a diplomatic lull at the moment and we're not getting fast I must say.

K: It looks that way. Well, I think the Turks will accept this but probably too late.

C: Yes. (laughter)

K: You know, one respect in which all the humanitarians and liberals and socialists were wrong in the last century was when they thought that mankind didn't like war.

C: Yes.

K: Its regrettable but.....

C: I came to that conclusion a few years ago when I saw the position in Northern Ireland Henry.

K: They love it.

C: There is only mind you a handful of people who do for a long period. Most of us like it for a day or two but there is a handful who like it forever.

K: That's right. It doesn't mean that the humanitarians were wrong it just means their life is harder than we thought.

C: Yes. And I think life is getting worse Henry.

K: I think you are right.

C: I don't know what sort of age were passing through or going to pass through but historian like yourself ought really to give us a rundown on it sometime and tell us how you think how this next half century is going to look.

K: I'll tell you it is -- I'm glad I'm not going to be running part of it. It's going to be brutal.

C: When I think your -- nuclear anxieties you know they're something.

K: [redacted] B1

C: Yes, of course.

K: But that's not what....

C: I Suppose the American taxpayers oughten to pay for long hours of philosophizing ought they.

K: Jim, I'll talk to you first thing in the morning.

C: Very good Henry. Bye then.

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SA 190

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

PAGES MISSING

TELCON
President
Secretary Kissinger
7/20/74 1:15 p. m.

N: Well, Henry, how do you think the briefing went? Well?

K: [redacted] B1

N:

K:

N:

K:

N: I would think they don't in view of what you say they said.

K: They are waiting for the answer and they may get antsy. [redacted] B1

[redacted] We are playing the hard line and are in step with all our ~~xxxxxxxx~~ allies.

N: If the Greeks did go to war, then I would come back to Washington.

K: And we would cut off all aid
N: That would stop the war.
K They can't fight long then.

N: That is the lever and we will use if if we have to.

K: I will call you immediately of furtherdevelopments.

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(SA 185) *

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

TELCON
7/20/74 - 9:30 a.m.
Ingersoll/HAK

K: Hello.

I: Yes. Henry.

K: Bob, that was a false alarm you got. [redacted] B1 There is no cut off of military aid.

I: Good. They told us unequivocally in the meeting that Schlesinger told them to cut off shipment.

K: You'd better go back there.

I: I surely will.

K: And make sure that they get in touch with their Secretary and that shipments are not to be cut off but on the other hand they're not to be delivered either. If you follow me. There should be in the next few days technical delays. There should be no formal announcement of a cutoff. We'll never get it started again.

I: Well this was -- they told us that they had already held up.....

K: It doesn't make a G. D. difference Bob. You're in charge of this operation until I get back. You just tell them what I agreed with Schlesinger.

I: Ok. You talked to Jim recently.

K: I just talked to him 5 minutes ago and he said its a misunderstanding but if its a misunderstanding you'd better make clear it doesn't happen.

I: I'll do that right away.

K: Has Hartman talked to theTurks.

I: And right after that he was going over to see Schlesinger.

K: I know. And he did and Schlesinger was not quite as tough as I would have wanted him but he was at least consistent with us. Did we tell him we'd have to cut off aid if there were no ceasefire.

I: I just heard the message described to me and he didn't put that in there. I don't know why.

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K: Who Schlesinger?

to

I: No Hartman. But we gave that/Joe and put it in a cable to him as well.

K: What do you mean Hartman didn't put it in there.

I: I just had read to me a memo on his conversations with the Turkish Ambassador and he didn't say it. At least its not reported.

K: Well, its going to be a lonely department when I get back. You called the Turkish Ambassdor. You get Hartman to call the Turkish Ambassador and and you tell Hartman that the next time he doesn't carry out instructions I want his resignation. I do not accept the principle that Assistant Secretaries have a judgment when they're given an order.

I: Well, there may be.....

K: There could be no misunderstanding. He was on the G. D. phone with me.

I: That's what I thought. I don't know that he didn't say. I just heard the message read to me and it didn't have it in it and I question it just before you came on the line.

K: There is no sense you doing it. Tell Hartman to call back the Turkish Ambassador. Tell him he did not make himself clear. He wants it clearly understood that the proposal for a cease fire that Sisco is bringing has our total support and that it is his view that it will lead -- that if we threaten it to Greece it will lead to a cut off with Turkey also and we want him to know that as a friend so that there will not be surprised if things don't go properly.

I: I'll do that right away.

K: Now, it took me an hour and a half to get Sisco to deliver this in Athens now do you suppose we could deliver it in Washington. We've spent 2 hours longer already than I ordered it so tell Hartman its safe. And I want a call in 5 minutes that its been done.

I: Fine.

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SA 222

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Taska/Greek Officials/Sec. Kissinger
July 22, 1974, 5:00 p.m.

T: I am in the office of the Gizikis, the President of Greece. All of the Chiefs of the Greek military services are here as well as the new leadership of Greece, Kanaloplis. They are very anxious to have a word with you. I have told them the efforts we have made and how much importance we attach to maintenance of peace in the area. They are very, very concerned about what is going on in Cyprus and it has created an impossible problem for them politically to face as the first democratic government of Greece since 1967. They would like to have you speak to them and Kanaloplis so they can explain this problem.

Kanaloplis: Mr. K. speaking.

K: How nice to hear from you. [redacted]

Kan: We are all here very concered and we are in a dilemma. It is impossible for us to accept this continuation of such activities in Cyprus. The situation has become very critical. I would be very glad if you would be kind enough to have a talk with Mr. Napolis.

K: I have heard you very well.

Kan: I have to tell you I am very glad to have this talk with you for the first time in my life.

K: I would like to tell you that our friendship for Greece is firm and you can count on our friendship and our alliance. I will get immediately in touch with the Turkish Prime Minister and urge him to show the greatest restraint.

Kan: Thank you very much indeed. Please be so kind to have a talk with Mr. Napolis.

N: Hello Mr. Secretary.

K: How are you. [redacted]

N: Fine. Thank you very much. I just talked to Cleredis. Re the military operations to happen to Nicosia tomorrow morning. It would be impossible for us to survive as a Government just as we take over. What is... come back to the ceasefire line. Otherwise we do not know how to stay in power. They are violating the ceasefire agreement. We would like you to intervene as soon as possible and ask them to come back to the cease-fire line.

*

K: I understand and I will call the Turkish PM immediately.

N: Thank you Mr. Secretary. The situation becomes very critical there and tomorrow morning in Nicosia the Greek forces will resist and there will be a massacre in the town and it will make it impossible ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ the survival of the two communities in the Island.

K: I understand. I will call the Turkish Govt immediately.

N: In case you have something to tell us we are in the office of the President of the Republic here in Athens.

K: I will call back within the hour.

END

SA 210 *

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon: 7/21/74:12:36 p.m.
Secretary Kissinger/
Joe Sisco

K: Hello.

S: Hello Henry.

K: Joe, how are you?

S: How is my favorite Secretary of State.

K: I'll tell you it is getting about as much sleep as his favorite Under Secretary.

S: Well I need it by God.

K: Listen, Joe

S: _____ right at the times when I felt low.

K: Well, you are a good friend. Now Joe

S: Do you knowwhat I miss?

K: What?

S: Those discussions we had in your room in the King David.

K: Yes, we cleared both our minds.

S: _____ one of these, you know it as well as I do.

K: Joe

S: _____ that comradeship that you and I had through that whole 33 days.

K: Exactly.

S: It means a great deal psychologically, and I miss it very much.

K: Well I wish I could be there. Now Joe, let me tell you the state of play and you better take it up from here.

S: Right.

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K: The Turks, you know they have now given up on that fleet. That they don't think any more is a good argument.

S: Yes.

K: So now they just flatly refuse to make a ceasefire tonight.

S: Yes.

K: They have proposed that they would announce the principle of a ceasefire tonight.

S: Right.

K: And they are prepared to meet at 8 o'clocktomorrow morning any place in Europe -- in Vienna if necessary at any level to work out the details.

S: Meet with whom?

K: With anybody from the Greek side.

S: They will never with them.

K: Well, I don't know. I called the Greek Prime Minister and he said they would meet with them on Tuesday but that was when he thought there was a ceasefire.

S: Yea, but they even changed their minds about that in the aftermath of a ceasefire as a result of what I reported to you in that other - you know that other

K: No, but when I talked to the Prime Minister about an hour ago - forty-five minutes ago, he said they would be willing to meet on Tuesday morning if there were a ceasefire.

S: Well that is a change from what he told me four hours ago.

K: And when I made him this proposition, he didn't reject it. He said it is totally new -- they would have to consider it.

S: Yes. All right ah

K: Now will you xx follow it up? I don't think he fully understood it.

S: Yes. All right ah now let me be sure I understand it. Repeat to me

K: The proposition is that the Turks announce tonight their readiness to accept the ceasefire.

S: In principle.

K: Yes. And that tomorrow morning at a place to be decided at any level that we decide. You know, Prime Minister-to-Prime Minister, Foreign Minister-to-Foreign Minister, we will send a man with plenty of potential(?) powers.

S: Right.

K: To conclude the ceasefire.

S: Right.

K: And Callaghan would be prepared to go there.

S: Callaghan would be prepared to go there.

K: And you would be prepared to go there.

S: Henry, I will try it. Let me tell you what my quick initial (?) reaction is. It is a stall.

K: Oh, (laughs) no. Are you sure?

S: Wasn't that a profound comment.

K: No, but I figure once we get -- what you should explain to the Greek to the Greek. Once we get the Turks to Vienna we are going to make him agree to a ceasefire.

S: That is right.

K: As the first item of business any stock(?) any way.

S: Of course. There isn't much that could go on after dark anyway.

K: Exactly.

S: People get into other kinds of trouble after dark.

K: OK Joe, call me back as soon as you have an answer.

S: Well I will go over and see the Prime Minister right away.

K: Good. S: Thank you.

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SA 207

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
F. M. Callaghan/Kissinger
July 21, 1974: 12:15 p.m.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 28 JUN 2004 200102979

K: Hello

C: Mr. Kissinger, have you talked to the PM in Greece?

K: Yes, and he said he would sit tight.

C: He said he'd sit tight? Well, now, what Ecevit says to me is this: He says that they would be willing to announce the principle of a cease-fire tonight. I then pushed him and he said he would be willing to meet in Vienna at 8:00 tomorrow morning, local time, in order to submit what he calls very reasonable conditions because they can't agree to a cease-fire without preliminary conditions, and it will be _____ will be able to agree to a cease-fire. I said I would want him to go and I would go myself. He said he would be willing to go, but of course if it were Foreign Ministers obviously it would have to be his Foreign Minister who would agree, but he would be willing to have a preliminary meeting with me. Now our people are very sceptical about all this. They think that once we got there we would find ourselves involved in an awful marathon.

K: Well, it would be the same as that Greek _____ that never existed.

C: That's right. And so, I just wanted to see what you thought. I'm not sure what I think. On the whole, as I like action, I'm ready to go, but on the other hand I don't want to get myself snarled down into a thing that goes on and on and, in any case, would the Greeks be willing to accept a meeting at 8:00 tomorrow morning if the Turks have announced acceptance of the principle of a cease-fire?

K: Well, why don't I call the Greek Prime Minister and ask him?

C: Well, you could do that or I could do that. It depends who would do it better. I think that you probably would, don't you? I promised to ring him at that number - 603018, but I see no reason why you shouldn't do it.

K: Well, I just talked to, I haven't really talked to Ecevit Why don't you try it?

C: I hope you're not bowing out of this, Henry Kissinger.

K: You want me to do it then?

*1

UNCLASSIFIED

C: You stay right where you are.

K: I'm not going to fail; you fail. What do you think? Do you think it would be better if I did it?

C: I think it would be, really. I think it would be better if you were to ring up and say you understand that there could be a meeting arranged at 8:00 tomorrow morning in Vienna, local time. I think it is the same as Greek time, and the acceptance of a principle tonight, the announcement of the principle tonight, and then, well, they really ought to hold their hands, ought'nt they?

K: Yeah, well let me call him.

C: Alright. Will you call me back?

K: Of course.

C: I promise to call Ecevit back unless you call him back, you see. He was going to call you, but I said, don't bother, I'll call Henry Kissinger, and then he and I can talk it over. So Ecevit may not call you for the moment.

K: O.K. Well, let me talk to the Greek.

C: You talk to the Greek.

K: I'll call you back.

C: Good bye.

K: Bye, Jim.

SA197 (1974)

RELEASED IN FULL

Conversation between Secretary Kissinger and Prime Minister Ecevit
July 21 - 10:40 a.m.

Kissinger: Good morning, Mr. Prime Minister.

Ecevit: Good morning, Dr. Kissinger. We are in the middle of a Security Council meeting to discuss this matter. We have a problem. We doubt the reliability of Greece. Ioannides word of honor is a joke. We have now figured out what the joke is behind his words. He said we could fire on any ships bearing Greek flags. His ships are drawing Turkish flags!

Kissinger: Well, no one can blame you if you sink your own ships.

Ecevit: No, Dr. Kissinger, they are not our own ships. They are Greek ships. They are Greek ships drawing Turkish flags.

Kissinger; Yes, Mr. Prime Minister, but you can sink them if they are not your ships but are flying Turkish flags.

Ecevit: They are using two tricks. We are NATO allies and the Turkish pilots know our codes. They speak Turkish. They call our pilots in Turkish using our codewords. We can no longer rely on the words of Greece.

Kissinger: What exactly is it that you want? I know you are an intelligent man -- I know that from the days of Harvard. With all due respect, I cannot take this. This can go on for six weeks on this basis.

Ecevit: They say that they want an armistice. It has become obvious that they want to exploit the cease-fire for massing troops on the islands. The Greeks must cease these methods.

Kissinger: What methods should they cease?

Ecevit: They say that they are ready for a cease-fire. They have already shown us the tricks that they will use to violate the cease-fire.

Kissinger: Are you telling me you will not accept a cease-fire?

Ecevit: We will accept a cease-fire.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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Kissinger: Today?

Ecevit: We are in the middle of discussing the problem now.

Kissinger: That means many more hours of delay again.

Ecevit: We have been occupied with the matter of these flags in our Security Council meeting. They had given us their word that no Greek ships would be around Cyprus.

We cannot rely on them. I will let you know. I will call you when the meeting is over.

Kissinger: Whatever the outcome is, it will be to the long-term disadvantage of Turkey.

Ecevit: I will telephone you.

Kissinger: It is not possible for the U. S. to stay its passage any longer.

Ecevit: I will call you.

*

SA 202

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Joe Sisco
7/21/74; 9:56 a.m.

S: The thermometer is getting awfully hot here. In particular, we now have in that other capital not one meeting that has to take place but two.

K: One of them seems already to have taken place.

S: It is in train and that was as of your time an hour ago and another one that is supposed to begin an hour from now. The problem is this that -- you know it as well as I do -- they have taken your chat and what I have to say on this end as something very considerably quicker than that and they see in the various settings of these double meetings, two hours apart, as a deliberate stall. What we have here just so you will kknow from the PM and the Foreign Minister is that they don't believe that they can hold any longer.

K: What will they do if they don't hold?

S: Only one of two things as I read it -- either a political decision on NATO or the one of _____ intervening.

K: But . . .

S: I just want to give you that . . .

K: Let me call Echivet again.

S: Yeah, the reason I think that is desirable -- Henry, I don't think this is entirely consistent with what he told you and what you really conveyed to the Prime Minister here.

K: That's right!

S: Two hours apart is really not consistent with doing this thing right away.

K: Well, let me call -- I will put in a call to Echivet and I will call you back.

S: All right, Henry.

K: Thank you.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 3 MAR 2003 200102979

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SA 195

RELEASED IN FULL

Conversation between Secretary Kissinger and General Haig

July 21 -- 11:20 a.m.

SECRET

Kissinger: The call was Callahan, not Ecevit. They are pleading -- the British! -- to save the Greek regime and to get Turkey to a cease-fire quickly.

Haig: The leftist channels -- that could unravel the whole thing.

Kissinger: We have a massive insurrection in Defense. Call Brown and talk to him privately. He is sitting down there dying.

Haig: You should go back there.

Kissinger: I want to go back and tell them I have just talked to San Clemente. This is what we are going to do. He will kill us in the press.

Haig: No, I don't think so, Henry.

Kissinger: Al, we can never go through another crisis like this. It has been too bad. I will talk to the President.

[Remainder was private.]

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 07 JUN 2004 200102979

UNCLASSIFIED

(SA201)

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

TELCON
F.M. Callaghan/Secy Kissinger
11:44 a.m., July 21, 1974

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, M. GRAFELD, DAS, A/RPS, ACTIN
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET REASON: 25X6
DECLASSIFY AFTER: INDEFINITE
DATE/CASE ID: 15 JUN 2004 200102979

C: Hello.

K: Him.

C: Henry.

K: I've just talked to Ecevit.

C: Well, well done.

K: Well, here is his proposal and see how that, as they say here, "grabs you." His proposal is that he is willing to meet any place tomorrow.

C: Yeah.

K: To discuss -- not he, but a representative -- to discuss a ceasefire.

C: Yes.

K: But they are not prepared to accept a ceasefire tonight.

C: Humm.

K: Now, of course the Greeks will never send anyone to discuss a ceasefire.

C: Nope.

K: So I have told them this was not acceptable. [redacted] B1

C: Yes. Yes.

K: [redacted] B1

C: Yes.

K: And that shook him up and he now promised me an answer in half an hour.

C: Well, I think I will ring him back because I've been speaking to Kipraiof [sp?] -- he's in a very excitable mood. He wouldn't even let me finish a sentence. What he says is they have been waiting for 3 days.

*1

If they don't have a ceasefire today, then I drew the deduction they would extend the action straightaway. But he has just gone off to see the Prime Minister, whose telephone number he gave me as 603018. They are to have a meeting there and I gather the decision is to be taken at 7 o'clock local time.

K: 60318?

C: No, 603018.

K: 603018.

C: That's right. And I think If they get on to them there, you'll get the Prime Minister.

K: Okay.

C: If you like to try that.

K: And you talk to Ecevit.

C: And I'll talk to Ecevit. And then, incidentally, Caprell (sp?) said that they would be willing to go to somewhere like Geneva or Vienna after three or four days because they were very tired.

K: [Laughter]

C: That the public -- don't laugh, Henry -- That the public is very angry and because the public is very angry, they cannot wait beyond the day.

K: Yeah, I understand. . . . Will you [play] with Ecevit and you can tell Ecevit that he doesn't have to worry about Sampson.

C: That he doesn't have to worry about what?

K: Sampson staying in office.

C: Why?

K: Because we will support his removal.

C: All right. Okay, okay. I'll tell him that. And then we'll exchange views again later.

K: Right.

C: Goodbye, ole man.

SA 199

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Prime Minister Ecevit of Turkey
7/21/74; 11:26 a.m.

E: Hello. We have reached this decision. Of course, we all accept the terms for a ceasefire once the Council has decided it and we want it to materialize. We are ready at the earliest possible time tomorrow to discuss the minimum conditions of ceasefire after all that has happened anywhere in all the countries concerned. It can be in _____ or anywhere in Switzerland so that we don't lose time travelling. And we will authorize our representative to declare for us the time of ceasefire for anytime tomorrow once the minimum conditions for ceasefire, for the supervision of ceasefire is complete. Would that be all right?

[redacted] B1

E: Even if that happens. If it is going to happen tomorrow, we will encounter the same difficulties tomorrow wouldn't we?

K: Secondly . . .

E: I mean this strengthens my arguments. You see, we will be _____ the ceasefire today -- sometime this evening. Tomorrow as you say there will be a change of regime -- a coup in Greece so obviously the new rulers will say we are not committed to this arrangement.

K: Well, in that case -- of course then you can start again if you want to.

E: This is a very new development and I'll . . .

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET REASON: 25X6
DECLASSIFY AFTER: INDEFINITE
DATE/CASE ID: 15 JUN 2004 200102979

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Prime Minister Ecevit of Turkey
7/21/74; 11:26 a.m.

K: And the second consideration that I must put before you is that if the threat of war between Greece and Turkey isn't ended. [redacted] B1

E: Yes.

[redacted] B1

E: I see. Well, that is very important. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ Our Chief of General Staff is here. I'll speak with him. We will leave the other subjects and then telephone you say within a half an hour.

K: Good. Thank you.

SA 212 *

TELCON
Joe Sisco/Secy Kissinger
1:00 p.m., July 21, 1974

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

S: Henry, I have one other thought that I want to mention if you think it's a good idea. I'll try out that idea that you indicated. What would you think alternatively -- the Turks and the Greek commanders _____ with the UN in Cyprus?

K: I think it's too complicated.

S: Uh-huh.

K: And there are too many possibilities for getting it screwed up.

S: All right.

K: But wait a minute, Joe, I've just talked to Callaghan. He says if the Greeks accept it in principle, he's willing to make a public appeal to the Turks to stop fighting until the meeting takes place and also he will join with us in bringing maximum pressure that it should be signed right away.

S: All right. That idea of an appeal will help a little bit.

K: And you can tell them we will join the appeal too.

S: Okay.

K: Now will you get him to call me immediately?

S: I'll go right over.

K: And you call me immediately when you are finished.

S: Right.

K; Good.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 14 FEB 2003 200102979

SA 203 *

TELCON
Joseph Sisco/ Secy Kissinger
11:49 a.m., July 21, 1974

RELEASED IN FULL

S: Yes, sir.

K: Joe.

S: Yes, sir.

K: I want the record to show that you were on ~~the~~ your knees pleading for this mission.

S: [Laughter]

K: And you may never come back.

S: Yeah, looks that way, doesn't it?

K: Now, listen, here is the situation in Turkey. They put forward a proposal that the ceasefire talks should take place tomorrow. I told them that was unacceptable.

S: Right.

K: And they told me they would let me know in half an hour.

S: Right.

K: Now I understand that the Greek Cabinet is now meeting.

S: . . . have not had word of this. I know they went into a meeting. The fact is they've been more or less in continuous session.

K: Now, should I call the Prime Minister or should you go in and see him?

S: Well, I think it would be very well if you called him because I have had ~~xxxxxx~~ to make three and four telephone calls in the last two hours saying we are expecting a response shortly and I think your direct call would help to draw this out.

K: All right. Will you call him and say that you have just talked to me and I'm placing a call to him.

S: I will do that.

K: But that we and the British are urgently -- whatever you want to say -- pressing the Turks for a rapid ceasefire.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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- MORE -

S: Yes.

K: Okay.

S: Well, I will put in a call and tell them that you are going to put in a call right away.

K: As soon as you tell me his name.

S: [Laughter] Andrewsopulous.

K: Andrewsopulous.

S: Yeah.

K: Okay. Well, we have a happy united group backing you up, Joe.

S: All right. I will call him right away. And then you should put in a call.

K: Okay. Don't go up to Dapasanaut [sp?]. You may be too visible there.

S: I know.

K: [Laughter] Okay, Joe. We'll be talking to you soon.

S: Oh, yes. Thank you.

END.

SA 206

*

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Greek PM Androutsopoulos
July 21, 1974; 12:01 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: In light of the very difficult situation we all face, we are making a major effort with Turkey to get a ceasefire tonight and I just wanted you to know that I have talked to the Turkish Prime Minister again and I hope to hear from him within the hour. But in the meantime it would help me if I could know whether the Greek forces -- the Cypriot forces would also stop fighting. on the island

A: They will, Mr. Secretary, when we spoke I made it clear that on the part of all the involved parties will take the necessary steps -- in other words as _____. Of course it will not be one-sided ceasefire. Of course everyone would stop.

K: Good.

A: But the problem is this when we talked I got the impression because I think you made it clear to me that the ceasefire will be immediate.
K: Well, that was my impression. My impression was that I would get a very /w/ quick answer but it has proved to be more difficult than I thought.

A: And later when Mr. Sisco came here he brought me -- he set the time for two o'clock and _____ have the ceasefire at the appointed time.

K: Yes, but now I think we will have an answer within another hour.

A: Will I have the answer from you, Mr. Secretary or from Mr. Sisco?

K: One or the other or maybe both.

A: I beg your pardon.

K: I don't know yet -- whichever works faster. I will do my best to call you myself.

convey
A: Mr. Sisco can ~~tell~~ the message. It is perfectly all right. It is up to you.

K: Good. We will hope very much that your Government will show the Greatest possible restraint. Because we value our friendship and alliance. Thank you.

A: I don't know what else can be done on our part.

K: No you can't do anything. I will be in touch. Good-bye Mr. P.M.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 14 FEB 2003 200102979

SA 204

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Tom Braden/Secy Kissinger
11:50 a.m., July 21, 1974

K: Hello.

B: Are we going to have a war?

K: I think we are going to try to quiet it down. We'll know within the next hour. I'll tell you, I'm beginning to get to the view that I cannot live any longer in this town.

B: Why? What happened now?

K: Because it's getting to be ridiculous. Every time you move some @#*! is putting out some story. We never supported the Sampson regime; we never had any intention of supporting the Sampson regime.

B: I know you never did. But Joe Kraft thinks so.

K: Does he have an article on that?

B: He has this morning. But he doesn't really say that. I haven't seen anybody -- well, I guess they have been illusions to that.

K: Oh, the New York Times . . .

B: The New York Times said so, yeah. Yeah, that's right. I mean, what are we going to do, put Makarios back in?

K: We haven't decided yet how to do it but we'll certainly not accept Sampson.

B: Yeah. Well, I just wanted to -- you know, I'm just the guy that called you in the middle of a crisis and bother you -- I just wanted to tell you not to worry about this crap. I mean, I don't think it's very serious. You know, people like to criticize about foreign policy but they're not really making any passes at you.

K: No, but -- what's so ridiculous is -- what you told me the other day, I mean, it shows what's going on in this town.

B: Oh, sure. Oh, I think your . . .

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
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K: It's not just -- I mean, all the animals are out of the cages. And here we've got a war cooking and the goddamnest leaking is going on -- inaccurate. You go to meetings -- I tell you this as a friend -- and you don't worry any more about the country, you worry how what you say will read when you see it in the Times or Post.

B: Um-humm. Yeah, there is . . .

K: What did you call about?

B: That's all I called about. Are we dining tonight?

K: We're dining tonight. There's a 50-50 chance that we'll get a ceasefire today.

B: That's great, that's great. And I wonder . . .

K: In fact, I'll know within the next hour.

B: Yeah. You think you'll be at dinner anyway, huh?

K: Oh, yeah. Because the bastards who are fighting are all sleeping.

B: Yeah, yeah. One of the two. Okay, I'll see you tonight.

K: Right.

B: Thanks for calling.

K: Bye.

SA 211

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

TelCon:7/21/74:12:55 p.m.
Secretary Kissinger/
Foreign Minister Callaghan

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS, A/RPS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 25X6
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 21 JUL 2014
DATE/CASE ID: 13 JUL 2004 200102979

K: Hello.

C: Hello Henry.

K: H Jim.

C: Yes sir.

K: I just talked to the Greek.

C: Yes.

K: And I don't think he quite understood the proposition. We thought that there would be a ceasefire tonight and under those conditions he would have been willing to meet Tuesday morning.

C: Yes.

K: Which was a change of his previous position.

C: Yes.

K: Now he is - when I explained to him there would be no ceasefire tonight, only the principle of it -- he said he would have to consult his colleagues and I just sent Sisco in there to talk to him.

C: Yes, yes.

K: I have no definitive answer. Now do you think if I brought some more pressure on Ecevit to accept it.

C: We were wondering we had so many interruptions in our phone call whether he was being pulled back by other people in the room.

K: Whether he was being what?

C: Pulled back by other people in the room. Because our phone call was interrupted three times. I think he is under pretty considerable pressure. But ah I think - I have come to the conclusion before you rang me that if the Greeks wouldn't accept this we have got to put more heat on to Ecevit. It depends upon how you assess the Greek position. Do you think the Greeks will come on? Let me read to you something that I have just written - scribbled out here as something that could be said under certain circumstances. Following quote "Following

discussions with the Greek and Turkish Governments the British Government understands that both sides agree in principle to a ceasefire and will send representatives to meet in Vienna at 8:00 a.m. tomorrow to discuss the modalities of its implementation. The purpose of this meeting is to put into effect paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution # 353 and the British Government urges all concerned in the meantime to cease all firing and to defray information which might further aggravate the situation. The British Government will be represented at the talks.

The wording of that picks up paragraph two of the Security Council Resolution which they both say they accept. Now do you think on reflection after having talked to them that the Greeks would accept that?

K: I doubt it. But I am not sure.

C: It is your target(? ?) Henry that I think if you think -- well all right then if that is the answer to the first question

K: Well let me find out - no let me first find out what Sisco is going to bring back from them.

C: All right. But then if you doubt it and if he brings back an adverse report, then the second question is, if they don't accept it what do they do?

K: That is a good question.

C: [redacted] B1

K: Well, I don't know.

C: All right. Well, let's assume the worse. Let's assume that it does mean that and that you get worst raging(?) then you have got now and I think we have got to turn the heat on Ecevit tonight and get him to accept the ceasefire not in principle but ah in actuality.

K: And it ought to be

C: And also I don't know what are these modalities that he will want to discuss. They could be very complicated and very tiresome things. Are you provising (? ?) it preventing the access of ships monitoring their entry and all the rest of it. Couldn't

K: They are bound to be.

C: Do you recken it will be cleared up in two or three hours.

K: I doubt it.

C: You are skeptical.

K: I am extremely skeptical.

C: Well, then, you see we keep coming on in circles at the moment, don't we.

K: Well, if the Greeks accept this proposition, then I think something like your statement would be excellent. If the Greeks don't accept that proposition, then we have trouble.

C: That is right.

K: And we would be prepared to join your statement or make a separate appeal.

C: Yes, yes. Well I think you ought to have a separate, a separate one because you have done so much work on it and we will be associated with the talks, you see. Don't you think that would be better.

K: That is fine.

C: I don't really mind.

K: No, no let's do it - we can do it separately.

C: I think we had better probably because we work in tandem so well today that I don't mind a joint statement but I think on balance that we have got to be part of the talks probably you had better put a separate one out.

K: That is fine.

C: Now, Henry, we haven't yet gotten it, have we.

K: No.

C: You will wait for Sisco?

K: Let me wait for Sisco.

C: Shall I ah - I shall not talk to ~~EKK~~ Ecevit again yet then.

K: Well, --

C: Because I may have to turn the screws on harder if you will. I mean, I think if Sisco comes back with a very adverse report, you will have to go in hard on Ecevit and then when you finish with him I will have to go in hard on him.

K: That is right.

C: And you let me know as soon as you finish with Ecevit and --

K: I will let you know as soon as I hear from Sisco.

C: Yes. Well, you let me know when you hear from Sisco. Then we can decide whether you want to talk to Ecevit and then you let me know when you have finished with Ecevit and I will go in and do the mopping up process.

K: Exactly.

C: Right, ole man.

K: Jim, will talk to you soon.

C: Yes. Good, ole man.

SA 198

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

Conversation between Secretary Kissinger and James Callahan, British Foreign Secretary July 21, 1974 - 11:15 a.m.

Callahan: Hello, Henry. I have read the telegrams and also had an interesting report myself from Athens from one source. Any changes made will be for the worse. Therefore, I believe we ought to remove any excuse for widening the problem. You should take a bit of a risk in telling them what the Turks are willing to do and as far as I am concerned, I would approach them and say we hold ourselves ready for talks which are available -- suggest perhaps in Vienna. The Turks are available, and as far as I am concerned, we are ready.

Kissinger: The Turks are not ready for a cease-fire. Ecevit is using the excuse of Greek fleets in Cyprus. He says there are Greek ships carrying Greek flags. There will never be an end to this. He says that they are speaking Turkish they learned in NATO. I said that no one could blame him if he sank ships carrying Turkish flags; they are his own ships.

Callahan: What did he say to that?

Kissinger: [redacted] B1

Callahan: The situation will be worse tomorrow.

Kissinger: I will tell Ecevit we need a cease-fire tonight. [redacted] B1

[redacted]

Callahan: How will that move affect the Greeks' move toward the USSR? There is some suggestion of a move that way.

Kissinger: In Greece.

Callahan: Would your bluff be called?

Kissinger: My bluff would be called if we went to war anyway. [redacted] B1

[redacted]

Callahan: What will you say to the Greeks?

Kissinger: I must talk to the Turks first.

Callahan: We can expect the next positive action from the Greeks.

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CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, M. GRAFELD, DAS, A/RPS, ACTING
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET REASON: 25X1, 25X6
DECLASSIFY AFTER: INDEFINITE
DATE/CASE ID: 15 JUN 2004 200102979

Kissinger: I will call Ecevit.

Callahan: Then on to the Greeks after that. We must get the record clear with them.

Kissinger: In what way?

Callahan: I have told the Greeks talks are available, so they have no excuse.

Kissinger: Tell them I am in urgent contact with Ecevit on the cease-fire. Go ahead with your overture.

Callahan: Yes.

Kissinger: So that they can get a little courage.

Callahan: You and I can exchange views when we have both talked to Ecevit on the cease-fire.

Kissinger: Bring maximum pressure on him for a cease-fire.

Callahan: I will twist his arm, but I don't have much influence.

Kissinger: Try charm.

Callahan: It doesn't work at 2,500 miles.

Kissinger: It works at over 3,000 miles.

Callahan: The other thing is that we have had a long convoy of more than 1,000 cars and lorries out of Nicosia. It has reached our base area now. The tourists and dependents are now out of Nicosia. Here is a "tender report" -- it suggests that Turkish planes have gone home. Three planes have been hit.

Kissinger: Talk to you soon.

Callahan: Alright.

SA 208

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Greek PM Androutsopoulos
July 21, 1974; 12:25 p.m.

K: Hello.

A: Hello, Mr. Kissinger.

K: Mr. Prime Minister.

A: Yes.

K: Can you hear me?

A: Yes, I can hear you.

K: I have not heard, myself, from the Turks, but the British Foreign Minister has, and they made the following proposal to him.

A: Yes.

K: They would accept tonight the principle of a cease-fire; they would be prepared to meet tomorrow morning at 8:00 local time, in Vienna, or any other European city, at any level. If you go, then Ecevit will go. If the Foreign Minister goes, he will send the Foreign Minister. He will send somebody with plenary potential powers, and they will then agree on a cease-fire tomorrow morning. Now can you accept that?

A: Well,
You say the cease-fire will take place tonight?

K: They will agree to the principle of the cease-fire tonight and announce it. They will announce it tonight, the principle. Then tomorrow morning at 8:00, they are willing to meet you in Vienna. And Foreign Minister Callaghan would be there and I would send Sisco there. And this is when the details would be finished.

(line is cut-off)

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(continued)

K: Hello.

A: Hello. We were cut short.

K: Yes, Mr. Prime Minister, I'm sorry about it. Mr. Prime Minister, the proposal is that the Turkish Government would announce tonight.

A: Yes.

K: It's an agreement in principle to a cease-fire.

A: I cannot hear you.

K: The Turkish Government would announce an agreement in principle to a cease-fire and it would agree to meet tomorrow morning at 8:00.

A: Yes.

K: It's an agreement in principle. Preferably in Vienna. Foreign Minister Callaghan would be there.

A: Is it possible for the day after tomorrow?

K: They will not agree to the actual implementation of the cease-fire.

A: I don't understand. The cease-fire will take place tonight?

K: No. The principle will be announced tonight.

A: Tonight. And the cease-fire will continue until ...

K: They will work out the conditions of the cease-fire.

A: They will work out the conditions of the cease-fire?

K: Yes.

A: What's going to happen in the meantime? Are they going to fight?

K: That's my impression, yes.

A: When are they going to announce it, Mr. Secretary?

K: Well, as soon as I know what your answer is.

A: _____

K: Well, why don't you consider it? I will talk again and I will call you again in an hour.

A: We don't want to put ourselves in a position _____

K: Well, why don't you talk to Sisco.

A: Sisco? Do you think it would be advisable?

K: Yes, or you can contact me, whatever you prefer.

A: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

K: Good bye.

SA 213

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Prime Minister Ecevit of Turkey
Secretary Kissinger
1:25 p.m., July 21, 1974

K: Hello.

E: Hello, Dr. Kissinger. I talked with Mr. Callaghan. He was going to telephone me but I didn't receive a call yet. Did you talk with him?

K: Yes, I've talked with him.

E: Yes.

K: And I've talked with the Greeks. I think it will be impossible to get your proposal accepted.

E: Why?

K: Well, as I understand your proposal, it is quite frankly another delaying tactic.

E: No, no, it's not a delaying tactic. You see . . .

K: You're a good student of mine.

E: We have reason to be [guarded] of their intentions. We made . . . . ceasefire. But they have pilots in there speaking Turkish, using our codes; maybe they're right, I don't complain. We cannot be sure whether they will not violate the ceasefire in our name so we must take certain minimum conditions of security assurances. We can finish that discussion within a couple of hours.

K: Um-humm. Well, I talked to the Greek Prime Minister and his first reaction was negative. I have now sent Sisco in to see him.

E: The Greek Prime Minister?

K: Yes.

E: All right. Then shall I call you again or shall I expect a call? I'm at the Prime Ministry.

K: I shall call you.

E: All right.

K: But again, you know what high regard I have for you. I would like you to . . . . .

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E: Could you repeat again -- your voice was cut off.

K: I said, you know my high regard for you.

E: Thank you, Mr. Kissinger.

K: And I would like you to think of the long-term consequences of what you're doing.

E: No, please don't think that I'm making a tactic. We have serious problems, Dr. Kissinger. I was just having to explain that to Mr. Callaghan when I saw him personally. If he wants a workable ceasefire, he must assure that it's going to be so. We can discuss the minimum _____ conditions within an hour or so. [If they are] giving you their word, they are not keeping it. They are . . . . . [beeping noise on line] . . . . . So we must make sure that if they are going to make ceasefire, [that they respect it].

K: Because on Cyprus itself we are very sympathetic to your position.

E: Yes, thank you.

K: And as soon as we have a ceasefire I would like Sisco to talk to you about our thinking because we I think would see things very similarly.

E: Well, even to know this, I think we have to hold short preliminary talks. We may hold this just with the British.

K: Yeah.

E: Or we can make a different arrangement. You see, we have to be satisfied with .....

K: Well, but why couldn't you make a 24-hour ceasefire during which a permanent one will be discussed?

E: Well, we can do this. In that case -- well, I don't know. You see, this _____ we do not know how they can violate -- how they are going to violate the ceasefire with their Turkish speaking pilots. Actually, this is night now.

K: Yeah.

E: And our troops cannot make any moves. So nobody needs worry about what the Turkish troops are going to do -- or in Cyprus. We cannot fly at night so there is no danger from our angle. But we can expect

- MORE -

them to play certain things. For instance, at Kyrenia (?), again through using those Turkish words, etcetera they .....[our people at night]. They can do the same to the ..... So we are afraid of what they can do with the intrigues that they have fought during the night. .....

K: Well, let me see what the Greek answer is and I will call you back.

E: All right.

K: But I must tell you we are deeply concerned and we hope that you are not doing something that will in the long term be a disaster for Turkey.

E: Well, you see, we have immediate worries as well and reason to be worried.

K: Yes, but it cannot be in your interests that when all of this is over Cyprus will lend towards the Communists.

E: Well, you see, Mr. Kissinger, I wish I had the chance to talk these things over with you as well as Mr. Sisco. We have followed the policy recommended by America in Cyprus for 10 years and where have we ended? We have different ideas about it. We believe that _____ Turkish peasants in Cyprus is the best guarantee against Communism.

K: Well, we're not opposed to that.

E: Excuse me?

K: We're not opposed to that.

E. But until now we haven't been given a chance. Our ..... all the time we tried to do something about this. Now we took the initiative here and Britain as well and we have reached somewhere. We want to make good use of it. [Beeping noise on line.] I mean, if Turkey were effective in Cyprus, there wouldn't be much more of the danger of Communism in Cyprus than in Turkey. After all, ...

K: Yes, but that outcome -- Cyprus cannot become part of Turkey.

E: No, I'm not saying that at all. But if Turkey were effective there, if Turkey was to be influential enough to help in Cyprus to prevent it's drifting away towards Communism , that would be the best guarantee.

K: Yeah, but that can only arise from the negotiations.

E: We were not given this opportunity up until now and we are not trying to seek it through our rights in the Treaty.

K: Yes, but I'm afraid you may be bringing about a situation in which exactly the opposite happens.

E: No, I don't think so. Anyway we have reached the night. We have doubts about what they would do in the night. Tomorrow we can make a decision. We can announce the time. I have no doubt about that. I mean, the Cabinet accepts the principle. Tomorrow we will announce it.

K: All right. Well, --

E: We --

K: After I have had an answer from Greece, I will be in touch with you.

E: All right, Dr. Kissinger.

K: Thank you, Mr. Prime Minister.

5090 *

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Minister Vorontsov
7/22/74; 11:00 a.m.

V: Henry, you are at it again.

K: It is getting revolting.

V: We've had good chances before and we will do it again. I have a cable to you from Gromyko. It is a short one. It concerns our decision to evacuate part of our personnel from Cyprus from the Embassy and other missions. In toto ~~of~~ there will be 150 persons evacuated.

K: Can we help you?

V: Yes, Gromyko asked your cooperation but mainly we asked the British to help us. [illegible] The main point is they are going to be evacuated by Soviet ships now in the port of Lanarka -- 150 persons.

don't
K: I/know where Lanarka is.

V: To the south -- away from the invasion point. We appealed to the British and UN.

K: We will do our utmost to cooperate with you. We are meeting now with our military and other persons. We will give maximum cooperation. If we can help with transportation, we will do it.

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SA225 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Dean Rusk/Secretary Kissinger
July 23, 1974
7:20 pm

R: I just wanted to give you...60 seconds of what went on with the Committee this afternoon. The impact was good. I started to make a hard _____ in terms of the method and actions of the FBI. I wanted to mention to you one point, and that is, I did tell them about our .....assessment during your work in the...and your work on Viet-Nam and I said that if you said something to me, I would believe it. There seemed to be general agreement around the table. I understand Haig will be coming on later. As far as you know, nothing Haig will say will undermine my veracity. I said if you were to say something to me on this subject, I would believe it.

K: It is not inconceivable to me that in one or two cases, Haig may have received orders from Haldeman or the President, as orders of the President. It's inconceivable to me that Haig did it on his own. There is no possibility that Haig would say I gave him orders to do things beyond what I have testified. I don't know whether you saw my statement.

R: No. They read two or three.

K: The backup material helps my case because it is now clear that the first four cases were done under Hoover's recommendation. It is clear that 3 of these people I had put on my staff against Hoover's recommendations so I wo uldn't have tried to prove him right..which proves Hiag was right all along.

R: ...that Hoover would make no...He never interfered with my ability to make a judgment on...or security matters.

K: In my case, he has, of the names given, 3_____to me and the 4th turned out to be an espionage agent.

R: And the 4th was Henry Brandon. That was ridiculous.

K: I know. That was Hoover's view. There were four cases where the ~~FBI~~ FBI.....signed a statement saying I just had a call from Haig who said that he had just been called by the President that the following four names should be put on the list.

K: My guess is that unless Haig's testimony sets them off balance, they are likely to say that after the most careful and meticulous re-examining they have no basis for changing their original judgment and will reaffirm the point that this whole business of wiretapping needs to be looked into by the Muskie Subcommittee.

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K: That doesn't bother me.. As a practical matter, there is no possibility for Haig to deviate from my testimony.

R: There were a lot of Senators there today -- many more than when I was ever Secretary of State but there was no hostile questioning in terms of you .

K: My impression is, in fact, they were a littletoo easy on me this morning.

R: I will be criticised a little for some phrases. I said talking to J. Edgar Hoover was like talking to De Galle. Well, I am going back to Atlanta tomorrow but I wanted to express to you what I said about my confidence in your veracity and make sure that Haig will not undercut me.

K: No possibility of that. You know I appreciate this.

R: Well, good luck and God bless.

K: Thank you and I think we'll come out alright.

R: Good luck my fellow.

END

SA 220

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.5(D)

TELECON
Pm Ecevit/Sec. Kissinger
July 22, 1974
5:30 pm

K: Our relationship is more intense than at Harvard.

E: What, I am not hearing??

K: I said our relationship is more intense and more frequent than it was at Harvard.

E: Yes, indeed.

K: We have had urgent reports that your forces are actively violating the cease-fire and I was wondering if when dawn breaks they could be brought under control?

E: I shall be concerned immediately.

K: It is considered a bad...and makes it difficult to do what we all want to do.

E: I shall do my best.

K: Good. [redacted] B1

E: I see.

K: If you could do your utmost to ~~xxxxx~~ ensure the cease-fire and we shall use our maximum influence with Greece.

E: Alright, I will do that.

K: Thank you, and You'll let me know about that other thing?

E: We have discussed it. It is impossible for me to leave the country. Couldn't you do something about coming here?

K: Let me look at my situation.

E: I have to be here.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 25X6
DECLASSIFY AFTER: HAK'S DEATH
DATE/CASE ID: 21 MAY 2003 200102979

K: I understand. Nr. Prime Minister, I am sendinf you some personal reflections -- on a personal and friendly basis.

E: Thank you.

K: Thank you.

END

SA218 LPS DC
RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
MelLair/Sec. Kissinger
July 22, 1974
5:00

L: Congratulations.

K: How are you?

L: You seem to be busy in another area in the Mediterannean.

K: There is no nation of maniacs that I don't get involved in.

L: It certainly seems to be some improvement. Very good.

K: You are a mind reader. I have been wanted to get together with you.

L: I would like to Henry. One thing I wanted to ask you and it sort of a personal thing. Dave Packard and I each September -- had about 65 Presidential appointees-- we take them to Airlie for two days. They were part of our team at Defense and we have continued this even though we left Defense. We go out for two days in September. ~~Mexwmaidxikke~~ You were at our first meeting in 1969.

K: I remember.

L: You answered question and had supper with us. This would include people -- members of the Joint Chiefs -- very few military--the rest will be civilians.

K: What day.

L: Either the 20th or 21st of September.

K: The only trouble is that I will be at the General Assembly but I could conceivably fly down -- what is the nearest town.

L: You could land at Warrenton.

K: With an airplane.

. I will look at my calendar and if humanly possible I will do it.

L: It will be a kind of old time --

K: It is the sort of thing I like to do.

L: Almost everyone of those people are out of Government now. As a matter of fact most of them wre let out after Dave and I left.

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K: I am at the stage I have to meet people who might give me jobs. May I insult you. I look back at your tenure with nostalgia.

L: I was not such a bad son-of-a-bitch.

K: You were terrific. I said in a crisis we never had to worry about Mel Laird.

L : I would be good to see you and let's get together.

K: Let's have breakfast next week some morning.

L: Fine, I would like too.

K: Can we call you.

L: At my office here.

K: Let's say tentively Tuesday or Wedn esday, 30th or 31st.

L: Wednesday would be best for me.

K: Let's do it Wednesday.

L: Come to your office.

K: To the State Department office. Wed., 31st, 8:00.

L: I will be there, Henry. It will be great to see you.

K: I will give you my answer then.

L: You certainly can and I no the problem. Dave and I were talking about it and what a great thing it would be.

K: If I can get away from the GA and if not booked for one of those two nights, I will leave for down there and return to NY that night.

L: It is informal.

K: I remember. I did it on a Saturday later afternoon. The Chiefs went off duck hunting except for Zumwalt.

L: That won't happen.

K: Good-bye.

END

SA 223

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Chairman Brown/Secretary Kissinger
July 22, 1974
5:55 PM

K: I wonder if you could make an analysis of the performance of the Turkish army based on what you saw in Cyprus. Do it in my capacity as Assistant to the President....what this means for NATO.

B: Right.

K: The President is insistent on that. I just talked to him.

B: We'll get right on it.

K: I would appreciate it. He's worried they didn't perform very well and whether that means anything.

B: I think they made a bad ___on the__they made the mistake you mentioned this morning. Sent it with too little power. I'll do the analysis and get it back to you.

K: OK. Thank you.

END

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SA 221 *

TELCON
Sec. Gen Waldheim/ Sec. Kissinger
July 22, 9:40 a.m.
[1974]

RELEASED IN FULL

W: I wish to tell you how happy I am about the acceptance of the ceasefire and wish to thank you for all your efforts.

K: We have worked together on many things Mr. Sec. Gen.

W: I wanted to tell you I had a call from the For. Min. of Turkey who bitterly complained about the...

K: I had a call from the PM and I was going to call you. We would support an increase of the United Nations Forces and any strengthening of the mandate.

W: Yes. I think this is what I want.

K: I am told it does not need to be changed.

W: I discussed this with some members of the Council -- the British Amb. here and I think that of course we have two possibilities -- either to get a new mandate from the Council which would create a debate in the Council and the other approach which I think is better -- is that I tell the Council that in this situation where we have a new role to play to separate the forces, we need strengthening of our forces and to ask that existing forces ~~xxxx~~ of Governments who are contributing to (increase) their contingent. You will go along with this .

K: We would strongly support it. We think it a better way of doing it and a faster way.

W: Yes. Otherwise I am afraid we will have a long debate.

K: We will strongly support it and I will instruct Scali to work with you on it.

W: I am grateful for this. I think it is the only possibility to establish order in the Island again and I think the British are quite ready to give us the necessary reinforcements.

K: My only problem Mr. Secretary is when you command the largest army in the non-communist world are you going to be too difficult to deal with. You are going to have a large army in Syria, Egypt, and now in Cyprus.

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W: (Silence) I think in this respect I don't really feel that it is impossible to handle.

K: I was just joking.

W: (Laughter).

K: Of course, we will strongly support it and I will tell Scali to work with your people immediately.

W: Fine. I appreciate this. I think it is very important also. It is said that if they don't stop massacring our people we have to continue bombarding those villages.

K: We will strongly support it.

W: With these 2-3000 men it is impossible. We need to be stronger. The British would be best to ask.

K: We will strongly support it and I will tell Scali to get in touch with you immediately.

W: Fine. Thank you for your information.

K: You will be coming down this week.

W: Yes. It is confirmed for 3:00.

END

SA 234

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TELECON
Governor Rockefeller/Secretary Kissinger
July 23, 1974

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are ;you?

R: Wanted you to know we are thinking about you. How are you doing?

K: What are you thinking about?

R: I was thinking about your friends in Cyprus.

K: This thing is coming out fine. It is coming out as you overheard me on the phone the other day.

R: I remember, but I was a little worried.

K: It has come out the way we want. Sampson is out and they have a guy in there who is really our first choice.

R: As long as you say it is alright.

K: But we are keeping open the option of the other.

R: That is number one. So it has come out according to plan.

K: Yes, and we kept the Russians out of it totally.

R: Well, you can mark down another one. I talked to John Dunlop yesterday.

K: He is outstanding.

R: Yes. He talked to me about what you asked him to do and I had asked him to go into a panel on International trade....

K: I think he is excellent.

R: I also thought because the _____people are crazy about him and David is crazy about him that we might get him to do some writing for us. But, from what he told me, his work is very parallel to this, Now, I wouldn't want to interfere in anything he has promised to do for you, but as I said, I think the work is very parallel and this shouldn't interfere.

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K: I have no objection to him doing any writing.

R: You don't

K: No, that is fine.

R: That's marvelous. And I'll be seeing him on Friday. Now, one other thing. On September 10 we are having a full commission meeting in Washington. We want to develop a new Panel., which would be in the public and private institutional....we are meeting on what is happening to the private _____system and we want to know if you might be able to come to this. It is the tenth of September and if you did you might want to say a word about the changing world of international institutions. We were going to ask Mike Mansfield to say a word on the restructuring of Congress and perhaps George Meany on Labor's rôle.

K: If possible, if I am in town, I will do it.

R: You're marvelous. This would be in the morning. Do you think we ought to ask the Vice President to speak at any time during the meeting. K He is still ex-officio.

K: It is a Presidential_____. I have no objection. I like Jerry Ford.

R: So do I.

K: Why don't you do it.

R: Good. Well, that is it. I do want to chat with you....

K: You're nice and on Cyprus, it has come out perfectly.

R: I don't know how you do it.

K: They didn't know the strategy.

R: Well, I am thrilled and give my love to Nancy.

K: Ok.

END

SA 235

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Senator Percy/Secretary Kissinger
July 23, 1974
4:07 pm

K: Chuck, how are you?

P: Fine, how are you? Dean Rusk testified this afternoon. I had met with him in London and we had about six hours alone and it was a good talk. His testimony was impressive. I think if anyone was doubtful before they cannot be any longer... He said dealing with Hoover was like dealing with deGalle who didn't tell him anything. I read to him sections of your own report____and what you understood to be the truth___He _____everything down the line. After Haig's testimony I think we will get this cleared up. I also asked him, ~~isn't it wise to clear this up~~ isn't it wise to clear this up? He agreed. I ~~think his~~ his testimony was extremely good and very helpful.

K: You'ave been a good friend and I appreciate the questions you asked this morning.

P: We are doing our duty here. We'll make it very clear that the investigation was initiated at your request and ~~what~~ what followed... That we have not been mislead. I can't believe but that Haig's testimony won't be very helpful.

K: Haig will support everything I said.

P: Ok.

K: Thank you.

END

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SA 232

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Prime Minister Ecevit/Secretary Kissinger
Jilly 23, 1974
3:30 PM

E: How are you?

K: Fine.

E: Things are moving.

K: You're causing a lot of ~~xxxx~~ trouble. I just want to find out how you see the situation.

E: I just called your Ambassador. I want to give you my comments on Clerides.

K: Don't tell me that on the phone.

E: What?

K: I think you should give me that view if I may suggest, if you could give that ~~xxx~~ view to ~~x~~ my Ambassador. Did you get my cable this morning?

E: I did. I got your oral message.

K: If you could call him and tell him.

E: I just did. He should come in 10 minutes.

K: Good. Give him my regards. Now, may I ask when should the talks between you and the Greeks start?

E: I have talked to Callaghan and he was wondering if ~~x~~ the Greeks could attend the conference in Geneva. I said I don't know, they don't seem to have a government but I said unless we hear from the Greeks to the contrary, Callaghan and Gunes will be in Geneva,

K: I think that is a mistake.

E: They may be able to appoint a Foreign Minister and send him but they have decided not to hold a private talk session but offered to open the ~~xxxx~~ meeting and wait for the Greek Foreign Minister to come. If he comes, alright, if he doesn't____. Wait, I just received a note....I mean they will attempt to open the conference and wait for the Greek Foreign Minister to arrive. If he doesn't they will postpone it. Noone from Athens has said they will not be able to ~~xxx~~ attend. If we ~~xxxx~~ hear they want to put it off, then we will.

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K: I think it is ~~xx~~ unfair to bring pressure ona government to attend a conference when they don't have a Foreign Minister. I think we should give them the courtesy of ~~xxxxxxxx~~ appointing a government first. This is my personal view. This was done without asking our view. I will not have an American representative there before Thursday.

E: Excuse me?

K: I will not send Buffum there until Thursday in any event.

E: One moment please. We have just received a message from Mr. Callaghan and he suggests that although uncertain that Greece can attend, they should still meet and discuss what to do. In the meantime, there are sumors that a delegation headed by the ex-Foreign Minister might go to the Geneva meeting. This is a message I just received from Geneva.

K: We will not send anyone until we know that the Greek Government is sending a representative.

E: They may send -- it doesn't have to be a Foreign Minister. ~~x~~ We have heard nothing to the contrary. Of course the conference will not be officially started unless the Greeks attend.

K: Whatever you want to do, you should proceed doing. If you have agreed to send somebody to Geneva with Callaghan then you should do it. I have no right to get in the way.

E: I didn't understand.

K: We cannot get in the way of an agreement you have already made with the British. But, I would prefer to know that all parties are coming.

E: Certainly. If word reaches us that Greece cannot attend the meeting tomorrow, then we will cancel it, but we have heard nothing so far.

K: But they don't have a government.

E: But their's is a different system and there is still a President and they can send a representative. According to a note I received, the Greece delegation headed by Gunes may come. If we postpone Callaghan and Gunes going, it would be worse. Gunes will ask our Embassy in Athens to approach whatever authority they ~~xx~~ can find and ask if they will be represented.

K: That is a very good suggestion. We will approach them too.

R: We can ask them whether they will be represented. If the answer is no, we ~~xxxxxxx~~ won't go.

K: OK. This is a very good idea.

E: OK. Thank you.

END

[1974?]

SA 228

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Andropolous/Secretary Kissinger
July 23

A. This is the Prime Minister.

K: How are you Mr. Prime Minister?

A: Fine, how are you?

K: Fine.

A: I am sorry I have to bother you again. I am in a difficult position to bring to your attention the cease-fire. Therefore, fighting took place on various parts of the Island. War materials were unloaded and military men have landed on the Island at the port of Kyrenia.

K: Yes.

A: And something must be done to stop all of this because there is a clear understanding and Greece has (inaudible)

K: I will do my best immediately and I am glad you are calling it to my attention.

A: What is going to happen tomorrow morning? Because in Cyprus now it is about 10:15 and during the night things may be somehow started and then it is morning and we may start all over again.

K: We will do our best to get it stopped.
Can I ask you a question?

A: Yes.

K: I was wondering if you wouldn't be coming to the United States at any point so we could exchange ideas.

A: I don't think I could make it right now.

K: You could not?

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A: It's something to be considered.

K: I think as we begin these negotiations....

A: The negotiations will begin.....our Minister of Foreign Affairs will carry out the negotiations and I think...cool off a little bit. (inaudible)

*1

K: We understand this

A: And then we will sit down and discuss..

K: I thought it might be helpful to discuss general strategy and intentions. The Turkish Prime Minister thought he might want to come over for a day.

A: I think now it might make it more difficult to have meetings together.

K: No, no. I t would be separate; it wo uldn't be joint.

A: Well,

K: Let me think about it. I will be in touch with you.

A: Thank you.

END

SA 229

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Connollopoulos/Secretary Kissinger
July 23, 1974
6:25 PM

K: I have talked to the Prime Minister of Turkey and he has promised me there will be no military offensive tomorrow.

C: Thank you very much. (~~xxxxxx~~ (inaudible)

K: I have great ~~xxxx~~ trouble ~~hexxxxxx~~ hearing you.

C: Thank you very much.

K: You're welcome. Goodbye.

END

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
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SA 230 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
July 23, 1974
8:06 PM

K: I wanted you to know what I've done. The British have recognized Clerides to act as President. I thought you should know.

S: I was going to say I felt that xxxx line was a good interim line. We're perfectly xxxx safe in recognizing him .

K: I've told Stabler to call the newspapers tonight or then the other question would be why are we holding back. The Turks said they will never recognize Makarios as President of Cyprus nor will they recognize Clerides as head of Cyprus.

S: I understand the first party.

K: They want_____.

S: That won't wash on the Turk side. But I agree with you. I'm very pleased to hear you say this.

K: You know, I think xxx you did a superb job. I didn't get a chance to say it to you xxx this afternoon. You and I make a good team. You know that final solution xxx was your idea. I just wanted you to know I know it.. I'm having lunch tomorrow x with Max Frankle and I'm going to tell him.

S: I'm very pleased that you are pleased.

K: Good, Joe.

END

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 14 FEB 2003 200102979

SA 231

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Flakos/Secretary Kissinger
July 23, 1974
5:40 pm

K: I have already talked to Ecevit and I've talked to _____. I would like to talke to Mr. Connelopoulos to give him the answer of the Prime Minister of Turky. Mr. Connelopoulos called me from the President's office of Greece. As soon as you get him on the line I will talk to him.

F: Certainly, Mr. Secretary. I just wanted to tell you what I showed to Mr. Brown. If there's no ceasefire and the Turks do not go back to the lines of 4:00 yesterday, the situation will be most dangerous.

K: I understand. there will be a ceasefire.

F: The ceasefire has not been respected by the Turks.

K: I understand all of this. I would like to get Connelopoulos back on the line.

F: I will try to get him on the line.

K: Can you tell me -- are you planning on going to the Geneva Conference tomorrow?

F: Not tomorrow. It is impossible.

K: We are not sending anybody until the Greeks have sent someone.

F: We have an understanding with the Turks and I think they agree that we will start either Thursday or Friday. This is a matter which has been settled...insist on starting tomorrow. I have the assurance of the Ambassador of Turkey that he will convey our message to the Turkish Government. But tomorrow, it is a materiel impossibility.

K I understand that. I appreciate it...

F: The problem is helping....

K: Will you get Mr. Connelopoulos to call be back?

F: He might find himself in a very difficult position and he might not be able to return.

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K: I have been assured by the Turkish Prime Minister that there will be no military offensive tomorrow.

F: I wouldn't want you to be lured by that fact. ~~thank~~ During the night there won't be any fighting. Usually the Turks don't fight during the night hours. They might start tomorrow at dawn.

K: I have been told they will not fight during the day. I have to get a call from Mr. Connelopoulos.

F: I will do whatever I can so you can have your call immediately.

K: Ok, Thank you.

END

SA 96

RELEASED IN FULL

*

TELECON
Mr. Sidey/Secretary Kissinger
July 12, 1974
9:57

S: Hello, well, you got through the Court alright.

K: I tell you,

S: Didn't lose any parts at all.

K: Two more questions and I would have confessed.

S: Listen, Henry. I have kind of reversed field and I want to see whether I can get your permission. I wanted to do a piece when all is said and done, when I considered all the implications that says Henry Kissinger has really had more fun than anybody I know over these last years. And I go on to say...

K: You want to kill me?

S: No, No. I am just so delighted that you keep your humor. Here is what I've done. I said hard work, sure; moments of anger and frustration, certainly, but as you have gone along this remarkable journey you have injected peace and good sense and yet have cast a wry eye over all the singular doings of mankind. And then I just wondered with discretion and that, with some of these little anecdotes that you have told us along the way -- and might be used. I talk about how -- the World Soccer match and then there was a call from Elizabeth Taylor and you said she wanted to give a briefing on European security Conference.

K: She wanted to get a briefing.

S: Get a briefing, yes. Ok. Just as a joke again.

K: Yes, you can use that.

S: And then that he stood fascinated on the grounds of Leonard Brezhnev's dachau and watched him demonstrate the collapsable glass wall around the swimming pool and once he took a ride with Brezhnev at the wheel of a Mark IV Lincoln, the results of which are still a state secret.

K: That's all fine.

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S: Is that alright. Then, I said the other night, you devoured delicious roast goose in a Bavarian restaurant and laughing as Gert Ferber, whatever his name is, told stories and pantomined, you know. And then I said the discreet Secretary surveyed the bosomy waitresses on the same night and after some hasty calculation, observed that if those particular girls had not served the dinner, the host would have had to increase the guest list by 30 percent to fill the room. Is that alright.

K: (Laughter) That is all fine.

S: And then, Kissinger listened to Brezhnev order him to Siberia, failing to yield enough in negotiations, but he has come back suggesting I should be a member of the Politboro since I meet with you guys so much. I would like to be in charge of ideaology. Is that alright.

K: That's fine.

S: Ok. He was thoroughly thrilled when he got to Moscow this time, when Smirnov, head of Soviet weaponry, said he was downright insulted that Americans like Senator Henry Jackson would believe that the Soviet s would put brand new missiles on old diesel submarines. That is what Kissinger has been saying to his critics about the so-called treaty "loophole", so when the Soviet -US heart agreement was signed in the Kremlin, Kissinger warned Smirnov , I don't want you putting your, putting any articifical hearts on those old submarines.

K: Yes, I said they can't put heart machines on those submarines either.

S: Ok, can't put any..

K: artificial heart machines on these submarines either.

S: Ok, good. There we go. And it is part of the legend now, that Kissinger came away from the negotiation session [redacted] with the Soviets once and said I would do anything for caviar, and I may have. Is that right.

K: That is also essentially true.

S: Back in '72 when the Russian did not start carry Nixon to Kiev, the mortified Alexi Kosygin asked if the Minister of Aviation ought to be shot, Kissinger tried to soothe things, explaining the inherent evil in objects: dropped coins roll away from a person, not toward him. Buttered bread falls butter down in direct proportion to the cost of the carpet . Kosygin eyes Kissinger and said he didn't agree. Kosygin had dropped coins that rolled toward himself. Kissinger changed the subject.

K: Laughter.

S: There is something in the world now called Henry's groupies. They are his former Harvard students. You can find one or two in almost every Government that we encounter. The Secretary flies in , there is a little meeting with the old seminars, that sort of thing. Oh, yes, here's one. Kissinger has been offered the choicest girls by at least one of his powerful hosts . He graciously declined. Even though it was in bachelor days. Once the offer was so insistent that he felt like accepting and then telling this host to hurry and take the pictures they wanted, so Henry could get back to work. Is that too delicate.

K: That, if you can avoid that, that might be a little bad.

S: Ok. We can take that out. Let me see, what else. Oh, he called for a massage once in Israel recently, and then you can say anything you want about Jewish intellectual attainments, he reported, but that guy almost killed me. And then, Kissinger's fascination with soccer is such a relatively new discovery. Reporters wormed it out of him that he had broken his hand when he played goalie as a boy in Germany; shifted to forward. Was he pretty ~~xxkxxx~~ fast, someone asked. Kissinger thought a moment. I wasn't so fast, he said laughing, but I was tricky. And then, Kissinger like Nixon has found that sports and politics have much in common. So a while back when East Germany was still in the world soccer contention, he sidled up to a Soviet official, "I bet I know one team you don't want to win" said Kissinger. East Germany, because if they win they will be more trouble than ever. The Russian roared and slapped Kissinger on the back for displaying such wisdom in the ways of this strange world. That's it essentially.

K: I think that's very friendly.

S: No, no. It is just good nature. I must say we are so burdened with heavy stuff , it seemed to me that essential in your success is your enjoyment of the job.

K: Well, I appreciate this and it was fun to have you on the plane.

S: Oh, goodness, Henry. I wouldn't have missed it. You know, I kept saying I was going to roll off but.. howis the rest of it going?

K: It is going along ok.

S: Is it easing out on this whole business?

K: On which.

S: Oh, just the whole trial thing.

K: I think, you know, now that I look over the evidence and so forth. I think I'll be fine.

S: I was worried that in court there would be cross-examination and all of that sort of thing, but it seems to me that this whole thing is breaking down. This business of involving you and that, but we'll see.

K: Well, I hope so. Anyway, I have that impression.

S: Strange days. Listen, I will guard you on this. No state secrets. Just good warm fun.

K: No, this is very friendly and I appreciate it.

S: Ok, good luck.

K: Many thanks, bye.

END

SA 242

TELCON
Hauser/Kissinger
July 24, 1974, 4:35 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

H: How did it go for you.

K: I think very well.

H: No problem.

K: Not at all.

H: What happens next. When they finish Haig then what?

K: They they will vote to clear me.

H: Very good and I think you will get washed out on the other thing. I think he is going to be finished. I have been on the phone with them. I don't understand their mentality about how to respond to this Supreme Court decision.

K: What are they saying?

H: Some don't want him to say anything; others want a terse comment. I have talked to three of them (Congressmen?). One more note of defiance and they will go to the other side.

K: This request is going to be the beginning of more and more.

H: What's his choice? If he turns them over and they come out as terrible stuff; he can't burn them. The tipover is 60 votes in the House. Really something.

K: I have not read the decision but it seems to be much too sweeping.

H: I only saw the ticker. Any lawyer could have told them this would be the case. They got made at me. They don't want to believe what is happening. They refuse to accept it. They don't know where it is to go. If I bet, I think it would be out. If I were you I would just hide out -- keep busy with Cyprus. You will get washed out in this.

K: That is what I am going to do.

H: Any breakthrough with Jackson.

K: I think so.

H: I talked to Lobell and I told him I thought there would be a compromise.

K: That was my strong impression.

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H: I'm glad all is all right for you.

K: All your points were included in my statement.

H: Fine. Will it be published.

K: Eventually.

H: O.K. I'm glad it is coming out right for you and we will see how this game plays out.

K: When you come down ~~xx~~ come in and we will talk about where we go from here.

H: I've talked to your buddy Mel Lair who is running around the country for Ford. He will be important if Ford becomes President. It is a terrible thing -- on how to handle this. If Laird is the real power in the White House, I think it will pose problems for you. You just mind your own business at the moment and be a good Secretary. Wait until the dust settles and we will see where we want to go.

END

SA 244

*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
French FM Sauvagnargues/Secretary Kissinger
July 24, 1974
4:45

K: I want to welcome you to the United States.

S: Thank you. It is a short stopover.

K: You are undermining our position in the _____now.

S: I don't think so. ...we haven't agreed on the EC position. Our British friends were rather obstinate on sugar.

K: Well, if you have any position, you are way ahead of me.

S: How are things. I have heard disquieting things about the Turks.

K: We are trying to dissuade them from taking the airport.

S: It is defended by the UN force.

K: That is right and the Turkish Prime Minister has promised me that he had no plans to take the airport, but..

S: (inaudible)

K: That is a good question, I don't know.

S: That is disquieting. I don't think Ioannidis should do anything now but perhaps the French government could..

K: I think it is too late. If you want to send a demarch, fine.

S: It is probably too late. Was there definitely a danger of an attack.

K: Our impression is there was a definite plan for an attack and calls from the Secretary General, the British and me have have delayed it, if Ecevit is in charge of his forces.

S: What about the conference in Geneva?

K: It is starting tomorrow.

S: xxxxxxxxxhave agreed. Both governments have agreed.

K: Yes.

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S: Why are they doing it? Probably they will through the military

K: They filed and they are now in a precarious position. If their supplies have to come by sea and there is only one open road to Nicosia they are in a precarious position.

S: And you are in touch with Ankara?

K: Yes.

S: I hope you succeed in stopping it. It could start the whole thing again.

K: I agree.

S: I wish you luck.

K Thank you.

S: Thank you for your kind message. I am looking forward to my next stay in September and I hope to see you. I'll try to come for at least one day to Washington.

K We count on that.

S: Thank you, good bye.

END

SA 240

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
PM Ecevit/Secretary Kissinger
July 24, 1974
3:05

K: Can you hear me? Mr. Prime Minister?

E: This is Ecevit.

K: Can you hear me?

E: Yes, I can hear you, how are you?

K: Fine. And since a day isn't complete without my talking to my students I have been calling all over the world. Your Ambassador in Cyprus who tends to get a little excited...

E: We have sent a liaision officer in good spirits with excellent english. He should be there sometime tomorrow.

K: He told the British and Cypriots that you are going to take the airport in two hours.

E: This is not true. I have talked with Waldheim, Macomber and Callaghan about it. There are confusing reports. It seems that because the Greeks were using the airport for transporting armaments and military men, our military units took over the airport and offered it to the UN forces. They did not arrive for a long time, so they had no alternative.. hello? Hello?

K: I can hear you.

E: They had no alternative but to take hold of it, the airport. The British forces arrived there and claimed they had certain legal rights at the Nicosia Airport based on the agreements. Our people accepted that the British had these rights based on the international agreements and we said we will agree to respect the British rights at the airport and we are doing that. According to the UN, it is not in control of the UN force but surrounded by the Turkish forces. What ever the position may be under Turkish control or UN control, Turkish forces have strict orders not to get into conflict with the UN forces but we are not clear about who really controls the airport but whatever the situation our people will respect it and maintain it. We may have a disagreement with the UN but Gunes will discuss with _____ in Geneva. UN claims they have right to control airport. We say why didn't you exert that when airport was in control of the Greeks. We ask for the protection of the helpless Turkish units..so this is the point. We are not going to cause any confrontation with British forces.

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K: I will send Ambassador Buffum to Geneva tomorrow and I think he should have a talk with your Foreign Minister about our thinking.

E: Yes, certainly.

K: We want to stay in close touch.

E: I appreciate that.

K: We want to continue these negotiations in a spirit of alliance and friendship.

E: The talks will be tripartite.? Won't they?

K: Yes. He will be available to give our view. His instructions are to be very cooperative with you.

E: Have you heard about the Canneloupoulos appointment?

K: We think it is positive.

E: We sent a warm message to him and we meant it. He is a wise statesman. And I hope this will be a contribution to better relations.

KL That is our view and itx we made a strong statement of support.

E: Good, So did I. I hope it doesn't work against him.

K: I hope so. It was a pleasure to talk to you and we really have to talk again soon.

END

SA 239

RELEASED IN PART
B6, B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D)

TELECON
Secretary Schlesinger/Secretary Kissinger
July 24, 1974
2:24 pm

K: Jim, how are you?

S: You brought it off a coup.

K: I announced it to the press yesterday.

S: The subject was reached. I had a long talk with Bob Ellsworth. I don't know whether you had a full read-out from Sisco.

K: No, I testified all morning. I'm meeting with Sisco right now.

S: He says he and Sisco agree. The subject he should brief you on... some of the weaknesses that were perceived in the Embassy in Athens on this thing. [redacted] B1, B6

K: The overthrow in Cyprus?

S: ....they may have thought they had American acquiescence.

[redacted] B1, B6

S: Yes, I can see that.

K: If this is true, I'll have to talk to Sisco about it. Then, I have a basis for doing something.

S: [redacted] B1

K: Yes.

S: I talked to Ingersoll a bit ago. -- about letting those two F-4's go.

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CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 25X1, 25X6
DECLASSIFY AFTER: INDEFINITE
DATE/CASE ID: 30 JUN 2004 200102979

K: Yes, I think we should.

S: We will let them go immediately.

K: Jim, you and I ought to get together on the next stages of SALT sometime soon.

S: Yes.

K: Ok

END

UNCLASSIFIED

5091 -*
RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Vorontsov/ Kissinger
July 25, 1974 9:50 a.m.

V: I have a cable from Gromyko and he asks me to briefly talk to you on the phone.

K: I have to go to the Senate.

V: It is about the environmental business--not to use it for military purposes. Gromyko suggests as fa follow-up of the summit. He suggests that we put into the agenda of the coming General Assembly an item called Prohibition on Effective Environmental...for Military and Other Purposes. That it would be inconsistent with international security and peoples welfare and health. Gromyko suggests we do it together as a joint initiative. What do you think about that?

K: Can I think about it an let you know next week.

V: O.K. But the only thing is Gromyko says according to GA rules we have to do it in the first days of August.

K: I have to consider it and I will let you know Monday or Tuesday.

V: That's fair enough. Thank you.

K: Good-bye.

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UNCLASSIFIED

SA 247

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Friday, July 26, 1974

1:25 p.m.
Secretary Kissinger - Prime Minister Karamalis

K: Mr. Prime Minister

Ka: Hello.

K: Mr. Prime Minister.

Ka: Hello, hello.

K: Mr. Karamalis, this is Henry Kissinger. The Secretary of State Kissinger

Ka: Ah, how are you.

K: How are you.

Ka: I'm well, but I have many, many difficulties right now.

K: I know. I called you first to tell you that I remember dinner with you last year with the greatest warmth. At Cy Sulzburger's house.

Ka: Our former friend.

K: And, secondly, I want you to know that we are in strong support of your efforts. We will do what we can to help your government.

Ka: I thank you for this but I think that you have to go further.

K: I beg your pardon.

Ka: You know the Turks are violating the Resolution of
They are _____.

Ka: I am in touch with the Turkish government right now.

Ka: ..... 5 days they violate the Resolution and.....
they say they are very dangerous.....

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K: Well, I will do my best. We are working quietly. With the Turks right now.

Ka: ..... but I think that you must convince.....for the.....

K: We are doing our best.

Ka: Ah, Mr. Kissinger. I think that the wishes of ..... are not enough. You have do something in order to prevent.....

K: I am writing a ... we will do our utmost.

Ka: It is a difficult problem.

K: Yes, we will do our very utmost.

Ka: You will..... Turks will violate....

K: I understand. Mr. Prime Minister, I am sending you a letter in which I am explaining to you what we are doing.

Ka: Thank you. ..... The public opinion here in the Army is..... very anxious and very dangerous.

K: I understand.

Ka: As you know, I am overage? and I want to find a peaceful solution but..... this provocation.....

K: I will do my utmost immediately.

Ka: An yway please try to control..... in order to stop this violation.

K: I am doing that immediately.

Ka: Other wise, if you don't do that I will be obliged to do it myself.

K: No, I am .... could you show some restraint for a day. I am intouch now with the Turkish Prime Minister right now.

Ka: I think that you know what is the.....

K: Yes, I am calling them now.

Ka: They continue to violate and to extend their control in Cyprus. Just put pressure to stop it.

K: We will exercise pressure.

Ka: But, if you don't do that, I will be obliged to do it myself.

K: No, no... We will exercise pressure. We will do what you propose.

Ka: Thank you. .....

K: We will do our very best.

Ka: We will wait to hear from you.....to have news.

K: Good. nice to talk to you, Mr. Prime Minister.

Ka: Yes, well.
K: I will be in touch with you.

Ka: Thank you.

K: Good bye.

SA 246 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON (San Clemente)
John Newhouse/Kissinger
12:55 p.m. - 7/26/74

(Missed first part of conversation)

K: . . . It doesn't do me any good to make one of these hackneyed speeches. What I now have is a sort of a B+ Cabinet level speech. What I have to do particularly at this moment is to give a strong lead of what our foreign policy really is in order to stop this debate. Take the Nitze article today. I don't know what he is talking about.

N: I had the feeling he wanted to really get something off his chest. He wanted to say the Pentagon is responsive to it.

K: That isn't my point. If the President wants them they will do it. But the question is that before the President orders them they create a frame of mind so the President can't. What I wondered is whether you could do it and forget the length, but do a careful analysis of what we are trying to do. First, the strategic situation. Secondly, our timing in SALT and thirdly, the issue which is more imminent, our potention loss of superiority. Fourth, what we did in SALT I and fifth, what we are doing with the 10-year program. I want to navigate between a sure destruction and sure strike capability. It is a disaster for us politically if the Russians have a (better capability than we do). We have to make a moderate effort in the strategic field to protect ourselves against _____ we cannot now imagine. Second, political responsibility as I mentioned before. I cannot define what military superiority will be like in the future. I don't want the U.S. to be so obsessed with the. . . . . .

N: I agree with everything you said.

K: So I would like to explain first our SALT position and secondly have a _____ of what we must concentrate on. Just write a separate paper on SALT. I would be tempted to have a morning session on the general detente and an afternoon session on --------.

N: My first reaction when I got the message from Bill Hyland was to do what you suggested with a preface on detente to give the thing a kind of political _____. Then do the points you just mentioned.

K: The need is for the country.

N: I fully agree with everything you have been saying.

K: If you do well you will not be doing much more work for ACDA.

N: Suits me.

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K: We have to talk about that. Make it as long as you want. If you make it 30 pages -- I will read 10 and put 30 in the record.

N: I will get you something. I will do it this weekend and you will have the text on Monday.

K: If an extra day enables you to do a better job, take an extra day. I would like it Monday night.

N: You will have it by then.

K: Thank you and again I appreciate what you did on that French paper. I would like to talk to you when we get the detente thing over with.

N: Good, I would like nothing better.

K: You haven't worked with me directly or you wouldn't talk like that. Thank you John.

*

SA 248

TELCON
Friday, July 26, 1974
4:18 p.m.
Secretary Kissinger - Amb. Buffum

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

B: Good evening, Mr. Secretary.

K: I didn't call you but I'm glad to hear from you.

B: Oh? The mission called me here in the hotel and said you were trying to reach me.

K: Is Eagleburger trying to reach you? .... I'm not trying to reach you. I think you're doing a good job. Hold on a minute.

B: Thanks very much. They have just broken up for the night. The Turks are being a little more accommodating than we might have thought in the formulation of conditions that they would accept. Although it all rests on a standstill ~~k~~ on their ~~basxx~~ present basis. Of course, the Greeks are having great trouble with this. And I would say that the odds are still four to one that the Greeks will accept this.

K: Against or for?

B: Against, I would think. Although I have the definite impression that Athens is ~~xx~~ proceeding out of great weakness ~~and~~ in continuing this far with the dialogue. ~~kx~~

K: Yeah. Now, Eagleburger did not want to talk to you. Delighted to hear from you Bill, and you are doing a great job. I like your reporting.

B: Thank you Mr. Secretary. I'm sorry to have troubled you unnecessarily and...

K: You didn't trouble me at all. I like your reporting very much.

B: Thanks very much.

K: Bye.

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DATE/CASE ID: 4 MAR 2003 200102979

SA 259 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Friday, July 26, 1974
Secretary Kissinger - David Frost
5:20 p.m.

K: Hello.

F: Henry.

K: David, I got caught on a number of other calls.

F: Oh, not at all. Forgive me for calling back but I was about to go to sleep here in London and I thought I would see if it was convenient.

K: It is absolutely convenient.

F: Oh, lovely. The other call got so inaudible--since I greatly cherish our conversations it is doubly maddening when the telephone company makes them inaudible.

K: Well, what should we do? Why don't you call me about a week before you get there and we'll definitely fix a lunch in Wash.
F: Oh, lovely. About Sept. 6 or 7, something like that.

K: Around there.

F: I had one other question to ask you, Henry. About ayear ago you were kind enough to say that you hoped that the next sort of general TV conversation whenever you did it, we might do it together. And I'm starting a serious series of conversation for the BBC in September which will then be seen around the world or not--as the subject wishes---and was wondering, would the timing possibly work--there is no one in the world I would like to do the first week than yourself. How would that timing work out for you--bad or good?

K: Well, David, let me see how our domestic situation develops before I do that.

F: Absolutely.

K: Can you call me or get in touch with me in the middle of August?

F: Absolutely. And in the meantime, Solomon's wisdom continue to be with you

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K: ~~Thankyou~~ Thank you, David, you've been a good friend.

F: It's a friendship that I greatly cherish and I continue to admire your every move.

K: Thank you.

F: I look forward to seeing you soon, Henry.

K: Thankyou, and I look forward to it soon too .

F: Lovely, bye.

K: Bye, David.

SA 252 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secy. Ingersoll- Secy. Kissinger
Friday, July 26, 1974
5:05 p.m.

K: Hello.

I: Hello, Henry.

K: Bob, did you reach Schlesinger?

I: Yes, I called him all day yesterday and then this morning. I finally got him this afternoon. And passed the message on to him. I don't know why---well, he was taking a physical exam at one time, making a swearing-in at another time, and he just wasn't available. But I did pass it on and he said OK, he had gotten the run down from Sam Nunn.

K: OK

I: I understood that-Joe called me a few minutes ago and said he had made some statement.

K: That was yesterday endorsing Karamanlis. Now, god damn it, did we approve it?

I: No, I never heard of it until now.

K: OK, thank you.

I: Henry...

K: Did you talk to the Chinese?

I: They are not available until 10:15 but I will see them then--this evening.

K: Well do it tomorrow. It is not that urgent.

I: Larry said we should. He said they were coming in this evening.

K: Well, Jesus Christ, that makes it sound like an emergency.

I: That's what I thought but Larry said you wanted them in this evening.

K: Well call him up and tell him you are delighted to see him at 10:15 p.m. but it is equally good for you tomorrow morning and it is not that urgent.

I: OK. I think that is better.

K: Now, wait a minute. I want you to make clear before we have

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K: total recall--and give him all the trivia--the only thing he is interested in is what anti-Soviet purpose does it serve.

I: Yes, that is whatLarry said.

K: OK. And just call their attention to the fact that our major concern is to have it solved without the Soviets getting involved and ~~Kissinger~~ our major concern about Makarios is that he wouldhave to lean on the Soviets. And they should understand our manuevers in these terms.

I: Right.

K: OK, but don't have 10 State Dept. guys in the room when you do it

I: I'll only have one--Art Hummel.

K: And Stabler. He knows what he is talking about which is a relief.

I: OK. I'll have Stabler. We'll do it in the morning.

K: OK. Bye.

I: Bye.

SA 253

RELEASED IN FULL

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TELCON
Secretary Schlesinger - Secy. Kissinger
Friday, July 26, 1974
5:15 p.m.

K: Hello,

S: Hello, Henry.

K: Hi, Jim. Wickham called Scowcroft today and then Haig came in saying you ~~had~~ had called him yesterday....

S: I don't recall calling him yesterday. Did I? I called him in the last couple of days.

K: Well, he seems to be under--he is under the impression that I have a task force at ~~it~~ work trying to prove that your estimate of the threat is inflated and so on and so forth.

S: I had heard that and we had chatted but I think that was.....I must have called Haig before the evening that I went over to the State Dept. and you mentioned to me at State that you were going to send over to me a copy of your speech to Foreign Relations.

K: That's right but I don't have a task force at work, examining the military situation at all. If I did, you would know about it. What I am going to do before the SFRCmttee. will be supportive of you.
S: Right.

K: I really think that whatever our personal feelings may be that within this present crisis that you and I cannot leave the impression to foreign countries that we are at each other's throats.

S: Couldn't agree more, couldn't agree more.

K: And that is my attitude.

S: That's fine. I had told Wickham to chat with Scowcroft--that if this were the case that it was unproductive for such a thing to take place.

K: It can't take place. Why would I do it? First of all, I honestly do not believe that there are great philosophical differences between us.

S: Well, I certainly haven't detected them.

K: Secondly, if there were , they should be taken care of in

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the normal governmental processes and not by my doing a task force, seeing whether your estimates are inflated.

S: Yeah. Well we had gotten that report some place or other.

K: That's fine. I'm doing a paper which is basically an expansion of what I said to Brooke---which, if eager beavers in Defense don't pick it up--could start a fight over---to be supportive of you.
What we cannot have is the Zumwalt line. That is what I'm attacking.

S: Right.

K: I'm attacking the Zumwalt and Nietzsche line because that is contrary to the President's policy.

S: Right.

K: But that is not your line. And I'm not attacking the Defense program--on the contrary.

S: That is clear. The point is, Henry,that this is a mute issue.

K: In fact, I hope you are going ahead on the Minute Man 3 -- going ahead on the production.

S: We are prepared to do that. We have just gone over the options and the feeling was that we had better start--putting more money on the throw-away missile.

K: That, too, I would strongly support. Can't you do both?

S: We can do both--but it costs money and we're under pressure to reduce spending. But we can do both.

K: So far as I would strongly support with the OMB and the President.

S: OK, well, part of the problem is that we have received a budget line that is ludicrously low from the OMB. But we can talk about that when you get back.

K: OK, I've asked Scowcroft to set up a breakfast as you suggested.

S: Don't let that other matter bother you. I dismissed it two days ago when we chatted.

K: Haig seemed to think that it happened yesterday.

S: He's wrong on that.

S: I'm pretty sure I called him before going over--

K: Well, he has been under so much pressure that the days may...

S: In fact, I think I called him on Tuesday.

K: The days may easily run together in his mind.

S: But once again, what I said to Al was that if this is so, this is no good.

K: No, Al didn't mention it to me critically. He mentioned it to me as an example of a tendency to pick fights. He knew I wasn't doing it. But that is not the point now. You ought to know that whatever may be in the press that I have never done anything but support you with the President.

S: Very good.

K: And I just think---it is like fighting for the captaincy for the Titanic.

S: (laughter) I wouldn't let those things worry you in any event.

K: I don't let them worry me. I can easily handle them. But, it is not doing the country any good. OK, Jim, I just wanted you to know from me that there was no task force going on and that my statement while it will be ~~pblx~~ phrased in a way that acceptable to the Senate For. Rel. Committee, whose support I need, will support you. But, you'll see it before I make it.

S: OK, fine, Henry.

K: OK, bye

S: Bye.

SA 251

RELEASED IN FULL

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TELCON (San Clemente)
Sen. Stennis/Kissinger
4:45 p.m. - 7/26/74

K: Hello.

S: Hello.

K: Mr. Chairman.

S: Yes sir, how are you, Mr. Chairman?

K: OK. Mr. Chairman, I've given a lot of thought to that meeting with the Committee yesterday which I thought was really a very useful one.

S: Yes, I think so too.

K: And I wondered if I could ask somebody who's talked to you as a friend on other occasions make one observation if I may.

S: Yes.

K: I believe that the origin of most of these disagreements that you gentlemen refer to is not in the State Department and I want to reaffirm to you again that I don't think the country needs a dispute between me and Schlesinger right now.

S: Yes, I think you're a thousand percent right.

K: And secondly I don't believe there are any significant differences between me and Schlesinger.

S: All right. Good.

K: You know minor ones on this or that number in a proposal but they do not go to the heart of the issues. And I thought I was saying that to the Committee yesterday. But I wondered if you could on a personal basis talk to Schlesinger and urge him in the same direction.

S: Yes, well I'll be glad too.

K: And you can assure him from me from what I said before the Committee that I will meet him three quarters of the way. But quite honestly I think they made most of the mischief that led to this Jackson hearing.

S: You think what, Mr. Secretary?

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K: I think they made much of the mischief that led to the Jackson hearing. They knew it was total nonsense and they could have just put out a statement killing it right then and there and they never did.

S: Yeh. Yeh.

K: I don't want to get you involved in the middle here because the issue isn't what the past was. The issue is that with our President being under the attack he is, we cannot have foreign governments see the two senior officials who have to handle crises in disagreement.

S: Well, I think your a thousand percent right and you're going more than half way in trying to remedy that situation.

K: And I want to tell you as a man you've seen me in action for five years, I give you my word, that I will not let it happen if it can possibly be avoided, and I think that if the Defense people show any cooperation it will be avoided. I was wondering whether you as a patriot and as somebody who is the Chairman of that Committee might not give Schlesinger a call and give him your impression of my testimony. You can hook it to that. So then you're not mixing into anything.

S: I'll certainly do it and I'm glad to. And I'm interested in it and concerned about it for the country's sake and I just -- I'll talk to him along that line and tell him that you and I were very frank at the table there and you were with all of us and so forth.

K: But that I supported him. So that he doesn't think that I went to his Committee behind his back.

S: Oh no, he couldn't think that. Remember I brought this up.

K: That's right and as you recall I strongly supported him.

S: Yes sir.

K: And also I want to tell you Mr. Chairman, if you ever find anything being done either by me or the State Department that you think makes an unnecessary point in this call me up and let me know and it will be remedied immediately.

S: I certainly shall and you're doing amighty big job in a fine way. I don't want this to bother you too much.

K: It isn't bothering me too much, but our country has to go on, Mr. Chairman, and these things will be forgotten long after the issue -- in a short time, but the country must now be preserved. You know I'm very worried about what's going on.

S: You know it's no time for you to be saying that and being concerned too. I'm concerned about the country. I meant that I didn't want you to be too much concerned about this. I meant to your detriment. You just keep going. You're doing a fine job.

K: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

S: I'll give you the impression of what he said. I think I'll just go over there and see him rather than just call him.

K: That would be even better, Mr. Chairman.

S: All right.

K: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

S: All right. You have a nice weekend.

K: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, my best to Mrs. Stennis.

S: Well she's all right and I'll give her your regards.

K: Bye.

S: Bye.

SA 255

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Ambassador Dinitz
Secretary Kissinger
6:10 p.m. 7/26/74

K: Simcha!

D: Mr. Secretary.

K: .....lost its mind? (Has Israel totally~)

D: What did we do now?

K: What you did now was to have on the Jerusalem radio that you gave a message to Jackson for the Chinese--

D: Jackson for the Chinese?

K: Yes. Of how they should use their influence in the Middle East

D: That is ridiculous.

K: I mean I don't much give a good-goddamn--it doesn't effect us--

D: When was this -- now?

K I just got the translation of it. You know really, if your government doesn't get itself under control you are going to go be in-- this I tell you as a friend--as far as I'm concerned you can make announcements about the Chinese three times a week.

D: But that's ridiculous-- .....to us but there was no message--

K: I'm just telling you what your radio said. And you know, the body search is being leaked to the newspapers also wasn't so good. The fact that the Egyptian body searches that you got a fairly friendly response--

D: Was this also the press?

K: Yeh. It doesn't come from you--it is not the embassy. Did you want to see me before---

D: I thought it would be good to have a short session sometime when you come back.

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K: Yeh how about Monday evening?

D: Excellent.

K: Good, around 6:45

D: 6:45--I'm sorry about the other night--I'm sorry about the othernight--

K: Well, it is a pity, it would have been nice to see you

D: Well, I miss you.

K: Now do you think Allon is coming with a --fairly concrete ideas.

D: They haven't informed me of anything--
He is coming of -- on Sunday and will talk to me on Monday.

K: Yeh.

D: So that I think is worthwhile--and I had a long talk with Schlesinger

K: With Schlesinger?

D: Yeh.

K: What did he have to say

D: Well, he is the greatest friend that Israel ever had.

K See.

D: Im' kidding--but I wanted to see him --

K: Did he make you some promises?

D: Yes, he said that he would look ....items

K: And who objected, I?

D: objected, no, was subjective--

K: What? Did he ~~xxxxx~~ say I objected?

D: No, no. No. There was no reference. He assumed that/... I think that you are our friends. I think that was a good one

K: Yeh, that was a rather good idea.

K: Well, Simcha then I'll see you on Monday--

D: Yeh, yeh. Were you serious when you said approximately 6:45 at

K: No, let's say/6:45
Good, see you then.

D: Yeh, bye. Bye.

SA 25D *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON (San Clemente)
Lloyd Shearer/Kissinger /Strobe Talbott
4:38 p.m. - 7/26/74

K: Lloyd.

T: No, this is Strobe. Strobe Talbott.

K: Oh, I'm sorry.

T: Mr. Secretary, Lloyd Shearer's right here. You've got the right line. Just a moment.

S: Hello.

K: Lloyd

S: Mr. Secretary, you're incommunicado.

K: Not at all, I've been trying to call you.

S: We've been trying to return the call for the last 65 minutes.

K: But that's because I'm mounting a campaign to waive the constitutional amendment. The one that bars me from the Presidency, but I've got a better solution. Somebody wrote me from Germany saying my wife should run and become President and then I could exercise the duties of the office but that I tell you is due to the fact that that letter writer didn't know my wife.

S: (Laughs) How are you?

K: I don't think she'd let me live there if she made it.

S: Really, I think she would.

K: But probably in a clearly subordinate position.

S: Listen, you probably have the most tolerant wife in America.

K: That's probably true.

S: I would like if I could somewhere along the line to talk to you about detente.

K: Yes, do you want to come to Washington? Look, may I make this suggestion to you, Lloyd.

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S: Yes.

K: I'm doing a very long piece for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on that subject which will be finished in about a week. Why don't I send that to you and then you can ask me questions based on it.

S: All right.

K: It would go well if you have a picture of Judy Brown with it.

S: Well, I have that and she's with Sakharov, etc. Sakharov says that you are the salvation of the dissidents.

K: I, Henry Kissinger, how am I salvating them?

S: You're the only salvation they have because if you forsake them -- for example, if those other people can accomplish whatever you want without the indiga of the dissidents being thrown into the equation, they'd go down the drain. But if you include their interger in that equation they'd survive so you are really the key man in their survival. How does that sound to you? Do you think there's any truth to that?

K: There's some element of truth in that.

S: Whether there is or not they feel that very strongly.

K: I appreciate it and I simpathize with them.

S: You are the last giant oak in the forest insofar as they're concerned. Whether you accpet that or not is something else again.

K: I'm pleased to let them think that.

S: The point, I think Mr. Secretary, is how you play it. If you play it up front with disarmament so that it takes on equal importance which I think is maybe the Jackson position, politically [redacted] anyway, that undercuts him if you do that. Or you play it on a back burner which then gives him a little move. Right?

K: Yeh. Well, what matters is what works. I'm not doing it politically.

S: No, I know and I'm not attributing such motives to him.

K: No, but that's a serious question.

S: Yes, that's right, but I mean

K: Why don't you let me send you -- it should be finished by the 6th or 7th of August -- and then you can come to Washington and we'll talk about it.

S: All right. You going to hang down there tonight?

K: Yuh.

S: You don't want to go to a big party tomorrow.

K: No, I can't stay.

S: You're going to stay down there.

K: Yes.

S: Listen, you or your secretary put in a call to Strobe.

K: Oh, to tell him he can ride back with you.

S: What time are you going to leave?

K: 11:30.

S: Where shall he be?

K: At El Toro at 11:15.

S: All right. I will give him that.

SA 249 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON (San Clemente)
Joe Sisco/Kissinger
4:30 p.m. - 7/26/74

K: . . . . . statement on Karamanlis yesterday?

S: I don't know what statement you're referring to as to the Defense Department. You mean they put out a statement or sent a statement? I know of no statement.

K: Schlesinger made a statement yesterday which went beyond what we said.

S: I see. No, I did not. I'll be very glad to . .

K: The Defense Department doesn't recognize governments yet.

S: Beg your pardon.

K: We're not in the business yet where the Defense Department recognizes r government.

S: You've got a point, haven't you? What would you like me to do? Shall I check Bob Ingersoll?

K: No, I just want to make sure that our guys are under control. I'm all for Karamanlis. But I'm against this indecent rushing around of the very people who last week were accusing us of being to pro-Greek -- I mean too pro-Turkish, who are now -- for whom we can't be too anti-Turkish enough now.

S: Sure, it represents -- I'll put it very mildly, 180 reversal on their part.

K: It's not going to be tolerated. We're going to steer a steady course.

S: Well, we are I think, don't you?

K: Unless we have some guys who are out making end runs around me through other departments.

S: Well, I certainly didn't clear that. I doubt that Bob has, but I'll be very glad to check for you.

K: Would you check?

S: Sure.

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K: I think we came out fine all right on the Security Council.

S: Oh yes, I think your intervention helped on that and Callaghan came to his senses on the thing.

K: Well, I've written a letter to Ecevit and Karamanlis of which you can get a copy.

S: Yes, all right.

K: But I want it very closely held. I don't want it to go to anyone except you or Hartman and Ingersoll.

S: All right. May I show it to McCloskey?

K: And McCloskey.

S: Will it be coming through our channel or White House channel.

K: It will come through a Cherokee channel but I want it read in Springsteen's office. I don't want the Task Force to read it.

S: All right. Shall I call Springsteen or will Larry do that?

K: I think Larry will do it, but you can check with Springsteen.

S: That'll be fine.

K: But I don't want this to get into the Task Force.

S: All right. We'll see to it it doesn't.

K: OK.

S: Thank you very much.

K: Fine, Joe.

SA 256
RELEASED IN FULL

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TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Secretary Ingersoll
7/27/74 10:35 a.m.

K: Bob, I just wanted to check--it went all right with the Chinese--you explained tothem in Soviet terms.

I: Very well. Right. We have a memo, we didn't sent it on to you because we thought--

K: No, have it at the other end. On the meeting--but we should stop asking them about Korea--now I've asked them twice and I noticed Hummel asked them the other day.

I: No, he didn't ask them--he only told them they were going to talk to other friends--he didn't ask them and then they came back and said we are definitely going to give you a reply.

K: Oh, well, they ~~that~~ that have told me too. Okay. Is everybody fairly quiet?

I: Yes, we haven't talked to Buffum today--we haven't heard from him. We think he ought to stay there as long as there--they are talking

K: Absolutely, I want Buffum--but he has been doing good reporting, so I'm assuming not much has happened.

I: Henry, have you had any chance to shake loose the announcement on Phil Habib

K: No, but why don't we just make it on Monday--

I: Doesn't it have to be a WH announcement

K: Oh, well we will get it made on Monday--

I: I heard it has to be handled by the White House--

K: Yeh, yeh, we'll get it made on Monday, I didn't realize there was any question about it.

I: I don't think there is--

K: No, I didn't know it was being held up here.

I: I see.

K: We'll definitely get it done--and I've--I want to talk to you about uranium enrichment.

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I: Yes, Larry mentioned it to me and we are workin g up a paper for you.

K: I'd like to give some preference to the Japanese but we have to do more for the Europeans, than your scheme permits.
I know yours is the fairest--

I: The only one we can support legalling--there is a concern in the ~~XXX~~ AEC--

K: Well, I want to look at that whole enrichment policy--this is one of our biggest levers on other countries and for us to turn this over to private industry on the basis of some doctrinaire Flanigan views is ridiculous.

I: I think the President announced it some time ago, Henry.

K: Then I'll get the President in again. That is a Flanigan idea, I don't think the President has saw through the implications of what we're doing here. But could you have a paper on that by the end of the week?

I: I'll have a paper for you when I get back.

K: Good, thank you. On both issues.

I: May take a little longer on the other one--

K: Well, but do it in a week.
Thank you.

I: Bye.

SA 237

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Haig/Secretary Kissinger
July 28, 1974
2:40 pm

K: I had a very good session this morning and if you follow the same route we're home free. Almost everyone agreed to clear us. Starting out on Kraft____they asked about that. I said that is all nonsense. Haig never did anything that he was not ordered to do and Haig never did anything I was not aware of. So the, that reduced it to Saffire.

H: They said what about Saffire?

K: I sa d I didn't know about it and I assumed Haig didn't know about the tap. They said how does Haig's name appear on that request. I said, I don't know. I don't know how they kept____on this. That is the only area you have a problem. All the rest of the stuff____ On the Young thing, I said I have no reason to believe Haig knew Young was requesting an investigation.

H: An investigation of wha t?

K: I knew Young was doing that one interview. I'm just talking about the Kraft article.

H: I don't know wha t Kraft is saying.

K: At any rate, the major problem is at the hearing this morning, it was so embarrassingly white-washy. I don't see how they can publish the transcript. A number of them made speeches saying it was a lousy method. It was amazing. It was embarrassing.

H: That's good. That Kraft piece came out of Saffire. I'm so damn mad.

K: In my view, you should stay quiet. If you stick with me on this you can't hav e any problems because we accounted for all of them. I have not created an independent role for you. It's filthy. He's going to write his own before the week is up. I would not get into an independent defense or they'll come after you. You see what I mean?

H: Yes.

K: You should only function as an appendage to me.

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H: That's right. Ok. You think everythin.....

K: The record this morning is embarrassing. It's a total clearing. They cleared the whole process. They started out trying to go the Kraft line and then gave it up.

H: Who's the tough guy on that?

K: Who was he.. Well, Symington isn't after you. He's after Haldeman and Ehrlichman. He says these guys always found some legal body to cover up what they did semi-illegally, like the CIA or NSC. That you know is true. Church was sort of semi-niggling. They subsided almost immediately. They said is it possible Haig did things on his own, I said no. They said is it possible he did it on the President's orders. I said I can't think of a single case....How do you accou for the Saffire tap. I said that the Brandon tap, I know Haig didn't have anything to do with it. I said take the first four, they never pursued it after the first three minutes. Javits was the guy who raised you. But, after the first three minutes your name was never raised again.

H: Ok, when are you coming out?

K: On Thursday night.

H: When do you plan to leave?

K: Saturday afternoon, why?

H: What time do you arrive Thursday?

K: About 9 or 9:30.

H: I just wanted to be sure we have that for the press.

K: I'm bringing Genscher with me. You'll see when you read this thing, if you stick to what I said, it leaves you out totally. In what I said, you're just a transmittal agent. I just wanted you to know.

H: That is virtually true. I don't know how to handle these cut-offs. I don't know who did it.

K: That is what you should say. I don't either. On the cut-offs, say I just don't know how they were cut off and that's exactly what you should say. Just say you don't know. I don't know either. I think the major problem is this is going to be an embarrassment. It was so easy.

H: I don't worry about that.

K: Unless things change course during the week.

H: That' can't happen.

K: I doubt it. They're looking for not the culprit, that's one thing -- their line is that nothing wrong was done.

H: Did they get into those other two guys. I don't know anything about this.

K: They didn't even mention you. They said, in orther words, you gave names that were tapped___it was all me_____they may come to you. Just read what I said. First, it's the truth and you see___nothing was done. It isn't that they are looking for a villian and thereby clearming me of something. They're claiming nothing wrong was done.

H: You think I should make an opening statement?

K: No. Just go up there without a paper before you and answer questions.

H: That's what I planned to do.

K: I wouldn't try to be clever. It's better to say you have no recollection. They are convinced these records are a mess. Dean Rusk is testifying this afternoon. --saying it is ridiculous to think that ~~xxxxxxxx~~ -- and that you would only act on a directive from the President.

H: Alright, good. Everything going alright in Cyprus?

K: Yes. There is a coup in Greece and _____has been brought back. You see, all the ____guys w ll come out perfectly. We've got to get Tasca out of there. That I have to talk to you about later. That guy is no good. I don't care what line he used with the President.

H: We'll talk about that when you come out.

K: Ok, there's no hurry.

END

SA 259

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

TELECON
Prime Minister Ecevit/Secretary Kissinger
July 29, 1974
6:05 PM

K: Hello.

E: Hello. Can we talk freely.

K: Yes.

E: I am reading you now. The text that Mr. Callaghan proposed to us this morning we accepted. The three Foreign Ministers agree that consideration should be given to the possibility of the eventual disarmament of the Republic of Cyprus and the desirablity of elaborating measures and meet the reductions by ~~xxxx~~ numbers of armed forces and of war material

This was propsoed by Mr. Callaghan and we accepted it. But after the Greeks (inaudible).

B1

K: I understand your position Mr. Prime Minister. The difficulty is that I think it is in your interest to settle this. You gain sometime before the political negotiations start. So without going into the merits of the various proposals it is clear one should not exploit your good intentions but you should not maneuver yourselves into a position where your opponents can exert pressure. That is my concern. Now if I understand it there are now two texts before us. One is a text that Mr. Callaghan proposed. There is another one he put before you which you rejected.

E: It was put before us previously but I brought it before the government and we accepted. It is formulated by Mr. Callaghan.

K: I understand. But now another proposal has been made.

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CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 25X6
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 29 JUL 2014
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E: The reason is that we accepted this proposal by Mr. Callaghan but the Greeks have not accepted it. He gives us an ultimatum to accept a proposal acceptable to Greece. I do not understand it.

K: Let me ask you this. Suppose I sent Buffum to your Foreign Minister.

E: I was having a talk with a friend of mine in Greece. I understand at this moment our Foreign Minister is talking to Mr. Buffum, actually.

K: I have instructed Mr. Buffum not to make any concrete proposals until we have talked.

E: What are you going to instruct him on?

K: We are trying to find some compromise between your text and the Callaghan text. We are not eager to come forward with an American proposal. The text he is now giving you is acceptable to Greece.

E: I am trying to be both peaceful and realistic. We don't have to reconcile with Greece but we want to make things easier for them. We do not feel ourselves obliged to come to terms with them on every point.

K: I am looking for a solution which is in between these two proposals.

E: We say clearly to the world that we are on the island. We have to remain there for sometime in view of our differing experiences in the past. For several days we have thousands of Turks who are in prison under the Greek regime and the UN will not help them. They are left there helpless. We cannot deceive the world by giving the hope we are speculating.

K: I understand this but what we have tried to do...

E: Not unless, not until a state for the Turks is established on the island.

K: Why don't you let me send a suggestion to Buffum and you consider it..

E: Another text.

K: Another text. It is not the Callaghan text.

E: May I have it first if at all possible.

K; Would you like it before I send it to Buffum?

E: I would prefer it.

K: All right. Let me do this. I do not have it in front of me. Can I have someone call your office in 5 minutes and dictate it? ~~xxxiii~~

E: I do not have a secretary with me. I will take it down myself.

K: I will have someone call you within 15 minutes.

E: Thank you Mr. Kissinger.

K: Right.

SA 2160

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TELECON
Ambassador McCloskey/Secretary Kissinger
July 29, 1974
7:32 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I never got your assessment of ~~a~~ your friends impact on the press, not that I give a damn.

M: A couple of people called me since I got back here. Marder was one____. He told both the Washington Post and other people that we're not ~~xxxxxx~~ bringing enough pressure on the Turks. The point he came in to make with you.

K: What point are you making to the press?

M: That he went away satisfied and that we are playing a constructive role and that if we are going to be effective we are going to limit what we say publicly and he ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ understood that.

K: Fine. It was not one of his more brilliant performances.

M: I've never seen him so bad.

K: That's OK. If one of us had to get rattled, I'm glad it was him.

M: I've given R__ a little fill-in.

K: Let's not be too ___. I would not go out of my way and say we're bringing pressure on the Turks.

M: No.

K: OK Bob, thank you.

END

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SA262 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
July 29, 1974
7:38 PM

K: Do you want to check with the President, through Haig probably, to see if he wants to see Allon who's here. It may not be a bad thing to do this week.

S: OK. I'll check.

K: Thank you.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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SA 261 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Joe Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
July 29, 1974
7:10 PM

(Missed first part)
S: I told him we are putting through a call to Callaghan to check on that text.

K: Which is the first version.

S: I said we would be back at him soon.

K: If that's wrong then we give him another version.

S: Let's assume, we then try/out it on Callaghan.

K: Then go back to Ecevit.

S: And what would you tell him?

K: I would then tell Ecevit this is what we are trying out on Callaghan. If he accepts it then you call him back and tell him we've turned it over to Callaghan.

S: I will give you an answer from Callaghan first.

K: OK. Thanks Joe.

END

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SA 257 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Senator Pastore/Secretary Kissinger
July 29, 1974
4:15 PM

K: Mr. Chairman, I'm meeting with your Committee tomorrow morning.

P: That's right.

K: I wanted to get your guidance so it would be of most use to your committee. I thought I would not make a substantive statement. I would be glad to, if you want me to. I'll say a few words about the budget and then your committee could ask questions.

P: I know you've been busy. You can justify the overall ___ and the work the State Department has to do and that the items have been approved.

K: Then on substance, you don't want a review of the world situation in a statement.

P. No, no, something along the line of a brief statement, then questions and answers off the ___.

K: It would take me about a half hour and then give the committee a chance to ask questions. I will make a brief statement without going into any details of the overall budget.

P: Good. That will be the only part of the meeting that will be released to the press.

K: OK. I'm looking forward to meeting with you.

END

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SA 258 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Wells Stabler/ The Secretary
July 29, 1974
5:47 P.M.

K: Did the Turks accept the idea of a buffer zone?

S: They have been trying very hard to avoid it. In the text of the agreement they had previously, without paragraph 4 they would accept this idea.

K: Paragraph 4 does not say anything. If we can get paragraph 4 accepted tonight.

S: There is nothing else. (He reads paragraph 4).

K: O.k. Good. Thank you.

S: One other thing. Ecevit, according to everyone I have found here and a quick check with Greeks and Turks, accepted nothing this morning.

K: Will you follow my tactic please. Now will you kindly go through the channels I have asked you to. Well, then, maybe there is a general misunderstanding.

S: _____ you asked me to put down for you what...

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SA 267

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Senator Jackson/Secretary Kissinger
July 30, 1974
6:00 PM

K: How are you?

J: OK. I've been over on the floor.

K: Scoop, I wanted to talk to you about these letters we have been trying to draft here. When I tried to draft xxxxx what a unilateral letter from me would look like. I wanted to phrase it in a way that you be accept and would not be offensive to the Russians. ___a letter from me to you and your report which I would then acknowledge and I thought this might even be better for you. You would be the one to put forward specifications.

J: As I understand -- we have been trying to modify the second draft.

K: Well, I will try both. Could I say one other thing? When Dorothy or Dick B___called Sonnenfeldt, they said this is another example of Kissinger's bad faith. I don't think we need this kind of relationship. I didn't try to put anything over on you. I don't think you need my political advice. There's a lot to be said for me doing a letter and you doing a supportive one, but I'll try either version.

J: Let's do both. In other words, go back to what we started out discussion on that day and that was a revision. Hal was going to work on a revision of the second. My counter-draft.

K: I know your counter-draft. I have to put it into a language that is more supportive to the foreign policy point. I'll give you what I think -- I can send you my letter which would then be all embracing.

J: Give both. I'll see you at the dinner.k

K: Alright.

END

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SA 266 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
The President/Secretary Kissinger
July 30, 1974
3:10 pm

K: Mr. President,

N: Hi Henry.

K: I wanted to tell you the Greeks and Turks have just signed an agreement to set up security zones and for your information we broke the back of it.. They were deadlocked last night and ready to pack up and go home at 9:30 and we came up with a compromise we were able to sell to the Turks and the British.

N: Good job.

K: It was your fortitude that did it.

N: Are you going to be here with Simon. I have him at 3:15.

K: I have Allon, the Israeli Foreign Minister here.

N: No stay there. I'll have..

K: Scowcroft?

N: Yes. I'll have him.

K: I thought it was going to be this morning.

N: It was,I slipped it. I slept in this morning. We were up late last night. That California time change.

K: It is the second night that hits you.

N: Yes, well I feel great now...

K: You can count on me.

B: The whole point is it has to go to the Senate and we just have to beat it.

K: It is an awful experience.

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N: We are not going to wring our hands about it.

K: Well, it is a terrible thing to watch and heart-breaking.

N: Well, don't break your heart over it.

K: You don't have to worry about anything from me except for support.

N: I know that Henry -- and congratulations.

END

SA 268 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Senator Fulbright/Secretary Kissinger
July 30, 1974
6:25 PM

K: How are you, Mr. Chairman?

F: Fine. I meant to call you but I have been in a hearing until a few minutes ago with General Haig.

K: I didn't know. Oh, you switched it from this morning.

F: We had to. Senator Morse's funeral was this morning.

K: Galbraith told me you gave one of the most moving speeches he ever heard.

F: Who?

K: Ken Galbraith.

F: Maybe the shortness appealed to Ken.

K: He said it was extremely moving and affectionate.

F: I didn't get a chance to talk to him. I had to go to a board meeting.

K: What I called you about this morning, Mr. Chairman, is, I am working with my colleagues on the statement for the detente hearings. I don't know how you visualize the proceedings. Would it be an all day or morning session. What is your view.

F: I thought of it in the morning because I didn't want to impose on your day too much. I wanted to take full advantage of it if I can. Unless you have other views

K: We're discussing two ways of going at it. We have draft about a 35 page statement which deals with the whole political context, including SALT. Including the whole strategic issue. I have been working with John Newhouse to do a much longer piece on the strategic issue. You can't really cover it in one statement. I could submit these documents and do it in one whole hearing.

F: We could have a hearing in the morning and then arrange to have one the following morning. I would prefer, if you have the time, to arrange for a second session the next morning. This is an educational adventure.

K: We could conceivably do it in two successive days. Could I look at my schedule and see if I can do that.

F: I feel the afternoon would be wasted.

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K: I see that point. It would be better for my schedule if I didn't take the whole day off.

and everybody
F: This way the press/is alive and so forth.

K: Are you absolutely committed to doing it on the 8th?

F: You have me that date. I don't think it could not be changed. I don't have my schedule in front of me.

K: I think it would serve our purposes best if my statement were as outstanding as I could make it.

F: You were awfully good at the generalization. Submit the long documents. How about perparing your own statement. I'm thinking about the media.

K: I will not speak for more than 20 minutes. I thought it would be better for you if I had a long statement so there would be one document of what our detente xxx view is.

F: Good, that would be for the press and others.

K: No matter what I say in a 25 minute statement they can take anything out of context and start shooting at it. If we have a long statement it protects us against the sharp shooters.

F: It would be impressive and we know you can be. What you said xxx on the critics and so forth. That would be part of the record.

K: Let me have Eagleburger get in touch with Holt tomorrow morning.
to check my schedule.
F: I'm not in my office. I personally am free that week.

K: If we want to slip it a few day that would not be ___.

F: If you wanted to come the 7th and 8th....the following week Jackson is coming. We thought we would lead by the two proponents.

K: I do not want to slip it forward. I want to slip it backward. When are you having Jackson?

F: On the 13th. You gave me the 8th and 9th.

K: You followed my suggestion. It's entirely my doing.

F: I think the 8th and 9th, if you can arrange it and cut it off at 12:00 to 12:30 and continue the next day at 10:00 to about 12:00. He'll come on the 13th. I forgot the rest of them. Jones is handling that.

K: Let me -- I'll be in touch ~~six~~ with you tomorrow morning.

F: I ~~think~~ think we can't overlook the opportunity to use the television. Of course, the impeachment is such a ___.

K: Will the impeachment be going on by then.

F: It is going on. I don't know when it will be finished.

K: I think on the 8th we may be in between the committee and the House.

F: I think that's right. That's good.

K: That's an argument to keep it on the 8th. I'll be in touch tomorrow morning.

F: I think that will be our main impact, your opening statement.

K: I don't think you would be heartbroken if the impeachment was on when Jackson testifies.

F: How do you feel yourself?

K: I feel fine. I don't know how Haig did.

F: He did alright. We will have trouble about getting the report. The committee is very split. At the moment __long or short one. It will be a week to 10 days before we get that in order.

K: That's up to the committee.

F: I'm sorry we have to do it.

K: No, I asked for it. Alright Mr. Chairman.

F: OK.

END

SA 263

RELEASED IN FULL

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TELECON
Mr. Singlinger/Secretary Kissinger
July 30, 1974
2;50 PM

S: Dr. Kissinger.

K: Yes.

S: I've never met you but I admire you.

K: Aren't you nice.

S: I was having a talk with Simon. Are you familiar with what I have been trying to do for the last several months.

K: What are you talking about?

S: I'll tell you what my concern is. I've just written a report and would like to h have a chat with you. I've got a forecast for the stock market, it's down about 18%. We have been forecasting the stock market for ___years.

K: I couldn't see you until next week..

S: I want to have one final session with the press and get down to the functional facts. He has about 3 or 4 days and he could turn the impeachment around. I don't think he has until next week.

K: Have you talked to Haig about this?

S: I have a call into him, but he hasn't called back. I asked __to come up 2 or 3 ~~days~~ weeks ago to listen to the interview and he did. ___and Rush. I hate to talk about personalities but a couple ~~of~~ more days like last night.

K: Who, Rush?

S: Yes. The intelligence of the American people is much higher. When they say everything is OK.

K: Let me try to get in touch with you tomorrow.

S: OK. ___and talk to Simon.

K: I'm seeing Simon tonight.

S: I had a meeting with Simon and Burns. I have a senario that could pull him out of Watergate. There isn't a Congressman or Senator who could against against the President.

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K: Let me see what time I have.

S: It takes me just a couple of hours to get down.

K: OK. It was nice to talk to you.

S: OK.

SA 264 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
July 30, 1974
2:55 PM

S: I have Bill on the other line. I got an agreement and it will be signed in an hour. He says what we sent during the night broke it.

K: Can we put out a statement and express our gratitude?

S: Let me get the details now and see what they are going to __and figure out what we'll do on this end.

K: Let's send a congratulatory message to Callaghan.

S: OK.

K: Thank you.

END

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SA 265
RELEASED IN FULL

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TELECON
Secretary Weinberger/Secretary Kissinger
July 30, 1974
2:45 PM

W: I don't know that it's all that vital. Yesterday there was a move that started to be surfaced around some young White House people that cabinet people should not be out of the country in August and September. This would get into the World Food Conference.

K: I disagree.

W: I thought it would be very....

K: I think we have we have an obligation to to control this as usual and not to give the impression we are not way off course.

W: That was my feeling. I felt very strong. It just looked ___. Maybe you can do something in Bucharest.

K: There's nothing you can do for the President himself. The only possibility is to control it as a functioning administration.

W: I've made some speeches for him. ___You can't do that in August when they're voting.

K: I think you're doing the right thing.

W: I just wanted you to know and ....

K: I would'd let all these affect me.

W: No one will xxx push it.

K: OK. Nice to talk to you.

END

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SA 272 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador McCloskey/Secretary Kissinger
July 31, 1974
~~5~~ 4:58 PM

K: Hello?

M: While you were still volunteering your remarks, you said the following: _____and there have been reports in which you ~~said~~ ___that their maybe a coup in Greece this morning and you gave comments and then they came back to it.

K: That wasn't the smartest thing to have done. Although~~it~~ it ~~did happen~~ happens to be true. We had just came from a WSAG meeting where we had ...

M: You just surprised me.

K: I probably should not have done it. Well, OK.

END

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SA 273

RELEASED IN FULL

*

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
July 31, 1974
5:18 PM

K: Did they make the announcement?

S: I got word about 15 minutes ago that they were going to put it out 10 minutes after Simon_____.

K: At the White House?

S: At the White House and I will call and see if it's been done. They decided they wanted to put it out there. Ziegler wanted it put out there.

K: It doesn't make any difference.

S: No, it's low key. All the ___are going to come out of Geneva for the U.S.

K: It's stupid.

S: I thought you were right in offering it, I really did.

K: OK. Thank you.

END

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SA 274 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
July 31, 1974
5:29 PM

K: Did you send copies to both Javits and.....

S: Yes.

K: With a note?

S: Yes.

K: OK.

END

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SA 275

RELEASED IN FULL

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TELECON
David Wise (NY Times)/Secretary Kissinger
July 31, 1974
8:25 PM

K: Are you going to try your accent out on me?

W: Oh, you remember.

K: You did it 2 years in a row.

W: I must confess I have forgotten. Did McCloskey explain to you what I'm up to?

K: Yes. I don't know what you wanted me to comment on.

W: Just a general assessment of his fine qualities and I may ask you one or two questions on how you came to __him.

K: I think he a dedicated public servant, who, in a difficult period is doing his best to keep the government together. He was an outstanding deputy to me.

W: And everyone says he works hard.

K: With great selflessness and great dedication. I'll tell you but you can't quote me. When he came back to the White House, I told me this was the most thankless job he would ever take. He said when he went out on __at the UN he couldn't refuse to go back. He might get __. To put his own personal__ahead of what he was __.

W: Do you remember where you told him that?

K: Yes. In his office. Just as a friend, I said this to him.

W: I can't quote you on this, but could I say you said it?

K: Well, then don't say a thankless job, just say it is an assignment that could end his military career.

W: Right. It's better, obviously. I get that Kramer and __ had recommended him.

K: He was __as a military man on my staff_____simply on the basis of intelligence qualifications and Kramer told me___. He said the outstanding character he ever met in the military was Haig, who was not on the list. I brought him in for an interview and he immediately pressed me and he never went back to West Point. He started working immediately.

W: *Where did you interview him?*

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K: I interviewed him at the EOB. Johnson and Rostow gave me an office in the EOB and I cam down 2 or 3 times.

W: Do you have any feeling about whether he influences policy. He obviously does more than ~~[illegible]~~ shifts paper.

K: I think he influences policy. He did when he would for me and he does now.

W: Your personal relationship remains what?

K: Warm and close. I consider him a personal friend. We went through a lot together the 4 1/2 years he worked for me. Even when we didn't agree there was always respect, but the times we didn't agree wasn't very often. He always stood up for his convictions which is what I needed.

W: Fine. Thank you for calling.

K: OK.

END

SA 270

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
July 31, 1974

K:..At this meeting this afternoon, I need Newhouse here and Haig wants to come over and talk about the President's problems.

S: Sure.

K: Can we do it Friday afternoon?

S: Yes.

K: Or tomorrow afternoon. We could do it tomorrow at 3:30.

S: Well, you have..

K: Well, I can change that.

S: That would be alright. In fact, I was told by ACDA it had been changed.

K: Yes, I just told Newhouse. Can we do it Thursday or Friday.

S: Yes.

K: Friday may be better. Which ever you can get more people for.

S: Alright

END

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SA 271 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador McCloskey/Secretary Kissinger
July 31, 1974
4:50 PM

M: I'm sorry to trouble you but I wanted to call your attention to an article in the New York Times from Flora Lewis saying that the Turks decided to invade Cyprus after Sisco____ that the USG had no objection to an invasion in Cyprus that (Sisco) told the Turks that military aid was being restored.

K: Is that true?

M: No. I would like to tell the New York Times that the story is false and the USG made a strong opposition to the ~~xxxxxxx~~ invasion and the Turkish government knew that. I also had a call from Binder. This he raised first with someone at (Defense)and gave it to them as I just gave it to you. When I spoke to him I told him one of his editors in New York ~~xxxx~~ didn't like and and may not use it. I said you have no business in ~~xxxxxx~~ using a piece like this.

K: Johnson has a piece in the Star saying we made the coup in Greece. You remember I said in my press conference.

M: ~~Xxxx~~ Yes, I see.

K: Therefore I must have known.

M: I thought you talked everybody out of that. I thought you convinced everybody.

K: The fact was we had reports all that morning of the coup. I didn't volunteer it, somebody asked a question.

M: You mentioned it and they came back to it in questions.

K: Oh really?

M: I'm confident you did.

K: That's surprising. Can you look at it?

M: Let me back off until I'm sure. But, is this line alright to take to the New York Times?

K: That's it's not true?

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M: Yes.

K: Sure.

M: OK. Let me call you back on this.

K: OK.

END

SA 276 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Minister Dimitriou (Cyprus)
8/1/74 9:15 a.m.

D: Hello, Dr. Kissinger!

K: How are you.

D: This is the foreign minister Dimitriou.

D: How are you, sir? I am calling you because a few minutes ago, a man entered my hotel from CBS--and American newsman and AP people have just come up from the north from the battlefields and saw tanks there and bombing continuously 3 villages. And the people have left these villages --there are people there and they're being killed.

K: All right, I will look into it.

D: The correspondents are quite desperate--I have contacted various embassies and everything and we really feel that you probably are the only person who can put a stop to this--especially after the peace signature at Geneva --we wish that this could be stopped!

K: All right, I will do my best. I will look into it.

D: I am sorry to be bothering you

K: I will look into it immediately and we will do what we can.

D: Thank you very much. We really have our hopes in your hands.

K: Thank you for calling me--

D: Bye.

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SA 281

RELEASED IN FULL

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TELECON
Senator Javits/Secretary Kissinger
August 1, 1974
6:30 PM

K: How are you?

J: Fine. How are you?

K: I'm OK.

J: You sound as tired as I am.

K: No, I'm fine.

J: I called you because Eberle was up her for breakfast with some other Senators and said the question of whether the administration should encourage the Committee to go ahead with the Trade Bill was very much up for discussion. Of course, I expressed my feeling that the Trade Bill is so important it should be signed into law. I thought the Trade Bill was important because of the present condition of the world.

K: I doubt that the President would agree to that.

J: You don't think unless this matter is settled?

K: This is my view.

J: The other feeling I expressed whatever tin plate is worked out on the Export Import Bank, might be a way of dealing with the situation and dealing with more than half the power.

K: I agree.

J: In negotiating the banking ___(Stennis) was in the meeting.

K: I understand you're being difficult.

J: Me? Who told you that?

K: I heard from reports.

J: I don't think those reports are accurate.

K: Eberle mentioned it to me this morning.

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J: Why am I difficult?

K: That you and (Stennis) worked up an address but I haven't seen it.

J: Neither have I.

K: I guess you can see the extend of my concern, I didn't even call you about it.

J: I'll have a look at it now, and see what can be done.

K: Is Marian coming down?

J: She is down.

K: What are you doing Saturday night?

J: We can do whatever you want to do.

K: Would you like to go to the theater?

J: To see what, I'm already planning to see (Two for a Seesaw).

K: The __thing, Desire under the Elm.

J: That would be great. Should I get tickets?

K: No. I have the Presidential box.

J: That sounds good.

K: Are you __for that?

J: Sure.

K: OK. Let's aim for that.

J: One other thing. Have someone in your office ___Arthur R__ to go to the UNESCO meeting.

K: He's a Foreign Service officer?

J: No. I NY man with a very good record.

K: I'll look into it immediately.

J: OK. I'll see you Saturday.

K: Let's confirm it up tomorrow.

END

SA 280 *

TELECON
Mr. Ingersoll/Secretary Kissinger
August 1, 1974
5:15 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Bob, were you at the meeting between Simon and the other people?

I: Yes, I just came back.

K: Did he burden them to ___100% (participation)?

I: I told them what you ____that they not rush into anything. They would like to have a meeting with you and Simon next week. We're checking on your schedule to see if it's possible.

K: I just don't trust his assessment of the situation.

I: They didn't agree with them either. Yamani told them something different from out he told them.

K: I don't see that the Saudis should runa risk to get oil prices down.

I: We'll try to get a meeting on Tuesday with all of them. We're checking your schedule.

K: Just because there's a vacancy on my schedule doesn't mean you can just put something in. You better check with me first.

I: OK.

K: How are you doing with MacGregor?

I: He's coming to see me in the morning.

K: Was he leaning towards_____?

I: Yes. He was leaning towards it.

K: OK. Thank you.

END

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SA 279 *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Anderson/Secretary Kissinger
August 1, 1974
5:35 PM

K: When you talk to Marilyn, I don't want a general weasel that the Secretary spends as much time as the White House as possible. Just tell her exactly what I did over ~~o~~ there.

A: But, I didn't.....

K: Just tell her exactly what I did over there. I saw some members of the ~~Foxiex~~ Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board this morning. Then I had members of the verification panel. ~~Wex~~ We must get into the habit of giving straight answers.

A: That's what I'm not sure about. Can I tell them about the verification panel?

K: I am herewith telling you to say that. What have you told her?

A: I told her that you were over at the White House for an NSC-type meeting. I didn't tell her what kind of meeting.

K: That's the kind of statement that gets you in trouble. Tell her in the morning I had one small group from the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and ~~o~~ in the afternoon a verification panel. And that I normally spend two or three houses ~~ix~~ there in the morning.

A: Right, sir.

K: Good.

END

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SA 277 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Senator Pastore
Secretary Kissinger
9:23 a.m. 8/1/74

K: Mr. Chairman, how are you!

P: Fine. Stop calling me Mr. Chairman, will you please start calling me John.

K: Good.

P All right.

K: I'll be much happier--only if you call me by my first name.

P All right, I'll do that Henry. Look I've got a letter from the Providence Chamber of Commerce from its President. I know this is an unusual thing but it is a hell of a ---- affair. Now I don't know what your policy is, but I've got to get in touch with these people--they are asking me that because of my relationship with you if you would be willing to address their annual meeting in October of this year--on the 10th or date in October that you would designate. Now I don't know what your policy is--

K: My policy is--I've got two contradictory policies--one is not to accept such invitations and the other to do almost anything within reason that you ask me to do. Can you send that letter over to me and I'll try my damnest to see whether I can do it.

P All right.

K: Does it have to be a very formal speech?

P Oh no, no no. Not at all. I mean these really--the business and industrial and leaders of the community--it is a very, very fine group, bankers and and the industrialists and ~~xx x xxxtxx xfx~~ the manufacturers, it is a high-class group and I have had occasion to address them from time to time--even when I was governor. And naturally of course if you decided to go, I would be privileged to introduce you and--

K I'd be very pleased--

P So why don't I --

K: And you send it over or have a messenger bring it over and I'll do my damnest to make it possible.

P All right, thank you.

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SA 282

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Atherton/Secretary Kissinger
August 1, 1974
5:02 pm

....missed first part of conversation

K: and dealing as we should. You remember that complaint by Fahmy that we don't keep Sadat informed. I think Fahmy....

A: No sir. We have a message to Fahmy which

K: We've got to do this fast and aggressively.

A: Faisal....we have a message which you approved and we sent it to the White House for clearance.

K: When I approve it, it's approved. Who would clear it in the White House except me?

A: My understanding is, it was over there for you to see.

K: I approved that over a week ago.

A: Ok, let me call Brent and see.

K: In the present position of the White House, we won't get anything approved and ....besides, Fahmy is in Egypt now.

A: I'm sure we can pass it.

K: That will make the Egyptians wonder what we are doing.

A: It shouldn't go before we have got the Faisal one out and..I'll find out why that hasn't gone to you yet.

K: My concern is, if we handle these things badly we are just going to... if we don't get a handle on this bureaucracy we will get behind the power curve.

A: It has been sometime, I agree.

K: Excatly, we just cannot have this. You must push them.

A: Ok, I'll start pushing right now.

END

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SA 289

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/The Secretary
August 2, 1974
10:40 a.m.

S: Are you going to talk to the President today?

K: Has he asked for me?

S: No, but I thought maybe about the Israeli thing.

K: I think we can move on that. You tell Dinitz, no let me call Dinitz. Did you talk to the Vice President? You gave him some feel for our strategy?--

S: I did and I and I pointed out the emotionality of the issue.

K: Did you tell him from our point of view it is a great success?

S: Yes.

K: In terms of tactics this is one of the best things we have done.

S: Right, and I said everyone of them has...and it couldn't have gone any better. We spent most of our time on that.

K: Good, because it is important for him to learn the complexity of it.

S: Yes, and he hadn't seen it in that light before.

K: That is why I didn't like the briefing yesterday.

S: No, I just was trying to give a principle...

K: O.k.

S: I'll see you at lunch.

END.

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SA 288

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Carlyle Maw/Secretary Kissinger
August 2, 1974
5:55 PM

K: Did we ever get the answers to the questions to the Committee?

M: No. They're making up another set

K: They will not vote until they get the answers.

M: The next set they'll make up for Al. I'm holding your answers until we get his testimony which we're getting today because several of the questions are ___.

K: They are also giving written questions to Al?

M: Yes. They will give them to him tonight.

K: When are they going to vote?

M: As soon as they get the answers to his questions and yours. They're working down near the end __. ~~x~~ They will be donw tonight and Al's are in the works. They will at least finish his questions today and he'll have them tomorrow or Monday.

K: There's no problem in his testimony, is there?

M: Not really. Just a little clearing up, just a few things.

K: No, there's no conflict between his and mine?

M: I don't think so. Several people are reading over it now. Some of the questions really just call for answers of what his position was and what he did. That's where we stand.

K: You think the case is pretty well over?

M: I do. It's just a matter of finishing up the details. They haven't made up the draft report yet.

K: Do you think it will be favorable?

M: Oh yes, no doubt.

K: The evidence seems to support my original ~~testixxxxxy~~ testimony.

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M: You haven't seen your testimony, have you?

K: No.

M: That's the only testimony that will be done here, the next we have to do up there.

K: We can't edit it, can we?

M: We'll do some. Just in substance a few little things they will agree to cut back on. I think it's all under control.

K: OK. Thank you Carl.

END

SA287 *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Yuri Vorontsov/The Secretary
August 2, 1974
10:41 a.m.

V: I am sorry to bother you but I got a reminder from Moscow.

K: No, I wanted to talk to you. Our view is this. In this particular proposal you made, it isn't consistent with ours. It goes beyond it. What we would prefer is to begin talks with you first and based on the result of these talks we would then join in at the UN but we question if it is desirable to do it through the UN when we are having bilateral talks.

V: We would have 2 months before the General Assembly.

K: Anatoyl and I agreed to, that is the first definition of the topic is not in the language we had in Moscow. It is your language.

V: Yes, not quite. It is broader. So you would prefer to do it the way it was in the Communique and you don't wish to join us on this move. I understand from a telegram that we got that we are to do it anyway alone on the broader basis.

K: While I have you on the phone, there are a number of things I want to talk with you about. First, we are making progress on the Jackson Amendment and we are doing it through a letter. It is my interpretation of a conversation I had with Gromyko--of course we won't mention Gromyko's name. I may show it to you next week. Maybe you and I could have a review of the situation next week.

V: On what?

K: I may have Sonnenfeldt tell you what we are doing that involves Moscow/US relations. We are working on SALT and other areas.

V: On the Middle East, are you making progress? You are talking now.

K: We have talked to the Israelis. We are making a little progress but not much. We will keep you informed.

V: I know Gromyko is interested.

K: You should let Gromyko know that no matter what happens, our commitment to this course is firm.

V: He can count on that?

K: Yes, thank you for calling.
END.

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SA 284 *

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
August 2, 1974
12:05 P.M.

RELEASED IN FULL

D: It was a lovely evening last night.

K: And substantive too. And it was the frankest talk that has ever been held below Golda's level.

D: Yes, and he is the only one who can have this kind of talk...I would say that...

K: I could see you suffering from time to time.

D: No, no. I didn't. There is one thing I have always tried to keep in our relations, so sometime when my colleagues take extreme positions, I try to...

K: I just wanted a direction from him. I have enough now to be able to talk generally.

D: It wasn't suffering on my part, it was a concern that you realized enough to place it in the right mosaic. The idea of something negative would never be accepted...what he thinks of as the final solution is the lowest of denominators of what he can get. But it was important to express the view.

K: I don't think we should worry about the final solution. Any attempt to getting a final solution will lead to war. I don't think we should face that now.

D: I don't think that was the intention.

K: I talked to Schlesinger this morning as I told you. I do not have the impression that _____ was as much of a surprize as you think. The real problem is the one I have given to you. You can tell Allon that he is not going back empty handed so he can ease his mind on that.

D: Do you think he will have results before he leaves?

K: Yes. Unless there is a paralysis at the White House this weekend.

D: I heard reports that he was aboard on the boat last night with his friend. And about you spending time at the White House...

K: And that was speculation. That I spent the day at the White House, just speculation.

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D: I know.

K: That meeting had nothing to do with Watergate. I had an intelligence meeting in the morning and a Verification Panel in the afternoon.

D: I was at the Press Club and they said what is he doing at the White House. I said that is where he works, that now that he has a wife to support he has to have two jobs to do it.

K: I am working to give him some items from both lists.

D: Let me understand...I want to know with regard to the special list the need.....

K: ON everything, the need to approve...but I am not blaming it on Schlesinger.

D: Also on the expenditures....

K: But I think we can do something on both lists. I have Haig, Scowcroft and others lined up. I will probably give you informal word and let formal word come through Scowcroft and that will make everyone happy.

D: I will be in New York over the weekend.

K: But we can reach you?

D: Yes. I want to thank you again for last night.

K: Well, if we can keep this confidence we won't fail. There are now some positive factors.

D: Is Sadat planning to come in November?

K: That was the original plan.

D: The Egyptian Ambassador was saying that last night....that Fahmy will come next week and Sadat in November.

K: That was the plan and then we will give him nuclear weapons.

D: No, we have to know your intentions... the State Department has not been helpful. They have been feeding the press.

K: Well, those sons of bitches do it to us. Any time you find something like that you tell me.

*

D: I will because it is against our mutual interests. I will tell Yigal.

K: Put his mind at ease. I will move heaven and earth and he can expect results.

D: Thank you and yourx will be here this weekend.

K: Yes, thank you.

END.

SA 283 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Sonnenfeldt/The Secretary
August 2, 1974
12:00 a.m.

K: Is that detente thing still being revised?

S: We are putting it together right now. We have a new draft.

K: Then there is no sense to work on the old one.

S: No, don't. We have to revise it and we are physically putting it together right now.

K: Where do we stand with Jackson?

S: I am meeting with Fosdick and Pearl tomorrow at 9:30.

K: Do they understand we are at the limit of what we can do?

S: I have tried to make that clear to Scoop. As far as it... it is as far as we can go.

K: What is their mood?

S: Well, yesterday it was that we need more assurances.

K: Well, will you make sure that Len Garment has a copy of both versions of the letter today and get them to the Jewish leaders.

S: Of both letters.

K: Yes.

S: Scoop has ruled that out.

K: ...if I confirm that, that is what we would agree to..

S: I have not told them that you would be prepared to confirm. I can do that in the morning...

K: Why don't you. I think it is better for them.

S: We could use a letter and that gives a little more. I'll try to do something.

K: Ok.

END.

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SA 292 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Hartman/ The Secretary
August 3, 1974
9:35 a.m.

H: Yes Sir, I was coming in a little later.

K: I'll see you then.

H: OK

K: I just wanted to see you briefly. You are going off later this afternoon?

H: Yes.

K: About these messages to Callaghan, Ecevit and Caramanlis.

H: We have letters that are in preparation.

K: I basically have an objection to Circular telegrams. If you inform the Greeks and Turks you are coming in a Circular telegram, I believe that is a poor way to do it.

H: Yes, but that is for our Embassies to inform them.

K: Don't you think it should be done on a more personal basis? Well, I can't change the Department in six months.

H: Well, it is mainly for our Embassies.

K: The mechanics of getting an appointment are the least of it. If I were the Greeks and Turks and received a message like that, I would ask what the hell he wants. You have now down-played it to where you will not achieve anything. We want to be able to say you are going there to exchange views with the countries. This is important, especially when our public line is our real link to informing others of our views.

H: Do you want me to change the cables?

K: Well, at least the ones to Athens, Ankara and Nicosia. They need more.

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H: Well, I 'm just going out there to tell them our position and bring direct word from you.

K: From my point of view that is not why you are going out there. It is to get a network of relations with these people. To get an analyses and define the limits of each of them; to get our analyses in tune showing compassion ahead of time.

H: I just hesitated in one place having him carry any message in advance.

K: That I understand. Why not say we are coming because we place great stress and as you are so closely related to my views you are coming to give themessage to them. Even Tasca can deliver that. To Callaghan on a very personal basis say we have some problem getting the best report out of Athens.

H: I thought we had that in the Callaghan message. That was the main purpose in the Callaghan message.

K: (Read sentence of message.) We better explain further what we mean. Why that is so.

H: OK. I will be in a little later

K: Good.

H: Thank you.

END.

(SA 297) *

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/ The Secretary
11:18AM August 3, 1974

D: Good morning Mr. Secretary.

K: We have had a very tough note from the Russians about your buzzing their ships that are engaged in minesweeping. They said two Phantoms took runs at them yesterday simulating attack runs. That if this doesn't stop they will take military action to protect themselves. That they expect the United States to take appropriate action. I told them that the last sentence was totally unacceptable. They didn't need to say expect...We would not stand for unilateral Soviet military action in the area, but I do not think this is the time to get into a confrontation.

D: Did you get the message I x passed to you last night?

K: Yes.

D: That was what I expected they might plan. [redacted] B1

That is one thing. Secondly, we have not, as you know, crossed into the middle zone to buzz them but they xx were sending their helicopters to take photographs and survey and gather intelligence on our aircraft.

K: The first is what are the facts? Second, is what we do. First, would you get me an unsigned note in response to our representations on just what you have just told me. Then we can aske them to exercise restraint. Would you tell them to be careful. The Soviets are looking for some opportunity to show how tough they are. I have seen this in the last two weeks. Why take the President on inflation? They are, therefore, looking for an opportunity for an ostentatious exercise with us. Please keep this in mind. I want from you a one page statement of your views of what happened. You say in reply I have brought to your attention their note.

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DECLASSIFY AFTER: INDEFINITE
DATE/CASE ID: 04 JUN 2004 200102979

D: (A) that we are buzzing the ships or their helicopters...

K: Both. I want the facts as you had already prior to the complaint pointed them out to me. Secondly, I would like you to urge on your cabinet in the next several weeks not to give them provocation. Normally I would say if the Soviets threaten, one should act brutally.

D: When they are crossing into our waters and taking photographs with their helicopters, shouldn't we send up planes?

K: If they send in helicopters I would not take runs on ~~thix~~ their ships. Send me a note and say if it happens again we will send planes. Then you will have some cover.... Simcha I am telling ~~xx~~ you to let them go. Once without sending planes and send us a note saying we will have no choice but to send up planes if they do it again. I do not want speculation on whether we are staging a Middle East crisis in order to cover up impeachment inquiries. ~~Pxe~~ Peres announcing it is a provocation. Tell Peres for God's sake to keep quiet. What you should do is to send us a note, let them do it once without reacting, send a note in response to the Soviet provocation, that Soviet ships crossed into your waters and if it doesn't stop you have no alternative but to send planes. I then have a record of your complaint which I can send to the Soviets and put them on notice.

D: I will get to work on it right away. Should I ~~kaxe~~ give them this note to Scowcroft?

K: I don't want it before tomorrow. I don't want to seem too eager. An unsigned note on a plain piece of paper.

D: A note from the Government of Israel to the Government of the United States.

K: It should be an unsigned typewritten note with no letterhead.

D: It should be in the wording of a formal note?

K: Not formal and not letterhead and not signed.

D: There are various ways of doing it that is why I said a blank piece of paper.

K: Good, we will send you to diplomatic school.

D: Everthing I know I had to learn.

K: You are doing fine. Thank you Simcha. END.

SA 290

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Scowcroft/ The Secretary
August 3, 1974
1:40 PM

K: The President has approved this thing.

S: Okay.

K: Although I am not quite sure he knew what he was approving. He called me.

S: Did he?

K: Yes.

S: Good

K: The only outcome is what I told him. Is Haig around?

S: Do you want me to have him call you? He wasn't there a few minutes ~~agaa~~ ago.

K: No. I guess I will call the Israelis tomorrow. Don't tell anything to the French yet. I will call the Israelis and you will get the French and inform them. That way Schlesinger can be happy. You can call them tomorrow.

S: Call Defense tomorrow.

K: Is Zeigler around these days?

S: He went by the window a few minutes ago.

K: Okay. Thank you.

END.

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SA 291
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/ The Secretary
August 3, 1974
1:35 P.M.

K: I have no illusions about the Newhouse thing. But I don't think Newhouse can do anything more than he has done. He has written it in his normal style.

S: I am concerned about the fact that it is a comment on the international scene. Clearly has problems of substance.

K: Right, what...

S: I think it is diffused. I think it shows an attitude that reflects an intellectual approach to these problems that isn't ours.

K: I would be more than delighted if you would use this as xxx a basis and turn it into something we can use. That's what I was planning to do with it.

S: It is a question of priorities and I had to get it in some shape...

K: Unless I tell Win what to say, he can't say it.

K
S: We really thought we were doing something yesterday that was a ...

K: I called for a national debate and then I come up with a superficial statement. It just doesn't have any high level.

S: I hope we will correct that in this draft.

K: Keep in mind I may ask ~~HAK~~ Hal to rewrite.

S: I am just finishing up with Richard, Pearl and Dickey.

K: How are they doing.

S: I explained that...letters are a limit of what the traffic will bear.

K: The major problem isn't what the letter ~~w~~ says but what happens afterward. If they want to conduct this like a ...

S: To cover what we have been talking about. I have made the point very strongly that the legislation does ...and then you have the guillotine that comes down.

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K: They will understand how it is to be measured.

S: I have not given them a set of standards.

K: The real result is what happens to emigration.

S: Exactly.

K: Give my special affection to Pearl.

S: Okay.

END.

SA293
RELEASED IN FULL
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TELECON
Mr. Clauson (WH)/ The Secretary
August 3, 1974
1:02 p.m.

K: How are you?

C: Fine. Just two quick things. No. 1, I am calling all the Cabinet officers to urge them to have their Departments crank out all of the low level legitimate news we can in the next two weeks. I'm sure I don't need to explain ... you know why.

K: Yes.

C: We just don't seem to be able to get anything into the papers but impeachment. Second, I don't know if you are aware that we have been holding small press sessions in my office in the last few months with about 15 press people, informal gatherings called "Cocktails with Clauson" because we have booze. We are coming up to #75 in the next week and wonder if we can have you as a guest?

K: Can we hold up on that for the next week and see where we are before you start inviting people?

C: Sure, we can wait for a week.

K: Fine.

C: Fine, thank you Henry.

END.

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SA 295 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Atherton/ The Secretary
August 3, 1974
10:21 a.m.

K: Hello.

A: Good morning, Mr. Secretary.

K: Roy, we have to do a message to Sadat telling him about the Allon talks. That it was tough going but that it will turn out OK.

A: We sent one up for your consideration to Fahmy. Have you seen it?

K: I haven't seen it. Let's send one to Sadat.

A: I'll pull it back and do another one. What about one to Asad?

K: OK do a little hand holding. Make it brief. One paragraph.

A: OK I'll do one and send it up.

K: Good.

END.

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SA 296

RELEASED IN FULL

*

TELECON
General Haig/ The Secretary
August 3, 1974
9:55 a.m.

K: Al, I have a substantive problem if you can focus your mind on it. It has to do with Arms for Israel. There is a huge shopping list here. I would like Allon to go back with just enough so he got something but not enough to make any difference. I talked to Schlesinger. We could give him 200 tanks, Redeyes and Cobras and that would leave the whole huge shopping list in abeyance. Can I do that without asking the President?

H: What is your timing,Henry?

K: Monday morning. Explain to him this is the absolute minimum of their package.

H: Let me do it first and see if he can focus on a report from you.

K: This is about 1/100's of their list. This is not anything that will make any difference in the military balance.

H: Well, the Redeyes will cause some stir probably when it gets out only because of the character of the weapon.

K: Well, the cobra will cause more stir because they will use that against the terrorists.

H: We have to keep this damn thing together.

K: They have seven items listed which we are got giving them. Then they have... it is a list of 20 pages of things that they want that they are not getting, except the tanks.

H. Right. OK. I think that's very durable. Let me run it by him. I think we can do it very quickly. If not, I will come back to you and you can tell him.

K: OK Thanks very much.

END.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 09 JUN 2004 200102979

SA294
RELEASED IN FULL
*

TELECON
The President/ The Secretary
August 3, 1974
11:15 a.m.

K: Hello, Mr. President.

P: Oh, Henry, I just talked to Al about that M-48 package. If it is your judgment we should go forward, but I thought you should know I think we should keep a tight string onthem but if you think this is right, OK.

K: It is about 1/ 100's of their total request. It is just enough to keep them from blowing up publicly.

P: 100%? you mean ....

K: No sir, what I mean is they have come in with a hugh package, not just airplanes but everything. I think we should give them a little because they have been completely attentive. Not everything but just a little.

P: OK, just say I made that decision.

K: All right, thank you Mr. President.

P: OK, old boy.

END.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 22 JUN 2004 200102979

SA 300 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Secretary Shhlesinger/Secretary Kissinger
August 5, 1974
1:05 PM

S: ____Israelis.

K: I got the general approval of the President. What I understood was, Waldhei had some concern about the number___. The fewer the better on ~~k~~ a ~~p~~ foreign policy aspect.

S: We can give them 200 ~~tkxx~~ tanks. They wanted 2,000, but they will be happy with 200. We'll give them 200 tanks__the cobra.

K: They asked for 24__. The President, frankly, I didn't get his approval on a certain number. I would prefer you're giving 12 to 24.

S: Allon saidto me, give us 10, give us 20, but give us some. We can give them 6 or 8 and they would just be delighted.

K: I would do that.

S: The cobra situation is a little hairy. I think it would be bad news ~~x~~ from the Israeli standpoint. I might try to give them some advance tanks. We never offered them the advance___before and ~~xxbxxxx~~ then we can fall back on the cobra.

K: Have you talked to them?

S: No, I thought I would check with you first.

K: Tell them we're ~~xk~~ together on this.

S: We're going to do another inventory on the tank situation. About a half of them lack periscopes. No one ever wanted these but the ___.

K: I think no one will question that.

S: It comes down to the question of who pays for the periscopes.

K: Sadat thinks our tanks are not much good.

S: He's got an interesting point.

K: He claims they burn too easily.

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S: Yes. We have a ~~xxxx~~ knowledge of that. That was one~~xxxxx~~ of the types where the ammunition is ~~xxxxx~~ stored in the __and therefore was ignited. We will not send tanks like that out.

K: I'm just passing that on.

S: Good.

K: OK. You will get in touch with Allon?

S: Yes.

END

SA 298 *

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Scotty Reston
8/5/74; 10:50 a.m.

K: Scotty, how are you?

R: How are you?

K: Okay.

R: Say, I am going over to interview Giscard and Schmidt tomorrow afternoon or tomorrow evening. Have you got any time or any thoughts about what would be useful in a conversation with them in their present moods?

K: You want to do it on the telephone or do you want . . .

R: Well, whatever you say or whatever is convenient to you. I will come to you when you are ready, if you are available any time.

K: Let me give it a little thought and can I call you before noon?

R: Sure. I will be right at the TIMES.

K: I think it is a good time to interview them.

R: I do, too. Also, it is a good time to get out of this time.

K: I tell you, I share that feeling.

R: I don't wonder.

K: Somebody walks out -- this is off the record -- somebody -- Len Garment came up to me in the hall -- in the corridor of the White House today and said if I could send him on a diplomatic mission he would be a friend for life.

R: (Laughter) I don't blame him. There are probably a lot of other takers, too.

K: I'll talk to you.

R: Okay. Bye.

K: Bye.

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SA 299 *

RELEASED ~~IN FULL~~

TELECON
Winston Lord/Secretary Kissinger
August 5, 1974
12:22 PM

K: I want to make sure that you really all drop everything today and work on the statement, because when you work seriously you do a good job. Is that going to happen?

L: Yes.

K: Do you think my children could come to that dinner tonight, or would the Chinese think we are not taking them seriously?

L: Let me call them. They just called and asked if their Secret Service could come.

K: In that case, we would have 3 children. Nancy's niece, who is about the same age as Elizabeth, is also here.

L: Let me call over there and fine out.

K: If you ask them, they'll say yes.

L: Yes.

K: Do you wanted to ask Hummel?

L: OK. I'll get his judgment on that.

K: Why was it we didn't have Congressman? That was stupid.

L: We suggested it and they came back and said, since they were having Fulbright and other at different functions the same week they didn't want them twice in the same week unless they were strong personal friends.

K: OK. Thank you.

END

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 28 JUN 2004 200102979

SA 301 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Vice President Ford/Secretary Kissinger
August 5, 1974
3:22 PM

K: Hello, Mr. Vice President. How are you?

F: I'm fine, how are you?

K: I'm getting along.

F: I guess we all are.

K: You're in a very difficult position and doing it with great nobility. Mr. Vice President, I was wondering, I thought that meeting with those congressmen went rather well.

F: I thought it was great. I saw half of them and they thought it was terrific.

K: Anytime you want to arrange a meeting with a group like this, just go ahead and do it.

F: I'll have Jack Marsh check with Lynwood for a time that is open on your schedule.

K: I thought it was a very good group.

F: They are and all they wanted was an opportunity to hear it first hand.

K: I think they are entitled to have a sense that the government knows what it's doing and give them a chance to ask questions.

F: They used to give us trouble -- trouble stemming from non-information and I'm confident they will be on their side.

K: I'll be very pleased to do it.

F: Maybe we can do it every couple of weeks or so.

K: Excellent.

F: I'll have Jack Marsh get in touch with Lynwood.

K: Maybe we can schedule it for a day that you will be in town. OK. Give me a list of who you think should be invited.

F: OK.

END

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 22 JUN 2004 200102979

SA 302 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Winston Lord/The Secretary
August 5, 1974
5:30 P.M.

K: Can I have that paper first thing in the morning?

L: Yes.

K: I can count on that?

L: Yes.

K: You don't sound very convincing.

L: We will have it when you walk in.

K: Is Sonnenfeldt really working?

L: Yes.

K: Ok. Thank you.

END.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 20 FEB 2003 200102979

SA 303 *

TELECON
Mr. Winston Lord/The Secretary
August 5, 1974
5:10 P.M.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Win, it is my understanding..correct..that they are all working on the material from page 12 onward.

L: That's right, except for the strategic section.

K: You are making a massive revision along the lines I gave you. You go with the same material but it must be reorganized. I find that as I work on it, I have to rewrite substantially the beginning too. But that is my worry. But it doesn't affect anything you do.

L: No.

K: I just want to tighten it up to my own style.

L: Right.

K: Good. Thank you.

END.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 20 FEB 2003 200102979

SA 304 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador McCloskey/Secretary Kissinger
August 5, 1974
5:00 PM

K: What did you do with Pincus?

M: I spoke to him about about a month ago and told him.

K: What's his solution?

M: That first, he won't be publishing anything for at least 2 weeks, secondly, he doesn't attribute anything to you, third, he thinks those two things together will meet your concerns. I think there's no real problem.

K: Is he a trustworthy man?

M: To the best of my knowledge. I never worked with him on any scale.

K: I like his writing.

M: Yes, he's first rate. And he's really a well qualified man in the field. I never knew him to be _____something that I simply couldn't handle.

K: He'll lead the talking?

M: Yes. He asked to see you, he has to lead it. He understand you found time for him and only because I urged him.

K: Good. Thank you.

END

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
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SA 305
RELEASED IN FULL

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TELECON
Mr. Ziegler/The Secretary
August 5, 1974
6:02 P.M.

K: Hello.

Z: Hi. Well, you got back on the 23rd. I remember thinking about this. You left China on the 23rd but you would have gotten back here the 23rd our time.

K: That's the problem.

Z: Rogers wanted to have a picture taken with you. The President didn't want him in the meeting. Rogers was saying,better let me come to have a picture taken.

K: That makes it all the worse. It just makes Rogers look all the worse.

Z: Its just a little black humor in a period where there is no humor. You were in China on the 22nd and also on the 23rd.

K: Its clear what happened now. I remember very well.

Z: He had a picture. You cut out and gave the President the full report. I can always be a private detective, if not a press secretary. Do you have the transcripts yet?

K: No.

Z: Well, they should be on their way.

K: Ok.

END.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 22 JUN 2004 200102979

SA 309 *

RELEASED ~~IN FULL~~

TELECON
Rita Hauser/Secretary Kissinger
August 6, 1974
6:15 PM

(Missed first part)

H: He told me the good news. I'm very pleased.

K: It was a good report.

H: It was __I think it will be fine, it's a footnote in this mess. How ~~x~~ was the President today?

K: He was alright.

H: Was he rational? There is now an enormous vote against him in the House.

K: It's pretty rough.

H: He's pleaded guilty and thrown himself on the____. I hear Goldwater is angry. I don't ~~nx~~ know who's going to rise up and defend him.

K: You mean during the trial?

H: Where is he going to get anyone to rise up in his defense. If he __he will be convicted and will go to jail.

K: If he resigns?

H: It gets close____willing to give him some sort of immunity.

K: It's unbelievable.

H: I think the whole thing is dreadful. Ford will take over and the end of our friend Nelson.

K: Unless he's made Vice President.

H: Jerry won't pick him. He's too big and powerful.

K: I think Nelson could do him a lot of good.

H: I would be astonished if he could. You're going to hang on?

K: Assuming there's a change quickly, I'll of course stay on to see what the shape of the new administration will be. I have an obligation now. I can't play around.

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H: You can stick it out.

K: I think I can give it six months and see where we stand. I don't think anyone knows what sort of President Ford would make, including Ford.

H: You can be sure Mel Laird will be front and center.

K: Is that good or bad?

H: For you?

K: I get along with Mel.

H: He's a smart fellow and knows how to __. He's got a hell of a problem in the economic picture. He has to bring in some real power. It's a very unhappy situation. I certainly hope you stay with it as long as you can.

K: That's all I can do. It's a disheavling period and in a funny way. Some awful mistakes were made by the President but he's doesn't deserve this.

H: ____to see it to the end.

K: Ziegler is a great political expert.

H: Yes. (laughter)

K: I wonder where Ziegler is going to decide...

H: I talked to him and said he should resign.

K: That the President should quit?

H: Yes. He said basically it's the President's decision to make. On the Latin American ~~thing~~ job...on the economic and business issue. There's a big fight between the _____. When do you want all this stuff?

K: As soon as possible.

H: We had planned to finish it at the end of September.

K: That's fine. Maybe I could meet with the Committee.

H: When?

K: Why don't you wait until the present hsyteria is over and try me in the next week or so.

H: Great. OK. ~~Harry~~Henry.

K: I hope to see you soon. Let me know when you're in town.

H: Well, I know your program is always hectic.

K: Well, today especially.

H: Does he talk to you at all about this?

K: No. He sometimes ~~he~~ tells me of a decision he's made.

H: Do you think it has any impact on foreign policy?

K: Not on any particularly country.

H: What happens to a country like Egypt?

K: Brezhnev will be in trouble.

H: OK. Be a good guy Henry and let's talk soon.

K: OK.

END

SA 307

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Maw/Secretary Kissinger
August 6, 1974
4:00 PM

K: I understand the Committee has voted on this thing.

M: And they have written a report.

K: But apparently what they are saying is that if they had known then what they know now they would still have voted to confirm me. But that isn't good enough. That says he didn't need to perjure himself.

M: Where did you get this from? I haven't seen the text.

K: I haven't either, but that is what Pat Holt and a number of others said to the press.

M: This is in line with what the opening statement was....let me find out what it is because they are premature in initialing it. I'll get a hold of Phil Trimble who is up there now and find out what the text is.

K: They don't have to say the actions were moral.

M: Yes, but they have to say a little more...but this thing about.....when they caled the hearings they announced that would be the issue. Let me get what they did say.

K: No, the issue is whether I lied to them.

M: And they are saying you didn't.

K: No, if this is all they said, it is consistent with he didn't need to lie because we would have confirmed him anyway, right?

M: I see. Let me get the text.

K: Right.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 28 JUN 2004 200102979

SA 306 *

TELCON
Cong. Wayne Hays/Kissinger
8/6/74 - 9:46 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

H: Hi, how are you?

K: O.K., Mr. Chairman, how are you?

H: Don't give me that Mr.....

K: Hi, Wayne, I just thought I'd flatter you a little bit.

H: Flattery will get you nowhere with me.

K: I've noticed that. I don't know, though, what will get me somewhere with you.

H: Well, you do alright with me. No Secretary has ever done as well in 26 years.

K: Look, I think it's one of the best relationships I've got here.

H: Listen, what I'm calling you about is, you know we're having this plenary session of this North Atlantic Assembly in London.

K: Yeah.

H: And they have the Prime Minister, if he's still alive, of Great Britain, and they would like two other speakers and one of the ones that they're very hot on having is you, and the other one they think they're going to get is the Prime Minister of Turkey.

K: Well, actually he's an excellent man. When is it?

H: Well, the Plenary opens on the 14th of November and, let me get my calendar open here. I think that's on a Thursday.

K: And is that when they want me?

H: Well, you know, for you they would set it up any day. The Plenary sessions do open on the 14, 15, and 16. We have Committee meetings on the 11, 12 and 13.

K: Is that supposed to be an evening affair?

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H: Well, it could be....

K: No, no, you just tell me, when is it?

H: Well, the Plenary, I don't have the exact schedule here. I just have it marked on my calendar, but the Plenary opens in the morning normally, you know, like 10:00.

K: You don't really gain anything by flying, because you lose the five hours so you can't say you leave in the morning and speak that night, so you can't arrive.... Look, I'll do my best to make it if you want me to.

H: Well, look, let me put it this way to you. I would be delighted if you did and I think it would do us and the foreign policy some good and you some good. Besides there will be a couple hundred Members of Parliament there. We're going to make a special effort to have some Greeks there. Some old Parliamentarians represented for the first time. If I have to go to Greece myself and talk to Karalmanlis and tell him to pick a few like old _____ and a few guys like that.

K: That might be a good idea anyway.

H: Did I tell you I got a letter from King Constantine?

K: No, you haven't.

H: Yeah, well you know when the USIA people were up here last year I quizzed them about what they were telling the Greeks about what was going on in Greece and the results were that they weren't telling anything except what the dictatorship wanted them to hear, that's the long and short of it. And somehow or another he got a copy of it, and the funny part of it is, the letter from him was written just three days before the Government fell and I got it about two or three days after the Government fell. And I got a new little girl outside and she came in with the mail and she said, "There's a letter here from London. Do you know any Constantine R. in London?" (laughter)

K: That's funny. That is funny. Look, let me check my calendar and I'll be back to you in a few days, but I'll do my best ...

H: Any day in that week.

K: Either the 14, 15, or 16th. I'll do my best, and I'll almost certainly do it.

H: Alright. Thanks a lot.

K: Right.

5092 *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Yuli Vorontsov/Kissinger
8/6/74 - 10:20 a.m.

K: Hello.

V: Henry, good morning.

K: How are you Yuli?

V: How are you?

K: O.K.

V: Fine. Henry, I got a cable from Moscow that's a fall-out from the communique on the part of the chemical, Asian chemical warfare. We suggest the start of discussing this joint initiative. They in Moscow have prepared a drug convention to that effect, and I'd like to send the drug convention to you. We suggest a practical agreement on this, or practical work on this drug convention should be made in Geneva by our representatives there in the disarmament committee, and as you suggested at the end of August if it is o.k. with you.

K: Can you send it over?

V: Right away.

K: And we'll give you an answer very quickly.

V: Fine. Thank you.

K: Thank you, bye.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 18 NOV 2002 200102979

SA 308 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador McCloskey/The Secretary
August 6, 1974
6:10 P.M.

K: Hello.

M: Yes, sir.

K: Bob, my wife went to Mt. Vernon with my children and her family today.

M: I just had a call about it.

K: The Chief of Naval Operations offered the boat to them. But I don't think we should make a huge mystery of it.

M: Who offered the boat?

K: Just say the Chief of Naval Operations offered his personal boat to my family.

M: It's both your family and her's, right?

K: That's right.

M: There is something about a line of people being pushed aside and kept waiting.

K: That must have been security.

M: Why don't we say we regret any inconvenience anyone may have been caused? Apparently someone in the Star called Simone Poulain ...

K: No, they called Mrs. Kissinger, who called Simone Poulain.

M: I was very pleased to meet the other side of the family the other day.

K: I am overwhelmed by Irishmen these days. I hardly dare go home any more. Eight Irishmen that meet and overwhelm you with affection. If I ever leave my Irish friend, they will ....

M: They bear vengence for years to come.

K: I am counting on their basic loyalties.

END.

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SA 310 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/The Secretary
August 6, 1974
7:11 P.M.

K: Hellow Simca.

D: How are you?

K: On this arms thing we did yesterday. For God's sake make sure there is nothing in the Israeli papers. Please make sure there are no comments because we are going through some final throes here and things are very difficult.

D: I understand. Nothing will be said.

K: Can you keep your head down in this period? We do not need any war-like statements-just keep quiet for a few days. Someday I will explain it to you...in a little while. There could be some unfortunate public things that it would take us a long time to dig out from.

D: I understand.

K: I had a good talk with the Jordanians on some of the concepts we discussed last week. Without timing on anything and there may be a chance. I know you don't want a chance.

D: No, no...

K: We may be able to push them to the verticle line.

D: Fine. I would like to hear details whenever you finish.

K: Our immediate problem is to keep this out of sight.

D: To keep quiet.

K: Also not to let on anything about this arms thing. There is a massive danger of getting it revoked in such a way that it would be difficult to reinstitute it.

D: I have done it already, but I will do it again in your name.

K: This is not a criticism. This is just a friendly bit of advice.

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D: I know and I appreciate it and I will act on it. Anything else happening on your side except what we hear in the news?

K: You s.o.b. You want some more news....

D: Did you enjoy your Chinese party? I think, Dr. Kissinger, the next big thing that you could bring about in the world is a resumption of relations between Israel and China.

K: I want you to know I'm working on that and I want to see you as soon as my immediate insanity stops here.

D: Until when is Rifai staying...Thursday?

K: He will be here a short while longer...

D: Ok. Good.

K: Well, goodbye.

END.

SA 311 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Herb Slosser/The Secretay
August 6, 1974
7:38 p. m.

K; How are you?

S: Ok. I just wanted to call and say I was pleased with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee decision. I thought all the comments at the end of the meeting were most appropriate and just on the nose.

K: Aren't you nice.

S: I know these are tough times.

K: We have to hold the country together.

S: I am glad that things for you personally are ok. And I am glad you will continue to be Secretary of State.

K: I was going to call you this week before everything blew up. Do you know who Frank Mankiewicz is?

S: ~~xxxx~~ He was the press representative for Bob Kennedy, wasn't he?

K: Yes, and he has just been in Cuba and filmed I don't know how many hours with Castro. Would you be interested in that at all?

S: A friend of his called me a few weeks ago on that. We normally in the news area don't buy from outsiders. What do you think of him...Mankiewicz?

K: I think he is very thoughtful. I don't know what sort of film he shoots. I rarely agree with him politically but that doesn't mean he isn't intelligent.

S: Well, the answer is probably no. But I will check and let you know.

K: ~~Wxxxx~~ When are we going to get together.

S: I would like to very much. I just got back from Europe yesterday. May be I could come down next week.

K: How about Tuesday?

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S: Ok. I'll call you tomorrow.

K: Let's aim for Tuesday.

S: Let's aim for Tuesday. I'll give you a call tomorrow morning. It nice talking to you.

K: I can't tell you how much I appreciate your call.

S: I know what we have in you and so many of us know. We all have to stay calm.

K; Goodbye.

END.

(SC3) *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Garment/Secretary Kissinger
August 6, 1974
12:25 pm

G: In light of the developments...talk to Buzhardt, it seems to me that the problem with your meeting..

K: I understand but I will handle that later.

G: It is a question of continuity, policy and so forth.

K: I think I will delay it.

:G: You think?

K: Well, what do you think?

G: I think you are backed up against a real problem.

K: I may delay it til Monday or Tuesday.

G: But there must be a continuity of policy.

K: But if it goes the way they are thinking, I will need all of Friday to get the transition done.

G: As far as Eberle is concerned there is sufficient time to do this.

K: He doesn't need it until the 19th.

G: Yes, let me know of anything you need me to do along the way.

K: Many thanks.

END

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DATE/CASE ID: 01 JUL 2004 200102979

SC9 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Mr. Sisco/The Secretary
August 7, 1974
7:03 P.M.

S: Yes Sir.

K: What I really wanted to talk to you and Hal about was to send a letter to Sadat.

S: We have it in train now.

K: In train does not mean it goes out on Sunday.

S:

K: We want to do the thing; this has been reported by the _____. Well I think we ought to get it out tonight. We have to understand what exactly you _____. Don't go into detail.

S: I will talk to Hal. I unfortunately have to leave in ten minutes to take the Jordanian Prime Minister to dinner in lieu of you. If they could only eliminate this damn social stuff. I don't object to a 12 hour day. It is the other four hours I don't want to give up. I'll talk to Hal immediately. I know it is being drafted.

K: Well, being drafted in this building means four days.

S: No, not with Hal Saunders. He is good. He'll get it right away.

K: Ok.

END.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 01 JUL 2004 200102979

SC7*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Barry Schweid/The Secretary
August 7, 1974
5:49 P.M.

S: I am a little bit puzzled by your answer on whether you had received anything from the President. On any basis can you tell me if indeed he is going to resign today? I know its an undiplomatic question.

K: Even if I knew ~~that~~ it I couldn't answer.

S: It is an extraordinary situation and we are all being undiplomatic today.

K: I don't believe anything is going to happen today.

S: Ok. Thank you very much.

K: Right.

END.

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SC6*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Eagleburger/Secretary Kissinger
August 7, 1974
2:47 pm

K: When you work with Brent on this, don't give me a draft like what you did..it is something someone bats out in ten minutes. I want to know who drafts it, when it's drafted..has to be redone. What meetings have taken place. I need a rational...

E: That's what we're doing now.

K: How much time did you spend on it? You didn't spend any time on it..

E: I noted on the top that it was some quick thoughts -- that it was just a first crack. We are working on a new draft now.

K: Will you redraft it and do a chart for me that I can show to the other guy by the end of the day. Also, I find major omissions in the draft that was typed. There are several Newhouse pages missing.

E: I went through it word for word against the draft with the secretary, everything you gave me is in it. I will work on the other..

K: No, there are some Newhouse pages missing, I can't find them. Well, it can't be done now because I know Scowcroft is with the Vice President.

E: He'll be right back. I'm waiting here for him and writing while he is gone.

K: Will you do it in a mature , rational way and not give me just an idiotic...

E: Yes sir, yes sir.

K: You should see the economic program list they gave me. It's one and a half pages...

E: Oh, on the Egyptian thing.

K: That's right.

E: Alright sir.

K: Thank you.

END

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SC8 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
General Haig/The Secretary
August 7, 1974
5:58 P.M.

H: Hello, Dr. Kissinger.

K: Al.

H: Henry could you get to the oval office in five or six minutes?

K: Sure, I'll come right away.

H: Ok.

END.

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RELEASED IN FULL SC 10 *

TELECON
Rita Hauser/The Secretary
August 7, 1974
7:19 p.m.

H: It is hard to get you. I called to tell you a friend of mine, who is a very old and good friend, advises me has was consulted by Mel Laird yesterday on two areas of interest to both of us. Mel is being considered as an advisor to Ford so that he won't be a threat to Jerry in 1976. My friend said that Mel discussed with him at some length whether he, my friend, could live basically with you as Secretary limelighting my friend. I say my friend because I am professionally obligated not to tell you. H_____ has been living in a very strange circumstance. I just don't think there is any problem in effect, which is what I told him. I thought it was very interesting that Mel was seeking advice on this.

K: Not every advice Mel seeks is _____.

H: Jerry preside over....Cabinet and WH and presumably at such time as Haig goes, Laird will come in and take over the WH. Rose Woods called me today in a terrible funk and said the President wanted my advice. I said it breaks my heart to say this, but I told her I thought he should resign and do it soon. She said he has made no decision. But Mel has certainly moved in and is getting off the shots. _____ would like to see Nelson as V.P.....does Nelson want it?

K: I have no way of knowing. Mel is Mel and we will just have to see.

H: I have no doubt, Henry, that he told you all along he would be a big wheel and he is the man who made Ford what he is. The best thing is for you to just do your business.

K: I get along with Mel and you never know what the WH will be like.

H: There is nothing else that can be done.

K: That is exactly my view.

H: _____ and let me know what you think.

K: I appreciate it very much Rita. Let me know when you come down here.

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H: I hope it works out for Nelson. I think it is his time in history. He will do no good to stay out. He can't make a run at an incumbent President. But Nelson may be carefully assessing Ford. I don't think he has _____. If Ford presides over a very serious reassessing, it is not going to be a _____.

K: I cannot take it on. Assuming there is a big reassessing then the Republican nomination is not good having.

H: You never know what the Democrats will nominate. I'll let you know if I hear more.

K: Thank you.

H: Goodbye.

END.

SC1 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Frank Mankiewicz/Secretary Kissinger
August 7, 1974
11:00 AM

M: I realize you have other problems.

K: I don't know where you'd get that idea.

M: I think you can't travel now. Did you talk to Slosser?

K: Yes. He said their first reaction in these cases is also to say no, that they shoot their own film. On my recommendation, He was going to look at it again and let me know in a day or so.

M: You have my number where I am. Maybe I should just call him.

K: No. Wait until he gets in touch with me. He's very reliable.

M: I may have lunch with these people. I gather I can ask them to go back and check a few things that are still __from the ___.

K: Yes. That might be useful, even more so now then previously.

M: Sort of establishing when the conference can be held. I'll try to do that early in September.

K: Good.

M: OK. I will wait until he calls you back.

K: If he doesn't call in a couple of days -- but, he'll call me back.

M: You have my number here in Long Island?

K: Yes. I don't have to indicate the ___.

M: On the SFRC .....

K: It's a good report.

M: It was __at a nice time. Well, that's done. I think that's going to be....

K: Maybe be some guys who won't quit even now but it's going to __.

M: Look at what's going on, the crisis is by no means over.

K: The wire tap thing is sub___.

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M: I was glad to see that came first. I hope you will be a symbol of _____.

K: That was very helpful.

M: I saw your statement yesterday when you came out of the cabinet meeting. It was terrific.

K: Thank you. You can be sure that whatever happens, that's going to be my theme.

M: ___any kind of policy.

K: That will be through even w after the thing has run its course.

M: You're the raft out in the sea and you are going to have to let everyone on.

K: I'm going to take foreign pk policy out of the 1976 campaign if they let me.

M: I can't be helpful in that area.

K: When you get back into town, we should talk about that.

M: OK. Well, just go ahead and do your job. Somebody has to do it. Sandman has proposed Rockefeller as Vice President. All of that is going to start happening. What you need is a .....

K: Where it's quiet.

M: For about 30 days.

K: OK. Nice to talk to you.

M: Bye.

END

SC5 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
August 7, 1974
2:35 PM

K: What I called you about was some concern I have for NEA. We have Fahmy coming next week. I don't know what we are going to do about this. I don't know who is invited, what is planned, where...i have to entertain ~~them~~ him, I don't even have a guest list in final....

S: There was a memorandum sent into you yesterday and I saw....

K: Yes, and it only raises four locations. What in the ~~name~~ name of God is so hard about it. An FSO-8 should be able to prepare it. Nothing makes it any easier, three days before or three weeks before.

S: I know... but let me take hold of this and see what I can do.

K: I understand you had lunch with Dinitz today. I hope you didn't tell him much.

S: Very little. I left that for you with Rifai... I told him ~~xx~~(x A) we are in general concurrence and willing to talk about this and secondly, there is a question about how these things can be done. What I really talked about was we have the Law of the Sea problems and secondly, he talked about arms, but he said he thinks he can explain why all of this war talk is coming out of Israel. He says they need this to generate the kind of professional preparations calling new__up and that sort~~s~~ of thing; ~~x~~ provisions to get weapons, tanks ready. I think this is a government that is politically afraid to get caught with their pants down. I found it a rational explanation ~~x~~ but from an international view point, it is difficult.

K: Take a look at NEA and if Atherton can't perform, we'll have to replace him.

S: I'll have a look and I'll do my best. This is my first love and I want to please you and do what you want me to do.

K: I know that. But now the problem is, here we have Fahmy coming on Monday and what are we going to discuss in the economic session, but why aren't ~~x~~ the invitations even out for a dinner for him? And it's too late.

S: That is true, it is late. One of the difficulties is they aren't clear in terms of when he is going to be here.

K: We could just pick Tuesday.

S: I think you should, that is, they suggest a working luncheon but you have to decide what you want to do socially.

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K: But are the Egyptians giving him a dinner?

S: Yes, they also suggested that, the memorandum says that you one, host a working luncheon, 2) _____the Egyptians on the 13th and thirdly, that you meet with Fahmy to co-chair the meeting. It does not say anything about....

K: That is stupid. He is here for the meeting. Who will chair the first session - Simon? We have to have the meeting at the beginning.

S: The first recommendations is that you meet with the delegration on the 12th for a brief opening session followed by a private meeting with Fahmy. But it doesn't cover the point you raised as to what social functions you would give, and you need to give one. I see it that you have a choice of Monday or Wednesday.

K: Alright. Maybe Monday night.

S: I'll do that.

K: OK.

END

RELEASED IN FULL SC4*

TELECON
Secretary Schlesinger/Secretary Kissinger
August 7, 1974
1:10 PM

S: Have you received any indication out of North Vietnam? Has Brent brought you up on that?

K: No.

S: They've been coming in for the past week but __in the last 24 hours. They have 3 divisions they placed on _____and go forward 7 miles. The 308th which is up there in North Vietnam is being put on standby. There's some other things that I can't go into now.

K: Anything we can do?

S: That's why I wanted to check with you. There's ndthing that we can really do. I thought we could put a carrier off the coast and have a ___scale mission.

K: I will call the Russians and Chinese and warm them.

S: You better wait until you get the intelligence report that's coming your way.

K: I think that's an excellent idea.

S: I ll go ahead and move these carriers.

K: How long will that take?

S: On the one carrier it should take a day and the others a little longer.

K: They won't just show up without my having a chance to tell the Chinese.

S: No.

K: Good.

END

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SC2 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Roland Evans/Secretary Kissinger
August 7, 1974
11:30 AM

K: How are you?

E: Fine. I hear you're having an easy day today.

K: It's very easy.

E: Can you give me about 7 minutes today.

K: What is it about?

E: It's totally off the record. I just have to get a feel and you're the only one who can give it to me. I've talked to every member of the _____all the way down the line. I just can't buy it. I don't believe it's possible. It would be kind of you to give me 5, 6 or 7 minutes and give me your opinion.

K: What time xx could you come? Perhaps shortly before one. Let me call you back.

E: OK.

END

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SC 16 *

TELECON
Senator Stennis/Secretary Kissinger
August 8, 1974
7:02 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Mr. Chairman.

S: Henry, how are you?

K: I just wanted to tell you how much I appreciated your telephone calls this afternoon.

S: Well, we need you.

K: When our President asks me to do something I'll do it in this critical period. For your information, he has asked me and he will announce it when the time is appropriate.

S: That's good. I'm certainly pleased with this.

K: You know I'll continue on a bipartisan basis.

S: On my part and yours too. After I called you I ran into Senator Fulbright in the doctor's office. He's going to be pleased. He'll probably let you know.

K: He hasn't yet.

S: No, he'll be pleased.

K: I won't be announced until after the President's speech.

S: You think it might be announced tonight?

K: Either tonight or tomorrow. We have reassure governments we have dealt with.

S: Yes, and the sooner the better. That's fine.

K: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

S: I look forward to being with you and everything makes me feel better.

K: I look forward to working with you as always.

S: Goodby.

END

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SC14 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELE
TELCON
Sec. Weinberger/ Sec. Kissinger
12:50 p.m., August 8, 1974

W: I am contemplating a short statement if the occasion arises. I would like to know what you think. I would place my services entirely at the disposal of the new President to do whatever he thinks would be helpful. I would leave it entirely in his hands. Some people have been calling and saying are you resigning with the President? I have not responded to that. That would be the general tone of what I would say. Do you have any feeling if that is the proper way to do that.

K: I am not saying anything.

W: This would be much later in the day. It would be later. These inquiries continue to come in. The thrust of the inquiries are, are you going to leave with the President.

K: I think it appropriate to point out that you are at the disposal of the new President so that you are not giving the impression that you are walking out.

W: Exactly. I don't want to give the impression that I am trying to hold on to my place but also that I am not just walking away with him. My services, for whatever they are worth, are at the disposal of the new President for as long as he wishes. I am trying to convey the impression that -- for example I think Ziegler would go at the same time and that is another catagory.

K: I think that is right.

W: I would not issue anything--would just have it ready. I wanted to check with you and I appreciate your advice.

K: I think it the right thing to do.

W: It is absolutely tragic.

K: It is heart breaking.

W: I think your statement on the Cabinet was extraordinary -- a very eloquent statement.

K: Thank you. I appreciate that. I have always enjoyed working with you.

W: Thank you.

END

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SC13 *

TELCON
Gen. Scowcroft/Sec. Kissinger
August 8, 1974, 12:45 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Is everything calm there?

S: Yes.Haig is at the EOB now.

K: With the President?Do you think I should call the President?

S: Might not be a bad idea.

K: O.K. Thank you.

END

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SC12*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
The Vice President/ Sec. Kissinger
August 8, 1974, 12:30 p.m.

F: Good morning.

K: Mr. Vice President.

F: How are you Henry.

K: Fine.

F: I just finished talking with the President and he gave me his decision and we spent about an hour and twenty minutes over there. During the course of the conversation he indicated that you were the only one in the Cabinet ~~whom~~ with whom he had shared his decision.

K: That is right.

F: I would hope we could get together sometime this afternoon at your convenience. I have no plans other than to start getting ready.

K: Would 3:00 suit you Mr. Vice President?

F: That would be fine, Henry. I would appreciate it very much and whatever your schedule is -- mine is totally flexible.

K: After the President talked to me yesterday I prepared some tentative suggestions for your consideration. Might I bring those along?

F: Absolutely.

K: They are things that need to be done in the next two days.

F: I will be delighted to see you and bring anything along that you want, Henry.

K: Right. One other technical thing. Can we say to the press that I am coming over to see you or had you rather announce that? It is not particularly necessary. We can just avoid it all together.

F: I see no reason why you can't say that you are coming over to see me. I see no harm in that.

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K: We would not say anything else.

F: I think it important actuatlly that it be announced -- so announce it, Henry.

K: I think from the foreign policy point of view it would have a calming effect.

F: Why don't you state it or have it released and in anyway that you think would be helpful. Don't hesitate to embelish it.

K: I think the best thing, if you agree, is to say you have called me and you have asked me to come to see you and I am coming to see you at 3:00.

F: Very good , Henry.

K: I pray for you and you know the whole world depends on you, Mr. VP.

F: I know that Henry and I will talk to you more about it. As I have inferred in our previous conversations, I really want you to stay and stand with me in these difficult times.

K: You can count on me, Mr. VP. We will have a chance to talk about it.

F: I wanted to get that in now so there is no doubt about it.

K: I am very, very appreciate of your thoughtfulness in mentioning it.

F: We will see you at 3:00 then.

K: O.K. Fine.

END

RELEASED IN FULL SC 11 *

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
August 8, 1974
11:25 AM

K: Brent, is everything still on schedule as far as you know?

S: Yes, and I've reconfirmed it. That's going on ~~w~~ right now. About the meeting announcement this afternoon, they said no problem, but they would rather wait until this meeting is over to make sure. They're ~~xx~~ going to call me after the meeting is over.

K: I'm going to be over there at 3:00.

S: Right.

K: At the EOB office?

S: Right.

K: OK. On drafting those letters, I think we ~~xxxxx~~ ought to draft them over here.

S: I don't have any problems with that.

K: Clift isn't in the same class as Sonnenfeldt.

S: That doesn't give me any problem.

K: Fine. As soon as I get my guys working there's a possibility that it will leak out so I want to make sure the other meeting is on.

S: I'll call ~~xx~~ you after the meeting.

K: Not my meeting with him.

S: No.

K: When are they going to announce the Presidential speech?

S: My understanding is noon.

K: Good. Will you let me know as soon as it's been announced.

S: Right.

K: OK.

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SC13*

TELCON
Gen. Scowcroft/ Sec. Kissinger
August 8, 1974, 12:45 p.m.

K: Is everything calm there?

S: Yes.Haig is at the EOB now.

K: With the President?Do you think I should call the President?

S: Might not be a bad idea.

K: O.K. Thank you.

END

SC 15 *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Ambassador McCloskey/The Secretary
August 8, 1974
6:36 P.M.

M: I hate to interrupt you. I forgot to ask you one thing. All the networks want to get you on tonight or tomorrow.

K: What do you think?

M: Well, you can't do Barbara Walters....

K: No, I can't do an interview. The question is whether I should do 3 minutes. Why don't I ask Ford in the morning?

M: Ok. Then I would do it for everybody and I would do it at the White House. I would not do anything until after the swearing in tomorrow afternoon.

K: Ok. Make sure it is in my talking points for Ford tomorrow.

M: Your girl has copies of the _____.

K: It has just lost us three hours.

M: I understand.

K: Ok.

M: Thank you.

END.

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SC 20 *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
President Nixon/Secretary Kissinger
8:36 p.m., August 9, 1974

K: Mr. President.

N: Hi, Henry, one thing I forgot to mention to you that I would appreciate your doing -- if you would -- it's a small thing. Would you just put out to the press that I did send these messages.

K: Exactly. I'm going to do that tomorrow. I've already talked to Ron about it.

N: I thought of it. Because that's my last request of you old man.

K: Mr. President, I hope not.

N: Well, I meant in this area. But I think it's important that our country know it too.

K: I will do it tomorrow.

N: All right, Henry. Thank you.

K: Right, Mr. President.

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SC 19 *

TELCON
Ron Ziegler/Secy Kissinger
8:15 p.m., August 9, 1974

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Ron, how are you?

Z: Good. That was very good of you to call.

K: No, not at all. And I don't mind your announcing it. I don't want you to particularly.

Z: No, I don't think we should.

K: Well, that's entirely up to you. Though I'm not ashamed of my friends.

Z: No, of course not. But we shouldn't be getting into that.

K: Incidentally, I saw you on television last night making your final statement to the press and you went out like a man.

Z: Oh, thank you. Thank you.

K: And Nancy, who has better judgment than I, thought it too.

Z: She thought that too?

K: Yeah.

Z: Well, I'll take her judgment.

K: You can trust her a lot more than me.

Z: Okay. Henry, you mentioned and asked me to call you that we had sent letters to Heads of States before he left from the White House.

K: Yeah, I sent some messages.

Z: I think that might be good to have people know. Now I can refer to it from out here and the press who are around here or you can do it --

K: Why don't I do it from the State Department?

Z: Yeah, he'd prefer you to do it from back there if you don't mind.

K: I think it's much more appropriate.

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Z: Okay.

K: Good.

Z: You know, the sooner, the better.

K: Tomorrow.

Z: Okay, just the fact that before President Nixon left he sent personal messages to -- and then just list them.

K: Right.

Z: Okay. Then you'll do it from there?

K: Right.

Z: Okay, Henry.

K: Good, Ron. And how are you settled out there?

Z: Well, we're not settled but we're trying to get settled.

SC18*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Hugh Sidey
8/9/74 8:08 p.m.

K: Hi, Hugh, how are you

S: Pretty good, how are you doing?

K:

S: Survive all of this?

K: Yeh, fairly.

S: Henry, is there any chance to come around/you at all--to get a little to see fill in on some of the events to the extent that you can that have happened. Or is that impossible.

K: When do you have to do it?

S: By tomorrow afternoon or evening.

K: Look, try coming over to my state department office at 8:30 tomorrow morning. I can't promise you it will actually work out, then.

S: I see.

K: Can you do that?

S: Sure, I can do that, that'd be fine if we could--where is that 7th floor?

K: Yeh.

S: Does that make sense0-you know we've got gaps in the story and we've got--

K: I'don't know how much I'd be prepared to say, but I might steer you away from things that are wrong.

S: Yeh, I would appreciate it, you know and after all we are not living under the heavy hand any more--I know Jerry Ford and its' pretty open Administr-tion, or hopefully it will be.

K: No, the problem really is--what happened to President Nixon is a human tragedy.

S: Well, maybe you can tell me some of that.

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K: You know, I want to --I don't want to go into too much of it--and when I say tragedy, it doesn't mean that it wasn't undeserved.

S: Yeh, I realize that.

K: It was like one of those Greek things where a man is told his fate is---- and fulfills it anyway, knowing exactly what is going to happen to him.

S: No, I can imagine the whole physical strain and emotional problems of the week and all and I understand that. But I would, if you had time, just like to run through the chronology and just--which you were involved in and see if it is correct and if there is anything we should know that we don't.

K: Okay, well come by at 8:30 -- I may have to shift it to 10:30 at the WH but you will un derstand that.

S: Okay, Henry.

K: Bye.

SC 17 *

TELCON
Senator Fulbright/Secy Kissinger
4:43 p.m., August 9, 1974

RELEASED IN FULL

F: Well, Mr. Secretary, I couldn't wait to call and congratulate the wisdom of the new President.

K: Mr. Chairman, aren't you nice.

F: On his statement last night, I was very pleased to see that. I saw it when I came out from his house and although I couldn't believe he wouldn't, but in any case I was delighted.

K: Well, Mr. Chairman, my only regret is that the voters of Arkansas showed very poor judgment.

F: Well, I appreciate that.

K: No, I thought -- Well, of course, we shall work together and I've already talked to the President about that because you must be saved for foreign policy in some way.

F: Well, I appreciate that very much. We'll have a chat about that.

K: Yes. And now it's much easier to do that.

F: Well, I was pleased. In fact, I'm pleased about the whole thing. I put a little statement a while ago -- I made a statement to the Senate about the whole situation. I think it's all been very painful but I think we're off that wicket and maybe we can do better on this one. To me, I thought the impression he made was quite favorable both last night and what I've heard about it.

K: The President?

F: The new President, yes. I said I thought that Nixon handled himself well last night and I was fascinated by his statement this morning. I saw you on television.

K: Well, it was one of the most painful things I've ever witnessed.

F: I could tell that. I didn't know he was coming on. I was just getting ready to leave. Betsy -- my daughter is here, you know -- and was getting ready to go to the plane and I turned it on and I was fascinated with it. Of course, it was painful and highly emotional. But nevertheless it was done and it was very interesting from a purely personal point of view.

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K: Well, it had almost all the aspects of his personality.

F: Yeah. . . . and the tragedy and everything else came through in that sort of disorganized and rambling way. In a way, it's more impressive than a prepared statement of any kind.

K: I agree. It was sort of a faded doom about the man.

F: That's right. And it was an interesting thing. Well, anyway, we have to go on from here. Listen, the Cyprus Ambassador came to see me while ago and he was excited -- and I had a call from the Greek Foreign Minister -- I don't know why they think I can do anything. All I promised him to do was to speak to you. They think it's extremely serious and that it is very important that we make the Turks be responsive in Geneva if we can. He said they've not and he told horrendous stories of the indiscriminate bombing around Kyrenia and other places and now he's said that they are engaging in wholesale -- he called it "wholesale looting" in the Port of Famagusta. And he claims there is $28 million worth of goods there from various parts of the world in the port and that is his story within the hour. And I promised him I would call you -- I said: what can I do about it? He says that I would hope that you would call it to the attention -- I understand why the Secretary has been preoccupied, which everybody does. But he thinks the Turks are being very, very uncompromising and extremely tyrannical. And also, killing people. He said there is a woman here -- American -- who has just come back from there and tells terrible stories about it.

K: Well, I told the Turkish Ambassador today that we didn't know all the details but in our judgment, their actions had to stop.

F: Well, that's good. What he particularly appealed to is that they be responsive in Geneva and give the Greek Government some hope. He thinks that there is a great danger that Karamanlis will have another coup if this continues. . . didn't know whether the Left or the Right will come back.

K: Exactly. And either is bad for us.

F: Yes. He said either one would just be disasterous. And he is very agitated and he certainly believes it. And the same thing was said in less dramatic tones from the call from Movoros in Switzerland.

K: Yes.

F: So I guess there is a good deal to it.

K: We do not have those reports. But I have a very good man -- do you know Arthur Hartman, the Assistant Secretary?

F: Yes.

K: He is in Geneva and I will get him to talk to Movoros. And may he refer to the Movoros' conversation with you?

F: Yes.

K: Because that will show that he has gotten some action.

F: They simply greatly fear that it would result in the overthrow of Karamanlis if the continues in this unrestrained manner. He said there were 40,000 troops there and they have moved out all over the country and he said the worst thing was that they were bombing houses -- I mean, private houses -- and killing people right and left in a sort of a frenzy, culminating in the looting of Famagusta. This is outrageous.

K: It is true, it is outrageous. I agree with you.

F: And I said I would call you. That is all I could think of to do.

K: Well, I appreciate this very much, Mr. Chairman.

F: Well, I hope that we can -- these things keep piling up on you, I know.

F: Good luck to you.

K: Well, I will turn to it immediately. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

F: Bye.

SC29

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Reston/Sec. Kissinger
August 10, 1974, 4:10 p.m.

K: Yes, Scotty.

R: Quite a week. Do you have any time? How long are you going to be there?

K: This afternoon? How about tomorrow morning?

R: Surely.

K: How about 9:30?

R: At your office? I will be there.

K: Fine.

R: All the best.

end

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SC30

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Prime Minister Ecevit of Turkey/ Secretary Kissinger
Sunday, August 11, 1974
9:35 AM

K: Hello Mr. Prime Minister

E: How are you ? Received your message. And after our talk, we have started working on your solution.

K: Understand I am not putting this forward in order not to show sympathy for your problems. My position...compromise solution. No one has seen my letter. Other parties not familiar with this. All our newspapers are saying I am too strong for Turkey. To be able to be effective, we all have these problems in politics. I call as a friend because you seemed distressed.

E: I'll ring you back in an hour or so.
I'll explain the handicap. We have been studying seriously about your details.

K: Macombers were his own.. Particulars were put forward by Macomber on his own.
What I was thinking--principle he gave you is correct. Locations I ~~xxxx~~ did not put forward.

E: We would have to make some suggestions.

K: You have to make solution of locations.

E: One of them--Area of our control to be started immediately.

K: Study it and let us have your ideas.

E: I'll ring you back within an hour.

END.

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SC33

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
PM Ecevit/Secretary Kissinger
August 11, 1974
11:55

K: How are you?

E: Fine. We have finished our study of your proposal and I explained the details to Ambassador Macomber who is with me.

K: It is not a formal proposal, it is just an idea. Well, let's call it a proposal for this purpose.

E: Let's say a compromise proposal. We have studied it in detail. It meets some of our requirements. We do have a reservation but I will explain that later. At the same time it may reassure those who are concerned about the possibliity ...it might lead to partition. When I put the reservation from our side... my reason is it might be difficult for us to protect the security of the Turkish communities dispersed in various capitals. But I realize this may be a way of preventing the humiliation of the Greeks and may stop the humiliation the Turkish community has suffered. However, we have one condition we cannot ....we must acquire immediate control of the major Compound and it must be the one now under our control. I t would be from Kyrenia to Nicosia and including Chattos., which is densely Turkish inhabited, but leaving the northeastern tip. for the time being..our individuals in the Turkish section of Famagusta.

K: Just a minute. Let me get my map. Now, what were the names?

E: You know the area under our control from the center of Nicosia, extend the line making a curve towards the North and reaching the port of Famagusta. Cutting it in half and on the northern side it gives us for the time being a partition. I have given the exact map to Macomber.

K: I will wait until I get it from Macomber. and I will give you my reaction then. I don't think we should do this on the telephone.

E: Should I give you a written note also?

K: That would be helpful.

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E: I'll do it now.

K: Many thanks.

E: We are happy to cooperate with you and appreciate your help.

K: Thank you.
END

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SC37

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Prime Minister Ecevit/Secretary Kissinger
August 12, 1974
4:15 PM

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E: Hello?

K: Hello, Mr. Prime Minister .

E: I'm sorry to keep you waiting I was in a meeting.

K: That's alright. I keep getting conflicting reports so I want to make sure that I know what's going on.

E: Your Ambassador sent you my message?

K: Yes.

E: The problem is this, this is the 5th day of the conference. I think they haven't had an original meeting, bilateral talks and we seem to be getting no where. In the meantime the British have started putting pressure on us in a rather odd fashion...creating a great reaction.

K: I would not recommend anyone put pressure on the Turks.

E: The Greeks according to reports___so the situation is deterent while we are loosing time there is a solution that may become more difficult. We gave instructions to ___to tell Callaghan that they should have the real first official meeting and put on the table our proposal, that I suggested after your non-proposal, shall I say. And then we shall be free to discuss any problems regarding the ~~fxxx~~ final__or whether we should seek ___arrangements.

K: But ~~tax~~ that is all he is going to do -- put forward his proposal.

E: Regarding the major Canton.

K: We are told if it isn't accepted tonight, he would go back to ~~Ankara~~ Ankara. My view is that if you put forth a far-reaching proposal you can't expect it to be accepted immediately.

E: Well, we would expect an answer within 24 hours. We don't expect an answer within 24 hours. We don't expect the conference to solve all the problems within a day or week. All we want is that in order to secure the security of the Turks on the Island, we must have this and continue the talks ~~xx~~ in a comfortable spirit. We are not pressing them on a final solution.

K: We will support a meeting tonight and I hope Gunes will present it in such a way it doesn't sound like an ultimatum and then see what comes. I will talk to Callaghan now. I'm assuming you will give them some time to reflect on this proposal.

E: Yes, but it should be a reasonably short time.

K: It should not be a delaying tactic.

E: Yes.

END

SC39

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Prime Minister Ecevit/Secretary Kissinger
August 12, 1974
5:26 PM

K: Here is the situation in Geneva. It is midnight there now.

E: No, it is 10:10 PM

K: At any rate, they cannot assemble them tonight but they promised me they would assemble them first thing inthe morning and have a reply for you tomorrow night.

E: Excuse me.

K: They will assemble them first thing in the morning and they will have a reply to you by the end of the day or night tomorrow. So you can do itwithin a 24 hour period.

E: Good. Thank you for your intervention. Gunes called and said they would go to a meeting at 10:00.

K: Marvos got instructions not to meet tonight. I have talked to Callaghan about this problem and he tells me the difficulty is this. He thinks Clerides can agree to a Principle of Geographic Separation but he can't agree to a principle of precise delimitation without ___for a___. He would be willing to work on the Principle of Geographic Separation and to set a two week deadline to work out the details.

E: On the whole thing, we can afford more time. I'm sure you understand the reason for it. ___work it out but the area adjacent to the zone we control there is a high concentration of Turkish population and before the coup that area to the west of our control zone was in control of the Turkish guards. So it is now.....

K: Which may be no problem. But it is politically impossible to do it in a rapid period. I would urge you to give Clerides an opportunity....

E: Can you do this? They are imprisoning our units there. They have laid mines all over the area; built-in installations and so forth. If you can convince them to get out of the area, to get their forces out of the area to a reasonable distance, then we can consider a few days more for a demarcation xxx line.

K: What is a reasonable distance?

E: Say 20 kilometers xxx or so. Beyond the range of artillery.

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K: Let me see about this.

E: The military danger should end and our military people will feel more at ~~ease~~ rest and we can discuss the demarcation line in a better spirit.

K: And would you agree you would not move forward?

E: Yes, providing they moved a reasonable distance.

K: From the demarcation line?

E: Yes.

K: OK. I'll be in touch with you about this first thing in the morning.

E: Thank you for your cooperation.

END

SC50 *

TELCON
Senator Humphrey/The Secretary
August 14, 1974
5:01 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

H: I have a couple of quick things I wanted to mention to you. I want to encourage you to attend that World Food Conference.

K: Absolutely. In Rome?

H: Yes.

K: In fact, I was going to ask you to join that too.

H: I think it is extremely important that we have you there. I had a visit today from the Ambassador from Bangladesh. Its a basket case. Are we going to have any official request from the Executive Branch for any disaster relief for these people?

K: Let me look into it. It certainly should be done.

H: I thought I would mention it to you.

K: I am most sympathetic.

H: In the House we are ready to act on that Rhodesia Chrome bill. A pleasant man. We need your help over in the House if this is going to pass. This can be done. I have talked to your representatives in the Department.

K: I will send some letters or a phone call. What do you think?

H: A phone call. They need to know that the administration wants it and I think ~~you~~ it is terribly important to have.

K: Who do I call?

H: In the House side?

K: Yes.

H: Rhodes is the Minority Leader. The House Committee has acted favorably on it. The big problem we have is the leadership. To make sure we have the right people leading it and the administration is solidly behind it.

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K: Let me begin by calling Tip O'Neil and John Rhodes.

H: I just wanted to put my oars in.

K: Ok. Thank you.

H: Goodbye.

END.

SC51 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Mr. Atherton/The Secretary
August 14, 1974
6:53 p.m.

K: How about having that Egyptian committee on Monday.

A: That doesn't give me any problems. It is just having it while Hussein is here. Is Fahmy going to be here.

K: He has agreed to stay.

A: We have offered the option to the Egyptians of a statement.

K: Well, you offered it without telling me about it.

A: We just suggested the possibility. We made it very clear it was not something that had been decided as a policy. They indicated they are very anxious to have something established. We indicated we would establish one. I think the main difficulty would be having... I think it would be impossible having both statements while Hussein is here.

K: Well, he won't be here on Monday.

A: No.

K: Let me tell Fahmy there may be a brief Jordanian statement too.

A: Ok.

END.

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DATE/CASE ID: 5 MAR 2003 200102979

SC64

RELEASED IN FU

TELCON
Prime Minister Ecevit/The Secretary
August 15, 1974
6:25 p.m.

K: Hello.

E: Hello.

K: How are you?

E: Secretary Kissinger this is Ecevit. Well I can give you an exact time for ~~it~~ tomorrow for the end of our operation 12:00 Noon New York time latest.

K: 12:00 Noon. Ok. Mr. Prime Minister can we inform the ~~Security~~ Secretary General of the UN of this?

E: Yes and we shall be available for talks at that time if necessary.

K: Ok.

E: Thank you very much.

K: Now Mr. Prime Minister may we inform the Greek Government and the Secretary General of the UN?

E: If you want we can also directly inform the Secretary General of the UN.

K: Give us a few hours and we will inform them then you can inform them.

E: Ok. Inform them before morning Turkish time. I suppose you know about the resolution at the Security Council.

K: Well I will try to avoid a vote on it.

E: Thank you very much Mr. Secretary.

K: Thank you.

END.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 6 MAR 2003 200102979

SC62 *

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
August 15, 1974
5:30 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I called Ecevit to try to stop military __but I don't have the time. I scared him with the Russian intervention.

S: You ~~xxxxxx~~ told him about the note?

K: Yes.

S: Good.

~~He~~K: He's going to call me back in an hour with a time.

S: I'll tell Wells to keep drafting that.

K: We have been reassuring the Greeks ____with 24 hours, but by that time it will certainly be within 12 hours.

S: OK.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 6 MAR 2003 200102979

SC57 *

TELCON
Eugene Rostow
Sec. Kissinger
August 15, 1974
3:00 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Gene, how are you?

R: All right. Yow are you?

K: Doing fine.

R: Good. I hope you are taking the shock of all these blows these past few months. I guess it is very painful for you.

K: It has been a very difficult thing.

R: Very. You have my sympathy.

K: The President appreciated the message you left for him.

R: Good. Now, my own good advice. There are two points I want to take up with you. One, I hope you will be able to consider this invitation to Ottawa -- be able to fit it in.

K: I ~~kki~~ am thinking about it very seriously.

R: I don't want to press you too hard. It is urgent but not as urgent as last year but it would be useful.

Let me also express my concern about the story that Gwertzman had last Monday about the course of the Middle East negotiatons.

K: What was that?

R: It seems to me that what he was saying that we are moving now toward a second round of military disengagment talks. Further withdrawals without clearcut peace agreements and it raised the flag in my mind that they were trying to press you into a repetition inch by ince of the pattern of the'57 withdrawal without clearcut peace agreements.

K: There is a big difference between peace agreements and commitments to certain actions that involve peace.

R: It all depends on what they are. We had all the commitments on earth in 1957 but they wre breakable and they were broken.

K: Every agreement is breakable.

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R: These were secret and passed confidentially and so on. It seemed to me...

K: I think the Israelis have to make up their mind on one or two things. If they don't want to discuss final borders they cannot have final peace. It is just impossible. The worst thing for Israel is to throw all of it into the same pot--borders, Palestine, Jerusalem. That is unbearable for Israel.

R: Why are they not willing to discuss final borders?

K: Because in practice they are not. They don't want to make another move with Syria. They don't want to discuss--they basically are not...

R: The experience I had with the thing of course -- 242 always contemplated in the beginning that there would be an agreement to move in certain stages. The idea of a time table was Egyptian not Israeli and that there would be an overall agreement and pursuant to that stage by stage various things would happen -- withdrawal, political etc.

K: The point is the Gwertzman story was not accurate anyway. There is no point in debating that. I think it is very hard to discuss that in abstract. What is meant by peace agreement; what is meant by breakable; what is meant by various things.

R: It is and on the phone too. I will be down on the 26th. Will you be in town?

K: What day is that?

R: Monday.

K: Almost certainly.

R: I have to make a speech that morning. Could I drop by in the afternoon.

K: Absolutely. Let's talk then.

END

SC58

RELEASED IN FULL *

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
August 15, 1974
3:30 PM

(Missed first part)

K: Can we find out?

S: It's just coming up, I put in a ___. I hope we have an answer for you by 4:30.

K: The cable I was going to send to the Greeks about what the Turks have told me. Has it gone out?

S: No, it has not. Wells was doing it...

K: We have to speed up our work, but in the future. When it takes 15 minutes to get xxxxx done, it should be sent out by 3:30, particularly when it's night in Greece.

S: That's fair enough.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 5 MAR 2003 200102979

SC69 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
August 16, 1974
1:00 PM

K: I was going to try and see you later today but I understand you're leaving.

D: I can leave at quarter of 6 to give you more time.

K: Why don't you come in at 4:00.

D: And I'll go from your office to the airport.

K: Is that better?

D: The earlier the better.

K: It's the only time I can do it but then you have trouble getting in touch with Israel.

D: I can get in touch with Shalev and he gets in touch with Israel.

K: OK.

END.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 6 MAR 2003 200102979

5094 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin/Secy Kissinger
10:45 a.m., August 17, 1974

D: Hello.

K: Anatol.

D: Oh, hello, Henry. I think you were still dancing all night.

[Laughter] Well, well, I'm really glad to hear your voice. How is Nancy?

K: [redacted] B6

D:

K:

D:

K:

D:

K:

D:

K: Anatol, I am sending over an interim answer on that Cyprus thing.

D: Yeah. Is it offidal text or just your oral explanation, so to speak.

K: An oral explanation.

D: So what is it about? We are going tomorrow to make joint intervention in Cyprus?

K: Absolutely.

D: I thinkit will be very nice.

K: We just want to get your -- If you send us the disposition of your forces in southemRussia, we will the n give you an advice on how to do it.

D: I think you'd even want our disposition in the north? Not in the south of Russia.

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DATE/CASE ID: 12 MAY 2004 200102979

K: Why in the north?

D: For us it's much more easier to jump over -- you know, when you have a [missile] along the range, it's very difficult to use it on a short range. It is better to go all right, so our divisions there used to use a _____ that goes for 10,000 kilometers, not three or two.

[Laughter]

K: Okay, Anatol, I'll send it over.

D: You will send with your messenger?

K: Yeah.

D: What is the main idea, just without arguing the question.

K: Well, the main idea is that we are willing to exchange ideas --

D: Yeah. About original guarantees, you mean?

K: Well, at the UN.

D: Yeah.

K: And maybe do some parallel things, but not necessarily joint right now.

D: . . [inaudible 3-4 words] . . . But, in general, Henry, the idea of now that you know that is's really quiet -- Will you not, I mean, I gather or I understand there are some difficulties in the UN, but including you and me too maybe to have certain kind of guarantees after they have settled their problems where there will be unfinancial (?) . . . [inaudible] . . I don't know. Those kinds of things.

K: Well, let's exchange some more ideas on that.

D: You propose something or you're just saying in a sense --

K: No, we're proposing to continue the exchange of ideas.

D: Of ideas. There at the United Nations?

K: We haven't really thought it completely through yet.

D: I understand. So it's your answer still saying that we will continue on in next week, yeah?

K: Exactly.

D: Because as I mentioned to you, some of my people . . . very tough. They have the idea that well, why don't we in a friendly way do something together. You see, there is real politics and there is certain [laughs] -- which sometimes which maybe you, I mean, off-the-record, don't quite understand. Some really have good intentions saying: It's rather simple. Why we shouldn't sit down and do something which will be really wonderful things for both so we have good personal relations on a top level. You understand?

K: Yeah.

D: So this sometimes happens. It's not really any specific tricks or not. So this is just on background I'm saying. Well, I will look through it and send immediately to Moscow for Brezhnev and Gromyko.

K: Right.

D: But the idea of continuation of ....., yes? I mean, the idea of exchanging of views.

K: Right.

D: Of views?

K: Right.

D: Henry, you're not going anywhere. I heard somewhere that you are planning to go somewhere outside Washington or for the time being here?

K: I'm staying here.

D: Next week too?

K: Oh, yeah. Oh, that idea of Cyprus -- total nonsense!

D: Well, this is the point. I heard that you're going there just to shuttle in between.

K: No, look, I can't make a joke anymore. I was walking through the hall of the State Department when a newsman came up to me and he said: Are you going to Cyprus? I said, "What I want is to shuttle between Nicosia and Limassol."

D: Laughter.

K: And I thought this was so absurd so they write, "Kissinger is going to Cyprus."

D: Yes. Good think you didn't say exactly between where you are going to shuttle.

K: Well, because they probably didn't know where either place was.

D: Laughter.

K: There is no intention whatsoever of my going to Cyprus.

D: Yeah, I understand.

K: What would I do on Cyprus?

D: No, no, I agree with you. I was surprised very much because on the radio I heard that you --

K: Anatol, when I go some place, it is usually prepared. I don't go to a place where I don't know what I'm going to find.

D: That's why exactly because you go there and many feel that it's a chance of rather great success. But once you stay there and be involved in this --

K: Well, or maybe even I get caught in a slow process like last time in the Syria-Israeli thing.

D: That's true.

K: But I won't go unless I know what the possible outcome can be.

D: This is true. I know this is exactly -- you're using I think the only right [exit] . . not ours but to know where you go.

K: The conditions are absolutely not right for my going to Cyprus.

D: This is my impression too. That's why I was (laughter) surprised.

K: Absolute nonsense. Okay.

D: Okay, Henry.

K: Thank you.

D: Bye, bye.

SC77 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELECON
Foreign Minister Fahmy (NYC)/The Secretary
August 17, 1974
4:38 p.m.

K: Ismail, King Hussein is delaying his departure so he can greet you at the airport.

F: (Laughter) [redacted] B6

K: [redacted]

F: I got a message from Cairo and he would like me to give him by tomorrow all the details about Marwan's business and the exact delivery times.

K: I will have the answer Monday or Tuesday.

F: I must have them Monday.

K: You want the delivery times?

F: Yes.

K: I will have them for you.

F: Good.

K: I will see you on Monday. Goodbye.

END.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 22 APR 2003 200102979

SC79 *

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
President Clerides/Kissinger
8/19/74; 8:21 a.m.

K: Hello.

C: Hello, Excellency, this is Clerides speaking.

K: How are you?

C: I'm terribly sorry, Your Excellency, that our first conversation has to be under such circumstances, and there has been an attack on the United States Embassy.

K: Yes, I know about it.

C: And Roger Davies lost his life.

K: I know.

C: I cannot but express my bitter sorrow and to him I have already issued a public statement to that effect. Roger Davies took all necessary measures to protect the United States Embassy in Cyprus and the American citizens there in the Republic. I am grieved because not only the United States has lost an Ambassador, but I have lost a precious friend.

K: Well, Mr. President, we understand that this was out of your control, and you are quite correct, Roger Davies was a friend and the United States thinks of itself as a friend of yourself and of what you are trying to do.

C: I rushed as soon as the news reached me. I entered the Embassy under fire and bring out . . . . .

K: Well, I understand, Mr. President. But the only thing I would ask is that the deliberate effort to blame the United States for what has happened is one of the contributing causes to this situation, and if we are to play a useful role, which we are eager to do, we cannot do it under this sort of pressure. And so we are asking all responsible Greek leaders to stop the anti-American agitation or we will withdraw completely from the negotiations, and leave it to be settled directly between Greeks and Turks.

C: [redacted] That's what . . .

K: Well, in that case there has to be an end to this agitation.

C: I will do my utmost to press upon the people that there is no reason to show hostility whatsoever against the United States. Today I had a press conference for everything that happened and I stated the United States had exerted a lost of pressure to prevent the Turkish Army from attacking.

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K: Exactly.

C: And I will continue bringing all Ican to prevent any anti-American feelings or any Anti-American demonstrations in Cyprus.

K: We are prepared, as Mr. Davies must have told you yesterday, to use our influence to produce the most favorable outcome and to use our influence to bring about a change in the present disposition of forces. But we cannot do this under the pressure of anti-Americansim.

C: I only appreciate the position you have just explained. Roger spoke to me last night about the points you have mentioned and I was today going to elaborate. But unfortunately for him it is too late.

K: Well, Mr. President, no one can blame you for this horrible tragedy. And we have supported you from the beginning and we will continue to support you.

C: Thank you.

K: But there are certain realities which you also must take into account which I have outlined to you.

C: Yes, I know.

K: And we will say the same thing in Athens.

C: Well, I am completely aware of the reality of the situation, and I feel because I was aware of the realities that I was fine. . . . . I will continue doing my best so that together we can work a reasonable solution to the Cyprus problem.

K: Right. And Mr. President we will do the same and I may send out a replacement in the next day or two so that we have a senior diplomat on the spot.

C: I will be very grateful if this is done. First of all it will help us all to have a senior diplomat here, and also because if . . . . . .

K: Yes, but there can be no question about the fact, and I'm not saying this to you, that if these attitudes continue in Athens and Cyprus, then we will just wash our hands of the whole thing.

C: I fully realize and you can rest assured that I will do everything, even publicly to prevent any anti-Americansim in Cyprus.

K: Good. Thank you very much for calling, Mr. President, and I hope we will have the opportunity to meet very soon.

C: I look forward to our meeting in America.

K: And you can count on me as a friend.

C: Well, you can count that in Cyprus you have both a friend and admirer.

K: Thank you, Mr. President.

C: Thank you. Good-bye.

K: Good-bye.

SC98 *

TELCON
Mr. Hartman/The Secretary
August 19, 1974
8:20 P.M.

RELEASED IN FULL

H: Sykes says they have no response back as yet. They expected one this afternoon, but it hasn't come in yet.

K: They are _____ another statement?

H: Yes.

K: On that CSCE I have looked over those cables you wanted me to send. Are they still acute?

H: That is so far in the past, I will have to look over them again.

K: Isn't something on which we are going to fall on our swords.

H: Ok, we will do that.

K: Good.

END.

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SC85 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
PM Ecevit/Secretary Kissinger
August 19, 1974
12:10

E. We have prepared for your consideration a text. May I dictate it to someone.

K: The text I am going to read? Go ahead.

E: The Turkish Government is reaffirming their commitment to the principle of timely and phased recution of forces as stipulated in the Geneva Conference on July 30..when conditions allos..(inaudible) the Turkish Prime Minister has declared publicly August 17 that the Turkish Government would be prepared to negotiate the demarcation line of the area that should remain under Turkish rule and he hopes that Turkey would not be.....(inaudible) about retaining all of the territory but it should be (inaudible) in an atmosphere conducive to developing and securing for all on the Island and negotiate for a final solution in a constructive spirit without delay. This should be a framework, if acceptable to you.

K: May I make a suggestion? What I am going to say is not a diplomatic document. It is an attempt to get control of events here. I think, for present purposes, it is enough if I can say that part of what you say about _____to hope.

E: Excuse me, I couldn't understand.

K: I should not refer to you public statement. I should put it on the basis that you have confirmed this to me. Secondly, I can say the gist of this but I think we should leave out all this about terrorism. The major point is to give people a face-saving excuse to get them back to the Conference. I should say that I have been given to understand that you will not insist on holding all the territory for Turkish autonomous rule.

E: I should tell you that...

K: The details I think we should leave to the negotiations.

E: What I am after is....

K: You shouldn't be asked to go beyond what you have given us before the Turkish operation began...not beyond that border that you give before the operation started.

E: I have shown the line to Macomber.

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K: What you said about the reduction..I can say..according to the Geneva Conference.

E: Timely and phased.

K: What I would like to say about the terrorism is that we do not believe, that is, I would say we do not believe that the territory not being held by Turkey should be put in the Turkish autonomous zone and we have been given to understand that in a negotiation Turkey would not insist on on that.

E: Say the Turkish Government would be prepared to negotiate the final demarcation.

K: I may put it that way, but I think for our public opinion it would be helpful to make you appear conciliatory.

E: I understand, but after the terrorist acts here, the public opinion has become fierce also.

K: I will say that the Turkish Government has assured me that they consider the demarcation line negotiable.

E: That's right. To a certain extent; to a reasonable extent.

K: Ok.

E: Alright, thank you and my condolences again.

END

SC92 *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Ambassador Anderson/The Secretary
August 19, 1974
5:18 p.m.

K: Are we taking press with us tomorrow?

A: No because you are going on a Jet Star and there are only six places. The only one of our regulars I know is going to be donw there in advance is Barry Schweib.

K: Do you want to take him along?

A: Well, you don't have any room sir. Is that ok?

K: Ok.

END.

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SC91 *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador McCloskey/Secretary Kissinger
August 19, 1974
4:45 PM

K: Did you go over with the British what I was going to say?

M: I gave them a rough sense of it. You were still working on it.

K: You had the text ?

M: I gave them the text. I called Sykes earlier and he sent someone over to get the text.

K: Were they unhappy?

M: I haven't had a response. As I went into the briefing with you he took it and went off. Sykes, was grateful that I called him in advance.

K: Yes.

M: I can call and get his reaction if you like.

K: Why don't you call and find out if there is any reaction in London.

M: OK. You remember that piece sent you before you went down, that's no problem. Are you getting some reaction?

K: Schlesinger asked what the British intention was.

M: OK. I'll check with Sykes.

END

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SC1Ø2*

TELCON
Cyrus Vance/The Secretary
August 21, 1974
7:45 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Cy, how are you?

V: I am ok, how are you?

K: Somebody told me you were upset because you heard that I said what you did in '67 was wrong. I can't believe you thought this because it isn't our view and nobody could possibly have said this.

V: That's ~~is~~ a distortion. Somebody said to me that they thought it was being said.

K: What we said was that the conditions are not the conditions of '67.

V: I agree.

K: That's the point we ~~xxxxxxxx~~ had been making. That doesn't mean '67 was wrong. Just that under the conditions we faced no acceptable government in Cyprus and a new Greek government...

V: What I had said was that I think it was a mistake this time recognizing the situation was different not to immediately have jumped in with support of the British position because that was the only thing that would keep the Greeks from moving.

K: But we substantially supported the British position.

V: But that never came through.

K: But the Turks knew it. That was the problem entering the first week. I think once Samson was in there the Turks saw an opening to do what they had missed in '67. We were ready to support almost everything in the British position. They were doing it openly and we were not doing it publicly on the theory that some Greek government would have to swallow it.

V: My position was that not doing it publicly....

K: That is a technical disagreement. We will never be able to prove it. It was never doubtful that we wanted to get rid of Sampson and we did it. Just say we were aloof. Maybe yes and maybe no but in it coincided with one week of a Presidential resignation and

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one week of a transition.

V: I have said that to everybody.

K: Compounded by the fact that we have been extremely forebearing with the British. They insisted that they had the problem solved. They did not want us to send anybody to Geneva. We did not realize until Monday that there was going to be a blowup. Callaghan had made some x threatening statements. I had k put forward a proposal that I thought the Turks would accept. Callaghan went through the roof that I put forward a proposal so that made the Greeks reject it.

V: I understand and I know there are always a thousand reasons.

K: One reason for calling you is that I want you to know I did not believe you were wrong in '67 and secondly that we were not saying this.

V: Somebody told me this had been said out of your office and I did not believe it.

K: Inconceivable. I believe there are now possibilities for working together that were not there two weeks ago.

V: Absolutely. Anything I can do to help you I will. If we have had disagreements, we have always discussed them. All you have to do is call on me and I would be delighted to help.

K: Good. Cy, why don't we have lunch next time you are in town? Will you call me?

V: I certainly will.

K: Good. Nice to talk to you.

V: Goodbye.

END.

SC1403 *

TELCON
Edward Klein/The Secretary
August 21, 1974
3:10 P.M.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

HAK: Ok and you?

K: Fine. I just spoke to Arnold de Borchgrove in Athens who had a long interview with Ambassador Taska. Apparently the interview is being sent to you for clearances and one of the reasons I called in the hope you would clear this interview for Newsweek in the coming week. I don't know if you have had the chance to read it.

HAK: No, what's the basic point?

K: It's an apologia.
For
HAK: /Him or for me?

K: For him.

HAK: We have not reached the point where my colleagues start defending their job.

K: Not yet. I think he makes a number of interesting points of what he considers to be the illegal _____. It might be useful for it to be published.

HAK: I didn't know he gave an interview.

KK: I guess it hasn't arrived in your office yet. You know our communications are quicker than yours.

HAK: I'll certainly not hold it up. I'll either clear it or not but I'll approach it with the attitude to clear it.

K: Fine. The other thing is, I gather a mutual friend of mine and yours was at dinner the other night and made a representation for me. She was very reluctant and embarrased to do it.

HAK: If you're going to get me jealous, I'll never do it.

K: You're not allowed to be jealous any more.

HAK: No, not just to give the effect. She talked to me about it

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and it changed what would have been a flat ⊠ no to my thinking about it. If I do it for you, I'll have to do it for the others. But I'm thinking about it sympathetically.

K: I think it might be useful to have a straight forward stand toward it on the record with you. It doesn't have to have a story to get with it. Just your own words. I would also like to say unofficially though, I realize there's a very important moment in American history and if there's anything I can do, I'm at your disposal.

HAK: I appreciate it. I'll see if I can do it within the next two or three weeks. I tried to outline in the speech yesterday some directions in foreign policy. That's not a substitute for an interview. But I didn't make much affect.

K: Yes, I saw the...

HAK: KWhy don't you check with me in a few days.

K: All right, sir.

END.

SC 109*

TELECON
Foreign Minister Rabasa
August 22, 1974
5:55 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

R: Fine. I read your fine speech in Miami. I was happy too because you mentioned Latin America.

K: I am glad you noticed it.

R: You know, Henry, it is very awkard in your ...and mind because you know my President wants me to speak with you on many things but I knot that you were tremendously engaged with big pressures but I know you will always be busy until you are writing your memoirs and even then.

K: Which will make you famous.

R: I am counting on that. So I thought I would go up there next week .

K: Good.

R: Would you say Thursday or Friday.

K: Not Friday. Thursday would be good.

R: Thursday would be good. Ok. At what time?

K: Let's say at 11:30.

R: In the morning.

K: 11:30 in the morning.

R: On Thursday, ok. At your office. Ok

K: Looking forward to see you.

END

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SC107 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
George Meany/Secretary Kissinger
August 22, 1974
2:39 PM

M: I wanted to talk to you sometime in the next few days about this maritime ~~xxxxx~~ situation and was wondering when you'd be free. Will you be around next week?

K: Certainly.

M: Could I come over Wednesday?

K: I don't have my schedule but we'll do it next Wedneday. What's the maritime situation?

M: On this thing about getting 20% of ~~xxx~~ oil _____
I'm sure you're familiar with that.

K: Wednesday. 4:00 alright?

M: 4:00 is fine. I'll be in.

K: I look forward to it.

END

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SC119*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/The Secretary
August 23, 1974
3:15 p.m.

K: Can you get that straight for me?

S: Should we do it through the Embassy here? The other way is to call (Kinkle) in Genscher's office.

K: Do it through the Embassy.

S: St...isn't __. I sent you a note in regard to Giscard.

K: But that's changed.

S: I would think that has changed. Ok, early September.

K: Or set it up for the last half of September, early October.

S: Ok.

END.

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SC123 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Roy Atherton/The Secretary
August 24, 1974
1:50 p.m.

K: Roy, we've got to do a message to Fahmy and Sadat and give them some sense of what happened.

A: Right, I am drafting them now.

K: And what we told them so they don't get confused.

A: I think we ought to do one to Hussein also.

K: When will I get these messages because I will be leaving soon.

A: How long will you be here?

K: Another half hour. Then I am going to Camp David for the weekend.

A: Let me get the Sadat one right up to you. That is more important. The other one can even wait a bit.

K: Ok.

END.

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SC136 *

TELECON
Ambassador Anderson/The Secretary
August 27, 1974
7:45 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B5, B6

K: Did you have a chance to ~~ex~~ run down that story?

A: With Newsweek? Yes. I got hold of _____.

[redacted] B5, B6

I knocked the other ~~ex~~ one down mainly by saying that there has first of all the subject has never even arisen. You have never even had any thought of writing your memoires. In early '73 before you came over to State you thought there was a possibility of leaving the government at that time and you might have though about it, but that was all. I said at that time several firms contacted Carl and he listened. He never said anything. ~~N~~ He never did any commercializing and that if they wanted to send something in and they ~~x~~ did and they are all on file. And that you probably didn't even know about some of them.

K: That's right. And you explained that?

A: I explained all that.

K: Ok. Good.

A: Ok?

K: Good.

A: Goodbye, sir.

END.

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SC141 *

TELECON
Hal Saunders/The Secretary
August 28, 1974
6:10 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hal, under no circumstances can the Egyptians publish our letter.

S: I agree. I saw that telegram and I think we just have to go back and say as he knows this is a very confidential exchange.

K: Just tell ~~them~~ him as I explained it affects our wheat prices and I did it as a special favor for them and as soon as they can publish it, I will let them know.

S: Ok. I'll get a cable up for your approval.

K: Good.

END.

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SC131 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Tom Pappas (Athens)
Sec. Kissinger
August 27, 1974
11:25 a.m.

K: Hello. How are you?

P: Fine sir. How are you?

K: O.K.

P: Sorry to bother you but I would like very very much to come to the States this week and to have the opportunity to see you just for a few minutes. I think it is very important. I am seeing Averoff tonight and tomorrow Karamanlis and I would appreciate to see you on Thursday or Friday.

K: I am leaving town on Friday.

P: Can I come Thursday, Mr. Secretary?

K: Would you call Mr. Eagleburger Thursday morning.

P: I shall come to the States and I will call him Thursday morning.

K: I will see you Thursday or Friday morning.

P: What is the number?

K: 632-0968 or the White House.

P: I know that number --456-1414.
What is the name?

K: Eagleburger.

P: Thank you very very much.

K: I will try my best to see you Friday, if I cannot see you Thursday.

P: I will be there.

END

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SC 151 *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Minister Shalev/Secretary Kissinger
August 30, 1974
12:52 PM

S: Hello?

K: Mr. Minister.

S: How are you? Thank you for calling. We are very concerned about the road in Syrians are constructing to reach the ___, which is in contradiction ~~xx~~ of the disengagement agreement and creates a new military situation there. I passed this on Wednesday to Mr. Saunders and I've since received further ones. Now approaching the summit to a distance up to 400 meters and we are asking your intervention.

K: We will do that.

S: Did you get to read ~~xx~~ Allon's....

K: I thought it was very good.

S: I passed it on to General Scowcroft yesterday at your suggestion.

K: OK.

END

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SC157 *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Paul Ziffren/The Secretary
September 5, 1974
6:46 p.m.

K: Paul, I have been trying to reach you for half an hour and now I have to run.

Z: Let me know when you have a chance because I wanted to talk to you about coming out to the World _____ Conference when you have a chance.

K: Good. Keep me informed and maybe we can work something out.

Z: Ok.

END.

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SC 154 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
9/5/74 - 12:44 p.m.
Art Hartman - Henry Kissinger

H: Yes sir.

K: Art, are you familiar with the discussions with the Germans about the Schmidt visit?

H: I wasn't until breakfast.

K: OK. Do you know the _____.

H: Just what I learned at breakfast that you're aiming for the 11th and 12th.

K: Well, will you check with Sonnenfeldt.

H: Yes, he's at this JCS meeting all day but I'll get him over there.

K: If you could interrupt running the Pentagon for a few minutes.

H: OK.

K: OK. Right.

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SC158 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Bill Colby/The Secretary
September 5, 1974
6:35 p.m.

K: Bill, Sy Herst just called Larry with a statement he has all the committee material on Allende with regard to the 40 and that most of the stuff he claims he got from CIA.

C: Oh, sure.

K: Where else did he get it?

C: Well, I don't know.

K: He says we had $1.5 million set aside to overthrow Allende.

C: He could have gotten this from two or three different places.

K: Like where?

C: We had to give a detailed breakdown to McClellen. Nedsy we had to give a report to.

K: To who?

C: Nedsy, the Chairman of our House Committee.

K: He claims he has notes from me and the 40 committee.

C: From you?

K: Yes.

C: I don't know if we have that memo around like that.

K: And that the Agency people are claiming I am the biggest threat to democracy. Do you have any idea how much money was spent?

C: I have a detailed breakdown of it.

K: How much is it?

C: You are in the $6 million category. But $500-600,000 was spent...

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K: That's my recollection.

C: We authorized more but didn't use it. We gave some to other groups.

K: Didn't we give some money to keep it alive?

C: Yes. But I have all those figures. I will get them out.

K: Can you get them to me by tomorrow morning?

C: Do you want me to show up tomorrow morning? I will if you do.

K: No. You will have to show up maybe on Saturday.

C: I will get xx all the figures for you by 8:30.

K: Good. Thank you.

C: I will try to get hold of Hersh and see what he has.

K: Ok. Thank you.

END.

SC168 *

TELECON
Max Fischer/The Secretary
September 7, 1974
6:11 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

Not on first part.
F: I don't know how you felt about it. I spent quite a bit of time overseas.
K
K: What don't you know about?

F: I always hate to bother you.

K: NO, no.

F: I spent ten hours over there.

K: People told me you were very supportive and I appreciate it.

F: ...on radio and tv and in this country. If you want to have any report of this...Any nuances I will be happy to sit down and ~~xxx~~ talk about it.

K: My problem is that my schedule is unmanageable. I would like to sit down with you.

F: I would be papred to come in tomorrow.

K: Where are you?

F: I am in Detroit. If you are busy now and would like to call me some other time, that's ok.

K: I will just have to see....

F: I think its....

K: No, no. I do want to see you.

F: I know that.

K: The only problem is to find the time to do it.

F: There is only 24 hours in a day. I am available on Sunday and Monday. Wednesday and Thursday. You have a lot of visitors coming in.

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K: The one thing the Israelis have to get into their heads is I have had it. Any more attacks and I will ~~xx~~ .... The press is atrocious. What the hell have we done?

F: I think if you get a little bit of the background of what I have to show you and what I can tell you...I understand how you feel. On the other hand, in discussing this with people who are newspaper...By the way, Henry, very warm regards from Golda.

K: She is terrific.

F: The people on the inside and the people on the outside...on the outside they are very supportive. I had a press conference and one of the things they were talking about...sending a group over the Ameri ca. I said they better stay home and take care of unity in their own country.

K: Yes.

F: Even inside the ~~xxxx

SC 171 1*

TELECON
Ambassador Tyler/ Secretary Kissinger
September 7, 1974
1:25

RELEASED IN FULL

K: (Missed first part) if the talks resumed we would probably announce Bruce as our man. I mentioned this to you, but I didn't understand if you knew you could mention it.

T: No, I didn't know that.

K: Also, I want you to know that I did tell Ramsbotham on a personal and confidential basis, but I pledged him to secrecy.

T: Ok, I won't say anything.

K: I wouldn't necessarily tell that to the Greeks. You can mention the Bruce thing.

T: Should I say that we hope to have David Bruce?

K: Say I hope to and I am confident we can get him..

T: Ok, Henry.

K: And if you would stress the general idea that we would be willing to wrap it up in a general negotiation . Bill, all the best to you. I am delighted to have you as a colleague again.

T: Thank you so much.

END

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SC165 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELECON
Mr. Enders/The Secretary
September 7, 1974
12:22 p.m.

E: Art Hummel has had word from Ortona that Italy has been invited to the meeting of Finance Ministers that is taking place. That sets up a difficult situation for your meeting on the 28th.

K: Yes.

E: Simon's briefing was simply to encourage others to see what ought to be done about the problem.

K: We have not approached anyone with it yet, so why don't we wait with it? Simon is not doing any inviting for the 28th is he?

E: No but he was going to talk about the possibility of...

K: I didn't understand he was going to do that.

E: Well...

K: There couldn't have been a misunderstanding [redacted] B6

E: He has already told the Finance Ministers there will be a meeting.

K: That's right then I will tell the Foreign Ministers.

E: What attitude should I take with the Italians? Should he discuss it?

K: I would think not. But we cannot exclude the Italians as the others have already invited them.

E: There does not have to be any connection between the two.

K: Unless it is set up while I am there.

E: It may be very hard to keep the Italians out.

K: That may be but since we have not formally approached any other foreign ministers, can't we keep it in abeyance until Monday?

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E: Yes.

K: Tell Simon not to formalize it. Tell him to get his Finance Ministers together minus the Italians.

E: Ok.

END.

SC169 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6.

TELECON
Dean Brown/The Secretary
September 7, 1974
6:03 p.m.

K: I didn't want you to think I had hung up... [redacted] B6

Have you done anything about the appearance of this building? The lobby? I don't want this building to look like a goddamn factory when you come in. I want that desk to look a little better. Then I want some art work.

B: We went down to look at the flags the other day and noticed we have five flags out of date.

K: I want that lobby so you feel you are in a distinguished building.

B: What about that statue down there?

K: Which one?

B: The one that looks like the guy is holding two meatballs. Its awful.

K: I don't care about that. You can replace it with a cast of me. I have no interest in that but I have an interest in _____. What are you going to do about these various streamlining proposals you were working on.

B: I have some study groups going on them. You have to give me a little time on it. I'll have it in a week or so.

K: Ok. Two weeks then.

B: Yes, sir.

END.

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SC 1706 1*

TELECON
Mr. Maw/The Secretary
September 7, 1974
5:56 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B5, B6

K: Carl, are you trying to double your salary by performing both as Legal Counselor and Under Secretary?

M: Well, maybe if I get overtime.

K: I know how greedy you are. If it wasn't for me you never would be making that salary. What are we doing about the replacement?

M: I have two or three people in mind. [redacted] B5, B6
[redacted] B5, B6

K: Like who?

M: I have one in New York, one here in Washington by the name of [redacted] B5, B6

K: Who in New York?

M: I am trying to get ____.

K: If you mention [redacted] I will throw you both out the window. B5, B6

M: No, but he has a good partner [redacted] B5, B6

K: Nancy has mentioned [redacted] B5, B6

M: How well does she know him.

K: Not at all. But anyone in her father's law firm...She says he has a brilliant mind.

M: He probably does. We have a little problem. [redacted] B5, B6
[redacted] B5, B6

K: [redacted] I want somebody in your d ass. B5, B6
He would never become a partner in Debevoise.

M: I know what you want. I am having trouble finding someone.

K: Is he going to be ~~xxxx~~ good in Latin America?

M: Yes. If not we will make him Legal Adviser.

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Mr. Maw - 2.

K: Do you think he will be good?

M: Yes. ~~He would~~ I will have something for you next week.

K: Good. Thank you.

END.

SC167 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELECON
Secretary Lynn/The Secretary
September 7, 1974
10:15 a.m.

K: Hello, how are you?

L: Fine. I checked up on your friend [redacted]. He is represented from about all the different sources working with my man to be extremely able, very bright, well regarded by the Japanese, for whom he has done quite a bit of work. From one source whom I trust very much, he wonders if he would be tactful enough. Sometimes he comes on too strong. It seems it is in particular from a very high degree of self-confidence. One person who was they key man to make the calls for me...who is your ____ with [redacted] He said clearly that in his mind [redacted] would be the better candidate. [redacted] B6 B6 B6 B6

K: If looks got us places, few of us would be in the right position.

L: That's right. I am the only one I know of.

K: What company is he with?

L: He's about to leave the [redacted] He is Senior Vice President of the [redacted] which is the holding company of [redacted]. The only shortcoming with [redacted] is too much self-confidence, which shows itself when he is talking. But that could be death with you. B6 B6 B6 B6

K; That's right.

L: Another thing, my friend, when are you going to send me to China?

K: There are only 26 Cabinet members who want to go who have no interest.

L: I know, but I thought once you heard of my interest, that that would move me to the top of the list.

K: You're right. I didn't know you wanted to go.

L: I do.

K: I'll look into it. Let me see.

END.

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SC181 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Hartman/Secretary Kissinger
September 9, 1974
12:11

K: He must have misunderstood. I don't want direct talks with Karamanlis and Ecevit.

H: I think that came out alright in the end. He must have mentioned it as a possibility.

K: It was never a possibility. My suggestion was that I meet Karamanlis and Ecevit separately as an interim.

H: I agree.

K: But that does not come across to me.

H: I'll tell him we agree with that and that my idea is, there could be a meeting between me and Karamanlis and me and Ecevit on separate days in the same city, say Rome, or any other place he prefers, or Vienna and alternatively, I could come to any place in Greece, besides Athens.

H: I think the other is much better.

K: Will you suggest that?

H: OK.

K: Otherwise, I could do it with Marvos and Gunes at the UN, but be specific.

H: OK.

"

END

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SC 191 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/The Secretary
September 11, 1974
5:21 P.M.

K: ...evidence of the destruction of Kunitra.

S: I was told about it, particularly since there was 90%, then it was down to 50.

K: On the 15th of November, 1973, it was down to 50%, now they have it up to 90%.

S: It's obvious what Rabin was saying at lunch was not true.

K: I will show it to him, and see what he says.

S: That's probably ~~xxx~~ true, that was from the destruction, Henry.

K: Ok.

S: Thank you.

END.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
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SC193 *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sonnenfeldt
Sec. Kissinger
5:40 p.m.
Sept. 11, 1974

K: ...I thought the Germans had been told it was off.

S: They have been.

K: On the 11th.

S: He asked if November was out and I said yes. He said he assumes December and I said I assume so but we would be in contact. He asked me about a Washington Post story about a visit from Giscard in January.

K: Giscard now wants his in Dec.

S: I know but I did not think I should tell him that. I assume Schmidt knows that from Giscard.

S: He has been told and he knows October is finished.

K: O.K.

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SC195 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Edward Klein/Secretary Kissinger
September 11, 1974
11:21 AM

K: We talked about my giving you a __this week with a possibility of me coming over to see you.

HAK: Did you want it on record or background?

K: On the record. So much has happened in the last year or few months in the whole area of foreign policy, which is what we want to get you on the record with. We can do this in any format you wanted. We simply do it as an approved text.

HAK: Let me talk to Bob McCloseky about it and I'll get back to you ~~x~~ in a few days. I'm more inclined to do it on a background basis.

K: I understand and I would like to talk to you and it would be useful as far as our (readers) are concerned. I'm open to any suggestion. It's a very unsettling period now.

HAK: When you think you have it quiet, the God-damn thing comes up again.

K: I'm drafting a note to our foreign correspondent and ___. We have put Watergate behind us____. Anyway, I appreciate you calling me back.
the end
HAK: I'll definitely be back to you by ~~early~~ next week.

K: OK.

HAK: Good.

END

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SC200 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Kaul/The Secretary
September 12, 1974
3:04 P.M.

HAK: How are you?

K: Very well, thank you. I got in touch with the Foreign Minister at the UN. He's giving a dinner for the President of the UN General Assembly on the 19th. It should be possible for him to be here and be here by 4:00 or 4:30 at the White House. Is that all right?

HAK: Let's aim for that.

K: About half past four. And you later, are they firm now?

HAK: I'll let you know within 24 hours.

K: I hope there will be a change.

HAK: It would only be a question of 24 hours.

K: I extended an invitation to Secretary Simon to visit India. He said to mention it to you.

HAK: I have no objection.

K: So, he said it I would mention it to you.

HAK: I have no objection.

K: We have recommended also the name of M. E. Kaul, no relation of mine, (who is financing ___ ___) for the new developmental committee they're setting up I mentioned it to Secretary Simon. Am I seeing you on Saturday?

HAK: I'll let you know later today or first thing in the morning.

K: Ok. Thank you.

END.

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SC197 *
RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Congressman Hays
9/12/74; 10:51 a.m.

H: . . . from New York asking them to get behind the Rosenthal resolution to cut off aid to Turkey.

K: Okay, thank you.

H: I told him no God-damn way and I said if you keep fooling around like that and what the Turks are going to do if that resolution passes and we kick them in the teeth and I said they are going to take the whole island. All of it and I said then you will just be in exile and you won't have a job anymore.

K: Good.

H: I thought you ought to know that. I don't know what you can do about it but I wanted you to be aware.

K: No, no, I appreciate it. I will do something about it.

H: Okay.

K: Many thanks, Wayne.

H: Sure.

K: Bye.

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SC2705 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/The Secretary
September 13, 1974
6:22 P.M.

K: Hal.

S: Yes.

K: Where do we stand on that meeting on the 28th?

S: I have been waiting to hear from you on it.

K: Is it fixed the Germans can't come?

S: I don't think Genscher can come and they were really hoping you could find another date.

K: That is almost impossible. I feel I have to go along on that date.

S: Have you heard from the British?

K: They can't come either.

S: They want to hear about the Von Staden and Gromyko visit.

K: What's to understand about it? They have to understand it did not go all that well.

S: I will tell them when I escort them out. I will tell them there is no other time.

K: Don't encourage them to think about December.

S: Ok.

END.

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SC204 *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Senator Packwood/Secretary Kissinger
September 13, 1974
4:10 PM

K: How are you?

P: Fine, thank you.

K: You called me.

P: I called you and then I got hold of Lin Holton. I was asking him when you were speaking at the Republic Caucus and if I ~~xxxx~~ could have you afterwards and he said he already had to rearrange your schedule. He said are they already to go and I said yes. Just to chat for 3 or 4 minutes and he said yes, there's time.

K: What is that for -- campaign?

P: Yes.

K: I'll do my ~~xxxxxxx~~ damndest.

P: I would appreciate it. They'll do it at 1:00.

K: I ll do my damndest to make it possible.

P: Good. Thank you.

END

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SC206 *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/The Secretary
September 13, 1974
6:49 P.M.

(Missed first part).

D: ...talk now and the continuation of the talk you had.

K: Yes.

D: And he suggested I should point out to you the items ... those are more striking in terms of our needs. If you have the list, I will read them to you by numbers. It is number 1, which is an added 200 ABM. Then we have the question of additional ___ guns...we need more ___. Then comes the schwibes (sp?).

K: There is no sense reading them all to me. You have to tell me their priorities.

D: I am not reading them all. It is just they are first. Then there are the schwibes. There is something we were promised in the past, Mr. Secretary, which we haven't gotten. I...

K: I know what it is. I don't think we can get it tomorrow.

D: It is really a major thing from our point of view.

K: I know.

D: This is all. I have no other requests for purchases. We have other problems ~~wit~~ I think can be settled. This is our request to...oh I am sorry, I forgot ammunition. ~~What~~ We want additional ones. What I am saying we have those planes you are using in Israel and that we want ~~k~~ you to extend their stay in Israel. These are the Mohawks.

K: I can't get that by tomorrow either.

D: You don't think you could?

K: no.

D: There are two categories we want on loan or continuation. The ~~kisk~~ rest of the things I read to you.

K: Good, I will call you tomorrow.
D: Good. Have some rest, Mr. Secretary. Thank you.
END

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SC214 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Art Hartman/Secretary Kissinger
September 14, 1974
~~8~~:55 PM

H: What I recalled having signed off on was NODIS cables which were sent to your office but they haven't gone out yet.

K: So we've made no approach. How did it leak?

H: I don't know. When I talked to the Yugoslav yesterday, he seemed to have ~~deducted~~ deducted ~~days~~ dates. This was when I was throwing cold water on the trip.

K: Were you tough on him?

H: Yes, extremely. He was quite shaken and I have a witness, my desk ~~officer~~ officer says he was literally shaking. _____ and then to make a statement like that is something. It may show the old fellow is loosing his marbles.

K: You think we ought to go?

H: We should wait to see what their____. They now have to __to this.

K: OK.

END

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SC215 *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Art Hartman/Secretary Kissinger
September 14, 1974
3:49 PM

K: Have you been approaching Embassies about my trip?

H: We approached -- yes, we made the initial approach.

K: On the basis of what decision?

H: Let me think. It seems to me I remember a message on both Bucharest...

K: You may remember it but it doesn't mean I approved it.

H: I'll have to check on whether we've done it and on what basis.

K: I have not yet 100% decided. I thought those two days could be used for Greek/Turkey problems. Those dates have been leaked.

H: To whom?

K: It's in the Washington Post today.

H: The Rome end of it....

K: The Rome end of it has already been fixed. I'm talking about Belgrade and Bucharest.

H: Let me check because my memory isn't good on that now.

K: OK.

END

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SC218 1*

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELECON
Peter Flanigan/The Secretary
September 16, 1974
4:42 P.M.

(Not on first part.)
F: ...I now understand what happened to the Isrealis and Arabs.

K: What have you heard?

F: Well, here I am. Happily accepting your proposal and haven't seen you since.

K: Peter, I'll see you anytime this week after Wednesay, but I have to go...

F: I don't have to see you. I have one question that has given me some problem and would like to have answered. I am obviously going over there, hopefully to do a piece of work.

K: No question...

F: I noted that by virtue of a change in Ambassadors that the negotiations ~~are~~ on the base are being done by an Ambassador-at-Large.

K: Right.

F: Because there is this change in Ambassadors?

K: That's the way it has always been done.

F: Not in Japan or in Berlin.

K: But the last Spain base negotiations were done this way.

F: I don't know who the Ambassador was, but if you have an Ambassador who knows his business and is a serious person, is he expected to do the serious work or is someone coming over...

K: Generally not, but if I take it away from McCloskey, I am going to have a fantastic morale problem.

F: I can't expect to do this negotiation. I will not be getting there until a few days...

K: If you are talking about future negotiations...

F: I am.

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K: On future negotiations I can give you my assurance that you will conduct them. This is an unusual circumstance. I would like to have McCloskey continue it partly because I have given it to him, but in the future any negotiations concerning Spain will be conducted by you and if it is otherwise, you can state your case. But I can foresee no circumstances...

F: Fair enough, Henry.

K: I want you to go there because I want you to do a major piece of work.

F: That is why I am going, that there is a job to do.

K: And I think it was the right decision for you and for the country.

F: Thank you. Two years ago I suggested Chuck Robinson for Under Secretary for Economic Affairs. I am happy to see that has progressed. If I can do anything, I would be happy to. I have known him for many years. He is a first-rate kind of guy. A very strong minded guy.

K: If I couldn't handle strong-minded people, I would not be in this position.

F: I think you will find him...he will want to do more than [redacted] B6

K: If he doesn't do more than [redacted] he won't last long. B6
I want him to do more.

F: Good, he is very good on Latin American and Japan.

K: On the Middle East he ought to be pretty good. He has to learn about Europe.

F: He will.

END.

SC 224 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Shalev/The Secretary
September 16, 1974
1:05 p.m.

K: Mr. Minister, we have a report here that your Prime Minister said the purpose of my next trip to the Middle East is to start the Geneva Conference again.

S: I'm sure he didn't say that.

K: We will not support that statement.

S: To start the Geneva Conference again...no I am sure.

K: Incidentally, if that is an Israeli purpose, we can do that. It is an easy request to meet.

S: I am sure it is not true. May I wish you a Happy New Year.

K: Thank you.

END.

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SC229 *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Newhouse/The Secretary
~~Mr.~~ September 16, 1974
7:00 p.m.

(Missed first part)
K: ...very, very helpful.

N: That's nice to hear. Are you still going to deliver it on Thursday?

K: Yes, I am not very pleased with ~~the part~~ it but I just don't have time to do any more.

N: Oh, I just worked on the editing.

K: I want to talk to you in the near future about how ~~x~~ we can work on....I just don't have good assistance on these. It is too late now to do a major division.

N: I am at your disposal.

K: I want you to know I was very pleased with it.

N: Thank you very much sir.

K: Goodnight.

N: Goodnight.

END.

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SC 233 *

TELECON
Wiley Buchanan/The Secretary
September 17, 1974
8:25 p. m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: You called me yesterday?

B: Oh, I just called because I was in the city. So I thought I would just check in with you.

K: I have not had any word ~~with~~ yet on this other situation. I will be intouch with you as soon as it clarifies.

B: Is he back in town?

K: Yes. But there has been no contact.

B: I sent a note to you today by Joe thanking you for being so gracious. Its probably at the house. I didn't realize you would be calling back.

K: You are very sweet.

[redacted] B6

B: Thank you for calling.

END.

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SC239 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Enders/Secretary Kissinger
September 19, 1974
9:16 pm

philosophy

K: I don't need a general ./. like this, I need what we promised at the General Assembly and why it is needed as our contribution to the less developed ...Isn't that why we want to do the Finance Meeting now?

E: I can do that in terms of ....and what should go.

K: Right. I am presuming you are doing something for this meeting of the Foreign and Finance Ministers. It has to have philosophy, look at my statement to the Energy Conference, and I do not want it printed all over the world before they meet.

E: It has ..

K: I do not want it peddled in every capital before I explain it and I do not expect an agreement. We wouldn't know what to do if they agree.

E: Well, we would know what to do.

K: Nonsense! We need six months to get ourselves organized.

E: There is a great deal we can be doing.

K: I want.....put it before them and let it jell by early next year. A philosophical statement coupled with a complete program and let's have a meeting on Saturday.

E: I will have for you by noon an analytical paper.

K: With a program?

E: Yes, and why it is so..arranged.

K: Good.

E: And I have to leave tonight to nail down the IEP.

K: When do you get back?

E: Friday, but I have to stay over if I can't nail it..we have in principle with the Norwegians and Australians and I have to pull it off.

K: Haven't you got somebody else who can do that..who can get..

E: Yes and no. I have somebody else who can get there but if I were

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E: not to go it would be misinterpreted.

K:...I think we should take the Federal Reserve part out altogether.

E: Ok.

K: With the Butz statement it is too had and without it it will raise too much ...

K: Ok.

K: I have got to get to work on this.

E: k, I just wanted to check on this one thing.

END

SC235 *

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.5(D)

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/The Secretary
September 17, 1974
5:23 p.m.

K: In this Department you have just got to get these bureaus under control. For three weeks I have been pushing paper back and forth. It never occurred to me they would schedule ____ for a date Bouteflika is giving a luncheon.

S: They never checked the date. On the other hand....

K: It is obvious I cannot go up there again on the 7th and again on the 3rd. [redacted] B1

S: What do you think of that dinner idea?

K: I don't care what they do but they have an hour to fix it. Another thing, the Latin American Foreign Minister seems to think it is on the 1st and it is on the 2nd.

S: The bureaus were afraid to consult with any foreigner. I think you ought to take that into account. That is the reason why it wasn't checked before hand.

K: They better get it straightened out within the next hour.

S: I will get Saunders up here right away.

END.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 25X6
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 29 MAY 2013
DATE/CASE ID: 02 JUN 2003 200102979

SC232 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Kubisch/The Secretary
September 17, 1974
11:08 p.m.

HAK: Jack, one thing I wanted you to understand...I am sure it requires no sayings...the thing I am most interested in is to get a confidential relationship with Karamanlis and that is what you should particularly stress.

K: That was my feeling from what you have been saying all along.

HAK: That way we can do our best.

K: Right. If the timing is not right now from his point of view, the thing I felt is to have a - reach a - useful channel.

HAK: The best time for me should be around October 14, but I don't insist on it.

K: I will just feel him out.

HAK: Just tell it to him.

K: To see what his reaction is to these various possibilities but you wouldn't insist on it.

HAK: Ok Jack. You have my blessings. And as much as I can do.

K: I know I have. Take care of yourself.

END.

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SC 249 *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Senator Pastore/The Secretary
September 19, 1974
8:56 p.m.

K: Hello, how are you?

P: Hello, just fine. I just wanted ~~to~~ you to know I had the House come along. It is only the 23% as you know.

K: Aren't you terrific. Many thanks. I appreciate this very much.

P: Let me ask you a question very seriously. You were a little shaken today weren't you?

K: If I made that impression I am sorry. No. Did I make that impression.

P: To me you weren't quite yourself. I wondered what the devil shook you.

K: I had just testified for three hours. I guess I'm a little tired.

P: You usually tell people to go to hell if you don't agree with them, but you didn't today.

K: I am basically very concerned about what will happen if this debate over the 40 Committee is pushed too far. It could be a very damaging thing. I wasn't conscious of it. I may have been a little tired.

P: That is probably it. There were a few parts there where you could have said who the hell do you think you are.

K: Can you give me an example?

P: I am not a diplomat at all. If someone says something to me I don't like I just tell them off.

K: What particularly were you...?

P: When you were discussing it with Eagleton. I thought you could have been a little stronger. ~~X~~ That's why I bring ~~it~~ up the point. It is only because I like you.

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K: I appreciate that very much.

P: Don't forget ~~the~~ one thing we need and the country needs you.

K: You are a good friend.

P: When you get there you are harrassed, just say what you think.

K: Ok.

~~XXX~~.
P: I leaned over to Johnson and said these fellows think they are talking to an enemy of the country.

K: Yes.

P: That's why I asked you the question what we stood to lose if we lose Turkey. Of course the sense of the Senate doesn't amount to a damn thing.

K: That's right. If they push it further we will have to take a hard stand.

P: Just stand up from time to time and just say it.

K: I will take that very seriously.

~~P~~: Tell them you did it for your country. But tell them they could be wrong too.

K: Next time I will.

P: You don't need any advice from me.

K: I do need it. Thank you John.

P: Take good care of yourself.

END.

SC253 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Joe Sisco
9/20/74; 1:48 p.m.

K: Joe.

S: Yes, sir.

K: I asked yesterday that a cable be sent to Fahmy telling him we did not give 50 F-4's. I get a cable giving Fahmy a lecture of what he can and cannot raise with us.

S: A - I didn't know you asked for the cable and B - I have not seen the cable that you are apparently looking at.

K: That is why I am asking you to straighten it out.

S: All right.

[redacted] B6

S: Yeah.

K: He is the Assistant Secretary of State. We don't lecture people. When we want something we say so but we don't -- when we don't have anything to say we don't say it. He writes a three paragraph lecture about things that he mustn't raise and dispute with us every item.

S: Uh-huh. All right let me have a look at this very quickly and we will get a redraft for you.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 24 JUN 2003 200102979

SC251 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Habib/Secy Kissinger
9:15 a.m., 9/20/74

K: Phil, it's quite important on that Korean trip that we do not fix the date because we may have to put it at the end of that other stop that I mentioned to you.

H: Oh, man, oh, man. You fixed the date.

K: Who has fixed the date?

H: We did. We told them when it was going to be.

K: Well, you untell them. You tell them it's going to be but there has to be a little flexibility about dates.

H: I'm glad to hear this but, you know -- Okay, we'll --

K: Well, it they don't like it, we'll cancel it.

H: Oh, no, no! It's not a question of not liking it -- that's not what it is, Mr. Secretary. What it is, we will go back on them now and tell them that's our tentative. Can we say that? When it is but we may have to move it a few days.

K: That's right because of other things.

H: Yeah, I realize that. I thought the other was all set. Nobody said a word.

K: Well, but the others now don't want him to come from there. They don' care where he goes. You see what I mean? From there. t

H: Well, that would have been useful if I had known that last night. We could have undone it much easier.

K: Well, if I had known it last night, I would have told you.

H: Yes, sir. We'll undo it right now.

K: I just learned it 5 minutes ago.

H: Well, I'm delighted because we can still stop the time of announcement and all. I'll get right on it. What we were doing was announcing. You remember, you said to me the other day: announce. So we went ahead to announce but I didn't realize that we weren't to announce the specific days. You know, is that definite now that we're going to shift it?

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K: Not yet. That depends on the talk with Gromyko.

H: All right. I'll see to it that the announcement doesn't contain a date. Okay?

K: Good.

H: And to just simply announce that he will be coming.

K: That's right.

H: All right. But that's pretty far along. . . . notify them, otherwise it will leak.

K: No, no, you can do that. But just say: Not the date, we want to retain some flexibility.

H: I'll get right on it.

K: And tell them not to leak that we changed the date.

H: No, no. We'll get right onto it.

K: Thank you.

SC255 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
William Colby/Secretary Kissinger
September 20, 1974
4:42 PM

C: Just to let you know Sy Hersh called our public affairs fellow and said he's in the course of writing a story that you only told about the propaganda funding and no about the other things we're funding. We didn't say a thing to him.

K: What do you mean?

C: Apparently he's trying to put together a story which implies you only told the people half the truth.

K: On Chile?

C: On Chile. At the cabinet meeting or the ___of the leadership.

K: What else did you do?

C: I sent you a little note telling you the whole story. I just sent it to you.

K: What else did he have? You must know since you contacted the agency.

C: He has the.....

K: There's something very funny.

C: He has the story he had this morning which is wrong, that we were supporting the truckers.

K: Then what he's telling is not true.

C: That's right.

K: Or is there something else?

C: No, it's all in the letter I sent you.

K: OK. Thank you.

END

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SC259

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/The Secretary
September 21, 1974
2:49 p.m.

K: In that demented way we operate we have now extracted a statement from the Romanians that they did not mean what they said about the Russians. It was the best goddamn thing and could do us some good. Can't somebody take charge of this outfit? Why didn't we let it stand?

S: I am not sure we did anything further on it. Let me check.

[redacted] B6

S: I hope I will not have to call you in New York and tell you if you only pick up the telephone we can stop a war--like I did the last time. Ok, I will take care of it.

END.

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SC 256 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Roy Atherton/Secy Kissinger
9:15 a.m., Sat., September 21, 1974

K: Roy, did we ever answer the Syrian request for food? You remember that long list they sent in at least two weeks ago.

A: We sent out --

K: Have we ever even acknowledged it?

A: On food.

K: You remember that list?

A: Yes, we have. Yes, I do. We sent out an instruction to Murphy on basis for him to talk to Khaddam about the whole range of how we might proceed on economic matters.

K: No, no. Have we told them anything in substance? Are we doing anything at all about it?

A: Let me check and see where it is, Mr. Secretary. I don't remember off the top of my head but I'll check it right away.

K: Well, what we have told Murphy antedated this.

A: That's right.

K: All right. Have we ever acknowledged receiving that list?

A: That we have, yes. We acknowledged that. I just don't remember what we've told them precisely on the food aspect. But I'll check that immediately and call you.

K: Well, you know, that's one of the few things we have to get our hooks into the Syrians.

A: I know. I realize that, Mr. Secretary. We are moving on it. I just want to check and see what the precise current status is.

K: Well, Khaddam expect when he comes here? Well, I am going to have an answer to it by the time he comes here so he better know that. If I have to have blood flow through the corridors of the State Department.

A: No, we've told them that we want to be ready to talk about the various economic --

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K: No, I operate on the theory that every problem will be settled in one three-hour period. We gain nothing by pushing it around the Department for six weeks. All right. Can you let me know immediately where we stand?

A: I'll check it immediately, Mr. Secretary.

K: Good.

SC 258

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Hartman/The Secretary
September 21, 1974
2:30 p.m.

K: You might as well tell the West Germans that December is absolutely out for a meeting with Schmidt and the President. January will be very difficult. We are thinking in terms of February. Secondly, you might point out to them that we are not even remotely amused by the UPI story saying Schmidt didn't find it necessary to see us before he went to Moscow. And the German Chancellor thinks he should not give the impression that he needs to see us before he goes to Moscow and that Schmidt does not think we are yet ready to discuss economics and that those are the two reaons we postpone the visit.

H: Ok.

K: Relay it in a way that shows our displeasure. There is a slight chance for January but he doesn't want to meet until after his State of the Union address.

H: Does he know the date yet?

K: Late January so we should be thinking in terms of February.

H: On that conversation we had yesterday--our position...

K: My problem is I really must not be thrown into meetings with so little briefing.

H: Can we have some time with you Sunday night?

K: No, I have a dinner. You have to tell that great State Department organization...I do not give a damn on these things any more.

H: Yes, but our problem...

K: But there has to be a minimum point to arrange my ____.

H: I think it would be helpful if I could sit in with you when you read these things, and then if you have any questions I could answer them.

K: Monday morning is better. We will have breakfast on Monday morning. I would like to see the East Germans for a few minutes.

H: Are you sure you have time? He is only the Acting Foreign Minister and I do not ~~k~~ think it is necessary.
K

K: Well, I think I should see~~k~~ them....

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H: What about Minic?

K: I think we have a better effect on him when we just ignore him rather than yelling at him.

H: I am a little afriad when they get into this with the Russians that they might think there is a little collusion. I have told them we do not like this public exchange on Cyprus.

K : The reason is what?

H: ___, partifcularly if you do not take your trip there.

K: Have they been told I am going?

H: I told them the question of your going there is even more remote because of this public exchange.

K: Let's keep that open. But I would like Mavros at 9:30. That means Callaghan at 8:00.

H: Would you then go up to see him?

K: Yes, I will go up.

H: We can put k____ back a little.

K: Ok, but him back. I understand that he is cramming for this thing.

H: He needs it. He doesn't know anything about foreign affairs.

K: Ok.

END.

SC 257 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Art Hartman/Secy Kissinger
9:19 a.m., Sat., Sept. 21, 1974

K: Art, we've never heard from the Yugoslavs?

H: We have not heard from them but Mac _____ saw one of them the other day and he didn't offer any excuses. He tried to say that they have been even-handed.

K: Well, then we better cancel my meeting with Minic (?).

H: I think you ought to see Minic (?) and let him have it.

K: Which of course serves your purposes. I mean, that makes EUR happy. You don't give a damn whether I let him have it just as long as we can put him down on the scoreboard.

H: No, I really think you ought to see him now.

K: Why? What's there to let him have?

H: Well, I think to tell --

K: If I tell him in the light of what was said, there's no point in a meeting. Why won't that let him have it?

H: Well, it will but I think we really ought to talk to him and find out what's going on.

K: We know what's going on.

H: Well, is this the old man just going senile? Or are they seriously continuing this public debate with us this way? Otherwise I just think it looks as though - - Well.

K: Why is Marvos the only Foreign Minister on whom I have to call? It's out of the question.

H: Well, this is a request from them.

K: That's lovely. But why do you do it? Why did you accept?

H: We have not accepted it.

K: Look, in principle, if it were anybody else, I would be glad to do it.

H: Well, they have made the request --

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K: How is it that Gunes (?) isn't on my list?

H: Gunes is on your list.

K: When?

H: I believe right after -- of course, Marvos.

K: Am I ever going to get talking points on any of this.

H: Yes. All of them have been prepared and we're doing checklists now.

K: Well, if I get them Monday, they are useless because I'm scheduled so much I won't have time to read them.

H: Well, you shoul d have them all today. They were all finished last night.

K: Well, don't you agree that I should not see Marvos at the Plaza?

H: I think it would be very difficult for you to do it because that means you will cut down on the time --

K: That's not the point, Art!!! It's not a question of the time. The question is: I will be going as a supplicant. He would be the only Foreign Minister on whom I am calling.

H: Well, that's right. Is he the only Deputy Prime Minister you will be seeing? That was the only argument they used.

K: Why was it moved to Tuesday?

H: I believe because of his speaking engagement and when he was going to address the Assembly. But we have not acceded to the request that he go up there -- that you go to the Plaza. That was the request that was registered with us and we said we would look into it.

K: All right, let me do it but then move it to 9:30.

H: 9:30.

K: Now I want to see the Swedish Foreign Minister for half an hour.

H: All right.

K: Can somebody explain to me how the Norwegian got on my list?

H: I'd have to look up the history of that. I can't remember how he got on. I knew we had wanted to talk to him about the Energy Group because they were the last ones to --

K: Yeah, but that's now signed.

H: Except that they have not yet acceded to it.

K: Can we move Silveira to 5:30?

H: Yeah. I'm on my way in now -- Let me go over it with Jerry.

K: I don't care what you do with Jerry, I'm telling you to move Silveira up! No, that's not your job.

H: No.

K: Well, I want it done anyhow.

H: All right.

K: And I am willing to see the Swede. That does us some good.

H: Yeah. We'll fit him in.

K: Now has somebody focussed on the fact that if we have a meeting with the President and Sauvagnargues and I have a separate meeting with Sauvagnargues which should proceed the President's meeting that ~~but~~ there will be in fact no time to see Khaddam that day?

H: That I am not familiar with.

K: Well, I better talk to Jerry about that. Good. Well, the Swede I have to see then. I'm not sure that I'm going to agree to see the Yugoslav.

H: Well, I'm going to see a number of people up there and I will see him. I'm going to see the East German and you know, the people you just won't have time to see.

K: Yeah. Okay. Good.

H: All right.

K: The East German is another guy that would be of interest to me. Hello.

[Mr. Hartman had already hung up.]

SC261 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
David Binder/The Secretary
September 21, 1974
3:21 p.m.

K: Why are you calling me instead of the Danish Ambassador?

B: I haven't talked to him lately. I wonder if you could tell me something about the Gromyko meeting?

K: We reviewed the whole relationship to see if we could make progress.

B: Did you see any signs for progress with SALT and the Middle East.

K: This is off-the-record. I think our relations are in pretty good shape.

B: Is this trade thing locked up?

K: It will take another week.

B: Is this with the Russians or with Jackson?

K: The Russians thing is in check.

B: It is really to settle it between the administration and Jackson. And that will take a week.

K: I guess. I don't know.

B: How about the Middle East? Is that a tour d'horizon?

K: Yes, it is a tour d'horizon. Ok. I have to run.

B: What about Argentina. Is that something ____?

K: It is in terms of the OAS meeting.

B: Ok. Thank you. Goodbye.

K: Goodbye.

END.

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SC264 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Lord/The Secretary
10:55 a.m.
September 22, 1974

K: ...the speech in general.

L: What I told you ... I think the substance is fine. You are worried about the tone.

K: Well it has no real elevation.

L: I agree. We still have to get the style up. It is a very meaty speech as I told you. I do want to step back and ⊠ look at the tone. I will step back and look at it from that angle.

K: Ok.

M END.

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SC 265 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Atherton/The Secretary
September 22, 1974
10:13 a.m.

K: You probably haven't seen that cable from Pickering where the King tells him he has frozen his activities with respect to Geneva. Pickering immediately tells him that he is unhappy about this.

A: I don't know quite what that means, freezing activities with respect to Geneva. Does it ____?

K: He said (Secretary reads cable to Atherton). Why the hell?

A: We haven't been pressing Geneva.

K: Would you get Pickering straightened away? Is there any law against our people having the right instincts?

A: No there isn't any law that I know of.

K: M I have a back-channel cable that Sadat expects me to get him a solution to the ___ thing before the Arab Summit. That is impossible. Would you also take care of that.

A: Yes sir.

END.

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SC275 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Larry Eagleburger/Secy Kissinger
11:05 p.m., September 25, 1974

K: Larry, do you know whether Stanley Hoffman from Harvard was invited to this dinner on Friday night?

E: I don't know but I can check.

K: Will you make sure he gets invited if he hasn't?

E: Yes, sir. Friday night.

K: You know, for Sauvagnargues.

E: Yeah.

K: Okay. You want to hear another State Department stupidity. Saqqaf asked that an official meeting would include Baroody and therefore he thought it should be brief and that there should be a separate private half hour meeting with himself alone. So the fools give Baroody a note saying one 15-minute meeting with him and a half hour meeting without him. So now Baroody is running amuck with Scali.

E: Why did they have to tell Baroody anything?

K: You caught on to the essence of the problem.

E: [Laughter]

K: Because he's the Head of the Mission and when you tell a Foreign Minister that he's having a meeting, you do it through the Head of the Mission.

E: I give up.

K: There's a total brutal -- they just do not want to think.

E: All they had to do was to invite the two and then Baroody would leave.

K: That is not what is wanted. What was wanted was to tell Saqqaf separately.

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E: Yeah, I understand that.

K: They could have invited the two and when Saqqaf got there, told him privately when this meeting was.

E: Well, what'll we do now?

K: There's no sense because Baroody is beside himself.

E: Maybe we will have to organize a separate one with Saqqaf later now.

K: Have you found out who distributed this thing -- don't you tell me they don't know.

E: The Leone thing?

K: Yeah.

E: No. I have been promised a name by tomorrow morning.

K: And I notice the Alfred Smith Dinner Speech is not in my --

E: Weren't you reading that in the car?

K: Yeah.

E: Oh, not in your briefcase?

K: That's right. Well, it isn't worthwhile now. Make sure I have it tomorrow.

E: I will.

SC272 1*
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Philip Habib/The Secretary
September 25, 1974
6:40 p.m.

H: Hello.

K: Hello. You called me?

H: You wanted me to call you on that thing you discussed with me last night in New York. I have talked to Art and Win and we come to this conclusion. You ought to go back to the Russians and say we will either go before or after Korea.

K: Ok.

H: I would go back to them.

K: Don't give me the tactics. I want to know what the outcome is.

H: You could explain it to the Japanese that he goes there after...

K: ...that it is the first country. Then we can't.

H: In any event if you want to do it that way, we suggest you go in there early and we would guarantee you a good vacation in between.

K: Good. Thank you.

END.

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SC274 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Senator Pastore/HAK
9/25/74 - 10:53 a.m.

K: Hello.

P: Henry, John Pastore.

K: John, how are you?

P: Look Henry. I know this is -- I hate to be bothering you on this -- but we've got a crowded program this afternoon and I was wondering if it would just be alright if I came down and paid my respects and did not participate in the luncheon. Is that all right?

K: Sure. Of course.

P: Because I wouldn't want to be sitting down at a luncheon and get the word that there is a vote going on and have to leave an empty chair.

K: Of you could sit down and leave. That would be all right. That would be understood too.

P: OK. Then we leave it that way.

K: That you'll sit down?

P: No, that I won't sit down.

K: OK, you'll just come and say hello.

P: Yes.

K: Good fine John. Bye

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SC278

1*

TELECON
Ambassador Habib/The Secretary
September 26, 1974
10:15 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Am I going to get talking points or a paper for that meeting with the Chinese before a time that I can still read it?

H: We talked about it yesterday and we are getting them to you tomorrow for the weekend.

K: I do not want us to go overboard on that Cambodia conference yet.

H: I realize that. I noticed the way you check it.

K: I think Dean is a little bit over-eager in general.

H: He isn't doing anything.

K: I just want to make sure he isn't.

H: No he isn't. I have seen nothing to indicate that he is doing anything or expecting anything. The papers are being typed right now.

K: I floated that conference thing past Gromyko in a very non-commital way.

H: What did he say?

K: He said he thought ~~it~~ it had many problems but he would let me know.

H: He would have more interest than the Chinese. It would give him a chance to get back in and play a little. I think the key thing is a meeting with the Chinese, Mr. Secretary. The vote is very bad in N.Y. Against us on the representation thing.

K: Is it?

H: Yes. Unless we have something new we are dead and even with something new we may be dead. As much as possible you should lay it on the line and get some of our friends to realize its importance. Then if anything comes of our approach at least we can make known what we were willing to do. We may pick up a few votes. Even if we ~~look~~ lose the vote they might be willing to talk after they win the vote. They would figure they had you at a disadvantage.

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K: Will think about it. I will make it in a not very hard way.

H: Why don't you see the color of their eyes?

K: If we move the Koreans....

H: That's an important one. I think we can get somewhere. The vote count is not bad.

K: __if we move the President's visit to Korea. The other think would be announced while I am traveling.

H: We owe it to Park to tell him. He will not leak.

K: The guy through whom we tell them will leak it.

H: No, it would be our man.

K: You mean we don't leak?

H: They better not. He will feel so much under pressure he won't.

K: Give some thought to how we do the moving.

H: Which way did you settle with Gromyko? Will it be before or after?

K: After Korea we do not have to move it. It will be before which means the Korean dates have to go back a few days.

H: That would be the 23rd, 24th, 25th.

K: What time were we going ... the morning of the 22nd?

H: Yes.

K: That way we would arrive the evening of the 23rd and leave the evening of the 24th.

H: As long as I have time. They are issuing 3 million commemorative stamps. What's the soonest we will be able to let them make plans?

K: The end of October.

H: It would be better ~~xxxxx~~...do you have a choice with the Russians?

K: If they insist we have to move them. Because that is what you told me.

H: It would seem to me as long as you go to Japan, what difference does it make?

K: We have to let them decide how to do it.

H: Do you need a crew? To prepare a Presidential visit on three weeks notice...

K: Well that's tough. I told you what would happen.

H: I told it a....if you let me tell Park personally.

K: I am not agreeing to that for two weeks.

H: Ok. Until you come back....

K: ...from the Middle East. Let me talk to Dobrynin next week.

H: Ok you let me know. Just a little bit of time.

K: Ok. Good.

H: The Korean Foreign Minister is here. When are you going to see him?

K: I am not going to see him.

H: You have to.

K: I don't want to hear it. Every Assistant Secretary has another magnificent reason why I should kill myself. It is 10:30 and I am still in the goddamn office.

H: What about....

K: I am going up to N.Y. next week. Phil, this Department is a scandal. It is unworthy to conduct foreign policy.

H: You have a lot of people working very hard for you.

K: They are good guys. I am not saying it is the guys in my outer office. You find twenty minutes that won't add to my appointments. In

the next three days, there is absolutely ... it is out of the question.

H: I was hoping we would get you Monday or Tuesday in New York.

K: Not that I can see.

H: Let me talk to Larry.

K: Don't bother to talk to me. Work it out with Larry. If you can get twenty minutes that won't add to my schedule, I will consider it. But don't send in anything without clearing it with me first. We will do the best we can.

H: Right. Thanks a lot.

END.

1*

SC282

TELECON
Mr. Stabler/Secretary Kissinger
September 26, 1974
12:55 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

S: Mavros has prepared the following statement which is going to be put out to the press and if I may read you what it says. (Reads statement.)

K: That's a little better. What should be do about Gunes?

S: I told him I would call him back after I reported to you.

K: I think we should leave him alone and see him on Monday night.

S: You mean Sunday night.

K: Yes.

S: You think Gunes should not come.

K: What is your instinct.

S: My instinct is Gunes obviously is trying to be helpful to get things back into shape. As far as I'm coneerned, this type of thing gets us into an endless spiral of ~~xdifficultiesx~~ difficulties.

K: Let me think about it for a half hour and call you back.

S: OK, I told Gunes I would call him back.

K: K__ said he agrees for me to go to Ankara but not to Athens.

S: That's interesting. We're getting into a mess in Ankara but Ecevit probably is getting to get __. He has not been able to reach an agreement with __points. Ecevit made a statement_____and a message from Mavros _____. I just wanted you to know it's not quite as clear.

K: ~~X~~ If it's not clear, I cannot go.

S: You have to have Ecevit in a position where you can do something.

K: OK.

S: I'll wait until I hear from you.

END

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SC280 *

TELECON
Mr. Stabler/Secretary Kissinger
September 26, 1974
12:33 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

S: I talked to Gunes and passed on these reports that you saw no sense in continuing the talks and I read him the AP item and the FBIS report. Gunes said this was not at all what the Minister had said, that he had been asked whether you were understanding Minister's efforts. He implied that he had not __you with ~~xxx~~ such a mediator effort and Gunes said it was a misunderstanding of the situation. I said to him, under these conditions, I think it's up to you and the Minister to issue some sort of correction on this thing. He said the Minister will probably wish to do that.

K: ___tell Gunes the following, that under these conditions, there's no sense of his coming down tomorrow until__clears this with the Minister. I see no sense in having a conversation with Gunes tomorrow.

S: I told him to call me back after he talks to Mavros. Gunes seemed to think he would put out a clarification statement.

K: If they don't put out a statement, I may cancel the meeting on(Sunday) but wait until he calls you back. But tell him I don't want him down here ~~xxxxxx~~ tomorrow. These guys have to learn that they are not free to attack us.

S: If he says....

K: He is not to come.

S: If he says....

K: Say I look forward to seeing him on Sunday but until then say I don't see any sense in ~~xx~~ further conversation.

S: I too feel Gunes should not come down. If he puts out a clarifying statement..

K: Did we tell them we would with (Mavros) ____.

S: I tried to reach Gunes last evening to do that and could not get him. In the meantime, I think the telegram did go to Athens.

K: And you didn't stop it?

S: ____.

K: I don't give a ~~xxxxx~~ damn.

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S: I stopped it ~~this~~ this morning...

K: And you're going to stop it now.

S: But it has gone.

K: We are not going to give military aid on the day they kick us around.

S: I'll have it stopped right away.

K: Can ~~it~~ it still be stopped?

S: I'll just tell Athens not to act on it.

K: Tell them to hold it until we hear from Mavros.

END

1*

SC286

TELCON
The Secretary/ Joseph Sisco
September 26, 1974
3:30 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: What is your view about Zunes coming?

S: If we get some satisfactory answer from the Greeks that they intend to correct the statement I would be incined to let him come.

K: What they are putting out is that they were misunderstood and it was not that they did not trust me but rather they were not entrusting me with mediation.

S: That is not bad.

K: I still think we should tell him to come after the next meeting.

S: I really don't feel strongly. This is not a bad correction. He really wanted to come down and he is really a strong leader and a good influence on the Foreign Minister and I don't think it is in our interest to offend the guy.

K: They don't worry about offending us.

S: We do not have many good guys -- Mavros I'm not at all sure that he is in our baliwick.

K: I have a message from Karamanlis that he wants me to go to Ankara.

S: That is positive too. I think we should let Zunes come along.

K: I will think a little moe about it.

END.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 10 MAR 2003 200102979

1*

SC 284

TELECON
Mr. Stabler/Secretary Kissinger
September 26, 1974
11:50 AM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How do you explain that Mavros statement?

S: Well, I find it difficult to explain it, coming so i mmediately after your talk with him. I don't see how it all came out in terms of your conversation. _____.

K: The opposite.

S: Precisely.

K: He did explain to me that they don't want anything done between Greece and Turky and they didn't want any negotiations going on before Nov. 10.

S: In that context, if the AP report is correct, his interest is obvious. _____. It would be something direct between the Turks and Greeks. I think in light of what appeared to be a good __in your conversation____sort of a blunt statement of rejection. A good deal of publicity has been given this on the radio and everything else. ___is coming down tomorrow to see Sisco.

K: I wonder if we should tell them __a meeting with Mavros under these conditions. I don't see any sense in running after them.

S: We have not yet conveyed to them ~~xxxxx~~ moving it from 6:00 to 7:00.

K: I have a note here saying it's accepted.

S: At 7:00?

K: Yes.

~~K~~ S: I don't ~~xxxx~~ know who passed that on.

K: We have a brilliant staff here. Saqqaf said he wants to meet with me alone without ___, so they told this to ___, so now we're back to where we started.

S: What we can do is let this stand.

K: I don't think we can let this stand.

S: Wait until __comes down tomorrow, say we find it very hard to __this statement. Maybe there's an explanation for it.

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K: I don't want to be defensive. I just don't see that there is any sense in continuing these talks. What is the disadvantage?

S: I don't think there is any disadvantages. Certainly they couldn't think you would be very pleased with this, but they may have some explanation.

K: Why don't you ask them.

S: I'll just call him and ask if there's any sense in having another meeting.

K: OK.

END

1*

SC297

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
September 27, 1974
4:02 PM

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: ____giving a dinner for him.

S: They arranged a very good program.

K: I may come by to your dinner if I get out of Camp David early enough.

[redacted] B6

K: Where do you live?

S: I'll tell the secret service. It's very easy to get to.

K: How far from where I live?

S: It's just beyond the district line, about 10 minutes.

K: I'll try to get away.

S: I would be very honored.

K: I would probably get there about 10:00. I should drop by on a courtesy call to him.

S: Rockwell was going to go but if you can, fine. If you want one of us to do it, I'll be here.

K: Let me see whether I can find 10 minutes.

S: If not, one of us can call on him.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 10 MAR 2003 200102979

SC 296 1*

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELCON
The Secretary/ Charles Bluhdorn [redacted] B6
September 27, 1974
2:31 p.m.

B. Henry, hello, how are you?

K: Fine thank you how have you been?

B: I called you because if it is conceivable sometime next week you could spare half an hour for me I would like to see you if possible.

K: Next week I will be in New York but I have a murderous schedule, however, it is conceivable sometime Thursday morning.

B: That would be good for me.

K: What do you want to see me about?

B: It would take 5-10 minutes -- it has to do purely with what you have been saying about the Arab oil situation and I would appreciate seeing you for 15 minutes. I have been talking to Jackson, Long and Ted Kennedy and I thought it might be worthwhile if you could spare me a few minutes to give you some thoughts. It is nothing beyond that just some thoughts I have on the subject. I saw Sulzberger for luncheon two weeks ago and the "New York Times" came thought with an editorial which was prompted by our talk. I'm not interested in any brownie points but would very much like to see you.

K: We will call you.

B: I would appreciate it, Henry.

K: Good, I will call you -- if you don't hearfrom me call through the White House.

B: Good, Thursday morning sometime. Thank you.

END.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 10 MAR 2003 200102979

SC293 1*

TELECON
Foreign Minister Rabasa/The Secretary
September 27, 1974
4:13 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I know you are in Cairo.

R: I seem to arrange things that you can't arrange.

K: Well, I am trying to arrange a meeting between the two Presidents for the 21st.

R: That's fine. October?

K: Yes.

R: I will call my President and call you back.

K: We have already approached you, but that's fine if you would like to do that.

R: Could it be just a little later Henry?

K: No, it's the only time for us.

R: Ok. I will call my President.

K: Give us some questions about a locality.

R: I think Mexicali, Henry.

K: We are receptive. It should be on your side of the border and also on our side.

R: I will call my President and get back to you. I will call you in a day or two.

K: Fine.

R: An abrazo Henry.

K: Thank you.

END.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 10 MAR 2003 200102979

SC295 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
The Secretary/ Ambassador Dobrynin
September 27, 1974
12:52

D: I understand you are preparing a barbecue at Camp David!

K: Laughter.

D: I am really bothering you in connection with the announcement to be made about the visit. It is fine except where it says "between countries" we would prefer "between sides".

K: That is OK.

D: The announcement will be made Monday or Tuesday.

K: I would prefer Tuesday at Noon.

D: OK Tuesday at Noon Washington time - that would be 7:00 Moscow time.

K: Right, Tuesday Noon.

D: Gromyko is talking and has a paper about the famous change of future ties to peaceful means. I will give it to Vorontsov who will be talking with Harman about it but I would like to ask you please to talke a look into it. Gromyko gave it yesterday to the Foreign Minister of Germany and wants to discuss it further with you.

K: We should get together next week sometime. I will be in New York until Thursday -- maybe late in the afternoon on Thursday we can have a drink.

D: OK Thursday in the afternoon.

K: Good. I thought I had a good talk with Gromyko. I will give you something about the 8th on SALT.

D: Fine, Henry I will see you Thursday late.

END.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 10 MAR 2003 200102979

SC294 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
The Secretary/Archbishop Iakovos
September 27, 1974
9:50 a.m.

I: Good morning, Mr. Secretary.

K: Hello Your Eminence.

I: As I promised I did try and come in contact with many throughout the nation. They all realize the situation but they are firm that the initiative must come from you with an affirmative statement.

K: But what would be an affirmative statement.

I: How you envisage the Cyprus situation - your favor and the settlement -- something strong andof that nature.

K: My problem is the direction in which we are moving but we have these amendments coming up to a vote next week. If they now cut off it will become obligatory which then makes negotiations impossible.

I: The general feeling is that unless the Secretary of State makes an affirmative statement we cannot continue to press the issue -- they really expect you to take the initiative.

K: I am taking theinitiative. Karamanlis told you this. I don't want to destroy the issue by making a grandstand play. This is my problem.

I: I am going to Chicago now and will try and get in touch with leaders now and talk further with them but I must reiterate to you how they feel.

K: I will take what you have said very seriously and hope to see you with the President next week.

I: Thank you.

END.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 22 APR 2003 200102979

SC3ØØ

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
The Secretary/Mr. Wells Stabler
September 27, 1974
2:00 p.m.

K: About those two cables, I don't think Kubisch should beat up on Karamanlis too much. Tell him basically that if they say that they were aware of it and welcomed it that would be fine. They don't have to say it until after my trip is announced.

S: Fine.

K: As far as Ecevit is concerned tell him yes, I will be glad to have _____ in the meeting. We should make sure Gunes gets a copy of my cable too but someone who we can trust should do it.

S: Fine, Eagleton is going up and will be meeting with him personally and will handle it.

K: That is good. Thank you very much.

END.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 10 MAR 2003 200102979

SC298 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Ingersoll/Secretary Kissinger
September 27, 1974
2:32 PM

(Missed first part)
K: You might call Bill Roger's attention to the fact he we knew what his views were before he was appointed. I saw him on TV this morning saying what he would do and what he would not tolerate on CIA operations. We knew what his views were.

I: I didn't know he appeared on TV. I sure will.

K: OK.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 10 MAR 2003 200102979

SC302 1*

TELCON
Monday, September 30, 1974
Ambassador Dinitz - Secretary Kissinger
6:35 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

.....

K: You probably read that Newsweek article. Let them try to send somebody that doesn't get along with me.

D: I had a lot of faith about it. It is a reproduction of the other article. Rabin says that I have his full confidence and no transfer is being contemplated. He should have done it two weeks ago
They called and apologized and they..... They said there was no one more helpful than Secretary Kissinger.

K: I just wanted you to know how I felt.

D: ..... I am trying to do the best for my country.

K: It is an outrage for two reasons. For one, being in my pocket is not necessarily a bad thing.

D: Besides that....I cannot think of a time when you mislead me or my government. I am so annoyed that it went into the international press. Mel Elfrin said he tried to find me on Friday evening and when he couldn't, he went ahead. I said, you should have waited.

K: I was outraged about it. For personal reasons. Because you have been by far the most effective ambassador Israel has had.

D: It will be allright. I don't think that they are contemplating a change to happen to me.

K: But not to me. See you soon.

D: OK, see you soon.

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1*

SC 303

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELCON
9/30/3:50 p.m.
SIMON/KISSINGER

S: Hi, Henry

K: How are you?

S: I want to make sure personally that you approve — Bob Ingersoll and Atherton have — to a reference I am making in my speech about King Faisal —in a laudatory fashion - .

K: What exactly are you saying?

S: Atherton has a memo with him and is going to show it directly to you

K: They have been pretty irresponsible on the oil prices

S: Not really — because they are forced to have the same price — 94.8 as the Iranians I said if they settle above that price we have to settle -

K: Frankly my frank opinion is I am not too wild about your doing it and I will tell you why. If we want to head into a confrontation we must not let the biggest oil producer off the hook.

S: All it does is put Faisal on the hook insofar as trying to reduce oil prices in this world. It applauds him for his statemanship in lowering prices which are in the best interest—

K: The danger is that he may get into trouble with the other Arabs when they see you gave him a certificate of good conduc t.

S: Well, of course Aikens is the one who feels strongly about this.

K: [redacted] B6

S: [redacted] reads statement he plans to make)

K: I am wondering if we should say anything - or just shut up

S: This is not crucial - I made sure that I would not be saying anyhhing of an inflammatory nature

K: My honest opinion is that if we sound too conciliatory it sounds as though we are backing off, and if we are not conciliatory enough — Can I think about it and call you?

S: Sure

K: I appreciate your meticulousness in thinking of this -

S: I would like to say it, but I can find many reasons for not saying it, why not take it out -

K: My instinct is to do that — I will call you back by 6:30.

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SC 304 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Dan Parker (AID)
Secretary Kissinger
9/30/74 3:25 p.m.

P: I feel badly. Larry talked to me and indicated that you have concern which I have too about leaks. I cannot attest that these are not coming out of AID.

K: I can say it came out of AID --but the continuation of foreign policyis impossible under these conditions when a foreign country expects that everything they say will get in the newspaper.

P: I absolutely agree with you and I will be having a meeting where I will laythe law down.

K Dan, let's get our relations straight. I have no doubt about your total loyalty and support. I do believe there are people in your agency who in order to get a bill through will skuttle anything.

P: Well, I will find them.

K Well, look at this leak on the Bangladesh. What is the point. I stress humanitarian interests in enough forums. I was the originator of the World Food Conference andpushed at the highest levels--so it is improper to get this into the papers.

Dan, I have not the slightest objection to what you have done. There is no problem between you and me. The problem is I do believe -- this leak comes out of AID

P: I am going to put the clamp on this.

K The distributions of cables, it is important to have the distribution limited.

P: I have already taken steps with Assistant Administrators and Deputy Assistant Administrators and to look at the distribution of these.

K: Dan, let's deal as partners.

P: Some time in a constructive manner, I would like to explain what happened this past weekend. I wasn't told there was a problem with PL-480

K: If we don't have food aid for..... we will have no basis for restraint on their action.

P: I apologize to you, I didn't know the problem and I wasn't forewarned, of this. and then I missed talking toyou. K I would appreciate your getting on top/

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SC305

[1974?]

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
9/30, 11:45 pm
KISSINGER/EAGLEBURGER

K: I guess it's too late to call Kennedy

E: I think you've got to do it in the morning. It's too late now. I don't know how much good it will do. The congressional types think it may help

K: But is this thing directed against me?

E: No. There is some feeling that this is one way to show we are not doing enough on the humanitarian side. I think you could have some influence on Kennedy. Congressman Fraser does have some feeling you are involved.

K: Why didn't we put these brilliant things out on Friday.

E: That's a good question. I must say I remember we had done it but I didn't remember we had done it.

K: I think it's hopeless.

E: You may have some influence on Kennedy - and if anybody has, you do. — I know, that's what we say all the time. The Congress has gone wild — they have gone around the bend on a whole series of things

K: OK. Thank you

E: Yes, sir.

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SC 313

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
October 1, 1974
Secretary Kissinger - Senator Mansfield
8:05 a.m.

M: Yes, Henry.

K: I just called to tell you I appreciated very much the role you played on the Eagleton Amendment. We lost out, but I appreciate what you did.

M: It is a bad amendment.

K: It is a shame. Also, we had a negotiation in Ankara and that will go down the drain now because they said if anything passed that they could not make a concession and the Chief Advisor to Mavros said that he had the same view but the Greeks cannot come out for aid to Turkey. But I called you to thank you for your help.

M: I am afraid of a tilt toward the USSR and away from NATO. Well, we will keep on scrapping, Henry.

K: OK, thanks.

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SC310 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
October 1, 1974
Mr. Hartman - Secretary Kissinger
5:40 p.m.

K: Hello, Art. Did you ever talk to the Yugoslavs about my coming there? I mentioned it to you on the airplane.

H: I thought you wanted to hold that just a little longer.

K: Now we announce it and they will have heard nothing. You know the foreign affairs implication of making the announcement without telling them.

H: Do you want me to call [redacted] now?

K: Yes. We can announce it later unless he wants us to announce it tomorrow.

H: I'll call him right away.

K: OK. Thank you.

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SC312 *

TELCON
Senator Kennedy
Secretary Kissinger
10/1/74 8:25a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Ted, how are you.

TK: Hello, Henry. Good.

K: I saw Unis the other evening. My regrets at yourdecision but I think it is theright thing foryouto do.

TK: Nice of you to think aboutit.

K: I called about your Chilean amendment and really, Ted, I think it would have been unfortunate consequences and with all that is going on you may not know what we are doing in the human rights fields. Ihave had a human rights officer in each bureau and a Deputy Assistant to the Secretary for Human Rights and a Legal Advisor for Human Rights and Popper had talked to the Chileans three times alreadyon the humanitarian problem

TK: Right.

K: I wasworking with the Mexicans to get release of 80 people at their embassy to get asylum and didn't want the Chileans to be intimated while they.....

TK: I offered t[illegible] lathe last year two different times. We tried to follow what was going on with you.

K: The Chileans I am not saying are a liberal regime.

TK You were very kind to call. But I got myself down that road.

K I understand your problem. But I wanted to make this call to you.

TK I appreciate it Henry. I am sure it willnot pass anyway.

K: Will you be in Washngton? I think we ought to gettogether for a drink.

TK: Yes, yes. I will be in D.C.

K: The best to your son.

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SC315 *

TELCON
Wednesday, October 2, 1974
Secretary Kissinger - Chairman Fulbright
5:10 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

F: Henry, did I catch you at a bad time?

K: Not at all, Mr. Chairman.

F: I wanted to report to you that I was called by Mr. Yamani. He just left. I spent an hour talking about that situation and he asked my interpretation. And then he ..... great efforts he had made to persuade the ..... people to cut the price of oil down. He said they had ..... and ..... from 6 and a half to 8 and a half. You may know all of this, I don't know.

K: No, but I have been talking extensively to Saqqaf.

F: He said they are very interested. They recognize the problems that it is causing. Then he hinted that we don't wish to set the prices, that we are looking for a confrontation.

I said the Shah of Iran, Venezuelans, Algerians, etc. are much more determined to raise the prices. And his government is [redacted] most unfavored but they have no support. He said they had asked our government to help with the Venezuelans, etc. and they felt that they had not had support from you or any others from OPEC, besides the South. He mentioned .... in Tehran. His government suggested five to six on the market. He said the Shah office? said it would be 11.65 whether the Saudis went along.

K: I'll talk to the Shah on my trip.

F: He said he had never talked to you on oil. I said you had said in the past that the economics were not your responsibility. He seems to be very concerned.

K: How long will he be here?

tape a program

F: He is going to/[redacted] on Friday with Henry Jackson, under the chairmanship of Laird. It will be shown on Sunday. He will probably leave after that. I am supposed to go to Arkansas in the morning.

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K: I appreciate this very much. I am going to try to find him. I will try to get together with him on Saturday.

F: He would welcome it I think.

K: That is my impression from Saqqaf.

F: It is the same settlement we discussed before.

K: Have you given that speech that you said you were going to make?

F: No, not yet. Metzenbaum put in this resolution. I don't know whether to give it or not.

K: I think it would help. I think you should.

F: I am on a tight schedule since I am supposed to leave for Arkansas.

K: Maybe you could give it early next week.

F: I hope you will have a change to talk to him. He seemed very serious. He was here an hour.

K: I will try to get it to get together with him. And if you could give that speech it would be helpful.

F: Well, we will keep working on it.

K: Thank you very much for calling, Mr. Chairman.

F: Thank you very much. I just wanted you to know about it.

SC318 1*

TELCON
10/3/74, 1215
CONNALLY/KISSINGER

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

C: I couldn't be better. I want you to know that I have been thinking about you and those SOBs who are after you. There is no question there is an element who wants to ask you to leave -- and from the inside -- old and dear friends Goddame, don'e you let them get you uptight and disturbed and don't think you can't do the job. Don't get in a pique and say you are going to quit---

K: I appreciate this very much --

C: You can't live in this political game without lots of things happening to you you don't like. You can't have everyone love you and agree with you. You are in the most vicious game in the world.
You are doing a great job and this country needs you with your intelligence and stability and strenght at this time and don't let anything cause you to get upset --

K: I won't do anything quickly and there is going to be a real scrap before I get through with them.

C: You've got to fight and there are lots of ways to do it, but not to quit.

K: You are right the tought has crossed my mind, but I can't tell you how much your call means to me.

C: We have been thinking of you --

K: All the best

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SC 324 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
10/4/74; 10:06 a.m.

K: Hal.

S: Yeah.

K: I called Dobrynin on this matter.

S: Yeah.

K: Dobrynin tells me that Butz was in his office three days ago and personally told him they could handle a million tons of corn and then they placed the order. And he says he doesn't know what I am complaining about.

S: Well. . . . The thing that I had heard is . . . .

K: Well, look . . . .

S: This is news that doesn't surprise me.

K: Look, I don't want to have discussions occurred -- I've got guys running around like chickens without heads -- afterall it is all in the same country -- we are all speaking English. Can somebody find out what the hell happened before we put the lid on it. Dobrynin says --and I didn't volunteer it with Dobrynin -- Dobrynin told me that his assessment -- that he doesn't know what it is all about. That Butz personally called on him without asking -- without being asked to come.

S: This is on corn?

K: On corn.

S: Yea. Well, the only thing I can do now is try and find out whether that is correct.

K: Will you and Hartman and Enders get together -- if Enders can interrupt running the Government.

S: Okay.

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TELCON
Secretary Kissin
Ambassador Dobrynin
10/4/74; 9:58 a.m.

UNCLASSIFIED

50101 *

RELEASED IN FULL

D: Hello! H

K: Anatol.

D: Oh, good morning, Henry.

K: Anatol, it was good to see you yesterday.

D: It was really nice to see you, Henry, because you are spending so lot of time. Is it true you met 75 minutes in Paris somewhere?

K: [Laughter]. I don't know whether it is true--it is such a ridiculous statement.

D: Yeh, I know. It is like a notorious play in chess.

K: That's right.

D: .....sitting with a whole row of foreign ministers...and you just going from one to another.

K: Well, on the Greek side you know I could do a little bit. We can't do serious work in New York.

D: I understand.

K: Anatol, we have some problem with grain purchases you are making.

D:W What kind of purchases?

K: The problem we have is that it is probably our people's fault in that they have triggered you into doing something.

D: Yeh.

K: And what I wanted to point out is this: we are having a great difficulty with corn and I understand that your people have placed an order for a million tons.

D: For how many?

K: A million.

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D: One million?

K: Yes.

D: Yes, but I also . . . . . one million.

K: Yes, but with frost and with the new difficulties. Our people think that 500 thousand is really the maximum we can handle. And we wondered--you see otherwise if you go through with it and if this gets announced then we have to do something about restricting exports which we don't want to do.

D: I don't know whether Buts reported to you or whether he was doing everything on his own. I already discussed with him and with Moscow authority and everything and it remained on a high order.

K: I am absolutely positive, Anatol, that it is our fault. I am positive that you responded to us.

D: Everything he asked me--so the last time he was with me -- about five days ago--if it is not more than one million, okay, but not more than one million, so I said to Moscow all right. So now it's changed in the past three days. He came to the Embassy and said exactly not more than a million.

K: I haven't the foggiest idea since--it is the last time he will come to your Embassy without permission--believe me.

D: Yes. I dnn't complain he came to me.

K: I am telling you he is not coming to your Embassy again without permission. Or we may have a new Secretary of Agriculture.

D: [laughter]. Really he asked me several things and on all exchanges it was a positive answer. So I reported everything this way. Now he is telling me a different kind of thing.

K: Another think he also placed for a million tons of wheat-was that also arranged with Buts?

D: He said about one million--we didn;t discuss exactly with....

K: Well a million we can probably handle on wheat if you don't go above a million.

D: So what is your/...

K: Oh, you have already ordered two?

D: I don't know. I don't know.

K: Well on wheat we can handle a million altogether. On corn we can handle 500 thousand.

D: You mean by the end of this year or before the elections?

K: Before the election there shouldn't really be anything.

D: They didn't discuss it really--it was a question where it was announced.

K: Well, it is going to be announced very soon and if this isn't-- if we can't get some understanding on it. Well let me get back to you within an hour. Let me check with the Agriculture Department.

D: Please give me what is your explanation because I am a little bit confused now.

K: Okay.

D: Okay, Henry.

K: Right.

SC322 1*

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger/Robert O. Anderson
October 4, 1974; 9:40 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

A: Henry, how are you this morning?

K: OK. How are you?

A: Fine. Say, I ran into a piece of information that I think could be very useful to you on your trip abroad. It looks as if Mexico has a discovery comparable to the North Slope, and it's not too far below Houston and it's on shore, which means it can be developed quite rapidly. Now the Mexican government has been quite cozy about it -- are you aware of it?

K: They told me something like this, yes.

A: Yes. Well there is enough to conceivably -- we think it could support at least 2 million barrels a day of exports out of Mexico, and maybe as much as 3. Unfortunately I don't believe anyone in OPEC is aware of this. I have felt maybe if some publicity could be given to it without involving our government that it might be useful. I think it would be better if you were in a posture of commenting on it rather than the bearer of it. I'm sure actually the field is far enough along that the Mexican government is offering some oil for delivery this month and next -- well, this quarter. So I thought I'm going to be in London tomorrow and over until next week, that if the occasion arose I might see if I couldn't at least say something that might start a lead toward this.

K: But what would you accomplish with it?

A: Well, I think psychologically it would be a real setback to the OPEC group. We think very seriously there's as much as 5 million barrels a day now that is without a home, and the prospect of another 2 or 3 coming out of production, even if it's a few years off, would do a great deal towards driving world oil prices down. As a matter of fact, for the first time I really believe we're going to see a break.

K: Yeah, I don't think they can take the heat.

A: Well, it's almost unmanageable now. Even the prospect of 2 or 3 million barrels which is much closer to market coming downstream would really put a hell of a lot more heat on them.

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K: Yeah, well the only thing I'm wondering about is if we get the word out too quickly whether it will hurt our bargaining position with the Mexicans.

A: Well I understand the reason they've been so cozy about it is there is internal disagreement whether they should cash in on this, which is conceivably as much as 7 to 10 billion a year for Mexico -- or follow the Norwegian pattern and sit on it as a national treasure. Now, I know enough about Mexico that I don't believe they're going to sit on this kind of money very long.

K: No.

A: And actually I think it is sufficiently useful in the OPEC matter to leak it unless there's some reason our government wouldn't want to.

K: Well, the only concern that I have is what it does to our bargaining position with Mexico, since it's bound to come out anyway.

A: Well, it will, yeah. They have offered 60,000 barrels a day for immediate delivery. I think it was $10:50 a barrel. And this thing is so situated that they can deliver oil into either the Atlantic or the Pacific. It's on the Isthmus of Tawanapek right at the bottom of the Gulf of Tawanapek.

K: Yeah. Well, I hadn't thought it through. My general strategy in a negotiation is to try to assemble as many cards as possible and not play them peacemeal, but I have no strong views, if I did I would tell you.

A: Well, it's a piece of information that you might find useful.

K: No, the information is extremely useful. I didn't know the extent of it. I knew they had some, but I didn't know the extent.

A: Well, Henry, If you'd like, I would have our company come into Washington just as private people to talk to you about it.

K: My problem is that I'm going off to the Middle East and I have next to no time before that.

A: Yes, well, I have looked into this quite carefully and our people are satisfied there's probably 18 to 20 billion barrels there, which is as much or more than Prudho Bay.

K: I don't mind your -- maybe you can get it out in a low-key way if it doesn't start a stampede towards the Mexicans.

A: No, I don't think it would. Actually it would be better if it came from Europe as a rumor. I'll see people over there and can get it started in a very quiet way.

K: OK, why don't you do that.

A: And really, I think psychologically it's very helpful to you right now.

K: Right.

A: Good. How have you been?

K: I've been fine.

A: I've thought about you.

K: Thank you.

A: Goodbye.

SC 323 *

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Dobrynin
10/4/74; 9:58 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

D: Hello!

K: Anatol.

D: Oh, good morning, Henry.

K: Anatol, it was good to see you yesterday.

D: It was really nice to see you, Henry, because you are spending so lot of time. Is it true you met 75 minutes in Paris somewhere?

K: [Laughter]. I don't know whether it is true--it is such a ridiculous statement.

D: Yeh, I know. It is like a notorious play in chess.

K: That's right.

D: .....sitting with a whole row of foreign ministers...and you just going from one to another.

K: Well, on the Greek side you know I could do a little bit. We can't do serious work in New York.

D: I understand.

K: Anatol, we have some problem with grain purchases you are making.

D: What kind of purchases?

K: The problem we have is that it is probably our people's fault in that they have triggered you into doing something.

D: Yeh.

K: And what I wanted to point out is this: we are having a great difficulty with corn and I understand that your people have placed an order for a million tons.

D: For how many?

K: A million.

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D: One million?

K: Yes.

D: Yes, but I also . . . . . one million.

K: Yes, but with frost and with the new difficulties. Our people think that 500 thousand is really the maximum we can handle. And we wondered--you see otherwise if you go through with it and if this gets announced then we have to do something about restricting exports which we don't want to do.

D: I don't know whether Butz reported to you or whether he was doing everything on his own. I already discussed with him and with Moscow authority and everything and it remained on a high order.

K: I am absolutely positive, Anatol, that it is our fault. I am positive that you responded to us.

D: Everything he asked me--so the last time he was with me -- about five days ago--if it is not more than one million, okay, but not more than one million, so I said to Moscow all right. So now it's changed in the past three days. He came to the Embassy and said exactly not more than a million.

K: I haven't the foggiest idea since--it is the last time he will come to your Embassy without permission--believe me.

D: Yes. I dnn't complain he came to me.

K: I am telling you he is not coming to your Embassy again without permission. Or we may have a new Secretary of Agriculture.

D: [laughter]. Really he asked me several things and on all exchanges it was a positive answer. So I reported everything this way. Now he is telling me a different kind of thing.

K: Another think he also placed for a million tons of wheat-was that also arranged with Butz?

D: He said about one million--we didn;t discuss exactly with....

K: Well a million we can probably handle on wheat if you don't go above a million.

D: So what is your/...

K: Oh, you have already ordered two?

D: I don't know. I don't know.

K: Well on wheat we can handle a million altogether. On corn we can handle 500 thousand.

D: You mean by the end of this year or before the elections?

K: Before the election there shouldn't really be anything.

D: They didn't discuss it really--it was a question where it was announced.

K: Well, it is going to be announced very soon and if this isn't--if we can't get some understanding on it. Well let me get back to you within an hour. Let me check with the Agriculture Department.

D: Please give me what is your explanation because I am a little bit confused now.

K: Okay.

D: Okay, Henry.

K: Right.

SC327 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Kosciusko-Morizet/The Secretary
October 4, 1974
7:12 p.m.

(Not on for first part)

K-M: ...and we think a very simple formula...

K: No, but when did you propose?

K-M: We can allow it currently on Monday or Tuesday.

K: All right. Why don't we say Tuesday?

K-M: Tuesday, yes.

K: All right.

K-M: And maybe I can send de la _____ to meet _____ with a proposed formula and as soon as you agree we can fix exactly the time on Tuesday.

K: And let me check with the President whether he would prefer Monday or Tuesday. Can I check with you tomorrow?

K-M: Maybe I can send _____ to the Department tomorrow morning.

K: Yes, and I will let you know whether we would prefer the announcement on Monday or Tuesday.

END.

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SC 328

TELECON
Bernie Gwertzman/Secretary Kissinger
October 5, 1974
12:00 Noon

RELEASED IN FULL

G: It's on the Jackson....

K: We're talking background.

G: A senior State Department official....

K: Just say State Department official.

G: It's such a complicated thing. My understanding is from the Senators source primarily.

K: Let me tell you what happened. We had discussed 3 letters with the Senato The first letter contained the assurance I received. If I had received more assurance, I could have put them in my letter. The 2nd letter , what he thought those assurance should mean, including numbers, which I told the senators were never give to me _____. We then sent the letters to Senate leadership, chairmen and ranking members of the Foreign Affairs Committee. If we had been able to make those assurances to begin with -- I told everybody from the beginning how these assurances translate into _____.

G: I'm told you did say that 45,000 would be acceptable to the Russians and I gather they came back with 75,000 and 60,000 was sort of agreed upon.

K: This assumes that I cam make Jews leave the Soviet Union. We say 75,000 therefore let's compromise on 60,000. It's ridiculous. What the hell can I do about it.

G: The question is, which was more troublesome. If this was the case why wa the ~~next~~ letter drafted in the first place.

K: It was also said the wording of these letters -- we would have to go over again and was an idea that the 3rd could be interpreted to mean that we would do our best. The more it was studied, the more people who believed it was a commitment.

G: That was my impression and that was the Jewish impression.

K: You find me one leader of the Jewish community to whom I said I could specify numbers .

G: They got their information from the ____

K: The senators kept saying it will be 60,000.

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G: When you saw (Gromyko), he would never confirm anything like that?

K: Never. I thought that if they could state a number and I could use it as a yardstick_____. I cannot say something that will be used against us. It's getting to be pretty tough to be humanitarian. Why would I want to direct them.

G: Some of them think perhaps you could get more out of Russia.

K: Why would I do it in 3 letters if I had all the assurances to begin with.

G: I could see why if there was something to say perhaps -- so profit minded.

K: I told them at every meeting I could not deliver a number. I told them _____to a substantial increase and I still believe it, but what the increase is, I don't know how many applications there will be.

G: What's the situation?

K: I'm planning a meeting with them on Monday and see what can be worked out.

G: Great expectations were built up -- certainly in the Soviet Union.

K: I think if you see those letters, you will say my ___we ___carried out.

G: I gather in your 1st letter, we have assurances that certain criteria will be carried out.

K: No restriction on application, all of which is somewhat changeable.

G: Jackson's letter is full of detail.

K: Which I was never given.

G: Do you think there's an honest problem here -- that there was a misunderstanding?

K: A problem that could have easily been worked out. I said from the beginning we want to work out in good faith. If I signed this letter and a year from now it will _____.

G: The letter was sat on the table for more than2 months.

K: It was the unanimous opinion of the leaders that this letter would be taken as a commitment. And they said you better not send that letter.

END

SC334

TELCON
Amb. Esenbel/ Sec. Kissinger
October 6, 1974
12:05 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Yes Mr. Ambassador.

E: Mr. Secretary, good morning. I just talked with Gunes. I referred to him our conversation of last night and he again explained the delay was caused by internal difficulties. It has nothing to do with...

K: I understand that.

E: He was pleased that you could make it on the second.

K: I will have to look at that. I will decide that later.

E: I told him it was my impression that you could cancell the Romanian trip and come from Tehran. He said by that time we would be able to do the things we talked about in NY so that this gives them ample time and so that there is no problem. In other words we would have given them enough time to work on these things because the govt probably will not be formed until the 20th of October or something like that. He is confident that it will be Mr. Ecevit again.

K: In that case I will make it on the 2nd or the 5th.

E: He was very pleased and he wanted me to reassure you that they will be able to come to some results by the time you are in Ankara which would be satisfactory to both of us.

K: Good.

E: I think it is all right. I think this clarifies more yesterday's conversation.

K: Good.

E: No problem in other words. You are welcome in November.

K: That I had no question about.

E: You are welcome nn the premise that something will be produced.

K: Very good.

E: You understand.

K: Yes. Thank you for calling.

END

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SC341 *

TELECON
Mr. Rosenthal (NY Times)/Secretary Kissinger
October 7, 1974
12:03 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I wanted to call Mr. Sulzberger but he was out in. I don't think that since I've been Secretary, I've called any newspaper to protest, but I believe this cartoon really goes beyond the __. I think it's McCarthyism in the worse xxx sort. Even the most extreme allegations that we had anything to do with the military, any xxxx fair assesement of the 40 committee is that it's a reviewing committee.

R: I'll not xxx argue with you about this. I have not seen it and it's rather startling.

K: I don't know who is responsible.

R: I'm going to make sure all those who are responsible get your opinion and mine.

K: I tried to get Sulzberger, but he's out of town.

R: I ll get hold of him. I agree with you.

K: I appreciate this, but you make it hard to get a fight started.

R: I was startled and won't pretend otherwise.

K: Good, then we agree.

END

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SC344 *

TELECON
Senator Javits/The Secretary
October 7, 1974
6:15 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I got a report that you have been told that I opposed your trip to Cuba.

J: Not you, but the papers have been carrying it and it must have come out of the State Department. I thought Bob Ingersoll was responsible but he called and disclaimed it.

K: I will say I knew about your trip ahead of time and validated your passport and that I found your report afterwards useful. I will have the press office release a statement tomorrow.

J: [redacted] Tomorrow? That's great.

K: If I put it out specially tonight, it will be counter-productive.

J: You do it the best way for me.

K: What is the best way?

J: I think during the day.

K: How are you doing in New York?

J: I guess I am doing as well as can be expected. People are worrying me about whether it will be close. If the trend holds, I am ok. That's why I would like to get something out on Cuba. On this other matter with Jackson, I have just had a discussion with them. I think it served to dispell some of the miasma. The staff fellows will concurrently take it up with Sonnenfeldt early in the morning. I think you should look over Sonnenfeldt's shoulder.

K: Good.

J: Thank you.

K: I called you primarily about the Cuba thing.

J: Good. Thank you very much.

END.

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SC337

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TELCON
10/7/74/9:25 p.m.
KISSINGER/SENATOR PASTORE

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I'm sorry to have to track you down at night

P: Do you ever go home?

K: I don't think so. I am sorry I haven't been able to explain why we haven't submitted the Threshold for ratification. First we want to negotiate with them on the P&E problem and see how to handle that. Wehave told them until the P&E is settled it cannot be submitted for ratification

P: We reported that out today, but there was some consternation because Price had invited you to come and apparently it was never given to you.

K: I never received it -

P: Why not write a letter to Price and explain to him the fact that you didn't get the message brought to your attention - and what you just said to me and we will file it.

K: I am very sorry the last thing I want to do is show disrespect to your committee.

P: Some of the boys - and to be frank including myself were a little put out

K: The first I heard of it was today saying you were expecting me between 2 and 4

P: I knew that was impossible with your leaving tomorrow.

K: I didn't know I had been asked to come. I had a message that I should call you in the next two weeks --

P: The man on our staff has been talking to Ingersoll and the Liaison man and apparently they have been brushing him off. They were evidently doing this without your knowledge.

K: That was right because you are one of the people I never turn down.

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P: But anyway, if you just write your letter that will be the end of it. It has been reported out of the Committee.

K: Nice to talk to you

P: Now go home.

SC345 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Bob McCloskey/HAK /Eagleburger
10/8/74 - 7:32 p.m.

M: Hello. I spoke to Marder and exactly as you and I agreed. But you've got to be prepared he'll have a story.

E: Has anybody warned the _____ M:./Somebody might tell the President too.

K: But let's sit on it now.

M: Good. OK.

E: See you to night

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SC 346 *

TELCON
10/16/74, 1000 a.m.
EDWARD KLEIN/KISSINGER

RELEASED IN FULL

EK: How are you?

K: A little bit groggy the first day back.

EK: I read - along with 40 million other people - about your stomach problems.

K: That's all right now.

EK: I am hoping we can set up a time you can come down.

K: I think the best time is between the next two trips.

EK: Which would be?

K: About the middle of November. When it would come out is your business, but after my trip to the USSR and the World Food Conference which would probably include the Middle East - and before I go to Japan.

EK: All right. As far as setting up the exact date is concerned, shall I leave it up to Bruce to handle it with Anderson?

K: Let's make it around the 12,th, 13th, or 14th -- somewhere in there. I assume I will have the opportunity to edit it.

EK: It will run as a Q&A if that's the way you like it.

K: We can discuss it. I would like to avoid excessive editorial comment there. You can do what you want with it.

EK: We will give you the exact text.

K: What you do elsewhere in the book is your own business, but that is not a problem. I am assuming you will do it responsibly.

EK: It is a safe assumption. I will tell Bruce to proceed on the exact timing.

K: Goodby

EK: "

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SC 355 *

TELECON
Secretary Simon/Secretary Kissinger
October 17, 1974
6:13 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

(Not on for first part.)

K: Make it 3.2 this year.

S: They are not getting 3.2 from our supplies in any event in this year. We have cut them back to one million tons of corn. We have given them one million tons of wheat. And an additional one million out of next year's crops.

K: Make sure it comes out of next year's crops.

S: How do you want to handle Mr. Dobrynin?

K: Let me think about that. Can I let you know when we meet at 7:00?

S: I wanted to let Mr. Dobrynin know tonight.

K: BUt you can wait with that.

S: Ok.

END.

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SC353 *

TELECON
David Rockefeller/The Secretary
October 17, 1974
7:55 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: How are you David?

R: Thank you for calling back. [redacted] I wasn't sure whether Nelson had had a chance to talk to you.

B6

K: Aren't you nice.

R: How as your trip?

K: I think we have a chance. But it will require great diplomacy. Sadat is in a difficult situation. They are counting a lot on us. We dont look so impressive now. It is a disaster what has been happening here.

R: What has happened to Nelson is incredible.

K: Well, all the people they are attacking. It is incredible. How do you create a conflict of interest by paying people who are already working for you?

R: It is outrageous. I must say it has been a painful period. We have had a few little problems in the bank, but all of it contributes to the atmosphere.

K: If we can pull ourselves together we have a chance at the Middle East. Just for your information, I have the next stage pretty well set, but don't want to announce it before the Arab Summit.

R: Are you still going back and going to India?

K: Yes.

R: I am proposing to go there in November. Because the media are now trying to make Nelson's trial a trial of the whole family. I think I should be back in time for when Nelson starts the testimony. But I think it would be a mistake not to see Mrs. Ghandi.

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SC362 *

TELCON
Robert Ingersoll/Kissinger
12:49 pm - 10/17/74

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

I: Yes, Henry.

K: Bob, I'm going to bring Simon who tells me he has seen a State Department paper on negotiations on oil we're going to have with Mexico. And I'm glad you see my papers before I do.

I: Well, I haven't seen it.

K: Do you know what he's talking about?

I: No. I sent you a notice of the meeting I had with the Arco people. That just told about the discovery.

K: Look, I know about the discovery. Bob Anderson has been peddling it all over the city last year. How he thinks you can get a concession when you've already declared that it's vital to you, I would like to get some advice on. Well I just want to understand how these great ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ business men think.

I: I don't know why they did that. I have no idea.

K: Because they thought it would put pressure on the Arabs., All it will do is force a coalition between Mexico and the Arabs because Mexico will have an interest in selling the oil at the highest prices. If they had a brain in their head they would get a maximum production of the Mexican oil first and that would bring down the prices.

I: Right.

K: What I would like to know is something entirely different. There seems to be a talking paper prepared for the President for his meeting with Echeverria so I expect it came out of ARA, which is busy peddling it around town. The Secretary of the Treasury has already given me his views and seen the paper.

I: I'll find out what it is.

K: You stop these guys from sending papers around town that are not approved by the seventh floor.

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I: Right. I wasn't aware of it.

K: I'll talk to you after one of our meetings this afternoon on the personnel thing.

I: Fine. Thank you.

SC 361 *

TELCON
Sec. Butz/Kissinger
12:46 pm - 10/17/74

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

B: Henry, Earl Butz. Two quick things. After the conference yesterday there was some mention about going down to Egypt and you said it probably was a good idea and you thought Syria, too. I know that was a _____ reaction of yours. I talked with my people and they say they don't see any way in which we can get the PL-40 thing into shape for Syria before two weeks or three weeks, or whenever I would be going there.

K: You don't have to get it in shape.

B: Did you make some kind of commitment to them on commodities when you were there?

K: Well, we talked in general terms here of some things, but you don't have to sign an agreement.

B: I understand that.

K: I just don't want...

B: But would there be any embarrassment if I went in there ahead of an agreement having been worked out?

K: Not at all. As long as an agreement will be worked out.

B: Would it serve your purposes if the Secretary of Agriculture went in there?

K: Absolutely. But if you go to Egypt I want you to go to Syria.

B: Well, should I go to either of them?

K: I think it's a pretty good idea.

B: Well, of course we got one worked out with Egypt...

K: Yeah, but I'd like the Syrians to have the sense that anything Egypt gets they are eligible for.

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B: O.K. Well, ~~would~~ it will serve your purpose, Henry.

K: ~~Absolutely~~ It would absolutely. I don't want the Syrians to feel isolated. But you'll suffer through one of their awful meals and don't be too honest. Now that shouldn't be hard.

B: O.K. I can handle that alright.

K: I mean just give them the impression they're getting a PL-40 program.

B: O.K. And we will work one out, but I'll go in there and be sympathetic. That's what you'd like.

K: That's all I need and give them love.

B: O.K. Now then, with respect to that speech of yours, some of our people are having input in it. I suggested that if they can just get the general principles you want and not get down to nuts and bolts, that I think then instead of the delegation a day or two later, I'll give _____ one that has nuts and bolts in it. Does that make sense?

K: That's substantially what I have in mind.

B: O.K. And I'll have our people get on this, Henry, thanks a lot...

K: Alright, except I want to have enough nuts and bolts in it so that it looks plausible.

B: Well, we'll do that.

K: Good. Thanks.

B: Thanks.

SC 368 *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Dinitz/Sec. Kissinger
October 18, 1974
3:05 p.m.

D: I cannot tell you how thrilled I am.

K: I can hear it in your voice. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

D: I want to tell you how appreciate I am and those in Israeli are for the agreement reached with the Senators this morning and we are highly appreciative. There is a cable coming to you from Allon and Rabin.

K: Jackson has immediately double-crossed us which may blow-up the agreement.

D: I was thrilled with the news and I know that it was the result of many people's efforts.

K: The substance is fine.

D: The second thing that I ask of you..

K: We have to meet before I leave.

D: There is something that just came to my attention. The Israeli Harmonic is giving a concert and you have been invited and we have word from the secretary that you will not be able to attend.

K: Monday night.

D: It is a gala occasion.

K: I will be with the President in Tuscon.

D: I see. It is something that could have very good impression.

K: I was there last time.

D: I remember when Rabin was here.

K: I will be with the President in Tuscon.

D: Too bad. It is only one night. Will Nancy be here and could she go?

K: She is in NY. If she is back. I will ask her.

D: She would enjoy it and would be received well. Shall I talk to Nancy or shall you?
K: XXXXXXXXXXXX Let's both do it.

D: I will have Vivian talk to here.

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2.

K: We have a number of things to discuss.

D: Tomorrow morning whenver you are available.

END

SC370 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin/Sec. Kissinger
Oct. 18, 1974
11:40 a.m.

D: Hello, Henry. How are you. I hope you are not tired after the long trip and suddenly you go to make a speech. I know it was arranged before. Too busy, even for you. You should rest a little bit. Maybe tomorrow. Use the United Nations as a rest day.

K: Want I get a rest in Moscow?

D: I doubt it very much because Sec. Gen. is preparing to negotiate with you and you know it is very difficult to do it.

K: When are you going?

D: On Sunday.

K: I may c ome up with another approach to the SALT thing as an alternative.

D: When?

K: Before you go.

D: I hope it will be better.

K: Unless you find it confusing.

D: I will look at it and we will discuss it. ~~and when exactly~~ When do you think?

K: Tomorrow probably.

D: Yes. I will look for you ...

K: Tomorrow morning.

D: All right. When. 10:00?

K: LET's AIM FOR L):00. I will call you in the morning.

D: You mean it will be another version.

K: Another approach.

D: Another approach in what way generally speaking.

K: I am not yet sure. One in which there could be inequalities in various things.

D: For both sides.

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K: Right.

D: Maybe useful. For the time being they are suspiciously quiet. I sent your proposal you are making.

K: I note that Brezhnev said to Simon "Kissinger does not like to make concessions."

D: Is that a secret?

K: I did not object to it.

D: It is a well known fact even within my govt of the Politburo. O.K. Henry.

K: One other social thing. Nancy would like to go to Leningrade on the second day. Not the first and by plane both ways.

D: No problem. Second day means you will arrive late and shd would like to go on the 25th.

K: Right. One evening if no negotiations , we could go to the Moscow ballet.

D: I think so. What?

K: Up to you.

D: In Moscow?

K: In Moscow. [illegible]

D: Do you plan to go to Leningrad?

K: Let's see where we stand in our [illegible] negotiations.

D: For the ballet we will arrange. No problem.

K: Tomorrow morning we will review the situation.

D: 10:00 unless you call me.

END

SC372 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELCON
10/19/74, 3:55 p.m.
KISSINGER/GOLDA MEIR

K: How are you?

M: Fine, how are you -- how was the trip?

K: I am fine. It is easier to call you from Washington than from Jerusalem.

M: That's the shortest way

K: I had to leave Jerusalem so rapidly to get to Riyadh before Ramadan that I didn't have a chance to call you but I thought of you.

M: I understood you were in a rush. Were you satisfied with your trip?

K: I think we had good talks in Israel and I think on the whole there are some possibilities -- it is not getting any easier but on the whole I was not dissatisfied with my trip.

M: When do you expect to be back in the neighborhood?

K: I think early in November and Nancy will be with me which means I will have to see you no matter what my intentions are because Nancy will not leave Israel without seeing you.

M: I will see her at any rate. [redacted] B6

K: [redacted] How are you.

M: I'm fine

K: Simka tells me you are coming here in early December.

M: Yes. I am leaving here the last week in November and stopping over for a day in Geneva and about three days in London.

K: You should come to Washington.

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M: No, there is no reason for me to come to Washington.

K: If the President invites you, will you refuse?

M: If he does it on his own without being asked by somebody to do it I can't say no to a President, but otherwise there is no reason.

K: Let's see what happens.

M: Don't worry about it.

K: For a Secretary of State you don't come?

M: No. You know I don't. I am democratic - I speak even to Secretaries of State

K: I wanted you to know your former Ambassador told me a little while ago that Iidealize you -- and the excellence of our cooperation -- of the way you and I cooperated.

M: I don't think it was bad.

K: He said it because I always compare other people unfavorably.

M: We didn/t always agree to everything, but finally we reached results.

K: We didn't always agree on everything but ultimately we wound up very close.

M: I have no regrets.

K: Nor do I -- unless, however you don't come to Washington.

M: Look, there will be all kinds of interpretations - that I'm meddling --

K: I understand but if we hear you are in America and you get a formal invitation which you don't initiate, then I don't see what choice you have.

M: Look, there are a few weeks. Let's see what happens.

K: I'll call you when I get to Israel and Nancy will certainly come to see you and if I have half an hour I will come too.

M: Thanks a lot

K: Simka sends his regards

SC373 *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
The Secretary/Mr. Arthur Hartman (EUR)
Tuesday, October 22, 1974
4:35 p.m.

K: Art, I have been talking to John Sherman Cooper and he tells me he cannot get any secure facilities and no Marines.

H: I haven't heard about that. They are going to be working on the facilities for a while and it will take time to get it all in shape but it is my understanding that it will be a fully secure position.

K: He has been told the contrary and that everything will have to be hauled back and forth from Berlin.

H: A lot of this is just until we get everything established and the offices set up.

K: We should have security there 24 hours a day.

H: I am sure we will but I will look into it and take care of it.

K: Thank you.

END.

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SC374 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELCON
The Secretary/ Former Secretary Dean Rusk (Atlanta, Georgia)
Tuesday, October 22, 1974
4:40 p.m.

K: Hello Dean, how are you?

R: Pretty good Henry, [redacted] B6
I am fine.

K: Dean, I am calling to ask you something and you can't blame me for trying -- would you consider our Embassy in London.

R: Thank you, Henry, I just cannot possibly do that. I am grateful for the thought but there is no possibility I could take it. [redacted] B6

K: [redacted]

R: Virginia and I have talked out this sort of thing before. Bill Rogers had a couple of ideas but we cannot take on any public service. When I left the Government we decided we would not return. I thought you were off for Russia today.

K: I am tonight but I would be much more reassured if you were a man of less integrity.

R: I know you are faced with a lot and I wish you all the best. The Middle East is getting a little rough again too.

K: Yes, it seems everything is.

R: Good Luck Henry, and thank you for calling.

END.

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SC 375 *

TELECON
Senator Kennedy/Secretary Kissinger
October 22, 1974
12:07

RELEASED IN PART
B6

.....missed first part.

HAK: It is the worst from of blackmail I have ever seen.

K: I wanted to try something out on you. I was thinking of going to Portugal. At first I was advised against going but in the last 36 hours Art Hartman has said it wo uld be useful.

HAK: I think it would...particularly if you could get a non-Communist forum.

K: I understand Brown is there now and you probably have been receiving reports...

HAK: I think you could do a lot of good there now and bring home to them that if they give the Communists a dominant role it is irreversible.

K: I just wanted to get some reaction from you.

HAK: I would support it.

K: I would go right after the election. They have been pressing me but I have been holding off. Hartman said a few weeks ago that he wouldn't do it but now he feels differently.

HAK: If you had asked me a while back I would have been reluctant but having talked to Costa Gomez I feel differently. He has tried to keep the democratic option open and we have to try to keep him from becoming a Kerensky.

K: OK

[redacted] B6

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K: [redacted] B6

HAK: Well, when I am here sometime, I will call you and drop over.

K: Alright. Have a good trip.

HAK: Thank you, Ted and you have a good trip.

END

*

RELEASED IN FULL

SDC

TELECON
Mr. Arthur Burns/Secretary Kissinger
November 11, 1974
4:00 pm

B: You had quite a long and tiring trip. Was it worthwhile?

K: It was. Our press has a death wish -- they are more afraid of success than a failure.

B: I am having luncheon with you on Thursday. I wanted, if I could, to see you for a few minutes before then. It is not necessary but it would be helpful. We have a number of baking problems and I know you are interested in them, particularly in Egypt. I have gotten all sorts of advice from your people and Treasury. We have banking problems, but I don't want any decisions made by this board til I learn your own views. I don't want anybody's foreign policy views but yours.

K: Can I call you tomorrow? I have to work on a speech and as soon as I have it in rough form, I would also like to ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ talk to you about that speech.

B: You call me and I will adjust.

K: Ok.

B: How do you feel?

K: Wonderful.

B: Good. You call me.

K: I will talk to you soon.

END

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SD7

TELECON
Senator Javits/The Secretary
November 11, 1974
6:24 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you? Congratulations!

J: Well, I thank you. It was not an easy one..I told you that.

K: That I know.

J: The whole situation is going the other way.

K: Where are you?

J: I am at Palm Desert.

K: Marvelous.

J: You must be tired yourself.

K: Well, yeh.

J: It has been a somewhat frustrating time.

K: Well you know our newspapers have a yen for defeat. We did not come out so bad in the Middle East.

J: Can it be construed as what we wanted to happen?

K: Yes. If we can shut up for a bit. All of a sudden there is this massive screaming about our not recognizing the PLO. Which we have no intention of doing.

J: We could usefully do that in the Congress.

K: When will you be back?

J: Next Saturday. Or Sunday at the latest. And I will be in Washington on Monday.

K: Monday I will be in Japan with the President.

J: How long will you be away?

K: Ten days.

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J: If you consider it highly desirable to talk to me, I can come in and be there Sunday morning.

K: Let me find out when the President is leaving.

J: Oh...he is going too?

K: Yes. If there is time it may be desirable for us to get together.

J: If you give me a ring, or have someone call me, I will do it. The economic situation looks pretty bad in Europe and here.

K: Yes.

J: The first problem is cutting the consumption of oil and gas. He must take a strong stand on it.

K: I am giving a speech this week on energy in which some of these ideas will be reflected.

J: I used it in the campaign including rationing and I think the public wants it.

K: That's good to know.

J: All my colleagues check it out the same way.

K: That's fascinating to know.

J: Love to Nancy from Marion and me.

K: Thank you.

END.

*

SD8

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/The Secretary
November 12, 1974
7:35 p.m.

K: I am already late for a White House dinner for your Austrian friend.

D: Yes. The President I think when he arrived I saw it on the radio the Austrian making me (unintelligible).

K: Look Anotoly I wanted to apologize for the request to come direct from Vladivostock to China. It was done by some eager beavers.

D: Yes, well...

K: I am apologizing so stop hitting me. You tell them it happened in my absence without my knowledge.

D: I understand.

K: It was done by some technical eager beaver trying to arrange the President's trip.

D: I was expecting to discuss it with you at ~~dinner~~ lunch tomorrow.

K: It will be exactly as before.

D: Ok. Tomorrow is ok at 1:00. Thank you very much and have a nice dinner.

K: Thank you. Goodbye.

END.

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RELEASED IN FULL

SD10

TELECON
Ambassador Kenneth Rush/Secretary Kissinger
November 12, 1974
3:32 PM

K: Ken, I understand you're going off today.

R: Yes, we're leaving at 4:00.

K: I wanted to wish you well and tell you you have my full backing.

R: I appreciate it. I'm looking forward to the post and working with you. I think it will be interesting.

K: It should be exciting.

R: We have great things to do and you're doing them. I want to help you.

K: We have some tough work ahead. We have to be hard on the French. If they keep it up with each administration then we have an endemic problem. You might talk to Sauvagnargues as a friend.

R: Have you any message you would like to pass on to him?

K: I would just tell him you're worried. We can't help but conclude that we are right back where we were last year.

R: Right, I'll do that. I can talk very plainly with him without any real problem, and I'll do it again. I want to stay in very close touch with you.

K: You have direct access to me.

R: I don't want to both you but I wanted to be sure I'm on your wave length.

K: Good. I hope to see you soon.

R: Do you have any plans for France?

K: No, well, I'll see you in Martinique.

R: I'll see you there. As you know, my one hope is that I can help.

K: If I didn't think you could, we would not have urged you to take this position.

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R: I'm very happy about the post and your supports means a great deal.

K: OK, all the best to you.

R: Thanks a lot. God knows I know the problems you have and I think you can handle the things very well and we're going to have some rough times before we see the daylight, but we'll see the daylight. If you can't pull it off with all the help we can give you, I don't know who can.

K: I appreciate this.

R: Thank you for calling.

K: Bye.

END

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RELEASED IN FULL

SD11

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Ghorbal
11/13/74; 10:27 a.m.

K: Hello.

G: Good morning, Mr. Secretary.

K: How are you?

G: Fine. How are you? And I hope Mrs. Kissinger is fine.

K: Oh, fine.

G: Good. I called you up because I didn't want to leave anything to chances. Yesterday news came to me or call it speculation and apparently it was speculation -- that the Israelis were geared up to stage on attack on Syria.

K: Yeah, we won't stand for it.

G: Well, I just -- you know, when I got that news and it talked about a possibleattack this morning, I thought I should not leave anything to chance.

K: I got the news, too.

G: You did.

K: Yeah, for the 13th and at best it will not be committed. We don't know whether it is true but we in any event wouldn't stand for it.

G: I want to thank you really for taking the time to call me back.

K: Not at all.

G: I appreciate it and with your permission -- I don't want to come out with [redacted] any unnecessary disturbing of you but . . .

K: No, no, you are a friend -- you can always call me.

G: I would do that in case there is anything that . . . . And I hope -- I know how hectic it was in terms of different cities but I hope you [redacted] found it rewarding.

K: No, I found it rewarding. I found it very useful.

G: And it will be my pleasure when you have the time to call me in to come and see you and pay my respects and to be briefed as you may wish to do.

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Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Ghorbal
11/13/74; 10:27 a.m.

K: Good. Let's do that soon.

G: All right.

K: Thank you. Nice to talk to you.

G: Thank you. My pleasure.

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SD/15

TELECON
Emilio Rabasa/The Secretary
November 13, 1974
7:30 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Emilio, how are you?

R: Fine. We missed you at Quito.

K: Well I got lousy advice.

R: I want to tell you that your delegation ...well to you perfect conduct. We would have loved to have the vote on our side.

K: But that we couldn't do.

R: I know. Ingersoll and Rogers were perfect from your point of view. Very discreet. They did not try to arm-twist nobody. They really did a good job.

K: We told you ahead of time what we were going to do.

R: I know. I was not surprised.

K: Where do we go from here?

R: I think we go to Buenos Aires. Althought we are not going to pick up that subject there. Because it would ruin the meeting.

K: I think we may be at the CAS meeting here we can handle it.

R: Next year you mean?

K: Yes.

R: I called you to underline what your delegates said.

K: You are a dear friend and I appreciate it.

R: My President is in Rome at the FAC meeting. He has been called upon by different delegations that it would be very commendable if the UN could excellerate the giving of food you are doing. Not only bilaterally but through the FAC. Could you put in more motion on this?

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K: Let me take a look.

R: Please call your Ambassador in Rome to see my President so he will see you are taking steps ~~x~~ in this direction. Call him and tell him I have called you. He should please report with my President so he knows you have the message.

K: It will be done tomorrow.

R: Ok. Thanks Henry.

K: I will send our Secretary of Agriculture to see him.

R: Fine. I would really appreciate it if he sees him. My President is very nervous and dynamic.

K: In that case I had better do it through our Ambassador because If I do it through the Secretary of Agriculture I don't have him under control as well.

R: They are thinking of putting some mention of the charter in the declaration of the FAO.

K: We have no problem in that.

R: Tell your delegation that also please.

K: Good.

R: If you could ~~x~~ hasten up your program a lot of countries would like it.

K: At least I will get somebody to see him.

R: Ok Henry. In a month I will be in New York. I will give you a ring to see if we could meet in New York or Washington.

K: Good.

END.

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SD17

TELECON
Mr. Enders/Secretary Kissinger
November 13, 1974
4:29 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: No problem with Morton?

E: None.

K: You won't let me say 3.5 million.

E: I think it would be a mistake. All we have offered is a million so far and it's disbelievable that we will make that and we're having trouble.

K: You say its only 10 percent of the total import of the group.

E: It's 10 percent but that's a survey this winder of 4 million barrels a day. Only changes the price 400 percent. This is a market that is very price sensitive.

K: OK, fine. We have to go ahead anyway. We can't let Schmidt drive us off.

E: We can't indeed. Larry has done a message, I think he has the right line.

K: We can give him the concession of cancelling the meeting,

E: Absolutely.

K: He can claim he achieved that.

E: Right.

K: OK.

END

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SD20

TELECON
Robert Anderson/Secretary Kissinger
November 14, 1974
2:30 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

(Missed first part)

A: ....and so I put him down as number 13. Jerry said there's room for 14.

K: Why him? There's so many other columnists we've never taken.

A: No other columnist has asked. Everybody that asked is on the list.

K: Has he been told?

A: Not yet.

K: Let me think about it until tomorrow.

A: OK.

END

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SD-22

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Arthur Burns/The Secretary
November 15, 1974
5:45 p.m.

B: Henry, one more banking question. I mentioned Lebanon to you yesterday. It turns out that the Lebanese Bank will be operating mainly in Kuwait. Does that make a difference to you?

K: No.

B: Are you interested in Kuwait?

K: I am marginally interested in it.

B: It is not like Israel and Egypt.

K: No, it is not like Israel and Egypt.

B: Ok. That's all I wanted to know.

K: I enjoyed our talk yesterday.

B: The speech was well reported. How do you feel?

K: I feel fine.

B: Hope to see you soon.

END.

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SD21

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
SYG Waldheim/The Secretary
November 15, 1974
5:53 p.m.

W: I know you were very busy in Chicago so I couldn't reach you. Thank you for returning my call. In regard to the Syrian...have you seen it?

K: Yes, I have seen it.

W: It looks rather serious. Because of the discussions he said well we don't have two vetos anyway in the Security Council.

K: Who are the two vetos?

W: No, you know of course there were some incidents this has been ironed out. This is a matter of principal. He said we have the parties six months time to negotiate a settlement. Can you tell me what kind of ~~parity~~ political progress was made. I stated, you know this takes time. He said what we want now is to return to the status quo . He asked me how many observers you had before. This is what I wanted to tell you in addition to what I put in my letter. I had a talk in the meantime with (unintelligible) in contrast to what he told me previously. This time he was very concerned and he said we think he really means business.

K: I am beginning to think so too.

W: I am wondering what we can do?

K: Let me approach Sadat , Faisal and a few others this weekend.

W: He told me he would immediately inform Sadat. I told him I think your President has good relations with Sadat, and maybe he could do something about it. He had another idea he said maybel they just want to force the Security Council to discuss the matter formally again. To have an opportunity to (unintelligible) that no political solution has been ~~xxx~~ achieved. If the Council further desires we would then accept the decision of the Council. That was an idea which the Ambassador discussed with me. I am not so sure it is right.

K: No, I think they mean it.

W: I must before the Council reviews the matter, I must present a report to the Council. In this case I think

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I shall wait until the very last moment.

K: When does the Council meet?

W: No time has been set. I can wait with my report until a few days before they meet.

K: Why don't you do that?

W: Yes, so we all have enough time to work on the Syrians to change their mind. I would appreciate it if you would let me know if you hear something.

K: Yes, of course. I will keep in touch with you.

W: Thank you very much.

K: Goodbye.

END.

RELEASED IN FULL

SD25 *

November 16, 1974
10:20 - Secretary Kissinger's conversation with Secretary Simon

Secretary Kissinger: Bill, how are you?

Secretary Simon: Great, how are you?

Secretary Kissinger: Bill, I noticed in yesterday's Washington Star that Oswald Johnston is trying to build some dispute between you and me on that $25 billion ...

Secretary Simon: I didn't notice that. The Wall Street Journal had an article that said that it --- that contradicted what I am going to do. I am going to address that in my speech today.

Secretary Kissinger: Because what I think I am putting out is the whole strategy. Of course, another argument is that this is a sudden improvisation. But I want to get across, and you are to get across, is that we have been meeting on this since summer! This is part of the strategy -- we have been waiting for the emergency program to get adopted. That was the only hold-up.

Secretary Simon: I am saying we have been talking for a year.

Secretary Kissinger: That's right. Alright, just put it out. Say you, Burns, and I have been meeting for a year to develop this. And, secondly, somebody told me, you know how rumors are in this town, that you are going to pull away from this figure.

Secretary Simon: What figure?

Secretary Kissinger. Of $25 billion.

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Secretary Simon: I did not. I mention $25 billion specifically in my speech.

Secretary Kissinger: Because, you know, without it -- the World Food Conference that got screwed up by Butz, blowing the whole thing sky-high.

Secretary Simon: Let me tell you. The verbiage in this speech has been developed with Butz, Enders, Bennett, and Cooper.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we have been together on this -- we will stick together on this, or they are going to get us.

Secretary Simon: I am going to land on all this...

Secretary Kissinger: You know they are right. What is the alternative? I mean, I have seen some of the European press and some of the comments. Now, neither -- in September they accused us of not getting prices down immediately, which we never intended. Our strategy has always been to break these institutions and to put them down reliably.

Secretary Simon: So, I am going to say, you know, when people scream hysterically at no policies and what have you, that we have been developing this over the past year and agreed to a _____ that is required in any conversations with whatever nations, whose reliance is far greater than ours, and, therefore, some of the solutions will be different. And that is why we have to work this thing very carefully. This whole thrust will get out in my speech absolutely. And the specifics -- we will have the $25 billion in 1975 -- I don't go beyond '75, I just talk about that.

Secretary Kissinger: You know, but I think you should say ~~think~~ that more is

necessary because that is what I said. We just shouldn't have any crack there.

Secretary Simon: No, I agree. I couldn't agree with you more.

Secretary Kissinger: Because I think we can turn this energy affair into a big plus for us -- let's do it now. We are the only country that has taken a responsible line.

Secretary Simon: I ~~agree with~~ stressed that -- as far as what we have done with the energy consumers' conference. The speech is too long, but it is necessarily too long. You will find it consistent. I am going to send over -- I hope to have the near final draft this afternoon -- and I am going to send it over to you and make certain it is put right in your hands. I think you will find it is completely consistent. Enders is out of town, but he has worked on every draft up to this one.

Secretary Kissinger: Terrific.

Secretary Simon: Great.

Secretary Kissinger: Thank you.

Secretary Simon: Goodbye.

Secretary Kissinger: Goodbye.

*

5D27

TELECON
Professor Landes/Secretary Kissinger
November 16, 1974
4:30 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

L: I'm sure you're very busy and I'm grateful you returned my call. I wanted to see whether or not I could come to see you either Monday or Tuesday morning.

K: I'll be in Japan with the President.

L: When will you come back?

K: In 2 weeks.

L: I wanted to talk to you about some things that are coming up fast. I wanted to talk to you about the way things are shaping up in the UN. I'm very sure you're concerned.

K: Very much.

L: That body is being turned into a kind of forum which is a vehicle for political pressures of a kind of cotery.

K: The Jewish intellectuals cannot beat me to death for being insensitive to human rights in South Africa and Chile and ask me to defend Israel. When it's something to their benefit.

L: I don't want to be beaten over the head for anything they say.

K: No,,I have to talk to somebody who is my friend. I couldn't agree with you more. We're resisting on South Africa on the ground that is bound to turn to a racist institution.

L: You could even take it back to the Taiwan business and that was a mistake and the UN will _____Lay out large sums of money to support it's economy to make this issue. And the Russians ought to be concerned about this. This ought to be reconsidered.

K: I agree with that.

L: Have you thought about a coalition of development and underdeveloped countries that tried to do with Israel what has already been done with Sough Africa.

K: I want to point out to you the ___when I make that argument. When I maintain a position on South Africa for this reason I was beaten to death by all liberal intellectuals.

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L: I think you may find out there is a change of sentiment that would be very helpful I think with some conversations on the ___. We could work out a more rational and intellectual approach on this.

K: We don't want to establish a principle. Take the Quito meeting. I don't give a damn about Cuba. I cannot establish the principle that the U.S. will let it's____.

L: That will soon establish a principle which entails whether or ____and they will use this form in a sense to get the U.S. through the sitatuion of this kind.

K: No question about it.

L: I would want to talk to you about this.

K: Why don't you come down the week I'm back.

L: Could you have someone call me.

K: Call Jerry Bremer.

L: Jerry Friendly?

K: Bremer. B-r-e-m-e-r.

L: I'll do that. I wish you good luck on your trip.

K: Thank you.

L: The Japanese_____.

K: I'm in complete agreement with you. We're using up our sources as a country in a way which is unbelievable.

L: I'm appalled at it.

K: You cannot look weak in all areas.

L: I could not agree with you more. Would you be willing to see a few other people with me.

K: I f you guarantee me they won't put it in the newspapers.

L: I'll guarantee it.

K: I think it would be a good idea to bring a few along.

L" I'll get in touch with Bremer next week.

K: OK.

END

SD40

1*

TELECON
Mr. Maw/Secretary Kissinger
December 2, 1974
6:07 PM

RELEASED IN PART
B6, B5

K: ____consider that statement alright.

M: I think it's a very good statement. What else can you do.

K: Jackson will scream.

M: This is what you've been consistent with.

K: If I don't do it now he'll blame me in a few months.

M: It's exactly as you say. He's misinterpreted what you said and he'll do it again. I think it's a good statement. I think you have no alternative.

K: OK. I want to talk to you when I have a chance about some personal matters.

M: [redacted] B6, B5

K: I think it's going to be a disastor. You know it's a disastor.

M: But convince these fools.

K: With no redeeming value.

M: We have been up there an hour talking and they made no sense.

K: Holton is a good fellow. OK. Thank you.

END

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SD33 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

Telcon
Ambassador Dobrynin
Secretary Kissinger
12/2/74; 10:23 a.m.

K: Hello.

D: Hello, Henry. Good morning.

K: Anatol, how are you?

D: How are you? Thank you. Welcome back.

K: Thank you. Have you got a cold?

D: Well, not a cold -- just back something happened to it -- otherwise everything is all right.

[redacted] B6

When could I come drop for a few minutes to see you -- internationalization, Aide Memoire, etc.

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Telcon
Ambassador Dobrynin
Secretary Kissinger
12/2/74; 10:23 a.m.

K: Let see 2:30 at the State Department.

D: That's fine. 2:30 is convenient to you.

K: Yes. Now let me ask you this: I think the President ought to use the figures tonight at the press conference.

D: Yes.

K: Everyone else has been using them.

D: Yes.

K: Most of our disagreements -- if there are any -- are esoteric details.

D: Yes.

K: In fact I don't think we have disagreements when I look at these two . . .

D: Well, really the only thing -- I haven't sent -- I received it yesterday -- the only one thing really I have personally is about this _____ to verification, you know. You have used it twice in this -- otherwise I don't see . . .

K: Well let's take a look at it at 2:30.

D: Okay. So in the usual place.

K: Yeah, at the State Department.

D: Yeah. Thank you very much.

K: See you then.

D: Okay. Bye-bye.

SD32 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador McCloskey
12/2/74; 10:19 a.m.

K: Hello.

M: Good morning, sir.

K: I wanted earlier to talk with you but I understand that Larry already has about this Cheshire story which apparently was also picked up in the Daily News and on the New York radio. Nancy is distressed [redacted] B6

M: Oh, my God.

K: I mean she feels that it is an attack on her honor. All she was trying to do was really to help the country.

M: Uh-huh.

K: And I must say this Department is just killing me! Why did you have to say we returned these gifts. They were returned because [redacted] Daley picked out the wrong ones. There was nothing wrong with it. She wanted to get something that had more class when she found out they were going to give a Mickey Mouse clock to Queen Alia. B6

M: We are preparing something which I will bring over to you. What is a convenient time?

K: Well, I will be over at State about 11:45.

M: All right. We will have something for you when you get over here. I am sorry to hear that she is . . .

K: She is defenseless against stuff like that. I mean I may ~~raise~~ rage and scream but I am used to it.

M: Did someone also call her mother?

K: That's right. Someone called her mother who had heard it on the radio. Her mothere is 81 -- I mean they have never been accused of stealing before.

M: Well, I don't know what all the facts are.

K: The facts are very simple. Nancy thought that the gifts we were giving were lousey. She then went to some jewelers to see whether she could get gifts at the same price which had a little more class and she picked out some. Then [redacted] Daley went up there and got some additional gifts from B6

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these same jewelers. She didn't want to give only Steuben and crap. And then the stuff that Daley had got was returned not because there was anything wrong with it but because Nancy didn't like it.

M: And not as a result of the Proxmire letter.

K: And not as a result of the Proxmire letter. And the price for these items was less than we are paying for the Steuben. And the ~~fig~~'s gifts were not to people she picked but to people on the protocol list.

M: The story quotes Daley as saying that he denied the Proxmire inquiry had anything to do with the decision. But then there is this next paragraph that says other State Department sources indicated officials anticipated criticism and decided to headit off. No one can account for who the hell that is.

K: If that is the case, then I want to have some house cleaning there.

M: Uh-huh.

K: There was no criticism. What can there be criticism about?

M: Well, only that Proxmire is the one leading the criticism.

K: I want Proxmire attacked, too.

M: Uh-huh.

K: What is the criticism. Is there a law that says we have to buy Steuben things.

M: No. I don't think anyone else would criticize this. I don't know what Proxmire's hang-up is.

K: It is one thing to attack the notion of gift-giving but when the wife of the Secretary of State who has no God damned obligation to do it at all tries to give some class to our gifts and spending as much money ~~as~~ has has been spent before goes to the trouble of picking stuff out -- what the hell is wrong with this?

M: There is nothing wrong with it.

K: Why the hell does the Department have to go into its defensive position

SD35

*

Telcon:12/2/74:11:48
Secretary Kissinger
Senator Javits

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

J: Henry, welcome home.

K: Thank you Jack.

J: Listen, somebody said last night - I think it was on the air or in person - that never in the history of our - oh yea, at a dinner I went to for the Braufman boys that I presided at

K: Which boys?

J: Edgar & Charles Braufman - the big liquor fortune - and Mitchell Sharp former Foreign Minister of Canada - now the chairman of that _____ Council. Do you know him?

K: Yes, very well.

J: Sharp said that he believes there is no man better known in the world than the American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. How about that.

K: I think that is great - that puts me on the list as a challenge to kill me.

J: [Laughs] Anyhow, that is what he said. And you know in connection in saying that Trudeau is going to be here on Wednesday.

K: Right.

J: Henry, you are giving me one of your precious evenings which I love and which is going to make me solvent again.

K: Well you are doing it on the worst possible date for me.

J: All right. So we are striking it out for that day if it's the worst possible day and I'll pick another. The middle of January. And ask you about the 13th of January.

K: Wonderful.

J: Because my guys are worried that it's too soon. I won't get the customers.

K: Well, you're saving my life.

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J: I saved your life. Listen, I do that every day and twice on Sunday.

K: That happens actually to be true.

J: [Laughter]

K: No, Jack, you've been one of my great friends.

J: Well, listen, I always want to be all our lives, even if you're a professor. And I adored your children being with you.

K: Look, you're going to be a close friend long after I'm out of this job.

J: Right. And I'll tell you a secret, you might be a greater man then. You won't have to make these compromises. Just like me, I'm in the same boat.

K: I'll be a more thoughtful man.

J: That's right.

K: Is it definitely the 13th?

J: Let me check it back in the next hour and I'll come back to you and record it on your calendar.

K: All I'd like to know, Jack, is: must I fly on the 13th?

J: Doh't be superstitious, you come up on Sunday and we'll give you a marvelous day.

K: Are you going to get me an airplane?

J: Yes.

K: None of these one engine jets -- that was a souped-up, converted glider that you gave me the last time.

J: Okay. We'll give you a real two-engine beauty.

K: Remember I'm a neurotic.

J: [Laughter] I know. Listen, Henry, when do I see you?

K: When are you back?

J: Well, I'm back tonight.

K: How about breakfast on Saturday?

J: Oh, listen, don't make it a Saturday. If you do, I'll come because I want to see but --

K: Well, then we will have to have drinks some day this week.

J: In other words, you have no breakfast except Saturday?

K: That's right.

J: All right. Well, give me an option on that.

K: Good. But I want to see you this week.

J: Yeah, I do too. And I'll be back to you a little later.

K: Good. Wonderful, Jack.

J: Bye.

SD36

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TELCON
Stanley Hoffman/Secy Kissinger
12:00 Noon, December 2, 1974

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Stanley, how are you?

H: I'm sorry to bother you but you're not in Washington very often and I wanted to ask you the following: We -- _____ and I met a few days ago here an Israeli leader called Shulamith Aloni (former Cabinet Minister).

K: Oh, yeah, I know her.

H: And who is in New York for two or three days and she asks us whether you could see her.

K: One of Golda's most determined enemies.

H: Yes, and a rather bright woman.

K: When must I see her if I see her?

H: She is at the Hotel Drake in New York tomorrow and Wednesday and could stay one more day I gather. And doesn't want to make a formal request for reasons which escape me but I said I would call you and ask you whether you could see her.

K: The Israelis are a small but a miserable people.

H: [Laughter] She strikes me as a better one.

K: No, no; they are heroic and they deserve a lot.

H: She has lots of guts, this woman.

K: Let me look at my calendar which is impossible but maybe late Thursday I can see her.

H: I f you can, can you have your secretary leave a --

K: I will call her at the Hotel Drake no later than tomorrow.

H: Okay.

K: When will I see you again?

H: When are you in town again and will you be in town at all in February?

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K: Yeah, but why not before?

H: Sure. I said February half in jest. We'll be gone the second half of January but between now and then --

K: Well, from the middle of December till February I will be here pretty constantly.

H: Well, as soon as the mad rush here ends and even if it is over the Christmas and New Year's, I'd love to see you if you have a minute.

K: Why don't we --

H: I'll call you.

K: Call me. I'd love to see you.

H: Yeah, me too.

K: Good.

H: It's been much too long.

K: Bring Inga (sp?).

H: Okay.

K: Bye.

*

SD37

TELECON
Ben Bradley (Wash. Post)/Secretary Kissinger
December 2, 1974
12:33 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Can I do something which has never worked yet? Complain about Maxine Cheshire.

B: What did she do?

K: I'm no longer provoked when she attacks me but now she's going after my wife. She had an article saying my wife bought jewelry as gifts for my visits around the world which an embarrassed State Department had to return after complaints by Senator Proxmire. We do not make the lists of gifts. There's a list of protocol gifts that are given on trips and she felt that the State Department had no class so she looked for gifts of the same price range at some jewelers and seleded some and then the jewelers sent the wrong gifts and they were returned. So of all the gifts that she really gave, she only gave one of the jeweler's pieces that she ordered. When you read the Cheshire story, you'll see that it sounds like she did something wrong. I'm used to this sort of attack but she's not and she's taking it harder than I would.

B: The list of gifts was authorized.

K: She doesn't pick the people who get the gifts, all she did was try to get more classy gifts when she found she was supposed to give a Mickey Mouse clock to Queen Alia of Jordan.

B: A Mickey Mouse clock?

K: Yes.

B: I don't believe it.

K: That's right. She was looking for something of the same price range, but something more distinguished and she went to some jeweler in NY and got a discount. Maxine gave the wrong figure. It was $1300 for all of them put together.

B: I'll run a correction. She has no business doing that.

K: Just checking with the office would make it clear. All Nancy wanted to do was to help the country. She wasn't getting anything out of it.

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B: Did Queen Alia get a Mickey Mouse ~~xxxx~~ clock?

K: No.

B: I'll get a correction on it. I don't want to be in that business.

K: OK. Thank you.

END

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RELEASED IN FULL

SD42

TELECON
Mr. Habib/Secretary Kissinger
December 3, 1974
8:22 PM

K: I want a new position on this claim and asset by the end of the week.

H: I have them working on it.

K: I won't accept the Aldridge double talk, or he'll have to be replaced.

H: He's doing his job as a lawyer. I did it the first day we can back.

K: OK.

H: Anything else?

K: No, thank you.

END

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SD48

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TELECON
Ambassador Zahedi/Secretary Kissinger
December 5, 1974
6:47 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

(Missed first part)

K: I pay a visit here occasionally.

Z: ____about the possibilities of his majesty coming to the U.S.

K: We want it very much.

Z: It might be possible sometime after the 15th of May.

K: Alright.

Z: Because I have to make a Venezuelan visit which would be from the 5th to the 10th and from the 10 to the 15 go to Mexico and it would be a few days after the 15th.

K: Let me check with the President's schedule and get back to you.

Z: I have the picture of the Queen for Mrs. Kissinger.

K: Good.

Z: Are you going to be here for a few days?

K: Until Tuesday.

Z: How do I send the picture.

K: Maybe you can come by.

Z: It will just be for a minute.

K: Terrific.

END

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ED55

TELECON
Foreign Minister Rabasa/Secretary Kissinger
December 6, 1974
6:52 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Is there any chance of getting this thing postponed for a week.

R: I think so.

K: A week to 10 days and if you work with me ...I'll take Percy out of it. I'll work for an abstention.

R: I want to check with me people here.

K: I'll be gone most of next week, if you could postpone it for 2 weeks, it would be good. I'll be here next Monday and then gone for the rest of the week and then I'll be gone for the following week.

R: I can't promise. I'm not familiar with the provisions.

K; Do what you can.

R: And take Percy out.

K: You and I will handle it.

R: OK.

END

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SD53 *

TELECON
Ambassador Ramsbotham/Secretary Kissinger
December 6, 1974
5:00

RELEASED IN FULL

R: Hello Henry.

K: Hello Peter. About that affiar of yours tomorrow night.

R: That is splendid that you are coming.

K: Wait a minute. I am hoping to come but I cannot produce anything significant. I have had my people come up with something, which I happen to think is unacceptable. For me to read something and pretend it is significant is wrong and I just don't have the time. If you want me to give a few informal remarks I will be glad to do it. Billington has shaken me. I have to have two night to produce a speech.

R: I saw that letter and I would ignore that letter from Billington. This is my show.

K: Could I just get up there and speak informally.

R: Do speak informally, because Christopher Soames is speaking informally before you for about ten minutes about his relationship with Churchill. And if you could say a few words.

K: They don't expect me to make a formal speech.

R: I don't think that will be necessary. You will be followed by reminisces by _____.

K: And all this will be on television.

R: No...it will appear later on a program.

K: I think you would get more out of me if I could say thing about what I feel.

R: Henry, I didn't know he (Billington) was writing you. I just want you to speak on the lines of what we talked about...

K: Alright.

R: I hope you do it as you feel and that is all I want.

K: If that is agreeable to you.

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K (cont.): You don't feel I am slighting a man I admire.

R: Not at all.

K: Ok.

R: I will be very comfortable with that.

K: Alright.

END

SD49 *

TELCON
Wells Stabler/Kissinger
12/6/74 - 10:35 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Wells?

S: Yes, Mr. Secretary.

K: I never found out whether you want to go to Spain.

S: I mean, I'm honored indeed.

K: No, no, I'm joking.

S: You catch me by surprise because...

K: No, no, this is why I'm calling you.

S: Yeah.

K: I'm calling you to get you to start drafting a statement about Turkey I can make at the press conference. And the point that should be made is it should not be done only in the Greek-Turkish context, it should be done in context of the essential requirements of the relationship to Turkey for Western security, and that this relationship exists not as a favor to Turkey, but to because it has always been judged in the entire post-war period. That the security of Turkey was in the interest not only of the Mediterranean, but of all of Europe and of the Atlantic area. And for us now to give this up is a disaster for which Congress will be held fully responsible before history and the American people. Secondly, in addition it doesn't help the Greeks. Thirdly, you can state some principles which we will try to pursue in bringing about a Greek-Turkish solution. You can say we did not approve of all of the actions of Turkey. We know Turkey has to make concessions, but this is not the way to do it. Can you draft something?

S: I will indeed. Yes, yes. But also just let me revert to the other thing that I'm in really quite overwhelmed, and extremely....

K: No, no, you did an outstanding job and you're doing me a favor by going there.

S: Well thank you very much.

K: I was just pulling your leg, of course. I think Deputy Assistant Secretary is a more important job than Ambassador.

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S: So does Lorraine.

K: So you should consider yourself demoted.

S: Yes I do. [Laughter] O.K.

K: O.K. Will you draft this thing?

S: Yes I will.

K: Thank you Wells.

S: Thank you.

SDE1 *

TELCON
Sec. Kissinger
Mr. Ingersoll
Dec. 6, 1974
7:55 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: ..I don't think it has fully penetrated the Department or I don't know why it should not that I am looking for an excuse to abstain from the charter. I am not looking for a victory there. I am not looking for getting Rabasa's brains bashed in.

I: I realize that .

K: I see nothing in the cables that Percy and Schwbel have any such interest.

I: I thought you said in the meeting the other morning that if two or three Europeans...

K: Yes, but look Bob it is one of those things where the Department has twisted my instructions. I would have liked to abstain but it is too late. They have now brow-beaten enough Europeans to vote with them. I suppose you are telling me that they have now got somebody.

I: I saw in the cables last night they had about six or seven.

K: That is not what I wanted but we now have to go with it. Please instruct these people or I will fire somebody today. I want Rabasa to feel that we are cooperating with him.

I: All right.

K: From Percy's triumphant account of me of his behavior yesterday he was beating Rabasa's brains in.

I: I see. I suppose Rabasa feels that way.

K: I have not talked to him. I know Schwbel and I know Percy. Percy does not give a damn about this limited charter. He does not care what went before or what will follow after. I will talk to Bill about that. At a minimum I don't want to jeopardize our relations with the Mexicans.
~~I: --At a minimum don't~~

I: I will get that across.

K: It does not seem to have gotten across yet after three weeks of my pointing it out. When I three times disapprove a cable it should be clear what I want.

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I: I tried to get Buffum to go up there yesterday to help out.

K: Why didn't he?

I: I don't know. I tried to reach him last night. I was in meetings with Soames. I will try to get to him now.

K: See what you can do and let me know.

I: All right.

END

SD57

*

TELECON
Senator Percy/Secretary Kissinger
December 7, 1974
11:33 AM

RELEASED IN FULL

P: Good morning.

K: How are you?

P: Fine. I just wondered if you knew that Echeverria will be up at the U.N. on Wednesday in connection with the charter.

K: No, I didn't.

P: It's highly confidential. I have good resources inside the Mexican delegation, but he'll probably be there. I do not detect in the Mexican delegation the negative attitude that Rabasa expressed to Scali that he thinks this is very serious. I think this will simmer and cool off very quickly. I have expressed to the delegation that we intend within time to have a charter that will be meaningful. Scali's speech was not aimed at the charter. I've had a good response from the Mexican delegation to the tone of that speech.

K: I know Echeverria well. I think the reaction will be very unpleasant. That has been his pet.

P: Their feeling as Rabasa expressed it to Scali, is that the Mexican people will be outraged at this. I can't believe that. I can understand Echeverria and there's no question of their disapproval.

K: This depends in part on how they -- on what the Mexican government says and the Mexican public's reaction.

P: I'm more convinced then ever we simply could not have acceded to the pressure.

K: We voted that way so we obviously agreed with it.

P: I wish I could have pulled something together but there was no way without total capitulation on our part. We even made a few changes on the floor in order to get New Zealand and Australia which helped a little bit.

K: OK. Thank you for all the work you've done.

P: Thank you.
END

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SD60 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Saturday, December 7, 1974
The Secretary/ General Brown, JCS
12:42 p.m.

The Secretary called General Brown.

K: How are you.

B: Fine Sir - good morning!

K: I ran into Senator Buckley yesterday who is carrying on about throw-away problem and badges and I told him I thought the military were estatic about it. He said he checked and his sources used the word apoplectic. All the forces I know seem to me to be strongly for it.

B: That is right. I will get in touch with Buckley right away.

K: Jackson will try and beat us to death and I hope to maintain strong unity between the White House - Defense and us. I don't think this Congress will vote for extra money.

B: I think you all did a masterful job.

K: I appreciate this. Will you try and get to Buckley and I believe Goldwater is a problem.

B: I think we have Goldwater in hand. I got a commitment from him yesterday.

K: If you could talk to Buckley it would help. He is a decent man and wants to do the right thing but he is on the wrong tract.

B: I will try and reach him right away.

K: Thanks very much.

END.

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SD 602

1*

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
December 8, 1974
2:33 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

D: You're so busy nowI don't want to both you. Are you still going away tomorrow?

K: That's right.

D: What are we going to do with this Vladivostok paper?

K: Look, can you come by about 6:00 today?

D: Of course.

K: Why don't you come by at 6:00.

D: At your office?

K: Yes.

D: I'll stop by.

K: Good. I think we can settle it.

D: 6:00. I'll be there.

END

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SO 108 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
December 9, 1974
2:03 PM

D: You're so busy now I don't want to bother you. Are you still going away tomorrow?

K: That's right.

D: What are we going to do with this Vladivostok paper?

K: Look, can you come by about 6:00 today?

D: Of course.

K: Why don't you come by at 6:00.

D: At your office?

K: Yes.

D: I'll stop by.

K: Good. I think we can settle it.

D: 6:00. I'll be there.

END

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SD68 *

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Robert McNamara
12/10/74; 9:45 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I am going off to NATO this morning. Larry Eagleburger talked to you yesterday because I had to give a speech. I understand that Teddy is going to join Mondale and Mathias on some sort of resolution on reduction. If they want to have reductions after this agreement is signed I am all for it. But to horse around with this agreement now would be a disaster. You said yourself at a breakfast that it didn't make any difference where the ceiling is as long as there is a ceiling.

M: I agree with you, Henry. I haven't been following Ted Kennedy on this.

K: He seemed open-minded when I talked to him yesterday. I think he is looking for a way of opposing Jackson. But I don't want him to go too far on the other side. If he says no agreement unless there is a reduction, he is fueling the arms race.

M: I think that the Jackson position is awful. Is Mathias supporting this.

K: Teddy didn't quite know what Amendment he would be supporting.

M: How long do we have. I don't want to go to Kennedy and say Henry called me.

K: He said he was going to put his name on something today. I don't think Teddy will mind you saying I talked with you.

M: Okay, I will get right on it.

K: Can we have lunch next week.

M: Your office called and I am looking forward to it.

K: Good.

M: Have a good trip, Henry.

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RELEASED IN FULL

SD 71 *

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Senator Humphrey
12/14/74
10:24 a.m.

K: Hubert, I'm seeing Brademas in about 10 minutes, but he has asked me to keep it secret--now, I'm sure he'll leak it all over theplace, but I just wanted to make sure he came from him

H He asked to keep it secret?

K: Yeh

H Brademas did?

K: Yep.

H: I see. well that I imagine he might do a little leakingof it but I--the thing I was worried about--I got to talking--thinking last night, when I sat in the office with him there yesterday, he said something which may have been slightly braggidocio, but he said, you know we have a direct line between this office and the Greek Premier--or Prime Minister and so --when I was telling this I thought things were moving and so on--and I got to thinking after what I told you that you ought to see him--this may be something that I hadn't weighed in the balance--

K: The trouble with the Greeks is that they are playing a very complicated domestic game and they want our help but want to pretend they are doing on their own.

H Yes, yes, yes. I know. I think we just as they say--the journalists--they say we have to bite the bullet--I guess you have to take a bit of a risk here.

K: I will show him these letters if he leaks them, he is responsible for the thing failing.

H Yes.

K: Because there is also now a letter from me to the Turkish FonMin which expresses the Greek view which is just the reverse side of the one you have seen and I can also show him a letter that Karamanlis wrote me a few weeks ago asking me to be active

H: I think we better go ahead with what you are doing and I'm going to insist in the conference that we stick with that 15th of September--

K: It is one of those phases where usually you can say there are two sides to it --a question, but this is a case where it is not just --it is my judgment we have

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a 50-50 chance of rapping this whole think up in three months--where in addition to that the damage to international position are forcing the Turks out of our defense relationship is phenomenal

H: Well, I'll have no part of that--exactly right. Well stand our ground

K: You've been marvelous--If I have a minute before I catch the plane for Martinique after I talk to ~~Exxxdx~~ Brademas I'll call you

H: You don't need to--you just let Eagleburger know.

K: Good

H If there is anything that you need do that I need to know, Henry

K: Terrific, many thanks.

H And good luck to you on trip to Martinique--I hear you are going to the Virgin Islands--you are going to love it.

K: I'm going to go to Puerto Rico because you got the house I want in Caneel Bay

H I'm not down there--

K: [laughs] You get on over to Caneel Bay

H It is so much better than Puerto Rico it isn't even funny

K: They really talk of your visit down there with great affection

H We have a marvelous time--

K: It's my favorite place too.

H: You enjoy--best of everything for the holidays

K: Thank you

H: By the way--if I'm needed in Minnesota, I'm there.

K: Good.

3073 *

TELECON
Wells Stabler/Secretary Kissinger
December 16, 1974
7:37 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: On that Turkish aid, you better get word to Esenbel for his confidential information and send word to Kubisch that we reached a solution which will settle it which will enable us to resume aid even though this will not become apparent for several hours after he receives it. And tell Kubisch to say the same thing to Bitsios.

S: OK.

K: Don't put it in the ____

S: NO. Do you want to see these?

K: I think you can draft 3 lines yourself.

S: Yes.

K: I want to give you confidence.

S: OK.

END

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TELCON
Stabler/Sec. Kissinger
Dece. 17, 1974
8:30 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: The Star reports that Morgan said that I had assured Congress that both Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers had said that progress could be made promptly if aid to Turkey were restored. Will you call the Greek Ambassador and say we have said no such thing. We are issuing a denial that anything like this has been said.

S: I think it would be better if I called Jack directly. I don't know what ~~you~~ (the Greek ambassador?) would report.

K: O.K. call Jack and tell him we will issue a statement first thing in the morning from the State Department. We are calling all of the newspapers now. It has been in only one newspaper.

S: I will call him right away and tell him; that there will be a denial in the morning but we are telling the newspapers now.

K: Don't you think.

S: I think we have to. It puts the Greeks and Turks in an impossible position.

K: If they say progress could be made but to say both Greece and Turkey say it could be made if the US cut-off were delayed...

S: To say progress could be made would be fine. But not if aid was restored. That really puts us in a very difficult position and I will get the word to Jack and Alexandrax (sp?) right away. You are going to authorize a denial.

K: Yes. He can say I did not say that. Say it is my judgment that progress can be made. The Greek Govt has expressed no view whatever on the Turkish aid question. Make sure that is put out.

S: All right.

END

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SD80 *

TELCON
Eagleburger/Sec. Kissinger
Dec. 17, 1974,
8:45 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

E: McCloskey no where to be found. I talked to Gwertzman and it does not contain that quote (in the NY Times). He stuck to simply the Greeks and Brademas in talking to you, you said you felt with more time progress could be made. Berger is checking to see what they are carrying. Apparently, the story in the Star is an AP ticker.

K: It is a Jerry O'Leary story.

E: My statement is "The Dept has seen reports that Sec. Kissinger said the Greeks and Turks believe progress can be made if the arms cut-off can be delayed. The Sec. has made no such statement nor was he ever so assured by either For. Minister. At the same time the Secretary has said as the results of talks in Brussels he has a feeling that progress in Cyprus can be made.

K: O.K. that is fine.

E: If we don't say both Foreign Ministers we put the Turks in trouble.

K: Should we issue it or what do you think?

E: The Times is all right. If the Post does not carry it -- if the Post is going to carry it I will read it to them and issue it in the morning.

K: If they are going to carry it, maybe they would issue it tonight.

E: The Post?

K: Yes, with the story.

E: That is what I will try to get done.

K: Did Marilyn understand our concern.

E: Yes. She did not write the article but she is trying to find out who did.

K: Good work Larry. Thank you very much.

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SD76

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Congressman John Brademas/Cong. Sarbanes/Secretary Kissinger
December 17, 1974
12:15 PM

K: John?

B: Yes sir. Paul Sarbanes is here also. Do you mind if he gets on?

K: Not at all. This is confidential, but I want to have everything clear. We are putting together that response that I mentioned to you and we thought, all things considered, it would help Esenbel the quicker the better. The problem is the Turks have made the condition that the Turkish Aid cutoff must be terminated and we have been talking to the Turkish Foreign Minister and he is willing to go ahead tomorrow if we can send him the conference report and he has been given to understand that this will be accepted by Congress.

B: I think you can say that because we are putting the finishing touches on a press statement and when it is ready I will send it down to your office.

K: Good. It won't embarrass you if I authorize Esenbel to say that this conference report will be accepted by Congress?

B: It won't me. What about you Paul?

K: Because then we can get Denktash and Clerides tomorrow by 5:00 Nicosia time, or at least establish contact.

S: The only reason I have apprehensions about him saying that publicly is that this could appear to undercut Bitsios and leave him standing naked in the rain.

K: Bitsios is waiting for the call.

S: Can't Esenbel say that this conference has made this report, at least on the Turkish Aid question he understands there is a move to accept it.

B: In a certain sense you would be protected if you tell him you don't control Congress, it's an independent operation. But Sarbanes, Brademas and Rosenthal.....

K: That we can tell him but his problem is they have taken an NSC decision not to negotiate while there is a cutoff in effect. Congress wil act tomorrow and get the talks started on Thursday. That would be the easiest way. If we want to speed it up, we have to let Esenbel say something. The Greeks are willing to do ___. I think the Greeks would just as soon get it started, but we are talking about 24 hours.

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P: I am inclined to think we ought to bite the bullet up here without having it complicated by the Turkish Foreign Minister making promises about what the Congress is going to do.

K: Alright. Then delay it 24 hours.

P: The Foreign Appropriations bill contains nothing else.

B: I'm sure it will pass, but you know _____.

K: Yes. That's why I wanted to check with you.

B: You don't know who will be away for the holidays -- suppose you lose everything by one vote?

K: Our estimate is that it will pass tomorrow. In both houses.

P: We hope it will pass the Senate today and the House tomorrow.

K: Alright, my suggestion is that we delay the thing until Thursday and then Esenbel doesn't have to say anything. He can respond to a Congressional vote and nobody will double crossed. As soon as we know k when the talks start, I will tell you.

B: Good. The other thing, we are going to request ____in anticipation the negotiations will begin shortly.

K: If you could say you anticipate that progress will be made very shortly, use thw rod progress, not negotiations.

B: Then we get into whether it's Clerides (Bitsios?) and Esenbel or Clerides Denktash.

K: They prefer the Clerides and ~~Exx~~ Denktash format. I wouldn't say that because they haven't decided, but Clerides is standing by to ~~xxxxx~~ make the call. We'll tell him to make it Thursday.

END

SD77 *

TELECON
Congressman Passman/Secretary Kissinger
December 18, 1974
3:27 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I just talked to Geo rge Mahon

P: I wason the line.

K: I talked to him again. I had forgotten about Portugal. There are elections in Portugal in March and the Portuguese Government has asked us when Costa Gomez was here, that whatever we could do before the elections wo uld help to cut down the Communist votes.

P: They refused to take our aid 25 years ago and now they have a new government and will take our aid.

K: Senator Kennedy has put in an AID amendment in the Senate and I think it's being cut from 50 to 20 million. I just wanted to tell you what the legislative situation is.

P: Henry Kissinger means something but as far as Kennedy is concerned he shouldn't have opened that car door. I promised Mr. Ford that I would do what I could. I told him if he wants that Bill, I would ask the Chairman to ask for Israel and Egypt. I will do something. But if we don't let my Committee remain in charge of this bill, I'm destroyed.

K: I appreciate that and the solution you came up with. From the foreign policy view, that was a lot better.

P;It would have looked better..asked that it be weighed in favor of Egypt. Before I_____thie Bill yesterday, I hoped I would talk to you or maybe the President.

K: You think you could get 20 or 25 million?

P: How much did you ask for?

K: In the Senate they have 50 million. If you could -- I think it's been cut in the conference to 25. If we could get that I wo uld appreciate it.

P: You're talking about the regular bill.

K: Yes.

P: If you want that -- you're going to get it.

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K: We want it in the Continuing Resolution. It must be before March. Mahon called you and the President.
P: /I want it in the Continuing Resolution. I said I want an understanding. If we get an authorization bill signed into law then we ought to be coming back here on January 14. I'm going to call my Committee into session the following day and move my bill on Wednesday and then move to full Committee on the 17th. I'm going to write my report and have this bill on the floor.

K: That would lose us a month.

P: How much do you want?

K: 20million into the continuing resolution.

P: Let me talk to the Chairman.

K: I have talked to him. I just don't want him to think I am going behind his back.

P: Ok. I will talk to him and I'll see you at breakfast tomorrow morning.

K: Yes. Look forward to it.

END

DD78

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TELCON
Larry Eagleburger
The Secretary
8:25 p.m.
Dec. 17, 1974

RELEASED IN FULL

K: The Washington Evening Star reports that Morgan said that the Foreign Ministers of both Greece and Turky indicated to ~~him~~ me in Brussels they were confident that progress could be made ~~even~~ if US aid ~~were~~ cut-off. We cannot let that stand.

E: Nope. But I don't know how to stop it. delayed.

K: Can't we make McCloskey go to work on it and call the Post and NY Times and say it will blow everything up. The Greeks have said they cannot express an opinion on that subject and I said that to the Congress. Can that be done in the next 15 minutes.

E: I can't get a statement out in 15 minutes.

K: You can get a statement out in 15 mins. Normal people can.

E: All right. I will get a statement out.

K: Call them up and call me back.

E: O.K.

END

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SD81

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TELCON
Eagleburger/Sec. Kissinger
December 17, 1974
8:50 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

E. Marilyn tells me they do not have it that way. They say Morgan says additional time was added to the bill on assumption that negotiations would take place by that time.

K: Good. We will get the Star to retract it tomorrow.

E: I will talk to Anderson tomorrow.

K: Get Stabler and tell him only one newspaper is carrying it that way and not to make a big thing of it.

E. O.K.

END

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SD85 *

TELECON
Congressman John Brademas/Secretary Kissinger
December 17, 1974
1:25 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I just wanted you to know it's all set for 3:00 in Nicosia on Thursday and the Turks will send a man over there tomorrow, their time which is I think about 8 hours different, to make sure there is no screwup. Clerides will call Denktash at 3:00 Thursday.

B: And we did not use the word negotiation.

K: Well, I just wanted you to know exactly what was going to happen.

B: OK. Thank you.

END

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SD83

TELCON
Atherton/Sec. Kissinger
Dec. 17, 1974
9:15 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Have you finished the paragraphs. I am leaving now.

A: I arranged with David to have them brought to you wherever you are.

K: I am talking about the paragraphs.

A: Yes, but we have to retype the whole telegram.

K: How much longer?

A: About another 15 minutes.

K: I will be at Joe Alsops until about 10:30.

A: I have arranged with David to deliver them to you and I will be at home awaiting your instructions.

K: Thank you.

END

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SD88

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TELECON
Chairman Mahon/Secretary Kissinger
December 17, 1974
3:17 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: On another tiem. We must have, before March, aid to Portugal.

M: Oh my goodness.

K: I should have mentioned it . But they have the elections in March and if we are going to do it, this is the time.

M: We will have a Foreign Aid Bill by the end of January.

K: We are not talking about a hell of alot of money.

M: We are having a full committee meeting in a few minutes. Maybe you could take that up in the Senate.

Aid to Mahon: Would it be helpful if during the debate you raised that and say another bill will be introduced early in the year, make reference to Portugal and recognize that Portugal is a critical situation....

But

K: That would be a terrific help. /You can't put anything in for Portugal now?

M: I don't think so...we have to go before the Rules Committee...you might try it in the Senate.

K: It is a hard case to deal with in the Senate. We really need it before the elections.

M: If we had another week or so we could have reported a foreign aid appropriations bill.

K: I realize that. I have been cooperative with your problems.

M: We have done all the work except the formal mark-up and I don't see why the Committee could not organize the week they are back and then report it the second week.

K: Let me talk to the Senate side.

Aid to Mahon: Mr. Chairman, we have Full Committee at 4:30. We have yet to introduce the Bill and it has to go to Rules. We are having an awful time.

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K: I understand. I would appreciate it if you could take a look at it and see if it is possible.

M: We are getting this thing in order to introduce it.. But we are in a squeeze here and it is a real jam.

K: Ok.

END

SD96

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TELCON
Cong. Passman
Sec. Kissinger
December 19, 1974
10:00 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Mr. Chairman, how are you?

P: That was a hell of a nice breakfast yesterday mogning. I pulled your leg a bit to hard.

K: You can never do that.

P: I want your advice on two things. I don't intend to move on this Middle East stuff without consulting with you. My counterpart in the Senate called yesterday afternoon and said they wre going to take figures as they came over. They added $10 million for the Palestine movement. It frightens me.

K: The Palestine movement?

P: Inouye of the Senate Foreign Aid Committee -- we sent over $150 and $150 as we outlined yesterday morning but they put in $10 million for the Palestines. I think Kennedy put it in.

K: It must be for the Jewish refugees.

P: No. You are familiar with UNRA. This is a $10 million bilateral for Palestine.

K: Never heard of it.

P: Can you get into this before it gets too mixed up or have one or your people call me. Check it out and call me back.

K: I. will.

P: We don't want to upset the apple cart overthere.

K: I will have Atherton callyou within the hour.

P: Another thing. It is extremely important --you know they are choking off this aid to Cambodia. We have to do everything we can to keep them from choking this country-- to hold up the government.

K: I couldn't agree more.

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P: There is a limitation in the PL-480 -- $250 million in commodities. We had worked out some language that could give us more flexibility. Conte caught it and now we may be caught. Here is what we suggest and I apologize for coming to you. I told Murphy of the AID agency that you are getting ready to buy rice and to buy all of it. Have the pipeline completely dry when you come before my Committee in January so I can rework this language and get you more money for Cambodia. They need to dry up the pipeline. I insisted on buying 100,000 tons of rice. They are not moving. They need to spend it all. I want to be able to say Mr. Conte we have no money left and we will have to give additional money. You know I mentioned to you the PL-480. Are you getting on top of it?

K: I am taking steps.

P: I will not worry you again for six months. I am your friend. If you can get through to AID to buy 100,000 tons of rice to dry up the pipeline. Then I will be able to get more money for you in Jan. Otherwise I am stuck.

K: I will do my best.

P: Happy holidays.

K: Thank you Mr. Chairman.

SO 109 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
December 19, 1974
6:24 PM

D: Hello.

K: Anatol.

D: Hello Henry.

K: I just got a ~~note~~ note here that says the Communist diplomats in London are saying that the publication of the Gromyko letter is the beginning of a general attitude by me on the Kremlin.

D: I saw it.

K: What do you think?

D: ____they publich many other stories dealing with Soviet/American relations.

K: Where, at the Chinese Embassy?

D: Maybe they have better communications. The British publich many things, of course there are some ____. You shouldn't rely on such information.

K: On this matter I have been trying to defend the Soviet point of view. OK. See you soon.

D: On Monday.

K: Yes.

D: I'm now going to NY.

K: Oh, I'll see you tomorrow.

D: Where?

K: In NY at the dinner.

D: What dinner.

K: Aren't you going to a dinner there.

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D: What dinner.

K: In NY.

D: Oh - yes, I'll be there. I didn't know you would be there too.

K: Yes.

D: OK, I'll see you then.

END

SD 93

*

TELCON
Cong. Hays
Sec. Kissinger
Dec. 19, 1974
12:00 noon

RELEASED IN FULL

K: When are you going over?

H: Henry, maybe I should not have been talking and I should have been listening. I don't know whether I should go over there or not.

K: I think you should go there.

H: The only thing I could do is tell Esenbel and Dimerol (sp) I had a strong hand to play in getting this extension and unless they reciprocate there is nothing I can do for them in Congress and if I cannot do anything then no one can.

K: I think it would be helpful.

H: I will tell them in a nice way.

K: Tell them that I am totally on their side and I am trying to help but we need something that we can point to.

H: Yes. Do you think they would give any on Nicosia Airport and Famagusta.

K: I think it can be done.

H: If they will give on those two points I can get Congress to give us alonger extension. I am sure of that.

K: Why don't you tell them that.

H: That is what I propose to do but I don't want to go off and propose to be a diplomat and screwup what you are doing. I think you are doing a hell of a job and I am trying to defend you against these creeps. I think you are doing a hell of a job.

K: Without your help we ~~will~~ would have been in a hell of a condition.

H: If I go to Cairo and look at that property with Ralston, can you get me from Cairo to Ankara.

K: No question. Get in touch with Larry Eagleburger on how to do it.

H: All right. My proposal would be if I can have one more second of your time to go to London on the morning of the 27th and sty over there until probably Saturday and Sunday and go down to Cairo on Monday and look at the property and on Tuesday to

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Ankara and spend a couple of days there. I will stay with Macomber and you can tell him that whoever I should see I will. I should see Esenbel and Dimerol. I don't know Ecevit at all. I don't know what I could do with him.

K: I will take care of it.

H: I will then come back. Do you want me to stop and see Karamanlis. He is an old friend of mine.

K: I would stop there too and say it is your impression that I am working very hard on this but he should call off his dogs there for a bit.

H: O.K.

K: I think you could be very helpful. You are a good friend of all of these people.

H: All right I will do it. I am not really looking for a trip. I will go commerical as far as Cairo and then I want to get from Cairo to Ankara and back to Athens and I will get back commercial from there.

K: We will take care of it.

H: I will talk to Larry about it.

K: Many thanks for what you did this week.

H: All right. Any time. You know me.

K: Come in when you return.

H: I will certainly come back and give you a report.

K: Look forward to it.

H: Is is all right if I tell the press at home that I am going on this mission to Turkey in view of the situation in Congress and it has your approval or should I leave your name out of it.

K: Can you tell them after you come back.

H: Yes.

K: After you come back and we then don't have to answer to many questions from Turkey.

H: I will say I am going out as President of the Atlantic National Assembly.

K: That you talked over the trip with me and it has my full endorsement.

H: That is all I will say.

K: Good. Wonderful.

H: Thank you.

*

SD100

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
W. Stabler/Sec. K
12/23/74 - 12:45 pm

K: Wells, I told Art Hartman I wanted to see at least once a week a note to Callaghan.

S: We are doing one up. Another one is on Cyprus.

K: ok.

S: ..and then we will think of something else. It was just on Cyprus and meeting of Ambassador on the 3rd of January.

K: Why.

S: There is one thing that's come up and that is that he has just asked about the timing of a visit to the White House.

K: He should be there shortly.

S: He may not leave until the 3rd. ...whether we want to see ....if that meeting is scheduled for the 6th.

K: I want our guys present for that negotiating process. But I will see them on the 4th or the 6th.

S: Perhaps on that Monday. How long do you want them here for?

K: Just a day.

S: A day or a day and a half.

K: Ok. Good.

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SD106 *

TELCON
Senator Javits
Sec. Kissinger
December 23, 1974
12:15 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

J: Henry.

K: Jack, how are you.

J: O.K. I don't like your statementsin the paper about your quiting.

K: I didn't say that.

J: It makes me unhappy. It is sort of speculating. They have it as a quote in the NY Times.

K: They ask me if I am going to leave. I say I have no compulsion to stay.

J: I wish you had said a flat no. You have an enormous job to do for country and the President. You should say that you have no time to think of such things.

K: Good idea.

J: Your answer feeds speculation.

K: O.K.

J: I have invited about 100 high-powered people to the dinner you are doing for me. These people have a million things to do. My acceptances are 80.

K: What's wrong with the other 20.

J: All right, I will forgive you for that statement.

K: I am delighted.

J: I just wanted to point out to you it is really an acid test, and I thought you should know it. I have never seen anything like it.

K: I really cannot judge that.

J: I can. I will show you the list. They are the business people from all over the country.

K: Not just from NY.

J: No from all over the country, and all of those have accepted.

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K: I understand your point and I will keep i t in mind. I have always thought that my best strategy was to leave the impression that I don't give a damn.

J: I don't agree. I think you are so involved in such monumental events that one has to have a sense of mission. You would never hear Churchill say that and that is what you are.

K: I appreciate your saying that. I appreciate your advice in addition to the compliment.

J: Right now it is the hinge of fate. I think it is that serious.

K: Frankly, that is what is keeping me here.

J: I know that.

K: But I have always felt that for me to leave that implication is very dangerous.

J: I think the implication you have to leave is one of absolute dedication and you have to have the backing of the Preisdent and rule out this nonsensical speculation. You are there and going to be there and do the job. There is no one in the country who could do it better and you are needed more than ever.

K: I think there is no problem with the President.

J: I think that is the way to do it considering the organization of the American government.

K: You think it desirable that it come from here.

J: You take it up where he leaves off. Why the discussion. I am here on the job and I have enormous responsibility. Why get diverted on the speculation of what might -appen.

K: I have no trouble with that. My problem is that I thought it best not to leave the impression that I am clingking to the job.

J: That impression is made more by your uncertainty than by the philosophy that you are needed and wanted in the job.

K: I understand your point. It would be best to say it is not my decision to make. As long as I can be of service I will stay.

J: Right. You are just too busy and too much involved to speculate in that way.

K: Good point. I agree.

J: The other thing I want to suggest is that I am anxious to see you. It does not have to be tomorrow but I am deeply worried about certain situations that I see developing.

K: Do you want to have lunch on Thursday.

J: I am going to Acapulco and I will be back on the 6th.

K: Let's have breakfast or lunch the week of the 6th.

J: If you could set it down for the 9th while your calendar is clear.

K: Let's set it down for the 9th or I will call you this afternoon.

J: Let's make it luch.

K: Let's say lunch on the 9th at 1:00.

J: Call me if there is a change. You are staying in Washington.

K: We are going to Dorodo Beach with Rockefeller. We are leaving on Thursday and back on the 3rd.

J: Happy New Year from Marian and me.

K: The same to you.

END

SD102 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
RTKennedy/Sec. Kissinger
12/23/74-11:44 am

K: Do we have them? They were going to give us a study on them.

Kennedy: The two bases were going to close down.

K: Well, can you ask Wickham to have them today.

Kennedy: Yes.

K: And the number of personnel that are involved. Have you found those two daily reports?

Kennedy: ...working on them. They are around. That is what we are doing.

K: They are perfectly normal reports.

Kennedy: The very first one was tabbed by country.

K: Well, can I see it?

Kennedy: I will find out these bases and be back to you.

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SD/13

*

TELECON
Ambassador Anderson/Secretary Kissinger
December 24, 1974
2:55 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Any problem about that?

A: No. Not about the fact that Helms is returning.

K: What's the problem.

A: He asked me yesterday if we're calling him back on consultation. I said no, that there was no credibility gap. Bernie Gwertzman did nitpick that statement you had me read....illegal domestic. He wants to know what objective was the ___on. There was no legal domestic operation.

K: I quoted from the Helms cable. Call Bernie Gwertzman back and tell him that.

A: Right. The only other question I ~~have~~ got was when you get the ~~Col~~ Colby report ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ to transmit it.

K: This afternoon.

A: OK.

END

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SD116 *

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
December 24, 1974
2:57 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

D: I'm sorry to trouble you but I have a few things. You remember I mentioned to you about the situation in the north and you asked me whether we will inform our neighbors up there and I said I had no instructions. Our Prime Minister said you can use this information any way you want. We have no intentions to do anything. We don't want to tell you what to say to them.

K: You have no objections.

D: No. I told you about the scheduled meeting?

K: Yes.

D: I postponed it until after the holidays. _____thought it better.

K: I have decided not to communicate with ____. I'll just let it rest. I'll never answer.

D: The 3rd thing. Our press official, I'm not saying it not as a complaint, told me the diplomatic _____ and our not giving generous suggestions for Israel.

K: Can you find out who is doing it.

D: They are reluctant to give names. It's low echelon.

K: They should not know what's going on. You give me a name and I'll do something or even just give me the office.

D: I'll try to get more information.

K: It's also totally unauthorized.

D: I know it's against your institution, but they are doing this.

K: I conduct my own psychological work.

D: I'm sure you don't need any assistance. I understand you talked to Golda.

K: Yes, It was very nice.

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D: In case I don't see you before you leave, have a nice vacation.

K: When are ~~you leaving~~. you leaving?

D: Tomorrow.

K: If I hear anything I'll let you know.

D OK.

END

SD 117

*

TELECON
Governor Reagan/Secretary Kissinger
December 26, 1974
11:15 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: We have a hell of a time getting together on the phone.

R: Well, I know how busy you are.

K: I always like to talk to you.

R: I just couldn't resist making this call even though it took some trouble and imposed on you. I think you are going to have a newSpecial Assistant for (security?) -- Ed Hickey, he's a former Secret Serve man. We took him from the secret service out here. I just had to tell you and thought you might want to know. He's a hell of a man. He reorganized our state security and he created .....the morale is so great.

K: Isn't that nice of you to tell me. I appreciate it.

R: I know that you will be very happy with him there. I understnad it has to do with the protection of foreign diplomats and embassies.

K: I'll take a special look at him.

R: He's a wonderful man and so efficient.

K: Do you come through Washington any time?

R: There may be a possibility a little later on.

K: Will you call me and let me know.

R: I would love to. I really know how busy you are.

K: If I'm busy, we know each other will enough to tell you.

R: Well, I hope you have a happy holiday.

K: I'm going up to Puerto Rico.

R: For fun or business?

K: For fun.

R: Good.

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K: I hope to see you in (January?) and my best to Nancy.

R: Same to you and nice to talk to you.

END

SD125

*

TELECON
Mr. Atherton/Secretary Kissinger
December 26, 1974
3:25 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I should write to the Shah.

A: *I thought this was your instructions.*

K: I never gave any instructions. When have I ever___.

A: We'll certainly change it.

K: Make it more thoughtful. I believe we have....I don't want to do this in __. I want him to know I asked George Shultz to continue that private discussion on oil which we discussed and I'll be glad to send him out anytime that suits him.

A: OK.

END

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SD123

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TELECON
Mr. Habib/Secretary Kissinger
December 26, 1974

RELEASED IN FULL

(Missed first part)

H:....just writing you a nasty note asking you to reconsider your decision. Do you want me to inform him of a few things?

K: I'm not running a boarding school. He is a fool.

H: Can I say something to you. I think we can inform Dean. I have a draft which informs him of the ___and without any risk of operation.

K: For 5 years I conducted a successful operation___.

H: Everything you're doing is fully consistent with his own views.

K: Will you kindly do what I asked and send up that cable___that fisheries treaty. You remember?

H: Yes, I remember very well.

K: ___and I would like a memo done to the President.

H: Right. We'll have it up to you today. When are you leaving.

K: You can have it sent to me.

H: Yes, before we sent it forward.

K: Absolutely. On the ____thing, I don't see why we have to be more ____.

H: He seems to remember....

K: He would prefer to have the note....

H: He realizes that is not the best job.

K: He prefers to have it tomorrow.

H: Graham is right if you don't indicate you reservation. The wording that he proposes is a change only to delete the last paragraph. Graham

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wants to say we __. It would be better not to make it a more general statement.

K: We better not submit anything.

H: We have to at least submit something that doesn't create all those problems. Because no one knew about it, who knew about these things.

K: Then you can say we're treating everybody in the UN according to these rules without identifying the PRC.

H: That I would like to try.

K: I have no intention of separating myself from Martin on this issue. I don't believe that Aldridge has any sense on those topics.

H: I think the only trouble with that is Graham is right in terms of .....

K: Therefore I'm willing to go...

H: I think you've given me a clue ____saying what Graham wants to say. Then we don't mention the PRC in this.

K: Could you ask Graham in my behalf. Do it in a cable form that I would like the press assessment of what the situation is in Vietnam. Do it ~~from~~ from me, he'll do a better job.

H: We'll get it off today.

K: OK.

END

SD120

*

TELECON
Paul Ziffren/Secretary Kissinger
December 26, 1974
11:45 AM

RELEASED IN FULL

Z: .....and a very prosperous new year.

K: Just serving for ____these days.

Z: I would say you did better than that. I think you've done very well.

K: You're very nice.

Z: I think it's really been an extraordinary year.

K: You are such a good friend.

Z: I wanted to talk to you. (Brisson?) said he was talking to you about coming out for some speech for the UN.

K: I have a number of speeces in the first 2 months next year and I want to pick Los Angeles as one of them.

Z: This would be a very good place for a UN speech. The UN was born in California. Any idea when you could come out?

K: I'm thinking about the last week in January.

Z: I think that would be an exciting time and there are those 2 good forums out here -- the World Affairs Conference.

K: The World Affairs Conference is out there.

Z: That's a very good forum. Ken Galbraith is coming out Monday. He has been working with Fred Neal on American/~~Soviet~~ Soviet relations. I'm trying to push them to make a statement that would help. Fred is trying to get (his people?) to go to the Soviet Union. You think that's a good idea?

K: I think it might be interesting.

Z: He has been talking to me about that and I'm talking to him about getting a statement out. This would be a good time before the Congress gets back into session, to make a statement. Would you letme know. Have you been in touch with the World Affairs Conference?

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K: No, but my people have been.

Z: I won't do anything until I hear from you.

K: Right.

Z: Have a wonderful year and get some rest. Let me know if I can help in any way.

K: I may have to talk to you about some Israeli problems.

Z: Anytime.

K: OK, talk to you later.

END

SD/27

*

TELECON
Mr. Enders/Secretary Kissinger
December 26, 1974
3:50 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I trust you're doing a report for me on what happened in ___.

E: I did it. It will be available to you in 10 minutes.

K: I'll be on my way to the airport.

E: I'll get it to you sooner.

K: Those messages to OPIC countries are exactly what was in the summary of the communique. What we need is something that ___ the communique and speaks of cooperation. We're trying to keep them___.

E: I haveh't look at that.

K: When I talked to EUR they said they came from you and when I talk to you you say you haven't seen them.

E: They were done in my absence.

K: I want them today. I want one to the Shah just to simmer things a bit.

E: How can I get it to you if you're going to the plane.

K: Take it to the bottom of the stairs.

E: OK.

END

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SD119

*

TELECON
Bill Rogers/Secretary Kissinger
December 26, 1974
3:45 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: ...Linowitz statement.

R: He made a long speech.

K: Was it corrected?

R: Not on the Linowitz statement.

K: OK.

R: In the context of the new pressure of the ____he did not mention Linowitz by name. He was getting so much.

K: Will you make sure the other ones know this.

R: Do you want Linowitz mentioned by name.

K: What do you think?

R: I don't think so.

K: Can you work on the speech for Latin America with the same-- the same way we got the message x out. You say the most outrageous irrelavant things. Have it waiting for me when I get back, assuming I can get out of here.

R: Have a good trip.

END

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(SD122) *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Habib/Secretary Kissinger
December 26, 1974
3:15 PM

K: You can send this crap to Dean but only by adding the statment that he is not permitted to show it to anybody or discuss it . I will ___him if there is a reference to it.

H: Exactly.

K: It isn't in your cable.

H: It will be now.

K: Another thing. On that PR__. My instinct is to go along with Graham Martin. But I want Martin to be given an opportunity to express his view again.

H: Nothing will happen until we hear from him. I think he'll like that.

K: OK.

END

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SD126

*

TELECON
Mr. Hartman/Secretary Kissinger
December 26, 1974
3:43 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I think these messages are sort of senseless. They just repeat what was in the Moscow communique.

H: They were done by Tom.

K: I don't give a damn.

H: I' ll get together with them and gets those thoughts in.

K: OK.

END

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SD124

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TELECON
Mr. Hartman/Secretary Kissinger
December 26, 1974
3:02 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I don't recall I ever asked for message to OPIC countries.

H: These were prepared on your instructions when we got back ___.

K: Where are they? I'm leaving here in 1/2 hour.

H: Tom Enders is doing that I thought.

K: What about the ones to Greece and Turkey?

H: I'll have to ask Wells. He also sent for the report.

K: I'm leaving here in 1/2 hour. I better have them.

END

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SD132

*

TELECON
Larry Eagleburger/Secretary Kissinger
January 3, 1975
7:00 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

E: They are prepared to make all sorts of deals on the Middle East if you let them. And I don't know how to handle it.

K: For Christ's sake. This town is sick.

E: I know.

K: What ___do they want to give the Israelis.

E: George Ball is working I think.

K: I'll give that to them with great pleasure.

E: I can call them back.

K: Or should I call.

E: I think it would be better if you did.

K: I'll call them.

END

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SD134

*

TELCON
Ted Koppel
Sec. Kissnger
3:15 p.m.
January 3, 1975

RELEASED IN FULL

TK: ...said it was lousy weather but he looked tan.

K: I do to but we had lousy weather.

TK: Did you enjoy it.

K: Medium.

TK: Are you relaxed.

K: Go ahead, hit me again.

TK: Are you going to join us on Monday.

K: I will talk to McCloskey first. I would agree only to do it if you agree not to ask me about war on the Arabs. I am about to throw-up.

TK: That is the big story.

K: You guys have lost your minds.

TK: Don't say that about you guys.

K: The American press has stopped reporting news; it is now making news.

TK: In the context of the interview it is leaving things open.

K: In the context of the interview there is no Sec. of State who could have said anything else. We could we say yes in the case if we were being strangled to death -- would we let ourselves be strangled.

TK: I think that is the thing to say. In that context it would be a useful thing to say. What else could you say as a minimum response without saying the US is willing to let ourselves be strangled.

K: I will propose to McCloskey 5 mins.

TK: How about 10 mins. 5 mins. is unrealistic.

K: I want to be unrealistic.

TK: One other thing, would it be possible to do it at the studio. I think it wold be earlier enough to fit into your schedule -- between 7:00 and 7:30.

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K: I will call you by the end of the day.

TK: One other thing -- the founder John Gainey with the Paulist Fathers -- one of their communicators; does a radio show.

K: What is a Paulist Father.

TK: A Catholic sect -- a respectsble group pf priest. He called me this afternoon and said the Catholic-Irish broadcasters are doing a year-end program and would like a radio tap just asking you the question what is your vision of peace. I figured if you did it on Monday, perhaps you would have no objection of answering that question on peace. Perhaps something about a minute long.

K: Let me think about that.

END

*

SD131

TELECON
Marilyn Berger/Secretary Kissinger
January 3, 1975
7:02 PM

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: This is on background.

B: Did you have a nice holiday.

K: It rained all the time.

B: The reason I'm calling, I met today with the Russians who was talking about a number of things and the interesting one is the Middle East. He was saying the Americans are ____.

K: You will write that?

B: No, I'm not writing anything until I find if it's true.

K: What do you mean?

B: Let me tell you. I said as far as _____.

K: Why don't you ask Dinitz how the Israelis feel.

B: I'm really interested in the American policy. I think I understand it.

K: If we want to impose a settlement, we don't need the Soviets.

B: Would it last without the Soviets?

K: Yes. If we are willing to have 67 borders, then we can do all of this.

B: He said with some alternatives.

K: This goes back to Rogers. All of this was part of the Rogers negotiations.

B: At the time of Rogers negoations they refused to go along with the Russians formulation.

K: That was no a significant problem. The suicide and self destruction of American (liberals).

B: What I'm trying to find out are they going on and ____and want to talk peace in the Middle East.

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K: They are always willing to talk peace anytime they want. They've been prepared to open that since 1969. There's nothing new in this.

B: There's a new situation now.

K: When we get ready to propose a settlement, we will be happy to do it with the Russians. None of this is for quotation. The Russians can manage themselves into a position of being good guys be a rejection by Americans.

B: I'm tryin not to use my intuition.

K: They are not banging at our door. The fact is, this has been part of the negotiations ever since 1969.

B: Hasn't the situation changed since that time? With the war in Israel. I'm just asking you. Isn't that what we're doing. Are we at the end of the line?

K: I don't believe we're at the end of the line. I believe that to force Israel back suddenly might leave it in a situation like Czechlovakia.

B: To do it suddenly.

K: To do it maybe at all. This I don't want to face now. Will you look at all guaranteees in the last 40 years and tell me which have really worked. The only guarantee that can help Israeli is an American guarantee.

B: Would it hurt to have both.

K: It might. It might give the Soviets -- the Soviets have never made a concrete proposal to us.

B: We don't believe it would be useful.

K: At this time.

B: Does that really mean after the next (Sinai) thing.

K: If there is a next Sinai thing.

B: Do you see yourself having to go there?

*

K: I'll have to make up my mind in the next few days. I have no immediate plans. I don't have any plans right now but that could change. Nor am I making any plans.

B: By the way, I'm very disappointed that you would choose Bill Moyers over me.

K: That's been arranged over me.

B: I'm hurt and insulted.

K: That's ___.

B: I have to check one other thing with you. A story we're running. They want to know if there's an offensive comment on this. (Reads story)

K: We have tried to make clear all the ___ between the U.S. and Soviet Governments.

B: Have they told you the 1972 things is null and void.

K: No. They told us and our questions about it and we're discussing it. I cannot go into a confidential exchange.

B: You don't want to make a statement.

K: No.

B: You sound tired.

K: I'm fine.

B: You don't enjoy talking to me.

K: I enjoy talking to you but to have to come back to Washington and to all this nitpicking.

B: If someone tells you they are _____.

K: You have to ___it and does it sound plausible.

B: It sounds like ___.

K: To get a settlement?

*

B: No, that they want to get into negotiations. The reason I called you, no one really knows what exchange there are between you and the Russians on certain issues. You are the authority on it

K: They barely told us more than what they told you.

B: They say that they want withdrawl on the 67 borders.

K: If you look at it. What does it mean the U.S. has to guarantee it and ___.

B: They are capable of lying to us.

K: There are a lot of things involved.

B: We didn't question them on that. You don't know a thing without an analysis in the aftermath of the oil embargo.

K: We don't want to bring about a situation that breaks the back of Israel in the ___of bringing a final settlement in months. In the long run, we are prepared to talk to the Russians about a settlement.

B: Don't the Israelis realize they have to get back to something that looks close to 67.

K: This is not something I want to talk about.

B: For a different ___in the current situation.

K: The situation is being complicated by [redacted] like GeorgeBall. B6

B: He's saying things because he's____. Sadat talked about 3 months.

K: After that it will still be a gestation ~~peri~~ period of many months before you can talk about war.

B: You really think so?

K: Yes.

B: Even if we have some movement it will put it off further?

K: Probably.

B: How much time do you think we have?

*

K: I don't know. R__is the great ___on expressing his strategy. I'm not.

B: OK. Thank you very much.

END

SD139 *

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
January 4, 1975
3:45 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

D: Tomorrow there is a government meeting and he asked me to phone you. That's why I am disturbing you. He is not pressing to have the meeting held at the time we orgiinally planned...the 8th, 10, or 9th. It could be said the internal situation on the other hand and the time for clarifying more business. In addition...and I do not want ~~kx~~ you to feel he is pressing for the visit or trying to delay it. He will abide by whatever you decide. I would like to know before tomorrow mornings visit. He would postpone the visit to the JAA but he does not want to leave it hanging. I told him we are trying to look for the best way. What your apprehensions are and if he came, it is this meaning.

K: What do you want to hear from me? Whether he should come?

D: Yes.

K: I think that they better leave it open or I will have a ~~kxxk~~ lot of explaining to do in Egypt.

D: You think he should come?

K: No. I think he should leave it open and make the decision during the week.

D: In one or a few days we will get a picture here.

K: Yes.

D: Ok. I will tell him this. But he should leave in tact his plans with the JAA.

K: Yes. At least until Monday or Tuesday. We want to have a chance to tell the Egyptians he isn't coming.

D: Ok. So I can say to him that he should say to the government tomorrow that no change has taken place. If there is a change they will inform him. Then we will have to have a special cabinet meeting.

K: Can't they give him the authority to come and leave it open?

D: Probably. It will also involve for him changing plans of the JAA.

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K: I would be delighted to see him if we can then keep the discussions out of the newspapers. From my point of view it would be good if he came.

D: Oh, it would.

K: Yes. Then it would show some motion.

D: I will tell him leave it open and give us until Monday or Tuesday until a final answer.

K: It is impossible to do business with your government. Then they will leak out that we will not let him come.

D: No, he will not report to the Cabinet.

K: Ok.

D: I think that would be the best. I am not playing games with you.

K: Well, I frankly don't see how this thing...you know what I tell you I can see what the Soviets and Egyptians are ~~ge~~ doing. Every report we get is that relations are stalmated. If I weren't here, it would have blown long ago. There are ten cables a day coming in here of the presures that are building up. You don't move, the Egyptians don't move.

D: What are we holding?

K: You are holding nothing Shimca. I have tried to explain it to you.

D: Mr. Secretary, you want us to come to you ~~with~~ now with a proposal we are prepared to evacuate....

K: No. You draft it. Somebody has to draft it.

D: We will not draft or accept such a proposal for the return~~to~~ s the Egyptians are prepared to give us. It is possible we can move further but not on the Fahmy line.

K: I also just read an interview with Dobrynin and Goldman. It just ~~is~~ isn't possible to be stalmated.

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D: It wasn't...

K: What Dobrynin told Goldman.

D: I thought what Goldman told Bdbrynin. I don't think we are stalmating the situation. You had a private talk with Rabin, you had one with Allon.

K: What is maddening to me I dare not tell anything to your government because it would leak.

D: Maybe you should come to the Middle East again.

K: Then what?

D: To find k out the positions of the governments and go back to Washington and formulate positions there.

K: Let me think about that. Well, come here maybe at 5:00 p.m. tomorrow.

D: Where?

K: I will call you tomorrow.

D: Don't be disturbed.

K: I will see you tomorrow Simcha.

D: Ok. Goodbye.

K: Goodbye.

END.

SD/38

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TELECON
Bill Rogers/Secretary Kissinger
January 4, 1975
2:31 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I noticed that the talking points you or somebody prepared for the meeting of the Ambassador gives our whole program for Buenos Aires. That concerns me because it means everybody in ARA must have read these. Secondly, I have no intention of telling all the Ambassadors what I plan to do in Cuba. How many people have seen these?

R: Me, Bowdler, Sch____, Luigi and Bloomfield.

K: Each of which have debriefed two other people. Don't you think?

R: Well, I ~~told~~ don't think Bloomfield would and I have talked to Win Lord.

K: Isn't Bloomfield your man?

R: Yes, he only has two people in his office anyway.

K: It is out of the question that the Ambassadors will be briefed on these things. Once you let things out to the Country Directors, it gets into the newspapers. Also, my Latin American trip is everywhere. What did we gain by getting it out so soon.

R: It is now coming out of the capitals.

K: That's water over the dam now. I have handled enough of these things...I will not be pushed into Cuba moves. The minute I am pushed, I stop.

R: I know that. Don't consider this as trying to push you. I understand how this has to be handled.

K: Have ~~x~~ we sent a cable to Brazil?

R: Yes.

K: I haven't seen it.

R: Shall I send you a copy?

K: Yes. Are we asking for their reply?

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R: Yes, indeed. Are you going to be there for awhile?

K: Yes.

R: We have a problem with respect to the Chile military training.

K: What is it?

R: Carl has a problem which was the ___ that we were going to base it...

K: Why?

R: He said it would be regarded by Congress as too inconsistent with the cutoff. Aldrich in Cairo thinks it is a good idea and so do our lawyers. We had Defense signed up for it. Carl wants to do a Section 25.

K: Let's do what the lawyers have agreed to.

R: We have a split between the lawyers on this side and at the Pentagon.

K: Why don't we continue it until Congress comes back and consult with them. Then if they have any objections we would go to the other formula.

R: That's the way I wanted to do it. I think we have a legitimate argument.

K: Well, I would...

R: Want me to run these cables up?

K: If Aldrich agrees and the Defense Department agrees, I would... tell Maw I have backed Aldrich and the Defense Department lawyers. Do you think we can sustain this?

R: Yes.

K: Let's do that then.

END.

SD137

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TELECON
Emilio Rabasa/Secretary Kissinger
January 4, 1975
4:30 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Emilio! How are you?

R: Fine. How is Nancy?

K: She's fine.

R: How ~~xx~~ was the vacation?

K: It was raining all the time.

R: You should have come to Mexico. Are you going to Latin America in February?

K: Yes.

R: When are you leaving?

K: About the middle of February.

R: I wanted to talk to you. I don't know if I could come to Washington or you could come here.

K: Why don't you come to Washington?

R: Why don't we make it this week or the next week?

K: Not the next week, the week after.

R: Yes.

K: Let me call you and let you know.

R: Any day you choose the week after is ok with me.

K: Ok. I am cured of the Carribbean. It literally rained every day.

R: You are still welcome here.

K: I thought it was too much to ask you to make arrangements after all the trouble we had in December.

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R: That's how things are.'

K: See you a week from next week.

R: Any day you choose is all right.

K: I'll let you know on Monday.

R: Ok. Goodbye.

K: Goodbye.

END.

SD144

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TELCON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
January 5, 1975
8:10 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I have been reading the material on the talk with Dobrynin tomorrow and what I want to check is the ~~X~~ section ~~XXXXX~~ on the trade agreement ~~XXXXX~~ making an exchange of words. Does it require an exchange of notes beyond that ~~XXXXX~~ one paragraph of which you gave me three versions.

S: Well, that is ok.

K: That particular paragraph is by the Trade Bill....

S: To say that the constitutional process have been gone through and the thing would now go into effect.

K: That has always been in the international agreement.

S: Those 3 paragraphs are alternatives to take care of 18 months problem..

K: Could you give me the text of the entire exchange of notes that should take place with him and give it to me before I see him. What is your judgment on what is going on in the Soviet Union?

S: I am beginning to think there is a succession problem going on as well.

K: In the sense that Brezhnev is on the way out?

S: It is probably a longish process and it may be he's getting telescoped a little bit. So that these various issues may be -- we may now be moving into a period of delay and procrastination and not taking alot of risks and gambles so that for them on this issue we are just talking about simply a delay in the finesse. Maybe the simplest and controversial in terms of debate.

K: I will tell you from my own point of view--I wouldn't mind it if the Soviets got a little tough. It would bring a security to our operation.

S: One of the difficulties is how it spills over into the Middle East problem. Well they seem to be getting tougher there too. Don't you think that is the area where th-re toughness can have the most without and dramatic effect.

K: Sure, but that is what I have been trying to keep understood with and all these wise guys and sob's. Now we will see how tough we can be.

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S: I think in many ways it can have a salutory effect. I am not sure we can stand a tough period with the Soviets.

K: If I ~~though~~ didn't think we could, I would not have pursued the policy I am. ~~So I don't know where it leaves us in the trade.~~

S: ~~Yes~~. So I don't know where it leaves us in the Trade...

K: Yes.

S: It is really a terrible period. Why I guess we are to blame ~~he~~ because of the rhetoric of the past year and President Nixon. I am really confused by the issues. I can't ~~xxxxxx~~ delay what you have said to the SFRC .. what you have said on the ye past two years.

K: (Inaudible)

S: If that had only been better understood we might not have come into this case.

K: In Jackson's case, he should have had the sense to understand. Do you know that the sob has attacked my oil statement.

Anyone reading that statement -- it was the minimum I could say.

S: It may be the issue~~xxxxxxxxx~~ arrive without putting you at the front of it.

K: But I regret the part I said about the Europeans. Are they blowing at all or have they been fairly quiet. es.

S: I gather that the press has been blowing a bit but that will blow over.

K: Should I have a spokesman say tomorrow for Christ's sake read the Business Week and don't blow this into an international crisis.

S: I don't think you need to say anything about this. I think it ought to be permitted to (blow over). I will get you this other thing tomorrow.

K: Right.

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SD142

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON

Secretary Kissinger/Mr. Harold Saunders
Jan. 5, 1975
7:17 pm

K: I have a letter here from Fahmy about that military action thing.

S: I hand't seen that.

K: It just came in. Can you draft a reply first think in the morning in which you make clear that this is the absolute minimum we can do given these constant threats.

S: Do you want to include any of these other things?

K: They should understand that it was not a threat.

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SD/143

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON

Mr. Ingersoll/Secretary Kissinger
January 5, 1975
7:20 pm

I: Hi, Henry.

K: Hello. Where are you?

I: I am at the apartment. I was in there and I told them I was available. Then I called them ....

K: I told them I would see you about 7 or 7:30 but I've gotten all tied up here. Why don't we have breakfast Tuesday ?

I: Ok. See you then.

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RELEASED IN FULL

SD145

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TELECON
William Rogers/Secretary Kissinger
January 6, 1975
8:21 p.m.

K: Have you looked into sending somebody to Caracas?

R: Yes. He was wrong. We do not have a reply from Schacht yet.

K: Was he wrong whether we have a reply from Schacht?

R: He was wrong.

K: Maybe Schacht is under the impression we have to make the move of sending somebody down there.

R: We are going back to Schacht to ask him what we are supposed to be doing.

K: We have a letter to make a conciliatory statement on the trade law. Can you do that?

R: Yes.

K: Where is the letter to Ecuador?

R: I have two letters in my hand now which I plan to bring back to the Department. The basic issue is whether we can say you are going to propose a change in the bill to Congress when it reconvenes.

K: You can say we will explore with the Congress to alleviate injustices.

R: Ok. We will have it on your desk first thing in the morning.

K: Thank you.

END.

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SD150

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Atherton/Secretary Kissinger
January 6, 1975
1:54 PM

K: Roy, will you make sure they get an answer to Fahmy about the Allon visit.

A: I put a paragraph on the end of the letter that we've redone to Irwin to give him an explanation.

K: OK.

A: That should be with you. I asked them to send it over to you.

K: OK.

END

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TELCON
1/7/75 - 12:03 p.m.
[redacted] Art Hartman/HAK

RELEASED IN FULL

Esenbel

K: Hello. I just talked to [redacted] and they will agree tomorrow to start political talks. They would appreciate it very much if Clerides would say privately to Denktash that political conclusions will be put before a five power conference. Not for guarantees but you know just for discussion. Now I think that should be achieveable.

H: He would say this privately on the side in the meeting.

K: That's right. [redacted]

H: Are they going to insist on that before they.

K: Well, he was vague about that. I had the impression no.

H: And it wouldn't be a prior condition in other words.

K: Well, but I don't see why Clerides can't say that. When we can go tell the Greeks now that they've agreed not to insist on the guarantee thing but they want as a face saving formula, some statement of Clerides that any conclusions will be also discussed in a five power context.

H: Do we have to tell that to them before because that might just make the Greeks back up if we indicate to them in advance that they're -- that this is a requirement.

K: How are we going to get it done?

H: You didn't say.....

K: But look, how are we going to get it done if I told them I'm going to try to get Clerides to say this.

H: I see. We can go to Clerides -- I think if we could leave the Greeks out of it because I'm afraid they'll be looking for something to say well, that's the same thing as raising the guarantee issue. Because it says that they'll be a five power meeting. [redacted]

K: He says they think Clerides has already said it.

H: In other words, he interrprets his formula that way. Because I don't recall that his formula was specifically an international.

K: As I understood Esenbel, he said that that five power meeting then could involve other guaranteeing -- could make other decisions on [redacted] guarantees.

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H: Okay. Well, let me get up something that we can

K: I think we should tell -- enough to the Greeks so that we get credit for its happening.

H: Right.

K: Can you draft something?

H: Will do.

K: Good. Thank you.

SD164

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TELECON
Roy Atherton/Secretary Kissinger
January 7, 1975
9:50 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Have you seen that reply?

A: Yes. About, I guess, what was to be expected. We are going to have to begin to put some more specific ideas out.

K: I do not think so. I think we ought to call Eilts back. There is no way we can put new ideas out without getting caught ~~by~~ between both sides.

A: I would not do anything with the Egyptians without first talking to the Israelis. Can we put some thoughts to Allon which will ~~be~~ not be thought as a position?

K: I doubt it. But I would like to see what they would be. You should all stop talking to the press.

A: I have ~~be~~ not talked to the press at all Mr. Secretary.

K: No one dealing with Egyptian matters should talk to the press.

A: I agree. I do not know who it could be. We have been very careful about it. I have had my people in and really laid down the law to them. I do not think we are going to get Sadat to come forward with anything more. What we have gives us something to start with.

K: What have we got? Opening the Suez Canal, they gave us last year.

A: ~~That~~ The fact is there is really ~~precious~~ precious little short of the final peace commitment Israel wants that we have left. That is one of the problems. The asymetry of giving up territory. The intangibility of the things Israel wants which are reversible.

K: Yes.

A: I think we could put together the elements of a ~~position~~ proposal, not as a proposal but to talk to Allon about. Then go to Sadat with something more specific.

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K: This will not do you any good. We will just be caught in the middle. A referendum to whom?

A: Well, each to the other.

K: That's useless. I won't make a proposal unless ~~xxxx~~ one of them signsit.

A: I honestly don't see any way ~~xx~~ to get Sadat signed up short of the ~~xx~~ risk of a trip with the little we have. That will be dangerous. I feel he is really under pressure this time and will not go out on a limb.

K: Why can't he meet me in Paris? We could have a secret meeting that theFrench know about.

A: I am not sure that he, I think he really is pretty well hooked on the idea.

K: I will not let myself get dragged by Hal Saunders with one of his theoretical exercises. What I need is a fulcrum on which to stand. I will be glad to look at your papers. I will not send some thing to Cairo that they can publish in Al Ahram.

A: I would not suggest we do anything until we have this talk with Allon.

K: Allon will not have the slighted authority.

A: Who do we get something from first?

K: The Israelis will take the position that they made a proposal. The Egyptians have not.

A: When you look back over the history of the last negotiation, the Egyptians did not make any proposal either.

K: I will be interested to see what you have.

A: I think we will have to begin to put something more concrete. I would certainly do it with the Israelis. Get them to understand we ~~xx~~ are up against a mental block with the Egyptians. It is basically the kind of ideas we had with the last Allon visit. With some refinement. Have we had anything from the Israelis at all?

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K: No but I do not want anything because they will immediately leak it. We want an agreement in principal they are willing to give up the oil fields. Let me see what your paper will look like.

A: The commitment in the message of no leaks on the Egyptian side with I think they will hold something.

K: They will until they have nothing. I am not giving them any more papers than I have already.

A: We are aiming to give you something by Thursday so you have something over the weekend.

K: I think what we should do is ask Eilts to come back. And let me get an assessment from him before Allon comes. He does us no good there right now. I want him back. You send him a message tomorrow morning...I want him home for consultation. He should call Fahmy and Sadat that he is going home for consultation.

A: I will give you something to look at in the morning.

K: Don't try to change my mind. I want to talk to Eilts.

A: I think the Egyptians are on the razor's edge.

K: Roy, if it is going to blow, let it blow. I am not going to be everybody's whipping boy. I will not hold still for unreasonable demands indefinitely. Somebody is going to move now. How can it hurt to bring Eilts back for consultation?

A: No. I just wanted to reflect on it overnight.

K: You reflect on it and send a cable tomorrow morning.

A: The positions are not all that unreasonable. They ought to be marriageable.

K: That's true.

A: I think basically there is a Sadat position we can do something with. How do we get it made more concrete for is the problem.

K: My problem is I see no sense putting myself in the position of

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K: being the whipping boy. I want to see some concrete result and I need to get some assessment from Eilts. I will give you overnight to give me any dissenting view you have. Tomorrow morning I want a cable to him. At the same time he should tell Fahmy a meeting in Paris could be organized. It would require the cooperation of the French Government. Our relations with the French Government are good enough to make that perfectly feasible.

A: I have to say in all honesty we could not keep it secret. The fact that you went there could certainly be...

K: I could go there for some other reason.

A: I think it is a high risk problem.

K: I have an existence in this world too. I am not the errand boy of Arabs and Jews.

A: No, no I fully agree we have to play it so that we do not get in that position.

K: Either Sadat is strong enought to make a proposal or he is not. I am going to communicate a plan to Sadat. The only way I would do it is orally through Eilts. You must totally dissassociate yourself of the idea that I will put it on paper.

A: I see no problem.

K: Why don't you draft omething. He is to tell Fahmy we can probably arrange a secret visit to Paris. My visit to Europe will be known. I am scared to death to formulate something.

A: I am aware of the problem.

K: In January last year I knew exactly what I was doing. I knew what Sadat's requirements were. I do not believe I should go out there and put myself in the position of getting it down. I have yet to see an idea worth a goddamn coming through the diplomatic channels. Write down your paper. I will look at it. I want Eilts back. I want to tell Eilts what I want Fahmy to know. I could go out perhaps on February 10 after we have had a preliminary meeting. I want that tomorrow morning. If you have a dissenting view, but that on a separate paper. I want your ideas on such a plan. I need that primarily for Eilts and Allon.

A: It is already in draft. END.

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SD/159

TELECON
Bernie Gwertzman/Secretary Kissinger
January 7, 1975
3:12 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I'm determined to go to war no matter what you say.

G: I haven't said anything.

K: You've been good, for a story that takes the cake.

G: I gather the Egyptians had a press conference today.

K: In Egypt.

G: Yes. I have a brief summary of it that they are joining the chorus. It's one of the feverish things that have swept the area. I'm looking for it on my desk. I can't find it, as usual. Oh, here it is. No, that isn't it. Anyway, their Information Minister deplores your statement and not in understated terms, I gather.

K: The Foreign Minister?

G: No, their Information Minister. Here it is. Secretary Kissinger stated allegations to the possibility of military action against oil producing countries and has embarrassed the government of Sadat. The Information Minister today called Kissinger's statement unnecessary, untimely and not serving the American-Arab relationship and peace in the area. The Egyptians have refused an offer of a second stage of Israeli withdrawal. That's the latest on that one.

K: OK.

G: I was calling because I have been intrigued by your comment in Business Week on the relationship with Congress. I spoke to some people and I'm trying to get some idea of what you really would like to chance in relation with the two branches.

K: I don't want to change anything between the two branches. This is not for quotation. As Congress takes a more active role in foreign policy, it is imperative we work out something. They prefer a tacticle decision on foreign policy to be made in Congress. It's a question of separation of power. You take the trade act, there is not a day that goes by a country does not call attention to discriminatory actions. I have a list of all the restrictions that have been put on ~~the~~ certain countries which covers 11 pages.

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G: I didn't realize that it was that much. I knew the major ones were Turkey, Chile, Cambodia.

K: Turkey, Chile, Cambodia, Vietnam with respect to PL 480 -- the restrictions on PL 480. Within each there are additional restrictions.

G: And the Russians have a whole slew of things.

K: There's a great danger that the restrictions with the Russians are going to bring about a situation where there is no benefit for Jewish emigration. No restrictions of economic aid to the Soviets because they'll be getting it from the Europeans and the Japanese. We'll be losing leverage.

G: Yes. Have you made any changes. Have you talked to Dobrynin at all. Have they cleared that?

K: It's not clear to me.

G: What are your intentions to meet with new members of Congress.

K: I'll meet with them next week.

G: And the leadership next week too?

K: Probably.

G: And you're going to spread it around?

K: Not in an aggressive way. I'm willing to work out full means of consultation.

G: You want to avoid writing into a specific detailed instruction on these countries.

K: Yes. It's too blunt an instrument and tends to be irreconcilable.

G: On aid to Cambodia, there's a mood in Congress to disassociate from Indochina.

K: I have to separate two things. Policy differences -- I disagree with those who want to disassociate from Indochina. That is an issue that has to be fought out in normal political terms.

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G: To separate that from tactical problems such as a limit on the number of people in Cambodia.

K: And on these restrictions -- when you put restrictions on the Soviet Union, you're being discriminatory, the sort of problems we have with the trade bill and OPIC restrictions.

G: Are you going to make any speeches on this.

K: I'm thinking about it.

G: You're not the first Secretary of State who had this problem.

K: No, but it's more acute now.

G: In the past, Dulles actually had a lot of problems with legislation.

K: There are two possibilities. Prices and policy which will be ____ and problems of legislation.

G: I see. That's the other thing. Have you had a call from Congressman Hebert to attend the committee?

K: Ho.

G: There is some story kicking around here.

K: What purpose?

G: Comments about oil and use of force.

K: Sometimes I think the whole world is crazy. If you read what I said, it's the absolute minimum of what could be said.

G: I think what happened, it happened to come out against the Tucker article.

K: I never even talked to Tucker. You behave with great restraint. I have no complaint.

G: I understand. My feeling is this will just simmer away.

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K: And it's done us a lot of good among the Arabs.

G: Really.

K: What the basic problem is, the moderates will be able to tell the ~~xxxxxxxx~~ radicals they don't think it's such a problem. To put emphasis on that, this isn't the only way to go. The fact that Egypt doesn't mean it will be helpful to Egyptian policy.

G: Right. One last thing. The Israelis already are starting in ~~xxxx~~ on the Allon visit, that it won't be helpful unless you go to the Middle East, ~~x~~ nothing can be accomplished. Is it a ploy to avoid facing the issue or what.

K: I can't come to the Middle East right now until we get a little further along.

G: They have to do something.

K: Yes.

G: Good. Thank you very much.

END

SD162

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TELECON
Mr. Hartman/Secretary KIssinger
January 7, 1975
2:26

RELEASED IN FULL

HAK: Are you doing something about what I told you?

H: Parker has the cable, in fact it is probably on your desk, I hope. We have done it in the form of a message to Nicosia using Weikman to avoid Makarios and we recommend that we not take any credit with the Greeks til after it works -- because Denktash has been fighting Clerides on this point. So if Weikman asks Clerides to do this and we have been in touch with Esenbel..

K: I would like to let Bitsios...

H: We will know if it succeeds in 24 hours. Bitsios is in Bulgaria and we can get a message to him there.

K: They will meet tomorrow.

H: We don't think he can be helpful in persuading Clerides.

K: I want to let Bitsios know there is a chance of movement.

H: We can take credit with Bitsios after the fact, if we get him involved before the fact, he can be unhelpful. Bitsios has been telling us each time they ask him to take the credit..this is close to what he said... we think Weikman can do it. We have trouble getting to Clerides because that means we haven't gone to Makarios, his boss. But I think Weikman can do it. I think you ought to look at the cable.

K: I have it. Ok.

END.

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SD/60

TELECON
Mr. Enders/Secretary Kissinger
January 7, 1975
12:45

RELEASED IN FULL

K: The Christian Science Monitor has a front page story that I have sent a message to the OPEC members inviting them to a producers conference. Is that the message I sent two weeks ago?

E: No.

K: Have we sent a new one?

E: No.

K: I have sent some message they are referring to. You remember that message that took four days to get through your bureau?

E: Yes, we redid it twice, I don't think that's it -- I will get a copy up to you.

K: Get that up to me and somebody get Hartman to call in the French Ambassador and show him these cables so they won't think we are playing dirty pool.

E: There has been another attack on the energy thing -- the conservation plan. By Seidman and his group. They want to water it down to 3 billion barrels a day.

K: Out of the question.

E: Absolutely. We just had a rough session and they are going to meet with the President at 3:00 this afternoon. Do you want to go or should I trt to, myself?

K: You should go.

E: Ok, I'll get on the tother thing.

END

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SD/Col

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
January 7, 1975
2:34

RELEASED IN FULL

K: The letter isn't what I need. I need a letter which is heavier on detente and lighter on trade legislation..half a sentence, but I wouldn't rub it in so hard because they are not willing to proceed. Can you do it this afternoon?

S: Yes. Have you seen that message Stoessel sent?

K: Yes.

S: Do you think we should send a two or three line message saying...

K: Yes, but will you do it?

S: Hung up.

END

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TELCON
Tuesday, Jan. 7, 1975, 10:08 p.m.
AsstSecy Rogers/ Kissinger

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Have you ever drafted another thing for the Cuban visit?

R: Yes

K: Where would it be?

R: It was in a sealed envelope in Larry's office three days ago.

K: I will see if I can have it tomorrow morning. When is the meeting?

R: I haven't heard. Larry was setting it up for Thursday.

K: I will see if I could get it out from him

R: I will call him right now.

K: I am leaving the office now. I'll see it in the morning. Thank you.

R: You bet.

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SD155

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Foreign Minister Esenbel of Turkey
1/7/75; 11:40 a.m.

K: Hello, Mr. Foreign Minister.

E: How are you?

K: I am fine. You know, I suppose, we have a lot of people listening in. I suppose you know what I am calling about.

E: Yes. I think it is all right as Macomber told you that privately Clerides should say to him that any agreement they may reach on political matters should be discussed and approved finally by the conference. That I should say that to him.

K: But why do we have to settle that issue now?

E: I think it is not an issue. He already said he accepted assistance of the Conference. The agreement -- the political agreement cannot be finalized unless it is approved by the Conference. That is the attitude of the Turkish side.

K: I understand that. No one is asking you to give up that attitude. All we are saying is that that attitude -- it is making -- it is a perfectly academic question until there is an agreement. I have told you what our point of view is.

E: Mr. Secretary, it is all right in principle. Guarantees is another subject. They exist but if necessary that can be adopted. That is another matter. The political subject -- any agreement to be reached should be finally approved by the five parties in the confference.

K: Let me look into it. I will call you back.

E: Tomorrow they will start the discussions. I already talked with Denktash. It is all right. It is all right. He said he will discuss also political matters.

K: That is a very good attitude. I will do my best on that other matter.

E: I told him he should start. They will discuss in addition to the other practical matters, political matters too.

K: That is all that is needed.

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E: Clerides should say this to him privately -- that any agreement that may be reached on political matters should be approved by the Conference.

K: I will do my utmost to do that, too.

E: What happened to the legislation? Our military is getting jittery about February 5.

K: I will give Macomber some specific ideas. If we make some progress during January we are quite confident we can handle the legislation.

E: Do you need a joint resolution or something? As it now stands that February deadline is February 5. In the meantime I believe you need some action.

K: We have already signed the determination that Turkey is now eligible.

E: But it is only good until February 5.

K: But we will put forth to Congress for an extension about the last week in January.

E: About the same language.

K: I will have Macomber explain it to you. We will ask for the President to have the discretion.

E: I see.

K: We think we can handle it if there is some progress during January.

E: That is also what Mr. Hayes told me. He will arrange to have some kind of a new amendment.

K: This is exactly our intention.

E: Then Macomber should explain to me how this should be done -- the technical . . . .

*

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Foreign Minister Esenbel of Turkey
1/7/75; 11:40 a.m.

K: You tell your military if we proceed on our present course I am optimistic that we can handle it and this time with a long extension.

E: It has to be done before February 5.

K: It will be done before February 5 -- if we can make the talks start.

E: The talks will start tomorrow -- there are no problems.

K: Very good.

E: My best to you and give my regards to the President.

K: I will do that. I look forward to seeing you maybe soon.

*

SD163

TELECON
Arthur Burns/Secretary Kissinger
January 7, 1975
2:20 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Arthur, how are you?

B: Fine.

K: I talked to Simon about your trip. It turned out alright.

B: He called me yesterday and he learned about this from Bennett or somebody and sounded like he was in an angry mood.

K: I think he's calmed down.

B: Good. That's fine. That was what I was going to check with you.

K: He's in a good mood.

B: Fine. Alright. I don't know, he seemed to be hurt because he had not been consulted.

K: I made clear this was not you idea and you had asked me to clear it with him and I just slipped through the cracks.

B: You do have one or two things to do.

K: When are you leaving -- on Friday?

B: Probably Friday morning.

K: I'm most anxious to see you before then.

B: Right. The German Ambassador wants to come over and talk about this. I see no harm in that -- do you?

K: No.

B: And Enders and Cooper want to come over and brief me.

K: That's all to the good. I would like to add a few things for Schmidt. When would be a possible time to see you.

B: Let my girl call your girl immediately and set an hour.

K: OK.

END

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SD156

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TELECON
Mr. Atherton/Secretary Kissinger
January 7, 1975
3:35 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Roy, I understand that Boumediene has let lose some blast.

A: I have seen the press report, I haven't seen the text.

K: What has he said.

A: Let me ~~them~~ get the text.

K: I wonder whether we should get a message off to the Algerians.

A: I think that would be a good idea.

K: And point out what we were talking about is the strangulation of the industrialized world, but secondly their reaction, without having the full text, seems inappropriate. I think we have to show our teeth a little.

A: Yes. I think the words you said yesterday were good models.

K: What we should emphasize is that it refers only to the actual strangulation. Do you think we should send one to Fahmy?

A: We did it.

K: No, but his reply.

A: I don't think so.

K: I understand their Information Minister has made a statement today.

A: And the press is now commenting, which they weren't the past few days. I think you made a very good point to Fahmy.

K: We could tell Fahmy we understand he has problems but we have problems too. There has to be some cooperation on their part. I don't know how to interpret their reference..their reaction to let Eilts see Sadat.

A: I only see it as his wanting to get his licks in first. He explained it in terms of Sadat's humor.

K: I see no possibility of moving the matter forward. On this basis, do you?

A: I don't either . I can't believe Fahmy's reaction is the final word. Fahmy admits he doesn't know whether his reaction would be agreed to by Sadat.

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A: They're trying to press us to send them something..

K: Then I'll be in deep trouble after it's done.

A: I think we have to wait for Sadat's reaction. He can't ignore that.

K: Ok. Will you do a message to Algeria.

A: I will do one to Bourmediene. I have some question as to whether we want to carry on this argument.

K: I think the Egyptians may misjudge the limits of our toleration. I'm just wondering whether it's a good occasion to snarl at them.

A: Why don't I put something together. I'll try my hand at it and see if on reflection it looks like a good idea.

K: Ok.

END

SD/65 *

TELCON
Sir Christopher Soames/HAK
3:25P.M.- 1/8/75

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

S: Henry, how are you? Happy New Year if that is the right....

K: Happy New Year to you too.

S: If that's possible. How nice to hear your voice again. Two things that I wanted to say to you. The first where's Bill Eberle going. I just want to say to you that we got very accustomed to working this end with him and Hal ~~Moungren (phonetic)~~ Malmgren and we would see it as difficult if they both went.

K: I understand what you're saying. [redacted]

S: Excuse me interferring in this way.

K: No, I appreciate this.

S: But you know what I mean. We have to work these things togetherand if both were to go and I heard rumors of that, that [redacted] would be a pity I think. The other thing is -- there was this meeting here the other day. In London --of the Finance Ministers.

K: Yes I know.

S: Is there anything...

K: Well, we didn't like some of the press comments that emerged out of it.

S: You don't mind doing a bit of both? A bit of that and a bit of yours.

K: No. That we will do. But we will not do a bit of one and study the other.

S: Exactly. I've got it.

K:q But I [redacted] think I can persuade my people to go along with a bit of yours if you go along with some of ours.

S: Yes, I've got it. Right. And I thought there was a splendid interview you did with Business Week.

K: Thank you. I mean some of the reactions have been astonishing. I mean the public reactions.

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S: Because they asked you the question about war. About intervention.

K: That's right.

S: But if they ask you the question you have to answer.

K: That's right. But actually...

S: So you answered impeccably. I thought it would have been a mistake to say less and a mistake to say more.

K: I'm glad you agree.

S: Yes. Well, lots of XXXXX love to Nancy.

K: I can stand a little luck too. Oh, love you said. I thought you said luck.

S: Well, I was going to say love to Nancy and luck to you both.

K: When are you coming over again?

S: Not in a hurry unless you want me. I'll always come over if you want to see me.

K: Good. Well, I'll keep that in mind. I'll always be glad to see you when you come but there may XXX be an occasion say in another month or so where we might just want to review the bidding.

S: Absolutely. I'm at your service. And all the luck in the world and keep at it.

K: Thank you.

S: Bless you.

K: Bye.

SD166

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TELCON
Joe Sisco/Secy Kissinger
7:08 p.m., January 8, 1975

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Joe, on that cable I agree with you that D&E should be deleted.

S: Yes.

K: But you should add another paragraph. Say: Please explain to Fahmi that we have not asked Allon to come with a specific plan since that would only leak and create new problems.

S: Yeah.

K: The purpose of the meeting with Allon is to bring home to him the urgency with which we view the necessity of a settlement. And this is more important than any specific proposal from him at this point.

S: More important than any specific proposal at this point.

K: Don't you think?

S: I think so.

K: Because if we don't tell them ahead of time --

S: Then they are going to be --

K: I mean, if we come with nothing, they will look at it as an alibi.

S: Yeah.

K: Okay.

S: All right. You want that actually a new paragraph.

K: To substitute for D&E. And then get it out.

S: Thank you very much.

K: Right.

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SD170

TELCON
Tom Enders/Secy Kissinger
10:58 a.m., January 8, 1975

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Tom, I find in the Washington Star that the Trade people in the State Department were upset about the State Department spokesman's statement about the Ecuador restriction yesterday.

E: I'm sure that is not the case.

K: State Department officials admit that Anderson's statement was prepared without serious consultation with the Department's own trade expert, rather it was ordered on political grounds by Kissinger's inner circle. Beyond the narrow motive of keeping the Latin nations happy and so on.

E: Let me get on this.

K: Now if you have any trade people who like to make press statements, I want them out of the Department.

Let me get on it.

E: Will do. I'll call you back.

K: Okay.

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SD178

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TELCON
Friday, January 10, 1975, 6:18 P.M.
MCCLOSKEY/KISSINGER

RELEASED IN FULL

M: I hesitate to raise it again - but California -

K: I will almost certainly do it. Can we wait for a final word until Monday morning? Tell them it is 90% certain. I haven't had a chance to read the speech and I want to do it over the weekend.

M: They have the problem with the invitations and logistics to arrange, but I'll ask --

K: You can give them an assurance Monday morning.

M: All right. You are very much inclined to do it, aren't you?

K: I will almost certainly do it.

M: OK. Good -

K: Goodby

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SD177

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TELECON
Mr. Enders/Secretary Kissinger
January 10, 1975
6:30 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Look, I would like to see you for 15 minutes tomorrow morning.

E: All right. Subject?

K: I am having a dinner with Denis Healey. I want to make absolutely sure I understand the operations of that facility.

E: Ok.

K: What are the nuances, how it would work, what our country is obligated to do. What I will be up against with him or Gordon Richardson.

E: Very good. I sent a cable to Arthur saying get us something Saturday night or Sunday morning. So I can brief you.

K: Yes. Before I see Denis Healey. Put it on paper so I can read it.

E: Ok. Fine.

END.

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SD181

TELCON
Jan. 10, 1975, 8:13 pm
KISSINGER/ ATHERTON

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I have agreed to the Sadat message deleting just one sentence. Are you going to do one for Faisal?

A: I think one should be up there.

K: These goddam bastards -- thank you.

A: The Faisal one is up there - and then an oral message to the Sultan -- we have to acknowledge--

K: I don't know what my children are --

A: It went up a couple of hours ago.

K: A couple of hours is not enough time

A: What did you do with the Sadat ?

K: I put it in my out box.

A: I will check with Parker - no need to bother you.

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SD179 *

TELECON
Mr. Hartman/Secretary Kissinger
January 10, 1975
1:25 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: The French have now popped off.

H: I saw the Italians did. I gave Ortona a copy of a cable to show Colombo. Colombo had the substance.

K: Well, the French have popped off, that they are referring to the statement of Sauvagnargues.

H: Whose statement?

K: Sauvagnargues before the National Assembly. Will you call Kosciusko-Morizet and say we're beginning to question whether there's any sense in an alliance where there are allegations of things we didn't say and which were said primarily for their benefit.

H: That's exactly what I said to the Germans on Schmidt.

K: Will you make it very tough and say this strongly refleds the view of the President.

H: I will.

K: We consider this sort of thing inconsistent with alliance relationships.

H: I will. Is this a cable?

K: A news summary.

H: I'm just saying this to the Dutch Ambassador. He's sitting next to me.

K: It's for their benefit.

H: All they have to do is stay quiet and they get benefit of it.

K: Exactly.

END

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SD182

TELECON
Ambassador McCloskey/Secretary Kissinger
January 10, 1975
6:25 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

M: You have ~~kxxix~~ poor Hartman terrified about going out there.

K: Why?

M: Because he should not be tlaking about U.S.-Soviet relations which is what he was going to talk about. Maybe he could make another speech.

K: Yes.

M: Ok. Let me talk to him. Joe Sisco is going also.

K: That's ok.

END.

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SD174

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TELECON
Mr. Enders/Secretary Kissinger
7:07 p.m.
January 10, 1975

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Should be communicated to Brousalette and not through their regular channels.

E: Yes. I told them this was confirming what you told Brousalette.

K: It was a Presidential inquiry for ~~Chkxx~~ Christ's sake. If every time the French use the Presidential channel, we go back through ~~the~~ Kosciusko-Morizet, we are ruining the channel.

E: I told them it was only Brousalette. I will confirm with him that he use the Brousalette channel.

K: Good.

END.

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SD176

TELECON
Mr. Hartman/Secretary Kissinger
January 10, 1975
6:57 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Did you talk to the French today?

H: I did and they had one comment back from them. They said Sauvargnes did not comment on your statement. We do have a message in from Kenneth Rush which also reports he had testified before the committee and had demonstrated forcefully the ~~X~~ French would not be drawn into criticism of the U.S. He concentrated on the Martinique Summit.

K: On the whole the French have played fair with us since Martinique. Ok. Thank you.

END.

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SD190

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TELECON
Mr. Schecter/Secretary Kissinger
January 11, 1975
7:58

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Did I wake you up?

S: It is ok. I am glad to speak with you.

K: I was told that you urgently had to speak with me.

S: I told Larry that I wanted to check with you about your way of conducting foreign policy with the President and that it would be difficult to do it by phone. We have a cover for next week.

K: He must have misunderstood -- he thought you said that you wanted to talk to me only on the phone.

S: Well, I don't know what happened. He said your schedule was all jammed up.

K : It is murderous, but I can always find ten or fifteen minutes for you. I guess it is too late.

S: It closed last night. I guess it is alright. We are in good shape. We are looking forward to seeing you..

K: Friday.

S: And I should like to do that interview.

K: I have to give a press conference before I do another interview because alot of newsmen...

S: How is your back.

K: That is another reason I couldn't see you. How did you know?

S: I have good sources.

K: Every time I open the newspaper I find something in it. I'm sorry that I woke you up.

S: No no, it is alright.
END

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TELECO
Robert A
January 1
12:08

A: I told
writes an
straighte
and he sa

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SD/91

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Robert Anderson/Secretary Kissinger
January 11, 1975
11:24 AM

K: Just say that's a malicious lie and the people who put it out know it's a malicious lie.

A: Thank you.

K: Don't you think?

A: I don't know if you want to be that strong. I denied the other story yesterday.

K: We were going through a WSAG meeting which is a contingency meeting and they were listing a lot of possibilities.

A: I would rather just dismiss it completely and deny it without say a malicious lie. I ~~xx~~ may call attention to it.

K: Just frankly deny it.

A: OK.

K: Could you call Abe Rosenthal of the New York Times and ask him what's the sense of playing on the front page a story which is totally malicious and which is based on no evidence at all.

A: I'll call him.

K: Will you?

A: Yes.

K: On my behalf.

A: Yes sir.

K: And call me back.

A: Yes.

END

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SD/188

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Helmut Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
January 11, 1975
1:06 PM

K: I think the reply to the Soviets is much too defensive.

S: I tried to make it in terms of present intentions in order to leave the general principle. I could add another sentence that no one could have known how ___.

K: I want to imply that it's none of their business.

S: That's why I said if we had anything they need to know.

K: Put the Soviet indiction into (Congress).

S: On trade.

K: I wonder if I should propose to Dobrynin that you call on Vorontsov. Call him in and walk him through these three stages and let them formally reject it.

S: Or we could _what they told us twice and inform Congress that this happened.

K: How.

S: Have the President say it in his State of the Union address.

K: No.

S: If we go through the drill we went through privately if we don't want the trade agreement and ....

K: Couldn't we have you and Vorontsov go through the drill formally and have Anderson say it at a press conference summary what has happened.

S: We've gone through the agony and given them everything we promised to ~~xx~~ do.

K: I don't think Anderson will be able to handle the briefing.

S: We would have to give him a script.

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K: Could you handle the briefing.

S: Yes.

K: Somebody has to explain what the three stages are.

S: I'm ___other obligations that has direct ramifications. Which Feldman is working on.

K: OK.

S: Why don't you check it with the Soviets.

K: Let me check with them. I'll see you next week something. It's inconceivable that you can leave now, that is out of the question.

S: I have a really messy problem.

K: Everyone has problems. I'm commiting suicide by staying. I can't possibly do without you in these circumstances.

S: I would like to talk to you as soon as you have a chance.

K: We will.

END

SD192

*

TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin/Kissinger
3:36 p.m. - 1/12/75

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

D: Hello, Henry.

K: Where are you?

D: On the beltway.

K: Are you going to your place?

D: Exactly. Is there something urgent?

K: There's nothing urgent. Nothing that we can't discuss Monday morning.

D: You could wait until Monday morning.

K: I don't think we should discuss this on the telephone where people can overhear it.

D: I understand.

K: You're in a car?

D: Yeh.

K: Well, that means we're overheard.

D: I understand. It is nothing urgent? Because otherwise I could come back.

K: No, it's hard to implement that message you gave me yesterday.

D: The message, yeh?

K: Maybe an explanation, maybe how to handle it officially. So far I'm considering it an unofficial communique.

D: I understand. But it could wait it until Monday, Henry?

K: It can wait til Monday.
D: You call me first thing in the morning.
K: Good. OK, see you then.

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SD193

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Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Secretary Simon
1/13/75; 10:22 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

S: Hi, Henry.

K: Bill, I just wanted to tell you where -- what happened last in my dinner with Healey. He said that he had had some word from the Germans already, that they were now willing to go along with the facility.

S: With our facility?

K: With our facility.

S: Okay.

K: And, he is of course pushing his, too.

S: Of course. The big one.

K: That's right. And he is now screaming for ten to twelve billion.

S: That's right.

K: Well, what I told him is all the Government has agreed to up to now is three billion. That gives you a little maneuvering room.

S: Good.

K: So you can go -- you know so you don't even have to go to five today if you don't want to.

S: Well, we will see what evolves and what the attitudes of this thing . . .

K: I know. I just want you to know -- I didn't give him five, I just said three is all that we got a concensus on. But it is not in concrete, I said.

S: That's just super.

K: And I am just very convinced that we shouldn't give too much ground quickly.

S: I don't think we are going to have to.

K: Now if he is resistant to the idea of our facility spelled out in too much detail -- he seems to think he can drag it into a longer period . . .

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S: That is part of his tactic -- into a study group -- and nothing ever happened. We are not going to allow that to happen.

K: Exactly! We must get out of this meeting a firm deadline for when the negotiations must be completed.

S: Well, as I said, I not only want an agreement in principle but I want the specifics of principle spelled out.

K: Exactly! We can get the quotas, we can get -- there is one thing that Enders told me this morning that I didn't know: that in one of our preliminary jogs we say that it is up to --that it is up to each country whether they will make their contribution even after they have signed up. Now, . . .

S: How they will do it, that's what people are arguing about.

K: How they will do it is different. But that they must do it, I think must -- it must be obligatory!

S: Well, of course. That's in the opting out procedures -- I mean that isn't even a bargaining point in my papers, anyway.

K: Exactly, I agree with you completely.

S: Okay, Henry. Thanks a million.

K: Good luck.

S: Thank you.

SD 214 *

TELECON
Chief Justice Warren Burger/Secretary Kissinger
January 14, 1975
4"11 PM

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: Mr. Chief Justice.

B: I'm sorry to both you.

K: You couldn't bother me.

B: I mentioned the subject to you awhile back on the senior physician [redacted] B6 He called me awhile ago and told me he was going over for medical consultation with the same people in Kuwait and Bahrain and some possibility that he might be seeing King Faisal in his capitol. This fellow is a very sophisticated fellow. He got a little concerned about 2 facts. One, the possibility of doing something offensive and avoiding anything that wasn't necessary. At that time I agreed that I would send you his resume and background on him and for some reason or another I did not send it to you. I can send this over to you right now.

K: I think it would be helpful if he got a little briefing.

B: He's either coming to Washington at the convenience of your man or stop here in NY on his way to London.

K: In any event, I would be grateful if you send this material and if he would call Mr. Atherton who is Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.

B: I'll send this over to you now. Should I send it to you or him.

K: To me.

B: How will that get into your office?

K: If you send it to Ms. Jane Rothe.

B: I'll send it over right away.

K: It was very nice to talk to you.

END

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SD215

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
January 14, 1975
5:07 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

D: Hello.

K: Anatol.

D: Yes Henry.

K: That goddamn story is all over town.

D: What story?

K: About the trade. Harold Scott said you cal led him.

D: I did not call him. He called me. Said he wanted to see me and I told him on Thursday morning.

K: Goddamnit. I just talked to Ingersoll and he said...

D: Henry I did not speak to him at all. Today he called Yuri Feronsov (sp?) and he said he discussed with you...

K: I have never talked with Soott. I do not know what [redacted] looks like. B6

D: He said he had to speak with me to stop this announcement and maybe we could work out something.

K: Total nonsense. Eberle told me Scott was going to Russia next week. I said before he goes he should wk check in to my office at the end of the week to make sure he knows what our position is.

D: With me he said....

K: I think we will release the announcement tonight.

D: That is all right with me.

K: Anatol I just told the President I knew the story was not true.

D: I spoke to our trade people in New York....

K: One k other thing.

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D: Yes.

K: When you say you are no longer bound by your obligations of 1972, if you make a statement like that, it will cause all hell here.

D: Look Henry I think the best way to do it is the agreement on economics was in 1972. The decision taken by the...this is the Russian way. In the Russian opinion.

K: Why don't we say it is an economic agreement?

D: Ok. It is economic agreement which contradicts the provisions of the trade agreements.

K: Ok Anatol. Thank you. We will announce it at 6:30. We will send it right over.

D: Ok. Henry.

END.

SD210

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TELCON
Ken Fried/Secy Kissinger
8:02 p.m., January 14, 1975

RELEASED IN FULL

F: Mr. Secretary, I'm sorry to bother you after that session but for a couple of questions that are up in the air that I think are important. You seemed to be pretty careful in saying that concerning the overall affect of this on detente in relations generally that you had no official communications from them or notes. Were you saying that there might be something that was done unofficially or privately.

K: No, no, no. We actually said we have no evidence yet. Don't read the tea leaves that carefully.

F: Well, you know, I have to do something to earn my keep. You don't think then, you don't expect any pressures anywhere or any deterioration?

K: Well, look, off-the-record now for your guidance, what I think is this: It is perfectly possible that the Soviet Union has every intention to maintain the detente, which I think they do. In every crises, however, what is the restraint on them? What can we say if you are not moderate, we will do what? We will get mad?

F: Um-humm.

K: We will use military force? So there are fewer leverages on them.

F: Yeah.

K: That's a fact of life.

F: Did this thing catch you by surprise? I know you said -- your public statements and all that -- but I continued all through this to have an impression that things were going to work out and so I have to say that I was surprised by this.

K: Ken, a lot of people think you can keep -- we are talking on deep background.

F: Okay.

K: A lot of people think they can keep piling on on the theory that I can always pull it out.

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F: And you're not superman after all, huh?

K: Well, I was not surprised when the ExIm Bank [hit]. I think we could have carried the Jackson-Vanik with a big ExIm facility.

F: Uh-huh. What is next? A little unclear. You're going to go to the Hill and ask for their advice. Do you expect that there will be any restoration?

K: I'm not in favor of a quick restoration. We have to let this thing simmer now for a bit.

F: How long is a bit?

K: I don't know.

F: End of '75, do you think?

K: I just don't know.

F: Yeah.

K: I was not surprised in the last three weeks. I was fairly sure it would happen.

F: Okay.

K: When I exchanged the letters, I thought we might just barely make it. But I wasn't much in favor of them.

F: You weren't apparently able to convince the people on the Hill of this. They just didn't believe your warnings on this sort of thing? Or was there any kind of attempt to --

K: Ken, off-the-record, you look at the record, Jackson was running around the country saying Kissinger told me it couldn't be done but it could be done.

F: Have you talked to Senator Jackson about this since it happened, since Friday?

K: I've had somebody -- I've had Sonnenfeldt talk to him.

F: What was his reaction?

K: Nothing particular. I don't want to get this into a fight between Jackson and me.

F: Yeah. Well, you may already have one.

K: Why? Has he said something?

F: No, he hasn't yet. But I wouldn't be surprised if he did though. You know he is going to have to blame it on somebody. He won't take the blame in a Presidential year -- the one coming up.

K: (laughter) Ken, between you and me, it's not easy to blame this one on me.

F: (laughter) No, I guess not. Okay, Mr. Secretary, thank you very much. Sorry to have bothered you.

K: Bye.

SD 213

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TELECON
William Eberle/Secretary Kissinger
January 14, 1975
4:28 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How many people have you been talking to about the Soviet trade.

E: Nobody. I got a call from Marilyn Berger of the Post saying I was quoted. I didn't talk to anybody.

K: How does Harold Scott know anything?

E: I told him you may be getting in touch with him. I mention that he was going to Moscow. I didn't tell him anything about our conversation.

K: I had a call from Rita Hauser saying I told Harold Scott this was not going to come.

E: When I talked to Harold Scott I said you maybe getting in touch with him. I told him you were going toMoscow?

K: I?

E: I told you he was going to Moscow.

K: I told you before that I would try to ~~brief~~ bring him up to date.

E: I simply mentioned that to him. He called me yesterday and said what was my opinion about the Russians. I said I thought this could be worked out, long before I had a call from Marilyn Berger who asked me to my knowledge if the Russians had rejected this. I said I know of nothing.

K: OK.

E: The only thing I said to Harold was that you may call him.

K: OK.

END

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SD209

TELCON

[redacted] Secy Kissinger

7:54 p.m., January 14, 1975

RELEASED IN PART B6

B6

[redacted] Henry, by the way, you were very good last night. You were very nice to do that for Jack by the way.

K: Well, he's a good friend.

[redacted] But I tell you it is still a very, very nice thing to take that night off. I think it was just a damn nice thing. Let's leave it on that basis.

K: Well, aren't you nice.

[redacted] They got me on the plane as I was coming from Chicago and I called McCloskey to hear that. And of course this doesn't surprise me one bit.

K: Well, you know we were going to announce it on Thursday but that [redacted] Harold Scott leaked it out.

[redacted] Well, anyway I tell you what I've done. You remember -- I've sensed this. I only hope that it's not just more than this particular issue I hope for the sake of the country.

K: Well, you know it's going to be tough on the Jews is it is.

[redacted] I mean, I hope it's not your whole policy. I remember what you mentioned last night.

K: Yeah, but I warned everybody.

[redacted] Yeah. Look, I completely agree. I've warned everybody you can drive too hard a bargain. You've heard me say that. In any event, what I've done -- I've called quite a few people and I just told them they better keep their shirts on right now until this thing settles out. Because you know we are going to have some hot heads around. But I want the responsible leadership just to sit still and see where you're going because I don't know what your program is or what you have in mind.

K: Well, I think that they should. You know, I think really that the Jewish Community ought to keep quiet now. I have given a very concillatory statement. I said the Administration shared the objectives of those who pushed the Jackson Amendment. We differed only as to methods and we don't want to look into the past. We are willing to work with them for the future.

[redacted] Well, that's the important thing. No, not that you're not on record

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[redacted] Secy Kissinger 2 B6

[redacted] (contd) because I've been in theinside counsel and I've taken the same position my own self about you drive too hard a bargain. But where we are now, you can't put the eggs back in the shell right now. The thing to do right now is this -- remember when I was in to see you a few days ago, I mentioned to you that this Import/Export thing, which is a key element in this thing, we may have to take a look at. I don't know. I don't know whether you know. You probably know more. I don't know what your program or what you have in mind, but I think you ought to share it with me -- at the right time -- so I know how to behave on this thing. B6

K: You mean, on the Middle East?

[redacted] No, on the Soviet thing. B6

K: Well, I think I will have to let it sit for a while.

[redacted] Yeah. Let it settle down. B6

K: Yeah. I don't think we can do anything else.

[redacted] Yeah. Well, I hope this doesn't affect the rest of your whole policy, that's the most important. B6

K: Well, that's what I hope.

[redacted] That's right. Well, Henry, I've sensed this. I had this feeling last Sunday. I told some of the people around the country. It's a funny thing, on Friday I had to say it to them but I sensed the problem. When you told me that day that you thought there was a 50-50 chance, I read you pretty loud and clear. B6

K: Yeah. Well, that's what I figured.

[redacted] What's that? B6

K: That's what I tried to figure.

[redacted] Well, when you said 50-50, I meant the odds were against it. B6

K: Of course.

[redacted] Now you know I understand you by this. You've been pretty well on record. Now we're going to have a little screaming from people. Let's just be calm about this. But the Leadership, I've already been on the phone all evening long. B6

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[redacted]/Secy Kissinger 3 B6

K: Terrific.

[redacted] And I just want them to calm down. We've got another problem, I don't know how this affects even the Mid East, but you've got these meetings in a couple of days. I'm going to be in town -- I want to come in town, I want to try to get together before I leave the country. Next week some day. B6

K: Well, good. I would like to talk to you early next week or maybe even at the end of this week.

[redacted] Yeah, I thin k it is important. Because I have my own feeling and I think my own intuition tells me a few things about this thing. I would like to give you the benefit of my own input for whatever it's worth. B6

K: Right. Well, let's try to get together at the end of this week.

[redacted] All right. We'll do that. And we'll keep in touch on this thing but I just wanted to tell you I've already been on the horn on this thing. B6

K: Good.

[redacted] There will be some screaming. We've got to let some people ventilate some feelings but as far as Leadership is concerned, I'm not so much concerned, but we will have some ventilation. Just relax and we'll just keep the lid on and see what's happening. B6

K: I agree. Many thanks.

[redacted] B6

[redacted] Because I don't know how you're going to keep up this -- you know, your own nerves. You've got to be a strong character in this next year. This is going to be a real tough one. I really have great sympathy and understanding for what you're going to go through this coming year. B6

K: Well, [redacted] we're counting on you. B6

[redacted] I don't have to make a speech on this. B6

K: Well, okay. See you soon.

[redacted] Fine. B6

K: Bye.

SD 208

J. Rothe notified

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Governor Holton
1-14-75; 10:32 a.m.

K: Hello.

H: We will work it out either Friday or Tuesday. It is scheduled for Friday right now but he has got to check it a little bit.

K: Okay. Will you check with my office to make sure Tuesday is possible.

H: Right. Well, . . .

K: But I am sure it is.

H: Okay. Well, the preference now, he said, is for Friday.

K: Okay.

H: So we will figure on that and if you have to change it, I will work it out with Jane.

K: Okay, good. Thank you.

H: Yeah.

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SD203

J. Rothe noticed

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Governor Holton
1-14-75; 10:30 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Lin.

H: Yes, sir.

K: Do you think I can switch my Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony from Thursday to Friday on the grounds that with the President's State of the Union address tomorrow the Allon meetings had to take place on Thursday.

H: Uh-huh. I don't know. Friday is a bad day -- you know they will be going home.

K: Friday morning.

H: I don't think they will stay this week.

K: Well, then, how about next Tuesday?

H: All right. Why don't I check it out with Pat Holt and get back to you.

K: Can you do it right away because some of our plans depend on it.

H: Let me just see what his reaction is and I will come back to you with it.

K: Good. Within 15 minutes?

H: Sure. Where are you?

K: In the White House.

H: Okay.

K: Thank you.

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SD223

TELECON
Senator Javits/Secretary Kissinger
January 14, 1975
5:15 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

J: k Thank you again for last night.

K: How did you come out today?

J: I lost 23-14. We did not do very well. I did not win any of the conservatives. It indicates the party is essentially conservative. I do not mind it a bit.

K: Jack. We heard from the Russians that they are turning down that trade agreement. We were going to announce it on Thursday. But now somebody at the White House told Harold Scott from the Chamber of Commerce, who has it leaked all over town. We will have to announce it k at 6:30 tonight. I will do it in a very conciliatory way.

J: You do not have any idea what Jackson will say?

K: No.

J: I will call him.

K: I am having Sonnenfeldt call him.

J: Ok. Tell Hal to let my office know when he has reached him and I will call him.

K: Ok.

END.

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SD221

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sen. Humphrey
Sec. Kissinger
January 14, 1975
1:15 p.m.

H: I have a problem here which I did not anticipate. We have action here today on all the resolutions on this N.H. election. The leaders feel we may vote anytime. We have a live quorum here now. May I beg off lunch today.

K: Of course.

H: I hate to do it.

K: I am anxious to talk to you about a number of things.

H: How about seeing you tomorrow?

K: That is the State of the Union.

H: Oh, yes.

K: Why don't you invite me to lunch up there after the address.

H: As soon as he is through?

K: And after you have delivered your comments which will take about 20 mins.

H: (Laughter). When we are through with the State of the Union would you like to meet me in my office.

K: Sure. Wherever it is most convenient for you.

H: To be perfectly frank with you about it, I think it would be better to come back to your place so we could have some privacy.

K: Do you want to ride back with me. I will wait for you at the exit.

H: I think it would be easier for you to go ahead and I will join you.

K: Fine.

END

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SD222

TELECON
Amb. Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
January 14, 1975
4:25 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Anatoyl.

D: Yes, Henry.

K: All the newmen here in town are going wild about allegations regarding the rejection of the Trade Bill by you.

D: Nobody knows about it.

K: I want you to know we are not going to say anythingofficial til Thursday. I wanted to make sure you don't get triggered into saying anything. They have some sort of garbled story.

D: We are not going to say anything. This, I know for sure. They are not going to do anything. We have no intention. You will say it Thursday.

K: Thursday around noon.

D: About tomorrow -- 8:30 or 7:30.

K: I'll let you know in an hour.

D: You'll call me?

K: Yes.

END

Dobrynin called right back:

D: If you have the time tomorrow, I could schedule some movies for a little bit.

K: Let me check with the Vice President. We may have to go to a reception around 10:30.

D: What kind of a reception so late?

K: After a concert.

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D: After you have a good dinner, so then you go to a reception.

K: I'll talk to you later.

END

SD225

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TELECON
Senator Mathias/Secretary Kissinger
January 14, 1975
5:45 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

M: Hello.

K: Hello. How are you.

M: Fine. I just want to report to you that I follow your every command to the letter.

K: You have been terrific.

M: You tell me to go to Damascus and I am on my way.

K: Are you going?

M: Next week.

K: Terrific. I want to talk to you. Are you going to see Assad?

M: I don't know. The Appropriations Committee is going to the Middle East and I have arranged a side trip to Damascus.

K: Great.

M: I do not think we should go to that part of the world and ignore them.

K: Right. Can we give you a briefing?

M: I am leaving Saturday.

K: Well, let's get together before then with Joe Sisco and some others.

M: Ok. On the other matter...

K: I would warn very strongly against any language that sounds like you want to renegotiate the Vladivostok agreement. The Soviets have turned down the Trade Agreement.

M: Have you seen the latest draft?

K: Yes. It is very close to what we can live with. We can accept all your recommendations if you can put it in terms of accepting the Vladivostok agreement.

M: I was working on some language that would explain it. It is a completely separate thing.

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K: I really would warn that if the Congress trys to be too specific in describing the Vladivostok agreement, they will blow that up too.

M: We certainly don't want that. I am concerned that if this thing flops around the Democrats will coalese on it and make it very tough. We have a chance to get them all on the team. I think there is a further asset in it for you in that this is a time in which you are reaching out to the Congress and working with the Congress and this is an example of the Senate giving advice in the Constitutional sense.

K: I welcome ~~the~~ it except it should not be construed as giving advice on how to get additional concessions from the Russians.

M: Absolutely. If the formal language suits you, we can work on it. I do not know how many will complain but we can work with some.

K: Let me check with Hyland what the latest word is.

M: Let me know on that.

K: You will have to tomorrow.

M: Before I go to the Middle East.

K: Tomorrow.

M: All right. If you can set up Assad I will be grateful.

K: I will do my damnedest.

M: Thank you.

END.

SD219 *

TELECON
Mr. Atherton/Secretary Kissinger
January 14, 1975
3:00 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I'm not sure that is very clear. Will you send him all the relevant passages and tell him to __the whole thing.

A: He has them. We had a number of people___.

K: Do you think anybody has the whole thing?

A: All the Embassies have it. The Senator has it. He mentioned it in a number of speeches.

K: Secondly, this is a little bit defensive. It's too defensive. The first purpose of the limit was to counteract the use of force and political warfare with respect to oil prices since the criticism to which we're exposed is we're too soft on oil prices and need to be worked out. He said there was some hypothetical cause____actual strangulation of the industralized world and no one can expect us in case of actual strangulation___.

A: I thought I had this in there.

K: Make it stronger. Third, ___moderate Arabs, if they think about it, they should understand this might have got them some ___and it gives them some argument. If you could shape it up a little.

A: I'll add them both and I'll make sure he has the text.

K: Did Larry tell you I thought cable drafting has inproved?

A: No, I haven't heard that. Maybe it's just the guidance we get.

K: Could you do it, it doesn't matter, by the end of the day?

END

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SD241

TELECON
Arthur Burns/Secretary Kissinger
January 15, 1975
6:00 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

B: Henry.

K: Arthur, let me do something slightly unethical. Bill Simon asked me to intercede with you on the gold concession. Since he is on the way to you now, could you tell him I called you.

B: I will.

K: Someday I have the uneasy feeling if you have the currency backed by nothing, you will have a monumental collapse of credibility. He thinks he has a communique almost negotiated with the French and he is afraid you will block it.

B: I am trying to block it, yes.

K: Will you at least say I interceded. As long as you and I understand I do not know a goddamn thing about the subject.

B: You and I both...

K: I have been very uneasy about moving gold in and out of the system. I have kept my mouth shut because I do not know anything about it.

B: It is a complex subject there...let me only say I appreciate your desire to bring about a little harmony.

K: He asked me to call you. If he had not, I would not have done it. If he brings it up and you can say I called...

B: I will.

K: I frankly do not have any views and it would be wrong for me to intercede.

B: Ok.

K: I hope to see you very soon. Are you in town on Saturday morning?

B: Yes.

K: Let's get together Saturday morning for a little bit.

B: Ok. Thanks very much... END.

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SD240

TELECON
Secretary Simon/Secretary Kissinger
January 15, 1975
5:55 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Ok, Simon, you got the number one on the line first.

S: How about that. Did you call Arthur?

K: On the gold?

S: Yes.

K: No I haven't had a chance.

S: I am driving over there now. The French and ourselves agreed on a communique. You can't have any knowledge of that. If you could tell Arthur, Simon said...

K: I will call Arthur and you will help me on the solidarity fund?

S: Absolutely.

K: Ok. I will call him this minute.

END.

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SD239

TELECON
Ambassador McCloskey/Secretary Kissinger
January 15, 1975
5:39 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I am wondering whether you should...

M: I think that is an arrogant, goddamn thing for him to do.

K: Shouldn't somebody call him for the record and tell him what triggered us was Harold Scott was going around negotiating.

M: That's ok. I will do it but I would also like to say to him that... he said you said a few things bordering on being outrageious. That it was unethical for you to be announcing it last night and it will effect what he writes in the future. He said, the Secretary's action will effect what I will write in the future. He said the Secretary should at least have called him. There is a Jewish word called chutzpah (sp?).

K: It's a Jewish word and he will understand it.

M: I think I should call him. I do not think Sonnenfeldt should. Do you have a moment? Can I step in to your office?

K: I have somebody with me now.

M: Then before you go upstairs at 6:00 p.m.

K: Yes.

END.

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SD233

TELECON
Linwood Holton/Secretary Kissinger
January 15, 1975
10:15 AM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: .....always tell me that is a disastor.

H: We have Cranston with Fraser's group. They came voluntarily together. Don't call them freshmen when you talk to them.

K: I'm not that stupid.

H: I don't think there will be any problem.

K: Will you ask Fraser to get his group in week after next, but call him today so I can say it's been done.

H: We've already ~~xxkk~~ been working with them. They may have a date.

K: Make it week after next.

H: OK. Anything else?

K: We'll see what happens this afternoon. I thought I would talk for 15 minutes and answer questions.

H: I think that's best. I thought I would introduce you with about 30 seconds.

K: Good.

H: How did you react on this USSR thing? Would the blame be put on Jackson?

K: I think so. I had Brademas and Sarbanes in this morning. They and Greece didn't contradict me. I said if you want to produce in Turkey what Jackson did in the Soviet Union, we'll have a public brawl.

H: Have they lost their belligerency?

K: They have to do something.

H: I'll see you tonight.

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SD237

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TELECON
Robert Anderson/Secretary Kissinger
January 15, 1975
2:10

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Did you have a chance to put out this story about the Rockefeller house?

A: Marvin Kalb called me and I gave it to him. I gave it to the AP. I had no briefing today because of the State of the Union. The press office has the guidance. Did you know that Governor Rockefeller denied it last night.

K: Yes, but I still think that we should say something.

A: With the sarcasm and facetiousness, I agree. I did that with Marvin and he just laughed. He didn't even know about the story. I told him about it. He said it was absolutely crazy. I repeated the substance of what you gave me and I left the thought with him, but he didn't take it seriously.

K: You ~~xxxxxx~~ might get it into your briefing tomorrow.

A: Ok.

END

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SD227

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sonnenfeldt
The Secretary
January 15, 1975
3:10 p.m.

K: I am seeing Dobrynin tonight and I just wondered whether you could give me a check list because he is going back to Russin on Sunday.

S: Are you going to give him a piece on the use of force business.

K: Yes but redo that ~~xxxx~~ a little bit. Say we have nothing to add to the President's statement. A hypothetical situation dealing with a hypothetical case.

S: O.K. I just stopped Casy from issuing a statement that the Bank would...

K: That is right. Draft a directive to all of the Departments and agencies of what they may or may not say.

S: I told Casey if their press guy gets a question all he can do is say as far as they are concerned the past arrangements stand and as far as the future stands the law speaks for itself.

K: What was he going to say.

S: About all past commitments will be honored. We have no authority to issue loans. We will issue no new loans.

K: Will you draft that for me?

END

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SD 236

TELECON
Mr. David Binder /The Secretary
January 15, 1975
12:15 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: What has the Danish Ambassador told you now.

B: Your pretty close. A friendly NATO embassy is convinced...

K: That is a contradiction in terms.

B: Is convinced that they think that things are pointing to a reconvening of the Geneva Middle East peace talks.

K: Total, absolute nonsense. It is up to you whom you believe; unless they know something that I don't know, it is inconceivable. I am not being cute with you. We are talking off the record.

B: Yes.

K: I don't mislead you either should something begin in three months. There will be no steps taken as of today. I have never even heard that proposal.

B: Good. I wanted to check this out because it seemed strange to me too.

K: There is no basis.

B: They thought it was a way of getting the PLO presence..

K: I have never heard it.. The PLO problem is not an obstacle.

B: That was it. Thank you. I was sorry to trouble you but I wanted to check it out.

K: I have to tell you -- you have always been extremely fair and decent.

B: Will, I try to be fair.

K: Contineu being decent too.

B: I am working on that. Thank you.

END

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SD232

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RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELCON
TED KOPPEL
Sec Kissinger
January 15, 1975
9:45 a.m.

TK: How are you?

K: O.K. Ted, as someone who has been in your house perhaps I can take some liberty. By what tortured logic can this thing be a setback for me as you seem to have said on television last night? For two years we have warned and fought against it. Everything we predicted has come to pass.

TK: I said you had been predicting this but a setback in relations withthe Soviets.

K: It is a bad setback but it is what we predicted. It doesn't help the people. There are fewer Jews coming out. The Europeans are now going to get the credit and become more independent with the Soviets.

TK: I don't know what you saw are heard.

K: Bob McCloskey said he heard you say"it was a bad setback for Henry Kissinger." It is a bad setback for the US. We have fought against this Goddamn thing. I did not want to turn it into--what I said publicly yesterday was to give Congress a chance for some reasonable dialogue. I did not see any sense in getting into a shouting match with Jackson. But those of you...

TK: In a sense what I said was a bad setback and I was using you and the entire cause of Soviet detente interchangeably. I did make the point and I am sorry Bob did not hear it. I did make the point in half a dozen spots I made yesterday that you had in fact been predicting this for many months that if we put too much pressure publicly on the Soviets on their internal problems it could come unraveled.

K: I was against the exchange of letters. Perhaps it would have worked if everyone had shut-up. Even after Vladivostok it was said that this proves that Kissinger said with respect to immigration what would not work.

TK: Do you think Congress has now learned its lesson?

K: We are not talking for attribution.

TK: No. [redacted] I will not be in today. I am interested in your assessment--if you think it is going to come down to a knockdown-drag-out fight in which you and Congress will be eventually blaming each other in public B6

K: I will use this as a lesson for both sides. We have not put out anything. When people say that the thing failed because of us

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then I have to say something. But we are not going to take the initiative ~~MR~~ with the Congress. We are not going to start casting stones but I think it should be a very sobering lesson. You know as well as I do that even though the Soviets say detente will continue and even though they intend to have it continue in any crisis we have now lost the leverage.

TK: Do you have any particular areas for example the Middle East, Viet-Nam where they will try adventurism?

K: Not yet but there are two problems. Will they try adventurism, I think not. Can they be dragged by events into a 5% sharper line on every issue, I think, yes. Accumulative effect of this will be very bad. How will it effect the economic relationship?

TK: I heard on the radio this morning some US companies say to the best of its knowledge its trade relations remains unimpaired.

K: There is one aspect where communism has been proved forever wrong namely that businessmen understand their own interests. Most are screaming idiots. How will they know if relations are impaired. This is just the beginning.

TK: True.

K: What has been lost is not what has been achieved, but it is the future -- expansion that would have been possible. And the leverage has been lost.

TK: What do you think -- was the $300 million the straw that broke the camel's back.

K: Off the record -- what broke the camel's back was they were -- what broke it was the Jackson announcement at the White House which we did not quite understand he was doing. The claims that were made afterwards that the Soviets were pushovers if you were only tough enough and above all the Ex-Im restrictions.

TK: In the final analysis the $300 million

K: Plus the claims

TK: What if it had been for a larger amount?

K: If it had been no amount there were two chances out of three they would have swallowed their pride. Two aspects on the restrictions -- they were the only country singled out for a ceiling and second, that the ceiling was rediculous.

TK: Your basic action now is to do nothing now but to sit back and wait.

K: Thre is nothing we can do. I don't think it a good idea now to go to Congress and say how about a billion and go back to the Soviets and say will you take a billion;that teaches them to kick us in the teeth.

TK: If you don't go back and too much time elapses you are coming up on the Brezhnev visit and it might be difficult for him to come.

K: We will have to see what happens now.

TK: I wish you good luck.

K: Thank you. [redacted] B6

END

SD247

*

TELCON
January 16, 1975
KISSINGER/ ENDERS

RELEASED IN FULL

7:49 p.m.

E: It's about the $25 billion facility. Simon and Bennett made a half-hearted effort and then sort of blew it in the end. The Dutch were the only ones to insist on formulation which I think was on the question of two years. It could have been finessed but it was earlier introduced by Simon himself and hence his half-hearted attempt to change it -- half-hearted, embarrassed, and not successful so the only thing we have now --

K: He doesn't have presidential approval and therefore no authority.

E: The only other thing is, of course, we can get instructions to them that the dam thing can't be issued - it has to be held up another day.

K: What is 12 1/2 billion going to do -- half - 7 billion -- who will that impress?

E: Nobody

K: What can I do now?

E: I don't think anything. We are going to get a statement that it is 25 billion dollars initially and have two years -- and open the question of larger sums later

K: I don't accept that -- Why did he do it? We had all the cards.

E: He could have finessed the whole issue. I don't know why. He thought we were asking too much from Congress

K: But why not check with us?

E: He didn't check with his own people.

K: Well, what can we do now?

E: I don't think anything. It's blown.

K: That is our major program

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E: I think what we can do is to make sure that at ever possible occassion we emphasize it really is $25 billion and we will get more each year --

K: That is what we did to Healey -- You know that won't work.

E: I know. I don't know what the answer is now.

K: OK. Thank you.

SD244

*

TELCON
Senator Javitz/HAK
2:45 p.m. - 1/16/75

RELEASED IN PART
B6

J: Henry. You've seen the statements that Jackson, Ribicoff and I made.

K: Yes. I thought it was a very moderate statement.

J: And the line being pursued will continue because I think he's now been persuaded that it's against his interest to run the risk which he'd run if he -- you know, made some XXXXXXX declamation about this matter. So I think the ball's back in your court and the face that I think we would like to put on it is that if there is a proposition that involved more money maybe we didn't want to unlock the Treasury gates but we're certainly willing to listen to a proposition and see what the money is for and it doesn't have to be confined to 7 smillion.

K: Right.

J: I think that as far as we could -- listen this is a disaster but as far as we could the situation is not being further compromised

K: Right and I've tried to be restrained.

J: Oh, you were great. You were very restrained and I thought that -- because the press is climbing all over me and Jackson and everybody else to see if they can find out if there is going to be a fight or we're going to denounce this or that or the other thing. The other thing that I wanted to tell you is this. I think the sentiment is consolidating up here to have a select committee to look into this situation of the intelligence rather than the Armed Services Committee.

K: I think he'd welcome that.

J: And I think that the important thing will then be to have some influence to who goes on that select committee. And I've just been reappointed the Chairman of the Committee on committees so I may be able to have some effect.

K: Oh good.

J: I hope you will also take the necessary whatever time it takes to brief these so called Jewish leaders as to you know what has happened and our commit---

K: You think I should do that next week?

J: I think you should. I think it would be desirable. Only from the point of view kind of a stop/loss operation not to have somebody go off on his own.

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K: I agree. I'll do it.

J: Which I think could be desirable. And then as to Israel, the Israelis situation. That you know is tougher and tougher all the time and that's where I think that by having a talk between you and Macs and myself would be useful. I'll be out two or three days next week. I have to go into the hospital for a little operation.

K: B6

J:

K:

J:

K: Where are you going to be?

J: I'll be at Harkmisnow(totally phonetic)

K: In New York.

J: Presbyterian. And Henry I've heard nothing -- and call me -- you were absolutely great. I'm deeply greatly to you. Everybody who attended and I had ten calls has just been absolutely thrilled.

K: Well, you've been a great friend and it was a privilege to do it.

J: It was great. They loved it. Come back to me whatever I can do.

K: Thank you. Bye.

SD246

*

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Tom Enders
1-16-75; 4:25 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Tom.

E: Yes, sir.

K: Have you proceeded as I told you?

E: Yes.

K: And is it in the process of getting cleaned up?

E: Well, we are trying too. And they got all the Ministers in the room there and it is going to tear them all upside down. I think there will be a big fight.

K: I have one of them here.

E: I talked with him at lunch and I don't think he has any problem with it.

K: Yeah. He says he has got a modification which clears it up. At any rate, this is our position.

E: It doesn't really because that modification says the thing is established for two years but the total quota is at $25 billion so that it doesn't quite put a fine point on it. But the effect is the same.

K: Well, you know our position and it has got to be.

E: Yep.

K: Okay.

E: Thank you.

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SD243

RELEASED IN PART
B6

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Bob McCloskey
1-16-75; 2:40 p.m.

K: Hello.

M: Hi. Mr. Secretary, I have been up and down the line on this interview matter and I regret to say it won't be physically possible to have even one of the cuts re- inserted. So what I am going to do -- I am making a protest to Hartford Gunn, the President of the Organization, and his lawyers somewhere between London and Bonn or Paris and Bonn and when I get him, do the same thing. The physical situation is that it has been fed out through this video-tape process already so it is in New York and overseas. So what I am going to do is release the entire transcript and call attention to what has been edited for the broadcast and call the press here and tell them that we were not consulted on the changes.

K: Can you make sure this gets in to -- at least to the press.

M: Yes. That is what I am going to tell the press. And I will give the press the full transcript with everything in it.

K: And say that the network, without our authority, ~~XXXX~~ deleted certain parts.

M: Yeah.

K: Well, in the future, though, we better make sure that we control both their press coverage . . .

M: That, I just think is unconscionable. This is why I have a long history distrust of [redacted] I know that I abdicated you during the program B6
and I still would have done that.

K: No, no. I haven't read the transcript -- is it a good program?

M: It is. I think you will be perfectly satisfied with it. The points that you liked and that I liked have been edited by the ~~XXXX~~ broadcast are going to be on the public record in any case.

K: Okay, well then get what's his name -- Rogers -- to distribute them to the Latin Americans.

M: Okay.

K: And say I said this in the broadcast.

M: Yes. All right.

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K: They won't listen whether it is actually being said or not.

M: No. I don't know how much _____ the broadcast will have, although I hope it's wide because it is a good program. But, the Embassies will process from the transcript -- the full transcript.

K: Yeah. Make sure we distribute it to the Embassies.

M: Yes.

K: All right. That's the best thing we can do. I think in the future, though, we better lay down very strict ground rules.

M: The only reason . . .

K: I thought he was doing it according to time.

M: He was -- when they put the 30 seconds thing up in front of him you, of course, couldn't have seen that and then he said he wanted to ask another question. Now, PBS, unlike CBS is not all the tightly bound by commercials and ~~XXX~~ so on and I just thought they were going to use it all. We never talked about it. He never said he was going to edit anything.

K: Before that I asked him whether he was doing it to time and he said yes.

M: This is just -- you know -- [redacted] is not the kind that can be trusted. B6
And then going off and briefing the press on an embargo basis I think is just kinda uncomfortable without telling us.

K: That's another thing that hadn't occurred to me he would do.

M: I am going to protest that to Hartford Gunn.

K: And will you also make clear to the press that we don't stand behind anything that [redacted] may have said in his press coverage because I don't B6
want to start a brawl with Jackson and Javits.

M: Okay.

K: Okay.

SD-257

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TELCON
Sen. Kennedy
Sec. Kissinger
Jan. 17, 1975
3:20 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

TK: Henry, How are you.

K: I am going to issue a statement supporting your statement.

TK: That's nice. That would be helpful.

K: Do you want me to?

TK: It would be helpful.. I understand that they did not get to it this morning. It would be useful. Generally it has been on all the wires and it would bring some attention to it.

K: Have you a good press guy you can lend me. All the press things I want put out they will not put out.

TK: Do you want me to send it down.

K: What we should say?

TK: Yes.

K: No. If you want to I will say that I consider your statement extremely constructive and that we thought your resolution would help achieve the purpose and take us beyond into an era of negotiation.that would be helpful

TK: That would be helpful.

K: We will put it out this afternoon.

TK: That was nice last evening. I enjoyed it.

K: I wanted to call you to thank you for your statement. We will put our outtthis afternoon.

END.

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SD249

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TELCON
Mr. Rogers
Sec. Kissinger
January 17, 1975
12:12

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Should we send at least to Venezuela and Ecquador the comments I made on TV about the trade bill restrictions.

R: Yes. We should. I will get them out right away.

K: In the interview.

R: With Bill Moyers.

K: Would you get the transcript. Should we send it to all of them.

R: I think we should. Hell is breaking out all over the place.

END

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SD248

TELECON
Jerome Weisner/Secretary Kissinger
January 17, 1975
6:15 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

W: Hi.

K: Hello. Jerry?

W: Yes.

K: How are you?

W: I am ok. And you?

K: Ok.

W: Are you aware of this-in any conscious way-of this Kendall Committee?

K: On Soviets...?

W: Yes. We have been wrestling with a statement on detente which was worked out before these most recent events. We are kind of soul searching about whether it makes sense to say something now or sit tight.

K: I would favor saying something.

W: You think it would be useful?

K: Yes.

W: I suspect then one has to take a position saying that what was done to handicap the agreements was wrong. So I suppose we need in a sense to chastize Mr. Jackson.

K: That's up to you.

W: That's all one can say if you say something publicly.

K: You can say you shouldn't put these conditions on a country.

W: It is my own opinion he didn't care...it was a game...he was playing.

K: Exactly.

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W: That was really my question.

K: Do you come to Washington?

W: From time to time.

K: Will you let me know?

W: Yes.

K: I would like to know. I might not be able to make it but I would like to have a chance.

W: I will tell Fred Neal, who is drafting this, to have another crack at it. It was for detente and trade but made no mention of this.

K: No, I think you will have to say something.

W: Right.

K: Thank you Jerry. See you soon.

W: Right. Goodbye.

END.

*

SD250

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec. Kissinger
Roy Atherton
January 17 [illegible]
2:50 p.m.

K: Do you think we should send my amplification of my remarks to at least a few of the key posts.

A: I have already asked someone to do that. I think they will be getting the text. I have told them they should draw on it.

K: They should not make a specifical call on people.

A: No, but to use it as the subject comes up. In the normal course of things they will get the text of the interview just through normal channels.

K: To the Saudis and Sadat they could call special attention.

A: I think re the Saudis we should tell Jim to take a little credit...

K: Not that Jim should take credit but I did it at the Saudis request.

A: Right.

K: Good.

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SD252

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec. Kissinger
Lowenstein
January 17, 1975

12:10 p.m.

K: I saw that a memo of Hartman's about the Security Conference of what we should do to push it to a conclusion in Geneva by June.

L: Yes.

K: I don't see why we have to push it to conclusion by June. I see no overwhelming American interest in that.

L: All right.

K: I don't want us to hold it back but as far as I am concerned I think September would be slightly preferable for the conference. It would assure better Soviet behavior at the summit. I would not pay a price for it but if it could be conveniently done and as I see the schedule shaping up it looks feasible.

L: I think also it would be ...

K: Don't send out a dispatch to that fact but basically that is my view.

L: We will communicate that to Amb, Sherer and be guided accordingly.

K: Good. But for his guidance.

L: All right, Sir.

END

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SD259

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Bernie Gwertzman/Secretary Kissinger
January 17, 1975
4:40 p.m.

G: Mr. Secretary, hi.

K: How are you?

G: I know you are very busy. I want to talk about the results ... which is very upbeat that you would agreed in principal to commit a __ax.

K: As well as I can I do not know what that means.

G: Last time you said you would not want to meet out there until you narrowed the gap. Did this happen this week?

G: I can really do that. We have had extensive talks and I hope they will lead somewhere. I do not make any predictions at this point.

G: He left the impression, with how many of my colleagues I do not know, he had not really substantively changed the Israeli position but I had notes the Egyptians were ready to____. I asked him what his position was based on. He said he thought the Egyptians might be more amenable. Which to me looked like putting the best face on a situtation he could not control.

K: It is probably somewhere between what you said and he said.

G: What do you do now? You send Eilts back. Is the ball in Sadat/s court?

K: I do not like let it develop that way. There is nothing he can accept or reject.

G: All the Israelis are saying is lets start talks without any preconditions. Is that a fair estimate, that they don't really want to talk or give away their position yet?

K: They had many reasons, part of which is public opinion.

G: He said they would not give up any strategic positions. He avoided timing, he avoided maps with you just to give the impression he was very forthcoming and if the Egyptians were forthcoming, the talks would have their own momentum. He said you did not set a time.

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K: That isn't so bad because then when I come the public demonstrating against me cannot say I come out to do pressure.

G: In your own mind you have decided when to go?

K: Right. It will not be within the next week or ten days.

G: Your calendar has you in Latin America then you have Bhutto... If you would go it would be middle or end of February and that would be a very full month.

K: Let's worry about it...trips can be shifted.

G: It is wrong to get too upbeat?

K: That's right. But there has been some conceptual progress. It is also wrong to be pessimistic.

G: Some progress but not enough to meet you on the plane next week?

K: You have to keep in mind also, Bernie, going out there now has to be well done because if this thing blows up while I am out there it will be bad. If it blows up at all, it will be bad. I have to run.

G: Ok.

END.

SD257 *

R
12-18-01
P/H

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Cong. Rhodes
Sec. Kissinger
January 17, 1975
4:25 p.m.

R: The National Cotton Council has been in touch with me several weeks now concerning a situation developing with regard to future contracts with the sale of cotton in the Far East, particularly Taiwan and Korea. ~~XMXX~~ This is the normal way of selling cotton. They sell it for delivery some months ahead and then at the time delivery is about to be expected, a letter of credit is issued and delivery is made. Last year everyone was eager to do it because they are able to buy the cotton at a price and then the price went way up. This year quite the opposite happened. It was bought at a price and then the price went down. This year they are not issuing letters of credit and are not taking delivery. The American cotton merchants are really holding the bag. The implications for the future are very bad. It is like breaking a contract because you upset the hold pattern of trade.

K: If this is not fully in my shop enough of it is that I can get the right people working on it.

R: Habib knows about it.

K: Could you write me a letter so I will have a peace of paper to take action on. Otherwise I will be doing it in a vacuum.

R: I will do it and you should have it by Monday or Tuesday.

K: Send it to my office and I will be sure it is handled.

R: We believe that the governments there are tacitly aproving of the businessmen renegging.

K: I cannot tell about Taiwan but I would not doubt it about Korea.

R: Thanks alot.

K: O.K., John. Nice talking to you.

END

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SD253

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELECON
Mr. Califano/Secretary Kissinger
January 17, 1975
12:30

C: How are you?

K: You wanted to offer me a House Chairmanship?

[redacted] B6

K: Maybe nothing can hurt the Democrats, but it will lead to chaos in the House.

C: The House will be a disaster this year.

K: All these chairman will be scared to death and any semblance of leadership will be lost.

C: THey have to run for election in the House as well as at home. We had a system for elections, I wrote a book on it -- It doens't make any difference in quality.

K: It makes them more insecure and doesn't get you better people.

C: I know. The reason I called -- [redacted] called me yesterday. B6

K: I like him very much.

C: Yes. He is a good man.

K: YOu brought him to my office.

C: No, no. You went off somewhere.

K: No, he came to the White House.

C: That's right. You have a damned good memory. He has been trying to do something with the Egyptians. Coke has a lot of desalting stuff and an excellent farming process they have worked out with the University of Arizona. And he is doing a program with them that he has worked out. The American Ambassador is back in the US and is familiar with it.

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K: An excellent man. Is that the one in the _____ zone of Egypt.

C: I don't know. [redacted] called me yesterday and said he realized how busy you are but if he could get ten mintues of your time and he would like to tell you about it. B6

K: I want to talke to him and I want to get to know him because he ought to be in Washington.

C: He should be. If Johnson had been reelected he would be.

K: Let's say 4:30

C: On the 21st.

K: Yes.

C: Oh, good.

K: And you'll come with him?

C: If you don't mind.

K: I would like it.

END

SD255

*

TELECON
Robert Anderson/Secretary Kissinger
January 17 1975
3:20

RELEASED IN FULL

K: DId you say something about the Enders thing?

A: We ~~made~~ made an announcement. Paul Hare did the briefing and he said something.

K: But ~~he~~ now Ted Kennedy says we said nothing about his resolution.

A: There was a question asked after the briefing and it is in the record. There was no question asked during the briefing.

K: Could we make a statement that we welcome the statement of Senator Kennedy and the resolution of Senator Kennedy and we believe the resolution that was issued by Senators Kennedy, Monday and Mathias will help achieve the purposes of the Vladivostok Agreement and upon completion of these agreements can serve as guidelines for further negotiations on arms control.

A: Will do, sir.

END

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SD256 *

TELCON
David Binder
Sec. Kissinger
January 17, 1975
4:15 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: .... I won't call you decent again.

B: Not with two calls in one week. I understand that things are looking up on CSCE to the point that one might consider that it is possible or probable that a summit might be in Helsinki in July. Could we say something useful about this.

K: Don't tie yourself down to a date. You know it is not impossible. June and July -- we are talking on background--

B: Yes.

K: -- The way things are going I would not be amazed if ~~xhexe~~ slipped to early September but that does not affect your conclusions in anyway.

B: It could very well be a summit.

K: It could.

B: I am told this immigration thing has been settled to the point of being -- I think the language it registered in the formulation in the Basket III would seem to take some of the sting out of the abrogation of the trade agreement.

K: Not really. Those are two separate problems.

B: But the formulation as I understand it...

K: In the CSCE there is a specific provision none of this can contravene domestic laws, etc.

B: In other words you don't think the Russians can say we are going to do it in this way so we don't have to do it ~~x~~the other way.

K: I would be amazed.

B: Anyway the people I talked to today really just in passing, I was not searching this out, seem to be quite optimistic about having resolved 7 of the 10 principles in the first Basket then having registered quite a lot of language in the third basket and felt that we are going to have a hell of a lot of negotiating between now and March and in another session later in the spring. It seemed if there was enough intent at the highest level they could come to a summit in June or July.

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K: Well at any rate within the first 8 or 9 months of this year.

B: I wanted to go bsck to my first question or suggestion. Since the American people and I presume the Congress have probably forgotten about all of this with other issues coming up , do you think it would be useful to say something about this prospect.

K: I think it would be useful to sum up where it goes when things are moving along.

B: The prospect of 35 heads of State getting together...

K: Is absolutely mind boggling. They did not get to these position for having low egos.

B: Yes. It ~~xxxxxx~~ would be a kind of landmark for detent wouldn't it.

K: Yes.

B: I will see what I can do with it. I am not trying to go all that hard on something not that hard yet.

K: I think it a thoughtful article for a Sunday paper or whatever. A thoughtful article indicating that in other areas detente would be quite useful.

END

SD254

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TELECON
Mr. Rogers/Secretary Kissinger
January 17, 1975
12:00

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Did we ever respond to the Argentines on their idea to the meeting?

R: No.

K: We promised them an answer ten days ago.

R: I had a memo on your desk with four options.

K: You may have had it on my desk, but I never saw it.

R: Anyway, I think that probably has been overtaken by events. Based on a conversation I had with Orfila.

K: I think it is a basic principle that we cannot look like Latin Americans. When we say we will have an answer on Thursday, we do it.

R: I agree.

K: Can we get an answer today?

R: Yes, through Orfila. I will tell him that since we agree with Venezuela,'s proposal that there would be an announcement in Buenos Aires.

K: An announcement of what in Buenos Aires.

R: That the countries in Buenos Aires agreed that the Rio Treaty should be amended to permit sanctions to be lifted by a majority.

K: Why don't we do that.

R: Ok. I'll tell him.

K: And no participation by Cuba.

R: No.

K: Ok.

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R: There is one other point. Orfila is pessimistic about the meeting. They are encouraging that if one or two countries do not come, then in that case, they want to postpone it.

K: Fine with me. Will they come?

R: I think it is 50-50. I think it will be very hard for Ecuador to back out now.

K: Ok.

END

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SD261

TELECON
Mr. Enders/The Secretary
January 18, 1975
4:20 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: The section you are working on on food and energy has a theme which ought to be the reality of interdependence. What has been done and what we are trying to do. We are trying to have the *industrialized nations, Western Europe and Japan, have a ___ they* can master their destiny in this crisis. Then something about the consumer and producer. Where we are going. Preparatory meetings. We can do a very positive thing.

E: Ok. I think we are getting out from under this. Can I include a third item on managing the overall economy.

K: Well, you will have to do another paragraph. On a global basis?

E: Yes.

K: Yes. But in the context of the interdependence.

E: Ok. I'll try it.

K: Ok. Good.

END.

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SD263

TELECON
Mr. Edders/Secretary Kissinger
January 18, 1975
12:28 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: In drafting these sections make sure you don't make them into technical sections. What we are trying to do in energy in a few paragraphs xxxxyou can draw on the Business Week thing. What we are trying to put together. The financial solidarity and then say where we are going next. There you cannot give a proposal but describe the problem. We will have a proposal in a few months.

E: Good. I think it has to be very broad.

K: It has to be broad and specific.

E: I think I know what you want.

K: It has to be specific. I am not sure that they teach you that at Yale.

E: They probably do, but I do not think I took the course.

K: You weren't planning to do anything else this weekend, were you?

E: I was going to work on a draft on fertilizer(?).

END.

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SD262 *

TELECON
Wells Stabler/Secretary Kissinger
January 18, 1975
8:05 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: You better tell the Cyprus Ambassador that if any Americans get hurt we will pull our Embassy out.

S: Ok.

K: We will pull our Embassy out and withdraw from all negotiations. Don't you think?

S: Yes I do. They said that they would do everything they could. But according to Brown they are not. I was quite sharp with the Ambassador this morning.

K: You tell them if any Americans are hurt we will close our Embassy and we will withdraw from the negotiations. Should we tell anything to the Greeks?

S: I do not think so. This is a Cypriot responsibility. I do think we should do as soon as I have done this, we should put it on the wire and have Kubisch tell Vitzios what we told them. You have the report from A_____ which was negative.

K: Was that in response to what we did last night?

S: Macomber felt there was no use going in and losing capital on what he thought was a lost cause. He concluded that no purpose would be served by flogging a dead horse so he did not do so.

K: Yes.

S: Besides letting Kubisch know what we said to the Cypriots, I do not think we ought to pin the Greeks with this at the moment.

K: Will you call the Cypriots?

S: I will do it right away.

END.

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SD264

TELECON
Win Lord/Secretary Kissinger
January 18, 1975
1:09 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: ....the traditional foreign policy things. I would not make them sound all that traditional. I would say progress has been made. There is the third ~~rejection~~ objective of preserving the moral and political health of the Western World and Japan.

L: Where would you put that?

K: I would say in the independent world we always give special attention to saying we do the ____.

L: But we ... I am going to put on the first part of the speech Charlie Hill.

K: I do not care.

L: I think it will work better. I will go over it personally tomorrow. We really don't have more than four or five pages to talk about Congress without getting into trouble.

K: That's right.

L: We need an upbeat note.

K: It isn't an upbeat note, it is a confident note. I am saying we have a challenge and we have to meet it.

END.

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SD/172 *

TELECON
Joseph Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
January 9, 1975
12:18 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Eilts sent in a cable asking whether he should tell the Shah he's coming back. I think he should. He might also straighten out the Shah that the Egyptians are playing theSoviets against the U.S. He denied it. I sent the Shah a letter saying it's beyond reality.

S: He took an opposite view to the letter you sent. You remember he came in with a telegram saying that he doesn't agree with our assessment.

K: Joe, I don't agree with my assessment on that either. I want the Shah to warn Sadat against temptation in what has already happened. For you seen the cable this morning where Eilts told the Shah his assessment is not the same as mine?

S: Which he should not have done. Whatever Herman thinks is his business.

K: What I tell the Shah and what he thinks are two different things. I want the Shah to warn Sadat against the ___.

S: We'll get you a cable in the next few minutes.

K: Have you slapped Herman down?

S: Roy said he sent something this morning. I haven't seen it.

K: Roy is such a fierce person. I'd like to know how he slapped him down.

S: OK. I'll get it up to you.

END

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SD-365

TELECON
Mr. Stabler/Secretary Kissinger
January 20, 1975
3:30 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

S: Reuters has put out a story from Nicosia. It has been releasted by the _____ and says that US Secretary of State has threatened to withdraw his (Stabler reads ticker) and the Embassy of Nicosia does say the Cyprus Public Information Officer has released to the local press the substance of all your instructions.

K: It was not violence to American property.

S: No. It was if anybody was injured. Anderson is getting a lot of calls from the press on this. My suggestion is that you say if any Americans were injured we would withdraw our personnel from Cyprus-- and that if we had no one in Nicosia -- and the negotiations were taking place between Clerides and Denktash, it would be difficult, therefore, to have a useful role. Rather than suggest...it isn't what was said.

K: Why do you think they did it?

S: Well, it goes on to say that Christoffedes' response was that the government of Cyprus was doing everything possible to protect American personnel and property. I think it may be useful for them to do this. It puts them back on the side of the angels.

K: Ok. Why don't you go ahead.

S: Thank you very much.

END

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SD266

TELCON
January 20, 1975, 6:30 p.m.
KISSINGER/STABLER

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Will you get Stoessel to give an apology to Gromyko for the Ukrainian shooting?

S: Yes -- the Ukrainians --

K: The Ukrainians - or whoever did the shooting

S: The shooting at the Ukrainian mission -

K: Yes

S: All right

K: When are you going to tell me what happened in Nicosia?

S: In a -- I met this morning

K: I mean on the Turks

S: On that we do have a message and it was 100% unsatisfactory -- even on the airport thing

K: You better draft what I told you -

S: The Turks rejected -- came up with a 15-point proposal, most all of it unsatisfactory and we are back to zero.

K: Will you draft --

S: Good, I'll have some thing for you first thing tomorrow.

K: How about last thing tonight?

S: You want it tonight? All right.

K: Yes. Thank you.

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SD269

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
January 20, 1975
5:10 p.m.

Regarding Dinitz meeting with Dobrynin.

RELEASED IN FULL

D: ...you want me to call you later?

K: Just give me the essence.

D: The essence was he was very anxious to get it incorporated into the diplomatic process. He said, why are you excluding us? If you go in the system of step by step diplomacy you are eventually going to run into trouble. You will be back in '67 without peace.

K: With ____ of '67.

D: He said will pull us back to '67. When I told him why we would not accept it, he said it is all right if the Arabs agree. We are open - minded on this. If you and the Arabs agree on the changes, it would be all right with us. We are not legalistic. We will offer a joint guarantee of your borders. I am not working against Henry. I am working with Henry. I know you do not like Geneva. Because we can influence some Arabs to have more modern position. He told them before take out ____. I would like to know how they are different from the Arabs. You are also receiving Arafat. We tel l him we do not accept any solution that does not include ____. You are not even having diplomatic relations with us. I do not want to go into all the details. He said he speaks personally. He said in three or four months maybe we would have diplomatic relations.

K: Yes, but all together it is rather encouraging.

D: It was very mild. It was aimed at undermining your step-by-step diplomacy. All very cleverly done. All coated with sugar. It was very mild and very conciliatory. They are offended more because of the credits than because of the ____. They will keep relations with the U.S. He said it would not affect emigration. Maybe there could be a direct flight once a month. That we should continue our meetings.

K: I would like to see you this week. Thank you Simcha.

D: One more thing. You are going to see Schlesinger for breakfast on Wednesday morning.

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K: I have to change it to Thursday.

D: Why? I want that everything should be communicated to the President. That said now the State Department will not allow our technical commission to come. Please, Mr. Secretary, I had a long talk now with Rabin. Simon is sitting on his ass back there saying we are trying to pressure us.

K: Look, so far we have kept every promise we made to you.

D: The Pentagon is giving us a hard time. If they aregoing to play politics with the F-15....

K: I do not believe any request for F-15s have come over here. Look, it is every week there is some other ~~problem~~ insanity.

D: What can I do?

K: If I wanted to bring pressure on you, it wouldn't be done. I cannot go through this chicken shit every three days.

D: I agree with you. I want to tell you about my conversation with Tip O'Neil today.

K: What did he say?

D: He was in Boston and had a meeting with some professors who are very critical of you.

K: They are out of their minds.

D: One was Morganthau, one was from Fletcher. So I gave him a lecture...

K: With great joy. If the Russians will help us get improved frontiers with the ~~Russians~~ Syrian's, they will help them incorporate tomorrow. It is inconceivable the Russians will do it.

D: Of course they will not do it. They are trying to get in the back door after you threw them out the front door.

K: But the stupidity of these liberal professors. Where are the people who say great.

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D: Tip O'neil things very highly of you. I told him what the dangers are.

K: I recognize the dangers.

D: He is going to Israel and Egypt with a big delegation by the way. I think it is important he follow a reasonable line. I believe in your system.

K: Simcha, the worst that can happen in my approach is what is certain to happen in the other approach. If the Soviets are brought to improving their terms, it will be because they are afraid they will be excluded forever.

D: I agree with you 100 percent. I do not want the Soviets in on a process we will be disrobed of our positions.

K: I will see you in a few days.

D: Whenever you have time, I am at your service, Mr. Secretary.

K: Good. Goodbye.

END.

SD270

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RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin
Sec. Kissinger
January 21, 1975
3:40 p.m.

D: What can you tell me on what we discussed yesterday?

K: We would like to increase the SALT levels to 2600.

D: 2600.

K: Yes, so Jackson can build 200 tridents.

D: I think that is a good idea then he will get 400 as a premium. Not a bad idea.

K: On what we discussed yesterday, I have had some -- the President thinks we should not do it immediately.

D: I am not speaking of immediately.

K: But we should begin some consultations with the Congress which I have already started. What we think should be done is that both the EX-IM and the Trade Act should be done simultaneously.

D: I think so.

K: That is what we are doing.

D: I think it a good idea. But I have this in mind -- not do it at the end of the year.

K: It almost certainly will be done in the first half of the year

D: That is the point.

K: You can count on it. I have had extensive discussions already with them today.

D: This is the only point. When we were with Rockefeller...

K: I changed my mind on that. Instead of the end of the year, we will do it in the first half.

D: I think it would be easier to really.

K: We will do it in the first half. You can definitely tell this to your leaders.

D: I will.

K: We have sent over the letters.

D: You will send it now.

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K: It should already be on the way over. I want to raise one thing with you.

D: One thing.

K: There is a professor [redacted] B6

D: A difficult case.

K: It is. Can you tell me personally what the problem is. He is married to a Russian...

D: Yes. This is the problem. Only yesterday I received some information on this and it is a difficult case. The girst is involved in a certain kind of thing dealing with our security. Don't mention this, please.

K: No, but it will affect my action on this. He has been decent in the manner in which he is pushing it.

D: I know. There was some White House-State Department influence.

K: I have stayed out of it up to now.

D: One of your assistants mentioned it to me and I checked it with Moscow two weeks ago. Just yesterday I received a telegram.

K: I don't know the women at all.

D: It is nothing for herself as such but she was involved in -- nothing specifically about her and I know nothing really. But this is why I am prepared to give you an immediate answer. Only yesterday I received intormation telling me it is a difficult case. The did note your views -- in any case they know about the State Department views. I am being honest with you by telling you I received this information just yesterday.

K: You know the problems on humanity grounds. It is a deserving case. I don't know the security situation.

D: It is in Moscow. She worked with some of our agenst -- I shouId not say this.

K: I understand.

D: That is why they don't want to let her go. This is very personal information I am giving to you. She is not a professor really and she is not a brilliant girl at all but she knows something because of the character of her xxxxx record. While

in Moscow I will mention it one again to Gromyko. I hate to say no, because I have a personal question to ask you, Henry, on behalf of my government. You plan to go to Chile we have heard.

K: It is tentative.

D: It is a possibility.

K: Yes.

D: The question is, can your good office say that we are prepared to give them asylum in my country if you will do it, as was given to others in Romania--amnesty for five or six people there. If you could give any of your good influence If you go to the Chilean authorities. You are not under any obligation.

K: O.K.

D: If you could do it.

K: You can count on it. If I don't go, I will make a personal internvation.

D: If it is possible I am sure it will be appreciated.

K: You can tell Gromyko it will definitely be done in three weeks.

D: It is important and it will be appreciated. They are not all in our party and specifically not in our foreign policy.

K: You can count on it.

D: Good.

K: O.K. Have a good trip. See you in March.

D: My very best to you. Thank you for everything, Henry.

K: Same to you and I look forward to working with you.

END

SD-272

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TELECON
Mr. Stabler/Secretary Kissinger
January 21, 1975
9:00

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: I saw in the report of Holton's that he is negotiating with Brademas. I don't know where your guys got the idea of a 20,000 withdrawal.

S: I have never mentioned that.

K: I know that [redacted] Brown ~~xxxxx~~ mentioned it in Cyprus and now Holton is mentioning it and Brademas has already rejected it. B6

S: Oh good God.

K: And there isn't a snowball's chance in hell of our getting the 20,000.

S: Of course not and of course ~~XXXXXXXX~~ Brown, when he said that, he was talking in general terms. He was trying to get a feel.

K: Why try to get a feel which is total idiocy. If he had said 2,000 and worked it up, there would have been a chance.

S: I don't know. I did not realize that Holton was doing this. I have been in touch with McCloskey about my contacts with Brademas.

K: Will you get him under control?

S: Yes, right away. You have probably seen the Esenbel interview in the Post this morning. It is not helpful at all.

K: I agree.

S: I will tell him to lay off figures completely. I have never mentioned anything to Brademas, I agree with you.

K: 20,000 is so outlandish. Supposing Brademas had said to Brown we will accept it?

S: We would never have been able to deliver it.

K Exactly. I don't know what these guys think they are doing.

S: I don't either. It is so clearly out of the ball park. I have, since the other day, delayed any of these ideas.

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K: Also, in the Times, I saw the leak that we are ready for a Summit in the summer for the CSCE.

S: Good Lord.

K: That follows closely my telling....

S: That was absolutely eyes only.

K: I saw it.

S: I am at a loss as to how that could have gotten out. I know none of my people have told anything. It was limited to three people.

K: It is from David Binder. See that we keep quiet, will you Wells?

S: I will sir.

END

SD273 *

TELCON
Win Lord
Sec. Kissinger
January 21, 1975
2:50 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I am working on this bloody sp-ech. I have your comments on a page by page basis. What is your over-all comment.

L: I think the speech will be fine in the sense that the basic message is one of hope -- that we are beginning to master our problems, for example in the energy crisis. This is important although it is not structured properly at the moment. You have broken the back of an important event. There is a lot of work to be done in terms of ~~xxxxxxxxxxx~~ structure and elegance.

K: Do you really think this?

L: Yes. You are saying we have to rally together. We have done it before and we can do it again. In the example of energy, we have done it and we will do it again. I think this will come across with the congressional thing. I think this is important.

K: On the Congressional thing -- what do you think about putting back some of these things I took out -- that we should not consider foreign aid a favor.

L: I think the congressional thing lacks specifity. I have not gotten into that section in terms of specific changes. In reading it quickly it looks like it loses a little specifity.

K: When are you going to have it done?

L: This is all I have been doing. It takes me a lot of time. I will keep feeding it to you. You are concerned with the first part.

K: Yes. I want to get your over-all assessment to guide me in my editing.

L: I think it isn't the proper wording for the speech but that can come later. It is the psychological shock that you need now.

K: O.K. Thank you.

END

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SD276 *

TELCON
Wm. Rogers (ARA
Sec. Kissinger
January 21, 1975
8:20 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I noticed in that note to Mankiewicz that you went along with that baseball team going to Cuba. I am not going along with that.

R: You don't think that's a good idea.

K: No. And I think a thing like that should have been discussed with me.

R: I gave it to Larry.

K: But apparently Kuhn has not ever had a positive answer. Did you talk to him last week. Did you tell him to go ahead.

R: No. I told him we would get back to him.

K: I am for a baseball team going eventually but why do it now when we have not had a God-damn thing happening. Let them answer. Let something happen. Straighten it out and also do a note to Mankiewicz in which you can say principly we have no objection but we want our relations a little better or you don't have to say anything. Also get to Bowie Kuhn.

R: O.K.

K: What do think about what happened in Venzuela yesterday? Can I have a coherrent paper of what is going on.

R: Yes. We were working on one last night but it was not finished until 8:00.

K: As I understand it Venzuela said yesterday that they would not go to Buenos Aires.

R: No. They said we will look very carefully at it and it will depend on what happens here at the OAS meeting.

K: Perez said something yesterday.

K: That is news to me.

K: I saw a news clip on that.

R: I didn't see anything like that.

K: Perhaps it was a ticker item.

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R: There was a ticker item from Benzeula talking about somethings coming out of there on Sunday.

K: I saw it last night before I left and of course having had it on my desk for 10 seconds it has gone away again -- of course, I might think about it again.

Is it worthwhile for me to try to kill myself to get to Venzuela in February.

R: Not if they are not going to Buenos Aires.

K: All of them?

R: If two or three of them bail out they will postpone it. If that happens you could go in March.

K: Then I don't have to go at all.

R: Before the next meeting of the For. Ministers.

K: I disagree with you. I want to give a speech on Latin America.

R: I think you should.

K: What these hot-shots are saying is not so important. And I would like to do it before the middle of February before there is a chance of going down.

R: I agree you should.

K: I don't have to comment on every statement of Perez'. I could just state what we are trying to do.

R: I think the tone should be difference from what we wrote last week in view of what has happend.

K: I never saw that speech.

R: I know.

K: I don't think we should give a slobbering speech. It should be a strong speech.

R: I think it has to be more moderate in tone.

K: We can say this is what we want to do and point out some of the problems that have risen of which they are partly to blame.

R: As soon as we get a reading on the final results of the OAS meeting.

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3;
Rogers

K: Would you do a memo for me so I will have it by the end of the day and straighten out this Bowie Kuhn thing.

R: O.K.

SD278

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TELECON
Robert Anderson/Secretary Kissinger
January 22, 1975
3:45 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

A: I've told the press office that once it gets on the wires that they are not to report themselves but call me and I will go down and bring the press people in and then go into it.

K: And say Nat Davis is one of our more distinguished foreign service officers. You can tell them, off the record, of his civil rights activities.

A: There was one question this morning when you told me to say Nat Davis volunteered to go to Guatemala. There was one thing that came to my mind, there would be many guys who volunteer to do anything to become an ambassador. Do you want to stick with the word volunteer or say he went there right after the assassination. That was my only question.

K: But the major thing is to say we cannot accept a proposition that a Foreign Service office doing his duty should be penalized for carrying out instructions from Washington. Then you can give them the civil rights activities, off the record as background.

A: OK sir.

END

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SD280

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TELECON
Governor Landon/Secretary Kissinger
January 22, 1975
8:03 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

L: Hi. You are working pretty late.

K: Yes.

L: I just wanted a word personally. I would like you to deliver the Landon [redacted] lecture out here at your convenience.

K: I have not seen the invitation yet Governor. But I can tell you that there are few men whose name I would find more attractive attached to a lecture.

L: I consider it a high compliment because I admire the job you have done so much. I do think it would be very valuable contribution you would have to make that 's why I am taking up your time with this call. To get out here in the Mid-West in the ~~Ag~~ Great Plains area. It brings you in touch with an area. A personal touch. I am sure you would have a crowd of around 15,000. Not only students, but generally from all over. If your schedule permits, I would like to have you come in the night before for just a small dinner here at the house with mainly publishers from all over Kansas. They would have the benefit of...

K: That sounds very attractive.

L: I hope you can find a date to take it.

K: I am sure I will get it in the next day or so.

L: It is nice of you to call me.

K: It is a privilege to talk to you.

L: It would be a great honor for our country for you to spend a brief visit out here.

K: Thank you.

END.

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SD277

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TELECON
Winston Lord/Secretary Kissinger
January 22, 1975
3:29 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

L: I think it's getting better all the time. I think it's a good speech. I think we have tonal problems. I think there's a tendency to get back to the _____. I think we have to make it clear that we have equally important things to do. I think we have to watch that. I think it's feasible.

K: What about the Congressional thing?

L: It needs editing. It's better over all. It's repetitious. The structure is troublesome. I think it's going to be one of your more important speeches. I think if it ends up a little long, you don't have to give it all ~~xxxxxx~~ verbaly.

K: The reason I have to have the _part is the yahoos in Los Angeles. They have to hear something about energy. That isn't (disputable). For the press, if I don't have the 2 central sections.

L: You have to have the central sections.

K: I think in reading it, I'll got very short on the traditional agenda.

L: I don't think you can cut it too short.

K: I think I can cut it down to about 35 pages in reading it -- in writing it, no. In reading I think I can cut that 2 pages for reading, not for distribution. I can cut back a bit on the next section. They are not interested in every nuance.

L: We need at least two more go arounds.

K: We don't have 2 more go arounds.

L: This one and the next one.

K: I can do one more on the plane and that's it. You think it's turning into an important speech.

L: We all get very tense about each paragraph. The important thing is the overall impact.

K: OK. Thank you.

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SD283

TELCON
Scotty Reston/Secy Kissinger
10:25 a.m., January 23, 1975

RELEASED IN PART
B6

R: Good morning, Henry.

K: Scotty, I don't know whether -- how to handle this problem but I really feel that [redacted] is going beyond the bounds of fairness. B6
Every day practically -- in every column -- he has an article, not criticizing my views but criticizing my integrity.

R: Yep.

K: On the basis of totally misleading evidence. After all, I am the person who brought about a doubling of food aid. Now, of course, you can prove that this had profound machiavellian motives but the much more rational explanation is that I believe we have to prove the need for interdependence. I believe that we have to give additional aid to Vietnam, not because I want to prove that I was right all along and love to kill people but because I really believe that to let a government -- country go, on which in reliance on our promises made certain undertakings for peace, would be irresponsible. Now I am not calling him a traitor when he has a different view. I recognize that serious people can have different views and I'm not asking him to moderate his conclusions but I seriously wonder whether it is possible that -- I mean, the figures he has got are partially wrong; his presentation is much more _____ by any account. We have tried to take account of the Congressional prescription. The reason we haven't announced the new level of food yet is because I have people on the Hill now dealing with Humphrey and Hatfield to work out an allocation that Congress goes along with. So we're not doing anything behind anybody's back. Egypt is a most seriously affected country by any definition -- by the UN definition. But I don't want to debate his point because people have differed on that.

R: Well, you can't debate the point with him. This is a little bit like the original problem we had with Bill Fulbright with that analogy. But anyway it's become a personal thing. I was talking to Winston Lord's wife at that little dinner for Allister Duncan (?), and she was trying to make the same point.

K: Is Allister in town?

R: Well, Allister has come over here to the Woodward Wilson School. He's going to do a serious book on American Foreign Policy since . . .

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K: Well, I'm anxious to --

R: I'm sure he'll be after you soon. He has just arrived and he's living in Henry Brandon's old house on Rodman Street.

K: Well, really, I don't ask obviously for your support. It's the constant attacks on the moral standing that I think affect the whole tone of our public discussions.

R: Well, as you know, I don't believe in feuds and I think this has to be talked out between you and [redacted] I really do. It's becoming a source of some gossip within the town of the times -- you know he's shouting and roaring at you every time he sits down at his typewriter. So that the only thing I can well imagine you're saying: Well, the hell with it, why should I talk to him. He's going to cut me up and suggest that I'm not a manner of honor. B6

K: It's not a question -- I don't really think he's doing me a hell of a lot of damage with this sort of thing.

R: Well, he's not doing you any good. I don't know what it is, you know, aside from the normal period of idle sniping that we're going through at the present time. There is some of this stuff in the academic community, as you know.

K: No question.

R: And I think living in Cambridge there all the time that some of your old colleagues sit around, partly out of jealousy and partly out of vanity, thinking how much better ideas they've got.

K: Yeah, but I think it's a separate problem. If they call me an idiot, I won't like it but I can't complain about that. But if they call me a liar, a cheat, and a war monger, I think it contributes to a type of public debate which isn't doing anybody any good.

R: I agree. You want me to try to talk to him about it? Do you want to get together with him?

K: Do you think that makes any sense?

R: Yes, I do.

K: Or is he just going to say that this is a way of trying to co-opt him?

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R: Oh, sure, I'm sure he will. But that doesn't -- You can be big enough to take a risk on that. You've got plenty of capital.

K: Well, if you think --

R: Let me think about it.

K: Think about it. If you would suggest it, I would certainly take it very seriously.

R: Okay.

K: Thank you, Scotty. See you soon.

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SD289

TELECON
Henry Brandon/Secretary Kissinger
January 23, 1975
2:35

RELEASED IN FULL

B: One thing -- is there a chance to get a few minutes with you?

K: I am on the way to Los Angeles.

B: It is on the Wilson visit.

K: Maybe next week. Let's try for next week. Call me Monday.

B: Monday. Do you have a minute.

K: No. I am on the way now.

B: Well, good luck.

END

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SD287

TELECON
Winston Lord/Secretary Kissinger
January 23, 1975
2:25 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: You think I'm being too conciliatory?

L: No, but...

K: Larry thinks I'm being too tough.

L: He must be right. I think it's a matter of 2 or 3 sentences. There's a page that bothers me a little. It's a little defensive, but I think it can be fixed in the last round. I think it's much tighter and the tone is about right.

K: I'll have to see. Thank you. Thank you for your help.

L: Good luck.

END

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TELCON
Tom Enders/Secy Kissinger
10:21 a.m., January 23, 1975

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: Hello, Tom. How is it that these food aid figures constantly leak into the newspapers? [redacted] has an article today which has all the figures in it of all the options. My talking points for Humphrey were in the papers on Wednesday. B6

E: Yes.

K: Well, who in your shop does it? No one else could know it.

E: Well, I'll have to investigate again. I haven't seen the [redacted] article but the ones in December came from OMB and the ones -- B6

K: But we're not talking about December. We're talking about the article in which Humphrey's conversation with me was described based on the talking points you people did for me.

E: Yes. But I did them personally so nobody had them but me and your office. I don't know the answer to that but I'll find out.

K: Let me add, I know you didn't do it so this is not a veiled way of getting at you.

E: No, no, no. Humphrey's people may think that it was done by one of his members of his staff. A member of my staff talked to a member of his yesterday --

K: Yeah, but look at the [redacted] article today. It's an impossible situation. B6

E: Okay.

K: Okay. Thank you.

E: You'll get a report.

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SD-281

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TELCON
Secretary Kissinger/Secretary Butz
9:30 a.m., January 23, 1975

RELEASED IN FULL

B: Henry, I want you to know what we're doing this noon here. I took the initiative in calling a little luncheon session this noon on U.S. participation in stamps regarding the World Food Council coming up after I got a telephone call two days ago from John Hannah, who is going to be serving as the Secretary General -- or whatever you call it -- of this World Food Council, as you know.

K: Yeah.

B: He said he wanted to come down here. He said I've got four or five questions and he ticked off these questions. I said: we don't have the answers to them because we just haven't gotten together here. He said: I would like to talk to you folks in Agriculture and in State and in AID and any place else. So I am having a luncheon this noon over here with Chuck Robinson in and Tom Enders and Roy Maury and I've asked Julius Katz to come but he's sick and Jim Frank is coming and I'm having 3 or 4 of my people in to discuss some of these things. Now I think we need to move ahead, Henry, on three or four things. This committee was set up back here with you as Chairman after the World Food Conference to resolve some of these things and I was Associate Chairman -- or whatever it is, I don't know. I think we need to move ahead here to name the U.S. delegate to the World Food Conference. Now would you like to have Chuck Robinson do that or how do you feel on that?

K: Yeah, that would be good.

B: I said World Food Conference. I mean, the World Food Council.

K: Yeah.

B: Now it's not clear to us yet what kind of delegation the other nations are going to --

K: Now we must have somebody from you too.

B: Well, that's right. And I think we ought to get some reading on whether the membership on this thing will be primarily at the Foreign Office level or at the Agricultural level as far as the major nations are concerned. And I don't know yet. Do you have a reading on that? On the character of the chief delegate from the other major nations.

K: No, I don't have any idea.

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B: Will it be primarily for Ministers of Agriculture or Ministers of Foreign Affairs?

K: I don't know.

B: Well, if the chief delegate were named from State, you would want it to be Chuck Robinson, would you?

K: Yeah.

B: Again, I don't know on this, if the other major nations -- and I'm talking about the European nations, and Canada and Australia, for example -- are sending people primarily from their Ministeries of Agriculture, would that change your attitude any on this?

K: Well, I'm open-minded on this. I would like somebody from State there.

B: Oh, obviously. But I'm talking now about the one we name as the chief delegate.

K: Can we decide it next Monday?

B: We can do that. We'll leave it open here.

K: Right.

B: I'm not going to be in town Monday.

K: Well, I'll be in town all next week.

B: I'll be here the fore part of Monday, I guess. I've got to go some place Monday afternoon. Okay, we'll discuss that some this afternoon and leave it open. In the meantime, maybe we will try and find out what some of these other major nations are doing.

K: Okay.

B: It may give us some guidance.

K: Good.

B: If it's okay with you, Henry, -- I know you're busy as hell here and I'm more heavily involved in this than you are -- I'll pick up the leadership on such things as this and move ahead and keep your people informed. Okay?

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K: You mean on the group?

B: Yeah.

K: Right. I've been waiting on the basic policy decision until you -- until that had been sorted out on the stocks and so forth.

B: Yeah. Well, that's coming up. And I understand we're coming up for this modification of this so-called loose position.

K: Yeah.

B: And my boys tell me that we're about together on this thing, Henry.

K: That's my understanding too.

B: Okay. Then we'll be in touch with you.

K: Good. Thank you.

B: Just wanted you to know what we're doing this noon.

K: Thank you.

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SD284

TELCON
Tom Enders/Secy Kissinger
11:42 a.m., January 23, 1975

RELEASED IN PART
B6

E: The figures that you are supposedly concerned with in the [redacted] article -- the so-called Kissinger Third Option, the second paragraph of that -- are figures from an options paper put forward to OMB by State in early December before the Humphrey amendment was passed. Now they do not correspond or reflect figures that are now under consideration. Now the question is: Do you want in some way to signal that these options are not under consideration and pre-date the Humphrey amendment? B6

K: But to whom would you do that? It's senseless to talk to [redacted] B6

E: No. Do you want an Anderson response or something? Say decision on this is a phony, don't you think?

K: I think yes. Don't you?

E: I have one drafted.

K: And say these are not the figures that have been under discussion.

E: My view was that, as I say, Anderson should volunteer it, simply saying that this is --

K: He should volunteer it.

E: And that's your view, is it?

K: Well, what do you think?

E: I think he should. I think he should say that this column is misleading, it's _____ Mr. Kissinger is attempting to undo, in fact to fly in the face of this Congressional expression of policy.

K: And that the figures in none of the countries are those the figures that we are working from.

E: Or have been since the Humphrey amendment was passed.

K: That's right.

E: Now, there is a slight implaction and the implication is that we have changed since the Humphrey amendment was passed.

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K: No, just say these are not the figures that have been under consideration for two months. You don't have to say as a result of what.

E: Right.

K: Say these are --

E: As far as we are able to identify them, these were discussed two months ago and they have not been considered since.

K: That's right.

E: I'll do that.

K: Right. Thank you.

SD286

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TelCon
Secretary Kissinger
Foreign minister Esenbel, Turkey
January 23, 1975 - 12:00 p.m. [Noon]

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello, how are you, Mr. Foreign Minister?

E: How are you, Mr. Kissinger?

K: OK. I just wanted to check with you in the light of my recent cable to you how you think things are going.

E: You know I am making a fresh effort, but you must understand that this is not a very good moment here because the public opinion is very touchy about this . . . the public opinion first is very positive. But anyhow on the air talks it is not pushing.

K: Good.

E: And they should come to some understanding.

K: Our Ambassador from Nicosia said you had made a new proposal today which complicated matters. I haven't had a chance to study it yet.

E: But you know the _____ hasn't really started negotiations on the airport. This is nothing new.

K: Yeah, well I don't want to go into every tactic of every issue. I think that would be important though to get something done on . . .

E: Right. Our side wants equal footing on the governing body.

K: Yeah.

E: The other side they say well we are wrong, that the UN should be the governing body for the time being. This is the main difference. Understand?

K: Yes, I understand.

and

E: Well, they understand/they try to work on this basis that there should be a cooperative body between Greeks and Turks, which is responsible for the airport. I think they can arrange everything that could remain to be but the principal is not yet agreed.

K: Right.

E: On Famagusta, I don't see there is any difficulty. If they don't agree our side will say well all right then we are offering the port to you . . .

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K: Well, that's what I thought.

E: Well, we can do that. Now the troop reductions..

K: You'd better do that through Macomber. We had better not do that on the phone.

E: OK

K: But that again is a unilateral thing you can do. That's not something to negotiate.

E: No, no, not yet. But I have, because this is, because our people, our military, as I indicated to you, are conservative. They think they are bolstering their forces there. But we will do something.

K: Good. Well that's all good to know. It would be helpful if some progress along these lines could be registered next week, because we want to go to the Congress about extending that deadline. And we don't want to do it at the last minute and get into one of these brawls.

E: No, Dr. Kissinger, Famagusta and the Turks will be done anyhow.

K: Good. I would recommend that you do that following the Nicosia agreement.

E: All right. But/~~to suggest to the~~ the Nicosia agreement may take more time. You see, I am not so sure.

K: Well, I think it would be important to have it before the 1st.

E: I know but ~~the~~ in principle there is this difficulty that I tried to explain. The others are mostly a unilateral thing. Before next Thursday I will let you know through Mr. Macomber. But the first one needs more negotiating, more bargaining, so I am not so sure. when we will be able to finish.

K: Well, I am afraid we almost -- that will make it very tough here.

E: Also, I think they will discuss it - a Cyprus peace proposal -- you understand?

K: Yeah.

E: In other words, all the Turks that are in the ~~north~~ south should be able to come north and an equal number will be accepted in the Turkish _____.

So we are working on that too.

K: OK. Well, I really feel as much as can be done before February 5th, really, because we won't have any bases and we would like to remove it then substantially permanently. So then you don't have this issue every six weeks.

E: Yes, yes. I am going to have a debate, you know. They are asking for a general debate on the situation. So I am thinking this is _____ here too.

K: Yeah. Now look, I know your attitude and I hope you know mine.

E: Yeah.

K: And you know that I am speaking to you as a friend.

E: Yes. Well, we will do our best. But you know where is the main difficulty. It's the airport and the question of principle. We are going to cover the airport. And we want a joint thing to do it. This is the perfect position. But the other side say no, not the teams, but the UN should be the governing body. But this is the main difference. Now if you can help on that I think we can solve the rest.

K: How about the UN as well as the parties?

E: Well, I don't know. They haven't talked all that. They say that if this is going to go federation then why don't you start now for the good will of the country.

K: Well let me talk to my colleagues ~~in~~ and see what they think.

E: Yes, all right.

K: Good, I will be in touch with you.

E: Yes, be sure.

K: Nice to talk to you. Bye.

E: Goodbye.

SD 290

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TELECON
Wells Stabler/Secretary Kissinger
January 27, 1975
8:30 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Have you seen that cable from MacComber?

S: Yes.

K: Does that help us at all?

S: I must say if we get something, we can determine what the true number is.

Of course,

K: the horses asses are doing it in such a way there is a minimal impact.

S: That's their stock in trade. If we can confirm the 3,000--5,000 refugees have returned along with the opening of Famagusta...

K: The most important would be the refugees. Can we get something off to Esenfeldt (?) asking if there is some way to confirm?

S: Yes.

K: You say we are working like crazy on opening the Famagusta port and the refugees.

S: In light of what Humphrey said, if you could produce these things.

K: Would you do that?

S: Yes.

K: Would you get a cable out to MacComber tonight--in a restrictive channel.

S: Yes.

END.

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SD 295

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TELECON
Mr. Stabler/Secretary Kissinger
January 27, 1975 4:00

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I just saw something that the Athens radio claims that the Greek Government reports a proposal by me for concessions in the Agean in return for concessions in Cyprus and they allegedly got that from Eagleton. Is that conceivable.

S: I don't think it is conceivable at all.

K: Can we deny that.

S: Absolutely. The greek press has gone mad on this. You saw the thing about your role in the talks, which we have denied. I don't know what they are trying to do. And they have gone public on this ICJ thing.

K: They have?

S: There is a message in from Kubisch in which Bitsios is grateful for your action on the meeting in Ankara.

K: What did he say?

S: It was sort of double talk on the phone -- and they said they would get together later. Talked about the idea of a meeting and sites, but he would think it over. This is ridiculous and I think we might suggest that we put something out immediately.

K: Will you do that.

S: I will indeed.

K: And will you call in the Greek Ambassador and tell him that this is impossible to have to deny what didn't happen.

S: We mentioned this again when he saw Sisco this morning. -- about the rejection of the Turks and he said his government didn't believe that at all.

K: Did we get a report on today's meeting.

S: Only the press announcement so far -- but not the background. They talked about the constitutional process, airports and Famagusta. But we don't have the inside story. I sent upstairs an account of my talk with Humphrey.

K: How was it?

S: He said two things. One is if there is no there is more chance of getting an extension. If you can get one or two things, the airport and something on Turkey. I think that would be the ___. He said, I think ___, Brademas and Sarbanes will come to see me at 4:00....I think I can do it. They want to be helpful.

K: OK.

END

[1976]

SH200 1*

1/28/75
3:15 p. m.
The Secretary/David Binder - NYT

RELEASED IN FULL

B: It is going to be a bad year isn't it?

K: It is looking that way.

B: Have you made up your mind as to whether the Cubans were nudged through Angola or went in with flags flying.

K: I tend to think they went in with the flags flying.

B: Good, that was the first question. The second is there is a rumor flying around that you called Sen. Magnuson and asked him to delay this fisheries thing.

K: No, I didn't call him at all.

B: Didn't you talk to anyone on that?

K: No.

B: I gather that there is some kind of expectation that the thing is going to sit in conference for quite a while.

K: That seems to be what people think.

B: He is having some sort of an Alaskan fish fry in the Senate today.

K: Well, why not?

B: But there wasn't anything attempted by the Administration to tell him to hold off.

S: No. Okay David.

B: Are we going to see you on Saturday? Did you get a look at the book?

K: I have it here but I haven't read it.

B: I would like your views on it sometime.

K: I will see you Saturday.

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SD302

TELECON
Senator Hugh Scott/Secretary Kissinger
January 28, 1975
2:55 pm

RELEASED IN PART
B6

SS: Your secretary is more cautious than most. She asked if I was Hugh Scott.

K: Yes, because there is another Scott up there [redacted] B6

SS: There you go. Can I start by saying Henry Byroade was in and I told him if there was any way to lift the embargo to Pakistan I favored it and would help him.

K: Terrific.

S: I think you know the facts better than I do. I hate to see Bhutto turn against us.

K: That is my problem. I called to tell you that I though you made a moving statement this morning.

S: Thank you. I haven't lost track of the idea of you talking to them. There are two things. I think it would be good to arrange a luncheon for you with the members of the _____Republichan Committee.

K: Anything you want to do.

S: In reporting today's meeting, Senator Javits urged we have someone speak for the President on Vietnam and Cambodia. I said that had to be you. Senator s Tower and Curtis will be in touch to see if you can talk to all the Republicans on this Vietnam matter soon. You will hear from Tower and Curtis

K: On this morning's statement -- you had no ulterior motives in what you said and I wanted to tell you you are a true statesman.

S: Nelson had something good to say too.

K: It was moving and correct.

S: It was nice of you to call. Give my love to the pretty member of your family, will you?

K: (Laughter) Yes.

END

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SD304

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Senator Pastore/Secretary Kissinger
January 28, 1975
1:00 pm

P: This will be alot of Greek to you at first, but I have to go into it.

K: Do you have to say Greek? They're giving me more trouble.

P: Yesterday I went up to Rhode Island. I was summoned there by the Fishermen. On January 15 the lobster pots were destroyed by a fleet of 70 Soviet fishing trawlers. These people are shaken up over it. They're bankrupt. Their pots are gone. We did take this matter up with a Commander Schowengerdt who is connected to the Coast Guard and assigned to the State Department. I understand these people have to bring some kind of proof and get their affidavits together. We were assured by this Commander that he consulted with the Counselor for Fisheries Affairs of the Russian Embassy. His name is _____. I understand he was going to cable Moscow and recommend that the fleet be removed. I have two questions. First, these people are asking for some kind of help until the claims are settled. Though, I doubt if you have authority to do anything about this in your shop. Secondly, the question is how long will it take to resolve these claims and what will the State Department do to justify these claims; how agressive will they be.

K: Let me call you tomorrow. I'll look into it this afternoon. If we have any legal claims, I promise you we will be aggressive . Let me find out what the leagl position is and second y, I will have no hesitation, seeing that you are involved, to call the Soviets and make this a political matter.

P.: Do you have the name of that Counselor?

K: Yes. I'll call you back tomorrow.

P: Ok, Henry, nice to talk to you.

K: Ok.

END

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SD278

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Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Senator Inouye
1-28-75; 11:00 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

I: Hello, Mr. Secretary.

K: How are you, Senator?

I: Fine, sir.

K: I have had good reports of your trip around the Middle East.

I: Oh, thank you.

K: And I . . .

I: Not to put you in trouble . . .

K: No, no, on the contrary. You were extremely helpful. And I think in Israel in particular by point out the limitations of what could be expected from Congress. You were very, very helpful.

I: I think they got the message.

K: I thought it was really helpful. I am calling you about that ~~a~~ New Hebrides project. We have been in touch with the British and French. We have not yet heard from the French. The British have indicated some sympathy for it.

I: Oh, great.

K: And they have said -- I am calling you from the White House, and I have the details in the State Department --but an Under Secretary of Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs said that they would be prepared to listen to reasonable propositions. And I had told them that my impression from you was that that was all you wanted.

I: Uh-huh.

K: And that that lady, Miss Parks, is now going on a trip through that area and when she returns she would be in touch with us.

I: Fine. Fine.

K: I will send you the details so that you can get in touch with whoever you are dealing with on this.

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I: Okay. Well, you have got your work cut out for you. I don't know whether I should feel sorry for you, but . . . .

K: I like it. It is tough, isn't it.

I: Oh, God! I think it is too bad that very few Americans have any idea of what is happening there.

K: It is sort of heartbreaking, too, because I think if the Israelis miss this chance the whole thing is going to blow up sooner or later, don't you.

I: Yeah, I think the fuse is beginning to burn, now.

K: Well, I hope -- do you think I can get -- will get Congressional support if we get into some hot water with the Israelis on this?

I: I think things are beginning to change. It was almost as a jumping gun -- this call -- my visit there -- when Sparkman was quoted in the Jerusalem Post -- Sparkman.

K: Yeah.

I: The statement. That shook them up to no end because they thought that everything was fine when Bill Fulbright left.

K: Uh-huh. Yeah. I see.

I: So, uh, I think they are getting a bit concerned now.

K: Well, I want you to know that I really -- I thought that you really behaved in a very responsive -- responsible way.

I: Oh, thank you.

K: And I appreciated it very much. I will send you the details on what I was given.

I: Fine, sir.

K: Nice to talk to you. Bye.

I: Bye.

SD300

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TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
January 28, 1975
5:03 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Now your Prime Minister has said to at least three people that he proposed to us that there be a demilitarized zone along the Lebanese border, control by anyone including the UN. Israel has suggested perhaps there could be an adjoining zone next to it. Secretary Kissinger rejected the idea as a good idea but not practical. When did all this happen?

D: I never heard about it before. This is the first time. I do not recall...did he raise it with you ever? In any event if I can find out what he has in his mind, but there is no malicious intent here.

K: Will you find out what he is talking about.

D: If you heard it from Percy I would discount everything he said.

K: But did you find out.

D: I will sir.

END.

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SD311

TELECON
Arthur Hartman/Secretary Kissinger
January 29, 1975
1:00 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Art, we've got to get that meeting organized -- the Esenbel meeting.

H: We haven't heard from Esenbel about a date and when we hear from him, we'll go back and confirm it.

K: We also have to tell the French. Why don't you tell the French that we're exploring this and perhaps they don't mind.

H: Alright, and you'll be happy to see Sauvagnargues sometime.

K: And we'll want the President to know. I probably will spend two nights in Paris and go to Israel the next morning. If I leave at 8:00, I'll be in Israel by 5:00. I don't have that much to do on my first visit in Israel anyway.

H: You'll be there as long as Monday night and we have to tell the Embassy at some point.

K: Will you do that?

H: I'll do that right away.

K: Will you?

H: Yes.

END

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RELEASED IN FULL

SD309

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TELCON
1/29/75 - 7:31 p.m.
Asst. Sec. Wm. Rogers/HAK

K: Bill, I just want to make sure we did not send the group on science and technology.

R: We did not. Cancelled.

K: Good. Thank you.

R: Litton - you told me you wanted to talk to me about that -- the Cuban thing.

K: Yes. When do we have to make a decision.

R: EUR got another heavy load of pressure from the Canadians today so its narrowing down to a few days now.

K: Okay. We'll do it early next week but why don't we send a message to the Cubans saying we are doing it.

R: Okay. Good.

K: Let me see the message first before you throw in Guantanamo.

R: They're not interested.

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RELEASED IN FULL

SD306

TELCON

Peter Lisagor
Sec. Kissinger
4:10 p.m.
January 29, 1975

K: What I called you about is somewhat out of date now. I called you this morning about that remark you made as I was walking out about Joe Kraft's comments.

L: Yes.

K: Since one's honor is one of the few things one can take out of here, I thought it was somewhat out of line but secondly, what examples can you cite that you have been told an untruth in the field of foreign policy since I have been here.

L: I don't have a sort of catalogue of examples and it was said more in jest than anything else. We were half jesting as we were leaving. I have no case or dossier to make. I think what Joe would have in mind and myself would be the whole history of the Viet-Nam thing and the experience of the Cambodian thing.

K: First, when I speak of a crisis of authority, I am not saying the congress is to blame. We are talking about a condition that affects the whole Western world, however we got to it. There were certainly grave abuses on the part of the Executive but the conditions we are facing now it makes no difference who originated it. Nor is it one of Congressional abuse. It is a problem of how you can establish a relationship in which you can't have foreign policy without authority. It cannot be done and how can we rescue that under present conditions.

L: I think it is the whole Watergate catharsis myself, Where everyone is much more skeptical than they once were. They hark back in their mind and what they believed that the evidence was at the time of that situation. And I think it relates basically to V-N and I think that is what we have. While I sense the fact this is a condition that you have to deal with, that we have to deal with, but I think it is a part....

K: I genuinely believe that the press too -- we are in such a different situation now as a country. This constant hacking away really will have a tendency to make it difficult to rescue things.

L: I is my feeling that it is less so now.

K: I am not complaining about anything you have written.

L: I understand. It is my sense that it is less so and we are coming out of it a little bit from this agonizing period where no one believes anybody. Where there are all kinds of questions.

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2.
Lisagor

It is my sense that we are getting a better footing. Don't you sense that? I don't know. It is my sense that things are settling down abit. Not that it wouldn't be desired. I think there is some sense of perspective.

K: I think things are settling down a bit between the press and the Executive. I think things are getting more complicated between the Executive and the Congress--not in terms of attitudes. The personal relationships are excellent but both sides have to work out a way where Congress can get involved without legislating every involvement. I don't know what the solution is.

L: My feeling is that the solution will work itself out. My respect for Congress'ability to do very much is limited even in an obstructive way. I knowyour experience has been different. Over the years that I have been here in this town Congress makes these breast beating noises periodically and then accepts the rationale for whatever we are trying to do. I don't know whether it is true or not. [illegible]

K: Certainly, in all of my contacts with the Congress, despite some of the reports it has really been very constructive and I have not noticed either antagonism or obstructionism. All of this is of course personal.

L: I understand. About Sparkman-- how is it going to work. You had a good relationship with Fulbright.

K: Peter, I cannot tell yet. Everyone tells me it is going to be easier with Sparkman than Fulbright. First of all I did not find it that tough with him. He is a very thoughtful man. I cannot get a grip on how it is going to be.

L: Too soon.

K: He is not as interested in the day-to-day stuff as Fulbright was.

L: Right.. Just curious. I will watch it but I was curious in this early going how you sensed it..

K: The relationship is good but I cannot really judge yet how he is going to exercise his function as Chairman.

L: You have the problem of keeping him awake.

K: Between you and me that is right.
L: Thanks, Henry, I am glad to talk to you about it. I am as concerned as you are about it and I think most responsible newsmen are.
END

SD308 *

TELCON
1/29/75 - 7:25 p.m.
Arthur Hartman/HAK

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Art did you ever make a protest to the Sweds about their Foreign Minister.

H: In both places.

K: How, tough or...

H: Very tough.

K: What is your definition of very tough?

H: That the remarks were unacceptable, we quoted him parts of his speech and also Robert did the same thing in Stockholm talking directly to Anderson.

K: What was their reply?

H: I just heard about Roberts. I haven't heard what he was told. The fellow here said he'd report it back. But he said we thought it was very unfortunate, we were getting into the whole same kind of problem that we got into last year where they were making comments specifically about us and our actions, their statements were not in any way balanced, they didn't say anything about what was going on in the North and subsequently with the fellow here -- we got into a discussion with him. He brought his Asian expert in and we had some people from EA.

K: What do you mean you had some people from EA. When do we owe an explanation to the Sweds?

H: It's not an explanation but when they got to talking about it it's quite clear they have not the slightest idea what's going on in the South. All their information is about the North.

K: It is not our duty -- when one of these sobs attacks us to wail all over him and bring in Asian experts to determine the facts. Even if the facts are true they have no right to say that.

H: But it was not in the sense of wailing all over them. We were just telling him he didn't know anything about the situation.

K: After the Sweds kick us around we do not bring Asian experts in to ~~XXXXX~~ the situation as long as I'm Secretary of State clarify

H: I wanted to have one guy there in case they asked I didn't have the answer to.

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K: You don't understand. My position is that I do not give explanations, to the Sweds. I don't answer questions when we make a protest. What I wanted you to do was to protest and throw him out of the office.

H: The protest was very tough.

K: And then you started explaining why he was wrong. That is a totally wrong way of proceeding with all respect

H: Well. Okay.

K: Seriously. And the next time they step out of line it needs to be called in with a sharp protest and dismissed.

H: Will do.

K: It's not caused by a misunderstanding. It's a policy decision.

H: I recognize that and that was made quite clear.

K: ~~XXXX~~ Have we heard from the Turks.

H: We had another message but he still hasn't given us a reply although he did say something about wouldn't Rome be better but that was just a side remark. But he promised us a reply. He didn't ~~XX~~ say when.

K: Have you told the French.

H: I told the French and I called Ken Rush for his personal information.

K: That's good. Then there's nothing we can do.

H: I'm holding the Bitsios cable until tomorrow. It's up in Joe's office. I don't think we ought to.

K: What is the Bitsios cable.

H: Just firming up with him.

K: Do you think you'll hear tomorrow from Esenbel?

H: I hope so. In any case I think tomorrow we better go firm up with Bitsios. And also we may -- I've asked my people to work on a message for Bitsios anyway. We're a little bit concerned about a report from Bill Crawford that Makarios may be ready to make a speech and I think we ought to try to head it off through Bitsios.

K: I've seen that and also that we're going to have an explosion in ~~Nic~~ Nicosia if we get concessions.

H: Yes, but I think his way -- Bill's suggestion is to how we deal with this are good ones.

K: Until we become too dangerous to fool with it .

H: I'm off to meet Mr. Wilson.

K: I just think that if we may just sit it out for a bit and let people come to us.

H: When they've tried their way.

K: Particularly if the Congress cuts off aid.

H: That may be. I'm worried -- I don't know why we haven't gotten a whimper out of Turkey as to what they may be ~~xxx~~ planning. They must have thought this whole thing through and they must have planned some steps. I can't believe they're just going to sit back. The only think I've heard even ~~xx~~ suggested is they're going to come present us a bill for our facilities.

K: You mean their counter-move. Can you try the Agency to see what they have to say and will you get together whatever intelligence reports we have on that subject plus the Libyan contacts and other contacts they may have.

H: I didn't know this morning. You recall that about three weeks ago Khadafi was there.

K: No I didn't recall that. Why should I know that?

H: I don't know.

K: That would have been current some time and therefore I wouldn't know.

H: Let me get those reports together.

K: I want them for the meeting on Saturday morning. I think we should have Rosenthal there shouldn't we.

H: It would be a good idea because he may be prepared to be a bit helpful.

K: You know we are going to make a fight but if they're not going to do it fine. The hell with it.

H: Should I tell Lynn about Rosenthal.

K: Yes.

H: So they'll just be ~~four~~ the four then. Humphrey, Brademus, Sarbane and Rosenthal.

K: Or should we have a few more?

H: Do you want Eagleton.

K: Yes. I agreed to that this morning.

RELEASED IN FULL

SD307

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TELCON
Dick Valleriani/Secy Kissinger
6:32 p.m., January 29, 1975

K: Dick, I wanted to make one comment to you about some of your observations this morning of deliberate deceptions.

V: No, I didn't say deliberate deceptions.

K: Well, at any rate, deceptions -- deliberate or not. I hope if we deceive, it's deliberate.

V: Laughts. I [didn't] use the word "deceit" either.

K: Well, that's the impression that was left. But the point I want to make is, you know, we have an obligation to be as candid as possible but I think the press has an obligation to give the benefit of the doubt. Let me give you exactly what the facts were which we had on Saturday. On Saturday we had the Embassy being partly set on fire.

V: Um-humm.

K: And that was by an unorganized mob. We had information that the EOKA-B and other even more radical groups were going to come in from Limassol on Monday. I then warned the governments of both Greece and Nicosia that if any American were hurt, I'd pull out our personnel. I wanted to make this public. Our people convinced me that: One, this would make it a test of manhood with the Greeks and they couldn't intervene. Secondly, that those radical elements who are violently anti-American to begin with might then have a high incentive to kill an American because that would get us out and would throw the whole situation into their hands. And for these rasons, I was urged and it seemed to me that in the interest of saving lives we would say nothing about warnings on that Saturday.

V: Um-humm.

K: In other words, there -- And as soon as the march on Monday was over, we confirmed what had been done. Now that does not seem to me an unreasonable proposition nor a secret way of proceeding. It seems to me inherent in the situation.

V: Well, Mr. Secretary, I agree that it is not unreasonable but we are in a situation where the questions are asked directly to the spokesman and the answer comes back the other way around.

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K: Well, the spokesman at that particular time didn't -- the warning actually was made after the spokesman talked to the press. But we would have had to make a new announcement. There were two waves of information we received. One very early in the morning and then one around noon. So the warning was actually extended in the early afternoon and we would have had to call you all back to give you new information.

V: Um-humm.

K: And that would have had the consequences ~~ek~~ that we considered unfortunate. So when the spokesman made the information, he was telling the literal truth and there was no other plan at that moment. At that time, we didn't know yet of the new demonstration being planned for Monday.

V: My impression --What I used were relatively minor examples. But I think the way that they reflect the mood that exists there now --

K: Yeah, but what I would like to point out is that maybe the mood has a certain _____ tendency to it.

V: Um-humm.

K: And that everybody has to accept that this is a very complex situation sometimes in which with the best intentions in the world one cannot inevitably give -- I forget what the second example was.

V: Well, the point I was trying to make was that when the information in both cases involved the communication with a foreign government, in both cases the foreign government in effect made public what had happened and we were in a position of the American people hearing what had happened from foreign governments and not from our own government.

K: Well, in the second case -- now, I know what it was -- in the second case, that was not a policy decision. I don't know why that wasn't made public. I just don't remember -- that was certainly not a deliberate deception. It may have been just a screw-up because we had no reason in the world not to make it public.

V: Well, no, I'm sorry you read that as deliberate deception . . .

K: But, you know, when you read the cumulative stuff that is being put out and it compounds the which is in any case going to kill us if it keeps up. Of lack of confidence, everyone trying to deceive everybody and I wouldn't bother if I thought you were -- if this had been

K: (cont'd) malicious, if I didn't think you were basically fair, I wouldn't bother you with this. What I was trying to convey to you is that serious people are trying to do this thing, not for the sake of keeping anything from the public but in the case of the Cyprus situation in order to save lives and in the second case, it was just a screw-up. I was never conscious of the fact that it had been denied that there was a protest. So I really will have to check back on that to find out what happened.

V: Yeah. Well, let me tell you, frankly, you know, I do try to be fair.

K: You are fair.

V: And there was a correspondents meeting last Friday to deal with the problem of some of the briefings were getting stricken from the record or something -- I forget what it was all about. But some of the people brought up other business and --

K: And I'm taking seriously what was said then and I think you will see --

V: Well, I want to explain to you one thing that came up seperately was -- somebody in the meeting said why don't we form a committee that ended up being called the "More Forthrightness Committee." I mean, there was a general feeling that there ought to be more information. I'm often affected with that same --

K: Yeah, but you people also ought to realize -- I can understand the competitive pressures on you but you ought to realize the pressures that exist on people like myself. And it isn't always lack of forthrightness. You take the Middle East situation, that thing is hanging by a hair. I cannot for the sake of getting a few headlines compound what the Israelis are already doing and the Egyptians by adding my five cents to every day's news. Some of these situations are just inherently very sizey (?) and complicated. Now on some of your other comments, I agree with you -- not some of the comments that were made at that meeting. I understand the restiveness. You are going to have more backgrounders of Assistant Secretaries. I will have more regular press conferences.

V: Well, I think that's basically it. There is a feeling that the information is just a little too tightly held and that people are reluctant to talk because of an overall policy. I mean, that kind of backgrounding is really essential to our understanding of a negotiation.

K: That part of -- I had a long talk with McCloskey and a lot of your comments I thought were well taken. And I hope you will see that we will try to respond to those. So I'm not saying all your complaints were

K: (cont'd) unjustified. But it's the complaints that contribute to the mood of a general malaise, that's the problem.

V: Yeah. Well, thank you very much for calling.

K: I ..... considered that what you did was in any way malicious.

V: Well, I can assure you that I . . . .

K: No, no, I know that. Look, I really know that.

V: Yeah.

K: Okay, Dick.

V: Thank you.

K: Bye.

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TELCON
BOB Anderson/Kissinger
1/30/75 - 10:05 a.m.

SD313

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

A: Yes sir.

K: Now that I've seen what he said, it really grew out of the Cabinet meeting. You can tell them on background that the subject of Vietnam was not discussed at the lunch, but was discussed at the Cabinet meeting.

A: Thank you, sir.

K: Can you do that on deep background on the President?

A: Right. Will do.

K: Good.

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SD330

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Robinson/Secretary Kissinger
January 31, 1975
4:52 p.m.

R: Mr. Secretary, I have survived.

K: I understand it was a rough session.

R: It was pretty rough. It was highly politicized and domestically oriented but I was able to get over our basic points in terms of our ISA program. I think we did as well as we could.

K: Yes.

R: Could have done a great deal better. I do not think we lost the game today. It was Senator Jackson and Senator Stone of Florida took a most demogogic stance.

K: How was Jackson?

R: He was running for President. Everyone is concerned about how you reconcile the idea that prices are too high and you raise them higher. This was what they asked. Why do we impose import fees and taxes to riase them.

K: What is the answer?

R: It is we have to in the long run develop a stable solution to bring prices down and eliminate the _____ we must decrease our reliance on imported oil. That ultimately will bring the price down. It is an aspect of the President's program that has not been understood and not presented as clearly as I think it must be if it is to be successful. It is the key issue. It permeated the entire discussion today.

K: Ok. Thank you Chuck.

R: I understand you are going to give a xxxxxx speech on Monday and I want to tell you how important I think it is.

K: Yes and I want you to take a look at it tomorrow morning.

R: Ok. I will be in tomorrow.

END.

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SD331

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELCON
1/31/75 8:20 pm
KISSINGER/ JAMES LYNN

L: What can I do for you?

K: What makes you think I didn't just want to chat with you?

L: Although we are very simpatico - we both know that there is no need to confirm --

K: I've just checkd the Lynn-Peterson agreement in Moscow that failed so miserably -

L: I know the agreement is in terrible trouble when I get credit for it.

K: [redacted] B6

L:

K: Is the budget release fixed or can it be moved? Can you move it from Monday to Tuesday?

L: Move what?

K: The release of the budget.

L: I can't move it. This is Ash's budget -- I am going to the floor vote --

K: What do you think?

L: No. It was only extended to the 3rd on the Hill. You would have to go to Congress for a one-day extension.

K: No. Don't do that. OK. Many thanks.

L: You're welcome.

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SD328

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TELECON
Crosby Noyes/Secretary Kissinger
January 31, 1975
5:40 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: ...agreement and it isn't that I disagree with you but if you act as if it were possible to achieve that partnership.

N: Yes, I understand.

K: Even if it doesn't work.

N: I do not think it will.

K: It is a misunderstanding. They know what they are doing.

N: I don't mean to imply...

K: No, you were not critical of me. I considered it an extremely thoughtful article.

N: I thought you would. We do not mean to be critical.

K: The only reason I am calling you is to tell you it was extremely thoughtful and my analysis is the same as yours.

N: It is a very disturbing situation.

K: We are talking off the record now.

N: Yes.

K: I have never been so worried about the country. The least danger our country faces is going into a Vietnam war. Any foreign government thinks you may be disavowed when you come home with a situation like this, they will not do anything. If we have a crisis the way we have managed crises in the past is by rapid and ruthless moves. They won't believe we can do that now.

N: Are you getting that across to the leadership?

K: Now they are going to cut off aid to Turkey.

N: Do you think they will?

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K: You add to that the OPEC, the trade bill...

N: It goes right across the board.

K: If we do not get additional money for Cambodia by March 15, at the latest, it will be finished by April 1.

N: You will not get money for Cambodia.

K: Right. Then you have the Chinese looking at us and they will think we are not strong and they will be forced back to the Soviets. It is a grim prospect.

N: It is indeed.

K: And for what?

N: They may give us something on Vietnam but will put all kinds of provisos on it.

K: Then they would be better off not giving it.

N: It is a grim picture and we are very much on your side.

K: I know that. This was not a call for public relations reasons. I wanted you to know how much I appreciated it.

N: Ok. Thank you. Goodbye.

K: Goodbye.

END.

SD327

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TELCON
Art Hartman
Sec. Kissinger
January 31, 1975
12:50 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Art, I don't see any problem with Brussels.

H: I don't either. I think what will happen since those cables crossed is that Kubish will try Bitsios out on it and he will say he prefers Brussels over Vienna or that it is o.k.

K: Let's try Brussels on Esenbel and then we have everybody and we can choose. Why don't you call Macomber.

H: O.K.

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SD321

TELCON
Senator Inouye/Secy Kissinger
10:47 a.m., January 31, 1975

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

I: Hello, Mr. Secretary.

K: How are you?

I: Fine, sir. I was just having a chat with Senator Mathias and it occurred to us that if it would be helpful to you, we would be very happy to drop by at your convenience to brief you on our journey out there.

K: Well, good. Look, I have invited tomorrow morning a group of Congressmen and Senators including Mathias to discuss the Greek/Turkish thing for breakfast. If you wanted to join that -- well, at any rate, for some time tomorrow morning -- if you wanted to join that, you could stay afterwards. Let's see

I: I'm going to be taking a little trip myself. I'll tell Mac --

K: But if that doesn't work for you, we'll do it some other time.

I: Okay. No, I'm going to be going out of town soon.

K: Tomorrow?

I: Yeah.

K: Well, in that case, why don't we do it next week?

I: Well, we thought it might be helpful.

K: No, I would like that very much.

I: Okay.

K: And a s I told you, I thought that you really did a very responsible job there.

I: Appreciate that. Then shall I call you back Monday?

K: Yes. Call my office Monday. Or we will call you, whichever you prefer.

I: Oh, any way, sir.

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K: It's probably more reliable if your office calls mine.

I: Fine, sir. I'll do that. Okay.

K: Right.

I: Bye.

SD322

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TELECON
Arthur Hartman/Secretary Kissinger
January 31, 1975
3:54 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: It seems to be Brussels, don't you think.

H: Esenbel just said OK to Brussels. We're getting a cable saying we would go ahead with Brussels and when you announce your trip you can say your going to Brussels to pick up these conversations you had earlies in Brussels to keep it low key. Bitsios may not like that. He thinks an early announcement may be bad.

K: You better make clear that the trouble will be __, otherwise it will certainly leak out.

H: That's right

END

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SD323

TELECON
Arthur Hartman/Secretary Kissinger
January 31, 1975
3:13 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

(Missed first part)

H: ...wasn't sure he could get to him tonight. He's trying and we should have word back by flash ~~xxxx~~ message.

K: Bitsios would be prepared to do Brussels but he wasn't sure of Vienna.

H: We're getting a message.

K: Let's get them both right up, hopefully by tomorrow moring. I thought I should stop in Germany on the way back from the Middle East.

H: He's anxious to see you. We have a report from the British. They may back the ___. We have no report on that yet.

END

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JD833

TELECON
Mr. Bowdler/Secretary Kissinger
January 31, 1975
4:55 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I am not coming the middle of February.

B: Would you like us to do individual letters or what.

K: Yes. I would have thought an individual letter necessary. And will you call in the Chilean and hold his hand in particular. Tell him I clearly will go when I go (to Latin America) which should be the first week in April. Definitely before the OAS meeting. It will definitely be the last week in March or the first week in April.

B: Have you seen my note on the status of the. . . .

K: No, what is it?

B: It seems the ____ and the Ecuadoreans are not sending delegates and this has caused the Argentines not to go ahead with the meeting . The Argentines are in the process of polling the other delegates on this postponement.

K: Ok, good.

END

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SD326

TELECON
Amb. McCloskey/Secretary Kissinger
January 31, 1975
5:45 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Will you start a program by which I get once every ten days some Congressional group not identified by a committee?

M: Yes. I have a paper coming up to you as a response for Fraser. I promised him one next week.

K: Ok.

M: Good. Thank you.

END.

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SD338

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELECON
Amb. Robert McCloskey/Secretary Kissinger
February 1, 1975
6:55 PM

K: I have no recollection of that conversation that the Washington Post wants to cover. How the hell ~~I~~ can I know what happened.

M: I would have thought it's so far back.

K: Besides, all those intellignece things they were talking about are after December 1971. I don't believeAlsop ever had him at his house. I aan't believe that.

M: The guy who called me made it sound as ~~w~~ you went up____ knowing that would be there.

K: Why the hell would I hope to go ___to see him.

M: I'll say you have no recollection of any such thing. Can I say you don't remember.

K: Can they check Alsop^

M: Yes. I'll suggest that.

K: I don't say it could not have happened. It's extremely unlikely.

M: I'll take care of it.

K: All the more so, I was seeing him regularly anyway.

M: When you were at the White House.

K: That's right. It just doesn't sound sensible.

M: OK. I'll tell him.

K: This town is so sick. A nut can say anything he wants. What did you think of the meeting with the Greeks?

M: I thought it was a good meeting. I thought there was a freshness and an absenteeism of any feeling of confrontation. Rosenthal would like to see some __ to help the situation. even Brademas and Sarbanes.....

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K: Eagleton [redacted] B6

M: He had track of all of this. He spoke to me about Cyprus the other day when I was on the Hill. He didn't pay much attention to it.

K: OK.

M: How's the speech coming?

K: Well the trouble is, I work on this crap and then it only gets 3 paragraphs in the newspapers.

M: You'll get good coverage at the National Press Club.

K: I think it will be alright.

M: OK. I'll take care of that other matters

K: OK.

END

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SD337

TELECON
Mr. Thomas Enders/ Secretary Kissinger
February 1, 1975
9:05 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Where are you?

E: At somebody's house.

K: If your conscience permits that. Will you be here tomorrow?

E: I'll be back there at some point. Do you want me there now?

K: No. Since you double spaced your material, I cannot begin to work from it. You guaranteed it would take you x through the test of your party. (laughter). I need a few sentences which I have to have tomorrow morning on how much we can spend on alternate energy sources, how much on R & D, how much can we afford as a country and how much IEA can spend. As long as I have you, what do you mean (reads sentenee from speech).

E: Well, a lot of European countries have a tax on oil and they can transform that into a tarriff.

K: OK. See you tax tomorrow.

END

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
The Secretary/ Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt
Saturday, February 1, 1975
3:35 p.m.

K: Hal, where are you?

S: At the office.

K: I, unfortunately, now have to work on the speech. I tried to reach you earlier and couldn't. Can we get together Monday afternoon after my speech? I would just be jumping up and down if we talk now.

S: That is fine.

K: Do you agree with Hyland's assessment on Brezhnev?

S: I think it is total speculation and because of his health. I don't think he is in serious policy problems per se. I think he is just running out of steam but I don't see any chance of real problems on his policy control.

K: Do you think he would make it this summer?

S: I think so unless something is seriously wrong healthwise. He is still in the hospital. I think he would like to make this an orderly change. He above all wants to be in the history books.

K: Let's get together Monday afternoon.

S: OK. I tried to reach you last night. Several correspondents were trying to work something up on a consumer conference and matters related thereto that we had worked out with the British. I knocked it down hard.

K: It is nonsense.

S: Of course it is but they cannot believe that there weren't any real issues. Just like the stories in the press this morning are very skeptical.

K: This town is so sick. It doesn't make any difference what or what not you do. I don't remember when it was as sick as it is now.

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S: I talked to Von Staden and he will get back to me. You are planning to stop in London and Paris?

K: At least London.

S: Have you made any contact with the Soviets yet?

K: No not yet but I will offer it to them in the end.

S: Maybe then I will plan to meet you in Bonn and ride to London and Paris.

K: Good, good.

END.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

SD343 *

TELCON
Mr. Tom Enders/Secretary Kissinger
February 2, 1975; 3:00 pm

B6

[redacted] Tom where you say capital ? over the next ten years, will it be 5 hundred billion? Is that for the far planning or is that just ax figure.

E: That is what would be required .

K: But are we planning to do this?

E: No, that is the estimate of what maximum development of alternate supplies would require. K: Somewhere this had a figure of 10 billion dollars for research and development.

E: That is for five years = a federal program. That is also in the alternative sources section.

K: But what do you think the national effort is? What do you estimate? Several times that order?

E: I think it is probably at least that again. If you really want a figure, I can get one to you by this afternoon.

K: Yes.

END

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SD345

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELECON
Mr. McNamara/Secretary Kissinger
February 2, 1975
10:00 am

M: What a shame you are still in the office.

K: I have got tow ork on an energy speech. Now that the Post has realized that we don't need conversation, I think somebody has to speak out why our national and international programs are connected.

M: That is one aspect of the problem. The other one is Scotty Reston's cblumn. You are Scotty's friend. I was going to call Scotty. I was going to tell him that was exactly the kind of thing you needed. I think that needs to be said.

K: On the Arab/Israeli problem -- that was a very good column. Maybe I should call him.

M: You should and I will talk to him too.

K: Bob, what I also want to ask you today is this. It is a twofold problem. One is that I genuinely believe that if we do not get some more discipline out of the Congress, we are not going to have a foreign policy left in the next six months. Yet we have been preaching for them to cut the god damned thing. Now, I am going to the Middle East and they are going to cancel the President's authority on tax. There is no Democratic program.

M: I agre there isn't.

K: And now they are cutting off aid to Turkey. Who is the victor in this? Makarios. He is not our friend, and ecen if he was, what can he do for us.

M: Those [redacted] liberal Greeks. It will help Papandreaus and Makarios. B6

K: One other reason I called you this morning is the editorial in the Washington Post. It is a bad thing, what is happneing and it is basically the fault of the Administration because Kissinger is too devious and secretive. That is just putting oil on the past flames. I have met with congressional groups 110 times in 16 months. The only thing I have kept from them is the Gromyko letter -- for which there was good reason. I asked if Gromyko would publish this and he said no, we don't

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K: publish secret communications. When the letter was received I was on a trip. Then we decided we would give it to Congress anyway. By the time I got back, Congress was out. By the time Congress was in session, the President was on his Far East trip. After that we were in the middle of the Vladivostok outcry. Then we decided I would incoroporate the substance of that letter, as my views, without mentioning the Gromyko letter in my testimony at the Senate Finance Committee . We thought we could avoid having another blowout of our detente policy.

M: I will talk to them and see what I can do. It is almost impossible for Congress to have a program. [redacted] is so very weak. B6

K: But, Bob, we discussed my own position a few weeks ago. You know damn well from my point of view I have nothing to gain by fighting this battle. From a long-range point of view, what they dismantle now we will pay for three or four years from now.

M: What about Caraminlis? I didn't mention to you -- some of the Turkish Ministers gave the US here...

K: Turkey is going to go sharp left.

M: Caraminlis is going to pay a heavier price than we.

K: You couldn't be more right. The real victim is Caramanlis.

M: Can't he....

K: No. I have tried it and he has explained it to me. If he does anything, it will be sent back to Papandreaus and it will look like he is getting too close... If you want to do it, that's fine.

M: But how are you going to get help. ?

K: That isn't why I am calling, but if you want to....When the Chinese see the US pushing that country aside, they have to conclude that we have gone mad; that we are not reliable. It is vitally going to affect our China policy. When I met with with Mao and Chou they do a survey of the political situation. That Turkey aid cutoff is one of the worst thjngs we have done. For the Post to say that I am at fault or the Administration -- that M: is unfair. Do you think I could have done anything.

M: No, not a damn thing. It is the rest of us who need to get to work. Papendreaus and all of his associates, there are alot of them in this country.

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K: Look, Bob, ~~xxxx~~ a stalemate helps in that order -- Papandreaus, Makarios and the Turks. The Turks wouldn't mind a stalemate. They will get one third of Cyprus.

M: If the Turks go left; they don't have a government there now; they very well could go left.

K: What advice -- ~~x~~ what can I do about that Washington Post? Itis really contributing to this. I need help with it.

M: I will try to do something. I can't do anything except try to avoid another article from coming out in two days.

K: On the Hill, I don't know what can be done.

M: Price is a pretty good guy. What is going to happen to the aid.

K: I had the Greek congressmen in yesterday. They are over a barrel. They don't know what to do.

M: Let me talk to the Post editorial ....When do you leave?

K: A week from today .

M: The most we can do at present -- well, I don't think we can swing a pro-Kissinger policy.

K: I know now what you went through in 1967.

M: It is still going on. There is nothing you can do that is right.

K: Particularly when you are succeeding. They knock one prop~~x~~ after another out from under you. First the Soviets, then Latin America, the Vietnam issue and now Turkey.

M: I don' think you are as weak as you think you are. I am circling around these embassies and other people. You have a tremendous reputation -- support and respect from around the world.

K: I am strong around the world and I hafe a high public opinion in this country.

M: I wouldn't worry about your own personal opinion. I don't think you are weak in Congress.

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K: It is the foreign policy of the United States. The Congress doesn't have anys upport for anything. I would gladly give up my personal reputation if it could save the foreign policy. I have to be a lion tamer on the Middle East. If I look weak....

M

M: You dontt look weak to the Arabs or the Israelis. The Israelis are suicidal and Sadat doesn't have too much maneuvering room.

K: What they will make out of it is the agreement.

M: I would suggest you put Turkey out of your mind. I'll see what I can do. But it will not erupt immediately and the Middle East could.

K: BUt it will be long-lasting.

M: But you can pput it back together again.

K: I doubt it. But whatever happens doesn't have to be done in February.

M: Right, but the Middle East does have to be done in February or March or April.

K: Ok -- thank you.

END

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SD354

TELECON
Mr. Hartman/Secretary Kissinger
February 3, 1975
7:56 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.5(D)

K: This isn't your day.

H: I guess it isn't.

K: On that Muskie stuff. This is a brilliant paper for an expert on Cyprus negotiations. I do not want to put it on the ground of what it does to Cyprus. But what it does to Greek, Bypruss and Turkey. That is produces a stalemate. We have [redacted] B1
facilities in Turkey. I must put in on the grounds of general foreign policy. Can you do that by first thing in the morning?

H: Yes.

K: Good.

END.

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DECLASSIFY AFTER: 25 MAR 2025

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SD351

TELECON
David Binder:Secretary Kissinger
February 3, 1975
4:44 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

B: Are you doing all right? I am calling about this crazy Chile business.

K: Look David, what drives me out of my mind is how people have lost any sense of sanity in this place.

B: ...says you were not there.

K: I do not remember that I was every at a dinner for Letelier.

B: Yes.

K: The reason I do not say positively is that some nut would remember I was there. I never talked to Joe about it.

B: No, he doesn't remember. He does not remember your call.

K: I know damn well ~~you~~ that would not have happened...

B: You said the CIA was ~~in fact~~ not fooling around.

K: ~~Was that~~ For what reason would I would get a ~~t~~ message to him and say something special to him. ~~Exactly~~ Why didn't I send that message to him at the time I ~~tell~~ told him I had a message? Why didn't I call him to the White House?

B: Yes.

K: Having arranged so many secret meetings, why did I do it ~~with~~ at a journalists' house?

B: I am sorry to have to bother you with it.

K: What has happened to journalism?

B: Yes.

K: Does it make any sense to you?

B: No. I cannot imagine anybody in his right mind....

K: What that story says was I got word to him ahead of time. That I had a special message to give him. If I testified about it now I would have to say I was not at that dinner.

B: I am sorry to bother you with it.

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K: I do not know if you have ever been to Joe Alsop's dinners. There are about 30 people there. He may have been in some other room and I didn't see him. It is absurd. This is all not for publication.

B: No, I have to go through these motions. We are not going to use anything on this.

K: You have always been fair.

B: I understand you will be walking the free streets of Cardiff, one of these days?

K: That's right.

B: Will you tie it to the Middle East?

K: Yes.

B: Give my regards to Larry.

K: He is on his knees here now.

END.

SD352

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TELCON
2/3/75, 6:58 p.m.
KISSINGER/HARTMAN

RELEASED IN FULL

K: On that circular to Macomber and Kubisch, you are leaving no time -- not a second -- for me to see the Belgian Foreign Minister or Prime Minister and I must see them.

H: You have time in the middle of the day. We don't know if we are going to get the two of them together. We have got a possible time on Sunday and breakfast with Esenbel and a meeting later in the morning -

K: There is practically no time on that schedule. I have a meeting with Bitsios at 10:30 and that will last until noon and at one I am hosting a lunch --

H: If we get them both together -- you don't have to leave until 5 in the afternoon.

K: All I am saying is there is no time on that schedule and you had better see there will be some time. At sometime I will have to call on the Belgian officials. That has to be redone -- we are sending them back.

H: OK

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SD353

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TELECON

Secretary Simon/Secretary Kissinger
February 3, 1975
6:25 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

S: ....absolutely super.

K: But Bill there have been three newsmen who have come here. They say Treasury is totally opposed to a floor price and Enders put something over.

S: I have not told that to any one.

K: No. But could we both stick to the same statement here?

S: Yes. Of course.

K: No, but can we just stick to the statements in the speech?

S: There may be variations of those. We have no trouble with it. The question is how do you keep this goddamn bureaucracy quiet here?

K: I have prohibited Enders from putting anything else out on ceilings or investments here.

S: Enders was adamant we ought to fix investments here and how to have a foreign policy investment.

K: We will put an end to it here. Let's stick together on the statement.

S: Exactly.

K: I would appreciate it very much.

S: Well, I will go around right now and call each one of the people that were there and let's give some strong support to the statements.

K: Thank you.

END.

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SD347

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TELECON
Yuly Vorontsov/SecretaryKissinger
February 3, 1975
3:25 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

B: Which place do you prefer. Whatever you say. Right now Gromyko is planing to land in Geneva.

K: On the 16th.

B: And to proceed on the 17th.

K: When should be announce it.

B: When do you prefer? He's not saying anything about an announcement.

K: How about Thursday.

B: This coming Thursday. That will take a little time. He's in Cairo now. I'll try to settle this with him.

K: I'll plan to arrive in the late afternoon on the 16th and then meet with him in the evening of the 16th.

B: And then continue on the 17th.

K: We could have dinner on the 16th if he wants to.

B: OK.

END

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SD359

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TELCON

[redacted]

Sec. Kissinger

6:45 p.m. 2/4/75

RELEASED IN PART B6

B6

[redacted] Henry, good of you to call me. B6

K: I have to run to a congressional meeting, but I wanted to return your call.

[redacted] Thank you. I just wanted to tell you that following this trip to the Middle East, I came back with some very strong impressions -- I met with Javits -- I think there has to be a whole different mood in the American community here which I think may be effective in bringing some pressure to bear on the Israelis. The Israelis came through very badly of all the countries -- B6

K: Really

[redacted] The only ones who appeared inflexible-- B6

K: Well Headley Donovan told me that and I was going to call you to check with you. That's why I wanted to give you my impression because I was terribly disappointed--they just came through as the only country that wasn't reasonable, that wasn't forthcoming and they are obviously paranoid--had a terrible impression on the group.
It was almost disastrous. I told that to Rabin and other s there. I told that to Dinitz since I've been back. And it means if people go over there and come back carrying this impression it's going to make it that much harder. I think to a .....they felt that while the Arabs seemed to be reasonable and willing to compromise the Israeli was stiff necked and hardnosed

K: And Donovan said extremely arrogant

[redacted] I don't--they were more arrogant than the others, the point which was so disturbing was that one, everyone we met was military--stupid arrangement--e verybody from Rabin to Allon to Dayan--even Barlev they brought in on commerce, secondly, almost as thought they want to assure the group that this was a good investment, they had to prove how tough they can be. Don't worry we can knock them off--and we hit one General in the Golan Heights--pearl handled revolvers were standing there telling us they had 1200 Syrian tanks, we've got 600 of them , months of preparation was the best they can do, that is the best they can do, if they come on again we'll knock em out--So Haskell said to them, what are you afraid of , they said we're afraid of the Russians. The whole feeling was we can handle ourselves, don't worry about it, gives us the weapons we'll do the job--no sense of what Israel is about--no sense of what kind of a nation it is going to be, very very unfortunate. And I felt ...presentation. And I'm going to saythis B6

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I'm going down the weekend to see the Board of Governors of the American Jewish committee and I 'm going to tell them that we here in the United States have to recognize that Israel has to know it is a new day. They have to do two things: the leaders are different than at the 1940 group of Arab leaders--I don't know whether we ca believe them or not--but my God what came through was a very impressive group of people who spoke of peace and seemed to be flexible and quite moderate and secondly, I think you've got to tell them the situationin the US is diffefent. There is no longer any automatic endorsement.

B6

K: [redacted] if you can help get this across before I get there

B6

[redacted] I' m going to--That's why I just didn't want to trouble youx, I was going to do it anyway, but I want you to know that I'm convinced it is terribly important. I'm going to meet with 150 Jewish leaders down there this weekend.

K: I can tell you as Jews they should want it, because it's the only way to save Israel.

B6

[redacted] I'm convinced of it now, Henry. Your role, I don't know if Headley told you this, but he should have--is quite clear that what --wherever we went, Henry Kissinger-----, and if you'll forgive me, I'm goin g to also tell them for Crhist sake, recognize that you've got a stake in this guy--you back him to the hilt and--

K: ...don't cut me up--

B6

[redacted] I'm going to get into that. Ribicoff and Javits fully agree that this had to be said -- and we talked how to devise a strategy so we can begin to really counter some of the extreme Jewish ...in this country who can be terribly difficult to be--

K: I don't know if you saw the Safire article-

B6

[redacted] if you'll forgive me--what the hell does he--why would he do this?

K: He's blaming me for the wire tap

B6

[redacted] That s what I wondered--that's a rotten thing to do.

K: To me he was one of 20 speechwriters--if he had thought about it for 5 minutes there is only one man who had an interest in wiretapping him

B6

[redacted] It was a mobscene piece--I felt he so degraded himself by it.

K: I must run because I have to get to themeeting.

B6

[redacted] I just want you to know I'll be in there pitching. K:Many thanks.

*

SD360

TELECON
Mr. Yuri Verontsov/Secretary Kissinger
February 4, 1975
8:30 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Where are you landing now?

V: In Saudi Arabia.

K: Are they stringing you?

V: Yes, for a very long time. They are not ready to accept our diplomatic relations with them.

K: The King would be delighted to see you.

V: I got the agreement of Gromyko and it is set for the 6th of February, 11:00 a.m. Washington time.

K: Do you have a text?

V: Yes. In accordance with the agreement reached between Minister of Foreign Affairs Gromyko and the United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger will meet in Geneva on February 16-17 for exchange of opinion on matters of mutual interest of both sides.

K: You don't mind if we say "as agreed" instead of "in accordance with agreement reached?"

V: Yes. Wonderful. Gromyko suggests we should inform through our Embassies in Bern about the meeting.

K: Good idea. When will you do that?

V: Just before publication.

K: Will you approach them on Thursday morning?

V: Yes. You will do the same thing?

K: Yes.

V: In the morning Bernese time?

K: Yes. Fine.

V: I will report that to our Embassy in Bern.

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K: I am having dinner with the Foreign Minister on Sunday night.

V: Who is inviting whom?

K: Well, whoever invites whom the other will have lunch for him. I will invite him for lunch the next day, if I have dinner with him the night before.

V: Ok. Fine.

K: It maybe easier if we have dinner at your Embassy because I do not have an Embassy there. Then I have lunch for Gromyko the next day.

V: Ok. Fine. I will report it that way.

K: If it is difficult, we will do it the other way.

V: This is still on the 6th?

K: Yes.

V: Anot her matter is West Berlin and the intention of some elements namely the Free Democratsx to transfer the title of one of the institutions of Professional Education. They want to turn it into a federal agency for education.

K: I am sure we have agreed there will be no new federal agencies.

V: Ok. Hewould like to see you do something with the Germans.

K: Tell Gromyko I am not w aware of this. We will stick to the commitment I made to him in Moscow.

V: It is an institution of professional education.

K: Ok. I am assuming that Gromyko and I will review not only the Middle East but everything else.

V: Yes. I think that is what he has in mind.

K: Good.

V: Fine. Thank you very much.

K: Thank you Yuri. Give my regards to the Foreign Minister.

V: I will. K: Goodbye. END

SD363

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TELECON
Mr. Hartman/Secretary Kissinger
February 4, 1975
8:37 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Arthur, I just talked to Verontsov. Can you arrange that the Swiss government is notified on Thursday morning? We will make the announcement at 11:00 a.m. on Thursday morning. Notify them Thursday morning Swiss time.

H: Ok.

K: Do you think we should get a message off to the Turks to cool off.

H: Have you seen the message we drafted?

K: No.

H: It is in your office.

K: Where is that message?

H: I left it with your office. Where are you now?

K: In my office. Ok. Thank you.

END.

8:43 p.m.

K: You ought to be ashamed of yourself.

H: I am avoiding the snow.

K: I do not think we should meet Bitsios in Brussels.

H: I thought....

K: Have you seen the cable saying the Turks would take it very hard?

H: Yes. I think we ought to leave it to Bitsios. I think he will not want to come. Are you looking at the cable we did?

K: ~~Are you looking at the~~ Yes. Where it says, I am ready to be of assistance.... In that way I am not offering to meet with him.

H: I think thats right. K: Ok. Fine. END

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SD356

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TELCON

[redacted]/Secretary Kissinger

6:25 p.m. 2/4/75

RELEASED IN PART B6

B6

K: Hello, [redacted] B6

[redacted] Fine and you B6

K: Okay

[redacted] That's good. I wanted to give you a report. I tried to get a call through to the Prime Minister ...that matter. I couldn't so I reached a fellow by the name of ...Shearer who is really ....for Israel--this is on the Saturday--the day after I saw you B6

K: Right.

[redacted] And He was leaving and I told him what the problem was, then he called me from Israel and said the Secretary or the Premier is absolutely --something has to be done for you in that respect. But he wanted me to tell you that when you see him in Israel, be sure to bring it up because in his words, he has a plan that he thinks will do the job for you. Now I thought he'd get you over the weekend--to give you that message. Then Zeb (?) called me this morning --got back this morning, for you own information--he said--I'm not sure it will be Azheb (?) because he said I'm not sure he gets along with Rabih too well, but he said now that I'm here I can tell you that ~~what~~ he has as much concern about this as I would have or you would have. In other words, something has to be donein this country to --among our coalitions to get this thing back on track because it is not right. So they apparently are going to do something about and he's got a plan he will discuss with you. B6

K: Right. Many thanks [redacted] B6

with Len---

[redacted] Okay, I just wanted to say--by the way--I also played golf at ----- / I must say I never heard such praise for the State Department --the operation the way it is running--how different it is , while he says he wasn't there in the early days--he said people that are part of not only the embassy but part of the opposite embassies --everybody looks up to what you are doing. And what you have done to this whole division. You've given them a new spirit a new character-- B6

K: I'm delighted to hear that

[redacted] I'll also tell you if you have a sense of humor--I told Lew--that the Thursday afternoon--before he left for the---I said Lew--you need a little material--why don't you say Henry used to have some great friends B6

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out here--one in particular who he sought some advice from -- this fellow said, I'll tellyou what, when you get Salzburg call a press conference and tell them you are going to quit unless the press get off your back -- so now he is no longer looking to Hollywood for advice.

K: Haheh heh.

[redacted] So Lew says to me -- you know him, I don't know him well. He's liable not to laugh, I said you don't know Henry Kissinger. B6

K: I would have liked it.

[redacted] Lew said afterwards, he would have enjoyed that. B6

K: I would have--thank you [redacted] B6

[redacted] Take care of yourself and Wallace calls me sand said now remember if you talk to Henry, the house is his. B6

K: We had a terrific time.

[redacted] Henry, you just can't run around the world without taking some time off. And the most beautiful time is Easter down ther. You ought to think about it B6

K: Good.

[redacted] Have a wonderful trip. B6

K: Thanks for all your friendship--

[redacted] Okay. B6

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SD358

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Henry Kissinger
Sec. Schlesinger
2/4/75 6:36 p.m.

K: Jim, we are just sending a paper to the President on the Bhutto visit and I find to my dismay that that it hasn't been coordinated with you and it involves the issue of arms sales in Pakistan

S: Ah huh/

K: Our view is that the President ought to consider cash sales, not FMS or credit

S: Okay

K: On a very moderate level. But you know, just for the principle of not cutting off--embargoing the friendly country.

S: I'm perfectly happy to go along with your feelings on that--I am not real sympathetic with the Paks but that's just my personal observation. If you think it is advisable, we'll go along with that. You can put me down as mildly negatively--hows that?

K: Mildly niggardly?

S: [Laughs] Yeh. I'm not really worried about the diplomatic thing--I just think that we've got one hell of a congestion on arms production

K: We're thinking primarily of defensive weapons, not tanks or airplanes

S: That's all right. As long as they don't get into the way of our production sp----and they just get into line for production items, I don't see anything wrong with that--your problem is primarily with the Indians.
That may be what you want to do.

K: That is what we partially want to do--to just open it enough so you can step it up if it ever serves our purpose--we are thinking no more than $ 50 million a year--we are not talking about a huge program.

S: Okay, fine.
Hear we got a go ahead on Malmstrom

K: Yes. On that basis that you and I discussed the other day.

S: Very good. Well tomorrow I'm off to try to sell the Defense Budget --to 1,000 of critics.

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K Well, Jim, any help I can give you, you put me down before committees or anything else

S: Good. There was a call for you from Passman's committee on the Cambodian supplemental--you've probably heard about that.

K: Yeh, but I can't do it--wait when does he want me?

S: I don't know, I just heard about it this morning, from some of our people.

K: I'll be eager to help on that too. I'll have to look at that, I don't think I can do it on the day he wants me.
But I will do it on some day

S: Okay

K: Good Jim and all the best

S: Oh thank you.

SE2 *

TELECON
Mr. Atherton/Secretary Kissinger
February 5, 1975
6:19 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: You and Chuck Robinson get together and give me a paper on how we get relief from the Saudis. I asked for it ten days ago. On what economic relief would be like in the bilateral field.

A: I will check on it. I think you asked Mr. Ingersoll and Mr. Enders to get at it.

K: I am assuming the Undersecretary for Economic Affairs gets into these things.

A: I will check on the status.

K: I want to see you in twenty minutes on the trip anyway.

A: Ok. I will...(secretary hangs up).

END.

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SE 1

TELECON
Mr. Robinson/Secretary Kissinger
February 5, 1975
6:15 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Say, Chuck, how could it be you don't understand I wanted your response to something the Saudis ~~xxxxxx~~ sent us through intelligence channels two months ago?

R: I have a memo I will have in your hands....

K: Why should you have talked me out of it? Why shouldn't I do it? What's the argument against it?

R: There is no argument against it. We have the agricultural group coming back....

K: They have nothing to do with it.

R: We have something we are going to propose...

K: What can an agricultural group do on a bilateral oil deal?

R: Well I misunderstood.

K: Chuck, how can we do big things? Well, it did not get to you. I had Atherton...

R: Roy has not talked to me. I have two projects. ...

K: I got a message two months ago saying the Americans have not ever asked us for anything bilateral. For all this time I have tried to get something out of this Department on a bilateral deal.

R: I have a proposal for a joint U.S.-Saudi project.

K: I want the money. I want ~~the~~ it invested here. Like that British oil deal.

R: I have a Specific project that deals with it. I will talk to you on Friday.

K: I need something in this area.

R: I discussed it with Dick Cooper.

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K: If you discussed it with him, it will be....

R: Just generally.

K: Simon is opposed to it.

R: They will keep openminded on it. I have a proposal that deserves serious consideration. Develop a mutual bilateral relationship.

K: We better meet tomorrow. Can you get it finished tomorrow or by tonight? But Chuck I do not know whether you have ever talked to the King. You cannot talk to him about a lot of details. I can't give him 20 projects. I have to have a concept.

R: I have two proposals either one of which tied together make good sense. I can get part of it in your hands tonight and the other by noon tomorrow.

K: Ok. Do that. But I need a concept. I need to give him an idea of the what we want relief for. I want something from him, not a contribution to him. He will take all these contributions we offer.

R: That's why these two things tie together.

K: I want something that takes care of the balance of payments problem or lowers the price for us.

R: That's what I am proposing. I will have that in your hands by noon tomorrow. The other I will get to you before 7:00 p.m.

K: Ok. Thank you.

END.

SE7 |*

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELCON
Carl Maw/Secretary Kissinger
12:05 p.m. - 2/5/75

M: Is there any way we can move on the Hill with this Commission? Even Fraiser is now for it.

K: What commission?

M: To go out there.

K: Let me talk to the President again. I know, you guys always follow this -- it will not work -- but I'm going to ask him again.

M: Alright. But let us go up and talk.

K: What do you want to talk about and to whom?

M: To Doc Morgan for example.

K: Let me talk to the President. I forgot to raise it this morning.

M: Okay. And I've got a problem on [redacted] and the Law of the Sea. Is it alright if we go along with him. B6

K: Yes. Well you want him.

M: Well, he's the only one I can get.

K: Why wouldn't [redacted] do it? B6

M: He's got too many commitments. He can't pull away from he says. He's all tied up and he knows this is a full time job and he can't do it. I didn't ask him why but he was very clear.

K: Alright.

M: I tried to press him but it wouldn't work.

K: I'll let you know.

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SE5 1*

TELCON
11:55 - 2/5/75
Bob Anderson/Secretary Kissinger

RELEASED IN PART
B6

A: Good morning Mr. Secretary. Two or three things I need guidance on. Esembel publicly announced in Ankara that he will not attend -- not go to Brussels. I understand you had no reaction from....

K: You do not discuss anything else and do not leave open -- just say if they ask if you meet Bitsios if that's your question. I do not want to leave the impression that that's up to Bitsios.

A: Right. They will ask me in view of the fact that Esembel is not going to Brussels now what...

K: Just say you have nothing to say on the subject. Or do you want to make another policy statement on Greece. What do you suggest we say.

A: I will say I have nothing to say...

K: If you say we're in touch with him it implies that we might meet him.

A: Right. I just have nothing to say on it and I hope to be able to give you all the details on the Secretary's...

K: In the next few days.

A: trip tomorrow.

K: No.

A: I can't say tomorrow?

K: We hope tomorrow.

A: I hope tomorrow. Alright now, in view of Marvin Kalb's thing that he came out with on Gromyko. I don't know where he got it.

K: What did he say flatly.

A: Yes, he said he will be meeting him in ...

K: Well, when did the sob ... You know we're just a whore house.

A: I know, it's just .. He called me yesterday and I gave him the guidance as you gave it to me and he already had had something else. I said that there had been exchanges on the subject, I had nothing to announce which is the way we discussed yesterday. Then Sadat came

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out in a press conference today in Cairo saying Secretary Kissinger will be visiting Cairo on February 12 and we welcome this visit.

K: GD/say ~~you~~ it we have agreed with these governments. Don't let yourself get beaten from pillar to post on when an announcement should be made. Now any of them go and beat their own deadlines that there problem. we are not goinng to do it.

A: Right. Okay.

K: It can hardly be a secret that I'm going to the Middle East next week.

A: Okay. And I'll just say I hope to give you all the details tomorrow. Gwertzman and all the others are screaming at me.

K: What do you mean screaming at you?

A: Well they're saying everybody else is telling us. That Sadat's announcing it etc.

K: When we have cable traffic on specific times we'll gladly give it to them.

A: Okay. I can handle that. That doesn't worry me at all.

K: The President's waiting for me can you come to the point a little faster. B6

A: Yes sir.

K: [redacted]

A: I just want to deny it. Okay. That's all I need to bother you with now.

K: Okay. Thank you.

*

SE3

TELECON
Congressman Otto Passman/Secretary Kissinger
February 5, 1975
2:26 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

P: OK. This is Otto Passman.

K: Mr. Chairman, how are you.

P: Do you have a moment?

K: I have to run to see Prime Minister Bhutto, and I'm already late.

P: This is something for you, not for me.

K: How about telling me briefly.

P: I'm going to talk about rice, Cambodia and Vietnam. I need two votes and I'm not the one to get them. If you have time, call me.

K: I'll call you before the end of the day and I'll do everything you suggest to get the maximum number of votes.

P: Fair enough. Let me tell you when you call. It will take just a couple of minutes.

K: OK.

END

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SE4 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec. Ingersoll/HAK
11:53 a.m. - 2/5/75

I: I just wanted to mention to you that at the Executive Committee Economic Policy Board this morning everybody present agreed that we had no objections to going ahead with the Pan Am mandate. Then Seidman who wasn't there called back later and said that he wanted to postpone action on it until there had been a study on U. S. investments. I just thought this might give an unsatisfactory signal to the Iranians if we did delay it. I wondered how you felt about it?

K: I don't think we should.

I: Alright, I'll get back to Seidman then. I just wanted to be sure on how you felt about it because I think we shouldn't.

K: We cann't delay it.

I: Alright. I'll tell Seidman that.

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SE 8 1*

TELCON
Sen. Javits/HAK
3:43 p.m. - 2/5/75

RELEASED IN FULL

J: Henry. David Suskind wants to do a television show to discuss you that means considerably in depth and he has got to do it and it will be on the end of next week and his debaters are Tony Lwis and Brazenski. Theoretically against you and Joe Kraft and he wants very much for me to go on.

K: I'd be flattered.

J: You would.
K: Yes.
J: That's all I need to know. If you wish me to do it I'll do it.

K: I'm assuming you'd be generally supportive.

J: Yes, of course.

K: But you know you of course have your own position. Did you see that Safire article.

J: I'll have to read it now if I'm going to do this. I haven't read it yet.

K: His basic point is that I colluded with Dobrynin to thwart the agreement with Jackson.

J: That's all such bullshit it's funny.

K: I'd be very pleased if you would do it.

J: I just wanted to be sure because this is likely to be shown all over the country and a pretty good panel.

K: I'd be very pleased. Well, Lewis would be viciously against.

J: So I gather. I know Tony Lewis pretty well.

K: And Brezenski you know.

J: So I'll prepare it and go on with him. Henry, God speed on what you do. It's so critically important it isn't even funny for more reasons than just the Middle East.

K: You know that is true.

J: And my own feeling now is in the best interests of the Middle East and peace we've got to simply trump this Arab oil card. And I'm

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going to devote myself very, very heavily to that.

K: And that's what I'm trying to do with all these speeches.

J: I like what you said very much and it makes alot of business sense and I rather think that things are going to move in the direction of much bolder than it's taken so far.

K: Well, if we can get that done that will enable us to do alot of other things.

J: Well, I thoroughly agree and I'm -- we'll lend ourselves to it strongly. With all respect I don't think the President's program you know on the -- I'm not asking you to comment -- three dollars optimum but you can't beat something with nothing.

K: Well, I was going to say from my foreign policy point of view anything that replaces it of some value I can live with. But you shouldn't treadison it without having something immediately in its place.

J: Exactly except we can't have a standstill. I thoroughly agree. Do you feel alright?

K: I feel fine.

J: Because you've got a hard trip coming up.

K: It's going to be difficult.

J: Very. By the by you know we're putting together a parliamentary delegation to go to the Soviet Union. Did you know that?

K: No I didn't.

J: Well, it's a return to the Soviet delegation.

K: Oh yes. Are you joining it.

J: I will join it and Scott and Sparkman are going to be the bipartisan leaders. But I started this in 1962 so I am going to go. And we'll talk before I go. You'll be gone about a week.

K: About 10 days.

J: Good take care of your health.

SE10 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Phil Habib/HAK
10:58 a.m. - 2/6/75

K: Phil. Can you repeat to me exactly what that question was of Valeriani because I'm thinking of calling Schlosser of NBC.

H: Don't. The question was -- I don't recall it exactly.

K: You give me the question Phil and then I'll decide what to do. I don't want your advice.

H: The question was, "To what extent is the request for this additional assistance brought about by the Secretary's relationship to the peace agreements and so on. Is it a question of the Secretary's ego." The word ego was used. Given the fact that he had negotiationed the settlement. And peace had not...

K: Well, give this to Anderson. I want him at least to speak to Valeriani

H: Let me tell you what I said. I gave a very strong answer.

K: I don't care about your answer. I care about the question.

H: But it knocked him back on his heels.

K: I have no question Phil that you defended me.

H: I did more than defend you sir. I knocked him back.....

K: I know. When State Department comes after me it's by leaks. Listen you don't leak. I don't worry about you. Remember that Korean stuff that you were going to give me a few weeks ago.

H: I've got a draft on my desk.

K: I don't need a draft I can look at the ~~KX~~ original cables.

H: I have to get them. They were looking for some more stuff and they were going to bring...

know you
K: Phil my boy. I/don't want me to have it. Can you have it there at noon.

H: You'll have the stuff.

K: You know you can get it.

H: I'll call them right now.

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K: Your're just afraid I'm going to do some mischief with it so you.

H: Come on.

K: Give it to me by noon like a good boy.

H: What I'll do is give you my memo and then I'll have them bring -- of course they won't leave that stuff with me. I'll have them bring it to your office at 12:00.

K: Or 1:00.

H: That will be better. I have to get them out from NSA. It's all out at NSA.

SE 9 *

TELCON
2/6/75 - 10:22 a.m.
Arthur Hartman/HAK

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Arthur: Maybe Aqaba would be better if it isn't so close to the 10th.

H: I see.

K: But that means I want you there. Don't you think?

H: Yes. No, I would arrange to pick you up at your previous stop.

K: What I want is offer him both but say I will -- it will have to depend on my schedule which one of them works better. And then go to the two countries and -- in that case you'd have to tell the Jordanians I'm arriving earlier. See what I mean. I'd leave Israel at 1 and then and that would give me an extra two hours.

H: Now Roy is doing that cable both to Cairo and to...

K: Yes, and tell them to flash back an answer.

H: Right. But you want us to express a -- well, just say it depends on your schedule but you'd have to choose which ever one and we'd like to know if we could do both.

K: Right.

H: We might have to help him get to Aqaba, in other words...

K: Tell him we'll pick him up in an airplane.

H: Well, I don't think he'd want to be picked up in Greece but maybe we could pick him up in Beirut or something. But we've put in a sentence saying that if there is a transportation difficulty we could help.

K: Okay.

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SE13 *

TELECON
Ambassador McCloskey/Secretary Kissinger
February 6, 1975

RELEASED IN FULL

K: On that Reuters guy. I think he is a good fellow.

M: There is no question that the organization and the people are good and the man in charge of it all is a personal friend of mine and I have just gotten off the phone with him. Our problem is that we ~~xxx~~ will be severely criticized for keeping off an important ~~x~~ American news organization in favor of a foreign organization and Pat Helperin (SP?) understands this.

K: That fellow Lars hit me downstairs.

M: That wasn't necessary.

K: He did it on the grounds ~~x~~ that I took his name off the list.

M: I told him last night that we have a real problem -- that if we take a foreign news organization off and keep the American organization on that will be greatly criticized and there was no reference to your bumping him off. They understand our view. I told Helperin that we would lean over to try to accommodate them -- maybe next time ~~then~~ they can go on it. But if Lars told you that -- he made it up. Unless you want to bump someone off and take seventeen press.

K: That ~~xxxx~~ would be too much.

END

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SE 14 1*

TELCON
2/6/75, 7:17
KISSINGER/EAGLETON (& State Dept.)

RELEASED IN FULL

The secretary asked Eagleton to notify Esenbel that it is no longer possible to meet him in Cairo on the 12th and that he would prefer to meet him in Aqaba, that transportation could be arranged.

The ~~Eqqx~~ Egyptians object to the meeting on the 12th thinking it would be detracting from Secretary's visit there. The Secretary strongly prefers Aqaba but could conceivably make it the morning of the 13th in Cairo but it would wreck the rest of his schedule.

Mr. Eagleton agreed to do a cable on the above.

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SE 15 *

TELCON
Cong. Goodell
Sec. Kissinger
February 6, 1975
2:45 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

G: How are you?

K: Fine. How are you?

G: I have three quick items. One, I would like you to think about and check with me. I had some contact -- a former college professor contacted me and he has done a great many writings on the Congress. He was contacted by a lot of second echelon who indicated that they were interested in my visiting Cuba. Frankly, I think their interest is that they know of my friendship for Ford. I have sent absolutely nothing back and said I would check it out.

K: If you go on your own I have no objections. If there is any presumption of being an emissary for President Ford...

G: I would never do that but I would never go if it would be interpreted that way and I would certainly deny that and I would not go in any official capacity.

K: We are in contact and they have to be kept to one channel. Otherwise I have no objections to your going.

G: You don't think it would complicate matters in otherwords.

K: No.

G: O.K. That is fine. I don't know whether I will go or not. I have no great desire to go. I was afraid it might be interpreted that way even though I would deny it.

K: It doesn't worry me.

G: Number two, I spoke with a couple of people in the State Dept, Mr. Polansky last, about a matter that came to my attention through a client that Mr. Kulakauf (sp) in the Soviet Union...

K: I don't think think this is a good time to invite him over. It might look like we want him to maneuver into the position struggle.

G: I understand. Third, of a private nature, Mr. Christoffny who was Chairman of the Board of Aerospacial -- a very large French company that makes the Concord -- is coming over and will be in Washington on Tuesday and the question is whether somebody you think appropriate from the State Department might att end the dinner. Not obviously to discuss in great detail

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the Concord but whatever factors are involved.

K: I will produce somebody.

G: The name suggested was Enders. Is he the appropriate one?

K: He would be good. I will talk to him.

G: That's it. Thank you, Henry. Nice to talk to you.

K: Good.

SE 19 1*

TELCON
Sen. Javits/Kissinger
2/7/75 - 5:14 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: Hello?

J: Henry I'm sorry to trouble you, just before your going, and I wouldn't of except that this can't wait for your return. It's about [redacted] tHe came in to see me. He's a very bright guy. There's been a certain amount of agitation against him on the ground that if you put him in ACDA he's a hawk in a chicken coop. But do you want him? B6

K: Yes I do.

J: You do want him? That is not the information which is universally emanating from your office.

K: From my office? They have no right to make such a statement.

J: O.K. That's all I need to know and I'll do my best to get him for you. But I just wanted you to know the circumstances.

K: Well can you tell me who in my office....

J: I certainly cannot, and if I could I wouldn't.

K: O.K.

J: [Laughter].

K: O.K. Jack.

J: You deposited your money in a good bank.

K: I know that.

J: [Laughter]. Have a good trip.

K: See you soon.

J: Alright. Good bye.

K: Good bye.

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SE 18 *

TELCON
Amb. Zahedi/Kissinger
2/7/75 - 5:03 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello?

Z: Good afternoon, Sir;

K: How's the old Iranian intelligence doing?

Z; The old Iranian intelligence is very bad. [Laughter]. I have talked with His Majesty, I have conveyed your respect and your regards to him. He has thanked very much. I have brought it to his attention about the dates we have been discussing and about the place. Now I am glad to say that I have been able to arrange it such a way ~~that~~ which would make it easy for everybody. He will come to Zurich for that date, which would be the 18th.

K: Right. Now I have to see whether I can rearrange something I had to do here on the 19th.

Z: Well I tell you what we can do. You can come for lunch on the 18th.

K: No, that I cannot do, it will have to ....

Z: You'll have to do it in the afternoon.

K: It would have to be late afternoon or dinner.

Z: Alright. You come late afternoon. You have all the talk and then you have dinner with him.

K: That's what I thought. I can't get in much before 6:00.

Z: Don't worry about it. So then let's make it _____ because I have to call him back and I have arranged that he will come to Zurich but any time after 6:00 you come. I shall be in touch with your Embassy in Paris - you are staying at the Embassy, aren't you?

K: No, I'll be there just for a day.

Z: How will I know, then, what time you are coming so I come with the car to the airport?

K: Well I'll let you know all the details early next week.

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Z: Alright. So then we will arrange it that on 18th evening you will have dinner with the Shah.

K: Excellent.

Z: Of course the Queen will be in Samoras (St. Moritz)? for your information.

K: Yes, well Nancy will be with me but she can take care of herself.

Z; Alright, or we could arrange anything she would like. We could have the ladies for her, that would be very easy we could arrange it. Or we could have a talk, you and him and then for dinner she would join us. So that's easy, ~~xxxxxxx xxxxx~~ how you could arrange it.

K: Good.

Z; So, marvelous. Then the 18th, dinner and afternoon, and all the night.

K: Good.

Z: Right?

K: Thank you.

Z: Thank you very much.

K: I look forward to it.

Z; See you then.

K: Goodbye.

SE 21 *

TELCON
Joe Alsop/Kissinger
2/7/75 - 5:21 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello?

A: Hello, Henry.

K: How are you, Joe?

A: Well, I'm fine, but is this Turkish thing as bad as I think it is?

K: It is every bit, it's worse. Makarias is now making our foreign policy. Makarias ~~x~~ wants a stalemate and the humiliation of the Turks. We are driving the country that has the largest ground force in NATO, next to the Germans, out of NATO. The country that stands between the Soviet Union and the Middle East.

A: And they _____

K: You know, Vietnam is awful, but at least you can understand that was a big domestic debate. This one you can't even understand.

A: Well then you got the Portuguese thing, too.

K: Yeah, but then you have the Chinese looking at us, seeing us knocking out a prop from the containment of the Soviet Union for no discernable reason. And what will they think?

A: I know what they'll think. They'll think we're crazy, or paralytic or both.

K: But will they deal with a crazy paralytic?

A: I doubt it.

K: Well that's the problem.

A: Listen, your old friend there has come out on top again. Oh, dear. Well, I'm not going to write about it, just thinking. You'll be back when?

K: In about ten days.

A: Well could we sort of think of getting together as soon as you do come back?

K: Yes, definitely.

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A: Lovely.

K: And another thing it will do to complete the circle, is it will ....

A: Knock the props out from under you, too.

K: Well that too, but that is now the national sport, but it will knock the props out from under Karamanleis.

A: What are you going to do about it, Henry, have you thought about him, are you going to stay, or just say the hell with it?

K: I don't know what to do yet. But we can talk about it. I can't do anything until my trip is over.

A: Yeah. Well, I'll see you when you get back. Is Nancy going with you?

K: Yeah. I have to go to a meeting now.

A: A million, million, million times luck.

K: Thank you, Joe. Bye.

SE 25 *

TELECON
Mr. Hartman/Secretary Kissinger
February 7, 1975
8:00 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: ....military action this weekend. ~~Isn't~~ Shouldn't we send a note to the Turks telling them for god's sake don't do that?

H: To send it to Esenbel does not do much good. If we want to go again to K_____, if they are ~~xxxxxxx~~ planning something he is probably not being consulted.

K: If we tell him he is ~~xxxxxxx~~ apt to go to K_____. I would like to send a message saying he should take it up with K_____. That in a month's time we can probably get this ~~xxanged~~ changed. But if there are _____ actions it will be impossible, don't you think?

H: Yes. I am becoming so discouraged about them. The reports look authentic. ~~Xxxxxxx~~ Oneof our fellows went around yesterday saw nothing unusual and today they were all ready ~~xx~~ to go. We will get up a message.

K: We better get it out tonight.

H: Yes.

K: Ok. Good.

END.

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SE 29 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
February 7, 1975
7:27 p.m.

K: We have a cable here from Scali recommending we call ~~the~~ a Security Council meeting if the Turks move. He thinks this will keep the Soviets from calling for an international conference.

S: The advantage of the pre-emption is to go get it on the ground floor and put in a resolution which would take note of the talks and say get on with the Denktash/Clerides talks. We could collect some support. Then you would be confronted with some of these outside proposals. What the Cypriots would want would be Soviet support or substantive proposals whatever this February 10 thing is. This resolution, of course, would also call for restraint on all sides. I think we should consider it. In the long run it gives you no more nor no less control of the proceedings. Lets look at it in the morning. We could move quickly if we need to.

K: Lets get together around 10:00 a.m.

S: Ok,

END

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SE 22 *

TELECON
David Rockefeller/Secretary Kissinger
February 7, 1975
11:48 AM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I have the felling that my office has screwed up our meeting.

R: Your assistant, Mr. Borg, didn't seem to know of any possibility of it.

K: I would have thought, however, that he would check when it concerns you. At any rate, I proposed to me to meet this morning and then I heard from Nancy that you were hosting a luncheon for Bhutto.

R: We're doing it here at the bank at 12:30.

K: I then switched around something I shouldn't have to suggest breakfast at 8:30 but by that time you had left.

R: He call and it seemed to be pretty clear that you couldn't do it, but we can do it on the phone.

K: ~~xxx~~ He called to tell you I could not do it. I told him 11:30.

R: He told me that, but I couldn't do it anyway.

K: I would have changed it.

R: You have enough worries without worrying about me.

K: I didn't know what was going on.

R: I think Mr. Borg was under such pressure, he didn't feel he could reach you. It's no problem. I did sent you 3 memos which you may take a look at.

K: I will read them. I may call you over the weekend about it.

R: ~~Xxx~~ Have /you a minutes or would you rather do it over the weekend.

K: I'd rather do it over the weekend.

R: I'll be in Tarrytown most of the weekend.

K: Good. I'll call you Sunday.

R: That would be great.

K: My apologies. END

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SE17 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
William Buckley/Kissinger
11:03 a.m. - 2/7/75

K: Hello.

B: Hi, Henry.

K: Hello, your grace.

B: How are you, Doc?

K: That was a sarcastic note you sent me and the fact that you weren't correct doesn't make it any less wounding.

B: (Laughs) I've been practicing.

K: I tell you I don't want to go into all the complicated details, but I will definitely do a program with you before May 15th.

B: Oh, that's wonderful!! How're you feeling, Doc?

K: Well, if you keep writing those silly columns making me soft and Jackson tough, I'll get discouraged.

B: Remember all those years you told me you wanted pressure from the right.

K: Yeh, but not on me.

B: (Laughs) You're the whole show now.

K: Now, Bill, what I called you about - I didn't know you were in Switzerland. Are you still?

B: Yes, I am.

K: I wanted to get together with you and a few of your friends because I'm really getting very concerned.

B: On the Vietnam issue.

K: Well, no, that's just a symptom of a general collapse of authority.

B: Yeh. Yeh, yeh. Yeh. Yeh.

K: And you know it's no longer a policy issue. Policy issues are manageable.

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B: That's right. That's right.

K: But we've got to get a few people together now to save the country.

B: Well, uh, I'm at your service as always.

K: I thought if you and your brother and say, four or five people that you designate would meet with me at some point.

B: OK. When will you be back from the Middle East? In about 10 days?

K: Yeh. About the 18th.

B: Listen, let me try to set it up and I'll drop -- who should I drop a note to your way?

K: Would you be back --

B: No, I won't be back until the 28th approximately.

K: OK. Well, let's do it early in March then.

B: OK. OK. I'll set it up and correspond with who - Winston Lord or directly with you?

K: Larry Eagleburger.

B: OK. Fine. Fine. Will do.

K: Where are you in Switzerland?

B: Rougemont.

K: How far from Geneva?

B: About an hour - an hour and a quarter - an hour and a half.

K: That's too far to come by for breakfast.

B: When?

K: The morning of the 17th.

B: Would it be a breakfast with a million people?

K: No, no, it would be breakfast with me alone.

B: I'd be delighted to do it.

K: Then we can discuss -- you know that's not a substitute for the other one. We could discuss what I have on my mind.

B: OK. Well, I'll tell you what, Henry, why don't I simply wait until your plans are fixed but I'll hold the 17th or whatever you say.

K: Let's say around 8:00 o'clock in my suite. But I don't know yet where I'm staying. Where can I get in touch with you?

B: I'll be right here at the Chateau de Rougemont. It's 029 481 59.

K: OK.

B: So I'll just hold the 17th until I hear from you.

K: Good.

B: Terrific.

K: And if breakfast doesn't work out, maybe an hour before I leave.

B: Let me know at least a day ahead of time.

K: Oh no, I'll let you know well before then. I'll let you know by the middle of next week.

B: Wonderful.

K: Good Bill, it's nice of you to call. I didn't expect such quick service. Did I ask you to call me?

B: You surely did.

K: I didn't think you would call from there -- not until you got back from America.

B: That's entirely too casual for my rhythm of affairs.

K: (Laughs) Well, I'm flattered.

B: Have a good trip, my friend.

K: Thank you and I hope to see you on the 17th.

B: I look forward to it.

K: Bye, Bill.

SE 30 *

TELECON
Mr. Saunders / Secretary Kissinger
February 7, 1975
6:18 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: The reason for Robinson's visit to Jordan is not to meet the King but to work. To see what economic relations need discussion. Your cable puts it as if it were a social thing.

S: That's not my intention. If it reads that way...

K: Just tell them I want...that he is going to take charge of all these economic commissions and I am eager to have him meet the King. We do not need agreement now on who sits in on what meeting.

END.

7:12 p.m.

K: Will you get off the ~~back~~ back of these people? What made you think I wanted Robinson in on a Sadat meeting?

S: My understanding...I thought you...

K: Let me handle that when I get there. The Sadat meeting is always very informal.

S: Ok. We will leave it out of the telegrams and you will take care of it when you get there.

K: That's right.

END

7:25 p.m.

K: What have we decided to do? Are we going to sign the agreement with the Egyptians?

S: You have a memo up there.

K: I will do whatever the Egyptians want me to do.

S: Fahmy said the same thing.

K: What do you want me to do?

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S: I think they should do it before you get there. You should not get involved in it. Should I tell Eilts to go ahead?

K: Yes. But they want it comparable to the new one.

S: The recommendation is not to change it at this point. The interest rate is so low. Much of the ....

K: Well, all right, will you explain all this to Eilts? Leave it open if they want me to sign it, I will. Tell them I will do whatever they want. I have no preference.

END.

SE 20

1*

TELCON
Secretary Butz/Kissinger
2/7/75 - 5:19 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello?

B: Henry, Earl Butz. Last night at the White House you raised a question about additional wheat to Egypt. I checked with my people. Discussions have gone forward on that for the additional 200,000 tons which both you and I discussed with Sadat at different times, and my people tell me no question about availability. We're ready, but somehow it hasn't cleared your people over there yet. But I think he should tell Sadat that this is in the mill, ready to go. I raised the question about how we're going to assist..... you plan to get up there, too, I think.

K: Yeah.

B: When I was there we were negotiating 100,000 tons - 75 of wheat and 25 of rice. That has been shined. I understand they're having some difficulty on getting their details worked out and part of the problem is that Syria doesn't really assign responsibility to somebody to be responsible for it. So that question comes up. From out point of view this is on tract.

K: Can we raise that a little bit if we had to?

B: Can we raise .. we got the stuff available, Henry. No problem there. And I think it depends on the allocation by countries that we've worked out and I think that can be done. If we feel the need for it, I'll back you up on it.

K: O.K., Earl, many thanks.

B: I understand that our shipments to Israel are on schedule; no problem there I am told.

K: Many thanks.

B: Luck to you, Henry.

K: Thank you, Earl. Good bye.

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SE 36 1*
RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Robert McNamara
Sec. Kissinger
February 8, 1975
5:18 p.m.

M: I was just fighting one of your battles. Someone going to take a blast at your statement about going to war in case of strangulation.

K: It is working beautifully.

M: You damn right. A beautiful statement from the Brookings ~~Institute~~ man yesterday.

K: Did you see Yamani's statement.

M: No.

K: He said he hoped oil would never be used as a weapon.

M: He had begun to say something like that about two weeks ago. Yarmalinsky was on the line.

K: This country is crazy. Attacking me....

M: I said before you write that article you write an article on the Middle East and tell me what you think should be done out there. After that then we will talk about whether we should or should not use military weapons in the event of strangulation.

K: I called you about seeing you for half an hour before I go.

M: Yes. When are you going?

K: Tomorrow night.

M: Sure. I am relatively free.

K: How about noon.

M: Sure, Any place you want.

K: Come to the State Department at 12:00

M: I will be there.

END

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1*

SE 39

TELCON
Amb. Macomber/For. Min. Esenbel
Sec. Kissinger
February 8, 1975
4:43 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

M: Hello, Mr. Secretary, this is Bill Macomber.

K: How are you?

M: Fine. Esenbel is with me and we have no indication of this. The For. Min. has checked with Gen. Sancar and the Prime Minister and the President and all of them flately deny that there will be anything likt this tomorrow.

K: Bill, I am very grateful to you.

M: We are keeping a very close eye and for the country to do this it has to get rived up.

K: We have what are alledged to be very reliable reports and this is why I called Esenbel to begin with. People are beginning to crank up the Security Countil meetings. I have written Esenbel a personal letter today.

M: It has come in.

K:: The personal one.

M: About dates. It has just arrived. It is 1:00 in the morning here. I have told him the general contents.

K: It is to make him understand that we understand his problems and that we will really be in a very difficult position if there is no restraint on the Turkish side.

M: He is right here. He would like to talk to you.

E: Hello, Mr. Secretary.

K: I appreciate the care with which you are going into this problems.

E: I talked with everyone I could talk to. The highest people and they all said I could deny it.

K: All right. I will call the President and tell him that.

E: We woke the Chief of the General Staff and I had the Prime Minister talk to the President.

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K: I appreciate it very much.

E: You should understand that we are facing, certainly myself, very heavy pressure here. It is building up. The people are getting very much offended. You understand the psychology of it.

K: You are a proud people and I understand this. I am going to be out of the country for 10 days and the Congress is going to be out of the city for 10 days. When we come back and when the Congress comes back I will devote myself fulltime to this problem.

E: Yes. You understand for me to meet you I have to have a reason.

K: ~~You understand for me to meet you I have to have a reason.~~ I understand and I will do my best and if you will be patient as long as you possibly can, I think we can use this period to come up with a stronger relationship and then to move the Cyprus issue forward.

E: Even you know better. If you ~~will~~ feel that you can give something you can come here on your trip. You can stop here but then I think it would be proper for you to be able to say something.

K: I will plan to do it in connection with my March 6 trip.

E: I can ~~anytime~~ meet you anytime anywhere later on when you think you are ready to give something to me.

K: I understand. If in the meantime you keep the status quo; you don't do anything.

E: I can tell you there is no truth to it.

K: All right. ~~Many~~ Many thanks. We will be in close touch. We will keep you informed of any talks we have with the Greeks.

E: Yes. Please do.

K: There will be nothing behind your back. Any rumors you hear -- what you don't hear from me is not true.

E: Thank you and good night.

END

SE 43 1*

TELCON
2/9/75, 1:55 p.m.
KISSINGER/CONTE

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I called you the other day because I understand the Passman Committee is going to work at this aid to Cambodia.

C: We xxx will work at the aid as far as authorized -- any more than that they will have to go through the Authorization Committee.

K: I think they are working out something by which they will let you add it.

C: I thought we were limited to the $200 million for the military and $177 million for economic -- $377 -- that is all we had before unless the Authorization Committee reports a somewhat --

K: That they will do, but what I wanted to tell you is that I think the foreign policy impact of our not doing this would be quite serious -- of the Congress not going along with our request.

C: With the -- over 2 1/2 million ?

K: That's right

C: Let me give it a hard look.

K: I know what the public mood is and I know what it is in Massachusetts -- and what the mood will be

C: They don't want even the $377 million.

K: And what their mood will be if they see Communist troops markhing into Phnom Pehh -- that that is guaranteed to happen by April 15 if they don't get the money.

C: We will take it up right after we get back -- the $200 million and the $177 million -- unless the Foreign Affairs Committee does something. On that I have asked that they appropriate the full amount -- $177 million for economic, -- if the Foreign Affairs Committee moves that and goes higher, we will take a hard look.

K: I would appreciate it.

C: Get a little relaxation this week.

K: In the Middle East? I am going to have a great time.

C: We need you. Take care.

K: Aren't you nice.

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SE 52

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Mr. Sisco
Sec. Kissinger
Feb. 20, 1975
2:15 p.m.

K: I am assuming we are proceeding with the Congress on the India/Pakistan thing.

S: Yes. I talked with Roy this morning.

K: But are we doing it. We are probably collaborating with ourselves.

S: I will take a reading. I saw him at 10:00.

K: Had he done anything.

S: Not by 10:00. ~~xexmakingxxhe~~

K: We are making the announcement tomorrow aren't we.

S: I thought on Monday.

K: Do the consultations. Also get a cable to the Indians saying we wanted to make it before he (Chavan) was here so he would not be held responsible. We have Schneider appealing. Do you think we can ever get Foreign Service officers who are not spokesmen for the countries where they are.

S: India affects the Ambassadors as well as the staff.

K: Schneider wants to delay. I think that would be a mistake. Then it would be Chavan's fault.

S: Right.

END

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SE 57

TELECON
Mr. James Reston/Secretary Kissinger
February 20, 1975
4:17 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

R: I thought I ought to cheer him up.

K: When they start ~~xxxxxx~~ leaking that they are good, then something has happened to the Department.

R: I do not see why they should not leak they are ~~xxxxx~~ good because its the truth.

K: I was very pleased with it. I think it is well - deserved.

R: We talked about guarantees a long time ago and you were privately wondering and sympathetic but now you are talking about ~~xhex~~ it vaguely in public.

K: There is so much truth about how a settlement can be assured and I thought we better get some of the problems out in the open.

R: I agree. I can say the obvious. It seems the risks are greater without than with.

K: You will not get an agreement without guarantees. For your understanding, the Russians always say to us we are for a ~~xx~~ settlement with all effective guarantees. And I asked Gromyko what he meant. He was just floored by the question. I said why don't we think about this and get in touch with each other. What multi-lateral guarantees can be achieved and what unilateral guarantees we would want to consider.

R: If you go back to what you have already promised with them and they have promised to us, I would have thought you would get a multilateral guarantee if you believe in it.

K: I do not believe in it. I do not think they have thought about it. I think they meant their signature on the document. And that would be totally inadequate.

R: Do you think you have the votes ~~xx~~ at some point for a treaty guarantee in the Sean te?

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K: I am not longer so sure of where we stand with the Congress. A year ago I would have said yes.

R: I am puzzled by it. It seems to me there is no way 130 million Arabs are going to reconcile themselves to the permanence of that State and those boundaries unless they understand we would not tolerate their violation of either. What theme do you think is the sensible theme to strike in the conscience of the country and in relation to your trip?

K: On my trip the issue isn't Geneva. It is under what conditions Geneva should be, should it be the only course open, for maximum pressure on the U.S. Secondly, whatever happens now sooner or later the issue of a final settlement will have to be fixed.

R: Are you clear in your mind about what guarantees should figure in it?

K: An outsider cannot provide all the guarantees. I am not clear in my mind just what the security guarantees are but I am going to find out.

R: What did you find on this trip? Anything that surprised you?

K: I think it is our last chance at a moderate evolution there. If we go to Geneva under conditions of failure, it means the radicals will dominate the scene. If we go there under conditions of success, the moderates will dominate.

R: Geneva has to ratify and not solve.

K: To ratify the next step. As between Egypt and Israel there is a good chance. Whether the Arabs context will permit Egypt to move is another thing.

R: What did you find in Syria?

K: We are talking off the record now.

R: Yes, of course.

K: This is so totally beyond the capacity of the Israelix structure now, we will have to work around it.

Mr. Reston - 3.

R: Abba Eban was in for lunch today and he said before they could get down to any reasonable solution they would have to go to a referendum the way Wilson did.

K: Even on the Egyptian side?

R: No, he was talking about the Israeli domestic weakness in the government.

K: For a final settlement I agree.

R: I think he was saying even to get out of the ____ and to give up the oil wells it was very hard xxxx for his governm nt to deal with it.

K: If that's that case, there is no time for a referendum.

R: He feels out of things these days.

K: I think that's right.

END.

SE 60

1*

TELCON
2/20/75, 6:45 p.m.
SPARKMAN/KISSINGER

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I neglected to mention to you when we had lunch that the India-Pakistan arms program that we briefed you about a few weeks ago -- we have decided to go ahead with cash sales to both of them. Pakistan has given us assurance not to go into nuclear explosives. They would observe international atomic energy safeguards and not go into production of explosives. We couldn't embargo an ally when its neighbor was getting $4-5 million worth of arms. We are not going overboard and giving credits or grants. We are talking about cash sales. We are announcing this Monday.

S: That sounds logical to me.

K: We wanted you to know about it.

S: Thanks.

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TELCON
Amb. Zahedi (Iran)/Secy Kissinger
10:37 a.m., February 20, 1975

SE 47 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

Z: Mr. Secretary, good afternoon, sir.

K: How are you?

Z: I am very well, thank you. How are you?

K: Okay.

Z: I hope you are not too tired.

K: No, and I had a great time and I appreciate everything you and your colleagues and His Majesty did.

Z: Not at all. His Majesty asked me to convey his regards to you and tell you how happy he was that he had seen you. And that matter that you mentioned to me in the car, you remember. There was one thing you had forgotten and you mentioned to me that if His Majesty would . .

K: Oh, yes. Yes, indeed, yes.

Z: We have already sent a message to that government and they probably would receive it either tonight or tomorrow.

K: Right.

Z: He wanted me to tell you that that is taken care of.

K: Good, wonderful. Aren't you nice. Now, on our social life -- your party -- Hello.

Z: Yes.

K: On your dinner, if you could do it on the 4th, it would be better.

Z: On the 4th?

K: Yes.

Z: All right. I will get in touch with Washington and ask them to call . . because there are many of the people . . . but I think we can telephone them.

K: I will then give a lunch on the 3rd or 4th. I'll let you know.

Z: Lunch, okay. And Mr. Ansari [Min. of Economics & Finance] is actually coming alone, not with his wife.

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K: Oh, he's not coming with his wife.

Z: No.

K: Too bad.

Z: Yes. . . . she can't make it.

K: Okay.

Z: I will try to change it on the 4th.

K: Good.

Z: Thank you very much.

K: Good. Wonderful.

Z: I look forward to see you.

K: Bye.

Z: Bye, bye.

SE 49 *

TELCON
Senator Hugh Scott/Secy Kissinger
12:20 p.m., February 20, 1975

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

S: Hello, Henry. Certain Soviet sources have conveyed this to me and I want to pass on to you -- I'm sure the sources are good -- that their Trade Committee and their Central Committee are holding meetings and there will be some important meetings next week during which the people in Moscow are advocating that the Soviets make a command decision not to make any -- as they put it -- any of its resources available for trade dealings with the United States; that they are doing so well with this $7 billion or so aid from Western Europe that they will simply make a decision not to leave any leeway for future trade with the United States and that the Ambassador here and others who have a sort of more pro-America view are all hoping that they will leave themselves an out or some flexibility in the hope that something can be done on the Ex-Im Bank aspect at the least. I wanted them to know that you had said this morning -- you had expressed a hope that something can be done to give more flexibility in Import/Export Bank the next time around.

K: Yeah.

S: That's as far as I thought I should go. But they want something optimistic to pass on to those Central Committee guys.

K: Yeah.

S: For the future.

K: You're absolutely right. That's exactly what's going on in the Soviet Union.

S: Yeah. Um-humm.

K: It's really the scariest period I've seen in our foreign policy.

S: Well, it is if the Congress --

K: Because we're being castrated for no purpose whatever.

S: That's right. There's no advantage in it. The votes that did that to us are AFL-CIO votes of course . . . Well, I wanted you to know. I would think that if there's any way by which the President could communicate publicly -- at least to them . . . They're going to ask for

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S: (cont'd) elimination [or illumination] of that _____ in the next Ex-Im Bank or in some other message.

K: Well, I'm glad you called this to my attention because I'm seeing three senior Soviet trade officials this afternoon.

S: Now that's why they got the word to me. I think they also hope that our private trade people like Kendall, Murphy and someone they mention as Scott would be a little bit more public and more aggressive in urging trade with the Soviet Union. They say it would help. They think -- they say politely -- they think our businessmen are too modest and too quiet about this.

K: Okay. I'll talk to Kendall. He'll be there.

S: Well, that's good. Because they'd like -- Now they've also talked to Humphrey who was sympathetic but was very pessimistic about any possible change in Ex-Im or in the Trade Bill in the near future.

K: You know, it's one of the damnest things I've ever seen. You talk to individual Congressmen and Senators and you have the impression that in a secret ballot all these things would carry.

S: Yeah, I know.

K: Don't you?

S: Yeah. You have that impression. I think the leadership are not sympathetic to this grossly discriminatory attitude towards the Soviets but the rank and file -- the bank (or back) benchers have got them by the testicles.

K: Yep.

S: Well, Sir, I wanted you to know.

K: Good. Thank you.

S: If Kendall and some of these people would speak up a little more forcefully, it would help.

K: Good. We will do something

S: Fine. Thank you.

SE 59 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
February 20, 1975
6:35 p.m.

K: Could you get typed up for tomorrow morning that part of the conversation with Schmidt that concerns the Secretary.

S: Sure.

K: I mentioned it already to the President but I want to hand it to him.

S: That special part?

K: Yes.

S: I have it done. I will have it given to Dave Gompert.

K: Second, I got a message from the Shah saying Marwan told him if we could get him the passes and oil fields, Sadat would stand up to the Syrians. There is something from the French on their security council proposals too.

S: The thing that came in from Kubisch...in light of that I think we have to take it seriously.

K: If the bastards could ~~kx~~ lift the aid thing, we could move it.

S: I have something for you to see in the morning where we have MacComber lightly broach the thing to the Turks.

K: MacComber is coming back this weekend. Send a message to him saying that our consultations with the Congressional leaders indicate we can make progress but we need a little more time on the aid cutoff. Secondly, could we broach them lightly and thirdly MacComber is coming hom and should ~~gx~~ tell Esenbel too.

S: Should we hold him there?

K: He should be home Sunday night.

S: We will get this message to you tonight.

END.

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SE 53 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Mr. Atherton
Sec. Kissinger
Feb. 20, 1975
2:20 p.m.

K: Are we doing any Congressional consultations on the India-Pak thing.

A: Yes we are. Did it come up in your meeting with the leadership.

K: No. We had such a heated discussion on Turkish aid we figured one more would kill it.

A: I wanted to be sure.

K: We did not cover anybody.

A: Are there any you want to call personally.

K: Not if I can help it.

A: We thought if you could call Sparkman.

K: I just had lunch with him and forgot it. I will call him. Tell them about the nuclear business.

A: We are featuring that.

K: I have just talked to Sisco and urged him to have Schneider tell the Indians the reason we are not holding up for Chavan's visit is we don't want him to be held personally responsible.

A: Kaul suggested that.

K: But / Schneider makes the same point.

A: I think it would be a disservice to Chavan.

K: Make that clear to / Schneider and get h i m to warn the Indians and if they get to nasty we will be forced to retaliate.

A: Yes, indeed. We have made it clear to them that it doesn't ~~xx~~ need to cause a major blow-up unless they do it.

K: If they do do it we are willing to respond and feature with them the nuclear explosion business.

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Atherton

A: We have done that but we will reemphasize it.

K: Finally, do a cable to the Egyptians making clear whatever discussions have guarantees taking place are only in the context of a final settlement.

A: Yes. We put that in the message to Sadat.

K: I noted there was some newspaper comment in Egypt.

A: Yes. Which is picking up the Marvin Kalb misinterpretation.

K: Yes.

A: We will go out and reemphasize that point.

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SE 50

TELCON
Califano
Sec. Kissinger
Feb. 20, 1975
12:35 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

C: Fine, how are you? How was your trip.

K: O.K. But not operating under ideal circumstances.

C: Let me say when you were on TV with Gromyko and the comment you made about I would like to know who that person is and I will join him was terrific.

K: Thank you.

C: I am calling because Coke is pressing on an urgetn basis a peculiar problem. The Cairo newspaper says the Egyptian Govt is reconsidering and restudying the boycott. Austin has cables and phone calls from his guys there who he put totally in neutral after we met with you.

K: I would strongly recommend staying cool now.

C: ~~Xxxx~~ The question is whether if restudying it should those guys resume their conversations with the Govt.

K: They can do it but nothing will happen until the results of my trip are clear.

C: He did not want to do anything that would create problems.

K; He should not mention any discussions with me.

C: What he was talking about was that he had guys working on the agriculture thing we mentioned to you and whether -- they want to go back and go talk to the Egyptian agriculture ministry or whatever it is and resume with them in the ordinary course of business if you would have no...

K: I have no objection to their talking and I think they should continue normally.

C: O.K. No body knows even in that Company except Paul and me about our conversation.

K: I think that would be good.

C: O.K. Thank you for calling and good luck.

K: Thank you for calling.

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SE 65 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Jack Heinz
Sec. Kissinger
2/21/75

5:40 p.m.

H: I apologize like anything for bothering you. I have the following situation. It will be very nice if you could put your nose into it. Next Tuesday the Agri Business Council on whose behalf I was in Rome when you made your somber presence felt having an annual meeting. I invited Demoray (sp) to come and speak at lunch as well as Butz but Moray cannot as of yesterday and Mr. Rocides (sp) , the Deputy, I think will come. We have a group of about a hundred with the press, the best leadership of the agri business community, appropriate congressional committee representatives, IBRD, Agriculture, 6-8 ambassadors of the countries we are working with. Javits said he would come about 1:00. We will try to make a nice occasion. I was hoping and I apologize for even asking you if you might come just before lunch, or hopefully even at lunch, and would say a very few words.

K: At lunch is out of the question because I have first the Cypriot leaders are here and Luns and just before lunch is when I see the Cypriots. Maybe just after lunch.

H: About what time?

K: Can I call you tomorrow. I have not got my calendar.

H: I will be in Washington on Sunday night. I will call you Sunday night or early Monday morning.

K: I will do my best to make an appearance.

H: That would be great. I know it may be absolutely impossible but an appearance would be a very nice thing and I would have the time absolutely right. Will you suggest I call you Monday morning.

K: Call me first thing Monday morning.

H: What time?

K: 9:00. Where is it taking place.

H: At the International Club.

K: If I cannot come would Ingersoll help you -- the Deputy Secretary .

H: I think that would be very nice.

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K: One or the other of us will be there.

H: Very nice.

K: Good, Jack.

H: I hope your trip was not to exhaustive.

K: Prety hectic.

H: I thought you guarded your words very well everytime you stepped up to a mike.

K: Thank you very much. Nice talking to you.

H: Still hope to come to Turkey?

K: Absolutely.

H: Goodbye.

END

SE 64

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TELCON
Atherton
Sec. Kissinger
Feb. 21, 1975
5:30 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Have you seen that ~~Paris~~ Peresi Interview.

A: No.

K: Someday you and I are going to get the same material.

A: A telegram or ticker.

K: A ticker with an FBIS thing.

A: I have not but I will go after it.

K: Will you get it an Asad interview with DeBorgrave.

A: I havenot seen those.

K: Get both and call me back. Talk to Sisco too.

A: Right away.

END

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SE 62 *

TELCON
2/21/75 - 10:43 a.m/
Joe Kraft/HAK

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

JK: Welcome back.

K: Joe, how are you?

JK: I'm very well. How are You?

K: Joe, I want you to know that several press people said that you were my conscience.

JK: My God, you're in trouble.

K: No, theres something in that. I wanted to -- you had a column the other day about the oil policy and what -- while I don't want to debate the conclusion, on the assumption that you believe me when I issue to statements of fact -- I think you ought to reconsider some of your sources. For your information, never -- I've checked every conceivable record -- never did Defense propose to tie the arms sales to an embargo -- to promise not to engage in an embargo. And -- I'm not going to debate it because frankly, the reason why I'm ~~XXXXXXX~~ moderately for these sales and for getting as many hooks into Saudi Arabia as possible, is so that in case of an embargo we have something to cut off to them. So as far as my policy is concerned I want these things -- you know without making it explicit -- as something that we would start in case there were an embargo. Secondly, again just for your information -- while I'm for these sales, I was not the chief energizing factor. I was more a benevolent tolerance. I wasn't pushing it particularly.

JK: Why would the view of attaching conditions to the sales ...

K: I would on the whole think its a mistake to attach conditions but I would at the same time make it very clear to the Saudis on an informal basis what we would do if there were an embargo so de facto conditions I'm in favor of. My whole strategy is to make it as costly as possible for them to have another embargo.

JK: I think so. Yes.

K: The same incidentally with that Pan American deal. We went along with it but we were far from the pushing agency. It was far down the road before State was ever asked. And again I don't want to give you the wrong impression. We were sort of moderately for it but we weren't pushing it.

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JK: I understand. I understand the factual punch you're making that I'm in error in saying that State was pushing for this as part of the be nice policy and.

K: There is no be nice policy. I am opposed to having a political and economic confrontation with Iran because I do not believe it will get oil prices down or because what it would take to get them down -- the amount by which they would get down that way wouldn't be worth the political and economic cause. I'm strongly in favor of creating the objective conditions that will get them down and we are well underway to doing that.

JK: Part of those objective conditions are interdependent.

K: But that's to be able to get tough in a real sense. No, no. I didn't think it was a nasty column.

JK It wasn't meant to be. Look, I appreciate your taking the trouble to do this. And look, can I ask another question. Can I have a free question.

K: Yes.

JK: I, at least in my own mind, have the sense that any guarantee is something that sort of is not for now. That it's...

K: Not for now, you're correct.

JK: I see okay.

K: Look, the reason is this. Basically, say mentally his view was this. The Soviets have been fooling a lot of people by saying they're in favor of new -- the existence of Israel with the best possible guarantees. Then you ask the Soviets what they mean by guarantees. They haven't got a clue in their head. So I thought I'd better get the issue on the table so that they cannot substitute guarantees for security. Or at least that we know what they're talking about.

JK: In any case, it's not within the present disengagement.

K: No, this is for a final settlement.

JK: Right which I take it is not... I mean I had the impression just from reading things coming out of Cairo and Jerusalem that you really did very well. / After Egypt and Israel we did well. Whether it is quite
K:
enought to succeed even between then is not yet clear. For the reason that Rabin is no Golda Meir.

JK:" Yes.

K: You know, if there were a person there that could beat those recalcitrants into line, it would work in Israel. But I don't know whether Rabin has that sort of strenght. But then what is not clear to me is whether Syria can line up enough Arabs to keep the Egyptians from moving.

JK: Yes. I must say, whenever I hear people talk about that there are alternatives that we ought to go to Geneva. That strikes me as being about the cheapest talking point I know. That is not a serious argumne t and.

K: And it's usually made by people who are for Israel. Its what with Geneva with all the Arabs united and frustrated it's the worst outcome for Israel.

JK: The common denominator of the people that make it is that they are in opposition. Whether they are in Israel, here or...

K: Yes. I think the Israeli Government fully understands this.

JK: Well, I thought the statement Gore made yesterday or the day before was very encouraging.

K: I think in those two countries... Egypt and Israel...we moved to a level of understanding which gives us a chance.

JK: Let me. I'd like to come in and chat sometime if you have some time and I will call Larry and try to arrange it.

K: Do you want to have breakfast tomorrow morning?

JK: Perfect.

K: 8:00 at State.

JK: 8:00 at State. I'll see you then.

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SE 63

TELCON
2/21/75 - 12:32 p.m.
Senator Case/HAK

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello. How are you?

C: I'm fine. Do you get any sleep at all.

K: It was a hectic trip.

C: I'll bet you.

K: Chris, I wanted to talk to you about an idea I had discussed with Sparkman yesterday. I would be prepared -- and he thought it might be a good idea -- to send up once a week somebody from the Department McCloskey, or if it's a special case anyone else. To bring some of the cables, maybe of particular interest to you and to Sparkman. Just for your own background information so that -- I can't leave it with the staff but it would give the Chairman and ranking member an opportunity at least to see some of the things that we are working on and then if you have any particular questions we can get you additional information.

C: I think that would be good Henry. There is a little precedent for it being developed now in relation to the CIA.

K: I thought it might be a way by which -- I mean I'll continue to do regular briefings but those obviously are my distillation of events and this would give you an opportunity to see some of the action.

C: I should think we ought to be able to work out something that would be very helpful and I certainly appreciate your initiative here. We have John and I haven't yet talked about the CIA thing. There has been a question or two raised about the adequacy in respect of other members and whether there was some -- we could develop up in this -- but this is our problem -- within the committee which we could apprise our colleagues on the committee of things of consequence so that they could go down in this case -- in the Case of the CIA -- to the CIA who also keeps the documents and see themselves about anything that is of unusual character. The point of course is that it's one hell of a responsibility to get information that you can't transmit to collegaues. Because it means you have to make the appraisal yourself as to its importance and all that.

K: I think that Frank Church's committee will have to consider this. This doesn't help you now because I frankly. We haven't approved any covert operations since these additional briefing requirements because. Frankly, when so many people have to be briefed its getting very dangerous.

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C: I'm not complaining about this at all. My only point is when we work this thing out in a way we take advantage of your very generous suggestion but also not compromise us or the committee.

K: On the stuff that I'm showing you. I'm much less concerned about it then I would on covert operations. And if their is any member that shows any particular interest at any one particular aspect I would approach that with the attitude of being cooperative.

C: I am sure you would. Let me talk to John about it. I'm ~~grea~~X grateful to you and I appreciate your calling.

K: Most of the time they won't be things -- take the Greek Turkish negotiations. You probably wouldn't want to brief the other members about every nuance of a detail but I'd have no objection if you -- it would be up to you really how you wanted to handle it. This is not in the same category as covert operations.

C: We also would want you to understand certainly what we're doing in that way too. Let me talk to John and we'll be back to you.

K: Good to talk to you.

SE67

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TELCON
2/22/75, 5:37 p.m.
WALT ROSTOW/KISSINGER

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

R: I am sorry I am troubling you because I was in town Thursday and Friday and I ran across a piece of information which may or may not be known to you, but my reflection tells me it may be the best ~~xxx~~ route to save Southeast Asia.

I had lunch with A CIA economist and we discussed a piece in the London Times which George Carver gave me. The companies that have been working on oil in Vietnam have been very closemouthed until recently about what they found. Now they are anxious about security and are revealing they have a find about the size of the find in Indonesia. My reaction first was, this is the first -- if this can be developed, this is the first basis I could see that would make sense out of getting this 3-year aid cutoff to make sense, because ~~xxxx~~ the oil would not be forthcoming for five years. If they are working on it it would provide an exchange the way the British are handling the North Sea oil. This is the scenario that might tip the bill in the Congress. First, make sure the story is correct and that you get it published in a creditable way. They tell me the Washington Post is backing the aid thing and it may be if you could reliably get a full story with the cooperation of the companies -- a very solid, creditable lead would be necessary. My thought was that President Ford should go to the Congress at the critical moment and make a speech that would be solid in its own way -- to make his case in Vietnam in solid, strategic terms, and go back to Roosevelt and point out as President in his own way considered this a critical area. -- to talk on the oil thing not as an excuse to hold on but to make creditable that three years would do it. You may be way ahead of me --

K: I appreciate it and it is one of the great tragedies of our time what we are doing to Vietnam.

R: I agree and it would be a bad thing for this great country on the eve of its 200th anniversary to commit the most sordid act of policy in its history. You are carrying the heat of the day --

K: I am getting the 7th year show of the Administration. We all get into the same situation. All the bastards are after me.

R: Don't let them get you down. You have got to try to see this Middle East thing through. Give them the best fight you can on Southeast Asia and among other things, try to hold the whole OECD

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world together. Did you see the article in the London Times? George Carver has some copies. I wanted to share it with you.

K: Thank you, Walter.

SE 66 1*

TELCON
Meg Greenfield/Sec. Kissinger
2/22/75; 4:45 pm

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: You are going to regret that --

G: Why?

K: The Nat Davis editorial.

G: I have talked to McCloskey about it. So we have had one exchange of views.

K: Let me add my own outrage to it. What did Nat Davis do? If you guys want to have...if you want qualifications, name me 5 FSO's better qualified. Here is a man who was in the Peace Corps where he traveled around Africa; he has taught at Howard University, has been a minister in a Black church. Here is a man with deep compassion for the Blacks. [redacted] I want some major direction. B6

G: ...had a meeting today. Our feeling was just expressed in that editorial. We weren't suggesting a precedent or that there was something particularly terrible about him.

K: But then why should he be the victim?

G: You think he is the right guy?

K: If we don't pay enough attention to Africa...You look over my appointments and find me one case where I have not killed myself to put the best man in the job. I thought so highly of him that it was between him and Sisco for Under Secretary for Political Affairs and if Sisco had gone to accept a University Presidency, I would have made Davis that. I made him Director General of the Foreign Service instead. [redacted] B6
[redacted] If I had wanted the Department...had nothing to do with South Africa. [redacted] B6
[redacted]

G: You think, in other words, there is nothing...

K: How did this thing start. Congressman Diggs went to Zaire and got all these people all jacked up.

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G: The Africa situation, you mean.

K: Yes. What did Davis do in Chile, for God sakes.

G: We don't know -- alot of things happened.

K: What do you want him to do? Everything that happened in Chile was approved in Washington. Everything in Chile was started under JFK.... we have been carrying this for ten years. Why should an Ambassador believe it was something...I say that an Ambassador...it stands to reason that Chile, which was a very special case, that a man who was in Chile, not initiated it, that he isn't being put into Africa in order to destabilize.

G: ...you don't have to believe that.

K: But what did poor Davis do? Does that mean he can never get another post?

G: No, I wouldn't think so.

K: Exactly what was done wrong in Chile. Has anyone ever analyzed that. What exactly was wrong in Chile. You had a government that was... we kept the free press and the opposite parties arrived. That failed and that is why a military (gov't) moved.

G: One doesn't have to be sentimental about the Africa situation but you don't see what Davis represents to them. Anything that...

K: I picked the best man for that job that I had around here. If I had wanted to....I could have one of the ten guys that would have been adorred by the Black Caucas and would not have done a damn thing. I have a rigid policy of putting the best man in. I have been wanting Davis as an Assistant Secretary since I brought him back.

G: McCloskey thought it would bring him through.

K: I may not fill the post. I say it is McCarthyism. At least when [redacted] was crossed off it was for views he held. He is attacked for having been Ambassador to Chile on that basis. On that basis, no Ambassador feels presently he can get another post. What we are saying in Africa is not what he represents to the Africans. It is our sickness expressed abroad. B6

G: We thought that it was not unreasonable for them to be disturbed. We mean someone they considered sympathetic by someone they regard as an agent. I do not mean a CIA agent, but an agent of something different.

K: Why would I want to put a man who is not sympathetic to them. What rational reason should a Secretary of State have to do that.

G: The Secretary might not realize how this thing would be received there.

K: You know this building. If you don't want policy to be carried out, there are lots of...It isn't hard to have second-raters to fill a job.

G: From their viewpoint it is something they fen as policy..

K: But don't you think it is unbelievable for a foreign country to tell us whom to appoint in our government. If I did that to Chad, there would be an outcry. What have they got against him? If he is a destabilizer, he will be one anyplace. If we don't go through with it now, we couldn't send him anyplace except Denmark. Where can we send him. Every government will feel it has to prove itself. He certainly can't go anywhere in the underdeveloped world.

G: I don't know whether that is possible. I don't think this means that he is limited to some minor..

K: Like what. He can't go to Eastern Europe because he had trouble in ~~Belgrade.~~ Sofia. So you confine him to Western Europe.

G: Asia.

K: I have no intention of yielding on this anyway. There is going to be a monstrous brawl if this is pursued. I believe in defending my associates, contrary to the CIA.

G: What do you mean by that?

K: Nothing.

G: I bet. Do you expect it to shape into --

K: I don't see how a liberal newspaper could do this. If you want Africa policy reviewed, that is fine and proper. It is not our strongest suit.

G: But anybody nominated for an office, I think, if he is not automatically confirmed..

K: This is witchhunting. There is certainly every right to look into his role, his qualifications. They are extraordinary...

G: We shall perhaps look at him again.

K: Here is a man who was in the Peace Corps, who volunteered to go to Guatemala after our Ambassador was shot, who served in Chile, served on the NSC Staff. Served as Director General of the Foreign Service, has an active civil rights record, has a predilection for the Black people, taught at Howard University. He has done volunteer work in a Negro church, he was an activist in trying to get a Black minister in his own church and failed in this effort. For such a man to be attacked on the grounds of not being interested in Africa is an outrage.

G: What do the Africans say?

K: I have felt that it was not proper for FSO's to become political activists to capitalize on any political mood. I will make it public on Monday. It will be put out on Monday.

G: Do the Africans, are the Africans aware of all these aspects?

K: I don't think so. At least I have never told them.

G: It says something, but I am not sure it grows from their anxieties...

K: Ah, baloney, with all due respect. Do you think we would put in somebody...It is an exportation of our malaise -- that everybody can take a whack..the move was lead by Algeria, one of our friends.

G: All of them over there don't feel the same way.

K: No, but when you have such a weak executive authority as we are developing now - - and each country has a premium in kicking the U.S. around, why not do it?

G: Have you talked to any of them or has anyone tried to find anything authentic in theiranxieties?

K: I don't believe there are any anxieties; I think this is demogogery but never heard of it until Diggs appeared in Zaire. Naturally when an American Negro goes around saying it, why wouldn't the Africans do it? I think it is McCarthyism.

G: I am not sure I really agree with that.

K: It never looks like that at the time. People can assassinate...

G: I think it does. It did then and there are certain aspects of Watergate, but I don't think..

K: What are they saying. That he was in Chile and that the odious practice of political destabilization is being carried to Africa. Destabilization was never used by a Government official. It was an invention of Cy Hearsh. Colby says he never said it. What exactly was done in Chile while Davis was there? Newspapers that were being used by the Communists -- TV and radio stations were being supported by us. If you don't do it a dictatorship is established.

G: We oppose it in some places.

K: We oppose it selectively. All right.

G: I think that it is not necessarily McCarthyism... I can imagine appointments that would be offensive to people who might be qualified in some ways who raise a specter for say the host nation that makes their appointment.

K: Absolutely. If you send him as Ambassador to that country. They then have a right to complain. That isn't the case. This is an American appointment.

G: That strikes me as the harder part of it, and we tried to take account --

K: Why shouldn't he be given a chance. He is responsible to me, not them.

G: That is clear, but --

K: If we see an expert in political warfare -- if we send someone from the intelligence community, I can understand it. But this is a Foreign Service Officer. It would be like saying he can never get another job because he was in the position of carrying out orders. He is a do-gooder. He was deputy to Sargeant Shriver.

G: The Peace Corps thing probably reinforces it in their view. The Peace Corps...

K: I thought I was picking somebody with a broad view, with a special interest in the Blacks, not one of these limited Africanists who cannot fit it into foreign policy.

G: Not Soapy Williams?

K: I respect Wayne Fredericks. I am talking about the recent six years. Soapy Williams was good. He showed interest. Wayne Fredericks is the one I like.

G: Was he? I don't even know what happened to him.

K: He is in foundation work. Ok, Meg, I have made my point. I have never called the NYT. They slandered Davis six weeks ago.

G: We will bring it up again.

K: Between you and me, I am not that wild about him. I think he is a distinguished FSO, so this is not one of my cronies I am defending.

G: We will check it out.

K: I just don't want these FSO's getting into the habit of doing their job politically.

In addition to everything else, let me say that on foreign policy, your editorial policy on the whole, you are entitled to an occasional aberration.

G:....letter from Joe. He is in Jerusalem.

K: Has he been in Syria yet?

G: I talked to him on the phone. It is a better connection than you get to New York. He said that he had some sort of commitment there but he was hoping to wait and let it take place. And Marilyn is there.

K: Assad gave me his firm (word) to see him and he is my special favorite.

G: He is probably going there in a few days. Marilyn is over there somewhere.

SE70

1*

TELCON
Senator Fulbright/Secretary Kissinger
February 22, 1975; 9:50 am

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Nancy had invited Joe Alsop to come over and somebody told me you and he don't speak. I just didn't want you to think I was being offensive.

F: He criticized me so long he felt bad about it. This is about the Vietnam war two or three years ago.

K: I had no idea of this.. [Fulbright didn't care] So we will see you tomorrow.

F: Just between you and me I don't think he is very bright.

K: Well, he wrote the same column for about three years.

F: He has always been the spokesman for the Pentagon. I don't have any objection, Henry. How is everything else going.

K: I will talk to you at greater length on Monday. It's really a question now whether the Israelis understand that three million people cannot keep the world at ransom. It almost comes down to that.

F: I got in the mail a most interesting communication from the great violist, Yuhadi Manunin .

K: That is very interesting. On the Middle East?

F: Yes. It was on the action of the UNESCO. He was commenting upon a message from Leonard Bernstein and saying you have got to be cool. The Israelis have to be magnanimous and not to get vengeful. They ought to respond by acknowledging that Jerusalem is a sacred city and that they talk for the rest of the world. If the ~~Arabs~~ Israeli gover-ment would follow his advice, even today the Arabs would begin to see....

K: Mr. Chairman, if we had a unanimous government....The Arabs are in the state of emotional exhaustion . They fight over every...they have to live in this country for the next generation, not just the next 6 months.

F: Sometimes I think some of these artists are alot more smarter than alot of other people.

K: We look forward to seeing you tomorrow.

END.

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SE 76 1*

TELECON
Secretary Schlessinger/Secretary Kissinger
February 24, 1975
5:05 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Jim, it is really a little passe now. I called to say you did very well on that Cambodia issue on whatever program you were on yesterday. I think you put it on the right moral ground. I told the President this morning.

S: Those questions are getting a little tougher.

K: I thought you did well altogether but particularly on the Cambodia one.

S: Good.

K: The ___ that the U.S. can deal with Khmer Rouge and then deliberately sells people down the drain, it is unbearable. Well, that's all I wanted.

S: Well, I have a couple of things. Muskie is head of the Budget Committee and has been talking about a $5 billion cut. I do not know how much is serious. I presume he will be pulled off from the $5 billion cut in outlay. He is responsible to you. If you could work on it, it could be very helpful.

K: Ok. You can count on it.

S: He is the critical one. But Kennedy is also on the committee.

K: I am having dinner with Kennedy this week and I will do it then.

S: If you can [redacted] move on Muskie..

K: I will tomorrow.

S: You must do something about the Economist--the caricature does not make you an object of beauty. Have you seen it?

K: No. Of course it is possible that there are limitations to the subject matter.

S: They have done more to it than deserved. It is kind of amusing.

K: Ok. Thank you.

END.

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SE 73 1*

TELECON
Ambassador Catto/Secretary Kissinger
February 24, 1975
8:20 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: I need some advice about Texas.

C: I will be happy to give you all the advice I can.

K: This is going to be a speech on Latin America.

C: I did not know that.

K: You do now. Is that a bad thing to do in Houston?

C: No.

K: I was going to cover relations with Cuba and the Panama Canal. The Cuba part is a big step toward reconciliation. Will ~~that give~~ they go out of their minds?

C: No. The ardor has cooled.

K: I am going to say we will accept a majority vote of the OAS. And we will not restrict American companies doing business in foreign countries from dealing with Cuba.

C: I think that's fine.

K: You think it goes too far?

C: No.

K: I do not see how we can change the position anyway.

C: I agree.

K: They will not have me down as a screaming radical?

C: No. The urge to make a cause out of that is gone. They don't care in Miami, let alone Houston.

K: The Panama thing I am concerned about.

C: That's an important issue.

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K: At the dinner I am discussing general foreign policy.

C: You are talking about the luncheon speech?

K: Yes. The only thing I can say on Panama is we are going to change the treaty.

C: I am sure Senator Towers has changed the resolution about any change in the status quo.

K: I do not know.

C: About sixty senators have signed something about changing the status quo.

K: I am just giving an account of where we stand.

C: That's fair enough.

K: Are you coming down with me?

C: Yes. If I am invited?

K: [redacted] B6

C:

K:

C:

K:

C:

K: But you think it is a worthwhile thing to do this trip?

C: Yes. I think it is a very exciting thing to do.

K: Will I win these guys over?

C: I think so.

K: I have approved the list. Who will do the afternoon?

1*

Catto - 3.

C: I hope to have some input.

K: We need to get the invitations out soon.

C: We will tomorrow.

END

SE 81

1*

TELCON
Sec.Kissinger
Tom Enders
Feb. 25, 1975
2:50 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How do you explain the Japanese refusal to receive you.

E: I don't take it -- do you have a cable saying they don't want too.

K: Yes.

E: They say rather not?

K: Yes.

E: The way it was put on is that we would come if it would be useful in their internal process. They are a little worried about having a visit & a lot of xxxxx publicity at the time their diet is still sitting. The lower house is due out early next month but our visit would undoubtedly be a high profile thing.

K: Take a look at the cable and let me know what you think.

2:53 p.m.

E: I have seen the message. This is very much as earlier advertized. A combination of two things: One the diet think and two, the Japanese are obviously bobbing and weaving and trying to avoid getting caught up in this. I have seen a separate approach from the Miki people who have sent me their finnessing position and asking for our thoughts. I take this as an opportunity for their internal processing and I will go back to them xxxxxxx tonight on what we regard as important.

K: Just stay hard.

E: No give at all.

K: Don't you think?

E: I see no reason for it. We can end play the Japanese if we can ever stomp down the Treasury.

K: What did you think of what I said in the press conference.

E: I am really running behind. I did not read it.

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K: I used guaranteed price rather than floor price and some idiots have concluded I have given up the concept.

E: Shit.

K: I don't see that there is any difference.

E: There is none. Your statement originally spoke of protective prices which is the same as guaranteed prices but no one wants the tariff.

K: I agree. It is not an issue. Get word around today that what I said today is exactly what I said Feb. 3.

E: Shall we try to schedule a meeting with the Preident as soon as he can do that.

K: Yes. Thank you.

SE 86 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON

The Secretary/Mr. Robert Anderson
2:31 p.m. Tuesday, February 25, 1975

The Secretary called Mr. Anderson

K: Say, Bob, Sonnenfeldt tells me that that damn fellow de Segonzac is saying that because I used the word "guarantee prices" I have given up on the flow price idea. Now, could you call up de Segonzac and say I was talking about exactly the same thing that I talked about on February 2nd and call around a few other places and make sure that there is no confusion and say a flow price has a technical meaning in Treasury but I am talking about a uniform price.

A: I will do it now.

K: Will you let me know what they say?

A: I will.

END.

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SE85 1*

TELECON
Mr. Atherton/Secretary Kissinger
February 25, 1975
2:40 pm

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: Do you think I was too hard on Kaul?

A: Iwouldn't have gone so hard myself, but you say I tend to be too soft. I would have let the thing stick by implication rather than so explicitly.

K: Did you give Kaul hell this morning?

A: I did. I sent a little memo up to you.

K: What did he say?

A: He was testy and brisk. He asked me to convey his response to you that in answering questions from the press, he made clear that as far as the public assurances are concerned we will have to wait and see....

K: Whose assurances in the past?

A: He wasn't specifying. He has asked for it. I have no problem with making him uncomfortable but I don't think we should get into a public battle because he is digging his own grave.

K: I wouldn't let it go anymore.

A: I think we have gotten in there in Delhi.

K And...

A: And Kaul did overstep his bounds.

K: Do you think he is going to let loose another blast?

A: I wouldn't put it past him. But I don't think he will find much of an audience.

K: [redacted] B6

A: I think he has done more harm than good for India's cause on the Hill. I find this from my contacts on the Hill.

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K: I had made the distinction...

A: No, the distinction was made.

K: BUt it is done now.

A: Yes and it is not the end of the world. I think it was a good statement on our policy and I hope it gets fair play in the India media.

K: They don't seem to be going wild.

A: No. On other ironic thing that helped was that this coincided with the return to Kashmir of Sheik Abdullah....

K: Yes. The collassal nerve of them to make a statement when Grechko is there...

A: I agree. It was completly illogical.

END

SE 80 *

TELCON
The Secretary/ Winston Lord
Tuesday, February 25, 1975
11:40 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

The Secretary called Mr. Lord.

K: What did the Chinese want?

L: They just agreed to John Rhodes visit - late March or early April.

K: Nothing on Cambodia?

L: No, and I did not raise it.

K: Don't you think you should have raised what Sihanouk discussed with Chou en Lai at the hospital yesterday?

L: No, I did not think I should - I didn't want to appear to be over eager on these guys.

K: Our people in Phnom Penh will want to know. Nothing on Cambodia huh?

L: No, nothing and our people will know the other in good time.

K: I want to be sure I am the one to tell them. You know they always go to you first.

L: You can be sure you will be the one. (Laughter).

END.

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SE 75 1*

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Moynihan
2/24/75; 10:16 a.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: Pat!

M: Good morning, Henry. How are you?

K: How are you, Pat?

M: Mr. Secretary, I . . . .

K: Don't you give me that Secretary stuff in that tone of voice.

M: I am very well. How are you?

K: Okay.

M: You had an exhausting trip -- a good one, I think.

K: I ~~have~~ had the the potential of a good one.

M: Uh-huh.

K: And it depends now on what we can -- whether we can pull it off the next round.

M: Uh-huh.

K: Because we had massive opposition from Syria.

M: Yeah, yeah.

K: And perhaps Saudi Arabia.

M: Uh-huh.

K: Uh, Pat -- Saxbe has already disavowed us so if our former ambassador could moderately -- I can't ask him to support something you disagree with.

M: Oh, I will be willing to say, something to the effect that, if the Indians had thought ours was a decent policy for ten years they might have let us know. And that we don't mean to put a large amount of arms.

K: Now, look, I can assure you that to us this is primarily a symbolic thing.

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Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Moynihan
2/24/75; 10:16 a.m. -2-

M: Could I say that it is my sense that it is a symbolic thing?

K: Well, you can say it is your sense that it is not a large -- that we are not talking -- that you know that we are not going to get an arms race started there.

M: Right.

K: And you can call attention to the commitment -- which you can say I have reaffirmed to you that we will do nothing to upset this strategic balance there.

M: Can I say you said that to me?

K: Yeah.

M: Alright. Okay.

K: On the other hand, it seemed to us wrong to be the only country embargoing what is after all an ally, when its neighbor was receiving massive quantities of . . .

M: That's the case. You would know my view and I assumed the decision had been made when I saw you so I wasn't going to bother you. I was going to raise it with you and the President and then you had to leave and I felt it would be wrong for me to raise with the President a position where I didn't agree with you.

K: You are a noble man. You really are. I am serious.

M: I mean you would get mad at me, if I did that.

K: But that isn't why you didn't do it. You didn't do it out of fairness.

M: I did it out of prudence, Henry.

K: Oh, come on, what can I -- my being mad would not always deter you.

M: Not always, yeah. I also had assumed you had made up your mind. That was another thing.

K: Yeah.

M: I thought if it really were open I would have pursued it. Well, look, yes, I will do this. I have got about five phone calls to return and I will do this. Can I quickly say to you -- I got back here, never having really had a personal word from the woman for two years, I got back here and got a long letter from her.

K: Really.

M: And, if you don't mind I am going to send it down to you. It will take you a minute to read.

K: I would love to read it.

M; It is a very complex letter sort of saying listen I like you all -- you know -- I never said any of those things, which in fact she said.

K: Look, Pat, as far as we are concerned, if you can have any influence with the Indians, [redacted] B6 here, to cool them a bit. If they turn this into a monumental confrontation.

M: Only they can lose.

K: Then there is going to be one.

M: Yeah.

K: But if they played it in low-key, this thing will drop like a stone.

M: Right.

K: It cannot be in our interest to start pouring arms into Pakistan. Pakistan doesn't have enough cash anyhow.

M: I will call Kaul and give him my view on this. Yes, I will. What did Saxbe do?

K: Oh, Saxbe made a statement -- you know, for his own sake we told him to delay his arrival for a few days and to get sick so that he would not arrive on the exact day that we resume arms aid. So he has announced that he is not sick, that he disagreed with the decision.

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Moynihan
2/24/75; 10:16 a.m. -4-

M: He is not sick, he is sulking.

K: Yeah, (laughter)

M: Well, that's great.

K: And he hasn't even presented his credentials.

M: I will leave you with your ambassadors. Listen, one other thing, I would never have called ~~XXXXXX~~ you about this, but I have a huge article coming out in Commentary entitled, "The United States in Opposition." It argues that we have in a parliamentary sense that what we have to do with the third world is go into opposition. After thirty years we have not been doing so.

K: I would love to see it.

M; Commentary is all excited and they are giving a press conference on Wednesday and I will send it to you because I came aways with no one thing more clear in my mind -- or at least no one thing I wanted to say more than this particular . . .

K: Could I have it in the next few days because I am drafting a speech on Latin America and I wanted to say a few words about third world relationships.

M: I will get it in the mail to you this moment. Who do I send something to that gets to you?

K: Eagleburger.

M: To Larry. Okay. Uh, and I would -- some of the fellows around you might read it. If you approve of it, it means you have got to do things in terms of who you send to the UN and who you send to these forums -- different from what we have done for thirty years. I think if we don't we end up -- at some point at the last General Assembly we had a floating block of the United States _____ in the Dominican Republic. Well, you know my thoughts. Maybe you will just . . .

K: NO, I will read it and the quicker you can get it to me the better I like it.

M: I will do it. I will do it. Nice to talk to you.

K: Bye.

SE83 1*

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELECON
Mr. David Binder/Secretary Kissinger
February 25, 1975
3:05

B: I didn't want to ask you this in the press conference. On this Davis thing it looks like it is building up to something nasty.

K: It is the worst form of McCarthyism.

B: It is nasty.

K: What the hell did he do? He is a decent guy. I tried to bring in someone who is good on human rights and has a background.... and they get all over me.



B6

B: I like Davis.

K: He is a hell of a good guy.

B: There is another rumor that you leaned on Dinitz to lean on Rosenthal to ease off on the Turks.

K: I have not talked to Dinitz about talking to Rosenthal. I will tell you off-the-record -- at the Leadership meeting we explained what the impact on the Middle East would be and they said why not get the people who were interested in the Middle East. I called Rosenthal and he said he couldn't speak for Brademas and Sarbanes -- so we included them.

B: So it was normal business and didn't ....on Dinitz.

K: No.

B: I am sorry to bother you about this gossip.

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K: I just hope I do better by Dinitz with Egypt than he did by me with Rosenthal.

B: (laughter) I am sorry to bother you about this trivia.

K: No, no it is alright.

END

SE 74 1*

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
February 24, 1975
7:45 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: If I ~~xxx~~ performed as well as Rosenthal ~~xxx~~ did in my meeting with the Greeks, you will be back at the '47 borders.

D: Was it bad?

K: He was more Greek than Brademas. ~~x~~ Maybe he did it in order to show how tough he is.

D: Maybe so. I talked to him yesterday and he said he was doing his best to pull the Greeks together.

K: Yes, but in what direction?

D: Was it bad?

K: They think if he really tried to get the aid cutoff the Turks will agree to a settlement without aid being restored.

D: That is impossible.

K: I just wanted you to know you did good.

D: Is it closed?

K: No, we are going to meet again in 72 hours.

D: Jerry Schecter called me today and said there is a story in town ____.

K: He did not get it from me. Who gave Jerry Schecter the story in Time this week?

D: It did not come from me. I told Jerry to drop it. He said he would but the people on top.... This does not worry me. What worries me is that ~~he~~ was hoping something would come out of it. Didn't they agree that if they got the aid now we could solve it?

K: No.

D: The Congress cannot overcome these 6-7 Greek Congressmen? I praised you so much he is going to Stevenson. He is very upset Stevenson and Bentsen came out with a statement criticizing you when you are trying so hard to work things out.

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K: You can tell Rabin on these guarantees talks there will not be more than one or two meetings. We will not take the initiative. I want this meeting to achieve nothing.

D: I wrote this in the cable yesterday after our meeting. I will emphasize it again.

K: But read it again.

D: My report goes only to the Prime Minister.

K: Ok.

END.

SE 96 1*

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
February 26, 1975
5:45 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I don't know what to tell him.

S: What can we do?

K: I can't blindly promise that I will leave the country whenever he is there. I'll be in Aswan and he'll be in Cairo.

S: Are you sure you'll be there?

K: Assuming the Israeli Cabinet makes a proposal that I consider decisivie the evening of the 15th am I to ~~xxx~~ stay out of Egypt until the 18th?

S: I agree. It is pathetic. I will tell them...

K: Tell them I will go to the limit to avoid embarrassing him or putting him in a difficult position.

S: And if ~~x~~ for some reason you are in Egypt, you will make every effort ~~xx~~ not to be in Cairo.

K: In Cairo that is easy because Sadat will be in Aswan but that creates a Fahmy problem.

S: And a Gensher problem.

K: I will do my best to be out of town for one of those days. I could try to go to the Gulf States....It may be possible. If the Egyptians are biting their nails I can't say the German Foreign Minister is coming ....

S: I'll tell them that you are uncertain and it is quite possible you will be in town.

K: Tell them it is out of my control and so far as it is in my control I will stay out of there.

S: And if you are there ~~xxxx~~ you will do everything you can.

K: If I am out of the country there is nothing to accomplish -- tell him as a friend. He would have something to go by in two weeks.

S: In two weeks he will be safe

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K: If we haven't done it by the 30th -- at that time he really might have done some good -- which is only fifty/fifty. I really would advise him as a friend to postpone it. If I am out of the country and the Egyptians are hanging in there he will be meeting them in a preoccupied way and won't be able to tell them a thing. It is possible I'll stay out of Egypt at that time but I am sure Sadat would not appreciate my staying out or interrupting things for two days so that Gensher can bring the German press in.

S: I'll talk to him and try to get him to postpone the entire thingx.

END

SE90

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TELCON
Amb. Moynihan/Secy Kissinger
3:13 p.m., February 26, 1975

RELEASED IN PART
B6

[Missed first part -- some humorous discussion about [redacted] B6

K: . . . in which military power of course does not matter anymore. But even political and economic power are being depreciated. All that matters now is the intransigent merit of ideas.

M: I see.

K: He ought to try that on Mobuto.

M: Wow! I think you ought to come back to Cambridge, that's what we think.

[Laughter]

K: Yeah, but you don't practice. Listen, Pat, that isn't why I called you. But I've read your article which I think is spectacularly good.

M: Oh, how good of you to say that.

K: Now, just a minute.

M: Yeah.

K: Now that you've got me started on this goddamn thing, I want you to do something about it.

M: Well, what can I do for you, Henry?

K: Well, could you get together a group that develops a strategy of how we behave in the United Nations on this issue. I'm serious. And the political side I can handle.

M: Um-humm.

K: But what do we do on economic and social side; what is the strategy; how do we act? I fully agree we have to start harassing and we have to make it tough as these reports wind their way through.

M: And we have to -- If you would take my view, an opposition just doesn't come in and say don't do that; do this.

K: I agree with you but you know I'll never get it done by the State Department.

M: No, you won't. You will not.

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K: Well, therefore, it's got to be done by you. I'm serious.

M: Well, all right.

K: It ought to be fun.

M: Of course it would be. Can I think about this?

K: Well, think about how you will do it. I want to do it. But it's got to be done. I haven't even mentioned it to the President but I know he will approved.

M: All right. Now can I talk to people at the CFIA?

K: What's the CFIA?

M: You know our country here.

K: Yes. As long as [redacted] doesn't get involved. B6

M: I'll keep [redacted] . . B6

K: No, no, I don't give a damn.

M: Let me -- what are you thinking about -- a sort of a group to work through the spring and summer?

K: That's right. And meet with me.

M: And meet wi th you. And when you think of a group, you think of six people sort of?

K: Whatever you need.

M: All right.

K: But then, you know, you know the State Department. You've got to draft instructions: What is it we tell people to do?

M: That's right. Otherwise, it just doesn't happen.

K: And who do we appoint to what.

M: Yeah.

K: And we can find some financing for it, I'm sure if that's an issue.

M: I'd be honored to try. Somebody should try. I couldn't be more pleased that you thought it good. I have had a good press conference in which I ended up defending Cambodia and aid this morning in New York. I don't know how I got into that one but there you are.

K: It's a shameful thing not to send ammunition . . Look, I think it's going to fall.

M: Of course.

K: But for it to fall with the United States refusing ammunition to the defenders is shameful.

M: That is shameful. I couldn't more agree with you. I was at Pearl Harbor with Moyan (sp?) you know, and sat through those briefings and I said to _____ In other words, it's all over. Is that it? Because it's all over unless we do something. I said, "Well, we're not going to."

K: Yeah.

M: Listen, I'm delighted. I had a beautiful letter from Paul Sever (sp?) who had a comment -- . . . said that Teaberry who is a political scientist --

K: I know him. One of the few honest ones around.

M: He said this is as good as Miss Derucks (sp?) piece in terms of, you know, the time has come we've got to do something.

K: I couldn't agree more.

M: And I'll take it very seriously.

K: Don't just have it in the old babble factory up there, you know. I want to know what instructions we give; when; to whom.

M: Right, right, right. I follow you. Who should I talk to with your people -- Larry?

K: Larry and Win.

M: And Win. All right.

K: But I want to meet with that group.

B6 *

M: Exactly. I got you. Could you do me the favor of giving me your opinion about a person -- [redacted] B6 A large corporation of whom I have a friend is thinking of hiring him and they've heard good things and bad about his performance.

K: Well, he was a disaster as [redacted] but I don't know whose fault that was. B6

M: Do you have any feeling for the [redacted] or was that before you? B6

K: That was before me.

M: Okay. Well, that's a good thing. It was nice of you to call. Can I just say on the Pakistan thing, I called Werksman [Gwertzman ?] who didn't use it and I called Murray Marder, asking in both cases, saying: Had they called me? I had a garbled message from my daughter. Murray took it all down what I said but then he only used the first part. I said: Well, now I maybe wouldn't have done this but let's keep it in perspective and I went down that whole list of things.

K: You know that [redacted] is carrying on like a banshee here. B6

M: He'd better watch out or you're going to send him packing home, aren't you?

K: Well, if the fools will just stop now, there isn't going to be any problem. Do you think we're going to send hundreds of millions of dollars . . .

M: No. You don't have the money and you don't have that --

K: We don't have that inclination. We'll do just enough --

M: And I've told them you would not in effect.

K: I said it publicly yesterday.

M: You know, Henry Kissinger's word . . given a call for conference type or when the Minister of External Affairs is serious. He knows what those words mean when he says: We will in no circumstances participate in an arms race; we will do nothing to change the strategic balance.

K: That's right. But if he goes around calling me a liar and if he turns it into a confrontation, we'll have to do something.

B6 *

M: Well, you have to do something about him, not about arms.

K: That's right.

M: Yeah. Well, that's another subject and another time [Laughter]

K: Okay.

M: Henry, thanks.

K: Pat, don't talk about my retirement unless you get me a job back in Cambridge.

M: There's a federal statute about 65.

K: Doesn't apply to Secretaries of State. In two years you are going to be eligible to go up again.

M: I look forward to seeing you.

K: Right. Bye.

SE92

1*

TELCON
Ted Koppel/Secretary Kissinger
4:16 p.m. 2/26/75

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Ted, how are you?

TK: Very well.

K: Larry told me about your conversation--I'm anxious to talk to you very soon, I've got to get that damn speech done.

TK: Right, there is one thing I wanted to discuss with you--even if it was possible for me to stop in for five minutes--it really would be five minutes, but it pertains to this subject and I'd like to get your views on it.

K: Okay--how about at a quarter to six?

TK: Fine, very good.

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SE 91

1*

TELCON
Speaker of the House Carl Albert
Secretary Kissinger
3:21 p.m., February 26, 1975

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

A: Yes, Sir, how are you?

K: Mr. Speaker, how are you?

A: Very fine.

K: Mr. Speaker, I called you earlier to tell you that the Chinese have accepted a visit by you and Rhodes.

A: That's splendid.

K: And of course your wives and a small staff. But no others of in that visit.

A: How many can we have, total?

K: We'll work that out. No other Congressmen but you can take staff members.

A: No, we will have two Congressmen. I told the Foreign Affairs and Appropriations Committee they should go separately because they're on a mission that's different from ours.

K: That's right.

A: But I would like to take about -- I'd like to take my wife and about five staff members. Do you think I can do that?

K: Well, let me -- Can I check into that? I have no experience with that.

A: Well, I don't either. But if I can, I'd like to take one of my men and at least three of my secretaries.

K: Yeah.

A: Do you think that that can be done?

K: We'll do our utmost.

A: And my wife and I. That would be five for me. And Rhodes would have probably three -- four: his wife, one secretary and one man.

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K: Right. I think that can probably be worked out. And we'll be glad to send somebody along with you.

A: Well, I think we have to have somebody that has experience. I don't know whether we need a doctor or not. Mike Mansfield took a whole h_____ as I understand it. Is that right?

K: I really don't remember.

A: He, I know, took the House physidan -- the Capitol physician.

K: Well, if that's what he did, then you should too.

A: I should take the Capitol physician and I don't know whether he took a military escort or not.

K: I'm sure not. Because they wouldn't permit --

A: I wouldn't want a military escort . . .

K: I don't think they would permit that.

A: About four of my staff and my wife and that would be sufficient except for a doctor that we might need. And Mike has taken him every time he has gone. So have the others too.

K: Right. Well, I'm sure we can work that out.

A: All right, sir. But only two Congressmen, that's Rhodes and I.

K: Rhodes and you. Then there would be a separate Congressional --

A: That's fine. That's much better.

K: This is really a special concession to you and the Minority Leaders.

A: All right. And this would be during the Easter holidays, is that all right, the timing? Or have they set a time yet?

K: The time can be worked out, the end of March or early April. You work it out.

A: How will I work it out?

K: Well, I will get Winston Lord to get in touch with you.

A: All right.

K: He's my diplomatic . .

A: I really appreciate this, Mr. Secretary.

K: Well, Mr. Speaker, I'm delighted. And I know you'll have a great time.

A: Fine. Thank you very much.

K: Bye.

A: Okay.

SE93

*

TELECON
Mr. William Rogers/Secretary Kissinger
February 26, 1975
5:58 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: ...baseball game is on in ____?

R: No, ABC.

K: What difference do4s it make what network it is?

R: They want to cover it. I ~~don't~~ told B___ and the promoter no daily. I said that would be a great mistake. It would not help matters ~~at~~ at all.

K: There is no game.

R: ~~M~~ No, B_____ knows that and so does the promoter. Yahoda is the promoters name.

K: Are you working on that speec~~h~~h?

R: Yes. I sent the draft a few minutes ago.

K: With more than one-word comm~~m~~ents?

R: Yes.

K: You are coming down to Houston with me? No, you have to brief up here.

R: I will do it either way.

K: You had better brief up here. When are you going off?

R: A week from Sunday.

K: Then I will see you before you go?

R: Yes.

END

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SE100 1*

TELECON
Mr. Wm. Rogers/ Secretary Kissinger
February 27, 1975
7:06 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Will you explain to me just exactly what it is we are doing at the OAS meeting. Is this a charter measure?

R: No.

K: What is it? I do not want to get moved easily along without knowing what I am doing.

R: It would be a resolution of the organ of consultation which can consist of the master...

K: I understand that. What review...

R: Paragraph three of the 1964 resolution of that organ of consultation.

K: What makes ...what changes, the 2/3 to a majority?

R: Well...

K: Bill, was it decided in '64 that henceforth sanctions could only be lifted by 2/3rds?

R: Yes. That sanctions would be lifted by the organ of consultation. The Rio Treaty provides the organ of consultation...

K: We are modifying the Rio Treaty?

R: No, it permits ____ rather than the organ of consultation can act to change sanctions.

K: Isn't that a modification of the Rio Treaty?

R: No.

K: What does the Rio Treaty provide for lifting sanctions?

R: Nothing. It provides for the lifting of sanctions by 2/3rds.

K: No we need a 2/3 vote to change it to a majority?

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Rogers - 2.

K: What exactly are we proposing at the OAS? I cannot... I do not know what I am saying in this speech.

R: You are saying we will vote for a resolution which amends the original 64 resolution to provide that those sanctions set down can be lifted by 2/3rds.

K: Can you draft this in three comprehensible sentences that make ~~the~~ it clear we are not supporting the lifting of sanctions but only a procedural change. After that we will then engage in consultation abou the lifting of sanctions. Do you see what I mean?

R: Yes. I do. That's a big help.

END

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SE 114

TELECON
Clifton Daniel/Secretary Kissinger
February 28, 1975
7:00 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

D: I won't keep you long. I relayed your message today. I tried to use your language as best I could. You said we would very much have the option of continuing it. They ask if that's just an expression of desire or whether you consider it a matter of great importance.

K: We consider it a matter of importance. I don't know how much Colby told you. It might give us ____.

D: He said the same, more or less. You are ~~xxxxxx~~ endorsing what he said.

K: I have no knowledge of what's on a submarine. I endorse it, that's why we've gone after it.

D: The second question is, as the Russians much know about this operation and they are worried they lost a submarine, what is the reason for continued secrecy.

K: They never raised it with us. I think once it's on the front page of the New York Times. I think it was only in a San Diego newspaper.

D: It was on the front page of the Los Angeles Times and it appeared on the front page of the New York Post. The Washington Post did not use the story.

K: Well, it's never been raised with us.

D: My final question is, the submarine, as I understand it, is a 1958 ~~xxxx~~ model but it went down as 1968. Has everything changed since then?

K: Our technical people think that by knowing the design it would give us a pretty good clue to where we're going from there.

D: Alright, I think that's all.

K: We may deside to cancel this. If we do, I think we would be honored bound to tell you.

D: I hope so. I don't like to use the work honor bound.

K: I'm telling you, we'll tell you, by then you would be free to do what you w ish, assuming you go along with us now.

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D: Alright, I'll relay all that. I'm sorry to both you this late in the day.

K: Not at all.

END

SE 111 1*

TELECON
Mr. Hartman/Secretary Kissinger
February 28, 1975

RELEASED IN FULL

K: We better make clear to the French that if they insist on having a specific ~~xxxxx~~ date it is going to be extremely troublesome.

H: That is pretty clear.

K: They are calling him in tomorrow to announce a decision.

H: They told Ken their deadline is Sunday.

K: You are going to get that letter out with that in it?

H: ~~X~~ The last paragraph says late March or April. What I'll do is take out ~~xxx~~ that and say the timing is what we discussed in Paris.

K: Ok.

END

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SE 112 1*

TELECON
Mr. Vorontsov/Secretary Kissinger
February 28, 1975
3:18 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

V: I have got a piece of good news about the Old European Conference... I got a cable from Gromyko. The phrase about the ~~peaceful~~ peaceful change of border -- he says to tell to you directly that the formula suggested by Mr. Hartman is acceptable to the Soviet Union.

K: Good.

V: The participating states consider their frontiers can be changed by peaceful means and by agreement -- this is acceptable and we would not mind that this phrase will be put in the text of the principles of sovereignty as the Germans have agreed to do.

K: That is my impression. Should we notify the Germans?

V: Since Mr. Hartman told me that is your Compromise language

K: Why don't we notify the Germans and we'll get it to Geneva. We have sent a letter to the General Secretary.

V: To me?

K: Through you to the General Secretary. General Scowcroft has it

V: I will be waiting for it. Good. Are you flying next week?

K: Wednesday afternoon. I will write the General Secretary next week.

V: Good. I have heard you are making it a European trip as well as the Middle East.

K: I am not sure.

V: I had heard that you were going to stop in West Berlin.

K: I am going to go to West Berlin at some point but not on this trip.

V: You were criticizing a man by the name of Vorontsov by saying he is ~~xxxxx~~ siding with a certain man who is an adversary of yours and ours....

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V: The correspondents contacted me...I told them I don't remember the contents and someone else is informing them of the contents -- not me.

K: The whole thing didn't sound right to me.

V: To me either but they were quoting me -- but I didn't inform them.

K: I appreciate this and I am going to look into it on my side.

VL Good.

END

SE 104 1*

RELEASED IN PART
B6

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Edward Klein (Newsweek)
2/28/75; 11:31 a.m.

K: Hello.

Klein: Hello, Mr. Secretary. How are you?

K: Okay.

Klein: I am sure this couldn't be a worse possible time for me to call you but I don't know when will be a good time. I will tell you why I am calling: We discussed both the last time I saw you and on the phone this question about late March on WGBH, if you recall.

K: Yeah.

Klein: And I wondered if you had had any time at all to give it some thought.

K: I really can't take anything on until that next negotiation is behind me.

Klein: So, that will be sometime in April?

K: And also I had promised Barbara Walters that I would do the next thing with her.

Klein: Uh-huh.

K: So I have got to get those things behind me.

Klein: Okay. Well, then I will come back to you, you know, after that's all over with. May I ask how are things going on the Hill?

K: On what?

Klein: As far as Cambodia is concerned.

K: I -- uh . . .

Klein: I didn't call for that.

K: No, no, no.

Klein: So you don't have to answer.

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Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Edward Klein (Newsweek)
2/28/75; 11:31 a.m. -2-

K: No, no, that's not the point. You know, the Hill right now is extremely weird in the sense that you can't talk to anybody who represents anybody.

Klein: Hmmmm.

K: And I think people are extremely uneasy and extremely paralized. As they are on everything else.

Klein: I was stunned to see this reversal on Turkey. I frankly find it hard to understand.

K: What reversal.

Klein: Well, the TIMES is reporting that the leadership there in the Senate is now considering giving the President to reinstate aid.

K: But don't you think that is right?

Klein: Of course I think it is right but it was wrong in the first place and why are they reversing themselves now?

K: Yeah.

Klein: You know, it is confusion and very strange behavior.

K: Well, they put it through in an emotional fit and they didn't really think it through. Somebody told me you are going to have another -- you have an article speculating about my resignation.

Klein: No, we don't.

K: Because I wondered whether you could let me get off into a negotiation with a little bit of my . . .

Klein: (Laughter) I sent a cable down to Washington asking them to look into the alleged statements by Richardson and we . . .

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Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Edward Klein (Newsweek)
2/28/75; 11:31 a.m.

K: I will tell you, off the record, . . .

Klein: Yes.

[redacted] B6

Klein: (Laughter) Exactly. Well, I wish you luck.

K: Thank you. Call me when I get back.

Klein: I will.

K: After that you you may not want to interview me.

Klein: Oh, no -- in any case, I always like to see you.

K: Okay. Best to your children.

Klein: Thank you very much.

K: Bye.

Klein: Bye.

1*

SE 105

TELCON
Scott Reston/Kissinger
2/28/75 - 11:50 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

R: Hello Henry.

K: Scotty, how are you?

R: Alright. Sorry I missed you the other night. I thank you for...

K: Well we loved having your wife there and I'm very fond of Dick.

R: Well, he can run through a hard time and _____.

K: He's a very honorable man.

R: Yes, he's a fine young guy. I'm trying to think through this next trip. You're going off on Wednesday, aren't you?

K: Wednesday, yes.

R: I'm trying to put it in some kind of perspective of the long struggle. How do you see it? What's the nut question here?

K: Well the nut question is really it will determine the mood, the philosophy and the framework of the final settlement. There has been a lot of discussion whether this would be an alternative. That isn't the issue, the issue is whether we can get the Soviets to come along in a moderate approach. I think if we succeed we have a fair chance. Because that will be the only approach that's ever worked. And it's also the way we can get into Geneva under the best possible conditions. I really think it's the future of moderation in the Arab world will depend importantly on whether I succeed.

R: And how do you estimate that and who are the key figures?

K: Well the chance of the negotiation as such, I don't want to sound like Eliot Richardson putting odds on contingencies, but I think the negotiation itself is slightly better than 50-50 between Egypt and Israel. Then the problem is, you know if we could also move on the Syrian front then the odds would be pretty good. But since this may be difficult the odds are a little more complicated.

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R: The odds are against on the Syrian front?

K: The odds are against on the Syrian front in the same timeframe as on the Egyptian front. Not permanently.

R: The Israeli front, you think....

K: Looks better in the leadership and totally uncertain in the Cabinet and Parliament. But with them it is a very grave event with the Jewish community doesn't always understand because if it fails some members of the American Jewish community think if it fails there will be a massive crisis in Geneva with Europe, Japan, Russia and the Arabs all uniting to better rapid progress.

R: You can have a real smash-up unless you go there with a real vacious for settlement....

K: And with the moderate Arabs having achieved something.

R: Has Sadat got the influence really to bring the rest of them along or not?

K: That's the $64.00 question. I don't think he knows the answer.

You write all of this on your own.

R: Oh sure, I just want a little guidance as to what is the sensible position to take at this particular moment.

K: But anything you can say to the Israelis about going to the American Jewish community that this is a grave matter along the lines of your previous....

R: Yeah.

K: Cause it really is for them.

R: Of course it is. They're really up against it. What I don't understand, however, is, taking the other side of it for a moment, why would they be satisfied to leave the passes and the oil field? If the only thing they get out of it is some vague ...

K: They'll get more out of it.

R: They've got to have something in writing, don't they?

K: Oh yeah, they'll get something in writing.

R: What does that amount to? What _____ do we want? What would....

K: Well, I can't go into that, Scotty, but I think in that direction we made progress on the last trip. What is in writing will not be as important as the intangibles. But it will be significant. But the difficulty is to make people understand that what we are negotiating about now is the process and not a condition. But there will be a document, they're not being asked to withdraw unconditionally.

R: Well that can only go back to the rating of 214338, can't it?

K: That willl certainly be part of it.

R: ... and internationally guaranteed borders. Have we resolved the guarantee problem within our own government?

K: No, but we're thinking about it very hard.

R: How is the situation on the Hill. Has that calmed down a bit?

K: It calmed down but it's very weird, Scotty, because I think that you can have a superb dialogue right now and not know what it means. In the old days you could talk to Russell and BDirksen and Benners, and they could tell you exactly what would happen. Now you take Turkish aid -- I have the impression that in a secret ballot, 5 out of 6 would vote for removing the cut-off. In fact, I've yet to meet a Congressional group other than those who sponsored it, bthat isn't highly uneasy about it, but there's nobody who you can really talk to who can get it from here to there.

R: Yeah, we're fresh out of Sam Rayburns and Lyndon Johnsons.

K: That's right. And it's especially difficult in the House.

R: It's this democracy, you see.

K: But Scotty, if you look at, over the years, one would have to say that the odds of this leading to executive predominance are very high, cause right now you have a Congress that's a little bit out of control, and the non-elected President. But you get yourself a President who has just wbeen elected against a Congress where the leaders have structured totally _____ and the odds would have to be with the President.

R: Oh, sure. Well, from what I read the immediate thing is it's going to go back this way anyway and with all the distractions and ambiguities of the questions before us, it's just hard to get a pilemont of any kind really, to get a lead.

K: And to get a lead to act consecutively.

R: Well, maybe in the parliamentary system where you got the whip and the government goes down maybe you could do it, but you can't do it under our system.

K: No. If it really keeps going like this it will be more like the Third and Fourth Republic.

R: I see Mr. Roth has retired you.

K: Who?

R: Tom Roth, of the Sun Times.

K: Has retired me?

R: Yeah, he's got you resigning.

K: Oh, gee, I just wish I could go on a trip once with a little permanence.

R: Well, as a matter of fact, I think that is one of the points that ought to be made -- get off this guy's back, at least during this session.

K: Scotty, I have talked more seriously to you about this subject than to anyone else and you know my views and they haven't changed since you and I have had lunch, and there's nothing current on this.

R: Well there better hadn't been cause our country needs you.

K: Thank you.

R: Well, good luck. I won't see you before you go. How long do you think you'll be away?

K: I have no idea. It could be up to three weeks.

R: Is your gal going with you?

K: Yes.

R: Good. Thank you, Henry. All the best.

K: Nice to talk to you. Bye.

SE 108

1*

Telcon
2/28/75 12:17 p.m.
Senator Symington
Secretary Kissinger

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Stuart, how are you -- what a nice dinner that was the other day.

S: I was so glad to see you and Frank get together.

K: It was a nice thing of you to do.

S: Always a pleasure to see you and I must be frank about it, at least a pleasure to see Nancy.

K: She's prettier and probably brighter.

S: I wouldn't know about that -- I was sorry I missed you because I was out of town -- I was down with a group of people in Florida to be frank. I missed your briefing.

K: Well, you know my views on these subjects.

S: ~~XXXX~~ I will read it, I promise. What I called you about ole fella, I know you are very busy. I'm the chairman of the Arms Control Subcommittee of the Senate -- and we would like to start off, of course, with you first and at your convenience, or if you're too busy, to have somebody come that I could say was speaking for you. So that we wouldn't get off on any --

K: When do you want to do it?

S: Well, at your convenience, if you could do it.

K: I'll do my damnedest, if you want me to.

S: I do want you to.

K: If not, I could send Sonnenfeldt.

S: I'd a hell of a lot rather have you. I'll make my time your time.

K: And can we work it out when I come back from my trip?

S: Sure, when are you going to come back?

K: I don't know yet, two or three weeks.

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S: I see, but sometime after the recess.

K: I think so.

S: I'll make it any time day or nite you say.

K: Okay, we'll do it.

S: Did you see Jerry Smith's article in the Wall Street Journal?

K: Yes, I thought it was good.

S: I did too. I don't agree with those that say nothing was accomplished but I think from what I know that it was a tremendous success in getting the forward based aircraft out of the picture. There are somee things I'd like to see cleared up and Jerry's a hell of a good fellow and I think he wrote a good article.

K: I agree and it's very generous of him.

S: He always says what he thinks. I thought we'd start with you and end with Schlesinger. A lot of people don't want to testify nincluding some of my colleagues, you know.

K: Well, I'd be happy to do it.

S: I appreciate and I won't bother you about it until after you get back from your trip.

K: Terrific and then let's have lunch or dinner.

S: I'd like it much, whenever you are free. My time is your time. Best of luck to you, Henry.

K: Thank you. Bye.

*

SE 106

TELCON
Clifton Daniels/Kissinger
2/28/75 - 12:03 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K:] Hello.

D: Mr. Secretary.

K: How are you?

D: Very well, Sir. I say very well, but actually I have a cold. Go ahead.

K: Well, Bill Colby told me about his conversation with you, and I don't want to tell you what to do. I just wanted you to know that a decision, whether to go ahead, whether to cancel, has not been made and that we would very much like to have the option to continue, in light of the fact that there is some information there that would be uniquely valuable to have.

D: I'm making a note on that.

K: What we have to do is to keep watching this over the next months, and then see what the recommendation will be.

D: Let me tell you precisely what my situation is personally. I'm reporting this to New York, is the reason I'm taking notes. Yesterday after that conversation I sent a memorandum to the _____ in New York about it because the ultimate decision on what we will do will be made there. That memorandum has been taken under advisement. I have been this morning in touch with them, talking to them, they asking my judgment of it. I have not yet had a meeting of the people here concerned, but I'm going to do that in just a few minutes. I've got an office full of foreign military officers who are here studying. I've been chatting with them this morning so I've been busy but I can assure you that this is being given very serious consideration. We're glad to have your opinion. We appreciate your advice and I hope we can be free to call you back and discuss it further if any of our people have the need to do so.

K: Absolutely, but I just wanted you to know what the White House position on it was, so that you could take that into account, too.

D: Alright, sir.

K: I mean as to the possibility of going ahead. If you want to call me

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back I'm available.

D: Alright sir. Have you any time frame in mind, you say watching over the coming months. Do you know what....

K: When we would do it?

D: Yes.

K: In the summer months. Probably July or August.

D: Yes. Swell. That's what we were told yesterday.

K: Depending on the President's visit since we don't want to do it during his visit.

D: I understand. Alright sir. I don't think I have any other questions, but if I do after we think this over, I will give you a call. Thanks for calling.

K: Good bye.

D: Bye.

SE 118 1*

TELECON
Mr. Enders/Secretary Kissinger
March 3, 1975
8:37 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

E: You did an extraordinary job. Did you promise my hide in return?

K: You are totally invaluable to me which makes you a pain in the neck. I just have to admit the obvious. I am very loyal to my subordinates, especially the ones I admire.

E: It may take two meetings to pull it off. If you authorize me to accept the invitation.

K: You have no authority to accept it, just report to me. Even if it comes out precisely.

E: I will cable you during the course of the meeting.

K: I will not give you the authority to accept it but you can cable me if you want to.

E: The French are upset about invitations.

K: Send them a note.

E: If other cases of this kind come up with friendly governments, may I do the same?

K: Yes.

END

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SE 123 *

TELECON
Ambassador Bowdler/Secretary Kissinger
March 3, 1975
~~8~~ 7:22 PM

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: I see the Ecuadorians ~~k~~ are protesting my speech in Houston. [redacted] -- I was defelding them. B6

B: I have not seen that. Is that a cable or a news ticker.

K: A news ticker.

B: API - UPI?

K: I had it here a minute ago.

B: Those people don't have any sense.

K: Can we get in touch with them?

B: We certainly can. I'll get hold of the news item.

K: You'll do it in the next 15 minutes?

B: I'll try to find it here.

K: OK. I just had it. They'll find it here somewhere. Will you tell them I was defending them?

B: I certainly ~~wxix~~ will.

K: OK. Good.

END

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SE 117 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Hartman/Secretary Kissinger
March 3, 1975
12:17

K: On the Bitsios meeting. Can we make sure it holds til Thursday?

H: We have to say something to the Belgians about the fact that you are coming there and we'll have to make arrangements.

K: Can we do that tomorrow?

H: Yes. I think we have to alert our people and have them tell the Belgians. Bob may get a question about other stops but he could say it is not definite yet.

K: You tell Bitsios we'll do our best but it is not easy because we have to make technical arrangements.

H: And we'll try to hold it until Thursday. I think the Embassy residence is probably the best place.

K: Ok.

H: It means going in to town.

K: But that is only 20 minutes.

H: Ok.

END

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SE 124 *

TELECON
Chief Justice Warren Burger/Secretary Kissinger
March 3, 1975
5:13 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I understand you're going to be at the Iranian Embassy dinner tonight and you're x responding to the toast.

B: No one informed me. I thought it was routine we should go in___ if we could.

K: If you do xxxxxxx respond to the toast try to do so without going into the details of foreign policy. The ___we have with the Israelis now is to give them moral support. Anything that could be taken_____from them would be helpful

B: I'll see what I can work out.

K: I have no objections if you do get into foreign policy.

B: I do.

K: I could see some reserve on your part. If you could convey they could not count on unconditional support that the American ____.

B: I take it x you're not going to be there.

K: Yes. I'm go ng to be there.

B: How is it you don't xxxxxxx respond to the toast.

K: Because you outrank me .

B: It's helpful to be informed of this. I'll try to think of something.

K: You don't have to get intothe xxgx details of the negotiations. I'll leave it to you.

B: I'll try to think of it in terms of the ___process.

K: That would be exact.

B: I'm grateful to be alerted.

K: My information may be wrong but somewhere along the line I learned that you would xxxxxxx respond to the toast.

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B: Someone forgot to tellme about it.. If I have any questions I'll check with you when I get there.

K: I'll see you this evening.

END

SE 132 *

TELECON
George Shultz/Secretary Kissinger
March 4, 1975
5:25 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

S: I was in town today so I thought I would call you.

K: Good.

S: To see if there's anything more I should know.

K: We're in favor of another meeting of your group. It hasn't done much good with the French, who have called a preparatory meeting.

S: Your thinking of a small group -- 5?

K: Yes and then you can move to some producers.

S: Is the Germans going to take the lead.

K: We wrote to Schmidt that he should____.

S: This would be more focused on what kind of discussion should be carried on with the producers before I ~~xxx~~ go.

K: I had a good talk with the Shah.

S: How did he react to my visit.

K: Very well. And that's a contact we must retain. We had a good meeting with the Iranian Joint Committee, but it got screwed up at the end.

S: We got some ___that the Iranians in _proposed with the____. It was all set up, but because it didn't seem as though the overall agreement of how the nuclear power would be handled...

K: I think we straightened that out this afternoon, at any rate, we're determined to straighten it out within the next month.

S: I'm sure we know they have nothing.

K: We're ready to go on it.

S: Alright, I'll just stand by and wait to hear from you on those other things. If I hear anything from the Germans...

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K: Let Eagleburger know. He'll get in touch with me.

S: I'll also hear from you about anything in respect to the Shah. Good luck on your trip. The last one seemed to go well from the reports.

K: The next one is the key one.

S: OK.

END

SE 138

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Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Assistant Secretary William Rogers
3/4/75; 10:35 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

R: Mr. Secretary.

K: I understand the Latins are running amuck now about the speech.

R: Well, not the Latins in general. The Ecuadorians are tee'd off.

K: Why? I was trying to help them.

R: I agree. The answer to your question why is the Ari Moleon AP story. Moleon did not attend my briefing and wrote it up. The lead to the story was Kissinger accused Latins of doing terrible things. It was a gross mischaracterization of the story. All the other stories that went down there on the other ~~WIX~~ wires were very good.

K: Yeah, but now Ecuador has officially protested, hasn't it?

R: Yeah, but I think we can get back to them. I've got to talk to the Ambassador up here this morning. We are sending that cable out also this morning.

K: Well, I asked for it to be sent last night -- why didn't it go last night?

R: Because we thought you wanted to see it.

K: No. Okay. About the Venezuelans.

R: I think we have got to talk to them, too. I'll talk with Furley this morning.

K: They have blasted off.

R: Yeah, well, I think Furley ought to be able toget them to quiet back again. We are bound to get these kinds of reactions among some people because every time you talk about confrontation they respond and say you can't criticize us for confrontation -- it's not fair.

K: Well, what you should tell the Venezuelan Ambassador is that this is my last attempt. Who is the AD Secretary-General?

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R: The AD Secretary-General? He is a politician.

K: Mata and Iturbide -- who started blasting off. What I would like you to get across to them is that if it is a confrontation that will rip it as far as we are concerned.

R: Uh-huh.

K: Because I was defending their position. And fighting for their position. I am just sick and tired of their using now that as an excuse.

R: I agree. I agree.

K: Can you get that done today?

R: Yep! I'll talk to them both.

K: Okay. What is the reaction elsewhere?

R: The other stories came through -- it wasn't bad. The other wire services were reported -- the thing was some of the wire services were carried in some of the papers and the Ari Moleon story was carried in others. Now I think what I ought to do is get in touch with some of the other wire service stories and say look, Moleon carried a bum rap and you better carry a clarifying story. I am going to try and talk with some of them also today and see if we can't get some other correcting stories going down the line.

K: Okay, good.

R: You betcha!

K: Thank you.

SE 131 *

TELECON
Mr. Hartman/Secretary Kissinger
March 4, 1975
2:30

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Has the press spokesman ever denied the Karamanlis story or is that not important?

H: We sent out a message which I signed off on which I think corrected the story that Athens...

K: Which is what?

H: Which they were denying.

K: Why then is it that Karamanlis seems to think it should be done here.

H: I thought it ought to be done in Athens. We haven't had any question about it...

K: Don't you read Kubisch's cables? Are you on the distribution list?

H: Yesterday's cable?

K: There is a cable from Bitsios accepting a meeting in the Embassy in which he said Bitsios was brusque because the press is continuingto report it. Why couldn't we deny it here and send my denial to Greece? Wouldn't it be more sensible? Have Anderson say it and then send it there.

H: It sounds sensible to me but can I look it up, so I can see what our last message said? I ~~don't~~ think what is happening is when you talked to Qerides and to the Congressmen and say this may not do Karamanlis any good....

K: But I never said his intransigence is not doing him any good.

H: No, but when it goes through 2 or three people it can come out that way.

K: When I go back to the University ~~this~~ is the time to do an analysis of why things happen but now that it has happened can we rectify it?

H: Yes.

K: Even if we have to ~~bend the Jews~~ bend the Jews a little bit? Can it be done in the next half hour? Can you do it?

H: Yes sir.

END

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SE 134 *

TELECON
Wayne Hays/Secretary Kissinger
March 4, 1975
5:15 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

H: This assembly which I'm President voted last fall, before I was elected President, to set up a committee on detente, which I thought was a ~~stupid~~ stupid idea and they want me to nominate someone for it. I suggested to K__, he said this might go down the road and I don't want to go out to get someone to serve. I would like to have ~~your~~ your advice. I should tell them no American wants to serve on it. I don't think we ~~should~~ should be ~~messing~~ messing around with detente.

K: I agree with you. I have no problems with that. That would be a good proposal to make.

H: I wrote a letter to the Secretary General and said I'm not going to nominate anybody until I talk to you.

K: I think what you suggest is correct.

H: In case you don't think I've been spying around, I know you are going to be in Cardiff, you have to be ~~careful~~ careful.

K; I won't be there ~~very~~ very long.

H: Someone said they're giving Callaghan the ~~key~~ key to the city____.

K: OK. I'll see you when I get back.

END

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SE 137 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Secretary Simon/Secretary Kissinger
~~Feb~~ March 4, 1975
4:22 PM

K: If you want to know how these stories come out on State-Treasury disagreements, I don't know if you've seen the Wall Street Journal today.

S: No, I havent.

K: Henry Jackson asked somebody, Edward Simon, you must know him, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Treasury, it said a big baloon went up from the Secretary of State about floor prices.

S: It could have been meant to be funny. Let me find out of that's about.

K: It's not right taking cracks at ~~each~~ each other.

S: It's silly. Let me get on it.

K: I thought we had a good meeting yesterday.

S: It was very good. Enders and Parsky go off in a friendly fashion.

K: And we'll meet each week from now on.

S: Yes.

END

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SE 133 *

TELECON
Tom Enders/Secretary Kissinger
March 4, 1975
5:18 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: You're not going to beat people to death on the floor prices. You said on the German thing you want $8. I think it's $6 or 7.

E: In order to make sure we get out of the German's middle range, I think we ought to go from $6 to $8.

K: What's from $6 to 8. That means anything we agree to.

E: I think I good result to this would be a 6 to 8 range. The Germans might say they're committed from 6 yo 7 and we're still 6 to 8. The range is better in dealing with the producers and Congress.

K: What will that leave us?

E: Concretely, the only over lapping point would be 7, which would be a good result.

K: OK. Fine. Thank you.

END

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SE 128

TELECON
Anne Armstrong/Secretary Kissinger
March 4, 1975
6:40 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

(Missed first part)

A: I talked to a friend in Houston and it was in part___ I wanted to tell you about that man who asked you about _____ At dinner that night, it turns out a group of cattlemen met with __Friday and explain this in ~~detail~~ detail with him and he turned it over to Hick D__. This has been presented to Earl Butz. I think some people think it has some merit. The cattle business is in a slump. I think N__ had the whole subject explained to him very ~~well~~ well.

K: Good, I'll check with him.

A: OK, fine. Have a good trip.

K: Thank you. It was good to see you.

A: God ~~speed~~ speed.

END

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SE 126

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TELECON
Mr. Rogers/Secretary Kissinger
March 4, 1975
2:40 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

Missed first part.

K: The whole thrust of the speech was to oppose the restrictions on Ecuador and that is almost hopeless when these guys start jumping you. Otherwise, it is alright.

R: Fine. The Ambassador is comgin in at 3:00.

K: Anything else.

R: The only people who have spoken have been party politics. Most of the press has been borderline if not favorable. I think it is a purely Ecuadorean reaction -- typical of their shoot from the hip activity.

K: Ok.

END

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SE 130 *

TELECON
Robert Anderson/Secretary Kissinger
March 4, 1975
6:17 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

(Missed first part)

K: ...handle that Iranian deal.

A: I'm worried about Marder. He called just now. He asked about our entire line__ _the export and import don't jive with what's given here. I'm just trying to get hold of Sober and tell him to get hold of Marder immediately. I don't know enough about the background.

K: We should have just stressed the new ___.

A: I know, then you get into oil reports, then they go over the military figures.

K: How could the Department of Commerce tell him it's falling apart.

A: They have budget figures on a world wide basis and Marder said some of the figures don't jive with some of the figures we gave him this afternoon. He's the only one that called me on this thing. I just hope we can move fast enought

K: Will you move quickly?

A: OK.

K: Let me know how we're doing.

A: OK.

END

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SE 139 *

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Congressman Otto Passman
3/5/75 8:56 a.m.[1]

RELEASED IN FULL

P: Mr. Secretary

K: Yes, Mr. Chairman

P: I'm going to be brief. I delivered yesterday and of course this is classified, if you want to get something in the paper, let it be classified. I kept your package to the Middle East $100 million --$250 million and the $324 million 500--well there is a $300 million and a $40 million for the relocation of Soviet refugees. You got your package complete, just like you want it. Not one ....up. Did you know that?

K: No, but I'm very pleased to hear it.

P: Every penny and if you want to jot this down, I know you are very busy, but this is damn important to you because you are going out there--here is what is in for Israel--$324 million for economic aid; $300 million military aid; $100 million of it grant. $40 million for the relocation of Soviet refugees. Every penny of it is in there.

K: Good.

P: Now we deferred to the Foreign Affairs Committee, passed over the Cambodia--I'm prejudiced because I ~~kiss~~ lack one vote of having a sufficient number of getting it through.

K: Right.

P: Now, good luck to you on your trip and who is it in your Department if I want to talk to about something that is extremely important and something in Indonesia, I won't worry you because I know damn well--

K:

P: Who in your department can I talk to that can actually make decisions if they have too--

K: Eagleburger can get to me very quickly. Larry Eagleburger.

P Because I want to talk to him about the PL-480--

K: He is the man on whom you can rely. E-a-g-l-e-b-u-r-g-e-r. Like Eagle .....

P: Are you feeling all right this morning?

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K: I feell--I am disappointed about the Cambodia thing.

P Don't be disappointed because I'm afraid you don't know what happened. I don't know what the press said, we were told by one of your assistants that the Senate held hearings 3-4 days ago on Cambodia and the Foreign Affairs Committee will start their hearings on it tomorrow morning, understand? And rather go in on the mark-up I didn't have the votes, I was one vote void, now if I had given you a defeat, you understand, the thing would have been dead, it would hit the press ~~and~~ -- instead we deferred it to the Foreign Affairs Committee and we have three ways we can put it in before the Bill passes, you understand, if these people don't move. There is no set back. I don't care what the press says. It was beautifully moved over.

K: Good. Mr. Chairman, we have to count on you, you are the expert --

P You can count on me but you tell this man Eagleton--when I ask him

K: EAGLEBURGER

P: Eagleburger, okay tell him --that I probably will want to see him and I won't try to get to you, hell

K: No, I will be gone, I'm going to the Middle East.

P :You, you, I think you will have a successful trip.

K: Thank you Mr. Chairman

P: And I call Eagleburger.

K: Right.

TELCON

Secretary I
Roy Athert
3/5/75 9:

K: Ro

A: Ye

K: Th

SE142 *

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador McCloskey
11:09 a.m. 3/5/75

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Bob, I talked to Brademas and what I agreed with him is that I would -- we would not get this thing to a vote this week--saying that we would stock after I talked to Bitsios.

M All right, did he seem assured by that?

K: Yeh, but you know

M: I have an appointment to see him I think at 2:15 but

K: Right, you are on my side. Oh

M Oh, of cours----

K: [Laughs]

M: Look I don't go out of town for one day and forget where my interests are.

K: Look your interests I'm not interested in, it's your loyalty.

M: [laughs] You've got that.

K: Okay, I know that Bob; I've got to run. But I wanted you to know.

M: But one thing about Macomber, shouldn't he go back this weekend?

K: Yeh,

M: Okay, thank you.

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SE 144 *

TELCON
Art Hummel
Secretary Kissinger
3/5/75 11:15 a.m

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Art, I didn't have a chance to see you yesterday before you go off.

H: Yes, I know you are very busy.

K: Now, I want you to know what we are going to do. We are going to authorize something like $7 million of ammunition.

H: All right.

K: You can explore what possibilities there are for negotiation. But you mission is not to win the Nobel Prize or to get ahead of anybody. I would prefer negotiation. But ~~we~~ you are not to beat them into it.

H: I understand quite clearly, and I won't.

K: And I can't have another John Dean running around or lose in another part of the world.

H: I'm not another John Dean.
No sir, I read you loud and clear and I'll follow your instructions.

K: You know, I would like a negotiation but I did not want us to be the ones that force them into it.

H: No, sir. There is no way to force. We can assert compliance on either side--on the battlefield or anywhere else. So w

K: So when you go there, tell them we are going to give them some ammunition and I will also tell the Arabs we are giving some ammunition.

H: All right, sir. It will help me if you could have Joe let me know any progress that is made in your discussions.

K: No, we will keep you informed.

H: Very good.

K: All the best to you, Art.

H: Thanks much, sir. Bye.

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SE 141 *

TELCON
Secretary Butz
Secretary Kissinger
9:10 a.m. 3/5/75

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you Earl?

B: Okay. Are you returning my call?

K: Yes. That's right, I think you called me.

B: Ah, oh I think we got it taken care of -- about the Presidential approval of that sale of corn to the Russians, he approved that yesterday and this was important to you, IKnow. Best of luck to you, when are you leaving?

K: At noon.

B: Best of luck to you and if we can do anything --on PL 480 I will help, Henry, you know.

K: You are a friend, and you've been really terrific.

B: While you are on, probably one thing. Probably hasn't come to you attention--Our representation at the forthcoming FAO Council --has that been bøought to your attention?

K: No.

B: Well, the FAO is essentially a technical organization and heretofore we ahared the Council representation --there is a little hassle about whether it will be one of our people Roy Morry (sp). My feeling is that if he can tell you to have the top spot in the FAO, which is primarily technical and the World Food Conference Chuck Robinson is going to chair that--he should I think it's more political. Henry, best of luck to you.

K: Many thanks Earle.

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SE 140 1*

TELCON
Phil Habib
Secretary Kissinger
9:02 a.m. 3/5/75

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Phil, I just want to tell you I am raising so much hell all the time, that I think you have really done a heroic job on this

H You don't raise hell with me

K: And I just want you to know I admire what you are doing.

H: I appreciate you taking the trouble to call

K: If you ability could go with your character we'd really have a good Assistant

H: [bursts of laughter]

K: No, but I want you to know that I'm probably going yell and scream again before the day is over, but I want you to know I think you've behaved with rare nobility and extraordinary efficiency.

H: Ah thanks a lot, I appreciate your calling. Don't worry about your yelling, it doesn't bother me.

K: No, but I want you to know this because I think you have done an absolutely superlative job as Assistant Secretary.

H: Thanks. We're not doing so hot on some of our late exercises, though. This Cambodia thing is a mess.

K: Look Phil, you know and I knowthat it's not going to work and yet we owe it to our conscience to go down with our head up.

H: That's right and I think we are going to have to go all the way-- We had a meeting after I left you last night, did anyone give you a report on that?

K: No.

H Deciding what strategy to follow--you know the Passman committee deferred action--Now it will go to the House Foreign Affairs Committee and in order to Doc Morgan to move--he is reluctant you know, some pressure has to be put on him. So the WH people are going to try to get the President to call Morgan today; will you put a word in for that?

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K: In fact, I've got to go to see him now.

H: Okay, good.

K: Fine. Bye.

SE 187 *

TELECON
Mr. Hartman/Secretary Kissinger
March 31, 1975
10:00 AM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Why do I have to see the Canadian one half hour before lunch. I know this has been done since ~~Jerr~~ Jefferson's time, but why do I have to do it.

H: It was just that you were inviting him down and I wasn't sure how much business you could do at the luncheon. I thought you may want to make some points to him on the Middle East.

K: 12:45 is the earliest I'll see him.

H: OK.

END

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SE 150 1*

TELECON
Mr. Ken Freed/ Secretary Kissinger
March 24, 1975
7:00 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

F: I am a little puzzled about this reassessment. I am particularly fouled - up over how this reassessment will work in relation to Israel.

K: Look, this is a Middle East policy review. Why the excitement?

F: But what would it accomplish?

K: I think it is self-evident that we would have a reassessment in the light of a new situation in the Middle East. ~~Ax~~ You know, normally we are accused of not reassessing policy in light of changing circumstances.

F: Ok. The aim would be I gather to try to prevent another impasse. How did that work in regard to the Arabs and the Israelis?

K: What?

F: The reassessment.

K: That's what we are trying to determine.

F: The question of aid to Israel or the Arabs is part of that?

K: Yes. But it does not mean it has to involve any reduction. We have not started the review yet and have no fixed conclusions.

F: You do feel some thing has to be done?

K: All of this is on deep background.

F: Ok. The question of reassessment implies a need for change?

K: I amy or may not. We are facing a totally new situation. It is a more comprehensive approach.

F: When I write in assuming one of the aspects of this thing has to deal with handling the Geneva conference. An Israeli told me he thought the step-by-step may not be/as dead as we thought.

K: It is not up to us.

F: Will this be in the NSC channel?

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Mr. Ken Freed - 2.

F: Will this be in the NSC channel?

K: Yes.

F: ~~x~~ Are time prospects 2 to 3 weeks?

K: Three to four weeks I would guess.

F: I think maybe I was just jumpting to too many conclusions.

K: I think Bob was trying to answer~~x~~ too many questions.

F: We tried to help him, but he just kept on.

END.

SE 153 *

TELECON
Senator Sparkman/ Secretary Kissinger
March 24, 1975
6:00 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: At the meeting today I negotiated to urge on the committe the desirability of getting out the Scott Amendment on Turkey.

S: I intended to ask you about that.

K: I think it is essential to maintain the situation.

S: I will do my best on it.

K: Should I call Senator Case too?

S: Yes.

K: Ok.

END.

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SE 145 1*

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Senator Mansfield
3/24/75; 10:06 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

M: Yes, Henry.

K: I just wanted to tell you how moved I was by what you said today.

M: Well, it was the truth!

K: Well, it still was a big thing to do . . .

M: Well . . .

K: And I think sometimes when you . . .

M: I have an idea of what you have gone through, Henry, and believe me it has been a tough one.

K: Well, it . . .

M: Personally and nationally.

K: Well, I agreed completely with what you said. I didn't want to say too many things but I tell you privately, the Israeli behavior has been scandalous.

M: They must know what they are getting in to or at least, as you say, there has been too much political affect on Rabin to . . .

K: It is a combination of that and the fact that they think that we can't really do anything because they can handle the Congress.

M: Uh-huh. Well, I think that . . .

K: And they may be wrong there.

M: To use an old expression: They may be -- an old miner expression -- they may be dulling their pick. But, uh, let's hope they will have second thoughts quickly.

K: Right. Well, that would be the most hopeful thing. But, I appreciated it very much.

M: Thank you very much, Henry. Bye.

K: Bye.

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SE 146 *

TELECON
Joseph Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
March 24, 1975
1:05 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Call Ghorbal and tell him that I noted the Al amar article. (They should try) to contain any attacks on us. Really, as a friend, I urge them to do this. Things are going their way in our public opinion now.

S: He wants to see you, but I'll call him.

K: Will you do a message by tomorrow from Ford to Sadat and Fahmy saying we remain committed and this may turn out to be a blessing to get it all settled.

S: I'll do that.

END

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SE 148 1*

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
March 24, 1975
2:20 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Could you have Atherton , or could somebody draft something I could say about the Middle East at my press conference?

S: Your press conference -- is it Wednesday.

K: Yes. Could you have it tomorrow morning?

S: Certainly.

K: I think this failure may turn out as a blessing for us.

S: It could. There are forces at work. There is a lot riding on this. It has support on both sides and people are concerned that a war could break out... it means alot. Let's wait and see.

K: I don't think the Israelis are going to be able to unlease the campaign I thought they were.

S: I don't think so. I don't think, I don't know what Simcha is doing. Ghorbal told me he is on the Hill. We know he met with the Jewish leaders but I have not gotten any calls from anybody. I am curious to see how soon Max Fisher calls me.

K: Will you start briefing on the Hill -- including Inoye and Mathias.

S: I am setting it up.

K: And you know how to tilt it.

S: I know. If I don't know by now I never will know.

K: Ok

END

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SE 151 *

TELECON
Mr. McCloskey/Secretary Kissinger
March 24, 1975
6:07

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I am prepared to cancel the House Foreign Affairs Committee. I don't see how I can report -- give a ten minutes statement or even make it extemporaneously. Tell them to go to hell and I'll have an open hearing later.

M: If they back off on the ten minute session...

K: It is not worth it. ~~XXX~~ There will be a scene. If I give a briefing on the Middle East in this charged session there will be hell to pay. Or if I do, why do I give a press conference?

M: Right. I'll ~~xxxxxxxx~~tell them it has to be an executive session.

K: Tell them I will be happy to ~~xxxxx~~ meet with them in an open session for a general review after I get back. I am not afraid of them.

M: Ok. I'll tell them.

END

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SE 161 *

TELCON
John Chancellor
Sec. Kissinger
March 25, 1975, 5:20 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Are you going to take over shuttle diplomacy now.

C: We are hoping to go from here to Athens and on to Cairo. We don't have your flexibility but we have your same purpose in mind but I don't think we are going to do it. Let me begin by saying I am sorry. You tried like hell and I know you did your absolutely best.

K: You are a good friend. But as Joe Kennedy said, show me a good loser and I will show you a loser.

C: Now, come on. You know we are all very sorry. I thought what I might do is anticipate with you some of the responses you may be giving tomorrow in the press converence. Somebody is going to say who is to blame. Have you given that any thought on your answer. I am just looking in background in terms of what I am doing tomorrow.

K: I will not go into that. I will not assess blame.

C: O.K.

K: I will say both sides tried hard and did not make it.

C: How serously should we regard the reassessment. You are going to be asked "Does that mean a reduction in support of Israeli (aid).

K: YOu know it is hard to discuss on an open line to Jerusalem.

C: I know. But you will be aksed that tomorrow. If I were there I would say it could conceivably -- it could mean a reduction in aid.

K: I will not say that. We face a new situation which we have to assess.

C: What about your feelings on the danger of war breaking out.

K: I think the danger of war ~~breaking~~ has increased. None of this is for quotation.

C: Not a bit , just for me.

K: Right.

C: Do you see Geneva as a talking exercise where the US

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is going to be forced to be on the side of Israel and the Russians and all the Arabs on the other side.

K: We are going to try to use Geneva to make progress towards peace.

C: Do you think King Faisal -- and what has happend there -- does that have an effect up here.

K: We ill have to see how the succession works out.

C: Thank you for talking to me. Do you have any words for Rabin if I see him. Shall I say you are in his thoughts.

K: You can say that. Give him my warm regards. He is a good friend. Where are you staying.

C: I am in the Hilton. Just arrived. We are trying to put together a program in which we get both sides own and Rabin has agreed to be interviewed in the morning and we are hoping for an agreement from Sadat.

K: Sadat has agreed with me that he would do it with you. I asked Sadat and he said he would do it but that was in happier days.

C: We will see. We are pressing as hard as we can. Are ~~you~~ are going to get any rest.

K: Not in the next few weeks.

C: Give Nancy my best.

K: I will talk to you tomorrow.

C: Fine.

END

SE 156 *

TELECON
Richard Valeriani/Secretary Kissinger
March 25, 1975
3:40

RELEASED IN FULL

V: I understand Dinitz and Ghorbal are coming in to resume the talks. Are there any indications?

K: You said last night I was both depressed and depressing.

V: I didn't say that on NBC. You might have heard it somewhere else.

K: You did say something.

V: Yes, I did a piece, but I didn't say that. What about Faisal?

K: One of the strong forces of moderation in the Middle East is no longer there.

V: Will it help the Russians?

K: It won't hurt them.

V: What about Fahd?

K: He doesn't have the authority but he is more modern than Faisal.

V: Khalid is the King and Fahd will be the power behind the throne. Can he be worked with?

K: Yes, he can be worked with.

V: They are likely to be more active.

K: Yes, but they don't have that mystic picture that Faisal had.

V: How does that effect us.

K: They don't have the moderate influence with the other Arab states..

V: About Fahd -- will he be less effective?

K: He is a friend of the US but doesn't have that sentimental attitude that Faisal had.

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V: What about Jerusalem.

K: He might be more moderate, but then the old boy never did anything, despite what he said. He just talked.

V: What about reassessment?

K: It is because we face a new situation.

V: It is not directed at the Israelis alone, but the element has to be there.

K: Yes. They are part of the Middle East, but it is not particularly directed against them.

V: Is their xxxx assessment off base that you are putting the squeeze on them?

K: For what? There is nothing they can do now. There is nothing we can ask them.

V: So now, it is how do we get to Geneva and what to do there.

K: Right.

V: Thanks very much.

END

SE 163 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Marvin Kalb
Sec. Kissinger
March 25, 6:35 p.m.

MK: Mr. Secretary.

K: Marvin, you want to brief me. Your sources are not better than mine in Jerusalem.

MK: Sir, Cronkite called me and he had a report from Public Broadcasting of your "imminent resignation".

K: Oh, look, Marvin, I may have to say something dramatic later to put these rumors to rest. No immiment resignation. Not imminent nor otherwise, unless the Preident should ask for it.

MK: I understand. I did not have that impression. Cronkite had it as a strong....

K: Totally wrong.

MK: Thank you very much.

END

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SE166 *

TELECON
Senator Javits/Secretary Kissinger
March 26, 1975
12:15

RELEASED IN FULL

J: Very good, highly professional. You fully recovered all your composure.

K: Thank you. I understand you put -- there was a report that this waiver thing was put in by you and Percy.

J: It has not been put in. I told Percy that I was not putting it in and I would get you a coean vote on the Scott Bill. No contradiction of any kind. Percy said he would vote & with me. I said the Secretary must have a clean vote. I said I am not putting it in -- if it fails I will put it in.

K: Many thanks and I appreciate what ~~h~~ you said about my press conference.

J: Fine.

END

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SE 168 *

TELECON
Emilio Rabasa/Secretary Kissinger
March 26, 1975
4:03

RELEASED IN FULL

R: Hello Henry.

K: Emilio, how are you?

R: Fine, and you. I called you because I read that you were depressed and didn't feel too good about your journey to the Middle East.

K: That is true.

R: And I wanted to tell you that we hope for success for you and that these things happen and you can't always have complete success. And you are trying very hard and we know you are trying and it is to the benefit of the whole world.

K: You are a very good friend and you let me know when you come to Washington.

R: Ok. And I hope your trip to Latin America is a success and you are attending in May?

K: I'll be there. I think we have a good atmosphere. Maybe you could come a day early and we could talk.

R: Ok. This was just a friendly hello and a thanks to you for bringing peace to the world.

K: Thank you very much.

END

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SE 170 *

TELCON
Joe Sisco
Sec. Kissinger
March 26, 1975
5:20 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Did Waldheim call you today.

S: Yes. I have just sent you a note.

K: He tried to reach me.

S: About 30 minutes ago was when I took the call. He was all apologetic. He has sent you a telegram explaining it.

K: I don't want it explained. I want an apology. I want a public apology.
S: They did put out a statement which said this does not reflect hi views and that it was out of context. ~~He expressed~~ He backed off and he is to be pitied.

K: Why the hell did he do it.

S: Who knows. God knows. He has written you a telegram which tells you of the press statement he has put out. I even felt sorry for him. He cried over the phone for 15 minutes and I listened. I told him I would tell you.

K: Did we make an official protest.

S: Yes, that is why he called.

END

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SE 171 *

TELECON
Marilyn Berger/Secretary Kissinger
March 26, 1975
7:20 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

B: I was at a briefing given by one of your opposition.

K: By whom?

B: Dinitz.

K: Is he my opposition?

B: I am kidding. He was giving that old debate of who struck John. It is very sad.

K: Its sad. Its a tragedy.

B: The step-by-step thing cannot be stopped.

K: What x do you mean?

B: It has to go on. You need an American initiative.

K: I did not call you to discuss politics.

B: Some day we need a blow-by-blow of your negotiations. I have tried to get k something from your staff.

K: It is fruitless. Because they used to say about Roman historians that the major thing is to understand the historical truth. This thing is getting obfiscated. Give the literal truth will make it very complicated. For newsmen it is complex because there was some very skillful manuevering to make sure the blame wouldn't go one way or another. I think you all have the essential story. That goddamn lead of your Monday story...foreign policy in a shambles--is that what you had to do?

B: Yes.

K: Thanks.

B: We all wrote the same stories. Had you meant us to write stories like that?

K: No.

B: When I blew up at you I was asking if Israel was being evenhanded. I wonder if you saw through.

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K: I thought the stories would come out somewhat more evenhanded. The briefings we gave are essentially correct.

B: These are the proposals that leave out little shadings. The Egyptians said they wanted to move some forces into the passes.

K: The Egyptians, the Israelis have the Egyptians over a barrel. The Egyptians have to prove they were not willing to sell out.

B: I am glad I cut that out of my story.

K: Do you see what I mean?

B: Yes.

K: The Egyptians were willing to let the Israelis stay in the passes if they could get to the other end of the passes.

B: When did they make that offer?

K: At various stages. The Egyptians now are in one hell of a fix. Because for the Ameridan audience they should look forthcoming.

B: The Israelis are in a fix too. When are we going to Geneva?

K: Listen, goddamnit Marilyn. I made one human gesture to you. I have no idea.

B: Just for my personal information, I want to take a trip.

K: I have no idea.

END.

SE172 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELCON
Pete Peterson
Sec. Kissinger
March 26, 1975
7:40 p.m.

P. Hi, Henry.

K: Pete.

P: How are you?

K: Fine. One who has the Greeks and Jews against him cannot be all wrong.

P: That is what I keep saying. I wanted to express my friendship and support and see if there is anything I can do to help you during what I ~~must~~ know must be an extraordinary time for you. I have been trying to think what we on the outside could do. Instead of good ~~politi~~ politics to attack you, it may be bad politics to attack you and maybe if there is someway, some of us could help on the substance side.

K: I have a group of people coming in on Monday. Could you come?

P: When?

K: At 4:00.

P: Maybe I can.

K: Then you and I perhaps could talk half an hour before or after.

P: All right. A couple of thoughts for size. One, thought I have is the desirability of perhaps adding a bipartisan quality to this -- as you rethink whatever your strategy is going to be -- maybe a group that could be seen as helping you get support on the Hill but might be a group that is a little more public and a little more visible and one that is totally off the record. There are a very small number of guys in this country who have a certain amount of credibility and I try to think who I am talking about. I know you and George have your problems from time to time.

K: Ball?

P: Yes, but he has the great advantage of...

K: Personally, I like George and he has constantly been the agressor with me. Why do you think he is ?

P: I think I will be having a long talk with him this weekend. He has been in Egypt. George, I think, carries a lot of weight in this country. Elliott I guess. Cy has a pretty good constiuency.

Some are not my favorites but I have been trying to think

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of the people who might come up with some ideas and that could be helpful with the Congress and public with you at this time. On this Russian business, I guess you must be having a hell of a time with what you do with them when you get to Geneva. I have been trying to figure how we could turn this Jewish lobby around and accellerate some of this economic and trade side. Must be smart enought to know they are going to be isolated over there.

K: I doubt it.

P: I am wondering how you are feeling. Do you think there is anything that we on the outside could do to help you.

K: Pet, we have to pull this country together or we will have a total collapse of our foreign policy. Come Monday at 4:00 and let's talk about it.

P: I think I can do it. Think about what you would like us to do. On the thing we did on energy, if the right people are asking you can get quiet a lot of support in this country and I have a feeling that Washington has this self-destructive inbred thing going on. When I get out of Washington I find a lot more support for you than I do in Washington and I am not so sure we cannot get a lot of people across the country mobilized to support you in a fairly tangible way.

K: If you could do that, I think it is needed for the continuity of our foreign policy and if people would stop thinking in very short terms they would realize that it would be advisible for an inherrent administration to inherit a (good) foreign policy.

P: I don't think they would want the world in flames. Would you react at all in thinking of getting a group together.

K: Very well.

P: Some of the people I think of you might disagree with me. The kind of people who have tended to be thought of as being more right than wrong. For example, I know you and Mac ~~getxa~~ meet a lot. He tells me you do on energy etc. Mac may not be right for what I am thinking of because he is identified with mistakes -- if you follow me -- ~~xhexexappxopxiake~~ whether appropriately or not. I am just calling you to see if I can perhaps help you on getting a trade thing through or what ever you want. I have great compassion for both you and the country at this point.

K: I appreciate this very much, Pete and I will see you on Monday.

P: O.K. Incidentally, are you and Nancy inclined at all to come down and have a good time. We were going to give you a party and have some fun.

K: We are inclined. I will look at my schedule and see if I can come.

P: We can talk about it on Monday.

K: Let's do.

[redacted] B6

Rx

END

SE 169 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELCON
Mr. ~~KXXXX~~ Ed Klein
Sec. Kissinger
March 26, 1975
5:00 p.m.

K: How are you.

EK: Very well. I wanted you to know I watched your news conference and found it very impressive. You msut be exhausted.

K: Thank you. It was a hectic trip.

EK: I can imagine.

K: And you know it is a little sad when you see what is likely to happen.

EK: I left a message yesterday.

K: I didn't get it. What was it.

EK: Last night on WETA -- our public broadcasting station there -- I had Amb. Martin, Walt Rostow and Pete McCloskey and Tony Lake for an hour.

K: [redacted] Tony Lake is making a project out of working for me ~~for 6 months~~ five years ago. B6

EK: I was disappointed in him. I had hoped he would come on strong and would hold up his end of the debate.

K: Does he know what his end of the debate is.

EK: I think an avowed dove, isn't he?

K: Sort of.

EK: Martin was what one might expect. He felt very deeply -- I am not sure he comes across so well on television and Rostow was ~~very~~ very rastovian. Pete McCloskey was very good. He.is good on television.

K: I think we all have to look at Vietn-Nam now again.

EK: He did not seem to know where he stood. I asked him where he stood and he said he was confused. On the one hand he thinks further aid should be given but the three year plan that Martin briefly outlined on the program was more than Congress could be expected to appropriate.

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K: Yes.

EK: I thought it went very well. I wondered if you had had any further thoughts given -- we are doing a cover this week on you. You will be the subject of the cover which comes out next Tuesday and will be done by the cartoonist John Kunar (sp).

K: In other words, I will be bleeding all over.

EK: Almost. I hope this is in strictest confidence.

K: Nothing I can do except complain to Kay Graham.

EK: It is a representation of you as Gulliver being tied down by the Congress, by the Archbishop Makarioses of the world.

K: That's not too bad.

EK: And the North Vietnamese.

K: That doesn't sound unfriendly.

EK: It isn't. I think if you have been reading what we do we have not been unfriendly. I read Time this week and I think the editorial Time story was --

K: I did not read it.

EK: It said it is time to get out of VN. Enought of shit stuff. Sort of a negative reaction.

K: The problem in Viet-nam -- I don't know whether it would have worked in the Middle East this time under any conditions but it is sort of scary when sitting there with Asad saying why is Sadat making concession whe you are going to let Israeli go. I said we are not. He said you let Cambodia, V-Nm, Turkey, now perhaps Portugal -- maybe that is different. That is one side but on the other side you can read the Israeli newspapers and see what they have been saying. Right now, the issue for me has nothing to do with Viet-Nam but has to do with the fact that the American authority to preserve the peace in the world is declining. If it declines too much, we will live in a very dangerous environment and the real problem is I would settle for anything that would get the national debate off our back.

EK: I will ask you again.

K: I know, I guess it is the TV think.

EK: Yes.

K: I have it very much in mind. I have two obligations -- one to Barbara Walters and another one for three years to Bill Buckley which I unwisely gave and I have to fulfill. How late in the year can I do yours. Would May still work for you.

EK: It would work. Let me tell you what I have in mind. There are two approaches. One, I origianlly broached ~~you~~ with you. The more personal approach. I am not certain at this point that that is thebest approach for you. Do you want it on a policy level or personal level. If personaly, I don't think they would conflict with any prior commitments since Barbara Walters thing would be a 20 minute thing on the morning program. This would be an hour on PBS. As I said originally more of a ~~person-to-person~~ person-to-person thing. On ther other hand, if you prefer to do more of a tour of the horizon, I can understand you have these prior commitments and I suppose that is as good a time as any.

K: Now that I am back for a while, I will get in touch with you again or you bug me.

EK: I will bug you.

K: I don't mind that.

EK: Thank you.

K: Best to your childeren.

EK: Thank you.

END

SE 173 *

TELECON
Joseph Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
March 27, 1975
12:55 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: What is your objection to bringing Eilts back?

S: Do you want this much.....

K: Yes. I want to get a message to Sadat which I don't want to put in writing.

S: I see. I just thought it would be better to keep ~~the excalmxdown~~ it calmed down. ~~Bringing him back Perhaps~~ perhaps some kind of _____.

K: I want to avoid that. They Egyptians get so impatient that they will announce something of diplomatic activity.

S: Don't you think what you've done and you message could do that. Do you think you ought to get Eilts back and send him back to do that..

K: I don't want the Egyptians to announce they're ready for renewed contact.

S: I'm now thinking of it from the Egyptians points of view._____ It seems to me moving an Ambassador back and forth is not ~~consisting~~ consistent with .....

K: Where are you?

S: Having lunch out of the building. I'll be back there shortly.

K: I'm afriad the Egyptians will let it out that they want to resume diplomatic activity and ~~break~~ the Israelis will get out of hand.

S: Send a message to them to tell them to keep quiet.

K: I don't want to send amessage, the way this place leaks. But I understand your point.

S: You have my point and there we are.

K: You can tell Eilts I will almost certainly want him to come back early next week. I'll tell him he should not say this to Fahmy get and I'll let him know tomorrow what ~~we~~ we should say to Fahmy.

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S: Do you want ___ along these lines?

K: Keating I can wait with.

S: You won't miss him.

END

SE 174 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON

Secretary Kissinger
Secretary Schlesinger
6:12 p.m. March 27, 1975
Thursday

S: Hi, Henry. Say, don't take this stuff personally, for Christ sake, you did as much as anyone could do in Southeast Asia. How the hell could you imagine what these constraints would be at the close.

K: Oh no, I--

S: When I referred to the effectiveness of US policy, if we are going to go into Danang we ought to be able to--

K: No, no, I didn't think you were aiming it at me

S: Yeh, okay.

K: No, really, I think that you and I are now exactly on the same wicket.

S: The reason I came today, when I read Habib's paper, I thought that there was an assumption that DOD was going to be some kind of deus ex machina and could pull a rabbit of his hat .

K: Well, he wanted me to run it past the president and I wouldn't do it. And that's why we called the WSAG. Jim, no, no, believe me , I didn't think you were aiming these remarks at me and I really think that you and I are perhaps among the few who understand the nature of what's happening to our country right now.

S: Just tragic, just tragic.

K: And we will pay dearly for this.

S: Well, we already have, as you know.

K: But in parts of the world outside of Indochina.

S: Well, I think you were very gentle and I think you were right to be gentle yesterday in your conference when you mentioned it was a factor but probably not the dominating factor--

K: Well, I didn't want to use it as an alibi -- it sounded like sour grapes.

S: If the prestige of the United States were high, I think you could have pulled --

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K: Look, if the prestige of the US were high and if our assurances meant anything, it would have worked.

S: Right, the damn thingis tragic.

K: Jim, if there is some way we can get out the fact that there hasn't been much fighting and that this collapse has really been caused by us---

S: The only reason, I haven't done so, to this point, is to say that there hasn't been that much fighting--kind of puts the tail on the incompetency of that retrograde operation Thieu started.

K: Yeh, but the retrograde operation in itself was a panic--

S: Oh, quite right, quite right. We will--that is the line I've been taking and I shall continue to take it.
As you know, I did that last week, I think some time or other--some briefing.

K: I think it would be helpfub.

S: If you look at that aircraft situation -- when Thieu looked at his inability to get mobility forces into Damytuet (sp?) which has never been taken and it is the main juncture--once Damytuet fell they couldn't use their highway down through the highlands. And naturally, he paniced. Now the handling of that withdrawal--

K: Oh, its been a disaster. Disaster. But you can see how he came to the conclusion his execution was a disaster.

S: Q Well, that's right, but in addition to that, when he didn't consult with anyone--well, some of those fellows over at State have this notion that don't just stand there, do something and I don't mind that as long as what we are doing is going to be effective.

K: Jim, we don't want--the exit from Vietnam shooting its fleeing refugees--that is the conclusive argument there

S: Right, well take a good hard look tomorrow at that MSC boat--we may try that as a test case--

K: The what?

S: The commercial boat that we are talking about putting in there

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K: Are you against that?

S: I'm worried about it because once again, you get the US involved in a token operation and can turn into a very questionable outcome.

K: That boat won't put in before we hear from Truong

S: Right, I will make sure we don't move it until we hear from Truong

K: Make sure about that and then let's you and I consult.

S: Okay,

K: Good, Jim, many thanks.

S: Right, Henry.

K: Bye.

SE 175

*

TELCON
Secretary Simon
Secretary Kissinger
March 27, 1975 6:20 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

S: Hi Henry; we are disappointed you can't do it tonight.

K: I have to run off to New York. I'm expected. I really regret it, but Bill, Bob Ingersoll told me about your conversation with him yesterday.

S: Yes

K: And I want you to know a stop is going to be put to this immediately--you and I are going to have a talk about it.

S: Precisely.

K: We work together intimately all along and by God we are going--

S: For two years, everything is super--then all of a sudden, the bureaucracy is at war with each other--you get one story, I get another story--

K: It is ridiculous

S: It sure is --

K Look we managed the Washington Energy Conference -- every problem that we aren't even in disagreement much less an argument

S: That's correct

K: And we are going to--as far as I'm concerned, there is no dispute between you and me--

S: Precisely.

K: I don't want to get into economics and you don't want to get into foreign policy and where the two intersect, we are going to talk.

S: Exactly.
And we have never had any disagreement on that, it's just again the bureaucracy and the game they play

K: So, let's get together very soon and really my apologies about tonight.

S: Don't be silly, we'll miss you. K: See you soon. S: Okey dokie.

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SE 177 *

TELECON
Secretary Schlesinger/Secretary Kissinger
March 28, 1975
11:05 AM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I was going over with my press people that New York Times article by John Finney which says, (reads article). It sort of contradicts what I said about spare parts.

S: It should not do that. I said last Friday that the (inaudible).

K: There's no disagreement between you and me about it. If you read the whole article, in the last paragraph it makes it pretty clear there's no disagreement. Rather than have us comment on the story, I was wondering if your press could say something. I know you and I are in complete agreement on this.

S: That's true.

K: I would like to have our people says that the Secretary of Defense and I are in the closest touch about it and there's no difference at all and this will be confirmed by Defense if anyone wants to ask questions.

S: That will probably be alright. I don't like ~~this~~ the word "confirmed".

K: We can say, they can check it with Defense if there's any question.

S: OK, Henry.

K: Thanks Jim.

END

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SE 179 *

TELCON
Amb. Bruce
Sec. Kissinger
March 28,1975
5:50 P.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

B: Hello, Henry.

K: David, welcome home.

B: Nice to hear your voice.

K: I am sure I ruined your Easter plans.

B: No, not at all; I'm very keen to see what is going on.

K: When did you get in?

B: This afternoon. I saw Sonnenfelt and I have been sitting here talking about Greece, Turkey and Cyprus.

K: If you came in this afternoon, let's talk tomorrow. How about 12:00.

B: Suits me.

K: Let's do it at 12 and then you can get some rest.

B: I can do it earlier if you want. Suit yourself.

K: I think that is the earliest I can make it.

B: All right, I will be there at 12:00.

K: You will be at hom.e

B: Yes.

K: Nancy wanted you to come by for drinks on Sunday.

B: She asked me to come to the Kennedy Center tonight. I cann't tonight. I have a Portuguese family I am having dinner with.

K: How about Tuesday.

B: I had rather not go to the Kennedy Center if I can help it.

K: Never.

B: I have been and if it is just a social thing. I will talk to you about it tomorrow.

K: Good. See you tomorrow at noon.

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SE 183

TELECON
Secretary Schlesinger/Secretary Kissinger
March 29, 1975
12:55 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

S: The USN's LST's at Subic Bay. Preparations are being made to put them to sea to pick up refugees.

K: What is your view?

S: I am very skeptical, but we now have a kind of widespread universal view in our bureaucracy, State [redacted] perhaps more pungent on this. They are saying [redacted] you can save people and so forth. We've even had a request from the Vatican. We have the ships going in and if people can be litered then I can see using the LSTs.

K: If we go in with LSTs, can we hold rioters?

S: No. We would have to require them to be litered out. I think you will have a repetition of the Chou Lai incident.

K: I agree with you. I would not hesitate sending naval ships now. But I agree with you on litering.

S: Ok. Very good.

K: Is there enough litering capacity there?

S: We are taking a look at it and see if there is enough capacity.

K: Ok. I agree with you. Thank you Jim.

S: Ok. Bye.

END

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SE 184 1*

TELECON
Mr. Habib/Secretary Kissinger
March 29, 1975
1:25 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: On the Sihanouk thing.

H: I have a draft in the typewriter. We will have it up shortly.

K: You don't mind if I give you instructions, do you? I do not want a message passed through the Chinese. He should put in writing ... he said this is what he was going to tell you.

H: Let me try something else on you. We thought the message... the guy has already got it fourteen times. We should ask him some .... I realize that you do not want to g meet personally. But how about designating a representative?
K:
K: What I want you to do is to send a letter to him and say we will take care of the cultural objects. We want his views on sending a representative to discuss ~~the~~ it and we are prepared to do it. Nothing more. Do not ask him any questions. Just tell him the requests he is making will be met. We are prepared to discuss with him his ideas on the political events in Cambodia.

H: You do not want this to go through the Chinese?

K: You can inform the Chinese after it is done.

H: Ok.

END

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SE 185 1*

TELECON
Ambassador Ramsbotham/Secretary Kissinger
March 29, 1975
1:52 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.5(D), B3, CIA

K: There are two things I forgot to mention this morning. This is only between you, me and Jim. [redacted] B1, B3

R: Ok.

[redacted] B1

K: On the Israeli thing--I hope it will be handled with some delicacy.

R: Yes. I have already done it--very quietly.

K: We have told literally no one else.

R: Ok.

END

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DATE/CASE ID: 5 MAR 2003 200102979
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 25X1
DECLASSIFY AFTER: INDEFINITE

SE 192 *

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
March 29, 1975
12:24 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Have you seen that cable from Eilts on Van der Stoel?

S: Yes. I told Roy the reply should be we have some reservations about the objective of anything like that.

K: I would not say reservations. Just say we will discuss it with Eilts when he comes back. We could have David Bruce talk to him.

S: Sure.

K: We could not put it in a cable though. I am inclined to let David talk to Van der Stoel.

S: I think he would be good on this. He should not do anything with this and we will talk about this and other things, ~~you should~~ I will tell Eilts that.

K: How ~~did~~ could Eilts do anything about it? Just tell him it is an interesting suggestion but he should not do anything with the Egyptians on it. You could brief David. Do you think I was too rough on Peter?

S: No. I think they needed it. They handled that whole letter very dump. The Israelis will come and say you tell us the Europeans don't agree with us. The trouble with the Europeans is that they don't do anything.

K: The single worse mistake in the post-war period was to encourage European unity.

S: Well, but do you think there was anything else we could do?

K: Yes.

END

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SE 189 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
March 31, 1975
10:08 AM

D: You mentioned he was here or outside the United States.

K: My impression from the report I received that he was here and he talks to some ___ members of Jackson as well as other.

D: He spoke with some officials or he spoke how it was done.

K: He talked to people on the Hill.

D: About a meeting with____

K: Victor?

D: Yes about his desire to see you but you didn't permit him to.

K: Yes, I made it clear that I didn't want to see him.

D: On the Hill at the same time with officials.

K: He told the officials on the Hill that I refused to meet him..

D: He simple was....

K: He thought it ___ he was in town and ask if I could meet him.

D: I checked here and found nothing about him being here.

K: Maybe it was in Europe.

D: I'll check it.

K: I can look into it more. We got the information from our intelligence sources and the people he contacted..

D: OK. Thank.you.

END

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SE 193 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELCON
Max Fisher
Sec. Kissinger
March 31, 1975
8:40 p.m.

K: How are you Max?

F: Fine. I am leaving on Wednesday night for Israel. I received an invitation to go over there.

K: Wonderful.

F: I want to do a little thing on this. At the same time, it would be helpful to me -- we talked about this foreign policy thing -- the input. We talked last night.

K: What foriegn policy?

F: The foreign policy speech.

K: I am promising you it will not be directed against Israel.

F: That is not the point. I might want to bring Israel Miller with me. No one knows yet I am going over.

K: You mean to see me or to Israel?

F: You.

K: All right.

F: My plane leaves for Israel on Wednesday I think about 5:00 out of NY. I could come in tomorrow afternoon or take the early flight out Wednesday morning. I think we should have a visit before I leave.

K: What would you prefer?

F: Let me do this. If I come in I might want to do this -- I might want to bring Israel Miller in for 10 minutes. And I will see you afterwards or before.

(Shuffling of papers)

K: Let me find out whish is the better day. / -- Makes no great difference.

F: What I will do is let's ~~xxxxxxxxx~~tentatively say I meet you at 3:00 tomorrow afternoon or would later be better.

K: 3:00 is fine.

F: Here is what I would like to do. I would like to meet with you at 3:00 and at 3:30 I would have Israel Miller come in to discuss the Jewish Community meeting next week. This will be very helpful.

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K: Max there is a relatively minor problem. A number of Jewish leaders are calling around town calling me anti-Semi.

F: I know nothing about that.

K: [redacted] B6

F: Never heard of him.

K: Arthur Burns said two leading Jews called him today and said I was an anti-Semi.

F: No one has ever called me. I have never heard that.

K: I don't much care but the only hope that now exists for the Jewish Community is to show a little bit if discipline. I am talking to my friend now -- I don't have to convince you.

F: Did you meet with a group of professors today.

K: Yes.

F: One of my good friends called and said that he wanted to meet with me.

K: Stoessenger, Weisel, Kampelman and Morganthau. I didn't complain about the Israeli Govt. I just explained where we are now.

F: [redacted] is a hardliner and you just cannot talk with him. B6

K: He was not all that hardline today.

F: I will have a report for you tonight because your having mentioned [redacted] I know probably why he called me. I will find out what the reaction is when I see you. B6

K: Maybe I should not see any G-D intellectuals. They always blab it all over the Jewish Community.

F: Why would I not hear about these things.

K: I tell them about 1/100th of what I tell you.

F: I hope so. Where would be the best place to meet -- State or White House.

K: State Department.

F: I will meet you at 3:00 and Miller will come in at 3:30.

*

K: What does he want?

F: Nothing. Just the President (of the Community). I told him ~~xxxxxxxx~~ about the foreign policy speech and he was worrited. Tell him when he comes in not to worry. He has been very supportive.

K: Yes.

F: A little bit of politics.

K: Of course. I will of course do it.

F: I will get in there early and he can meet me later.

K: Could somebody slow down Simcha a little bit. He is totally misconceiving the problem. He thinks it is a public relations problem.

F: Until I go overseas, I can't get involved. I had to do this today. I had my friend Irving Bernstein speak to the UJ Group in NY. They asked why I was going over. They said me or the Chairman of the Bosrd has to go over.

K: When will you be back.

F: Probably on Saturday or Sunday.

K: You call me the minute you get back. I will see you tomorrow. Thanks, Max.

END

SE 191 *

TELECON
Secretary Butz/Secretary Kissinger
March 31, 1975
3:27 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

B: I just wanted to hold your hand a minute. I want to say hang in there, this administration needs you and this country needs you. I know sometime you think about ~~xxxx~~ chucking the whole thing. There's something that needs done and only you can do it.

K: I don't really think I can leave right now and I appreciate you're saying this.

B: That's the only reason I called.

K: I can't tell you how ~~xxxxx~~ much I appreciate it.

B: That's why I called you.

K: Well, many thanks for calling.

END

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SE 195 *

TELCON
Joe Sisco
Sec. Kissinger
March 31, 1975
8:55 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

S: . .... must have taken a little bit out of you.

K: Before we get to that, Joe, I think it a mistake for you to see the American Jewish Community tomorrow.

S: You think so. I think I can handle them.

K: Who took the initiative.

S: They did. Not the whole Community -- a half dozen people.

K: Who are they?

S: Bookbiner and Tannenwald who are both reasonable. I think they will take a few more with them. They asked me about a week ago. I did not think of checking with you. I can handle them.

K: O.K. I am basically opposed to it. I think we should show great aloofness right now.

S: I will handle myself accordingly. I am not going to be particularly forthcoming and rather than making a presentation, I will let them ask questions.

K: Make absolutely clear where the fault lies.

S: I am. First, we cannot play it straight down the middle. They will murder us.

K: Right. That Israeli cable today was an insult.

S: I have not gotten over that. I will make it clear. These 3 or 4 guys on the whole are pretty reasonable.

K: What did you think of the meeting this afternoon.

S: I thought it was great. I wish I thought they carried more weight but they don't, of course, and our big problem is in my mind which remains ~~xkx~~ quite unresolved. How do we cope with this damned public relations problem if these guys step up the space over the next 3 or 4 weeks. I don't think the right thing is to confront and yet they are going to get away with it. That is the thing that -- I don't have a satisfactory answer. I have been grappleing with this in my mind today and I have not come to a satisfactory solution. You are damned if you do and damned if you don't. That is what bothers me.

K: Yes,

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S: Did you talk to Max today.

K: Briefly.

S: Did you get anything out of him. Is he going off to Israel?

K: Yes.

S: Ye put in a call to me and I have not returned it. If he calls me tomorrow, anything I should say.

K: No. Just make clear that this is not a joke.

S: I am sure he doesn't need any convincing of that after his meeting with the President. But I will certainly stay with that.

K: You think I gave a reasonably balanced approach.

S: Sure you did, but these people have long ago known where the problem is and I would only take xx exception to one thing said by them at the meeting. I think they tend to underestimate the ambivolence or split in the Jewish Community.

K: They will all support Israel.

S: I know they will.

K: O.K.

S: All right, Henry. Thank you for calling.

K: Best to Jean.

END

SE 198 *

TELCON
Mosbacher
Sec. Kissinger
April 1, 1975
12:30 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

M: Couldn't be better. I hope you are, in spite of all your trials and tribulations. How is Nancy?

K: She is fine and I am fine.

M: Tell you what I am calling about. I have a friend from Lisbon whom you have probably heard about before. He talked to Nelson and Scowcroft last spring -- end of May. He came in last night. The past record, he has been right on what he has said and what he told us was oing to happen. He is here now and he has some thoughts and ideas which he expressed to me last night and which might well be of value to you if you could find a minute to see him.

K: Could he see Hartman, The Assistant Sec, and then I will see him too.

M: I think that will be fine. Whatever you say. I think that he feels it terribly important -- as you can well imagine -- to keep a low profile -- even a non-existent profile. He would be in bad shape if this is known at all.

K: He should see either Sonnenfeldt or Hartman and they can bring him in to see me.

M: Fine. Which would you prefer I call.

K: Call Hartman but tell him that I told you he should keep it very confidential.

M: I think that would be very important. What is Hartman's first name.

K: Arthur.

M: I will ca-l him and tell him you suggested it.

K: Absolutely.

M: Wonderful. I think it might be worthwhile. Thank you, sir.

K: Bye.

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SE 196 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Mr. Sisco
Sec. Kissinger
Apri 1, 1975
10:35 a.m.

S: I wanted to mention some ideas that came to me overnight. On the Middle East, why don't you if you have time, and if not, then me, meet with the editorial board of the ~~xxxxx~~ Washington Post. They had a good editorial this morning. I suggest you meet with the Post and the Board of the NY Times. We have to get at them. We cannot let these people get in this field all alone.

K: I agree. I hink I should do both.

S: If you would not object, I would like to attend both and listen.

K: I will do that.

S: Now with Demiril in, we shold start on what we should do. I think Tyler is the right man as far as the Cyprus problem is concerned. He is not the right man in terms of the Hill. A counter suggestion -- I think you should let Hartman or Buffum. I detect, for your on background and between us -- a little sensitiv ty on the part of Hartman, and if I were the Assist Sec, I would not want another Assistant Sec in my area.

K: The reason I cannot accept someone with high visibility is that I don't want the compromise to be that Kissinger having screwed it up was rescued by Bob Murphy.

S: I know that. My suggestion is to send Hartman. Keep it in hous If I had time, I would ask you to send me. I have enough to worry about with you on the Middle East. I think this is our number one priority. ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~

K: I think the Israels are beginning to get scared. I called Arthur Burns last night and Simcha was there and bled all over me. He indicated the cable was misread. He said they cannot cave but they are looking for some way to get out of it.
S: Shy doesn't he come in to see me?
K: I said if there is something to say check with Jerusalem and come in and ~~xxxxxx~~ see us.

S: Right. How else could we read that telegram.

K: I asked where is the line. He said he didn't know. He would check and call again. They are playing now non-belligerency for Ellarie (sp) and ElTor.
S: That is nuts.

K: Of course. I don't think the Egyptians will accept it. Do you?

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S: I don't. I would be willing to try it. We have to be careful that they don't give us a proposal so they can then say they went the other mile and it shows their flexibility and you, Kissinger, have no business doing anything that might hurt Israel in reassessment.

K: One thing we have to do is, I am getting more attracted with the idea of coming forward ~~with~~ with a final proposal and seein what can be done on that.

S: On the final settlement.

K: Yes on the final settlement. My worry is that in an interim settlement, we will spill so much blood they will say we did it for you and we will be forever responsible ~~for~~ for it. Have you seen the Wallach column. Israeli diplomats told him they were dumbfounded by my departure. They had just made a new proposal and the Egyptians rejected it out of hand.

S: It was those two things when Rabin patted Allon on the arm and told him to shut-up.

K: It was already finished.

S: Of course. You and I know that.

END

SE 202 *

TELCON
Hank Trewitt
Sec. Kissinger
April 1, 1975
2:30 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hank, how are you?

T: Fine thanks. I need some guidance. It occurs to me that we in the media have all missed the most important point of the double review that is under way in all of the meetings, etc. -- Vientma, Middle East under review. You have a policy of containment which no longer applies -- or we had one.

K: Just a minute. Don't say it no longer applies. I don't accept that.

T: Certainly, in its manifestations it does not apply.

K: Yes.

T: The Nixon Doctrine is somewhat eroded as it applies to SEA. The larger point we have been missing is that the review that is underway may produce a policy line which will fill in those gaps, give us a new basis so that other countries will have a better perception of what we can be expected to do in a given xxxxxxxx set of circumstances. I am changing my language because of what you said about containment. It seems to me that what we need to do is something that people have some basis of how we are going to behave and provide a partial basis of containment.xxxxxxx

K: Absolutely. We have to articulate some conception of the national _____ so that others can relate to it.

T: I suppose this will be articulated in the President's speech to the Congress.

K: It is the beginning.

T: And we will see manifestations as we go down the road. There is a great deal of confusion about the nature of the meeting yesterday.

K: Which meeting?

T: Dillon, Vance, Rusk, etc.

K: No. I have been meeting with that group more or less -- 80 percent xx I have been meeting with about every six weeks.

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T: Should I assume that these general lines we are talking about w discussed with them.

K: Yes. On a deep~~ex~~ background basis. I thought your article on the State Department was well taken. I think these guys with all the bitching that goes on all the time are beginning to shape up and becoming an organization with high morale and superb service.

T: With our economic and military influence somewhat on the declin the burden falls ultimately to Diplomatic lines. This has been overlooked in the general crisis atmosphere. They are in fact shaping up and you will be astonished how many of the Kissinger critics while using profanity say you have them working and thinking.

K: They will not pay me for being liked although I suspect they will feel differently given time.

T: In some of these policies in refute you see people coming up an facing the ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ consequences of things four or five years ago. Maybe we are beginning to come up to it and nevertheless this is a day of reckoning and I think we are coming up to it now. Just needed your guidance.

K: Always a pleasure to talk to you.

T: Thank you very much.

END

SE 204 *

TELCON
David Binder
Sec. Kissinger
April 1, 1975
3:00 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: My constant friend. What does the Danish Embassy say now.

B: I thought you would drop that for 1975.

K: If I get hold of a joke there comes a period when people get bored with it but then it gets so old people think it is funnay again.

B: I meant what I said. I think you two guys have a good quality in common.

K: I appreciate it very much.

B: I meant it. I am calling about these flash stories coming out of Palm Springs saying we have started a diplomatic initiative or effort to settle the V-N problem.

K: Bullshit.

B: Have we got anything going at all -- Russkies, Hanoi.

K: Look, David, you know Noth Vietnam and you diplomacy. Under these conditions what can be done.

B: You under -- I am working on this story today -- and when we get a flash...

K: You cannot say I said bullshit but I am not aware of anything but I don't see how they can be aware of anything I don't know since they get their information from me.

B: Reuters xx did a flash on this and it is absolutely incorrect.

K: Yes.

B: We are not talking to anybody. Waiting for the blood to dry and the dust to settle.

K: What is there to say.

B: Habib got a lot of these same questions today and these bulletins from Reuters.

K: I appreciate your checking but there is nothing ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ unusual going on.

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B: A hell of a mess. My God.

K: Well, David, one day we will look back on it as not a proud moment in our history. Maybe they would have collapsed anyway but we triggered it.

B: We certainly contributed to the panic.

K: There was only one battle.

B: I have been thinking about you and no bad thoughts.

K: You have been a good friend and I appreciate it.

B: Thank you very much.

END

SE 205 *

TELECON
Hans Morgenthal/Secretary Kissinger
April 1, 1975
3:25 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: It was good to see you again.

M: I was good to see you.

K: Hans, Simcha Dinitz called my assistant today and said that you got the impression that the purpose I called the meeting for -- well, first of all, I didn't call the meeting; John Stoessinger did.

M: I haven't said anything.

K: He was under the impression that I wanted to blame Israel. That isn't the point now -- it is where we go from here.

M: I am surprised. I did not talk to Dinitz.

K: You didn't think the meeting was to blame Israel?

M:: Not at all. You were critical of Israel, but this was not the purpose of the meeting.

K: Not so much -- but critical of the opportunity that may ha ve been missed.

M: I was under the impression that you were engaged in a _____ with Israel.

K: I am tryi ng to do what can be done to save Israel.

M: You assistant told me you wanted to see me before I go to Israel.

K: I beg your pardon.

M: Mr. Bremer told me you wanted to see me.

K: I would like to have a talk with you.

M: I go on the 9th of April -- next week.

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K: I couldn't do it before the 8th.

M: On the 8th I can come down. Should I call you assistant and make an appointment?

K: Ok.

M: I have not talked to Dinitz.

K: I am not so concerned about Dinits. I am concerned about whether you understand what I am talking about. I am not asking you to agree to it.

M: You are searching for a xxx way to restore the settlement.

K: And get some... and I would like to talk to you about what the peace prospects are. If we can not do it step-by-step over years -- what can we do so it will not lead to a collapse of Israel. -- And you talk about frontiers, how xxx would one do that?

M: I will give it some thought.

K: I will see you next week.

END

SE 197 *

TELECON
Mr. Clifton Daniel/Secretary Kissinger
April 1, 1975
12:15 pm

RELEASED IN PART
B6

D: I only want to take a minute of your time to continue our conversation of the other night which we had [redacted] B6 About this submarine operation. You gave the understanding that if cancelled we would be informed and I wanted to make sure that we would be informed. I trust that this is in order and when you make a decision, I ask that we be informed either on-the-record or off-the-record. I would have some questions to ask then but I don't think it appropriate to ask them now.

K: What do we get out of informing you ahead of time.

D: I understood you that if we were to withhold this x story you would feel morally obligated to let us know about it.

K: But you didn't withhold the story.

D: We had -- we held it until somebody else published it.

K: You did and you behaved very fairly.

D: I would like to ask that -- unless there are overpowering reasons -- if you let us know when some decision is made.

K: We haven't made a decision yet.

D: That is what I understand and I wanted to let you know of my interest and concern.

K: Right.

D: That is what I wanted to know and I won't keep you any longer.

K: Right. Good bye.

END

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SE 219 *

TELECON
Donald Kendall/Secretary Kissinger
April 2, 1975
7:28 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I'm ___things are doing very well despite all the problems, we'll continue with our 10% increase. . I'm winning power here and there and lossing come, but winning more. I know you have enough problems but I'm very concerned about what Simon is going to indicate on his trip to ~~Moxxx~~ Moscow and in my conversation with him, I don't think he'll indicate any position unless you say so.

HAK: He'll say that we're going to do our best.

K: I said before, as I'll say again now, I don't think it's important how you do it, it's the fact that it will depend on where you do it. I think if somebody could spend a little time on it, I think it's one of the problems that you're trying to do so much with all these problems and nothing happens until you're in the middle of a storm.. If somebody in the Administration was given the authorization with your backing -- if it was indicated that you ~~xsp~~ support what they were doing....

HAK: That just isn't true. We're have big problems with the Jewish community. I'll authorize Simon to say we'll make a major effort, I can't give time.

K: Who can. The important thing is that another God damn condition not be made. I don't think the _____.

HAK: We're going to tell him that we'll do our best.

K: If Bill could make it clear. They're all looking for ~~indxxxxxx~~ indications that we're going to fight for this even if we don't____that we're gongafter it.

HAK: That will be done.

K: On the other side, I think that -- I know you haven't the time to do it.

HAK: I have the time to do it once we get a strategy lined up.

K: What I think you can do in Congress, I had a little talk with Ullman, Stevenson and Long and with Carl Albert. The only guy I haven't talked to is Jack himself. He's got to get this off his back.

HAK: How.

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K: I don t know the way. I've just finished, which I'll have ready tomorrow, we've done a complete survey of all the editorials across the country. As a result of what happened and it will ____ the support of the press. Across the country with trade relationswith the Soviet Union.

HAK: You don't have to ~~sssx~~ sell me. It's how you get it through the Congress.

K: Ullman has agreed to give support. I talked to Green who is _____ if somebody comes up with a suggestion.

HAK: ~~W~~ Like what that does not involve Jewish emigration?

K: I don't think it has to ~~x~~ involve Jewish emigration. I think you can make the thing long term enough that where Jewish emigration does not get involved.

HAK: Simon will be told by me to tell them we'll make a major effort but we can not give them an exact time. They will be told.

K: OK.

HAK: OK.

K: Make it clear that you'll fight for it.

HAK: That will be made clear and I'll make it clear to Dobrynin.

K: I think you should but I think it's also important that Bill make it. They'll be listening to what he says.

HAK: Both of us will make it clear.

K: ~~K~~ Keep the fight up.

HAK: OK.

END

SE 2/2 *

TELCON
George Ball
Sec. Kissinger
April 2, 1975
10:25 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: You have been lacerating me in a rude and abrasive form and I have been making lots of comments about it. I wanted to use this opportunity to tell you I thought you behaved really in a statesmanlike way in the meeting the other day.

B: Well, thank you. Have you a memorandum from me yet.

K: No.

B: You will have it this morning. I am putting it in Springsteen's hands. It expands substantially on the ideas I put forward and I think it will be of some use to you.

K: I would like to work closely with this group. Having gone through this horror of Vietnam, I think we should do the Middle East on a bipartisan basis. I had the sense of the meeting the other day that we might have disagreements on tactics as we go down this road...

B: What I suggested in this memorandum is that I would be glad to mobilize support for a statement that the President might make. Have it orchestrated so it would come immediately afterwards if that was decided to be a useful line of policy to pursue. It is spelled out in detail and you should have it for your eyes only.

K: If agreeable to you, I will read the memorandum and then have lunch with me alone and we will talk about that and the situation in general. I will arrange that in the next few weeks. The reason for calling you, given the doubts you had about the previous phases of the policy, you behaved like a statesman.

B: Thank you, Henry. We have to pull this together on a bipartisan basis. There are too many pressures on each side.

K: It will not do anybody any good -- if the Democrats make it a partisan issue and then get stuck with a war it will not have done them a bloody bit of good. You would not do that on that basis anyway but it is not riskless to make it partisan anyway.

B: I am willing to do whatever is useful to you.

K: See you soon.

B: Thank you.

END

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SE 220

TELECON
Bruce Van Voorst/Secretary Kissinger
April 2, 1975
7:45 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

V: I'm told I have 6 minutes.

K: You don't have six minutes. .

V: OK. I have 5 minutes. ~~Then~~ I wanted guidance on the Middle East refugees on the __. Are there any decisions the Israelis are about to make. Or the ~~&~~ Canadians.

K: What Canadians.

V: You had the foreign minister in.

K: The foreign minister asked to be briefed on the Middle East and I did it. Don't you think I would use the Canadians to get things started?

V: I don't know what you'd do to get things started. I do know you talked to the Canadians and the Dutch.

K: The Dutch. No, I did not talk to the Dutch.

V: You didn't see the Dutch Ambassador?

K: No. Joe Sisco ~~briefing~~ briefed a number of NATO Ambassador. We're not asking anyone to get things started again.

V: Have you reached any serious discussions with the Israelis?

K: Not that I'm aware of.

V: In all this ~~&~~ talk about proximity talks.

K: That's all nonsense.

V: Does the Egyptians request for a resumption____before you go to Geneva.

K: There's no concrete negotiations going on.

V: Until you have something ~~firm~~ thing from the Israelis.

K: We have not got any new from the Israelis.

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V: It looks like a major ____seems to be interesting in getting these talks started again.

K: I'm making no effort to get the talks started again.

V: Not in any format.

K: No format.

V: I'm reassured if this _____the Israelis.

K: We have to design a strategy for G__. You have it all wrong. The Israelis made their decision.

V: They don't seem to be sticking with the decision. They'retrying to leave the impression that they're still interested in what might be offered.

K: In the old terms.

V: Until they do, they'll be interim talks.

K: No. The ball may be too far down the court.

V: On Vietnam, the Secretary of Defense today said and the Vice President said about the same thing that Saigon will fall.

K: The Vice President claims he did not say that.

V: In any case, for guidance, is your operational assessment the two governments will fall shortly.

K: I can't say until I talk to Weyand.

V: What will be the impact on the American political scene on the ____.

K: I know aht it will be abroad, it will be very serious. You know my view, you heard me on theplane. You know I'm right.

V: There is a school of thought around down that there is a question of whether this ton and ___is sort of self created.

K: When you predict things you're accused of causing what you predicted.

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V: The question really is how serious.

K: This is all on deep background.

V: I realize that. The Vietnam thing is it not more your personal involvement.

K: Come on. What is my personal involvement?

V: Getting the agreement.

K: Which was ___ after the U.S. was deprives the ___ of ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ enforcing it. You tell me, would treaties have been maintain when no party was willin g to enforce it.

V: It has happened.

K: Just say it's my personal ego or you can ___. When a major power makes an agreement that is totally ____.

V: Again, come back to the question of ....

K: Bruce, I really have to go. ~~Six~~ I'm sorry I'm so short.

V: I appreciate just to get a chance to get these observations.

END

SE 228 *

TELECON
Winston Lord/Secretary Kissinger
April 3, 1975
5:10 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Are you getting a draft speech?

L: I think I've got this one for you and the President's is much better.

K: Are they going to be very overlapping?

L: Some. I have been working on both and trying to keep them in ___. Your's is much more ____ and his is more concrete. Your's is going to be 2 weeks now.

K: But if you reflect enough...

L: I think it will hold up.

K: I have to give a Middle East speech within the next week [redacted] and the Law of the Sea speech.

L: I've been working on that.

K: I'm thinking of making a statement on Vladivostok.

L: On SALT.

K: Yes. I think it's a good time to remind people of our successes.

L: I'll try to do that in your speech as well. I think this will give you a good start.

K: OK. Thank you.

END

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SE 226 *

TELECON
Mr. Habib /Secretary Kissinger
April 3, 1975
5:07 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Could you send that note to Martin about evacuation / in a friendlier tone.

H: I thought it was polite. His tone wasn't that friendly. I thought I put it very business like to him. When a man doesn't carry out instructions from the Secretary of State and ~~sayd~~ say's he's been waiting for 3 marines he asked for is like he's not going to do this until we do something for him.

K: I know what the problems Graham Martin has.

H: He's got to learn to take orders.

K: I would just give him a specific order in a more polite was. We want him to get the dependents out and he's to move on this.

H: Did you see what I said?

K: Yes. It's a little too harsh.

H: I'll to anything you want. ~~A~~ Except I'm beginning to run out of patience.

K: I understand why.

~~H~~:

END

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SE 223 *

TELCON
David Rockefeller
Sec. Kissinger
April 3, 1975
3:40 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

R: Thought you were in California.

K: No, but I am on the way.

R: I thought it was a fascinating meeting and I want to say again we would like to do anything we possible can to support you. I had lunch with Pete and he has been working on George and he feels that there is a good chance. I think it was a very wise thing. How did that get out to the press?

K: I think Geroge must have told it to the press.

R: Pete thought it had been released by the State Department...

K: Absolutely not.

R: Do you think it was hurtful.

K: A number of Jewish people attacked me by having collected an anti-Semetic group but I sort of -- you know they are in a state of hysteria.

R: On that score I had a visit from this fellow Sherer who is the economic minister of the consulate here. His govt he said had instructed him to see me and the purpose of the visit was to say we are in the same boat but the Anti-Defamation League is pushing to make a statement about the Chase. He wanted to know if we had any suggestions. Implication is if we did not change our mind they would be forced to come out with a statement supporting the anti-Defamation League attacking us which they would hate to do. Within 15 minutes of the time that he left, the office of two Israeli news services telephoned to say they knew he had been there and did we have any word indicating that we had changed our position.

K: They are tough.

R: I think we will get more pressure there. What I did not get a chance to tell you the other day after my quick trip to Europe is that I had a very interesting conversation with a French Foreign Min. Chirac whom I had known before. I told him of my trip to the Middle East and mentioned the trip to Irag and it turns out that Khaddam Houssein is a close ~~friend~~ of his and comes to Paris ~~frequently~~ frequently and usualy has a meal with Chirac. Chirac felt that perhaps he could be helpful in pursuing things if you wanted to and would be happy to do so.

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K: ~~Chirac~~ Who is this?

R: Chirac -- Khaddam Houssein.

K: In Iraq?

R: Yes.

K; That is an interesting idea.

R: I thought you s-ould know about this. If you remember from the memo I sent you, he made it clear that the key to open his door was an arrangement -- was pulling off the Iranians. I don't know that you did it but in any case they seem to be off and therefore I would have to assume that he would be very much more receptive then he was when I saw him to a further advance and it seems that Chirac could be an interesting intermediary and would be extremely flattered if you wanted to use him.

K: I must see him on one of my trips throu Paris.

R: I thought it worth putting the thought into your mind. Chirac I thought ~~was~~ seemed to think he was quite friendly.

K: I would like to ~~see~~ meet him anyway.

R: And you have not.

K: No.

R: I wanted to tell you and to see you before too long.

K: That would be nice.

R: I assure you you have many friends.

K: You have been marvelous.

R: Don't get discouraged even though I understand why you might be. I thought Reston's article was a well balanced one.

K: A little too optimistic.

R: I agree. Are you going to call another meeting again.

~~Kx=xAxexyouxgoixngxtoxexaltxanoxhexxmeetingxagainx~~
K: Yes. Within two weeks.

END

SE 232

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELCON
Governor Harriman/HAK
4/5/75 - 7:05 p.m.

K: Hello.

H: Henry.

K: You're going off tonight.

H: You're good to call me.

K: I've talked to Dobrynin today to tell him that you have my full confidence and that I hope that some senior Soviet leaders will see you. And he promised me that he would.

H: Good. Well that's nice. Kosygin has asked to see me but of course I want to see Brezhnev.

K: Yes. Well, I've urged it on him.

H: That's wonderful.

K: Now what I would urge when you talk to them is to tell them the extraordinary importance of restraint on their part in these next months.

H: On what subjects?

K: You know, in the Middle East and elsewhere.

H: Yes. The Middle East I think I know all about and I'm also using their influence with Syria and the Palestinians.

K: And also the great importance in my view of concluding the SALT Agreement.

H: That would be a farce if that wasn't done.

K: That's right.

H: He won't have a very warm welcome if he doesn't have a SALT agreement.

K: Well, I don't see how we can have the meeting without a SALT agreement.

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H: I thought also, unless you agree, you know they worked with us when I was involved in '68. The embassy helped alot when we got into trouble with the North Vietnamese that I hope they'd use their influence on the North Vietnamese to do things. One, to -- on retaliations and the other thing on quieting down on Cranston?

K: Yes.

H: Now the -- I don't know they have fight for 30 years whether they can cool off but they can create a lot of trouble in Thailand and elsewhere if they want to where as if they consolidated their position and Indochina why they've got a very tidy situation that they can influence it -- they can have an influence in the world. Don't you agree?

K: Absolutely.'

H: You don't mind my mentioning that do you?

K: No, I think it would be helpful.

H: You got my message. I thought your press conference was.....

K: I was very touched by it.

H: Tell me was there anything in talking to Vernon that came up. I saw him last week. He came and had dinner with us but was there anything else particular ... What about the European conference. There can't be a Summit meeting unless they come to an agreement can there.

K: No. I think that's coming along pretty well.

H: I gather they're going back a little bit on that bundle three aren't they.

K: I think that's going to come out alright. We went over that today

H: You think it's going to come out alright.

K: Yes.

H: There is no harm my mentioning it as a great success if it is achieved is there? I say if they achieve it I will be considered....

K: Oh yes. If it's achieved. And I think it will be achieved.

H: Yes. Well, there is nothing particularly.....

K: No, those are the major subjects.

H: Of course the Middle Eaast is the most.... By the way when are you going to Geneva? Have you made up your mind?

K: No, but within the next two months?

H: Well, that's what Brezhnev was keen about and I certainly can talk about the fact that we look forward to -- now they have responsibility as co-chairman they'll do what they did when we working on Laos.

K: Have a very good trip. You cann call me..... When are you coming back?

H: I'll be back on the evening of Monday the 19th so I'll be here the 20th.

K: You call me when you get back.

H: [redacted] B6

K:

H: Fine. The best of everything to you and good luck and I am ~~XXXXXX~~ grateful to you for giving me this job to do and I'm very much interested in doing it.

K: Well, we'll give you some more when that's finished.

SE 233

TELCON
Harriman/HAK
4/5/75 - 7:12 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

H: Henry, thanks. You took me by surprise. I forgot to mention trade -- what can I say about trade?

K: You should tell ~~them~~ them we are determined to move ahead on that but that we have to pick the right moment to introduce it into the Congress.

H: I gather from some of our friends in the Congress a number of them are ready to move.

K: Not yet. That's my impression.

H: But some are ready to move but its premature.

K: It's a little premature.

H: Is there anything they can particularly do to help that on.

K: If we can make progress on all these other issues I think we can move it.

H: I thought that I'd get the name of one or two of these Jews that are creating trouble and saying for God's sake. Brezhnev said to me we're letting them all out. And there are one or two of them that are creating trouble. I thought I'd get them -- their names and tell them for God sake let them out.

K: I think that's a good idea. We talked about that at lunch already. And I favor it.

H: Did Dobrynin say anything about that?

K: No, at lunch between you and me. I didn't mention.

H: But you don't mind my ~~[illegible]~~ mentioning it.

K: No, I think it's better that you rather than I.

H: Good. Okay.

K: Have a good trip.

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SE 234

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Jack Heinz
4/8/75; 10:24 a.m.

K: Hello.

H: Jack Heinz.

K: How are you, Jack.

H: I am calling to inquire the possibility of _____, April 23, 24, 25 -- Bilderberg.

K: I don't think I can do that.

H: Well, I saw Hal Sonnenfeldt and he thought not, too. And I certainly do understand and I also know that you wanted to, which I shall convey to the Prince. May I ask if you would let us know whom you would like to designate. Our suggestions would be Sisco, Robinson, Lord in that order and maybe Elliot Richardson. Now, you might want to call me back on that because I don't know how involved Joe is with . . .

K: I will -- I better leave Joe here. So why don't you do Robinson and Lord.

H: What would lyou think of Elliot?

K: I have no problem with Elliot.

H: Would you prefer to have one or the other: Robinson or Lord or would you like to send them both?

K: I think they would be good both because they complement each other.

H: That would be my feeling. Lord is kind of a natural -- I mean Robinson is kind of a natural and Lord performed particularly well last time. He made a very good impression -- the kind that you would have been proud of and we, too. So, if Robinson and Lord could come we would be very pleased.

K: Good. I will talk to them.

H: Right. Now then, will they get through to Joe Johnson?

K: I will tell them to.

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H: All right. All I can say, did Hal tell you about the prophet of imminent doom Mr. Alsop the other night.

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Jack Heinz
4/8/75; 10:24 a.m.

K: No.

H: Joe did a marvelous job in which I found people like Brzezynski and Coles(Sp.?) and Doug Dillon who started out saying oh, Lord, here goes Joe again all ended up by saying Joe is about 80% right.

K: Oh, really.

H: Which is rather nice.

K: That's amazing.

H: Well, he really just said how the Senate was just as shy of being traitorous that the media -- especially the NEW YORK Times should be destroyed and there is nothing that would do harm to interest in South America less than inundation of eight feet of water across the boards.

K: (Laughter) Jack, I've got to run.

H: Bye, thanks.

K: Nice to talk to you.

H: And you.

K: Bye.

SE 246

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Ben Bradlee/Secy Kissinger
2:40 p.m., April 9, 1975

[Small talk at beginning of conversation]

B: I don't want to keep you; I know you're busy today and every day. I am very concerned about the --

K: We're in a real hot swig in foreign policy right now. I hope you give us some credit in your newspaper.

B: I'm not mentioning that. I don't want to bring that up. I wanted to worry about my -- I've got three guys in Saigon who concern me and worry me and the evacuation of whom is obviously important to me. They seem to doubt the implementability of the evacuation plans and I am worried about whether you are satisfied that --

K: Well, now what are you talking about -- Americans or Vietnamese?

B: I was talking about both. Now I'm talking exclusively about Americans. I mean, I would love to make arrangements and I know that there are plenty of efforts, and I'm sure you've been involved in them, to get the Vietnamese employees out. Now I'm worried about the Americans themselves. Do you feel that the evacuation plans are okay?

K: Look, the evacuation plan -- this you cannot use.

B: I'm not using it at all.

K: Our problem with evacuation is to do it in such a way that we don't trigger: one, total panic, and two, anti-American riots.

B: Yeah.

K: This might then prevent anybody from getting out. So I can't give you -- I think the evacuation plans are okay. And then between you and me, we've got an Ambassador there who is maybe losing his cool.

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B: Well, I think he is. And I've known that Ambassador for 25 years.

K: And so we are going to watch that situation. I'm not so worried about getting the American s out unless the thing goes to pieces in a way that's going to be a total disaster.

B: Yeah.

K: What worries me is, you know, there are hundreds of thousands of South Vietnamese towards whom we must make at least a show of trying to save their lives. And those plans -- that's tough.

B: Yeah. But I talked to Don Oberdorfer this morning and he is a responsible, cool man --

K: Where is he?

B: He's in Saigon. He says that the current evacuation plans require 12-18 hours notice and no opposition.

K: Well, let me put it this way, whatever isn't in shape by tomorrow night will be in shape by then.

B: Okay.

K: I mean, we're going to reduce that readiness considerably.

B: You're going to reduce it 12-18 hours?

K: Well, I haven't got the exact figures here but I can assure you it's one of the things -- you know, unless the thing goes in 24 hours . .

B: In the next 24 hours?

K: Yeah. I think we'll -- by the weekend we'll have the evacuation plans in good order and we will be reducing people to a point so that it will become more manageable.

B: Okay.

K: And now, Ben, I have to rely on you --

B: Yeah.

K: Not to print any of this.

B: Yeah. Absolutely. Okay?

K: Okay.

B: Don was particularly worried about Graham Martin and saying that he's back in '68 and he would rather go down with the ship than anything else. You're aware of that?

K: As a friend, I'm considering seriously of replacing him.

B: Okay. Thank you, sir.

K: Right.

SE255

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Jerry Bremer/HAK
4/10/75 - 10:55 a.m.

K: .....tradition since Jefferson I will take a few questions.

B: I don't think you want to spend 45 minutes anyway do you?

K: Nor do I want to talk 45 minutes. Now will they in the future please check with me.

B: It's no problem. Would you like us to tell them you'll speak about 20 minutes.

K: I'll speak about 25-30 minutes. Then I'll take 15 minutes of questions.

B: Okay. I'll tell them that this morning.

K: Assuming I can get someone to write a speech for me.

B: Win I think is right now undertaking that. He was just doing his last comments on the last draft of the President's speech and I think he's starting on that now.

K: Can Peter work on it too?

B: Yes, I know he's planning to. They're planning to get it to you Saturday evening in a draft.

K: Which means it will not get to me Saturday evening.

B: It will.

K: If I could have it Saturday afternoon I could get to work then.

B: I'll pass that on.

K: Ok.

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SE 259

TELCON
Sen. Humphrey/Kissinger
4/10/75 - 3:28 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

H: Hello, Henry.

K: Hubert.

H: How are you my busy friend?

K: I may get overpraised, but I'm sure catching up with it now.

H: I'll tell you, it is a rough time.

K: I didn't know there were so many heroes here in town.

H: Well, you'd be surprised. What can I do?

K: Well, I wanted to see you, Hubert. Mostly on the Middle East. I don't think it's worthwhile to talk about Vietnam except...

H: Yeah. He's going to give us a message on that ton ight, I imagine.

K: Yeah. Are you in town this weekend?

H: No, I'm not Henry. I'm going to be back... I regret to say I've got two universities, two colleges in Minnesota on Friday night and Saturday, and then I'm coming back in here Monday. But, you're going to be tied up, I suppose, on all day Friday? I'll be back in Monday evening.

K: I just want to have a talk with you. I really don't want anything from you.

H: Well I'd like to talk with you.

K: But I think.... I want you to understand what exactly I have in mind on the Middle East.

H: Yes sir.

K: And I think it's important for you to understand. You don't have to support it, but I just don't want this thing to get galvanized into another debate, if we can avoid it.

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H: Right. I don't know if you heard I was on a TV show here the other day for the Israeli television?

K: Yeah.

H: The question was put to me as to what....

K: I hadn't heard anything you said.

H: The question was put to me what would happen if the aid request came up and I said I doubt if they'd get as much as they were asking for, number one. I said, number two, I thought it greatly depended upon how movement there was between Israel and Egypt. That there wasn't any deterioration of support in the Congress, as yet, but that I thought the Congress was expecting that there would be some movement intterms of the bilateral relations between Israel and Egypt.

K: Look, you can be sure that no one is thinking of cutting off Israel...

H: We know that.

K: That isn't the issue. The issue is how we can get this thing from, you know, on top of all the agony we now had, if the Middle East blows sky high, you know this town won't be worth living in. And there's a good chance we could have a Middle East war by the end of this year if we don't get ahold of it.

H: Yes, I think that's a possibility. My own feeling, and I told you this, I think, once before, is that I think that there is such a thing as just a kind of a settling period, and time, of course you have to be used, but I think that some time is on your side in this thing.

K: Well we've got until about the end of July. You know, we don't need a decision in the next week or two.

H: No.

K: Would you be free for breakfast if I can clear my calendar?

H: Sure.

K: How early can you have breakfast?

H: I can have it mighty early. How ever early you want it.

K: Even around 7:15?

H: 7:30, oh, cut it out, you're not a farm boy.

K: Cause I got a staff meeting in the morning and I have to get my people together.

H: Even tomorrow morning?

K: Yeah.

H: Well, let me ask you, how about the first part of next week? I'm prepared to do it tomorrow morning, as far as that's concerned.

K: Let's aim for 7:30 tomorrow morning.

H: I'll be there.

K: And that gives me until 8:15.

H: Perfect. Well, if you want it 7:15, I'll be over there.

K: Let me call you about that.

H: 7:15, 7:30.

K: Well, let's say 7:15, Hubert. Fond as I am of you, I don't really think you can conduct a conversation earlier.

H: You know me too well. I'll be there. Bye, bye.

K: Bye.

*

SE 254

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Joe Sisco/HAK
4/10/75 - 10:54 a.m.

K: Hello.

S: Good morning Mr. Secretary.

K: Joe would you call Tom Braden and tell him really as a friend I'm really hurt by his printing such crap as he did yesterday.

S: I must say when I read it it kind of made me sick. He's a dear and close friend to you. He bought that whole line -- I don't think he checked with anybody.

K: The simplest check would have made it clear that it is a pack of lies. What happened. Sadat sent us a rather forth-coming offer. Complete demilitarization of the southern part. I take it back. It's totally rejected. I'll then see whether I can get some more concessions. And to this he said he won't give any concessions until he knows what happens to the passes. Isn't that right.

S: That's accurate. I'll call him. I must say.....

K: On the Syrian thing exactly the opposite is true.

S: Of course, the Syrian thing is exactly the opposite. I'll take care of it.

K: And will you tell him that I'm really hurt. He is an old friend of mine -- putting out such crap.

S: I will tell him this.

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SE 257

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELCON
Sen. Symington/Kissinger
4/10/75 - 3:12 p.m.

K: Hello.

S: Henry?

K: Stu, how are you?

S: How are you, my dear friend? On the question of [redacted] We can talk quite frankly. B6

K: Yes.

S: There are things I've heard that disturb me from the standpoint of where other people got information.

K: What do you mean?

S; Well, you'll have to diagnose that yourself. I think that perhaps I am seeing you on Sunday and I could go into further detail. But somebody's been passing out information down here.

K: I don't quite...

S; About various plans. And this gentleman, I heard, was very close to some of the people here on the Hill. I mentioned it to you once before and I took the position, and I'm taking it now if you're sure that you want him in this position I will not oppose it being brought up on the floor. But I felt obligated as your friend, and your well-wisher without any reservation of any kind to just give you that thought. Sparkman spoke to me today and I said, well, I'll call Dr. Kissinger myself. We got some letters, but they weren't signed and I just wanted to be sure that....

K: Well, Stu...

S: that you felt that you wanted this man this job.

K: Well, Stu, can I talk to you as a dear friend?

S: Yeah.

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K: He was appointed without my fully knowing it. He also worked for me for four years. So I've got to support it.

S: O.K. That's all I want to know.

K: And I'll keep him under control.

S: That's all I want to know. And I think perhaps I am going to see you on Sunday?

K: That's right. I look forward to it.

S: I'd like to have five minutes with you. I'll explain what's on my mind. I know you'll protect me.

K: You can count on me.

S: Thank you very much.

K: What are you doing Saturday? Maybe we can get together for half-an-hour then.

S: I'm going out in the State.

K: Oh, so you won't be back until Sunday?

S: No, I'm going back Friday and I'll come back Sunday afternoon.

K: Well, then let's have a drink next week.

S: Anytime you say.

K: Good, Stu.

S: Good luck.

K: Thank you.

S: Bye.

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SE 251

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
David Binder/Secy Kissinger
9:45 a.m., April 10, 1975

B: Hi, Dave Binder here.

K: Listen, I have no view on this Lester Colestein (?) question, so why don't you ask your Danish friends.

[Laughter]

B: You're in good form!

K: When you're on a happy streak like we are, why shouldn't you be?

B: [Laughter] What's this about you picking on Frank Carlucci? I read in the Post today.

K: What the hell are you talking about?

B: Oh, there's a big Post saying Kissinger doesn't think Carlucci is tough enough.

K: They're absolutely out of their cotton-picking minds!

B: I don't know where they picked this up. This is a leadman story. It's pretty nasty because Carlucci -- well, you know Carlucci's situation.

K: Well, first of all, I picked Carlucci. Secondly, I have not had the slightest disagreement with Carlucci.

B: I figured that. I just wanted to hear it.

K: You know, sometimes there are distortions; sometimes I express irritation at a staff meeting which was not policy over -- but this is a case where there hasn't been one disagreement.

B: Good. Now, you said something about letting me come to a staff meeting. Was that kidding or are you serious?

K: I was kidding. [Laughs]

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B: When you're not kidding, let me know.

K: Oh, no, you'd be sorely disappointed.

B: I'd be interested in the mechanics of it.

K: The mechanics are a desire by everybody to keep everybody from finding out what's going on.

B: (Laughter) Okay.

K: Okay. Thank you.

B: You understand when we get these kinds of --

K: No, I appreciate your asking. I didn't even know the story existed. I haven't gotten my daily masochism yet, where is it?

B: Oh, it's somewhere inside the paper. I couldn't give you a page number but it's in the second section or somewhere, I don't know.

K: You know, I don't even know what it is -- sometimes there is a basis of where you have a staff meeting. I just don't know what they're talking about. Besides, it absolutely does not reflect my view.

B: Good. Well, fortunately, we don't have to deny other people's stories so . . .

K: Yeah. But if you get that story, you can be absolutely sure that there's nothing to it.

B: Good. Thank you.

K: Right.

B: Good luck.

SE 253 *
RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Bill Rogers (State)
4/10/75; 10:37 a.m.

K: Yeah -- Look, we have to settle on the trip to Latin America. An eight-day trip is absolutely out of the question under these questions. Now, and I don't want to be maneuvered by ARA so eight days is out of the question and I can't be uchered into it. So can ~~I~~ we know decide on what I can do in a minimum amount of time if I must do something.

R: Yeah. We think you -- we sent you . . .

K: I don't know what you sent me because there is no communication between my outer office and me so can you tell it to me.

R: Yes, I can. We sent you a six-day schedule starting . . .

K: Six days is out of the question.

R: Six days is out?

K: Well look, six days is a week. Even by any ARA standard.

R: Starting Monday night that will give you Monday and that would include all five countries. Less than that you have got to cut out some countries.

K: Then I will cut out some countries. Have they done anything in the human rights field in Chile?

R: We had a meeting yesterday and we are supposed to get a report today but ~~XXXXXX~~ the premise was that they were going to move significantly.

K: Look, Monday night means first of all that I have to go to work the minute that I get there.

R: Uh-huh.

K: Which is an exhausting exercise.

R: I told you to cut it down it is going to . . .

K: Look, if I leave Sunday night I will be gone all week. Well, at least can I see these God-damned schedules.

R: Yes, sir. We have that schedule arranged leaving Monday night and we had one leaving Tuesday night, making four countries.

K: Which would be which?

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Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Bill Rogers (State)
4/10/75; 10:37 a.m.

R: Six, leaving out Lima.

K: But that would create a furor in Lima, wouldn't it?

R: It would I am almost sure.

K: I just ~~don't~~ don't see how I can be traveling around -- supposing Saigon collapses while I am out of the country? Is there something where I can leave on Wednesday and be back Sunday night?

R: I think -- no doubt we are going to have to at least drop one country to do that.

K: Then we will have to drop countries. Is that going to be a disaster?

R: I think the best thing is to drop both countries.

K: Well then can we drop both.

R: Yeah, we will prepare your schedule.

K: What do you think.

R: I think it will be tough but I think it is tolerable if you announce . . .

K: And I will come back later.

R: Yeah.

K: And then I can take a trip through the Andes sometime.

R: That's a fall back position.

K: Okay, good. Will you do that?

R: Sure.

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SE 252

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Art Hartman/Secy Kissinger
10:05 a.m., April 10, 1975

K: Art, are we eating each other again?

H: I hope not. This is the story this morning?

K: Yeah.

H: No, I am absolutely furious about it and I will get to the bottom of it.

K: We ought to be able to make some comments. First of all, I don't believe this about Carlucci. Secondly, I make comments about everybody.

H: I know. I say the same thing myself. No, I realize that and I think the only way to handle this publicly now is to state full confidence but I am going to get to the bottom of this because we just cannot have that kind of thing going on and have any kind of exchange.

K: Yes.

H: And I think I'll be able to.

K: Okay. Good. Will you do something about it?

H: I certainly will.

K: Good. Thank you.

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SE 277

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Dave Binders/The Secretary
April 11, 1975
Time: 8:10 p.m.

B: I thought that the speech last night was just great, superb.

K: Well aren't you nice.

B: First class speech, and my wife thought so also.

K: You can say that to me, but I want to preserve your position on the New York Times, so don't say that to your colleagues.

B: I risked universal scorn today by telling them what I thought about it.

K: Oh no!

B: Yes, I know about that. I am calling about the Israeli business. I have had queries about the Soviet mission to Israel.

K: Let them talk about it.

B: Did we get advance warning about this?

K: Have they confirmed it?

B: Yes.

K: Well then, yes we new about it right after it happened.

B: Does this mean anything?

K: If the Israelis want to go back to the 1967 lines with Soviet guarantees, it is a good way for them to do it.

B: Is Israel saying anything came of this today? Could there be something after this?

K: We have no objection if they want to proceed.

B: It would be the direction of permant guarantees?

K: I don't know what they were proposing, or whether there is any future in this.

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B: We have a general appreciation, if their attitude is that significant progress....

K: Have you heard the statement that is out about the collapse of American guarantees in Viet Nam being one of the chief reasons that they did not agree to the Egyptian settlement?

B: Yes I did.

K: There is a rapid reorientation.

B: Yes people all want things by pieces.

K: Yes

B: Thanks.

K: Yes and I did appreciate your calling.

B: I know this is minor, but wait until next year.

K: We will look better next year. I don't know what that means in election terms but....

B: I am glad you are consistent.

K: Right, thanks.

B: Goodnight.

K: Goodnight.

SE 276

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Hartman/The Secretary
April 11, 1975
Time: 7:46 p.m.

K: About the cheese issue...

H: I have just cleared a cable about this to go to the member states along with Britain's proposal on the Council meeting on Tuesday.

K: Will you get in touch with Stephen Gardner in Treasury and work out this problem. I know he had received instructions from Simon that none of this was to lead to countervailing.

H: Good, that helps us in the bargaining.

K: Good.

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SE 273

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/The Secretary
April 11, 1975
Time: 5:55 p.m.

D: Hello Henry, I have been trying to reach you today, but you were giving an oath or something.

K: Yes, I was swearing in another Ambassador.

D: There has been quite a series of oath taking lately.

K: Yes I am swearing in all the people under Congressional attack.

D: I have been checking about a time on Monday. It would be a discussion about the Middle East. I could send it to you before hand.

K: Why don't you send it to me and we will continue our discussion perhaps on Monday. However, there might be some trouble in meeting on Monday morning. I am writing a speech. Could I call you Monday morning when I know about the timing?

D: Where are you making a speech? (When)

K: Thursday, on foreign policy.

D: I will give you a call on Monday....

K: Right.

D: Maybe we could meet for 1/2 an hour.

K: Right.

D: Is this a speech to your office or whom.... shall I send the paper...

K: To Scowcroft, he will get it to me.

D: To Scowcroft.

K: Yes.

D: I will await your call.

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SE 266

TELCON
Secretary Schlesinger/HAK
4/11/75 - 9:01 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

S: Henry. How's it go? Pochentong was open all day yesterday. We had 20 flights in. They could have back-loaded people on. No problem. This guy is just acting like a looney.

K: Look. He claims -- I checked it after our talk -- that he together with his, with all the military people there, felt he couldn't do it.

S: That's just plain flat wrong. Any advice he's getting from Tyler and from Palmer is just to the contrary which is get moving. And he is in this position in which he wants to go out in a great wave of glory of helicopters to descend upon Phnom penh. That's just a hairy operation -- while he's got the fixed-wing aircraft he ought to be loading people on.

K: But Jim it is now dark. As I understand it by daylight they're going to be ready to move so... As I understand it there is no further disagreement.

S: If he wants to stay on he ought to load. Is he prepared to go out?

K: He's prepared to go out tomorrow.

S: Okay. His feeling is he can't get to Pochentong so we have to bring him the choppers.

K: That's his judgment.

S: Yes. But that was his judgment yesterday too. Pochentong was open all day. Okay.

K: You know. I just don't know what I can say. He claims that he and the military people he's got there feel it's got to be done by choppers.

S: He has been getting continued advise to the contrary but be that as it may. Now on Martain. Martin is doing a splendid job. He reduced the number of Americans by 570 yesterday. The way he did that was to fly out a few dependents and shift many of the so-called Americans to the role of aliens.

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K: Jim!

S: He need a good kick.

K: Martin received instructions -- the theory was that he would first help you of our AID request and on the basis of that he would start evacuating people. And I think that should be going into operation today.

S: Okay.

K: You know, we also do have the responsibility not to collapse the whole thing.

S: I know, but Henry we could have gotten out 250 people a day or 100 people a day or 75 people a day for the last 10 days.

K: He is instructed now to get it down to about 1200.

S: Okay. Well. Just keep him to the mark.

K: Okay. Thank you.

SE 267

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Phil Habib/HAK
4/11/75 - 9:07 a.m.

K: Phil, in this maneuvering that's going on in the Department. In the Defense Department. I've just had a call from Schlesinger and he claims that in his judgment fix-winged can do it. Now, I'm sticking behind you. I just want to find out -- Dean believes it cannot.

H: Dean's specific words to me were if you want to save lives, we'll do it with helicopters. If not -- it is dangerous -- we can't get to the airport. The airport is under fire. They lost another airplane there last night. They had a few people killed yesterday they're only 2 miles from the airport. Phil if you want to save lives, do it this way. I said John, you've got the hand on the throttle. You do it your way. Now he did get some airplanes in last night. Yesterday with supplies and gotthem out but it's not the same thing as assembling 100's of people, taking them to the airport across town, putting them on the airplanes and taking off. Dean believes this is the safest, cleanest way.

K: I'm backing you ... look the sob just wants to be able to say two things. That he was pushing evacuation if anything goes wrong it's our fault. I'm behind you.

H: You know, I kept saying to them yesterday.

K: Phil, you stick to your cause. You've been a hero in this. I'm proud of you and I'm behind you. I just....

H: I think sometimes you get angry at me though. You know.

K: Well, I sometimes get angry at you because I don't like Arabs but you know, it's a racial feeling, it has nothing to do with your competence.

H: We semis have to get along you know.

K: I didn't think yesterday I needed a lecture in front of everybody.

H: Sorry about doing it in front of everyone. But know what happened is that I felt we lost a little bit of time by.

K: It was a screw up but I spent all my day with the President. I wasn't in an overly....

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H: I didn't know what was happening to even respond to you. You asked me questions that I can't answer because I don't know.

K: It was a screw up.

H: Did you get my little note this morning as to what went on through the night on that thing.

K: Yes, but we couldn't get in touch with him.

H: Well, we finally did and he in a way raised the ante. But I've told Dean....

K: What does he want now?

H: He's talking now...it's not enough for them to call him back, he's got to get the bonses(?) and the populous, the peasants, and the army all have to call for his return so that he can come back. Otherwise the Khmer Rouge --he'd have to come back with the Khmer Rouge. I -- that's indirect. That's what his man is saying. The door is open. The Cambodians know about it and I've told Dean to go ahead with Eaglepull. Not to hold up.

K: You know, if we had a sane Secretary of Defense I'd hold up on Eaglepull.

H: I think very frankly that we can't. It's too dangerous now. They're very very close in. And the final thing is that if the Cambodians still want to do what we've opened the door for them to do with Sianouk. They can do it without our presence now. Because we've passed all the messages that we need to pass.

K: Okay. It's not a proud day but we did the best we could.

H: Okay. Bye.

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SE 265

TELECON
Mr. Koppel/Secretary Kissinger
April 11, 1975
1:04 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I have gotten wind of the Cambodian evacuation and I know the critical aspects if the next few hours and I won't use the story til this evening at 6:00. But I do need to know the scope and who is involved. Do you have any idea of numbers?

HAK: It is several hundred. The remaining Americans and some Cambodians -- whose numbers we do not yet know.

K: Do you have any idea? Tens? Hundreds?

HAK: In hundreds.

K: By air?

HAK: All by air.

K: The other question which relates to the Vietnamese evacuation. Do you have any conception of what kind of American military force would be necessary? How many divisions? It will take divisions.

HAK: I haven't got that yet.

K: You are thinking in terms of divisions? It would have to be a fairly massive force.

HAK: We haven't thought it through yet.

K: Thank you.

END

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SE 286 *

TELECON
Mr. Julius Katz/The Secretary
April 12, 1975
Time: 5:25 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: What are we doing on this Prepcon? What are the issues?

Katz: The issues are that we are trying to maintain a link with energy and keep it an energy conference. We have agreed to include raw materials and some technology, if energy related issues are kept in the forefront. The Seven subordinate energy and want to talk exclusively about technology and raw materials. The Europeans have been out in the front and we are playing a lowkey role. We have been proposing some formulations to break the deadlock, but other than that the Europeans are in front. They are talking about a new international economic order, for instance, Venezuela says we have the strength and you must do what we want. The Japanese and Europeans might want to break it up.

K: What do you think is going to happen?

Katz: I think they are likely to find some kind of formulation. The Venezuelans have found something in Paris which removes the link; the link we proposed on energy-related materials. They have removed that, but have given energy a more prominent role. If not, they will adjourn and leave it to the French to reconvene.

K: O.K.

Katz: It is not an interesting proposition to us at this point. We could be doing the same things in the UN.

K: What is your prediction?

Katz: I can't believe that they will break off. I think that they will put something together. I talked to Tom and he was pessimistic, however.

K: Pessimistic?

Katz: Yes, in that they would not find a formulation.

K: O.K. Thank you.

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SE 284 *

TELECON
Mr. Goldwin/The Secretary
April 12, 1975
Time: 4:30 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Two things. First you assembled a great group for the meeting. I didn't quite understand how you wanted to handle this, so I might have played a little to dumb, but....

G: I don't think so.

K: I needed someone to talk to about these problems other than bureaucrats.

G: The idea of these meetings is to try to get ideas to the President that don't come through the bureaucratic structure.

K: I didn't want you to think I had taken over your meeting, but these people were in the position to supply me with information I needed.

G: There was a mix-up and you were invited over a week ago to attend this meeting.

K: Well O.K. Listen, I am planning to give a speech on this subject and nobody can give me more information than I have already spoken on.

G: I have a lot of material from these people that I have gathered while arranging this meeting.

K: Well could I use it or would you work on the speech with me.

G: O.K.

K: I don't want you to think I took over the meeting deliberately.

G: I think you added substance to the meeting; there is no need for apology.

K: Good. Well I will talk to you and as soon as I have the speech I will let you look it over.

G: O.K.

K: Good.

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SE 283 *

TELECON
Mr. Atherton/The Secretary
April 12, 1975
Time: 4:15

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Roy, you made clear that this was a protest from the President.

A: Yes indeed, I did.

K: To whom.

A: To Shalev.

K: Did you call him in?

A: No I called him on the phone because of (Chalbed) who tries to observe, but I got him on the phone and gave him everything you told me.

K: Good.

A: O.K.

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SE 289 *

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Phil Habib
4/14/75 11:10

RELEASED IN FULL

H: Yes, sir. I'm in the committee room

K: I've already talked to miller--Bob Miller--whatever his name is--I need the questions and answers and statements by noon

H: Today?

K: Yeh, hold on a second--and I'll talk--because I may have to testify this afternoon --which committee is that?

H:

K: The House Appropriations--

H: All right, sir. I'll get a message to them -- they are already working on it, but I'll get right to them.

K: I've already gotten to them, so there is no need for you--

H: I'll be here for at least a couple of hours--it'll be a little rough This is the Judiciary committee refugee problem--

K: Okay, you are a good fellow

H: Ah, thank you sir.

K: Bye.

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SE 293 *

TELECON
Mr. Sonnefeldt/The Secretary
April 14, 1975
Time: 6:05 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Can you give me a few paragraphs on implementing.....

S: What are you talking about?

K: On my speech.

S: I have to give one myself to the Board of Trustees of Johns Hopkins tonight.

K: Well, how about tomorrow afternoon?

S: O.K. Say did you know that Dick Moren died yesterday?

K: No, how?

S: He had the flu. He was out in California. That just shows you shouldn't go to California. Say, we have a problem with Robinson in Paris. We thought it was just the way Enders was reporting it, but he is saying they can't understand our behavior in Paris; for instance, the fact that we are passive and don't go to conferences, or play up issues to get agreement.

K: We set a very strict guideline for them.

S: I know and that sets in with something that came from (Domine)

K: Well, can you call Enders?

S: I did. I gave him the instructions and I have a briefer one for the conference chairmanship that I have cleared that he should stand firm on the issues. Hopefully this telegram stems them.

K: I really don't see what we can get out of the conference.

S: I don't know what we could have gotten out of it either.

K: I was never...

S: I have something to give the Frenchmen and the Ambassador. I just wrote you a note about it.

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K: Well, see what you can do about writing me a few paragraphs.

S: O.K.

SE 297 *

TELECON
Mr. Habib/The Secretary
April 14, 1975
Time: 6:35 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: When am I going to get material for the thing tomorrow?

H: I just got back from the Hill myself and it was all up there.

K: I want questions and answers, breakdowns of figures; the sort of thing I can handle. Are you going with me?

H: Yes, if you want.

K: You have to go up there with me.

H: O.K. I will check to see what they have sent up there. I have to look at it and see, on the basis of my experiences there today, if it is alright. They really put me through the wringer today. They won't treat you the same way I hope; they should still have some respect.

K: What is the major line?

H: They are uptight on the military aid thing. The sort of things that came out on the evacuation business are why does the President need or want this authority?; how many Vietnamese are involved?; etc. We could tell them how many Americans are involved. I talked in open session and I understand you are going to be in open session also.

K: Right.

H: How can we talk in open session about the evacuation? We went into executive session after I brought it to the chairman's attention that we couldn't talk about these things in open session. They took a vote and then we went into executive session.

K: I will just say they should be in executive session.

H: One other problem, we don't have good breakdowns on the military aid, especially for open session. Are you going to handle military and economic questions?

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K: I am. Why am I appearing before the Appropriations Committee?

H: Because McClelland said that is the one key committee you should appear before. The military budget starts usually in Armed Services. However, eventually they get the armed services stuff in the Appropriations Committee.

K: Can I have the breakdown fast?

H: In 15 minutes to start and then we will decide whether it is sufficient.

K: O.K.

H: O.K. sir.

SE 296 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELECON
Mr. Connolly/The Secretary
April 14, 1975
Time: 9:47 p.m.

K: I called you a few days ago when your trial started. I am thinking of you and hope for the sake of the country for you.

C: Well, thank you. We are doing well.

K: [redacted] B6

C:

K:

C:

K:

C: [redacted] How are all of your problems?

K: Well I have gone from hero to villan in a heck of a time.

C: You are not a villan in many peoples' minds.

K: How long is the trial going to last?

C: I think it will be over this week. I am on the witness stand now. I was on today. We also had Dean Rusk, Lady Byrd, Stans, Billy Graham, Jordan testify. There was quite a parade today.

K: [redacted] B6

C: Sometime I will go into it with you.

K: Maybe when it is all over we four should get together for dinner. I have been thinking of you all this time.

C: Yes let's do. Believe me, I can't help you this week, but I am going to try next week.

K: You have always had my admiration.

C: You are a great man, working for your country, and don't let those bastards get under your skin.

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K: If you don't have an alternative, you have no problem. I have to fight the battle.

C: That is right. You are performing in the interests of this country, that's one thing for sure.

K: I never thought the Secretary of State would have to go to a Congressional Committee and plead for money for an ally.

C: The hell of it is you plead, and you probably won't get it.

K: I don't know about politics but I think there will be a horrible day of reckoning. They don't know what the communists are like that are going to take over Saigon.

C: Yes, it will start problems in Malasia and Thailand. Marcos already has a war in his country.

K: We started the panic, that's the hell of it. There would have been no offensive if it wasn't for Congressional debates on help to our allies.

C: They read the newspapers. They know poor South Vietnam has no choice but to surrender when their ammunition runs out.

K: I am going to read a letter before the Congress that (Thou) wrote when we offered to take him out of the country. (South Vietnam). It is pitiful; he is a dead man, you know, but he refused to come out.

C: Well, I just don't know. Well best of luck.

K: Thankyou, goodnight.

C: Goodnight.

SE 288*

TELCON
Bob Miller
Secretary Kissinger
11:05 a.m. 4/14/75

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello?

M: Yes, Mr. Secretary.

K: I want to make sure that I have the questions and answers that I need before Congressional committees, plus a revised statement by noon, because I may have to testify as early as this afternoon.

M: All right, sir, I'll get them right away.

K: So, just cut out a few staff meetings on it.

M: All right, sir

K: ....do it alone.

M: Right,

K: Good, thank you.

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SE 300 *

TELECON
Mr. Robert McCloskey/Secretary Kissinger
Tuesday, April 15, 1975
6:17 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

M: I am going to resist--forgive me for raising this again with you--another request from the HFAC for Thursday.

K: Maybe Thursday afternoon.

M: You have WSAG.

K: It can be changed. Can't they do it Fri day morning? Let me look at my schedule and I will get back to you.

M: Ok.

END

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SE 310 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Chairman Mahon/The Secretary
April 16, 1975
Time: 6:35

M: It developes that we are going to have a meeting of the House on Friday. Normally they don't meet on Friday. Since we have a meeting scheduled would you have the time to appear? It would be at 10:00 a.m. on Friday. Are you free at that time?

K: Unfortunately, I have just agreed to appear before the House National Affairs Committee.

M: I was taking a chance.....

K: I would have given you first choice but I have already agreed.

M: O.K. We will keep it at 2:30 on Monday, that will be our target date. Do you think I ought to put it in closed session or open. You could be franker if it were closed. I will suggest it should be closed and see what happens from there. You will have to be more cautious in open session.

K: I have no strong preferences. They leak it out anyway.

M: You can't have 50 members and expect them all to keep quiet.

K: Don't bother to put it in closed session.

M: Anything in particular on Southeast Asia?

K: Well, the South Vietnamese are fighting very well. I think some Senators are more afraid of a South Vietnamese victory than defeat because they may have to vote for another appropriation.

M: (Laughter). O.K. We will see you.

K: O.K.

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SE 302 *

TELECON
Chairman Mahon/Secretary Kissinger
April 16, 1975
12:50 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

M: I'm out of breath, I've been down to this lunch. I wanted to be sure to make contact with you. We just have to have a hearing with you. You said you would be glad to accommodate. We were thinking in terms of 2:00 on Monday.

K: That is almost certainly alright.

M: I've got to announce it because they'll have to cancel a subcommittee hearing.

K: Can you do it at 2:30. 2:30 or 3:00.

M: OK. 2:30 on Monday. That's OK and I can make an announcement.

K: That's right.

M: I really appreciate it.

K: Let me just check my calender. They never tell me anything. OK. Assume it will be done.

M: That's great. I'll be in touch with you.

END

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SE 306 *

TELECON
David Binder/Secretary Kissinger
April 16, 1975
5:43 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

B: I only try to call you when Eagleburger is in there. Are you going to get the authority to pull out (of Cambodia)?

K: The only authority I'm not going to get is to pull out Ambassador Martin.

B: I understand that. I'm thinking about the Cambodian refugees.

K: What refugees.

B: The bunch that's there in Thailand.

K: I don't know. That's about the parole authority?

B: Yes.

K: We'll get it.

B: Is that today or tomorrow. That's pretty heavy politics_____Vietnam thing by implications.

K: The parole authority?

B: Yes.

K: What do you want us to do? Keep them there?

B: No. It's a rather delicate situation.

K: Yes.

B: You don't know whether it's going to be today or tomorrow?

K: No.

B: OK. Sorry to bother you.

K: Not at all. I alway's take your calls.

END

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SE 303 *

TELECON
Ted Koppel/Secretary Kissinger
April 16, 1975
12:35

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I am sorry to bother you. There are two things that I need to talk to you about and I was wondering if you could spare me ten minutes in the afternoon. We are going to do a story -- and one is the Newsday thing.

HAK: Is that going to be a big affair:

K: I am hoping not and that is one thing I would like to talk to you about and the other is Cambodia. Have you heard the latest report?

HAK: No.

K: The airport has fallen and the remains of the government is asking to negotiate a settlement -- it is in effect a surrender.

HAK: Well, it is almost impossible today for me becaus e I have to work on my speech.

K: Where are you speaking?

HAK: At ASNE tomorrow.

K: What is that?

HAK: The Society of Newspaper Editors.

K: Are you going to make a major address.

HAK: I hope so. I am working on it as if I were.

K: Can you slip me in for five minutes? Let me speak to you now for about five minutes. There is nothing that we can do at this point.

HAK: Nothing that I can think of.

K: Does it look to you as though Sihanouk will come back.

HAK: I wouldn't bet on that.

K: That would be a disaster if he doesn't.

HAK: That's right.

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K: Where do we go? What if anything can we do? Are you active in any fashion?

HAK: We tried to get Sihanouk back last week. It is not easily explained.

K: What you are saying is there is nothing. Are you in touch with the Chinese are the Russians?

HAK: It is a great recommendation of Scotty's but what the hell could the Russians do?

K: I saw Scotty's ~~ex~~ piece, but what about the Chinese

HAK: What could they do? We have been in touch.

K: Have they been cooperative?

HAK: I don't think they could get him back. I think he may come back but he may be a figurehead.

K; On this other business -- we were going to do a story tonight from up at Capitol Hill and....

HAK: On the Newsday?

K: On Newsday. I think it will be delayed but do you think tomorrow will be any better?

HAK: Hopefully. Look, if I get a minute around 4:00...

~~Good~~,
K: Good, but if not, then tomorrow moening.

~~HKX~~:HAK: On this basis, there will be no letter that will not be considered this way. Look at the records -- what the hell are people talking about?

K: If it is any comfort, I have been talking this to ____ on Capitol Hill. He sees no movement in that direction.

HAK: I do'nt give a damn about the call for resignation. The call for resignation is separate from this charge that there was a secret agreement .

K: But that is what triggered it.

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HAK: And that is what I think of as McCarthyism.

K: Ok. If you get a chance tomorrow I would like to talk to you about it.

HAK: Alright.

END

SE 319 *

TELCON
Bob Anderson
Secretary Kissinger
6:25 p.m. 4/17/75

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Yeh, what did Valeriani want

A: It is actually the same thing Koppel played on

K: What is it for Christ sakes, everyone tells me-

A: Allright, fine, because of your statement and your speech we shall not forget who supplied the arms which North Vietnam uses a mockery .....of the past accords, they consider that an attack on Moscow and Peking and they are comparing it with what the President said yesterday in answer to a question

K: And I said the same thing in answer to a question

A: That's right and then Valeriani said -- well, there seems to be an inconsistency between--

K: Just point out the speech was read by the President

A: Okay, fine.

K: There seems to be what, an inconsistency between what the President and I said?

A: That what he said and also he said he saw an inconsistency between your answer after the speech and this one sentence--

K: How was it handled?

A: Your answer?

K: WHAT GUIDANCE did Valeriani get or are ~~xxx~~ we just going to put him on there with waffles.

A: HE was waiting to try to get ahold of you.

K: I know, but my idiots didn't tell me about it

A: Yeh, well that was the thing, and I will just deal with it tomorrow

K: It is too late now it will be on television

A: That's right and the tickers have all had the same sort of thing, but I think we can turn it off tomorrow morning, sir.

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SE 318 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Chancellor Kreisky
Sec. Kissinger
11:45 a.m.
April 17, 1975

K: Hello, Mr. Chancellor.

BK: How are you?

K: All right. Sorry we couldn't meet on this visit.

BK: I am not to leave for some hours.

K: Fine. I appreciated your friendly reference to me in your speech yesterday.

BK: There were a lot of discussions in the Council. I said frankly what I believe. I believe in the step-by-step policy. I have had a lot of talks with some of my Arab friends from Egypt and other countries. I think you have to continue. They are very realistic.

K: I will continue but you know some of our friends in Israel don't make it easy.

BK: Yes. I know that. The International Sec. of the Israeli Labor Party is coming in tomorrow. He will come and talk with me.

K: They will proeuce in my judgment a complete disaster for themselves. Don't you think?

BK: Absolutely. But now the younger generation is irritated about all that and they are sending man (to see me). It is very curious. The day after he arrives Jalud (sp) will arrive. I would have been very happy if there had been an opportunity to see you.

K: I suggested that you might come to Washington.

BK: Yes, but it was already impossible.

K: I understand.

BK: I thought perhaps by accident you might be coming to NY.

K: There was no chance. I have to spend most of my waking hours testifying before the Congress. If there is a chance, I am thinking of meeting Gromyko sometime over the next 6 weeks -- maybe in Vienna and then maybe we might have a change, of course subject to approval of your government.

BK: Of course. What I want to say, is do you know the formula that has been presented to me by one of the more outstanding

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people in the Arab countries -- land released for peace should not be used for war. Have you heard that formula.

K: I had not heard that particular formula. Which means what?

BK: There should be an obligation -- someone said a possible formula for Egypt and the Israelis to discuss.

K: You mean the demilitarization of most of Sinai.

BK: Yes.

K: What do you think? That would mean the 67 borders.

BK: As a process. My view is that -- my idea is I don't like to be a mediator because I say a mediator has to represent power and arms. I think this man who is the Internatonal Sec. of the Labor Party will be very frank with me. I think they have a very bad conscience now as far as you are concerned. Some of the younger generation -- they have an extremely bad conscience. I will find out what they really think.

K: How could I find out what you find out?

BK: I can phone you.

K: Would you do that?

BK: Yes. If you give me some direct line, I can inform you.

K: Call me at 632-9630.

BK: There are other things I would prefer to tell you next. There is a lot of effort now. Most on the Israeli side to find new possibilities to contact the Arabs.

K: One thing you should get across to the Israelis is what they did in March at the end of my mission is not a minor matter and has forced us into a consideration of ~~xx~~ overall solutions which we would have preferred to defer.

BK: Yes, yes. I think they are now understanding that. They did not immediately. Now they are ~~xx~~ more aware of that than before.

K: Because we cannot possibly -- you understand this. We cannot possible finance a stalmate without taking a position.

BK: Of course.

K: It is diplomatically -- from a domestic point of view we could not justify it.

BK: What do you think about this change in the government of Hegazi.

K: I don't think it will effect the foreign policy very much at all.

BK: Hegazi is not a friend of Sadat's.

K: I am more interested in the fact that the Commander of the Air Force was made Vice Preisdent.

BK: The Min. of interior (unaudible).

K: In my mine there is no question that Sadat genuinely wants peace.

BK: He is highly interested in continuation. Because I invited these people from Israel only because I know that Egypt would be friendly to them and (unaudible).

K: Of course there are some people in Israel among whom you are nearly as unpopular as I am.

BK: The problem is it is a terribly weak government. Very curious -- you see when I was in North Africa there is only one man who has a certain popularity -- in a negative sense -- Dayan.

K: True. The same with Sadat. They all think they can deal with Dayan.

BK: Only a top young man can be tough.

K: I don't think it is so silly. Unfortunately right now he is not in so strong a position in Israel.

BK: Israel could change from one day to another. I think they are working hard to get Dayan to replace Rabin. I will know more tomorrow and if there is anything interesting.

K: If you call me you will probably call me on Saturday. On Sunday call me through the White House.

BK: I will wait until Monday because I will have a long talk with Jalund. I will do it on Monday.

K: Good. I look forward to seeing you soon.

BK: Good-bye.

SE 316 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Jerry Bremer
10:31 a.m. 4/17/75

K: Jerry, I want Hartman to understand that he cann't go off to Greece and Turkey without an extensive talk with me.

B: Okay, he's got a memo--

K: I don't give a damn about a memo--I want him and Sonnenfeldt to come and talk to me first about the NATO meeting, and secondly, about that Greece/Turkey think--although we ought to get Sisco in on that too.

I mean Sonnenfeldt should be in on the NATO meeting--the Greece/Turkey thing, we should get Sisco in. Hartman is to sit in on both. And he cannot leave until you put that on the schedule.

B: Okay.

K: I also want to talk to Habib about the diplomatics in...

B: Okay.

K Now, when -- can I have breakfast with Ramsbotham on Saturday?

B: He'll be out of town Saturday--he's leaving tomorrow morning, or tomorrow at noon, rather. You could have breakfast with him tomorrow, but -- that might be the best alternative unless you want to see him late today--6:30 - 7:00

K: I'll let you know.

B: Okay.

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SE 314

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TELCON
Robert Anderson
Secretary Kissinger
4/17/75 9:25 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Bob, you are going to get that speech out by 11:00 ?

A: Yes, sir.

K: And will you make clear, that I might cut a paragraph, here and there in the text--to speed up the reading ?

A: Yes, sir.

K: But that this whole text stands.

A: Yes, sir.
K: Will you make that clear ?
A: Yes, sir, I've also made sure you won't have more than 15 minutes of questions.

K: Right.

A: Okay.

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SE 313

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Robert Anderson
Secretary Kissinger
9:19 a.m. 4/17/75

the Reuter's

K: Hello, Bob? You know / guy has broken....

A: Yes, sir I've seen the ticker that you gave David and there are two others, also, I called him at his house. He's never been to one of these luncheons; he's just having a fit and apologizes all over--but the main thing is I told him that he is to call Reuters immediately and if he has any further story he has planned to write, that he is not to have any attribution whatsoever.

K: And I want you to complain to .....

A: I've done that also.

K: What does he say?

A: He said he has learned his lesson now, even though he explained even though he explained the ground rules three times to this guy, he said that he will never bring any number 2 from any organization again. Because Pat Hafeniam was out of town--

K: Well, then we shouldn't have brought him.

A: That's right

K: All right, now will you get it straigthened out?

A: Yes, sir, I have done it with him.
It's awful.

K: Okay, thanks.

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SE 331 *

TELECON
Mr. Washerman/The Secretary
April 18, 1975
Time: 5:55 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I tried to return your call yesterday, but nobody answered, it must have been your office.

W: O.K. Thank you. I have to tell you, I just got a call to come to the White House at 2:30 tomorrow. Also, I spent an hour with Allon today. I want to get you filled in on the input of the meetings we had on the coast with some of the so-called leadership. When can I see you?

K: Can you come in for breakfast tomorrow. Say around 8:30.

W: Yes that would be good. I will see you at 8:30.

K: O.K.

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SE 3321*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Avril Harriman/The Secretary
April 18, 1975
Time: 9:40 p.m.

K: Sorry I couldn't see you today.

H: I understand.....

K: As you see, I am still in my office.

H: Did you get my note?

K: I got it and I am in principle.....This is something we should discuss. Can you have lunch on Tuesday.

H: Yes, indeed. I would be happy to.

K: We can talk in greater length then. There is not much difference between your view and mine.

H: I don't know what you feel about him, but he double-crossed Johnson. I think the least we can expect is no reprisals.

K: I will talk to you about it on Tuesday. The only problem between us is the tactics.

H: I think you have got to let him go.

K: That is not an issue.

H: Best of luck.

K: Let's have lunch at 1:00 on Tuesday.

H: I have not much confidence in our Ambassador either.

K: There is nothing we can do about that now.

H: I like the work that Phil is doing.

K: He is doing a good job. We have brought in Dean Brown to help out.

H: Thanks for calling. I will see you at 1:00 on Tuesday.

K: Yes.

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H: In your office?

K: Right.

SE 337 *

TELCON
Phil Habib/Secy Kissinger
5:38 p.m., April 19, 1975

RELEASED IN FULL

K: On that thing we were doing last night, the reaction was rather positive in the sense, you know, he thought it was a reasonable proposition to put forward.

H: It is.

K: Yes, but how many people have you talked to about it?

H: [Laughter]

K: I don't want Dean Brown in on this.

H: I haven't told him a word about it.

K: Well, what did you think he thought you were talking about?

H: Well, you know, I don't know. I just asked you what you did last this morning. I don't think he knows what we're talking -- he doesn't know anymore than anybody suspected from what you said in that meeting.

K: In that meeting I'm just trying to keep defensive.

H: That was very good. You kept Ellsworth -- kept his curiousity down when he questioned you about it. I thought that was well done. Because you know they're not stupid; they knew you were saying something. I think you had to. I think you had to say what you said. Otherwise, they would think you were -- you know.

K: They had to think -- which what happens to be true, that we may just be able to get more people out that route.

H: Of course, of course. It's the only route.

K: You know he asked some clarifying questions.

H: What particular questions did he ask?

K: You know, whether in case of evacuation the American troops that may be there to help evacuate would leave immediately or would stay. Not a stupid question.

H: A good question.

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H: Yeah.

K: You're doing a superb job, Phil. Even I admit that. Now, I just want . . .

H: . . . the results you got, I'd say that --

K: No, unfortunately, I saw the French Ambassador yesterday and I asked him what the PRG ideas were about evacuation. Just in question -- in conversation.

H: He took that as a . . .

K: Now he has got an answer but I don't know what it is yet.

H: Is he coming now?

K: Yeah.

H: Himself?

K: No, he's coming to the White House. I made sure that Scowcroft who gets the answer lets you know.

H: Yeah. Because you know the press are beginning to speculate too much about him seeing you and that gives the French a glorious role . . .

K: Now that I've got the Russians in the game, the French are going to be kicked out of it.

H: Yeah.

K: Okay.

H: All right. Is there anything else you want?

K: Nothing, no.

H: I think that's a good first [or fresh ?] start.

K: Okay, good. Thank you.

H: Right.

K: Whether we are willing to accept a neutral government. [Laughs] I said: Listen, little boy, the head of a neutral government and you . . .

H: Did you tell him he fell for that one?

K: I didn't say that.

H: [Laughter] That question about the troops is interesting. You could go further: that under certain circumstances there wouldn't be any.

K: No. They'll always have to have troops there for crowd control.

H: Well, if it comes down to a bargaining point, there might be something to be done with that.

K: Listen, you let me handle . . .

H: Yeah, I will . . .

K: We'll never get down to that. That will never hold it up.

H: Yeah.

K: That's not the issue.

H: Did he carry that neutral government any further?

K: No. Look, you're obsessed with that goddamn thing!

H: I'm not obsessed.

K: Whenever we get to that, we can do it.

H: I'm not obsessed, I just -- you know. You must admit that memorandum I sent you was a good one. I know you hate to admit that.

K: No, I agreed with it.

H: It was based and it laid it right on the line. When You picked exactly what I knew you would pick out of it and we kept the others in reserve. . .

K: Listen . . .

H: Exactly what I knew you were going to do. You cursed me all the way.

K: Because you cannot let anyone else talk. But you are doing a heroic job.

S6334 1*

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Dobrynin
4/19/75; 12:10 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

D: Hello.

K: Anatol.

D: Yeah.

K: On that matter we discussed this morning.

D: On what matter -- the first one?

K: The one on which I gave you a note.

D: Yeah, I already sent it.

K: I know, but what I wanted to add to it is that under the conditions we envisioned it would of course not require any substantial American forces to do the evacuation.

D: Not substantial.

K: No, just enough to prevent mobs at the airports.

D: I see.

K: Just a few hundred.

D: A few hundred.

K: Yeah.

D: Uh-huh. This is an important point. Thank you very much, Henry. I will add this and they will go immediately after . . .

K: And they will leave with the last airplane.

D: Okay. Thank you.

K: They will not stay -- you know, they won't stay a day after that.

D: It is important because this question crossed my mind, too.

K: You can then communicate it.

D: Thanmk you, I will do that right away.

K: Thank you, Anatol. D: Bye-bye.

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SE 338 *

TELCON
Secy Kissinger/Hal Sonnenfeldt
5:55 p.m., April 19, 1975

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.5(D)

K: Hal, what was the question that I asked [redacted] yesterday to which they are now going to answer? The French. B1

S: The question you asked them?

K: About the PRG at that meeting. Do you remember I told them if they could get us some clarifications, I'd be glad to hear them? Then he said we should get rid of Thieu.

S: Yeah.

K: It wasn't anything monumental, was it?

S: No. I talked to the Ambassador at 2 o'clock or so and told him what the answer on the other thing was. But I had the record open; I can't put it back in my mind now what you asked them.

K: Because I can't --

S: Has he given you an answer?

K: No, de La Gorce is coming in to see Scowcroft with it.

S: Well, maybe we can figure out the question when he comes in.

K: Yeah. No, I just wanted to be prepared. I can't imagine what he could be doing.

S: It's on Vietnam.

K: Yeah. It's from the PRG.

S: We didn't ask them about evacuation?

K: But you were there.

S: I'm trying to think.

K: Well, if neither of us -- it never came up when we were talking privately.

S: Well, I'm sorry. That latest record of the thing Bremer should have by now.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 5 MAR 2003 200102979
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 25X6
DECLASSIFY AFTER: HAK'S DEATH

K: Okay.

S: I made _____ write it up this morning.

K: Okay.

S: I'm sorry I can't think of it.

K: Okay. Well, we'll know in a minute. I'll let you know.

S: All right, Henry.

****

Subsequent Conversation -- 6:01 p.m.

K: Yeah.

S: What it was that he was talking about was the situation after Thieu and you were talking about the question of how they would conduct themselves with respect to Saigon and [their] people leaving. And you twice said please have you any concrete ideas of how they would conduct themselves . .

K: Yeah.

S: . . in a government without Thieu, either the North or the PRG, with respect to people leaving and with respect to I guess -- It was all rather vague but you twice said do you have any concrete ideas as to what . .

K: But I didn't tell him we would get rid of Thieu.

S: No, no. On the contrary, you -- And then on the other question he asked you, I spelled out and said you know you didn't give him any . .

K: Okay.

S: I hope incidentally with the man that's in there now you can work out some modus vivendi because it's messy.

K: Oh, certainly. Okay.

S: Fine.

SE 336 1*

TELCON
Secy Kissinger/Amb. Koscielsko-Morizet (France) RELEASED IN FULL
5:27 p.m., April 19, 1975

M: Hello, Mr. Secretary. I have some new elements, some answers concerning the questions you asked yesterday about the position of the PRG. So I think there are some important elements. Maybe I can send de La Gorce to Sonnenfeldt to give you all these elements. I think they are something new, sir.

K: All right. [Hesitates]

F: . . .

K: No, no; I'm just wondering whether Sonnenfeldt is still in the office.

M: No, I think he is at home.

K: I'm at the White House. Why don't you send him -- can you send him right away?

M: Yes, of course.

K: Send him to see General Scowcroft.

M: Okay.

K: Okay. Good. Thank you.

M. Thank you.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 29 JAN 2003 200102979

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger/Joe Sisco
12:11 p.m., April 20, 1975

SE 340 *

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Joe.

S: How are you, Mr. Secretary?

K: I'm fine. Where are you, in Church?

S: I'm home. Mowing my lawn, believe it or not.

K: Well, you've got a strong wife.

S: [Laughter]

K: And I'll tell you what I did, I paid for my backyard. No one can get tempted to ask me to mow.

S: It's good exercise and do I need it.

K: Where is that paper I asked you to redo yesterday.

S: Oh, that was sent to you about 4 o'clock yesterday afternoon. So do you want me to call S/S -- we finished both papers, the Allon Talking Points and --

K: Yeah, the Allon talking points I've got. Okay, let me find it.

S: I can check if you want me to.

K: Can you check and see whether they can send it out for me?

S: Oh, sure.

K: To my house.

S: It really should have been in your pack because we finished it yesterday afternoon.

K: You know, it might even have been put in a separate folder since it was for the President.

S: [Laughter]

K: That would be against State Department procedures.

S: Yeah, but I wrote you a little note on top -- it was from me to you. All right, I'll check.

K: Good. Thank you.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 29 JAN 2003 200102979

SE 350 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Secretary Schlesinger/The Secretary
April 21, 1975
Time: 7:59 p.m.

K: I have nothing, I just wanted to check whether you heard about the thing we talked about earlier. We haven't heard anything.

S: They have speeded up the evacuation. Dave Jones told me that we were flying out some 130's from Clark.

K: Right.

S: One thing, we have 90 air planes that we got out of Cambodia and the Thai Foreign Minister, I don't know whether it was a superficial comment, says they belong to the Government of Cambodia which is the Khmer Rouge. We got them out because we don't want to give them to the Khmer Rouge. After all American law states that they remain under the control of the U.S. Government.

K: Can you work with our people on a cable tomorrow. Get Ellsworth together with Habib and I will strongly support it.

S: We may be able to get some equipment out of the country.

K: Can we fly to the Philippines?

S: You leave that to me.

K: I want it in the Philippines.

S: I am fairly sure. We will be able to move the stuff that we don't want to leave to our friends there.

K: The F-5's, can they reach it?

S: The F-5's and the 130's can get there.

K: Whatever you can do to get stuff out will be a great service.

S: We must work quickly.

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K: I can't agree more. The more you can get out the better off we are. Unless that mission lands we aren't going to make it.

S: Right.

K: Talk with you tomorrow.

SE 347 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. McCloskey/The Secretary
April 21, 1975
Time: 6:35 p.m.

M: Mr. Secretary, that Committee voted 36 to 15 for $165 million for military aid and $165 million for humanitarian aid.

K: Great men, great men, $230 million bucks for a dying country.

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DATE/CASE ID: 29 JAN 2003 200102979

SE 344

1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Habib/Secretary Kissinger
April 21, 1975
9:05

K: Do we know how many people we got out yesterday?

H: We have not gotten the morning report. We usually get a morning report, we should have it soon. If we don't we will telephone for a report. And I will let you know.

K: Telephone it over to me at the White House.

H: Ok.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 29 JAN 2003 200102979

SE 349*

TELECON
Mr. Sonnefeldt/The Secretary
April 21, 1975
Time: 8:06 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: What would you think if we went to Italy?

S: We will solve a lot of problems.

K: If we saw the Pope and the Italian Government and said it was because of the President's concern for the southern flank of NATO.

S: If he goes to Spain the Italian thing would fit very well. The German thing would really cause some problems with the Italian Government and the Spanish.

K: If he came back from Spain to Germany?

S: The problem is the with the Spain thing, Sunday is a good day to be there. Otherwise he would have to go back to Germany. If he went to Germany first he would be arriving in Spain on Sunday.

K: Right.

S: If he went to Berlin first....

K: That would be hysterical. If he goes to Germany.....

S: Right.

K: Then I go to Berlin.

S: Yes and with those other meetings.....

K: Right.

S: In the case of the Italians, he would have to go after the weekend. He can't go to see the Pope on Sunday.

K: He could go to Italy on Monday and spend.....

S: And see the Pope.

K: Right. (Shalam) is a problem too.

S: Whenever that is decided.....

K: It is decided. I had to cancel my Latin American trip. I just don't think I can go now.

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S: It makes good sense to stay. However, I don't know what you can do on VietNam, but things could move.....

K: The whole thing could collapse.

S: Have you talked to our other friends?

K: We got a message off yesterday. It was being conveyed to Hanoi that we wouldn't take any pre-emptive action. We got rid of Theiu.

S: I can't figure out how it happened.

K: Martin called on him and was to prepare him for the possibility of resigning. I never told him that we wanted him to resign right away. Martin didn't tell him that we wanted him to stay as long as possible. Did you hear that Martin said he didn't receive full instructions?

S: I don't think we can get any Vietnamese out now.....

K: Theiu was our card to get the Vietnamese out.

S: I think you can get a few hundred out maybe.

K: We will be lucky if we can get the Americans out.

S: Their negotiations will have that as a pre-condition.

K: Have what as a pre-condition?

S: That we won't abscond with thousands of Vietnamese. Any negotiator that is acceptable to the Vietcong wouldn't permit the Vietnamese to leave in large numbers.

K: I agree.

S: I will have an itinerary for you tomorrow.

K: O.K. Let's talk about it tomorrow.

SE 342 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sen. Kennedy
Sec. Kissinger
April 21, 1975 11:35 a.m.

TK: Henry, how are you?

K: O.K. I am fine. Not lacking in actions right now. A real hot strike too. I called you last night to give you a little advance warning of what might be happening and to tell you I have asked Dean Brown here to keep in close touch wit you on the Refugee evacuation problem and before he does any other consulting on the Hill to talk to you first to get your advice if you are willing to do that.

TK: Fine.

K: Our problem is to prevent panic at the other end and we have an Ambassador there who might like to go out like Chinese Gordon but I cannot say that publicly. I have to keep supporting him.

TK: I will be more than delighted. We have been following with Habib on the general movement of people.

K: I need help on Congressional authority on parol authority.

TK: Right. I was terribly hopeful that we might be able to see what kind of initiatives could be taken to try and see if we can get protections of the population there.

K: That is strictly for you -- that is what we are working on now. We have some other countries involved. We have to weigh this again -- the fact of panic starting spontaneously.

TK: I think it very important that as much restraint as possible is made in talking about a blood bath. I am sure there are going to be some tough situations but I think the more it is talked about the more therer might be. Obviously you have to gear up because of the possibility but as much restraint as possible should be used in talking against blood bath. I am hopeful they can do something. I just called Waldheim last week and also Jackson who is heading up the UN on the refugees and Waldheim has a personal plea to get help.

K: I thought, when you said Jackson, you meant my expert on immigration.

TK: Oh, no.

K: Get another amendment passed.

TK: I do hope that something -- there is a tremendous -- as you can gather --- concern of the massive movement.

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K: Almost no possiblity of massive movement unless there is cooperation by the other side. We really owe it to 15 years of effort to get some of the key people out.

TK: I think that is right.

K: And if we can get controlled conditions maybe more. If we can get controlled conditions that will be very ~~xxxxxx~~ obvious and there will be time for consultation. We are not going in with a division or two and pull them out.

TK: Is ~~thexexaz~~ there talk about that being declared a free city.

K: We are now waiting some possible moves and we are in touch. How it is to be done, we have not begun to work out. We have not got the principle established yet. That is what we are trying to do.

TK: Is this real significant with Thieu going out.

K: I think it will lead to a negotiation.

TK: Not just window dressing.

K: I don't think so. Incidentally, this is strictly a private conversation.

TK: I understand. O.K. Thanks very much.

K: See you soon I hope.

END

SE 341 *

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Secretary Schlesinger
4/21/75; 9:21 a.m. (Secure voice)

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: I'll see you after the WSAG meeting. You were away yesterday and I did not want to discuss it on the open phone.

S: Of course.

K: We have been in touch with the Soviets about an orderly transfer and ceasefire. This was before Thieu had resigned. [redacted] resigned 48 hours before we wanted him to. One of the Soviet's replies was they were interceding in Hanoi and we should not do anything precipitous. We thought it would strengthen their case in Hanoi if we went forward with that move that Brown had mentioned . . . B6

S: Okay, but as a signal I am not . . . . It's obvious that we have considerable power but we are restricted in employing it. There are other reasons for moving that battalion up to . . . .

K: As long as it was going to be moved . . . . We don't have to say anything. We should just move it and say nothing.

S: I think that division at Okinawa deserves some re-enforcement at this time. Aside from any signaling . . . . As a signal is what I am concerned about in Southeast Asia. We have signaled many times before and given the circumstances we have not been able to do anything when our bluff is called.

K: In the case of the Tonkin Gulf I think we all agreed it would not be done.

S: . . . . . to move without justifying before Congress would have given us a chance.

K: It would have given us a chance.

S: No question. Our deployment kept them petrified for 18 months . . . . After Congress passed the new . . . .

K: I just wanted you to know the background. We won't discuss it in front of the others but then you can come up after and I will bring you up to date.

S: Israel is taking a hardnosed position -- unless they get a decision on their aid they are not going to do a Goddamned thing.

K: I have not talked to them yet -- I will report to you after I talked with them.

S: It is a high-level leak.

K: I think it is Rabin. I will probably have to cancel my Latin American trip. Let's have breakfast or lunch . . . .

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 23 MAR 2004 200102979

SE 363

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TELECON
Mr. Sisco/The Secretary
April 22, 1975
Time: 7:15 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: There seems to be some problem about going to Italy from Spain and some problem about negotiating, you know, about whether the Spanish want us to meet there. We want to propose to the Egyptians to meet in Switzerland, either in Geneva or Zurich.

S: That would be fine. They should find no problem on that as a location.

K: Can you get that cable rewritten saying that we would like to propose Switzerland rather than Spain because the visit the President is planning to make is for another purpose?

S: I am on my way out to dinner. Can I do it in the morning?

K: Well alright, I will have Gompert do it. That is no problem. Say, you get invited to so many of these dinners and I don't.

S: If you feel shorted in any way, I can get you invited anywhere.

K: O.K. Goodnight.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 3 FEB 2003 200102979

SE 352 1*

TELECON
Ted Koppel/Secretary Kissinger
April 22, 1975
2:30 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

HAK: You changed your mind.

K: No.

HAK: If you want a challenge, we really have it here.

K: Yes. I just bet a very expensive lunch that you would still be in office by the first of August.

HAK: Did Church come out against me? Senator Church?

K: I heard it on some radio service in the drug store and they were quoting Church as calling for your resignation.

HAK: But that would be a big story.

K: It would have. I haven't heard it anywhere else. I don't know if they got it confused. But the key element is clear if you don't want me to lose the lunch you better stay in office.

HAK: They've got [redacted] to realize -- there is a distinct groundswell going up. [redacted] They have to see if they can -- how they can get me from hero to a villian in twelve months.

K: You just have to bring off the Middle East and you will be back in their good graces.

HAK: I don't think it can be brought off in any quick time.

K: Really? How about Geneva?

HAK: What do you think is going to happen there?

K: I don't know. When I heard the President mention three options -- I hoped it might be... I had the feeling. The President's option three from last night which [redacted] was going to Geneva and getting some kind of interim agreement. That is the most likely of the three

HAK: I doubt it. [redacted] What did you call about?

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K: I called about the Vietnam negotiations. Can you give me any kind of guidance?

HAK: I don't know that I can. give you any guidance. I don't think anyone can have any real story floating.

K: Has there been any contact? Is anything happening?

HAK: We;'re exploring some approach.

K: Directly or through a third party

HAK: I don't want to get into that.

K: Did you see the story on the front page of the Times which talks about your favoring keeping some Americans in Vietnam while some in the State Department and DOD are opposing it.

HAK: I wish we could do some thing with a minimum of dignity. Everyone is [redacted] covering their ass right now. Our problem is we want to get Americansout in a way that won't spark a panic. We've got it down to the 1500 range.

K: Do you plan to get them all out? I know up on the Hill you made a very passionate plea -- calling it x unreasonable that we are keeping them there as hostages.

HAK: It depends on what you're trying to achieve. The discussion is to get them out before they are jeopardized and that we are trying to do. We;re also trying to save some South Vietnamese. You can't just leave everybody there.

K: When you talked about South Vietnam -- at one point you were talking about 200, 000 people.

HAK: That is the minimum list of those that we g can put together. I doubt if we can get that number.

K: Do you have a realistic count. Can you give me some idea of a time frame. How much time do you think we have?

HAK: That depends on the efforts the North Vietnamese are willing to make.

K: Is it your feeling that they want a battle at Saigon or do they want to avoid it.

HAK: I would slightly weight it against their wanting it, ~~xxxxxxx~~ but not more than 50/49,

K: That would be_____they want to bein Vietnam or some other place.

HAK: That remains to be seen. Ok, Ted.

K: Ok. Thank you very much Mr. Secretary.

END

SE 356 *

TELCON
For. Min. Silveira
Sec. Kissinger
APRIL 22, 1975
3:45 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Antonio.

S: Hello, Henry. How are you?

K: I am fine. I am glad you are still talking to me.

S: I am very happy to talk to you.

K: Look...

S: You know the Brazilian position is to be by their friend's when in a difficult position.

K: It would never be understood in America if during this week when we have all this problem I would be out of the country.

S: We understand that. We are hoping that you are going to be very successful.

K: There is not much to be successful about.

S: I know but we trust you. We ~~have~~ know that finally you are going to be successful. We attach a great importance to the position of the United States. We know very well that the leadership of the (free world) is in the hands of the United States.

K: I am very anxious to come to Brazil. I would like to do it but I would like to give you a firm date when this present situation has cleared up a bit.

S: Of course.

K: I will see you at the OAS.

S: Yes, and be sure that we are you know praying for you and for ~~President~~ President Ford and we understand.

K: Thank you and my apologies to your President.

S: I am going to send you a letter. Of course, we will be very happy to receive Robinson.

K: Good. And I will see you soon.

S: All right.

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K: My profound apologies.

S: Thank you very much and best regards to Nancy.

K: Thank you. Will your wife be with you when you come for the OAS.

S: Yes. We

K: We will see eather other then.

S: Fine.

K: Look forward to it.

S: Thank you Henry.

K: Bye.

SE362 *

TELECON
Bernie Gwertzman/XSecretary Kissinger
April 22, 1975
7:24 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: What did I do wrong now?

G: I don't know. I had kxpx to put together a piece today on where the diplomatic situation lay and it was mostly based on pasting together statements for Hanoi and Peking. I was trying to check my own guidance on whether anything was happening now?

K: That remains to be seen. It is the best you can do.

G: On the airplane you once said there was a period you were in touch with Le Duc Thuo regularly and then you said you did not keep in touch with him anymore. Was there any point in dealing with him directly now?

K: No. He is very familiar with our views and I do not want to go any further. You usually do pretty well with these x stories.

G: In 1972 in July we were writing you talks were getting no where and you said the fact you were calling should be read as anything significant.

K: I would make the same statement now but on negotiating position it is not brilliant now. It depends on the Hanoi perception. They know they can evaluate the thing.

G: Right. Whether they want to handle it over there and that they have not decided.

K: That's my impression.

G: Thank you.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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DATE/CASE ID: 3 FEB 2003 200102979

SE 370 *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Lord/The Secretary
April 23, 1975
Time: 5:19 p.m.

K: Will that speech be rewritten before I look at it again.

L: We will have it for you tomorrow morning.

K: That would be fine. What is your judgment of the food speech?

L: It needs work but the meat is there. I don't know how we stand on selling these things to the public.

K: Let's get a meeting together. I want to get out in the country.

L: We are putting together a basic speech for you also.

K: Good.

L: O.K. Sir.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 3 FEB 2003 200102979

TELEC
Senator
April 23
12:55 PM

K: I'm t
Canal.

T: I und
to stop i

SE 374 *

TELECON
Foreign Minister Escovar, Venezuela/The Secretary
April 23, 1975
Time: 6:20 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Mr. Foreign Minister?

E: Hello Mr. Kissinger.

K: I wanted to call you to express my deep regret at having to cancel the visit. I just want to tell you how sorry I was the events of this week were so unpredictable.

E: We are sorry too.

K: I appreciated the statement you made. It was very kind.

E: I received a letter from President Ford to President Perez and I am glad to have that.

K: I look forward to seeing you when you come to the OAS meeting.

E: I will be pleased to see you in Washington. I called your Charge, of the American Embassy, and I was telling him about the Organization of American States because I would like to hear from you something about the General Assembly in Washington.

K: I will answer whatever questions you have put to him.

E: Thank you very much.

K: And I will see you when you come to Washington.

E: I will be pleased to visit you.

K: Goodbye.

E: Goodbye, Dr. Kissinger.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
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SE 373 *

TELECON
Marvin Kalb/Secretary Kissinger
April 23, 1975
6:17 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: You gave me an assignment ten days ago. I have been thinking very hard. I do not know where you stand with [redacted].. B6

HAK: Yourself...you would be my favorite.

K: No. My recommendation is [redacted] I know you do not know him but he knows the Department well. B6

HAK: Does he sympathize with me?

K: I do not know immediately but he is awfully professional and he has a sensational social and professional background. He is a first class man.

HAK: I know who he is.

K: Whether the two of you would hit it off I cannot judge at the moment but my strong feeling is if there is an outside pro whom reporters can look up to and in whom you can invest confidence, I would recommend him.

HAK: Where is he now?

K: He lives in Washington.

HAK: I mean, is he working now?

K: [redacted] B6

HAK: What do you think about Dick?

K: My feeling about Dick is that he would do a good job [redacted] B6

HAK: I am sure.

K: This person must have an understanding for what you say, for your policies.

HAK: Well, would he have that?

K: I think he potentially would. Partially because he is such a fine human being, but it is something I can't immediately judge. He is my first choice.

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Another name that came to mind is [redacted] B6

HAK: Yes.

K: [redacted] he is the kind of person who is solid and he has worked for both television newspapers. I have a lot of personal respect for him. B6

HAK: How about [redacted]? Koppel recommends him. B6

K: It wouldn't be the first name that would come to mind.

HAK: Do you know him?

K: Not in the same way I know [redacted] I don't think he is in the same class as the others. He is very bright maybe too much so, and up with the current times. B6

HAK: To defend my views in the next year will be a nightmare.

K: I am thinking of people who are solid, mature and fixed in their views on foreign policy that go back to WWII. Someone like [redacted] strikes me as a solid person. B6

HAK: I will turn to this problem later. I was waiting to see whether I could here from you in the next few days.

K: These are good men and I would put them high up. I talked to him and he said to me something almost like what you are saying, does he know me, and could we deal with oneanother. The most important thing is for you to understand and sympathize with his ideas I said. He also asked whether you had ever considered him and would you talk to him before you made any decision. My judgment is that he is first class.

HAK: What he needs is confidence in American foreign policy. We must rebuild confidence in ourselves.

K: It is going to be as you say; a tough job. I must say there will be more difficulty with Israel and the Middle East than elsewhere.

HAK: With I, Henry Kissinger, or with the United States?

K: The U.S. and President Ford. Some of the things he said on Monday have raised hackles all over the country. I have had 10 calls today on this.

HAK: Do they think I put him up to that?

K: No. It was posed in terms of a general war. If the President can say on television that the Prime Minister of Israeli might not be welcome here then they are worried.

HAK: There is a real problem. All these stories that I was saying one thing for publication and saying another privately miss two essential points. I was trying to make a deal which you understood, but which the immediate merits of the negotiation did not bear out, and the long term consequences is what we were driving at.

K: There are difficulties.

HAK: I am worried about what will happen through the logic of events. What decisions does an American president make when given problems we are faced with.

K: Part of your problem is that you must get someone to Israel that can talk to the Israelis. [redacted] B6

HAK: He is getting better.

K: I like him but he isn't the guy.

HAK: The Jewish community has to understand that their methods are not good. The Israelis must understand that this is a complex problem. Israel's margin of error is small, so small that they can't take chances.

K: Right. I am going to see a number of Israelis tonight.

HAK: Again, Marvin, it doesn't help them to fortify their self-righteousness. They need to understand that they must face the trends in this country.

K: Do you see any evidence of errosion within the Congress?

HAK: Yes. No question an almost total errosion when you come to military action. On the money, it is really the least of Israel's problems.

K: Well.....

HAK: If I conceived a Middle East war without American presence, then I see a disaster for Israel. I don't see the Congressional base for that, do you?

K: No I really don't. South Korea will be a problem, and then Israel.

HAK: That is right.

K: If there is anything I can do let me know.

HAK: (Laughter). Thanks, Marvin. You have been a good friend.

K: O.K. Goodbye.

SE 380 *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Robert Anderson
11:11 a.m. 4/24/75

K: Say, Bob? I don't know whether they are still going to ask you about that speech of last night. If they do, then you say, of course, there is a full congruence of views between the President and the Secretary and that the Secretary had every opportunity to express his views on the President's remarks

A: Right

K: And input -- no input -- just don't answer it.

A: Right. Okay sir.

K" And call their attention to my ASNE speech and my congressional testimony which was a harbinger of this.

A: Right, okay.

K: Of no recrimination, okay?

A: Right, sir.

K: Good.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 3 FEB 2003 200102979

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SF 3

TELECON
Ken Freed/Secretary Kissinger
April 25, 1975
@ 4:30 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

F: How are you?

K: OK.

F: Can we talk a little?

K: I haven't got much time to talk at all.

F: Is there anything diplomatic going on we can look at. Is there any basis for what Broomfield said?

K: We're talking on background.

F: Yes.

K: Broomfeild had no basis for saying what he did.

F: Can you be ....

K: I don't want to get into that.

F: There's nothing you can say to me?

K: Not really.

F: If you can't talk....

K: I think it's important to keep things as they are.

F: Do you expect anything to develop say by the weekend?

K: I think he had no basis at all.

F: /There is anything in the way of a movement -- settlement toward it apart from any ceasefire for the evacuation. I'm think more in terms of a report which came back from Saigon about a South Vietnamese official going to Hanoi, something alone those lines?

K: I have no information about that report, even if it should turn out to be true. I don't believe it, but I think it's better for me not to talk about anything on the diplomatic side.

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F: Do you think you will be able to soon?

K: I hope so next week sometime.

F: OK. Are you going to say anything tomorrow at the Lion's Club?

K: NO.

F: It's not worth watching except for the award?

K: I would think so. I don't expect to say anything. I expect to say some conventional things.

F: OK. Thank you very much.

END

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SF-8

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dean Brown/The Secretary
April 26, 1975
Time: 10:15 am

K: I have just gotten one of Martin's backchannels to me. He wants to slow down the evacuation because it is such a mess in Guam.

B: He can't do that. Even if Clark and Guam are overwhelmed. We have 12,000 at Clark and more at Guam.

K: Don't put these figures out.

B: I haven't. There are thousands more on the way.

K: I thought he was bluffing me. That means we have gotten 25,000 or more out.

B: Right. Say, Martin hasn't answered the telegram we sent asking for his feelings and what the high risk options are, etc., yet. It is near panic at the airport and they have no control over the situation, especially the issuing of certificates. What appears to be happening is that Americans are walking down to the planes with their Vietnamese friends and saying get on. 15 to 20% of the people have no papers and there is no proof that they are high risk at all.

K: What can we do?

B: Nothing. Martin can't control the situation, because he can't be at the airport.

K: Can't anyone?

B: There are people who are trying to at the airport, but it is difficult. Everybody is taking care of friends, maybe they are sorting them some how. But it is close to chaos. There is also a difficulty with California. I talked to Jerry a couple of days ago.

K: Is he against it?

B: No, but the Federal Government hasn't done anything for California and with their high unemployment etc., he is saying it will be difficult. His impression is that we want to dump Vietnamese on them. It is a political problem. I have Weinburger set to call him today and talk to him. He will say that we will try to be helpful but we are going to have to start moving groups to the U.S. We need some place in the U.S. to hold them until

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we can let volunteer agencies move them on. I have talked to the airlines and asked them if we can have free passages on planes because there is no money within the U.S. to move them.

K: Yes. It is a nightmare.

B: It is not going to come out very nicely. One of the things I wanted to say in the WSAG is how many people do we want to get out?

K: How many do you think?

B: 5 to 10 thousand more. If we could move them from Saigon to _____, we could alleviate a lot of pressure.

K: Let me think about it.

B: O.K. Also think about Hawaii or the possibility of moving them now directly to the States. We will talk about it.

K: O.K.

B: Defense has got to cooperate. Weinburger is calling Schlesinger and telling him to give the Army a good name for once by letting them take an active part in the refugee movement. They are bucking us again. We need to let people use military basis as the next staging area to let the volunteer agencies have time to pick them up. It should work just like the Hungary thing.

K: O.K.

B: Thanks sir.

SF10 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Habib/The Secretary
April 26, 1975
Time: 2:40 p.m.

K: I hope that Stone will not turn this into a frenzy.

H: I had the same reaction as you did to that cable.

K: He didn't see him. He should never have asked the other one.

H: Right. We sent a cable asking him to cool it.

K: All he can do is listen.

H: He has been told that.

K: He is not to talk to the French without checking with us.

H: That is what he did.

K: It is undignified. He is not to go to the PRG Embassy without our instructions, especially there. And thirdly, he is not to take any French advice.

H: It makes you wonder. It was so clear in our minds. But I gues we had better spell it out.

K: Yes, spell it out for him.

H: I will send it to you in a few minutes.

K: O.K.

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5F13 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Robert McCloskey/Secretary Kissinger
April 28, 1975
4:45 PM

K: In looking over the briefing today, Anderson can get into more trouble then anyone I know. He ___ that Martin may have delivered an ultimatum from the Viet Cong that Thieu had 48 hours to resign. That isn't(done). That's just absolutely ___.

M: I see that Martin has made something ____. I'm now getting the transcrip. He should : have hit it harder.

K: He didn't hit it at all. He got about 4 questions . It started out as a report than he gave him an ultimatum from Viet Cong. It says, it is a rather unusual role for an American Ambassador to deliver an ultimatum from an adversary. Anderson said, I am not confirming or denying he has delivered any ultimatum.

M: I have it in front of me now.

K: And then it goes on and on and on.

M: I remember he raised that question with me.

K: He raised the question of diplomatic initiatives. He didn't raise the question of an ultimatum. He said he left the impression that something is going on.

M: There's something in Newsweek about Martin passing a message to Thieu.

K: I didn't focus on the fact there was a message from the Viet Cong.

M: Neither did I.

K: If he had said it was a message from the Viet Cong, I would have told him to deny it.

M: I'll remonstrate it with him.

K: Can we straightened it out?

M: Yes.

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K: Can he call a few of the key people and frankly deny we carried a message from the Viet Cong to Thieu?

M: Larry and I want to talk to you about ____when it's convenient.

K: Why don't you and Larry come by now.

END

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SF 22

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Martin
10:43 p.m. 4/28/75

K: Hello,

I think the personnel security

M: Hello, Henry. /is.disintegrating at Tan Son Nhut, more than the enemy action and they tried to load a VNAF C 130 and got considerable interference from the ARVN. So I think the only thing to do is to go for execute on .....(frequency wing)?

K: Okay, how much time do you need? --Well, you handle it from out there.

M: Yeh, okay.

K: Don't you think?
we'll give you the approval back which you will have within 15 minutes, and then you schedule it, but then you do it during your daylight hours.

M: I'm not sure we can complete it all today, but we'll sure try.

K: Okay, no you better complete it today.

M: Okay,

K: Okay, Graham, you did your best and it was excellent.

M: I don't like much A for effort, but

K: Well that's what all of us are getting. That's all we are going to get out of this.

M: Yeh, I know that.

K: Okay, we'll be back to you wtihin 20 minutes.
Thank you.

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RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon:3:49-4/29/75
Secretary Kissinger/
Harold Saunders

K: Hello.

S: Yes sir.

K: Have we heard from the Egyptians about approaching the Austrians tomorrow?

S: We have a cable which I just received but I haven't read it yet. encourage an approach to Austrian Government April 30 but because of problems with his Ambassador in Vienna will do so in Cairo. He also agrees to simultaneous announcement May 2. We will use our draft text exclusive of language about Middle East situation. Just plug the strings about the and expects it will invoke critical Arab and Soviet reactions. He wondered why we want to make the announcement so soon. We must be more than a _____ There must not be another Nixon-Sadat type communique which aroused such great expectations and brought few results. The Ministerial(?) will be more useful to the USG than to Egypt. For Egypt concrete results are needed if Sadat's image at home and the Middle East area is not to suffer. If arms and interim agreement out we use economic help is the only potential significant elements that express concern that under Secretary's upcoming visit is only fact-finding and consultative.

K: Well, what the hell. Do we have to announce it this early.

S: I wouldn't think so from our point of view unless you have some

K: Well now it is out of -- you know he is going to approach the Austrians now anyway.

S: April 30 is tomorrow. We can still turn it off if you want it.

K: Oh but then it would be obvious that there would be a hole in the schedule. We might as well go ahead with it.

S: OK.

K: Well, than would you call in Dinitz tomorrow.

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S: Do you have a time for inviting Rabin.

K: Yes, the week of June 9th.

S: Monday, June 9.

K: But anytime from the 10th on. It is not a state visit it is an official working visit like Hussein. You know, no arrival ceremony.

S: Right. So we should tell him tomorrow then that this announcement is to be made of the EgyptianPresident and given the invitation for the later during that week.

K: Yes, but during that week.

S: Yes. OK. I will do that.

K: And then we will discuss it. You know and then they should give us the answer and we trust - they will not leak it.

S: Right. We want their reaction as to whether coming(?), exact time and make an announcement when we have their answer.

K: The trouble is we are going to announce it as of the schedule and if we don't put that in it will arouse more OK, good. Thank you.

S: Thank you.

K: Wait a minute, hello.

Telcon:3:52 p.m. 4/29/75
Secretary Kissinger/
Mr. Saunders

K: Al.

S: Sorry, I thought you were finished.

K: Has somebody drafted a cable to the Austrians?

S: I think Roy has that in motion. I will get

K: No, no, no. Work out this evening.

S: Yes, OK.

K: And

S: Do you want our Ambassador there for simultaneous position(?)

K: Right.

S: Egyptian approach.

K: Right.

S: 11:30 (?)

K: Right.

S: OK, we will make sure it goes out tonight.

K: To Kreisky.

S: An approach to Kreisky, right. Would there be something about him meeting with Kreisky. who you are

K: Well why don't you not worry about that now. First just say I am sure the President will want to see this man. The first(?) meeting with Kreisky.

S: OK.

K: But just get the God damn cable out without -- we have four weeks to work out the details.

S: Sure. OK, we will tell them

K: Hal, if a Deputy Assistant Secretary cannot send a cable arranging a meeting, than we are in trouble.

S: We will get it out.

K: OK.

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SF45

RELEASED IN FULL

Hal Sonnenfeldt/HAK
4:05 p.m. - 4/29/75

KXS: Hello

KXK: Hal, on these various extractions -- on these various meetings. Have we definitely given the Russians the date of 20th 21st.

S: No except that Dobrynin was just here to talk about CSC with Hartman and me and he said that they were going on the 20th 21st. That the only thing that remained to be settled was the city.

K: Did you raise it or did he raise it?

S: No, he raised it. He raised it because he was talking about the Ballet coming at the end of May and he said oh my God that will interfere because on the 20th and 21st we've all got to be you know where. Are those the dates you have in mind? I wasn't sure whether it was the 19th and 20th or 20th and 21st.

K: 20th and 21st.

S: Because I thought it might be better to go to Berlin early. That's why we gave you that program to look at.

K: I just don't think I can leave before -- on the 18th unless I get the Vice President to see him off.

S: Who will be here?

K: Well the Vice President does not plan to be in town. I just can't address that question now. Okay. The Italians I take opted to go there overnight?

S: The last thing I heard was that Ortona told Hartman -- asked Harman -- whether informally privatly whether we would like to stay there the entire time.

K: What do you mean the entire time?

S: In that summer place. Whether that would be more convenient. And I think Art didn't encourage him on that score.

K: What does that mean? That the Cabinet comes out.

S: Yes.

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K: Well why not?

S: He didn't encourage him one way or another because Ortona said he wasn't raising it.

K: No, but that doesn't mean we should come the night before.

S: Actually they haven't answered yet. They are still trying to consider that.

K: Okay. Fine. Thank you.

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SF42

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
George Meany
Secretary Kissinger
3:08 p.m. 4/29/75

K: George?

M: Hi, Henry.

K: How are you?

M: Pretty well. Laid up with a cold, otherwise, I'm all right.

K: Oh are you? I hope you feel better soon. I just wantedto call you to tet you know that the Labor leaders that you were particularly concerned about have been taken out of Vietnam.

M: Mr. Bhu and his people.

K: Mr. Bhu and I think all of his people. But certainly most of his people. And I think we got--I think there were 200 hundred--...said we got all of them, but it is sort of a messy situation. But Bhu is definitely out and his closest associates are out and I wanted you to know that.

M: Thank you, I'm glad to hear that.

K: And when you feel better, if you have the time, I'd like to get together with you and bring you up to date where we stand on various things.

M: All right, sir. Have you talked to John Dunlop about the upcoming ILO(?) conference?

K: No, I haven't.

M: Some real problems there.

K: Well, we usually take your advice on that.

M: It is going to be a real fight to give the PLO status there.

K: Well we will not go along with that.

M: It just negates the whole damn idea of the ILO

K: No we will totally oppose that.

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M I talked to Dunlop and said he would talk to you--

K: He hasn't had a chance.

K:

M: I guessthe last few days have been too hectic.

K: Exactly.

M: All right,

K: Talk to soon.

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SF 52

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Ken Fried/HAK
4/29/75 - 10:31 p.m.

K: Hello.

F: Hello Mr. Secretary. Ken Fried here. I just -- just as I was coming over to pick up the phone we moved a bulletin saying that President Minh has announced an unconditional surrender to the VC.

K: Is it true?

F: Well, it's from Saigon where we've still got our reporters. "We are here to hand over to you the power in order to avoid bloodshed." That's a direct quote Minh said in a radio speech addressing himself to the VC ordered the Saigon Army to stop firing and remain in place. Is that the way it was supposed to go?

K: Well, you know we didn't have that clear. No, that was not my expectation. Well, by Monday that's the way it was supposed to go. Yes.

F: By next Monday.

K: Yes. No, by this. No we didn't have that detailed of a scenario. By Monday. This is all background. By Sunday night Monday morning it was clear to me that this is the way the Communists were forcing it to go.

F: So there was no understanding but you expected it.

K: No, no. I expected late last week that there would be some form of negotiations.

F: As was indicated. So this does catch you a little bit by surprise.

K: No. Sunday night -- not because of an understanding -- but simply because of the way things were developing.

F: Okay. What I wanted to talk to you about mostly was more future stuff. As I say this thing just moved on the wire five minutes ago. I was interested in what I thought was kind of an ambivalent approach you took to dealing with DeBerry's question. I think the first question here in the news conference. I had assumed we would come out with some kind of strong statement about trying to redevelop American strength of policy in the area and I wondered if I could some kind of focus on what you expect.

K: No, we expect to do that but I just didn't think this was the occasion for a great policy procouncement. You mean for Asia?

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F: Yes.

K: No, we will develop a strong policy.

F: Is this going to begin immediately at countries like Thailand and the philippines.....

K: Thailand I think is in a special situation but the Philippines and certainly Indonesia.

F: How about China? What kind of role are they going to play?

K: We'll maintain our relationship.

F: I dont hear much enthusiasm there.

K: No, I think we have to develop. What the press generally does with China is to assume that something spectatcular has to go on at any one minute.

F: That makes for headlines

K: I know, but if you analyze the problem simply from maintaining the existing relationships we are getting the leverage we want.

F: When do you say your're going to try to develop this strong policy in Avia on this. Without any apparent agreement by Congress to maintain any military presence in the area of any major part, how will this work. How will it develop?

K: I beg your pardon?

F: Well, I get the/Congress is still _____ when talking to some of these people about any kind of major American presence for a lack of a better word in South Asia and Asia generally. And ....

K: I've been up till 3:30 in the morning why don't we discuss that some other time.

F: Okay. I've been up too. So we're both tired. Okay. I dont want to keep you up in longer and I know you've got more important things to do.

K: That isn't the point. I'm still in my office. Good. I'll talk to you again.

F: Thank you.

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5F 51

TELCON
Bill Clements/HAK
8:01 p.m. - 4/29/75

C: We finally got those people out.

K: Is that absolutely certain now.

C: Absolutely certain. Yes. The last deal they changed the numbers on us three times. They finally told us all three guys left. And we went in to get out the 10 and there were 11 instead of ten. It is unbelievable. I called not only for that reason but to tell you that I am damn sorry about any crack you are in now because of that. When you said the evacuation is now complete... has it caused you some problems?

K: It is causing me some problems and when your people are briefed over there it will be worse.

C: Can I say something that would be helpful.

K: We must see how it breaks tomorrow. But if you want to tell your press that you gave us the information that is the only way left.

C: I'll do that in the morning. I'll do it. Okay Henry. Bye.

K: Bye,

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SF47

TELCON
Lou Wasserman/HAK
4:30 p.m. - 4/29/75

K: Lou, how are you.

W: The purpose of the call is to tell you that with all the problems you're having that there are alot of your friends out here that are thinking about you and that love you.

K: Aren't you sweet.

W: I'm going to hang up and let you go back to work. That's the only reason I called you.

K: Lou, you're a good friend and I won't forget this.

W: We're all rooting for you Henry.

K: Thank you.

W: It goes without our saying that if there is anything we can do we're available day or night.

K: Well, I can't tell you how much this call means to me. Especially today.

W: Well, hang in there. We'll with you.

K: Thank you Lou.

W: Take care Henry.

K: Bye.

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Habib/Kissinger
4/29/75 - 1:55 p.m.

SF 40

K: Hello.

H: Yes sir.

K: I just want to find out what's going on.

H: I wish I knew. They were late getting off by at least an hour and 50 minutes. The last ETA we had, estimatedtime at the landing in Saigon was 3-0 it is now 3-7, and we just talked to Saigon again and they've seen no helicopters. Now we've had one report ...

K: You're sure you're not using the Danang plan?

H: No, we thought we were using the ....

K: We've screwed up everything else in this war, why not that.

H: This is screwed up alright, I just hope they show up. I'm worried about FA-7's, but can't do a thing but worry. We've got an open line to the Sit Room. As soon as we know anything... Are you in your office? Or at home? Or where?

K: I'm in my office but I'm going home now.

H: Well, if anything dramatic occurs we'll give you a call.

K: Right. Well, you keep the Sit Room informed and they'll get to me.

H: Yeah. We've got an open line to them. But nothing to report.

K: But you don't really know what's happened.

H: We don't know a thing. We don't know where the choppers are. They're overdue in Saigon.

K: They're overdue in Saigon?

H: They are, yes, they were due at ...

K: But would they be shooting at American helicopters?

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H: There's been no shooting reported.

K: That we would know?

H: I think we would know that. But we do know that the fighter escort has not expended any ordnance. That's the only fact we've got.

K: Right. Okay. Well, good. We gave it a good effort.

H: They'll be in there in a minute, I'm sure.

K: O.K. Good. Goodbye. Thank you, Phil.

H: Goodbye.

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SF32

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Larry Eagleburger/Secy Kissinger
4/29/75 - 12:52 a.m.

K: Hello. Has this been cleared by Defense?

E: Yeah. General Pauly just cleared it with Habib.

K: Okay. Let me just show it to Rumsfeld.

E: Okay.

K: We'll call you right back.

E: Okay.

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SF33

TELCON
Secy Kissinger/Larry Eagleburger/Philip Habib
1:-- a.m., April 29, 1975

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

E: Mr. Secretary, Phil's on. He doesn't want to issue anything.

H: Hello, Mr. Secretary. My feeling is -- I was just talking to Defense -- that the later you can issue a statement, the better, rather than issuing it before the evacuation starts or even at the beginning of it. Official confirmation it's going on will get a different kind of play out there than the kind of rumors and news reports that are now being used. It seems to me -- the news reports are already carrying it's going to take place. All that we need now is this kind of a statement say about toward the end of the actual lift. There are about 3,000 Vietnamese out at that airport right now.

K: Yeah.

H: And there could be a mad scramble for additonal ones to get on. Who knows what's going to happen out there. And I think it would be better to hold off on this sort of thing until you are a little way into the operation.

K: Okay. Well, why don't you do it mid-way through.

Habib: All right. When we get some idea that it's about half-way through or that there's no trouble developing. If there's real trouble developing, than I think we should call you.

K: That's right. And don't say "is being protected as necessary". Why don't you say, "is being protected by security forces", isn't it -- of U.S. Marines or by a security force?

H: "Is being protected by a security force." Then we'll use the word "necessary" down below about force. We'll say, "and is being protected by security force of U.S. Marines. Force will not be used unless necessary."

K: And I would say "tactical aircraft."

H: Well, that's another one we cut out of it deliberately because if we put that in, then you've just given away what's overhead. They might even know what's overhead if we don't tell them.

HK: Well, if we do it well into the operation . . .

H: . . make any difference.

K: Put in "tactical aircraft."

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H: All right. "Tactical aircraft are in the vicinity in the event they are needed" or "are in the vicinity."

K: We don't have to say so. "By a security force of U.S. Marines and tactical aircraft."

H: All right. Fine. We'll hold up on this a while and when we do it, we'll have Bob start calling around.

K: Bob who?

H: Anderson.

K: Yeah. Well, once you know it's well underway, then you better let it go.

E: Okay, sir.

K: I'm afraid we may have waited too long.

H: No, the word is out already because the newspapermen are filing from Saigon that . .

E: We waited too long to do it or to announce it?

K: To do it.

E: That may be.

H: Yeah, that may be. That's why I'm a little reluctant to announce formally too soon

K: Yeah, but once it's underway -- Look, Defense is leaking this stuff like crazy.

E: That's frankly what worries me.

H: Look, Defense is leaking it but the press out there are filing stories too because they've been notified . . .

K: Yeah, but I'd like State to come out with something.

H: All right. Fine. All right, we'll put it out fairly soon.

K: Okay.

H: All right. Bye.

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RELEASED IN FULL

SF 35

TELCON
Dean Brown
Secretary Kissinger
10:22 a.m. 4/29/75

K: Rog Morton says that he may be able to take up the 4,000 Vietnamese into the trust territories.

B: The trust territories?

K: For clerical work and so forth.

B: Oh, that'd be great.

K: Will you get in immediate touch with him to see whether you could really work that out.

B: We'll be in touch with him right away, sir.

K: Okay.

B: Looks like we are still moving quite a few people out--down to about 750 still left in the compound.

K: 750 total?

B: Yeh, total.

K: Including Americans

B: Yeh. This was just a fast flash figure in from --

K: Oh but that's pretty good.

B: That's right.

K: That means--that they can move in less than an hour, probably.

B: That's right, sir. It is one-third of what what we were talking about earlier.

K: Okay, good work.

B: Right, sir.

K: Thank you.

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SF28

TELCON
Phil Habib/Secretary Kissinger
4/29/75 - Midnight

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I tell you Phil if you had a good heart, we'd really work you.

H: As a matter of fact, I asked Larry if I could come in and he said he'd let me know. After he gets done.

K: You know we are evacuating tonight.

H: He told me.

K: We had no choice did we?

H: You're absolutely right.

K: You know Graham was bitching but I figured .....

H: You're absolutely right. I say that with a degree of positive knowledge as I know that situation.

K: I just thought that it would come apart in Saigon

H: There is no circumstance in which there is any reason to lveave them there. What can they do?

K: Exactly.

H: If there was a function to perform then you could leave some. The only alternative he has to take everything except a handful. If there is a function to perofmr.

K: He wanted to stay behind with three people but I don't know what he would do.

H: Heroics. But I would have said no.

K: I ordered him out. I told him he had no choice. It was a Presidential order. But Phil what we need is a joint Defense State statement like we did in the Cambodia thing. Which should be issued in the middle of the operations. And then we need a Presidential thing. For the end.

H: You'd better issue it fairly quickly because as soon as he starts to move the last thing the press will do file stories out of there that they're moving.

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K: Well then do it as soon as the operation has started.

H: What time has it started. Does it start?
or
K: In an hour/two.

H: Alright. I'll come down.

K: I'm in the White House but I.....

H: I'll be in the operations center.

K: Will you call me with a statement.

H: I shall call you.

K: Good.

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SF 37

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Senator Kennedy
Secretary Kissinger
8:48 a.m. 4/29/75

TK: Oh Henry, how are you?

K: Ted, how are you? I just wanted to tell you what's going on -- we are evacuating all Americans from Saigon. There was shelling during the night their time at Tan Son Nhut -- which was end of the afternoon yesterday here in Tan Son Nhut airport --we tried to operate out of Tan Son Nhut and we have about 8,000 high-risk Vietnamese there, but panic developed on the field and all the runways were closed, see we moved as many people as we could to the DAO compound and into the embassy and we have been operating out of there during our night, their ~~dyx~~ day. Now they are still operating--it is dark there now --we have evacuated about 45,000 people up to now, there has been no opposition. And we expect to continue this evacuation for the next two hours; after that there will be no Americans that we know of left in Saigon. That will end the Vietnamese evacuation, also, except for whoever gets out by boat.

TK: Yeh.

K: So, that is the end of that chapter.

TK" What was the problem with Minh--they couldn't--did it just take too long to get the--or did they just refuse to negotiate with him.

K: Well, we thought we had something set with the Russians that included a political process, but apparently, the North Vietnamese were prepared to only let us evacuate without interference and they just wanted him in a position of total impotence. Now I suppose now they will start negotiating with him and I think there will be a sort of a government setup--a tripartite government which they will control.

TK: What is your reading, Henry, of have we had any kind of flexibility in terms of the resources to try and bring the monies that have been appropriated--can any of those funds be used to in terms of the coalition government or -- security people and that sort of thing.

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K: Well, I have the impression, I saw a breakdown of it, and I had the impression that something near $100 million might be available. And we could continue in Cambodia, but right now in Cambodia they seem to be engaging in mass executions--they don't respond to any approaches.

TK: Is that right.

K: You know, the UN and the ICIC have approached them and we informally told the UN that we would be sympathic, but they are even kicking out the French. In Cambodia, it is pretty bloody right now.

TK: Is it?

K: Yeh. But in principle we are open-minded on that subject. And then for your information, we established contact with the PRG in Paris so they know how to talk to us.

TK: Yeh.

K: We just thought it was too dangerous to keep some American sitting in Saigon in a situation that for a while noboby might control.

TK: Yeh, yeh. I think you are absolutely right.

K: We then might turn out to be hostages. If we do give relief, it w should be a free act.

TK: Yeh, that's right. Okay, well I appreciate it. Very much. I was disturbed by that story about the relationship of the UN over the weekend. It was in the toast.

K: I had lunch with Waldheim--on Friday and we have been in touch with Sir Robert Jackson and I don't think there is any problem in principle with the UN. I'll look at the story, I don't know ~~whether it is correct~~ what exactly it said.

TK: I had just called last week about Ambassador Brown--getting them out by.....

K: He did testify didn't he?

TK: No, he didn't.

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K: He didn't?

TK: No, which was you know an unfortunate part because they had had the meeting with the press the day before and an hour interview on the television program, and then...

K: He's been under strict instructions to stay particularly--I had called you about this.

TK: I remember you mentioned Brown was handling it

K: And I told Brown to be in touch with you before he did anything on this subject.

TK : We had--the day Habib came up -- but it was on the committee but they indicated Executive Privilege on it and it was a thing that was unfortunate is I didn't know until that morning that they had all the interviews with the--the day before, and I talked to him subsequently and he--and I think we got it in line now. He has met with the voluntary agencies--

K: He met with them on Saturday.

TK: And I think its back on track. And I was just calling about that. And you were kind to return the call. But if there are problems, I'd get back to you.

K: Right. And I'll call Dean again to make sure to check with you before he does anything over there.

TK Thanks very much, Henry.

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RELEASED IN FULL

SF 36

TELCON
Ambassador Phil Habib
Secretary Kissinger
4/29/75 8:42 a.m.

K: Phil, I think you ought to call a few of our congressional people and tell them what is going on. I know the WH is doing a lot of this --but we ought to call some of our key committee people.

H: Who have they called, do we know?
Why don't I at the minimum call --

K: I'm sure they called the Chairman

H They will have called the Chairman and the ranking minority-- why don't I call some of the key guys who have been after us like Kennedy and Clark

K: Let me call Kennedy.

H: You call Kennedy , all right, I'll call Flint.
And Clark.

K: Just call a few of the key members; I'm assuming Mansfield and ---

H: How about Humphrey will you call him or will they call him?

K: No you call Humphrey, say you are doing it on my behalf.

H: Okay.

K: You'll know who the people are--McCloskey will--let McCloskey do a little calling.

H: I'm going to come over to a meeting with you in five--I'll have McCloskey--

K: Don't make a huge problem of it--just get somebody to make the calls.

H: Right.

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SF 29

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Larry Eagleburger
4/29/75 12:16 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: ..... to draft a statement, you know, to be released when the operation starts.

E: Okay.

K: And as soon as you have an agreed text, call me.

E: Right.

K: And then we are drafting one here that the President can issue ~~and~~ when it's completed.

E: I'll have it for you in a few minutes.

K: Good.

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SF-54

TELECON
Senator Sparkman/Secretary Kissinger
April 30, 1975
3:35 pm

S: You got time to breathe?

K: Not much.... you called me.

S: Oh. I imagine that was -- that may have been Pat Holt. We were meeting this morning and the suggestion came up that we ought to have you up at your earliest convenience to give us a briefing.

K: I would be happy to do that.

S: When?

K: Can I have one of my people to get in touch with your staff?

S: Yes. That would be Pat Holt.

K: Ok.

S: Thank you.

END

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SP59

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Senator Javits/The Secretary
April 30, 1975
Time: 7:50 p.m.

J: Hello Henry.

K: Hello, say I am on the way out to dinner.

J: The Hussein dinner?

K: Yes.

J: Good we will see you there. Have you done anything about the Shah?

K: I told Scowcroft to put you on the list.

J: O.K. I want to talk to you about the war powers thing, but I will see you at dinner.

K: O.K. Good.

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SF-53

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Senator Taft/Secretary Kissinger
April 30, 1975
3:30 pm

T: How are you?

K: Fine.

T: I have been asked to relay an invitation to you from the University of Cinncinati for a commencement speech/Honorary Degree by the President Warren Bennis. It is on the evening of June 15 at 7:00 pm.

K: Let me look at my schedule. Is that invitation going to come here?

T: It will but I was asked to call personally on it. If there is any chance...

K: I am not absolutely sure what my schedule will be in June.

T: I am sure of ;that.

K: Why don't you ask them to send the invitation and the fact that you called will influence me very much.

T: He is a first xx class guy.

K: Do you genuinely support it.

T: Yes. It is an excellent forum; excellent backing and support. It is a very large school. My son is in law school there. I will have it in the mail to you today.

K: Good.

END

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RELEASED IN FULL
SF 55

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
April 30, 1975
3:37 pm

K: Where do we stand with the Italians?

S: They have not called back. We have given them the draft of the announcement. I will call them if you want -- I didn't want to press them. I can easily call and see what they have concluded.

K: Yes. We have got to know and we have to announce it on Friday because we are announcing Sadat.

S: Well we shouldn't announce Spain and Italy at the same time....

K: We can't announce the whole Presidential trip?

S: Yes, if it is the whole trip, but I thought you were going to announce... on Monday.

K: We will announce the whole trip on Friday.

S: Ok. Let me check with EUR. They were working on a statement and were waiting for them to call back with an approved text.

K: Let's do it Friday. Why don't you call back and say we would like to do it Friday.

S: Yes.

K: Ok.

END

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SF 58

TELECON
Mr. Atherton/The Secretary
April 30, 1975
Time: 5:58 p.m.

K: Could you get to Dinitz and say it would be more convenient if the meeting wouldn't take place before the 11th, 12th, or 13th or any day after that?

A: I told him the 10th through the 13th but I will correct that.

K: If we could start on the 11th, that would be fine.

A: Very good. I will do that right away.

K: Also, why did we disapprove the sale of British torpedos to Egypt?

A: We would have to sell them and it would require a Presidential determination and approval by Congress. It is one of those cases.

K: O.K.

(This telecon combines one at 5:58 p.m. and one made at 5:59 p.m.)

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TELECON
Mr. Atherton/Secretary Kissinger
May 1, 1975
9:40 am

SF-63

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How did it happen that both Nouira and Hussein are here in the same week?

A: Those were the dates we got from the White House. Remember it was to be Bourguiba originally and was converted to Nouira when he couldn't come. We were aware at the time that they were both coming together but the White House was aware of it and approved it.

K: Of course, they will approve everything we recommend. Why did we recommend it?

A: I can't remember the specific details.

K: We cannot do this to the President or he will wind up not doing anything. We are taking advantage of him. There is nothing that Nouria is bringing up that could not wait until September.

A: This is the time when Bourguiba was to come and when Bourguiba fell through he asked if Nouira could come in his place.

K: Well, let's not let it happen again.

A: Right, sir.

END

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SF64

RELEASED IN FULL

TelCon
Roy Atherton
Sec. Kissinger
May 1, 1975
9:40 a.m.

K: ....I went through it on the India-Pakistan thing. I want a sharp protest;giving a list of explicit actions to be taken. No more delays. I want it out today.

A: All right, Sir.

K: I want a responsive thing to Saxbee saying I agree with him. This is the correct thing to do. He should make a shpart protest. List a few of the things they have said about VN and others and if this continues it will be very difficult to proceed on some of the projects.

A: We will proceed.

K: I think your second calbe is more waffley than the first.

A: I know, but now I understand what you want.

K: I want something between one and two. I want it today. No wafflers saying we are already doing very well.

A: It will be tough. I think tougher ~~xxxx~~ now that I've read Mrs. Ghandi's statement on VN. We only have the NY Times report but she apparently welcomed the NVN victory and said that it was the US failure to appreciate post-colonial nationalism that had underestimated the strength of the North VN liberation movement.

K: I would like it strong.

A: We have to ~~xxix~~ cite this also as one of the examples. We will take care of it.

END

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SF62

TELCON
Mr. Sisco
Sec. Kissinger
May 1, 1975
3:35 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I noted that Sadat is giving another speech tomorrow and I wonder -- if he thinks he is going to push us into the direction of where he has a hint of our going he is nuts.

S: So far he has been good. We should do a short calbe for Herman in a low key and see if he can't get across this notion of keeping a lid on things but ~~with~~ we have to do it very carefully because he really hasn't steped out of line this far.

K: Do it very carefully. You are coming to the meeting?

S: Yes. We can get it done right after that.

K: Good.

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SF-66

TELECON
Mr. Hartman/The Secretary
May 1, 1975
Time: 5:17 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I want a very sharp protest made to the Danes.

H: On.....
K:
K: On Jorgenson's remarks on Vietnam.

H: I haven't seen it yet but I will get it.

K: As a matter of course I want you to follow this on the European end.

H: Will do. I am sending you a note on a conversation I had with Eagleton. He is in an exploratory mood but wants to talk to his friends in the House first. He still likes the waiver idea but talks of it as acting as a unilateral action to get results from the Turks.

K: O. K.

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SF 72

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELECON
Ambassador McCloskey/The Secretary
May 2, 1975
Time: 5:36 p.m.

K: Where the hell are you?

M: Here in the Department.

K: In the building? How many recorders do you have on this thing?

M: Only one but it is not in perfect condition.

K: It sounds as if you are far away.

M: We have tried to run down O'Leary.

K: I have called Albritton. He will break his back to make it possible. He will call me Monday morning.

M: Hemstone arrived with a note [redacted] B6

K:

M:

K: Lets try O'Leary and if we get turned down we could go back to Hemstone. Is his mind changeable?

M: It would take some persuasion on your part, but don't you think he is a sound fellow?

K: I like him.

M: O'Leary will jump at the chance.

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K: God damn, where the hell is Broad Branch Road?

M: At the end of Rock Creek Parkway. Why are you going there?

K: For the Tunisian reception.

M: That is very far away.

K: Those guys cannot do this to me. Oh well.

M: I still would like for you to do the U.S. News and World Report thing.

K: O.K. I will do it.

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RELEASED IN FULL
SF-78

TELCON
Mr. Lord
Sec. Kissinger
May 2, 1975
11:40 a.m.

K: Win, for this speech in Kansas City, I would like to give a general foreign policy speech of a somewhat upbeat nature. That is to say we have an important problem, let's not delude ourselves but we also have important tasks and those are the ones I want to talk about today. Take some of the material from the detente statement about the importance of what needs to be done -- have making progress towards peace. I would stress the structure of peace. Why it is important that we are engaged internationally; why it is in our selfish interest.

L: We had already put together something I was going to get to you based on the earlier speech. I will make some adjustments and get it to you. I will adjust the focus. I think we can get you something fairly soon.

K: O.K. In other words, I don't want it to be a wailing speech but a strong and confident speech.

L: In this connection, I am about to send you a Circular message which is going to the field about what our posture should be. You mentioned this in a staff meeting. I am thinking about sending it to all of the Ambassadors.

K: Except that it will leak.

L: I don't think there is anh harm in this if it does leak.

K: O.K. Let me take a look at it.

END

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SF 76

TELECON
Mr. Barry Schweid/Secretary Kissinger
May 2, 1975
3:30 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

S: There is a story in the Star this afternoon which is causing some interest in my office.

K: I haven't read it.

S: About the talks being deadlocked and there must be a recess.

K: There has always been a recess at this time.

S: I was talking to some others and they said it would be ridiculous for there to x be a recess at this time. They are going to recess?

K: XX Yes.

S: Based on having been at it for some time....

K: Right and there will take some political considerations to move it further.

S: Can you say something in a positive sense depicting this?

K: There is no problem. The purpose of the Geneva talks is to explore the technical problems and then there is a political decision somewhere along the line -- none of these issues has ever been settled at Geneva.

S: Right. Do you know how long the recess will be?

K: About ten months.

S: Are we still thinking in terms of a December summit.

K: It has never been definitely set xxxxxx but that is still a reasonable date.

S: Ok, thank you sir.

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SF 74

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/The Secretary
May 2, 1975
Time: 4:53 p.m.

K: What is this with the President's schedule in Brussels some madman made it up. It says here that he will have breakfast at 7:00 in the morning. There are two successive days in which breakfast is put down for 7:00 a.m.

S: It must have gotten by me.

K: It says from 7 - 8:30 breakfast and then at 8:30 another bilateral.

S: He said he would be available to both the Greeks and Turks.

K: Whatever he does it won't start at 7 in the morning.

S: O.K. Let me look at it.

K: O.K.

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RELEASED IN FULL

SF80

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
May 3, 1975
9:40 am

K: What did you do -- ride out on my meeting with Fontaine?

S: I checked last night with the boys and they said you wanted to see him alone.

K: Nonsense.

S: Was it edifying?

K: I think even they are a little shaken.

S: We'll see what he writes. You're right, he is a man of principle and not easily shaken.

K: Did you find out whether the 21st is doable?

S: They haven't called back. The Hungarian Foreign Minister comes in at 1:00 but they had to check it with Schmidt to see if he can do it and he has not yet called back.

K: Because that we could substantially confirm.

S: They promised to call back as soon as they got to Schmidt because he wants to go to Berlin with you. I told him you would want to leave by 3:00. If I haven't gotten a call by noon I may call to see where it stands.

K: Ok. Is there anything else we have?

S: I haven't seen anything. We have to have a meeting on Diego Garcia.

K: Today?

S: No.

K: No, I want it. I thought I had it today.

S: I'll let you know if I get anything from the Germans.

K: Are you playing tennis today?

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S: I wish I were.

K: Where are you?

S: I am in my office.

K: I was told you were not in your office.

S: Well, here I am.

K: Let's get together on Diego Garcia at 10:30.

S: We'll need Lord and Vest.

K: Well get them.

END

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SF 86

TELECON
Senator Jim Allen/The Secretary
May 5, 1975
Time: 5:25 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you.

A: I am fine. For a man that has the weight of the world on his shoulders, I hestiate to call about such a trival matter.

K: I have not forgotten your resolution last year.

A: I feel for you on these situations around the world. The weight is on your shoulders and we couldn't have a more competent person in the job than you.

K: I appreciate that.

A: Some of my constituents asked that I speak to you about coming to Alabama and making a speech before the Southern Commodity Producers Conference sponsored by the Alabama Farm Bureau. Mr. McCloskey wrote to me saying you wouldn't be able to do it. I understand that.

K: What is the timing on this?

A: It is scheduled for August 14 in Birmingham.

K: Let me take another look at it.

A: I appreciate it, and hope you can send someone in the event that you cannot come.

K: Let me see whether I can do it or send someone. I will certainly send someone if I cannot come.

A: I talked to Mr. McCloskey yesterday and asked his permission to talk to you. I didn't want to go over his head, but he said it would be fine.

K: I appreciate your call. I have a predisposition to see what I can do for you.

A: That is not necessary.

K: You wouldn't put it on that basis, but I want you to know that I feel this way.

A: Thank you.

K: I will be in touch.

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RELEASED IN PART
B6 SF-84

TELCON
Mr. Albritton
Sec. Kissinger
May 5, 1975
2:55 p.m.

A: Mr.Secretary.

K: Yes, Mr. Albritton.

A: I saw you Saturday afternoon at the international gathering of 10,000 people. It is to bady we didn't have time for a personal conversaton. Those little things, I suppose are as time consuming and the least productive as anything.

K: I agree and boring.

A: I don't know how you and the President can stand it. At least the rest of us can sneak out if we want too. It must be the most burdensome part of your duties there. You have my sympathy in those regards.

K: Aren't you nice.

A: May I get to the point. I have gone into that matter here with [redacted] and mentioned to Bellows -- editor of our paper. This is B6
my problem. As you have probably surmized, we are beginning to
make some changes here at the Star [redacted] B6

K: I would be delighted. You have my enthusiastic support. B6

[redacted]

The matter that B6
involves you and the real point is the talent stable that I have B6
got. It is thin. [redacted] is one of the few good ponies that I have
in the stable and I must say, Mr. Secretary, if there is someway that
we could help without surrendering one of our horses at this time --
in no sense of the word do I want to say to you, who is doing a
fantastic job, I don't want to say to you that we cannot see our

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way clear to do it. I wish there would be some way to help in a way other than giving up the one talent that we have. We have such fierce competition. I came to this conclusion, [redacted] did and B6 also Jim Bellows, if there is some way we caould help your good offices without giving up our limited talent we wish there would be a way to do it.

K: Right.

A: Nothing would ~~xxx~~ please me more.

K: You are not telling me if I insist that you will let him go.

A: If the Secretary of State of this great country tells me he has to have him -- it is like the President's calling me and saying I have to have this fellow.

K: Let me see if I can come up with someone else. What do you think about [redacted] B6

A: He has left our paper. He is a good writer and producer. [redacted] B6

K: But that makes him tough to be my spokesman.

[redacted] B6

he has talent. He can write. As your spokesman you would have to inform him of his need to have a degree of elasticity to the situation to be able to be your spokesman. [redacted] B6 B6

[redacted]

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3.

K: No, no. I understand that. We are talking about whether he can do something of a major responsibility which requires a willingness to subordinate his views to mine.

A: You have, next to the President, and in another sense of the ~~word~~, the most sensitive job. The foreign policy of this country is the most important responsibility we have now. This is the area were it all depends on that.

B6

K: That was my instinctive feeling. That is why I came back to you about

B6

A: If it is not a burden on you could I give some thought to this; could I confer only with Bellows and when we come to some thought we will come to you with it.

K: I really appreciate the manner in which you have approahced this.

A: Anytime that we can help.

K: If I can be of any help to your paper, I don't know how but I would be ahppy to do it. I think this town needs two papers.

A: Indeed, it does. You have been encouraging to me when I met you at the White House. I shall never forget what you are doing ~~xx~~ for your country and we will help you in anyway we can in that regard. If I might I will give this some very deep thought and confidentially and if I have something that makes sense, might I pick up the phone and call you about it.

K: I would be very pleased.

A: Thank.

K: Talk to you later.

END

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RELEASED IN FULL
SF83

TELECON
Mr. Sisco
May 5, 1975
4:04 pm

missed first part

S: One thing is it is beginning to leak. And we want the Israelis to have it. On the right response -- I told Bob McCloskey there are a limited number of Congressmen to check with and Roy talked to Dinitz.

K: What did Dinitz say.

S: Roy is here -- it was low key but he made some snide remarks about how did this square with holding up the Lance. Marvin Kalb has gotten this story somehow. And, I am concerned about the briefing today. Bob said nothing has been decided.

K: Well, why did he say it.

S: I don't know. I would say that to him, but we are trying to straighten this thing out this afternoon and I just wanted you to know about it.

K: Ok.

END

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RELEASED IN FULL
SF-82

TELECON
Senator Baker/Secretary Kissinger
May 5, 1975
4:00 pm

K: How are you?

B: I am fine. How are you?

K: Good.

B: I am going to the Middle East on May 15 as the newest and youngest member of the Foreign Relations Committee on our side and that was all well and good til I saw that the President was going to meet with President Sadat and ~~x~~ I wanted to make sure my schedule would not mess up with his.

K: I think it is good for you to go over.

B: I am going to be in touch with someone down there about things.

K: Talk to Joe Sisco.

B: Joe Sisco.

K: Yes, and we will try to ~~gexx~~ get you an appointment with Sadat and the other leaders.

B: I just wanted you to know.

K: I think it is an excellent idea.

B: The Tennessee paper published my visit and said it was a Kissinger-like visit ~~axxxx~~.

K: I don't know if that is good or bad.

B: Well, it is ambitious anyway. I have about six countries to visit.

K: Good, I am all for it.

B: Good, and if there is anything I ~~xxxx~~ need to know in this connection, I would appreciate it if they would let me know.

K: Ok.

END

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SF93

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. McNamara/The Secretary
May 6, 1975
Time: 6:40 p.m.

M: Right now you have a credibility problem but the cruel thing in the end is the way you have been treated. Secondly, I want to say that during the last few weeks I was away in Europe and members of the European establishment met with me, and I also met with Giscard in France and I can guaranty there is no problem with that group as far as your credibility goes. They feel that no one else has the same effect as you with foreign policy, in a positive sense. Finally, the events of the past weeks do not change the fact that the Middle East is the major problem area and you are the only one who can deal with it.

K: I appreciate this. I can take it from almost anybody but the people who are attacking the settlement in Vietnam for not being good enough.

M: And the refugees.

K: Yes, that makes me sick.

M: It is a difficult time.

K: You are a good friend and I hope to see you soon.

M: Yes, let's get together, and by the way, give my best to Nancy.

K: O.K. Bye.

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RELEASED IN FULL
SF87

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Joseph Sisco
9:25 a.m., 5/6/75

K: Hello.

S: Good morning, Mr. Secretary.

K: Joe, can I know within a half an hour how much aid we gave to Israel (1) since the President came in both military and economic and in dollar amounts.

S: In dollar amounts?

K: When I testify before the Foreign Relations Committee.

S: Right.

K: And secondly, how much since October '73.

S: October '73 -- all right, I will try my best.

K: Leave them with my secretary.

S: Fine, thank you.

K: Thank you.

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RELEASED IN FULL

SF-88

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/The Secretary
May 6, 1975
Time: 10:55 p.m.

S: I won't have a chance to talk to you tomorrow so I want to tell you I will talk to the Frenchman, as we planned. O.K.?

K: Don't you think.

S: Yes, I do. I want to get a more detailed version of what he is saying. It will come up in the telephone conversations and then I will give the procedural part to him.

K: O.K.

S: After talking to you, there is no chance of a separate meeting?

K: Wait, let's hear what he has to say and then proceed. First find out what he will say and don't give him an answer tomorrow.

S: O.K.

K: O.K.

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SF90

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Congressman Hayes/The Secretary
May 6, 1975
Time: 5:43 p.m.

K: I asked Eagleburger last week to get you in here for drinks.

H: I told him I could do it Monday. I have so many things scheduled for this week.

K: How about Wednesday. I am not going to be here Monday.

H: I have a speech at Georgetown University where I will be defending Kissinger.

K: Well then, next Wednesday or Thursday, or where are you going to be this Friday?

H: In Ohio.

K: How about tomorrow?

H: Let me see what I have going. I have a reception for some artist from 5:30 to 7:00.

K: Come by at 7:15.

H: O.K. That would be good.

K: O.K. See you then.

H: O.K.

K: Bye.

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TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/The Secretary
May 6, 1975
Time: 6:32 p.m.

SF92

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Anatol?

D: Yes Henry.

K: We are having trouble getting you to the phone lately.

D: Yes, I have a Japanese professor, and when you have a professor.....

K: I thought you were meeting with Dinitz. Listen, I have David Rockefeller here. He is going to the Soviet Union in a few weeks in connection with the Dartmouth Conference. You know the young Menchikov.....

D: The one in New York now. I heard about him.

K: He called on David and said that Brezhnev might want to see him and he is supposed to work out the schedule.

D: That is nonsense. I could tell you that from the beginning.

K: It is entirely up to you, but my advice was to go about this through you.

D: If you have something to discuss with Brezhnev I could organize it.

K: The initiative came from Menchikov.

D: I am trying to say that I could arrange a meeting.

K: David did not take the initiative.

D: You know how small people are. However, is he interested in meeting him?

K: He would be happy to meet him.

D: Not a social occasion, but.....

K: It would be helpful to discuss the economic relations between our countries for both of them. David could be helpful on the most favored nation thing, especially if he favored it.

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D: When is he going?

K: I will let you know and get David to call you. I want to know whether my advice on Menchikov was correct.

D: He is one of the employees of the United Nations staff. There is no need to go through that channel.

K: I favor David's meeting with Brezhnev. In fact, I recommend it. If you can work it out.....

D: Let David call me about the dates, and then I will mention it to Brezhnev.

K: I will tell him not to deal with Menchikov.

D: Alright.

K: O.K. We will be in touch.

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S/S 95

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Larry Eagleburger
Sec. Kissinger
10:48 a.m. 5/7/75

E: The Prime Minister of Malaysia was not here, he was in NY last week and Habib saw him there on his way back from the Commonwealth Conference. Lee Kuan Yew, however, was in the building yesterday to see Sonnenfeldt and you are seeing, I think, it is tomorrow.

K: How did that happen?

E: Apparently Sonnenfeldt was supposed to see him in his hotel,

K: But why was he supposed to see him=---

E: I've got a call into him to see what that was all about, all I know now is that Lee Kuan Yew changed the plan and came here to see Sonnenfeldt

K: I just want to know why

E: I know I'm trying to find out now--but there was a PM in this building yesterday and I'll find out what the hell it was all about

K: Okay.

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SF-96

TELCON
Mr. Wasserman
Sec. Kissinger
12:17 p.m. 5/7/75

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Lou, how are you?

W: Fine, I wanted to tell you I thought your television appearances were excellent.

K: The ones with Barbara Walters?

W: Barbara Walters.

K: Aren't you nice.

W: I've heard a lot of good talk--I've been in NY today and everybody's talking about it

K: You are a great friend. Are you coming to Washington?

W: No, I'm going overseas tomorrow--I may come thru on the way back. But you probably be overseas then.

K: When

W: We getback around the 21st or 22nd.

K: Yeh, I'll be overseas.

W: How do you feel?

K: I feel -- it was a fough week last week, but I think now we can straighten things out

W: Take care of your health, we want you around.

K: Lou, you are a good friend and I can't tell you how much I appreciate your call today and last week it was--you couldn't have called at a more important day. You made me feel good.

W: It comes from the heart.

K: I know that

W: Give our best to Nancy and hang in there.
I'll call you when you get back.

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TELCON
William Rogers/HAK
4:01 p.m. - 5/7/75

SF-97
RELEASED IN FULL

K: When might I see a toast that you might consider/giving at that lunch.

R: Isn't it up there yet. We cleared off on it yesterday. I'll get it right away.

K: Okay. It should be somewhat substantive.

R: Yes, it talks about Latin America in the context of our global policy

K: And in some relationship to the Houston speech.

R: Right.

K: You bet.

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SI-108

TELCON
5:55/5/8/75
Phil Habib/HAK

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

H: Yes Sir.

K: Look Clarence Ferguson popped off that we would look at humanitarian.

H: I noticed that. I wondered if you had authorized it.

K: It is not authorized and I'm telling you the Department is too revealing And I'm going to crack down on all of you.

H: Now you know Clarence Ferguson sits in a meeting and he elaborates on a statement you made.

K: What I say is different.

H: I said, he elaborates on it.

K: I've never said we'd examine it. What

H: What you said once is that... Once you said that of course we'd consider that he's. ...

K: I said that there is a specific humanitarian request for a specific purpose and we might take a look at it. And you take a look at it and we will turn it down.

H: As we have done. Waldheim asked somebody and we turned him down.

K: Will you get him under control Phil?

H: I will telephone him.

K: You're not in tomorrow.

H: Yes sir I am but only part of the day.

K: Let me tell you something. If you do not have three consecutive days in addition to the weekend off you are not authorized to leave.

H: I have already made my plans. I will have three consecutive days off. Let me just point something out to you. I want you to understand me. I think in many ways... I don't lecture you even though you're the boss you shouldn't lecture me. Let me point something out to you.

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I'm just now sending you up a memorandum about Laos on ... I'm concerned. You know for several days I've told you I'm...

K: Yes. That's gone.

H: Yes sir and it requires some very careful thought on our part. I'm sending you a preliminary memorandum because what I'd like to do is to get you to do what you did when we were in the early stages on Vietnam. Sit down with four or five people for half an hour. Do it over with us. Then we would know what/do.

to

K: I agree with you and I must have that meeting.

to K:

H: I will get the memorandum up/you first. /Well I can do it tonight say about 6:45.

H: [illegible] You're going to be at the White House tonight for dinner. I have to go home and change my clothes and get my wife.

H:

K: Okay. Fine. /Besides I'd rather do it tomorrow with you.

K: Well, look Then get at my sechdule.

H: I have already spoken to your aids. I'm just telling you one of the reasons why I was originally going to take tomorrow off. That's why I'm not taking tomorrow off.

K: You're taking then three days off next week!

H: Alright. Yes sir.

*

SF100

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Wm. Rogers
Sec. Kissinger
May 8, 1975
9:10 a.m.

K: I am under enormous time pressure. Can you get together some folders for me of what I must have for these meetings tomorrow. I cannot possible sit there and respond to notes my staff is handing me.

R: I will strip out the parts that are in the briefing book which are in the briefing book which are relevant to the four agenda items. We will have those for you by noontime.

K: And some sense of the procedure and the toast. And then we can release it. Make it a little sharper than this one is. Both more concilliatory and a touch sterner.

WR: On the non-confrontation points.

K: Yes.

R: We have that on the way.

K: Avoid the phrases of redistribution of wealth.

R: O.K. Thank you.

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SF-102

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Mr. Sisco
Sec. Kissinger
May 8, 1975
9:22 a.m.

K: Chuck Percy is in my office and -- about several things, including the Mexican Charter -- are you familiar with that.

S: Sure.

K: He says there is a meeting set up that he set up with the Zambian For. Min. and Schwebal to see whether they would help us modify the Charter. He says that meeting was cancelled on instructions -- the night before last -- from the Department.

S: Never heard of it.

K: When Percy has arranged something we cannot have subordinates cancelling.

S: We certainly cannot. I will look into it right away and will give him a call.

K: I told him I am not as optimistic as he is about what can be achieved.

S: Nevertheless we should not take that kind of action without checking with him. I will look into it and give him an early call.

K: Appreciate it.

END

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SF105

RELEASED IN FULL

TelCon:10:45-5/8/75
Secretary Kissinger/
Secretary Simon

K: Helllo.

S: Hi Henry.

K: How are you Bill.

S: Well good. I don't think Enders and I had trouble yesterday in our joint testimony.

K: Oh good. Bill, I am giving a speech in Kansas City on Monday - on Tuesday, which I don't think is going to break any new ground. It is sort of a summary of our international economic positions on energy, food etc. But I want to make sure that you have had a look at it. [redacted] Unfortunately, it doesn't exist yet.

S: Yes.

K: Are you going to be around on Saturday.

S: I will be back on Saturday. I have got - I am going to the Business Council tomorrow and speak to them and I will be back Saturday.

K: Well can I send Enders or somebody over to see you on Saturday morning.

S: Saturday afternoon - early sure.

K: Well you see I am giving it on Monday, so I -- the agriculture section on food reserves has been checked by Butz. On energy I am saying nothing except for what I have already said in different language and where we are going. And on raw materials which are included I will only say we will study -- you know I will state what the problem is but won't make any proposals. I will just say we are studying some of these things empathetically and we will give our position at OECD and elsewhere.

S: Very good, fine but what

K: But I want you to see it because I don't want to have another confusion arise like last time.

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S: Well, that will be fine.

K: It is not intended to be - what it is intended to do is to tell - is to convey for everybody to keep their shirt on we know where we are going.

S: Yes, exactly.

K: And that -- Vietnam is just a small part of the world and there are a lot of other things that need to be done.

S: Exactly. No, that is super.

K: Good.

S: Thank you Henry.

K: Right, Bill.

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SF104

Telcon:10:24-5/8/75
Secretary Kissinger/
Tom Enders

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

E: Mr. Secretary.

K: Tom, I want to make sure that anything that may be in that speech is cleared with Seidman, Treasury, etc. so that we don't have a weekend problem.

E: When do you want to do that. Maybe they can see the next draft.

K: No, then you have to do it on the weekend. I mean can't you get the basic ideas and tell them we just don't have a draft cleared before Saturday.

E: Well they will want to see I think that

K: Look, I remember I am not going to get into the trouble when people run to the President. Knowing I will do a speech not seeing it.

E: All right, well then I can start clearing what we have now as long as it is being rewritten.

K: Well that is the food speech.

E: Well we have the food and the agriculture(??) speech ~~xxxjxx~~ substantive pieces now.

K: Well I don't(?) want it all over the place. Can it be given to some other group.

E: _____

K: OK.

E:

E: Now, ah, Butz has cleared the reserves language with some minor changes so that we have a position and it is a good one. We won't have a fight over the grain reserves either. Well, Mr. Secretary

K: Yes.

E: I think the rhetoric is going to be probably more troublesome with Treasury but there is no - I don't anticipate _____ fight with Treasury.

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The rhetoric of the OECD speech.

K: Well, I don't know whether I would give them the whole OECD speech yet. But when you talk to Simon whether we can get one to him that we won't have a text until Saturday morning.

E: Yes.

K: And work out something by which he can clear it.

E: And the

K: Yes, I think that may be safer. But keep in mind we also need a major statement at OECD. Do you think we can do both?

E: Well, we are going to have to cannibalize it to some degree.

K: But so that it ~~doesn't~~ still doesn't look identical.

E: It won't look identical.

K: I just think ~~this~~ a speech entirely devoted to food now isn't going to be worth it.

E: Oh no, I understand very well your decisions.

K: We can get a food reserve thing in there -- into the Kansas City speech.

E: Yes, that is pretty well.

K: Into the context of a general approach -- you know international economics.

E: Exactly.

K: OK.

E: I will pick the contact of these men so that we don't do it in two parts -- keep it four(?). It will come out

K: Very good.

E: All right.

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TELCON
6:01/5/8/75
Joe Sisco/HAK

5/C/09

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Joe, you notice my whole trip has leaked?

S: Yes, I saw it.

K: Well, I'm not amused and somebody has to shape the Department up.

S: Are you sure it's coming out of here Henry?

K: Well it couldn't have come out of anywhere else because the White House doesn't even know the dates. They just know I'm doing it.

S: I'll look around.

K: Don't look around because I'm going to make some blood flow.

S: Well, Henry, if youknow where the blood.....

K: I don't care where the blood is. The Foreign Service Protective Association will soon close ranks if a few people get fired.

S: I would agree with that Henry but I don't understand.

K: Listen, I consider Art Hartman among the best Assistant Secretaries. If his job keeps leaking I'll have to replace him.

S: Well, I noticed it and I don't know how it got our Henry.

K: Well you are in charge of this sort of thing in the Department. I talked to Larry about it. Secondly I'd like you to call in Dinitz tomorrow. Or let Atherton call him in. I don't really like it at your level. If Atherton is around. And tell him about my meeting with Gromyko. Tell him if there are any observations -- it will be announced on Monday. And if they have any observations to make before I meet with Gromyko I'll be glad to consider them. Don't you think.

S: That's wise. Give him an opportunity to make an input.

K: And say we'd be glad to know what they think about the Geneva Conference and other things. And secondly that if Rabin comes with any new ideas, if they could let us have them ahead of time it would also be helpful.

S: That's a good tack as well.

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K: But it should be very formal.

S: Alright. I think that's fine.

K: Okay.

S: Good.

SF-101

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Mr. Hartman
Sec. Kissinger
May 8, 1975, 9:15 a.m.

K: Art, I noted that Demeril is requesting an appointment with the President. I conclude from this that we didn't carry out the instruction that we should request this appointment three days ago.

H: We did indeed. And I have seen a report from Macomber that he did it.

K: He couldn't have said it in anyway that they could have understood, otherwishe there is no point in their requesting it.

H: This could be the hint that they still want Esenbel to see the President.

K: That I have already agreed to. Please check to see if those instructions were carried out.

H: I will do it.

K: I do not think we should schedule a lunch for Demeril and Caramanlis when they are being seen separately. That should be the next day.

H: I will check on it right away.

K: If it has not been carried out ~~xxxxx~~ get it carried out in the next hour.

H: I will do that.

K: Thank you.

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SF-113

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
May 9, 1975
3:12 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I talked to Symington today. He seems to be under the impression you told him to go and sign that letter Jackson is circulating.

S: He never asked me. I never talked to him. I'd be glad to call him.

K: No.

S: He must be trying....

K: He said someone check with you.

S: No one checked with me. That is the story. Tell me what you want me to do.

K: Nothing. I just wanted to make sure.

S: It surprises me.

K: I wanted to make sure .

S: I'm getting tied of your saying that. I haven't talked to Symington. You have to stop saying this to me. I spend four hours defending American foreign policy....

(The Secretary hangs up.)

END

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RELEASED IN FULL *

SF-116

TELECON
Congressman Rodino/Secretary Kissinger
May 9, 1975
3:40 pm

K: I wanted to tell you how moved I was by your speech the other day. It was in the best tradition of our country.

R: Thank you so much. We got to do our duty and that is all I was doing.

K: That isn't always the majority view.

R: I know that. There are times when it is difficult but duty is duty and when you do it you feel good about it; but I think we are going to be alright.

K: I have the impression that the mood has turned.

R: Yes. I noticed reading some newspaper articles today concerning some of the reactions. While some letters were initially hostile, they are levelling off. I am sure the mood will turn; it has to. But there are still those who will be the haters and biggots and look out for themselves.

K: You provided a great service.

R: T-ank you. And as one who has been an admirer of yours, just keep that upper chin. It is tough. You have done what has been in the public interest.

K: That is what I am trying to do.

R: I know and your job is almost impossible. But keephealthy and keep going.

K: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

R: Good luck.

END

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SF-114

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELCON

Cong. Conable
Sec. Kissinger
May 9, 1975
3:25 p.m.

C: I have a pesky matter that may or may not interest you. It has to do with -- apparently a week or two ago you meet with a number of Greek leaders. The President was there too.

K: It was the other way around. The President met with them and I was there.

C: I understand. A fellow named [redacted] who is a former national leader of AHEPA was very much impressed and wondered what he could to to help. He has a feeling that he could move around the country with the Greek community and perhaps do some gooe in representing the Administration viewpoint. Your meeting with them apparently next week also. B6

K: That's right.

C: I think he will be among the group and I wondered if you wanted to talk to him special in any way. He is a constituent of mine and talked with me about it afterwards.

K: Do you recommend it.

C: It is perfectly all right. ~~xxxxx~~ He is a very loyal Republican and quite taken with the President at this time.

K: Could you spell his name.

C: [redacted] B6

K: I will ask him to come for 15 minutes before or stay 15 minutes afterwards.

C: I think you might want to explore it. He thought he might work for the Administration in some~~way~~ capacity but I have no idea what he is suggesting and he apparently -- he really thought if he could help the Administration in some way he would like to do it. He is elderly in the sense that he may be 60 years old. I have no idea what kind of thing you might suggest or whether you might want to suggestanything at all. I wanted you to know that he is very friendly and was quite impressed with the President at this meeting and explored with me how he could help with improving relations with the Greek Community.

K: I will have a talk with him and thank you for calling.

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C: Thank you and I appreciate your taking the call.

K: Not at all. You have always been helpful.

C: We are all in this together.

K: Absolutely.

END

SF117 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/The Secretary
May 9, 1975
Time: 5:22 p.m.

K: Listen, I promised Dobrynin that we would let him have our ideas on SALT.

S: You have had them over at the White House for two days.

K: There is something insane going on here. Why can't I have them over here?

S: It is just a problem of location, they were typed over there because you were over there. I have a xerox copy here that I can send you.

K: O.K. Good. What are the ideas? I don't mind going beyond these.....

S: There is something about verification of complexes and ideas on trade-offs on cruise ships and missiles and bombers, and something on the backfire.

K: On the Hollenburg thing, could you call Dobrynin for me. What do you think, should we use it?

S: I think the practice has been that we use our own facilities. It is awkward to use Austrian facilities.

K: Let's do that.

S: In your case, it would be your hotel area.

K: Shouldn't we give the dinner at the Embassy Residence? Of course, that means without Buchanan.

S: Yes. In Geneva we have done it at the hotel.

K: But we have no Embassy there.

S: There is a mission.

K: Can you and Hartman work it out?

S: Yes. I don't think we should use the Austrian facilities.

K: The question is how to set it up, the meal at the Soviet Embassy.

S: Let me talk to him.

K: O.K. Fine. Thank you.

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TELECON
Mr. Hartman/
May 9, 1975
Time: 5:25

K: I have

H: Was it

K: No I ha
with Ka
raise.
emerges.

RELEASED IN FULL *
SF120

TELECON
Morris Liebman/Secretary Kissinger
May 10, 1975
4:55 PM

L: I have been down in Washington the last couple of weeks seeing a few friends of ours at the White House on Thursday and Friday and I wonder, is there anything we can do. I've stayed in touch with our friends.

K: You're coming back Thursday or Friday.

L: I'm coming Wednesday evening.

K: Why don't you check with Jerry Bremer. Maybe we can talk for 5 minutes.

L: Can I call you.

K: Call Jerry Bremer.

L: Is there a number I can call.

K: 632-0968.

L: 632-0968. I'll call Jerry Thursday morning. If you have a few minutes I would be glad to talk on ____. I would like to figure out how to d o it. We have a number of instrucments available. It seems to me I need some directions from you at this point.

K: Let's try.

L: I will call and check it with Jerry on Thursday morning. There's so much going on. So much discord. Somebody has to do some movement.

K: I appreciate it.
would
L: I/appreciate getting a signal from you.

K: You call Jerry.

L: Best to Nancy.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 10 FEB 2003 200102979

RELEASED IN PART
B6 5F121

TELECON
Senator Hartke/Secretary Kissinger
May 10, 1975
5:25 PM

H: I have been in touch with some people who are not in the government. _____ representing Rabin and indicated to me several times that_____. I was wondering if there's any___.

K: He's a friend of Rabin?

H: I got a call last night at 3:00 in the morning. He's not in the government. He's an old and close friend of Rabin. Prbably the closest friend he has. They will meet any place in the world. They are not interested in any publicity___off the xxxx record.

K: What the xx name of the person.

H: [redacted] B6

K: I don't know him.

H: In other words, they really don't want any embarrassment on the thing. He was here and left about three weeks ago. We have been talking for quite some time.

K: Let me thing about that and I will be in touch with you.

H: If it presents any type of effect, any _____. That's what I would like to do.

K: Let me think about it.

H: He's supposed to be back xxx around the 10th or 11th of June.. I don't know how else to proceed.

K: It has to be before the 10th and 11th.

H: When he was here x he suggested that. I do have some friends who indicated to ____again that _____. He has been a friend of his for 10 or 11 years.

K: Let me think about it and get in touch with you.

L: It might be something worthwhile. I know he says he can ~~speak~~ ~~xxxxxxxxxxx~~ speek for the Prime Minister and I can get confirmation on that.

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K: I'll call you on Monday. Either Sisco or I xxxxxx will call you.

H: OK. Keep in touch.

K: I was delighted to meet your wife the other day.

H: She thinks you're great. She likes your intelligence and sense of humor.

END

SF-129 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Mr. Herb Schlosser
Sec. Kissinger
May 12, 1975
11:20 a.m.

S: You asked me my judgment on whether you should go on the TV program. My judgment is that you should. This is as a friend and not as NCB. Obviously, we would like to have you all to ourselves. If they are doing a program about you and [redacted] you do not appear they will say we asked him to come on and he refused. You are a good spokesman. You will have an opportunity to see what is on the program beforehand. This will give you a chance to put things into perspective. One sugestion -- one thing you should say among the things that you will say and coming from you it will add a note of reality.

K: All criticism is anti-semitism.

S: After this you might decide not to be Jewish. When you were superman the buildup was too great. You are the same guy as then. You have said you cannot forever walk the tight rope. All you did then and all you did now is the very best job that you can do. Some things work out well and some times they don't. You get the feeling that the incredible praise for you then was inaccurate then, as perhaps it is inaccurate now about your failures. You get over to people you know a very clear notion of your very own self-appraisal. That is why it is inaccurate. The image is that of a guy who rode very high. Who is very temperamental and cannot brook criticism. That is not the guy that I have seen. If you can be a little philosophical -- you always knew when you were riding high ...

K: Which happens to be true.

S: I know. It would be healthy for those [redacted] commenting on public affairs to be saying you were a tremendous superman and then six months later you are not. Neither is accurate. The only thing you can do is to do the best job you can. Say, I have worked as hard as I can. I will continue to do so. Some mention of what you have tuilt in the Department. Some of the young people. It tends to take it away from a little one man show criticism.

K: Which is also untrue. That I said on the Barbara Walters show.

S: I heard you say that. I think there is no harm in doing that.

K: I will see you this Thursday.

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S: I am coming down at noon. Perhaps I could see you before the affair. I will be going back the next morning. Maybe afterwards.

K: I cannot do it afterwards. We have to go to the French Embassy. Come in at 6:00.

S: What time is dinner.

K: 8:00.

S: You mean I should be dreassed at 6:00 and come to State.

K: Where are you staying.

S: At the Madison.

K: Come in at 6:00 and be dressed or leave at 6:45 and change.

S: I will give you a call when I get to town. If I cannot make it for any reason ...

K: That's all right. It is just social. I have nothing to discuss.

S: Fine. How many people come to these things.

K: About 150.

S: Never been to one.

K: I will be interesting.

END

SF123 *

TELECON
Secretary Simon/Secretary Kissinger
May 12, 1975
9:08 AM

RELEASED IN FULL

S: At the economic policy group meeting this morning there were several people who had read dradt two, which I had not. Comments were made about what was appropriate and there were various opinions. I think everybody's opinion that this speech, in view of the President's trip to Europe and the builk of these being studied, that the recommendation is going to go to the President aht (a) he ought to think about giving an international economic speech and (b) that a lot of these decisions ____ ordered and the price mechanism change in draft two. They were not in draft one. Real decisions on this have not been made.

K: I didn't know there's any price mechanism change in there.

S: I haven't read it. I wanted to apprise you on this. You might want to talk to Bill Seidman.

K: We're not talking about price mechanism problems.

S: ____.

K: On what, raw materials?

S: It might have been on the raw material section. I'm at a disadvantage. I haven't read it and I won't have an opportunity to read it because of Rabinowitz being in here all day. You may want to talk to Bill Seidman. He has also read draft two.

K: Of course we're working on draft 3.

S: It's the latest draft.

K: We've got to get an agreement today when my speech gets put into the economic____.

S: I have absolutely no troubple.

K: Your people don't clear your speeches that way.

S: It was just distributed over the weekend to various people. I got the first draft. That' s what I think we ought to do. You're probably up against a time problem. Maybe you won't give it tomorrow.

K: I just decided to give it.

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S: Let me have Bill Seidman call you. He had the benefit of reading it.

K: I will call Seidman.

S: Super.

END

SF-126 *

TELCON
Bill Siedman/HAK
10:44 a.m. - 5/12/75

RELEASED IN FULL

K: There's something wrong with our clearance process for speeches when they get into the economic field and you and I have to talk about it.

S: I would love to.

K: Now that we've got a current one. My impression was that it was being cleared with all the Agencies all along.

S: I guess some got it and some didn't as to what the President calls his economic policy group so I got it to the rest of them this morning.

K: But I do object, Bill, to this idea that the economic policy board as a body goes over my speeches. You know I don't mind them going over it individually.

S: That's what they are doing. I just gave it out to them and they're going to get their individual -- really it only the people who are involved I think are Dunlop and Greenspan, Simon and Lynn. That's all that's involved.

K: Well, Agriculture but we've cleared with them. But physically the only section that could be even remotely controversial is raw materials. [redacted]

S: I that that would be the the one -- the energy one I understand you -- has been cleared with Zarb so....

K: Well the energy one is just a rehash of our position. And the only thing in the energy one is not an economic point. It's our willingness to resume the prepcon.

S: Right. And that would not be in our....

K: On raw materials we had checked out at every point with Treasury.

S: Treasury I know has looked at it. They were going to give us their comments. All I am doing at the moment.

K: No. That's alright. I want you to do it Bill. Don't misunderstand me. I will have. .. I talked to the President about it. What we're trying to do with that speech. Let me explain to you.

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S: Yes.

K: We are trying to get debate away from a real evaluation of American foreign policy. What the hell are we trying in abstract to do concretely? So I'm giving a speech tonight and saying glory and this is what we have to do in the political field. And I'm giving a speech tomorrow in Kansas City in which I just wanted to give the outlines of the economic field.

S: Let me tell you. I think its a very good speech.

K: I don't even think its a very good speech.

S: I think considering the constraints let me put it that way. But all we are doing right now is.....

K: That's okay. You don't have any objection to the substance yourself?

S: No. The substance is good. The only problem I have with it is you know we have this overall economic review and some of these questions were sort of still being debated. Now if these -- which I don't think he's come down on anything.... That settles the debate.

K: It doesn't really settle the debate. The only advance we are making in raw materials is that we're saying we're willing to talk about it.

S: I read it that way if everybody else does why we'll be set.

K: Look, we're going to have to do one hell of alot more than that before the year is up.

S: Yes. That's where the great debate will be I agree with that.

K: That I don't intend to settle with that speech but it's absolutely irrational for us to say oil prices must not be high but everything else must be low.

S: I suppose as customers that we'd like to keep everything low that we can though we realize there are other complications.

K: You know the best way to do that is to get it into a debate in which we control the forum. We don't have to settle that in the speech.

S: That's the point and as long as ... As soon as I have the comments in from these four people I will get them to you.

K: If you're just clearing it that's what I want you to do.

S: We are right now clearing it.

K: Terrific. You know we've been trying to reach you and you were out of town.

S: No, I've been talking to people. I understand. I got the speech last night and went over it last night.

K: Well we have a better draft now.

S: Yes draft three. I have draft three as of last night so we'll be getting back to you about noon or thereabouts.

K: You get in touch with Enders.

S: I will. Thank you.

SF-128 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Larry Eagleburger/HAK
10:54 a.m. - 5/12/75

K: Larry, are they producing that speech now for distribution.

E: The first one, yes.

K: Now let me see. There was something that I crossed out when I said we have to stop tormenting ourselves and get to work.

E: They were going to redo every page wehre you had done anything.

K: But do you think that sentence should go out?

E: No. I was even sorry you took out my use of the word nonsense. I think you need to be kind of tough about this.

K: That's early in the.....

E: I can find it.

K: Put something so its time we -- can we say tormenting ourselves?

E: Sure.

K: Alright. Then put the sentence back in.

E: Okay. Will do.

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SF130

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Herb Schlosser/Secretary Kissinger
May 12, 1975
11:20 AM

(Missed first part)

S: ...whether you should go on that program. My judgment is that you should. This is as a friend. The reason is this. If they're doing a program about you and you choose not to appear___. You will have had a chance to say or to have some ___to put those into perspective. Can I make one suggestion?

K: Yes.

S: You know what you ought to say. Coming from you, it will add a lot for reality.

K: ____anti-Semitism.

S: And then you might decide not to be Jewish any more. (laughter) When they brought you up as Super K and ___. You're the same man now. All you did then and all that you're doing now is the very best job you can do. Sometimes things work out and sometimes they don't. You;re getting now that you get over to people you know. A very very clear notion of you on self____. I think if you can be a little ____.

K: Which happens to be true.

S: I think coming from you it might be harder, not just for yourself but for those who comes on____.

K: That I said on the Barbara Walters show.

S: I heard you say that.

K: Will I have a chance to see you while you're here?

S: I'll be coming down around noon. Could we see each other before the ___.

K: You're going back that night?

S: No, the next morning.

K: Can you come in at 6:00?

S: What times does the dinner start?

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K: At 8:00.

S: I should be all dressed at 6:00?

K: Where are you staying?

S: At the Madison.

K: Come in with a ___. I will have to change myself. Come in at 6:00. If you want to be dressed, fine.

S: I'll give you office a call when I get in touch. How many people come to these things?

K: About 150.

S: It should be fun.

K: See you on Thursday..

S: I'll give you a call before.

END

SF 134

RELEASED IN FULL

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TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Secretary Butz
2:00 p.m. 5/12/75

K: You know, I cut back that food part of the speech very much so that we are now down only to the resource points. If I understood, Enders had cleared with you.
Now I understand it's all getting unstuck again and I have to give that speech tomorrow.

B: There is one word Henry that I think the group is separated over--and have been separated for some time. And that's the use of that work "priority" if you got that particular paragraph.

K: But we had in the World Food speech.

B: I know you did, but could you simply say to assure access and leave the word priority out

K: H ow about preferred access?

B: The word priority means you are going to cut across the market system and that gets our farmers upset as the devil. Could you same the same thing to assure access and leave the details to be negotiated in London?

K: I haven't got the damn text -

B: As I recall its' the paragraph that says something assuring priority access --

K Yeh, I got it now.

B: If you could put that word "priority" out I think we probably could silence most of the critics there.

K: In other words, the system must assure access to supplies for countries that participate in the reserves ...

B: Yeh, could you do that and then leave the word priority out, because priority means you cut across the market system. Then you wouln't have yourself blocked in on it.

K Okay, I probably can do that.

B: All right, I'll phone back my people and say--and you may still do it, you understand, but you don't have yourself blocked in. I think we shouldn't wave a red flag in front of our farmers.

K: Okay, fine.

B: I'm sorry to cause this much trouble, Henry. K: Okay, fine. Bye.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 24 MAR 2004 200102979

SF135 *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Tom Enders
5/12/75 p.m.

K: I just talked to Seidman and hesays there are really massive objections.

E: That's what he is saying, but I don't think--

K: Have you got the comments?

E: They are on their way over.

K: I don't see the sense in giving a speech ~~with~~ which soon will be disavowed by all the agencies.

E: I think we can take into account the tone points of Alan Greenspan, but the difficult one is going to be the grains reserves one.

K: I can't reach Butz--he is in Sarasota, can you reach him?

E: All right.

K: And then on raw materials, we have offered to discuss prices, I thought that's what we didn't offer to do.

E: No we didn't offer to discuss that. When I get these points, I will try to take them all into account, should I not?

K: Well, only if there is still a speech left then.

E: No, no, without cutting away at the speech.

K: I want to be sure we don't have endless sniping afterwards.

E: Right and I

K: And I want you to sit down with Seidman to make sure that the points are represented.

E: I will and with Bill Simon.

K: Simon doesn't want the speech given, that's perfectly clear to me;

E: But he's already told you he has no substantive intention (?)

K: That's what he said

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E: I will make sure that Bill Seidman's points if at all possible satisfied.

K: Okay, well I'll have to call you when I get back. And work with Brent on this. How is the speech itself, coming?

E: We are through the redraft--so we'll have that well within the time schedule.

K: Okay, good, I'll call you from St. Loouis.

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SF-140

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Joe Sisco
12:12 p.m. 5/14/75

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Joe, can we just send that letter to the Secretary General and not to the President of the Security Council.

S: We can do one or both.

K: Then just do the Secretary General.

S: All right, and we'll make that public--that looks like a serious attempt and we can always hold that other one up

K: Good. You go ahead on that.

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TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Joe Sisco
5/14/75 7:58 p.m.

SF-147
RELEASED IN FULL

S: Just a couple of very quick things--we have started the telephoning and I will have Bob Ingersoll when he comes to your 8:00 o'clock dinner, give you the list of the countries--

K: But I don't some of these usual pansy briefings.

S: Henry, I have conveyed precisely what you told me to the boys; I have confidence--I told them firm and you've got Art Hartman doing this; you've got Phil Habib. These are not pantywaists that are doing thi s

K: Yeh.

S: The other thing I've got three telegrams'' I can either have Bob carry them to you within the next five minutes--what it is--or I can read them to you. What it is is a very brief telegram to all diplomatic posts; a short telegram for Bangkok which gives him a little guidance and third, Henry, another letter this time going to the Security Council because we are using force and we are obligated to tell them we are using force under Article 51. And we should do this from a public relations point of view. And those are three--I could have them hand-carried to you

K: Well, have them hand-carried.

S: All right, and then they can be transmitted from there.

K: Good, thank you.

S: Thank you very much.

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SF145 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Mr. Sisco/Secy Kissinger
6:16 p.m., May 14, 1975

S: Mr. Secretary, I'm here with Bob Ingersoll and Phil Habib and all the Regional Assistant Secretaries. On this notification, we have the following suggestions: that we ought to put together a very short, 2-paragraph cable that would go to the key posts.

K: The only trouble is the NATO people it would arrive too late.

S: Well, the other alternative is to pick up the telephone, Mr. Secretary. There isn't really time to pull the Ambassadors in and to get them in here.

K: Why not -- Why is there no time to get them in at 8:30 tonight?

S: What time is your announcement going to go out?

K: About 10:00.

S: Oh, well, that gives us more time. If the announcement is at 10:00, why then we can get them in here at 8:30. That's a different matter. [Hold on] Everybody here feels that they also want to get a cable to the field as well.

K: Why?

S: Because it's the governments concern that are really the primary things rather than the Ambassadors here. They've got their own communications but their communications are fairly slow and in many instances, unless we --

K: Well, look, it's midnight in Europe!

S: Yeah. Do you have any objections to their doing this telephonically with the Ambassadors rather than getting them in together as a group where there will be a lot of questions which I don't think we should want to answer at this particular time.

K: All right, you can do it telephonically but I want a strong -- I don't want a weeping State Department -- just say we're trying to rescue the ship and the crew and we are doing military operations on the Island and trying to seize the ship and there may be a few associated operations.

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S: Yeah, that's all you would say.

K: Yeah.

S: Sure. And you might add one other point: namely, that we undertook certain diplomatic steps beforehand and _____ they will do to achieve the results.

K: Yes, but I do not want to give the impression of super reasonableness.

S: No. All right, that's fine. I'll pass that along. We're all right here. But I think we can do this telephonically in each instance.

K: All right. But make sure the Japanese know -- you can the British a little more.

S: Tell the British a little more, all right. We'll work out a half dozen talking points on this basis and we'll spread out and we can start.

K: Okay.

S: All right. Good. Thank you.

SF-139 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
David Binder
Secretary Kissinger
10:20 a.m. 5/14/75

K: Look, the brains don't know a goddamn thing about Cambodia, no matter what they say.

B: [laughs] Yeh, they admitted as much. I've got two questions for you. One is a kind of favor, on the assumption it might interest you. I have pal named _____ who is head of the Hungarian television series--they do a news program. He is in town on a USIS grant and he wants to do something with somebody about detente and I said it might serve Secretary Kissinger's purposes to say a few words about detente before he takes off.

K: I don't think so.

B: So, I just thought I'd put a bid in, if that served your purpose to talk a few minutes on Hungarian TV.

K: Well, let me think about that.

B: Okay. And the second thing is, I wanted to ask after hearing from one of the Vietnam Task Force people that one of the options was before the fall of Saigon to leave a token force in the Embassy -- if that was worth exploring for a story.

K: Yeh, that was one of the options.

B: Do you think it will serve a useful purpose to take that a little further and---

K: I don't see how much further you could take it--

B: In other words, what considerations were involved in that kind of option--in terms of who would take over--

K: That was on the theory that Minh would be in for a while--

B: Ah

K: To conduct the negotiations. I don't know what the Task Force considered -- it nev

B: I see. But not in terms of relations with--

K: No that was never considered. I don't know what the Task Force considered--it never got up to my level.

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B: I see. Okay. I think I'll drop it then.

K: Yeh, there was no serious consideration--in fact there was no consideration --

B: Yeh, how are you getting along with that Cambodia thing?

K: "We are on top of it-" he said as he went under.....

B: [laughs]

K: No, you know I really think we know what we are doing and we've got to assemble things before we can even go further

B: Yeh, Well, I wish you luck as always.

K: Thank you, you've been a good friend.

B: I think I am x.

K: I know that--I deeply appreciate it--I want you to know that.

B: Good. I feel strongly aboutit. Good luck to you.

K:

B: If you think about it--it would serve a useful purpose--perhaps the --one of your people could get in touch with me about Pa_____ He's a good man.

K: It's not that--I've two problems one I have--for all purposes no time at all.

B: This would be a five-minute sort of thing.

K: Maybe I'll do five minutes.....

B: Okay, I'll hear from you if you decide that.

K: Yeh. Right. Bye.

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SF 140

TELCON
Julius Katz/Secy Kissinger
6:31 p.m., May 14, 1975

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Yes, Mr. Secretary.

HK: I wonder whether you know -- Did Tom yesterday get in touch with the French and IEA (?) partners --

K: Yes, sir. We got a cable out the night before so that they could be informed first thing yesterday morning. The French de La Gorce, the Minister Counselor, was in to see me this morning and the Ambassador is coming in to see Chuck Robinson tomorrow. They were very appreciative of prior information.

HK: Okay. They ought to be appreciative of the substance too.

K: Well, they are. They're a little uncertain as to precisely what it meant and I said well, we wanted to move forward and that there would be consultations of course with them and others on how to proceed.

HK: Yeah, but they can have the Conference. We don't want to call it.

K; Yeah. Right. Sure.

HK: Okay.

K: No, I think they were quite flattered and pleased.

HK: Okay.

K: Yes, sir. Thank you.

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SF-143

TELCON
Jerry Bremer/Secy Kissinger
5:55 p.m., May 14, 1975

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Jerry, we have a Leadership meeting scheduled here for 6:30. I'm going to stay over here but I am going to try to come to the Bunker affair. Of course, that folder isn't with me, is it?

B: I don't know. If it isn't, I'll get it over there right away.

K: Okay.

B: What do you want to do about Ziegler?

K: I'm going to try to reach him to see whether he wants to come here at 6:00 for ten minutes or do it tomorrow.

B: We won't do anything then.

K: But I would like to see these intellectuals.

B: Yeah. Let me talk to Winston and see what we can do about that. He said they were fairly relaxed but they know that there's no chance of your seeing them this evening really.

K: Well, are they here tomorrow too?

B: Well, let me find out and I'll give you a note on that, sir.

K: Good.

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SF-137

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Art Hartman
Secretary Kissinger
9:31 a.m. 5 / 14/75

K: Hello, Arthur, where do we stand on the KLM issue?

H: We have agreed to disagree--that is we will have no agreement--they are cutting back a little bit of their traffic and I ~~think~~ our people are going to hold still.

K: Is he going to raise it?

H: I think only to say they are happy it turned out this way and they hope that maybe next year's negotiations won't be as difficult.

K: Okay, good.

H: Right.

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SF-156

TELCON
David Rockefeller/Secy Kissinger
4:08 p.m., May 15, 1975

RELEASED IN FULL

K: David, how are you?

R: Thank you for calling. I'm fine. I saw our Korean friends this morning and had about an hour with them. It was in a very friendly tone. I started out saying you suggested it was on the basis of their having told me several months ago that their objectives were entirely peaceful and they have no intention of any kind of military action that have made me feel that there was a basis of conversation and that I talked to you and that if that continued to be --

K: Tell him to -- Excuse me a minute. [Talking to someone in the room:] Tell him I want to see him for two minutes, tell him to hold up. David, I've got to call you back -- I've got to go to an NSC meeting with the President. I thought he was running behind.

D: Oh, all right.

K: Let me call you back in an hour.

R: Okay.

K: Bye.

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SF 138

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
May 14, 1975
9:55 AM

RELEASED IN FULL

S: On this ship matter, for public relations reasons only, why don't we go through the cosmetic motions by writing a letter to the UN and send it to the security council protesting the seizure on the high seas. It will help us with the Congress when we get to military action. Why don't we also try to get the Secretary General ____. I know nothing will come from this.

K: The Chinese have not turned us down..

S: I was looking at this statement this mooning. It's that good ____ and we can't lose a thing by it.

K: Why don't you prepare such a thing.

S: OK.

END

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SF155-

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Joe Sisco/Secy Kissinger
11:36 p.m., May 14, 1975

K: Hello.

S: Hello, Mr. Secretary.

K: Joe, I don't know whether yet but we got both the ship and the crew.

S: Yeah, I just got the word. I must say that is terrific, Henry.

K: So will you modify your messages to add these facts to it.

S: Beg your pardon?

K: Will you change your messages to add this fact to it.

S: Which messages now are you referring to?

K: That circular one. I haven't even looked at the three I've got here

S: Yeah. Well, all right.

K: . . subject to all diplomatic posts.

S: Yeah, as far as I'm concerned, that's dead. There's no point to it. See, we've done the telephone calls.

K: Yeah, but the one to Whitehouse, I would add that fact to it because it will reassure the Thais.

S: To the Thai one.

K: That is right. Why not a circular -- where are you?

S: I'm at home right now. I just walked in the house.

K: Well, why not a circular message to the posts to bring them up to date.

S: All right. That's fine. We can do that. As far as the Thais are concerned, they're not so interested in whether we got the boat and the Americans, they're interested in making sure the Marines don't go back to --

K: That we can also tell them. But the major thing the Thais want to know is that it worked.

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S: Yeah. Why don't I have a paragraph added to that Thai message and a paragraph added to that circular.

K: Okay.

S: All right. I'll call it in.

K: Thank you.

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SF154

TELCON
Joe Sisco/Secy Kissinger
9:15 p.m., May 14, 1975

RELEASED IN FULL

K: . . . Sending a message to the Cambodians by releasing it to the press.

S: Good.

K: Saying we have heard the broadcast, we want you to confirm it and we will stop military operations as soon as you assure us you will release the crew members promptly.

S: Good.

K: In the meantime, we've seized the ship but we will not stop bombing the mainland.

S: Yeah, I see that. Well, then that takes care of my other question because I was worried on the press side, . I was going to recommend to you that you take the offensive and take the initiative because the one kind of criticism we would face here is if you guys had waited another hour or two, you know, and all that sort of thing. That's what we will hear here so I was going to recommend to you get out and get our side of the story that these guys have had three days to respond. But

K: That's right.

S: But now this announcement I think meets that particular concern, you see.

K: Yeah. Okay.

S: All right. Look, I'm going to go out and get a bowl of chili but I'll be back if there's anything you want from Phil and me.

K: Okay, fine. You can send that letter to the Security Council although I just don't see why it can't wait until first thing in the morning.

S: No, it . . . to know. I'll send it now, Mr. Secretary. Take my word for it, get it out.

K: Why?

S: Simply because you are fulfilling an obligation . .

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K: Okay, go ahead -- send it.

S: . . and nobody can criticize you.

K: Okay.

S: Okay.

RELEASED IN FULL
SF-157

Telcon:12:58-5/15/75
Secretary Kissinger/
Secretary Schlesinger

K: Hello.

S: Hi Henry.

K: I notice you and I have been in disagreement again.

S: On what.

K: Well our thoughts are different(?).

S: Where was that?

K: They said you and I differed throughout this. You were for moderation and I was not.

S: Where is that. an AP story.

K: Yes.

S: UP.

K: AP. Freeport. Well, we both know it is baloney.

S: Henry, looks the Thais are jumping all around and this fella Masters out there is heading a panic. Now, my judgment is it would be desirable for us to ~~xxxxx~~ show that in a moment of crisis - you know we don't care that much what all the nonsense is from the host government. I am not sure that won't have some therapeutic affect in Portugal, the X Azores, and so on. I am not sure that we ought to hop around to make them happy again. We ought to

K: Well , what - are my guys going to

S: No, no I am just making ~~xxxx~~ a general thing. I discovered this morning that we are pulling the Marines out and if I had ~~thought~~ thought about it, I would have said let them stay a couple of days until it seems to be

K: Well, I think we should - I haven't focussed on it but I wouldn't revert that order now.

S: No, that was my reaction. But If I had had a chance to think about it I would have been rather casual about it - a little more casual.

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K: I would have ignored them and I am going to make sure that Masters isn't going to apologize all over the place.

S: Well, you know we have had some trouble with him. You check that I don't mean the Department. We the United States have had some trouble with him. For one thing he refused to announce that downed chopper out there. Now just because he didn't want to be associated with these combat(?) activities. Now that is an aberation for an Ambassador. It may have been justified in these circumstances, but his telegrams that I have seen are kind of on the panicky side. He seems to think that Thai/U.S. relations doesn't need(?) consideration. Anyway,

K: Jim, I am - personally have to run to a luncheon I am giving for the Shah.

S: Right.

K: But I think it xxx was beautiful of them and I think it was the best cooperation and the NSC of all of us.

S: Right.

K: And I feel very good about it.

S: Well, that is right. It worked out very well, even those bastadds in Thailand. I had a press conference last night about 3 or 4 o'clock - somewhere in there. And those God damn press people - it was the first time I felt my gorge rising. Now they really were frustrated that the United States was being humiliated.

K: Oh, yes they wanted us to leave (lose?).

S: And all these questions about the Marines being pinned down on the beach. Just dreadful. There was a pin down you know, but that was this crash crew. They were isolated at another part of the Island. We got them out too. But that was the only pin down.

K: Yes.

S: OK.

K: Good, good. I will see you later.

S: You bet.

K: Bye. S: Bye.

*
RELEASED IN FULL
SF-160

TELCON
Larry Eagleburger/Kissinger
5/16/75 - 10:42 a.m.

K: Hello.

E: I just got a call from Avraham Kochba in New York. He says that Perez will not be able to come to Vienna. I thought you would want to know that.

K: Well, that is what I figured. Say, did you ever call Joe Kraft about that other thing about calling in people?

E: Yes.

K: What did he have to say?

E: Oh, you know Joe, he never gives you an answer. He fluffed around. He didn't give me any answer, he just -- well, Larry, I've heard you, you know.

K: O.K. Thank you.

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TELECON
David Rockefeller/Secretary Kissinger
May 16, 1975
2:35 PM

SF-162

RELEASED IN FULL

R: Do you have a minute? I followed pretty much the line that you had suggested I follow in talking with this group yesterday. They were very friendly. I've sent you, by hand to Jerry Bremer, a good two-page account of it which you can read if you find time.

K: I'll certainly read it.

R: I started out saying I came to them because they indicated to me originally they wanted to find a ~~xxxx~~ peaceful solution and if that were still the case you would be prepared to have a meeting with them on an informal basis. And they said _____ Mr. Kim reported their point of view._____. I thought it was important for them to know and you wanted to know in the event that they took ___ from what happened in Vietnam. That there would be an immediate response along the lines your suggested. They listened very carefully and very polite and said they would be very happy to meet.

K: Let's see what they come back with.

R: I don't think they'll come back with anything. They said, you set the date.

K: Do you think they'll confirm their peace intentions.

R: In their own peculiar way. I think Joe Reed took notes, maybe you should read the text and see what feeling you get. I think they went as far as they're going to go, that they will not take the initiative in a ___. They listened very carefully when I told_____.

K: That we don't ask...

R: The question then is, I'm ~~xxxxxxx~~ raising/came from ___.

K: We can't do too much until June.

R: What I would like to suggest, we try to set a date for June when I get back. Do you want to pick ~~xxx~~ a person now?

K: Why don't we wait until June.

R: And not even set a date.

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K: No, let's pick a date in June.

R: And not say who it will be.

K: No, why don't you call me in June.

R: Meanwhile, organize a time with ___.

K: We don't have to be that hair triggered.

R: And you will be happy to have the meeting.

K: I want some more formal confirmation that they will not initiate action. I want to get it confirmed from Yang.

R: Whether they will be prepared to do that through me, I'm not so sure.

K: Then there's no sense in talking. Let's see what they're going to do.

R: I wonder what my word is to them.

K: You word is, what they said is just their own view. The word must come from Yang.

R: I think they were.

K: They could not have possibly reported back and got your answer.

R: I don't mean in terms of meeting, in terms of nonaggression.

K: That's right.

R: OK. Let me tell them that and if this is given, that you would like to set the me eting when I get back.

K: That's right.

R: I was delighted at the way you handled this Cambodia thing.

K: I came out well. Nelson was a great help.

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R: It was absolutely right and strengthened our position throughout.

K: I think so. You're going to Indonesia?

R: No. Japan and South Korea and then through Moscow.

K: That's right.

R: I will be back in the middle of June.

K: You can tell them if they are prepared in the middle of June ____ Yang instructions confirm they we will be able to arrange a meeting.

R: I'll see what they say. Very good.

K: I just don't want to have it leaked that ~~xxxxxx~~ there's a meeting in this ____.

R: If you have any further ~~xxxxx~~ thought, maybe you can get Jerry to call me if you don't have a chance.

K: I'll read that paper ~~xxxxx~~ today.

R: It should be in his hands right now.

K: He hasn't given it to me. Thank you for everything.

R: Good luck.

END

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SF 166

TELECON
Foreign Minister Rabasa/Secretary Kissinger
May 17, 1975
6:32 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

R: I don't know if I still have a friend here in Wash ington.

K: You have a close friend.

R: I think everything has come out alright.

K: I hope you're still a good/friend (enough) to come up for lunch or dinner outside the OAS.

R: When areyou coming back?

K: Next weekend, and then I'm going away again.

R: When you're in Washington give me a call.

K: Last weekend you had to go away and then I had this Cambodian problem and then I had the Shah here for three days.

R: I have been speaking with Bill Rogers. He's a good man. I think we can get in the position on this question before we go to Costa Rica. We are not going to say what you decision is_____and a man with guts in the State Deparment.

K: I consider you a good of friend as always.

R: Best to you and Nancy.

K: We'll see each other soon.

END

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SG 87 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/The Secretary
July 24, 1975
Time: 5:58 p.m.

K: Did you see that Greek Ambassador today?

S: I certainly did. I blasted him. I am sick of this vote. I have McCloskey and Hartman here. If the President issues this we ought to send it in a message to Ankara saying that they ought to keep their chins up.

K: Let me get it to the President. Has he got anything?

S: You cleared off with Bob so I assume -- It has gone, it has been phoned to the White House.

K: Let me call the President.

S: O.K.

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SF 169

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
The Secretary/Mr. Mark Childs
May 24, 1975
Time: 4:55 p.m.

K: How are you Mark?

C: Fine, but the question is how are you?

K: I am staggering along.

C: Good. You remember you said you would get in touch with Sadat for me and give him that message.

K: When are you going to be there?

C: The 19th for a week. The 19th to the 26th of June.

K: O.K. I will arrange it. You may have to go to Alexandria.

C: I will try to write a constructive column. That letter from the Senators is terrible.

K: It is an outrage. When you analyze the part about secure and defensible borders that means they can stay where they are.

C: That is how to define it, they can stay within the borders they are in. For one thing, the timing was terrible. By the way, we are going to Brussels and we may see you there.

K: Good, give me a call. I will see if we can get together.

C: Thanks a lot about Sadat.

K: You can count on it.

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SG 103

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
July 25, 1975
10:49 AM

D: I just got a call from the Prime Minister's office that we will have an answer in 10 or 15 minutes, so I thought maybe we ought to try to get together.

K: Let me get to another telephone.

D: OK.

K: I don't know. My problem is whether I can do it. I'll have somebody call you. I have to go to the White House now and I have to give a press conference. Maybe we can do it around 2:30.

D: 2:30.

K: There's no hurry about it?

D: No, except the Prime Minister is making a speech at 7:30 this evening Israel time.

K: Is that speech relevant to your answer.

D: What I understand he's going to say is the Egyptian counterproposal did not meet -- it's not acceptable to us. That is the gist of the answer... It's more along the lines you suggested to us.

K: Is it really necessary to turn it into a test of manhood.

D: I'm just reporting to you what he said.

K: I can't say that's very helpful. It's obvious it isn't acceptable in a sense that it will not lead to an agreement. Why turn it into a test of manhood of the Egyptians.

D: I'll try to see whether I can ___propose it.

K: Will you tell the Prime Minister I really think that it's obvious it's not acceptable. It has never been suggested to you that it be acceptable.

D: I understand. The answer is of course ___the Egyptian proposal.

K: My problem is, if you announce it unacceptable they haven't said your proposal is unacceptable. At the end it will ~~be~~ make it very hard to avoid

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a score card of who won or lost.

D: I will talk to the Prime Minister again now.

K: On the basis of what I have said to you. In addition I wanted to call you last night ~~xxxx~~ on what your people have done on the Golan book because you have shaken my confidence.

D: Shalev has given me all the material. It's not a question that our confidence should be shaken.

K: You must know as well as I have that he can't write a new book in four weeks.

D: It's been four months.

K: We'll have to discuss that later. The question now is ~~xxxxxxxxxxx~~ to get the Prime Minister to avoid saying this. I haven't raised it with the President yet, but ~~xxx~~ he will not be amused. Everyday there is some explosion we have to explain to the Egyptians.

D: That was in a context of a much wider position.

K: We calmed that now but to say it's unacceptable. We're not asking you to say it's acceptable but I think we will make some progress.

D: I'll talk right now to the Prime Minister and we'll aim it for 2:30.

K: Either 12:30 or 2:30.

D: I'll wait to hear from you.

Dinitz - 12:53

K: After thinking about it for three minutes, we have been saying the negoations are in progress ~~x~~ and for the Israelis to announce that it's unacceptable, we have to contrue in the American press and everywhere else as that the negotiations are in difficulty, the requirement of the Egyptians to yield, we will not find this a very helpful statement and we may be forced to say this on the eve of the President's trip. We cannot find this helpful either. We want to say that they're in progress, that no agreement has been reached.

D: I will convey this to him immediately.

END

SG 105 *

TELECON
Mr. George Meany/Secretary Kissinger
July 25, 1975
2:40 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

M: Before you went abroad I thought I would ask if you made a decision on the ILO thing.

K: No, but it will be the first group out of which we are going when we take retaliatory action.

M: What?

K: We haven't made a decision yet, but we want to hold it as the first group we will leave out when we have a pretext for retaliatory action.

M: With the ILO and the Arabs we don't need much pretext.

K: No.

M: Ok.

K: But it is still active and importantly a question of timing.

M: Ok.

K: Good, George.

END

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SG 96*

TELECON

Ambassador Habib/The Secretary
July 25, 1975
Time: 9:35 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I want ~~the~~ White House to be brought under control or I will recall him.

H: What is the problem now?

K: What I described to you this morning. Your job is to get policy in not to protect our Ambassadors.

H: I don't protect our Ambassadors. What he is doing is saying it is the time to move on it.

K: ~~The~~ White House told Alsop that he didn't understand why I wanted to hang on. It isn't his job to make policy it is his job to do what I tell him.

H: I have written him a letter this morning. But let me point out to you what he is recommending is what they are reporting to us. There is a cable which Defense and we agree makes a sensible first step. It is important that he do it on a gradual basis. Whatever he told Joe is not what.....

K: I don't want him to talk to the newspapers.

H: Why do you think I wrote him a letter. In terms of what he is recommending, it is in line with your policy. It is important to get the cable off to keep the Thais forcing the issue.

K: I want them to force the issue but I don't want him to urge them to force the issue.

H: He isn't urging them.

K: O.K.

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RELEASED IN FULL

SF176

TEL ECON
Mr. Joseph Kraft/The Secretary
June 4, 1975
Time: 6:15 p. m.

K: I appreciated that article you wrote. You know the one I mean.

Kraft: I didn't mean to say anything nasty. I am delighted that you read it. I was calling with a suggestion which may be inappropriate but I think it would be helpful to put forward. I think you have the step-by-step back together again. I think that Rabin and Sadat have to remain prominent this time. The only part that couldn't be done again is the shuttle. You should get another mediator so that those two are heightened rather than overshadowed. I was going to say that it might be useful for you to nominate someone now.

K: The reason is that...?

Kraft: The reasons are because it will take some time, and secondly because I think you need someone who will push them forward and not overshadow them. There are alot of different reasons. It ought to be somebody who can afford to fail.

K: It is not an inappropriate suggestion. I am going to try moving... The way we have to proceed is to rely less on obvious negotiations and the decision cannot be made until we can see how close we can get them and at that point I can decide what to do.

Kraft: With respect to the leaks it would be good for you to have somebody you can trust. That was all I meant to say.

K: I appreciate it and understand it. We have a long conceptual road to go. I don't know how much time it will take. I think we have got the concepts on track again.

Kraft: What has happened with the Syrians.

K: We will have to see. They are preoccupied now.

Kraft: They cannot not be in as much isolation as some people think.

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K: Not in the case of the Israelis.

Kraft: I think that the basic fact is that the two people with the strongest interest in step-by-step have emerged.

K: That is the basic reason why I think there is a chance.

Kraft: They should be kept strong.

K: I have kept myself the same on substance, but I have also been in the background lately.

Kraft: On the record, I was puzzled by the fact that before the meeting with Gromyko you mentioned the possibility of mirving.

K: No only how to count them.

Kraft: What I don't understand is why you would want to mention it to reporters in advance.

K: It had already been mentioned in Geneva.

Kraft: It was put on record?

K: No it wasn't a new idea though. It wasn't a controversial idea within the Government either.

Kraft: Are you sure? I am blundering into this.

K: There is obviously a double set of books being kept. Larry told me of your conversation and I wanted to let you read the record of the NSC meeting. It would have made things clear to you. I re-read it myself to make sure I wasn't dreaming. In the Verification Panel what I put forward was accepted unanimously and not put forward by me. Now people are saying what their Departments have agreed to, and this I cannot say.

Kraft: I don't want to make bad blood among people. They have been much better to me than in the past. Did you see Shultz's piece on SALT cheating?

K: They are right, it is outrageous.

Kraft: It is something that was well understood.

K: Well understood. You talk to anybody that was in those meetings, Clay, Colby, Clements there was no debate about it. We were talking about how to count mirvs and complexes with respect to the AT. That was not a new idea.

Kraft: I will see you soon.

K: Are you goirg to be here this weekend?

Kraft: No I am going to the country.

K: When will you be back? Do you want to have lunch on Monday? Either Monday or Friday?

Kraft: I will be around on Monday but away on Friday.

K: Let's aim for Monday.

Kraft: I hope to see you in New York on Wednesday evening.

K: What is Wednesday?

Kraft: The Japan Society thing.

K: I thought that was the 18th.

Kraft: Right, O. K. I will call you to see about Monday.

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TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/The Secretary
June 4, 1975
Time: 6:08 p.m.

SF 174

RELEASED IN FULL

D: I would like, when you have time tomorrow, 1/2 hour to speak with you on some things.

K: On what area?

D: All of Europe, and SALT.

K: O.K.

D: On Europe, in connection with your message.

K: O.K. Do you want to finish it up in Geneva or not?

D: What in Geneva?

K: The Security Conference.

D: I don't understand.

K: I see no obstacles to clearing it.

D: I would like to discuss this with you.

K: O.K. Let us discuss it. You come by tomorrow, or I will call you no later than tomorrow and you can come the day after.

D: Tomorrow you will call. Gromyko would like to continue the discussion which was started and finish with the interim meetings. I will wait your call.

K: O.K.

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SF171 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
June 4, 1975; 12:40 p.m.
Mr. Tom Enders/Secretary Kissinger

(Missed first part)

E: Would like to have 2 of us as US representatives for the . . . I had been planning to have 2 of my deputies -- Katz and B... -- if this is agreeable to Robinson. But I wanted to flag it to you. Simon flagged to me through B...

K: What is the issue? Whether Saate or Treasury has the lead. Within OECD.

E: Traditionally, we have had the lead. Our delegation is Robinson. I don't think we will have any difficulty in leading it, but wanted..

K: Can we make it joint?

E: Yes, certainly.

K: Why don't you propose it to them.

I want to find out the source of all these newspaper articles.

E: I talked to Gwertzman but on the _____.

K: It is all procedural. I can't see how it would come from you.

E: I think it is basically coming out of the White House group.

K: Like who?

E: I know that some of it came from Greenspan. I believe some of it came from Lynn and possibly Seidman and Simon has been talking..

K: - TOLD the ? how well we did it.

E: That is right. It is a systematic sort ..

K: If people want to advertise their bureaucratic defeats, that is their problem

E: Exactly.

K: Okay.

END

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SF 172*
RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Mr. Bill Seidman/Secretary Kissinger
June 4, 1975; 12 noon

S: Mr. Secretary, Bill Seidman.

K: How are you?

S: I am pretty good--just recovering from your friendly telegram to me. You have not lost your sense of humor despite your somewhat barbed approach to it.

K: I know you have had nothing to do with it. You have been a friend and supporter but we have a problem. Look at the Gwertzman article today. Nobody who was in Europe with me would question what we did and that it was the right thing.

S: I have not read it.

K: We have got a new approach and we are pissing on our own accomplishments.

S: I have not seen it. Most of it is a rehash..

K: the whole procedural point..

S: I have a piece of paper I would like to drop by and see you with.

K: I suggest that we have lunch or breakfast on Saturday.

S: Breakfast would be fine.

K: Let's have breakfast on Saturday.

S: I will show you these papers.

K: Do you think these maniacs could be kept..

S: I would like to know where it is from. You certainly read Evans & Novak this morning.

K: We have 2 problems. One, the White House group that is trying to get me. That is not even Simon or Lynn or in the economic area. That is in the Robinson area.

S: We have had no leaks out of that place since we have ..

K: I think myself that Simon is the cause of most of these stories.

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S: He was in Europe. It was a defeat for him. I can't understand what he would gain from leaks.

K: Somebody keeps putting out these stories. Believe me, I have been here long enough and in 6 months after we are out of here no one will give one good gd.

S: It is foolishness. I agree. My judgment is first thing, Simon was with you.

K: You get alot of these things. Now you tell me what _____ oil policy.

S: You know Simon has been running around to cut off Iranian spare parts.

K: And we will be in the same place we are with Turkey and it will take three years to take effect.

S: I am no judge of that. My judgment is where these articles came from is that it had to either come from your shop...

K: Impossible.

S: Or it came from the UN(?) group if you call T___ / was in the meeting.

K: It cannot come from my shop. First they know I would kill them. If some ? wrote that I defeated Bill Simon by getting a paper approved....

S: certainly John Dunlop doesn't do it. Lynn doesn't do it. Simon was with you and I cannot see what benefit he gets out of it.

K: Will he was

S: That was reall6 not what this article was about. I was totally baffled.

K: The Gwertzman article lists Simon, Burnett, and Parskey as being opposed.

S: People write like that.

K: But when you read it, you'll know he had some substance.

S: I hope it doesn't get in the way of our trying to establish a good working relationship.

K: But you and me ---I think we have to do our utmost to get the ETB...

S: The approach has been decided unless somebody wants to bring it back to the President.

K: No. There is no need to change it. Well, let's have breakfast on Saturday.

S: Okay.

K: Good.

END

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SF-173

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Bill Rogers
6/4/75; 3:19 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: BIll.

R: Mr. Secretary.

K: They are having a leadership meeting here at 6:00 which I hope will be over at 7:00 but it may run until 7:15. Is it still worthwhile to go over then.

R: Oh, yes. It is six to eight.

K: Okay. Do you want to pick me up here at 7:00 then/

R: I will pick you up there at the White House at 7:00.

K: Good.

R: You bet.

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TELCON
Secretary Simon
Secretary Kissinger
6/5/75 11:05 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

SF179

S: Hi, Henry

K: Hi, Bill.

S: Henry, a couple of things. A fellow who is a friend of one of my senior people over here, Steven _____, has ~~been~~ told us the following. He has been in touch with the Chief of Staff of Equador Government--if that is what they are called. Equador would like a senior official in the United States Government, outside the State Department to discuss supposedly this government .... they want to pull out of OPEC, they want to make sure they are able to sell their oil, if they did pull out of OPEC and they would like to discuss a potential deal with the United States and then pull out of OPEC. He also mentioned in passing that he thuught that Venezuela might want to do the same thing.

K: I don't believe it--

S: I don't believe that either. I just mentioned that --

K: From whom did you get this--

S: This came from a fellow whose name I don't remember--Roberto somebody of Cuban national who is a businessman in this country, now and--

K: It could be trap

S: Sure , it could be. We can either A, forget it B we could say, all right and not involve you and you say, all right, Simon you go talk to em and let's see what kind of a story he tells us.

K: But I don't think you should see him either. I think -- I don't think it should be at the Cabinet level, now who is it that they want to send--

S: They want to send the Chief of Staff--General sombody in Equador

K: Let me talk to Bill Rogers about it, he's a good man and see what he thinks--he knows these people

S: Okay, I will do nothing until hear from you--this is similar to the last request we got where people say we don't want to talk to State

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because what we've got to do is lay the groundwork for this--

K: When was the last request, I don't remember that.

S: Oh it was another country, but I've forgotten which one right now. But I passed it along to you--actually I sent you a memo on that, but I decided not to memo this one.

K: Okay, well let me check with --

S: Next thing did you do anything on the Schmidt thing while you were over there--

K: I mentioned it to him, but it was sort of at the tailend of a conversation, but I can take it up again, in fact what I wanted to do was to discuss it--mention it to Genscher or to Sheel when he comes here and let them talk to Schmidt or I'll call Schmidt.

S: You just use your own good judgment on this

K: No, I think it's a good idea--I think in fact it's necessary.

S: I did too, I thought it was an outstanding Idea.

K: And I'll set it up within the next three weeks.

S: Good, Okey dokey.

K: Bye Bill.

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SF183

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Tom Enders
6/5/75; 3:00 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

E: Mr. Secretary, Tom Enders.

K: Yes, Tom.

E: How did you come out with Jim Lynn? Is he back on board?

K: Well, I came out with both him and Seidman: Simon one, I want Senior State Dept. representation on the Economic Policy Board.

E: Okay.

K: Uh, secondly, . . .

E: Uh, I -- go ahead.

K: Why?

E: Well, I think that given the fact that there is an Executive Order saying that Simon does both these and the way he conducts those meetings and the way they are stacked against us, I don't think we want to make that a basis for doing business.

K: No, but I think we should be there then we can't complain.

E: Okay.

K: I am not saying that should be the basis on which to do business. Secondly, I told Lynn I would let him know ahead of time within about two months warning of the things we think on which decisions are needed.

E: Okay.

K: And he would then help us. He is basically aboard if we improve our procedures a bit.

E// Okay.

K: He is eager to be helpful. Thirdly, he said he would be very eager to have some of his people work with you on agricultural -- on some agricultural ideas they have in addition to the reserves.d

E: Okay.

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K: Can you do that.

E: Certainly, I will follow that up.

K: Good.

E: All right now, uh, let's see now, well then you want either Robinson or me to go to the EPB?

K: Right.

E: All right. Now, second ranger of issues: the question of an oil agreement with Iran, uh, this is not properly speaking my business but I told Chuck I wanted to raise this question with you since I think you are determined to go ahead.

K: No, I am willing to discuss it. Why don't we set up a meeting on it.

E: Okay. The third question is I just want to make sure that we prepare right in Europe for it if that is the line you are going to take because otherwise IEA may crack under it and it doesn't have to.

K: Well, let's discuss it. Let's get a meeting set up with you, Robinson and me.

E: Okay, very good, Mr. Secretary.

K: Good.

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TELECON
Mr. Ken Freed/Secretary Kissinger
June 5, 1975
3:38 pm

SF 191

RELEASED IN FULL

....missed first part.

F: And an Israeli official said it would be a test case.

K: They have pulled back from that.

F: There is a story saying it is not a test case, so who knows? But the question remains whether as to what the American attitude is on this. My understanding is that there is an attitude and....

K: I can't comment on anything. the Israelis and Egyptians may have between each other.

F: But there is an American opinion. Isn't it your understanding that the Israeli cargo will be allowed to go through.

K: I don't want to make any comment and if everyone would shut up things might happen for the best.

F: It got pretty bad for a while. But if there was a quiet Israeli attempt to slip cargo through, it would go without any comment?

K: I wouldn't be surprised but this is on deep background.

F: I always handle your stuff that way.

K: Ok

F: Sorry to bother you.

END

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SF 189

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Hartman/The Secretary
June 5, 1975
Time: 4:50 p.m.

K: Can I agree with Dobrynin that the confidence building measures are the only ones remaining?

H: Right. There are still other issues like the desire for the Mediterranean, but that is not between us and the Soviet Union.

K: Suppose the Soviet Union agrees to 250 kilometers, could we take a common stand with them? Then we could work together to get the other measures developed. It is the only issue outstanding between them and us.

H: Right. The French are still trying to negotiate the quadrapartite, but that is not between them and us.

K: Good and then their delegate and ours can work together on the translation.

H: And also on calming down the other high flown propositions.

K: Then our Ambassador and theirs will work together to get the thing finished if we can agree on the kilometers.

H: Right.

K: O.K. Thank you.

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TELECON
Mr. Atherton/Secretary Kissinger
June 5, 1975
3:35 pm

SF-190

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Could you prepare a read-out for the Jordanians?

A: Yes. I'll do something general.

K: Very general but plausible along the lines that we kept open both possibilities but keep it flexible.

A: I understand.

K: And could ~~you~~ you call Dinitz and tell him we hope they won't make an ostentatious test of the Suez Canal.

A: I will. Have you seen the latest ticker. The Foreign Ministry spokesman has said they are not aware of any ship destined for the Canal or any in the near future. So they have g backed off. And the Transportation Minister got ahead of himself, but they pulled him back. I will call and reinforce the point.

K: Ok.

END

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SF193

TELECON
Mr. David Biner/Mr. Bernie Gwertzman/Secretary Kissinger
June 5, 1975
~~3:45~~ 3: 46

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

B: Welcome back. Had a good trip?

K: I think it was fine.

B: I wanted to ask you a question about CSCE. I have to do a ....

K: You don't think I understand it, do you?

B: I know you have some thoughts on it. I have to do a big article on it and my impression is that there was a feeling there hadn't been enough publicity and some of what there was was negative -- such as Safire's 2 column article the other day.

K: Did he blame me for that one?

B: He didn't mention you.

K: Then I am that far ahead.

B: The thrust was let's postpone this and get something out of the Ruskies. I was wondering if you had any time to talke for ten or fifteen minutes.

K: I can't do it on the record or background.

B: Fine.

K: Only on deep background. But I can't do it today.

B: Tomorrow?

K: Tomorrow. Call Jerry Bremer.

B: One other question. Are you preparing a convention on security?

K: Not yet.

B: But we ~~have~~ have some thoughts on the idea.

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K: Yes.

B: A third thing. Just to get it off my chest. Do you have any feeling about when you are going to Latin America? Some are talking about August.

K: That is what I am thinking.

B: I am thinking about my own vacation.

K: Would you go along?

B: Yes.

K: That would be fun. I am thinking August.

B: Late August.

K: As late as I can.

B: That helps me. Bernie Gwertzman has a question for you too -- he ~~is~~ is sitting right here.

K: He is?

B: He is my friend.

K: ~~KXX~~ I like Bernie.

B: I'll ~~x~~ tell him.

K: Bernie, are you ever going to write any substance again? Or are the procedures of how my speeches are made more interesting?

G: I was asked to do that.

K: I was asked to give *two* ~~x~~/speech and everyone is only interested in how they were written.

G: We gave good play to the Kansas City one -- ran the text -- and big excerpts. The reason for that article is that there was so much interest generated on how it came about -- they wanted a piece. I tried to be fair.

K: It was very fair. What is your question?

G: On the Middle East. The Egyptians are saying they are ready for another interim agreement if the Israelis are forthcoming. They are ready but the problem is to make it sweet for both sides.

K: That goes a shade too far, but there is a possibility -- we have to see what Rabin says.

G: Rabin seems to be saying that he will give up the passes and oil fields if the duration is satisfactory

K: That seems to be the case.

G: But I am...

K: Bernie, I have to run.

G: Ok, thank you.

K: Bye.

END

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TELECON
Mr. Rogers/Secretary Kissinger
June 5, 1975
3:43 pm

5F192
RELEASED IN FULL

K: Simon called me and said he has been approached by a Cuban, which seems inconceivable to me, that the Chief of Staff of Ecuador would like to meet with him privately to get Ecuador out of OPEC if they could arrange to sell their oil to the United States. Does this make sense to you?

R: No. The Chief of Staff of the army?

K: Yes. It doesn't seem right.

R: Smells strange. Let me sniff about and see if we can find anything out.

K: Call Bill Simon and see if he can explain it any more lucidly. And Javits has some scheme with Echeverria to set up a quadrapartite group to work out some investment procedures. This seems good.

R: This came through on one of those reporting cables.

K: Do you want to talke to him about it.

R: I think it is a good idea.

K: Will you tell Javits that on my behalf.

R: Yes. I'll work on both items.

END

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Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Jack Anderson
6/5/75; 3:10 p.m.

SF 184

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello, how are you Mr. Anderson?

A: Fine. You have been very busy and it is wonderful that you have a moment. I have some documents that tell of a conversation that you had with Jobert -- my pronunciation is bad.

K: With who?

A: The French Foreign Minister.

K: Jobert.

A: Jobert.

K: Yeah.

A: This -- well, I will read you portions of it. The meeting began with Kissinger briefing Jobert on the Middle East trip he had just completed. This goes back to -- this meeting occurred on December 19, 1973.

K: Yeah.

A: Jobert then raised the oil problem and made two points. First, Jobert could not understand the American Government's attitude toward the Shah of Iran. It was clear, he said, that the Shah was going to push for another major oil price increase by exploiting the current embargo, induce shortage and yet the United States acted as if it considered the Shah to be a friendly country with a same interest. Jobert told Kissinger to be careful, calling attention to the $22 - $23 a barrel auction prices that the American independent oil companies have recently paid. Jobert warned the Secretary of State that these artificial prices would be used as a pretext to justify higher overall OPEC prices. Second, Jobert told Kissinger that the French Government agreed with the US Government about the need for oil consumer cooperation. Such cooperation, he said, should be kept within the OECD framework, that is creating a new multilateral framework for oil would not bring additional leverage but it would only appear confrontational to the producers. Kissinger however seemed to -- Kissinger however underestimated the economics and overestimated the Middle East political problem in the terms of time sensitivity according to Jobert. Oil prices were more immediately vital to the French. So they were more central(?) oriented than conflict oriented. Does this conversation sound accurate? This is a Government paper.

K: I just -- you know, I just can't remember that. I would have to check my records. And, you know, I would caution against drawing too sweeping conclusions from it because Jobert was not particularly our friend. And

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he was working to undermine us all over the Middle East at that time. Uh, I am talking to you off the record incidentally.

A: Sure. Well, the paper goes on to suggest -- and this is why it struck me as completely different than anything that I had heard before -- it goes on to say that the French wanted to hold the line against the oil prices. Their subsequent action was a reaction to our failure to do so.

K: That's total nonsense. We have been resisting the oil prices -- the oil price increased consistently and the French refuse to cooperate with us in the International Energy Agency and made a whole series of separate deals.

A: Well, there is even a charge here that they offered to join us in military intervention.

K: Oh, that is totally -- that is totally -- that, I know, is total nonsense.

A: I will read it exactly the way it said: they raised the issue of joint US military action -- just raised the issue -- references to this French proposal were made at the Embassy level and were reflected in the cable traffic. I don't have the cable traffic -- what I have is a summary of it that comes from the State Department or from people in the State Department.

K: Well, look, Mr. Anderson, it is a very, very complicated issue.

A: I am sure that it is and . . .

K: I have read some of your columns on the Shah and it's -- it depends on a lot of assumptions, like you crack the oil cartel by means of the Shah or whether you keep the Shah off the oil cartel as much as you can for other reasons. Uh, and these are complicated questions of judgment but this conversation, even if possibly would turn out to be true, which I can't confirm -- I'll have to look to see whether I can find a copy of this memo or an equivalent of it. Because you know, some of it sounds plausible to me.

A: This call is because I wanted you to know exactly what I've got. This information was made available to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and my sources are over there.

K: But by whom?

A: Uh . . .

K: Basically the French position -- I mean, if the French offered consumer cooperation there was always some sort of a gimmick to it.

A: I see.

K: So I would have to know what exactly they offered because I am sure I will be able to explain to you that it had no practical significance because whenever we try to tie them down to something specific they absolutely refuse. And at a time when we were facing an embargo for us to take on the Shah who was our only supplier of oil in that area was not the most intelligent thing to do.

A: Senator Church has contended privately according to the sources -- this isn't in the papers but I talked to the people up there -- he has contended that it has been a one-way street with the Shah, that we have done -- we have gone along with the price increases and we are paying these exhorbetent prices and he doesn't do anything for us. We give him arms, we give him . . .

K: Yeah, but why would we do that now, Mr. Anderson, I mean . . .

A: Because of the geopolitics, I would think.

K: Well the geopolitics are not irrelevant and it's not irrelevant to have one country that won't join an embargo and that might be available in case of a Middle East conflict but that is not the only consideration. I will be glad sometime to explain our oil strategy to you and I think at least you will understand what we are trying to do. You can disagree with it after I have done that.

A: I would like to do that.

K: But it is not -- you know, this town is sick right now. There are a lot of people in the whole mosaic and I speak to you frankly because I know you are a decent man who uses whatever information he gets as fairly as you know how or you wouldn't be calling me.

A: I try. And I . . .

K: No, no, ...

A: And if I am wrong it is not because I didn't try.

K: No, no, I know that. But you know -- a lot of people -- it is easy in a mosaic way -- where you have hundreds of conversations in a six month period. To pick out one and give it a little twist and hoist it on even a serious newspapwr man who may not know all the details of what was going on.

A: Uh . . .

K: You look at December 1973, you didn't have a single disengagement agreement

yet there was a high possibility that the Middle East war would blow up again. We were under an embargo from all of the OPEC countries -- ah, the Arab countries, we had the Europeans trying to make special deals. We didn't even have to be kidding of a structure of a consumer cooperation. You have to look at our strategy in the light of that period.

A: I agree. It must be kept in context.

K: And not wanting to add Iran to the embargoing countries is not the worst -- is not a senseless judgment.

A: Uh-huh.

K: At that time. Now at the present time it is a more -- there are other complications which I will be glad to explain to you sometime.

A: Well, I think that I see part of it but I would be delighted at your convenience to get a briefing and . . .

K: Well, why don't you come in next week sometime for a half hour.

A: If I may I would like to.

K: And I'll just explain to you -- because that is perfectly above board what we are trying to do.

A: Uh-huh. Now, if I use anything from this at all can I use the -- because there is this outright statement about military - joint military action.

K: That I just . . .

A: Can I ~~XXXXXX~~ quote you as saying that is total nonsense if I decide?

K: You can quote me as saying that is total nonsense.

A: And the rest I don't quote you at all on.

K: Right.

A: Okay, wonderful, and I would love to come over next week.

K: Thank you.

A: Many thanks.

K: Bye.

*

SF-185

TELECON
Mr. Hartman/The Secretary
June 5, 1975
Time: 5:14 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: What the hell are you doing with the Embassy out there?

H: We are trying to keep things moving in parallel.

K: He tells me ours is approved in Moscow.

H: It is approved with about five changes.

K: They have now approved it?

H: They have approved it with changes.

K: What is the problem with the changes?

H: We will have to do a good deal of additional work. We are going to have difficulties with the Congress if we are not moving in parallel. They have the understanding that this is moving in parallel.

K: He tells me that we are moving in parallel.

H: We are about 15 months behind them. We will have difficulty with the Congress if we cannot show we are moving step-by-step with the Soviets.

K: They have to wait 18 months for us to catch up with them?

H: We sent you a memo on it. There will be a reaction in Congress if we move too fast.

K: He tells me there is an agreement that they cannot open facilities until we open ours. What is the problem?

H: The problem is moving in parallel.

K: Who else is interested in this?

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H: FBO.

K: What is FBO?

H: Wayne Hayes.

K: I can take care of Wayne. Who else?

H: No one.

K: Would you get on this immediately with the decisions we need from the Soviet Union. Let me take it up or you take it up with Dobrynin personally.

H: Will do.

K: Get them up and let's get going.

H: O. K.

K: Thank you.

*

SF186

TELECON
Mr. Hartman/The Secretary
June 5, 1975
Time: 5:21 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

H: We have suggested and the other allies have suggested that there be one signature on a covering document.

K: You don't think I am crazy. You settle it in Geneva.

H: They are insisting on signing all four.

K: What all four?

H: That they each have to be signed creates conflicts with the Germans. If you could convince them that just one signature is necessary....

K: That is a clerical problem.

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SF187

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Hartman/The Secretary
June 5, 1975
Time: 4:24 p.m.

K: What is Dobrynin likely to raise about the Security Conference?

H: I think he will probably say they have begun to move in Geneva and that they need our help. They are moving there, we have gotten reports on it. I would stress that speed is essential. The Fins say they need four weeks for translations and things like that.

K: Can you stand by just in case?

H: O. K.

K: Right, thank you.

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SF-188

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Hartman/The Secretary
June 5, 1975
time: 4:45 p.m.

K: If the Soviets went to 250 kilometers do you think we could get the allies to accept the 30,000?

H: I think so.

K: And what was the other? 18 days?

H: I think it is the depth that concerns them.

K: I wanted to make sure. I was right. Could we sell 250?

H: I think so.

K: I know they are insisting on 300, but could we make it 300?

H: We would have a selling job.

K: We would? Could we in good conscience get behind it?

H: Yes.

K: O.K. What is their view of the date? The week of the 21st or 28th?

H: The Fins say they need four weeks. If we could finish by the 20th of June that would give them until July. They need the flexibility for translation and such.

K: The 20th of June. O.K. Good.

H: They really have made a lot of concessions.

K: Good, thank you.

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SF 201

TELECON
Mr. Hartman/The Secretary
June 6, 1975
Time: 6:50 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I have settled with Dobrynin that the two Ambassadors will cooperate there.

H: O. K. Do you want to sent a note to France and Germany and the British on this?

K: Yes.

H: Saying we think it is a good idea.

K: Will you work with them?

H: I will get something up on this.

K: Yes, will you?

H: O. K.

K: Two additional things. On Sovena coming, any time the week of the 23rd would be better for me.

H: They had suggested the 27th.

K: I would like to keep open that for my vacation.

H: O. K. Not the 27th.

K: If I go I would like to go for a week. I have tried to explain this before.

H: Not to me.

K: Are you arranging a dinner for Antone?

H: Yes, he suggested the date of the 21st.

K: The 21st is a Saturday, impossible!

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H: Well, we will just have to wait until he gets back and get a date, one that is free on both your calendars.

K: My children will be here that weekend.

H: When do you get back from leave?

K: That will be impossible. I will be involved on Middle East issues. How about the week of the 23rd?

H: He had to go back to Paris. .No wait a minute, that is right, he would be back by the 21st.

K: Why don't you check with him?

H: O.K.

*

SF-202

TELECON
Lord Ramsbotham/The Secretary
June 6, 1975
Time: 6:59 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

R: We had a good referendum. I have seen your message with Jim. I am very happy about it. We have to get on with our own work at home.

K: I received that long message from Jim. I am in complete agreement with him.

R: It is not so easy to say what we can do about it.

K: We will hold tough.

R: Arthur Hartman is coming to lunch two days before the IEA meets. We could talk about it then too. One can't put all one needs to say in messages. I will give him a note that you are replying.

K: And that I am in agreement with him.

R: And say that Arthur and I can talk in greater detail on Monday.

K: Tom Enders knows the most about it.

R: Perhaps I should talk to him. Would he want to joih us for lunch.

K: Yes. Right.

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SF 203

TELECON
Mr. Enders/The Secretary
June 6, 1975
Time: 7:00 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Are you going to the IEA Governing Board meeting next week?

E: Yes.

K: I have a letter from Callaghan about a conversation he had with Yamani which you should look at. I have asked Ramsbotham to invite you to lunch Monday if you are in town. They now want to create three groups, the French do, of equal stature.

E: They want to leave themselves in at the chair and guide the whole process.

K: Make sure you work with the British and give me a draft reply to this.

E: O. K. Fine.

K: Bye.

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SF 195

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Secretary Simon
6/6/75; 3:50 p.m.

K: Hello.

S: Hi, Henry.

K: Where are you?

S: I am up in New Jersey. We have two family graduations this weekend.

K: Okay, just remember I will campaign for you.

S: Listen, can we possibly meet on Sunday or are you going to be not there?

K: I was hoping not to be there but I find now that I will.

S: Well, do you want to get together for a little while on Sunday?

K: Yep.

S: And I can bring you up to date on this gold issue and on the potential meeting with Helmut Schmidt. By then we will know whether Helmut would be available to meet with me. So I'll see you. I will just have my secretary set up a suitable time with you.

K: Fine Bill.

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SP200

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/The Secretary
June 6, 1975
Time: 6:45 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I want to give you an answer.

D: So what is it?

K: The answer is that we will work with you if you accept this. We think that the British and the Federal Republic will support us but you should do it in a way less clumsy than usual.

D: What do you mean?

K: Your man should consult with ours before we throw it in the machine.

D: Consult there?

K: Let them get together and decide how to proceed.

D: In a better way there?

K: Yes, but we will support you.

D: Work together?

K: Yes.

D: You will send instructions to them and they will work it out?

K: Yes.

D: O. K. I will send a telegram that you are going to get together with the others.

K: You let me know when you have sent instructions so we can tell our man that you will accept this.

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D: Yes, we will do all the necessary things to get together.

K: Good.

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SF 187

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/The Secretary
June 6, 1975
Time: 5:32 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Can we get any other countries to join us in the veto?

S: Yes the British and the French.

K: O.K. Good. Thank you.

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SF-199

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Hartman/The Secretary
June 6, 1975
Time: 6:35 p. m.

K: The Russians are willing to accept the 250 kilometers if we assure them about the other two parameters.

H: I think we should go to work on it. The British, French and Germans will buy it.

K: We should say we will support them if they are willing to do it. We should assure them of our support.

H: The major countries will also join us.

K: Right.

H: Do you want me to get the message to them.

K: Well, no. I will call them.

H: Alright.

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SF198

TELECON
Mr. Enders/The Secretary
June 6, 1975
Time: 5:51 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: I just found out that you cooked up a letter to Schmidt without telling me. Don't you think I should be informed before it is done?

E: I thought.....

K: I may or may not be of importance, but communications to Schmidt are of interest to me because I have other things going on with him.

E: It is my fault. I assumed it was alright after that memo I sent you last week.

K: The content is alright but the tactics are not. [redacted] B6

E: Simon suggested.....

K: I suggested alot of things to Simon for tactics sake only. At one time I might have suggested to Schmidt to see Simon to get him off my back, but I would never send Simon for serious negotiations with Schmidt. I might have told Schmidt to see him about other initiatives.

E: Burns is going.

K: No, as I understand it only if Schmidt wants someone else present.

E: What Burns is doing is making sure.....

K: You do not understand what I want Schmidt to do with Simon. It is not to conduct serious negotiations. Well it is done now. Are they going to see him?

E: There is no response yet.

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K: The fact that it is a Presidential letter makes it high power.

E: Well, we have a fair size interest in preventing a gold block. It is a question of which Europeans could coalesce three or four years from now.

K: Three or four years from now is a long time. Well it is done now.

E: Sorry, my fault.

K: O.K.

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SF-196

TELECON

Mr. Yuly Vorontsov/The Secretary

RELEASED IN FULL

June 6, 1975

Time: 4:24 p. m.

B: Anaytol asked me to call you before he gets back to Washington to tell you that he got a reply from Gromyko on the parameters. Let me read you the text. We are ready to consider the possibility of enlarging up to 250 kilometers, however can we be sure to get the parameters and the number of troops to 30, 000? If so, I think the 250 kilometers will be accepted. The question of military matters will be closest. The concern about the major military matters is, will it be kept in force and not be subject to any changes. Only on this basis are we ready to consider the agreement.

K: Let me get you an answer by the end of the day.

B: Can I send the text to you?

K: Yes, send it to Scowcroft.

B: To Scowcroft, alright.

K: O. K.

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TELCON
Amb. Dinitz/Secy Kissinger
3:40 p.m., June 6, 1975

SF-194

RELEASED IN FULL

D: Mr. Secretary.

K: Where are you?

D: I'm in Cincinnati, Ohio. I'm getting an honorary degree from the _____ College.

K: Under what name, Dean?

D: Yeah. [Laughs] That's right.

K: Look, what I wanted to call you about was two things. One, you may or may not believe this but I am making a major effort to create the best possible atmosphere for the visit.

D: I appreciate it.

K: As your various leakers on the Congressional Committees will without question report to you.

D: No, they haven't reported to me yet. But I believe you, I don't need them to report.

K: But I really would urge that your people just keep their mouths shut now for three or four days. Why did Yigal have to say today that he warned against my coming out there because the last time I suffered from misconceptions about the position of the parties?

D: I did not see this.

K: Well, he did. Now, that of course will force me -- or could force me into saying that it wasn't I who suffered from misconceptions. And I don't think that will do anybody any good.

D: I did not see it. Where was it? In the press or was it in a cable?

K: It was on the ticker. On Jerusalem domestic radio.

D: I think what Yigal probably meant to say is that he didn't want you to come before there is a --

K: I don't ask him to tell me to come. I just ask him to keep quiet.

D: I understand. But he didn't mean . . . I'm sure. I'm sorry if it came out like this. I know that it's not -- I'm sure that what he

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D: (cont'd) intended to say is that this time we should have a more concrete -- like you say, a more concrete --

K: The second point is I read in Gwertzman's article today that I put to Israel a two-year proposition. Now there is no possible way any of my people could have done this because they don't know any -- nor have I put a proposition to you. I tried to give you an estimate.

D: Mr. Secretary, I did not speak to Gwertzman or to any living person about our meeting.

K: Well, did he talk to that person who has communications?

D: No, no; not in any seance either. Gwertzman and before him -- what's his name -- Kalb and others have been broadcasting various years for two or three days already. He has in fact yesterday before I even came from the office, Kalb broadcast from American officials three to five years. I asked Shalev to call Eagleburger and tell Eagleburger that these broadcasts have been going on now for several days and again yesterday and I did not want you in any way to think that there was influence by anything that I said because I said nothing.

K: Well, you know five years is absolutely inconceivable.

D: I mean, I could not call Bernie Kalb or Marvin Kalb and say to him: Five years are inconceivable but we will settle for one or two or three or four.

K: The way you are going, to settle for one and call it having outsmarted Kissinger.

D: No, Mr. Secretary. [Laughter] We will not. We will not settle for one and we would not call that we outsmarted Kissinger.

K: Because Kissinger wouldn't give you even one.

D: . . . Dr. Kissinger is after the Egyptians . . .

K: I'm glad you caught on to that.

D: Well, you see, it takes me time but -- Were you able to get the President to change his position on those three items?

K: No, but I really think we can do it. I did talk to him about it. I really think it's a soluble problem.

D: But it's important that he should know that it should be done before. Before even the meeting when he meets on Sunday with the Cabinet. But that's just my gut feeling.

K: Well, let me think what --

D: He definitely should not take [at least] the words that Yigal said. I mean, it could have been an unfortunate phrase but the Prime Minister made a good statement last night. I hope that you saw it.

K: As a friend, I'll tell you: Maybe he should be a columnist somewhere.

D: [Laughter]

K: There is no requirement for a daily statement.

D: [Laughter] I am Jewish so I can't agree with you more.

K: He is not under contract.

D: I gave yesterday my first interview in two years since I am in town to the Evening Star.

K: That's the third thing I wanted to tell you. I read it and I read it to the President -- which is more important to you -- and he commented favorably on it.

D: I thought I was trying to, you know, to stay -- I'm happy that he did -- because I was trying to stay within --

K: No, he commented favorably.

D: Well, I'm very happy.

K: Okay, now, if you keep your wild men under some sort of discipline.

D: Yeah. Then you cancome with some good news over the weekend.

K: No, that I doubt. I really doubt it. And I really think --

D: I really don't think you're making that great an effort because if you would, you would succeed. I really mean it.

K: No, I made a great effort once before.

D: On this?

K: In September.

D: Oh, for the -- Believe me, you have no reason to regret it. Believe me, I know that you think that because we got arms or so you say sometimes to the press in briefings that we became spoofnaked and so on.

K: Never have I said this.

D: Well, there was an inference that Israel got what she wants and wasn't fulfilling their part of the deal. But I think that the important thing is that the fact that we got arms then prevented a war from breaking this summer. I think this is of great importance. And precipitated this possible _____ negotiation. You have never gone wrong with us, Mr. Secretary, even if sometimes we are difficult, we are --

K: Impossible.

D: Impossible, we are never impossible. By the way, Sadat gave a beautiful peace-loving speech across the Canal.

K: I didn't see it. You mean, that sarcastically?

D: Yeah, I do. I do. He said that every occupied piece of land will have to be liberated by force, that opening of the Canal makes it easier for him to start war and things like this. So --

K: I haven't read it yet. We shall also point it out to him.

D: Well, I'm just thinking that Ghorbal probably gets less --

K: I don't deal with Ghorbal.

D: You don't miss a thing I can tell you. [Laughs]

K: There are months when I don't see him.

D: But, I mean, the point about Yigal. . .

K: But I could easily move you to the position of Ghorbal. Then you'll never get a phone call.

D: Oh, I love your phone calls. It's the content I'm arguing with, Mr. Secretary.

K: Come on, Simcha, now. Now, what are the plans for -- I'm going to meet Rabin at the airport.

D: Yeah.

K: And then what is your suggestion?

D: I understand that there is a meeting at 10 o'clock the following day with the President.

K: Right.

D: Do you think that you two should have breakfast together before?

K: What is your thinking?

D: I definitely favor a meeting of some sort or another -- breakfast or no breakfast -- between you and him before the meeting.

K: Well, when is he leaving Israel?

D: He is going to be in Washington -- he is arriving in New York --

K: I know.

D: 2 o'clock in the afternoon.

K: So he'll be very tired when he gets here.

D: I think it would be advisable to have a breakfast meeting rather than a meeting that night.

K: All right. I'll see whether -- I'll do an hour. He's staying at Blair House?

D: He's staying at Blair House.

K: Okay.

D: All right, Mr. Secretary.

K: Why don't you tentatively schedule that for 8 o'clock.

D: Okay. Okay, I willtell him this. Okay, I appreciate it and I appreciate what you are doing to get the thing removed psychologically before his coming.

K: I am -- If you see my statements to the press, I think you will find that I use every opportunity to speak of a constructive Israeli

K: (cont'd) atmosphere so there is no evidence on the formal level.

D: [Laughs] You are never able to conclude a sentence about Israel which is complimentary to them.

K: Come on, Simcha, you have not done badly with me.

D: I personally think --

K: Nor has Israel.

D: No, I think that we haven't done badly with you. And I say it all the time but I think, as I told you yesterday, that something happened to you in the last few months.

K: That's right. I've become anti-Semitic.

D: Not quite. [Laughs] Not quite. But some of your best friends are, Mr. Secretary.

K: [Laughs] Okay, Have a good time.

D: Yeah. Thank you.

K: Bye/

D: Bye, bye.

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Blank piece of paper attached at the end.

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SF209

TELECON
Mr. Atherton/Secretary Kissinger
June 9, 1975
2:47 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Did we announce the (Khaddam) visit today?

A: Yes.

K: Did we give the Israeli advance warning.

A: I think we did.

K: In other words we didn't. Who would have done it?

A: I thought we asked Tel Aviv to do it.

K: Why would Tel Aviv do it.

A: To the Government there.

K: Why wouldn't we do it to the Ambassador here?

A: I had the impression you told them at some point.

K: If we didn't, will you call Dinitz immediately and apologize?

A: Yes, I will.

K: And report back to me.

A: Yes sir.

3:05 PM

A: I thought I had given instructions that they be notified. I've called Dinitz and apologized to him. I've taken the responsibility and told him I meant to and I've given him the facts.

K: I'm sure he told it with great grace.

S: I'm sure he did. I think we got him in time. He heard the announcement.

K: Haveyou seen the Fahmy cable?

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Kx
A: I've just seen it.

K: Is it possible that nobody blabbed? Is NEA talking or not talking to the press?
A: No sir.

K: How many have been debriefed?

A: Hal and I are the only ones who know.

K: Draft a cabled to Fahmy and say that it cannot come out of the State Department. Is it coming from Dinitz?

A: That's my opinion.

K: I haven't given him any time frame. You tell him we can only assume that nothing has been discussed with the Israelis and that therefore everything that's in there has to be Israeli speculation. Can you get that out immediately?

A: Yes. This three to five years?

K: How about ____?

A: That's an old Israeli ___.

K: Why don't you point that out to him.

A: Yes sir.

END

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SF-204

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Tom Enders
6/9/75; 10:35 a.m.

K: Tom.

E: Mr. Secretary.

K: In that demagogic statement you wrote on oil prices there were two points according to which if it followed manufactured prices -- manufactured goods -- the price would be $1.50.

E: That's correct.

K: Are you telling me that the price of oil -- that manufactured goods have gone down?

E: No, what I am saying is that -- well, I think it is stated there. If the price of manufactured goods have in fact gone up, but quite slowly in this period.

K: And what was the price of oil and -- in '55, 60¢?

E: About $1, I think.

K: Look, the average person can't understand that. I think that part has to be written -- rewritten -- and say that compared to manufactured goods since '55 the price should only be 30 percent high and say compared to raw materials the price should only be you know, whatever the percentage is, in fact it is 600 percent.

E: We ~~id~~ can give the percentages gross in both cases and not have . . .

K: Okay, will you ~~t~~ rewrite it and give it to Funseth. I am not sure -- my present view is to wait and see what the President will say tonight.

E: All right.

K: And if he doesn't say it we may say it tomorrow.

E: Do you want a letter to the Shah -- I have drafted one.

K: Well, I want to see it, yes.

E: Of course. I did agreement at Camp David yesterday that in dealing with this issue all the energy officials try to avoid any shrill statements on this because it would only underscore our weakness. But that we could on the otherhand indicate our belief that these increases are unjustified.

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K: Yeah.

E: Is that okay?

K: That is correct.

E: All right.

K: Good. Thank you.

E: Right.

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5/F-207

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Buffam/The Secretary
June 9, 1975
Time: 6:17 p.m.

K: What exactly did we do or not do with the ILO.

B: Since the meeting began we have made a point of submitting an amendment to the standing rules of procedures on admission of the PLO to the Board of Governors to try to keep them out.

K: Did we make the amendment clear that we wanted the PLO out?

B: Yes.

K: I hear that Meany wants to pull out of the ILO and that he thinks we have not fought hard enough.

B: He is probably looking for a scapegoat. We have made a good fight, but it was foredoomed to fail.

K: Bill, just a minute. I don't care whether it was foredoomed to failure. In fact, in that case we should have made a clear record of our protest.

B: My understanding is that we have done that. We are trying to get Geneva on the phone now but.....

K: Does anyone except the three lawyers understand that? Does Meany understand that?

B: His people are there. They should be reporting back to him.

K: Who is the head of our delegation?

B: Right now Persons. Dunlop is scheduled to go over. He will do it if the AFO walks out.

K: Did we make it clear to the AFL that we were opposed to it?

B: We have done that. We have said that we will oppose the admission of the PLO.

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K: O. K. Find out for me what happened.

B: Indeed. I am afraid they will be looking for a scapegoat in this. They wanted to have an international campaign in the beginning.

K: Why didn't we let them?

B: We didn't stop them. We told them we would be working in Geneva to prevent the admission. They sent Brown to all the capitals to try and prevent it, if there is any difference. We didn't engage in diplomatic maneuvering before hand.

K: Why didn't we?

B: You and Joe and I agreed not to, because it wouldn't have been worth the effort.

K: O. K. Oh, will you let me know as soon as possible so that I don't get caught.

B: We are trying to raise Geneva on the phone now.

K: O. K. Thank you.

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SF-218

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/The Secretary
June 11, 1975
Time: 7:00 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I hear that the management guys are going to walk out too.

S: Really!

K: If that is true, our Government guy can't be the only one staying. He ought to say that he is walking out, out of solidarity and then he will return.

S: I had better get word to Dunlop's office on this. I have had a call from his Under Secretary. Have you talked to him?

K: No, not the Under Secretary. I have talked to Dunlop.

S: I just that he should walk out on that one meeting.

K: Don't yo u think?

S: I can live with that, or either way is o. k. Maybe he should stay to defend our interests.

K: I think he should say that he will leave and return for the next meeting.

S: To participate.

K: And to defend our interests.

S: O. K.

K: Good.

S: Let's do it that way.

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TELECON
Secretary Dunlop/The Secretary
June 11, 1975
Time: 7:06 p.m.

SF219

RELEASED IN FULL

K: You are getting involved in my business now. Look if it is true that the management people are walking out I will instruct my person -- is he my fellow or your fellow? -- to walk out.

D: My fellow.

K: He should say that he is walking out to show solidarity with his two private sector colleagues who can't participate. He will absent himself from the meeting and will return to the other sessions to defend American interests.

D: That afternoon?

K: Yes.

D: That would be fine.

K: That is the maximum we can do. It is more than we should do.

D: Would it complicate your other objectives?

K: It does but it would help me if you would tell Meany that I have instructed this.

D: I will do so. The three of us ought to have lunch.

K: Are you free for lunch next Thursday?

D: I will make it.

K: Let's have you and I and we will discuss the Meany problem.

D: Who sends instructions to the delegation?

K: I have told Sisco what to do.

D: Oh, you do. Lunch would be fine. I will call right away.

K: O.K.

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SF223

TELCON
Larry Eagleburger
Secretary Kissinger
6/11/75 2:50 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Larry, can I get that US News transcript again; I want to look at that one paragraph on the Middle East; so that it can't be misrepresented;

E: All right, I'll get it for you right away.

K: Okay, well I'll be over here for another hour or--

E: I'll get it brought over there right away; I think we have a copy

K: No, why don't you put it on my desk for the time I get back.

E: Oh okay, righto.

K: Anything else?

E No. It's very quiet.
I talked to Joe Kraft and he said tell you not to worry, he doesn't intend to do anything with it at all; he was just trying to--

K: No, no, no, no. I understood that; I didn't expect that he would do anything

E: He was quite relaxed about the whole thing and understanding. He said as far as he was concerned it was a tempest in a teapot.

K: I don't notice that the papers are blaming--

E: No, I don't think you ought to worry about this one--I think it will be gone in a day or so.

K: Okay

E: Okay.

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Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Secretary Schlesinger
6/11/75; 2:20 p.m. Secure

SF 222

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

S: Hi, Henry.

K: Hi, Jim, how are you?

S: Okay. I don't know if you have seen # FY 76 MAP proposal but I think your fellows at State are not representing what I have always taken to be your views on this. The biggest problem you know is Cambodia has fallen. The question is whether the aid request the President submitted earlier should be cut back concurrently. Our people have urged that we go with the original request of $848 million. I am not sure that we can get away with that. They have left out a number of programs. They cut Turkey to $70 million.

K: From what $80 million?

S: We had suggested $85 million, I think. And Greece. . . And Portugal is not uh . . . .

K: Portugal, I would like to think about. But my instinct is to back your preference on MAP.

S: State's view is that Congress is expecting a major reduction because of Cambodia. But we had starved the rest of the program because of Cambodia. State's position is we can go back later for a supplemental. I don't think we will get this until September and if we go for a supplemental it will go down the drain for the fiscal year. I think we should ask for whatever we need and cut insurance at the outset. I have always been more conservative on this than you have been.

K: I agree with you. I don't see how we can give MAP to Greece and not Turkey. I would like to look at Portugal. But I would look at the high side. Where is it now?

S: All over to the OMB and OMB is siding with State against DOD. Somebody leaked all of this to Gelb. I don't know if you . . .

K: I give a damn about it. If they give opposition to Defense on MAP I am going to raise hell about it. I did not personally review it.

S: I don't know if you want to raise hell about it but I think you would want to look hard at the numbers. As you know, I have never been a Korean aid booster but State's figure is $74 million and our figure is $125 million.

K: I am on your side.

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S: So I don't know if you want to raise hell but you should look . . .

K: I can't see $74 million on Korea. They know my views on Korea.

S: Take a look at the Gelb article. You will get a feel of the bureaucratic fighting that is -- has been going on. In order to get down to the lower number, State has advocated that we drop out the Middle East package until the reassessment is completed. So, there is nothing in the State package for Jordan and we have $148 million for Jordan.

K: Is there anything in for Israel?

S: I . . .

K: But Israel doesn't get MAP.

S: Right. But then that's foreign policy problems once you get beyond Korea and Turkey.

K: I don't know how they could drop Jordan. I will talk to these maniacs and hopefully I will get them into line -- I will get them into line unless they can give me reasonable explanations for what they are doing.

S: OMB has taken over State's position and urged that we drop $400 million.

K: They can't take over State's position if State changes its position. Let me review this and can I call you tomorrow?

S: Sure.

K: Let me give you _____ of the meeting. The President was extremely tough and said that he was inclined to go for an overall settlement and to make an American proposal and the Israelis could come up with an idea of their own.

S: That's not a bad position, is it?

K: No. Rabin went into a long explanation which proved why a final settlement was not possible. On the Golan he would not tell us what he wants. He indicated he was not willing to do too much. That's the gist of it.

S: What's the purpose of his trip.

K: That's the question. He said they would not leave the passes. Whatever else you can say about the passes -- there can be no question that we thought they had to get out of the passes and never did they say at all that it was militarily impossible. It was left that we would meet for breakfast tomorrow and then we would meet with the President. When do you see him?

S: Tomorrow.

K: I thought you were seeing him this afternoon.

S: I was supposed to but we thought it would be better to wait until we got the tone.

K: I will give you a readout tomorrow.

S: Okay.

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SF-231

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Barry Schweib/The Secretary
June 12, 1975
Time: 6:10 p.m.

S: I don't know if Bob McCloskey got to you.....

K: It is absurd. There is no possibility whatsoever. There is no conceivable development.

S: Well, obviously I haven't written it yet. I don't think anyone has written it. I got my information from a fellow from another outfit.

K: He will be proved to be totally wrong.

S: Do you have a second to go beyond that? About next month -- are we likely to be going?

K: There is a chance. What I said at the press conference today -- we will know by the end of the month whether we are close enough to go.

S: It wasn't clear to me. You were saying that Rabin doesn't speak completely for the government and that he has to go back and report. In some ways you are moving ahead but in other ways you are picking your way carefully. I know there is alot to be done.

K: It is somewhere in between. We are not there yet. It is correct that we are further ahead than before the trip started. This is just for guidance you understand.

S: Very good. Thank you very much.

K: O.K. Bye Barry.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 11 FEB 2003 200102979

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SF230

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/The Secretary
June 12, 1975
Time: 6:35 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Anatol, I have had our people check. We have been active there, your man should know. It is not only our allies it is the neutrals. We would really like to help bring this to a conclusion. What interests do we have if it is 50 kilometers more or less.

D: As far as the U.S. is concerned, what we discussed with you is acceptable? Unless the Germans, French or British come to our delegation, our channel sounds ridiculous.

K: I will suggest that the head of the delegation inform your delegation.

D: If you suggest that the British and French come to our delegation, Gromyko asked me to tell you the same thing.

K: Don't report it and we will have to deal with Kovspeloff.

D: It is your position that it is acceptable. I could report to him that your position is agreed upon by the allies are not.

K: We can't make a joint initiative on this with you and the allies.

D: As far as you are concerned, you don't mind if we use it.

K: I would rather they don't use it. Can you wait till tomorrow morning? I haven't found Hartman, but I will talk to him. Wait until tomorrow morning.

D: I will wait. Gromyko said that the 21st and 22nd are o.k. with Brezhnev.

K: O.K. Fine. I have seen somewhere that the Fins prefer it a week later. We are prepared to start the 22nd, we have no reason to change. As far as you and we are concerned, the 22nd is fine.

D: You will call me tomorrow?

K: Yes.

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D: I will do nothing.

K: I think it is better. If I send something, I will tell you what I am sending.

D: It is helpful to both of us.

K: You are absolutely right. Our people recommended that we do it that way -- I over-ruled them -- I was wrong.

D: We should talk.

K: Let's wait a day.

D: If you confirm your position, our delegation will work separately with them.

K: I think it is an excellent suggestion and I will let you know what we are doing. I will check it before we do it.

D: O.K.

1*

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Secretary Schlesinger
6/12/75; 3:52 p.m. (Telcon)

SF 224

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

S: Henry.

K: Jim, I just wanted to give you a readout of what went on this morning. He was a little more flexible today but more in terms of concepts than in terms of very concrete proposals. He said he was going to try to work out some arrangement on the basis that would come closer to the Egyptian position. But it was not a firm proposal. We in the meantime will explore that with the Egyptians. It will give us about two weeks before we know if there is a chance. On the access of oil fields I think we could make a compromise. On the Syrian side his only proposal is to let them narrow the disengagement zone of limited armaments (?). That's where we stand. I would urge you not to give any ground at your meeting with him.

S: No. Uh, the only area that I have come up with is the pricing policy but that is not a matter of concern to you.

K: That's not a policy decision.

S: It is a carryout of a law which requires us to give full cost. They define full cost in different ways from how we define full cost. (He mentioned something about increase cost of tanks, which I didn't hear.)

K: He mentioned something like that.

S: One thing, our position is dictated by legislation.

K: I think it is important that we all keep the same level of coolness. We were polite but distant.

S: That's easy. I thought -- uh, the position that he is taking is intellectually understandable but that does us no good.

K: We can't pay $2 billion a year to undermine our position in Western Europe (?) In fairness to him, I have to say the talks today were better than the talks yesterday. He at least grappled with the fact that something had to be done without committing himself.

S: How did your press conference go?

K: I only had ten minutes -- fifteen minutes. I only covered the talks. I tried to keep it vague, slightly positive.

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S: Bill Clements is scheduled to go to the Azores.

K: When?

S: Within the month as I recall it.

K: Can we talk about it a week before he is to go. If it is in the middle of some uproar, he shouldn't go.

S: Okay.

K: Okay.

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SF225

TELCON
Richard Valeriani
Secretary Kissinger
6/12/75 4:00 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: V: Mr. Secretary:

X: K: Yeh, I got to talk to a non-Israeli for a change.

V: Israeli sources are saying, however, that you might be back there as soon as the end of the month or early the first week in July.

K: Israeli sources son't know a damn thing.

V: Yes, I've seen a sense of panic I must say.

K: What I said this morning was correct--no plan exists for my going back there--whether such a plan will be made depends on on the exchanges that are now starting

V: What happens--.....back to the Cabinet--do they make a decision, pass it to you?

K: No, not necessarily you know we will now communicate with a number of the other party and we'd be in touch with them and they'll be in touch with us and I would think that within two or three weeks, a --their position will crystallize.

V: Hmhuh. And what do yo u think the outlook is?

K: Well, I mean this is all for your guidance.

V: Rabin said there is a basis for negotiations but he said don't look for anything quick.

K: I think that's a fair statement.

V: Would you say .....framework has been established?

K: No, I wouldn't go that far.

V: Not, that far, okay, thank you very much.

K: Right.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 11 FEB 2003 200102979

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/
June 12, 1975
Time: 6:27 p. m.

K: I just had
with Voronstov.

S: Both they
had to convey to
people are saying
predict what woul

1*

RELEASED IN FULL

SF-228

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/The Secretary
June 12, 1975
Time: 6:53 p. m.

S: Voronstov just called. You had agreed that they wouldn't report back to Moscow?

K: Yes. I wanted to meet with you and Hartman tomorrow. Let's get together at 9:30 tomorrow. We should let Sherer inform Karovof. It was your original suggestion. We should engineer it so the British French and Germans inform them so that we are not the spokesman for everyone.

S: I had better hold up on saying anything to Sherer.

K: O. K. Fine.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 11 FEB 2003 200102979

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5F226

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/The Secretary
June 12, 1975
Time: 6:23 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

D: I just came back from the meeting with Sonnenfeldt. He told us the bad news. -- 300 kilometers and 25 level. Also 21 days.

K: I can only tell you.....

D: You really meant this answer. We were thinking about 250 and now back to Vienna.

K: I have written a letter to every foreign minister personally. It was telling them that it is our proposition. I have had replies from the British, French and Germans, in fact, I will let you see my letter some time. I don't think you have to meet all three points in my judgment.

D: The question is whether we can meet the basic ones.

K: That is what I thought.

D: For the first time I am debating whether to telegram Brezhnev because he will be mad at you.

K: In this case he has no reason to be mad.

D: Now Sonnenfeldt has proposed that we come to Vienna, and look where we the proposal -- the same place it was originally.

K: If he did want to go to 21 and if he wanted to compromise with 275 and 20,000 as a last offer so that they could say they have exacted something from you, I think it would work.

D: Already we gave 50. It is worse than the previous one.

K: This is an issue on which we have no American interest.

D: If you would like it would be even better if I don't say anything. He really did believe in you -- all the other things you have done. But now coming back again -- I don't know what the reaction will be.

K: I don't know how Sonnenfeldt presented it.

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D: He presented it very well. He said that we failed and nothing else could be done unless we went to 250 and 21.

K: Let me call Hartman and call you back.

D: O. K.

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SF-235

TELECON
Winston Lord/Secretary Kissinger
June 13, 1975
12:50 PM

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.5(D)

K: When you get that speech done could you give it to Peter to edit so I could get it from him tomorrow afternoon.

L: Sure. I think he's working on the Atlanta speech and he's been tied up with Rabin. He was to get me more of the draft tonight and work on it tomorrow morning.

K: OK. Leave him alone.

L: Did you see my note that I'll be away the week of Atlanta? It's a big family deal.

K: I understand.

L: How the MiddleEast going by the way.

K: The Israelis are [redacted] I've ever met. Now they pulled back half the concessions they made yesterday. B1

L: Shortsightedness of those people.

K: The ~~ruthless~~ ruthless way they play with our chips. OK.

L: Good luck.

K: Thank you.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, M. GRAFELD, DAS, A/RPS, ACTING
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 6 MAR 2003 200102979
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 25X6
DECLASSIFY AFTER: HAK'S DEATH

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RELEASED IN PART
B6 SF-234

TELECON
Senator Pell/Secretary Kissinger
June 13, 1975
12:38 PM

P: I know the next few days you will be discussing the question of a replacement for ECOSOC and I wanted to inject the name [redacted] B6 with a couple of others ___ assistant for refugee affairs, ___ the President of an international list company on the stock exchange. I've known him for about 35 years. He wouldn't come into the Government in 1961. He's a strong republican. He's a very shy man, he doesn't sing his own praise. But he could handle the ECOSOC job in a brilliant way with a wife who speaks a variety of languages.

K: Your recommendation will mean a lot. I haven't heard who the other candidates are but if Moynihan recommends him, I'm inclinded to go along with Moynihan.

P: I readyl talked to Moynihan.

K: I'll call you after I talk to Moynihan. I haven't seen the other candidates and really haven't turned my mind towards it yet. I'll let you know next week.

P: OK.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 11 FEB 2003 200102979

TELECO
Mr. Habi
June 13,
3:18 PM

K: On th
would not

H: We ha
We're ne

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RELEASED IN PART
B6 SF239

TELECON
Herb Schlosser/Secretary Kissinger
June 13, 1975
6:33 pm

S: You will be in N.Y. next week for the Japan dinner, at which I will be? Will you have any free time at all?

K: If I don't go back ...why don't I stay over?

S: Ok.

K: Let's have a talk afterwards.

S: That evening or the following morning? You will not be in town before?

K: No.

S: The dinner is Wednesday the 18th?

K: Yes. I do not think I will be back in New York and I am hoping to get a vacation at the end of the following week. We can do it after the dinner.

S: Or the following morning. Are you staying over?

K: I have to check how late the dinner will be. I might prefer to sleep over.

S: Why don't I talk to you later in the week. Maybe we can spend five or ten minutes after the dinner.

K: What about before the dinner?

S: Ok. Dick Wall, the President of our news division, said he saw you in Europe.

K: Yes.

S: How are you? Things seem to be going better.

K: I'm ok. The Israelis are hard cases. If we can avoid anti-Semitism it will not be their fault.

S: I saw some remarks you made about Sonnenfeldt that were funny. You referred to him [redacted] B6

K: I can't remember. I made some remarks at the Israeli Embassy last night.

S: ok.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 11 FEB 2003 200102979

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SF 238

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/The Secretary
June 13, 1975
Time: 7:44 p.m.

S: On the Spanish bases -- you have approved the recommendations in McCloskey's memo to you to send him as assistant to the President.

K: Yes.

S: Have you given him oral instructions. Bob feels that the Pentagon is willing to see a five year way out.

K: I have told him he should bring back everything they give him and I will do it then.

S: I am not sure the Pentagon will do that.

K: I haven't given him the formal approval.

S: He has nothing in writing on it.

K: He told me that today.

S: I will make sure he gets it.

K: O.K. Fine.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 11 FEB 2003 200102979

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SF245

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
June 14, 1975
3:15 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

to Sauvagnargues

K: Why do you object to the paragraph/about the Nuclear Suppliers Conference?

S: I didn't think it was a good idea to send the message at all. I think it engages your position too early. Everything has been going well. The key time will come after the ___. The whole thing is messed up now. I'm a little concerned. I think it would be better for you to talk to him when he comes over. I don't feel very strongly about it. I don't think there's a need for you to correspond with him. The letter I think is alright. I worked on it last night.

K: I'm writing him about the prepcon and I thought I could stick these paragraphs at the end of that letter.

S: Maybe it's better not to have it as a separate letter.

K: You don't feel strongly about it?

S: No. I don't feel there's any particular need to ~~weigh~~ wade in this level right now.

K: Let me take another look at it. I just wanted to get your views.

S: It's a question of timing.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 11 FEB 2003 200102979

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SF 246

TELECON
Secretary Schlesinger/Secretary Kissinger
June 14, 1975
11:25 AM

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D), 1.4(A)

K: Hello?

S: Henry.

K: How are you?

S: Pretty good. I'm just going off to the ~~MBG~~ NPG.

K: To what?

S: The Nuclear Planning Group. It's held in Monterry this half.

K: You're also going to Alaska too?

S: No. I'm coming back afterwards.

K: We're not planning an NSC meeting this week.

S: I thought with theCommittee I would .....

K: When will you be back?

S: probably Wednesday.

K: I would like to review with you -- I just gave you a general rundown on the Israeli situation, not a detailed one. It turned out the concessions we thought they made on Thursday morning have evaporated. They said they would move to the East end of the passes. The east end of the passes is nothing. It's exactly where the were to begin with.

S: They ~~as~~ didn't seem as if they were going to make any great concessions on Wednesday evening. I gather Mrs. Rabin informed my wife that I was enthralled by you. I don't think that sounds very complimentary.

K: It wasn't supposed to be complimentary. (laughter)

S: Do you have any general views on the -- or any specific message for Labor, M__ or the Italians?

K: For Labor just my warm personal regards. [redacted] B1

[redacted] It's important to them to develop some strength.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET REASON: 25X1
DECLASSIFY AFTER: INDEFINITE
DATE/CASE ID: 24 MAR 2004 200102979

B1

[redacted]

K: I think what you had in your statement is something I could not improve. It's a damn good statement.

S: You know, Labor has brought up the subject of the 50 tanks they want to give us. I'm going to tell them to twiddle his thumbs.

K: After you and I talk you'll agree we really must do that.

S: I have no problem with you. Those people look/very relaxed. They kept saying that their military situation was good and kept talking in effect of how they were going to clobber the Syrians and maybe even the Egyptians as the need arose.

K: Our mistake was last September. If we had stayed with all of our ___. That's where we made our mistake. Everytime one of them ___. By the time they were all through they had quite a lot. Why don't you call me, when you get back and have a (drink?) at the end of the day.

S: If you want to get me, I'll be in Monterrey.

K: If anything important happens, I'll get in touch with you.

END

TELCON
Ambassador Esenbel
Secretary Kissinger
6/14/75 1:40 p.m.

SF 244

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello, Mr. Ambassador.

E: Well, how are you?

K: Okay, Mr. Ambassador I am concerned--I mean I have no particular reason--that when about the request to you to report -- I just hope that your government will not make any irrecovable decisions over this weekend.

E: I just talked with Caglayangil and he told me about the message he sent you--you received a message from him, I understand.

K: Yeh, about a week.
Earlier in the week.

E: Yes. Well, I just talk with him and I explained that -- I had wired back to him our conversation yesterday, and also having talked to you I gave them frankly speaking a timetable 15th of July. As I understand it, and I --but he is under heavy pressure from the sides that you know and as I expected they have a meeting on Monday, so I told him as my own personal suggestion that no irrecovable decisions should be made, At this point; But now frankly speaking you must understand that this can't wait for a long time, you are now on the limit.

K: Oh no, I understand that.

E: So I'm sure after having talked to him there won't be any irrecovable --now for you to understand how the situation is--there may be some preparations or some staff work or things like that--in case of a kind of contingency planning, but no irrecovable decision will be made. You may be sure of that.

K: And there would be no attacks on the United States.

E: Where, where. You mean the press.

K: The press we can control by the government.

E: The government--no, no. I'm sure they won't do that.

K: Okay.

E: But I've always been very frank with you and you must understand that there is a question of ... of the government now.

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K: Yeh.

E: In other words, if nothing happens, then the viability of the government will be involved.

K: Yeh.

E: So I understand them and I think they have to act, but I think they will--they will find ways and means to wait until this July 15.

K: Okay, good. And we will make a massive effort.

E: Okay.

K: Thank you.

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RELEASED IN FULL

SF250

TELECON
Mr. Charles Robinson/Secretary Kissinger
June 16, 1975
3:20 PM

K: Why do you and Greenspan have to see me again.

R: He suggested it. He wants to explain this more fully.

K: Come on, don't turn this small problem into a nightmare.

R: As far as I'm concerned we're in basic agreement. He is supportive of the program. I don't know what he has on his mind. He suggested it. I think he wants to have his views on the table. As far as the basic plan is concerned, he is supportive. I don't know why he wants a meeting. He just asked me to join him. Other than talking it over and talking about the next step...

K: The next step we'll decide when we see the results of this one. What I would like is to get the same amount from the Saudis. If they want more than they have to give us a better deal.

R: We're preserving the options. I think he just wants to have his views on the table.

K: What do you mean?

R: Views of the total scenario.

K: I have a speech to give on Japan.

R: I see no reason for the meeting. I just didn't want to antagonize him.

K: I'll call him up and tell him I can't do it.

R: Hold his hand a bit and that will solve his problem.

K: OK.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 11 FEB 2003 200102979

*
RELEASED IN FULL

SF 249

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/The Secretary
June 16, 1975
Time: 4:50 p.m.

K: I notice that the Israeli press has the essence of the proposal.

S: What newspaper?

K: All of them.

S: That means they are backgrounding.

K: It says that the Egyptian forces will move into the passes.

S: Oh yes, I remember that. This was a review of a number of newspapers.

K: Will you call Dinitz. I want them to know this is a formal protest. We have told nobody anything.

S: I will be free in a few minutes and I will call him. We haven't even sent any substance whatsoever to the Egyptians. There is a cable from Fahmy.....

K: We haven't sent anything to anyone else. I asked you to do those cables last Thursday. This is sloppy work.

S: They are waiting.

K: We can still send a message to the Arabs. Who are waiting?

S: They are being prepared now. You will have something by close of business today. It would not have been appropriate to send anything before your talks with Rabin were over. We sent one to Fahmy.

K: We have to send one to Sadat and the others. You will do it by the end of today or I will send them from here.

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DATE/CASE ID: 11 FEB 2003 200102979

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S: I met with them at 9:15 this morning.

K: A message is a question of 15 minutes. I object to the way this Department works on this. What is the big problem? How many people have to see them?

S: Nobody sees them.

K: Will you call Dinitz?

S: O. K. I will give you a run down on what he says.

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SF 251

TELECON
Mr. Charles Robinson/Secretary Kissinger
June 16, 1975
3:55 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I've talked to Al about the other____which I don't have time this afternoon.

R: I'm doing that stage later.

K: Along the lines he talked with you.

R: I think he wants to get into the act.

K: Let him develop the options he sees growing out of this. May I raise a point. I'm talking to the Germans about this pet project____.

R: We're planning. We're trying to get the facts so we can move with them.

K: Is K__doing 500 million?

R: Yes and they will all be in by _____and 600 from Saudi Arabia.

K: I told them that.

R: We don't know ____. Herman is coming in tonight and hoped we'll have a better feeling tomorrow.

K: OK.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 11 FEB 2003 200102979

RELEASED IN PART*
B6

SF 248

TELECON
Mr. David Binder/Secretary Kissinger
June 16, 1975
3:06 pm

B: I hear stories that there is going to be multilateral discussion of safeguards with the Germans, Brits and French probably in the next month in London.

K: That is one thing I can't go into. I better not go into it. It is a delicate situation. If it gets too much publicity it will make it totally impossible.

B: We are having trouble with the French, as usual?

K: Not as bad as usual.

B: So, it is delicate and it would screw things up if we write about it?

K: Yes.

B: I wanted to pass something on to you that Derwinski (sp?) said about [redacted] with President Ceausescu -- it was like going up to the Pope and saying hello wop. B6

K: That rude?

B: Yes.

K: I liked your article.

B: Thanks. [redacted] was impossible. Derwinski said it was the most disgraceful performance he had ever seen. I thought you would enjoy that. B6

K: Ok.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 11 FEB 2003 200102979

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SF 258

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Greenspan/Secretary Kissinger
June 17, 1975
3:22 pm

K: I am working on my speech, so is it very important that....

G: Can I tell you briefly what I have been thinking about. I had lunch with Chuck Robinson...

K: He tdd me.

G: It looks like a viable idea providing you think through and have some opinion on what will happen in Saudi Arabia. There are two advantages to this . One is the assurance it gives for an embargo and I can't find any ____ on it. The other is an OPEC price break vehicle. This can be done only if you can maintain chronic export production world wide over consumption. And the problem I have with the strategy is the way it has to be done to get Iran over ____.

K: That is what we are doing.

G: But you have to have pressure on Saudi Arabia. The amount of oil we import would be displaced. We would get more from Iran but less elsewhere -- if we are to pressure OPEC it has to come out of Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, or Nicaragua. -- some of these big areas. It doesn't work on the Canadian thing. If they cut back on their exports to the U. S. that will reduce their imports to Montreal from largely the Persian Gulf. What we have been getting from Canada was transhipments. We ought to get one million barrels.....that represents about one million barrels into Montreal... as they cut back on shipments to the US , that cuts back on their Persian Gulf imports, so Canada is a transhipment point for the United States. The concern I have is, prior to moving on this, the superior strategy.

K: But can't moving on this give us an option. If nothing else , it will give us an option to keep open this strategy. If we wait til we get this government signed on to a strategy.....

G: I am not talking about the government. I am talking about you. I want to suggest want alternatives foreign policy has got with respect to this. I would like to indicate what happens after you do this.

K: That ~~KXaX~~ I am anxious to do.

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G: It is not an Interagency thing. That won't do in order to make this work. I am referring to the fact that in order to make this work it is not only an issue of what you do with Iran, but also what you do with Saudi Arabia and I want to indicate what happens in these alternatives.

K: That I am anxious to do. That we can do in the next few days.

G: There are a number of technical problems about how we can do this. They are soluable but technical. It is not easy but I am trying to think of ways to do it and I think it can be done.

K: It would give us an option. It would give us protection against an embargo.

G: That is certain.

K: And a crack at the OPEC cartel.

G: It has worked effectively and if it works there, it could punch a hole in the operation.

K: Particularly if the Saudis react emotionally.

G: I would suppose that I want to indicate that you cannot immediately make a deal with Saudi Arabia or get to Iran because that would displace the problem to Nigeria and Venezuela.

K: That doesn't bother me. You can make a deal with Saudi Arabia. If they want to _____ it has to be better.

G: That is an important note.

K: But it is a good problem to have and I haven't thought through how to play it and I would be more than anxious to get your views.

G: It has widespread ramifications with respect not only to OPEC

countries but the oil companies. I am only concerned that before it is done you feel confidant with the secondary effects.

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K: I am anxious to discuss it with you. It may have to slip as late as Thursday.

G: There is no rush.

K: But this week. And we won't make a movement on that field unless we have had a talk.

G: Good.

END

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RELEASED IN FULL

SF 262

TELECON
Mr. Herb Schlosser/The Secretary
June 17, 1975
Time: 6:20 p. m.

K: How are you.

S: How are you, I am fine. You will be in town tomorrow. I was wondering if there would be a chance to see you other than at the event.

K: I ha ve to leave soon after the dinner. Would you like to come by before?

S: Maybe I can do that.

K: How about 6:30?

S: What time do we have to be there?

K: I think it is 7:00.

S: When will you be leaving Washington for New York?

K: Tomorrow.

S: Why don't i check the time.

K: Let's meet 1/2 hour before we have to be there.

S: At the Waldorf?

K: Yes. Suite 35A.

S: I will confirm it with your office tomorrow. How is Nancy?

K: Fine, she will be there.

S: Good, see you tomorrow.

K: O. K. Fine, bye.

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* RELEASED IN FULL
SF 256

TELCON
Joe Sisco/
Secretary Kissinger
11:45 a.m. 6/17/75

K: Joe?

S: Sir.

K: Is Hermann back?

S: He was scheduled to get back as of last night, but I gave orders pursuant to what you told me that there should be no debriefing by

K: This, of course, will not be ~~xxxxxxx~~-observed.

S: It will be, Henry--really, believe me it will be observed. Roy said he won't, Hal said he won't and I won't.

K: But is he back?

S: Yes. I don't have confirmation he is back--

K: Don't you think that it is weird that about 50 representational things are on my schedule, but Eilts hasn't quite made it yet.

S: All right, let me--

K: I mean I don't want to attract attention to something of secondary significance

S: [Chuckles]--would you like to see him today or tomorrow?

K" I would like to see him today and maybe between 12:30 and 1:30
S: Fine, and I'll call down and he'll stand by. But seriously, we have not said word one and we are not going to.

K: Okay, good, thank you.

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TELECON
Senator Curtis/The Secretary
June 17, 1975
Time: 4:40 p.m.

SF 260

RELEASED IN FULL

C: Thank you for returning my call. I had to talk to you because I talked to you before on this matter. We have run into trouble, I will send you a letter on it. I spoke to you about our Ambassador in Nicaragua. The press had given him a bad time. I urged you to keep him on, but you said that it was time to relocate him out. I said in a new assignment will it be worked out so that it won't be an admission of these smear tactics. I then took it up with Mr. Eagleburger and Mr. Ingersoll; and they have been very fine to me. But down the line it has run into troubles. I said this in a letter and I will send it over to you.

K: I will take a personal look at it.

C: I reported to him and others interested of our conversation and the commitment you made to me and I feel very strongly about it.

K: Let me report to you next week.

C: Alright. Thank you.

K: Bye.

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SF267

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
June 18, 1975
9:17 am

S: We are going to meet at 10:45 but I wanted you to be aware of what our recommendation is going to be and I think you may be surprised. Roy and Herman and Hal and I all agree. One is that the proposal not be presented to Sadat and secondly that we should call the Israelis in and assuming the map comes, and give them another chance for reconsideration and thirdly indicate the liklihood that we will put forth an American proposal of our own. I know that you are going to see the President and I wanted you to bear this in mind.

K: Ok, Good.

END

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SF268

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin
Sec. Kissinger
June 18, 1975
9:12 a.m.

D: In connection with this parameter. What he is verifying is before taking a final position, he said all of this mentioned about parameters was clear misunderstanding. He said you discussed it with him in Vienna.

K: That is correct. I know there are some of our Western allies that are changing their minds on that but we will not support them.

D: I will tell him you will support it.

K: I will firmly support it.

D: I mentioned this to him yesterday.

K: Also tell him I made this clear to the Germans yesterday.

D: I will say on behalf of NATO....

K: I think we can hold that togehter. I think the Dutch or one or two others will object but we will not go along with it. I am quite confident that we can hold this.

D: This is one question he was asking me urgently to give him a reply.

K: Right.

D: If you could see me today about our meeting.

K: It may be better on Monday.

D: O.K. with me.

K: We will do it on Monday.

END

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TELCON
Joe Sisco/Kissinger
6/19/75 - 5:13 p.m.

SF276

RELEASED IN FULL

.....

K: Did you explain to him that there was a meeting that I had changed?

S: Yes, well no, what I said to him was, you were just about to leave and that the President had called you to a meeting and that was the tact I took. He understood;; he was very good about it.

K: But it was his delayed arrival that made it impossible.

S: Right. Well, I just got there right on the button as he arrived, just between you and me.

K: Which was when?

S: At 3:00.

K: Yeah, but he was supposed to arrive at 2:30.

S: 2:30, yeah. I did not use that. I probably should have but I just said that you were called to another meeting by the President right then and there as you were just to leave, and he took that very well.

You're going to find him in a ~~funky~~ fairly cynical sort of mood, I think, I detected, and it's typically Khaddam. In other words, where are we, where are we going and all. And I said that the Secretary will tell you all this. I didn't get drawn out.

Mr. Secretary, on the ILO matter, I gather that you had a word with Cederberg and Flak that....

K: Yeah, well could you check with Dunlop, how he made out with Meany?

S: Alright, I'll call him.

K: Good.

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SF 274

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Winston Lord
6/19/75; 10:47 a.m.

K: Hello.

L: Yes, Henry.

K: Say, Win, in redoing that Atlanta speech . . .

L: Right.

K: In the section on Alliances, you know, say something about Europe.

L: Right.

K: And say the need to go beyond simply security. Then say something which is sort of a synopsis of what I said yesterday.

L: Right.

K: Incidentally, that speech is getting terrific play.

L: Fantastic play on the radio and TV as well as the TIMES.

K: And this evening Cronkite is going to do an eight-minute interview on it with me.

L: Really.

K: Yeah.

L: Oh, that's terrific. You could just tell by sitting there listening to it that it just felt good as I said last night.

K: It's really weird. You know, we do things that we think are terrific and they fall flat.

L: No, this one I was really confident. I knew it was going to be popular and I thought it would be treated thoughtfully in this country as well.

K: Well, it is a nuisance for you to do all these things but I think you are making a major impact.

L: Let me say as I mentioned the other day -- it is an agony for all of us but they are so God-damned important I wouldn't want to be out of the business by any means.

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K: I really think we are making a major impact on the country.

L: I agree. I agree completely.

K: Because there is not going to be any alternative structurally.

L: I do rely on the substantive people on my staff on these things as well as the speechwriters. I don't know how much you are aware of the process but we do try to -- in addition to working with the bureau --

K: Win, don't press your luck. When I tell you are going a good job will you accept it without telling me how you are doing it.

L: All right. All right. I am puzzled sometime if you for example make the comment that Larry pulled the St. Louis speech together. With all great respect for Larry being so damned busy -- I don't expect him to do anything but he was very helpful for a few pages but I couldn't understand what the hell you were getting at on that.

K: No, no, but he did a good job on the end.

L: On the conclusion -- oh, terrific and given the time he has got it is amazing but you know I was just puzzled on whether you know how the process was.

K: No, no, I know that. Now listen, in that section on Alliances I think we should say something tough and let's say we should make one thing clear that Alliances must be reciprocal. That it is not tolerable that Allies blackmail us asking -- you know -- by their continued loyalty to the Alliance. You know we can use it as a slap against the Greeks, the Turks and others. And I think it will help us get the Turkish aid through.

L: Do you want that under the European aspect or as a general point.

K: As a general point after saying all of this. And then you can say but there are also a few other things that ought to be clear. It is clear we do no favor to countries by being their Allies. But they must understand they are doing no favor to us. And I want the Middle East part a little strong.

L: I've talked to Larry about what you told his yesterday and Will talk to Sisco. You say strong in the sense of determination to move ahead -- you mean.

K: Determination to move ahead and determination not to be pushed around by any of the parties.

L: Yeah. We are going to have a draft for you . . .

K: Can you get these thoughts in?

L: Yes, I will.

K: Good, thank you.

L: Right.

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SF271

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Charles Robinson
6/19/75; 8:43 a.m.

K: Hello.

R: Good morning.

K: Alan -- Chuck -- Alan is the guy I am talking to and I just want you to know I've got the name right. I've got Greenspan here who says he wants your job.

R: He wants it -- well, he can have it. If he'll take on all the problems.

K: He says he likes Enders, too. Listen, Chuck, Greenspan got Zarb in at the request of the President.

R: Yes.

K: I think that you, Zarb, Greenspan and I and maybe Scowcroft ought to have ~~ø~~ lunch next week.

R: You know I leave on Tuesday for the Rome Food Council Meetings.

K: And will you go from there.

R: I got from there to Tehran and .....

K: Okay, well, then let's have lunch on Monday.

R: Monday would be fine.

K: All you hve to do is get this past my ~~H~~ blockage. Will you tell Jerry Bremer there is to be a lunch on Monday.

R: I'll call him.

K: Can you do it Alan? And let's get Zarb, too. My suggestion is -- you know there is some legal question -- my suggestion is that you should conclude this thing with a weeks' option or some thing so that we can look at the mechanics after you come back.

R: I just had a wire from M_____ and he is anxious to meet with me on the 28th or 29th.

K: Okay, good. Well so we will meet on Monday. That's good -- that's what I wanted to find out from you. You are leaving Tuesday.

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R: Yes and I will call Jerry and make sure that's set up. Is that to be here?

K: Yeah.

R: Okay, fine, I will . . .

K: Do we have to have Enders at that, too?

R: No, I think it is better not. He really hasn't been involved and it just seems to me the more people you get in . . .

K: Secondly, I am determined to work cooperatively with these other agencies on the economic policy.

R: I called Bill Seidman -- I have a meeting with him tomorrow. I have called . . .

K: And I have also talked to Dunlop and he's going to be a big help.

R: Fine. Would you like to have me pursue a relationship with him.

K: Yeah.

R: I sent you a memo on that yesterday which also involves some suggested changes in our approach structurally which I would like to talk to you about.

K: Let's do that.

R: Okay, fine.

K: Good, Chuck, bye.

*

SF272

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Marvin Kalb
6/19/75; 10:30 a.m.

K: Hello.

Kalb: Mr. Secretary.

K: Marvin, I will tell you one thing -- if you were working for me I wouldn't talk to you so much. Maybe we ought to do that.

Kalb: Well, I gave you a chance.

K: You gave me a chance too late.

Kalb: Yeah. Listen, I just got a call from Cronkite. He was intrigued by your speech last night and wants very much to do what they call a news-maker interview with Iyou for the broadcast tonight. And the way this is done is a camera is brought to you a couple of hours before show time. Walter sits in New York -- the same thing that he did with Sadat in Salzburg.

K: Yes.

Kalb: Through -- He throws a couple of questions. The thing generally runs 5 to 7 minutes. But he was intrigued by the themes that you hit last night and asked me to ask you if you would please consider that for this evening. He would like very much . . .

K: What time would he have to do it? Because I have an unbelievable schedule.

Kalb: Well, I mean we can roll around that schedule if you could break loose 15 minutes at the maximum at a certain point and we would have the technology done. In other words . . .

K: For me the best would be around 3:30.
Would
Kalb: Okay. Will you be in the Department then?

K: Yeah.

Kalb: Can I then . . .

K: Or the White House. Where would your prefer it?

Kalb: I think State would be better but you know once again I don't want to _____ into your schedule. If it is easier for you at the White House we would do it there.

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K: Well, let's aim for 3:30 and I will tell you the place within an hour.

Kalb: Uh - okay.

K: Can you do it as late as 5:30?

Kalb: No. No. Because it has to be cut and then dropped into the show.

K: All right. Well, then, let's do it at 3:30.

Kalb: Okay.

K: The other possibility is around 12:00.

Kalb: 12:00. I am just concerned about the technology -- whether we can roll that fast and get our equipment in. Could I . . .

K: Or 12:15.

Kalb: Could I coordinate this with Bob?

K: McCloskey?

Kalb: Anderson.

K: Anderson. Yeah.

Kalb: Because I ∦ don't want to bother you with the technology on this.

K: If 12:15 would in fact be a little more convenient but I could do it 3:30 but I might have to move it to the White House then.

Kalb: At 3:30?

K: Yeah.

Kalb: Okay. But 12:15 would be at State?

K; Yep.

Kalb: And 3:30 at the White House?

K: Probably.

Kalb: Okay.

K: But that's not a major matter where it is.

Kalb: Okay. Let me go back to Walter right now and I will tell Bob, you know, about the technology.

K: Right.

Kalb: Thank you very much.

K: Good.

Kalb: Bye-bye.

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TELCON
Ted Koppel/Kissinger
6/19/75 - 5:17 p.m.

SF277

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: Hello.

TK: How are you?

K: O.K. Ted.

TK: What's the matter, has one of the acolytes fallen into disfavor?

K: What?

TK: I said, has one of the acolytes fallen into disfavor?

K: Why?

TK: Did you see the acolytes piece?

K: No.

TK: Do you know what I'm referring to?

K: No.

TK: Well, there was a marvelous little piece in New York magazine that referred to all of us who took you to dinner as your acolytes.

K: That came to the dinner?

TK: Yeah. We were either Kissinger groopies or acolytes.

K: You mean the dinner in ...

TK: Salzburg.

K: It's an incitement to riot. You mean about your broadcast?

TK: No, what broadcast? What did I do now?

K: That program you want to do.

TK: Yes.

K: Is that what you're calling me about?

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TK: That's what I'm calling you about. I have a call waiting from Bob Anderson and I feel you're sicing him on me anf if you're doing it through Bob Anderson...

K: No, no, I don't know why Bob Anderson, I asked Bob Anderson and McCloskey to give me a recommendation of the, you know, they have no business, you know, if you want to talk to him, fine, I'll call you tomorrow.

TK: Alright, fine, that will be great. Is he, the only thing I would really and I know what you're concerned about, but if we could do it while you're on vacation, believe me I'm telling you this now as a friend, you come off so much better when you're relaxed than you do in a stiff formal sitting up in the Adams Room, or whatever it is, those do not make good_____, and I don't think you come off well on them, either.

K: I'm told that on Saturday night on July 5th there are only going to be 31,486 people watching it nationally.

TK: Yeah, but they are all friends, and just imagine, and I'm serious now, on a Fourth of July weekend the Sunday newspapers are desperate and if you say anything that makes news on a Saturday night it's going to be all over the front page of every newspaper in the country.

K: Yeah. Peace is at hand - would that be a good line?

TK: That wouldn't be a bad line.

K: It didn't work badly the last time I used it.

TK: I think you can improve on that a little, though. I think you should make [redacted] Ambassador to Israel, though. B6

K: Do you think I should?

TK: Yeah.

K: O.K. All I tell you is this, when they turn on anybody, they're up, but when they turn on somebody who is Jewish, they're murder.

TK: Alright. Shall I call you tomorrow, or do you want to...

K: Yeah, well if I don't call you, you call me.

TK: Alright. Fine.

K: Good then, bye.

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SF 273

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Marvin Kalb
6/19/75; 10:45 a.m.

K: Hello.

Kalb: Mr. Secretary.

K: Yes.

Kalb: Technically it is much easier for us at the White House at 3:30 if that fits in with your . .

K: All right. We will set it up 3:30 - 3:45.

Kalb: At the White House.

K: Yes.

Kalb: Excellent. Thank you very much.

K: But be ready at 3:30 and . . .

Kalb: Oh, we will be ready so that when you walk in it will moe.

K: Okay.

Kalb: Very good, sir.

K: Thank you.

Kalb: Thank you. Bye.

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SF-286

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Yuly Vorontsov/Secretary Kissinger
June 20, 1975
11:57 AM

V: A small matter Gromyko asked me to discuss with you. He is suggesting a postponement in the SALT talks from the 23rd of June to the 2nd of July. He says it's partly by practical considerations that he asks for that smallpostponement. The last line reads, we don't think it will be necessary to make special publicity about the small postponement.

K: It will probably leak but we'll do it.

V: The 2nd of July.

K: Let me check with Sonnenfeldt to see if there's any particular problem, but I don't think so.

V: OK.

END

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DATE/CASE ID: 11 FEB 2003 200102979

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SF-286

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Yuly Vorontsov/Secretary Kissinger
June 20, 1975
11:57 AM

V: A small matter Gromyko asked me to discuss with you. He is suggesting a postponement in the SALT talks from the 23rd of June to the 2nd of July. He says it's partly by practical considerations that he asks for that smallpostponement. The last line reads, we don't think it will be necessary to make special publicity about the small postponement.

K: It will probably leak but we'll do it.

V: The 2nd of July.

K: Let me check with Sonnenfeldt to see if there's any particular problem, but I don't think so.

V: OK.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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5F-285

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
June 20, 1975
11:42 pm

K: I am trying to get the best possible presentation for you for Sadat. Can you come in about 5:30 to let me discuss some ideas I have.

D: Sure.

K: They don't change on substance of your position , but they improve the presentation. he could make of it.

D: I will be in your office.

K: And you could call the Prime Minister tonight.

D: We have a discussion at 5:30 -- that would be midnight in Israel, but I could call him in the morning.

K: As long as I get it first thing in the morning.

D: I could call him at 7:00 and give you an answer by 8:00.

K: That is ok.

D: Or I could get an arrangement -- if we finish by 6:00 I could pass something on. It would only be 1:00 in the morning.

K: We have to finish by ~~X~~ 6:00. I have to do a reception at 6:00. I don't see when I can do it before then. Or we could try it at ten minutes til 3:00. Is that better for you?

D: I think it is better for me at about 5:30.

K: Ok. You have a press conference this afternoon?

D: Oh, Mr. Secretary, I will tell you what I have to do this afternoon. I was invited to have lunch with George Meany and couldn't come so I am seeing him at 2:30 instead.

K: Will you tell him not to finish us on the ILO.

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D: I don't think that he wants our position on what to do with the c ampaign.

K: But he wants us to cut our funds for the ILO.

D: I don't know what he wants.

K: We want to use the threat of ~~xx~~ cut off to reform it.

D: I will see what he wants. I will see you, Mr. Secretary, at 5:30.

K: Ok.

END

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SF-283

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Joe Sisco
6/20/75; 10:53 a.m.

K: . . .points for the President uh for Eilts for Sadat. And they should be along the lines of this is the best we can do now.

S: Right.

K: Here are some changes we think we can ah get but they are the absolutely limit.

S: Right.

K: So your choice is between accepting this or having a government crisis in Israel. Then we go on and explain to him what our options are: either impose an interim settlement which would guarantee that we could do nothing else on the overall side for several years or uh, put ourselves into a position for an all-out effort early in 1977 while preparing the ground during 1976.

S: All right. We will have something for you to look at at 3:00.

K: Good.

S: Good.

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SC-287 *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Dinitz/Secy Kissinger
10:25 a.m., June 21, 1975

D: Hello.

K: Mr. Ambassador.

D: Good morning, Mr. Secretary. I received some replies to the points that you raised yesterday.

K: Yeah.

D: And it does incorporate some changes in the zone. So if I can come with a map.

K: In which? In the South or in the No--?

D: In the south, only in the south.

K: Okay. Can you come right over? In about 25 minutes.

D: Yes, sure.

K: To the White House.

D: at 11:00 a.m., then.

K: I'm desperate to get away.

D: So I'll come at 10 till 11:00.

K: Yeah.

D: To the west gate or whatever it is.

K: Yeah.

D: Okay.

K: Good.

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RELEASED IN PART
B6 SF289

TELECON

[redacted]/Secretary Kissinger B6
June 24, 1975
6:46 pm

[redacted] I thought it might be good, depending on your time, if we could get together to give you my observations of what I saw? B6

K: Let me call you tomorrow. I am going away Friday for a few days.

[redacted] Do you want to do it before? B6

K: If at all possible, yes. Where are you?

[redacted] In Detroit. B6

K: Let me see what I can do. Can you give me a quick summary?

[redacted] There are a few problems. I think it would be better if I could sit down and talk to you. I want to give you all the nuances. I believe it may take a little longer to get the job done. It is doable. B6

K: I want to tell you something [redacted] There is a time to bargain and a time to move. The United States is a great power and while Israel is not a satellite of the U.S., we are not a satellite of Israel. B6

[redacted] I know that. From my discussion I put it on a different basis. I called it the moment of truth. I spent two long visits with Rabin. I just think you ought to know some of the basic feelings. Where I think a little pressure might be helpful too. B6

K: You saw Rabin?

[redacted] Yes, twice. B6

K: I think he has a total misconception of the American domestic situation.

[redacted] No, he does not. If he did, in my discussion I made it quite clear. My feeling is that when a policy changes in a big government, it does not reverse itself. Bureaucracy and everything else. You go down hill on changes and it does not reverse itself. B6

K: My own judgment is this [redacted] Whatever happend in March, we could have buried on the Rabin visit and we set the stage for it. If this is carried on for too long we will inevitably have to take decisions. B6

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[redacted] - 2. B6

[redacted] There is no question about that. B6

K: It is very hard to know what the hell more we can do now. What if Sadat kicks us all in the teeth now? What if he says the hell with it?

[redacted] Then you have a real problem. B6

K: That's right.

[redacted] I think they should make a deal. Not only is it good for them, but it is good for America. They have to remember America's overall interests. I made it quite clear that if they do not want to hear my assessment, there is no use in my saying it. He said, no [redacted] I have too much confidence in you. B6 B6

K: I would love to talk to you. Can you come any day?

[redacted] Yes, I will come either Wednesday or Thursday. B6

K: We will call you first thing in the morning.

[redacted] The reason I want to sit down and talk to you is because I think (I had a long talk with Javits today and if it is possible I want to see Javits before I leave because I may need his help later) Rabin is the guy who has to stand up and be counted and take the responsibility on his own sholder whether it defeats him politically or not because the situation overrides his own political situation. B6

K: This is exactly my conviction.

[redacted] I had a long visit with Allon. B6

K: How is he?

[redacted] He strictly wants to make a deal. I am prepared to make another trip over there now. B6

K: I would not be surprised if the Egyptians kick everybody in the teeth and said they would not pursue this any more.

[redacted] I cannot help that. It would be poor policy on their part. B6

K: They have come quite a distance.

[redacted] I told him the President was very firm about this thing. Then I met with Allon and Rabin called me Thursday and we spent 1-1/2 hours together. I want to get the mood of the people which I think is better today than it was three months ago. I will show you the interviews of me by several papers. The people today want to see a step forward. B6

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[redacted] - 3. B6

K: It sounds as if you really did a useful job there. I will call you in the morning.

[redacted] Ok. If you close off your bargaining position you are in real deep trouble. I am totally conviced you were right from the beginning on your course of action and you are right today. B6

K: Above all for the sake of Israel.

[redacted] That's right. Golda is in the hospital too. B6

K: Yes I heard. Do you want to come tomorrow at 5:30?

[redacted] Yes. B6

K: Good.

END

*
RELEASED IN FULL
SF 295

TELECON
Mr. Bill Ronan/Secretary Kissinger
June 24, 1975

Missed first part
K:
R: I appreciate your calling back.

K: How are you?

R: Fine. I am supposed to depart for Zaire on Thursday and I wanted t o check to see if it makes sense. This is for the World Trade Center -- of the Port Authority meeting. There will be several of us going there.

K: I think we are getting this thing back on track.

R: Good.

K: When are you leaving.

R: Thursday.

K: If anything changes I will call you -- I am expecting another report. I'll call you if anything happens. If you don't hear from me you can assume it is alright.

R: Very good. And if there is anything I can do while I am there you c an tell you person over there.

K: Good. Have a good trip.

R: Thanks.

END

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SF-288 *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Joe Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
June 24, 1975
7:15 pm

K: Do you think...is it conceivable that Fahmy dragged Eilts up to ask him about the Syrian discussion?

S: No. It was incidental in realtion to the previous report. What we gave him was pretty satisfactory.

K: Do you think he is getting the answer today?

S: I think we will hear by midnight or tomorrow morning.

K: I would like to take over to the President all of the Eilts' cables plus the letter.

S: In the morning?

K: Yes, but I want the letter now.

S: I left that with Hal Sonnenfeldt..let me call him and get it to you.

END

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RELEASED IN FULL
SF-293

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
June 24, 1975
1:15 pm

Missed first part

S: With a Middle Eastern section like that it makes news. Are you pleased with the reaction?

K: I got a good reception. It was a big crowd.

S: It is fun getting out to the boondocks.

K: They are ~~kakkyx~~ healthy -- it is this town that is sick.

S: I have a speech tomorrow with a Jewish Group and I'll be god-damned if I know what to say.

K: Say what I said.

S: That 's right.

K: I think we have no choice but to take them on. Look at the Rabin interview -- ~~npt~~ one word of appreciation for the United States.

S: Well, this could be a fateful day. Herman is on his way to have a nother meeting with Fahmy. Fahmy will see Sadat. I have a draft for you on the Rabin letter but I am toning it down. I have written it too strong.

K: Let me see the tough version. Can you bring it down?

S: Sure , I have it right here.

END

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SF 292

TELECON
Foreign Minister Rabasa/Secretary Kissinger
June 24, 1975
5:00 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

R: Fine and you? How is Nancy?

K: She is fine.

R: You know we were supposed to meet in June and I wanted to see if I can see you Thursday or Friday of this week.

K: Can I call you tomorrow morning? I haven't got my schedule.

R: Alright.

K: My schedule is very bad but I will do my best.

R: Thursday or Friday at whatever hour is suitable for you.

K: I will try to shift something around.

R: And you will call me?

K: Yes. I hope to see you soon.

R: Thank you Henry.

END

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SF 307

TELECON
Mr. Ingersoll/The Secretary
June 25, 1975
Time: 7:06 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

I: Church just called to tell me that two major loans are coming up for Algeria tomorrow -- 40 and 80 million dollars. Under the NAC, Treasury would vote against it but they will be outvoted. Simon said that you had said you wanted some way to get at Algeria.

K: But not without warning them.

I: Well, I talked to Sisco and he said this wasn't the way to do it.

K: Right.

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SF 304

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Hartman/Secretary Kissinger
June 25, 1975
12:36 pm

K: Did you get to Esenbel?

H: I did. I gave him the word about what the speech meant and what is going on up on the Hill and that we are looking ~~at~~ into the C-141 and the other matter urgently.

K: Does he think there will be an explosion because of what I said?

H: The newspaper reports I have seen today -- there are so many d omestic problems that this seems minor.

K: But does he understand?

H: He understood and said he would report it that way. Is there a meeting tomorrow?

K: I think it is set for 1:45.

H: I have prepared some talking points ~~and~~ on pieces of legislation. I will send them to Brent. Do you want to see them?

K: Yes, send a copy to me and the rest to Brent.

H: Very good.

END

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SF 303

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Ted Koppel/The Secretary
June 25, 1975
Time: 7:49 p.m.

K: Were you a success in the heartland?

Kissinger: That is what the newspapers all say.

K: And they never lie.

Kissinger: You called me and I never got back to you -- was it about the July 5 idea?

K: Yes. But Anderson told me that you would prefer not to do it.

Kissinger: I would prefer to do it on a better weekend.

K: When are you going to be back from your vacation?

Kissinger: If it makes a big difference to you, I will reconsider?

K: I will tell you what I was going to ask, that will make it easier. That weekend I am starting a news program. If you come back early enough and I could do a five minute interview with you for that news program then we could talk at greater length some other time.

Kissinger: I have to go to Camp David on the 5th but I will make time for a five minute interview.

K: You will be back on the 4th and in your office?

Kissinger: No I will be coming back on the 4th.

K: Could you ask your secretary to give me a call.

Kissinger: You will have no trouble getting in touch with me.

K: Shall I call you at the office?

Kissinger: No, call Jerry Bremer.

K: Have a good vacation and I will see you in a week.

Kissinger: Y es, and all the best to your wife.

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SF 297

TELCON
Sisco/Kissinger
1:05 p.m. - 6/25/75

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

S: Yes sir.

K: We've now also had a letter from Sadat through a separate channel, saying that he sticks by what he said in Aswan, but he had no other choice with his own people, to put forward this kind of proposal.

S: Oh, I see. He was putting something forward. I misunderstood you. He sticks by what he said at Aswan.

K: Well, you've seen the long cable from....

S: No, I have not. It has not reached my desk.

K: Well, get it from _____. It opened with a formal proposal, which is in effect the Gamasy plan to move the Egyptian line. They said if the Israelis can put forward something outrageous, so can they, which usually we should not transmit because the Israelis will use it only as a kind of Egyptian _____. But he said he will not renew the mandate on July 24th, if no progress is made. But he will not immediately ask removal of the troops, he'll just not renew the mandate.

S: In other words, the response is then we are right where we have been.

K: But I think what we should do now is tell him we won't present his proposal till it's a good position. The Israelis say we are one-sided. But we would like the Israelis to reconsider them within the framework of the Aswan negotiations.

S: Alright. _____ cable right away and do something like this.

K: Well, let me talk to the President first.

S: Yeah, but I'll be gone by the time you, but Al is here, but let me read everything and if I can do any drafting....

K: But back channel you don't have.

S: No, I know I don't.

K: I just wanted to inform you of that.

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S: Alright. But he sticks by what he said at Aswan. Well, that's fair enough.

K: Well, what the Israelis are doing to us is unconscionable.

S: I know, Henry. I know.

K: Look, if they said to us we just plain can't do it.

S: Well, they would like to have it, but they don't want to pay any price. I still think they feel that at this point the oil fields are enough but Rabin is playing domestic politics as it relates to the passes. That's what it is, but not the strategic business.

K: Well, the strategic business is_____. Look, if they worked with us honestly we could work out fifty ways on meeting their needs. If they want to keep these logistic installations beyond the passes I'm sure we can work that out with Sadat.

S: Let me get ahold of this long report right away.

K: O.K.

SF 299 *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Hal Sonnenfeldt/Secy Kissinger
9:55 a.m., June 25, 1975

K: Yes, Hal.

S: Henry, are you going to see Kendall this morning sometime?

K: Yeah.

S: You know, I had a guy in here that Scott (?) sent to see me yesterday The heat is on from all these business people to get cracking on the legislation, mostly I guess because Flanigan has come back with a story that the Russians don't mind whether we win or lose as long as we are seen to do things. And I think that's a very bad idea.

K: It is out of the question.

S: Presumably, our interest is to try and get the legislation changed, not to be seen to do things. But we want the legislation, maybe not for Kendall's reasons but so we can control Kendall by having legislation.

K: Yeah.

S: So I think these people have to be restrained, and I think just told that they can do their missionary work but that they should hold back until they get a signal that we're actually ready to move on legislation.

K: What is your view, incidentally, Hal, as long as I've got you on the phone, on the Israeli situation?

S: Well, I haven't really been able to follow any of it. I saw this article in the Times this morning, which I assume is essentially accurate.

K: Well, it's not essentially -- the map is -- you know, it's essentially accurate except it gives a much misleading impression of what the Israelis are willing to do. Basically, their position has changed only in that -- you know, when you look at the map, you think the corridor to the oil fields is about 20 kilometers wide. In fact, it ranges in width from 200 meters to a kilometer.

S: Well, I don't see the Egyptians accepting any corridors to anything.

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K: If, for example, the road they show in this may -- the Egyptian corridor is to the west of that road and the Egyptians would have to construct a road of 75 kilometers --

S: Do you think it is even politically feasible for Sadat to accept a corridor, which is obviously subject to severance any time the Israelis want to do that? And it may be a huge concession, which it probably is from the Israeli standpoint --

K: It is not a -- believe me, when you see the map, you will see all along that road the Israelis -- at three major points they want military outposts; at all points they want to be right next to the road; at three points they want to be on cliffs looking right down into the road.

S: Well, my very general impression from literally just reading about it in the press is that the Israelis are trying to take the heat off themselves by doing a few things, probably the ones that are politically just barely feasible for --

K: Yeah, but do we have any choice except to take them on?

S: I think they've got to be pressed to do more or there is going to be a stalemate. You know, these _____ changes may be heart-rendering for Rabin to make but I don't think they're going to get you moving.

K: Yeah.

S: You know, that's the best that I can tell from -- they obviously feel the heat. They probably are uncomfortable and so they are trying to do a few things. But I don't see that those change anything very much.

K: Have you had a chance to talk to Larry?

S: No, not yet.

K: Well, look, I am determined to work it out if I have to have blood flow with everybody else.

S: You know, I'm really --

K: Look, I'm determined to work it out. I want you --

S: You know, I look at the press of the last two days -- I find everybody running his own policy on environmental modification on poliferation and it is a --

K: Yeah, but, Hal, that's no reason to leave because --

S: No, but it's a lack -- you know, it's totally impossible to establish any kind of authority here when one isn't seen to have it. If you know how the bureaucracy works, its -- it just flows wherever there is a vacuum.

K: Hal, I totally agree with you! I face this -- you face it -- but Ikle. I face it with Schlesinger and Simon who just go ahead making speeches as if we didn't have apolicy.

S: Well, I'll be glad to talk to Larry and see what --

K: Look at the mess we're in with Berbera now.

S: Well, that whole thing has been totally screwed up. Incidentally, I just sent you a note. I think you ought to testify on SALT in the Zablocki Committee because that's a friendly --

K: Yeah, but I don't think I will testify before Jackson.

S: No, but I think you ought to testify before Zablocki.

K: Let Jackson take me on.

S: Yeah, but this way --

K: What do I know that he cannot get from every other witness. There are no secret talks going on.

S: No, but my point on this other one was that you should take your constructive form first. If you get drawn into a thing with Jackson, you should ~~have~~ at least havelaid the base in a more constructive fashion with a friendlier group. Then later on down the road --

K: Besides, I think Jackson is finished.

S: Well, I don't know whether he's finished or not. He's got an awful lot of money, he's got a lot of organization. You know, finished compared to what, considering the other possibilities there? He's got a lot of capacity for raising hell.

K: Yeah. And I think he's saving it for the primaries.

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S: Well, maybe so. You know, it's technology, it's SALT, its' trade, it's energy, it's God knows what.

K: Okay.

S: Bye.

*

TELCON
Sisco/Kissinger
9:20 a.m. - 6/25/75

SF300

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Joe, have you seen the map in the New York Times?

S: I know it's there because I've got this summary. I couldn't see it very clearly. I didn't actually see the paper. I've got the morning Summary. What does it look like, actually?

K: Well, of course, it's again wrong. It doesn't extend over that far to the east and in the north. But it's basically correct.

S: The article is quite correct that's comes out -- the Terrence Smith article.

K: That's from Jerusalem.

S: Yeh, it's from Jerusalem.

K: They must be getting ready to put it to blow (?).

S: Either that or plus the fact that they want to be very sure that if there's a rejection from the other side that this has been presented in the most positive way and that it's been Israel that's been conciliatory which is another way of saying "getting ready to blow." But we'll see what the reaction is.

K: It's unconscionable.

S: It's from their point of view, Henry, a well-designed public relations plant. I mean, that story is quite something in the New York Times this morning.

K: Unconscionable.

S: Yeh. Remember I said, and I know you agree, that if it doesn't go at least they're going to try and turn the thing right around on the other guy's shoulders.

K: Joe, that may be, but the way they're dealing with our Government is unforgiveable.

S: Well, I know that. I know that. I notice two sentences at the end of this article where it says the very fact that they're not willing to give up the east end of the pass is going to cause some difficulty. And it was written as kind of a two sentence incidental at the end of the article.

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K: You see it also makes us liars with the Syrians.

S: Well, yes and no. I mean there are so damn many press reports here the Syrians will never know whether all this took place this weekend or when it took place.

K: No, but it's an unconscionable thing. OK.

S: OK.

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TELCON
Sisco/Kissinger
9:49 a.m. - 6/25/75

5F301
RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello. Sisco, I can't quite figure out what happened to Herman.

S: What happened was in the last cable you remember he said the road was bad and that there was a question as to whether they could finish up early enough for him to get back to Alexandria in order to get all of this stuff communicated. So I think it's really a logistics problem, Mr. Secretary. There are about, if I recall, about 50 or 60 miles from Alexandria.

K: You know incidentally, this story of Terrence Smith is based on very good briefing.

S: I think it's obviously an Israeli briefing and I mean it's an excellent briefing. That's correct.

K: The time is not correct though.

S: But the briefing is, as I say, on the mark.

K: But also they make the corridor of Upper Rudeis look much wider than it is. On this scale map you would probably not be able to see it.

S: Yes, well, it'll be interesting to see how --

K: And also that northern line is not that far over.

S: No, it's not that far over. It all looks better in the newspaper.

K: I think it's unconscionable.

S: Well it is and not surprising.

K: Why not surprising?

S: Well, I say I'm not surprised at all because the public relations aspect is

K: Yeh, but this sort of thing they've never done before.

S: Oh sure they have, Henry. Sure they have. This is their regular procedure. Yeh.

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K: No, but it makes it almost impossible for Sadat to accept it.

S: Well by now Sadat has given Herman the answer, thank God, and this thing won't get there for another 24 hours at the earliest. But you know the comparative portrayal of this thing of these two pictures particularly up in the north, it really show a tremendous expansion particularly between the representative marks in the ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ buffer zone as represented now is fantastic and that corridor makes it look like

K: Look that corridor on this scale looks 20 kilometers wide.

S: Well, it's at least that and moreover on the other side of the road in the _____ where the Israelis want to control it it makes it look as if it's all buffer of the road the Israelis were controling. You know darn well that's not the case.

K: It's not.

S: It's a helluva good public relations map.

K: Yeh, but I think we'll have to hit them.

S: One thing is, Henry, I don't see an acceptable difference between that line.

K: No, with the passes they've given up pretending.

S: No, that I say you can't perceive any difference.

K: No, but I think that Bob Anderson should put out at the press briefing today that we will not compete in putting out confidential information but we want to state for the record that the map in the New York Times today is incorrect and does not reflect what the Israelis gave us.

S: The only hesitation I have is what if Sadat decides to come close to this.

K: It's still incorrect.

S: Yeah, but I mean if we come out....

K: Yeah, but the trouble is it's still incorrect.

S: Yeah, I know it's still incorrect, you don't have to argue it for me. How about a phrase like this: I would caution you, however, that our experience shows that rough representations of negotiating which appear in the press cannot be an accurate reflection of the position.

K: I would put it more strongly than that.

S: I tried to give you a half-way diplomatic response. Let's put something together for you and then if you need to strengthen it, why you do that, but don't go too far, Henry

K: O.K.

S: O.K.

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SF 308

TELECON
Mr. Hartman/The Secretary
June 25, 1975
Time: 7:08 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I was told by Dobrynin that the Russian Desk told the State of Washington to keep high officials away from the two Soviets because we wanted to play the visit down.

H: Which one?

K: The two Soviet pilots.

H: That's not true. I signed a letter telling them that they were official visitors and asking for their cooperation.

K: Will you ask your desk what happened and then call Dobrynin and explain to him what, if anything, did happen. And instruct the desk to be more forthcoming in the future.

H: We are forthcoming on all things except our housing problems. We are trying to work out something on the Pioneer Point problem.

K: That is something else. I have seen your memo on that. Everything else should be done in a more forthcoming manner.

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SF 316

TELECON
Senator Goodell/The Secretary
June 26, 1975
Time: 6:54 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

G: I am glad you called back. I have two quick items: On the Concord for the British and the French, have you talked to Bill Romen on it?

K: No.

G: My understanding is that the FAA is likely to approve the Concord flight. There is some danger that the Port Authority will end up, because of political pressures working out a system to discriminate against it. This will have ramifications with the British and the French. The disposition of the members, the six members, and the New Jersey people is to go along with the FAA if they take the lead, which I expect they are going to do. They would come out first on the Dulles landing but the technical people are responding to the political pressures against it. I occurred to me that Bill can control that part of it.

K: I understand he has gone to the Congo. When will they have to make that decision?

G: Not until the fall. As I understood it, he was leaving the end of this week.

K: I think he left today. Let me talk to him after he gets back.

G: If you do, he can control the situation.

K: I am sympathetic to that for foreign policy reasons.

G: One other thing: the question of the Canadians cutting off the TV commercials on their channels.

K: I haven't heard anything about that.

G: Dick Wiley at FCC met with Juno, the Canadian version of the FCC. They are suggesting that on all televisions on cable, which is most of the Canadian television, that they cut off all the American commercials but leave the American TV shows on. The broadcasting industry is up in arms and have gotten to people on the hill. It could break

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out into an unnecessary warfare. I have talked to Robinson in your s hop, and he knows the situation.

K: Let me talk to Robinson.

G: What is desired is that Wiley get together with you and convince the Canadians we don't want warfare.

K: Let me check with Robinson and see what we can do.

G: O.K. Nice to talk to you.

K: O.K. Bye.

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TELECON
Senator Taft/Secretary Kissinger
June 26, 1975
3:40 pm

SF 311
RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

T: How are you? I am calling on a delicate matter. I have a brother who I don't know if you know, who is in the State Department and has been for some years. He was a professor like you and then the Irish Embassy, he was consul general and is now in the office of Oceans and Sciences that Dixie Lee Ray has just been in and out of. I talked to him at length last night. Bill has no ax to grind. He is going to retire in a few years, he is approaching sixty. But he is very concerned about what is going on in the office under the recent Assistant Secretary. I think it would be helpful to you if you could take a half hour and let him give you his views. I feel he is a person you might well consider as a possible replacement. I bring it up as something you might think about.

K: Let me.....

T: I talked to him last night and I think he has something to tell you about the way things have deteriorated there and it should be useful to you whatever course you take.

K: Let me see whether I can talk to him.

T: I told him I would call you. If you can call him I am sure he would make himself available whenever it is convenient to you.

K: Good. Thank you.

END

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RELEASED IN PART
B6 SF-319

TELCON
Sec. Schlesinger/Kissinger
6/27/75 - 9:24 a.m.

S: Hello, Henry.

K: Jim, how are you?

S: O.K., I guess. I always meant to ask you, and I never did, but I will now, what did you ever hire [redacted] for? B6

K: [Laughter] I wish you had asked me six months ago.

S: [redacted] B6

K:

S:

K:

S:

K:

S:

K:

S:

K:

S:

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K: Well, that's true, but I didn't resist it. So I have no reason to complain. I thought it was a rather good idea, but I should have checked with you.

Two things, Jim, one on Panama. I've been trying to keep the thing calm, and to see how long we could stall, but that's very hard to do when you people are running around the Hill and making a big issue of it.

S: Who's running around the Hill?

K: Clements and Calloway.

S: Bill was going along with the prevailing tide here and then I made my little speech and now he's shifted 180 degrees. Calloway, I can't... I've got him for three more days, and now that he's becoming a politico again....

K: Well, that long article by Marilyn Berger, I've, my people are....

S: Was it in the paper today?

K: Yeah. You know, we keep getting asked why we don't give any positive briefings. I, basically, would like to stall this thing as long as we can.

S: You're quite right on that.

K: But the only way we can stall it is to keep it quiet.

S: I agree, couldn't agree more. I didn't know Bill was getting that enthusiastic. He was enthusiastic about the movement toward the agreement a while ago.

K: You know, we may not succeed in stalling, but I would like to have it from a posture of looking willing to negotiate.

S: Whatever, the policy, there is no need for this kind of thing. What is it that they're briefing that the....

K: Well, first of all they're briefing that there's a total disagreement between Defense and State which isn't exactly true.

S: That's totally unfair.

K: Which is in the newspapers. Secondly, that Defense is unwilling to make any concessions on land and water. Well, I'm not even going

into the merit of it because I think it's an ....

S: I tried to stay out of this one because I'm kind of unsympathetic to the general trend, but I got on board here, pretty much the policy is locked up and it's really not my desire....

K: I know you're not behind this. See if you can calm them down a bit.

S: Well, what is it... Are they going up there voluntarily.... I don't know what I can do about Bo.

K: Well, they're apparently going up there.... You take that amendment that was passed yesterday to the State Appropriations bill, prohibiting the use of funds for negotiation on Panamy, that's going to produce an explosion if it passes.

S: That's crazy, really crazy. You know if it weren't so serious, it would be funny. It is funny.

K: And our Congressional people say that the briefings of some of your people are partly to blame for it.

S: If there's anybody who's in the range of the Secretary of Defense, I will shut them up. But I cannot _____ the work in the bowels of the Army, and the Army, as you know, feels very strongly. about this.

K: Jim, I've just been called to the President. I want to call you on the second point which concerns Israel, a little later this morning. I'll do it on the Secure Line.

S: O.K. Bye.

K: Bye, bye.

*

SF 325

TELCON
Art Hartman/Kissinger
11:22 a.m. - 6/28/75

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

H: Yes Sir.

K: How do we stand on the Security Conference now?

H: They had a meeting today in which the _____ put forward the week of the 28th. The others said we still have to settle several issues before we can fix a date.

K: When is it most likely to ~~xxxx~~ be -- the 28th or the 22nd? Bud's

H: ~~My~~ guess is that people are moving toward the 28th. The Soviets have insisted on the 22nd.

K: They'll yield on that.

H: I think they will.

K: Well, let us stay out of it.

H: We are staying out of it. The only thing I've done is to tell Bud for his own information about the Miki ~~xxxxx~~ visit.

K: Which is when?

H: The 4th or 5th of August.

K: Yes, but just let the Russians fight it out with the Europeans. It's a matter of total indifference to me.

H: OK. Now, should I ask -- another question.

K: Let's make sure it's not more than 3 days.

H: Well, we're pressing for that and have Soviet support on that and I think there are others as well. On Solzhenitzen

K: I will not go.

H: Right. To the dinner.

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K: Yeh.

H: Is there any plan to have anyone of the senior level people seeing him privately?

K: Why don't you -- are you senior?

H: I could be considered senior, yes.

K: Why don't you see him.

H: All right. I'd have to take the initiative -- no one suggested it to me.

K: Well, let's wait -- it would not be considered a friendly act by the Soviets.

H: I don't think so, but I think there will be some reaction around if we cold-shoulder him completely.

K: If these guys knew what he's like there'd be no

H: They may find out what he's like.

K: I would personally like to meet him.

H: Yeh.

K: Why don't you see him and tell him if we can ever do it privately I'd like to meet him.

H: Well, let me wait another day and see how the thing develops for the 30th.

K: Right.

H: OK.

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SF332

TELECON
Senator Hubert Humphrey/Secretary Kissinger
July 7, 1975
3:15 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

H: This is Hubert Humphrey. We are trying to arrange some time with you tomorrow. Is there anyway before 10:00?

K: Sure, how about 9:00.

H: 9:00 would be fine. That's excellent.

K: I understand you cannot do it for breakfast.

H: Most of the group feel they would be tired out if we go in before 9:00.

K: OK. Let's do it at 9:00 or 9:15 at the State Department.

H: We're be there. 9:15 or 9:00?

K: Let's say 9:15.

H: Very good. We'll be there and ready to visit with you.

K: I look forward to it.

H: I hope we'll have something you'll be interested in.

K: I'm looking forward to seeing you.

H: Good luck old friend.

K: Thank you.

END

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SF-335

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Socolow/The Secretary
July 7, 1975
Time: 4:50 p.m.

S: I am calling in Mr. Palee's stead. He is weathering it out somewhere in the Carribean. He would have made the call himself and asked to come to see you, but instead Bill Small and I will come. It involves the President and something in the foreign relations field. We would like about 10 minutes with you to lay this thing on your desk so that you can think about it. You may want to acce pt or reject it right there.

K: I will call you around 9:00 tomorrow. We will definitely see you.

S: There is an off chance that he may join us.

K: The only problem is that I don't have more than 10 or 15 minutes I can spend with you.

S: That's o.k. Your office will call us?

K: Yes, or you call me at 9:30.

S: O.K.

K: O.K. Bye.

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SF 336

TELECON
Phil Habib/Secretary Kissinger
July 7, 1975
11:55 AM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: If the President goes to the European Security Conference, then we may have to push it back a bit for the Japanese. How much crockery are we going to smash if we ask the Japanese to postpone it a bit.

H: His diet is out of session. The only reason they were postponing it was because he said the diet was in session. We don't know what kind of schedule he has. For a European Security Conference, that's a hell of a good reason.

K: When is he supposed to come here?

H: I don't have it hear. Just a moment, let me check. July 1 to 6.

K: NO.

H: Oh, the 5th and 6th.

K: We may want to shift it to the 7th and 8th or the 8th and 9th.

H: He has a schedule of speeches in New York. Maybe he could come in later and do a schedule and come down here for the last couple of days. Do you want us to try it on him and let you know ?

K: No, but could you find out what his schedule is?

H: Yes.

END

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SF 346

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Rogers/The Secretary
July 8, 1975
Time: 6:55 p. m.

K: The letters that you want to have sent on the Synder amendment put a consitutional point in on negotiating the treaty. If a treaty is concluded the Congress will have every opportunity to deal with it. And moreover there will be the closest consultation -- put this in. To prohibit the negotiations on something that has been going on for ten years is an invasion of executive authority which we believe the Congress does not want to undertake. Say that.

R: Good. I will have it up to you tomorrow.

K: O. K.

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SF 351

TELECON
Monroe Leigh/The Secretary
July 8, 1975
Time: 5:22 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I don't know in this place that we are both connected with -- I saw a memo on the Nixon-Theiu letters. You said you had a paper that listed all the commitments made of a similar nature. I would like to see that.

L: We sent it to Jock Covey yesterday.

K: Let me see -- oh, here is something that was brought in. Do you have the letter where President Kennedy told the...

L: The Thais that.....

K: Kennedy wrote a letter to the Paks in 1962 saying that any attack on them would be considered an attack on the United States but they may not have .....

L: We have found inaccuracies in that book. We can't guarantee that it is the last thing. I can track down the one involving Kennedy.

K: Good. Thank you.

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SF345

TELECON
Helmut Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
July 8, 1975
3:43 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Have we heard from the French about Giscard?

S: I had two conversations and in every case he said no.

K: I don't suppose it will happen.

S: I don't know about that. They must know ~~about~~ that you have another breakfast date. I tried not to be pressing, but to sort of inquire.

K: That's right.

S: I imagine something will come through.

K: OK.

S: I have another problem with the French but not on the phone.

K: OK, why don't you come by now.

END

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SF 340
RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Esenbel
7/8/75; 11:56 a.m.

K: Hello.

E: Hello.

K: Mr. Ambassador!

E: Good morning.

K: How are you?

E: Mr. Secretary, I wanted to check with you about you know the time because You know I gave my word to Ankara after having talked to you that by the 15th everything will be accomplished. Now I don't know whether the things are going in the same direction or whether there is a change. If there is a change in the policy I am afraid personally that this will have a bad effect.

K: No, no, thereis no change in the policy.

E: Yes. In other words, you know, we are acting under the assumption that . . .

K: Look, I am [redacted] meeting today all day with Congressional people. The President is meeting with them tomorrow morning and I. Then we hope the thing will come to a vote next week sometime.

E: Yes. The Committee. Because you said so in a message to Mr. _____.

K: That's right.

E: The fourth. But I don't see a sign that also the House action will be scheduled for that time.

K: Well, we hope that the House action will be done within the next ten days. We will have a better estimate tomorrow morning.

E: Yes. Because you know this is my firm personal -- the soonest you have completed action the better for the whole _____ in Ankara. But if this is not completed you know then we will lose credibility. This is what I am afraid of.

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K: Well, uh, I don't know what I can say except we will do our absolute utmost.

E: The reason . . .

K: There is no change in our policy.

E: You know, Mr. Secretary, I must be frank with you. I heard yesterday from someone who visited a general officer that the State Department, which I have not relayed to Anakara before talking to you that this officer said that the Foreign Relations Commiteee may decide on the issue but it wasn't expected that the House will at this point so the issue will be delayed until September.

K: Out of the question!

E: This will be very bad.

K: No, no, no. No, no, no. Out of the question!

E: And I didn't mention that.

K: No, no, you shouldn't. Look, I cann't tell you whether it is the 15th or the 18th.

E: Yes.

K: Or the 20th or the 16th, but it will be within this time period.

E: For God's sake let's finish it whatever the result is but let's finish it. I know that it is important for the Government in Ankara and I think it will affect the negotiations. And I want the negotiations to go in a friendly way and in the best -- under the best possible light but if there is delay here again then you know everything will fail. I am afraid of that.

K: No, no, there will be no significant delay.

E: In other words, I want to be able to say that you have given a promise and I know that you will stick to your promise.

K: We will stick to our promise within the limits of our abilities. But it will not fail because we will not agree to a delay until September.

E: In other words, you would expect that after the Foreign lRelations Committee has voted that this . . .

K: It will go directly to the floor.

E: To the floor. And not delayed until after the recess.

K: Absolutely not.

E: All right. Thank you, very much, Mr. Secretary.

K: Right.

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SF 344

TELECON
Arthur Hartman/Secretary Kissinger
July 8, 1975
8:05 AM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: On the European Security Conference, I don't see that we can let it slip beyond July 29 or if worse comes to worse, the very end of August.

H: The last few days.

K: Yes.

H: OK. I got the word around yesterday about all of August. I think the Fins are getting angry with everybody. They say they're going to slip a day everyday they miss getting an agreement in Geneva. I called the Romanian Ambassador and say they could not change the ____ in my judgment. They're still trying to make all kinds of changes in Geneva.

K: Yes.

H: We'll be in touch.

K: Just make sure it doesn't slip way back to that week.

H: How about it on Wednesday to Friday. Is that too late? That would leave practically no time at the other end.

K: Yes, it makes it tough.

H: The end of August is better. That would allow more time to make sure all documents are in order.

K: Let's say the 28th.

H: OK.

END

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SF-341

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Asst. Secretary William Rogers
7/8/75; 12:08 p.m.

K: Bill.

R: Yes, Mr. Secretary.

K: What did I say in that message to the Panamanians. I know I asked you to send one but when it blows what will be in it?

R: You saw the copy that went up . . .

K: I don't remember it now and I am not there -- I am in the White House.

R: Oh, forgive me. The message essentially was the stories that are coming out now are attributed to the success of our efforts thus far and I am standing by and we are going to continue to press forward towards a sensible solution to this matter.

K: Okay. Right.

R: Good.

K: Bye.

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SF 343

TELECON
Mr. Robert Anderson/Secretary Kissinger
July 8, 1975
3:40 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Did the garbage come up?

A: Not at the briefing. But what I did do after the briefing, in as much as Schweid asked about it and wasn't at the briefing -- I got a hold of O'Leary and Andre Meton (sp?) and Valeriani and I called them in and gave them the substance of the report plus the three points at the end -- you know, that this was of great anguish to Mrs. Kissinger. I did it on an informal basis -- but I said the Secretary is just revolted by this and he feels the privacy of his home should be respected.

K: What did they say?

A: Jerry had been up already and he found the man in North East and interviewed him. He had three or four sacks but only had been in to one of them. I reported all this to Bremer. I ~~ak~~ found out, according to Andre that on the question of trash on the sidewalks -- it has been all the way to the Supreme Court -- and it is considered abandoned property and there is no way we can get some of it back. I thought we might be able to get the rest of it back. But, I made all the points.

K: What is their attitude?

A: They felt it ought to be downplayed. The more we said about it the m ore we dignified it for this scandal sheet.

K: Ok.

END

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SF 342

TELECON
Congressman Wayne Hays/Secretary Kissinger
July 8, 1975
3:45 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

H: Are you flying away somewhere tomorrow?

K: Yes.

H: Are you planning to bring this Turkish thing up? It isn't going to fly.

K: You think so?

H: Not with you out of the country.

K: I will be back by Saturday night.

H: You will?

K: Yes. I am meeting with some people today and tomorrow morning on this.

H: I know about these meetings. How many are you having there tonight?

K: One group is about twenty and then all the freshmen.

H: I heard you were having about 100 and I told Eagleburger I wasn't going to come down because I couldn't be useful in that large a crowd.

K: There is a group of twenty of various leadership types. Could you come?

H: I'll do whatever you say. But if you leave the country it will take a nosedive. They'll say Kissinger doesn't care enough to even be here for it. But I don't think it will come up until next week.

K: Is Rosenfeld acting up?

H: Yes. I was with ten or twelve people at lunch and one of the guys from Colorado, Frank something, I'll think of his name, he said he got 40 letters and he didn't think he had a Greek in his district and he wasn't going to vote for it. I detected there is a hell of a lot of work being done on the other side.

K: Why don't you come at 5:15?

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H: Let me talk to Doc and if he ~~s~~ is coming I'll bring him down with me.

K: I think he is coming.

H: I tal ked to him and he said he wasn't but if there is only going to be twenty people there we may~~xxxxx~~ come down. I'll talk to him.

K: Right.

END

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Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Jerry Bremer
7/9/75; 9:52 a.m.

SF 353

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

B: Yes, sir.

K: Look, one, I expect by the end of the day to have an answer who is coming along on this trip to Wisconsin. Is Laird coming?

B: Not that I know of.

K: Has somebody asked Laird?

B: I'll check again and see. As of yesterday there was no answer that I am aware of, but I will check again.

K: Don't press them but I just want an answer so that we can get the right kind of plane.

B: Yeah. There are no Congressmen that I am aware of that have asked to ride, sir.

K: Zablochi told me yesterday, for Christ's sake.

B: Zablochi wants to attend but as far as the last I heard he hadn't asked for a ride -- there is no problem if . . .

K: He asked for a ride with me.

B: All right. But that was ~~late~~/ last evening.

K: I mean I don't give a God damn.

B: Mr. Secretary, there is no problem. We will put him on the plane. We will follow up with his office.

K: Let's get a bigger plane if necessary.

B: Right. We will.

K: Now, secondly, uh -- we uh -- I want the schedule so that -- if I get to the dinner by 6:00 that's fine.

B: That's how they have got it now.

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K: And that gives me a half hour rest in the Minneapolis hotel and a chance to change.

B: That is what they have done. You've got the full schedule with you. Paul will have it on the airplane.

K: Okay, thirdly, will you call Senator Humphrey, who isn't coming back in town, and tell him I tried to reach him unsuccessfully and I wanted his guidance for my Minneapolis speech. I would like to give a talk about the relationship of morality and practicality and foreign policy. Which may be a little bit philosophical and notoverwhemingly headline-making, but which will be thoughtful.

B: Uh-huh.

K: And does he think this audience will -- in that context I could get in foreign aid and other things.

B: Right.

K: It's a message I have been wanting to talk about. And what does he think of this?

B: Okay.

K: Or does he think a more standard foreign policy speech would be better. I prefer to do the former.

B: Okay. I will send you a telegram.

K: Okay. And find out whether he is going to be there.

B: Okay.

K: Good.

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Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Bill Seidman
7/9/75; 10:45 a.m.

SF 355

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

S: Hi! Bill Seidman. How are you, Mr. Secretary?

K: Okay. Bill, I am going to reform and try to work with your guys -- can you help me in getting them to reform to work with me?

S: That's my job. What can I do?

K: Well, I think meetings on OPEC price increases must be handled in very close discussion with us. It's not an economic question.

S: I agree. The only ones that I know about . . .

K: Well, I was told there is a meeting today at 4:30.

S: Well, what that meeting is is not for that purpose. The purpose of that is to evaluate what the economic effect of oil price increase is.

K: Okay. Can you make sure -- you know, I have instructed my people -- I don't know how well they are carrying it out.

S: They are carrying it out.

K: They are?

S: Yes. And we appreciate it.

K: I want to work very closely with you when you get into that special session.

S: Yes. I've got your list of your items which I guess Chuck Robinson and you worked out and Jim Lynn had given me the general outlines of the problems that you see. It probably wouldbe helpful for us to get together again sometime in the not too distant . . .

K: Let's do it next week.

S: All right. I will put in a call and get lined up on your schedule for next week.

K: Because I think we can do something significant. I think the strategy that we proceed in May has really worked superbly well. We now got this prepcon organized exactly as we proposed it.

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S: I agree. I think we are making good progress and . . .

K: We've got Venezuela, Iran and Saudi Arabia supporting our approach now the way we outlined it at the IEA.

S: Well, that is great. I didn't realize that that had actually taken place.

K: Yeah.

S: Well, I think that is good and what I would like to -- I would like to get together with you next week. But the meeting today is not for the purpose of . . .

K: Well, just as long -- you know, the way this place leaks -- if you have a discussion of reactions to price increases you might as well put it in the newspapers.

S: Yeah.

K: If it is a factual meeting -- fine.

S: The basic questions are what is the economic effect, e.g., the budget committee -- the Congress came out and said that the effect will be this, this and this and we are trying . . . .

K: If you would just stay in close touch with Brent and Robinson on it and then I will see you next week.

S: All right, we will do it.

K: I've got to catch a plane now.

S: All right. Thank you for calling.

K: Thank you.

S: Bye.

K: Bye.

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SF 354

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Jerry Bremer
7/9/75; 10:00 a.m.

K: Hello.

B: Yes, sir.

K: Make sure that I have all the Egyptian maps on the plane, too.

B: Yeah.

K: Good!

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SF 359

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Robert Funseth/Secretary Kissinger
July 14, 1975
12;40 PM

(Missed first part)

K: ....with the right release time.

F: It's embargoed until time of delivery.

K: Which is about 8:00.

F: 9:00 our time.

K: And Buffum is briefing them this afternoon.

F: At 2:30.

END

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SF 357

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
July 14, 1975
12:35 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

S: You had a meeting with Ikle last week and he's pushing me about it.

K: Did I give it to him.

S: Yes and you asked him to write an analysis on it and he's already shown it to three people. Anyway, he now wants to know what the reference is to the American proposal.

K: That's none of his business.

S: (Jack) and I have kept him at arms length.

K: I thought this/was one thing he knew about.

S: I'm just going to tell him it was just a general reference.

K: Exactly. Good Hal. Thank you.

END

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SF364

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/The Secretary
July 16, 1975
Time: 6:57 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Have you seen the other ticker?

S: That is the one that mentions the peace conference?

K: Yes. Would you call her and tell her that this was not related to the invitation.

S: They didn't relate it to the invitation. Their point was that you called him a man of war.

K: That isn't true either.

S: There were other tickers.....

K: Will you call?

S: I will.

K: O.K.

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SF 367

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Ingersoll/The Secretary
July 16, 1975
Time: 5:55 p.m.

K: Look I called Simon about the Zaire aid thing.

I: What response did you get?

K: In principle he was willing to do it. I told him to get in touch with you, but he obviously hasn't done that.

I: No.

K: Will you get in touch with him?

I: Yes. By the way, I called Lynn the other day and I think we have him on the right track. We will talk about that at 6:30.

K: O.K. Good.

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SF 368

TELECON
Ambassador Buffum/The Secretary
July 16, 1975
Time: 5:45 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I am talking to the Indian Ambassador about membership in the Security Council.

B: Fine.

K: He raises the question, what happens if there is no consensus only a majority vote in the regional convention.

B: That hasn't happened before. We would prefer the Pakistanis to the Indians but it is a hypothetical question and we can't foresee that situation developing.

K: We wouldn't start playing between the majority and the minority?

B: We would make a determination based on our own best interests. The Paks would be a better bet.

K: I don't question that.

B: We have never been willing to commit ourselves to a majority or a minority candidate

K: I think I understand now. Thank you.

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SF363

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/The Secretary
July 16, 1975
Time: 7:15 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

S: They have already issued a statement that says something like if you and the President had agreed to see Solzhenitsyn instead of cowering it would have been better for the country. It is a sad day when the chief spokesman of our foreign policy should side with the Soviets instead of on the side of freedom of speech. I gave them hell a nd told them it was totally impossible to conduct a rational debate this way.

K: Yes.

S: It is a bad show.

K: Well on the basis of the longer thing.....

S: At the very least they could have waited for the longer thing or asked the State Department for the text instead of flying off the handle. It was a bad way to deal with the issue.

K: Do you see anything wrong with it?

S: I told them you gave a statement on Solzhenitsyn's views translated into policy. I also said you weren't attacking him like Jackson is doing to you. They said if every time someone criticizes the administration, they get attacked that is extremely bad. Then I replied that this was no way for a responsible Presidential candidate to comment on any issues.

K: O.K.

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RELEASED IN FULL

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SG 1

TELCON
Mr. Hartman/Secretary Kissinger
July 17, 1975 11:24 a.m.

H: ....we have a meeting scheduled at 12:30, did you want to meet before that?

K: Okay, then at 12:30, but in the meantime can you get a message to Carlucci isn't out trying to get the ADA Award in Portugal for democratic procedures. Does Costa Gomez understand that if he moves, we'll support him?

H: Well, ah...

K: Yes or no?

H: I can't tell you on the basis of what I've seen.

K: Are we doing anything on this crisis or are we clucking our tongues and thinking ... procedures

H: No, we are talking about giving public support

K: We are talking, what are we doing?

H: I don't know what we are doing. He's talking to them--

K But what is he saying?

H: He is saying that they should support the democratic elements

K: Meaning what?

H: Meaning Soares and the PPD and getting the moderate officers in and Gonzoles out. But he is doing it very quietly with whom he is talking to.

K: With whom is he talking to?

H: He's had one conversation with Antunes, he has talked to some of the people in the Cabinet with Antunes and

K: To me Soares and the PPD are pains in the neck. I want the moderates of.... to prevail.

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H: Right. That is what theyare trying to do.

K: Can I get from Carlucci a precise description of what he is doingimmediately and secondly will you tell him that I hope he's doing everything he can to make Costa Gomez and Antunes understand that we will support them in their efforts to have a more moderate direction prevail--we want them to do it as tactfully as possible.

K:

H: Right.

K: But he isn't giving political science lectures all over town?

H: No, he is not.

K: He -- that isn't beyond him is it?

H: No, except--he's not really a political scientist [laughs]--he's an activist.

K: An activist, but for whom?

H: He's very practical fellow and I think he's--a little uncertain about some of these officers but I think Antunes is..

K: I agree, I think A---I am uncertain too. The one way to become certain is to let somebody win and see how he turns out.

H: There is a danger in there--if they should get rid of Gonzales right now, they are in dreadful economic straights.

K: And then we'll help them.

H: Yeh, but it is a very bad situation and

K: Art--if we can get rid of Goncalves, I'll take that problem.

H: Okay

K: I don't worry about that problem. If we can get rid of Goncalves and his crew, let me worry about the economic situation.

H: I agree, that's where we come out.
This group that will come in will have as wacky theories as Goncalves has but they'd be in a better political orientation.

K: Good, fine. At least the thing would be a little more fluid, then it will look as if someone has some muscle

H: And there will be less a less direct connection with the communists.

K: That's right. And if we can then trigger the communists into a move, we may get them smashed.

*

H: Well, they're all out on the streets now

K: Who the communists?

H: Both the communists, socialists--and that fellow Carvow is really- he distanced himself a little bit from Goncalves the other day which looks as though he may be helpful to the moderates in the end, but I think he wants power at some point

K: Well we are going to push the moderates now

H: Yep.

K: Okay.

RELEASED IN FULL

SG 2 *

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/The Secretary
July 17, 1975
Time: 8:36 p.m.

K: You called me?

S: I called you because the Poles are still pressing for guns.

K: Out of the question.

S: I sent out a message to say drop it. And also no travel..

K: If they want to go to Luts that is fine too. Say it doesn't have to be Crocaw.

S: I can send another cable. He didn't want to go to Kuns.

K: Do you think he is bright enough.....

S: I hope he means 1949 and not 1914 for the Germans.

K: Bright enough not to mention it as a reason, is what I mean.

S: I put in an FYI.

K: O.K. Good. Thank you.

S: O.K.

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RELEASED IN PART
B6

SG 4 *

TELECON
Congressman Wayne Hays
July 17, 1975
3:18 pm

Missed first part

H: To the contrary, I am not running for Secretary of State.

K: You were really great.

H: Thank you. You don't have to say that.

K: I said it to people who weren't going to report it.

H: I have two things. Do you think you can make that NATO meeting and if so, can you give me a date because they have a second choice -- Genscher.

K: He is good. What is the date?

H: Thursday or Friday, the 25 or 26th of September.

K: Can I let you know the end of next week?

H: Sure. Why don't you get your wife and make a weekend of it in Copenhagen.

K: Let me think about it. I would like to do it.

H: That is what you said last time. I am always getting these things -- I have been invited out to do a Telethon but it would be rough getting out there and not prime time. We are going to give you prime time over there.

K: It is a good forum and I am predisposed to do it because you asked me. Let me get you and answer by the middle of next week.

H: Ok. The other thing -- I understand there are x 2000 Kurdish students in Iran -- most of whom speak English.

K: It is plausible.

H: I had a letter from a friend about it -- he is wondering if we couldn't get some or all of the 2000 over here. If we don't they are going to become outcasts and political refugees. He made a plausible case to me.

K: I don't know enough about it. On this one, if we have any latitude we will do it.

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H: The President has that xxxxxxx refugee money and it wouldn't take that much.

K: *That is not limited to Vietnamese?*

H: He has extra and we are going to give him more in the Foreign Aid Bill.

K: I'll let you know next week.

H: Ok. Just look into it. We are going to the mat next week.

K: You think we are going to make it?

H: It may be the last time I cooperate with Doc.

K: He is not a hero there.

H: He fired that god damned [redacted] last week on Thursday. He was the troublemaker Rosenthal had around him and then the guy sees him Friday and said he had 7 children and need the money etc. And Doc hired him again. I wouldn't support it. So Doc says he'll get the money somewhere else. B6

K: You ought to be a diplomat.

H: *He said I am soft. I said, yes and I like you but you're a too god damned* soft. I said you send up a termination slip for four months from now and I will sign it and the one to put him back on the payroll now. But I will also sign the one to take him off the payroll four months from now. Doc said no. [redacted] I told Doc, he may be soft, but he wasn't being soft with me. I told him I am going to fight you on the Foreign Aid Bill and I am going to lick you. I have got him worried.

K: I hope you don't turn against me.

H: I can negotiate with anybody. I can be tough, soft compromising, xx whatever. I have got some milk of human kindness in me.

K: You are a man of your word and I prefer to work with you than some of those bleeding hearts xxxxxxxxxxx who talk a good game.

H: Well, I just wanted to let you know I wasn't after your job.

K: Ok.
END

*

SG 6

TELECON
Secretary Simon/Secretary Kissinger
July 17, 1975
12:00 Noon.

RELEASED IN FULL

S: On this Zaire thing.....

K: ___willing to back it but _____against it

S: If you go in front with ___, if you think it's that important to you, go ahead. You'll have my backing over here. I saw James Lynn.

K: He's opposed to it.

S: I told him what I did and told him why. I said Treasury should be a part of these talks.

K: We have the problem of not giving Zaire an ideal of what the feeling is on what's going on. _____

S: We're not talking about that much money You can use the ___if you need it. Jim Lynn agree with it.

K: Then I gave the President incorrect information. I'll straighten that out.

S: Maybe Jim will say pretty much the same thing.

K: That's really terrific news. I'll work out here an arrangement where at at least three weeks before I speak at the U.N. we'll go over it with you.

S: That's what we would like.

K: There will be no decisions made that you have not been a part of.

S: Get the Assistant Secretaries working together then we can work it out.

K: Together we'll work out whatever remains.

S: Exactly.

K: Many thanks.

END

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RELEASED IN FULL

SG 15 *

TELECON
Robert Anderson/Secretary Kissinger
July 18, 1975
2:50 PM

(Missed first part)

K: ....today that we're going to attend a monetary conference at a high level.

A: No sir. Enders called me. I haven't seen the ticker. The subject has never come up. I'm trying to get hold of the ticker now. The ticker says a State Department spokesman.

K: Who was that?

A: That could be anyone in the building. It could have been somebody in Enders bureau. I don't know. If I had been asked I would have just fallen back on what you said, i.e., that there has been no formal proposal. Tom called me, he's going to get me the ticker and then he's going to do up something for guidance. If I could run it up so we can knock it down...

K: Yes.

A: Is that OK?

K: Yes.

END

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RELEASED IN FULL

SG8 *

TELECON
Mr. Hartman/The Secretary
July 18, 1975
Time: 7:21 p.m.

K: The President agrees to a reception for everybody.

H: I have seen something in from the advance party that the Finns are planning a reception on that night. We will clarify that.

K: You will make lunch on the 31st with the other four?

H: I told them either Thursday or Friday. The Canadian Minister McEachen will make a statement on Monday. They want a briefing on the Middle East. I think it is in connection with their troops there. Should he see Joe, or would you... I thought you would be too busy?

K: Yes, have him see Joe.

H: O.K.

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SG 7 *

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/The Secretary
July 18, 1975
Time: 7:25 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: I just saw a cable saying a personal message from me to Sadat has been delivered. What is this?

S: I haven't the foggest notion. The only thing was the two telegrams last night.

K: Will you check on it?

S: Yes. The maps haven't arrived yet. They will get here later. Do you want to meet with Hermann again?

K: When is he leaving?

S: 2:00.

K: I have the President at 9:45 how about 9:15 or would later in the morning be better for you?

S: Whatever is most convenient for you.

K: How about 11:00?

S: Fine. I would feel more comfortable if we had the maps in front of us.

K: He is making an overlay?

S: Yes. You will see the overlay and the map tomorrow.

K: Do we have a chance to get it accepted?

S: No. We are in the ball park enough so they will come back with something, however.

K: In the south we are close enough.

S: Your initial assessment is correct.

K: Hermann's assessment that something is mean about this is correct too.

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S: We have seen so much of this we can't get angry now.

K: If I had been tougher in Bonn we might have done better.

S: I think you handled it just right. You are seeing Jaws tonight?

K: How do you know?

S: I keep track of things. Don't have a shark bite you.

K: [redacted] B6

S:

K:

S: I will set it up for 11:30 and I will have the overlay ready.

k; o.k.

RELEASED IN FULL

SG 13 *

TELECON
Mr. Eagleburger/The Secretary
July 18, 1975
Time: 5:43 p.m.

E: I am getting calls from Schecter and van Vorst. I know it is on Solzhenitsyn. If you want me to put out something I will or else I will avoid them.

K: I wish you would take their calls and ask them to read what I have said. Tell them to read the whole thing. I see Magurie has an article out.

E: If you do the Star, if she is on it.....

K: I don't plan to do the Star thing.

E: I have a note here that van Vorst called with a question that you didn't want an oral message delivered to Solzhenitsyn about a meeting.

K: That is true. But tell him to get himself, and Schecter, a copy of what I said. I said that I considered him one of the greatest writers, and only that his policies are not acceptable. Will you let me know what happens.

E: Yes.

K: O.K.

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SG 19*

TELECON
Assistant Secretary Habib/Secretary Kissinger
July 18, 1975
~~2~~ 3:22 pm

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.5(D)

K: I don't suppose your [redacted] clients, the Niponese, are _____ in their determination to come here. B1

H: It would be extremely difficult. I would give the answer no.

K: Do you think if we had insisted they would have done it.

H: In the first stage, yes. But once you have reconfirmed the dates, they would take it as an extreme slight.

K: Ok, thank you.

END

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DATE/CASE ID: 21 MAY 2003 200102979

RELEASED IN FULL

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SG 12

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/The Secretary
July 18, 1975
Time: 5:47 p.m.

S: Marilyn Berger has called and says that diplomatic sources are suggesting that the Americans find new Israeli proposals valuable and she wants to know if when we pass on these proposals to the Egyptians if we will pass them on with an endorsement. I don't propose to return her call, unless you direct.

K: I agree. They are unbelievable.

S: Yes, they are.

K: The more I think of it the more we need another round with them.

S: Let's see what Sadat says.

K: He may tell us to go to hell.

S: I hope not.

K: O.K. Thank you.

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UNCLASSIFIED
RELEASED IN FULL

SG 17 *

TELECON
Mr. Joseph Alsop/Secretary Kissinger
July 18, 1975
11:30 am

Missed first part.

A: About these Chinese, it is hopeless to deal with you through Mr. Bremer. I think it is sensible to ask them what they want. The only think to do is to say you are , by some strange chance, having a meal with me and would they like to come. And then you begin finding out if that is what they want. See what I mean?

K: Ok.

A: You have no day but Wednesday?

K: I could do it on Thursday too.

A: Thursday I can't because I won't have a cook or a maid. No, I will have a cook. We'll do it Thursday.

K: Ok, fine.

A: I'll get a maid in to sub.

K: Ok.

END

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UNCLASSIFIED

SG 29 *

TELCON
Dinitz
Sec. Kissinger
2:55 p.m.
July 19, 1975

RELEASED IN FULL

D: I talked to Rabin. I am going to Sisco to explain to him on the map. The line on the map is a think line and cannot be charted accurately. I will tell him in terms of meters what we are talking about and I think that will satisfy him.

K: O.K.

D: The reason I am calling you is I got instructions by cable now from the team of ministers to reemphasize before Sisco the points relating to the map on the various aspects that were raised in our conversations and they are instructing that our fallback position in all of these items we have presented to you is the final position. We mean this. The PM has authorized me to talk to you alone and tell you that what I said to you in _____ when we talked alone is to say that in the north and in the center our fallback position is the final position with exception of possible negotiation of a thinning out zone in the north. In the south he will in the course of negotiation try to meet some of the requirements not quite all the way to the blue line but better than the fallback position stand. He requests this should not appear in any of the communication that we ~~d~~ carry with Sisco and the rest of the group.

K: That is clear.

D: When you see what I give to Sisco do not react to it. You can react but...

K: I understand your point.

D: You know I am speaking to Sisco on the official position and when I saw this I deliberately went to Rabin to ask if I am authorized to tell you when I spoke on his authority. He ~~refax~~ reaffirmed it. I should tell you this but keep the two levels of communication completely different or otherwise he will get into a lot of trouble. I am going to see Sisco now and explain the points.

K: Thank you.

D: O.K.

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SG 28 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sisco
Sec. Kissinger
4:35 p.m., July 19

S: I need a minute with you on the basis of what he has left. I want your judgment on whether we will have to alter some of Herman's talking points. It will take me one minute and I want to come in if I can.

K: Yes, come on in.

END

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RELEASED IN PART
B6

SG 23 *

TELCON
Sen. Javits
Sec. Kissinger
12:50 p.m.
July 19, 1975

J: How are you?

K: O.K., Jack. How are you?

J: Fine. [redacted] B6

[redacted] B6

J: I am going to be very quiet. I called for two things. One, to ask you to key me to any personalities that might be particularly congenial. And to remind you that you are thinking about a Congressional Advisory Committee to the UN Session beginning in September.

K: I am asking a number of you who were at the other breakfast to go over our plans.

J: That is great.

K: It is working its way through our machinery.

J: Your machinery is the same as everyother machinery. I suppose you are heartened by our visit to Brezhnev.

K: Very. And I think you displayed great statesmanship. I was pleased.

J: Great. The Romanian thing I am ready to approve and so is Ribicoff.

K: I think the two of you are showing great wisdom in this.

J: It is more tight for me than Abe. I welcome his participation and I encouraged it.

K: I had assumed he must have cooperated with you.

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J: Very. And I have been very pleased with that. I think it is good for him and the proposition. The Chinese thing --

K: Again, I have a meeting that was supposed to be proposed to all of the members for breakfast Tuesday.

J: Great, because of what you said give me any particular name you might have.

K: In addition to that.

J: Yes. Good.

K: All right.

J: Take care.

SG21 *

TELCON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Sec. Kissinger
7/19/75 11:29 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hal, oh I find that an appointment has already been scheduled for us at 12:30

S: Henry, that damn Pole is baying at me

K: Look Schmidt specifically asked--

S: No, I was there

K: Not to go to ~~Xxxxx~~ Gadansk (sp)?

S: I know I was there, so Davies is going to go and keep pushing for Krakow on the grounds that it is the city that Americans attach the greatest importance to--

K: I think maybe the best is have --

S: That's what I kept trying--now Tramsinski wants to come in to see me so I'm going to tell him that too.

K: Tell him the best is to have no other town.

S: Yeh, okay. Thank you for your dinner invitation. We look forward to that.

K: Okay, good. See you.

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SG 25*

TELECON
Joe Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
July 19, 1975
2:50 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K; Simcha just called and said he was coming to see you.

S: I've been waiting for him.

K: He is going to repeat to tyou the official cabinet position. Don't mention anything about the southern part because...

S: You mean what he told you alone?

K: Yes. Make sure that none of our people mention it.

S: Ok. Is he going to look at the map?

K: Yes.

S: What is he going to tell us?

K: He will reiterate and tell us the fall back position is the final position.

S: We should send a cable to Eilts...

K: First you tell me what he says.

S: Yes, of course.

K: Just don't refer to what he told me Friday.

S: Ok.

END

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SG 27

TELCON
Wm. Rogers
Sec. Kissinger
2:30, July 19, 1975

RELEASED IN FULL

K: We cannot cosponsor anything on Cuba. It is out of the question.

R: Even with fourteen.

K: We can vote for the stupid thing. Why do we have to cosponsor it?

R: The Mexicans are saying...

K: There is a limit on what these people can put on us. We have moved an enormous way. We are now voting with them.

R: The Mailliard argument is the Mexicans are representing to him that unless they can get 14 people who are prepared to sign on to the resolution before the Organ of Consultation meets they are reluctant to call it.

K: Do the Mexicans have to call it.

R: Someone has to and they are out in front. The problem is that it is that narrow inbetween voting for when the time comes to raising hands an indicated that we will.

K: I don't mind indicating we will vote for it. We will not cosponsor it.

I am in deep trouble with the right on Solzhenitsyn; I am in trouble on the letter re Panama; I am meeting with the President on that negotiation next week. I just don't think it helps my position -- and it is expendable -- but the things I am trying to get done if I get ourselves into that position. We who put on the sanctions must now do away with them. There is no trouble with our voting for them.

R: I understand.

K: You know these [redacted] Mexicans are trying to make points with the Cubans. That is what this is. I think they are trying to prove that they got us to do one additional thing.

R: I think there is something to that.

K: My experience with Rabasa has been every time I tell him a concession we are making to Cuba he is sort of torn on the one hand he is glad it happened, on the other if he cannot prove that he extorted it what good is it.

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2.

R: I think he likes to demonstrate he can get you to move another inch. I will call. xxxx I am comfortable with that. I will not fight it. I do not feel passionately about it. I have been reluctant to put the sponsorship before you. I thought I had an obligation to put it before you. Forget about the cable and I will call him on the phone.

END

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SG 31

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
7/21/75; 10:31 a.m.

K: Hello.

S: Hi, Henry. I talked to Evans -- I gather he is coming to see you shortly. But I addressed principally the point of who took the initiative on the call. He said well there was a minor matter although he was interested in getting that straight. He tried to get me ϕ involved in the discussion of the whole business of your trying to prevent a view from being given to the President. You feel that the President would be contaminated. I said that I thought in Milwaukee you had addressed the substance of the guy. But anyway that is what he is going to hit you on.

K: Okay, thank you.

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SG 30 *

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Joe Sisco
7/21/75; 8:07 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

S: Good morning, Henry.

K: Joe, I have to run to a breakfast with the President. Could you get in touch fastest with Herman and say the Israelis have agreed to an August shuttle. If we can create the preconditions.

S: All right.

K: In the long memo Sadat asked him if the Israelis agreed to an August shuttle.

S: Yes.

K: And he said he didn't know.

S: Yes. All right. Let me send something right away right now.

K: Because I think that may make a difference to them.

S: Good. I will send a flash right away! It will be out in about the next three minutes.

K: Good. Thank you.

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Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Joe Sisco
7/21/75; 9:31 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL (SG 32)

K: Hello.

S: Two quick things, Mr. Secretary: Shalev just called and I just merely said that you were planning on calling.

K: Did you tell him we each had a conversation.

S: No, I said nothing. He said have you heard anything and I said the Secretary was about to call. If you want me to do it, I can do it very easily.

K: No, I will call him.

S: Secondly, we left a telegram overnight for you of instructions for Moynihan. I am ready to go ahead on it.

K: Well, what do you mean you left a telegram overnight. I mean that is an internal game. I wasn't in overnight. It wasn't sent to my house.

S: No, no, I left it to be shown to you this morning at your White House office. So it should be on your desk there in front of you somewhere, at this point.

K: I haven't seen it yet.

S: Let me tell you what it is because I have Moynihan coming in on the other line and there is a time bind because the consultations are going ahead. I think we are in pretty good shape as a matter of fact. Fahmy said that they wanted five points in this appeal. One, that the President be authorized to issue the appeal ~~in~~ by the Security Council -- in other words that the Council have some kind of a little formal meeting endorsing it. No problem on that. That the appeal express concern about the situation in the Middle East. No problem on that. That it express appreciation for the measures that President Sadat has taken towards peace. Now, this is a little problem, Henry. It ~~singles~~ singles out Sadat only. What I would like to do. . .

K: Will you repeat that?

S: That it express appreciation for the measures that President Sadat has taken towards peace. This is in the appeal. What I want to suggest to Moynihan is largely for the record so that we can tell the Israelis that we tried to get a little balancing language in this appeal.

K: Well, I think we have to do it more ~~for~~ than for the record.

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S: I think it ought to read express an appreciation for contribution of President and others are making to the negotiations.

K: Why not say all parties are making.

S: All right. Well, all parties. This is going to be an extremely difficult operation in this regard. In any event, I ~~we~~ will get a hold of Moynihan.

K: Why not drop it ~~all~~ /~~it~~/ altogether? I don't think Fahmy expects everything to get through.

S: Well, we . . .

K: So I can't possibly call both the Israelis and do this before I see the President in two minutes.

S: All right. Okay.

K: Why is it that I am not informed about these things in time?

S: Well, all I did was we got this late last night. We draft~~/~~ed the cable. My instructions were for you to be shown . . .

K: I don't even know where it is.

S: It should be on your desk in the White House because I asked that it be sent to the White House.

K: Yeah . . .

S: I can't make the schedules in New York. I mean I am sorry . . .

K: Okay. Well, what -- is it imperative -- I just feel it will ~~talk~~ make a lot of problems. The Israelis will never accept something that only praises Sadat.

S:; Yeah, but of course, it is not -- Henry, it is only an appeal to Sadat. This is not the resolution that we are talking about. That's the next stage.

K: Oh, I see.

S: This is only the appeal, Henry, by the Security Council.

K: Oh, well, then, of ~~that's~~ course.

S: But I want to go through the act anyway to try to get the balancing language. We are not going to get it but be as it may at least we are going to say to the Israelis we tried.

K: Right. Now, answer me this question since I've just been called to the President. Have you or have you not told the Israelis that ~~got~~ we got a response?

S: I said . . .

K: Yes or now.

S: No. Henry, I just told you . . .

K: But if I was going to call them in a minute, there must have been a response.

S: Well, all right. I suggest we have gotten something. I see what you mean. I have not told them anything about the response.

K: Why would Shalev call you?

S: Only to just say have you gotten anything. That's all. He called, have you gotten anything.

K: I cannot now call for an hour. Because I am now seeing the President.

S: Well, you know, I just said you would call at some point. That's all.

K: Okay. Thank you.

SG 38 *

TELECON
Governor Askew (Florida)/Secretary Kissinger
July 21, 1975
12:35 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Governor, how are you?

A: Fine. How you are?

K: OK. I'm returning your call.

A: I'm sorry. There must have been some mistake. I was trying to reach Mr. Rumsfeld. I had wanted to call you anyway. I was trying to find out if these was any chance at all that you might be able to attend a Southern Governor's convention in Disney World on the 15th and 16th of September.

K: What day of the week is that?

A: Monday and Tuesday.

K: Would I have to be there the whole time?

A: No. We would like to have you make some remarks. I understand that the President was considering having some type of regional briefings similar to his economic briefings and while this would not be in line exactly with what we're talking about, I thought some type of remarks or briefing that you could offer would....

K: That would not be on the record, just for the governors?

A: We could do it either way or both.

K: What do you prefer?

A: I would think that on the record might be a little better and then if we had a chance to visit privately we could.

K: Let me see about it. It's something that I'm inclined to do but can you write me a letter about it.

A: Yes sir.

K: If you do that I'll be inclined to be sympathetic.

A: There's no way you can come down for a day or so and just rest?

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K: I can come down for a day. That's different than coming down to give an on the record briefing. I would have to prepare that. My inclination is to do it.

A: I think an on the record briefing, I think really, would be helpful. Let me write this.

K: And I'll do my best to make it possible. I'll respond to your letter fairly quickly.

A: Alright sir.

END

SG 45 *

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/The Secretary
July 21, 1975
Time: 8:05 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I would like to hold up that message to Hussein until tomorrow.

S: I think you can. What we are working on was a 48 hour delay. Sparkman said he could delay. Go ahead.

K: I got a very nasty message from the Israelis. I gave a summary of the Israeli/Egyptian response to them. They have answered it without waiting for the counterproposal.

S: Well, I think they are doing that to stiffen us and to be sure that during this interim period we stand with them. I don't think I would take it too seriously.

K: I said why don't we wait until we get the response from the Egyptians. We haven't heard from Hermann yet.

S: Sadat and Fahmy are taking their time to do this.

K: He is drafting already, I got a cable in saying the message would be in tonight.

S: We will hear in the next three or four hours then?

K: Yes. O.K. Thank you.

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SG 43 *

TELECON
Foreign Minister Shalev/The Secretary
July 21, 1975
Time: 7:48 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

S: I have what is described as comments by the Ministers to the information that you passed on through me.

K: It is an orgy of toughness.

S: It is a reaction that I would like to pass on to you.

K: Can't we wait until we get the Egyptian reaction?

S: We have the first Egyptian reaction.

K: They were going to make a counter-proposal tonight.

S: This is just comments. They are reinforced by what is happening on the ground and it is questionable whether the Egyptians are ready to reach an agreement at all.

K: I haven't seen the evidence of what happened on the ground.

S: Well it says that the Egyptian reaction is disappointing and raises the question of further Egyptian interest in reaching an agreement. Israel made an effort, through the United States, to present proposals which would make an agreement possible. In the proposal Israel indicated a readiness to give up the oil fields. Israel was ready to give up 2/3rds of the shore and accept forward movement of Egyptian forces from line A to line B and to take into account any sensitivity by the Egyptians to the Gidda and Midla Passes. The Egyptian proposals were disappointing because the UNEF must be extended for as long as the agreement is in force. The subsequent violation of the undertaking and the location of the straights and the dismissal of the UN forces puts into question the Egyptian intentions. Israeli forces can defend their territory. In June the proposal that was made did not provide for U.S. presence. What the Egyptians have said now is not acceptable, because they are picking out the parts of the Israeli proposal they find most pleasing. Further more, the American presence was an important part of the package. What the main thrust of this is, is that there is a grave doubt about Egyptian intentions. We are not raising anything or changing anything, but expressing grave doubts.

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K: Look, can you get this typed up and sent over here? You should wait until you get the counterproposal which I haven't seen yet. We don't share your view of Egyptian intentions. At least not until we get clearer evidence.

S: We don't have a view we only have grave doubts. We have some e vidence that we are taking into account on the ground. If they come up with a good proposal great.

K: There is nothing we can say until we see the Egyptian proposal. We appreciate your call and I will pass it on to the President.

S: I don't know whether you have to do that.

K: If you could get it typed up I would appreciate it.

S: One other point, I need to find out. The American presence, was that an Israeli proposal or an American proposal?

K: That was an Israeli proposal.

S: We had the impression that you might want to present on your own.

K: No, we agreed to do it, but it was an Israeli proposal.

S: Am I right in detecting doubts about the information I have given you.

K: We have gone to the Egyptians.....

S: No the military information.

K: If it has been sent, they haven't shown me. If it exists I haven't seen it. I was told it was on the way. You know where it is?

S: I checked. I was told it had arrived there.

K: I will ask for it immediately.

S: I think you should have a look at it.

K: What is in it -- give me a summary.

S: It is quite a story. It has all been done in a carefully planned manner. The army has gone into alert and leaves have been cancelled and also the regular training camps have been cancelled and there are indications that staff courses have been interrupted. Various units which were in training exercises a considerable distance from their usual points are returning. The artillery has returned to the Canal Zone and in addition 20 battalions have been located near the Canal. One batch of officers who were supposed to have been released on the 1st of October have been extended. We have located preparations on the East Bank and on the West Bank for the crossing of the Canal. We have the impression that the East Bank has been reinforced, including artillery in number beyond that permitted by the agreement. We have seen reconnaisance companies. There has been a marked increase of personnel.

K: Well, that gives me enough.

S: Also thereis a naval flotilla going down the Suez. All this became apparent at the time Fahmy made his statement on the non-extension of the UNEF.

K: Well if they do anything as stupid as this they will be in trouble with us.

S: You are aware we have taken measures.

K: I understand that.

S: We have not announced these measures -- if everything works out it will be as if nothing had happened.

K: O.K.

S: Thank you sir.

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SG 40

TELECON
Mr. Buckley/The Secretary
July 21, 1975
Time: 5:03 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: How are you?

B: I am fine. I am sorry I can't have dinner with you and Nancy.

K: It is mostly Nancy's doing.

B: How are you?

K: Fine. I got your little needle just now. The next TV program I do is with you. That is a firm promise.

B: O.K.

K: Your only handicap is that you are too bright -- you wouldn't let me get away with anything.

B: I haven't seen you ever to be in trouble. I don't like toprod you on these things.

K: You are right. Let's do it in August.

B: O.K. What should I do -- the usual.....

K: Call me early in August and when I know whether I have to go to the Middle East again, I will give you a firm answer. It may have to slip to September, if I have to go to the Middle East.

B: Larry is no longer with you?

K: No, he is still here, but in a different job. You should call Jerry Bremer.

B: I look forward to seeing you.

K: We will renew the suggestion for dinner. Both Nancy and I have decided that we never have dinner with the people we like.

B: I will maintain that as a secret. I am having a program with Halpern.

[redacted] B6

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K: [redacted] He is pursuing it with great intensity -- getting depositions from Nixon, etc. B6

B: If I find the script interesting, I will send you excerpts from it.

K: While I have you on the line, may I make a suggestion. A lot of conservatives are screaming that the Security Conference is sanctifying the Soviet presence in Europe. The Conference wasn't our idea. It isn't something I am proud of. Our instructions to our men were to stay 1/2 a step behind the Europeans. Insofar as anything of substance in the conference is concerned, it should be looked at as a provision for peaceful change. The territorial integrity issue is something they have gone over for years. The French, British and Germans had already made their bilateral agreements. It is more in the direction of change than sanctification.

B: Do you think it is interpreted that way?

K: The Soviets started down a certain course and they are pursuing it. Heads of government shouldn't meet for something that isn't that important. It isn't in our interests to build up something that isn't that important.

B: Then why is the President going?

K: Because we were the last head of government to agree.

B: In terms of our allies?

K: Giscard, Wilson and Schmidt had agreed months before we had. I am not saying it won't be a great achievement. Look that isn't why I called you. I called because I was stung by your hard-written note.

B: I am taking lessons in sarcasm.

K: You started from a pretty high plateau.

B: (Laughter) Bye.

K: O.K.

SG-48 *

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
7/22/75; 9:35 a.m.

K: Hello.

S: Yes, sir.

K: Did you give me a paper on the SALT thing.

S: It is in the typewriter.

K: Can I have it as soon as possible.

S: Yeah, uh-huh.

K: Okay.

S: Do you want it over there or wait for you here?

K: Well, if it gets done before send a copy over here.

S: You are going to meet I gather at 5:00?

K: Yeah.

S: Okay.

K: But I think you and Wade should be there, too.

S: Well, it is up to you.

K: This isn't with the President, is it?

S: No. Is it here?

K: I don't know where it is -- where is it? It's at the White House

S: Okay. Well, I haven't heard back from Wade. He was supposed to call me and let me know what he and Schlesinger discussed but he hasn't done it. I'll get the paper -- it's in the typewriter right now.

K: Okay. Fine. Oh, wait a minute. I'm wondering whether we shouldn't let Ikle in on this.

S: Well . . .

K: [redacted] He is more apt to be an ally than an opponent.

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S: If you can control him.

K: Well, what do you think?

S: Are you going to have a Verification Panel meeting?

K: Yeah.

S; Well, apparently before than happens he has to be brought into it so that he knows what it is all about.

K: Why don't you brief him on a personal basis today and say he can't talk to anyone about it.

S: Okay, I'll do that.

K: I just think it is too dangerous if we don't let the ACDA Director know.

S: All right. I'll do that.

K: But don't have him at the meeting.

S: No, no. I presume you'll decide on what is going to happen next after this meeting this evening.

K: Right.

S: Okay.

K: Good.

SG 53 *

TELECON
Helmut Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
July 22, 1975
12:45 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: On that Polish schedule, why are we leaving at 2:30 from Krakow?

S: I'm sorry, I haven't seen that. I don't know whether it pushes up the arrival in Helsinki because of the dinner.

K: I don't notice the Auschwitz thing.

S: The advance team never made it to Krakow before the instructions came. I think it's in the schedule but they have not cased it yet.

K: I don't have any problems.

S: Just as soon get out of there. There's nothing to do.

K: Is that a personal meeting with Gierek?

S: I'm sorry, I don't have the telegram.

K: They just cannot get any work done that way.

S: On the Scheel thing, did Brent get any word that Scheel wants to meet for appearance sake with the President briefly.

K: That's fine.

S: All these papers will probably indicate a head-to-head meeting. I guess I did see that. I don't know what work there is to be done with Gierek. I can't believe it will be more than a half hour.

K: Except he just won't have the nuance straight.

S: I have a note here that they will attend a tete-a-tete with Gierek.

K: OK.

END

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SG 54 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
July 22, 1975
3:30 PM

S: Is there any time to see Dinitz tonight after your dinner.

K: No. They still haven't seen everything that they should have seen. The map cannot leave until 5:00 tomorrow afternoon and we won't meet until they have it.

S: We'll have the map at 8:00 or 10:00, depending on the plane.

K: Could you make a copy of the map and have it at my house tonight.

S: If it comes in, sure. I don't think it will take must long than that.

K: He's already told us that the map will not leave until 5:00 tomorrow afternoon.

S: He called me just now and said the Prime Minister doesn't want me to meet until the map is here. That's all he said. It's not clear when we'll see him, today or tomorrow. I just told him I was going to talk to you and that's all. If they can leave earlier than 5:00 then there would be a purpose to it all.

K: You know that they're trying to diddle us. You know, it's easy to describe this thing.

S: Sure it is. Should we get our own plane on this?

K: Absolutely not. That makes us look too anxious.

S: I'm going to follow it up now that manifestations on the grounds are not encouraging he said.

K: You know it's inconceivable the Egyptians will go to war. Let's not kid ourselves. It's just one of the God-damn Israeli moves.

S: There may be some element to this.

K: I know Fahmy and Sadat were blowing smoke, but there's no way the Egyptians will go to war without Russian resupply.

S: I don't believe they'll go to war. Not in a moment

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K: The Jews would be in Cairo three days afterward.

S: I'll get the map tonight and get it to your hou se as close to 11:00 as I can and you can look at it tonight.

K: OK.

END

SG 50

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Richard Valeriani/Kissinger
5:16 p.m. - 7/22/75

K: Hello.

V: Mr. Secretary.

K: Yup.

V: What do you hear from Cairo?

K: What do I hear from Cairo. They won't receive Solzhenitzen either.

V: (Laughs) Are they going to receive the UNEF?

K: I wouldn't overdo what Sadat said today.

V: What? Anything apart from that?

K: My impression -- this is for your guidance -- my impression is that that thing is going to work itself out.

V: It will. How about the reaction to the Israeli proposal?

K: We have now got to go back to the Israelis with that -- when we get all of it.

V: You don't have it all yet?

K: No.

V: Do you have anything on the line?

K: No. But I don't expect that for a while.

V: Would you call the reaction favorable?

K: I would say there is a negotiation in progress.

V: I would like to ask you if I can on a personal basis, does it look like you're going to be here -- you said you had a speech in Birmingham on August 14th.

K: Yup.

V: Do you expect to be there?

K: I hope so.

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V: Is it feasible that you would go to the Middle East before the 17th or 18th of August?

K: It's conceiveable, but

V: Aside from that it has to be considered.

K: It has to be considered.

V: OK.

K: I also might not go. It just depends on how much progress they make.

V: Uh-huh. OK. One other point on that -- the Kentucky Derby approved Henry the K.

K: Terrific. Now all it has to is win.

V: OK.

*

SG47

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
~~XXXXXX~~ Jerry Bremer
7/22/75; 9:28 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

B: Yes, sir.

K: Jerry, I think after many months we should have an agreement that these cablés and tickers come over with me, right? Plus I should have an agreement that Ihave a notetaker.

B: I'm sorry. They should have been in your bag.

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SG 52 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELECON
Mr. Atherton/Secretary Kissinger
July 22, 1975
2:40 PM

K: I just had lunch with Bill Paley and in Jerusalem they're building -- oh, I bet it's in the old city, some sort of museum built in his honor and there was going to be a ground breaking. I told him I would have Mac Toon there and he can't go, [redacted] and I said I would have Toon there to represent us. If it's in the old city I guess he can't do that. B6

A: We never have.

K: Then we shouldn't do it. Will you find out where it is?

A: Who is Bill Paley.

K: The President of CBS. No, the owner of CBS.

A: The Israelis are doing this. I'll check and find out.

K: If it's in the old city will you call Bill Paley and explain why it cannot be done. I have no obligation to him. If it were some place that was convenient, I think Mac could go.

A: He can go anywhere but not the old city. I'll check and find out.

END

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SG66 *

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Jerry Bremer
7/23/75; 10:56 a.m.

K: Hello.

B: Yes, sir.

K: Roy Atherton told me that he had given you a cable to Hussein. Did you bring that with you.

B: I did and Sisco said not to give it to you. He said you had already discussed it with him and he took it away from me.

K: Could I see it anyway?

B: Yes, sur. I will get it right back to you. I am sorry. I will get it from Sisco.

K: Okay.

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SG 64

TELCON
Roy Atherton/Kissinger
10:23 a.m. - 7/23/75

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

A: Good morning, Mr. Secretary.

K: Roy, just take up both of my messages to the Hill and tell them it is their responsibility.

A: Yes, sir. The outgoing of last night as well?

K: Right. There is nothing in there that I need to be embarrassed about.

A: I don't believe so. Let me review it carefully.

K: Look, we won't get away -- it just seems to me a face-saving formula.

A: That's right.

K: That's all right, yeh. That's implied in the reply anyway. Go to him and just say "this is what we did."

A: Right. The Senate of course will be with you but I will work on the House and the Senate as soon as you're through with your hearing.

K: And tell them this is one of the worst disasters we are inflicting on ourselves.

A: Yeh. It is.

K: A ~~dangerous~~ senseless disaster.

A: This will obviously help (?) you very much in your dealings with the Senate committee this morning, Mr. Secretary. You should know that they're going to press us to withdraw the letter and I just think we would lose all sorts of face for the King if we don't save it. We've put in what we think is reasonable and that's . . .

K: We will not withdraw the letter.

A: That's the unanimous view of all of us.

K: OUt of the question. Out of the question.

A: Absolutely.

K: Roy, I've got to get going. A: Yes, sir.

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SG65 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sisco/Kissinger
10:24 a.m. - 7/23/75

K: Joe.

S: Yes, Henry.

K: Have you talked to Congressman Baucus?

S: I have not because they're off in the Senate talks business.

K: He's been calling here every 15 minutes.

S: Well, let me try again. Let me try again. Hold on.

K: Say, look, I've got to go to the Senate now.

S: All right. I'll try again.

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SG67*

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Art Hartman
7/23/75; 10:58 a.m.

K: Art?

H: Yes. I had a group of Lithuanians in my office.

K: Art, you proposed the Presidential visit to Canada in December -- it is totally out of the question.

H: A Presidential visit?

K: Yeah.

H: Im' sorry, I had forgotten that note.

K: In a letter to Trudeau. I am assuming it came from your office.

H: Well, if it did it got by me. I'm sure it is there but I did not focus on it.

K: It is totally out of the question. It's when he is going to China.

H: Uh-huh. Okay, well we will hold off. I think if you . . .

K: Now, have you been in touch with them as I said?

H: Yes. On your visit to Montreal and that's okay and they say it is perfectly all right if you have a lunch with the Mayor. They would like to fix a date in September sometime between the UN sessions if they could.

K: All right.

H: . . . come back to suggest a date.

K: Good. Tell them that's firm.

H: Okay. And I will call off the other.

K: Okay.

H: Fine.

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SG63*

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Roy Atherton
7/23/75; 9:52 a.m.

K: Roy.

A: Yes, Mr. Secretary.

K: Roy, I think you should take that cable from Hussein up on the Hill and show it to Javits, Case and Bingham and just tell them this is where we are. We think the consequences are grave.

A: Sir, I'll do that. Jerry is on his way over with a message for you to look at, if you want to.

K: I know that. I want you to go up on the Hill first because we can send a message to Hussein after you talk to these people. It's at the end of the day anyway there.

A: The House is going to make it's decision at 1:45 today.

K: Well, that's why I want you to go up on the Hill.

A: The Senators have got until tomorrow anyway. All right, sir. I'll do that right away.

K: Good.

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SG 74 *

TELECON
Mr. Eagleburger/The Secretary
July 23, 1975
Time: 7:16 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

E: They bought all the changes without much argument. Also the report on Colby for the SFRC -- he is not talking to anybody. Sisco's report isn't correct. Maybe they will have a hearing on Angola next week but nobody has briefed him.

K: What do you think will happen now?

E: The Synder thing will be a tempest in a tea pot. In my opinion you shouldn't say anything publicly just way it is worth 15 minutes of your time. Do you want me to wire Helms?

K: No.

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SG 72 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Senator Tower/The Secretary
July 23, 1975
Time: 7:21 p.m

K: I called you -- I have already complained to Church about it. How you people think one can conduct foreign policy. While I am conducting the Middle East and SALT negotiations everyone will wonder whether the latest scandle will bring me down. You don't have a thing but we will have eight weeks of speculation before that comes out.

T: I am sorry about that. I have been one of the advocates of the Congress leaving foreign policy to the executive.

K: You are doing an assassination hearing and you call the Secretary of State. The average citizen will perceive that I am involved in it.

T: I know you weren't. Would you like me to make a public statement to the effect that I don't think you are involved but that you were called to give an overview on policy?

K: That would be helpful.

T: There is no suggestion of your implication.

K: I know -- I talked to Church and he says the same thing. I have the problem of how can I maintain authority while I am negotiating when people wonder what the hell is going on.

T: I am one of your strongest supporters and I will try to help you out.

K: O.K. Thank you.

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SG 71*

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Roy Atherton
7/23/75; 2:15 p.m.

K: Hello.

A: Yes, Mr. Secretary.

K: Roy did you show Case the Hussein letter?

A: Yes.

K: Janka says he is furious -- what is he furious about?

A: Before I even had a chance to brief him he started out referring to the Amman broadcast this morning which said that Jordan couldn't compromise on the size of the defense package. And he said he didn't appreciate our putting Hussein up to making that kind of a public statement. As soon as I could get a word in I corrected him and said of course we hadn't done that and I described in general your letter to him. We had made an all-out bonafide effort to persuade the King to accept the compromise and then I showed him the reply. He cooled off a bit at that point but said that as far as he was concerned that they now had to go ahead and -- unless the King changed his mind. He and all the others including, particularly Morgan, Sparkman and Bloomfield all felt that if at all possible we ought to have another go at the King now that he has had a chance to sleep on this.

K: Yeah. What did Javits say?

A: Javits said that the King should understand better our system of government. That he did not think the military argument of only six batteries was -- that six batteries wouldn't do the trick was valid and that's . . .

K: Try that on the Israelis next time. When they ask for something give them something less than half.

A: Well put this kind of language in the next letter of offer with Israel. In any case, Javits said he was going to send a personal message to the King as well. But he said he urges that we ask the King again to reconsider. All of them are very uncomfortable as a result of this -- of being forced to vote a resolution killing the whole deal. But they are in a corner and they don't see any -- even the supporters we have are all saying that this is the best that can be achieved.

K: Okay. Well, I am bringing back this message with a few minor changes.

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A: All right, sir. Incidentally, Mr. Secretary, Case asked if he could see the message that you sent to Hussein. Idid not have it with me and I said of course it was your personal correspondence. I couldn't make that commitment.

K: Well, what is in that message?

A: I thought you might want to review it. I will ask Jerry to have one ready for you to look at. I've looked it over and I frankly don't see any problem in letting him see it. It will probably help on the credibility sidebecause he is very suspicious of whether or not we are in effect playing the game, I think.

K: Okay.

A: So we will wait to hear from you when you get back. Oh, Mr. Secretary, on the timing, the Committee -- the House Committee -- is meeting now.

K: Well they better not vote anything before we have heard from Hussein.

A: Well I think if we can tell them that we are definitely going to go to Hussein again this will . . .

K: Yeah, you can tell them we will go to Hussein.

A: Okay. All right, sir. Thank you.

SG 73 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Atherton/Mr. Pickering/The Secretary
July 23, 1975
Time: 7:20 p.m.

K: Have you got a report on the Kays thing?

A: I haven't seen Tom. He just walked in the door.

K: Well put him on.

K: Did you show the letter to Kays?

P: I was as forceful as I could be. 'He had no objections and he was sorry that the other had come out.

K: Did you show it to the others?

P: I showed it to Bingham and Javits. Bingham said he never believed it anyway, but he appreciated your bringing it by.

K: O.K. Thank you.

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SG68 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sisco/Kissinger
1:00 p.m. - 7/23/75

K: Yuh.

S: Mr. Secretary, I've just reviewed the Jordanian situation with McCloskey, Atherton and Pickering who have reported. The feeling up there on the Hill is that we ought to go back to the King and ask him to reconsider and we're going to get another 24 hours in the process. My recommendation, therefore, is that we send that message that I brought to you this morning.

K: I better take a look at it.

S: Yes, sir.

K: Is it here?

S: Yes, sir, it's on your desk. Remember I had it.

K: In the State Department or the White House?

S: At the White House. Yes, sir, remember I handed it to you just before the meeting.

K: OK, I'll call you back after my meeting with the President.

S: All right. Thank you.

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SG 77*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Hills/Secretary Kissinger
July 23, 1975
3:46 pm

K: I was wondering, or have you done it?

H: I have talked to Nick.

K: Are they going to use it?

H: He is going to call me back, when he gets done. He says our story rings truer than the other one and doesn't think it is a big story. He doesn't think it is front page material. But he will call me back before they go to press .

K: Will you let me know?

H: Yes. I talked to him for about a half hour and went over dates and facts. They think it is a non-story.

K: It is a non-story. Ok, thank you.

END

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SG 70 *

TELCON
Amb. Dinitz/Kissinger
7/23/75 - 1:07 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

K: Hello.

D: Mr. Secretary, can I take a minute of your time? Whatever cables to the Ministers, that I understand, but I want to communicate, to Rabin only, the essence of our conversation, and I want to be as close to our understanding as possible. So I would read to you what I am trying to communicate to Rabin and you'll correct me if I'm wrong.

I would say that the strong recommendation of the Secretary is that we'll submit now the fallback position as it is -- that you can show it to the Egyptians. [redacted] B1

K: Right.

D: With regard to the shuttle itself, the Secretary states the following: He will support our fallback position in the north. He does not ask for any changes in the east. We will have to leave a sliver for a change in the south.

K: And you have to keep a certain flexibility in the north. But we are not talking here about a significant one.

D: Except certain...

K: You know, just for adjustments in the negotiations. But I'm not going to ask for a 5-kilometer withdrawal.

D: A few hundred meters.

K: Well, of that order. I don't want to tie myself. But I think I made my meaning clear on that.

D: This is only for Rabin so that he will -- well, I'll continue. We will have to leave a sliver for a change in the south. That's all in the framework of the shuttle. He will support our B-line, but may require a change of one or two kilometers during the shuttle. He sees no major problems with the southern corridor.

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K: Well, I see plenty but I think those we can....

D: It is no major unsolvable problem.

K: No insoluble problem.

D: I'm learning from you the terminology as well, Mr. Secretary. In the southern corridor. We will fight to reinstate the Israeli-Egyptian warning stations operated by Israelis and Egyptians respectively.

[redacted] B1

That is what I want to transfer to Rabin.

[redacted] B1

K: Yeh.

D: That I think summarizes the essence of our conversation and that I want to pass to his eyes only, so that he will have his guidance, you know, of what is attainable.

K: I just think that it should be .... We should bring it now rapidly to a point where a decision can be made whether it is worthwhile to have a shuttle.

D: Yeh.

K: That's my pressure on you now. My pressure isn't to give in to all the Egyptian points.

D: Yeh, I understand. I did not go into the Egyptian early warning posts or the two companies because they will not appear on our map and I don't know what the reaction to the early warning that they want to put in the north. Maybe we will demand to put early warning on their side. I don't know. It is just a . . . .

K: Well, I just want you to study it. Maybe there is something in there that can be traded off. I don't even know what they have in mind -- the size of the unit or anything else.

D: The point that you added now is we should bring it rapidly to a point of decision as to whether a shuttle is ....

K: I'm not trying to maneuver you into a position -- Rabin should understand this -- in that you get blamed for the break up of the talks. That's not now the issue. I think we are now at a point where you can say serious efforts have been made and it's not a question now of reasonable or unreasonable; it's a question that a breakdown has certain inevitable consequences however reasonable you were.

D: Yeh.

K: And that's the context in which you should consider it, and not in the context of how much blame will be attached to you.

D: I understand. Yet it is important -- I mean we want agreement but it is also important for us that we don't break with the United States.

K: My advice is tactically we've got to get some lines accepted as a basis for negotiation. Otherwise we're just blowing smoke.

D: Yeh.

K: And if we can get the lines accepted at least as a basis for negotiation, that means you can vary a kilometer here or there, but it doesn't mean that you cannot, you know.

D: Yeh.

K: Then when I have that, I can come [redacted] to the Egyptians. B1

D: Have you thought -- it's just an idea of mine -- maybe you should also meet with Rabin while you are in Europe now. I don't know if it's possible or viable, I just tossing the idea out.

K: Also, in addition to an Egyptian?

D: Yeh.

K: That would have to be in Helsinki.

D: In Helsinki. I understand your schedule is to be in Helsinki on the 29th, 30th, 31st and first.

K: Yeh. I don't exclude that, and I would be free the morning of the 30th, for example.

D: By that time will you have the counteproposal of the Egyptians?

K: No, probably not. But I might have it. Why don't you talk to Rabin and then talk to me again?

D: Okay. I will do this.

K: Fine.

SG 76 *

TELECON
Robert McNamara/Secretary Kissinger
July 23, 1975
3:25 P M

RELEASED IN PART
B6

(Missed first part)

M: What did he (Carl Rowen) say.

K: I said McNamara talked to me on the context of total disagreement with the ___ and I had to say it three times.

M: They don't want to weaken their case.

K: It doesn't weaken my case.

M: Whether I was in agreement or disagreement...

K: My case was that you in the face of a policy with which you totally disagreed trying to help me establish comtact between the critics.

[redacted] B6

K: I can tell you the one thing -- I'm completely on your side. It's nice to know there's one newsy who's not trying to screw me.

M: You're too ___.

K: I just wanted you to know what I said to him.

M: All I did was, I had my office say that I had not called people to say I was in agreement with the policy.

K: I said you were in disagrement with the policy but you tried to help us establish contact with the critics.

M: Many thanks.

K: It makes no point for you to say you agreed ___ even though you disagreed.

M: I don't give a damn what Rowen reports. Anything you need me for, call me.

K: OK. See you soon.

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END

SG61*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Senator Case/Secretary Kissinger
July 23, 1975
3:35 PM

K: I have asked Tom Pickering to bring you the outgoing message I sent to King Hussein we you can judge for yourself to what that message responds to you saw this morning. If I can make a comment, I think it's a sad state of affairs when the Secretary of State is accused of colluding with a foreign leader against the Senate who should have enough confidence in each other. When I tell you we appealed to him.

C: I appreciate that. I agree. When this immediate operation is over and I look foward to hearing from the Ambassador in my office.

K: I think he's on his way to the Hill and I think you can see this for yourself.

END

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SG 59 *

TELECON
Thomas Enders/Secretary Kissinger
July 23, 1975
3:10 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: For my meeting tomorrow morning with this group, can you give me a paper along the lines we discussed when we met here as a group, the various proposals. This is just not enough what's been given to me.

E: OK.

K: The paper I had last week to discuss that subject...

E: I can give you that. Some of that may leak back to other agencies.

K: Take out what we can't discuss.

E: OK.

K: At least give me that paper so I know in general what we're talking about.

E: Very good.

K: I cannot be thrown into these meetings by your people like the Queen of England whose function is just to appear.

E: You'll have the paper.

K: Can I have it fairly soon?

E: When do you want it?

K: Let me have it by the end of the afternoon.

E: We're in the middle of a speech but I can get away from that.

K: When else can you give it to me?

E: In the next hour if that's when you need it.

K: Let me have it by 6:00.

E: OK.

END

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SG 58*

TELCON
Robert McNamara
Sec. Kissinger
3:15, July 23, 1975

RELEASED IN FULL

Carl Rowen

K: Bob, your friend/called over here about something in Safire's book. Something on page 192. He mentioned -- I have not read the book.

M: I have not either.

K: That you came to me at the outbreak of Cambodian War and gave me 10 names and said you would call five and I would call five to get their support. Youf office has denied that, but that in fact did happen. You said, not get their support, but to stay in touch with them.

M: I don't ~~xxxxxxxx~~ remember that but not to get their support.

K: No, no, it was not for their support. You were telling me we were cutting ourselves off from these people and you were going to try to get us to stay in contact with them.

M: Sure, sure.

K: I told them as an example because of the spirit of the thing. You said and ~~xx~~ I have told the story. You said this is the craziest thing you had ever done but it is now a national problem and here are ten people going to give you trouble. You said you call five and I will call five.

M: I remember that but what Rowen called here to say was that I had urged support of the Cambodian bombing and said I would deliver five people.

K: Absolutely not.

M: It is all of this thing. He is just cutting me.

K: I have noted that. I will call Back Rowen myself. If I get somebody else to do it they will get it screwed up.

M: I hate to bother you.

K: If I give it to my press man and he calls him he will screw it up. I wanted you to know what I am going to say.

M: Sure. Sounds reasonable.

end

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SG 56*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Hobart Rowan/Secretary Kissinger
July 23, 1975
3:18 PM

R: Mr. Secretary.

K: I'm just calling you about that question you asked Bob Anderson about Safire. I've never read the book, but I have that quote here.

R: I too have the quote and that's all.

K: Let me tell you exactly what happened. It's 80% true what is in Safire's book. On the day, we went into Cambodia McNamara came to my office and I called him and he recalls it now. He said, Henry, this is the craziest thing you've done or has been done. However, it's a major problem and here are ten people who are likely to give you trouble, and I'll call five of them and you call five of them. It isn't a question of ___establish communication between the governments and the intellectual community. I've mentioned this to many people including, I'm sure, Safire and I wasn't considering that an example of his greatest of _____even though he disagrees with the decision.

R: He agreed.

K: He totally disagreed.

R: He totally agreed.

K: Disagreed with the decision in going to Cambodia.

R: I think that should be made clear. I appreciate your calling me, Mr. Secretary.

K: He made clear that he disagreed with the decision.

R: I got that about 80% true.

K: What he says is exactly true but it gives the context which I may not have mentioned to him.

R: I intend to use this ~~excerpt~~ exactly as you said it in a story tomorrow on McNamara and other things at the Bank. I don't know if you've seen earlier ___. I'll report it as you reported to me.

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K: I took it to be an ___ to maintain a dialogue between the governments and the opponents and I did not take what McNamara was offering as trying to drum up support for Cambodian evastion but to maintain a dialogue with the government.

R: Have you discussed this with McNamara in the last day or so.

K: I just called him.

R: I'll report it just this way.

K: OK.

END

SG 81 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Nick Thimmesch/The Secretary
July 24, 1975
Time: 7:23 p.m.

T: What a way to end your day -- facing the hotel problem.

K: Who says there is a hotel problem?

T: I came over to you as you were leaving last night about my hotel problem. About two months ago I applied for a hotel in Moscow. American Express said they were booked and then I went to the Embassy. After two or three weeks they couldn't do anything. Then I called Kendall. He put me in touch with a fellow in New York and we talked last week -- by the way I got a visa but no accommodations. He took down my arrival time and my schedule. I called yesterday and he said he needed my schedule again. He called today and asked for the date I applied and the application number. I don't even know if there is an application number.

K: Give the facts to Larry tomorrow and talk to him about it.

T: O.K. All I need is a room. I don't think it is on purpose because they gave me the visa.

K: Call Larry in the morning.

T: I will tell him I talked with you.

K: Right.

T: O.K.

K: O.K.

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SG 80 1*

TELCON
Richard Valeriani/Kissinger
5:34 p.m. - 7/24/75

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

V: Mr. Secretary, what happenen on Turkey?

K: I think it's an unmitigated disaster.

V: Quotable?

K: You can say I called it a disaster - don't say unmitigated.

V: Is there anything left to do?

K: No.

V: No. So now what happens?

K: Look, it is rare that a country that hurts every participant and above all itself and Dick, I don't see how any fair-minded person can question -- you know, the Arab-Israeli dispute you can argue forever what the merits are -- but you cannot argue it on this one.

V: Well, you know you were sort of mouse-trapped on the questions from the Congressmen. I don't know if you saw the stories that were out this morning.

K: Look, Dick, the record leaves no doubt that we never said that the Greek government wanted it. Never. You know this is something that is visibly disastrous but there is really nothing I can say.

V: What do you expect to happen?

K: I think the Turks will take fairly quick action.

V: Close the American bases or?

K: I think it will lead to a rapid, irreparable deterioration of our relations with Turkey without doing the slightest for the Greeks. And that's just the facts.

V: And when you say irreparable you mean they'll move?

K: I think they'll move on the bases.

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V: How quickly?

K: I think within the next two or three weeks.

V: And there's no way to repair it or get it back on the road?

K: No, no. OK.

V: Thank you very much.

SG-82 *

TELECON
Ambassador Esenbel/Secretary Kissinger
July 24, 1975
6:10 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I'm sick about what happened.

E: I just talked with the Prime Minister. This is what I have, you know, the first impression is that they are very very much destressing.

K: They are right.

E: They say that until this moment we stayed in complete quietness and didn't do anything and he doesn't know what they will have to do from this time on.

K: Mr. Ambassador. I have nothing I can tell you. We're issuing a statement condeming this action. I'm embarrassed as Secretary of State to have to talk to you. There's no excuse. You have been a loyal ally and it's inexcusable and if you can wait until you see the president next week, it would be good, but we understand if you don't. So, I don't really know what to say.

E: The President you mean, that he was expected to see the Prime Minister. Do you mean that?

K: Yes.

E: Are you sending a message.

K: Yes and also the statement we issued.

E: This is what he told me, that we were quiet until this time. We do not know what we're going to do now. The action is considered an enemy action. It's not a friendly action, it's an enemy action. What is affected is more than the material value of what the resolution would have meant. The preliminary principles is not accepted. This is what he told me.

K: Mr. Ambassador, this is the saddest day of my being in office, to do this to an ally there's no reason that is now relevant. I find it painful and inexcusable. I don't know what to say.

E: Thank you.

K: And you give my warm regarding to the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister. You can convey this to him and we will fight to restore this but you

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may have your own necessities. I'm sure we'll win eventually. I'm positive that September or October when it comes back that we'll win. I just hopes you don't use too much that can be used against us.

E: I'll tell him.

K: Should I call him myself?

E: I don t know. He wasn't in a very happy mood and it's rather late in Turkey. Did you ever talk to him on the phone?

K: NO. Think about it. If you want me to call him, call my office and I'll call him.

E: Why don't you do it. He might be up. It was just five minutes ago when he called. Try it.

K: I'll call him.

E: Why dont you.

END

SG85 *

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
July 24, 1975
3:16 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Would you tell Fahmy that the Israelis have told us that this request for face-to-face negotiations is nothing new and has nothing to do with the negotiations.

S: I sent it out the moment I saw it. I will send up the pink to you. I gave him the whole explanation and I hope Hermann has explained it to him. It was a unfortunate slip.

K: No, I think they are doing it deliberately.

S: I don't think so.

K: Well, deliberately or not, they are simply goading them on.

S: Ok.

K: Ok,

END

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SG 86

1*

TELCON
Sec. Butz
Sec. Kissinger
2:50 P.m., July 24, 1975

RELEASED IN FULL

K: ~~Bill,~~ Earl how are you.

B: I wanted to report on where we stand on this wheat thing. When you and the President leave you will be with Brezhnev etc. You know the figures. Assessed within the 10 million tons that we kicked about that we were going to do. We have a good public posture even though the newsmen are biting us. We have reached all of the grain companies. I am positive we have gotten control of the grain companies.

K: This is in the interest of the grain companies.

B: They phoned last night and are interest in two million tons more. I said hold it for a week until we see about the crop.

K: You have a corner on the market.

B: From my point of view we have now sold enought that there is no chance of grain prices dropping or we are in trouble politically. This morning there was announced another one million tons to Russia.

K: Great.

B: Someone said that the Russians have or are about to buy 20 million tons from the EEC.

K: Good.

B: We are getting out this afternoon...

K: They will all have to come to us.

B: We are getting out this afternoon our bi-weekly release on our estimate of the Russian situation. We are going to group the 10 million tons. It will be a bullish factor in the market. Our intelligence and CIA's concur almost exactly. The last was 15 million. This afternoon it will be about 185 tons. Perhaps the market is not closed yet. This means that what Dobrynin told you is probably an underestimate. They are going to have to buy at least another 10 million tons or cut back in consumption. They can cut back by liquidating livestock.

K: That would give them problems down the road.

B: Right. So far we think it is not likely that they would use liquidation this time. If they need 10 million more tons

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we think the Canadians can spare another million tons; quarter million ton in Australia, another one or two tons in European Community. If they need grain ~~xxxx~~ of that magnitude the only place left to get it is here -- 5, 6, 7 tons.

K: Or 10.

B: I am sure we have the capability for that. I am telling you that we have moved enough that we will not be in price trouble.

K: Now are you going to cooperate with us.

B: This means now, ~~xxxx~~and I talked to the President a few minutes ago. It means now from a political point of view internally and economic point of view, we can get our price from the Russians. ~~xxx~~ If the chance comes up when you are with Brezhnev and Gromyko you might as well be frank and tell them if you play on the team you will get it otherwise we do not need you as a customer.

K: Terrific. If your situation is ~~xxxxxx~~ that way we can really do it.

B: Please don't misunderstand me.I want to sell it but I don't need to. We are at the point where they have to come to us.

K: Terrific, Earl.

B: Best of luck to you.

K: You sit on the companies now.

B: We have them under control now. They are not going in. Word is out that we have asked the companies not to sell. We are saying we have decided to wait until we get a hold on the upcoming crop. Best of luck to you my friend.

SG89 *

TELECON
Congressman Rhodes/The Secretary
July 24, 1975
Time: 7:21 p.m

RELEASED IN FULL

R: We did all we could do.

K: I know you did. You made it closer.

R: We told them we could get 100 Republicans and we got 103 but that doesn't ease the blow. I don't know what the Turks will say but we still have the Military Sales Bill coming in October. I am in hopes we can get the Turks to hold off until we get a chance on the Military Sales Bill. Perhaps if it is possible for somebody in the Turkish Government to say that they are holding off because we made great progress in the House that would help.

K: I have a call in to the Turkish Minister and I have called the Turkish Ambassador with a plea similar to this.

R: He didn't help the matter much. He talked to too many people up here. He is an emotional guy. Several people mentioned he was pushing pretty hard. He was saying that it isn't a matter of Cyprus but a matter of our bases.

K: He is not the most skillful man in town. Let's see if we can hold together till the Military Sales Bill comes up.

R: I feel vindictive about it particularly about the Republicans who weren't willing to take our word for what will happen. We can't indulge these feelings much longer.

K: I appreciate your call. We will do our damndest.

R: I still think there might be a chance if they will make some sort of gesture on the Cyprus situation then we could publicize it and it would help.

K: Let's see where we stand in October and how much will happen before then.

R: I am sorry it didn't work.

K: You are a big man to call me.

R: O.K.

K: Bye.

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50113 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
July 24, 1975
1:00 PM

D: Hello.

K: Anatol.

D: Henry, how's your hearings?

K: OK.

D: I know when you come to the foreign relations committee they are preparing to work for administration and anything. I would like to check if you would like to have a light supper in my embassy. Only the four of us before the opera -- say 6:30.

K: My problem is that I don't think I can get there by 6:30.

D: Maybe than at 6:45.

K: Let me call you. Can I call you early in the afternoon, say 2:30.

D: Of course. No problem.

K: I'll call you at 2:30.

D: You'll let me know whether you can make it. It's rather difficult to organize a supper or we can make it some place. Going to a restaurant is unbelievable. You check it out. Maybe we can find something. Your Secret Service doesn't like you in big places.

K: Right.

D: This is the question. Please let me know at 2:30 or 3:00 whether it's possible.

K: OK. Right. I'll let you know by 2:30 or 3:00.

END

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SG 79 1*

TELECON
Foreign Minister MacEachen/The Secretary
July 24, 1975
Time: 8:53 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How nice to hear from you. I am so sorry that my schedule got so impossible this month but I told my people to set a date between the Special and General Assembly.

M: I have heard about that possibility, and I am exploring what my program is. I think we should set a date in the fall.

K: Let's fix a date and announce it.

M: How about October?

K: Let's do it in the first week of October.

M: I will get the date back through the pipeline in October. Will that be alright?

K: That will be fine.

M: I have one request to make. As you know we have decided not to have this Crime Conference this year -- the UN one. We made the announcement early this week and we have requested (I was down to see Waldheim a week ago) -- we didn't think it would be a success and we asked for a postponement. I understand the UN Committee on Conferences is meeting tomorrow afternoon to consider our request for postponement.

K: You want us to vote with you?

M: We want your help.

K: I am in favor of doing it automatically unless you hear from me to the contrary tomorrow morning. They will have to have a good reason for me not to go through with this.

M: I think the request is reasonable.

K: Assume that it will be done.

M: How are things going?

K: We just lost the Turkish Aid Vote.

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M: That is disappointing. It must have been close.

K: 10 or 13 votes, I think. It is the single most senseless act that I have seen because it helps nobody.

M: Will there be a second chance?

K: Yes, but it is technically impossible until October. Otherwise things are going O.K. Will I see you at the CSCE Conference?

M: I don't think so. The Prime Minister is going.

K: How can you be so lucky?

M: The Prime MInister is going to be there but I have bowed out so far.

K: I have to go or everyone would write that my influence has declined.

M: I am glad it is taking place.

K: I hope to see you soon.

M: We will try to get a date to you for October.

K: Good.

M: Have a good visit to Montreal. Many thanks and nice to talk to you.

K: O.K. Bye.

SG 104*

TELECON
Helmut Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
July 25, 1975
2:42 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: This is not the paper that I wanted. I want a list of the things we agreed to.

S: I thought you wanted them in sequence.

K: I want them the way I said. I want all the things we agreed to in their paper then the cruise missiles and the other ones at the end saying these ___and then I would like to have the one on backfire with tickers so they can read it. I would just list all the ones we agreed to first. I think that is psychologically better.

S: O.K.

END

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SG92 1*

TELCON
Amb. Dinitz/Kissinger
11:31 a.m. - 7/26/75

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

D: Mr. Secretary. I talked to Rabin's office and I give you the background. And I called to tell you exactly what he is intending to say. Yesterday and today there were full headlines in the Israeli papers, mostly by Dayan, that it is a castastrophe to have an interim agreement to the countries going to war if there is an interim agreement, etc, etc., etc. The purpose of Rabin's interview -- it is an interview of questions and answers on television at 7:30 tonight -- it is to set it in the proper framework where most of the interview is divided, is dedicated to argue the case why an interim agreement is good. On the specific point I will read you what is the question and answer and I think you will find it acceptable.

The question of the interview was this: It was published yesterday and today in the press attributed to political sources in Jerusalem that the hard Egyptian reply to the Israeli proposal should not be regarded as a final answer but a position that can be negotiated. On what do you people base this assumption?

The Prime Minister: First of all, the purpose of Israel is to arrive at an interim agreement with Egypt. But this does not mean at any price. We have received the Egyptian proposal. It is substantially not acceptable to Israel. But Israel does not merely reject but also sets forth its own positions. The process of negotiation therefore is continuing and no (surprise) can develop. And so the final conclusion should be expected within the next few days. This is the process of negotiation which must continue so that the best possible terms can be achieved for Israel which has as its purpose the attainment of an interim agreement acceptable to each.

K: That's not bad.

D: Therefore it continues, there is no reason to get excited either by newspaper headlines or by statements eminating from Cairo. I think this is a calming statement and one that sets the negotiations.

K: I would prefer if you didn't say "which is substantially not acceptable."

D: Well, but he used the words "substantially not acceptable" because he ...

K: No, I understand. Look, I'm not asking him to say it's acceptable.

D: No, I understand.

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K: Look, I've given you my idea of how this thing is going to develop and I've had some exchanges with Eilts in the meantime. I think if we all keep calm now. I can tell you for the first time since February I now -- in February I had an uneasy feeling that it couldn't succeed.

D: Yeh.

K: Now I'm beginning to think that if we all stay cool we are going to make it succeed.

D: But you see the purpose of this interveiw was in order to keep the minds cool because especially Dayan - that I'm telling you. . .

K: It's a disgrace.

D: Yeh, well

K: I mean why does Dayan get into this?

D: Well, because Dayan is trying at the same time to topple the government so he has his own ax to grind.

K: Look, I have to run to a press conference. I'll see you at 2:30.

D: At 2:30. Fine. At the White House or the State Department.

K: State Department.

D: State Department. Ok. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

SG 97 *

TELECON
Art Hartman/Secretary Kissinger
July 25, 1975
2:40 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

H: Macomber is over at the Foreign Office now. The Turkish radio has announced that Defense cooperation agreement and all related agreements have all lost validity, all activities except NATO are suspended as of tomorrow and all activities that have been suspended will be turned over to the supervision of the Turkish armed forces. That have gone all the way. Bill will be reporting in. We have a real success here.

K: You're now in the same category as Phil, you've each lost a country.

H: I'll let you know as soon as we get further word.

END

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RELEASED IN FULL

SG 98

TELECON
Minister Shalev/The Secretary
July 25, 1975
Time: 8:28 p.m.

K: You might like to know in Israel that we have had an urgent call from the Egyptians complaining about the Rabin statement. They say they can't negotiate when their proposals get rejected publicly.

S: He didn't reject it totally. He made a counter proposal.

K: Could we have quiet on the exchanges now.

S: Yes. I will pass that on.

K: It is tough enough on the substance. We are saying the same thing to the Egyptians. They haven't rejected anything publicly.

S: You don't know what they say. You people don't take into account what the Egyptians say.

K: I don't say they are worse or better but I call it to your attention. Where is Dinitz?

S: He has taken off for a couple of days. Should I tell him?

K: No that isn't necessary.

S: Have a nice trip -- take care of yourself.

K: O.K.

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SG 99 *

TELECON
Mr. Robert Kleiman/The Secretary
July 25, 1975
Time: 7:10 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

RK: I wonder what we should do about Turkey. Have you any thoughts. We had a fight here but I finally got it through. I think Ball swung around on the basis of what I said.

HK: It is a disaster.

RK: I agree.

HK: This is just a mindless disaster. The best thing you can do is to write a strong editorial that they should reverse themselves.

RK: Is there any chance of a vote before the fall?

HK: Well, some people think maybe next week. By the fall it will be hard to retrieve it.

RK: I wonder if it would help to hold the situation until the fall to unfreeze the 50 million.

HK: I don't know what you have been told, but the Greek Congressmen told us that we had to make concessions and then they would unfreeze it. Since the Turks have not been willing to make concessions then we would be in the same position as we are now. The Turks are willing to let us cut off MAP. What infuriates them is our embargoing already paid for equipment. They have rejected that compromise three times.

RK: I wonder in the present situation whether this shouldn't be kept open as a possibility.

HK: We would have to discuss it with the Turks first. We have two requirements: first the Turks have to accept it, of course; and second the Congress has to approve it.

RK: Rosenthal says the Congress wouldn't have to approve it.

HK: We need for the Congress to approve it so they can't say we have acted illegally. Rosenthal's position was that we need to get concessions from Turkey. We could have won the vote if we had done that.

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RK: The statement put this forward as a preferred approach without mentioning concessions from the Turks.

HK: That is what Rosenthal insisted in two meetings with the President. It has been rejected by the Turks. When I first heard about it I was intrigued but the Turks have rejected it.

RK: I was looking at the figures and annual shipments in fiscal years 73 and 74 and they were larger than 50 in grant and there was hardly nothing but grant in those years. Since there is 87 in the pipeline now in this crisis I should think the President could move and nobody would challenge him. A number of people who voted against the bill said they would prefer that. They thought the President had that authority.

HK: Then MAP doesn't get them the items they want. We will put it to them when we see them in Helsinki.

RK: You don't think it would be a good idea to just do it.

HK: No, but I will talk to the President again.

RK: When are you coming back from your trip?

HK: On the 4th.

RK: We have another meeting coming up. We are going on the 14th.

HK: Maybe we should talk. We will have made further headway on SALT.

RK: Would Friday the 15th be good?

HK: I can't predict that now. Would you call my office when I get back?

RK: O.K. Have a good trip.

HK: O.K. Bye.

SG 100 *

TELECON
Senator Edward Kennedy/The Secretary
July 25, 1975
Time: 6:29 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

EK: When you come back can I get a date from you for September?

HK: I have a firm rule not to appear before any subcommittees which applies to everybody but Kennedy. Do I have to apply my rule that no television will be allowed in the room while you are questioning me.

EK: Laughter.

HK: Yes, you can count on it. We will get you a firm date.

EK: Have a good trip.

HK: Thank you. Are you going to be around in August?

EK: Probably back and forth, but with a little luck I will be in Cape Cod most of the summer..

HK: If you are in town and want to come by for a drink, we would love to have you.

EK: Thanks.

HK: Nice to talk to you.

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SG 102 *

TELECON
Doc Morgan/Secretary Kissinger
July 25, 19975
9:32 am

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I wanted to thank you for the great fight you made which I know must have been difficult for you under the circumstances.

M: I thought we had it won until the last minute.

K: How do you explain it?

M: A terrific amount of pressure, of Greek pressure. Like, the Governor of Massachusetts is a Greek and we didn't get one vote from Massachusetts. And the Mayor of Syracuse is a Greek and he called Philadelphia and we lost all those votes. I have never seen such a pressure operation. Chairman Tom Foley of the Agriculture Committee came to me and said there was terrific pressure on him and when he saw it was switching we lost him. We lost Mel Price that way. It was up to 212 when it began to change.

K: You were up to 212? And they switched votes?

M: Right. As soon as they broke and went ahead the switching began so we ended 223 to 206.

K: Is there any chance of getting this idea revived in October?

M: I would think so. It is bound to come up again when we start on the Military Sales Bill.

K: I thinik an enormous amount of damage will be done between then and now. We are trying to keep it limited.

M: Well, we tried.

K: Well, we wanted to thank you. That pressure operated on everybody but you really did a patriotic and courageous thing.

M: Thank you very much.

END

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SG 106 *

TELCON
ART Hartman
Sec. Kissinger
8:35 p.m., July 25, 1975

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Art, first in the speech, but I will take care of it -- I think it is now unnecessarily nasty in certain parts. You cannot say that forces has been used to impose political conformity. For how long can we needle the Soviets.

H: Yes.

K: Secondly, I think your cable is ~~quite~~ quite misleading.

H: On the themes.

K: Yes. Makes it sound as if it is an absolutely cold war speech.

H: I think ~~xxxx~~ actually the theme exercise is out now. We will be seeing them before.

K: O.K. Let's forget it.

H: Let's forget the cable. I will look at the tone again. Are there many parts like that?

K: No. It can be handled by editing.

H: We have just had a message they have gone to a triumph~~phrase~~ vernte in Portugal.

K: Who is Artalo (sp)?

H: He is head of Copcon. He has been maneuvering around in the middle. He is pretty close to Gonzales.

K: There is no longer an armed forces movement.

H: It is not clear. The 240 man council has voted these three in as a kind of junta.

K: O.K.

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SG 94 1*

TELCON
Ed Klein/Sec. Kissinger
5:51 p.m. - 7/25/75

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: Hello.

EK: Hello, Mr. Secretary. Are you all packed and ready to go?

K: We're leaving tomorrow. [redacted] B6

[redacted] as I said in the letter I'd be delighted to get on a plane and come on down at your convenience.

K: Right. I'll be in touch with you soon as I come back.

EK: Ok. How do things look as far as this trip is concerned?

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K: Well, you know there is this hysterical press reaction. I think it is a useful step. It is not a monumental step and I think given the bilaterals plus the fact that we are touring Eastern Europe, I think it looks good but not spectacular. It's not intended to look spectacular.

EK: Does this reaction surprise you? I mean this is all just between the two of us?

K: Well, I think what we are seeing now is a combination of liberals and conservatives for tatally differenct reasons, and totally different motives -- the liberals are giving intellectual focus and respectability to the conservatives. And I think people have to ask themselves -- supposing we go back to cold war policies, where will we be five years from now. And aren't we going to replay the whole Vietnam domestic experience again.

EK: I think what took everyone by surprise was that this sudden focus on what are we getting out of this whole thing which I think hadn't been the focus of attention until what - ten days ago, two weeks ago or something like that.

K: And after all 35 nations were involved in this -- this was not primarily a U.S. enterprese.

EK: I'm also told by my _____ correspondent that it looks very good on the Middle East. Everyone seems to be quite optimistic.

K: Well, if everyone would -- you know, I think I said it at a press conference or to somebody -- if these two guys can survive each other's statements they can't miss on an agreement. No, it looks a little better. For the first time I can begin to see the outline of something.

EK: You know when Arnaud de Borchgrave was through here he came away from his meeting with you absolutely convinced that ....

K: There was no meeting with, I ran into him in the hall.

EK: (Laughs) Listen to Arnaud, that's a meeting. That step by step was a waste of time and that we should go for the big brass ring, or whatever he calls it and you know the whole. . .

K: The question is, how do you go for the brass ring?

EK: Exactly. In any case, he's been predicting a collapse of this town and everyone else....

K: No, that's not correct. There is a chance. Have a good vacation. I'll be in touch with you early in August.

SG-330 *

TELECON
Senator Humphrey/The Secretary
September 25, 1975
Time: 7:24 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: You were great.

H: I wasn't effective.

K: None of us was effective. Where are we now?

H: I talked to Cliff just about 30 minutes ago. I talked about his original resolution and told him it was good if you get the word President out of there.

K: That was fine.

H: I feel that what nees to be done is for you to take the initiative. You might tell Cliff that you want to work it out. I told you my concerns and let's see what we can do to work out a methodology, you might say.

K: We are becoming the laughing stock of the Middle East.

H: I know. There is no way you can conduct policy under these conditions.

K: Can you imagine what Asad will do to Sadat under these conditions?

H: He will say you were a jerk. If everything is laid out it will cause more trouble. I told McCloskey that we have to (I will talk to Dinitz, by the way) tell the Israelis to let some people know that we are worried about this passing.

K: He says it is caused by the distrust of the Congress for the Executive. My belief is that it is the public opinion and that they are looking for an excuse.

H: I part it is distrust of the Executive because that is a way to get in the news these days. In the second part it is distrust of the package, the money and all that. The opponents of aid to Israel as well as the supporters have congealed. You have people who were originally 100% in favor of aid to Israel but now they are becomming constitutional lawyers. The practical parts are being ignored. I know there are time considerations. I thing over the weekend I would spend some time, if you have any at all, getting ahold of our mutual friend Cliff. Tell him you have to depend on him.

K: Will he do it?

H: I think he will. Yes. I think we can be helpful working through him and with him. We can work through him. I think it is important for you.

K: I will call him tomorrow.

H: I think I would.

K: Maybe the President ought to call him.

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H: I think you first. That is my judgment now.

K: O.K.

H: I will do whatever I can.

K: I know you will. They are now directing this at the President and his policies. There is no alternative here like there was in Vietnam. There has to be some sort of an agreement.

H: It is a Hobson choice.

K: The Swedes have 1500 people there and they don't go through this agony. I am becoming worried about whether Israel will survive this thing.

H: I know.

K: Every Arab will ask if the Americans can't send volunteers to help will they allow Israel to be destroyed.

H: I will call Dinitz myself.

K: Thank you. This is the first time that I think we are in a nihilistic age.

H: I think we temporarily are.

K: Clark is talking like a college debater.

H: I know.

K: There is a reality out there. If the Middle East blows up he can wave his paper in everyone's face and no one will care.

H: I know. O.K.

K: Thank you. Bye.

SG 93 *

TELCON
Sisco/Kissinger
12:21 p.m. - 7/25/75

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: Hello.

S: Mr. Secretary.

K: Yeh.

S: I've just finished in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Javits, Humphrey, Percy and a number are urging us to do the following which I would recommend that we do.

K: Who?

S: There is pretty broad support in the Committee. McGee. . . .

K: Yeh, what is it?

S: One, is that we submit four times. When the 20 day letter runs out on the 30th, we submit exactly the same deal for 14 batteries in order to give us another either one 30 day period or two 30 more day periods, as you figure out the calendar. Only to buy time and I think it's a good idea. I would recommend we do it. It's essentially the same deal, no alternation. In other words all we're doing here is going through the . . .

K: Yeh, but they can't make a decision in August.

S: That's right. That's why there'll have to be a second increment so that it links over until September. And they all urge you strongly to agree.

K: What do you mean a second increment - oh.

S: There's a 20 day period under the law.

K: Wait a minute. Let me check that with Hussein.

S: Well, we can do that, but I think it's . .

K: It means that he will not know until the end of September whether he's got a deal.

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S: Well I know, but Henry he hasn't got a deal at all in my judgment. He's going to get turned down on this deal. Sure we could go to Hussein right away but they're going to meet at 2:00 and they're under the gun to take some kind of a decision. And I said I would discuss it with you.

K: Tell them I'm favorable.

S: Yes.

K: And that I will approach Hussein on it with a very strong recommendation.

S: Good. And then, well, we'll just propose they waid until Monday or Tuesday until you get the answer.

K: Yeh. Tell them I will strongly urge it; that I think it's a statesmanlike approach and you know by that time we might be able to find out what the Israelis say.

S: Well, let me give you my judgment. This could not be a deal between ourselves and Hussein. I think we should inform Hussein --

K: Where are you? At the Foreign Relations Committee?

S: No, I've just come back to my office.

K: Well, let me see the cable, Joe. We don't have to settle that now.

S: My point is that I think we're better off telling the Senate Foreign Relations Committee right now - yes, we buy the deal. It should not be ...

K: No, because I do not want it to get out into the newspapers that that is the deal.

S: Well, I'm afraid the part of this thing has gotten out already because this [redacted] Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. . . B6

K: I will not be on record as having agreed to it until Hussein has heard it from me so you better work out something with the Committee in which you tell them that as far as I'm concerned I'm agreeable, but in decency I must get in touch with Hussein about this.

S: That is not an unreasonable position, Henry.

K: And they have to understand it. It doesn't serve any purpose if he blasts off tomorrow. He seems to me to be in a very uncertain situation. I want to write him a very human letter saying that I think they are looking for a way to improve the whole deal and they probably will.

S: Yeh, well. . .

K: I do not want to conclude it. Just let them put off their decision until Monday.

S: All right. I'm not arguing the point. Why do you have to . . .

K: At 2:30 we're meeting a group of - we're meeting with Dinitz.

S: Are we? I didn't know that.

K: Of course not. Because that would not have filtered to you yet. It's not important enough.

S: (Laughs)

K: Will you assemble who will meet on our side?

S: OK. Good.

SG 111

RELEASED IN FULL

*

TELCON
Amb. Dinitz/Sec. Kissinger
8/6/75; 9:44 a.m.

K: Hello.

D: Good morning, Mr. Secretary.

K: I was going in to see the President so I told Larry. We did not discuss exact figures with the Egyptians about the demilitarized zone but my guess is that there will be no problem of having it substantially what it is. As I told the Prime Minister once, it might be that you have a few hundred or a thousand more -- might be a useful question [gesture] but we are not talking about 20,000 men.

D: You told it to me, not the Prime Minister.

K: I told it to somebody.

D: And the other question on Tito. Can I say to him something that will set his mind at peace?

K: On Tito? There is nothing to say on Tito.

D: No, what I mean is I don't want to talk much about the conversation.

K: There is nothing to report.

D: No, no, I said I don't want to report. But what happened was that Tito said, as you know, after the meeting that now after he talked with the President he has come to . . . .

K: Later on he explained that what he meant -- in the assessment of the situation.

D: I see. The point is there is no change there -- you know -- when Tito said he agrees with someone . . . .

K: There was no substantive conversation with Tito except Tito's repetition of his general view and our saying nothing that would give him anything to report to others.

D: Yeah. But there was no indication that the United States would accept -- I mean . . .

K: Absolutely not!

D: All right. Thank you very much.

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K: Wait a minute, now. I have now seen what the Prime Minister told Toon.

D: Yeah.

K: And I don't want to get into game playing exercises again.

D: Yeah.

K: We understood you to say that you had granted this because you were out of the Passes and therefore the major political objective of Egypt was achieved. This we transmitted to Egypt.

D: Yeah.

K: Every report I read says you are two kilometers inside the Passes. These are reports in your papers and now in the Christian Science Monitor and that we cannot accept.

D: I understand.

K: Now, we have given you all the _____ around there. Now there is no way that a bicycle could move in the area without being under Israeli observation.

D: Mr. Secretary, I don't really know what is in the Christian Science Monitor and I would . . . .

K: No, no, I just want to make sure -- we are willing to agree to some objective determination. What is out of the Passes? It doesn't -- you know -- this cannot be impossible to determine.

D: Well, I have passed all these on to Rabin last night and I'll find out what the answer is -- I really don't know. Maybe the answer is to have a very big map -- you know -- where the thing can be shown very specifically where we stand and then there will be no problem.

K: You know you may have to adjust it. I mean we can't accept the proposition that important XXXXXX as your negotiating team is, everything they say is engarved in stone.

D: No, we don't even claim this -- surprisingly enough.

K: On the other things we have for all practical purposes supported your position.

D: I passed it on to Rabin and I will get his reaction.

K: And I think if we can get that settled the rest will be negotiating adjustments.

D: You know, if you will remember, when the Egyptians first saw the maps. .

K: Their first reaction was it was out. Then when they started it they said it is in. Now they are not sure. So we cannot be talking about a hell of a big distance.

D: That is what I am saying.

K: I mean we cannot be talking about a hugh distance here.

D: That is why I say we should not pay attention to what we read in the paper. What is basically on the ground. And I think that there is . . .

K: In my judgment -- at first it looked like it was out and then they said it is in and now they are saying they are willing to let us determine it.

D: Yeah.

K: You can't be -- you know -- you can't be talking about more than a kilometer.

D: I really have no idea. Whatever I will say here will not be . . . .

K: No, no, you are not supposed -- I just want you to know that . . .

D: No, no, I understand your problem and I passed it on last night. To Rabin. We will hear what they have to say on this. I -- I don't think this should be a problem.

K: Okay.

D: Okay, Mr. Secretary.

K: Bye-bye.

SG 110 *

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Larry Eagleburger
8/6/75; 9:40 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

E: Yes, sir.

K: You can tell Dinitz that we didn't discuss figures with the Egyptians. But I think it is an easily manageable thing.

E: Okay.

K: You know, it may be that they should permit an increase of a 1,000 men if it comes to that point. But we are not talking about a big increase.

E: Okay. ~~I do~~ I'll do that right away.

K: But even that hasn't -- I would recommend that. But I don't think that that is a ~~huge issue~~ moot issue.

E: Okay. You recommend that they be prepared to go up about 1,000.

K: You know, that they go up from _____ number.

E: Okay.

K: But I don't know what they have in mind. But I would recommend that -- at least they keep -- that secondly -- that we are bloody furious that we were told they were out of the Passes. Now we want an objective determination of what that is. And just pointing to something on the map and saying that that is out of the Passes is not acceptable.

E: Yes. I will take care of that right away.

K: Okay.

E: Okay, sir.

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DATE/CASE ID: 5 MAR 2003 200102979

SG 119 *

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Chuck Robinson
8/7/75; 10:27 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Chuck.

R: Good morning, Henry.

K: I'm expecting you to go ahead with that -- Ansary.

R: Okay.

K: I am cutting through the fudge factory. Will you discuss this thing with Greenspan and Zarb today?

R: We are having lunch.

K: You go ahead. You just call him.

R: I will tell him. And then and the plan . . .

K: The guys will just have stupid nitpicks. They won't have any other problem.

R: I agree with that. I'll go ahead but I suggested to you that if I go back and meet with Ansary I should have a Government lawyer with me.

K: That's fine.

R: And I suppose I should talk to Carl Maw about that.

K: Yep.

R: Okay, fine.

K: I think we better move it now.

R: Okay, I will follow up on it right away.

K: Good.

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SG 120 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Dinitz/Kissinger
10:32 a.m. 8/7/75

D: Hello.

K: Mr. Ambassador.

D: Good morning, Mr. Secretary.

K: I notice that your newspapers are putting out the word that I am attempting to put pressure on you and asking you to speed up negotiations.

D: I did not see that.

K: Well, the statement will be denied here emphatically.

D: Well, we will deny it too, in the Embassy. We will deny it in the embassy.

K: And I've noticed they are also putting out the content of what I told you the other day already.

D: This I didn't see. The only thing I saw that was a _____ of my statement after I saw you.

K: OK. Well, I want to talk to you about that, I've got some people here now. Will you be there for 15 minutes?

D: Yeh, I'll be in the Embassy all morning.

K: OK.

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SG 117 *

TELECON
Art Hartman/Secretary Kissinger
August 7, 1975
4:03 PM

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: Do you think Carlucci understands our policy in Portugal. I have my doubts.

H: He certainly does.

K: What is he doing?

H: He's talking to a series of people and among the military and telling them they ought to do something now. Goncalves is gradually getting himself into a more authoritative position and we heard today that he may have formed a government and Frank is talking to all of those people .

K: What would an ambassador have to do when an Assistant Secretary reports to the Secretary that he's no good.

H: I don't understand what else he can do. We have not given him anything to offer them. Except to think of way we can strengthen those people. I think the action the Europeans took the other day is helpful. I think they now have to produce some concrete. I'm sure he understands.

K: I've asked him to come back next week

B6

H: I'm just about to brief the NATO Charge and I thought I would give them a view of our visit to Europe. Romania.

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K: It's almost maniacal thrust of the Russians.

H: And wanting to have all kinds of agreements with us.

K: There was nothing specific.

H: Bill Hyland is with me and he'll talk a little bit about SALT but not much.

K: OK.

END

SG 125*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Governor Askew (Florida)/Secretary Kissinger
August 7, 1975
11:30 AM

A: Mr. Secretary, this is Governor Askew.

K: How areyou?

A: Fine, and you?

K: OK.

A: How was your trip to Europe.

K: It was good. It was a successful trip.

A: I just wanted to double check with you on the Southern Governor's Conference. I thought a letter had gone out to you but I just got back and it had not goine out, but I wanted to touch base with you aga in on this. The Southern Governor's Conference, which is on the 15 and 16th ~~as~~ of September and it is my understand that the General Assembly of the U.N. opens on the 16th. Is that correct?

K: Yes. But I don't have to be there on the opening day.

A: If there's any way you can come on any day, we would be tremendously pleased.

K: On the 16th or 17th?

A: The 15th or 16th.

K: Tell me again. Do you want a formal speech?

A: I thought whatevery would be sort of easiest for you. I know your schedule in terms of preparation. We would like something that would be public but it could be as much as anything.....

K: How many people will be in the room?

A: It would be a public meeting with about 16 of the Governors.

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K: It seemed to me one thing we could do is for me to speak for 15 minutes and then answer questions. I don't mind this being public.

A: That would be fine. ~~The~~ I know the demand on your time. I think one of the things that we would be interested is a program on oil or something. I think you have such a knowledge -- it doesn't have to be an up to date briefing...

K: I can talk about the energy problem from an international point of view.

A: Then maybe let the Governors ask~~e~~ you questions.

K: Why don't we do that. I'll let you know whether I can do it the 15th or 16th. Where is it going to be held?

A: Disney World.

K: I'll bring my son.

A: Come and relax.

K: Where is the nearest airport?

A: Orlando, at McCoy which is the airport...

K: Why don't we say I'll definitely do it and I'll let you know later whether I'll come on the 15th or 16th. Which would you prefer.

A: I believe the 16th would -- well, actually it doesn't make any difference.

K: I don't have to be there on the opening day of the UN.

A: When do you anticipate they would reach a decision in the UN on expelling Israel.

K: That depends on wheter we get an Egyptian-Israeli agreement.

A: Let me do this. If your schedule is a little flexible -- I'm trying to get Bill Simon to come and speak and I think I'm going to talk to him shortly. I believ he will probably come on the 15th and Senator Mansfield, hopefully will come on the 15th and the 16th might be a better time for us.

K: Why don't we aim for the 16th. Oh, the 15th I can't do it.

A: Then let's plan on the 16th.

K: Yes.

A: I'll get you a letter confirming it.

K: What time of the day.

A: Sometime in the xxxxxxx morning of the 16th.

K: Then I could fly down that xxxxxxx morning.

A: Is there any chance you can come down and relax.

K: Let's see about that.

A: If there's any possible way -- have you've ever been to Disney World in Florida?

K: No. I've been to Disney Land.

A: Disney World is substantially more extensive than Disney Land. Disney World would be interesting in ___ xxxxxxx together with the World___ they are starting. They're trying to get representatives of all countries to participate in a sort of world fair. They're trying to get ambassadors from various countries. They had Dobrynin and others at the same time they had the space shot. I think it's something they would be very much interested in possibly spending a few moments with you.

K: Let's see what I can do. I'll definitely do it on the 16th. I'll give you a summary of our energy policy and then answer questions on any subject you have. You can have it open to the public.

A: I'm grateful to you for doing it.

K: I'm grateful to ;you for giving me the chance to do it.

A: Thank you and xxx I look forward to see ing you.

END

SG124*

TELCON

Senator Church
Sec. Kissinger
1:00 p.m.
August 7, 1975

RELEASED IN FULL

C: How did the European trip go? Are you pleased?

K: Actually the European trip went well and as s-on as sanity returns to our national debate which may not happen before the election we will see it in perspective. When people say recognizing frontiers every single frontier in Europe has been recognized in peace treaties or bilateral agreements. There are no frontiers for us to recognize or not recognize. This is not why I called you. What worries me is the liberal intellectuals are moving to the position of Dulles in 1954. This is a total untenable position for any length of time.

C: I think that is right.

K: I know it is not your position.

C: I think we need a healthy debate but I agree with you that there may not be much chance of having one immediately before the election. That is a prob lem we have to grappel with.

K: You asked me how did it go. No one in the conference room would have had the idea that the Russians were on the attack and we were on the defensive. If you read the speeches the challenges all came from the West and not from the East. If you look at the President's trip through the East there is no doubt that the feelings there are in the direction of liberalization and easing of their trying to shake off Russian domination to some extent.

C: Tell me this. There are a couple of people who are trying to get out of the Soviet Union. They are ~~jxxx~~ Jews and they seem to have a very good case and they have been blocked. Is there any way that we can help particular people?

K: Sure.

C: Without just gumming up the works.

K: I think it can be done.

C: Can I send you a letter.

K: The way I have found to be effective is if I take up names with Dobrynin and say this is not a governmental request but it would make a good impression. In about 60 percent of the cases it ~~xxx~~ works.

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C: I wrote a letter to Dobrynin and got a standard reply and I thought maybe if I approached you on it you might be able to be of some help.

K: The reason I called you was I ran into your press guy.

C: Spencer Davis.

K: He is a good fellow.

C: Yes, he called me and said he thought you might have misconstrued his remark that I was looking forward to hearing from you as a request for a telephone call today. He meant only your testimony.

K: I see. As long as I have you on the phone -- he made a reference to the fact that some of your staff people think that I have been talking to the press about the substance of the facts of this. I want you to know that I thought your staff people had been talking and I was a little outraged. I have not talked to the press. I will not talk to the press. I think this whole tendency of leaking fragmentary information is very ~~xxx~~ bad.

C: Very bad.

K: We have a difficult problem here of maintaing confidence in the government. I think from the record I can see that you would want to know what the procedures were. I don't see anything in the record about personal responsibility so I am very much at ease about appearing before you.

C: In that connection we have followed the practice that many of the witnesses have said ~~xxx~~ thought fair, if there are documents they which we want to question about, those documents are reviewed in advance. There is no entrapment.

K: You have sent me a list.

C: That's good. I think we will try and low-key your appearance as much as possible.

K: My concern is if I am going to go off now to the MIddle East that the thing -- that there be no implication of my personal...

C: There is nothing in the record that suggests that. We will be very careful about it.

K: If we could do that at the end of the meeting. I am going xx there to help. I am not going to be combative.

C: There is not going to be any combative mood in the Committee, I don't think.

K: I have not talked to the press nor has any member of my staff. No one knows anything about it.. The way the White House is playing this at the moment is xx never fully clear to me.

C: Nor to me.

K: You must not assume they are out to help me.

C: I know there have been a lot of leaks in this town. My Committee has been pretty good.

K: Honestly, when I saw these various Horouk or whatever his name is, I thought they came from your Committee.

C: That was my impression. We have looked into it closely. We have decided that it did not come from our Committee and we pretty well think we know where they came from.

K: If you know, you know they did not come from me. I was pretty outraged by them. They are substantively -- they are off the mark in real substance. In any event it is not a matter to be in the press while you are looking into it.

C: I think, Henry, after you appear it might be well for the two of us to appear before the press so I can make the point that you have come as we have called former Secretaries of State for the purpose of making certain that we have heard from the best witnesses available of what the national policy was at the time.

K: That would help me enormously.

C: I will be pleased to do that.

K: I think that would help matters greatly. Will you be in town all of next week.

C: I think so.

K: Would you like to have lunch after my xxxxxxxxxx testimony at some point.

C: Sure, let's plan to do that.

K: Not on that day but say Friday.

C: All right. Friday of next week.

K: I could bring you up to date on where we stand in the Middle East. I am really very concerned about the way the East-West debate is developing in this country. If we have another ten years of cold war where will we be at the end of it.

C: I would like to talk to you about that and anything else that you think would be helpful for me to know and as far as your detente policy goes, I am a strong supporter of it. I take issue with one or two aspects where it comes to natural gase and that kind of thing.

K: That is inevitable and it does not mean that you have to approve every individual move that is made.

C: Your over-all thrust of your effort is one that I approve and I would like to give some vocal support to it.

K: I would like to discuss it. What I really see is a worrisome situation. I think that John Kennedy got himself into a hell of a box by the sort of campaign that he ran in 1960. I know from him that he felt that. He did not really hit his stride until he had liberated himself from a rhetoric that he never really meant to sustain.

C: He managed to scare the Russians pretty badly.

K: Yes, but he really wanted reconcilliation.

C: We should avoid that in this coming campaign and I would really appreciate the chance to talk to you about it.

K: Let's have lunch on Friday.

C: I will put it down and we will see you on Tuesday .

K: I will be through by lunch.

C: I think so if we start promptly at 10:00. We will try to finish with you during the morning session.

SG 126 *

TELECON
Joseph Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
August 8, 1975
9:08 AM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I think we should send a note to Fahmy just saying the Israelis have agreed in principle to start the shuttle in the period of August 18 to 20 and Herman will bring him the specific ideas.

S: That will be reassuring. I don't think we need to say much more.

K: I don't think we need to say anything more.

S: I'll do that right away.

END

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SG 127 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Kaul/The Secretary
August 8, 1975
Time: 6:47 p.m.

Kaul: I wanted to confirm about our Foreign Minister's visit here from 3 to 5 October. Is that o.k?

K: Let me get back to you tomorrow. Has it been confirmed by the State Department?

Kaul: The State Department confirmed it, but there are some blanks to fill in.

K: I am just worried that it will coincide with the Japanese visit.

Kaul: No that is later. Would you like a lunch for him on Friday or Saturday?

K: Lets do it Friday.

Kaul: He has a press group for Friday.

K: O.K. Saturday then.

Kaul: How about dinner at my house on the 3rd or 4th?

K: I would prefer it on the 3rd.

Kaul: Good. He wants to see the President and the Vice-President. Would that be alright for Saturday.

K: I think that would be alright. Let me check.

Kaul: Shall I call your office tomorrow to confirm everything?

K: Yes.

Kaul: Thank you.

K: Bye.

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SG 132 *

TELECON
Mr. Robinson/The Secretary
August 8, 1975
Time: 8:26 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Dobrynin says they cannot do 20% discount. That would be political incomprehensible in the world position and in their country. They can do a straight swap. They will do 5 to 12 or 8 to 18 -- do you see what I mean?

R: I understand.

K: With each side taking the chance on world prices.

R: That is a risk.

K; That way you enlist us in bringing down the oil prices he says.

R: That is right. He has a point there. I am not sure whether it is a position we can sell. In my opinion it makes sense.

K: How would we handle it?

R: Work out an arrangement.

K: Why shouldn't we be able to sell it?

R: There are those who think the price of grain is down in relation to oil and the price of grain is more likely to go up than oil. We should get a differential and if it is wise then we can sell it. Over the past 18 months grain is down in price. In a swap arrangement we get less oil for grain.

K: Where is the price of grain now?

R: It will go up in the morning if that announcement goes out that I told you about. It will change the ratio.

K: It wouldn't be 5 to 12 any more?

R: No, if we fix prices then we have to look at the ratio more carefully. We have to decide where the price of grain and oil will go.

K: I see no evidence that the price of oil will come down over the next few years.

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R: Let me give some thought to this.

K: O.K.

R: The issue of whether grain is more depressed in price and therefore if we fix the ratio we are loosing an opportunity for increases is a tough one. And then the question of the mechanics of how we tie these two together comes in.

K: You think about it.

R: O.K. Bye.

K: O.K.

SG130

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TELECON
Mr. Robinson/The Secretary
August 8, 1975
Time: 8:00 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: On this grain for oil deal, do we have to put down requirements of discount or 5 million against 10 million of the world price?

R: Yes, 5 million for 10 million of oil which is the price.

K: Supposing -- that's right. The way it works out, if you swap 5 million against 10 given what 5 million tons of grain costs it amounts to a discount.

R: We have to parallel deals. We need more oil if you get the 20% discount. We should have 12 million tons of oil. We are not really talking about a swap.

K: The 10 million would be at world prices. The discount for the oil would be 12 million.

R: If you take 12 million at 20% discount, it would be the same dollar amount on 5 million tons of grain at the market prices. If you get a discount on the grain, you need more oil...

K: Right.

R: to come out with the same thing.

K: 20% more oil or 20% off the price.

R: If you are working on a straight swap basis it should be 12 million tons.

K: Are we going to do this regardless of how the price develops over the years? Can we keep that ratio regardless of the prices?

R: You can only approximate the dollar amount on both sides of the equation. We are saying that we will let you in if you give us a discount. We don't know what the market prices for the grain will be or the price for the oil.

K: My understanding from Dobrynin is that it is easier to agree on a swap.

R: We can work that out. It makes it more complicated. However, it is a way they can avoid the political disadvantages of saying they are giving us a discount.

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K: How can we work it out?

R: On a volume basis. We will take our chances that grain and oil move the same percentage in the same way. We should take that chance.

K: Let me see, if they agree in principle you and one of their technical experts should get together to work out the details.

R: What you said makes sense -- recognizing that we have to pin down relative prices of grain and oil.

K: O.K. Fine.

R: I am leaving on Sunday to meet with Ansary.

K: Here goes your last chance to go to heaven. Don't you tell me that he is living like a monk down there.

R: I will tell you Wednesday.

K: [redacted] I am an expert on Ansary. B6

R: I will see you tomorrow.

K: When are you coming back?

R: Wednesday afternoon.

K: O.K. Good.

SG 137 *

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Tom Enders
8/8/75; 9:24 a.m.

K: I am told that Treasury is making an major anti-dumping statement this morning on automobiles.

E: That's right.

K: And you think it is a minor matter with Miki in the country?

E: Well . . .

K: And a week after the President sees Giscard, Schmidt and Wilson and gave them no advance notice.

E: Well, we have been in touch with all of those governments and they have been in touch with us, and expressed their views on it. The announcement itself is couched in conciliatory terms and there was no legal . . . .

K: Yeah, but wait a minute, Tom. You guys have no right to make foreign policy like this. I mean the fact that you, Hormats and some guy in Treasury all agree on something that is hairbrained doesn't mean that I would approve it.

E: I think you have no option in . . . . Treasury has no legal right to delay beyond thismorning.

K: And I . . . . You would do this while Miki is in the country!?

E: We have in fact _____ it out as far as we possibly can for that purpose.

K: It would have been a hell of a lot better to do it last week or next week.

E: Last week just before he came I would have thought would have been difficult.

K: Oh, but doing it -- if it is difficult to do it before he comes, it is easy to do it while he is in the country.

E: It's not easy to do -- no, it will be difficult for both him and the Germans and a number of other countries.

K: And we just go ahead and do it. We do not find a way of avoiding it.

E: We have been trying to find a way of avoiding it. The announcement has been made in what I think are extremely conciliatory terms.

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K: Does Schmidt know about it?

E: The German Government knows about it.

K: Since when?

E: The German Government was in to see me about two days ago on the subject on instructions and I told them very probably we would have to go ahead with this. The . . .

K: But look, the President has just gotten through talking to people who tell them that we are wrecking their economy or at least not doing enough to build it up. He gives them no advance warning. He is not back a week when we announce anti-dumping actions. Now, I will not accept the proposition that a _____ bureaucracy couldn't have found a way around it. I just don't accept it. What do you mean it couldn't be delayed beyond today? What would have happened if we had delayed it?

E: Well, if we had delayed it, beyond today, then the Treasury would have been subject to legal action by the interested parties.

K: Like who?

E: The UAW and Congressman Dent are the two main interested parties but the UAW is the most powerfulobviously.

K: And you don't think we could have gotten them to lay off for two weeks? Two or three weeks?

E: If you think it is that important?

K: Well, I sure as hell don't think we should the week the President's comes back from a trip, for God's sakes.

E: Let me get on the phone to Treasury to see whether I can just tell them that.

K: I mean it just makes it look as if he is kicking them in the teeth.

E: Okay. Let me see if I can get them to put it off for two weeks.

K: Okay.

SG 134 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Eagleburger/The Secretary
August 8, 1975
Time: 8:34 p.m.

K: What did you settle with Dinitz.

E: That unless he heard differently from me tomorrow, he should contact Sisco.

K: What did he say?

E: That this is a private message between Kissinger and the Prime Minister.

K: What does he want.

E: I told him that he could come out to Camp David.

K: I want to meet with Eilts tomorrow but Jerry has loaded my schedule.

E: At some point I want to talk to you on Chile.

K: Have you looked at my schedule. When can we talk on Chile unless I stay until 6:00 in the evening.

E: In my opinion, Chile is only 5 minutes at most.

K: There is no time. Have you talked to Jerry?

E: Yes.

K: What is his solution?

E: We came to no solution. We will have to protect your personal time every day if it kills us.

K: O.K.

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SG 138 *

TELCON
Arthur Hartman/Kissinger
1:48 p.m. - 8/9/75

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

H: Yes, sir.

K: Art, I approved that cable.

H: Good.

K: What do you mean "good?" That means it hasn't gotten to you yet in an hour.

H: Right in front of me.

K: But take a look at it again. Is it strong enough?

H: Yes, no I think it is and it has reached the point that Fox thought would come up if such a conversation took place.

K: But why is - why doesn't he have it take place?

H: No, no, no. He said he was going to have another conversation but this is the first one after the manifesto and this deals with the questions he thought he might come up.

K: Yeh, but he should say he will have total support and he shouldn't just confine it to economic support.

H: No, it doesn't. The first paragraph says "support for him."

K: Well, but what I'm suggesting is that . . . . each of these weapons. We'll find a way of putting those in too.

H: Well, I'd let him respond. I think this makes it clear that it is support for him.

K: Look, this is not a Foreign Service exercise. And I want to make sure that he knows he will get full support. I know that Carlucci's going to take 30% off it anyway.

H: He won't because this is exactly what he wants to say now after the manifesto.

K: How about Suarez? Did he talk to him?

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H: He is seeing him for dinner tonight but I think he should just indicate general support. This is the key now.

K: That's right. I agree with that.

H: OK.

K: OK.

SG 145*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Enders/The Secretary
August 12, 1975
Time: 6:42 p.m.

K: You called earlier.

E: I am making some progress with the items to go into the UNGA speech. I would like to tell Parsky about the completed list of the problems and themes that would go into the speech.

K: O.K.

E: I have not committed you in any way.

K: You have already told him?

E: I have given him the things I gave you but I said that you hadn't approved them.

K: Well, o.k.

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SG 149 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/The Secretary
August 12, 1975
Time: 5:29 p.m.

K: Would you do some talking points for the White House Congressional people?

S: We will try to do that tonight.

K: What I would like him to say is something on the management of the Israeli and Egyptian warning stations which is mostly a face saver and a number of other things. Don't say two things -- see what I mean?

S: Yes.

K: Just four or five paragraphs long.

S: O.K.

K: Good.

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SG 148 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Ted Koppel/The Secretary
August 12, 1975
Time: 5:35 p.m.

TK: Can you give me an idea of where we are going -- I am going on the air in 25 minutes?

HK: I have a preliminary Egyptian response and all I can say is that the ball is still in play.

TK: How much further will it have to go?

HK: Until it is completed.

TK: You told me yesterday that within the next 10 days you would know.

HK: Now it is within the next 9.

TK: Everyone keeps using the word preliminary -- aren't we far enough along to stop talking about preliminary? What stage are we at?

HK: I can't go into the details. I keep screaming at the Israelis when they do it.

TK: Are we talking about secret understandings or the public agreements?

HK: We haven't agreed on the public agreement.

TK: What did Eilts go back with?

HK: There shouldn't be such a clear separation between the two. Everything is being discussed simultaneously.

TK: Are you satisfied with the Egyptian response?

HK: I think the follow-on movement is continuing.

TK: You still keep to your estimate of yesterday? On the basis of this Egyptian response nothing is delayed is it?

HK: No, but we are getting into details with the Israelis that we have to work out. We will know better at the end of the week.

TK: O.K. Thanks very much.

HK: O.K.

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DATE/CASE ID: 6 MAR 2003 200102979

SG 146 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Hyland/The Secretary
August 12, 1975
Time: 6:40 p.m.

K: I just want to see where that paper is.

H: I handed it to Jerry just a minute ago.

K: Then I will get it in three days.

H: I will call him and tell him to bring it forward.

K: O.K. Good.

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SG 150 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELECON
Mr. Hartman/The Secretary
August 12, 1975
Time: 5:28 p.m.

K: Could you give me tonight something I could say in the press conference or in part of my speech?

H: I don't know the general topic of your speech.

K: It is on detente. I could but it in the detente part or in the part on decisions that have to be made.

H: Yes, I can get it for you. I am taking off but I am not leaving town because [redacted]. I would like to stay out of the office because of that reason. Bruce will follow this matter but I will do the statement before I leave. B6

K: O.K. Good.

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SG142 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON

Mr. Phil Geyland/The Secretary
August 12, 1975
Time: 6:59 p.m.

K: I called you this morning in the meantime Larry called you. Birmingham is not going to be a classic example of one of my speeches. It is something I am doing for Sparkman and Allen. It is a town and audience that I would not normally go to.

G: What is this group like?

K: It is the Southern Farm Producers Association.

G: You are talking with the city leaders though?

K: Yes.

G: There will be a local press?

K: Yes, except I never would have picked Birmingham to go to.

G: Why did you agree to do it?

K: For Sparkman who is the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. It is not going to be a good speech. I gave a major speech yesterday -- this one is a general review of foreign policy.

G: I am really interested in the aspects you and I talked about -- what is on those peoples' minds.

K: I have no feel for the Birmingham crowd. It is a pity you couldn't have been with me in Milwaukee or Minneapolis.

G: I take it you are not going to do any others for a while.

K: I don't think my schedule will permit me to do anything before October.

G: But you will be doing this again?

K: Yes.

G: You don't have any room in your aircraft for me do you?

K: I don't know. I am not trying to scare you off if you are free, come. For all I know Birmingham is a hot shot town. Normally, I pick towns in the center of some area. The ones I profited from were St. Louis, Milwaukee and Minneapolis. I have no feel for Birmingham. Undoubtedly, it is on the conservative side.

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G: I asked Anderson about the plane and he thought it was impossible. If you have any space I would appreciate it.

K: I am going by jet star and it is very small, but I will look into it. As long as you don't consider this a typical trip.

G: I am looking at what the people are worried about.

K: I can't judge in Birmingham.

G: It is a big city.

K: In every place I was impressed by how well-informed the leadership groups were and how uncynical. We will probably come to Birmingham and find a batch of yahoos.

G: I will take to Anderson and get some sense of other trips.

K: I am thinking of going to Cincinnati at some point.

G: You know it takes more than a day to get down and back from Birmingham so if you are going to do this again soon maybe it will be more representative city and I should go then.

K: I just don't know when I am going to do this again -- sometime in October.

G: Are you goingto the Middle East?

K: I will know for sure next week. I think it is likely.

G: Is it moving?

K: It is moving but I thought that once before.

G: You have that behind you now.

K: Yes, I think we should work out something better this time.

G: Someone quoted you on 52.

K: Which means Gwortzman would interpret 58.

G: We are short handed so I will have to think about Birmingham.

K: You will see what is not a typical speech. But the audience is the least interesting part anyway.

G: It is the leaders and the local press I am interested in. Remeber about the plane.

K: O.K. Let me take a look at it. O.K.

G: Bye.

SG 158 *

TELECON
Mr. Robinson/The Secretary
August 13, 1975
Time: 5:45 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: You have staged a coup -- you got me to pick up the phone before you.

R: I didn't mean to do that. Do you have my copy of the cherokee message?

K: Yes.

R: I think everything is ready but we have to tell him and he wants to make sure.

K: I will call the President tonight. Don't get too many people involved.

R: Our problem is that the Shah has said if we can conclude a deal by the end of August it is o.k.

K: We will do it. I will call the President but you do it. There has got to be a way of doing it.

R: I think that the Treasury can sell these notes in exchange for oil.

K: There is no risk whatsoever.

R: I think that is the way to go. We have to get Simon's agreement.

K: I will get him tonight. We can still go the appropriation route but first let's make the deal.

R: I will call Ansary tomorrow. We have the moratoriam period then.

K: How much?

R: They will go beyond the four months.

K: We can get a double discount any way.

R: Our problem is Greenspan and Zarb said we should get it in six months, if not we shouldn't do it.

K: They are small timers. You saw of Saturday. What difference does two months make -- 10¢.

R: It makes about 10 or 12¢.

K: How high is he going?

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R: I think we can get him to four-and-a half or five months.

K: Then take him to five months. That is all minor league stuff.

R: I agree.

K: The big thing is the concept.

R: The concept is sound.

K: It will be terrific. I will call the President.

R: I think it is important. We have to get Simon's clearance and his lawyers.

K: Whose lawyers?

R: Treasury's lawyers.

K: O.K. Did you just get back?

R: Yes about a half hour ago.

K: Are you in your office?

R: Yes.

K: Maybe we can get together in about 45 minutes.

R: I want to tell you about the meeting with the French.

K: Can't they send the invitation out and leave something for the Prepcon?

R: They want to get it out next week but they also want to get our general understanding on it.

K: O.K.

SG 161 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Enders/Secretary Kissinger
August 13, 1975
5:05 pm

K: Have you talked to Simon?

E: No, he is on the beach.

K: Did you try him this morning?

E: No, I wanted to talk to Jerry first.

K: We have to make a decision whether to have a meeting in Vail. I had better call him myself. Would you follow up on the call?

E: He will be calling at 5:30 on a conference call.

K: Look, I will call him and you can follow-up.

END

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SG 156 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Enders/The Secretary
August 13, 1975
Time: 7:20 p.m.

K: He says he doesn't need to go to Vail, Simon that is. Are we all set?

E: I haven't bargained out all the issues.

K: If they are not settled then we have to have a meeting. You give me a statement of what differences there are.

E: I am going over there to get the remaining ones settled.

K: O.K. Right.

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SG 159 *

TELECON
Secretary Simon/Secretary Kissinger
August 13, 1975
5:25 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Bill, what I wanted to check with you is do you want to go to Vail or do you think it is unnecessary?

S: I do not think ~~xxxx~~ there is anything we need to put to the President.

K: My impression is that Parsky and ____ are doing very well.

S: We are not going to have any problems.

K: That's my impression.

S: *If we can keep our bureaucracy under control we are fine.*

K: Do you want the symbolism of a joint meeting out there?

S: I do not . . . are you and Nancy going out there?

K: Yes. I need to talk to him about the Middle East before I go there next week. As far as I am concerned, you will not be taking me out there, I will be there anyway.

S: I think it will only be a show and tell and the President will be subjected to the criticism of ~~xxx~~ all the planes flying out there.

K: Then let's forget about it.

S: When will you be back?

K: Monday. I told Enders and ____ to put in a conference call to you.

S: Ok. I will make sure if there are any problems they are kept to an absolute minimum.

K: Thank you. It could not have gone more beautifully.

END

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SG 155 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Funseth/The Secretary
August 13, 1975
Time: 7:28 p.m.

K: Do you know -- are any or all of the regulars going to be in Birmingham?

F: Well, there will be Ted Koppel, Bernie Kalb, Ken Friedman, and Lars Nelson.

K: We will get a good coverage from them. You will make sure that the speech gets distributed -- and call attention to the Portugal statements. Give them a good backgrounder.

F: It carries itself -- it is a general speech.

K: You might call attention to the Portugal part.

F: Right. Did you see those questions I got on Solzehnitsyn?

K: What about him now?

F: I thought you might get asked about him, so I sent some up. The other things were on the consultations with Congress. Are we seeking Congressional approval on the agreement?

K: There is not yet an agreement on this and secondly, if there were we would ask for Congressional approval.

F: O.K. Have a good trip.

K: Thank you, goodnight.

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SG 162 *

TELCON
Amb. Moynihan
Sec. Kissinger
3:12 p.m., August 14, 1975

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Pat.

M: Hi, there.

K: How are you.

M: I have a problem for you on Puerto Rico. But you have something else on your mind.

K: I am having a press conference and I am in Birmingham. If they ask me about your comment ~~and~~ we should not walk out of the UN, I am going to say we have not made a decision what we are going to do.

M: This was with UPI and I said withdrawing altogether, abandoning our Security Council position is a very different thing.

K: If it comes out that I am disavowing you. I am not going to volunteer it. If I am asked what do I think about it I will say nothing has been excluded. Depends on the circumstances.

M: No problem.

K: I can tell you there is no chance of your walking out of the UN.

M: I don't want people to think they can goad us to getting out of the Security Council.

K: No possibility. In fact, I am not in favor of leaving the General Assembly completely. That I would like to discuss as exactly what to do. We will have to have a session. Second, is to plead for your help in getting a little lieft into my UN speech.

M: I sent down a 15 page s this morning.

K: I have not seen it.

M: No, it is just being put together. I think you have a hell of a speech there.

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K: I think so but I need a lift.

M: This is more a State paper than a speech.

K: Needs an explanation of why we are doing it. The rest I can handle.

M: Right.

K: What is your problem.

M: The Committee on 24 is meeting now and will be for the next couple of days to consider the Cuban Resolution on P. R. which is horrible.

K: Just be brutal.

M: We are not on theCommittee. The State Dept. is preparing a cable to go to the capitals. If I may say in ~~ex~~ your personal interest as well as in the interest of the U. S. I think that cable should say to these countries that we would regard it as an unfriendly act.

K: Oh, yes.

M: Can I say that.

K: Certainly.

M: To which we will have to consider the consequences.

K: Just say it would be an unfriendly act and we will act accordingly.

M: All right. I have been terrifying the IO by asking that they get a list of the countries involved because we will probably want to bombard them.

K: Call Buffum and tell him to put it on my desk in the morning.

M: The governor of P. R. I will tell you are 100 percent behind him.

K: 110 percent.

M: 16 police states plust the Danes are lecturing us on democracy.

K: Do not worry I.

M: Gotcha you. That was a good speech today.

K: Let's see what our friends are going to say.

M: That you are interferring in the internal affairs.

K: Exactly.

M: They are saying you are endangering detente.

K: Now they are after me on their good friend Indira.

M: I called last night to query the voting record on the one key roll call that I could find. The rest having been voice vote. Rosenthal and Fraser voted against India and against the State Dept to impose a $50 million aid limit on India. It is obscene.

K: Hippocracy.

M: I spend two years asking for support .

K: I will see you soon. Have to run to a press conference.

SG 165 *

TELECON
Tom Enders/Secretary Kissinger
August 15, 1975
2:45 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: When am I going to get another draft on that.

E: Tomorrow during the course of the day by LDX.

K: Will you work in the Moynihan material, which I haven't read yet. Is it workable in?

E: It's not his best. Some paragraphs are helpful. We're putting that in and will give you an entire redo. It will look different.

K: Will it be shorter. Don't worry about the length now.

E: I hope to get it down to about 55 pages. Mr. Seidman says he has a commitment from you to see the speech by the 15th.

K: I will not clear the speech any more. I'll clear the idea.

E: I told his people I would be glad to go over the idea with simon w next week.

K: I totally refuse it.

E: That's good. Alright.

K: I'll let Simon clear it but I will not go through that nightmare.

E: You want Simon to see the text.

K: Are they clearing their next with us?

E: We'll clear the concept, and k both sides will talk about things that will cause trouble. That kind of stuff.

K: Ithink it's crap.

E: We have an agreement to locate all the time bombs.

K: Between Simon and Schlesinger, they're both freeloading on my work. It's easy to be tough on the SS-19 when no one knows that it is.

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E: That's right. Of course he is, in effect, saying the ___ and not doing any practical work. I'm close to an agreement with Treasury.

K: I have to present it to the President tomorrow and I don't understand it as well as you do. Are you giving me a book along the xxxxxxxx major themes.

E: It's been given to you. I tried not to do it in my __ style. This is as clear as my last one was.

K: OK.

END

SG 172*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Secretary General Waldheim/The Secretary
August 19, 1975
Time: 4:45 p.m.

W: I know you are very busy but I wanted to tell you that I had a good conversation with Rabin. We discussed many things.

K: I got your report on that.

W: I think that he was -- I pressed the need for an interim agreement with Sadat. I tried my best to convince him that he shouldn't hesitate. My impression was that he understood the need for doing it now. I asked him to go ahead with the agreement.

K: I appreciate it very much. Apparently it has done some good. I will be in touch with you and let you know what the results are.

W: In regard to the suspension question -- I have now a better feeling. I had the impression from Tito that there is a strong threat against such a move. All in all, he clearly said that we could solve the problems in the UN and that he sees no reason why they should support that move. We are asking him to use his influence to try to get more support on this. We don't know how the moderate elements will react on this movement. From all the talks I have had during my trip and back in New York I feel this would be in the interests of the Assembly.

K: I agree with you completely.

W: You have the same impression -- I am glad.

K: Yes. We will be in close touch with you.

W: I wish you a good trip and good luck.

K: Thank you. Bye.

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SG 169 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Les Gelb/The Secretary
August 19, 1975
Time: 6:12 p.m.

G: Everyone wants to give you the credit for 2.8 billion in the speech. Do you deserve the credit?

K: Yes. I deserve the credit. We jointly agreed to this.

G: I heard throughout the day it was your idea and then I got a call from the Pentagon. Schlesinger says he talked to the President a long time ago on this.

K: Your first information was correct. The Pentagon didn't disagree, however.

G: My question is the position on what was in the speech yours?

K: Your first information was correct.

G: Best of luck on your trip.

K: O.K. Thanks.

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SG 171 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/The Secretary
August 19, 1975
Time: 4:50 p.m.

S: Dinitz would like to see you on two critical points we haven't been able to square away. On this letter.....

K: He can hang by his feet from the roof as far as I am concerned, I am spending this evening with my children.

S: We will get everything typed up on clean drafts and I will arrange some time on your schedule tomorrow.

K: O.K. Bye.

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SG 173 *

TELECON
Mr. Jack Valenti/The Secretary
August 19, 1975
Time: 4:40 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

V: In the middle of all of your problems you return my call -- how nice. One quick thing -- I was talking to Kirk Douglas. He is going to Japan and some other places and asked me how he could go about getting into Red China to visit. I am sure they would like to have him there. I was invited by them and I have not accepted yet because I am afraid of what Taiwan would do in our picture making. I wanted to ask you.

K: You could get in touch with the Chinese liaison office here and then let me talk to my colleagues. I can drop his name in a conversation with the Chinese without making it a formal request.

V: I didn't know whether they would resent my approach.

K: They would resent my formal request, but I will talk to them informally.

V: Thank you very much, Henry.

K: Hope to see you soon.

V: O.K.

K: Bye.

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SG 170 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/The Secretary
August 19, 1975
Time: 5:58 p.m.

K: Where do we stand with our darling?

S: Their principle concern is the letter and two last points. They wouldn't veto the proposals they say. As far as the Syrian point goes they wanted assurances that they wouldn't have to go down from the Golan. I hope we maintain the line -- we can't give them this kind of veto.

K: We can give it in de facto.

S: Yes. The interesting thing to me is this paper exercise. You have agreements, protocol and assurances. From letters they want assurance upon assurance. There is never an end to the assurances.

K: What did Dinitz say?

S: The way we left it was we would think about it over night and get back in the morning. It has to be left to the shuttle in my opinion.

K: There is not much more we can do now.

S: They keep saying Nixon gave us this commitment. They hear what they want to hear.

K: Nixon gave us two opposite commitments so which one counts?

S: (Laughter)

K: O.K.

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SG 166 *

TELECON
Mr. Lord/The Secretary
August 19, 1975
Time: 8:13 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Have you heard from the Chinese.

L: No.

K: Would you take a look at something that came from the White House and see if there is something we should do about it?

L: Yes.

K: The Chinese are saying that I am using them to manipulate with the Russians -- but what are they doing?

L: Is this an intelligence document?

K: You just take a look at it. Did you give them the new dates?

L: Yes, the 19th and 20th.

K: I want some flexibility. I may wish to arrive as early as the 18th, if necessary.

L: O.K.

K: But don't change that now, let them come back to us.

L: O.K.

K: I don't think it is a problem.

L: Right.

K: O.K.

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SG 167 *

TELECON
Mr. Max Fisher/The Secretary
August 19, 1975
Time: 8:08 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

there is
F: You know,/one fellow there that is absolutely antagonistic -- he is the head of a synagogue. He is trying to get a meeting with the President. Either you ought to tell Brent not to let him see the President, or I will tell Brent.

K: O.K. Why don't you tell Brent.

F: He is out at Vail?

K: Yes.

F: Everyone else was positive. I think it was just right.

K: I hope we get support. The Jews have to back this thing.

F: The people don't know anything about it and there is turmoil over there. Rabin and Dinitz are working like hell. Have patience. I can see you are worn out.

K: I didn't show any impatience with them.

F: No, you answered some very tough questions. It accomplished the purpose. I told Sisco I wanted this group to ventilate. I think they did.

K: O.K. You were terrific.

F: On the Turkish thing -- I lit into you and you picked it up. That was great. You go with my good wishes. You will have a tough time and one thing I told the group -- being a mediator is tough. Now when Sadat says he wants to make a deal the PLO is accussing him of being a traitor. Whenever you are a mediator you never satisfy anyone. What you are doing is right. You get this and it will be a great accomplishment. That meeting went very well.

K: I appreciate everything you have done.

F: I want to see this deal happen. I have worked long and hard for it.

K: O.K. I hope it will work out. All the best and thank you.

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SG 168 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/TheSecretary
August 19, 1975
Time: 7:58 p.m.

K: Have you seen the cable to Fahmy?

S: Yes.

K: What I wanted was that we tell him what is in the preamble and what is in the text both of which he had agreed to. The letter is less important. Say these are the things that we had agreed to and we have been talk ing to the Israelis on that basis.

S: And you want preconfirmation?

K: Then you can add what the text of that letter would look like. Can you do that tonight?

S: Yes.

K: I have made a minor change on the Sadat letter but I will handle it with Jerry.

S: O.K. Good.

K: Thank you.

Mr. Sisco/The Secretary
Time: 5:59 p.m.

K: What's his name called me. He has another formulation for that last sentence. It says the U.S. will not push Israel to give up this position.

S: He tried that out on me.

K: I don't think it makes any difference.

S: I rejected it. It is not the language it is that they are insistent on this. We have to be equally firm. I told them they are better off to delete that and we accept their first two sentences.

K: How about the paragraphs before that?

S: Even there they are insisting on a veto.

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K: We cannot give them a veto in light of the letter we sent to Sadat.

S: Of course.

K: We can promise them the fullest consultations.

S: They will cave on both of these.

K: I have reached the point where if it doesn't work it was fate. They have screwed up the agreement by pretending that they were raped.

S: What they have lost is the benefit that could have been gotten by Sadat feeling that this is the beginning of a new chapter. Now he will just take what he can get and get ready for a showdown two or three years from now.

K: That is right. They should have done it in March. 90% of this they could have done before. What they are getting in addition they would have been better off not getting. The American presence in the passes will be a nightmare.

S: They want a veto over everything and us there as a trip wire. I hope they are now convinced that this will not be accepted by most of the country with enthusiasm. Swanson of Standard Oil called me and said that they are driving hols into the Suez on the West side of the median line. What he would like to do is further south of Abu Rudies to begin to drill holes on the east side. In that area where it begins a UN zone they can make holes anywhere. He wants 30 or 40 miles south of this. I didn't encourage it.

K: Right. Do you think we have an agreement?

S: I think we are as near as we can get. I think we will get a few 100 kilometers more on one of the passes. If Sadat decides it isn't enough it could fail, but I don't think he will be that foolish.

K: Should I raise the figure we are going to give them?

S: Hold it until you talk to Rabin. Everything you give to Dinitz you will be unable to give to Rabin. If you move to 2.3 then give it to Rabin.

K: I agree. Thankyou.

SG 178 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
August 20, 1975
1:00 PM

D: I just wanted to tell you, I talked to Rabin about our meeting and I have to tell you, he didn't ___. One thing he asked me to ask you. On the (Lance), the whole __if you can make a statement to this effect before you go.

K: I thought we were not going to announce it.

D: The point is, the (timing) of the thing is important, primarily to create a better atmosphere. We would have __it anyway. Could you say those items that he been in the reassessment no longer present a problem. It doesn't mean we have a__. He's thinking about you and him.

K: I understand. I'm just wondering how I'm going to do it, since I'm not going to see the press.

D: Not before you leave?

K: I could make a very general statement.

D: How about the State Department spokesman.

K: The other problem is how to limit it to the lance.

D: You can say that would not present a problem, or something like that.

K: I'll look for an occasion. Can't he do it before I get there?

D: It's atmospheric.

K: Let me get in touch with Shalev this afternoon.

D: I can tell Rabin they can leak it out Israel. It's not important in the press here, ~~x~~ it's important in Israel.

K: He has to understand all the (president) has ~~x~~ released is the lance. Please phrase it in a way I don't get creamed.

D: He can say it resulted of leaking. I think it would be better if he says that.

er

K: That these ideas no long/present a problem. Where is that reception, at his house?

D: Yes

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K: I'll get there about 6:30 or 7:30 so it may can't be much before 8:30. That's without food?.

D: It will be drinks and hors'dourvers.

[redacted] B6

END

SG 180 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Tom Enders
Sec. Kissinger
August 20, 1975
7:45 p.m.

K: While you are still working on this speech, I hope you remember my September 15 speech in Cincinnati.

E: It is started.

K: O.K. Good. How did the rest of the meeting go?

E: It was devoted entirely to procedure. Everyone wimpering why were they there if they were an advisory group and not going to be shown the package. We sparred a little. They got sleepy. I offerd to take all of their substantive suggestions and tell them in detail the reactions of the Government to them. They seemed very worried that their principals were some how not going to be able to make the input into the process as they had hoped.

K: Why didn't you tell them a li-tle?

E: I gave them the areas. They said specifically, what are you going to do on this and that. I bobed and weaved per your instructions. They got the areas and basic concepts but not specific proposals.

K: Right.

E: They said will the Secretary's speech be made available to them before delivery.

K: Who has ever heard of a Secretary of State's speech being cleared by Congress.

E: Never. But they are not only trying to take your finger but your arm.

K: OUt of the question. We have done a lot for them.

E: I think so. They were not too unhappy. It was calm.

Do you have a memo about calling Sparkman.?

K: No. Is it significant. I haven't packed yet.

E: It is about oil embargo. He has a key vote and perhaps you are the only one that can move him.

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K: If the Foreign Service cannot deal with my outeroffice how can I deal with them. I have not been able to deal with my outer office and if you guys cannot get papers through to me....

E: I will call your outer office.

END

SG182*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Richard Valeriani/The Secretary
August 20, 1975
Time: 5:15 p.m.

V: Is it in the bag?

K: No.

V: It could still come apart?

K: If I didn't think the odds were good I wouldn't go.

V: Are you concerned about the demonstrations in Israel?

K: The emotional scene is more than they can handle.

V: Will it interfer with the negotiations?

K: What I am doing will be seen in time to have been the only way that Israel's survival can be assured.

V: Is there a chance that the Knesset will not go along with it?

K: Really Dick, I have to do the best I can on the basis of the best assessment that I can make. I don't want to go down in history as the man who finished off Israel. But I have to look at what is best for the U.S. Everyone told me that this job wouldn't always be easy.

V: What happens with the Syrians and the Jordanians?

K: I am going there on this trip.

V: Is it true that there is a commitment to Assad to make a major effort?

K: There is a commitment which we have stated publicly to make an effort toward peace, but there is no secret commitment.

V: Do you expect/to make a departure statement?

K: If so, it will be very brief.

V: Thank you sir, see you then.

K: O.K. Bye.

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SG175*

TELECON
Mr. Hal Saunders/The Secretary
August 20, 1975
Time: 6:11 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Two things: I trust we are recognizing Bangladesh. I know above all they have the disability of being pro-American.

S: We are doing routine business with them.

K: Have you seen the cable?

S: No.

K: Where is Roy?

S: He went home to get his stuff together.

K: There is a cable in which they are imploring us to give them moral support. Can we give them a friendly reply? I want to say that we will be glad to confirm that we are recognizing them. Can we plant a question at the press briefing tomorrow?

S: I think so.

K: We should get it on the record that we will be sympathetic to their needs to the limits we have. You will make sure that tomorrow this gets on the record?

S: We have made clear that we are doing business with them.

K: I wish the Department to make clear that we recognize them.

S: Right.

K: Secondly, I want to make sure that Scowcroft will have in his office a set of all the documents we take.

S: We have provided him with everything.

K: Do we have the model?

S: It will be in the plane.

K: Make sure that we have the proper security when we move this from place to place. What do you think of the Israeli demonstrations?

S: I think there is enough dissension within Israeli society so that the Israeli Government won't promote this.

(CUT OFF -- CALL NOT RETURNED)

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SG-189 *

TELECON
Mr. Herb Schlosser/The Secretary
September 4, 1975
Time: 7:07 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

S: I saw you on NBC and you just went off of CBS. I wanted to say congratulations.

K: Aren't you nice.

S: If things ever quiet down, we should get together and talk.

K: I would love that. Why don't you call me next week?

S: I am going to Europe the week after, but I will call you before. My best to Nancy.

K: Thanks. It was tough going. My best to Judy.

S: Take care and get some rest.

K: Many thanks.

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SG 192*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secretary Simon
Secretary Kissinger
September 4, 1975
2:25 p.m.

S: Congratulations.

K: Many thanks for the terrific cooperation on the UN speech.

S: I tell you not only did we have terrific cooperation in Enders and Joe; we broke through all of the deadlocks. It doesn't bother anybody. It orchestrated properly in the press. Your speech with the President's with a few veiled references. If I had one person there were one hundred that it was marvelous that each set of remarks dovetailed with everyone elses.

K: That is what I found so terrific and you were very generous -- I read it in some press conference -- that you and I had worked on this together and if there would have been differences we would have taken them to the President but there were none.

S: I explained this to Leonard Silk.

K: That is where I read it. It was an example of how cooperation is beneficial to both.

S: Exactly.

K: And we could maintain our basic position. Moynihan reported we have the LDCs discombobolated. They don't know what to do .

S: Whare you doing to get Musard (sp) mad at you? I am the only one he should be mad at.

K: We maintained our position. He can be mad. Doesn't bother me.

S: I think we stand 50-50 chance of no increase.

K: The Saudis also say this.

S: I had the Kuwaiti at my house and he is very vociferous. He said if you put in your speech that informed this commission that you agreed to do this etc. That is why that stuff was in there.

K: I did not realize the reason for it.

S: Oh, yes.

K: Good. I think we have a 50-50 chance. I really do.

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K: I look forward to working with you in the future closely and it is good professionally and a human joy.

S: The feeling is mutual and thank you. Whatever I can do give me a holler. God bless you and congratulations again.

K: Thank you.

SG 191 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/The Secretary
September 4, 1975
Time: 7:30 p.m.

K: The Soviet Charge says if we don't put the thing before the UN then the Soviets won't have to take a position.

S: He is right. I think we can assure him the only thing that will ever come up is the UNEF extension. We don't have any intention of putting it before the UN.

K: We may give them a summary of the additional assurances to the Congress without showing them the documents but I am leary once we start putting out Presidential correspondence.

S: You might be able to get away with that. If you can say that these are the total amount of assurances. If you put them on paper maybe you can get away with it.

K: Case said he doesn't want anything but a statement of intentions.

S: He did, I remember. I thought he made a good point there.

K: I think we can do it without my talking to the President.

S: Yes. Pat told me can you make all the documents available. I said no. He doesn't have any right to ask that.

K: I want to tell Sparkman and Case and then give it to the Committee.

S: We meet first with Sparkman and Case? I didn't get the impression that they were meeting in Committee on Monday morning.

K: I think they are, but you had better get it straight.

S: O.K.

K: Thank you.

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SG 184*

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Joe Califano
Secretary Kissinger
9/4/75; 10:29 a.m.

K: Hello.

C: Henry, congratulations!

K: Thank you, Joe.

C: You really did a fantastic job!

K: Well, it was a rough negotiation.

C: But it was . . . . . .

K: Exactly, that's what made it so rough.

C: I think the _____ thing will be a political problem.

K: Yes.

C: A lot of people up there are getting a hell of a lot mail.

K: The Israelis wouldn't do it without it. It's one of the dumbest things they have ever done.

C: What do they think they get out of it, Henry?

K: Nothing because we are going to pull them out at the first sign of danger. It's the only way they could sell it to their Cabinet.

C: Yeah. Listen, I was calling because Paul Austin called me this morning.

K: Yeah.

C: And, uh, I don't know if you remember some time ago . . .

K: Yeah about Coca Cola.

C: And Egypt.

K: Yeah.

C: Is there anything he should do now? I mean I don't . . .

K: I think give it two weeks and then I think he should approach the Egyptians.

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C: Did this come up at all in your discussions?

K: Yeah. I think they will be receptive. I would approach -- he ought to approach Fahmy.

C: Fahmy?

K: Yeah. The trouble with American companies is they always run around like idiots.

C: Yeah.

K: Go to Fahmy first.

C: Okay. All right. The other thing is we are going full blast on Cuba. To move Coke into Cuba. You know in terms of . . . . . I thought you ought to know that.

K: Through a subsidiary?

C: Yes, through a foreign subs. It's okay -- I mean I have talked to . . . . I haven't identified the client but I have talked to all the people at Treasury and Commerce.

K: No, no, that's legal.

C: It's no problem now.

K: That's all right.

C: He obviously doesn't want Kendall to know that.

K: Look, I am not one of -- I don't belong to the Kendal boosting club.

C: No, I know it. We just had a terrible experience once with John Ehrlichman.

K: I know.

C: But you know -- and that may happen quite soon. I mean within a month or so -- that's a real possibility.

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K: That actually fits in with what we are doing pretty well.

C: It should be any day now -- and It is kind of a good -- you know -- I don't know, maybe I am wrong but I think in terms of the country it is kind of a good thing because it is a product with zero technological problems or anything else and it is very symbolic of the United States.

K: No, I d have absolutely no problem with it.

C: Okay.

K: Okay, Joe. All the best to you. Do you think you can keep ~~yddd~~ your piranha fish up there a little calm.

C: Yeah, I think -- I'll tell you the only thing I have heard -- I mean I just heard from a couple on the House side that they are getting a hell of a lot of mail.

K: Yeah.

C: But I assume that -- I mean the Jewish Lobbyists know how to send mail and it seems to me tremendously . . . .

K: Yeah.

C: To get some of that done. But I just -- a couple of people just volunteered that they -- that the mail was going very heavily against the Americans going in there. Nobody understands -- you know. . .

K: It's a suicidalist -- a stupid thing of the Israelis. You know they will do some marginal good but not compared to the price they are going to pay.

C: Well, it just has to be distinguished from Vietnam. My hunch is that the guy on the street, Henry, thinks that they are military advisers in some way.

K: Yeah. Okay.

C: All right.

K: Bye.

C: Bye.

SG 188 *

TELECON
Foreign Minister Rabasa/The Secretary
September 4, 1975
Time: 6:58 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

R: Fine. Say, congratulations on the settlement. You did a wonderful job. We are very happy.

K: Aren't you nice.

R: You showed them again. I am here in New York. I am going to deliver my speech tonight. I am going to blast you as usual. When can we meet?

K: I will be down tomorrow. Can I call your office? I don't have my schedule in front of me. We may be able to meet tomorrow or Saturday.

R: Sunday I have to leave for Mexico. If you want to have lunch or dinner that would be even better.

K: I really don't have time.

R: O.K. I am at the Park Lane.

K: We will call you.

R: Or you can get in touch with me through our permanent mission in New York.

K: Good.

R: You will reach me tomorrow?

K: I will call you tomorrow morning.

R: We will meet tomorrow or Saturday?

K: Yes. Look forward to it.

R: My best to Nancy.

K: Thank you. Bye.

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SG 187 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Winston Lord/The Secretary
September 4, 1975
Time: 6:45 p.m.

K: What did the Chinese want?

L: I sent you a note.

K: Win, you know my system doesn't recognize you.

L: They accept the dates in principle but they would like to get a specific date from us, since they had given us two or three dates.

K: How about me?

L: I gave them the 19th and 20th.

K: Give them the 19th for me and we will let them know about the President later. When is Thanksgiving?

L: I don't know.

K: Look it up, then let's do it the following Monday, arriving the following Sunday. Give them those dates.

L: O.K. They said we shouldn't announce your trip until 10 days before the trip. There is a possibility they are trying to hold off on announcing it because of internal problems.

K: Tell them we need two weeks.

L: O.K.

K: Do it tomorrow, O.K.?

L: Yes.

K: Thank you.

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SG 195

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Winston Lord
Sec. Kissinger
September 6, 1975
10:55 a.m.

L: You called me.

K: I have gotten my answer now. Have you given the dates with the Chinese.

L: Yes. I had left the word. They asked me again about the announcement. I said we would like two weeks in advance and we would get back on a specific date. They said 10 days.

K: I don't see how that could make a difference.

L: How did it go last night.

K: O.K. Sonnenfeldt arranged for two advisers.

L: I told him the smaller the better.

K: We spent most of the time just the four of us. On the 19th for me and the 30th for the President. We may have to slip that by a day.

L: It means taking off the day after Thanksgiving probably.

K: I want him and me to stay overnight somewhere before going in there.

L: Particularly for him.

K: Even for me I don't want to fly through and tell the Chinese I want the first evening off. They cannot conceive that.

L: O.K.

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SG196

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Moynihan
Sec. Kissinger
September 6, 1975
10:35 a.m.

K: My imperial staff got it all screwed up.

M: That happens every day. No problem.

K: I wanted you here.

M: I was there and went away.

K: And they sent you away.

M: Yes.

K: Be that it may I have talked to Rabasa and he gave me a three page document for the group of the area they might be willing to work.

M: Good.

K: Some, I told him, we could not accept. A package of 18 commodities that should be negotiated. We can not go beyond the case by case thing. Some things we could in my view accept in principle. I have told him of my idea that you had on the paper yesterday and we discussed it with Pronk. He thought this not inconceivable. I will leave the paper here for you.

M: I will come down and pick it up.

K: I thought you were in your office.

M: I came back when I got the call that you wanted me.

K: &**()(**&¢¢

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SG203*

TELECON
Mr. Winston Lord/The Secretary
September 8, 1975
Time: 7:38 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

L: Joe Alsop has bulldozed me into lunch tomorrow. I wanted guidance because I think he will talk on the Middle East. He is doing a Readers' Digest article. He wants to say the Israelis need more vision.

K: Tell him what he can use. The real problem is where do we go from here.

L: The other question is the Chinese Ambassador has invited Betty, me and the kids and another couple for dinner. Is there any message I should get across?

K: Have you told them I expect to be seen by Mao this time?

L: Do you want me to get that across?

K: Yes, either then or at another time.

L: I wanted to alert you to that. How are things going on the Hill?

K: The Israelis made a mistake, a grave one.

L: You get that feeling already?

K: They will vote for that but they are getting alot of mail against it. It is the beginning of the end for them. In terms of my long-range strategy it is working fine. In two years they will be taken.

L: An overall settlement?

K: Yes. It will be my children who will suffer.

L: (Laughter)

K: It will keep them off the Chinese for a while.

L: They will be turning on the Chinese in 10 years.

K: Are you work ing on the UN Speech?

L: Yes. I am getting Peter and Buffum also.

K: I would like Peter to do a speech for Cincinnati drawing on my testimony on the Middle East.

L: You want a whole speech on the Middle East?

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K: I want a tour d'horizon in which the Middle East takes 20 minutes or so. I have asked Sisco to do where do we go from here.

L: There was a statement that Peter went over today that you could use.

K: Yes. I could go to Pittsburg and make an energy speech. I can say something about the price rises in the General Assembly which is two days before the OPEC meeting.

L: O.K.

K: The theme I want is in effect a new international order backing up the Special Session theme with the problems of nuclear weaponry, SALT, arms limitation and nuclear spread and relations with countries with which we are contentious now. I think we can give a useful speech.

L: We can build something around the East-West -- North-South theme also.

K: O.K. Thank you for calling.

SG 201 *

TELECON
Mr. Arthur Hertzberg/The Secretary
September 8, 1975
Time: 7:15 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How did it go?

H: With Church -- he says he has to play it reluctant for a while, but he will come along in the end.

K: Good.

H: He is going to be alright. I talked about his Presidential ambitions also. I had 10 democratic liberals at a meeting -- Moffat was there, and also Fenwick. She was marvelous.

K: She is a great lady.

H: Right. Why can't we make this a UN Affair is the jist of what they said. I gave them a counter argument that neither Israel nor Egypt trusts the UN. Moffat was concerned about our giving Isreali too much aid in arms. They will come along on the radar technicians without much trouble. Their mail is running against it.

K: Can't you stimulate some mail for it?

H: We have been laying low until today's meeting. We will stimulate lots of mail. _____ was there.

K: How was he?

H: Excellent.

K: That's very helpful.

H: I will be back in Washington next Thursday. I have a meeting with the Black Caucus and the Jewish Caucus and I am sure this will come up.

K: That would be a big help.

H: It is being worked on. I think that we will get their estimate today -- the liberal side of the House -- on the face that we will be getting 2/3 of the vote. I think it would be useful if non-Jewish mail were stimulated. Do you have any suggestions?

K: I talked to the President of Boston University. He says he will talk to his alumni.

H: Maybe I will talk to Rovosky. He is chairman of my International Affairs Commission and I will talk to the Colburn people.

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K: Terrific. And stay in touch.

H: I will be in town next Thursday.

K: Give me a call -- maybe we can chat.

H: Can I call your secretary if you have some time next Thursday -- probably after lunch.

K: Before I cannot do it. It would have to be after lunch because I am testifying.

H: What time -- like late afternoon -- say around 4:00?

K: Let's aim for something like that.

H: I am coming over Thursday at 4:00. I have assigned my staff people to work hard on the liberals. I am doing what I can. I think you know that since I came on board, I have tried to be as supportive as possible.

K: You have been more than that, you have been great.

H: All the best, see you next week.

K: Bye.

SG 202*

TELECON

Ambassador Dinitz/The Secretary
September 8, 1975
Time: 6:40 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.5(D), B6

D: How are you?

K: Fine. I am testifying every day about the agreement though.

D: I followed you in the House International Relations Committee. They were impressed. When I finished with them they said I had said the same things you had.

K: Good, it is about time.

D: They asked me regarding the presence and support. It is a good atmosphere, I got a good feeling.

K: I am stressing the fact that we didn't do it to buy the agreement but that it was objective need for Israel's security.

D: That is the line I used.

K: There may not be any better cause than Israel's security for a long-term basis.

D: It is a function of the agreement but it is a function of keeping Israel in a defensive capacity. The additional aid cost is unimportant if you calculate what the cost of a war would be.

K: Excellent.

D: We have a number of other issues that I was wondering if we could get together and discuss.

K: Can I call you first thing in the morning?

D: Yes. Rabin called me to remind me with regard to the sum.....

K: [redacted] Call Golda for me..... B6

D: With regard to the letters.

K: I have the things signed.

D: Don't holler at me, he has already hollered at me.

K: He hasn't said one good thing about me.

D: He did in the Knesset.

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K: Not to Americans he didn't. Time Magazine quotes one of the negotiators saying that we will never forget what has been done to us. I had the letters signed the morning after I came back.

D: He was kidding about the letters, more than not. We have other things to discuss, however.

K: I am testifying tomorrow. It will be at 4:30 at the earliest, but I have to confirm it.

[redacted] B1

K: Let me think about it and talk to you tomorrow.

D: I will hear from you tomorrow?

K: Yes.

SG200*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Robinson/The Secretary
September 8, 1975
Time: 5:55 p.m.

K: Did you call?

R: It is all worked out. I have sent you a memo reporting on the conversation.

K: What did he say?

R: He thought it was a good idea. He wasn't certain that we would have an answer by noon tomorrow. In the event that we don't have an answer.....

K: We will delay the announcement.

R: Right. We would wait until we get the answer. He was very cooperative and really pleased with the news that there could be a lifting of the boycott. His attitude was positive.

K: Did you tell him I requested it?

R: Yes.

K: Seriously, I need credit because of their sore feelings on the Middle East.

R: It made a good impression on him. There are two other matters I have to take up. On the prepcon, I have a wire that should go out, you have the memo.

K: Yes, I have it.

R: We have a report back from Ansary, also. Things have come to an impass.

K: What is the problem?

R: They are getting cold feet. The closer we get to the date, the harder it is to come to an agreement.

K: I asked the bureaucrats to make changes on the letters on the oil price rise five days ago. I still have not got the letter.

R: I haven't seen those cables. You want them back to make changes?

K: I indicated what changes I wanted already. They are now on their fifth day of that.

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R: I will find out who is doing it.

K: I marked it up on the plane home.

R: Would Lord know about that?

K: No, but the maniacs in my outer office might.

R: You want to hold those up until the announcement of the prepcon?

K: No, it has to do with the oil price rise.

R: O.K. I will get on it right away and find out where it is being held up.

K: O.K.

SG 197*

TELECON
Joseph Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
September 8, 1975
5:30 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How did your meeting go?

S: I'm in Bingham's office.

K: I know. Just tell me well or bad.

S: Alright I think. Their suggestions is that we try our hand at a summary that might be included in the committee report.

K. Of everything?

S: No, the documents.....

K: Of what you showed them this afternoon?

S: A summary.....

K: But of what you showed them this afternoon?

S: On that the dilemma. Both reserved their positions. They report a suggested, Sparkman suggested, that he would like to try to get in the summary of the commitments. That's basically where we stand.

K: Are you coming back here?

S: Yes.

K: Don't leave until I talk to you.

S: Those cables you want are ready. I worked on them before I came here.

K: I don't know where they are.

S: I'll put in a call and see that you get them. I'll be back in a little while.

K: I have appointments until about 6:30.

S: That's alright. I'm not planning to leave before that.

END

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SG-214*

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/The Secretary
September 9, 1975
Time: 6:08 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: One other thing Dinitz complained about privately was that somebody told the press that we left with a negative feeling toward Israel.

S: I wouldn't know who that was. That is one line we must not express to anybody - no member of the Jewish community, nobody.

K: That's right. Could you make sure that Atherton sees that this does not happen?

S: Alright, I will pass that along.

K: Thank you.

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SG 219*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Lord/Secretary Kissinger
September 9, 1975
3:11

K: Is it possible to get any of these papers tonight? Or part of it? Because I have tonight free and could work on it.

L: The answer really is no. Peter has done some work on the Middle East that we can get you, but that is the best we can do as of tonight.

K: You'll have the other thing tomorrow?

L: The Cinncinnati thing? Yes. On the UN...

K: UN can wait. I want the energy too.

L: You'll have energy and Middle East tomorrow night and the UN the next day.

K: Good.

END

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SG-218

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec. Kissinger
Under Secretary Sisco
September 9, 1975
3:05 p.m.

S: I have Bob Ellsworth in my office and he just had lunch with Les Gelb. Gelb has said to him that tomorrow the NY Times is going to print secret agreements between the US and Israel. What this means I don't honestly know but he has just told me this and I thought I should tell you.

K: Could only be the memo of agreement.

S: That is what it is in my judgment. That is all they have got.

K: So what. Fine. There is nothing in there that is particularly embarrassing.

S: No. We will get a little scream out of Fahmy.

K: I don't think from Fahmy. Jordan is bad. Syria is not in there. We can explain as long as the Rabat decision is not over...

S: We will have to live with it -- not that we can stop it.

K: It just shows how impossible it is to conduct foreign policy.

S: I know. Well, Henry, it just strengthens our case. Let's see what they print.

K: O.K.

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SG 212*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/The Secretary
September 9, 1975
Times: 8:10, 8:22 and 8:27 p.m.

S: I haven't done the Fahmy cable. I will tell you what I have done. We have sent you the Sadat cable. In that cable we decided to put the .700 million where it will make more of an impact. We should wait 24 hours or so and see what happens. I am sending up the Jordanian cable and the circular.

K: O.K., but I would like to leave. When can I see these others?

S: I will get them to you right now. I am trying to write the summary that you should see because I will be on the Hill all tomorrow morning. (talks to staff) The Jordanian cable is coming right up.

K: O.K.

8:22 p.m.

K: I thought we were going to send the Presidential cable to Jordan?

S: Rather than from you?

K: Well, the one I have is on the HAWKS for Jordan.

S: It fit nicely with the other.

K: Let me take a look at it again.

8:27 p.m.

K: The only thing that is still missing is a letter to the Shah.

S: It is being drafted now.

K: You are a little slow (laughter).

S: You should see what is going on in this office. Would you like to see it here or should we send it out to your house.

K: Send it out, but leave a number for me to approve it.

S: Well.....

K: Just read it to me on the phone.

S: O.K. Roy will read it to you on the phone.

K: O.K. Good.

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SG 220*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Robinson/Secretary Kissinger
September 9, 1975
3:05 pm

R: I have heard from Brosselette and he says it is all set. They approve the releast of the announcement but they want to include their negotiations will be of a preliminary character.

K: Ok.

R: The meeting was apparently cancelled and we should get it back on track. We could get Brent to do it. Do you want me to call him.

K: Yes, you call him.

R: Ok, I'll do it right now.

END

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SG 205*

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Anderson
9/9/75; 9:45 a.m.

K: Hello.

A: Good morning, sir.

K: Do you think you can move the press conference to 12:00 or will that create too much hell now?

A: I'll move it.

K: What do you think?

A: I think we can do it -- if you think you can hold to that. There was only one national public radio that was planning to do it live but I did it on the condition with them that it might have to be changed.

K: Which is the national public radio?

A: It's not important -- it's like PBS, your Bill Moyers type thing only on radio.

K: It isn't . . .

A: It isn't one of the major networks and I warned them yesterday that it was tentatively set for 11:30and the Secretary might have to change -- I didn't know, so I can change it.

K: You can?

A: Yep!

K: Okay, well then change it to 12:00 because I would like to meet with you and Bob at around 11:00.

A: 11:00?

K: Yeah, when I get over there.

A: Okay.

K: Good. Thank you.

A: Right.

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SG 209

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec. Kissinger
Sec. Earl Butz
September 9, 1975
2:40 P.m.

K: You are one of the few Cabinet members that I respect so if there was any misunderstanding it was entirely unintentional.

B: I understand that.

K: You understand my concern yesterday.I was amazed that you didn't know about it.

B: We knew he was going to MOscow and I had to find out by the grapevine why. I asked him why he could not find out from anybody in State. I got it a couple of days earlier.

K: It didn't jell until a couple of days earlier. I thought you told me weeks ago that you favored a long-term deal.

B: I do. That is not the problem.

K: You are afraid I will take your job.

B: I do favor it. The problem is that someone was going there to negotiate and we needed some input.

K: Are you going to let me surrender quietly?

B: What?

K: I will be glad to have someone from Agriculture along.

B: That has been aranged. Someone is going.

K: This thing can work only with your enthusiastic cooperation.

B: I am for the long-term. If you make it too formal it puts us in trouble with other countries who want it too.

K: I want it.

B: It is going to be awfully easy to back u into a position we don't want. We can only say that if we keep our export markets open

K: I want them open but the only ones from which we can get some political advantage is the Soviets.

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B: I would go slow on these Eastern European countries.

K: Only way it can work is if you screw it up with the Eastern European for a few months. It will work. They have to come to us.

B: O.K. But we are going to get the President in trouble if the wrod gets out that we have slowed down.

K: Can you not give it a try.

B: We are going to get him in trouble because he has a strong commitment.

K: I talked to Hays in Alabama who would run you for God if he could but he was bitching a little about the Soviet thing and when I explained it to him he became enthusiastic.

B: O.K. But these Eastern European countries are something else.

K: I don't want to tell you about the farmers but why should they complain because they are going to make the sells any way and probably at higher prices.

B: They see that it would be no export controls. I think I have this fixed up on the Soveits if it is extended beyond the Soviets we are in trouble.

K: If you had said it is not convenient for the Agriculture Minister to come over for a few weeks -- from Poland --

B: Yes, we could have done that.

K: If you could delay it a few weeks. They cannot just go ahead yby themselves.

B: I expressed myself rather stonrly yesterday chiefly because I said we should have a man besides Chuck.

K: I agree. The reason I am calling you is that you have really been tremendously cooperative and you are one of the few Cabinet members sho is interested in the subject.

B: I plan to be. But cooperation is a two-way street.

K: That is why I wanted to call you.

B: Whom the Gods destroy they first praise.

K: See what you can do.

B: We are playing with dynamite on that one.

K: But you have usually found a way. Why should you be the only popular Secretary of Agriculture in history.

B: I am cashing in my chips in the country now.

K: I know but seriously when I go into the farm states both in Minnesota and Alabama they could not say enough good things about you.

B: I have some chips but I have cashed some in.

K: Cash in another set and by January you will be another hero.

END

SG 207*

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
John McCloy
9/9/75; 10:27 a.m.

K: Hello.

M: Henry, I am sorry to bother you.

K: Jack, you couldn't bother me.

M: I got a call the other day from London. They have got a thing over there called the Titular Lectureship that is under the auspices of the English-speaking . . .

K: Oh, yes, I have been asked to do that.

M: Well, they say . . .

K: I mean not this year. I have been asked to do that in the past.

M: I am so damned busy I am not looking for jobs. The thing they -- I said what do you want me to talk about. Do you want me to reminisce about Churchill , I can do all that it makes no difference to me. I said this to him and he said this to me. They said no. What they want is a concentrated study of where the new relationship between the United States and Great Britain really is. That is to say that all that is going on domestically NATO wise and there is no longer any special relationship perhaps -- what is the rationale between the United States and Great Britain. That's quite a big subject. Do you think it is something that I ought to try to treat with?

K: Yes, I think you could do a terrific job with it.

M: Could you tell me somebody to talk to down in your shop that might give me some guidance as to what . . .

K: Yeah, Hartman and Sonnenfeldt.

M: Sonnenfeldt. Who is the other fellow?

K: Hartman, the Assistant Secretary.

M: Hartman.

K: Yep.

M: Okay. And Sonnenfeldt. Do you think I ought to talk to Richardson?

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K: If you have lots of time.
I haven't

M: I've got lots of time. I don't want to do the damn thing because I've got so much to do with this oil business.

K: You know, making a point quickly is not Eliot's forte.

M: Yeah, I guess it is not. Yeah. Yeah. I think I will stay only at home. But I might come down and talk to . . .

K: I think it is a good idea and when you come down come in to see me.

M: Okay. And congratulations again.

K: Thank you, Jack. I recognize we will have to do the whole thing.

M: Okay.

K: So I don't consider that the final one but . . .

M: It is just damn good stuff.

K: I think for the first time I am optimistic that the whole thing can be done.

M: The very thing that I worry about is what are you going to have left to offer to bring the other people in.

K: We will talk about it when you come down.

M: I will drop by.

K: Good.

M: Thanks very much.

K: Bye, Jack.

SG 211

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Esenbel/The Secretary
September 9, 1975
Time: 8:15 p.m.

K: Mr. Ambassador,

E: How are you?

K: Fine. Do you know any good jokes?

E: What are they?

K: I don't know any. If I don't do anything else, I am going to teach the Turks to have a sense of humor.

E: I was away in Turkey on a vacation.

K: I know. The President is making urgent efforts on the issue of aid -- we are canvasing the Congress to try to find out where it stands. There is a NATO meeting coming up soon and Hayes is taking 10 people away for that so we have to schedule this either before or after.

E: I would prefer it before.

K: So would I, but we have to see if we can get it out of the Rules Committee.

E: I had a long talk with Hayes and Broomfield today. Broomfield is ready to do anything you suggest to him. Hayes is a problem.

K: We need Hayes.

E: Then I think the best way is that this could be handled right now.

K: We are ready but Madden will not pull it out of committee. We need seven days when we are ready to pull it out of committee. We are confident of getting a positive vote this time.

E: Hayes told me he would talk to Morgan to see if they could do it next week.

K: Let me talk to Morgan. I will let you know.

E: Thank you.

K: O.K. Bye Mr. Ambassador.

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SG 221*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador McCloskey/Secretary Kissinger
September 9, 1975
4:00 pm

M: It may be a little less dramatic than the first report. I talked to Guertzman who is doing the story. They do not have documents as such, they have some information about what appears to have come out of the Memorandum of Understanding with Israel. He would not go into it over the phone on how they got this information, but he said it did not come from where you would think most obvious -- meaning the Committee -- he said it came in a curious way and he will tell me about it another time. They are going to use what they have in a general way -- it won't be handled by itself.

K: Good.

M: It looks to me to be not as offensive as it might have been.

K: Ok, thank you.

END

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SG 213*

TELECON

Mr. Max Fisher/The Secretary
September 9, 1975
Time: 8:08 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

F: I will tell you, you scored a victory on this thing. After your meeting with them you pulled them all together. Everyone was behind it. I went to New York this week. You probably have heard from [redacted] B6

K: Yes.

F: He is from the left but he is a great help. Thursday, we will go back but I think that there is overwhelming support for you.

K: I am glad to be in a better relationship to the community again.

F: You know what I have always said to you -- work toward the right and then the praise will follow. I want to talk with you next week on some strategy on some of your problems. We want to get a concurrent resolution started.

K: I am glad you advised him not to raise the house. We trust you.

F: Meanwhile, the next thing, I am going to do. I am going to find an occasion for you to make a speech where you will get an award to cement the relationship. You have never spoken before a Jewish group.

K: I was asked to speak before the Weitzman Institute in Chicago.

F: That is not the one. I want something where you are deserving of an award.

K: I would be receptive to that.

F: I know the right one. I want you to get recognition. I would not give you the wrong advice. I will pick the one.

K: Well, I will be very receptive. I really appreciate everything you have done.

F: I want you to know that when I am for someone I am for them.

K: I appreciate that.

F: You have had a troubled time - it is a good thing to know when you have friends. You should tell the President he made a tremendous impression also. I will have to spend a lot of time on the political campaign. He was well received.

K: There will be other problems. The community ought to have enough confidence to know that when I don't agree with them, I usually think about what is best.

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F: I had three or four people who were very strong on you [redacted] B6
[redacted]. You got to them. I wouldn't let the 20A speak. B6
I don't know whether you recall them?

K: No, I don't.

F: He was the only ripple in the whole group. It was good in the caucus. I don't know how you do it, but you look great after that trip.

K: I have a good constitution.

F: I have to spend so much time on this. I wanted to let you know how things were going. It didn't surprise me one bit that they went well.

K: Many thanks for your help without which it wouldn't have been possible.

SG 215*

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELECON
Secretary Shultz/Secretary Kissinger
September 9, 1975
Time: 7:02 p.m.

K: I am sorry I have been hard to get a hold of.

S: My congratulations on your Middle East.

K: Thank you. I hope it holds together.

S: I hope the Congress doesn't screw it up.

K: Right. On your trip you should see the British. We will send a cable to them tonight that you will be in Europe. We sort of neglected this.

S: Well, in terms of time I am planning to leave Friday the 12th and go to Germany. It takes all day til the next morning to get there.

K: Why?

S: I am leaving from San Francisco. I suppose I could go to London and then go to Bonn and get there in the afternoon.

K: So that you could be in London during the day. What day would that be?

S: The 13th. If I could get to Frankfurt by 10:00 I could get to London by 10:00. (asks question of staff on time) Otherwise I could be in London all day Sunday. I could go from Bonn to London Sunday morning.

K: When could you see the British -- on Saturday? When do you have to leave London?

S: I have to get to Bonn to see Schmidt.

K: We will convey that to them.

S: The better alternative would be to see them on Sunday.

K: O.K. We will propose that alternative. Otherwise it would be Saturday morning.

S: I think it is important.

K: I agree. Secondly on whether we should have a summit. I can't make up my mind -- you should find that out.

S: If there is a tilt either way.....

K: The tilt is if we can have it on the basis of giving some psychological impetus to the people -- some hope of progress -- some hope of achieving something followed by some actions. If, however, it is

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just going to be a meeting of platitudes, it might be risky. We might be the fall guys for all of them. Schmidt seemed to think it might provide hope but the success or failure -- that is something I can't judge.

S: You would like to assess the results of my trip before being committed to a meeting of this group?

K: I wouldn't mind having a meeting of that group.

S: On the schedule -- I can get to London by 6:40 a.m. If I could see them around 9:30 or 10:00, I could get a plane to Bonn Saturday afternoon -- the earlier the better.

K: O.K. Let me propose this to them.

S: Did Hal tell you the dates in San Francisco that we hope you can accept.

K: No.

S: On October 31 the Commonwealth Club would love to have you speak. It would be good to know soon.

K: I will let you know by next week. I mean the end of this week or early next week.

S: I also have lined up facilities on the Monterey Peninsula. You could speak at noon to the Commonwealth Club and then I thought you would enjoy meeting some San Francisco people and then we could go to Monterey. We have space if you think it would be a good idea to have some people along.

K: Even if one is a non-golfer?

S: Yes, even that. [redacted] B6
It is restful and if you would prefer no one, we could be there together.

K: O.K. That sounds marvelous.

S: Will you let me know?

K: Yes. If October 31 doesn't work would the following weekend be possible?

S: I can't get the place then.

K: How about two weekends from now?

S: I am not sure.

K: Let me aim for that. My problem is that Sadat may be in Washington

on that weekend. Let me look into it.

S: Very good.

K: Have a good trip and call me as soon as you return.

S: I spoke to Hal about seeing Giscard as early as possible. On Tuesday I would be in Washington all day and could see you.

K: I won't be here on that day but I will be back on the 17th -- Wednesday.

S: I am meeting with the President's Labor Management Committee then.

K: Maybe I could meet with you after that?

S: O.K. Say, Meany told me he was pleased about talking to you.

K: I am delighted. Listen, I have to run but it was good talking to you.

SG 227*

TELCON
Richard Valeriani/Kissinger
5:21 p.m. - 9/10/75

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

V: Mr. Secretary.

K: Yes, how are you today, Dick?

V: Fine, how are you? I'm calling about that report on Sadat that you've probably seen.

K: I'll tell you what happened. This is how we finally got the agreement made. Joe Sisco threatened to assassinate him but didn't quite make it.

V: Is this off-the-record?

K: No, you can quote me. No, Dick, we don't know a damn thing about it.

V: OK. Another thing I wanted to ask you about -- there was a report I guess . . .

K: I mean we know no more about it than the ticker.

V: Than the ticker. Yeh, I guess the voice of Palestine is not reliable.

K: I wouldn't go. . .

V: Another thing I wanted to check with you is that there was a report circulating that Asad told you or told the President that he would make formal peace with Israel if Israel gave back all of the Golan Heights.

K: That isn't correct either.

V: That is not correct. OK. Fine. And did Bob Anderson talke to you about the show?

K: No.

V: The special. Well, I guess we'll get to it one day.

K: Oh, you mean for you and me to sit down?

V: Yeh, ~~kxdx~~ K: Let's aim for that. V: OK fine. K: Thank you.

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SG 226*

TELCON
Barry Schweid/Kissinger
5:06 p.m. 9/10/75

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

S: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Barry Schweid here.

K: Yes, Barry.

S: I called you because of the AP bulletin of the attempted assassination of Sadat which . . .

K: I don't know anything about it to tell you the truth.

S: No, it lost ground as the day went on. It turned out to be a Baghdad report and a report of an attempt a week ago so I took it at face value initially when I placed the call. Do you know of any attempt by any chance?

K: We don't know anything other than the bulletins.

S: Certainly when we were there we didn't know of any attempt, did we?

K: No, absolutely none.

S: All right. Well, I'm sorry to bother you. Thank you.

K: OK.

S: Bye. Bye.

K: Bye.

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SG 224

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Minister Vorontsov
9/10/75; 10:30 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

V: Good morning, Henry.

K: Yuly.

V: I am sorry to bother you but, Henry, you remember when we talked you promised to send to Gromyko some . . .

K: Yes, I will send it tonight.

V: On SALT business.

K: You will have it tonight.

V: Fine. That's all I . . .

K: I will have to get the President to look at it today.

V: That's beautiful because he needs some working days in Moscow to consult . . .

K: You will get it -- I will send Sonnenfeldt with it to you before the end of the day.

V: Beautiful! And, Henry, did you have a chance to look into our proposal in the General Assemby for complete ban of nuclear testing?

K: No. It is on my desk. I'll . . .

V: If you have any reaction, I will appreciate it.

K: Right. We will probably oppose it.

V: (Laughter) Yeah, I guess that . . . . Somehow we must get some kind of agreement not to be too violent about all . . .

K: No, no, look -- Yuly, you tell the Foreign Minister we are looking forward to his visit in a very positive spirit.

V: Right.

K: And we want to use it to build our relationship and not to cause difficulties. That will be our attitude -- in fact, if you tell me when he will arrive, I would would like to meet him at the airport.

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V: Oh, that will be beautiful! Naturally I will inform him, Mr. Secretary.

K: Will you let me know the time of his arrival -- and I will be at the airport.

V: Fine.

K: And I will give a dinner for him on the 19th.

V: Yeah. I hope he -- that that is acceptable to him.

K: Well, if not, I will cancel the dinner I had already accepted and give it on the 18th.

V: Uh-huh. Okay.

K: You let me know if there is any trouble for him -- I will give up my dinner on the 18th and give one for him then.

V: Fine. Thank you, Henry.

K: Right.

V: Okay.

SG 230 *

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/The Secretary
September 10, 1975
Time: 12:42 pm

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.5(D)

D: I talked to the Prime Minister. We will act on the other channel.

K: OK. Then we will .... this.

D: I would appreciate if you would do whatever you said you would do to get it to the man.

K: We will do it this afternoon the way you and I agreed and do it by point to where it came from. Are you fairly sure of the reliability of the source?

D: We would not have passed it on if we did not think it reliable. The source is reliable and a good source.

K: I read the Jackson speech and while it may be good from your point of view it is not good for us.

D: It is not good from our point of view ....

K: I think it is an outrage. Whatever the implication this morning, it could not have been achieved by more negotiations. It leaves the implication that more could have been achieved ....

D: It doesn't do any good to say many people in Israel are opposed and ....

K: And then he is saying he is convinced that all alternatives were not exhausted .... as if we had inflicted our presence on them.

D: He knows exactly how it was.

K: [redacted] B1

D:

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DECLASSIFY AFTER: HAK'S DEATH
DATE/CASE ID: 27 MAY 2003 200102979

[redacted] B1

K: But if he keeps referring to this in public speeches it will surely be denied.

D: I was careful when I talked to ....

K: For your own sake. The thing is to get these things implemented. It doesn't hurt one.

K: Could you talk to him sometime.

D: When I talked to him I was trying to get him out of attacking the agreement.

K: [redacted] B1

D: But he wants to make an issue not of the agreement but for political reasons.

K: [redacted] B1

D: But I can only talk to him and tell him not to refer to it. He would either listen to me or not listen to me.

K: If he makes .... will be either

K: Okay, I hope you realize what the consequences are.

D: I do and I will find an opportunity to talk to him again.

K: Good and thank you for the other information.

SG225*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Senator Javits/Kissinger
10:44 a.m. 9/10/75

K: Hello.

J: Hi, Henry.

K: I'm told I have special influence with you which I have disputed.

J: Well, I would never want to dispel their idea. Whether you do or don't Let's leave it as it is.

K: If you don't want to dispel their idea you should vote with us on decontrol.

J: I understand. I may not do that, but I still don't want to dispel their idea. I got your message too late to call you back last night.

K: Well, that's what I called you about.

J: I thought so because Nelson talked to me about it. I've kept my position open on it and it still is. You know I'm hearing you with the great respect that I always do -- similarly with Nelson -- and I'll decide what I need to do.

K: Well you know, if we don't need your vote then it isn't so essential, but if it turns out that it might matter perhaps you would take it into account because I really think that without it we have no energy program at all.

J: Henry, I'll definitely take it into account and as I say, what I do I'll decide. I really will and I pay very strict attention to what you say.

K: OK, Jack. See you soon.

J: Right.

K: Good.

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SG 223

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Dinitz
9/10/75; 10:22 a.m.

D: Hello.

K: Mr. Ambassador.

D: Yes, Mr. Secretary.

K: About that note you sent me.

D: Yeah.

K: I think it is a grave mistake for you to pass it where you are planning to pass it.

D: We are not going to do anything before we talk about it so that is what I . . .

K: Because if the information is correct . . .

D: Yeah.

K: How do you that this guy there isn't . . .

D: That is the same question I asked the Prime Minister.

K: And secondly, how is he going to get the information back to the people who can do something about it without it going through channels where some of the people may read it.

D: I agree with you on this and in fact before I even passed it on to you I asked again how does he know that this gentleman involved is not involved. And he said he probably isn't involved but that is why we want to make -- prefer to do it through the channel of the Secretary. And . . .

K: Now, we will be glad to pass it on but then we do not want you to pass it one.

D: Okay, I will tell it to the PM. I will tell it to the PM and . . .

K: But I want to have it confirmed before we pass it on.

D: I will tell it to PM and I will confirm it to you and with regard to the other thing, you know the Agency -- that we also leave up to you if you . . .

K: Yeah, I think we should pass it on to the Agency.

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D: Okay. One thing, Mr. Secretary, if I may suggest my own personal thoughts on this: I will talk now to the PM and tell him that it is our considered opinion and I have the same opinion as you that we should not diversify it in the other channel as well. This is my own feeling -- when you do pass it under these circumstances, say a word that it came from Rabin as a personal concern.

K: That is correct.

D: Because I think that will be the _____.

K: That I will do.

D: So I will tell it to the PM and I will get back . . .

K: And I would like to have that told to the top man personally.

D: Yeah, right. Right.

K: And I think it will do you most good there.

D: Right. That's what I thought -- we are really concerned because we would not have bothered you unless that was . . .

K: No, no, but it concerns information we have too.

D: I see. I see. So that I will tell the PM that you intend to pass it directly to the big man.

K: That's right.

D: You will do this in a formal and nice gesture on the part of Rabin; that your strong advice is that we don't do this in Geneva.

K; And as soon as you confirm it, we will pass it.

D: Right. Okay. I will do this and I will call you back to confirm it.

K: Good. Thank you.

D: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

SG 249 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Secretary Simon/Secretary Kissinger
September 11, 1975
12:45 PM

K: How are you?

S: Fine. I got a call from H this morning. Arthur Burns heard from (Clausen) and I won't comment on what he said over the phone. H said to me that Schmidt was furious on this and we have been holding together for 2 or 3 years in opposition to this....tell the Germans that our position is unchanged and we were satisfied with the idea of something like that on self defense and then the next week you come out and surface a position paper.

K: Who, me?

S: They're talking about the U.S. I told them the story the way it occurred.

K: That's right.

S: I don't know if that's going to satisfy ~~them~~ Schmidt.

K: This is not our position.

S: That's what I told them.

K: Tell them there's nothing to be concerned about. It's like you were hinting of me not knowing about that paper.

S: I know this is going to get blown up in the papers by some bureaucracy.

K: I would not have submitted such a paper.

S: I know it. I just wanted to warn you. It might be a good idea to call Schmidt.

K: How about what Burns told me.

S: They had been discussing it.

K: Why don't you call H back. That isn't our position.

S: H is satisfied. He was going to call the Chancellor immediately.

K: This is a bureaucratic snafu. As far as I'm concerned, that thing is withdrawn. It's not our position.

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S: Exactly. I'll tell him again. I thought maybe for personal reasons you would want to call him.

K: To call somebody and tell him that someone screwed up -- I would rather you handle it. Tell H___you talked to me and I didn't know what you were talking about.

S: I can do that.

K: That isn't my strategy. Why, if we wanted to do that and it would not be my strategy to do it in a file document. We don't get credit for doing it and we antagonize people.

S: Right now the Europeans are suspicious of us.

K: Why, it stands unequivocal -- it was just stated as a possibility.

S: Of course, that's what we're talking about.

K: I can't defend the thing because it stands to reason all I want out of it is a more conciliatory discussion then the last one.

S: I'm sure Schmidt is all settled now.

K: I might send Schmidt a note.

S: That might be a good idea.

K: I'll tell him I talked to you.

END

SG 243 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
September 11, 1975
3:55 pm

D: I have no problem on trying to meet Jackson again and I will ask him again...

K: It was my judgment and it was Ribbicoff's independent judgment that Jackson is spoiling for trouble and he is supported by Senators Bartlett and Scott.

D: Each for different reasons.

K: But therefore we have the same difficulties. We can handle Scott and Bartlett if Jackson doesn't make them legitimate.

D: Jackson is demanding the contents of the letter?

K: He says we should show to the whole Congress the letter to Allon and all the background papers on it.

D: We didn't even see that and I told him...

K: That is his argument. He is protecting you against my sharp practice.

D: You know he is not interested in the Government of Israel and the United States government. He can't stand it that the Agreement was concluded because it helps the President and you.

K: It is of universal benefit for our joint strategy if we can maintain it. Either the Arabs will collapse completely or the radicals will have to follow the moderate line.

D: I agree completely.

K: But if we help Sadat's opponents we will be in great difficulty.

D: I understand. And that is the line I have been following. I will ask for a meeting with him on a number of issues. If he thinks I am calling as a result of your request it would not be good.

K: No. You could say you have heard from Abe Ribbicoff of the Armed Services Committee.

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D: No,the last time we talked he had to rush to a vote and said we would get together. But the problem is he is not eager to see me.

K: If you told him you are ~~s~~ satisfied and that he could only do damage ~~h~~ and then he would be acting against the interests of the Israeli government.

D: I understand and I will do it. Did you have anything from the Egyptian government?

K: No.

END

SG 247 *

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
September 11, 1975
3:48 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I just talked to Ribicoff who was at the Armed Services Committee and he feels if you don't stop Jackson soon....

D: That hero Ribicoff can't do anything with Jackson.

K: All I can tell you, he thinks that if you could tell Jackson that you are at ease about it -- Jackson was saying to Ribicoff that Kissinger made the Israelis buy a pig in a poke and they are going to be hurt by it. Why Jackson should be the defender of the Israelis is beyond my comprehension. It's going to lead to a totally unnecessary brawl and will damage only you and Sadat.

D: I'm in agreement with you. The only reason I did not think I should talk to him again, I did not see that I can influence him but I will try to.

K: Ribicoff said after you talk to him, if you want him to do something, he will.

D: I talked to Ribicoff once. I'm trying to think of someone who has greater influence then Ribicoff.

K: You have to tell him that you are perfectly aware, on the basis of the record that you know the assurances will elaborate what you already have.

D: If we are not to trust what your people tell us, mistrust will effect us in more crucial areas.

K: I have a call coming in, I'll call you back.

D: OK.

END

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SG 242 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Atherton/The Secretary
September 11, 1975
Time: 8:50 p.m.

K: You had better tell the Israelis what the what the Egyptian reaction is on that ship.

A: Yes.

K: Just call D initz and tell him -- no debate.

A: Fortunately I told him we would sound out the Egyptians and that you and the President had doubts.

K: Say we are asking Sadat to commit suicide.

A: And give us a chance to reflect on this. What I am concerned about is that they will go public on this.

K: Tell them that they had better not go public. We are asking them not to. You can even let them read the cable, or substantial parts of it.

A: I grankly would be reluctant to let them read it.

K: I want a cable to go to Hermann. Say we went to Fahmy in good faith and of course we will abide by his judgment. Tell him we had to put the case before him because that is our role as a mediator. Did you get the message about the Shah to him?

A: Yes.

K: Tell him we are trying to get the EC-Nine to endorse it.

A: I am dictating the cable to Hermann right now and I will add this.

K: You call Dinitz also. But tell him they should keep their mouths shut.

A: And that we will continue to work on it.

K: O.K.

A: O.K. Thank you.

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SG 248 *

TELECON
Chairman Burns/Secretary Kissinger
September 11, 1975
3:45 PM

RELEASED IN FULL

B: Hi, Henry. Welcome back.

K: Thank you. I'm sorry we were really jinxed in our lunch appointment. I'm now proposing next Tuesday.

B: Good. Two things. My warmest congratulations. You did a wonderful job. We are all grateful to you. You know about this problem with the Germans that has arisen over this document that Enders and McCloskey circulated.

K: The first time I heard about it was from Simon. It is amateur hour.

B: Enders has been careless before. Look, (Clausen) called me and told me that Schmidt is up in arms. He feels he was double-scrossed. The basis for that is as follows. Schmidt sent a representative here that he, Schmidt, for political reasons is in favor of the link. I talked him out of it and Simon did too. ___get in touch with Schmidt and he withdrew the suggestion and now he feels that Kissingeris coming forward with the proposal at the U.N.

K: On the face of it, the thing is absurd.

B: You have a strong relationship.

K: Why don't I call him.

B: I think that would be very wise.

K: If we wanted to do something this dramatic, we would not slip it into a document. I will call him as soon as we hang up.

B: That's the right thing to do.

K: Simon called me about it and I thought he was a little over-wrought. If you got the same reaction...

B: Schmidt has a high opinion of you. Schmidt has a tendency to be suspicious of Americans. I talked him out of that. He was glad to be talked out of it. He doesn't want to be suspicious but it is of his nature. In view of your long relationship with him....

K: I will call him this minute.

B: Fine.

END

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SG-250 *

TELECON
Ambassador Esenbel/Secretary Kissinger
September 11, 1975
9:00 AM

RELEASED IN FULL

E: Good morning.

K: Do you know any good jokes?

E: You might have one.

K: Yah, but you won't tell me anything.

E: But I don't recall any more.

K: You called me yesterday.

E: After having talked with you and I checked with [redacted] Caglayangil, the Foreign Minister, they are indeed more sensitive about the possibility of a delay in the congressional action.

K: But you understand the problem. The President called the Speaker and Morgan -- I called Morgan and we are going to try to get a ruling this week, if we can. If not, we may be able to bring it up next Thursday. We cannot bring it up before Thursday because of Yom Kippur. Hays won't be back until Wednesday. Then the earliest we can bring it up with Hays is when Hays returns from NATO. This is 14 votes.

E: Hays told me he will talk to Morgan.

K: Today there is a meeting between Morgan and the Speaker and I am going to call Hays and ask him to join the meeting as backbone.

E: I hope you are successful with the Rules Committee.

K: We are going to win this one.

E: The time element is becoming to be more important. The government is in a very tough position.

K: I understand it. We are fully behind you.

E: I hope to hear from you again on this.

K: We will be in touch. Thank you very much.

END

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SG.246

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador McCloskey/Secretary Kissinger
September 11, 1975
9:45 AM

K: Have you talked to Gwertzman to find out where he got it from?

M: Not yet. I'm going to try to have lunch with him. He doesn't want to talk over the phone.

K: I am anxious to find out because the Israelis are blaming us.

M: Blaming us?

K: I would like to know the truth.

M: I will get to Gwertzman as soon as I can.

K: Good.

END

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SG-241 *

TELECON
Senator Case/The Secretary
September 11, 1975
Time: 8:20 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I wanted to call you to thank you for the courtesy with which you dealt with Sisco today. It has been a statesmanlike and constructive talk.

C: You are talking about the HAWK's?

K: And about the summary.

C: I have a proposal which I want to show you after it is cleared with the House. I think you will find it satisfactory.

K: Joe has talked about ~~talked about~~ it from the point of view of the Case Amendment.

C: He was very generous about it.

K: We have made a great effort and I know you have too.

C: I would guess we are not too far away.

K: That was my impression.

C: There is still a question as to the form, but we agreed after the exercise that we would do it in the simplest way. I would like to talke to you tomorrow and with the President as well, if that is not too presumptuous.

K: You are talking about the HAWK's. The President isn't in town tonight but he will be in tomorrow.

C: After it has been through the House. Yes, about the HAWKS.

K: The afternoon looks better. I have to testify before the House Arms Committee in the morning.

C: We will see.

K: Could you do it in the afternoon?

C: I will make it so. I will give your office a call.

K: Fine. You can count on the fact that we will talk to the President too.

C: Good.

K: Many thanks, Cliff.

C: O.K.

K: Bye.

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SG 251 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELECON
Congressman Buchanan/Secretary Kissinger
September 11, 1975
1:00 PM

B: How are you sir? I think, as Joe Sisco has reported, we did invite Secretary-General of NATO Luns over this morning. We had members -- I think it might be insufficient members to nail down the vote. I think it went rather well.

K: Well....

B: I called about another matter. I want to make a strong recommendation. I don't know whether the Department has done anything. I was disappointed about the developments of Nat Davis. I did have a recommendations I wanted to make. [redacted] of our Committee, from Pennsylvania, has taken an active interest in African Affairs and has quite a large contact. He was, before he came to Congress, a $100,000 a year criminal lawyer. He is restless in Congress. He has a strong African interest and I would have reason to believe he would be very respon sive to the opportunity to serve in that way. B6

K: Really?

B: I think he is an exceptionally good man. High intelligent, good scholarship.

K: Let me look into that.

B: I wish you would. I know you may be off in an entirely different direction.

K: I am off in another direction, but let me see if there is anything I can do.

B: If it's not too late, I wish you would take a hard look at that.

K: Let me say that I think highly of him.

B: I do think he would be a good man for that slot.

K: Let me look into that. I will let you know next week how it comes out.

B: Thank you Mr. Secretary.

K: Thank you for your thoughtful ness.

END

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SG 237

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TELECON
Chancellor Schmidt/The Secretary
September 11, 1975
Time: 5:47 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you, Mr. Chancellor?

S: Fine. What can I do for you?

K: Nothing. I found out that you were upset about the paper my people submitted about the STAR link. You are right. I had no idea that such a paper was being submitted.

S: Yes.

K: It is totally against my views. I have withdrawn this -- well some of the passages in the paper. After all, why should we introduce it in a working paper.

S: My concern is two things. Number one: I had made a proposal of similar things but more limited but I talked to Simon and he was opposed. Therefore, I ordered them to subdue this view in order to be in line with the Americans. Thesecond concern is the French, who would not be as hurt by the proposal, were against it.

K: You are right on both points. Once it has happened you can't explain how it happened. I never saw it. I came to my attention late last evening when Simon asked me about it.

S: I understand that.

K: Some damage has been done.

S: I am happy about your explanation. I will forget about it and I will talk to Genscher and my finance minister.

K: Can I raise one other thing with you while you are on the line.

S: Hello, Henry I can't hear you.

CUT OFF. CALLED BACK.

S: We were interrupted. Letme repeat my gratitude for your explanation and I look forward to seeing Mr. Schultz.

K: Can I raise one quick issue with you?

S: Yes.

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K: Would it be possible -- I understand the foreign ministers of the Nine are meeting in Venice. Could they make some resolution supporting this agreement in the Sinai. I think it would be helpful for Sadat.

S: Yes?

K: I think he could stand some support right now.

S: The Egyptian president?

K: Yes. It shouldn't be directed towards us, but towards him. Saying something like the diplomacy of the Egyptians was admirable, etc.

S: I would be understood by the Egyptians.

K: Exactly.

S: I will try to get a message to Genscher in Venice. I had a chance to defend you to the public today. There is a German Party rally and someone was attacking you and I launched a conversation in full support of you and the President.

K: Thank you very much. We look forward to seeing you on the third.

S: Right. Are we going to see each other?

K: Definitely. The President is planning a lunch.

S: All the best.

K: Thank you.

S: Bye.

SG 236 *

TELECON
Mr. Atherton/The Secretary
September 11, 1975
Time: 4:40 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Besides berating Dinitz about some others things, he is saying that we are mishandling the HAWK missile thing. He says that Case was talked to by a minor official of the USG.

A: Nobody called him from my office.

K: Did anyone call him?

A: Well Joe is seeing him at 4:30 today. My country director talked to Bryan.

K: That is what they are complaining about.

A: He didn't talk to Case.

K: Why deal with him, he is our problem on this. Why talk to Bryan?

A: It wasn't to tell him anything.

K: He must have given him the assurances last night. What did he have to tell him?

A: Joe asked us to pass to Case the message that we were trying to work out assurances and that we weren't ignoring him. We didn't tell him what the assurances were. Case has been almost impossible to reach this week.

K: OK Fine.

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SG 234 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELECON
Mr. Winston Lord/The Secretary
September 11, 1975
Time: 5:11 p. m.

K: Will you ask them about my seeing Mao tonight?

L: It is a strange affair because I have my kids and Rolie Evans there.

K: How... who?

L: Rolie Evans.

K: If you can't raise it, at least tell Evans I think he is [redacted] B6

L: He is giving you a tough time lately.

K: To say that I killed myself in the Middle East to refurbish my reputation is a little too much.

L: I didn't know he said that.

K: Another thing, you might be able to raise is whether they think that Kirk Douglas can visit China.

L: When does he want to go?

K: At the end of October.

L: As a tourist?

K: Yes.

L: It is strictly a family round table tonightand I don't want to make a point of calling him aside.

K: I want you to raise it lightly. Have we got my arrival time set with them?

L: I gave a firm date but they haven't confirmed it yet.

K: What time -- the 18th?

L: No, arriving on the 19th and the President arriving on the 30th. You said that might slip, but we don't have to tell them now.

K: O. K. Fine.

L: I will give you a readout.

K: O. K.

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SG-245

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TELECON
Senator Ribbicoff/Secretary Kissinger
September 11, 1975
3:38 pm

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: How are you?

R: I am great. You did a fantastic job out there. I wanted to tell you it is thrilling and if anything could be done for peace it has been done and no one could do it but you.

K: I think if we can get the thing implemented quietly it really offers good prospects. Do you think there is a chance of the Senate acting within the next two weeks?

R: Yes. I don't know what will happen with Scoop. I was there today and he wants to look ~~at~~ into the secret documents.

K: On the secret documents -- so far as an American undertaking is concerned, there is no problem. But between Egypt and Israel, it is none of Scoop's business If the Israeli's are willing, why should it be any of his business. If you make this publci, Sadat will have to disavow it, turn against us and my role as a mediator will have to be stopped.

R: I think you should get a hold of Simcha Dinitz and lay it on the line. Tell him to get to Scoop and say he is talking as an emissary of Israel. Scoop says he just doesn't know what is going on. I think if Simcha tells him....

K: How is it Scoops' role to protect the Israeli government?

R: Don't ask me about Scoop. I agree with you, but I am telling you how to handle it. Tell Simcha to meet with Scoop and point out to him that there could be no greater triumph for the Israelis and Simcha would hope that a s a good friend of the Israelis, he would use discretion here. I would rather have Simcha do it than anybody else. ~~X~~ He is in an official position. He knows Scoop and talks to him and I think he should do it before Scoop goes too far.

K: That is what I think -- you were at the hearing this morning.

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R: You made it plain. You have your enemies but as I was telling David Brinkley on Sunday, and as I have said before,-- and I say it now: you are the most popular political figure in America. I say political not in the sense of Democrat or Republican. You have to forget the Washington papers and a few Senators. In Connecticut you are twice as popular as I am. It is almost unbelievable. You have great strength with the people of this country. They trust you viscerally, they don't understand you intellectually, but they trust you. You should get confidence from that.

K: This is not a question of my critics. We have showed Sparkman and Case every relmotely relevant document. We are not playing hanky-panky here. We have an excellent record but it is because of that that we cannot put it forward.

R: I agree with you completely and Stennis buys it. Bartlett and Scott, I don't know, but they are stupid.

K: Bartlett wasn't so bad but Scott is [redacted], I think. B6

R: I think so too.

K: If we can keep Sadat on this moderate course we would change the whole policy in the Middle East. I will look good if they publish this out but Sadat will be finished.

R: That is not good. Whoever replaces him has to be a mad man.

K: Right.

R: Call Simcha.

K: I will call him.

R: Yes, and if there is any question I can chat with him but I think it is important for Simcha to see Jackson soon and if there is any problem call me back.

K: Ok.

END

SG 239 *

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/The Secretary
September 11, 1975
Time: 6:58 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How did you do?

S: I have just gotten back. I made some headway.

K: Do you want to drop in?

S: I will come right up.

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SG-235 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/The Secretary
September 11, 1975
Time: 5:06 p. m.

(missed first part)

S: And I don't see why -- I don't know how they would phrase it.

K: Something like that.

S: The proper way to do it would be through the Italians. Maybe the British would be better.

K: You want to talk to someone for me?

S: Maybe the Germans, maybe Genscher.

K: O. K. Thanks.

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SG 262 *

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/The Secretary
September 12, 1975
Time: 5:30 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Two things: have you tracked down the reply to the Algerians?

S: Roy is drafting something right now.

K: That is three days after I asked for it.

S: That is our fault.

K: O.K. You will be glad to know that Ellsworth has told Dinitz there is no trouble with that shopping list. I have asked Brent to get a group together to come forward with some proposals for the NSC meeting on Wednesday.

S: I told Ellsworth that I turned over a list today from the point of view that you laid down.

K: What we need is the implications of that before the NSC meeting and the President can then decide.

S: They played the game and told Dinitz already. o.k.

K: Where do you stand on the HAWKS?

S: A memo was done and it will be up with two suggestions. It tells you most of the stuff is mobile and some more mobile than others. Given your alternative sentences you should call Case and try out the alternative sentences on him.

K: I would like to couple them with a few things we can do later..... I don't want it to be a stone wall.
S: It is not a stone wall. They are getting the HAWK complements, you can't break it down that way.

K: Is there some concession we can make to him?

S: The one you made today which is the crucial one. We won't include that in the package -- the control console.

K: There is nothing else?

S: Not really. Why don't you read the memo and see what you come up with. I don't see anything else. We have time tomorrow.

K: I want to be out of here tomorrow.

S: We have a 9:00 meeting with the 40 committee at the White House.

K: With whom?

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S: The 40 Committee and you.

K: No one checkes it with me. (asks staff -- did you call a 40 committee meeting?) There is a meeting at 9:00.

S: I would love not to spend the whole weekend in here.

K: O.K. See you then.

SG 258

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
David Binder/The Secretary
September 12, 1975
Time: 4:05 p. m.

B: Good Afternoon. How are you, aside from the New York Times article?

K: What does the New York Times say? I don't read it until late afternoon.

B: We have been getting heat about the lead story.

K: There have been stories of the alleged agreement. If agreements can be killed, you will do it.

B: That is not the intention. The stuff is floating around--not from your shop.

K: Where is it coming from?

B: I don't know. And I couldn't tell you if I did.

K: You know, but you won't tell me.

B: I am calling about something quite different. I am told from the Defense Department that in the second week of August the White House sent out word to get all details and put together a presentation on Panama. I am told from another quarter that a whole series of exchanges are running from State Department to Defense to White House--going around in a circle. My Defense Department source, who is in the Panama business, and who did not go into great detail, said Ford personally sent a request along this line that Defense put together something in ten days on this matter.

K: That isn't true.

B: I am getting a little confused. What was roughly the consequence?

K: There were two NSC meetings in which a general agreement was made on how to proceed. One was in July and one in August, but I would have to check. And all the other stuff is just a melodramatic line.

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B: Was Defense leaned hard on this? Are they making up something?

K: Defense was not leaned on. That is absolutely untrue.

B: Had Defense dragged their feet on that?

K: Since then?

B: Before that.

K: Before that there was some. There was no clear procedure. It developed as a consequence. There was no Presidential leaning.

B: That is helpful. What bothered me about this was General Brown's statement. He said he had been requested by the President to go down there.

K: That is not true. He may have said it, but it is not true. He volunteered after we developed the new position. Brown and Clements volunteered to go down there.

B: That's what I heard. Brown's statement was misleading.

K: To put it mildly. It is true the President approved their going down there.

B: Do you remember when the meeting was? Mid-August or early August.

K: Obviously before the President went to Vail--first half of August.

B: That was not since wrapping-up package went into implementation of negotiating procedures for Bunker. That clears up a lot of mystery for me. I thought it was important for me to have something about this from the Defense Department, saying how they got to this stage.

K: They were not ordered to do this.

B: I gather Clements did a lot of ball carrying on this.

One other question: Is the MBFR negotiation resuming the week after next? Is our delegation going with new instructions?

K: No, on the same basis.

B: OK, there is nothing startling they are taking out there.

K: Nothing startling.

B: Thanks very much.

SG 261

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TELECON

Mr. Sisco/The Secretary
September 12, 1975
Time:

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Joe, I'd like to ask you--we never got off a reply to Boumedienne and now they voted against the agreement.

S: We did send a reply.

K: We sent a cable and they replied. And I wanted a cable focusing on American presence.

S: Let me check with Roy.

K: Let's get a reply. If they just analyze it carefully this is opening for peace. That is why we wanted it.

S: Let me check with Roy right away.

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SG 253 *

TELECON
Mr. Atherton/The Secretary
September 12, 1975
Time: 6:50 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Are you doing that Boumediene cable?

A: I have done it -- it is about to be brought up to you.

K: I have to leave soon.

A: I could get it to you in 60 seconds.

K: O.K. I will wait.

A: I will have them bring it to your office right now.

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9G 255

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TELECON
Mr. Joseph Califano/The Secretary
September 12, 1975
Time: 6:30 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

C: How are you?

K: Fine. I have a complaint about one of your clients. Coca-cola. They went to Fahmy -- a vice president of the company did -- and told him because the Egyptians are lifting their boycott they want to be considered. Why didn't they come to you.

C: I told them what you said to me, to wait a couple of weeks and then try to make an appointment. They put someone on a plane when they should have waited a couple of weeks.

K: They should wait until the middle of November.

C: You told me two weeks.

K: I forget when that was. My major point ..... that was before the negotiations?

C: No, I called you last week.

K: My major point was this is the worst time to do it. I just didn't focus on it properly if I said two weeks.

C: You did.

K: They did it very fast.

C: Yes. Is there something they should do to pick up the pieces?

K: They should cool it. I will talk to Fahmy when he is at the UN and then you check with me before they send someone else. Austin is a superior guy.

C: Yes. If there is anything I can do?

K: No, the best thing is to do nothing. The Egyptians have to pick their time now and make sure they don't ruin things. You have then check with you and then you check with me.

C: O.K. Thank you Henry.

K: Fine.

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SG 263 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt
Secretary Kissinger
9/13/75 8:55 a.m.

K: Would you send over here to the White House the -- your reply to Robinson

S: Yeh, sure.

K: And secondly,

S: We sent one last night, you know

K: No--unless you disobeyed my orders--

S: No, no just to say hold it for 24 hours and we will have something later.

K: Oh, I think we should keep the oil link to the grain.

S: Oh yeh, well that's clear--it says that.

K: With the hopes that he should not settle on the grain without--

S: No, of course not. I mean that's what that telegram said.

K: Okay, well that's what I thought it said. Well, will you send it over.

S: Yeh sure.

K: I'd like Brent to show it to Seidman and Greenspan

S: I'm getting vibrations from Butz.

K: Well, he's got his man there

S: Yeh, and Bell as I told you in my note last night called me and he obviously had been alerted by his man and Butz said he was ready to look at the technicalities.

K: Well, get him involved. I don't see any advantage in keeping Butz out of it.

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S: In that event maybe when Brent has done the other thing, I'll get Bell to come over and look at the incoming and look at the outgoing.

K: Okay. Don't you think? I just don't think we should -- can afford to have it said that State negotiated the major agricultural deal with Agriculture.

S: I assume Robinson's recommendations had --whatever that guy's name is--

K: Well, you tell him that

S: Now did you notice in the message that I drafted that there was one thing in the oil one that I recommended not approving.

K: Which is what?

S: The proposal to give them assistance with more efficient machinery and more in technology in order to increase productivity of their existing oil facilities because I think that probably gets into credits and all sorts of other things that might be hard to deliver on.

K: Yeh

S: It is in that incoming message, para 9

K: No, no, I remember it.

S: I'll get this over to you.

K: Okay, thank you.

SG 265 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Lord/The Secretary
September 13, 1975
Time: 12:50 p.m.

K: I read over this speech now. It is not one of our better ones. I can't believe much of an effort was made in writing the thing.

L: That's not true. But I agree. The first half, we said it so many times.

K: I am thinking about dropping the first half and expanding the energy section. There are two big issues--relations between North and South and use energy as an example.

L: In _____ of peace and security as Middle East. We have to be careful of the linkage.

K: We don't establish linkage.

L: First part might be good for audience, but we are sick and tired of it ourselves.

K: For the audience, it is always good but I could condense it. Detente is never good. Turns people off.

L: Take the whole global tour _____ energy and get it down to two or three pages.

K: I am wondering whether you or somebody could take first part and get it down to three pages.

L: You will cut back Middle East and beef up energy.

K: The 15 pages before economic I would cut to three or 4, emphasizing America's role and shoring it up. We are trying to do without argument. Do you see what I mean? You can still say relations and about nuclear arms races. Today I want to talk about two big issues--relations between North and South and then use energy as an example and then the Middle East.

L: As example.

K: I would condense the Middle East.

L: I think Middle East good part but too long.

K: It can be condensed.

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L: We will also have sort-of-lead in to issues. Have you talked to Enders about the other elements?

K: I will take a look at his long speech and lift pages out of it. They don't require a lot of work by you today. We may have it retyped first thing in the morning, then you could to an editing job in the morning and I could look at it tomorrow night.

L: Then we still have Monday morning.

SG270*

TELECON
Ambassador Moynihan/Secretary Kissinger
September 13, 1975
12:20 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

M: Well enough.

K: How are things going on the conclusion of the Special Session?

M: Well, we will know more in about an hour. Tome Enders and I are in one of the more critical talks. We have 90 percent of the text agreed to, but there are a couple of paragraphs which are tough for Treasury. Tom is mediating.

K: I don't want to fight Treasury on this sort of thing.

M: We are not fighting them at all. He is just kind of mediating.

K: What does that mean? What is the issue?

M: The issue is basically whether we will undertake to preserve purchasing power. It is an issue of indexation and it is a very touch issue.

K: Can't we leave that open and say it requires further study and work.

M: We can leave with that but the others want more.

K: But if we don't agree, what can happen? Supposing we refuse, what happens?

M: That depends on how we negotiate. We have been hoping for a consensus statement and we may have to end up having reservations.

K: I thought we had agreed. I don't like consensus statements with reservations because no one remembers there were reservations.

M: That is right and we would like a statement without reservations.

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K: The other alternative is we state something as agreed -- not a consensus statement. Both you and Tom are men of strong personalities. I do not want this thing to end. I don't trust Enders negotiating with.....

M: I have been around and I have a sense of what this situation is and it looks like it is going along on this score. On that score we are ok

K: We have gone farther than anyone thought we would -- so they need to come to us a bit.

M: That is what we have been saying.

K: What is the result?

M: First they said we will just break up and have a vote and then they have come back and they are talking to us again.

K: Will you give me a report in a couple of hours?

M: I will and we know your concerns -- they are yours and ours.

K: I don't want the Europeans to think we broke ranks with them.

M: The Europeans were behind us and then ahead of us.

K: When it is over they will say we double-crossed them.

M: That business where Schmidt got in touch with you that was garbled in their Foreign Office. That language had been dropped three days earlier.

K: I wish I had known that.

M: I talked to their Ambassador and he finally figured it out and there was no issue.

K: O K.

END

SG-271 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Kurt Waldheim/The Secretary
September 13, 1975
Time: 2:35 p.m.

W: This is Kurt Waldheim. I am sorry to disturb you. I want to inform you that the negotiations on these economic questions are serious again. I sent you a message yesterday, but I thought I should tell you quickly what is happening. I just talked with Krank, Chairman of the Committee dealing with practical _____. Three points are difficult. Mr. Enders is not a easy man to deal with. There is some criticism about him.

K: It is undoubtedly correct.

W: I wanted to mention three points which are difficult. The question of the purchasing power of the developing countries and their protection. Next, the establishment of the link between SDR and the developing assistance. And the third part is part played by 0.7% of developing assistance.

As far as the first part is concerned, the question of the purchasing power should be the object of the developing countries. This compromise would be acceptable to the 77 and EC countries, but it is not accepted by US delegation. The second point is the question of the link. Here is the Swedish proposal which is acceptable to the 77 and EC--the establishment of a link between SDR and developing assistance should form an integral part as and when they are created according to the needs of international equity. The third point is the target year. The 77 and EC have agreed that the target should be the end of the decade. The US has not accepted any target date.

K: The target date is what?

W: The end of the decade. Then we have the 0.7% of development assistance. The 0.7% of development assistance of the gross national product of what is to the developing countries. This is something on the agenda for Monday. The question is when can you accept the target date for implementing the 0.7%. This is not merely the main question. I was told if something can be achieved on it or maybe protection of purchasing power/the developing countries and in regard to the link between special rights and development assistance, then I think the target date wouldn't play such a role. The three points can be negotiated. Some concessions should be made. The EEC countries are more forthcoming than the U.S. They are starting to accuse the U.S. again. They (the U.S.) are too stiff

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W: and not really forthcoming. I thought I should let you know directly. There is the danger that this whole session that we have put so much hope in will break down. We now have working groups going. Chairman Krank will have meetings tomorrow. The closing session is scheduled for Monday. Over the weekend there will be a series of negotiations. Will you help us in this regard?

K: I will call Moynihan.

W: I talked to Moynihan yesterday afternoon before I sent you my message. He is fully informed. I thought it helpful to call on you.

K: I appreciate it. I would like a good outcome.

W: Everyone is happy. We achieved a dialog and atmosphere. It would be very detrimental if we end in conflict.

K: Right.

W: Many thanks for everything you can do. Otherwise the working group in Geneva does a good job. Things are going smoothly. No problem in this regard.

K: That seems to be our report too. Many thanks, I enjoyed our talk.

W: I enjoyed our talk too.

SG 269

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TELECON
Ambassador Moynihan/Secretary Kissinger
September 13, 1975
2:55 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I just had a call from Waldheim who tells me ~~they~~ things are going very badly.

M: He has been saying that.

K: And Enders has been antagonizing everybody, which I believe without question.

M: He said that, did he? I just left Tom about twenty minutes ago. He was in a meeting.

K: I am devoted to Tom but I don't think tact is his outstanding quality.

M: It was a calm meeting when I left it.

K: I would like a reasonable outcome in which we are not totally isolated. Waldheim says the EC and the 77 tend to agree on most points.

M: Well, yes and no.

K: On most points that remain open.

M: It is the case that we are the ones making the difficulties. On four points left, the Japanese would be with us on one and the Germans on another...

K: Could you get Enders under control. I know him and he can not bear fools and I am certain that up there he is among fools.

M: He is up against a very competent Venezuelan -- they respect each other.

K: I don't mind him pushing him around.

M: It is not a case of Tom being with someone who doesn't understand. There are just differences of opinion. Can I ask you to let me wait and see what the next hour and a half brings?

K: Sure.

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M: I doxx don't like Waldheim doing that thing. Did you see the letter I sent you?

K: The one I got yesterday? Yes.

M: Yes. Let me see what I can do and I'll be back to your about 4:45.

K: Ok

END

SG 288 *

TELECON
Governor Askew/The Secretary
September 15, 1975
Time: 11:20 am.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you, Governor? I will be seeing you tonight. I will be getting in one hour later. If it interferes with anything, don't meet me.

A: I wanted very much the opportunity. When will you be getting in--at 11:00? I will be there.

K: The question I wanted to ask you is this. I am not an energy expert. I can outline foreign policy not domestic side.

A: Bill Simon would have that. What might be interesting to us--anything you really want to say and just a general outline of trouble spots in the world and then close out on what you think the prospects for the Middle East are. To whatever extent you feel they are tied up with our ability to come to understanding with the oil nations. Just some of the international problems with oil. Specifics on decontrol would be partly domestic.

K: I will talk about their strategy with oil and a general view of international affairs in particular.

A: I think that would be excellent.

K: The question period could be more comprehensive than energy and more fun.

A: One of the questions in our minds as governors is whether or not stabilizing enough might have some impact on OPEC where they might mellow gauge us with an increase--the impact on national economic and states. Cover it to the extent you might like. Try to cover whatever you want. Will have you respond to any questions, even outside the immediate area, if you're agreeable.

K: I prefer that. What is Zumwalt speaking on?

A: Speaking essentially about oil and energy. Bear in mind that Zumwalt and Bumper will be talking and we will have a period inbetween.

K: Zumwalt is trying to run in Virginia to right of Harry Byrd. I can handle Zumwalt.

A: I don't _____. We are not going to have a panel.

K: He won't be there?

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A: He will be in the audience maybe. As they speak they will leave headtable. What we did this morning with Mansfield. When Bill came up Mike departed. Then Bill had it. I am trying to avoid putting you on the spot.

K: That is what I would like.

A: I can have somebody maybe get a better idea of what Zumwalt is speaking on and call you back yet today. Bumper obviously speaking essentially on Senate side of oil problems.

K: I know the domestic side but I couldn't get into a debate of governors on domestic aspects of decontrol.

A: That can be made clear. That is why we asked Simon to come.

K: I can tell you about international strategy.

A: And how you think it obviously has to help stabilize situation and make the Arabs more moderate. It started out as effort to use as leverage. If the _____ can stabilize, it is now just price. This would have substantial impact. You would like to speak on oil prices and beyond that everyone would like the opportunity to ask you questions generally.

K: That would be the most fun for me.

A: I look forward to seeing you. They asked me to be at the airport 45 minutes before time.

K: For god's sake. I am suffering from the imperial stage of my incumbancy. I don't expect you to be there. If you want to be there and ride in with me there is absolutely no reason in the world for you to be there. 45 seconds ahead of time is more appropriate. Can we call you when I leave so you can have exact arrival time.

A: That would be helpful. I will be in contemporary. I will be in the building.

K: I will get them to call you when I have left. If you were there 2 minutes before my appreciation for your judgment would decline. Nancy is not coming down.

K: I have to go to Cincinnati tomorrow.

A: Is your meeting definitely set up in the morning with your network people?

K: I hope they haven't asked them to be there 30 minutes ahead of time.

A: We sent out an outline. I need a better schedule. We will play that by ear. If you can call me and let me know.

K: Does this session have to be an hour and a half?

A: It can be cut short. We will settle that tonight. If I know exactly your time schedule for your arrival in Cincinnati, we will do our best to work it out.

Zumwalt is going to talk about the shortage impact on the private sector.

K: You tell him for me this is one thing he can't blame on me.

SG 284 1*

TELECON
Ambassador Buffum/The Secretary
September 15, 1975
Time: 2:55 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Moynihan is driving me batty. He wants to agree to 0.7%. I personally feel for us to agree to something like that is truly cynical.

B: The formulation they are working on this morning is that all countries who are not committed would make their best efforts to try to arrive at something.

K: There is no possible way we can arrive at --

B: It is a phony.

K: Let it go through in reservation. We respect it as a noble call but the only reason we can't approve it is that we can't meet it with our domestic situation the way it is. That is a much more manly way of doing it.

B: Certainly. It is more honest. The only question to be raised there is whether the final document will be put in with the understanding that individual reservation can be stressed or whether we list deep reservation everyone can accept. One could have the understanding that we are of the consensus that the document really does reflect true agreement of all parties or we have a document where individuals agree they can put up with part of it, which puts us back to the 6th Session, which we hope to avoid.

K: I just don't see how the President can on one hand veto bills of a billion dollars and then promise to put forth efforts to quadruple aid.

B: The original reservation we put in when development target was established, we did not object to ultimate target. It was to get a timeframe and the schedule LDCs were calling for. Javits who handled it that time put a reservation in on the time factor which we could handle now.

K: But in this climate in America to say you are going to quadruple our aid, I think is cynical.

B: It is phony. We know we are not going to obtain it in the near future. It is a question of whether or not we can accept this as a un___ q___ in foreign assistance without a time limit and since has been accepted in development. This is a broad objective to which we can provide and we cannot say when we ourselves can arrive

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at this objective. I think this would be understood in the UN and consistent with original reservation Javits stated in early 60s.

K: Yah. OK, I will talk to Moynihan again.

B: I am sorry he was bothering you so much. He is determined to pursue in a number of quarters.

K: He went to the White House and I am going to smash him. You tell him once more and we will have a new ambassador.

B: I already urged him not to come to you with bits and pieces.

K: Why is he in a hurry?

B: He just emerged from final negotiations. We have been resisting up to now. In the last round everyone runs for some kind of common denominator that we can live with for the sake of general consensus.

K: Well, I have to work on a speech.

SG286 *

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Ed Yeo, Treasury
9/15/75; 10:30 a.m.

K: Hello.

Y: Hello. How are you this morning?

K: Okay. I talked to Tom a little while ago and he claims that the 77 are beginning to cave but just a few words of here or there could break it. I told him to check them with you and then let's you and I consult. My view is that we will make no more significant concessions.

Y: Okay.

K: If we are talking about cosmetics -- if we are talking about a 3 percent change that provides a face-saver, I am willing to go along with it. Has he talked to you?

Y: Yes. We have been talking and we're trying to give him some language that might get them -- that might provide a face-saving mechanism and not in effect give away the point.

K: That's right.

Y: . . . very close on some of these . . .

K: Well we are so close to the margin that I don't want to make anymore significant concessions.

Y: You have it precisely as is the case and why don't we work with him on language.

K: But he understands that and I think he agrees with that.

Y: Yeah. And then I will be back to you.

K: Good. Thank you.

Y: Okay, sir.

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SG 287 |*

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Larry Eagleburger
9/15/75; 10:40 a.m.

K: Hello.

E: Sir, George Shultz just called from Paris and said that things have gone really outstandingly well as far as he is concerned and people have been more anxious than he expected. He is having breakfast tomorrow morning with the German, French and British.

K: Yeah, but I can't see him before Wednesday.

E: No, no, that's all right. He said Tuesday afternoon or Wednesday he would like to see you and maybe the President. But that is not the issue. His question now is what is your view of the posture he has to take at the breakfast tomorrow. He feels that he ought to indicate a disposition in favor if the others continue relatively anxious.

K: Well, if his judgment is that something useful can come out of it, that's what he was supposed to do.

E: Okay. That is his general view now. He said it has gone better than he expected it would.

K: That means Bechtel got a lot of money.

E: (Laughter) Okay, I will call him back and tell him that. He would like to see you on Wednesday and he thought maybe the Presiden. I'll write you a note on that.

K: Well, you may have to change Arthur Burns again. Maybe you can put George Shultz in for lunch.

E: Okay. I'll do that.

K: Because I don't know what other time we have.

E: Yeah.

K: Okay.

E: Okay

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SG 290 |*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Arthur Hartman/Secretary Kissinger
September 17, 1975
2:00 pm

Missed first part

K: I think it is goddamn outrageous. We were one group that consistently maintained the position -- the others did not.

H: Do you know what he is smarting under? His friends all over Europe are telling him that you were pessimistic about his chances. That was biting at him.

K: About his chances? That may be true.

H: Yes. ...the overt statements on aid...we have done everything he asked.

K: But the approach was right and everyone else was wrong.

H: I have it marked.

K: Why don't you ask Carlucci to see him and tell him whatever he may have heard that I want to express my highest regard of what he has done.

H: Ok.

END

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SG292*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Ted Koppel/The Secretary
September 17, 1975
Time: 8:03 p.m.

K: You want to humanize me?

Koppel: How much of a human do you want to be?

K: Will you do it in stages?

Koppel: No, in one fell swoop. I am offering it to you seriously.

K: You want to give me your dog.

Koppel: And two of the kids. No really you know Howard Kossel?

K: Yes, I like him very much.

Koppel: He is starting a variety program on Saturday. He has some people doing bumpers, which are one liners before commercials. He wanted me to ask you if you would be willing to do one.

K: When would I have to do it?

Koppel: Anytime. It would take seriously 30 seconds to film. I could get the crew up there.

K: Like what? Would I know what the question was ahead of time?

Koppel: I would recommend you say something like "I have mediated many sorts of diplomatic problems but Howard Kossel is something...." well, you know, just a one-liner.

K: I would just say one line?

Koppel: It is like a sting effect.

K: I am tempted to do it. Can I think about it until tomorrow morning?

Koppel: Yes.

K: Can I plug myself?

Koppel: You can plug the Sinai Agreement for all I care.

K: I would be in trouble if I did that. Do you remember our conversation on the plane.

Koppel: Yes.

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K: I think they have done it to themselves with the Agreement. I have a sense of growing uneasiness about the money and the technicians.

Koppel: Did that come about because of what we were talking about?

K: I will go through but I am amazed -- everyone likes the agreement -- but the bill is making people nervous.

Koppel: For some reason.....

K: More than the technicians.

Koppel: You haven't been able to get the point across that last year without an agreement we spent 2.8 billion and this year there is less. I don't know why you can't sell that point.

K: Because the Congress is determined to get us.

Koppel: Was it Congress that leaked this?

K: Yes. It was in a form that was given to the Congress. That is between you and me.

Koppel: Is Peres upset about it?

K: Well, it is no help to Israel. It starts a debate that doesn't help them now.

Koppel: He wasn't helpful today either in his press conference. I don't know if you saw that.

K: I didn't expect much. I didn't get much coverage at my press conference at Cincinnati.

Koppel: Just hold a press conference in Washington and you will get coverage. I will call you about the Kossel thing.

K: O.K. I will try to do it.

Koppel: If you can get Kossel into it, it would be great.

K: It is a two headed policy.

Koppel: Once you get onto a good joke you never let it go, do you?

K: It has been one of my unfulfilled jokes.

Koppel: I will get in touch with Rodman and he will do it.

K: O.K. Bye.

Koppel: Thank you.

SG 297 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Secy Kissinger/Joe Sisco
7:16 p.m., September 18, 1975

S: I drafted another cable. We got an answer to our question.

K: And what are they?

S: They're positive, Henry.

K: Well, what is it?

S: Regarding the third paragraph of the Presidential letter, Rifai said that their statement concerns what they will agree to in the contract. It does not change their previous position of accepting the third paragraph of the President's letter. They would prefer the private contact with the Congress and minimum publicity on this point but are prepared to accept the fact of some public notice. They ask, however, that publicity be kept to the minimum.

K: Okay.

S: The Government of Jordan is also prepared . .

K: Look, I have about 15 minutes more here and then I will come over there.

S: Yeah. I've got these cables.

K: Well, will you wait for me and Atherton?

S: I will.

K: It's just no way to conduct foreign policy but that isn't your fault.

S: No. All right. That's all I wanted to . .

[Secretary hangs up.]

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SG 295

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RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Roy Atherton
9/18/75; 10:31 a.m.

K: Hello.

A: Yes, sir.

K: ~~Have you got it? Have you got it?~~ Have you got the text?

A: Yes, sir. It is just . . .

K: Come on, just tell me what it is. It must be unpleasant or you would have told me by now.

A: It's pretty bad. I think it is . . .

K: What is Pickering doing at the other end? Or is this all part of the club!

A: No. Pickering, I think, is -- has done his best to get it watered down. He didn't get it watered down as much as we would want. From the Jordanian point of view it could be interpreted as something they needed for domestic consumption and that they might still be prepared to go ahead. I think our position simply ought to be that we stand on the commitments to Congress and Jordan . . .

K: Look, the God damn trouble however is if you had checked the letter we would know. We have now taken the Congress off the hook. I hope you realize also we have now opened it for Jackson to say none of the assurances we give to Israel mean a God damn thing because they will be disavowed if they become public.

A: Yeah.

K: And we have taken the Congress of the hook -- noboby can vote on the God damn thing now!!!! With any clarity of what the issues are anymore!!!

A: Well, that is between us and the Congress. They have our assurance that unless these understandings are . . . .

K: We are now part of cancelling the God damn HAWK deal instead of the Congress.

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A: Mr. Secretary, I think if it's cancelled it is the Jordanians' choice.

K: So you've put it on the God damn Jordanians.

A: Well, the Jordanians . . .

K: But everybody has covered his bloody asses!!!

A: The Jordanians have in effect had a second thought about what they agreed to . . .

K: They couldn't have had it if we had proceeded properly and if we had an ambassador there who was not half working for them. And whose major job [illegible] he thinks is to get along so he was fussing around all day long yesterday. I didn't have a [illegible] clear draft of the situation at any point!!!

A: Well, look, I am sorry, Mr. President -- we cleared and the King agreed -- reluctantly -- but he agreed to the language . . . .

K: But it is also true that if you read that letter -- in an Arab public opinion -- they don't know that four of these paragraphs are provisions of the law.

A: The Jordanians of course do. We've told them.

K: The Jordanians are living in the Arab World. The average Arab does not understand that this -- are the provision of the law and that this is standard. You could have at least made clear in the letter that in addition to the assurances here are standard provisions of the law which we feel of course familiar. That would have saved the King's prestige.

A: We can say that in any public statement.

K: You can any -- thousands of things now that we have been kicked in the teeth by the King. The whole point of using the HAWK thing is to get the King on a more moderate thing has been totally destroyed!!! Because, we are either going to grabble now and beg him to take the stinking things or we are in an endless fight with the Congress.

A: Well. I think, Frankly Mr. Secretary, that the Jordanians have . . .

K: I think frankly, that the Jordanians had to read this letter in terms of its cumulative impact and they are not part of the Foreign Service club -- he is not an FSO 5 whom you can push around. He has to live in the Arab World. We should have considered what the impact of this on the other Arabs would be!!!! And therefore we should at least have given him a chance to draft it in such a way that other people knew that there was only one paragraph that is a new assurance in this.

A: Right.

K: We ruined ourselves now in terms of our Congressional position!! If we can open up the issue of every assurance we give to anybody and what evidence we have for it. In the light of the Suez Canal thing, it is going to raise another set of issues. They have taken the Israelis off the hook. It's taken the Congress off the hook. It put Jordan and us on the hook!! This couldn't have been the point of the enterprise. Sure, we can now blame the King for it. We have a great way out. That's what everybody wanted!! Everybody's ass is covered but our position in the Middle East is further jeopardized. And you know that this is true! Certainly we can pin it on the King now and you know that this is the phony.

A: Well, the problem . . .

K: It would have been ten times better to get the ~~King~~ Congress to vote it down and have us not collaborate with it.

A: Yeah.

K: It would have been ten times better to get -- to go to Case and say he can't do this in a public document.

A: I was against a public document consistently, Mr. Secretary.

K: Yeah, but I've got assistant secretaries to tell me what the problems are!! Not to steamroller me into a temporary convenience. . . . took for granted that this letter had been cleared and that the King was aboard. And when Brent Scowcroft raised it with me yesterday I told him unbelievably the King has cleared this!.

A: Right. I am sorry for that if we misled you in that regard.

K: There was no hurry. We could have waited!! We could have waited a day and made sure. Have you called Case?

A: Joe called him. I was here in his office.

K: Yeah, but I want to make sure -- God damn sure -- that you guys don't pin it now on the King.

A: No, we haven't done anything now except tell him that we are trying to get to the bottom of this and asked that he not make any statements and we would be back in touch. And he said he agreed.

K: And now can we find out from Pickering, if he gets off weeping with Rifai, exactly what the Jordanians intend to do.

A: Yes. Yes, I am . . .

K: Can we get that within the next two or three hours?

A: Yes, sir. I will prepare something right away.

SG294

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RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Jerry Bremer
9/18/75; 10:29 a.m.

K: Hello.

B: Mr. Secretary.

K: Was Fulbright invited to the lunch today?

B: I think so, but I will check.

K: Well you better -- don't think -- just make sure.

B: I'll check the list.

K: It is of course a little early to give me toasts and things like that.

B: You have them, sir. In your folder on your desk.

K: And all I need is time to do ~~X~~ anything with them. I hope you realize the debacle that my associates have produced on Jordan.

B: Yeah, I saw that. I don't know how that happened.

K: It happened because again this God damn bureau was running wild and didn't clear with me. That's why! But the system is more geared to ~~XXXXXXXXX~~ harassing me and using me like the British Queen, to epitomize what they want to do. They didn't ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ check the letter with the King, which is the last thing I had imagined they would do.

B: Yeah. Yeah. I don't know how it happened.

K: Okay. Thank you.

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SG 299 *

TELECON
Mr. Ken Freed/The Secretary
September 18, 1975
Time: 8:05 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

F: Some of us got a very negative reading out of the Gromyko remarks.

K: It is almost impossible to deal with you guys.

F: Is there reason to be pessimistic on this? He was emphasizing the differences between the U.S. and the USSR and he backed away twice from the fact that Gromyko would come here this year.

K: That is geared to the SALT agreement. He doesn't want to give away his negotiating position. It was the first meeting we have had here about that specific issue. All of my colleagues thought he was upbeat. He was moderate on the Middle East and on SALT we had to most preliminary of exchanges; you couldn't draw any conclusion from them.

F: This year is the first time we can expect an agreement?

K: Yes.

F: Well then, I won't write a negative story.

K: Don't write one up in the air either.

F: This thing on the Middle East, was that a surprise.

K: Well, yes sort of.

F: I will play it down the middle then.

K: I think that would be a good thing to do.

F: Thank you sir.

K: O.K.

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SG 296

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RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Roy Atherton
9/18/75; 12:42 p.m.

K: . . . Are the assurances still valid? Don't say can we assume. We assume nothing. Are the assurances still valid.

A: all right.

K: If so, we will take the following lines. . . Second, is he willing to sign the contract, that doesn't incorporate this language but that has the usual standard language. In this case we will make sure that it is standard language. But I want the question to be objective. But I also want a God damn ~~XXXXX~~ cable out!

A: Yes, uh, you have it . . .

K: I have it over here at the White House and I don't like it. It says can we assume that. . .

A: all right. I will change that to simply ask the question.

K: And then get it out.

A: And the other changes.

K: Equally and make it an objective question. Don't ever say can we assume that. The whole thing is phrased in a much too leading way. We have now manuevered ourselves into the position where we are pleading with them to take the HAWKS.

A: Uh-huh. All right, sir. I think. . .

K: Paragraph B is all right.

A: I put in two just to see if you wanted to give him that . . .

K: Now, there is something you can tell me -- that too late for that. That's too late for all of this.

A: All right so we just eliminate the second . . .

K: Let's say that we are -- we regret that the letter -- did not show them the whole letter because we showed them all the parts that are the standard language -- I've got to leave.

A: All right, sir.

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SG 300

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Senator Edward Kennedy/The Secretary
September 18, 1975
Time: 8:30 p.m.

EK: How are you?

HAK: Fine. This is christian appealing to the lions. I want you to know I am in a no win position.

EK: We have no mercy. As long as you show at 10:30 you can do anything you want.

HAK: I thought it was 11:00.

EK: That is fine.

HAK: Will you keep in mind that I am doing this essentially out of friendship.

EK: Yes. The questions I have will make you come out way ahead.

HAK: I have had no chance to prepare a thoughtful statement. I can make a brief statement involving areas and energy.

EK: It will be a piece of cake for you.

HAK: I have never seen you in front of a television camera. They tell me you change.

EK: I am devastating.

HAK: Will you confirm something that was said by Buckwald about a speech you gave in Boston this year that was the same as last year.

EK: I sent them a note saying that we gave last year's St. Patrick's Day speech again this year. You are entitiled to do that on St. Patrick's Day. Seriously, it will go well. There will be a big group and I will make a brief comment at the beginning.

HAK: I will do the best I can.

EK: I think it will be questions that you can handle.

HAK: With all of the foreign ministers here for the UN I haven't had a chance to prepare.

EK: I think we have sent down some of the areas I was interested in.

HAK: I have gone over those.

EK: The Sinai agreement is nothing. It is a general question. There is nothing I think you will have trouble with.

HAK: O.K.

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EK: I understand if it gets into the other way, I will.....

HAK: I am sure I can take care of myself. I look forward to seeing you tomorrow. After the UN you and I should get together for a talk.

EK: Good. It is a tough road given the climate and atmosphere in the country. You are on the right track though.

HAK: We came out well.

EK: Right.

HAK: See you tomorrow, Ted.

SG-306 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/The Secretary
September 19, 1975
Time: 3:40 p. m.

K: My suggestion was if the Foreign Minister agrees that perhaps this afternoon we could talk first about SALT and let me get the explanation of his position. Then we can discuss the Middle East through dinner.

D: Yah. 2 hours before somebody called from your office simply saying possible first meeting will be SALT and dinner Middle East.

K: Good. Is that all right?

D: All right.

K: We will not yet have any proposals of our own. We want to hear what you have to say first.

D: I have nothing to add from yesterday quite frankly. We can begin with this one and then we will see.

K: Good.

D: Good.

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SG 302 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
September 19, 1975
2:00 pm

D: This will only take two minutes. I am going to see Scowcroft this afternoon and will tell him of the results of our conversations at the Pentagon, so he will have the particulars and he can relay them to you.

K: Good.

D: We were unhappy.

K: You were not happy? He gave me the impression this morning, I had breakfast with him, and I asked him how did it go and he said very well.

D: It went well because we talked for three hours about the situation in China and Portugal, as it effects the policy.

K: Whose fault was that?

D: Schlesinger's fault. In the last twenty minutes, he said all the items that need to be supplied to Israel that were not unfrozen by the reassessment, I mean, those that were frozen by reassessment and would be released -- but I already had that from you.

K: I told you that.

D: Yes, and those items that we agreed to -- can be ordered through the factories but not from the stocks, which in some cases is alright, except for two or three items. But all our regular items are under review of the NSC and therefore he and Ellsworth and his assistant could not give us any answers until the review was over, which freezes things like our HAWK (?) which we have ordered and on things like Fleur and Night Vision, they are under review and the production of 100 planes of the F-16 is with NSC. I am going to go over it in detail with Scowcroft.

K: Why don't you go over it with Scowcroft. You may not believe this but I can not find out what he tells anybody.

D: There is a General Fish there who is a mean person. On the Cobra we got six and we ordered six more and they were frozen. They allowed us to put orders in but delivery would be five years from now. OUr Chief of Air Force says you are manufacturing more Cobras than you ~~xxxx~~ know what to do with. This is just to show you their meanness.

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K: We will sort it out. I wanted to wait for your meeting with him.

D: I thought it would be good that you get the details, a review from Scowcroft. And, on another thing, the Prime Minister talked to me on the phone and asked if you had anything to tell me as a result of your conversations with Gromyko.

K: He was less pressing about the Middle East than I thought he would be, but I won't have a real talk with him until tonight.

D: May be tomorrow.

K: Can I talk in front of Peres?

D: Yes, if you have a more sensitive thing, we can talk on the phone afterwards. I talked to Larry about this — the Prime Minister was no happy about a meeting alone with Peres, but he told me not to tell you he objects. He told me he doesn't like the idea but he didn't want you to think he was telling you what to do.

K: There is nothing in it for me.

D: It would not be good because then Peres could relate things you said, whether you said them or not, to that meeting. Peres told me he has to fly to New York because he has a 2:00 meeting.

K: He indicated he wanted to see me alone and I said, Ok, -- Saturday afternoon.

D: He said he would be in New York by 2:00.

K: That takes care of it then.

D: I checked Rabin's feeling on it and he said don't tell him I am against it but you explain to him what you know I feel.

K: Fine.

D: The last point --you got from Saunders that we would be prepared to initial by Monday or Tuesday.

K: The Egyptians are violently opposed to that but it is -- you can't help it. But whatever you can do to get that goddamned Congress to speed up.

D: We met today -- I don't know who is holding it up.

K: The International Relations Committee hasn't voted it out yet, neither has the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. They are just not moving with great speed. There is no one opposed to it.

D: I will see what I can do in these two Committees. Allon and Rabin talked to me about the following matter. On Gromyko, you remember you arranged for Eban...

K: Yes, I got a cable on that. I think Herzog ought to approach the Soviets.

D: You got a cable from Toon? Rabin said find out your opinion.

K: I have nothing against it.

D: He said if so, to ask you to do it.

K: What do you think?

D: I think it should be done through you so they don't think we are playing behind your back.

K: Why don't I mention to Gromyko and if he is willing they can approach you.

D: We would be prepared for such a meeting and wanted you to check.

K: Ok.

D: About Gromyko. We are concerned about what is happening in the Credentials Committee at the UN. Did Sisco tell you?

K: No.

D: There are nine members -- two Europeans, Costa Rica, Venezuela -- these four are alright with us, they were both against suspension. Then there is Libya and Mali, both negative, then there is the Soviet Union, Mongolia and China -- all of which means the Soviet Union has the tipping scale on the Committee and we thought you might say a word to Gromyko that could prevent Libyans, who are behind the move in the Credentials Committee on those voting against us .

K: Ok. I will do what I can. Good., se you at breakfast.

D: Alright.

END

SG-307 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Atherton/The Secretary
September 19, 1975
Time: 3:43 p. m.

K: I was just told that you have been given the Career Service Award for 1975.

A: Yes, Sir.

K: I want to congratulate you.

A: I have now just focused on it.

K: Does it give you money?

A: No, it doesn't give me money; it gives me honor.

K: I would settle for money. I want you to know that it is well deserved. Even if I yell at you, I felt badly.

A: I saw Case and Bingham.

K: I talked with Case. He couldn't have been more thrilled with us.

A: He was relaxed and well satisfied. Case said he had to say something public but he said he would do his best not to go beyond what we had said and Bingham hoped he did not have to say anything. I am going to get a quick message out to Tom to tell Jordan to keep their mouth shut from now on.

K: OK.

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SG 304 *

TELECON
Assistant Secretary Rogers/The Secretary
September 19, 1975
Time: 2:20 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: What is it that the Panamanians object to? I thought I was supporting them.

R: This is another example of press distortion. "The United States must maintain the right, unilaterally, to defend the Panama Canal for an indefinite future, or for a long future." That was the sentence the press took out of what was otherwise a good statement. For example, this means Panama does not rule on defense of Canal. That is what has made them apprehensive.

K: Don't they understand anything? In the context of the Southern Governors' Conference, this was very tough support for them.

R: We are proposing another statement which is coming up to you in the next hour or two. We have been saying this to Torrijos that the thrust of the example was a good answer to Wallace and to watch out for guerrilla warfare. The way it got played in the press down there, to pick out one sentence and blow it out of proportion.

K: You can tell them what I am negotiating.

R: Sticking to the statement of principles.

K: Absolutely. I frankly had forgotten that the National Guard was supposed to participate in it.

R: We are trying to contain it.

K: Is it bad down there?

R: I called this morning. Everything is quiet. There was a quiet march into the Zone. Do you know Torrijos has been talking about the statement himself, about the progress of negotiations? I think we should get to Torrijos before he makes a statement.

K: There is no one -- I wasn't telling the Governors where we were heading.

R: He doesn't object to what you said. We are trying to get to him an accurate statement of what you said.

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K: Does he know what I said?

R: We got the transcript to him. It is down there now.

K: Okay, it doesn't make any difference. Why do the Panamanians think negotiations are at a deadlock?

R: I talked with Bunker. He is convinced they don't understand the proposal. What is going to happen? (a) First we will send our Ambassador down to Panama to tell them what we have in mind so he can explain to Torrijos. Then their subgroup is coming up here to work for three weeks on the real proposals we are making. It will be a month before they can perceive what we are talking about. Basically, they wanted to go with little progress because of the press play at the Southern Governors.

K: I thought I was giving them a lot of support.

R: You were. Torrijos read it that way. It was the way the thing was picked up and played in the press down there. It poisoned the atmosphere that way.

K: Just make sure they get the right report.

R: I will make sure he got the statement. I will get back to you about getting a statement to Torrijos before tomorrow.

K: OK.

SG 305 *

TELECON
Senator Case/The Secretary
September 19, 1975
Time: 2:35 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you? I wanted to do two things: (1) to thank you for the restrained way you handled the flare-up yesterday.

C: Not at all. I was very happy to. It has worked out.

K: If you had reacted to his temper tantrum with a blast of your own.

C: I am glad it worked out. I think I should tell you that you and Joe and your people down there have been cooperative now and it is a very comfortable thing.

K: We will continue it and extend it. The second thing I am getting concerned about is the passing of that technicians agreement through Congress. The Egyptians and Israelis are ready to sign the technical agreement next week. It will then be held up until Congress acts.

C: We haven't been able to take action because we haven't had the statement yet. As soon as it gets here, we will go over it and act promptly.

K: On the House side, they will vote on Tuesday in the Committee.

C: I have taken the position I can't do anything else until we have read the agreement. We have to have it before we can vote.

K: Let me talk to Sisco about it. Can he then get in touch with you?

C: I may have to leave early today, then he can get in touch with my people here.

K: Fine.

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SG 303 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Ted Koppel
Sec. Kissinger
September 19, 1975
2: 15 p.m.

K: I would go with Grace Ann. (see previous conversations.)

TK: I do too, the more I thought it over. I cannot be sure how they are going to use it and I don't want you to end up looking like a fool. I don't want you to do it.

K: I can arrange that by myself.

TK: That's right.

K: You are not supposed to agree with me.

TK: You promised me one time if anything came up on an oil/grain thing with the Soviets you would let me know. I have the distinct sense that it is in the works now.

K: Not in any direct way. And not immediately. But much closer than at the time you and I talked.

TK: What is Meany coming to talk about? Isn't this it?

K: No. Believe me I do not know what Meany wants to see me about.

TK: Oh, he asked to see you.

K: Yes.

TK: Where do we stand with the Soviets.

K: I testified to that before the Joint Economic Committee this morning. Robinson is going back at the end of next week. Nothing will happen before then.

TK: You are saying there is no direct trade involved. Indirectly it would amount to the same thing if they go back with grain and come back with oil. Isn't that the kind of thing being discussed.

K: Not that directly but I cannot go into what is being discussed. Up to now it is still being discussed. There is not shipping yet because there is no agreement.

TK: I find it difficult to draw the same distinction as you. If we sell them grain and we buy oil and it is part of the same deal it ends up being that doesn't it whether you talk about a separate grain or oil deal. The two will be linked in everybodies' mind except the legal theoriticians.

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K: That would be but I am not responsible for what happens in people's minds. It is a problem for the Soviets to link a think like this explicitely.

TK: I see. But isn't it a problem for use if we don't. The other way around-- it is good for use if we can link it.

K: In our case reality -- we don't have to say what it is. Everyone can draw their own conclusions.

TK: In the news report yesterday were you the unnamed official that said there was a positive mood with Gromyko.

K: It must have been Sonnenfeldt.

TK: I had the impression that everything was negative.

K: I think you are wrong. The press now is in a little bit of a negative mood. The mood was concillatory; the Mid-East things were moderate and SALT you could not tell because it was a generaly review of preliminary positions.

TK: Without SALT you don't get Brezhnev. Is it still your feeling you can get him this year.

K: Yes. My feeling is whenver one or both sides decide to settle this they could do it withinsix weeks.

TK: You have been saying that for a long time.

K: I cannot tell you when that point will be reached. It can happen tomorrow and two months from now.

TK: If the US was the one to make that decision you could tell me.

K: Right.

TK: So we are not the ones.

K: It is just not possible to tell. Really it is.

TK: I am trying to get a feel for tonight because obviously we have to do a piece.

K: Tonight as far as the mood is concerned I would describe as positive. As far as SALT I would be neither negative nor positive. Really we have not gone into that much detail. Sunday night I can tell you.

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TK: What areyou talking about tonight -- will that be SALT.

K: Will include SALT but the bigger SALT discussion will be Sunday.

TK: Do you know what you will talk about today.

K: Salt and the Mid-East.

TK: Obviously, if you say the discussions on the Mid-East have been moderate you talked about that yesterday. Forgive me for pressing you on that.

K: Yes.

TK: I am wondering how much there is to be talked about. Are you talking about future plans are what has been accomplished.

K: We are just talking.

TK: Did you hear Ball's talk. His three points.

K: That I resign.

TK: No. He was not that enthuisastic about your resignation. He addressed the Overseas Writers and said he gave you a proposal some months ago. The three points that we make secure borders, second, the US could not countenance holding on to captured territories and third that the Arabs would have to give dejury recognition to the State of Israel.

K: He has written that publicly.

TK: He was recommending once again that you make this kind of statement publicly.

(oil/grain deal)

K: O.K. It/want happen next week..

TK: and thank you.

SG 310 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Winston Lord/The Secretary
September 19, 1975
Time: 7:03 p.m.

K: On this Yuan Chen thing -- you don't have to make a federal case about it. I don't want to be diputed by the facts. Don't call him in.

L: I will see if I can get over there tomorrow morning. They are hard to see on Saturday, but I will try. I am not sure I should go into this length. Did you go over it?

K: I thought it was pretty good. Maybe I had better go over it again. When am I going to get the speech?

L: We can have it up to you tonight, but it won't have Sisco's comments or be very complete.

K: I don't want it before tomorrow.

L: We will have it with everything, up to you after your dinner.

K: O.K.

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DATE/CASE ID: 10 MAR 2003 200102979

SG 312 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Atherton/The Secretary
September 19, 1975
Time: 7:30 p.m.

K: What papers are you preparing for me tomorrow?

A: We have a check list with various items.....

K: I don't need a lot.

A: It is mostly a check list of the things that came up the other day.

K: I want that equipment list.

A: We have that, plus some of the Saunders telegrams to refresh your memory if you need them.

K: If I could have that by the time I leave tonight it would be helpful.

A: It will be ready in 10 or 15 minutes. When are you leaving?

K: About 9:00 p.m.

A: It will be up there.

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SG 309 *

TELECON
Mr. Colby/The Secretary
September 19, 1975
Time: 6:55 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: What do you want to see me about?

C: Well, about the Pike thing. I can do it on the phone now if you prefer.

K: Let's talk for a minute now.

C: The real key to this is to try to get both sides to avoid stating the ultimate position. If we put the emphasis on the procedures, it will be much better. We should try to separate the Congress from Pike, [redacted] The draft we have now is good but it should go one step further and think in terms of working levels, either working with Pike or the President working with the leadership. B6

K: I haven't read the draft yet. You know, I am not in control of this draft.

C: I don't know who is. The real key is not having a Constitutional question made out of this. We should get an appeal from the people on the Committee to the leadership of the Congress and the leadership to the executive.

K: O.K. Thank you. I am going to read this thing now.

C: O.K.

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DATE/CASE ID: 26 MAY 2004 200102979

SG 314 1*

TELECON
Mr. Pete Petersen/The Secretary
September 19, 1975
Time: 7:50 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

P: Fine.

K: Pete, I have to run off to meet Gromyko in a few minutes so I will be brief. I am going to have a lunch free in New York on October 1. I was thinking of assembling a group of senior people -- McBundy and the Council on Foreign Relations. But first I thought I would ask you if you wanted to have lunch.

P: When is this going to be?

K: On October 1, which is a Wednesday. The only reason I am asking you is because of our friendship.

P: If I am available I would be delighted. Can I call you office tomorrow?

K: Sure. Will you call Jerry Bremer and also suggestions as to who should come.

P: My strong suggestion is that you include some of the top business establishment.

K: And one or two of the press, but I talk to them anyway.

P: How many do you want to attend?

K: No more than 15, don't you think?

P: That is alright.

K: If it is in any way a complicated issue let me ask the Council on Foreign Relations.

P: I will let you know.

K: Will you call me tomorrow morning?

P: Sure, or on Monday.

K: After that, I will be in New York on Monday.

P: O.K. I will call you here then.

K: Good. Thank you.

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SG 321 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Under Secretary Sisco
Sec. Kissinger
September 20, 1975
2:37

K: I have dealt with Roay on it. (the cable to sent tomorrow to Fahmy.) I wanted to get the cable written on the Canal.

S: Yes. We have four cables for you.

K: I have seen them and I have made a few minor changes.

S: It really went well with the guy in Cairo.

K: You did a superb job.

S: Thank you Henry. I am about to have lunch and I will probably be back if needed.

K: Have you read the speech.

S: I skimmed it.

K: It is sort of -- when you read it it reads well but when you go into it it does not say a hell of a lot.

S: You are right. When you work on it line by line. If you get another draft I will be glad to look at it tonight.

K: What did you think of it.

S: You don't like this kind of a speech really. But it is somewhat peculiar to the UN. It is in the traditional style. You have a lot of items. You like something that really carries a message in three or four critical points but you have to live with this. I think this will be all right.

K: How is it going to be received.

S: I think very good. For two reasons -- on in large measure because of what you really produced in the previous session. There will be a lot of carryover on that and secndly I would say this is going to be a solid speech.

K: I don't know what possessed me to let MOynihan go to the UN. He is driving me batty again. Now he is screaming about VN. OUr VN position has plenty of support.

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S: Yesterday we abstained. And that was right for technical reasons. I thought about it for 10 minutes without my making a contrary suggestion.

K: What would have been contrary -- to vote for it?

S: No. The abstension was right for technical reasons only.

K: I am not so sure. We got the same heat as if we voted no.

S: Your instincts are the same as mind. I prefer to play it straight. Over the years you are better off to make it clear cut than fuzzy. That is my 20 years of experience.

K:. O.K. Thank you.

SG 324 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec. Kissinger
Arthur Hartman
September 20, 1975
4:45 p.m.

K: Have you read the section on Cyprus in the boring speech I am going to deliver.

H: I have not. I think someone on my staff has.

K: Who?

H: Bruce Laingen. I trust his judgment.

K: You dn't think a speech by me is worthy of your attention.

H: No, it is just that it was never shown to me. He saw a first draft and never showed it to me.

K: I will get a redraft and send it to you. Do you think the principles that are retated here -- do you think they say anything that is new or are they antagonizing to the Turks.

H: No. I don't think so. They just repeat the principles we have agreed to earlier. It is not inconsistent to the kind of things we think will be coming out. It is not acceptable to those who want unilateral independence. The remainder of them I think arethe things we have been saying that would have to happen and they are in line with UN Resolutions.

K: O.K. I will sned it out to you within the next hour. Can you then call me within the next hour.

H: Fine.

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SG 326 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON

Win Lord
Sec. Kissinger
Septmber 20, 1975
6:17 p.m.

K: I think that you and Buffum ought to brief this speech.

L: You mean in New York.

K: Yes.

L: O.K.

K: These idiots won't know what is going on.

L: I think that is a good idea.

K: It should not be done in an overly judicious manner. Just emphasize the political complement. Stress Korea, the MIddle East, nuclear processing plants.

L: Do it about 9:30.

K: Around 9:30 or 10:00.

L: I will get together with Buffum.

K: Get someone to lay it on now.

L: O.K. I think it should be done from NY.

K: They will not be able to do it on short notice.

L: I understand. I will get on it right away.

K: Good.

END

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SG 325 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec. Kissinger
Arthur Hartman
September 20, 1975
6:15 a.m.

K: Is this damn Cyprus section in my speech saying anything?

H: Yes. I think it is important to have some of these things in. First it reitrates the independence, sovereignty and integrity. In the face of these things I think it important to say again. The separation of the two communities is important. We think that is the way it should be.

K: Did they read to you the paragraph on refugess.

H: I preferred the old one above the new one. The new one is too close to the debate we are going to have on the resolutions in the General Assembly about refugees returning to their homes. I preferred the first one.

K: I did too.

H: I have told that to Lord. The other gets into too much detail about returning them to their home even though it does not quite say that. I told him I really insisted that the other language go in there.

K: Did he read you the other language.

H: He read me the new language. What I have before me is vaguer and expresses the same thing.

K: And that is good.

H: Yes.

K: O.K. Fine.

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SG 323

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TELCON
Win Lord
Sec. Kissinger
September 20, 1975
4:35 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I am assuming you have checked all the sections with the Bureaus.

L: Yes.

K: Is Cyprus cleared by EUR.

L: Buffum cleared that with Hartman. I will reconfirm.

K: Will you please.

END

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SG 322 *

TELCON
Amb. Dinitz
Sec. Kissinger
September 20, 1975
2:50 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.5(D)

D: Good afternoon, Mr. Secretary.

K: I am working on my UN speech, Mr. Ambassador.

D: I will take only a minute of your time. I talked to Rabin. He has one problem composed of two elements. He has a Cabinet meeting tomorrow and has asked if Egypt has given agreement to initial.

K: No they haven't.

D: That is what I explained to him and he asked what he should do.

K: I would go ahead.

D: Yes, that is what I said but he said for me to talk the matter over with you.

K: Exactly that.

D: On the both. I had a long talk with him and he was a little upset. I will tell you what he told me at the end and I think a compromise you can come up with. He said he would have tremendous difficulty -- I want you to understand that Shimon and Rabin are not exactly representing the same problem. They do not have the same problem. Shimon does not mind Rabin's having problems.

K: I did not note excessive loyalty.

D: The Egyptians could initial and while waiting for the Congress to sign you could get a date when the boat should pass. The date should then be after the signing -- the fullfilling but before the beginning of implementation. This is the maximum Rabin said he could stretch himself. Otherwise it will be voted out.

K: I have had the same idea which means-

D: Within two weeks after the signature.

K: That was exactly my idea. But I was not going to propose thise to the Egyptians yet. Let me propose it and say this is the maximum that can be done.

D: He said to tell Henry only as a last resort.

K: It is a very good idea. I had it but I was going to do

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DECLASSIFY AFTER: 31 DEC 2025
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it in two bits but it is better to do it in one. If they do it within two weeks they will not say three weeks. It does not ease their problem.

D: All kidding aside the problems that the PM would have, he would not be able to get the thing ratified in the Knesset -- I mean the implementation part of it.

K: My instinct is that we can handle that.

D: O.K. I will tell him that you will proceed along this line -- on the initialing.

K: Tell him we have supported it with the Egyptians and frankly they have no choice and that gives them about three weeks for the ship to pass. That is a fair compromise.

D: And we should get the Congress at the end of next week?

K: If you can dao anything on this. I will tell that son-of-a-bith at the Defense Department what he has done with these leaks.

D: I want to tell you that I have talked to Berger and Gwertzman and they are both going to take care of him and I am going to see the Defense Department gets the press that the Israelis expects them to get. It is so mean.

K: It is totally unconscionable.

D: They are doing two things. When we come to ask for something that is in stock they say we are weakening the American army. When we ask for something long range they say they have not been consulted.

K: Which is not true.

D: It is not true. We are damned if we do and damned if we don't. What is the nastiest part is it again starts a debate here.

K: Every American is in favor of not taking it out of stock. They don't have to elevate this into a principle. Sometimes perhaps we will want to take it out of stock. It would not start a debate if it is presented in the press in the same manner as to your people. We are only continuing the same policy. The Pentagon has been aware of this since 1974. All we are trying to do is give Israel a long-term security basis so we don't have to take them out of stock. If you can get it into the press, I will get out my statement of this morning.

D: I have already talked to Marilyn Berger and Gwertzman on this. I will talk to others.

K: Get to a few television people. Maybe Koppel.

D: I will talk to Kalb.

K: I think that would help. [redacted] B1

K: O.K.

D: Thank you.

SG 327*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Mr. Atherton
Sec. Kissinger
September 20, 1975
11:10 a.m.

K: I have a slight interest in the Sadat visit.Before you go pushing cables back and forth I would appreciate being consulted. You will tell Eilts to get off this insance business -- if the Egyptians want to bring more than twelve people they will bring more.

A: I think the ceiling is...

K: The ceiling God-damn it is what I say it is.

A: I think the realy problem is that 16 is the accommodation for Blair HOuse.

K: Then we put the overflow into a hotel. Tell them our normal rule is 12 and if they want to bring 20 that is fine also. If they want to bring 100 altogehter that is fine too. I note that Eilts is lecturing him that above 60 becomes difficult for us. God-damn it will you stop these petty harrassments.

A: O.K. We will get something out right away.

K: We are not trying to score bureaucratic victories.

A: He is reacting to acable that went out from Protocl and myself.

K: This is not a routine visit.

A: These were just inhouse.

K: I am objecting to this being treated as a routine visit. I would like a detaled scenario by Wednesday on this visit. and how it is being handled. It is not something for the Desk Officer to handle.

A: It will be from Catto and me.

K: Basically whatever they Egyptians want they are to get. They should get special treament from us considering what they did for us.

A: Including the planning stages.

K: Including the planning stages.

A: I will call Catto.

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K: Don't negotiate with him, you tell him.

A: I will tell him.

END

SG32Φ *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Roy Atherton
Sec. Kissinger
September 20, 1975
2:32 p.m.

K: Could you do a cable that we would send tomorrow night for Fahmy on the Suez Canal crossing.

A: Yes. I think I have clear what you want to say on that. Do you want to send it tomorrow? I would have it ready for tomorrow. If there is any dbout in the working group I think we should hold it until there concerns are settled.

K: Right. It should begin with this.

A: Yes. I understand. It should begin with the argument that things are getting settled. But there is one major problem.
K: He must have noted it brought about a drastic change in the Israeli position in the working group. There is a problem. Remind him that we told the Israelis that a ship would go through before the Knesset meeting and our own credibility is involved.

A: We did this on the basis of assurances from Sadat.

K: Yes. And we propose they give us a firm date and we feel that the Israelis won't sign otherwise.

A: On this one we have ...

K: On this one we cannot pre s them.

A: Right. I will do one.

K: And urge Eilts to present it in the most humain way possible but if necessary present it to Sadat.

END

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SG 317 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Win Lord
Sec. Kissinger
September 20, 1975
12:15 p.m.

K: I just talked to Moynihan and he says he does not have a new copy.

L: He is getting the one this morning.

K: Which is driving me to tears. What possible reason do we have to get the latest perfectionism when I need the comments today.

L: We have sent him both drafts and he has no comments.

K: He did not get the draft of last night.

L: It is on the thermofax now.

K: That means I will get nothing from him on it.

L: There are no major changes except on Korea. He has that and has had no comments. If he has any problem, I can include them this evening with my comments.

K: It would have helped me to have had them.

L: You are right I should have gotten it to him last night when it was first issued at 10:00.

K: This building is beginning to work for itself.

L: I should have thought of it last night. We will make sure we get his views.

K: He will comment on his views. He should have been told you must work on it and you must have your comments in by noon and then he would have done it. Don't just send it to him for views.

L: I will get back to him. Have you given him the urgency or should I call him.

K: You call him.

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SG316 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Moynihan
Sec. Kissinger
September 20, 1975
12:10 p.m.

K: Pat, how are you.

M: Well, thank you. Taking a little beating about the heads and shoulders on things you are aware of .

K: Take it easy. Don't get too combative.

M: No. I spoke back last night. I had too.

K: On what.

M: On the Vietnam thing.

K: Oh, that's fine.

M: And on South Korea.

K: I think you are right there. I think you are being a little harsh on the Russians. They are doing their normal thing.

M: You know about the exchange.

M: No, I don't know about the exchange.

M: The Albanians made a great speech about the US and that we have been keeping countires out all the time. I said the Albanians were talking about the wrong super power. The one that was socialist and not the non-socialist. I went on to make a serious statement about what would happen to the UN if it ceases to be representative.

K: Did the Russians reply.

M: Malik replied this morning in some indignation re Dulles, etc. I said to him afterwards that he really must write his memoirs.

K: I would not respond to the Soviet attack.

M: It was very restrained.

K: I would not deliberately pick a fight with them.

M: Not with them but with the Albanians.

K: This is not why I am calling you. I mention it only because of your cable. The other day which is likely to

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leak and for other reasons I don't want to heat up the temperatures with the Russians now.

M: Let me say that I don't perceive that in anyway around here.

K: That is not why I am calling. I am calling to find out if you have read the speech I am going to give.

M: Yes and also Len Garment. We like it and particularly the passages on human rights. We like it. I have heard there is going to be a third version coming up a little later.

K: It should be up now.

M: Buffum said it would be up this afternoon. It is being datafaxed.

K: If you can let me have your views as quickly as possible. I don't know why they didn't send it to you earlier. I am working on it and they aren't. Their version is finished. Your comments do me no good if you call me after tonight. Phone me your reactions.

M: I will. Let me tell you about the setting. This Vietnam thing is nasty. You read the Washington Post this morning.

K: No.

M: For what it is worth, we spent three heroic weeks on the Third World and economic matters. Never got on page 47 in the Washington Post. Vietnam comes up and we are on page 1 this morning. I guess I would have to say it is my sense that what the mood over there is that the Post reporter is right which is that ~~white~~ -- I got applause to my statement last night -- nobody believes us.

K: So what.

M: Well, I don't know.

K: They don't believe us because they don't want to.

M: O.K.

K: You mean on Vietnam.

M: Yes. Nobody believes us and the issue of Vietnam will come up again on Monday and the British last night were calling us to say that the Mauritanians might be trying to do something simultaneously with your speech in order to mar that impression.

K: How can they do it technically.

M: Mauritania is President of the Council. The British were being friendly in reporting this remor to us. The Mexicans were absolutely poisonnious about us. About how we got beaten in Vietnam and how we deserved it.

K: I think I will make a protest to Rabasa.

M: Well, do what you will. There is that situation. ON this point I need your advice and you are the only one who can give it. Which is I think the Koreans should resubmit their application the the Security Council on Monday because if they don't what I will be doing is vetoing the Vietnam while we vote for Papua New Guinea and I know it is all rather abstract. The fact is the case that we are keeping Vietnam out because we want Korea in but we are objecting to letting Communist countries in while keeping anti-communist in. My question is should we tell the Koreans to reapply.

K: As soon as we know there is a Security Council meeting.

M: There will be on on Monday. It will be on Papua New Guinea. Almost sure it will come up.

K: I suppose we should encourage them. Talk to Phil and Buffum and get back to them.

M: I will talk to them and let them get back to you.

END

SG 328 *

TELCON
Mr. Barry Schweid
Sec. Kissinger
7:10 p.m.
September 21, 75

RELEASED IN FULL

S: Sorry to bother you.

K: That's o.k.

S: On your remarks today. I have the text. The problem is that I don't recall any announcement that now Israel can have the F-15 Lancers, etc. And that is what you seem to be saying. You seem to be saying you don't want to go into general items but the items held up as stated publicly before. Perhaps I missed a step before.

K: Actually I don't know whether we announced it formally but the Israelis announced it.

S: The three of them.

K: I don't know whether we itemized them. We said the items held-up are being released. Rabin announced it about two weeks ago.

S: Part of my problem is that Schlesinger , a few days ago, was saying no new commitments have been made. I tend to think of Lancers as new.

K: He would have had in his mind that these were not new commitments.

S: O.K.

K: You see what I mean.

S: I do. And the Israelis are saying that there was always an agreement in principal on the F-15s.

K: That's right.

S: Which adds still another slight wrinkle. I have thought of these as new imtems waiting for the reassessment to be completed.

K: The F-15s were not withdrawn. We held up a visit of a training technical team.

S: Right. And a Lancer team that went whome which seemed to suggest a freeze.

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K: I think they had completed their training.

S: I see. I did not remember anything from the Israeli end. I was watching here.

K: I don't know whether there was ever a formal statement here.

S: One more and last point. The F-16 -- your remarks on the F-16 I think were incorrectly interpreted by Reuters which put out a story from London saying you are acknowleding that they are to get F-16s. I don't think your words say that. Am I wrong?

K: I said the problem of the F-16 is that they are five years in the future. I was addressing these stories in the papers today that a lot of new things had been promised because of these agreements. I said that they were already on the list.

S: Indeed. Pershings. Also I see things that are in conflict with Schlesinger that I followed you on.

K: If there is a conflict he has never told me. I read the newspapers but we had an NSC meeting on Israeli supplies which would have been the time to make his points if he has any and he nver made any.

S: You know what I mean. He said late Thursday or Friday that there was no advance consultation before that list.

K: There was no need to have consultations. The list was before us and before them. All we need to do is pick up the study again and perhaps accelerate it a bit. This is all on background.

S: Completely. I did not know how to deal with the Pershing because I was confused on the F-15 and F-16.

K: On the 16s we are quite sympathetic.

S: Do these things work through 69-80. Did Peres leave here what amounts to a commitment for the future.

K: We agreed in principal to look into it and as the plane gets ready they can begin to start placing the order.

S: But we have no new things.

K: No. We will be fairly sympathetic on the 16's. It is a follow-on to the F-4. A better plane.

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S: All the motion is being spent on the Pershing. I just watched CBS.

K: Tonight.

S: Yes.

K: What did Bernie say.

S: Bernie tread lightly on the Pershing thing. I think he mentioned the Lancer and F-15s. He did not make it a breakthrough day. Said something about further indications. Then switched to the Pentagon and they did the map of the Middle East and the population centers. A guy named Rangle said this would fuel an arms race. They would be able to hit population centers, and that a commitment does not mean anything.

K: When they ask for a battalion and it is a life and death thing they should hit something. A battalion is only four Pershings. People talk as if we are giving away hundreds of weapons.

S: Right. I don't do the Pentagon.

K: Is it your impression that all of this is being leaked out of the Pentagon.

S: Yes. It is my impression that the Pentagon is doing a job. I don't think it is the Hill. Laten yesterday -- why say there are no new commitments. Then the routine about the Pershings and no advance consultations. Sounds like a little antimosity there.

K: Yes. It stood to readon that we had to help Israel if we did his. This is one of the purposes of doing this. Never in was there a dispute about this. It will blow over I think.

S: I think so. ~~The major thing is to get this God-damned congressional vote.~~

K: The major thing is to get this God-damned congressional vote.

S: Have you changed or -- I suppose it is a technicality -- are you going for a current or joint.

K: I think joint. We will do whatever the Congress wants.

S: I would want the joint.

K: Joint means the President won't....

S: Some people think it has a standing that a current does not.

K: I think it will bea joint.

S: That is stronger and something to fall back on. All right, sir. Thank you. See you in New York.

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SG 332

TELECON
Senator Javits/The Secretary
September 25, 1975
Time: 3:35 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

J: I wanted you to know before you came up how strong the sentiment is here. It is very strong.

K: It is very strong here too. If it doesn't get better, we are not going to be able to conduct foreign policy and we may as well find out.

J: I think that is true.

K: I know you are with us but it cannot be that all of the accommodation must be made by the Executive Branch.

J: I think it is very important for you to come, knowing what the situation is.

K: What do you think I could do?

J: I think you should get down to detail of what there is in it that would be embarrassing. Not just the global thing. All of it is not embarrassing and would not be harmful to Sadat.

K: Jack, we are getting into the same position as we did before these committees that want to declassify an analysis of what went wrong in Cyprus--the intelligence paper. In itself we have no problem. If we ever have to ask for such a paper again, no one will ever tell us the truth again. How can anyone deal with us in mediation in light of what is going on now.

J: I believe the best approach is to start with particulars and then go to general rather than the other way around. You have to decide whether to take it or not. That is my advice. I would like to see particulars started with.

K: I have given up with it to tell you the truth.

J: Don't give up. You have to maintain your freshness of conviction.

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K: We have to ask you to vote it up or down and then you take the responsibility. We can't do it any better than what we have done.

J: You will have to go into the specifics.

K: All right.

J: All right.

SG 331 *

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/The Secretary
September 25, 1975
Time: 7:04 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.5(D)

K: I think we are heading for a tragedy.

D: It was that bad?

K: Are your people work ing or going through the motions?

D: I was looking for Church because I understood he was the problem. I talked to Javits after I couldn't get ahold of Church. I told him our position. He said it is similar to Kissinger's position.

K: Let me give you my analysis of what is going on. It affects your survival. This is a fight where there is a massive public opinion against the technicians but the provisions are part of it, they want to debate what they mean. They said it.

D: They said they were against the techincians?

K: No, they said they are for them but all the mail is against it and therefore they are looking for an excuse by which they can vote against the technicians without inflamming the Jewish people. So they are hitting our secrecy.

D: Our people don't read it this way.

K: Well, how do they read it?

D: They read that it is a distrust by the Congress of the Administration.

K: Nonesense. If you report that to your government you are misleading your people.

D: I am not reporting anything to them yet. I am just trying to help.

K: Where is the Jewish community?

D: It is writing and approaching senators on the problems. Not the problem of secrecy, of course.

K: The issue has nothing to do with secrecy. Everyone who is talking about disclosing wants to debate the substance of the memo of agreement on the floor. There are provisions in which it refers to the Egyptian disengagement on the Canal. You know what that will do to Sadat. We might as well give the.....

D: The Egyptian disengagement on the Canal?

[redacted] B1

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[redacted] B1

D: I understand the problem.

K: The next time the Foreign Relations Committee meets is next Tuesday. That is September 30. October 5 the first thing is supposed to happen. It will now not happen on October 5. The whole time table is off.

D: I am just as concerned as you. We have had seven or eight people working on the Hill today. We have tried to mobilize the community behind it.

K: Unfortunately what frightens me is that you can't do anything about it.

D: I can appear before the committee and tell them that we are satisfied with the commitments and that we have no interest in making them public. I could tell them we are anxious for the thing to pass quickly because of the October 5 date. We want the resolution to pass without interference. But I might tell you what I heard. They said there was a tendency to go along with Case. Then Joe angered them by saying there was no need for anything to go public, not even a summary.

K: Joe thinks there should be a summary more than I do.

D: The sentiment was going toward the Case thing.

K: Joe wants a summary.

D: He didn't this morning. Check with him.

K: I have. A summary has problems in my view because it will be compared with the New York Times article.

D: I am telling you what your people reported to me today.

K: You had better face one fact, which is that something has happened to the Israeli support on the Hill in the last few weeks.

D: I don't think it is an Israeli issue that is involved.

K: If you report this you are misleading your government.

D: I am not reporting anything to them yet.

K: There is distrust of the executive but it wouldn't produce this reaction unless the public was massively against the technicians. Even Magee was supporting us but he was saying there was opposition to the technicians in Wyoming. He said every once and a while we have to disregard public opinion in the interests of statesmanship. Not a one said that the public opinion was for the technicians. Humphrey was marvelous.

D: The whole thing is complicated because of the technicians.

K: It makes it impossible. On top of this if you add [redacted] the B1

2 million, I just don't like this. I don't like it to become demonstrated that we can't put through an agreement.

D: If I can do anything specific to help, I will.

K: I don't know what you can do. If you tell me you don't know what to do, I think we are headed for a disaster. It will be a disaster totally when the first Egyptians can't get through to Sutra (sp). [redacted] B1

D: When is the next meeting of the Foreign Relations Committee?

K: Not before Tuesday. There isn't the beginning of a solution. They are handling this the way they handled the Vietnam appropriations. They don't care. There is public opinion on their side.

D: The only thing is to go on the Hill to talk to them personally.

K: I am in despair.

D: I completely agree with you on the consequences, maybe not the analysis.

K: There is distrust of the Administration, but it is the public opinion that is ruining this agreement.

D: There wasn't public opinion.....

K: It is against the agreement. McBundy called 10 senators.

D: About what?

K: To get everything out in the open which is the new way of blocking the agreement.

D: We don't want it open.

K: There wasn't one of them who didn't link it in the session. They say they are for it, but then they argue against it. Scott was good but Case has fallen off completely.

D: Church is for the agreement.

K: Church is positioning himself for the Presidency. He depends on Jewish money so he is making demands that have impractical consequences and thereby stalling the passage of the agreement. Church could have said we will work together until it is settled, but he hasn't. Javits or Percy had the idea of putting the New York Times article in the Congressional report but Church rejected it. He tells you he is for the agreement, but I don't know.

D: He tells you that too.

K: He knew about the technicians.

D: Of course, I remember.

K: I showed him everything.

D: That is why I think they are fighting other wars.

K: I would be delighted if you were right. Suppose they pass it on Monday, through both Houses, and the President signs off Tuesday. If I were you I would get the Jewish leaders together because the situation still leaves us much less time and it is serious. I am recognizing Vietnam symptoms.

D: I understand this.

K: We have two problems. The immediate problem of getting it through.

D: I understand this. I have mobilized the Jewish community.

K: Only Humphrey had good things to say about Israel. It was like before. The secrecy is just a peg on which they are hanging this agreement.

D: Also secrecy is big deal now.

K: If there were public support for it they would have voted it through so fast your head would be swimming. When they want to pass the defense budget the committee gets on the floor and says we have seen this thing and you should vote it through. And so it goes.

D: I will see what I can do between now and Tuesday.

K: You can do nothing for us on this agreement. If it isn't implemented on schedule we will have a foreign policy debacle.

D: We have said Geneva, if it isn't done by the 30th the schedule will move in accordance with the delay. We want it.

K: The prestige of the U.S. will plumit.

D: We are affected by it, and aware of this.

K: Well, I have to run to a White House dinner.

D: After you give me hell, you run away.

K: For once I am not giving you hell -- you are not doing anything wrong. I am trying to tell you, you don't have a minor problem. The immediate issue is the most trivial aspect of the thing.

D: I understand. We will see what we can do until Tuesday.

K: O.K. Bye.

SG 339 *

TELECON
Senator Stennis/The Secretary
September 26, 1975
Time: 4:30 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Mr. Chairman, I want to talk to you as a friend, to get your advice.

S: Yes, If I can, I will be glad to help.

K: Here is the problem. You have asked me for the documents which are background of this agreement and you asked for a list of the military equipment. That I can't give you because there is no list. I will have to write you that we haven't agreed on it.

My problem is this. I wanted your advice. I have no hesitation giving you anything you want. My concern is this. I feel we are going through a period of collapsing Executive authority of the foreign policy and if every Senate Committee can ask for every document on every negotiation, how are we ever going to have coherence in our foreign policy.

S: This is what I had in mind --

K: This is another question I wanted to ask you. McClellan also asked for the documents. He is one of the great men in the Senate. I am afraid if I give them to his Committee, then I will lose with all the Committees. But if I give it to one Committee, then I have some control over it.

S: In the first place, I didn't realize what it was going to get into. I thought it would strengthen the cause that I had heard you say already at the White House and other Committees. They got into this and I just held it up and said we wouldn't go any further than the Foreign Relations Committee. Whatever pattern they adopted I was going to hold my Committee at that. To stop it there and hold it there. I talked to Sparkman in the meantime and I thought we had an arrangement.

K: I don't care what they do with us. If they will give you the papers that is their problem.

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S: Now that we have gotten into this thing they are calling on me to ask you to come back. This is not Jackson. It is spread on beyond that--Scott of Virginia. I just told them we would wait to see what developed with our two-man committee like the Foreign Relations Committee had. I asked Symington and Thurmond to confer about that. But it has gotten another turn now, as I understood. The Foreign Relations Committee--I don't know what they have decided. There is talk they may want an open hearing. I won't ask you about this.

K: They have talked about it but they haven't come to any conclusion yet. Now they are going away from it again.

S: I have been trying to hold it, as I told you, to whatever you did with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and in there somewhere Sparkman said he had been prepared to be frank about this thing. I am afraid, Mr. Secretary, you are going to have more trouble. McClellan and I have worked together a long time. He asked me if our Committee had been given these documents and I told him "no, not yet". We are planning to follow whatever the Foreign Relations Committee pattern was. He is very interested in something along this line.

K: I am not against you. I am against the attack on executive authority that is now going on.

S: I am not a part of that.

K: If I spread every document all over the place--they have been in the newspaper. It is just the question how can any government trust us again if we spread secret documents all over the place. I would much rather just give them to your Committee.

I would like McClellan to understand what concerns me. There is no appropriations substance to this thing.

S: I know. He likes to know in advance about things. He is honest about that. I think a head to head talk with him by you would be good.

K: Why don't I go up and call on him again.

S: If we could just work something with the Foreign Relations Committee, I believe all other Committees could be held with that.

K: I am doing that.

S: There would be a minority and they won't --

K: I am on the way to working something out with the Foreign Relations Committee. I would like to keep it at one and not three different committees.

S: I couldn't promise that. It could hold the Armed Services Committee to that. Could we put it this way? Could you show the list to members of our Committee--as much as you show the Foreign Relations?

K: Absolutely. There is no question about it.

S: That would give me help. I think Symington and Thurmond would be a good pair.

K: The Foreign Relations has everything.

I will send Sisco next week. He can debrief Symington and Thurmond and I will personally call on McClellan.

S: That will be a start.

K: And I will show him the papers. There is no problem of keeping it from him.

S: That would be good. I certainly wish you well in that and I hope we can come out on something like that and next if it has to be taken up by Appropriations.

K: It doesn't have to be taken up by them.

S: Some didn't get to question you that day.

K: I will be back, maybe at the end of the week when I return from the UN.

S: I just said we would straighten out about the papers first and then you will come back. If we haven't worked out something before

the papers then you will be in there to be picked away at again.

K: Then it will have to be the week after.

S: Good.

SG 336 *

TELECON
Senator Javits/Secretary Kissinger
September 26, 1975
4:05 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

J: I have thought this through and I have had conferences with McGee, Humphrey, Scott and Mansfield. And I come down with these two alternative propositions. One, if we went ahead with this resolution there is a good chance we can get it out of the Committee and Senate, if we agree to an Executive Session of the Senate at which everything will be revealed and if it leaks, it leaks; but you will not be leaking it. We think we can get the votes for it. We may be short one or two, but I think we can get them. I have a few uncertain ones. That is one alternative. That leaves frozen the question of whether these are or are not Executive Agreements.

K: The Congress doesn't have to approve Executive Agreements.

J: I understand that -- and that is your argument and we want to put that over. To lock that in we need you to file under the Case Resolution whatever you have got and secondly, there should be some certification that that is it and there will be nothing to come up that will plague us. The other way is for you to take all of your papers and throw them away and do a new memorandum with Egypt and Israel with all the changes and be willing to see them go public.

K: Negotiate a new paper?

J: Right.

K: That has occurred to me.

J: And then you don't care how public it gets and then it is out.

K: I like the first one better. In about 6 weeks from now I might be -- that is, once the Egyptians are in the oil fields and something has happened it will be better. At least the Agreement can't blow up and Sadat will look better and once the shouting is over he has got something and they have not.

M:J: Good.

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K: I am going to see Dinitz this afternoon. On the Egyptian side, there is no agreement -- only those letters, which no one would claim are Executive Agreements, -- but it doesn't hurt us to have them public.

J: You have to get either proposition. Either pass the second part of the strategy and lock in on the first -- submit them under the Case Resolution. Or scrubt it and have a new one.

K: Can I let you know?

J: Yes -- I will be away. I am go ing to a thing for Lady Bird Johnson, but I will be back and Monday night they can reach me. And the Executive is set for Tuesday morning. And the legislation I have drafted we will consilt with your men.

K: It will probably have to go the first proposition because I think the Israelis would be loathe to negotiate the document, but let me talk to him.

J: I will have my men take the legislation up with your people -- who should that be?

K: With McCloskey and Sisco.

J: One other thing. I had an Administrative Assistant named Jean McKee. Because her job got to be more than she could handle she left, but she is up before you for an appointment in John Richardons' office. She is one of three names.

K: I was aware of it. I was going to ask if you were genuinely interested.

J: I am. She worked on my campaign and she is a marvelous person. A very good worker and I'm interested in it.

K: Ok, I will look into it.

J: Ok.

END

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SG 337

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Senator Hubert Humphrey/The Secretary
September 26, 1975
Time: 4:36 p.m.

K: How are you Hubert?

H: Fine, but a little weary.

K: How did Robinson do, o.k.?

H: He was tops. It cleared every ones minds. We had Bellman, Dole, Young, Talmadge myself and Stone there. We were very pleased. Each of them said that this puts a different light on the subject. They realized that this was good for the farmers.

K: It is good for the farmers.

H: You were worried?

K: I am only worried about something you and I have to talk about now. I think we are in a nihilistic time when all the capacity to conduct foreign relations is being dismantled. My worry is that if every time we go out to negotiate, we have to put out a negotiating position before hand, we are helpless. I yielded to you on this because I was wrong when a friend like you is trying to help.

H: Talmadge is reliable. He gave instructions to everyone on that subject. He also said that everyone is to keep their mouths shut because the information, if it leaks, could only go out through them and they will be held accountable for it. I think they got the message. I know it isn't easy for you to have to do this.

K: Under those conditions it worked fine.

H: I know the precedent is for a mood of suspicion.

K: But today was more like it.

H: I get mad when the journalists tempt every senator to see who can give the biggest leak. Everyone asked today what happened. I said it was a good meeting. Then they said what did Robinson say. I told them to ask him. You know we voted to keep it in executive session. Stone raised the point, and they voted it.

K: What disturbs me in the session yesterday was that no one was talked about the national interest. They talked about documents that have already been published, and what good does that do anyone.

H: We had a meeting today of Magee, Javits, _____, and myself on this. Javits was to talk to anyone over here and we want to move on the belief that it will pass, of bringing up the simple resolution on 200 technicians and do what you heard him say yesterday — that we don't deny the linkage but we will deny having it linked on the floor. We will

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cross the bridge of the documents at a later date.

K: It wouldn't be as dangerous at a later time.

H: Right, once the first decision is over everything difuses. They have a new horse and pony show every week there. With the exception of a few senators, most of them will evidence a lack of interest as time passes. Frank has the CIA think going on so it won't bother him; Stew is into the arms control thing, so you start to lose the advocates and you only have a few left to deal with. Park is a very bright man but everyone in the country who has a cause comes to him. I know how that goes, I was a carrier of causes once.

K: You still are a carrier of the really good causes. I heard from Dinitz that he is coming over to see you. I think the fellow is suffering from a misapprehension. I think the Israelis have to understand that there is an errosion of support for them in this country which is at the heart of all this.

H: I will make it clear to him.

K: Don't you think?

H: Yes. Very much so.

K: Your colleagues would find 50 reasons to vote for this if it were not so.

H: Exactly. You heard all of them say yesterday that this was not too popular.

K: I told him that but he said it was between me and the Congress.

H: I will help impress this on him as strongly as I can.

K: They don't know what they are up against. What really worries me now is that I will squeeze them in the national interest, but I don't want them destroyed. The Arabs are going to say if we won't even support 200 technicians over there, will Israel be able to depend on us for its survival.

H: I think you are right. I will try to get it across to him.

K: Many thanks.

H: I will help you wherever I can.

K: I will call you when I get back from the UN.

H: Good.

K: Bye.

SG 338

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TELECON
Mr. T. Koppel/The Secretary
September 26, 1975
Time: 3:30 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

K: How are you? I never thought I would see the day when you are the object of my abject sympathy but you have/now.

HAK: I tell you, by God, if you are --

K: You are going to have me feeling very sorry for you. But that is not why I called. At some point I would like to set up an appointment to talk to you on behalf of the network, as the pool producer for the China trip is an ABC producer. There are a number of things to be changed. They have been trying to go to the Chinese directly. But the Chinese say that is something to be settled by the State Department. That is in large part because you went off on a secret trip and you had worked out in advance what would and would not have been acceptable. It is the feeling of the network that things are now normalized enough that it should be done in a different way.

HAK: I don't know how they were done before.

K: The last time what happened essentially was that people went out on advance trips. If something happened that you or your colleagues had discussed with them they were told that it was agreed with Dr. Kissinger that such and such would be done, or this item was not discussed with Kissinger so it cannot be done. That would go for specific items like how many cables can go out of the window.

HAK: This was never discussed with them.

K: The technician did say to them that we will be needing two cables for the satellite. They are saying this was not discussed with Kissinger.

HAK: Why don't we get together to discuss your requirements?

K: Sometime maybe late next week. Whatever would be convenient for you. It would only take 15 minutes to discuss what our requests are and what they would like changed from last time. If you would like Win Lord in on it --

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HAK: I would think Win Lord would be the best man.

K: Should I set it up with your Secretary?

HAK: Yes.

SG 334

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Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Senator Case
9/26/75; 8:28 a.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.5(A), 1.5(D)

K: Cliff.

C: Yes, Henry.

K: Cliff, I don't know if you know what I want from you except to -- I wanted to talk to you to see whether there is anything we can do. I am really profoundly disturbed by where we are going as a country based on this debate yesterday. Had nothing to do with Executive prerogatives trying to keep things secret. Let me tell you the three areas where my concern is: One is a doctrine of Executive agreements was enunciated yesterday -- we really have to examine carefully together. I don't think you ever intended, or at least I didn't understand you to intend, that everything -- I understand that [redacted] everything has to be submitted but I do not understand that everything has to be public. I am not talking about this agreement. Take all our military supply agreements with Israel -- they have never been made public, for the reason that when they happen it's one thing -- when you make them public you have a phenominal international uproar. [redacted] B1

[redacted] I am just saying that this is something that requires prayerful consideration on which we are more than eager to let the Committee to share with us.

C: Right. Yes, I do understand.

K: This is the first point. The second point is I am profoundly worried about the impact on general diplomacy of this doctrine. Thirdly worried about what the release of these documents in an authenticated way will be to our future possibilities in the Middle East which depend on our authority -- [redacted] finely balanced now to maintain. And finally, I am worried, what all of this debate will do to Israel because if -- one of the things that we have managed to do up to know is the convince the Arabs and the Soviets that if they touch Israel we will get involved.

C: Right.

K: And if we are carrying on this way about two hundred volunteer civilians in an area where the Swedes have 1500 troops without any questions asked, I wonder what people will say about our general readiness.

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C: Well, on your general concerns, we certainly must deal with . . .

K: I am more anxious to work it out with you -- I mean at least to try to work it out.

C: I appreciate that very much and certainly I will do my very best. I know that the people on the Committee -- maybe one or two exceptions -- but not many -- want to do the same thing. It may very well be that we will get with not too much difficulty some kind of a resolution. I do think on the present one -- which is our main immediate concern, there may still be some way to do it.

K: That's what I want to do: appeal to you as one of the statesmen on the Committee, our . . . I am out of ideas.

C: (Laughter) Bless your heart.

K: Well, you finally helped work out the HAWK deal.

C: Believe me, I want to help work out this one.

K: I know, Cliff, and there was no malice involved on anybody's part.

C: Not at all. The -- I think there may be a possibility. I had a brief chat with Humphrey. You did a good job with him.

K: It only proves that people that I din't talk to I do better with than those I do.

C: In any event, he has -- he has -- you said to me -- actually your approach is the right way. Let's see if we can get together on it. I said of course. I am going to be away two days. My brother-in-law died and Ihave to go up now to New York State for today and tomorrow and I left word with _____ and Mac on the staff to work with his people in working up ~~some~~ some ~~XXXXXXXXX~~ suggestions for the first of the week.

K: Wonderful.

C: And I think that -- I am not at all sure that we can't work this thing out. I rather think we can. We've got to.

K: In fact, we've got to next week because . . .

C: There is no disposition to drag it at all. It will involve something in the way of authentication. It may have to be a presentation of a document which someone in authority says is an accurate statement of the undertakings and assurances that were given.

XXX

K: . . . can eliminate some of them that are really for certain contingencies.

C: Yeah. We will have to see what . . .

K: But I don't want to say -- I . . .

C: I am not asking you to commit, Henry, I am just telling you that . . .

K: No, no I am telling you, Cliff, that anything that is -- you know we will stretch ourselves to the absolute limit. We are not trying to prove anything here.

C: Neither are we. Let's assume what is going on now and we will get back to it after the weekend.

K: Many thanks.

C: Okay, Henry!

SG 333A

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RELEASED IN PART
B6

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Jerry Bremer
9/26/75; 8:25 a.m.

K: Hello.

B: Yes, sir.

[redacted] B6

B: Okay.

K: Okay.

B: Mr. Secretary, Mrs. Kissinger is definitely not coming for the lunch and . . .

K: Well, I appreciate. . . . . .

B: Mrs. Burger or Mrs. Ingersoll . . .

K: Yeah.

B: I'll get on to that right away.

K: Tell her I appreciate that very much.

B: Yep.

K: Okay.

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Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Jerry Bremer
9/26/75; 8:15 a.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: Jerry.

B: Yes, sir.

K: First, I told Adams, who has probably screwed it up into ~~a~~ 500 insanities, about my theater plans next week.

B: Uh-huh.

K: You don't know about it.

B: I do.

K: I wanted to go with the Evans brothers on Tuesday night.

B: Right.

K: And with Thorne on Wednesday night.

B: Right.

K: I wanted Thorne to be told.

B: Uh-huh. I'll check it.

K: If so, I repeat my message.

B: Okay.

K: Secondly, [redacted] moved as I am by the nose count you gave me, would it possible for me to know who the hell is coming to the Arab League dinner?

B: (Laughter)

K: I know it is very generous that I was told ten people are coming but could I know who they are.

B: Yes, sir. I will get you a complete list on your desk over here when you get over.

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K: Could I have a toast or is that something that I have to do.

B: Yeah, Roy . . .

K: Roy what? ? ! ! I mean if you tell me that NEA cannot produce a toast for Arabs, I will get a new bureau! !

B: I agree. Roy said somebody was going to get it up today. I'll call his again and ask him where it is.

K: How about Latin America?

B: That one came up last night and I think it is on your desk over at . . .

K: Has a mind looked at that?

B: I believe Winston Lord had his people look at it, sir. I haven't had a chance to look at it but I think Win did look at it. I talked to him last night about it. I will take a look at it this morning. I'll get the NEA one as quickly as I can. I think Roy said the reason he didn't get it up last night is he wanted to get it to Winston. I talked to Win last night about it and said I knew you would be anxious for it and to get it over as quickly as possible. I'll quickly check on them again this morning.

K: Okay.

B: Mr. Secretary, I gather from Protocol -- just so that you know -- ~~KX~~ that because of the weather Mrs. Kissinger won't be able to do her thing on the boat. I guess they tried to reach her in New York. They are going to do it instead upstairs in the Jefferson Room.

K: How about Blair House -- no, no, they are living in Blair House.

B: Yeah. Just so that you know.

K: Okay -- well, Mrs. Kissinger may not come back.

B: Yeah.

K: In which case I want a senior person to do it. Senior person is not [redacted]

B6

B: No, it is Mrs. Ingersoll. I would assume.

K: Yeah.

B: Shall we wait until we hear from Mrs. Kissinger then?

K: Well, somebody perhaps can get in touch with her -- you know just bug her the way you bug me.

B: Okay. I will be sure Mrs. Ingersoll is standing by if she doesn't come back.

K: Just a minute, there was . . . I have to see Vincent on Monday afternoon.

B: He is set for 3:00, I think. Yeah, he is coming in at 3:00.

K: Okay. Get those theater things straightened out. Now if you can't get six together, somebody call Robert Evans.

B: Uh-huh.

K: And tell him that either we meet his brother later or his brother has to sit separately.

B: Okay. Okay. I will check and see where that stands.

K: Get it all done ~~xx~~/ this morning. Also, finally, Evans wanted us to come afterwards to watch the fight at ABC. Now, probably that show won't be over until 10:30 but if so, fine.

B: I'll check on when the show gets over.

K: Okay. And tell him afterwards it is up to him what we do.

B: Okay.

K: But put ~~XXXXXXX~~ Luxembourg the next day. I don't think he is ready for Evans yet.

B: I don't know. I hear he is a pretty suave fellow.

K: Yeah. Okay.

B: All right, sir.

SG 341

*

TELECON
Mr. Atherton/The Secretary
September 27, 1975
Time: 9:55 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: You have changes the -- you have sent the date changes to the Egyptians?

A: Yes, they went out after our talk yesterday.

K: Good. I have redone your cable -- the stream of consciousness one -- on the Preparatory Conference. I have cut a lot out. Can you pick it up?

A: Yes, right away.

K: Also, we should tell them I am seeing Khaddam for breakfast on Tuesday.

A: O.K.

K: O.K. I have to run.

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RELEASED IN FULL

SG 348

TELECON
Joseph Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
September 30, 1975
12:55 pm

S: They have adopted two resolutions. The first is the Javits resolution which requests the President to inform the Committee of all the assurances and undertakings between the United States, Egypt and Israel on which Israel is relying in entering the agreement.

A second resolution--Percy's--which gives a timetable for committee action: A request that you appear tomorrow morning at 10:00 am in a closed session and a request that you appear on Thursday morning in an open session and a vote scheduled by 11:00 on Friday.

K: I cannot possibly do that.

S: Holt said the following:

K: I am already late for a lunch. Can you make it fast.

S: Henry, I am going as fast as I can. This won't take long. Insofar as the President complies with the Committee's request, it is Holt's view that they would expect you to be speaking on behalf of the President. That means...

K: Joe, I know what that means.

S: Insofar as the timetable is concerned the Committee's view is that if the Secretary of State cannot meet that schedule, they are prepared to postpone it until later.

K: Right--placing the delay on me.

S: Lastly, that according to Holt, Senators Sparkman and Case were trying to reach the President to inform them of the above.

K: They are just trying to stick me with the responsibility. Why do I have to appear in a closed session?

S: The purpose according to Holt is to discuss any interpretations and I would assume discuss....

K: I would also like to know what they mean by assurances on which Israel and Egypt were relying in making the agreement.

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S: They have not indicated whether this means a summary or the documents. I would assume in the closed session part of this would come up for discussion.

K: Ok.

END.

RELEASED IN FULL

SG 347

1. POS *
2. J.C.
3. back to DC

TELECON
Senator Ted Stevens/Secretary Kissinger
September 30, 1975
10:40 am

S: I have a problem I hope you can help me with. The President told me when he goes to China he wouls stop off in Alaska. I have been trying to find out when that would be and they tell me the decision has not been made. Can you tell me when that will be?

K: In about three weeks -- I can tell you then. It might be about December 1.

S: We were trying to get him there the day after Thanksgiving.

K: Were you trying to get him to stay overnight?

S: Yes. He could go up and see the pipeline and the town and then go on the next day. But the problem is the facilities up there, if he is going to stay.

K: I just haven't got the exact dates yet. It will be about then.

S: I will go ahead and take my chances and tie the date down. Is there some timeframe or reason that it cannot be reached for three weeks?

K: We don't want to tie our hands down til I have been to China and see what they have in mind.

S: I understand -- it may not go at all.

K: That doesn't keep him from going to Alaska.

S: It does. The schedulers said it would because of the time factor.

K: I'll keep you posted as soon as I find out.

S: Thank you very much.

END

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SC 346

Telcon
Pete Peterson/HAK
Tuesday, Sept. 30; 11:30 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I guess we 're going to see the lions eat the Christians tomorrow.

P: Or the Jews eat the Greeks. Have them eat each other; then you would get both your problems taken care of.

First, I want to assure you about the lunch. We have close to 50 -- top businessmen. Some press: Hedley, Goldenson, John Oakes of the New York Times, Art Taylor, Herb of CBS. Then Nick Katzenbach, Joe Fowler, Lucius Clay, Jack McCloy. Businessmen; law firms. Also Bus and Guido, Vernon Jordan, Irving Kristal, and McGill of Columbia.

Henry, I know you must be going through a lot of agony at the moment.

K: The trouble we have is that -- it is right now no agony to me personally, but I am beginning to be worried what is happening to this country. George Ball is not an amatuer -- what does he think the choices are?

P: How do you want to do it -- How do you prefer an introduction. What theme? I will do what you want.

K: I will leave it up to you. Just say what comes naturally, don't you think?

P: I intend to say something about how this debate is getting out of hand. It is becoming a process that doesn't ask what the purpose is.

K: That I think would be the best thing.

I thought I would talk about 10 minutes and then answer questions. I will say let's forget about the tactics. What is it we are trying to do? How do you put the foreign policy of a country on a permanent basis when you have lost your physical preponderance and gone through two domestic crises. I will say a few words about that -- not go into the Middle East. I would say that this means the leadership groups in this country have to distinguish between the purposes and the process of discussion. That is our big problem now. Then I will say any questions they have on any specifics I will answer.

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P: They much prefer questions and answers.

K: If I give a talk on the Middle East. I am sure to be asked questions about the Middle East.

P: Can you make it from say 12:30 to 2:30?

K: I can go from 12:30 to 3:00 if necessary. I would just as soon get going, spend as little time as possible on food, or even start over food. I appreciate that very much. Can you come down next week sometime for lunch or breakfast?

P: Sure. Let's talk about it tomorrow.

K: Because I am most anxious to talk to you. Many thanks. Goodbye.

X1 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Former Senator Charles Goodell/Secretary Kissinger
October 1, 1975
12:24 pm

K: I tried to reach you -- to return your call and you were never in.

G: I was out quite a bit yesterday and you are very nice to call. You remember I talked to you about the Canadian thing?

K: Refresh my memory.

G: The Canadian Radio and Television companies were then considering and have now ordered all American commercials be deleted. The Hill has gotten involved and they have written you a bout it. A meeting will take place at the White House on the 8th of October in which the top TV executives will be coming in to talk to Bill Seidman. Now, I think you are going to be seeing Trudeau in October.

K: I am going up on the 14th -- why don't I take it up then?

G: If you could and maybe get Chuck Robinson to meet with the FCC. I think they will back off from going that far.

K: Would you call Art Hartman, my Assistant Secretary and give it to him so it will be sure to get into my briefing papers?

G: I will.

K: Good.

END

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X5 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
10/2/75 - 12:55 p.m.
Secretary Coleman/HAK

K: Hello.

C: Hi Mr. Secretary.

K: I want to apologize for...

C: I can understand. I realize.

K: I don't know how it happened. Can we meet tomorrow?

C: What time do you want to do it.

K: About 3:00.

C: No, I have to go off to Canada at 2:30. In fact, I'm representing you I suppose. Something is happening up there.

K: And I'll be testifying all morning.

C: Well there is no time to do it early in the morning is there. I just want 10 minutes.

K: I know. My problem is that I probably have to testify all morning starting at 8:00 but if not...

C: Do you have any time Monday morning other than at 11:00 when I have to go .....

K: Sure. Let's do it Monday morning.

C: What time would be convenient.

K: I've not got my schedule here. Here it is. I'm seeing the President at 9:15. How about 10:15 here at the White House?

C: I'd like to be.

K: Look I greatly appreciate your handling it this way. Look you're handling it the way I wish other Cabinet members would handle things. And therefore I felt particularly badly to have to do that.

C: No problem. I knew as soon as I got over there that you had somebody with you and just couldn't....

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K: No, what happened was we had scheduled while the Emperor was here. They happened to think that since I was not participating in the meeting between the Emperor and the President since if you want to give it a political connotation I was free. In fact, the Japanese have through the Emperor their Deputy Prime Minister so I had to entertain him while the President was seeing Hirohito and I didn't get free until 12 and then I had another thing.

C: Okay Henry. I'll be over there at 10:15 Monday morning.

K: Okay.

X4 *

TELCON
October 2, 1975 - 12:10 p.m.
Bob McCloskey/HAK

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

M: Mr. Secretary. Percy called me and he said he doesn't see where the Middle ground is.

K: Let them vote the agreement down.

M: He raised with me whether you would consider their releasing the document.

K: I will discuss it this afternoon.

M: He will raise that if you want him to.

K: There are two possible solutions. One is that the committee(?) makes its own summary and second is if the committee publishes the document we will protest it. But if they do it that's their problem. And we will be no part of it.

M: We would have to protest it?

K: That's right.

M: Okay. Do you want me to tell him that now or just tell him that I have mentioned this to you and that you can talk to him when you get up there. What he would like of course is a move that they summon and you'd say we have no objection. We can't do anything about it.

K: That's a disaster.

M: They're after the wrong thing. What they're after is publication of the document.

K: That have already been published?

M: That have already been published. It's bizarre.

K: If they do it we will publish an explanatory text. I've got to warn them. I'm going -- I'd rather discuss that with them. I'll tell them I have a number of massive concerns here. That if they publish the text. They'll have to explain what they mean.

M: Yes, I think you have to do that.

K: There are a number of things we have to do. We have to make clear that we do not consider them part of the agreement. We have to make clear that they are not all binding _____. And we have to make clear

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that many of them are not new.

M: Maybe we should consider letting them do that.

K: Bob, I'm not in the mood to compromise. And they've just got to yield. I'm just through compromising. I'm through maneuvering. I'm through with prancing around. I will not be in the position that they can smash the can and then say look what we made me do. It's just too bad. You just tell Percy he's got himself a problem which he's got to solve and if he can't solve let the demon blow up. I've gone to the limit. You don't have to go through all of this but you'd better tell him that I feel that it will threaten the very essence of our foreign policy.

M: Okay sir.

K: Let them force us to a show down. If they want to publish it fine. We'll publish an explanatory text with it. Then they'll have to publish their formal statement by me.

M: Okay.

K: In which I'll explain what this means along the lines of my testimony this morning. If they're willing to do that that's fine with me. We can do things enormously.

M: But we shouldn't agree in any way to letting them publish it with our having no objection.

K: No.

M: Okay sir.

K: But tell them I'm willing to discuss it this afternoon. I'd like to discuss it with the President first.

M: Okay. Because I'm pretty certain he's going to raise this .

K: All right.

(X2) *

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Larry Eagleburger
10/2/75; 11:58 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Larry.

E: Yes, sir.

K: I wonder whether somebody, either you or Lowenstein could make two phone calls. One to the editor of the Daily News saying they had an article -- and editorial today saying we should comply with the Senate's request to give them all the facts and we just want them to know they have had for three weeks every document that our Legal Adviser thinks is in the slightest sense binding on the United States.

E: All right.

K: And that it is not at all a question of their not having the documents. It is a question in what form they should be published.

E: Yep.

K: But that they have had every document -- can you do that?

E: Yep.

K: And secondly, the Baltimore Sun had an editorial yesterday saying that we egged on the Turks to be intransigent. I think somebody ought to call them and say it is really enough to despair. I went twice to Ankara. Hartman went twice to Ankara. On top of it I've met three times with their Foreign Minister elsewhere. I tried to move heaven and earth to get them to make concessions. It isn't my fault that what I predicted came to pass and we are reaching a situation where if you predict consequences and they happen you are playing for what you predicted and warned against. Can somebody do that, too?

E: I'll do it.

K: I just don't see that if I don't fight -- I just told Helen Thomas incidentally that they should get off your back. That I am responsible for . . .

E: Henry, will you stop that!

K: I just told Helen Thomas. It will be on the ticker.

E: Will you stop that!

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K: No.

E: You will make a mistake.

K: I said I ordered it. It's my . . .

E: You are making a mistake.

K: I said it is my responsibility . . . .

E: Beside that, I am having fund Goddammit!

K: I told them . . .

E: I think you are making a mistake.

K: Not at all.

E: Okay. I will XXXXXXX make these calls right away.

K: Okay, good.

X6 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/The Secretary
October 2, 1975
Time: 7:08 p.m.

K: We have two problems. One is a semi-problem. We have now an official world from Sadat that he will definitely be committed to a ship through the Canal on the 22 if you begin implementation of the Agreement on the 5th. If you don't begin he will delay it by the same amount of time. I would urge that you not go back to him right now because it is Ramadan.

D: I told you today that Rabin was told by Gamassy that they will be ready to send the technicians by the 10th or 12th. I can relay this back to Rabin. I think they are not ready on the 5. Gamassy said November 16 was the date for him.

K: All I can tell you is what I have had from Fahmy. Sadat has approved the 22 if you implement on schedule.

D: The 5th is the agreed schedule. What does he mean by agreed schedule -- is that what Gamassy wants?

K: If Israel goes through with the agreed schedule the GOE is ready to let cargo through the Canal on the 22. That is what it says.

D: He said why not the 20th. I thought Rabin was asking to make all the necessary arrangements either on time or otherwise. I will tell him you advised not to reopen the subject yet. In two days the boats will go.

K: I would strongly recommend this. The second problem is with Case. I think I have the whole committee lined up. I went through the documents, not completely, I have to go on tomorrow. Probably this may go on on Saturday. Basically what they may do is declassify the documents instead of asking for a summary. I may let that happen with a minor protest from me.

D: Did you say that Case got off the other things?

K: Case is saying unless we produce the letter to Rabin, he will speak about it on the floor of the Senate.

D: Did he say this this afternoon?

K: That is the way he ended.

D: I will try to get on this. His assistant said that he will advise him not to do this.

K: I am going up at 10:00 tomorrow. Church is really being supportive once we let him publish the documents. What they are forcing us to do is attach a legal document of what is binding and what is not. It is not helpful for Israel.

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D: This is in addition to declassifying the documents -- to issue another document.

K: We are supposed to say -- we will have to say that this is not a technically legally binding document and it is a statement of intention.

D: On every item?

K: It is a disaster -- I do not want it. I guarantee you we will walk away from the Rabin letter.

D: You are talking to me as if.....

K: I know you are not doing this. I have never seen a guy as [redacted] Case. B6

D: I will work on Case tonight.

K: *If you get into his head the problem, you tell him you didn't rely on* that letter for anything.

D: I told him, or I mean I told his assistant this. He complained why didn't we show the letter to him. I said the Senator saw the letter. I said I didn't show the letter to anyone.

K: We have never shown anything like this before and we will never do it again. I figures that he would, after he saw it, say there were no commitments.

D: Right. I will get to him tonight through his assistant. I am in New York now.

K: Convey that this is not a trival business. Take the two paragraphs in the letter -- one refers to a conversation a year ago and one to a conversation six months ago. When we give him this letter he will want to see those conversations. We will not do it. If he says this is part of the documents, we will withdraw the letter and give you another letter three months from now. I think he is quite responsive to you. Maybe you can get Rabin to do something about this other thing.

D: I will cable him tonight from New York and I will have an answer by tomorrow.

K: Many thanks.

(X8) *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador McCloskey/The Secretary
October 2, 1975
Time: 7:18 p.m.

M: It was defeated 229 to 187.

K: Is that the Brademus one?

M: Yes.

K: Good news.

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X20 *

TELECON

RELEASED IN FULL

Senator Case/The Secretary
October 3, 1975
Time: 6:35 p. m.

C: You have talked to Roy haven't you?

K: I just talked to him. One thing, there is one assurance which was passed through in a different form which you saw originally which we kept in Sisco's Office which we should give you to look at. It is an assurance and our explanation of the understanding of the assurance.

C: I remember there was another paper.

K: The reason it wasn't in this package -- it is a verbal note initialled by Sisco and it was kept in his papers.

C: O. K. There was one thing that Roy told me that seemed troublesome. It was after Sparkman had left.

K: He gave it to me.

C: I have a further thought on it. It was curious, I thought....

K: About the flight down the Red Sea.

C: Ambassador Dinitz has wanted to see me for several days. He had been fussing about the thing in the letter which talked about the same thing that I was talking about. It was the Golan.

K: What do you mean fussing?

C: He wanted to alert me to the fact that the letter was promised during the Nixon time and it was never delivered. He said it wasn't an inducement for this agreement. I said how many people know about this letter? He said Rabin, Allon and me. He said this would never be claimed to be an inducement for entering into the agreement but a previous understanding.

K: Yes, that is right.

C: That may take care of the deal.

K: In order to keep you from having to certify something why can't we just settle on the certification that we make and then the Senate can vote that there are no additional understandings or whatever.

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C: I think the way that McGovern put it in the Committee it will be necessary to give the colleagues on the Committee my assurances. I would be prepared to say that it contains legally a restatement of the positions in the material already given to the Committee and that it isn't necessary for them to look at it. It would only go for the Committee.

K: Good.

C: We can work that out quickly in a public hearing.

K: Good.

C: Let us be relaxed over the weekend? I want to talk to the Committee before I go public. I would appreciate it if you would wait to go public.

K: I just discussed that one question with Dinitz of what they were relying on. I will definitely wait.

C: He wanted to see me for a few days. I wanted to get my thoughts in order before I saw him, however. That assurance is touchy for the Israelis.

K: They didn't want to have any debate about it.

C: Or any questions raised now. O. K.

K: I want you to know that troublesome as you have been I have a high regard for what you are trying to do.

C: O. K. Take care now. Bye.

K: O. K.

(S59)

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
David Frost/Secretary Kissinger
2:55 pm
October 3, 1973

F: Hello

K: How are things there? I'll be there in a few weeks -- about the 14th or 15th.

F: I suppose it would be much easier for us to get together in W shington rather than here. I wanted to invite you to something small and informal -- a dinner in your honor. If there is a free moment?

K: I can't be sure. Will you call on the 14th?

F; Lovely, yes.

K: I will know something next week

F: Lovely, Lovely.

K: I don't know -- What in God's name is going on? (phone started making all sorts of noises)

F: I ll hang up and call you back again.

F: Hello, You'll be here for 2 or 3 days.

K: It's possible I could be free on Sunday night but I'm not sure.

F: If you say so I'll just have a few interesting people in for a small dinner.

K: As long as they are not official.

F: No, not one will be. I have started a regular series of television programs on Sunday. I presume you're not wishing to make any public appearances on TV?

K: No

F: I'm delighted by your conversation...

K: No appearances...except for by speech to the Pilgrims.

F: Oh, you're speaking to them. When next week will you be free?

K: Why don't you call me on Tuesday.

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F: Lovely, I'll do it. How are things going?

K: I'm becoming insufferable. nce I get things organized it will be easier because now I can give orders directly.. complete the job in 2 months. I'll have all my enemies in one place.

F: Laughter, Henry you're too much. Lovely to talk with you.

K: You'll call me... Do we have your number?

F: I'll call you on Tuesday.

X14 *

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Robert Anderson
10/3/75; 3:01 p.m.

K: Hello.

A: Mr. Secretary, Bob. On the 11 to 2 vote, sir, I have been asked for reaction and McCloskey told me only that I could say that they released this on their own responsibility. We didn't . . .

K: Against our objections. Over our objections.

A: Uh- over our objections. Now, Barry Schweid and some of the others feel that -- they are speculating that maybe you sort of cooked up a deal which obviously from ~~XX~~ what you just said you didn't -- you know with the Committee that you felt that they were . . .

K: Just stick with that and give no further explanation.

A: Right. And one other question, sir, I've been asked do you consider this damaging to the US role as a mediator and to our diplomacy in general in terms of dealing with foreign governments in confidence. A question of how far you ought to go.

K: We won't answer or we will just say it was done over our objections but beyond that we have no further comment.

A: Thank you.

K: Right.

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X13 *

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Jery Bremer
10/3/75; 3:00 p.m.

K: Jerry.

B: Mr. Secretary.

K: Can you get Saxbe in in the morning?

B: Yes sir.

K: There is no 10:00 meeting now.

B: All right. Sure.

K: Say 9:30 or 10:00 and you probably can get Schaufele in, too.

B: Yep.

K: And the Spanish better know I have to leave at 12:00.

B: I've already told them that.

K: Good.

B: Okay, sir.

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X18 *

TELECON
Ms. Kay Graham/The Secretary
October 3, 1975
Time: 4:38 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Well, when you can't print news, you make news.

G: (Laughter)

K: Don't you think you overdid it a bit though?

G: I went a long way, I tell you Henry.

K: I was thinking of you. It must be painful.

G: :You are nice to call in the middle of your troubles.

K: I don't know what the issues are, but I know you aren't a union buster.

G: It is a very complicated thing and one that takes too long to explain. You are right, we are trying to get the most modest control over things here. Through long years of mismanagement the whole thing got out from underneath us. They didn't give any reasons so they say we are union busting. The show that they did is so venal.

K: It isn't just a few people doing it?

G: It gave the sense that it was. However, it really was only about 25 out of 115.

K: They knew what they were doing.

G: They did it with great deception. They said they were going to go on negotiating. It has made me so paranoid, to the point where I have thought of everything including our ex-watergate friends. They just didn't want us to print a paper. This destroys their jobs and goes into millions of dollars.

K: They are trying to ruin the automation.

G: It is not the automation. It is totally incomprehensible.

K: I am beginning to think we are in a nihilistic age. You can't ask why they are destructive, they just are.

G: That may be one answer.

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K: I don't know why that is.

G: I don't think this is that kind of shooting at the President craziness. This was reasoned out and planned.

K: It was so destructive, you say it was planned?

G: I am not sure, but maybe it was the right wing forces.

K: You think it may be right wingers?

G: It helps him a lot, I thought maybe it was Albritton. However, it is to his interest to stick with us.

K: Of course.

G: I wonder about our Watergate friends.

K: When I read it I couldn't believe it.

G: When they called me, I couldn't believe it. It will take us months to fix those presses.

K: I just thought there was a little vandalism.

G: Well, but to destroy their jobs doesn't make much sense.

K: I feel for you because I know you would want to be cooperative.

G: We have lived with unions -- we have 12 in the plant.

K: It is inconceivable that the Washington Post would bust unions. It is inconceivable with what you stand for politically. What do the other unions say?

G: They are very shocked -- they came back to work. We got out the paper today. It was a miracle and very exciting.

K: It is a great success.

G: For our new baby, it is a miracle. We had helicopters flying copy and then we had to collect what we got and distribute it.

K: I don't know what I can do to help.

G: You are very kind. How are your troubles?

K: I have my own nihilists on the Hill.

G: I have concentrated so much on this.

K: We are in a ridiculous position. I will say something isn't a commitment but there are a bunch of senators who say something is a commitment, when I say it isn't. We will somehow get through that.

G: By the way, I love the pictures of you and Nancy in People.

K: They are nice. I hope to see you soon. I think I will see you next week at the Rockefeller thing.

G: Right. Very good to talk to you and thank you.

K: Bye.

X17 1*

TELECON

Chairman Doc Morgan/The Secretary
October 3, 1975
Time: 4:28 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: It went well both on the Turkish Aid thing and the Sinai Agreement.

M: The Sinai went 31 to nothing and on the Turkish Aid thing we surprised them.

K: You are a great patriot. Both the President and I appreciate it. By the way, how do you feel?

M: I am going to be alright. I have to find out what it is though.

K: I hope you have a quick recovery.

M: I will be out of this place in a few days.

K: Mr. Chairman, many thanks.

M: O. K. Mr. Secretary.

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X19 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/The Secretary
October 3, 1975
Time: 5:20 p. m.

D:Mr. Secretary.

K: Your agent Case is carrying on in a way that will endanger Israel. We will write to Rabin if he doesn't stop carrying on. We will say that since these letters have created such a mess the U. S. isn't bound by them and that they are withdrawn and that the whole subject must be redone. Everyone else is willing to abide by our decision that this isn't a commitment. I think that it is his staff man that is egging him on.

D: I am in his office waiting for him to return.

K: It would be a big help if you can convince him that what has been published is all that you relied on.

D: I will say that again to him. The point that makes it difficult, since he was privy to the letters, there is one to Sadat also.

K: The one to Sadat says that we will carry out Resolution 338. I will give you the relevant paragraphs.

D: That is not the point that disturbs me now. He feels that there is a conflict since he was privy to that letter and he has to say to the Committee that what was presented is all the documents.

K: He doesn't have to say anything. Let us make the certification that these are all the binding commitments. Let the Senate vote that no other commitments are binding. We will accept that. He can accept it. He can argue with us later about other binding commitments. If he pursues this, we will not have a public discussion.

D: I am doing everything in my power.

K: He has done more damage to Israel in the last few days by forcing me to go through everything and explain what it doesn't mean.

D: You suggest that.....

K: I am telling him to get out of the business of certification.

D: I should tell him to say on Monday that this is all the commi tments.

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K: What I will say is that this is all I will leave with the Committee. All the assurances have been submitted. Then the Committee can vote that nothing else is binding and that will be fine. He can get out of it, I don't ask for a certification from him. I would rather not have it -- it sets a dangerous precedent, that the Senate must certify all the documents from any particular negotiation. We will bring this about anyway. If he pursues this line, we will make everything inoperative. He will not achieve what he is after.

D: Also the letter for Sadat, the same thing?

K: There is nothing that Sadat has to withdraw.

D: Have you talked with Eagleburger this afternoon? I have given him some information that you should see. I will see what I can do and believe me, Mr. lSecretary, I am trying.

K: We will do it to Sadat, but it is senseless. You will just have to take my word for that. Sadat has things that I have said in public. I will give you the quotes for your information.

D: I am only concerned how to resolve this issue. Rabin has made a concession today.

K: Very much appreciated.

D: I don't want it to be dragged beyond this.

K: What I have been trying to tell the mad man of his staff is that these documents are unusable to you with this Administration anyway. They are a guide for the future. If we must make qualifications they lose significance. They shouldn't have legal significance anyway. They have the good will of the parties concerned, that is all. You never relied on it in the past with the LANCE. You have had the letter and never invoked it.

D: That is right.

K: These people are weakening what you have. They have weakened the Agreement. The best thing for you would have been a procedure like the House Committee wanted. The people who think they are friends are killing you. Like the coalition between Case and Percy where they were trying to weaken the documents. If he forces it further, we will make it inoperative and talk another way. I know you aren't behind it. The major thing is for us to get this under control.

D: I am missing the Hirohito reception because of this.

K: O. K. Call me after you have the meeting.

D: I will.

K: O. K.

X25 *

TELECON
Ambassador McCloskey/The Secretary
October 3, 1975
Time: 7:15 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: If you can find a tactiful way of telling the Spanish that initialing isn't a brilliant idea, you can do it. I don't want to fight over it, though. We talked to Schlesinger and he thought it was alright.

M: We will give them some indication along these lines. You have a paper up there on it.

K: It isn't in my folders. Will you make sure it gets into my brief case?

M: Yes.

K: O. K. Thank you.

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X24 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Enders/The Secretary
October 3, 1975
Time: 7:13 p.m.

K: Tom, you have to get on the phone first.

E: I should have, they never put you on first. The suggestion is about Robinson's negotiations.

K: We cannot fight the grain reserves now.

E: We want to preserve the integrity of the negotiations and the leverage in it.

K: I have to get ready can you be fast?

E: Yes. The issue now (we had a good meeting with the EPB group -- we used the guidance you approved), the question is this the EPB people feel that on the oil link, we go very hard and get a discount or we get out of oil altogether.

K: I would go out on the oil link.

E: O.K. They would like to see Charles tough on oil and stay as long as it takes to get something.

K: I agree.

E: O.K. Thank you.

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(X12) *

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Roy Atherton
10/3/75; 2:32 p.m.

K: Roy, I just wanted to make sure no one else is present.

A: Pat Holt is here.

K: That's all right. But no notes will be taken.

A: Yes, sir.

K: Okay. The same ground rules as last time.

A: Yes, indeed.

K: Okay and you call me when it is finished.

A: Yes, I will.

K: Thank you.

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X15 *

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.5(C), 1.5(D)

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Hal Sonnenfeldt
10/3/75; 3:48 p.m.

K: Hello.

S: Henry, the Canadians just called me and said the French turned them down flat when theyapproached them concerning the summit thing.

K: Well tell them what I would strongly recommend is that let us handle it at this weekend's meeting.

S: Okay. Tell them that these people are not going to have any authority of course to do anything about that.

K: No, but we will -- and then make sure that Shultz tells the French we insist.

S: Okay. I think we could probably get Schmidt into the act with Giscard because he told me Giscard had agreed to it.

K: Yeah.

S: And maybe I will talk to Schmidt tonight at this dinner that I am going to.

K: Okay, why don't you do that.

S: Okay. Right. Thank you.

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CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 25X1
DECLASSIFY AFTER: INDEFINITE
DATE/CASE ID: 09 JUL 2003 200102979

10/3/75; 3:54 p.m.

K: Hal.

S: Yeah.

K: When you talk to Schmidt also tell him to move on the date for -- you know, we can do it as late as the 20th if necessary.

S: Uh-huh. Well maybe by that time Giscard will be back from his trip.

K: What is that weekend. I don't have it . . .

S: The weekend is the 13th. That would be right after your NATO uh . . .

K: Well you know, it would be better for me but we could come back again. We could do it say the 19th and 20th and 21st.

S: That Saturday would be the 20th and Sunday the 21st.

K: The President might prefer that because he is going on vacation around the 22nd or 23rd.

S: All right that is a little more flexibility.

K: Yes.

S: Okay. Uh, on this Canadian thing, um, do you think we ought to make a direct pitch to the French in Paris?

K: What's the hurry for this weekend?

S: Because the Canadians are terribly upset about not being there this weekend. [redacted] B1

K: Yeah, but how would we make their presentation in France. It is now 10:00 at night.

S: Well, I would tell the Ambassador here that we feel rather strongly that . . .

K: No, you would not tell him we feel rather strongly. You can tell him we are . . .

S: That XXX it is getting to be a political problem and that as long as the Italians are in we think it is . . .

K: And we are told by Schmidt that Giscard has agreed to it.

S: And also that it is our thought that . . .

K: Yeah, but I do not want you to turn yourself into the manager of this whole enterprise.

S: Sure. That it is our thought this is Schmidt thought that even though there are seven people present that the three most important people can

have some discussions on the side.

K: Yeah.

S: So I will tell the Frenchmen we have heard . . .

K: But with great moderation.

S: Of course. I think the whole thing is a gamble.

K: Okay, bye.

S: All right.

X11 *

RELEASED IN FULL

Telecon
Secretary Kissinger
Cong. John Brademas
10/3/75; 12:14 p.m.

K: John, I just wanted to call you to tell you that now that we have this phase behind us, from my side I would like to do my utmost to see whether ~~KK~~ we can work out a cooperative relationship.

B: Well, I appreciate that and I would like to do that.

K: You know, I think you made an important point and now the major problem is how we can negotiate a solution.

B: Well, I agree and as I told the President on the night of July 23 before the last vote that no matter how it went we were going to have to work together to try to resolve the problem.

K: I want you to know that is going to be my attitude.

B: Good.

K: And I like to think anyway that you and I are not natural opponents.

B: I don't think so. We needn't be. We needn't be. I do hope that, now I've just seen this initial reaction of the Turks just on the ticker . . .

K: Well, I've told -- I wanted you to know -- I told the Turkish Foreign Minister last week that if the House voted to lift the embargo we expected progress in the negotiations and that if there weren't any, there would be a strain on Turkish-American relations on our end. And, we will move -- we have to wait until after the elections.

B: Of course.

K: And -- but we will move soon after the election and I would like to keep you informed.

B: Very well. I appreciate that, Henry.

K: Why don't you and I and anyone you want to bring get together at some early point when _____ of _____ wants anything of the other and just see whether we can establish contact.

B: I am grateful for that and I think that after these elections come over why don't we sit down and do that.

K: oKay, good.

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B: Okay, thank you very much, Henry. K: Bye, John.

X21 1*

TELECON
Mr. Leigh/The Secretary
October 3, 1975
Time: 6:37 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Case after talking to Dinitz has concluded that he need not see the additional papers and that he can make a certification that the documents don't go beyond what the Committee needs. He has to talk to Sparkman but he seems relaxed and told me to relax over the weekend.

L: Congratulations. I never thought it would happen. You have a draft up there and I will get another to you first thing in the morning.

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X10 *

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Jerry Bremer
10/3/75; 8:33 a.m.

K: Jerry.

B: Yes, sir.

K: In that mindless way of the Department they now claim I have this -- the cables, which I have already approved three days ago, for the contingency of the Turkish lift -- arms embargo lifting.

B: Okay. You approved them?

K: No, no, kindly come over here and pick them out. Now, I have told you a thousand times not to give me a folder with 100 cables in it when everybody in the Dapartment, or at least everyone in the country except the Department, knew the Turkish aid vote was coming up last night.

B: You have approved them -- that's it.

K: I thought I approved them. I want to see them again!!!

B: Okay. I will have themput in front of you overthere right away.

K: Also, I want you to bring the memo of understanding on the Geneva Conference of December '73 or maybe it is January '74.

B: Yeah. When you gotothe hill.

K: The one that is referred -- which has a back reference.

B: I'll have Roy bring that over, sir. He is going to dacompanny you this ~~XXX~~ morning. He is going to accompany you up this morning, too.

K: Okay, are you?

B: Yeah.

K: All right. I want these two ~~XXXXX~~ cables first.

B: All right, I will get them there.

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X23 *

TELECON
Ambassador McCloskey/The Secretary
October 3, 1975
Time: 7:03 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I have since then talked to Dinitz and Case, and Dinitz was more persuasive than you. I am being sarcastic.

M: Your confidence in me has been not the most uplifting thing this week.

K: If the guy is an Israeli agent, what can you do?

M: Well.... the Chicago Times is going to have a story this Sunday.

K: To say that I am on the way out?

M: No that you gave Sadat an assurance that during the life of the Sinai Agreement that you would push for an overall settlement that would include Israel going back to the '67 borders. Also that this assurance would include not only the Egyptian territory, but the Golan. That this assurance was made with Sadat with no diplomatic aides present.

K: Where did he get this?

M: The "diplomatic sources" are tracing it back to something Sadat said to the other Arabs.

K: It is a bogus story.

M: If you like, I will get back to him and try to talk him out of publication. It needs a denial anyway.

K: Exactly, o. k.

M: This town is going to kill us all one way or another.

K: Oh, yes. It is unbelievable, it is sick.

M: O. K. I will get back to Ross.

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X31

TELECON
Mr. Liebman/The Secretary
October 4, 1975
Time: 3:15 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

L: How are you? How is Nancy?
Let me tell you what I am bothering you about. On the 17th and 18th of October my American Bar Association is doing a two-day thing for law professors. Armitage and Polansky will be there.

1. Will you tell them how much I appreciate them for being there.

2. If you had any time during the 17th and 18th of October --

K: I will be out of the country.

L: Will you be sure that Armitage and Polansky know you approve.

K: You can count on it.

L: When you get back I would like to see you on the part you can do with American Bar broadly. Your speech there was terrific. And the last speech that I got was just fantastic.

K: Aren't you nice.

L: I would like to do something broadly in the ABA with you on our whole educational thing. If you have a few minutes I would like to come down and talk to you.

How is Al Haig doing? The reports are even better.

K: OK.

L: If you would like someone to come out here, I am President of the Law Group and we have a month's dinner for the establishment. Could you spare Joe Sisco?

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K: Whom do you want and I will put in a good word?

L: I will write to Joe and send you a copy. Love to Nancy.

K: Thank you.

X29 *

TELECON
Ambassador Habib/The Secretary
October 4, 1975
Time: 3:50

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Phil, I wouldn't encourage Australia and New Zealand to expect a Presidential visit.

H: What about the other two?

K: Possible.

H: Remember you said something to Willacey (?) and Pat Shaw about possibility.

K: Tell them very tiny chance but not very likely.

H: But on the other two?

K: Very likely.

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X26

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador McCloskey/The Secretary
October 4, 1975
Time: 1:50 p.m.

K: Did we get that maniac out of the building without blowing us up?

M: Yes. We got the statements out. There were a lot of questions, of course. I took calls from Gwertzman and Schweid.

K: What did you say?

M: What you agreed upon here was essentially the question of relationship between the U.S. and Spain. It is the basis of a new agreement we are concluding in the Congress. I pointed out what the Spanish objectives had been and it finally had to be taken to the Foreign Minister level.

K: Did you tell them we had five protocols to do?

M: I told them nothing comes into effect until the implementing of the agreement. We are satisfied that it will be some weeks. They shouldn't jump to any further conclusion. No one asked for any action to be taken.

K: Do you think they will report that we have completed an agreement?

M: Well, they should only say that we completed the basis of an agreement--framework.

K: Yeah.

M: I am waiting to see what the tickers look like.

K: And you will go to the Spaniards with me?

M: Yes.

K: OK.

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X27 *

TELECON
Ted Koppel/The Secretary
October 4, 1975
Time: 2:00 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: Hello.

TK: How are you?

K: How are you, Ted?

TK: We have a story coming in from Boston today on a Russian oil tanker that is off the coast of Boston that is carrying Soviet oil to the Shreve Oil Company.

K: Never heard of it.

TK: We have the President of the Company confirming that he has bought oil from the Soviets and he is trying to get long term underway right now.

K: I don't know anything about it.

TK: Is there any problem? Do they have to apply to the State Department for permission?

K: I don't think so. If they did, I didn't know about it.

TK: Are you aware that Shriver yesterday in Boston said that Kosygin indicated that the Soviets are interested in making a long term deal with the US?

K: I told you about that.

TK: The last time we spoke it had not been solidified.

K: That is correct.

TK: Is it now?

K: We have made progress but it is not solidified.

TK: The last time we spoke the Soviets were concerned about the linkage between wheat and oil in public line--on separate and parallel channels.

K: That is right. But why don't you call Enders?

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TK: He hasn't taken up his new post yet?

K: No, he will be here until December.

TK: One other question. Are you going to be able to see us on the China visit?

K: I will try.

TK: [redacted]

K:

TK:

K:

TK:

B6

X28 *

TELECON
Joe Kraft/The Secretary
October 9, 1975
Time: 2:05 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

HAK: How are you?

K: I am fine. You got me right in the middle of my afternoon nap.

HAK: They shouldn't have waken you.

K: No, I was getting up. I get up at 2:00.

HAK: You sound better.

K: Yeah, I feel very well. They are keeping me under a tight rein. I feel really very strong.

HAK: I am told they don't let you out.

K: They will not let me out. As a matter of fact, I asked Larry if you could drop by.

HAK: Certainly, maybe late tomorrow morning.

K: That would be perfect.

HAK: What is your address:

[redacted] B6

HAK: I never had a chance to tell you about your article.

[redacted] B6

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HAK: [redacted] B6

JK: In any event, I will look forward to seeing you tomorrow about 11-12.

HAK: Good, Joe.

X50 *

TELECON
Mr. Enders/The Secretary
October 6, 1975
Time: 7:56 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

E: Following your conversation with Seidman on Soviet grain and oil the meeting broke up. Most of the people in the EPB feel that Robinson should be instructed to hand tough. There is not the same feeling that the existing language on the oil letter of intention would be accepted, as I understand.

K: I don't mind that language as long as there is a understanding what it means and gets into a letter that isn't published.

E: On our side were.....

K: Right, but it will leak out. We can testify to it.

E: Isn't the question going to be raised as soon as the grain deal is done and you are still negotiating on the oil thing of what are you going to use agropower for?

K: That is why he must get a firm price.

E: You want a figure?

K: Right.

E: What figure should we give Chuck?

K: 15%.

E: He can't get anything in writing. All he can get is a discount of a few percentage points that may not be enough. He can't get 15%. Will it carry us politically?

K: Then he should hang on.

E: Either that or be ordered to return home.

K: That is alright with me.

E: We discussed what pressures the President would be under.

K: They want to seel to the Poles.

E: Right.

K: If they can't negotiate with the Soviets who have had a disastrous crop year, when can they negotiate.

E: Then Chuck should sit it out?

K: He can tell them he has 48 hours and that will get some action.

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E: He can go ahead with the escape clause he worked out on grains. Lynn is vehemently opposed to it.

[redacted] B6

E: In fact your judgment is hand lose.

K: Yes, settle the grain deal, but don't sign and hang tough on the oil.

E: TEll them that you have 48 hours?

K: Yes. He has to come back with new instructions.

E: Do you want to go to the President on this?

K: Yes. Just send a cable.

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S72

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Eban/Kissinger
Oct. 6, 1973
8:25 a.m.

K: I have talked this morning since we have received a number of reports. Are you aware of the mssage given to us last night?

E: Yes. I received a message to the effect of this and what we fear they may be up to both in the North and South. Three hours ago, I was told to stand by and there would be further details.

K: I want to bring you up to day on what I have done this morning. I received a call at 6:00 this morning from Amb. Keating that he had been told there were these authentic reports and urging us to use our influence. I called first the Russians and tole them to use maximum restraint and we established communications for them to Moscow. I have called the Egyptian For. Min. and urged maximum restraint on him. We received a message from the Prime Min. through Amb. Keating in which she assured him the Israelis were taking no pre-emptive attacks. I passed this along to the Egyptians as well as to the Soviets and tole them this was our very urgent recommendation to the Israelis and we were happy to have these assurances and in these circumstances even greater restraint is needed. We set up communications for the Egyptian to Cairo. He has talked to Ismail. He tells me naval action in the Gulf of Suez. If that is the case it would be very unfortunate; it is inside Egyptian waters.

E: What is the naval action.

K: Shooting. Israelis -- air and naval attacks. Given the urgency of the situation, I thought I should talk to you about it. If your people are doing this they will know where it is. I must urge you strongly not to have any Israeli operations in these circumstances.

E: That surprises me. We have assurances of no pre-emptive attacks. Where can I reach you.

K: You can reach me at the Waldorf. If those are busy call the WH.

E: I will be in touch.

K: We are passing all of our information routinely to Washington.

E: Since we are here I would be happy to be in touch with you.

K: Fine.

E: Any information we will pass to you. We will take no initiative without telling you. END

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X35 *

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/The Secretary
October 6, 1975
Time: 2:50 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Do you think that statement is all right?

S: I do. I think it is quite a good statement as a matter of fact and I think it tells the story very straightforwardly. I did quite a bit of work on that Legal paper after you had seen it because I felt still a little watering down could be done without getting into trouble with the Israelis and I made a number of changes as well.

K: We should get it off today.

S: It should be gone any minute now or within the hour.

K: Okay.

S: Thank you.

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X 36

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TELECON
Richard Valeriani/The Secretary
October 6, 1975
Time: 5:29 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: What have I done now?

V: Nothing. I want to make sure that the documentary has been explained to you fully. You are willing to do a staff meeting but no sound?

K: It will be phony to have sound.

V: The people will feel.....

K: What can we discuss in your presence?

V: Someone will screen it so that the sensitive material which cannot be used will be out.

K: Let me think about it.

V: I want to get a picture of your day. Whatever time you could make available we could be unobtrusive.

K: You don't know how to be unobtrusive, Dick. But I get the point. Let me think about it.

V: O.K. Thank you.

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X34*

TELECON
Mr. Lord/The Secretary
October 6, 1975
Time: 1:00 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Did you ask the Chinese whether we can take the press?

L: I don't think we have gone either way.

K: Why didn't we? We can't even have a sign-up list now. Why didn't we automatically tell them we are assuming the same rules for the press as in the past.

L: I will see them in the next day or two.

K: You are not going to see them in the next day or two--in the next 10 or 15 minutes.

Why couldn't all technical things be taken care of when we are leaving in ten days?

L: We should wait one more day.

K: Why wasn't the question asked?

L: I think frankly the assumption was that it was always the way it was in the past. When we bring our list, we would also bring the list of journalists. There was never a problem before. It is conceivable it was done at the technical level.

K: I don't understand these bureaus. They are beyond our belief.

L: I should have thought of it.

K: Am I my own assistant?

L: This should not have happened. The assumption is we knew--

K: One should learn there are no assumptions. It doesn't cost anything.

L: It is conceivable it is done.

K: If you didn't do it it is not done.

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L: We will call over to them tomorrow.

K: Tell them it is inconceivable if we don't take the press.

L: You are right.

K: Do you know whether Lynn is coming or not?

L: I assume that Bremer got the conversation he wants to go.

K: (background conversation with Bremer)

L: OK.

X38 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Monroe Leigh/The Secretary
October 6, 1975
Time: 5:50 p.m.

K: Have yousent up to the Committee that masterpiece of yours?

L: I think it should be there now. I have been in meetings for the past hours.

K: That is your problem -- don't weep on my shoulder.

L: (laughter)

K: I would like not to say that all of the exchanges between either of the parties are embraced in the confidential documents delivered to this Committee.

L: I think you should leave it out now. It opens another area. Besides you have already said that before.

K: Exactly. We can forget that at the executive session. They have so many perjury items going against me at the moment.

L: No, I think the record is clear up to now.

K: O.K.

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X39 *

TELECON
Senator Javits/The Secretary
October 6, 1975
Time: 5:43 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I called just to find out what the state of play is in the Committee.

J: I think we beat Mr. Ball and Warnke had a somewhat inconsequential Amendment to submit, but it failed. We have Fullbright and Eagleton tomorrow but we know what to expect from them.

K: How long would I be asked to testify?

J: About an hour.

K: If you could help me -- I don't mind testifying as to the substance but if I could avoid having to confirm the actual texts -- if the questions could be asked without forcing textual confirmation from me, I would appreciate it. I have already talked to Frank Church, and he goes along with this.

J: I think we can manage that.

K: That is the major problem.

J: It looks pretty good. We are getting rid of all the miscellaneous witnesses today so we should finish tomorrow. There should be an executive session even if it is tomorrow night.

K: Can Mike determine that?

J: He is a member of the Committee and so is Scott. Sparkman is on your side as is Case. Perhaps the President or someone could call him and ask for an executive session.

K: O.K. Many thanks for calling.

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X37 *

TELECON
Senator Church/The Secretary
October 6, 1975
Time: 5:35 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Can I give you some guidance about my testimony tomorrow?

C: Surely.

K: To speak of binders -- I want you to advise me because you have been helpful throughout this whole thing. In my testimony I will have to object in a mild way to what you did this morning. I hope that this will be understood.

C: It is understood.

K: I want to acknowledge the spirit of cooperation during the session last week and I am saying the Committee faced a problem to which no good answer existed.

C: You have your position to uphold, I understand.

K: The second thing -- I really would find it impossible to comment on the documents themselves in open session. Will that give us a problem?

C: Some questions were asked today concerning the documents in open session. I was there during Ball's presentation.

K: I have no problem with what other people say.

C: Questions may come up in the Committee and if you can't respond to them it will be awkward. It may be that Committee members can frame their questions so that you aren't put in a position so that you have to read or refer to the documents directly.

K: That would be appreciated. I am trying to make it a harmonious session. It shouldn't look as if this agreement comes out of a dog fight between the Administration and the Congress.

C: O.K. When is the hearing? At 10:00 tomorrow?

K: No, at 10:30.

C: It might be good for me to speak to members on that problem and see if they can frame their questions so as not to put you on the spot.

K: We have sent a legal opinion as to what we consider binding and not binding which we have classified. I don't know whether you have seen it. It should have come up this afternoon.

C: Fine. I wi-l do what I can to grease the skids, Henry.

K: I think you played a responsible role and once the thing developed I could find no other solution but what the Committee adopted.

C: I breaks the impasse and should result in speedy action now. We will see

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you tomorrow.

K: O.K. Fine.

C: Thank you for calling.

X49 *

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/The Secretary
October 6, 1975
Time: 8:05 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Will you call Case in the morning and tell him I tried to reach him.

S: First thing.

K: Have you read the statement yet?

S: It is on its way out -- I will get it in an hour.

K: If you have any changes send them to my house.

S: I doubt that I will, but I will do it.

K: O.K. Thank you.

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TELECON
Mr. Seidman/The Secretary
October 6, 1975
Time: 7:54 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Are you calling from the car?

S: Yes, I am.

K: I just want to make sure on that matter that there isn't just a abstract assurance of a price break, but an agreement, however it is explained in a formal document.

S: That is what we decided and went along with you.

K: O.K. Good.

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X44 *

TELECON
Mr. Seidman/The Secretary
October 6, 1975
Time: 7:36 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I understand you are discussing this negotiation?

S: We are.

K: It remains to be seen whether we can negotiate this way. My view is that we can't break the oil link.

S: What?

K: We can't give up the link between the grain and the oil. Second thing, I don't care whether the oil deal makes it clear there is a price break. We can leak it out later.

S: Everyone here says if we have to announce that we don't have anything any reduction on price, we will look silly.

K: Who is everyone?

S: Simon, Greenspan, etc.

K: Why do we look silly?

S: I don't think that buying it at market values is of any importance. We would have built up hopes that there was a good deal and we have nothing.

K: As long as we get a price break in the long run it would be worth doing.

S: If you want to go for the oil deal we have to block until the crop estimates come out. They are counting on our farmers screaming. We should get a oil deal before we have a grain deal.

K: My strong view is to hand in until we get an oil deal. We will get a reduction. I don't insist that the reduction be shown in/terms of the agreement. the

S: You want to know what the reduction is before you sign the grain thing?

K: Yes. I would be willing to put a statement in the letter -- it is that clause where it says that the prices will be in the best interests of both governments. We should have an aside, another letter about the price break.

S: They will go by the date when we announce the crops. Earl says we can hold them for a week if we agree to sell to the Poles.

K: I will think about that. Earl is an old pirate, he is going to sell to them both anyway, but tell him not to black mail me.

S: I will give the gentlemen here your views.

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K: Just make sure they prevail.

S: They happen to be mine, so I will try. Can I get to gether with you on the summit after I get back from Knoxville?

K: Yes, O.K.

S: Thank you sir.

X42

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Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Senator Stennis
10/6/75; 10:50 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

S: Good morning, how are you?

K: How are you, Mr. Chairman?

S: I know you are driving to try to get this technicians matter disposed of this week.

K: Yes.

S: Now, you know my general purpose is to help not hinder but you were with us _____ _____ _____ _____ but as it worked out, we couldn't sit that day but about an hour and a half and several of the members didn't get a chance to get into the thing. Get into questions. I am going to have to ask you to come back by here. We agree -- we will accommodate you on time any way we can. I thought before you came back we ought to try to dispose some way of this matter about those documents.

K: Well, they are all now being published.

S: Well, you mean they have all been published?

K: Well, what we have worked out with the Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Chairman, is that all the documents that involve American commitments have been published. And that they are going to certify that that is all that involves a commitment.

S: I see.

K: And I in turn am going to certify that there aren't any other commitments.

S: I see. Well, that's -- I had taken the position that we couldn't go any further than the Foreign Relations Committee went.

K: Well, that's the Foreign Relations Committee position.

S: Yeah. But if you could let two of our members that I selected -- Thurmond and Symington -- I was willing to step aside myself if you could let them see what the Foreign Relations saw.

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K: Well, that is all the Foreign Relations saw. Now then, in addition, we showed Sparkman and Case those documents from which extracts were made so that they could see we were playing fair.

S: Yeah. Yeah. Well, . . .

K: And they are going to certify that no other -- that these did not contain any additional commitments.

S: Well, just putting it on the nailhead here, what about you showing Senator Thurmond and Senator Symington -- he's a member of Foreign Relations, too, just what you showed them and that will preclude anyone from saying that . . .

K: Yeah, but then on what ground can I prevent any other committee from doing the same thing?

S: Well, . . .

K: You know, I appeared before your committee as a courtesy.

S: Yeah, that's right.

K: Look, I have total confidence in you. I have total confidence in those two senators. . .

S: Yeah.

K: But I am afraid we are going to undermine any Executive authority if every document even those that don't contain commitments are going to be forestalled.

S: Yeah. Well, I recognize the problem all right, but . . .

K: I don't see how . . .

S: But I've gotten into a hole about it. It is going to toss some bolts -- I publicly said I would support your agreement about the technicians. I am committed. I wouldn't commit myself to any amount . . .

K: No, no, we are not asking you to do this.

S: I know you are not. Well, anyway, anyway, the least we can do is for you to come back now for the _____ committee and when we get to that point you can tell them if that's your final position what you have just told me about you have shown Sparkman and Case these matters and that they are going to make a certification and you are going to make a certification. We will have

to go that far -- asking you to appear. But my counsel with you is that if you possibly can, . . .

K: How can I then prevent the Appropriations Committee?

S: Well, I don't think you can, frankly.

K: And on that basis we won't have any governmental secrets left and then every thing that is an intention is out. And then the distinction between intention and commitment will be hopelessly garbled.

S: Well, just be sure we understand each other, Mr. Secretary, you are prepared to take that position before our committee?

K: Mr. Chairman, it is a position that the Foreign Relations Committee is supporting and your committee isn't being asked to pass on it as a committee.

S: Yeah. All right.

K: And when we talked last time I misunderstood it. I thought the issue was could your committee have those papers we gave on a classified basis to the Foreign Relations Committee.

S: Yes.

K: Which have now been declassified by the Foreign Relations Committee.

S: All right.

K: I never understood there were any other papers being discussed.

S: All right.

K: But I will be glad to come before your committee.

S: All right. Well, we will pick a time now -- I know you have already committed yourself no doubt to a good many things. If you could have your man pick out a time and we could set it now and get it certain.

K: Well, I am not in my State Department office, but you have to understand, Mr. Chairman, I have testified for three straight days.

S: Yeah, I know.

K: I just don't think we will have a foreign policy left if this thing keeps going like this.

S: All right. Well I am not going to fuss about that now. I want to get this thing settled, thought, and . . .

K: I will appear but if it opens up the whole issue again that it took me three days to settle with the Foreign Relations Committee with your committee and I have still not seen McClelland.

S: Yeah.

K: I was going to see him last week and I had to cancel it three times because the Foreign Relations Committee kept me for three days.

S: Well, . . .

K: I will let you see anything, Mr. Chairman. No problem.

S: If it is a fair question or comment at least, _____ _____ _____ sure enough if you go fussing with the Appropriations Committee than you do with the Armed Services Committee.

K: I won't go as far with them.

S: Beg your pardon?

K: I will not go as far with them.

S: Well, I am not trying to influence you.

K: No, no, but do you see -- our procedure had always been that my committee of jurisdiction is the Foreign Relations Committee.

S: ~~XXXX~~ Of course. And I believe . . .

K: And when I come before you, it is as a courtesy to keep you informed.

S: All right.

K: And I have worked out a procedure with them now where anything that is a commitment even if it is classified they have got. In addition, two of them have seen the letters ~~of~~ from which the other stuff was extracted.

S: All right. Well, if that's your position you just be prepared to stand on that, then. And you are not going further with that than the Appropriations Committee or any other committee.

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K: That's right.

S: All right.

K: ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ I just am afraid of what I -- look, there are no two Senators that I would have more confidence in than Tower and Symington.

S: Well. ..

K: So I'd have absolutely -- or Thurmond and Symington -- whom did you have? Thurmond and Symington?

S: Thurmond and Symington.

K: I have no problem with either of them.

S: Yeah.

K: But how am I going to refuse McClelland then if he makes the same proposition?

S: Yeah. Yeah. That's right. All right. You let your folks look at your schedule there and let's pick a time as soon as we can this week for you to come before our committee.

K: Okay.

S: And we will have the declassified documents and all in the handsof the committee members and then you take any such position as you see fit. We have got to act, you know. Time has come to act.

K: I agree, Mr. Chairman.

S: You are going to drive to get this thing disposed of this week, if you can.

K: It should be.

S: I think you are right. I think you are right. All right. Will you have your folks call me back then today.

K: This afternoon.

S: If I am not here, Miss Horvat -- I will leave word here who for them to talk to.

K: Right, Mr. Chairman.

S: TA Thank you very much.

X43

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Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Carl Maw
10/6/75; 5:48 p.m.
(4:48?)

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Carl.

M: Yes, sir.

K: Are you doing the taking papers for me?

M: They are being prepared now.

K: Being prepared means I will get it at midnight.

M: No. You are going to have it at 5:00 I said.

K: And how about a paper for the President that explains it to him?

M: There is one of the way to him.

K: I don't -- what does it mean and how could a paper go to him that I don't see?

M: Let me find out. I will be there with both of themas soon as I get my hands on them.

K: Can you leave it because he keeps asking me and if he could read it tonight he would know what was going on.

M: I'll see that he gets it -- I'll see that you get it right away!

K: Okay.

M: Right, Henry.

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X48 *

TELECON
Mr. William Rogers/Secretary Kissinger
Monday, October 6, 1975
8:10 pm

RELEASED IN FULL.

K: That week we had set aside for the trip is now preempted by an economic summit.

R: Do you want to think about January?

K: Either January or the following week -- but Genscher will be in Brazilia that weekend.

R: We could check back with them.

K: He said any week but that.

R: Should I ask him again if he would prefer January or that weekend?

K: I had a plan to go to Africa in January, but I can change that.

R: I thought Genscher was not going to be around that much. Let me find out.

K: Secondly, I am very upset about that human rights thing in Chile. It is one thing on the grounds of prudence to cancel it and another thing to make it an issue under 502B.

R: We have not made it an issue.

K: The proposal is we tell Congress Chile does not qualify because of 502B.

R: No. We do not disqualify Chile under that. But in terms of the overall military program zero credits for Chile. There is no official language in terms of the report to Congress.

K: I will have to think about it again. I think it is my obligation not to run with the pack.

R: I do not think we should do it in a way that harrasses them publicly.

K: On pragmatic grounds I ~~can~~ can listen to it.

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R: It will not become a moral issue if we handle it the way I want to handle it.

K: Would Section 25 cancel everything?

R: Yes. Sales as well as credits. I will put it in ~~x~~ in the next week or two.

K: Would you do better letting them knock out credits on only sales?

R: Well....

K: Look, I have to go. I am late for a dinner already.

R: Ok, sorry.

END

X41 *

TELECON
Mr. Joseph Kraft/The Secretary
October 6, 1975
Time: 7:15 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you Joe?

JK: I am in good shape. It was nice to see you. How did the Dobrynin thing go?

HK: Inconclusive.

JK: Did he make a counter offer?

HK: Not yet. I didn't expect it that early. Gromyko didn't get back until a week ago.

JK: He wasn't outraged?

HK: What do you mean?

JK: I have a chance to write something about Schlesinger. He went over there and surfaced the whole Pentagon position. The Economist supports it. I was surprised and called them up. The last lines of piece say it is better to get the cruise missile thing straight than to have a bad SALT Agreement. What I planned to do tomorrow.....

HK: I knew he was talking all over Europe about this. It happened after we made the deal on the cruise with him.

JK: I have a theory about him. I would like to write something about him that will turn him around. I would like to show how he will go down in history with a bad reputation.

HK: I doubt you can do that.

JK: You really do? I am trying to show what is happening. Latin and Kalveman thought it would work.

HK: Kalvman is good -- Latin I don't know. The cruise is so ill assorted. There are so many confused things in there. Why do it with cruise when you have 1,000 airplanes. It could easily lead to our removal of our tactical airforces.

JK: Yes. But is there a new position to be taken?

HK: What I told you yesterday, that we are waiting.

JK: What I would be saying is that we are waiting but it would be probably helpful if the Russians could come back with a counter proposal rather than a flat turn down.

HK: That would be helpful.

JK: Is there anything in the way of counter.....

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HK: The two big areas are backfire and cruise. They wouldn't propose anything on the backfire because it is there offset to our overseas systems, but maybe on the cruise.

JK: Their present proposal is one that limits the range to 300 miles?

HK: No to 600 kilometers. There is a compromise possible there.

JK: You mean add 1,000 -- is that the kind of compromise?

HK: Or a distinction between air-launched and ship-launched cruises.

JK: That takes you way out. Do they need to say something about conventions.

HK: That is the next issue, but they don't need to say anything about it now.

JK: Let me see what I can do.

HK: It is a useful subject to do something thoughtful with. I am going to get myself.....

JK: It is the first couple of pages of the Economist.

HK: O.K. Thank you.

X57 *

TELECON
Senator Javits/The Secretary
October 7, 1975
Time: 6:35 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: I just wanted to thank you.

J: It was some deal.

K: And even when you asked me questions that sounded tough, I knew what you were doing.

J: We pre-empted it.

K: Without your resolution, we would have been through. You locked the back door and even Case came along.

J: Mike -- you should talk to him. He was great about getting it on the calendar.

K: When is it on?

J: It will begin tomorrow. He felt it was his duty even though he was against it. He felt that since the Administration placed such a high priority on it it was important.

K: Are we going to have trouble on the floor?

J: My guess is we are and that we will have a Saturday session.

K: Three days?

J: It wouldn't be three days. He will bring it up Thursday and Friday and my guess is Saturday also. The only relenting will be if they want to go on vacation.

K: Who are the guys opposed?

J: Biden, Clark and Aberesque and also some of the conservatives may talk against it.

K: Scott of Virginia was [redacted] when I testified. B6

J: There you are.

K: He was almost [redacted] B6

J: He can get his teeth in some things. The feelow from North Carolina, Helms might cause some trouble. He might talk at some length. My appraisal is somewhere under 30 votes. I am hoping it will get a 2/3rds majority.

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K: We have the rebuttal by Leigh of that OLC draft. Would that help?

J: What draft?

K: The Office of Legislative Council's draft.

J: Oh, with the idea of a treaty.

K: It is unclassified.

J: Let's take a look at it. The way we resolve the question of the agreement is they will put it as an appendage to the hearing record.

K: I wanted you to know that you came through on this -- it was important that you did. I think this thing is taking a turn for the worse. I am very uneasy about the mood developing towards Israel.

J: I am concerned about it too.

K: I don't want anything from them now.

J: The public relations could be handled much better.

K: They are paying a price for these technicians out of proportion to the problem.

J: Yes.

K: Because of internal domestic Israeli political problems. The money we could have handled if it came up as a separate bill.

J: Right. The technicians thing captured the headlines. It brings back reminiscences of things people are afraid of.

K: Golda was opposed to it and for that very reason.

J: Her perceptions were very good. Let me discuss that with you one day before too long. The other thing -- Alkimov was in today. We had a bland discussion with him. We referred him to you, and told him he had better talk to the State Department first and then discuss it with us.

K: Should we get together on this?

J: Simon's Office has been drafting up changes. If you talk to Alkimov, will you get a reaction?

K: I talked to him earlier today.

J: If you have made any progress you should talk to Abe and myself. We told him the numbers had to come up. If there are any prospects for movement you should talk to us. You don't think he is ready yet, do you?

K: No, we don't want to embarrass you by putting a request in that you can't support.

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J: I think it is in measurable reach on an agreement basis. B6

K:

J:

K:

J:

K:

J:

K: O.K. Bye.

X53 *

TELECON
Ms. Marilyn Berger/The Secretary
October 7, 1975
Time: 7:53 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: It is only out of friendship that I take your calls because you are going to start harrassing me now.

B: I am writing a story that I thought it would be good to get your opinion on.

K: That I am going to resign?

B: No, are you -- is that the rumor that is going around now?

K: No, but it surfaces every three months or so, it is about time.

B: No, my feeling is that listening to the debate, that Israel was better off before everything was in writing.

K: Off the record?

B: Well, I want to use it in my analysis.

K: You can use it as your idea.

B: O.K.

K: I agree with you. I would have/extended it even to the 200 technicians as a private view.

B: Did you tell them this before?

K: Yes, many times.

B: Can I tell them that you warned the Israelis about this?

K: No, don't get me involved.

B: Well, they need the help. Percy now says they are never going to get the Pershings.

K: Don't just put it on the Israelis asking for it in writing.

B: I won't quote you if that is what you want.

K: The point is there have been previous memos of understand of a similar nature that appeared which we submitted on a classified basis and that was the end of it. But this time it got one level of formality to far.

B: In connection with earlier agreements they didn't leak them?

K: Right. I don't know whether it was a pro or anti-Israeli who leaked it.

B: I got mine from Jack Anderson, that is all.

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K: It could have been an enemy of Israel or a friend.

B: Do the Arabs see the American-Israeli relationship as weakened?

K: No, but the debate doesn't help anyone. That is my concern.

B: It is an errosion of your authority too.

K: I can work around that in most situations.

B: When it comes down to the bottom line, what would have gone to Israel will still go, is that the case?

K: It has made it harder.

B: Do you think they will raise your aid request?

K: There will be trouble on those.

B: Because of this?

K: Yes, but we will put them up anyway.

B: How about aid to Egypt?

K: We will put that up too.

B: Will it be harder to put it through?

K: I don't know.

B: Do you think everything is caused by the technicians or by the post-Vietnam era thinking?

K: Both.

B: You are not hurt by it too much?

K: No.

B: There are attacks on your draftsmanship they say that Kissinger does things behind our backs.

K: Who?

B: (sp) Woreski says that.

K: He has Greeks in his district.

B: My it does get complicated, doesn't it.

K: What looks like shoty draftsmanship is sometimes a way to maintain freedom of action.

B: My story was not a fair report of what happened yesterday afternoon. You haven't read it yet?

K: No, I haven't read it.

B: It made it sound as if Ball got up as your spokesman, which he would never do.

K: (Laughter) We are living in a nihilistic period. There is no reason for the attacks. They put forward no alternatives. You have seen at the Post.

B: The Post has voted by a margin of 15 votes to stay in.

K: Is that good?

B: I think so, I don't like those pressmen anyway. That is off the record sir.

K: (Laughter) o.k. Look Marilyn, I have to go.

B: I appreciate your calling back.

K: Bye.

X56 *

TELECON
Senator Mansfield/The Secretary
October 7, 1975
Time: 7:40 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I wanted to thank you for the way you handled the Sinai Agreement by putting it on the schedule. I tell you my own misgivings about the technicians were severe too.

M: We should get it out. We will try and get it through before the week is out.

K: You think it will be an extensive debate?

M: The recess might slow them up a bit.

K: O.K. Thank you bye.

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X55 *

TELECON
Mr. Atherton/The Secretary
October 7, 1975
Time: 6:43 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Should we sent my statement to the Foreign Relations Committee to the Arab posts?

A: I think that is a good idea.

K: They will like it.

A: What we should do is send a message calling it to their attention. The text will go out automatically through the wire services and we should send instructions to accompany it.

K: O.K.

A: Do you want it brought to high level attention. I am inclined to let them use their own discretion as to how they handle it.

K: That's fine. Has anyone talked to Eilts today.

A: Just on some schedule changes. He is staying until Thursday because he wants to have another session with you. I was told your schedule was too crowded tomorrow.

K: O.K. The Vice President said he would give a lunch but someone had better get it on his schedule.

A: We have been in touch so we are o.k. on that.

K: O.K. Have you seen that Asad letter.

A: Yes. We are preparing a response.

K: Combine the two.

A: We don't want to get into a long thing.

K: Basically it wasn't an unfriendly letter. Say we understand his position but we feel a talk would be useful.

A: O.K. We are drafting it for you.

K: Good.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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DATE/CASE ID: 15 APR 2003 200102979

X58 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Lowenstein/The Secretary
October 7, 1975
Time: 6:24 p.m.

K: I trust you people are working on some toasts that are at your level and not at the country director's level.

L: I will make sure we are.

K: I know that I am supposed to be extemporaneous -- the format is that alot of people will get up and make toasts. Can you work on the toast yourself?

L: Yes, I can.

K: I need one for lunch with Trudeau. Are you going with me?

L: No, Arthur is.

K: He will be back?

L: Yes.

K: Is there anything that can be done to get Pat Holt into a more responsible mood or is that hopeless?

L: I think it is a hopeless case. He has lost control over the committee staff and over the structure of the committee as it splits into subcommittees. He is annoyed at the work. I assume that McCloskey is working on it.

K: Not very effectively. He is doing some bad things like sitting in on meetings and telling other committee members what was said when they didn't want anything said.

L: I will be glad to talk to him.

K: Let me think about it.

L: Or get Marshy to talk to him.

K: Let me wait until I get a concrete issue. It may subside now that it has been voted out.

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X52 *

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Jerry Bremer
10/7/75; 9:28 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Jerry.

B: Yes, sir.

K: I want to delete one more sentence.

B: Okay.

K: On page 14.

B: Yep.

K: Take out that sentence I want to acknowledge the spirit of cooperation and responsibility.

B: All the way to the end of the sentence. Okay.

K: Yeah. And then just go to we are prepared to work out with this committee . . .

B: Right.

K: We are prepared . . .

B: To work with this committee -- yeah, we will just take those out.

K: And also in what we distribute.

B: That's right.

K: Thank you.

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X54 *

TELECON
Senator Humphrey/The Secretary
October 7, 1975
Time: 7:04 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Many thanks for everything you did. You were the only sane voice on that Committee.

H: There were other sane voices there. However, they were going to review the documents again today to see whether this was binding.

K: That would start another debate.

H: I told them it was ridiculous. Scott said let Hubert handle him.

K: Case wasn't going to get that stuff out.

H: We get into fights occasionally at the expense of the country.

K: What will happen on the floor?

H: Aboresque objected to bringing it up but it will pass this week.

K: Will it be an extensive debate?

H: My judgment is no. The real help around here is that everyone is so busy they don't have time to be on the floor. I don't think it will be too much debating. Most people want to get out of here on the weekend.

K: You were really a great patriot.

H: I talked to Mike about it tonight. He said if they didn't want to pass it on Thursday we would be here on Friday or on Saturday.

K: When is recess supposed to start?

H: Friday. It will be done.

K: Marvelous.

H: We don't need any conferences -- we should just take the whole bill and pass it.

K: Good.

H: However, we have to make sure that no one gets an amendment tacked on to it. How was the Indian Foreign Minister?

K: He is not a ball of fire.

H: Sometimes you should be grateful for favors.

K: Right.

H: Take care Henry. Bye.

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X59 *

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/The Secretary
October 7, 1975
Time: 6:23 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

S: With the aid package problem it is more likely on Tuesday. Tuesday is the day you go to Canada, however. Friday is the best day to try to do it.

K: Fine.

S: I will tell him.

K: Tell the Canadians -- well, I will tell them myself tomorrow.

S: I had Warren tell the Ambassador the thing was stock and we are still fighting for it.

K: O.K.

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X69 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Senator Nunn/Secretary Kissinger
3:10 p.m. October 8, 1975

K: I just wanted to tell you that, it was clear anyway, that my sharp reaction was not to your question, but to the body of allegations underlying it.

N: Ah, I understood that, I certainly did not take it personally. I've been in too many court rooms to let anything like that get me, so don't worry about it.

K: But the problem is that it is easy to take a free ride on an accomplished agreement and to give the impression that one is opposing something that was never going to happen anyway and I've taken strong objection to that, but that has nothing to do with you.

N: My point is that I just think on these matters involving arms sales that there really is a lack of policy right now--

K: But that is a different issue and that doesn't really apply to Israel so much -- In Israel we have a document we've been working from and every once in a while we turn it off and on to meet our political needs. But that is a different--foreign policy needs I should say, which is a different problem from saying -- making a new sale to Abu Dhabi

N: Right, well I understand that and I agree with that--I do think that in some of these negotiations if there could be a better liaison between the State and Defense Departments that the country would be better off.

K: That may be true, but this one is not a good example of it. Because in this one I just assure you there was absolutely no weapons system discussed in Israel that wasn't already on the list.

N: Right, right.

K: And that list has been in the defense Department for a year.

N: Okay, well I x certainly appreciate your calling and there is no problem from my end, as far as--

K: I just wanted toexplain to you why I reacted so sharply.

N: I understand that and I appreciate your calling though.

K: Okay,

N: Thank you sir.

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X64 *

TELECON
Senator Mondale/The Secretary
October 8, 1975
Time: 6:50 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

M: We have this big problem -- I talked to the staff assistant in your office, has he talked to you yet.

K: No, I haven't seen him yet.

M: Well, you know King Olaf is coming to Minnesota and they scheduled a helicopter to take him around. Now this afternoon, we are told there is no authority unless the State Department authorizes it. I talked to your staff assistant about it.

K: What did he say.

M: He said he would see what he could do about it. It seemed crazy to me. If you could be kind enough to let the word out.....

K: There is no question about it.

M: I am sorry to take your time.

K: We will take care of it.

M: Can someone let me know right away so that I can call them back?

K: They will get it.

M: I want to call the people back to ease their minds.

K: Whom did you talk to?

M: I talked to someone in Schlesinger's Office. He said they couldn't do it.

K: It is incredible. If you were on the Armed Services Committee they would find a way to do it. It will be done. When is it?

M: He is coming on Saturday. They have all the plans so they must know by tomorrow morning.

K: I will call the White House -- that is the only place to get any quick action.

M: Thank you.

K: Bye.

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X67 *

TELECON
Mr. Bradlee of the Post/The Secretary
October 8, 1975
Time: 10:20 a. m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: Can I add to all of your other troubles with a minor complaint? You have got on the front page extracts from Mitchell's testimony on wiretapping. At first he said he didn't know anything about it. That his signature was a forgery. That was his first word. Before the Fulbright Committee he made a statement supporting what I said. Now what he said isn't inconsistent but giving it a little twist. To reopen this g. d. thing every six months with a front-page story really is g. d. -- You know I can't complain about it. You have every right to do it and he did say what he did say. The veracity of Nixon people has proved that overwhelmingly.

B: Are we the only people to play it on page 1? Doesn't the Times have it?

K: I can't find it. Maybe they have it under such banner headlines. I can't find it yet. It is not a major thing. Anyone comparing what I said and he said--it is not all that different except that he gave those vicious little Nixon twists.

B: Henry, I have to confess to you that I didn't see that story before it went in last night.

K: I am not asking for a change. I have testified what I knew about it. It isn't possible to predict. I can't prevent what Nixon and Company are now going to say as they get the only people that they did not get to drag down with them.

B: Are you going to have to testify again?

K: Oh, yes.

B: When?

K: Eventually I will have to give a deposition on the Halperin thing. I am not concerned about the testimony as such--it is just about this awful malaise that keeps developing, and you sometimes think that anyone who even touched Nixon is never going to end.

B: That will end. Don't worry.

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K: It is not a major issue. After having made a deposition, that is all that can happen.

How are you doing at the paper? I called Kay the other day to tell her --

B: I know you did and she appreciated it. Most people I can understand.

K: Some day when no one can think of ulterior motives, we should sit down and think how this nilhilism has developed. There are so many things happening that don't make any sense.

[redacted] B6

[redacted] B6

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

B6

K: Unbelievable. Well, I wish you luck.

B: Pray for a quiet day.

X68 *

TELECON
Don Davidson/The Secretary
October 8, 1975
Time: 1:00 p. m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: How are you?

D: Thank you for calling back so promptly. Lousy. I am not, if you thought, calling you about the item in the Post. That has nothing to do with it. I am not interested in the legal aspects.

K: I am beyond that. You know, now that all of the people have been convicted they have suddenly become credible.

D: If you have testimony, you have John Mitchell. That is the problem for the courts. I want to make it clear that I am not part of this problem.

K: I know.

D: Well, considering I did write that article in the Times. What happened then I was angry.

K: Dan, if you think about it, if the people think about it rationally, it is clear that it was more directed against me. Why, in the name of God? I brought in people against the violent opposition of everybody. What was I going to get out of it? I was under tremendous pressure to get rid of all these people involved.

D: And others.

K: This whole thing is sick. I could have become a great hero.

D: I want to become one of your friends again.

K: I could have become a hero in the White House by firing these people.

D: [redacted] B6

K:

D:

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B6

B6

D: You have my deep and sincere congratulations on the Middle East. I just don't understand the opposition.

K: Well, they can't stand success any more.

D: I don't see anything better.

K: Without it it would have been worse.

D: A pernicious idea has come up that Congress can conduct foreign policy. You will have to live with that for sometime.

K: It is not as bad for me as for my successors.

D: Something about the Panama Canal.

K: I must run.

X65 *

TELECON
Senator Stennis/The Secretary
October 8, 1975
Time: 10:10 a. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Mr. Chairman, I will be up in 20 minutes.

S: All right, Sir.

K: I don't want you to misunderstand our conversation of the other day. To you personally I would be eager to show anything. I am very concerned about protecting the integrity of our foreign policy. The Foreign Relations Committee has certified they have seen all the documents relevant to their Committee. I don't see why I have to go beyond that.

S: I told the Committee members we couldn't get ahead of the Foreign Relations.

K: The Foreign Relations Committee has certified all of them but Sparkman and Case. They have seen those documents we have sent extracts of to show we aren't cheating.

S: They filed their report last night.

K: I am happy --

S: Are you, in addition to that, going to have a certificate or statement by Sparkman and Case.

K: Sparkman and Case have certified to the Committee already.

S: You can testify to that effect.

K: I want you to know, on a personal basis, that I would be glad to send up Sisco or anyone else to see you.

S: I don't demand that. I don't require that. But you have those Committee members there, you see, but I don't know what position some of them will take. But if you stand on the position you have gone as far as you can go and so forth. That is a just position.

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K: I am through with the Committee. If they raise the secrecy --

S: You can't keep an individual Senator from raising it, but you can't make the Committee raise it against you. I want to get through with this thing without having you come back. If Sparkman and Case are going to file a statement publicly or one that you can bring with you that would be helpful. You know that they have reviewed these matters. But I haven't talked to them. Things went fast when they started moving. We will do the best we can. I am not in ill-humor or anything. On that basis you can handle it and we will see what happens. OK?

K: OK.

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X87

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/The Secretary
October 9, 1975
Time: 6:06 p.m.

K: I am trying to get out of here tonight. Have I got that cable back?

S: Bremer said you didn't want to see it again. He has it.

K: Can I have your recommendation of how to proceed on this tomorrow? I want a memo on how to proceed after that. It will be turned down, won't it?

S: I have sent the first two paragraphs of the telegram over already. I think it will.

K: Have you talked to him?

S: Yes, on the phone.

K: If it gets out that we are hung up on the oil deal and we let it get out, it will cave in. Do we sign on Saturday -- the grain deal or hold it up?

S: My idea is that we sign but put out a notice that if they don't come through on the oil deal, it will fail.

K: Instead of initialing.

S: We could try to initial the thing.

K: I am afraid if we initial it we will have trouble. If we can't get the oil we will have problems anyway.

S: If we sign the oil thing and can't get the letter, then we are in trouble. The Russians don't object to initialing the letter of intent.

K: We don't gain anything by not signing it.

S: It is a letter of intent.

K: We are better off signing and having the negotiations fail.

S: I don't think it makes much difference.

K: Can you give me a memo tomorrow?

S: Yes. Should we circularize the field on this announcement.

K: Yes.

S: To tell them it is coming.

K: Yes. O.K.

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X84 *

TELECON
Yigal Allon/The Secretary
October 9, 1975
Time: 3:50 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

A: Hello, Henry.

K: Hello. I understand you are going home tonight. I just want to wish you a good trip.

A: Thank you very much.

K: I think you have had a successful visit here.

A: We worked hard, not without results.

K: The only thing I wanted to tell you is that your press is screaming at me now for my statement before the Congress.

A: On what?

K: Defining our commitments. You have to understand that I am the only member of the Administration who is defending you. You can't turn on me. You would be crazy.

A: I haven't seen the press.

K: They asked me about a Palestinian state. There has always been some talk about greater autonomy. They were going to have an amendment. You have to watch what is going on here. You watched it. It is getting very difficult for you.

A: In case I am asked when I land, what should I say?

K: You get the text. I didn't say anything damaging about an independent state. I didn't say we would deal with the PLO. What I said was fine. I talked with Dinitz about it. My message for you is to have a good trip.

A: I saw this morning just for five minutes Waldheim when I came to the Assembly. I told him I talked to you about my conversation with the Secretary General and you asked to see him about the Syrian matter. He seemed pleased that you would talk to him.

K: q I will give him a call.

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A: When he talks to you about our conversation and if he can get this renewal without any fuss that would be good. Maybe he can be instrumental in this case.

K: I will talk to him and have a good trip back.

A: Thank you.

X75 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Monroe Leigh/The Secretary
October 9, 1975
Time: 5:03 p.m.

L: They took this pretty will. Symington had hoped to see what Case and Sparkman had.

K: I will let him see it.

L: Thurmond was non-commital.

K: What business do you have talking to Thurmond?

L: I thought you told me . . to show it to Thurmond.

K: I have instructed you to show him your legal analysis.

L: That is what I showed him.

K: Oh, I am sorry.

L: That is alright.

K: McCloskey has been dying to show him the other stuff.

L: I told Symington that.

K: O.K. We will not produce any more documents.

L: I think that is good. They are debating my memo now. Bydon has an amendment to declassify it.

K: That's o.k. Can we stop battling around the Hill now. McCloskey has this compulsion to confess. I thought I had hired less Catholics than the CIA.

L: I don't think he said a word about these things.

K: If they want to declassify it, let them.

L: Symington wanted you to know he is not sure he can support anything for Egypt, certainly not military and maybe not economic aid. He is worried that helping them on the stations would be classified as military aid.

K: The Israelis have been at work again.

L: They accepted the legal judgment I gave them.

K: O.K. Fine.

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X83 *

TELECON
Ambassador Anderson/The Secretary
October 9, 1975
Time: 4:37 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I may change my mind and do the show live on Sunday. Could you alert Spivak?

A: He would be delighted. He would much prefer that.

K: I may decide tomorrow.

A: I will tell him that.

K: Who are the panel members?

A: Clifton Daniel, Bob Keatley, Dick Valeriane, Peter Lisago.

K: That is not a bad list.

A: That is the panel for 11 a. m. on Saturday. I don't know if they are booked for other programs. This is the panel lined up for Saturday, if you take it.

K: I will let you know tomorrow.

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X72 *

TELCON
Ambassador McCloskey
Secretary Kissinger
11:47 a.m. 10/9/75

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Bob

M: Mr. Secretary, They are not getting very far very fast up here although there are a lot of amendments
The most troublesome fight now is an amendment by Mathias--which would suspend the President's authority on February 1, 1977. I'm trying to get to him, we can't locate him, but I want to tell him that I'm speaking personally for you, and that this can be very --

K: Make it impossible--

M: It is even worse than the Findley amendment.

K: That's right.

M: All right, I can tell=- I want to tell him I'm speaking personally for you

K: That's right and ~~x~~ he doesn't ~~xxxxx~~ realize what he is doing--it will create a crisis on February 1 when this thing has to be reinstituted. I mean there are enough safeguards in there to pull things out.

M: Yeh, okay, it might appeal to his ego if ~~xxx~~ he were/to go to the Floor and say you know that--

K: Look on February 1, 77 it can't be in the interest even of the Democrats if a new President comes in--he'll immediately be faced with whether he wants to continue this, the Egyptians will be faced with the problem of whether they'll ask for it again. I think it is a disaster.

M: Okay, I'll make it emphatic.

K: Okay. Thank you.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
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X7p *

TELCON
Secretary Butz
Secretary Kissinger
10/9/75 10:46 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Earle, could you tell Bell to shut up, please. He is now saying the grain deal is wrapped up but the oil deal--

B: Where was he saying that?

K: I don't know, he said it off-the-record to a number of people. An off-the-record statement by Bell -- it reaches me within hours. It is all over the country.

B: I haven't seen that. I asked my man this morning and the paper said if he was in London, he said "no comment".

K: But he's told a number of people off-the-record. We are going to be killed if we put it all on the oil deal and then if we--

B: I'm having somebody meet him at the airport this afternoon and bringing down here and keep him away from reporters--

K: And if we fall off it then it is going--what should be a success is going to turn into a failure.

B: Well, I'll do my best, but I was told this morning that he was just simply saying no comment.

K: I'm going to keep my people quiet too.

B: Well, we'll do the same thing here. Did you talk to the President about this Polish deal.

K: Yeh, I think we'll probably let you go ahead with that--I'd just like to have one more exchange with Robinson to find out what he is going to do--I mean to see how that Soviet negotiation is going on the oil.

B: Okay, but this--my critical time is tomorrow, Henry.

K: Yeh, I'll have an answer by tomorrow and we are leaning in the positive direction.

B: I think we have to because of the President's credibility on this deal --the roof will fall in on the farm belt out here.

K: Okay.

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B: I thought we had him just simply saying "no comment"

K: Well, we could have kept everybody there but my people made as many mistakes there as yours.
I understand my people left also, so...we can't yell at you. If theprofessionals behave like amateurs, we can't complain--~~look~~ at the Agriculture Department.

B: Who ~~stayed~~ stayed there--just a very small group with Charlie?

K: I've never seen a negotiation where we have a corner of the market, the Soviets are in demonstrated need to transform a negotiation where we hold all the cards into a pressure play against us. What we've now done is by pulling all the Agriculture people out and all the State Department experts out and leaving only the oil people there, we've made it clear that only oil is holding things up--we have lost the leverage on grain because the Russians know it is wrapped up so we can't reopen that and we are getting much too little for a corner on the market.

B: You pulled all your grain people out, partly.

K: Partly for that--you know you are an old pirate, Earle, we ought to leave the impression that they might not get any grain and since we know that they cannot do with out it, we had ~~x~~ it made. And now if it all goes on oil and if we don't then get the oil deal, they will turn what is a big success into a failure.

B: There's that possibility. Well, I'll play on the team as best I can, Henry.

K: earle, I'm one of your admirers. There are some other Cabinet members that I'm not an admirer of, but you are one my--

B: It's mutual Henry, but I do think we ought to do this Polish thing to keep the President's credibility.

K: I've just come from the President, I've supported you on that. I'll even let you sell a little to the Russians.

B: Well, no I don't want to at this point. Let's hold tight at this point, and I think what I'll do tomorrow when this crop report comes out, I think I'll be in there and Bell out of there. At thatpoint, I'll simply indicate that there are still some negotiations to be done on the grain deal.

B: And then I guess tomorrow we don't have this one-third shipping wrapped up yet, do we here?

K: No

B: And have they agreed to the freight rate?

K" I think so.

B: Well, there are some other things to be wrapped up and I'll simply indicate that...

K: We've done pretty well in the negotiation

B: I think we have, but I'll indicate that there are still some things to be wrapped up in this and the embargo stays on--

K: Is it true that you are going to get the Vice Presidential nomination?

B: [Laughs]--

K: You are going to carry the goddamn farm belt.

B: No, no, I won't. But I'd like at that point to indicate that we have released the Poles. Now the Polish ambassador-- a week ago--

K: Yeh, but don't tell the poles today.

B: No, I won't. But I ask him, if we do releas this, will you do it gradually, and he said we certainly will. We'll do that ourselves. And I think we just ought to free them dompletely.

K: I understand that the Russians have hired two more intelligence analysts to figure what you and Bell were talking about every evening.

B: Is that so--we tried to keep it under--

K: They got a hundred pages of notes on each meeting.

B: On each meeting?

K On each conversation.

B: There wasn't that much conversation.

K: [Laughs.] That's all right, I'm pulling your leg.

B: Henry, we talked in very very general terms. Now how are we going to notify the poles on this--

K: You take care of this tomorrow. T omorrow..

B: Directly with the Ambassador?

K: Yeh, but give us a little credit will you?

B: I certainly will. Okay, I'll do that henry.

K: But not today.

B: All right, we'll do it tomorrow.

K: Okay Of course the President has n't formally made the decision yet.

B: And I won't make any announcement until----

K: And will you stay out of towns where I'm supposed to give a speech, because I'm getting sick and tired of hearing what a great man you are when I go to Birmingham and Minneapolis.

B: Oh, fiddlesticks. Henry, you are doing a great job--it is a tough spot to be in--you know I'm playing on your team here.

K: I know that Earle....Okay, bye.

*

x86

TELECON
Secretary Simon/The Secretary
October 9, 1975
Time: 3:25 p. m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

Missed the first sentence.

K: ... including my colleague at the Pentagon.

S: These are great days for you and me too.

K: It is unbelievable. We can survive almost anything if we could only get our own people to back us.

Bill Kuhn told me you were throwing out the first ball. Is that on Saturday? How are you getting there?

S: Yes. I am going up on government plane. Do you want to go up with me?

[redacted] B6

S: You just pay regular commercial fare. That justifies it. Come along.

K: What time are you leaving?

S: 9:30 - 10:00 in the morning.

K: That means I may not be able to do it. I was going to do "Meet the Press"--tape it.

S: Tape "Meet the Press"?

K: Let me think about it. What time is the game? What are you flying?

S: I think jet star.

K: Would there be room for all of us--with all the Secret Service?

S: We can cut back on the Secret Service and pick them up in Baltimore.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 15 APR 2003 200102979

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K: I will see you tonight. Good, Bill.

S: Fine, Henry.

X71 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELCON
David Binder
Secretary Kissinger
10/9/75 10:57 a.m.

B: Did you happen to see the story this morning about the CIA --detente thing? --there are two things and I'm still mildly interested in one of them. Actually both in both of them.

K: Yeh.

B: What is that crap anyway.

K: Listen, David, I've never seen the goddamn study, I never knew there was such a study, it's never been called to my attention.

B: These clowns are obviously fielding at you in this g thing.

K: Where would you get that idea, given the good relation that exists?

B: [laughs]. They sent this thing around to this right-wing marriage and security council for public distribution and to be declassified --on the spot to do it--

K: To the American Security --

B: Yeh, kind of sleasy stuff.

K: Really?

B: Yeh. That's how the thing got out--you know they unilaterally declassified this--and sent it around for --

K: David you know as much about it as I do and I'm not going to get into a debate on it.

B: Well that was the question I had yesterday. And the other thing I wanted to ask you about is what is the status of this Portugal aid package?

K It's moving ahead.

B: Ah ha. Is that over at the White House already?

K: Yeh.

B: How big is it?

K: $675 million

B: Wheez.....

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K: No, no, I'm kidding.

B: Is it in the hundred range?

K: No, not yet.

B Will it be up there?

K: A little less than a hundred--about 85. But we can increase it.

B I gather this is being done in close cooperation with Congress?

K: Yes.

B Are you guys holding back on this because of all this turmoil on Portugal?

K: No, the trouble was we were going to put it forward with all the other aid requests, but now we are moving it faster.

B: Ah hha.

K: We are not holding back on it.

B: ..going to come when Antunes is here?

K It g could.

B: He's coming down next week or something?

K: Tomorrow.

B: Oh yeh. Can I write about this?

K: You can xx write that we have an aid package--don't get the figure

B: Yeh, okay.

K: Sorry I didn't get back to you, but I didn't --couldn't have helped you much on it--frankly the first time I heard about it was when I read your article

B: Anyhow, I wanted to tell you that the article I wrote about your appearance in New York last weekwas supposed to be friendly.

K: I thought it was friendly. You know I think it is sort of sick that that sort of question gets asked, but it was clear to me that you were under instructions to ask it. I took it to be friendly.

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

B6

B: Well, I am--one of your last, who knows.

K: These things go in waves and there isn't any real clear focal point of attack --

B: Okay, thanks a lot and I-- all the best.

K: Good, thank you.

X85

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TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/The Secretary
October 9, 1975
Time: 2:58 p. m.

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.5(C), 1.5(D)

K: Hello, Hal. Are you going to -- have you read these cables?

S: I have instructions for your signature shortly. I don't think it needs to change what you indicated.

K: Would you call Dobrynin on my behalf and tell him what we are doing.

S: [redacted] B1
I am putting in a brief introductory paragraph to Robinson. (reads para) It gives you the option of breaking hard or soft.

K: I think you should be on the soft side. My feel is that if we have to fall off any way in 30 days --

S: These are suggestions on getting around the problem.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 25X1, 25X6
DECLASSIFY AFTER: INDEFINITE
DATE/CASE ID: 09 JUL 2003 200102979

X73 *

TELCON
Winston Lord
Secretary Kissinger
12:03 p.m. 10/9/75

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: Win, who wrote that snotty ~~x~~reply to the Koreans?

L: What snotty reply to the Koreans?

K: That neither would I come -- which I was never asked whether I might not change my plans and go there for a day -- nor would we tell them whether we would send somebody.

L: Well, --- may have wrote it, but I cleared it--

K: Well, I have news for you, somebody is going, if I don't go--

L: Nobody ruled anybody going--

K: Now they are to be informed that if I can't come -- which is unlikely, then Habib is going.

L: Okay. It wasn't meant to be snotty to the Koreans, it was for Snyder's information to say that we will keep them -- we don't know how we will do it yet, until we obviously --

K: Well we'll do it

L: Fine--no one has any objection to that.

K: Now don't tell me that EA isn't harrassing the Koreans at every opportunity they can.

L: I don't think that was the purpose and I cleared it not thinking that was going to happen--the point was--we didn't think he had to check with you on whether you could go--we thought that was clearly out of the question.

K: I could conceivably go on the 25th.

L: Well, I had no suggestion that you had even considered going, so I did clear the thing, so I'm responsible as well.
It was not supposed to be snotty to the Koreans, just for Snyder's guidance. I -- we can get out another message --

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K: You know, I might leave Friday evening--is somebody drafting some UN remarks?

L: Yeh, we are working with IO on that.

K: Good.

L: Now related to this Waldheim thing on the North Koreans, I'm doing a little note--I don't think we have any choice of what Phil is going to recommend, but I'm concerned about our ever talking to the North Koreans directly--no matter how its conditioned on South Koreans getting into the act later--I just think that is--a mistake.

K: I disagree.

L: I know you do. I was sending you my concerns about it. Phil thinks you are right in that the S. Koreans may ~~think~~ even want us to do so.

K: I think we can do it once.

L: Well, the human rights attacks on this country and the general nervousness-- but Phil knows the Koreans psychology better than I do, but I look at it -- I think it's rather dangerous. In Vietnam for example, we had no choice in Vietnam, but I see the North Koreans ~~k~~ diddling us wrong and the South Koreans--

K: Well, they are not going to ~~diddle~~ diddling us wrong

L: Yeh, well I 'll talk to Phil--you want a message saying you will send somebody by there--do you want to specify Habib or--

K: Well, it probably will be Habib

L: I will say probably Habib--

K: Because if we leave Tokyo at 8:00 in the evening or 7:00 in the evening on Friday--this is what I'm now leaning to and they better not make any plans for Friday evening--I think they were planning some sort of social event--the 24th

L: Okay, I'll make sure that is clear too.

K: Could do it the evening of the 23rd, if they want a social event--

B6

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K: [redacted] I think if we are going to invite Ohira and Fukuda to the Embassy -- B6

[redacted] B6

L: That's true. Okay, I will get with Phil--there is no intention to be snotty to the Koreans.

K: Will you make sure then--

L: Okay.

K: Okay, also, whatever social event Hogdson is planning is for Thursday evening--

L: Okay.

K: And that we will probably come home Friday evening.

L: Okay. Fine.

X92 *

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/The Secretary
October 10, 1975
Time: 6:55 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

S: Fine. It looks as though the Soviets blinked on the oil thing. I think we are alright on the instructions. He has to leave anyway and he has given everyone a chance to mull it over.

K: What did they do?

S: It looks as if they are ready to consider various gimicks. Maybe the 15% but at least shifting it around. Butz is saying he can hold his troops for a few days.

K: I will talk to him right now.

S: Look, he said a week. I said don't plan on any fixed time. At least the Poles know.

K: O.K. Good work.

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X95 *

TELECON
Senator Case/The Secretary
October 10, 1975
Time: 12:57 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I called to tell you that I thought you did a really noble job this week.

C: Thank you very much. I am glad it worked out. I forget the final vote.

K: 70-18. It isn't just the vote. It is the way you helped conduct this whole process and would like to think it strengthens what you have been trying to achieve with the Case Amendment.

C: Thank you very much. Good luck to you.

K: I hope you get a little rest now.

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X90 *

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Senator Javits
10/10/75; 10:15 a.m.

K: Hello.

J: Yes, Henry.

K: Jack, I just wanted to thank you for the really marvelous role you played on this.

J: Well, you know my colleagues Case and Humphrey performed unbelievably. I hope you will talk to them.

K: I have already talked to Humphrey and I've got a call in to Case.

J: Good. They really performed yoeman service. This has not been without cost and I'd like one day soon to tell you what I think.

K: To whom?

J: The cost to the general situation.

K: Oh, yeah. Look, we have had -- on these documents we now got a real blast from Sadat, saying that he construes this as being aimed at him.

J: Well, he's gonna be permitted to speak before a Joint Session so I am sure his ruffled feelings will be smoothed.

K: Well, it is hurting him enormously with the Syrians. Although I don't see what choice you had.

J: I didn't, but a lot of eggs were broken.

K: What worries me most is what is happening to the Israelis.

J: In what way, I mean, I don't . . .

K: Well, I had a sense that there were some real potential antagonism.

J: That's what I am talking about.

K: Didn't you?

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J: Well, let me talk to you about that.

K: You and I ought to talk about this. I don't want anything from them.

J: I understand. Well, whenever you say. Are you going to be working tomorrow?

K: I may be available.

J: All right. Why don't you let my office know.

K: Maybe we could have an early lunch.

J: A breakfast or an early lunch. I'd prefer a breakfast but . . .

K: No, breakfast I can't do.

J: Well, I can come in just before lunch.

K: Okay. Come in about -- I am going to be on Meet the Press at 11:00 but come in at 12:00

J: Good.

K: See you then.

J: Bye.

X93 *

TELECON
Mr. Mike Wallace/The Secretary
October 10, 1975
Time: 6:00 p.m-

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: How are you.

W: Fine. It was plesant last evening. You know about what Nancy and I talked about.

K: You wanted to do an interview with both of us.

W: You are on Meet the Press this week.

K: I am doing it for Spivak. I think these shows don't have any audience.

W: The Sunday morning things -- I couldn't agree with you more. My request was triggered by People Magazine article. I talked to Nancy and I know you don't do these things but some day you might want to so why not do it on "60 Minutes". We want to do a piece patterned after the People thing. She said I will talk to Henry. She suggested that we talk last night, but I didn't think it was a particularly appropriate time so I am pursuing it today.

K: What sort of questions would you ask.

W: You have me out. I have not thought about it. There would be no difficulty at all in getting a fascinating bunch of questions which are really patterned after the kind of thing that was covered in People. And except that you people would be saying them yourselves and hopefully it would not be just an interview but we would have an opportunity to observe you a bit. A delightful way would be to follow you to China. Had there been a television camera on the Middle East trip it would have been perfect.

K: Let me think about it.

W: I don't think we would have any trouble working out an attractive and useful piece.

K: Let me talk to Nancy. She will overwhelm me if we both appear together.

W: I agree without a doubt.

K: I am too insecure for this. Why don't you interview Nancy alone [redacted] B6

W: You know something, that would make a fascinating piece. People have no idea about this woman.

K: About Nancy. We will talk next week. It was good to see you again.

W: It was good to see you again. Lorainne was very happy to see you.

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K: I like her. She is a marvelous and deep human being.

W: She had a good time last night.

K: O.K. See you soon.

W: Think about it seriously.

X88 *

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Senator Humphrey
10/10/75; 9:57 a.m.

K: Hello.

H: Henry!!

K: Hubert, I tried to call you last evening and couldn't find you.

H: Well, I was over fiddling with the Senate for a while and then went out and had dinner.

K: Well, I wanted to tell you that this is a great tribute to you.

H: Well, I told you we would bring them through unscathed and we did.

K: Well, you did a tremendous job and a patriotic job.

H: Well, thank you, Henry.

K: And it is a privilege to work with you.

H: Well, I wanted to do a good job for you. I thought you had gone through enough misery on this business and I thought the country needed it.

K: I think it worked out well and I think it is . . .

H: I do too, and I believe that we -- uh, the main thing is that there are a lot of things said in debates that you kind of wished weren't always said but the main thing is what the resolution said and I think we established very well a couple of things. Namely, that the assurances and understandings that we had taken were taken in good faith and that we were -- we felt morally bound and committed to carry them out. I didn't think we ought to downgrade them.

K: I agree with you.

H: And secondly, that if the circumstances changed and therewas a . . . .

K: I had said that myself.

H: Yes, of course! Exactly right. Well, you know, we had a few people there that were just determined to change the course of handling foreign policy and I just didn't think this was the place to do that. And we changed it enough, for Christ's sake.

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K: Well, I tell you, at least I still have prestige and reputation so I am not as handicapped but a new Secretary coming in and a new President, whenever that happens, if all these new procedures stay in effect, they are going to have one hell of a time.

H: Well, one of the great advantages is that with time some of this stuff subsides. You see, they are still in the _____ of the period of suspicion and doubt and when fellows get up there in the Senate I don't trust anybody. I don't trust this person, I can't trust the President, I can't trust the Secretary of State. I don't trust anybody! When you have got that kind of_____ attitude, you know, you've got to keep in mind that that's a minority and it doesn't really . . .

K: And it is not the country.

H: No, it is not.

K: There is no reason. What we need is to restore some faith and authority.

H: Exactly right.

K: In this country because these people don't realize to what extent we are the key to stability and progress in the world.

H: They do not. They have underestimated our country. They have underestimated our role in the world. They keep thinking that somehow or another because things went bad in Vietnam that this means that we tossed in the towel. I don't buy all that crap. Just between us I have figured that my role in this Senate is to at least have some sense. That's all -- I mean, I don't need anything and really don't want a damn thing so I just, I just do it the way I . . .

K: Well, I tell you, I have really been tremendously moved by your conduct and inspired and I wanted you to know that.

H: Henry, thank you very much. That was a very fine tribute and I appreciate it.

K: Are you going to get some rest?

H: Yeah, I am going home today. We've got King Olav from Norway out there and we are going to spend a couple of days with him and then I will be out there towards the uh, Thursday and get back here.

K: I am going to be in China, but as soon as I come back let's have lunch.

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H: All right, you bet. I look forward to it. When are you taking off for China?

K: On Friday.

H: Uh-huh. Well, good uh my best to you friend. Have a good trip.

K: You won't be back on Thursday, will you?

H: Uh, yeah. I'm in here -- I come in Thursday -- yes, as a matter of fact . . .

K: Do you watt to have lunch on Thursday?

H: I think somebody called over from your office whether we could have on that day.

K: Oh, good. Will you be free?

H: I think I am free that day.

K: Marvelous. Well then we will have lunch. I look forward to it.

H: Good luck to you.

K: Bye.

x103 *

TELECON
Mr. Saunders/The Secretary
October 11, 1975
Time: 12:05 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Can we get something to the Israelis about that Fahmy thing on Asad?

S: Yes.

K: Before they jump out of their skins.

S: They have not been told about the possibility of an Asad meeting?

K: They have been told in general terms. We told the Egyptians that on a European trip we would offer it. It is in connection with UNDOF.

S: Do you want to do that through Mack?

K: Dinitz is out of town.

S: Right.

K: Yes. Can you draft something right away.

S: Immediately. Get it right up to you.

K: O.K.

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X99 *

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/The Secretary
October 11, 1975
Time: 3:50 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

S: I don't know whether you have read the latest two messages from Robinson but the mood has turned sour. They complained about Butz's statement when he announced that the embargo was lifted from Poland and not the Soviet Union because things have to be settled on the oil agreement. Tolechev said that is a lie that everyone knows the oil thing was finished. The reason we are saying that is to try to put pressure on them for further concessions, he says. I want to call him and tell him that the reason we are saying this is that we want to draw attention away from the oil thing right now.

K: I think I would leave it alone.

S: We could do that to.

K: I would leave it alone. I will call Dobrynin on Monday.

S: In fact, it is a correct analysis.

K: I don't think we should show this much nervousness now.

S: O.K.

K: O.K.

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X100 *

TELECON
Mr. Laingen/The Secretary
October 11, 1975
Time: 1:23 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I am going to teach the bureaus that I am not an object for them to handle. The Canadian toast has been changed every time I see it. Are you working on the CAnadian trip?

L: No sir, I am not.

K: I get every day a different signal of what the bureau is doing on my toast.

L: I will get Jim to call you back on this, sir.

K: If I am not reachable, then have him call Sonnenfeldt.

L: Right.

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X 98 *

TELECON

Mr. Saunders/The Secretary
October 11, 1975
Time: 4:05 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: On the Meet the Press today they asked me about our military aid to Egypt and I said Sadat told many visitors that he would ask for military aid but we don't know whether it will be specific or general and we aren't prepared at this momemt to discuss specific aid requests with them. I said we are not prepared in terms of specifics. Should we send that to Hermann.

S: Yes, I think we should. I will do something right away for you.

K: And get the exact text.

S: Does Jerry have it?

K: Someone in my office has it.

S: O.K. I will pick it up.

K: Good.

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X102 *

TELECON
Mr. Herb Schlosser/The Secretary
October 11, 1975
Time: 9:43 a.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: Bremer told me he talked to you. You should let them do whatever you want to do on television [redacted] B6

[redacted] B6

S: Well, they are in the box. I will talk to them. There is a chance of rain here tomorrow.

K: Then I won't come.

S: I think you will know before hand.

K: How is it today?

S: It is just cloudy. There is a chance of showers today and tomorrow. When would you be coming down?

K: I won't be leaving until tomorrow morning. Do you have a hospitality tent up?

S: Yes.

K: Do you want me to come?

S: Do you want to come. It might be a place to stop off at until the traffic eases up. I will see you if you are here.

K: Nice to talk to you.

S: How is everything going? You have that thing signed now.

K: Now we can turn to the remaining problems which are 90% unsolved.

S: At least you have the freedom of movement. I thought you were excellent at the Peterson lunch.

Mark as original

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K: It was a good group.

S: It was clear what your intention was -- not just to answer questions but to give an overview. People left there with a good expositio n that covered every part of the world.

K: I wanted them to have a sense that there was a mind at work and not just random decisions. I hope you don't mind my asking you this. [redacted] B6

S: I think it is a prudent request and I will see that it is gotten to the people who need to know.

K: Good. Thank you.

XIII *

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/The Secretary
October 13, 1975
Time: 6:50 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Where is that memo that was supposed to be here at 2:30?

S: It is there.

K: It is somewhere within five blocks of my office?

S: I have talked to your staff assistant who had a question on some of the sentences, so I know it is in your office.

K: On my desk?

S: I am sure it must be on your desk, Henry.

K: O.K.

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X108 *

Telcon:5:10pm/10/13/75
Secretary Kissinger/
Jerry Bremer

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: Hello

Br Yes, sir.

K: We are totally behind/on schedule everything.

B: Yes, we have apologized to Eban and he is perfectly relaxed.

K: Yes, but we have Jerry Schester waiting too.

B: I talked to Funseth about Schecter and I

K: You can't talk to Funseth about anybody because it is none of your God damn business.

B: He was trying to get a feel for deadlines and things but he points out that if you are going to review the transcript Schecter really has to do the interview.

K: I will be over in about 15 minutes and I will have breakfast with Haig tomorrow.

B: Here?

K: Well, probably.

B: OK, alright.

K: And probably quarter to eight.

B: Right.

K: And the others have to wait. Now will you call up/Mr. Allen and say I can't go to the football game tonight. [redacted] B6

K: [redacted] Now I want a DISSENT ~~defense~~ channel(?) cable of Boyatt. They all were discussing it and I hadn't seen it. So I don't know what the merit of the debate is.

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B: I will get it right away.

K: OK.

B: OK.

X107 *

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/The Secretary
October 13, 1975
Time: 11:57 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: (didn't get first sentence)

D: At the end of the hearing your legal adviser submitted a paper to the Committee which singled out our commitments and intentions. Am I right? Is it possible to have this copy?

K: Let me think about it. But even that is a totally misleading thing. Even if the government ... it doesn't mean that it wasn't meaningful.

D: I think what the Prime Minister wants to be assured that the commitments we made are not weakened or not valid.

K: But the paranoia. You can't afford it. It leads to an insane debate. You have been hurt by your own supporters. He will put it out in the Cabinet and then we will start another debate here.

D: I haven't thought it through but if you could give a statement to the Ambassador or to me stating that nothing that conspires with Congress would change the nature of what we agreed.

K: I may be able to take out those statements important to you--some are legally binding,some good faith of the U.S.

D: That will set the record for us. There has been some confusion with us. That will set the record straight.

K: Good.

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X115 *

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/The Secretary
October 13, 1975
Time: 10:15 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: On that paper I have which we are probably going to be bouncing around until Robinson is back in this country -- what is the recommendation?

S: On the oil or the grain thing?

K: The grain thing -- my view is he should sign it.

S: The main consideration is whether that is alright in the Congress. We should make phone calls before he does it.

K: You know that better than the President, who wants to sign it?

S: I can only give you the issues -- if you want to sign it, sign it.

K: I don't think the Congressional argument is the important one.

S: Both Case and Long say they want to be consulted before it is signed. On balance, however, I think it is better to sign it.

K: The oil is of a complexity that I can't comprehend.

S: There is a letter of intent which would be signed by Robinson and Potolichev. In that letter it contains a letter on pricing.

K: What about the side letter?

S: That states the follow on negotiations in which the letter of intent would concur. The one letter says we assume the Soviets would continue the negotiations with a price break. One goes through the various gimmicks the other one comes out and tells the difference between the world price and the price we are asking.

K: That is 15% again?

S: Roughly.

K: What would we give to Dobrynin?

S: Any one of those three and they would have to say that is the basis on which the negotiations would continue. The soft letter would give us some additional statements from the Soviets that they would be helpful in the follow-on negotiations. We won't get what we want anyway now.

K: Not now. I thought I would call Dobrynin and tell them what we have in mind.

S: You said you wanted to have something from the Soviets that you could cite when people raise the question about that clause.

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K: I am worried about instructing Robinson. Can we instruct him to get some sort of assurance with respect to the four points and giving us a price break?

S: Are we going to tell Dobrynin first?

K: I wouldn't think we should do that.

S: Either you give it to him ahead of time or tell him in Moscow.

K: I would like it somewhere between/three and two. What the best approach would be is to let the Russians know what we want and let Robinson try to work it out.

S: It comes down to the same thing because you have to tell Dobrynin ahead of time.

K: I plan to tell Dobrynin, in fact I will try to reach him now.

S: He had the four areas where we wanted some breaks before. They are not likely to produce anything in writing from the Soviets, hence the third letter you have there.

K: I hate to give them something else that they will reject and then cave again.

S: There is likely in the first to.....

K: I want to leave it up to Robinson what to do.

S: Then we will have to instruct Robinson.

K: Could you do that.

S: Yes.

K: O.K.

X114 *

TELECON
Mr. Jerry Bremer/The Secretary
October 13, 1975
Time: 8:10 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Have you talked to the Canadians?

B: I couldn't reach Warren -- he is out to dinner. I left word that I called. I will try to reach them in the morning.

K: Thankyou.

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X119 1*

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
George Meany
October 14, 1975 10:44 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: George, how are you?

M: Oh, pretty good. I didn't hear anything more on the ILO thing. I was wondering where it stands.

K: That's going through, the only--we've been asked by the Secretary of Commerce to delay until the end of October because he's got a negotiation which he believes would be affected. But all the departmental procedures have been completed and its just a question now of a few weeks. Either the end of October, the first week of November. They've agreed on the date on which to do it.

M: Are you going to be away?

K: I'll be away the last week of October. I'm going to China on Friday. But if you wanted to see me before, I could do it.

M: This is the only thing I've got on my mind--when you and I talked a couple of weeks ago about it.

K: It's definitely--let me call you back and tell you exactly when we are going to do it. It's got to be within the next three weeks.

M: Fine.

K: Right, George.

M: Okay.

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X120 *

TELECON
Senator Javits/The Secretary
October 14, 1975
Time: 12:35 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

J: Any news from Turkey?

K: Yes, Jack. Both parties gained but the right wing group lost.

J: Echevit?

K: The group with Evercam (sp?). Echevit and Demirel gained. The right-wing group most opposed to settlement lost, which is not bad. In terms of popular percentage, Demirel went from 29 to 40, Echevit from 33 to 44.

J: I see. It makes them pretty much neck and neck.

K: It makes them a two-party race since neither of them opposed to settlement and since right-wing party lost.

J: Looks good. Should I ask my people to take it up and see what Macomber suggests?

K: Yes.

J: Anything new on Israel?

K: Nothing new. If they could hear from somebody like you--they just don't understand what is going on. Just for your information they asked me now to give them another letter reaffirming all assurances. If this appeared, all hell would break loose in Congress.

J: I couldn't get anything from seeing Dinitz.

K: I think he is the problem.

J: I will handle from this point. One other question, we passed in Congress and passed to the President the Japan-US Friendship Act. The main number of appointees for that Commission are yours because they were picked up from the existing Committee that administers a roughly comparable effort but doesn't use revision money or money as a result of the Japanese occupation (?). The President is being urged by OMB to veto the bill. I think it is disgraceful. Could you call the President?

K: I am aware of that. I don't think this will happen.

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J: I hoped to give it to them as a going away present. If the White House needed reassurances from me, I will make them. I am not particular nor stiff-necked about it in any way.

K: When are you going?

J: To Israel? I haven't decided yet. I was going South tomorrow morning. I will be in touch with you.

K: Good. Nice talking with you.

X109 *

TELECON
Mr. Habib/The Secretary
October 13, 1975
Time: 5:40 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I saw that the Chinese are screaming about the Tibetan thing. I know we are brillant but why was that necessary?

H: Telling them that we weren't going to close the office in New York?

K: Yes.

H: Because they approached us about it. We told you.....

K: My judgment may not always be good, because I don't get to look at every paper that comes up here my schedule is too crowded.

H: From the moment we took the Cuban thing to them they have been approaching us on this. We didn't want to do this before the trip. They have forced the pace. The statement they made said they have decided to issue their statement because we haven't responded or we have the issue under advisement. They raised the Cyris Vance thing -- even Dun Shou Pin (sp) was in on it.

K: What if we didn't answer?

H: They have forced the issue with a public statement. We can answer it in terms of stating that we have the matter under consideration. Roy Atherton and I think it would be best if we could duck this issue. There is one thing which we can do if pressed -- that is as far as our policy is concerned nothing is based on the idea that Tibet is still a part of China. It has always been under the suzerainty of China according to our policy in the past. I think we should try to slide it off, but we should say nothing if they will let it lie. We have prepared something -- the crucial question is one of territorial integrity; if we conceive Tibet as part of China. We have before accepted that Tibet is under Chinese control but that isn't acceptable to them now. Our relationship with the Dali Lama makes it hard. We are phasing out of that now thought.

K: Yes.

H: We have prodiced some responses to questions tomorrow. Would you like to see them? They go through all the possible questions the spokesman would be asked.

K: Yes I want to see them, that is if Jerry hasn't scheduled me to the point where I can't read anything.

H: I will see that Funseth has them with him tomorrow. I will send the piece of paper up so that you can see it right now, also.

K: I have six people waiting to see me. When are you going to show me your newest China thing?

H: It has been delivered today, or rather Saturday.

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K: I wanted two versions.

H: Yes, I know. The niggardly one and the general one.

K: O.K.

X136 *

TELECON
Mr. Rogers/The Secretary
October 16, 1975
Time: 6:15 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Did you see that INR summary that the Panimanian military delegation is leaving for Cuba?

R: I did.

K: Raise cain with them. Go to Lopez and tell him it is tough enough to do the things we have promised them without such nonsense.

R: Let's do that. The Mexican's have offered to help us.

K: Good. Tell Rabasa.

R: O.K. I will prepare something right away.

K: Second I could take the trip on November 6, but I think early January is realistic.

R: That would beO.K. I don't think there is a difference between the two dates. I would like to tell everyone to stand down on November as soon as you decide.

K: I will let you know tomorrow. I will be gone most of December.

R: You have a vicious travel schedule starting tomorrow.

K: I will be back until the middle of November.

R: We can do it in January. I don't think it would be that bad.

K: Yes. O.K. Is it going to be very hot in January?

R: No. Rio will be warm, but not as bad as Washington in the summer.

K: I would aim for January 10.

R: Don't you have -- there was some rumor about the Soviets coming?

K: No.

R: Let's don't do anything until we have fixed dates.

K: O.K. Good.

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X137 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Scotty Reston/The Secretary
October 16, 1975
Time: 6:26 p.m.

R: I talked to Silsburger and Grusome and told them what you said to me and what I thought about it and I don't think I got very far but anyway....

K: I appreciate it. As long as they know my views on it. It isn't all that damaging but it isn't intended for public knowledge.

R: It raises an ethical question. It may be embarrassing to you but it is truthful. The point is that there is an invasion of privacy -- that is the issue. Surely you are entitled to express your views about anyone in a private situation.

K: And to someone like the Speaker of the Canadian Parliament whom I would expect to keep it in confidence.

R: Did you say anything that would damage your personal relations?

K: It didn't help me with Nixon -- it seems like a low blow to him. I said what I believe and saying that Kennedy hadn't accomplished anything it true.

R: True, also he was almost in a Congressional crisis when he died.

K: I don't think that helps me with his family.

R: You spoke honestly but sometimes the truth is damaging.

K: I objected to the invasion of my privacy. It wasn't the sort of conversation where I was examining what I said.

R: To be quite cynical -- the Times didn't carry a line of this yesterday because they were beaten to the story. For us to come up and print the text of it, it is because of this.

K: That is waht Binder told my staff.

R: It maybe true but I raised it with them. If you don't print the texts of his speeches why will you print this, I said. Well, o.k. when are you off?

K: At noon tomorrow.

R: For what?

K: A week.

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R: What is the prospect?

K: I am not really -- I think it is an important trip in terms of philosophy and psychology but there probably will be no observable result.

R: I had a talk with Les Gelb who is going with you.

K: He is?

R: Yes. He said something to me which , I don't know where he got it, he says he has a idea that what you are doing is going there in absence of doing anything politically to negotiate sophisticated arms contracts with them.

K: Absolutely wrong.

R: I said it sounds ridiculous to me. The one thing that would stop detente would be to negotiate arms in Peking.

K: There is no list and it is no evasion of what I say. I am not hiding behind some formulation.

R: You had better talk to him on the plane.

K: I hope to see you when we get back.

R: Good. All the best. Goodbye.

X132 *

TELECON
Mr. Binder/The Secretary
October 16, 1975
Time: 5:25 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

B: What were you doing talking up there?

K: I don't want to carry this further -- this is for your information only, not to be used.

B: O.K.

K: This was in the context of that lady asking me about the qualities of the Presidents. I told her I thought Nixon was a good President. It wasn't critical of Nixon. The rest were fragments of personality stories that I told.

B: I heard that she asked you who were good presidents and you listed Turman, Eisenhower and Nixon.

K: Right.

B: And after that you cited some of his good qualities. It went on from there. Have you talked to Nixon today?
K: I told him I was sorry if I caused him any embarrassment. He doesn't need that from me. This is not for quotation.

B: O.K. I understand.

K: Are you going to write a story about it?

B: Yes. I have to. Someone made a recording up there and it is being broadcast all over the place.

K: Is there more?

B: Do you want to hear what we have?

K: Is it worth it.

B: It starts with Kennedy at the time of his death you said he had not done any substantial work. I want to make clear that I liked him as a President -- I thought he was a disaster for the first two years in office and he didn't know where he was going. What did he accomplish? That is what we have for him. On the Nixon thing, he was very good on foreign policy but he was a very ordered man. He was decisive, but unpleasant. It was an effort for him to be on TV. When he met someone, he thought it out very carefully and that meant he didn't enjoy people. He hated to meet new people. That sort of thing. There is more about Jackie.

K: Are you going to run the whole thing.

B: I am afraid we have to.

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K: You know, I think journalism is turning vicious.

B: It turned that way along time ago.

K: It is highly unethical.

B: I think it is disgusting.

K: What does it say about Joe Kennedy?

B: You said he was a good loser.

K: I said he was a tough guy.

B: Mind you, this tape isn't good quality. It is sort of like the Watergate tapes.

K: I wasn't talking to her continuously so it must be fragmented.

B: I am sorry.

K: This is going to have the great advantage of infuriating everyone.

B: I am told someone erased one tape but this little girl from New Radio Limited kept a record. I am sorry.

K: O.K.

X134 *

TELECON
Mr. Scotty Reston/The Secretary
October 16, 1975
Time: 5;43 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

R: Fine. You are going to lecture me on the ethics of the press?

K: The Times is now running the tape of that dinner conversation tomorrow. When I think how I have knocked myself out to give speeches that you haven't carried it really is low.

R: I couldn't agree with you more my friend. I will make a call and see what I can do.

K: Binder read me some of those quotes and he let me comment. That quote of me saying Kennedy hadn't accomplished much before he died -- I didn't intend this as a historical document.

R: I t is a bitch. Let me make a quick call and let you know. Where are you now?

K: In my State Department Office.

R: O.K.

K: Thank you. Bye.

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TELECON
Ambassador Anderson/The Secretary
October 16, 1975
Time: 5:00 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Did you -- have you got the Schecter quotes that they want to use in Time?

A: There is a memo. We got it up to you today. Either Jerry or Al has it.

K: Get Win and Sonnenfeldt to go through it.

A: Al may be doing that now. I will check it right away.

K: Do they use alot of it?

A: I would say about 1/3 -- it will come to three full pages in Time which I am told is very unusual.

K: Good. Thank you.

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X138 *

TELECON
Mr. Robert Evans/The Secretary
October 16, 1975
Time: 7:25 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: What are you doing on the West Coast?

E: I am on the East Coast. I just got back from Paris.

K: My people told me you were on the West Coast. Can I call you tomorrow because I am on the way out.

E: When are you leaving for China?

K: At noon tomorrow.

E: I need your secretary to send a cable to me from you. A lunch is being given in my honor.

K: When.

E: On Thursday, -- can I get a cable from you. I know you can't attend.

K: Sure.

E: Who do I speak to on that?

K: Jerry Bremer.

E: Good. I will be at the hotel at 8:00 tomorrow morning. Can you call me at 7:30 in the morning?

K: Well, can I call you at 9:30?

E: I will be out. Can I call you sometime tomorrow? When are you getting back from China?

K: Can you call me at 11:30 at the White House.

E: Exactly at 11:30.

K: I will leave a note that I am to be called out of a meeting.

E: Good.

K: O.K.

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X124 *

TELCON
Monroe Leigh
Secretary Kissinger
11:11 a.m. 10/16/75

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Monroe?

L: Good morning, sir.

K: Can you find out whether Pike got that letter yet?

L: I could only do it by asking Donner.

K: Well why don't you ask then.

L: We tal ked about it yesterday with Larry and we thought we better not do that but I'll be glad--

K: Why do you think we shouldn't do it.

L We thought it would be showing more interest in their internal affairs than was appropriate--at that stage.

K: I'm just wondering whether about publishing it before it had seen it.'

L: Oh, well, all right, let me call down--

K: What do you think?

L: I think it is preferable/~~now~~ not to ask him.

K: All right, well let me think about it--don't do anything unless I call you back.

L" All right, I'll just hold off.

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X130 *

TELECON
Mr. Harris/The Secretary
October 16, 1975
Time: 4:35 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

H: Just fine. I wanted to tell you -- I have one late thing from the field. Your rating has gone up to 68 %.

K: Oh really.

H: Apparently that is on the heels of the Middle East business plus what you have been able to do in demonstrating that you can work with the Congress.

K: That was the weakest.....

H: I might say thatthe desire to get on with the China business has gone up too. It is inversely in relations to their trust of the Russians. There is a growing skeptism with the Russians. People are worried about high prices relating to the wheat deal. There is quite a lot of irritation on Portugal also.

K: Yes.

H: But on the other hand the desire for SALT II is high, and this proves there is still a desire for an accord with the Soviet Union.

K: What is the rating on SALT II?

H: You get 71 % who want it.

K: How many against?

H: Only 12 % -- that is overwhelming. They are willi ng to take the chances -- it is an article of faith in you that they want to do it.

K: How about my relations with Congress?

H: That has turned around -- you get 54 % positive on that.

K: It had begun to turn around last time.

H: It is now increasing. The President doesn't seem to go up much on this but that maybe because he has been campaigning out around the country.

K: The President's rating on foreign policy hasn't gone up?

H: Not like yours. Just a little bit.

K: When will this be published?

H: In about two weeks. I wanted to ask you one other thing -- are you going to be in the country on the 18th of November?

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K: Most certainly.

H: We will have a meeting of 40 executives in business -- we want to discuss the international situation and how people are supporting you. It will be in New York and we would love to have you attend.

K: What day of the week is the 18th?

H: Tuesday.

K: It is hard for me to commit myself. If you were coming to Washington it would be easier.

H: To Washington, huh -- we will think about that.. Should I write a letter to someone in your office?

K: Yes, write to Larry Eagleburger.

H: EAgleburger?

K: Yes.

H: Have a good trip -- the country is behind you.

K: If you can send me these results I would appreciate it.

H: I can and will get them to you immediately.

K: Thank you.

H: O.K. Thank you and good luck.

X126 *

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
10/16/75; 11:20 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hal.

S: Yeah.

K: Could you draft _____ to Schmidt and say -- there are really two problems. One the intrinsic matter of the case but the second, the procedural issue whether one man has a right to blackball the others.

S: Okay. I have sent you a memo on a talk I had with _____, which was a double talk to point out ~~XX~~ to them that we cannot go down to two people.

K: Yeah.

S: That we talked about yesterday. Okay.

K: Okay. Now, secondly, do you know the Wall Street Journal people -- do you know Les Gelb?

S: Yes, I know Les Gelb but I'd prefer not to talk to him. You know that's that's -- he has obviously been working on that although it turns out to be the reply to Kleiman -- I don't know what the hell we do -- it's just going to go on and on and on and on.

K: Well, you know, it is a God damn outrage. Did we know about the backfire at Vladivostok and _____?

S: We knew about it as a problem but it was not really an issue in the SALT work and in fact, as you know, the _____ statement as late as February still raised serious questions about ~~it~~ _____. You may have noticed in that piece of paper that I gave you for your discussion this morning from Canada, which has that same phrase ~~it~~ in it. I underlined it for you. Where even in September _____ ~~said~~ said that it probably wasn't strategic.

K: Yeah. Was not!

S: Yeah. What about the Wall Street Journal?

K: Well, they have an other editorial blasting me.

S: Because I talked to Ben Stein, who is Herb Stein's son and who is on the editorial board and raised hell with him about the Rostow thing . . .

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K: Well, can you look at that editorial and raise a little hell with Keatley there. First of all, I had not said that there will be no concessions. That they have made - they have made we have made -- I said in the last eightenn months -- which happens to be true -- what concessions have we made?

S: Yeah. This is what you said on Meet the Press.

K: Yeah.

S: Yeah.

K: They are blasting me for that then of course they go into the cruise missile business and. . .

S: Let me read it and I will call in . . .

K: And sloppy drafting and Vladivostok we weren't on the ball and no Defense Department representative.

S: Incidentally, the microphone at the dinner table wasn't the only one that was on. There was ~~some~~ a microphone ~~phone~~ on yesterday at the end of your press conference and they picked up your chit-chat with MacEashon as you left the podium.

K: That wasn't a problem.

S: That's going to appear in the press, too.

K: It is?

S: I guess so. That was even picked up on the sqawk box up here when they were listening to the press conference.

K: Yeah, but that doesn't bother me.

S: Well, let me read the Wall Street Jouranl.

K: Okay, fine, but will you draft this to Schmidt?

X127 *

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Secretary Butz
10/16/75; 12:03 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Earl.

B: Yeah, Henry.

K: Earl, I am a little upset about -- first of all, about the Washington Post story yesterday.

B: There was some truth to it.

K: Well, there may be some truth to it, but you know, if every Goddamn Cabinet member thinks he is the President.

B: I understand that.

K: We have an impossible situation. There is such a thing . . . .

B: As I told you earlier, Henry, I am playing on your team but you never . . . . I said I was tired of being treated like a cross-eyed step-child and this morning we had that economic board over there and Dean Hinton was there and at that point Dunlop made an impassioned plea that food policy has got to be a general policy here and I said I quite agree with that. Part of that general policy should be the Department of Agriculture, too.

K: Oh, I couldn't agree more, but the thing that really upsets me isn't so much the news story. But I was talking to Dobrynin the other day and Dobrynin says he was told by both you and Bell that the President and I are the ones that are embargoing food.

B: Listen, I haven't even talked to Dobrynin in three or four months. And I am sure that Bell hasn't talked to Dobrynin either. As a matter of fact . . .

K: If it wasn't Dobrynin then it was told to the Russians in Moscow. The point is, if that is the game they are going to play that means the President has to pay for _____ _____ for one week. Which is all we were talking about.

B: Listen, Henry, there is a hell of a lot of loose talk taking place around this place. Now you know -- you called me about not breaking the discussions taking place in Moscow and not relating oil to grain and we have been scrupulously careful.

K: No, you -- no, that came out of . . . .

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B: That came out in the Times and I don't know who the hell the Times . . . .

K: That came out of . . . I am really in despair. How -- we are hanging on by our fingernails as a country, Earl.

B: Yeah.

K: We have lost a President, we've had Vietnam. We are in deep trouble and if -- the few assets we have we squander. Now, you ask the President, I have been one of your big boosters here.

B: I know you have and frankly I have been one of yours, too, Henry.

K: That's right. I've always . . . .

B: News leaks on this thing and frankly we have been extremely careful.

K: But what concerns me is this.

B: On Sunday, I don't know where the hell they got that.

K: They got it out of Zarb's shop and it is an outrage.

B: Some of it may have come from National Security -- I don't know but I . . . .

K: I don't think so -- I don't think anyone here knew enough about it.

B: Anyway, where ever they got it, I don't know but I just want to tell you that I think that our people have been remarkably careful in this situation.

K: But what we need is -- you know, when we ask you to do something, you are to carry the can on technical grounds. Once it is in the paper that Kissinger wanted to -- and Ford wanted to have an embargo on Poland in order to keep the heat on Russia, that creates unbelievable resentments in Moscow. It is a lot easier to have them sore at you than at us.

B: Well, I agree with you but then -- listen, this is putting two and two together -- they didn't get that from us, Henry.

K: No, it is a direct quote.

B: In where, this morning's paper?

K: In the Washington Post, either this morning or yesterday.

B: Direct quote? Who are they quoting?

K: Agriculture official.

B: Oh, hell, that is just like when they quote State Department officials -- they make it up and they quote somebody, Henry. Now, you talk about Dobrynin saying that -- I haven't talked to Dobrynin in three months. Nor has Bell. I suppose contacts have been made at lower levels -- I don't know. Was invited to this Russian reception Monday night for the astronauts and I purposely didn't go because it is best not to . . . .

K: Look, you can -- I have always felt that you and I -- you have constituency and within the limits that are set you have go to please them and basically I want you -- I want to please them -- but you know for our policy it helps -- it is easier to say Butz is a son-of-a-bitch than to say we are the sons-of-bitches. You are not responsible for foreign policy but if we say we have tried to squeeze Russia and that goes to Brezhnev, then we pay all across the board.

B: Yeah.

K: That's our problem on this.

B: Oh, I hope none of our people said that.

K: They have got the Polish thing very right in the newspaper -- that I wanted it and in fact that Ford and I wanted it in order to keep the heat on Russia.

B: But that quote on that was not new -- that's been in stories around hither and yonder for two or three weeks, Henry.

K: Okay. Well, let me raise another question with you. You are fighting very hard for that 7 million tons. I prefer six million and let them come back for more.

B: Well, Henry, we discussed this Tuesday morning very fully in the economic policy board over there and the decision at that point was unanimous on this deal.

K: Yeah, but none of these guys has any foreign policy sense.

B: Well, I think there is very considerable question if they will even buy six. Our best intelligence is they have now bought about 22 to 23 million tons around the world some place and our own estimate was that they were going to need 25. Now they may need more than that but in the meantime there is evidence that they are cutting back in feeding rates and that they are going to take less than originally contemplated and I think what we have done, Henry, is make ourselves once again the residual supplier in the world market -- all of our competition has cleaned out their warehouses and bins.

K: Yeah, but there isn't . . . .

B: And we said here now that we take what we can get. And I suspect that we are going to end this year with a substantial increase in _____. So my sticking with seven was that we had a full discussion of this Tuesday and the facts were on the table. I don't know if 1 million tons makes that much difference.

K: But if they cleaned out all the bins then it means for sure if they want more than _____ they have got to come to us.

B: If they want more than six -- it is a very considerable question. I guess your instructions to Chuck are that we would like to have the Russians say our intentions are to buy so much. I don't think you are going to get the Russians to say that because if they openly say--for publication--our intentions are, that weakens their position at the bargaining table vis-a-vis our grain export.

K: No, no, our instructions were that -- unless they were changed -- we would tell them privately they couldn't go above the figure.

B: We would monitor that very carefully.

K: But they didn't have to announce what they were going to do.

B: They will ask us what we think they will buy, and at that point I think that Dick Bell or somebody could say, well, our best analysis is their needs may be this much.

K: I would prefer to say you can buy 6 million now and come back to us if you want more and not say you can't buy more than six.

B: Why do you pick the six?

K: Because that's what is the other agreement. .... frankly to have a figure where they have to come back to us.

B: These are two separate things. [Missed a sentence or two] I discussed this with Bill Seidman. His initial instructions were going to be that they could buy 6 million tons starting next October 1, but the wheat crop is going to be available in June, you see, and therefore I suggested that we

make the language that they could buy X million tons, whatever it was, out of the 1975 crop. Which means they can begin buying over -- they can buy for delivery out of the '76 crop, too. Just as a year ago in October they purchased some for delivery out of the 1975 crop.

K: You know, in fact, Earl, for a variety of reasons including total indiscipline in the government, we have not gotten out of this grain situation what we should have.

B: I kind of agree with that. We are coming out of it with nothing except a long term agreement. I guess that's right. And, frankly, from my point of view it would be awfully nice to have some kind of petroleum agreement. A part of my problem, Henry, is to diffuse this knee-jerk emotional reaction against selling anything to the Russians.

K: That's right.

B: And if we had a petroleum agreement it would make it a hell of a lot easier from my point of view and yours too.

K: Exactly.

B: And if it was just a cosmetic agreement.

K: Well, that's why I want it.

B: Well, I am for you, as you know, if we can get it.

K: But it isn't only the petroleum. We've just gotten ourselves over a barrel and really, you know, as far as I personally am concerned, in the seventh year of being in Washington, I don't give a damn anymore what people say.

B: I am getting that way myself.

K: Because my record is, for better or worse, now fixed.

B: It is a good record, Henry. Listen, why don't we go now on these instructions to Chuck. I understand that he is going to be in Moscow tonight. He is probably there right now. That he can talk in terms of seven, and we will watch this very, very carefully as we did before.

K: But the problem is then we have no leverage if....

B: They may want to go beyond that. I doubt if they will go to 7.

K: Yeah.

B: But we will watch this very carefully. As you know, on that prior sale of 9.8 million tons there wasn't a ton sold without our prior approval over here. When it approached 10 we put our brakes on it.

K: Yeah.

B: Why don't we go at this and we'll watch it very carefully.

K: That doesn't help me if they buy more than 6. What I would like is something we could hold them up to.

B: Why don't you pick 5 then? If you arbitrarily picked 6....

K: Well, I picked 6 only because it was consistent with the other -- I will be happy to pick 5.

B: Of course, this isn't consistent -- because the other is a minimum of 6 and maximum of 7. We have already sold them 9.8 and we are talking about some on top of this.

K: But you will scream even more if I say 5.

B: Well, obviously.

K: I had it five and, in fact, I increased it by one.

B: Well, the group yesterday, based on the....

K: Yeah, but that group, Earl, with all due respect -- there isn't one man in that group who has the slightest foreign policy sense.

B: Uh-huh. You have your man there.

K: Yeah, I don't know -- who is the guy?

B: Well, you had Dean Hinton there this morning. I don't know -- there was nobody there Tuesday, I guess. Well, we discussed it again this morning. Have you talked to Hinton since our meeting this morning?

K: Hinton is working for me and, by God, he does what I tell him to.

B: Well....

K: We haven't reached that point yet.

B: Well, he was there this morning. He can report back to you. Again the discussion this morning was let's stick at seven. And that was the consensus of the group there this morning as it was Tuesday.

K: Okay. Well, let me talk to Hinton.

B: Okay, thanks, Henry.

X141 *

TELECON
Mr. Atherton/The Secretary
October 17, 1975
Time: 1:00 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I am getting so confused. I can't understand what is going on. There is the NSC review.

A: That is correct.

K: Do we have a man on that? Of course, we must have a man.

A: There is a working group. Hal, PM and NSC are working on it.

K: But it is under Ellsworth.

A: It was assigned to Defense.

K: Are there joint meetings? Ellsworth told Dinitz that he didn't know how long it was going to last. I know how long it is going to last. We are going to have the paper by November 1. Why did he tell them he didn't know how long it was going to last? Are you following this?

A: Yes, everyone is working on it. Everyone is well aware of the deadline.

K: Will it be finished?

A: That is the deadline.

K: It is beyond my understanding what the problem is. What are the Israelis complaining about?

A: I don't know. We had an understanding that we had to review first.

K: What is NATMON (?) 75.

A: That is the first increment they wanted in the first year.

K: Is that being held up?

A: It is part of the overall study. The terms of reference go in the study.

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K: I said 1000 times--I don't want to turn it into a _____ operation.

A: I think it is very clear.

K: Is anything moving to Israel?

A: Things approved in the past are moving. We are holding things up for export licenses. They signed contracts for the Lance yesterday, for example.

K: Okay.

X139 *

ary Kissinger
Waldheim
/17/75 11:53 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello?

W: This is Kurt Waldheim.

K: Kurt, how are you.

W: Good morning, Henry. I know you are leaving today, I wish you a good trip.

K: Thank you. I've written you a letter on that Korean business which you may or may not have gotten.

W: Well, I haven't got it yet, but I got your other letter, and I have already answered thanking you for your kindness and -- may be sure we will continue to coope ate fully so things will go well. Of course we have now this problem that the Egyptians apparently don't want--that I put something in my report to the Council about duration of the extension of the mandate in the Sinai. I sent the message to Fahmy because the Ambassador didn't get any instructions until yesterday evening and this morning he rang me up and said well...doesn't want to make any concrete proposal, so my solution is that I just say in regard to the question of the extension of the mandate.... Security Council....th the early provisions on the...which is contained in Article 5.

K: Good.

W: I think this is perhaps the best way out of the dilemma, huh?

K: I think so.

W: Yeh. Henry, you have heard also from Allon about the talks here we had. They are apparently very interested in doing something about the prolongation of...end of November. They even suggested I should go over there to talk to Asad, etc. I told Allon that he should first discuss the matter with you, because ah...

K: I thought it was a good idea.

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W: I'm not sure what the outcome will be, but ..

K: Well, it can't do any damage and it might do some good.

W: Hmhuh. So you feel that it is justified to do it.

K: Yes.

W: The best then would be to do it around the middle of November--not too early.

K: I would let it develop for another two weeks or so.

W: That was my feeling, we should wait for a certain time to see how things develop and then we can always decide . You will be back in the meantime...

K: I'll be back on the 24th.

W: Yeh, and we then can perhaps talk it over again, huh?

K: Exactly.

W: I just wanted to know in principle whether you feel it is a good idea to do it.

KL I think it is a good idea.

W: Good. Maybe I have to suggest I contact you again when you are back.

K: I would appreciate it.

W: And as far as the Korean question is concerned, I am waiting for your letter, you got from Moynihan the information about their idea to avoid parallel talks--that came after I wrote you ...

K: You can tell them if they are willing to have the South Koreans present, I accept immediately.

W: But to have parallel talks--because their explanation is we wanted to discuss the peace treaty which should replace the armistic agreement and future of the American forces--with the Americans alone--as far as their future of the two Koreans is concerned, this should be discussed in parallel meetings between North and South Korea--this is about the position.

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K: Oh they want to discuss with us about the future of the armistice

W: Right, right.

K: Then they will talk parallel with the South Koreans.

W: Right, about the future of Korean, the question of unification, they mentioned a confrederation so that each country could have its administration, but to form a sort of conf ederation and this way..

K: Let me look at this w again. I'll be in touch with you.

W: See it was anew ...which the Vice Foreign Minister who is here for the Korean debate mentioned to me in a visit made two or three days ago. And I informed your mission here.

K: No, I have that. All right. You'll be hearing from me about this in a few days.

W: About the Western Sahara, I am deeply worried. I think if the Moroccons really starting this march, it can lead to a very serious situation.

K: I am seeing their ambassador in a few minutes.

W: Yeh, I do my best here, and in my contacts, I hope we can stop this kind of thing. It would be very dangerous.

K: I agree.

W: My best wishes foryour trip.

K: Many thanks, and we'll be in touch with each other when I return. Bye.

X 144 *

TELECON
Mr. Hinton/The Secretary
October 17, 1975
Time: 1:55 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I have approved the paper, except we don't just prefer that there be no reference to world prices we insist that there be no references to world prices. He can't accept it with those prices. Also the phrase that we asked the Russians to make the purchase is totally unacceptable.

H: Yes, Sir. I will run this through the interagency.

K: The Russians need grain. Until we sign the agreement, they haven't got it. Robinson shouldn't panic. I agree that Monday is time to make the announcement.

H: I am going to have a session with the people at the White House. I will get Seidman to get the restriction out tonight.

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S0118 *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
October 17, 1975
2:14 pm

K: Hello Anatoyl.

D: How are you Henry. Thank you very much. How was your trip?

K: I am just leaving.

D: I mean your trip to Canada.

K: Didn't lyou read about it in the newspapers? It is getting to be like the Kremlin.

D; It is no problem. You are covered -- it is an open door policy.

K: Two things, three things really. Patolichev is acting too nasty. We are trying to get this thing settled and a little more conciliation on his part would be helpful.

D: I don't understand.

K: His behavior is getting to be too tough. I understand your problem but your analysis is not exactly correct -- the one you gave me the other day.

D: It is our analysis.

K: I think you are wrong. If I want compensation I want it in the political field, I don't give a damn about the economic thing.

D: Sure, like...

K: That is ridiculous. That is not the issue. I think we can settle it in turn. I think we can settle it in terms agreeable to you if you can -- well, first of all, I think the behavior is too rough.

D: I don't have any information on this.

K: I want to tell you this privately and if we make this agreement I think we should do it in a way that we are pleased with each other. Those are the instructions Robinson has.

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D: The real....

K: Those are exactly his instructions and you will have to help us a little bit in not pressing things to the absolute limit. I am meeting your basic point.

D: I will pass on the points you mentioned since I don't have any information yet.

K: Ok. The second thing is the date that looks best to meet Gromyko is the 14th.

D: The 14th of November. Late November you couldn't do it.

K: No becuase I have to visit your allies.

D: Yes, you have a political problem. Ok. I will check with him while you are there and when you come back, tell you.

K: Yes, and I wanted to tell you I am taking Sonnenfeldt to China. This has nothing to do with you. It is to give him some experience and satisfy his ego. He is not along for any substantive purpose. I have him along for his education and his ego. I wanted you to know this from me -- it has nothing to do with you.

D: I understand.

K: I know we have an occasional reason to be irritated with each other, but I think this thing will come out alright. We should have a serious talk sometime soon when we can on where we should go in our relationship.

D: What about SALT?

K: I am waiting for your response. I can't do any more til I have a reply from you.

D: I understand. Will there be anything new when Sadat will be here. You promised to tell me.

K: We are giving them B-52s but that wouldn't affect you -- they are aimed at Israel.

D: Otherwise, there is nothing interest.

K: There won't be anything spectacular that I foresee.

D: Do you take him to Disney World?

K: I won't , no.

D: What about the beginning of this building of our apartment house in the complex of our embassy?

K: Let me get you an answer when I get back. I have to catch a plane.

D: Ok.

K: And you'll let me know about the 14th?

D: Yes.

K: We'll meet the 13th

D: What do you mena?

K: I will arrive the evening of the 13th and we'll meet on the 14th.

D: Ok. You will be in Paris.

K: I will be in Paris afterwards.

D: Ok. Have a nice trip.

K: Thank you.

END

X 151 *

TELECON
Mr. Eagleburger/The Secretary
October 27, 1975
Time: 4:10 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: What did you wa nt to see me about?

E: I wanted to see how it went but I can do that tomorrow.

K: What did Aspen want?

E: He wants to give me a few ideas. He said I have some small problems and will give you a call. I will see him tomorrow. He sounded friendly and said you are basically correct.

K: On the other matter he is adamant to go ahead with his proposal.

E: The whole thing is..... I suspected that after your talk he wouldn't say no.

K: Yes.

E: He is personally affronted.

K: Yes, well we can discuss it tomorrow.

E: O.K.

K: Good.

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X153 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/The Secretary
October 27, 1975
Time: 6:36 p.m.

S: I have been informed that because of the Zionist vote the mayor has decided not to pay a call on President Sadat.

K: [redacted] B6

S: There is some question -- Ismail just called me -- that maybe the governor might not call on him either.

K: I will call both of them.

S: Ismail wasn't very excited about it. I think it is dumb. By the way, I am at home now, I haven't changed if you want me to come to the meeting.

K: There is no need, it is just a courtesy call.

S: O.K.

K: Thank you.

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X169 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec. Kissinger
Sen. Humphrey
October 28, 1975

4:00 p.m.

H: I just talked to the Governor and he will be there. The Governor will be there and I told him to get the Mayor and put him in his entourage. He said he would accept my advice.

K: You are great.

H: May I respectfully suggest that either you or the President wire the Governor and say perhaps that you are pleased that he will be calling on Sadat.

K: And that it is a great national service.

H: Yes. And that it would mean so much in the efforts in the Middle East and urge that he get the Mayor to join him.

K: We will send it out within the hour.

H: That will help a great deal. I laid it right out on the line and he said he would take my advice.

K: You are terrific.

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X165 *

TELECON
Secretary General Waldheim/Secretary Kissinger
October 28, 1975
Time: 6:50 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

W: Good evening Henry. How are you?

K: O.K. Fine.

W: I am sorry to disturb you but I just came back from Spain, Morocco, Mauritania and Algeria. I thought it was important to give you my impressions. Also President Boumediene asked me to convey his concern about the situation.

K: Could I call you in 1/2 an hour. I have someone with me and it is very difficult to speak right now. I will call you around 7:30.

W: I am in my office and will give you all the other information then.

K: O.K. Fine. Bye.

W: Good.

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X162 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Robert McNamara/Secretary Kissinger
October 28, 1975
Time: 6:03 p.m.

K: Bob, I have to see the President about something in which I have to make a decision tomorrow morning. Is there any chance of your dropping by on the way home?

M: At 7:00. Would that be o.k.?

K: Fine. Are you going to that dinner?

M: Yes. I will be there at 7:00.

K: Good. I will see you then. Bye.

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(X167) *

TELECON
Ambassador Moynihan/The Secretary
October 28, 1975
Time: 9:15 a. m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

M: [redacted] Abe Beam. Have you heard that -- B6

K: That is what I am calling you about.

M: I just heard this.

K: It is wrong.

M: You are absolutely right. It is absolutely disgusting. What do you want me to do? I am willing to see him. I am willing to put out a statement. Abe Beam, you don't do it, the President doesn't matter, the Secretary doesn't.

K: Why did Abe do it?

M: Bad politics. He doesn't get to be President that way. The disgusting scum of this city. All theydo -- the mean little calculations these people are making and then they expect people to like them. You don't get as mad as I do.

K: We are afraid that Cary may do the same thing.

M: What do you want me to do? I will call. I have known these guys for 25 years.

K: How about calling Cary? And make sure that he goes.

M: I will call him immediately. Should I call Abe? I will say, Abe, it is a profound mistake. Do you want me to do it?

K: I think it will cause needless trouble. It isn't, strictly speaking, in your jurisdiction. You would be taking on a fight. If you would call him, if you know him. The major thing is to make sure that Cary does it.

M: *I don't know anything about this visit. What was he supposed to do?*

K: Just pay a 5-minute courtesy call on Sadat on Thursday morning.

M: Can I offer to accompany, something like that?

K: Certainly, fine with me.

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M: I am sorry. As I told you, Len and I called Beam and told him it was his duty as an American and a Jew. I am sorry. [redacted] B6 Should I try to get some Jewish groups to denounce this?

K: It would be a smart thing to do.

M: The Israelis wanted him to see Sadat. Do you want me to try to work on that?

K: If you could do it without turning it into a huge confrontation.

M: Should I try to get the Times to deplore it? I will call Sulzberger now. Should I tell them I talked to you?

K: Yes.

M: Should I come to lunch?

K: Yes. I would like to see you for five minutes on the racism. I think we made our point on the withdrawal from the UN. We may have to face expulsion from the UN.

M: From the expulsion of the US. We should make public position what the other fellow did.

K: We should stay with....

M: We will need some working capital. That is easily done. Do you want to see me?

K: Aren't you coming to lunch?

M: Is it at the Blair House?

K: No, it is here.

M: I will be in my office if you want to see me.

X161 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Jack Valenti/Secretary Kissinger
October 28, 1975
Time: 5:30 p.m.

V: You were fantastic today. That was a touching toast by Sadat.

K: Aren't you nice. We are going to be at the same function on Thursday night. I wanted to ask your opinion. I am going as a favor to Evans to that dinner, now they have asked me to make some remarks about him. I believe it is inappropriate.

V: May I talk to you off the record?

K: I am talking to you off the record.

V: Good There is no problem about your being there.

K: I am at the margin by being there.

V: No, there is no problem with that. If you are there and you don't speak you make it clear you are there out of friendship but my advice is not to speak.

K: That is what I wanted you judgment on.

V: It is not a place to talk about the Middle East -- you could be humorous, but you do that best in a serious situation.

K: I think people would wonder what I was doing making a speech at a testimonial for Evans when I have refused some people who were -- on the surface -- much more deserving. What is this award?

V: It is an award for a man who is outstanding in the visual field. It is a prestigious award in that field. There will be television executives and people in the theatre there. It is a legitimate award and worthy. I have been to others -- one where Schlosser and Lemon received it.

K: They had me on the program for a 10 minute speech. I really would have trouble knowing what to say.

V: My firm instinct is that you shouldn't speak.

K: Are you afraid that I would get a few democrats on my side?

V: No, it is just showing support for him if you are there.

K: You can say my being there shows the many friends he has. You confirm my judgment. I will tell Bob there are other senior guys that have asked me to speak at things like this and I have turned them down.

V: Just being present is a great gift you have given Bob. It was a wonderful lunch today. I was touched by Sadat.

K: He is a remarkable man. For this man to say that ni November of 73 he would make peace with Israeli and go step-by-step and to brave all the attacks

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on him, it took a lot of guts.

V: I was touched by his embrace of you. It is no small matter for the head of an Arab nation to embrace you like this.

K: It shows tremendous courage on his part.

V: I liked it very much. Say, I am grateful for your invitation.

K: O.K. See you soon.

V: See you Thursday. Oh, something else. I tell you, when I think of the press -- these people talking about integrity and then everyone evesdropping on a dinner like that.

K: And then the way they played it in the newspapers. As you know it was a two sided conversation, but they only printed my side. I was favorable to Nixon. That lady sitting next to me asked if he was such a good president then why was he disliked. I answered then that he was a cold man.

V: You were very complementary. I must say no one around Nixon could deny that statement.

K: No, not even his wife probably.

V: Well you are right. See you on Thursday.

K: Right. Thank you, my friend.

X159 *

TELECON
Cardinal Cooke/The Secretary
October 28, 1975
Time: 4:30 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

C: Hello.

K: Hello, is this Cardinal Cooke? I called you this morning to ask for some help with the Governor but I went through more political channels. I wanted to ask you to get the Governor to call on President Sadat.

C: Have you been in contact with him?

K: I haven't, but Senator Humphrey has. He has agreed to do it.

C: I can still be in contact with him to encourage him. I will be glad to do that.

K: It would be helpful and it would mean a lot to the country.

C: We will try to be in contact with him this evening. I can assure you of my prayers for your efforts.

K: I miss seeing you. Do you ever come to Washington?
and Nancy

C: I hope to be down in the next month or so. I hope you will come to New York. I still owe you a lunch.

K: We would love to.

C: It was good speaking with you. I hope this visit works out.

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S0119*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
October 28, 1975
Time: 5:47 p.m.

K: How are you?

D: Fine. And you?

K: O.K.

D: May I talk to you tomorrow -- I have a message from Moscow. Just for 10 minutes.

K: Does it take 10 minutes to say no?

D: I didn't know you were going to answer no -- it might be in the plus.

K: I was hoping you would come back with something we could study.

D: Could we make it tomorrow any time?

K: I will probably cancel both dates in another day or so. I cannot keep it open on Gromyko.

D: I understand it is a well taken point. So what about tomorrow?

K: I will give you a call first thing in the morning. Can you come by today about 7:00?

D: No, I have something.

K: I will call you first thing in the morning.

D: O.K.

K: O.K. Goodbye.

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X157 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Secretary Dunlop/The Secretary
October 28, 1975
Time: 4:45 p.m.

K: How are you?

D: Fine. I know you want to talk about our ILO matter. I agreed with Buffum on the date of November 3.

K: O.K. I don't want this to become a circus.

D: I agree with you on that.

K: Anything that involves Moynihan is a circus. Why do we need two cabinet members and Meany there?

D: I agree with that. Suppose Meany and myself and Smith were there.

K: Fine. I will have some low level type come from here.

D: I will work it out with Rog so that he will have a low level guy there also.

K: They are not to sit on any platform.

D: There are not to be putting on a show, I agree. It is to be a labor-management/Government show of unity, but not a big show.

K: Exactly.

D: Now let me -- the only other issue is the test of the letter. I am still working on that and I will be back to you by the end of the week.

K: O.K. Thank you.

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X 158 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Senator Scott/The Secretary
October 28, 1975
Time: 4:32 p.m.

K: How are you?

S: Fine. I wanted to give you a background on something. I talked to Helms several times and he said I have great respect for these guys. We had to push those names out -- they couldn't hold them indefinitely. He said don't worry about it. I will take the hold off of everyone but Sonnenfeldt. Later we confirmed him by voice vote.

K: I appreciate it very much. It is a very deserving appointment. He is just about the hardest line guy I have around here, I don't know why the conservatives were after him.

S: I told him I thought he was a conservative.

K: You know, I am coming to your state in November.

S: I am glad. I am not sure of the details though.

K: I am going November 11 to give a speech in Pittsburg. You are welcome to come.

S: It is birthday, so I am not sure that I will make it.

K: Can I make a reference to you?

S: I would appreciate it -- you can wish me a happy birthday.

K: O.K. Many thanks.

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(X154) *

TELECON
The Secretary/Robert Seamans, Administrator, Energy Research Development Agency
October 28, 1975
Time: 3:15 p. m.

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

S: ... our relationship in the Middle East with Egypt and so on. I understand also at stake is our relationship with Congress, the public here and the use of nuclear energy and there is increasing concern about everything we do in the nuclear field and at all times to build one on top of the other. This is where I come in. I realize that at some point I may be asked what are my views on the agreement. I want to be sure that I will be able to properly answer questions as they come along, that I understand the backdrop and all that is centered into the final decisions that are being made.

K: Let me call you back because I have to go to a signing ceremony and then I will explain to you. When I explain it to you, you will agree with me that it gives more leverage [redacted] B1

Let me call you back before the end of the day.

S: I just want to be prepared.

K: No, these are fair questions.

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CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS, A/RPS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 25X6
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 9 JUN 2023
DATE/CASE ID: 31 MAR 2004 200102979

(X 170) *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sen. Humphrey
Sec. Kissnger
October 28, 1975
3:45 p.m.

K: Hubert how are you.

H: Fine. I'm trying to follow-up on our talk last night. I reached the Governor's office last night. I talked to his secretary -- Burke -- and told him it was imperative that the Governor receive Sadat. He told me that he would receive Sadat.

K: He should call on Sadat.

H: He will call on Sadat. I meant to say will call on Sadat.

K: Yes.

H: I am waiting back for any further confirmation but the secretary told me and assured me that he would do so.

K: You are a good friend.

H: I have been on the hpone for half an hour with Abe Beam. Some of these Jewish leaders talked him into making that damn fool statement and I think it is ludicrous that he has done so. I will get Carry to take Abe with him. That will get Abe off the hook.. I will arrange that and take him right on up there when they call on him.

K: You are a great friend and I think it is a great service to the country.

H: As I told Abe, for Christ's sake you can put your arms around brezhnev...

K: On the one hand he said that Zionist resolution is racist and now as the Mayor of New York City he cannot call on Sadat.

H: We passed a resolution calling on the Gen. Assembly to reject that. We passed it unanimousely. I think we will have 80 cosponsors of the resolution. I just wanted to report in to you. When I get the details from the Governor I will get back to you. Moynihan is calling him too.

K: I asked him to do so but I don't know that he did.

H: Carry will do it and I will make sure that he picks up that Mayor. I said we have enough trouble down here and all this does is make it more difficult for us to pass this Middle East Aid Bill which includes $2 1/2 billion for Israel.

K: He got himself talked into it by a few local people and did not look at the national or international side.

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H: If New York City has any hopes of help from down here...

K: Ma-y thanks.

H: That was fun last night.

K: I thought one more turn and she would go off the precipice. I don't think it will play very well in Riyahd.

END

X175 *

TELECON
Mr. Ben Bradley/Secretary Kissinger
October 29, 1975
Time: 6:00 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: When you said you would get me off the record I didn't know how seriously you meant it.

B: What are you talking about?

K: About that Ottawa thing.

B: *O.K. I had forgotten about that. Would you do me a favor? Things are* very confused in Beirut. My man is marooned in his hotel room, he was dictating when they were caught. He is being told that he is very low priority to get out.

K: What is his name?

B: Jonathan Randel.

K: Let me see what I can do.

B: Without getting anyone in trouble.

K: I don't know what the facts are.

B: *There is one other guy in there. Markham from the New York* Times has gotten out, but Godley tells my man that he is low priority.

K: Wait a minute, if one gets out then the other has to get out too.

B: I am not sure of my facts, everything is so confused.

K: You had better not get caught somewhere because I won't lift a finger to help you.

B: (Laughter) I know that. I just wanted to make sure he wasn't left there.

K: I will do everything I can, my friend.

B: O.K. Bye.

K: O.K.

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X172 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
SG Waldheim/Kissinger
8:40 a.m. - 10/29/75

K: Hello.

W: Yeh, good morning, Henry.

K: Good. I am sorry I couldn't get back to you last night.

W: That's all right. Don't worry. Henry, I just wanted to tell you what my impressions are on the Sahara. The emotions in Morocco are going very high and involves some difficulties to discuss quietly the situation. The emotions are so high there including the King himself. He wants to continue the march and only if Spain agrees to cede the Sahara to him and to Mauritania, he is ready to step up the march.

Now the reaction by President Boumedienne is serious. I never saw him so furious and rather uncontrolled than on that occasion. I had several meetings with him and he was always very much controlled.

K: He's always very controlled.

W: He wants to do that and that means fire in the area. I'm definitely not ready to tolerate this. He made a quick reference to the resistance of Polisario (sp. ?), but he said this is not the worst. If it comes to such a solution then it will have repercussions not only on the neighboring states but those on the Middle East. He asked me to tell you that he cannot tolerate such a development. In other words, he means between Morocco and Spain and he asked me to convey to you his request that you make a suggestion to the Moroccans to stop the march and to start reasonable negotiations on the basis of existing resolutions; in other words, a self-examination for the people of the Sahara. But I want to stress that the mood of Boumedienne is very serious and he seems to be decided to do whatever is in his means to block any solution worked out between Spain and the Moroccans.

I then had, in Madrid, extensive talks with the Prime Minister. It seems to be that the Prime Minister is more _____ than the Foreign Minister. But we discussed a compromise solution inasmuch as I suggested that they should work out a plan that Spain is making a declaration to restore everything in two or three months. That then to establish an interim administration of let's say, six months or so and during this interim administration Moroccans, Mauritanians and representatives of the population of the Spanish Sahara could participate already in that interim administration to work out the conditions of the referendum or consultations -- of course a referendum will be difficult with _____ there.

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W: (con't) I was mentioning an agreement which was reached in '62 between the Netherlands and Indonesia. It was a very similar procedure. The Indonesians were already involved in their interim administration before the Finns (?) turned over their territory to the Indonesians. So in this way maybe a resolution could be found. I have mentioned this to King Hassan when I was there. He did not reject it but he didn't accept it either because he said, "Well, ~~xxxxxxxx~~ firstly we have to get a direct transfer of the power from the Spaniards to us." Actually when I mentioned this same idea to Boumedienne he was in favor of it and thought that it would, at any rate, be a compromise one could discuss. And Spain was rather enthusiastic about it. Both of them -- I put these ideas on paper and both of them, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, are rather enthusiastic about it saying "Well, if they ~~xxxx~~ are agreed, that would of course, get them basically out of the dilemma.

K: What do you suggest we do?

W: Sorry?

K: How do you suggest we proceed?

W: I think that certainly, Henry, it is important to send a message to the King to stop that march because the real danger is that if he is crossing the border that the real resistance is not by the Spaniards. The Spaniards, I think, are not so ready to fight. They don't want a colonial war, but the whole area is full of mines. The Spanish government has told me this. Also the mines are marked by the Spaniards. It is easy to see that there could be an incident and this would create some serious problem. And then, of course, Ricarios (?) supported by _____ by a shooting incident, guerilla warfare, etc. I must repeat, however, I was that much impressed by the extremely tough and rather emotional way in which Boumedienne reacted. He said if it comes to such a solution, this is the beginning of a fire in the whole area and I shall not fail to do whatever I can to fight against such a solution. So I was quite impressed because normally, you know, he is always rather quiet, but he was extremely tough and rather emotional. Complaining bitterly, not only about King Hassan saying it is the end of our relations but also about President Ould Daddah calling him a hypocrite. I said, well I try to defend Ould Daddah saying my impression was that he was a little embarrassed, that he would rather prefer a solution which maintains the friendship with _____. He said, "Oh no, he is a hypocrite." He could help in talking the King out of this whole thing but he doesn't do it, he is just going along and supporting him. He is extremely bitter and I'm afraid he will react in one way and the other. He didn't elaborate.

K: Who did he say was a hypocrite?

W: (Apparently the Secretary General did not hear the question.) He could not tolerate this and that he would have to react. And he asked me repeatedly to convey this position to you asking you to help in avoiding such a bilateral deal with Spain because it would have consequences, not only for the region directly concerned but also for the neighboring regions and he mentions the Middle East especially.

K: OK, well, I'll keep that very much in mind. And I'll let you know what we plan to do.

W: Yeh. I just wanted to -- I wish to repeat that I consider the situation very serious. If you could perhaps _____ or if you think that I could talk to Sisco this morning, he's coming for the lunch that I'm giving for President Sadat.

K: Yeh, I will tell them to talk to you.

W: Sorry.

K: I will urge one of them to call on you.

W: Yeh. Because I could then give you more in regard to this compromise plan which I have just mentioned and which could perhaps be a way out of the dilemma. For your information, after having been in Madrid I then sent one of my closest colaborators, the Frenchman, I sent him to the King. He was received by the King yesterday afternoon and he sent me a cable saying that he got the impression that although the King did not immediately agree to this compromise he was giving not a positive answer but he thought that there is a possibility to do something about it and he will fly on to Boumedienne this morning to see how he reacts finally and if there is anything new I'll let you know.

K: OK. And I'll send Sisco or Atherton to see you.

W: Yeh, I would appreciate that because I could give them all the details especially in regard to this compromise idea.

K: I'll do it immediately. OK, thank you.

W: Goodbye.

K: Goodbye.

X173 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Ted Koppel
Sec. Kissinger
October 29, 1975
2:20 p.m.

TK: Mr. Secretary I have a couple of questions. First, on Lebanon -- are you able to give me any guidance on what the US is doing -- what we are getting from Bob is just a bland statement urging restraint on the neighbors.

K: The basic situation is caused by the fact that the real balance between the Moslems and Christians has been altered partly as a result of the PLO. Our major concern is to keep the Syrian military out and to prevent this thing from escalating into a general conflict.

TK: Any indication that the Syrians want to bring their military in.

K: No. If they did there intention might be to prevent a total overturn of the balance by the PLO.

TK: Would the Israelis have to respond then.

K: Yes. It would be hard for them not to.

TK: Why in fact have you ordered all Americans out of there.

K: It is physically too dangerous.

TK: The other embassies have not other than the British.

K: This is a decision that is usually left to the local Ambassador.

TK: And Godley recommended it.

K: Yes. We did not take the initiative.

TK: One question about the event night before last.

K: Where was I.

TK: At the White House dinner -- this may seem like a frivolous question but I am serious. When Pearl Bailey danced with Sadat-- I am interested in doing a piece on how the perceptions of different cultures can lead to different audiences . I know that to Americans it looks friendly and innocuous but as I understand it, particularly the MOslems are upset.

K: I don't think it will play well in Riyahd.

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TK: Is it your understanding that any kind of dancing is forbidden -- not just public.

K: That I don't know. But certainly public dancing is forbidden.

TK: Any feedback from Arab capitals.

K: No, but I would not be amazed that the reaction/we are talking on deep background - - I would not be amazed if the reaction would be roughly what you expect. To say sort of pained but the mere fact of having to explain it gets you into difficulties.

TK: Why is he going to heavy on the Zionism thing. That csn be explained too but the mere fact that ...

K: Our press I think is getting to be unconscionable. You get a lot of Jewish people on the press hacking at thim.

TK: If he had just limited himself to the Zionism quote when he starts talking about the Jewish (boycott.

K: Whether it is true or not it is stupidity. It is also probably untrue. I am sure this is a great story in Cairo.

TK: What's a good story.

K: That is a good answer to give in Cairo.

TK: Yes.

K: It will take a while to make the cultural adjustment.

X177 *

TELCON
U/Sec. Sisco/Kissinger
8:51 a.m. - 10/30/75

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.5(D)

K: Joe?

S: Yes, sir.

K: I'm counting on your reading to Fahmy some of the Israeli requests.

S: Oh yes, um-hmm.

K: From a paper.

S: I'll get the paper that he left. It's an oral piece of paper and use that. As you indicated last night.

K: The paper they first brought -- not that they left. Are we talking about the same thing?

S: I hope we are.

K: I wish Fahmy to be told -- there's only two choices, whether you do it or I do it.

S: First, if you'll tell me to be sure I know what you're talking about. I'm not sure I know what you're talking about.

K: What I'm talking about is that I want the Egyptians to know some of the original Israeli requests. I know NEA AND you are violently opposed to it but it will be done.

S: You're talking about the [redacted] now. B1

K: No, I do not talk. .

S: I'm sorry, Henry, I just did not. . .

K: I talk about the original requests of the Memorandum of Understanding -- the paper they came over with.

S: All right. Well, let me dig that up right away.

K: I'm counting on it being read to them.

S: All right. That's what you want. I shall do that. And I'll just get the original -- way back.

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K: I mean I just want to show them how much we cut it back.

S: Right. All right. OK. What do I do if as I read from it he insists on having it in his hands.

K: Well, he can't keep it. Just don't give it to him in a situation where he can make a copy of it.

S: OK. Well, I'll just get him into a situation where we're in a room where he can't keep it.

K: But I think it would be useful to them.

S: All right, I'll get it right away. I know where it is. It's in the file and I'll pull it out now.

K: Second, I've just had a long talk with Waldheim.

S: Yes.

K: Which is nearly incomprehensible to me. He's got a compromise plan for the Sahara and he says Boumedienne is almost really irrational with rage and if that is true, and he would like to talk to you or Atherton today while you're up there.

S: I'll talk to him.

K: Will you call on him then?

S: Sure, absolutely.

K: And send me a memo.

S: And send you a report.

K: And - can we make arrangements that business doesn't stop completely while you two guys are traveling.

S: Atherton is here -- he's not traveling.

K: Oh, he's not traveling?

S: No, we decided not to do that. We felt it was to o many.

K: I agree.

S: He'll be right here. In fact he's going to follow up on this [redacted] negotiation B1 with the fellows.

K: OK. Good. Will you get that for me then.

S: Yeh. Saunders is here as well. And I'll get you a full report.

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K: You get an analysis of what Waldheim is suggesting.

S: I'm seeing him at lunch today, but I'll get an appointment with him. Call him.

K: Why don't you have somebody call and make an appointment.

S: I will -- for this afternoon.

K: Because if it is as he says . . . Finally, I would like ~~Percy(?)~~ Murphy instructed to tell Asad that he's coming home to discuss the situation. That ~~Murphy~~ has turned him down.

S: Right.

K: So that he, Murphy, can then call on him to give him our thinking and that if Asad has anything to say -- any messages or any further consideratio -- we would be very grateful, both on the Middle East and on Lebanon.

S: All right.

K: Because he's coming back for a policy discussion.

S: All right. And this also puts. .

K: You know it's just insane judgement to just low-key to Khaddam. What the hell is he going to learn from Khaddam?

S: Not a damn thing and he's the wrong person to talk to as you well know.

K: OK, so would you. . .

S: I have it.

K: Thank you.

UNCLASSIFIED

X178 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sen. Inouye
Sec. Kissinger
October 30, 1975
9:00 a.m.

K: Senator, I got your friendly letter yesterday. I did not know what you were talking about frankly. Let me tell you what happenend. One of those stupidities. First my apolicies. I had no idea what had been going on.

I: I figured you didn't. We had sent 4(?) letter I think.

K: I called on Senator McClellan before it was passed and explained to him that all the documents that the Foreign Relations had, had been released and I left one additional document with him which represents the legal analysies of the other document. I will be glad to send you that documentation but I have two concerns which I want to raise with you. One, is the concern that I do not want to raise the proposition that whatever assistance request we submit derives from the Sinai agreement. I think it derives from the nature of our relationships with the parties and I think we will get into a very bad situation if we imply that we buying these agreements.

I: That is far from it.

K: This is my concern. You did not say this but I want you to know my concerns. The second concern I have which I hope you can understand is that I am, in principle -- I have no hesitation to showing you anything but I have some concern establishing the principle that any Committee could ask for any document that really should gro properly to the Foreign Relations Committee. We have to protect these documents or we want have a foreign policy left. I am not worried about your leaking.

I: Youwill never have leaks from my place.

K: If we agree that any Committee can ask for documents -- I had the same problem withthe Armed Servcies Committee. I think the Foreign Relations Committee leaks more than others. I had rather do it on the basis of showing them to you. Although we have nothing to show.

I: If that is the case, let's just have a copy in our files.

K: Of what has been published. I will send it over to you. You certainly did not rate such an answer. The answer should have been that they have already been published and these are the official documents from which you can work. I would like to send my Legal Advisoer up to go over the legal document with you. You can use it as you see fit but use it as your personal document rather than the official document. My apologies. I was not aware of these other problems.that had gone before.

I: All right. Wish you luck in New York.

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X 188 *

TELECON

Mayor Richard Daley/Secretary Kissinger
October 31, 1975
Time: 6: 50 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Mr. Mayor, I wanted to thank you for your great reception -- the one you gave to Sadat yesterday. It was good for our country.

D: That is all I know. What you were trying to do is good. I thought all of us should be helpful. It is a difficult situation. I talked to our fellows -- the majority were understanding. I said I think this man is the only hope.

K: Exactly.

D: I said if you can't see that, there is something wrong with your leadership.

K: Exactly. There is no other hope for Israel. They will have a radicalized 130 million Arabs on their back without Sadat.

D: He has a great respect for you. They were fine people. I think he is sincere -- he said all I am trying to do is to restore and continue peace in the area. We should do everything to help him. He said I am criticized, but I said we all are so don't worry about that. Out here I am criticized but I do the best I can.

K: Well also my wife.....

D: She was tickled to death today when they visited the center.

K: She is a great fan of yours.

D: Nancy was with them today.

K: She told me what nice things you said about me in the introduction -- it means a lot to me.

D: Anything I can do to help you -- you are helping all of us. I don't like the action in the Congress -- what is the matter with them?

K: You are a great patriot -- I am an admirer of yours.

D: Thanks for your thoughtfulness in calling, Mr. Secretary.

K: Thank you for what you did.

D: Bye.

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X 186 *

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Roy Atherton
10/31/75; 10:10 a.m.

K: Hello.

A: Hello, Mr. Secretary.

K: Roy, I see the old protective organization is working well.

A: What's this?

K: I haven't heard one word about Toon from you.

A: Oh, no, no, I sent a message and we got a reply. Haven't you seen them?

K: Why should I? That might be of interest.

A: I will get the references to your staff and . . .

K: The next thing is I want a message to Rafi in Syria saying that Toon made these statements without authority and not on instructions.

A: Yes.

K: And that they do not reflect our policy.

A: Yes. All right, sir.

K: And you send a copy of that to Toon.

A: Okay.

K: And you tell Toon that he is not in business for himself.

A: Yeah. The message that went out last night I think made clear that he was to stick to lines that have been approved -- approved guidance -- not free will and his response, uh, it doesn't really explain what I think was an incredible performance but it does say that he regrets and will be more careful in the future. He does however add that -- he says, I [redacted] stand on what I said.

K: Well, you reply to that and say if he wants to stand on what he said he better do it back here and not as Ambassador. You tell him that remark is totally inappropriate and he is hereby instructed to stick to our policy and if he can't do it, then he should come home. What does it mean he stands by what he said?

A: Well, those were his words.

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K: Well you tell him that that remark is inappropriate and I want an explanation.

A: Okay. Well, I'll get . . .

K: You tell him I expect Ambassadors to follow guidance. If there is any problem with it, could he please explain it to me.

A: All right.

Have you seen our suggested press guidance on this? For today -- because there will be questions ϕ about what we have -- we said yesterday that we were asking Toon for the transcript and we've got it now. I gave Bob Anderson . . .

K: Yeah, that's fine.

A: Okay. Mr. Secretary, can I ask you one other thing -- I've just had a call from Dinitz on the second boat and he said he has had a very strong reply from . . .

K: The answer is no and we will ~~XXX~~ side with the Egyptians.

A: What they have said is they want us -- they want this to become routine and they don't think they ought to even have to go through us. They were doing it the first few times to be sure there weren't any foul ups.

K: It cannot be done while Sadat and Fahmy are here.

A: Yeah, that's what I would like to go back and say.

K: And you tell them after that they can make it as routine as they want.

A: Exactly. That is exactly what I would like to say. We don't want to be in the middle of this.

K: And we don't say they have to do it through us every time but this God dammit can't be done while Fahmy and Sadat are traveling through the country and we have next to no effective means of communication and their meamsn of communication are poor.

A: Right. This is what I said yesterday. Rabin's reponse is that they can't accept this reasoning. That's exactly how Dinitz put it to me.

K: Tell them if they proceed we will have to ~~stay~~/ state our views publicly. We consider this a provocation.

A: All right, well this is what I wanted to reply and I . . .

K: You tell them that it has been taken up at the White House and we consider it a provocation and not an exercise to -- to put this to the Egyptians at a time when they are in grave -- when they are travelling in this country. Let them give us a date after Sadat has been here and after he is back.

A: After he is back in Egypt.

K: After he is back in Egypt. Then they can make it as routine as they want.

A: Right, that's precisely the line I would like to take.

K: Yeah. But take it strongly.

A: Yes. Yes.

K: And I say it has been raised here.

A: Right. I will do that.

K: Good. Thank you.

A: Thanks

X181 *

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Joe Sisco
10/31/75; 10:17 a.m.

K: Hello.

S: Henry, I know you are going before the Pike Committee so I will only take ten seconds just to tell you that Daly did such a tremendous job last night and particularly in what he said about you that later after you have testified you ought to give him a call and thank him for the tremendous job he has done with Sadat and he was just great!

K: Thank you.

S: And Nancy -- he singled out Nancy. But Henry, you got as big a round of applause here last night as Sadat and this Mayor just stood out in very sharp contrast to New York.

K: Yeah.

S: Yeah.

K: Well I gave Mayor Beame a little Hazing in New York.

S: Did you?

K: Yeah.

S: Well, Sadat and the Egyptians are up in cloud nine with the reception that this man has given them.

K: Terrific. I'll call him if I am still ambulatory.

S: Well I hope you are and good luck.

K: We have turned down this idea of another ship transit on Sunday.

S: I know. I told Roy to tell you the following: That you might tell the Israelis that while we don't agree -- we don't disagree that this should become routine. We can try to make this routine after the man has left.

K: That's right.

S: Thank you, Henry.

K: Bye.

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X193*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. David Frost/Secretary Kissinger
October 31, 1975
Time: 8:50 p.m.

K: David, how are you?

F: Very well. Longing to see you whenever you have a moment.

K: Where are you.

F: I think I am in London at the moment. But I was wondering when we could get together and knowing that running the world is a busy occupation I wondered what your movements were in the next two weeks. What do you think about the sober BBC interview idea?

K: I haven't come to any conclusions about it yet.

F: It didn't involve there being any hard views at the interview. The BBC wanted me to do this week review on world issues and for New Years we could do the priorities of last year and then get into the priorities of next year, the issues that will be coming into importance. There don't have to be any amazing news breaks.

K: I will let you know definitely at the end of next week.

F: That is lovely.

K: Our those live -- can they be taped?

F: Oh, yes. We can tape it anytime in December as a review of the world issues that will really count in the coming year or counted in the past year. We can talk before hand to decide what to include but I want to do a serious reflective conversation on world issues.

K: Let me let you know by the end of next week.

F: Lovely. I have longed to talk in public as we have so often talked in private over dinner.

K: I eventually come through for my friends.

F: I know this occurred to me as one that would be the best conversation to be aired first to British audiences. It would create good will.

K: Let me think about it. Let me ask my colleagues. The general advice I get is not to go on foreign television.

F: Foreign affairs are a portion of your responsibilities so you have a defense.

K: Call me at the end of next week.

F: You have done Barbara Walters three times since I talked to you.

K: She is less risky than you are.

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F: Oh, I hope we are better friends than that. How do I check to see if you have a spare meal?
K: Call Mr. Bremer.

F: Mr. Bremer. alright.

K: Is it a one hour program?

F: Almost, 45 minutes. It is the wekk of New Years and the plan is to do an examination of the issues of black and white, ARab and Israeli and rich and poor nations and the ...

K: I have read your letter.

F: In the middle of the week is the fulcrum -- yourself.

K: O.K. Call me at the end of the week.

F: Absolutely done. Greetings from London and look forward to seeing you soon.

K: Hope to see you soon.

F: Greetings.

K: O.K. Bye.

Saturday
November 1, 1975
3:10 P.M.

TELECON

X198 *

Secretary Kissinger/Joseph Alsop

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: Joe, I'm not sure I understand your message..... can you come earlier...?

A: I told you I was tied up at 7:00. [redacted] B6

K: So you can come later?

A; I can come anytime that suits you, in fact I'll give you dinner, if you'd like.

K: Where?

A: Well, we could go out.

K: Quietly. Let me call you about 5:00 pm about that.

A: Okay.

K: Maybe we should do that, ----have a quiet dinner, where we can talk.

A: I'll take you to the Chinese restaurant, where they give me this little private room at the Yung Sing Palace.

K: Okay, why don't we do that....around 8:00 pm.

A: Okay.

K: And I'll call you at 5:00 pm and confirm it.

A: That's fine.

K: Good

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X 199 *

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/The Secretary
November 1, 1975
Time: 2:45 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

S: The Pittsburg speech. I didn't get to the meeting this morning. I don't think the detailed summit stuff in there should stay. It involves you and makes you vulnerable.

K: No. I told them to cut down on details.

S: Good speech as far as the theme is concerned.

Do you want some of the papers for the Monday meeting? To read on the plane?

K: Yes, you can bring them by. I have to go to the dentist now.

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Saturday
November 1, 1975
3:15 P.M.
TELECON

X197 *

HAK/Julie Eisenhower

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

J: Hi, this is Julie. How are you.

K: Fine. I was very moved by your letter, which I got yesterday. And I want you to know that this story came out on the day I left for China, and I called your father immediately and it is an absolutely outrageous story. The whole conversation was in the context of my explaining to that lady who was the Speaker of the Parliament that I consider your father.....the whole conversation started when she asked me to list the outstanding President's of the post-war period.....and I said Truman and your father. And she listed a whole lot of criticisms and said how can he be an outstanding President? That's when this other quote came. I said, even if all of this is true, and he was all these things.....Then I did say to her that you have to understand what a tremendous effort of discipline this man made ---- who was not a natural politician -- who was really quite shy, and extremely sensitive -- to make himself a politician.

J: Right.

K: So, I wanted you to know that I called the newspapers and tried to get this story killed. I never made these statements. This was answering questions -- and they just took isolated sentences.....and strung them all together into one coherent speech....and there was absolutd y nothing I could do about it. If you read carefully, you will see that I said, for example, Kennedy was a bastard.....they could hav e put that on the headline.

J: Oh, I know, well. You know it must be Tricia who wrote you, I didn't write.

K: Oh, was it Tricia?

J: It must have been Tricia. But I think you are so nice to call and I'll call Tricia this afternoon, and .....

K: Well, I'll call her myself. Where is she?

J: She lives in New York. The WH Opr. has the number.

K: Well, I want you to know that I was deeply touched by it.

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J: It was nice of you to call Daddy...

K: I want you to know.....well, I called him as soon the story appeared.

J: Yes, he told me that.

K: And I want you to know that I have never forgotten who appoint ed me as Assistant, and who made me Secretary of State.

J: Well, I know that.

K: And, you know I've called your father every two weeks or so since he has been in San Clemente.

J: That's great. That's means a lot. It really does, because he is isolated. It is so very nice of you to call, and I really appreciate it.

K: Well, I, ll call Tricia myself. You can call her too, but I'll give her a call.

J: Well, that's really kind. And please say hello to David and Elizabeth.

K: Thank you, I will.

X221*

TELECON
Mr. Rogers/Secretary Kissinger
November 4, 1975
Time: 6:22 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: Hello, who is this.

R: This is Bill Rogers, sir.

K: Oh yes. How did we get into this mess with Brazil?

R: We sent one cable which follows the standard format.

K: I don't think we should use Brazil like we do others.

R: I have told Crimmons not to press forward with respect to those issues. He is under instructions not to raise it another notch. He is seeing Silverra tomorrow. We are getting a read out from him after he sees him tomorrow.

[redacted] B6

K: You had better hold off on my Latin trip. Don't send the cables before you check with me. I have to check out this crazy situation here.

R: I was right about that.

K: It hadn't occurred to me when the public perception is that the foreign policy is in good shape and the economic policy is in bad shape to fire the foreign side.

R: You will be divisible by four soon. I am going to raise the lease with you. The British sent a few reinforcements in a panic situation.

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K: Will it hold until I see Callaghan?

R: No, I think it will fall out before then.

K: Well...

R: We will have something for you by tomorrow.

K: O.K. Good.

X223 *

TELECON
Mr. Eagleburger/Secretary Kissinger
November 4, 1975
Time: 7:30 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

E: Kraft threw me off base. He has the Hyland thing.

K: What Hyland thing?

E: That he has gone over to the NSC. I said i didn't know much about it. The Schecter thing is that he is anxious to see you later this week. They are doing a cover story on how it happened and what it means. He said the story around town is that the newsweek story is from Van Vorst coming up to you and weedling it out of you. I blew up at that.

K: McCloskey told me that already.

E: I think Van Vorst ought to explain that.

K: Will you call him and tell him it is a lie.

E: I will call Bruce and also call him back.

K: I told you what I told Bruce. I told him he had the context wrong but I didn't tell him what the context was. What did Evans want?

E: He wasn't there but I left word for him to call me.

K: I wonder when Schlesinger is going to unleash. He will unleash on someone. [redacted]. B6

E: That is another element. Anyway I wanted you to know it wasn't very deep on either case.

K: O.K. Good.

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X230 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELECON
Ambassador Richardson/The Secretary
November 4, 1975
Time: 3:55 p. m.

K: How are you? Congratulations.

R: Well, thanks. I have rather mixed feelings again about moving so soon.

K: No, I think it was the right decision.

R: I think it is good. I think it is very interesting. The more I learn here about international economic trade problems, I think it is important.

K: I think that is right.

R: I was really calling mainly about my successor. Have you given that any thought?

K: I haven't come up with any names.

R: I have one suggestion which I think would be well received here and who would do a good job- [redacted] B6

K: Is he from Boston?

R: [redacted] B6

K: Let me raise it with the President.

R: I think the British would like the fact, because I have asked two or three people, that I have occasionally made joking remarks that I recommended him to Bob Ingersoll in October 74, having no idea I was coming here myself. [redacted] B6

K: I don't know him. Let me mention him to the President when I see him. When will you be back?

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R: I plan to be back for a meeting and will be in Washington for miscellaneous business on the 13th and 14th of November. I understand you will be away.

K: No, I will be here. Yes, why don't you come in.

R: OK.

K: Good, I look forward to seeing you again.

R: I will look forward to seeing you more often.

K: It will be a pleasure to work more closely with you again.

X211*

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.5(D)

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Roy Atherton
11-4-75; 8:30 a.m.

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CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 25X6
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 9 JUN 2013
DATE/CASE ID: 14 JUL 2003 200102979

K: Hello.

A: Mr. Secretary.

K: Yes.

A: I just want to report on my talk with Joe last night. By the time I got back to him he had -- he and Herman had already seen Fahmy. This is on the seabird.

K: And of course they did what I had told you I didn't want done. Right?

A: Well he said that they just put it to him in a very flat non-pressure . . .

K: I told you that this shouldn't be done and you did it anyway.

A: Well, I . . .

K: No, I had said all week long it shouldn't be done that way -- did I not? You just went ahead.

A: No, the last I knew, Mr. Secretary, you had said you were going to take it up over the weekend.

K: That is right and I told Sisco on the way out and I told Herman not to take it up and nothing had changed on that.

A: That's exactly what they did . . .

K: No you did not! You simply carried a message for the Israelis which I told you not to do.

A: Well I am sorry. Larry had called Joe and Joe was already acting on the basis of that call which I gather was that -- as I understood it from Larry -- that he should . . .

K: Joe should take up what I ordered him to do. All right. What is the answer?

A: Fahmy said that they have no problem with the ship going northbound empty. When it picks up its load and starts back, then he said that they would like it to delay for about a month. But he said as far as the first transit is concerned he sees no problem. My recommendation would be that we not tell the Israelis this until Wednesday.

K: All right, tell them on Wednesday that I've taken it up and they can move it north.

A: And then I think we just have to get out of this business because they are planning to send ships through very frequently. There are three they announced in the ticker today that they play to send through in the next few weeks. And I think we ought to stay out of it.

K: Yeah. They are unbelievable [redacted]! B1

A: Except when we do tell them about this one I think we ought to say they ought to stop putting out a press release everytime there is a ship scheduled to go and go quietly.

K: Okay. I've got to go into a meeting.

A: All right. Fine. Thank you.

X228 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ms. Tricia Nixon Cox/Secretary Kissinger
November 4, 1975
Time: 4:35 p.m.

K: Tricia?

C: Hello, this is Tricia Nixon.

K: How are you?

C: Fine.

K: I received your letter last week. I first thought it was from Julie but I called her and found out it was from you. I wanted to tell you that I was moved by it and that I think you are right. What you couldn't have known was that these news stories came out when I left for China and therefore I could do nothing about counteracting them but call your father. It was a vicious story. I never said any of these things in a coherent conversation. The whole conversation developed out of a conversation with the lady from Parliament ask ing me to name two outstanding Presidents, post-war Presidents. I said Truman and your father. Then she asked me questions criticising him. All of the comments were not representative of the questions she made. Then what I said about your father was really in the context of the fact that I was amazed that he had entered political life because he is a sensitive man.

C: We have all been misquoted.

K: This was a dinner conversation.

C: I read something that was sent to me from one of the Chicago papers. It was an editorial about what you were alleged to have said. The press were in another room so they must have gotten it garbled.

K: There was one girl who put a tape recorder on it. This was a two and a half hour dinner conversation they took out all the things that sounded critical of your father and printed them. They didn't put in anything where I contrasted your father favorably with Kennedy. Only the New York Times printed that.

C: I can't say that I am surprised.

K: One half of the things that were ascribed to me the lady said. They all admitted that you could barely understand what was said. I feel very strongly about the point you made.

C: Which one?

K: That your father did me the honor of appointing me Secretary of State, and that I should stand by him.

C: He still sticks by you.

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K: I have tried to stick by him and I call him regularly and try to help him with my colleagues here. I feel strongly that you should know I have not forgotten him.

C: That is all I care about. I said that our whole family really supports everything you are trying to do and we are proud that Daddy appointed you and that you are making a great representative for our country.

K: Your father designed the foreign policy that we are carrying out now.

C: Our country really needs you.

K: Above all I want you and your family to know that I have not forgotten your father and that I am sticking with your father also.

C: He is staying with you too.

K: It was a touching letter that you wrote me.

C: It was a letter of concern because even knowing how the press distorts things and gets them wrong I felt the letter was necessary.

K: I wanted to let you know that it made an impression. I hope to see you again.

C: Good. Bye.

K: Bye.

X212 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec. Kissinger
Max Fisher
November 4, 1975
10:00 a.m.

F: Henry, How are you?

K: O.K., Max.

F: I was in Washington all day yesterday. You certainly got enough print in the newspaper.

K: We certainly know how to get headlines.

F: I know a bit about what is going on -- more than what the newspapers talk about. I think it would be appropriate -- I will be in town again on Friday -- are you going to be in town.

K: Yes. Friday is better for me than tomorrow.

F: What time can we get together?

K: Say, about 5:00.

F: I will see you at 5:00, Friday. I have quite a few things we should go over.

END

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X224 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Ramsbotham/Secretary Kissinger
November 4, 1975
Time: 7:03 p.m.

K: Before the Egyptians get to Britan remember our conversations about the sales you wanted to make to them? We have no objections, I wanted to make that clear.

R: You used the word essential.

K: It is desirable. They asked us to put in a good word for them.

R: I know. There are no obstacles there as far as I know. I will pass that on. I hope we can -- I look forward to seeing you at breakfast.

K: Haven't they set it for Friday?

R: Yes.

K: Good look forward to seeing you.

R: Bye.

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X210 *

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Jerry Bremer
11/4/75; 8:18 a.m.

K: Hello, Jerry.

B: Yes, sir.

K: Jerry, I want to see Gleysteen and Lord and Solomon at 9:30 at the State Department.

B: All right, sir.

K: And at 10:00 I want to see Hartman.

B: Okay.

K: Also at the State Department. I don't want anything scheduled for the White House anymore.

B: I understand. Okay.

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X 322 *

TELECON
Mr. Hartman/Secretary Kissinger
November 4, 1975
Time: 7:38 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I want to be sure we are writing regularly to Callaghan. Have you sent him something on Greece and Turkey. Why don't you do that tomorrow?

H: Have you seen the letter on Belize?

K: I am going to hold that. Rogers wants to do something else tomorrow.

H: I think they took it back because Hal got something at breakfast, I remember. We will do something on the other thing tomorrow.

K: Good.

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X213*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Lewis Harris
Sec. Kissinger
November 4, 1975
3:25 p.m.

K: How are you?

H: Strictly, wild times, aren't they? I think the net of it is though, despite people thinking it was your hands in this, I don't think you come out badly at all.

K: It was not my hands.

H: I know it wasn't.

K: I don't know how it will strike public opinion.

H: I think ironically, the move by Nelson will have more impact than the others.

K: On whom, me?

H: No, no, on the public.

K: IN what way.

H: I think it will be unsettling even though the concern had been in the battle against Reagan. I think people think it gave an important quality to the Government.

K: I will be looking for that.

H: Will you be able to come to our meeting.

K: First, must it be at 11:30.

H: We can make it some other time.

K: Must it be on the 18th.

H: Yes. They are coming from all over the county.

K: My problem is I will be coming back with the President from the European Summit the 17th or 18th. If I come back on the 17th I could try to make it.

H: On the 18th you would get back late.

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K: Late in the day.

H: End of the day. I would hate to prevail on you that evening. That would be too much.

K: That would be a little too much.

H: You don't know when you would be coming back.

K: The present plan is the 17th but if Franco's death falls in th wrong way from your point of view, the President may stop on the way back.

H: And you would go with him.

K: Yes.

H: If earlier then it won't be.

K: If at any time this week I probably would not get back until the 18th.

H: Everything would go back a day.

K: No, we are not going to the funeral. It would be for the coronation of Juan Carlos.

H: I see. What shall I do?

K: Can you wait a couple of days and see how it looks. Say on Thursday.

H: All right, I will do that. On Thursday. I have to go out of the country but I will have Mr. Farrell of our office give you a call.

K: O.K. Why don't you do that.

X236 *

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
November 5, 1975
Time: 5:58 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Did Scowcroft call you about working on a speech for me?

S: Yes. He called about a speech for the President and your Pittsburgh speech.

K: I told him not to bother you about the speech for the President.

S: Winston is doing that but we are trying to stick to similar themes.

K: Win's should be more simple. Win should go ahead with the speech I told him to do and we will get your stuff in there.

S: About two or three pages?

K: As long as you think it should be. I think it is needed.

S: O.K.

K: Fine.

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X232 *

TELECON
Mr. Schlesinger/Secretary Kissinger
November 5, 1975
Time: 5:55 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Jim, how are you? I called you to tell you how much I regretted what has happened. I hope you know it wasn't my idea.

S: From what I know, this was not your idea.

K: You know, it is a pity our relationship developed as it did because I think you and I could have held this thing together.

S: That is correct.

K: And perhaps only you and I.

S: I am afraid there maybe something in that, Henry. Someone today said Henry has the best mind but we have to be careful. I muself will be careful in the sense of protective -- there is a lot of unfair stuff about you going around.

K: Some time when this thing quiets down I would like to sit down with you and figure out what went wrong.

S: I must say that your auspeciousness was a part of the problem. I tried to keep it undercontrol.

K: It would have been easy to say there was nothing to it but Jim you know that was sort of minor league harrassment -- that was not a cause for what happened.

S: That is a judgment with which I would inclined to concur.

K: What I have said to people is that when you and I are back in academic life our views will be only tactically different -- even about the Soviets.

S: I think we are reasonably close.

K: I really want you to know I regret it and it never occurred to me that anything like this could have happened.

S: I never occurred to me either.

K: I did my best to prevent it. I wish you well.

S: Thank you Henry.

K: Have you decided what you will do?

S: I just don't know. O.K. Henry.

K: I hope we can stay on contact.

S: Righto.

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K: All the best to you and your wife.

S: I think you are going to have a difficult time.

K: Of that I have no doubt -- bureaucratically not to speak of domestically.

S: O.K. Henry.

K: Nice to talk to you, bye.

X 237 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec. Kissinger
Mr. Buffum
November 5, 1975
3:10 p.m.

K: As far as I can see I am being blackmailed to proceed with that resolution.

B: Oh, really.

K: I am being told if he does not put it forward everyone will know I vetoed it.

B: I don't know why he should say that.

K: Can you call him (Moynihan) I am constantly at meetings today and he should understand that I have one or two other things on my mind and tell him of my concerns this morning that I mentioned.

B: I did. Right after Staff Meeting. He was hounding me.

K: What did he say?

B: He said he did not think the resolution would pass anyway and he would want a chance to discuss with you personally. Nowe we cannot be sure that it would pass and probably not in the present form. He felt that perhaps it could be put off until next year at a minimum. The disadvantages that you saw, I think, would really exist for us whether or not the resolution was adopted as long as we have taken the initiative to put it into this catatory.

K: Tell him I am just too harrassed to focus on this and can he wait a week.

B: Very good. All right. I think it would be over in Committee but it is subject for introduction.

K: Tell him I cannot address this thing today.

B: Very good.

3:43 p.m.

K: When you reach Moynihan, tell him I did try to return his call but now I am out of pockett again. Do tell him I am really deeply troubled about these things. I do have other concerns than him and he has to have a little compassion occasionally, hard as it may be for him, and not harrass me unmercifully when he has an idea. I feel sufficiently uncomfortable not to go ahead.

B: I think there is good reason not to. There is the memo which indicates (this) in as subjective a way as I could put it.

K: O.K.

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X245 *

TELCON
Sec. Kissinger
Herbert Schlosser
November 6, 1975
8:20 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Sorry, I could not get back to you.

S: I had no specific reason to call except after these announcements came out I wanted to say I am sure you are in great shape. I am sure there are a lot of questions and problems.

K: I am not talking to the press about it.

S: I know that. I am just calling to say take care and good luck.

K: You are very sweet. I would not go to far but I think things are perfect. Many thanks for calling.

S: Take care.

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X240 *

TELECON
M. Brousselet/Secretary Kissinger
November 6, 1975
9:30 am

RELEASED IN FULL

B: Henry Kissinger, this is Brosselette, how are you?

K: How are you.

B: I won't take much of your time but the President, who is in Tansania has asked me to call you about the Rambouillet meeting. There are three points. First, Shultz and the others have planned a new meeting in London next week. We understand you do not favor very much this meeting.

K: We don't see much sense in it.

B: We think it would do no harm.

K: Let me look at it again.

B: We won't press the matter. We want you to know we favor this meeting because they could look at the subjects that will be discussed and many other subjects will be discussed. Since the Heads of Government will not have much time, on the economic matters, maybe it would be better to have this group go over these things and agree to say what could be in an agreed communique. And after the meeting there could be an agreed communique and it would be better to work out beforehand what would be in the communique. But if you have a problem, it is ok.

K: Alright.

B: The second point is that we have organized the meeting so that sometimes the other Ministers would not have access to their Chiefs....

K: It is not a question of sometimes. Sometimes I think it is desirable but we get the impression that at no meals could any Minister w be with their Chief.

B: We have organized ~~it~~ it so that Ministers can participate in all meals at Rambouillet.

K: But our understanding is that they are in different rooms from the others.

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B: That can be decided at the last moment. My understanding is that meals will be taken monstly together and the President is aware of your views and asked me to tell you he is going to help as much as he can.

K: It is not so much important for me as for Simon.

B: You and the others too. But we are going to be flexible and follow your lead at the meeting, when we discuss these matters. The third point -- we are worried, you see, Rambouillet is a small place and your people are asking for far to much for your delegation to get in and out of the castle. We decided only 15 people from each country would be able to get in.

K: How many have we asked for?

B: Your requirements are different from Schmidt and Wilson, so we will be more flexible with you, but we will not be able to meet all your needs.

K: Don't worry about it.

B: We will discuss it with your embassy, so you don't feel too cramped.

K: They will understand, or we will understand it here. Will I see you there?

B: I don't think so. We planned this meeting as rather secluded and only a small group of people. I will be in Paris, but I don't think I will go to Rambouillet, unless they need me.

K: I may be able to see you then in Paris.

B: If you stay in Paris, or arrive a bit beforehand. I will see you with pleasure.

K: Good.

B: I hope I see you by the end of ~~a~~ next week.

K: Good. Nice to talk to you.

END

X 239

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TELECON
Mr. Ken Freed/Secretary Kissinger
November 6, 1975
Time: 7:35 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

F: How are you?

K: O.K.

F: I am getting pressure from my desk.....

K: I am not going to the dinner because there is a long-standing dinner engagement built around me, that I have had which I mentioned to the President. The President said don't break it. It has no significance.

F: That wasn't really what I wanted to talk to you about. Kormer said this is very serious, however.

K: Is he in your shop?

F: Yes, he covers the White House.

K: I asked the President -- tell him to check with him. I offered to him to change it.

F: Who is the dinner with?

K: It is a private one.

F: Well, since I went to China they have been trying to get me to do a SALT story. I held off but the response is in. I wonder if we could do a progress report.

K: I don't think this is an ideal moment.

F: How is the Soviet response -- will it change things?

K: I don't think it moved things forward very much.

F: What about the chances of an agreement.

K: We will have to see.

F: Have you decided what the next move will be?

K: We haven't had a meeting on it yet, because we are trying to find some of the players.

F: What does that mean?

K: (Laughter)

F: I guess I know what that means. What does this do about a summit meeting -- is it less likely there will be one?

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K: No, it will be down to two or three issues. The fact that they are not settled now doesn't mean they won't be settled next month. None of this is to be quoted you know.

F: Of course. The talk now is the summit will be late December or early January.

K: I am not going to speculate on that.

F: It doesn't sound good to me.

K: You guys have a vested interest in creating disaster.

F: It keeps things going. Listen have a nice dinner.

K: O.K. Bye.

(X241) *

TELCON
L. Eagleburger/Kissinger
11/6/75 - 10:45 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello. Larry?

E: Yes sir.

K: I think Bob Anderson should say that I'm planning a press conference early next week - probably Monday.

E: All right. I meant to mention that to you this morning.

K: See what I mean.

E: Yeh.

K: That would preempt also Schlesinger's thinking.

E: OK, I'll take care of it.

K: And you know we won't have to explain that.

E: No, that's right. OK, I'll take care of it.

K: I want to see you for a minute just before lunch. Can you be there at ~~xxxx~~ one -- about that matter you discussed with me this morning.

E: Yeh, I'll be there at one.

K: I found a solution.

E: OK. I'll be there.

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X 251 *

TELECON
Kay Graham/The Secretary
November 7, 1975
Time: 1:25 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Kay, how are you?

G: When I called you, I didn't realize you were having half of the staff to lunch. Henry, what I was going to propose to you was this. Would you think over -- and Phil has now gotten together with Harry for some reason or another, for good reasons I suppose. Harry called me and I have done one or two things once for the news side, but almost never and when I do I just say I am doing them officially.

K: Yeah.

G: And so I was wondering if you would think over the possibility of varying degrees of talking to us on the whole subject on what the hell is going on or the larger issues or on anything you want to talk about. I would like to talk to you. Let me propose two or three ways. One is if you see Marilyn on whatever basis--just straight news.

K: No. When do you want all of this?

G: Whenever you want it.

K: You would wait until next week?

G: Whenever you will do it. Will you do it in any form with Marilyn or with me and Meg, or as a last resort with me with their questions.

K: I will tell you that I will probably do it next week with you and Meg.

G: That would be fine--on your rules.

K: Fine. I think it might be useful for me to put things into perspective as far as I understand them.

G: I think it would be good for you and for us to be the conveyors of your thoughts.

K: Tuesday or Wednesday, no I will be out of town. Well sometime next week.

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X256*

TELCON
Hugh Sidey
Sec. Kissinger
November 7, 1975
12:00 noon

RELEASED IN PART
B6

S: What do you say, Henry?

K: Hi, Hugh.

S:You are still there. I have to check.

K: I find that a new way of making news.

S: How.

K: By just being there day after day. That is headlines.

S: I have a beautiful piece here. I wanted to check some of it with you.

[redacted] B6

S: It reminds me of Lyndon Johnson when he was getting a flowery introduction he said it was just a shame his father could not be here. My father would have enjoyed it and my mother would have believed it. Again, this is just a mood peace here casting you as the man of long duration. It would say and I quote you in talking about the bitterness that accumulates around a man who hasbeen in the office this long it is inevitable, says Kissinger, when you live at that level of power for seven years you gain criticism and few supporters. There are no exceptions -- Acheson, Dulles, Rusk. His relations remain as close an as popular with Ford as have ever been. It says you are still doing the White House briefings although the routine may change. Then I quoted this. Agains, this is your talking to friends or otherpeople. The news story around town is that Richardson is being brought back to take my place. If he is I know nothing about it but maybe some Sunday morning I will be called to the White HOuse and fired. Dr. Kissinger laughs. The sense of humor is still in contact. Seriously, he continues in his pursuit of peace

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and in the midst of some of his worst trouble he carries along the concern of the national interest. Do they think I want another upheaval after Watergate, Vietnam, the Middle East. What seems to hang in the balance now is whether we will go back to the days of cold war and unlimited arms build-up and bitter confrontation with the Soviet Union or whether we can keep the new relationship alive. Then we go on talking about this strange city of Washington which makes the effort to dismantle so much. Kissinger, hwn he is not protecting his flanks is still looking into the future. So many people seem to have the belief that God has been giving the United States the right to experiment with no penalty. The time has run out. If there is no accommodation with the Soviet Union now and no _____established for peaceful causes, we may slide back to the cold war. It wouldn't be like the 50s. If there is confrontation with the Soviet Union and we mobilize and take a stand it will be possible only if the people know we did all we could to prevent it. We have a great opportunity now .

K: Can you say will be sustainable rather than possible.

S: I see. O.K. We have a great opportunity now. The Soviet leaders have gotten older and tired. We are going the only way left. In a single matter of pursuit like the Soviets, Kissinger sometimes says he does look at times like a ruthless power grabber. Many friends have urged him to get out now. They believe that a man who staysssso long can only harbor more bi-terness. But the Secretary has said in conversations that someone has to stay in an pick up the pieces and fight the same battles. I go on about my views. Despite Congress and despite a cynical country he intends to stay as long as he can. He has found a personal reserve of enthusiasm in the middle lands. It amuses but gratifies him. They want Russian markets for grain and common sense says it is the only --accommodation. Also a peculiar thing now but thc Secretary has some support in Congress. He has gained a little yardage with the Pike Committee and a long with the Turkish miltiary embargo.

K: Could you avoid saying amuses but gratifies me. Amuses sounds too patronizing.

S: We can take it out.

K: I don't want it to seem as if I am looking down on these people whom I respect enormously.

S: I know that and I see your point. The survival is routed in the rightness of the goal even if sometimes his methods have been questioned. His chief worry is that politics will turn debate to personalities--his mainly-- and he may have to leave before he wants to. He is still armed with a sense of humor and sensitivity of what will matter around the world. Two

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years from now no one will give a damn if I am up down or side ways. These are the essential quotes.

K: Sounds very compassionate.

S: It is not that profound.

k; You have been a good friend and I appreciate it.

S: It is a tough old world.

K: It never ceases to produce surprises.

S: Anymore on the way.

K: Not that I am aware of it.

S: I am not either but I have been casing around town. Gosh, sakes it is kind of unfortunate. I think Ford has proper movites in mind and had he not had the press conference it might have worked well.

K: You think that hurt.

S: I think a great deal. When people conceive you to be weak or vacillating. In the middle of the Vietnam War with Johnson, I said something about leadership under crticism and he said one thing always remember you are not in trouble until they begin to pity you and that is when you...

K: That is a very good point.

S: You begin to -- as long as the criticisum is there you are still in comand of much.

K: Many thanks.

X253 *

TELECON
Ambassador Buffum/The Secretary
November 7, 1975
Time: 8:05 a. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I didn't get that paper. That paper wasn't put before me on the UN discussion. I don't want us to go actively lobbying against the Palestinian resolution.

B: Right.

K: I also would like ~~the~~ Moynihan to be somewhat restrained in his speech.

B: We have a draft prepared here. Atherton worked it up and Joe looked at it. It is here if you would like to look at it. We will send it in right away.

K: OK.

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X258 *

TELECON
Richard Valeriani/Secretary Kissinger
November 7, 1975
4:20 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

V: Fine. I saw that Dobrynin was in last night.

K: For fifteen minutes yesterday -- offering me honorary Soviet citizenship.

V: (laughter) Did he bring anything of interest on the SALT thing?

K: Well, Breshnev wants advice on how to handle domestic affairs.

V: He came to the right place. Did you___?

K: I tell you, it made me proud to be an American. I will say this, you have been decen and fair and balanced.

V: I tried to be.

K: You were.

V: There has been alot of stuff.

K: It is low.

V: I wondered if you were ready to set something up with Gromyko?

K: No.

V: You ar e not going anywhere else except with the President to Paris?

K: No.

V: I have heard the last response from the Soviets was not satisfactory.

K: That is correct.

V: Where does it sit now.

K: We are still exchanging ideas.

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V: Nothing beyond the regular channels?

K: Right.

VL Ok., thank you.

END

X260 *

TELCON
Sec. Kissinger
Sen. Humphrey
November 7, 1975
6:15 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

H: Henry.

K: Hubert, if you keep saying good things about me you will give me a hell of a problem next fall.

H: I am going to continue; it is just your hard luck. A man of your character has got to be forced to make hard decisions.

K: Now I have made you make an admission.

H: PRETTY clever. I am going to ask you to do something but we got the State Department authorization bill out. Everything in it that you folks wanted including your grievance procedure on your Foreign Service. We threw out the other stuff. I think it is a damn good bill.

K: Many thanks.

H: I know you were on the House Committee about the MiddleEast. I know you are going to Europe.

K: You want me to come before the Foreign Relations Committee.

H: Our subcommittee at least.

K: Sure.

H: We will work out the time so that it is convenient for you. I just want to be sure. We just could not possibly handle the package without your coming up.

K: Look, after all your doing for it that is the least I can do for you. I literally have a tremendous problem with my schedule. I am in Pittsburg on Tuesdan and Wednesday and -- when do you want me.

H: You tell me. We don't need you in the immediate...

K: What is my time frame.

H: Let me take a look at this crazy schedule. If you could make it any time between -- the middle of the week you are away and then to Europe.

K: Europe is the next weekend. I will be in town on the 14th. I might do it Friday morning.

H: Hold a minute and I will check the schedule. I wanted to check that I would be here.

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K: I would in fact prefer to do it the following week, like the 19th.

H: Let's see what we have available in the morning.

K: The 14th would be better for me. I could have somebody call your girl so we don't have to negotiate it here.

H: O.K. There is a possibility of the 14th and if not then the following week.

K: An open session.

H: Right. YOu know we have these new rules around here.

K: No reason not to have an open session. I think in both our interests.

H: Then I think we should have a private talk about it when you get back to see if we have to do any tinkering with it and where the tinkering department starts.

K: We may need to get $45 million for the Israelis.

H: They are high priced .

K: I am telling you, they came in to see me and said I had chisled them out of $45 million and they are getting $2.3.

H: Holy Moses.

K: Can we get it through unimpared.

H: The whole pacakge as it is.

K: No, the Israelis and Egyption ones.

H: I don't want to make a forecast.

K: You just line up those 76 senators.

H: You have a very good memory. YOu saw what we did with the Forei Aid Bill. 54 to 41.

K: You were marvelous.

H: By God it is hard work. The 14th would not be the best time for me.

K: What would be the best time.

H: Looking forward into the next week I suppose the morning it the best time for testimony.

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K: I am too unreliable without a schedule before me. Have them call Jerry Bremer.

H: All right I will do that. We will work it out mutually convenient.

K: Absolutely and many thanks for everything you are doing.

H: Listen, I want to sit down and talk to you one of these days. I don't know what the hell is going on in this government.

K: Hubert, as I can tell you as a friend, I don't know everything either. I am serious.

H: I am sure that can be the case.

K: I know the substance but not always on personnel.

H: Let's stay in touch.

X265 *

TELECON
Mr. David Frost/Secretary Kissinger
November 8, 1975
Time: 12:45 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello, David.

F: Greetings from the people of Manchester.

K: (Laughter) Sorry I was so difficult to reach, it has been a busy week.

F: Unfortunately I missed a reception for your guest, President Sadat, because I only just got back from the States this morning. He has made a favorable impact here.

K: Good.

F: One thing -- are you free for lunch next Wednesday, Thursday or Friday. Secondly, I want to ask you about your decision on the BBC thing.

K: I am not free for lunch. I am trying to do the BBC thing. Can you check next week with me.

F: If it makes it any simpler I can arrange for it to be seen on American television.

K: That would help me.

F: I can easily do that as soon as you give me the green light.

K: Check with me Thursday.

F: Good, it is a date.

K: Good.

F: Have a beautiful weekend.

K: O.K. Bye.

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X261 *

TELECON
Ambassador Anderson/Secretary Kissinger
November 8, 1975
Time: 9:53 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Thank you for the note you sent me.

A: I didn't hear you the first time. As you know I meant it. I was flabergasted.

K: By what?

A: By the things that you said and the fact that you did it. You have other things to worry about.

K: Bob, on my press conference, it is when?

A: At 11:00. I am holding off.....

K: At 11:00. Good. Say, can you make it 11:30?

A: That is alright. You mentioned that you had to leave at 12:00 today.

K: Why do I have to leave at 12:00?

A: That's what you said. If you did it at 11:30 you probably wouldn't be out until 12:15.

K: I want to give them time to write their stories and then go out and get drunk.

A: (Laughter) 11:00 would be better for them.

K: Tell them 11:00 or 11:30.

A: And then I will get the word out now.

K: Make it 11:30. It is safer for me.

A: Alright, sir.

K: Thank you.

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X273 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Enders/Secretary Kissinger
November 10, 1975
Time: 5:29 p.m.

K: I am perfectly prepared to take out these additions on trade. I think the ministerial meeting we should leave in.

E: Have you had a chance to talk with Simon?

K: No.

E: How may I represent your discussions with the President to him?

K: Tell him that I gave an advance preview of one or two major items. I am willing to take out that it should be completed in 1977. I don't think that is essential.

E: I think we can get that one. The key thing is convoking of the Finance Ministers.

K: Why do they object?

E: First that it is their area and you are organizing it. Second, it is the argument about scooping the President.

K: See what he says. Are you going to take to Simon, himself?

E: Yes.

K: See if you can get him to agree to it.

E: I will get back to you on this.

K: O.K. I am willing to take out the trade thing.

E: Otherwise we have agreement on everything but the MSP and we are in pretty good shape.

K: Right.

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X274 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Buffum/Secretary Kissinger
November 10, 1975
Time: 6:34 p.m.

B: I just wanted to reassure you that Moynihan got your message and cut out the most offensive sections. It is toned down quite a bit.

K: What is wrong with that guy?

B: I question -- I thought I knew what the motivation was -- political ambition. However, he has denied that. Up to that time everyone who talked to him in New York was satisfied that he was going to run for Senator next year.

K: Isn't that one of my more brilliant moves. O.K. Thank you.

B: O.K.

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X272 *

TELECON
Ambassador Buffum/The Secretary
November 10, 1975
Time: 4:25 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: What do you think of that speech?

B: It seems to me they are overdoing it after the fact. The motion to adjourn the debate has been defeated by 2 votes 55-57. This is written into the speech on the assumption it will be voted on tomorrow. We have been overdoing the defense of Zionism as a philosophy and a system. This deals with it in excessive length.

K: I thing it deals with it in excessive length. It says it gives symbolic amnesty to the murder of the 6 million jews. It is too much.

B: I agree.

K: Can you call him and tell him to tone it down a bit.

B: Fine.

K: And particularly that phrase. It is just wrong.

B: Very good.

K: What do you think?

B: If we had a little more time I would have hoped we could have restructured the whole thing. It is a bad philosophy to build up. It has been blown out of proportion and this just perpetuates the same problem. He is bound to say something and all we can do is ask him to cut it back.

K: Ask him to cut it back. We are conducting foreign policy. This is not a synagogue. Don't tell him that.

B: I was glad to hear that. I thought Pat was being converted tomorrow after hearing that. Let us get him to take some of the flamboyance out.

K: Good.

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X268 *

TELECON
Ambassador Buffum/The Secretary
November 10, 1975
Time: 11:04 a. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Would you call Moynihan and tell him he is ordered not to threaten any reduction in our relationship to the Assembly any more? That is a direct order from me and I had enough of that.

B: I appreciate that.

K: He is to clear his statement. As long as I am here, he is an Ambassador.

B: Just what we need. He was about to run off and attack the members in the Fifth Committee today.

K: What did he do?

B: It is a routine resolution on the public information office of the G. A. In his draft speech, which he dictated personally, he said we wouldn't support this because in most countries they don't have freedom of the press and the UN should not be in a position of passing out information.

K: Did you cancel it?

B: Yes, I told him I found it totally unacceptable.

K: He is on the way to the plenary. You get him out and tell him I will not stand for that any more. Tell him these are direct instructions from me. We may need this for other issues. In a vote we are going to lose, this is not to be done.

B: I will call him right away. Thanks very much.

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X 266 *

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Jerry Bremer
11-10-75; 9:59 a.m.

K: Jerry.

B: Yes, sir.

K: I think the people that meet me at the airport should have the chance to ride in with me in Pittsburgh.

B: Okay.

K: And you should -- and we should stop that imperial bit business. Now make sure they are not dragging them out ~~a half~~ an hour ahead of time.

B: Yep. I'll take care of that.

K: And could somebody call Scranton and say I am not asking him to be there but I don't want to be in Pennsylvania without telling him that I am there and if he wanted to come -- you know --

B: Uh-huh for the speech.

K: Yeah.

B: . . .invited . . . I'll check first before I call.

K: Okay.

B: Okay.

K: And have you got people working on this thing?

B: Yes sir. Larry has got the part you wanted done and will have back to me before noon and I'll then put it ~~g~~o together with Winston -- Winston will put it together. I've gone over your comments.

K: Also tell him I have talked to Pete Peterson.

B: Oh, you have.

K: And there is no need for Larry to call him.

B: Okay.

K: Bye.

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X267 *

RELEASED IN FULL

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Pete Peterson
11/10/75; 9:55 a.m.

K: Pete.

P: Yes, sir.

K: How are you?

P: Very good.

K: I just wanted to thank you for coming down yesterday.

P: Well my great pleasure, sir.

K: And it was a big help to me and I am not going to do anything.

P: Yeah.

K: I mean we will have a chance ~~gó~~ to discuss it further -- I mean any further thing can be discussed in the light of the conditions that then exist.

P: Well that is the course where I come out. But that is your decision. What I would like to do, Henry, . . .

K: It is important, Pete, that there be no discussion of anything -- something along that line.

P: Absolutely! Henry, what I would like to do, though, is to sit down just with Larry or Larry and whoever else you designate. I really do think we should give some creative thought to how you position yourself over the next several months.

K: I would greatly appreciate this. How could we do it?

P: Larry and I could do it. I could have him come down or I could spend the evening with him and then we ~~w~~ could present you with the plan of some sort.

K: Do you want me to send him up?

P: Yeah, I would be delighted to do that.

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K: Okay.

P: Because finding the right position, Henry, between on the one hand not appearing to be undercutting anybody, if you follow me, but on the other hand not appearing to be too closely tied to them and finally not be vulnerable so that they can tack you up is going to be a work of artistry it seems to me.

K: That's right.

P: Yeah.

K: I agree completely.

P: Right.

K: That's exactly the strategic problem.

P: Right. Okay, why don't you have Larry call me and I will spend an evening with him.

K: Okay, Larry is ill today but as soon as he recovers I will ask him to call you.

P: I had dinner last night with Hubert.

K: Yeah.

P: And I told him how highly you regarded him and so forth. Very interesting. He said you tell Henry what I have been telling him -- let him go out and see the people and he discover that he has a lot more support than some of these Washington politicians think he has. Which I thought was interesting.

K: He urged that to me.

P: Yeah.

K: Many months ago. In fact that was one reason why I went out.

P: Yeah. Well I /ih/ found that interesting.

K: Well one other thing that is interesting -- you know I am going to Pittsburgh tomorrow and all the bloody politicians of that town are coming out wanting to make damn sure that they are with me.

P: Uh-huh. And I think if they can see the response that will have just the effect that we want. I wish some of your leader's people could be there. Could they?

K: We will have to see.

P: You know some of the political types.

K: Yeah. I'll have to see how I can arrange that.

P: For example the ex-governor that is a good friend of his -- that's a good friend of yours -- Mr. Scranton.

K: Yeah.

P: People of that type who have -- who would give him feedbacks on the . . .

K: That's a damn good idea.

P: Okay.

K: Okay.

P: If you will have Larry call me we will come up with a plan.

K: I'll have Larry call you. Many thanks.

P: Bye.

K: Bye.

X269 *

TELECON
Mr. Hartman/The Secretary
November 10, 1975
Time: 11:25 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: (*missed first part*). What is the issue? I know this is not your Bureau and it is to be held closely, but what is the issue. You send me a canned answer but I don't know what the issue is.

H: The issue is we are approaching a negotiation of a treaty which will help us in shipping oil and gas.

K: Do we want a pipeline through Canada?

H: After we have the treaty, then we can discuss the advantages. We want a gas line eventually.

K: Do we want a gas pipeline?

H: Yes, in the McKenzie Valley. I think we should say we need the framework.

K: I think I need by the end of the day a paper that will help me in the Press Conference. I know it is not in the Vine interest but me.

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X276 *

TELCON
Amb. Buffum/Kissinger
9:29 a.m. - 11/11/75

RELEASED IN FULL

(First part inaudible)

B: I didn't have a chance to compare as delivered. He told me he was taking it out or at least that's the message that came back from his press spokesman in New York who is preparing the text for release to the press. He had scratched that sentence, but let me double check that with the transcript, if I may, and see which is the correct version. I'm not sure which one you have.

K: At any rate, that's the one they distributed so it doesn't make any difference. Well, I will not put up with any more of Moynihan. I will not do it.

B: If I might, on that one sentence, let me doublecheck and see -- that was supposed to come out of the distributed text because I talked to his. . .

K: Well, it isn't out. I have the text here. And now he's starting on this Upper Dike (?) thing again with Mitchell and Fraser.

B: Well, you know the problem, Mr. Secretary. . .

K: Well, the problem is that I'm going to fire him if he doesn't behave himself. That's the problem. We got tired of conservatives, let's try a liberal. Well, I want your memo as quickly as possible.

B: All right. I've got notes already started. I'll put it together today for you.

K: OK.

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X 277 *

TELECON
Ambassador Moynihan/Secretary Kissinger
November 11, 1975
11:20

RELEASED IN FULL

M: How are you?

K: Ok.

M: It is awful times. We have been ~~xxxxx~~ dealing through middlemen for so long I thought I would call and take a minute to go over the events yesterday and see what you think I can do to be of any help.

K: I don't think I need to go over it. My problem is I recommended you because I wanted you to stand up but we can't be imbroiled every day in an issue and be confrontational. And I thought that speech was too nasty. It is a good issue but we can't have our whole foreign policy revolve around it.

M:: No, there was a question...

K: No, now, we have to testify whether we should cut off aid programs to Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan.. it is an impossible position to be in.

M: I wasn't talking about that. Bill ~~Xxxxx~~ Buffum mentioned you thought I hadn't taken something out that you wanted out. Now, that was one sentence and when I knew you wanted it out -- out it went.

K: ....the murderers of 6 million jews -- I don't think it does.

M: I had instructions to take out one sentence and that I did. And then I toned down and cut down and sliced it. The speech was given after the vote. They listened hard. The applause was warm. It was not a speech that roused anybody up.

K: I know, I agree with the basic view but I feel we will be more effective if it doesn't look as if we are spoiling for a fight with everybody.

M: Right. I agree. And we don't go looking for fights.

K: That is luckey for me then -- you are doing so well .

M: We find alot.

K: Why don't we have a talk about it. I may be in New York next Tuesday and why don't we get together then.

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M: Very well. I have two other things. The first is am I to do anything tomorrow with this thing you have with Thorn?

K: Who?

M: Of Luxumborg.

K: Let me see about dinner at the White ~~HOUSE~~ House.

M: I am invited there. I mean am I supposed to be doing anything?

K: I am having a lunch but just for him and his wife and Nancy and me. If I have anybody else he will have to have his Ambassador and he doesn't want him there. Are you going to be in town tomorrow?

M: I am invited to the working dinner at the White House -- I was wondering if I have to do any work there.

K: No, maybe we can have a word after that.

M: Two other things. Can I be of any help to you with the Congress?

K: Our problem is the aid. They are using this to cut aid to Egypt.

M: I can say I have been up here doing what Henry is telling me but what you are doing is not going to help us one bit. I will call anybody you want. I have been on the phone day and night.

K: It hasn't crystallized yet. Let me get Atherton to call your after he sees ~~whether~~ where the hard cases are.

M: Right. One last thing. The question of Chile comes up tomorrow. The Department say we should vote with this resolution. Bill Rogers thinks it. Bill Buffum thinks it. We think it. I hope you will sign off on that because it will make things follow.

K: What resolution is that?

M: It says the practice of human rights in Chile -- it says you haven't done very good and to do better.

K: We are experts at undermining our friends.

M: Can I make this point? It has merit. I think the resolution is marginally justified. If we get this resolution passed I propose to make a speech on Thursday in the General Assembly. I will start off with how come the only thing the UN ... about is Chile and South Africa and then make a case for Chile. Chile is the first country to consider letting the Human Rights Commission come. The Latin Americans will probably split about 7-7-7. The Western Europeans are solidly for it. If we arent' for it I am afraid we will have problems with Fraser.

K: I will probably go along with it but I don't like it.

M: But I think it is tactfully the way to go .

K: But when we get a Portuguese government in power in Chile we will be in a .....

M: I agree. And I will make a speech on this behalf.

K: I will get Rogers to call you on that.

M: I will have to ask for a call by this afternoon.

K: I'll get him to call you by this afternoon.

END

X283 *

TELECON
General Norstad/The Secretary
November 12, 1975
Time: 3:00 p. m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

N: I have two or three points I would like to mention to you. In the first place, I hope you don't let all this turmoil distract you from the important work you are doing. It must be difficult. I have one comment to make on that. I think the feeling around the country is (inaudible) to the marrow than to the stars, particularly as far as you and Jim are concerned. The only thought I have on that is that if you have a natural occasion you might say something nice about Schlesinger.

K: I did say something nice about that on Monday.

N: That would be very well received. I don't think you lost anything on this exchange at all.

K: I don't think so.

N: But I think you could make a plus of it because I think most people have taken great assurance from the fact that two such fine minds were working on the problems.

K: It wasn't my idea to let him go.

N: I think at this stage what you could say naturally is a good thing. I think you did take steps on Monday. That isn't reason I am calling. Keep up the good work.

K: You are very nice.

N: And don't let little people throw you off the track.

K: Larry, I appreciate that. Thank you very much.

N: I must say this change isn't going to make the President's task easier when he starts to campaign around the country. Again, it isn't a matter of substance. I will drop that for the moment. But you do have a great deal of very deep and genuine support around the country. It looks like we are in a lot of trouble.

K: Larry, I appreciate your saying that too.

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N: I have gotten a letter from the Center on University Studies. They are doing research on de Gaulle. I got mine from Jean Paul _____, Professor at the University of Strasbourg. They are having a group doing some studies on de Gaulle, on his policy and the man. He says it is at the initiative of the French and foreign universities. They are having a colloquium in June which will be presided over by several Ministers of Defense--Bourges, Messmer, de Pres (sp)--all of whom I know quite well. Messmer wants me to write to him expressing my interest in this and wants me to come to this thing on the 8th of June 1976 and to talk on the subject of General de Gaulle or NATO or any other subject I might prefer. That is not an easy task.

K: I would favor it.

N: I have had a little different contact than most.

K: Larry, I have to go to a meeting at the White House at 3:00. Could I call you tomorrow.

N: If your reaction would be favorable to this, I would talk to you later on when we come closer. I am a little reluctant because it is tough. I will talk to you later.

Let me get one pressing reason for calling you. You know of Dr. Howard Rusk. He is a great benefactor of mine.

[redacted] B6

He is a great guy. You are probably familiar with his international organization. I think the most recent evidence of that is when he went over to Egypt.

K: I got him in touch with Sadat.

N: He started to establish a unit for them in Egypt. It was after that that Howard called.

K: I really have to call you about this tomorrow.

[redacted] B6

K: I will call you tomorrow afternoon or noon time, whatever is convenient.

X279 *

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
November 12, 1975
Time: 6:40 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Did you communicate with Schmidt that I wanted to get their views?

S: No Von Staden came in with something.

K: Why not let him give it to me in.....

S: I thought if he had something in view of your lunch, we should know about it.

K: He has now sent a complicated letter in.

S: I told Von Staden if it were possible to put it in writing before you met, that would be better.

K: That is a good idea. Listen, can you give me your analysis by tomorrow?

S: Yes. Does it say it is from Von Staden?

K: Yes, but it seems to be pretty detailed.

S: O.K. I will get right on it.

K: Good.

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X 281 *

TELECON
Mr. David Packard/Secretary Kissinger
November 12, 1975

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

P: I am fine. You are you

K: Ok.

P: ~~WE~~ You had quite a time last week.

K: It has been exciting.

P: It is too bad the press makes things out of this. I am calling to ask if you could come over to the Business Council meeting on December 10 in Washington. -- and say a few words.

K: On the tenth I am going to the NATO meeting. Is it only on the 10th?

P: Yes. Ok, we'll give yiu a raincheck.

K: Good, give me a rain check.

P: How are things?

K: Ok. Let me know when you come to Washington, I would like to see you.

P: Alright. By the same token, if there is anything I can do to help you just say the word -- you know that.

K: I know that David. Thank you.

P: Ok

K: Nice to talk to you.

END

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X284 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Senator Inouye/Secretary Kissinger
November 12, 1975
3:45 pm

I: Sorry I didn't return your call earlier, I just found out about it.

K: That is alright. I am sorry this has turned into a test of manhood. I am not trying to keep anything from you. I am going to let you have these documents. We are not trying to maintain that our aid is based on the Sinai agreement. I trust you and your associates but the way our classified information is being handled is getting to be a dingerous thing for the country. I can cope with it but my successors will suffer. I have the highest regard for you and your committee, but my worry is how will I handle the other Committees. My Committee leaks more than yours. Some day come over for a drink and I will explain what worries me. I want you to know it has nothing to do with you and I will send you these documents as official documents.

I: Ok. And I accept your invitation.

K: Any documents we give to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee appear in the newspapers. We have a problem on how to conduct diplomacy when this happense and how to conduct matters with the Congress.

I: That is a problem .

K: We will ~~talk~~ talk about this but not on the telephone. You won this one and I ~~x~~ will send the documents.

I: It is not a matter of winning.

K: Ok.

END

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X287 *

TELECON
Mr. Rogers/The Secretary
November 13, 1975
11:10 am

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: The Brazilian recognition of the MPLA -- why is that necessary?

R: I analyze it this way. I find it consistent with Silveira's general policy of ignoring ideology and trying to improve relations with everyone.

K: Well, then, why not improved relations with Unita?

R: He is doing it in part to seek out a position of leadership and a relationship with Portugal. And he feels he moved too slowly on the Mozambique thing and was cut out. And he is talking out of both sides -- it is for personal reasons. I am having -- we don't have any major guidance from Brazilia yet on why he has done it. These are reasons I worked out myself.

[redacted] B6

K: Good. Ok, Let me know what they say. Should I call Silveira for a chat.

R: I think so, but after you return from the Paris meeting.

K: Why?

R: I think their vote on Zionism indicates that a day or two postponement would be appropriate. And, they voted wrong on the issue. There is no reason publicly why you need to call him right now.

K: Ok, good.

End

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X291 *

TELECON
Mr. Scotty Reston/Secretary Kissinger
November 13, 1975
Time: 6:30 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hi, Scotty.

R: How are you.

K: Bearing up.

R: It is not easy. I am getting reports from Vale that you have been in Pittsburgh. I am sorry to bother you but I don't know what to do.

K: They have decided to make me the fall guy for it.

R: You are going to do it?

K: They have decided the President can't do it -- you want me to do it.

R: Yes, of course. That is even better. Now the question is where do I tell the old man to go and what time.

K: Can I work that out.....

R: All I have to do.....

K: Maybe we can do it at my hotel which is in Paris, just outside of Paris, or maybe I can do it at his apartment.

R: You don't have to do that. It is not necessary. I think he would be more pleased if you did it -- that would mean a lot to him. You don't have to go out of your way, however. We have to get someone to say where.

K: I would suggest Saturday afternoon or Monday morning. Can I let you know first think in the morning?

R: Sure.

K: You are not going to be there?

R: No, unfortunately, but.....

K: With whom do we work over there to get it done?

R: I think just have someone call John and tell him where he should be.

K: We want to do it up right. We will get him picked up with an Embassy car and an escort.

R: Yes.

K: Should we have some press there?

R: Yes. I would tell your guys to have a photographer there.

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K: Can you send some material on this to me?

R: You have it all in your office.

K: O.K.

R: Larry has it and send a car to him and bring him to you whenever it is convenient to you because you have more problems than he has.

K: (Laughter) When I don't have them people create them. On the way back from China for the first time since Watergate I noticed that we had the Congress quieted down.

R: It is a great kindness that you don't have to do but it would mean a great deal to a great man. Just send the car.

K: He has done as much to change events and to be an inspiration than anyone else.

R: He did more to bring Germany and France together than anyone else.

K: I will do it Saturday afternoon or Monday morning.

R: Bless you. All the best and hang in there.

K: Thank you.

R: Bye.

X 285 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
November 13, 1975
Mr. Clements/The Secretary
Time: 9:40 a. m.

C: Henry, I tried to call Larry and found out that he is home with the flu. George Brown and I are sitting in the office with some other people and we are talking...

K: Why don't you ask Ellsworth about the paper he tried to get past me to the President?

C: Now, Henry. Let us talk about the other matter I called on. What George and I are concerned about is we have heard through one of your staff people you may be going on a trip beyond.

K: To Moscow? Absolutely not.

C: OK. We have something that we have been working on for quite some time which are alternatives where we are now in regard to SALT.

K: I will make no move on SALT without you people. You can take that for granted. I just told Scowcroft to send over the Russian reply to you and George.

C: We have something we think you will have a high interest in.

K: If that is the case, could we talk informally about it today because I am having lunch with Dobrynin tomorrow. If I could have an idea what you are thinking...

C: What I would suggest -- I am leaving here that is why I rushed the call through on a short trip. I was going to cancel it if you were going to Moscow.

K: Absolutely not.

C: I would like George to come over and talk to you prior to your informal meeting with Dobrynin.

K: He could be sure I will not pass on anything to Dobrynin. I can keep myself from making a mistake.

C: George will be in touch with you to get a time.

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X 286 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Lord/The Secretary
November 13, 1975
Time: 10:45 a. m.

K: (missed sentence)

L: I assumed they gave it to you days ago. I just assumed it being done. I didn't think about the issue.

K: They approached us twice.

L: It was entirely justified. No question about it. I couldn't believe it when I saw that Habib and Buffum sent you a memo. I just didn't realize. I should have thought about it last week.

K: I had ordered it done.

L: It is unbelievable. One has one thing back here. They should have let you know. The one hand doesn't carry out your instructions. I didn't think of this issue. But being China I assumed it being done.

K: It is obviously a conciliatory gesture by the Chinese.

L: I agree. I don't know whether there is any purpose about telling them very frankly what happened.

K: How the hell can you?

L: It makes us look silly, I know. You have every right to be outraged on this one. I don't understand it.

K: Could you call Moynihan and explain to him what he has done this time?

L: It isn't his hand. It is back here. I will make the point that any time the Chinese do something we have to move swiftly.

K: Just not a vote issue to us. How long will your party go on?

L: It is a buffet. It will go until at least 9:00.

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K: That doesn't mean I have to be there at 6:30.

L: 8 or 8:30.

K: I will be there at 7:30.

L: How was Pittsburgh by the way?

K: Good. It went very well.

L: I was reading your press conference. Every now and then you get a dig in about having a long term ahead of you.

K: I am trying to get into the public's mind I am dis-associating a bit.

L: I think it is very skillful.

K: The public reaction was favorable. The speech is not the foreign order speech (?) but it was as well received as the other speeches, except for St. Louis and Birmingham. It was better received than Minneapolis. They applauded 4 or 5 times in the middle of the speech. The audience was the most responsive. The public mood is still very favorable.

L: Next week or so is going to be very hard.

K: Not going to be my problem.
I will see you tonight.

L: Good.

K: Would you call Moynihan and say we don't want to nag him everyday but to get home to him there are bigger issues than Zionism.

X 289 *

TELECON
Mr. Binder/The Secretary
November 13, 1975
Time: 3:35 p. m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

B: (missed first sentence)

K: Oh, I had an appointment with him and moved it to next week. Is that snubbing him?

B: No, I am just teasing. I heard it from a Danish source.

Is it worth saying something about detente being frozen for the duration of the election year? Are you guys really going on plugging?

K: That's right.

B: It is beginning to look from some of the statements including your own that there has been a basic statement saying let us not get into the domestic fray with this question -- with the Wallaces, the Reagans and so forth.

K: That is not correct. It might turn out to be correct later.

B: It is beginning to seem like that.

K: That is correct.

B: I will drop it then. How are things otherwise?

K: It is a weird period.

B: [redacted] B6

K:

B: I wrote a book on Willy Brandt. They are having a big debate on it at the Quadripartite meeting. It raised a great stink there. I am looking forward to being a stinker.

K: Is it unfriendly?

B: No, I am just being objective.

K: Those are the best bios to write. Will you send me a copy?

B: I intend to. Free.

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X292 *

TELCON
J. Bremer/Kissinger
9:49 a.m. - 11/13/75

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Jerry.

B: Yes, Sir.

K: Are we ever going to have that meeting with the African Bureau on the MPLA issue or is there some conspiracy on that too.

B: No, I was waiting for that point where you had time on your schedule.

K: At that point you make a decision, right. So that they can all do what they want.

B: No, no, I think they're all under control. You want to try to do it just before lunch? I don't know how long your Summit meeting is going to go with the President.

K: Yeh.

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X288 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Prime Minister Palme/The Secretary
November 13, 1975
Time: 2:45 p. m.

K: Hello, Mr. Prime Minister. How are you?

P: Very good. Kind of you to call me.

K: I am delighted you are here. I told my associates yesterday I wanted to arrange a meeting with you. But now I'm told you are leaving. I misunderstood the dates you were to be in the country. You are leaving this evening I now find out.

P: I am supposed to do so, yes. That is very unfortunate. I would very much like to talk to you.

K: You come here quite frequently, don't you?

P: 1970 was the last time.

K: Was it 1970? I don't have anything of overwhelming urgency that needed to be discussed. I enjoyed our meeting in Helsinki and would have enjoyed the opportunity to talk to you.

P: I met some of your associates last night.

K: They told me. They told me about your kind remarks about my speech in Pittsburgh.

P: I saw the text of your remarks and I thought a very timely speech. I am in full agreement.

K: I don't know what we can do about our getting together because you are leaving tonight.

P: I am supposed to leave tonight to deliver a speech to the NORDAC Council on Saturday. Are you going to Europe?

K: I will be there this weekend and then I will be there the following month for the NATO meeting. Maybe on that occasion we can work something out.

P: Anytime you care to come to Sweden you are most welcome.

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K: I appreciate that.

P: I know you were there before you assumed your public responsibilities.

K: I was. I was there before I resumed my public responsibilities. I will make it a point to come on one of my visits. I appreciate what you are doing and I enjoyed our talks.

Let me take this occasion to welcome you to this country and let me express my regrets that we weren't quicker in getting together.

P: May I add that I hope the meeting in Paris will be successful. May I say for my small country two things. We assess great importance to the fact that some vitality is brought into Europe; that they really try to create the spirit of a little more optimism than the gloom hanging over Europe; and the meeting could be very helpful.

K: I consider that in many ways its most important function. The problem of many industrial democracies is psychological problem.

P: The problems of industrial countries are difficult but not insolvable. We have attached very great importance to this dialogue that you are discussing because I think it may turn out to leave you in a calm atmosphere in the whole host of problems in the third world and developed nations.

K: That, of course, will be taken up primarily in the meeting in Paris the following month, don't you think? It will be taken up by the heads of government but they have such a full agenda that they might not be able to spend too much time on it. I will be getting together with the Foreign Ministers to spend time on it. It is one of the key problems.

P: I am sitting here at the luncheon with a number of UN Ambassadors of the third world. I am criticizing them heavily on the Zionism issue.

K: They have made our domestic situation very much more difficult for no purpose I can see.

P: No purpose whatsoever. The problem now is to calm down the atmosphere and to be brought down without increasing confrontation.

K: I agree absolutely.

P: No one can define properly what Zionism is.

K: We will attempt to build on what we submitted to the Special Session and to the dialogue in September and make some additional proposals.

P: I think they basically feel somewhat bad about it.

K: It was a senseless matter to bring to an issue. No one knows what Zionism is. It raises many profound moral issues.

P: Exactly. It does a terrible mistake of pointing out the Jewish community of the world instead of speaking of the proper role of the State of Israel.

K: To attach a stigma to the State of Israel on Jewish grounds makes the problem insolvable. If it were on national grounds it would be much more possible to solve and easier for people here trying to solve it.

P: Exactly.

K: I hope you have a good trip back to Sweden and a pleasant stay the remainder of time you are here.

P: Thank you for calling me.

X293 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Winston Lord/Secretary Kissinger
November 13, 1975
Time: 6:40 p.m.

K: Did you ever explain to Moynihan what he did?

L: Yes.

K: What does he say?

L: He is sorry about it. I think there is as much blame in Washington as up there. I don't think he understood the significance of the Chinese move.

K: O.K. I will see you later.

L: I explained to him we have to move quickly whenever they do it. I don't think it will happen again. He came in at one point and said Thorn is coming in with a question. They told him to wait and that meant another three days with the Chinese.

K: That isn't as important as the Chinese question.

L: I know. Working with the Chinese is important in itself.

K: Right. Are you at home?

L: Yes.

K: O.K. I will see you later.

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X295*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Saunders/Secretary Kissinger
November 13, 1975
Time: 7:07 p.m.

K: Have you sent up these talking points, I am about ready to leave.

S: They are just coming up.

K: You distract me to tears. What is it in NEA -- maybe we should cut the personnel in half. What about that reply to Rabin?

S: I finished that an hour ago -- it should be in your office.

K: Don't you think this is a unbelievable message.

S: It is a method -- it is an attitude towards us that I find unacceptable. It is no way to treat a sovereign government let alone a friendly one.

K: Will you put into that message that I have never understood that we were under any obligation to inform the Israelis of our internal discussions with our ambassadors.

S: That is essentially what I said -- that our talking with our Ambassador is not a sign that we are ignoring their interests. It is just their normal way of operating unfortunately.

K: O.K. Fine.

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X309 *

TELECON
Mr. Lord/Secretary Kissinger
November 14, 1975
Time: 7:32 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

L: On the speech.....

K: Yes.

L: I come out with a tour d'horizon -- I don't think we can do a whole Asian speech. Japan we did effectively a few months ago. I don't know what we can say about China. I don't think we can do much more than five pages. We could talk about the four or five major things that will happen at the end of the year.

K: Why don't we do that -- do it on that basis.

L: O.K. Good luck on your trip.

K: O.K. Thank you.

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X308

TELECON
Ambassador McCloskey/Secretary Kissinger
November 14, 1975
Time: 7:08 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

M: There is some conflict in these calls. They, most of them, are not making a lot of it. Newsweek said they will only have a paragraph about it.

K: Yes.

M: I am going to get together with the White House tomorrow morning to put together a fact sheet.

K: Tell them if they don't straighten out this mess, I am going on my own.

M: I told Marsh that.

K: On Tuesday morning when I get back I am in business for myself.

M: I understand that.

K: O. K. I appreciate what you are doing.

M: Have a good trip if I don't see you.

K: O. K.

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X3045

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TELECON
Mr. Rogers/Secretary Kissinger
November 14, 1975
Time: 5:17 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

R: The earlier house didn't work for the security system that you have to have.

K: Why is that?

R: It takes so many people. I think we have a better solution. That is the house that Churchill stayed in. It is owned by a fellow named [redacted] and it will be available. It has its own beach and is more isolated than the other one althought it is near a hotel and an airport. So unless you are dead set on the other house, I think this one is very nice. B6

K: What does it mean the security people?

R: You have 35 people who are in attendance -- that takes a lot of hotel rooms.

K: I have never realized that we needed 35 people to guard me.

R: It is a massive force.

K: But they pay for themselves, don't they?

R: Right.

K: There just aren't 35 hotel rooms available, is that it?

R: Right. Not next to the other house. However, this one turns out to be better anyway. It is place that Churchill used to stay in.

K: Well, since I don't know the house I can't judge it.

R: I will get some pictures up for you. I think it is very elegant. It would definitely be comfortable.

K: Does it have a swimming pool?

R: Yes. It is right on the beach also.

K: Why don't we do that.

R: You can set your own pace there. The only thing that would be in order would be a meeting with the Prime Minister but he would be happy to do that there.

K: O.K. Thank you.

R: We will go ahead with that, sir.

K: Good.

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X302

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Maw/Secretary Kissinger
November 14, 1975
Time: 2:12 p.m.

(MISSED FIRST PART)

M: In view of the Pike Committee action they asked if you wanted to be spared this hearing this afternoon.

K: Who -- Passman?

M: Yes.

K: No, I am coming -- it is ridiculous.

M: Hedoesn't know what it is about.

K: There isn't any basis for it is there?

M: No. It is to test the executive privilege.

K: Why don't they cite a White House guy for contempt?

M: They thought it would be more spectacular to cite you. I would ignore it if I were you.

K: O.K.

M: Can I tell Passman you will be there in 20 minutes?

K: Yes, I am on the way now.

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X303 *

TELECON
Ambassador Anderson/Secretary Kissinger
November 14, 1975
Time: 5:15 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Would you call Bartlet. Tell him from me that whoever told him about me objecting to Casey was a liar. I think he is highly qualified to be a member.

A: I will do it immediately, sir.

K: Good.

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X3D7 *

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
November 14, 1975
Time: 6:53 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Dobrynin overwhelmingly stated the message that Brezhnev is dying to have me come to Moscow and that we must send such a letter and that they know they have to make a compromise and that I can't leave with a failure.

S: Well do you want to write such a letter?

K: Don't you think?

S: Yes. The main reason for not doing it the last time around was because I thought you wouldn't get a position here or that you would get smeared. The last consideration holds to some extent still.

K: He totally turned down the idea that we sign the Vladivostok agreement -- they said that can't be considered. I lightly touched the cruise missiles thing but they said counting backfires is undoable.

S: How do you want to proceed on this letter?

K: Draft a letter for the President proposing December 12 and 13 or 18 and 19.

S: One of those is the Chiefs of Mission conference.

K: We just then cancel that or the days 18th and 19th of December.

S: Shall I refer to some of the recent exchanges or do it blandly?

K: You should say our relationship has reached a point where some progress has to be feasible on the assumption that there will be a result there.

S: It is worse if there is none.

K: Do you see what I mean?

S: Yes.

K: O.K.

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X325 *

TELECON
November 19, 1975
Senator Humphrey/Secretary Kissinger
7:15 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

H: I had a good heart-to-heart talk with Inouye.

K: what's bothering him?

H: He does not want a meeting because he has never had a bipartisan report and he was afraid people would think he was meeting behind their back. So he is coming with Mathias.

K: You are a great friend.

H: Ok.

END

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X313 *

TELECON
Mr. Hartman/The Secretary
November 19, 1975
Time: 11:30 a. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: We have to move the Denktash meeting to 10:00 because the swearing-in for Rumsfeld is at 11:00 and I can't miss that.

H: I will get in touch with him now. When you met with Dobrynin, did you raise the Embassy status thing.

K: I raised these various things and told him to take it up with you.

H: On that Gundelag appointment, you don't have to see him. I would like to have you see Walt though.

K: Who?

H: Walt Stoessel - before he goes back.

K: Good.

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X 311 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec. Kissinger
Hal Saunders
November 19, 1975
9:30 a.m.

K: Did Toon ever go in with that complaint of Rabin's?

S: Yes. I just talked to him about it. He did it right after he received the instructions.

K: But he did not think it important enough to report?

S: He said that he assumed that we would assume that he would do it as soon as instructed.

K: I assume that any ambassador should assume that if I ask him todo something, he should report back to me or get out of there.

S: That is what I told him.

K: How can I assume that he carried it out.

S: I don't think you can and that is why I told him to acknowledge immediately.

K: You still haven't given me a cable on the Cabinet decisions.

S: Unfortunately, I have been getting your instructions third hand, and I am not sure exactly what you want.

K: I want to protest formally that the Israeli Cabinet makes a public statement about something that a deputy Assistant Secretary makes that implies that this indicates a change in U.S. policy in the face of repeated assurances and repeated public testimony on our part of what our policy is and our change of policy is announced at my level and not by the government in Jerusalem. I don't want to debate you paper.

S: I fully understand and agree.

K: I want to slap them about making a public statement regarding congressional testimony. I told them our policy and I announced it at press conferences. Make is sharp and tell Toon to go in there and protest.

S: I will I think it is fair to say it is an internal exchange. Your statement to them is the statement they should react to.

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2.

K: Larry tells me he has talked to you about the INR job.

S: Yes.

K: Will you take it.

S: I will do whatever you want me to do. Which is more important to you.

K: I think you can work it the way Hyland did. On big matters like SALT I used him operationally. On Middle East matters you could still go along on trips with me.

S: I would certainly be very pleased to do that.

K: O.K. Let's consider it set.

S: Thank you very much.

END

X 312 *

TELECON
Marvin Kalb/The Secretary
November 19, 1975
Time: 11:25 a. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you? I was going to call you.

MK: I am still creeping around. It is getting a little better.

The only reason for this call was to tell you that despite all appearances to the contrary in this city you still have some friends. I count myself among them.

K: I appreciate that.

MK: I think there is a terrible viciousness around these days. Even if 20 per cent justified, the 80 per cent is not.

K: I cannot tell you how much I appreciate that.

MK: There are a bunch of bastards running around town, not taking anything into account but personal ambitions. They don't think from one day to the next. They have no idea where they want to go -- anything malicious is glorified. I was reading the papers. You do have friends around town and I hope that you will stick with the long picture and not the short one.

K: I can't tell you how much that means to me.

MK: You know that I mean it too.

K: I do. Thank you very much.

MK: I had to get it off my chest.

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X 328 *

TELECON
Ambassador Zahedi/Secretary Kissinger
November 20, 1975
Time: 6:40 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

Z: Fine. Good evening. It is wonderful to hear your voice.

K: D on't take that tone with me -- you don't invite me to your parties any more.

Z: (Laughter) I have the ticket which you regretted.

K: What ticket?

Z: The Shah's birthday. I wrote you that P.S. on it. But I forgot to call you about it.

K: I have a bunch of morans working for me and they have instructions not to accept invitations to national holidays.

Z: You were very busy with Sadat so I was teasing you. I did explain to His Majesty that I didn't call you personally and talk to you about it.

K: If I had had the slightest indication I would have been there.

Z: In the future I will bring these things to your attention.

K: I talked to Clements who was at a party of yours to which you didn't invite me.

Z: (Laughter) I want to give a part in your honor.

K: Don't do that to me. I will be in prison before you do it. Clements tells me on our side there is no problem. I admire the Shah -- he is one of the few outstanding leaders we have left in the world.

Z: The problem was with the gentleman who left. I was rather nasty to him the night in Chevy Chase -- another party you weren't there. I told him if I want to see him it was because the Shah says so and my understanding is as Ambassador I have to go through the State Department and if there is anything I have to bring to the attention of the President I will go through the Department. But from the State Department we have wonderful cooperation. I am not cross with you any more.

K: You are one of the people I like most. I have a great devotion for the Shah.

Z: I have a wonderful picture of you and the Shah. Have you seen it?

K: No.

Z: I will send you one. It is beautiful because the Shah is smiling at one of your jokes.

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K: If you liked me as much as the Shah we would have a good relationship.

Z: We would? We missed you last night. We didn't want....

K: You didn't want me there, I know.

Z: Thank you very much -- you are terribly kind.

K: Give my regards to the Shah. Bye.

X330*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
November 20, 1975
Time: 6:26 p.m.

K: That note on Angola -- why is it so strained to the Soviets.

S: Have you got the new version.

K: No.

S: You sent it back and wanted it informal.

K: Oh, I haven't got it. We have heard form the Soviets they want it for the 18-19th.

S: Ugh. That may mean you have to come back first. You don't want to spend that much time if the Paris thing doesn't work.

K: If it doesn't I will be back on the 19th. My present thinking based on nothing but superficial -- if we can reduce the total to 23 -- if we then say cruise missiles and SLCMs -- I think range of more than 600 count in the total but not to exceed 200 that heavy bombers with ALCMs are counted as MIRV'd then we have countered their backfires or used cruise as an offset to backfires. They won't be able to put up SLCMs or backfires.

S: It is to reduce their throwweight.

K: Could you work something like this out. How do we handle the bureaucracy?

S: I have worried about this too. There is a story that the President has been given a proposal already.

K: Not that I am aware of. Will you think about it and let me know tomorrow morning?

S: Yes. We have to put it into the bureaucracy in some way. Let me see if I can formulate the ideas.

K: Maybe you could get in on paper tomorrow.

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X329 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Charles Robinson/Secretary Kissinger
November 20, 1975
6:36 pm

K: The Russians have agreed to a meeting the 18th and 19th. Therefore, if the conference starts on the 16th, I cannot stay more than two days.

R: If Callaghan is Chairman it won't make any difference.

K: Well, I don't want to be chairman.

R: If the Conference starts on the 16th it will go into the 18th. But I do not think it will take place on the 16th.

K: I will have to leave the afternoon of the 17th.

R: Well, I think that is when the other Foreign Ministers would start leaving too.

K: Are you seeing Ansari this weekend?

R: Well, I am talking to him tomorrow and I might go to New York on Monday to see him. We have a plan all worked out.

K: I have the impression he is offering a separate deal to the Germans.

R: That's very possible.

K: Ok.

END

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X327 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Prince Juan Carlos/Secretary Kissinger
November 20, 1975
Time: 6:45 p.m.

C: This is the Prince of Spain.

K: How nice to hear from you. My warmest good wishes.

C: Thank you so much, really. I know the difficulties you are having to see if someone else can come here.

K: That is the trouble. The Vice President is definitely coming.

C: You don't think on your way?

K: Unfortunately, the President is going over Alaska. We are trying to send the Chief Justice together with the Vice President. If you can give the Vice President some time -- he is a close personal friend of mine. I will come the 15th, if I can.

C: I told Stabler he could tell you it was o.k.

K: You can count on our full support.

C: I know and I can't thank you enough -- and tell the President of my best wishes for everything.

K: We hope you will visit us in America soon.

C: I think the link is very well set.

K: How nice to hear from you.

C: We will look forward to meeting you soon.

K: Good.

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X331 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Arthur Hartman/Secretary Kissinger
November 20, 1975
Time: 6:22 p.m.

K: In this nut house I run here how is it that you learned what I offered to the Russians?

H: Because you instructed your staff to show me everything.

K: How many of your staff know it?

H: I am the only one. I will not reveal any of these things.

K: Your secretary must know it.

H: She knows nothing, even though she typed the note. She has worked for me for many years.

K: O.K. It is on the 18-19th.

H: Can I get guidance on those other two questions? Maybe we should say if you are going to see him we should hold open the question of visiting the States.

K: Yes. And tell him I will be there on the 15th.

H: Should we get Wells back -- will you see him Friday?

K: I will do my best. If I change my mind I can let you know. You should stiffen his backbone.

H: He will understand -- I have sent him explicit instructions.

K: O.K.

H: Also Hal has asked me for a copy of the note -- I had to tell him one was sent. May I show him a copy?

K: Yes.

H: O.K. Thank you sir.

K: O.K. Good. Thank you.

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Y338*

TELECON
Joseph Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
November 21, 1975
7:14 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I am not too anxious to get after Waldheim on the Arafat matter. How do you feel about it?

S: Well, as a minimum....

K: I do not mind pointing out to him what the impact will be on Israel. You said at the end you suggest he not go and see him. I just don't see how we can go that far.

S: Let's strike that sentence. I just wanted a record. I think it will help him get a UNDOF extension. On Monday we can say we tried.

K: They are an amazing bunch. This government is really weird. We get Toon back and right away he says we should have brought him back with Murphy.

S: I thought the tone in that telegraph was pretty bad.

K: It was disgraceful. Did I hear correctly that you want to go to China?

S: No. It does not make any difference to me.

K: You want to go rather than Atherton?

S: No. I will talk to NEA.

K: If it means a lot to you, I might be able to arrange it.

S: It does not mean that much to me.

K: You know I am putting Saunders in at INR?

S: I would not do it right away because it will be read you are shifting him because of that paper.

K: No. It is a promotion for him isn't it? I will wait a week or two. Who would you recommend to replace him?

S: We will come up with a list of about three people. We cannot have a void. We need someone right away. Roy should get you a list tomorrow.

K: Ok. I may wait a week or to, but we will have to announce it soon.

S: Ok.

K: I did not think that paper would have this impact. END.

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X 342 *

TELECON
Mr. Barry Schweid/Secretary Kissinger
November 21, 1975
Time: 6:05 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I am returning you call.

S: There is a rumor that someone put Mr. Richards up to that.

K: How could that possibly be conceivable?

S: I know.

K: How could a Secretary of State ask a foreign diplomat to attack his own Ambassador. I have heard all variations of this. This is inconceivable to me. It shows how sick this town has become. Can you imagine any American going to a foreigner asking him to attack his Ambassador?

S: No. There is another story that the White House is responsible for your trouble with the Pike Committee.

K: Even if that happened it wasn't planned that way. It is conceivable that the White House irritated the Pike Committee.

S: Well, to get back to Moynihan -- you spoke to him today?

K: Yes, twice.

S: Was he about to quit?

K: He was upset about the Richards speech. Were you at the hearing yesterday when I was asked about it. I said he is a close friend who has my support.

S: Will they plan to keep him?

K: I am going to do my damndest.

S: May I use that last quotation?

K: Yes, but say my very best and hopefully we are. He is a national asset.

S: I like his style.

K: He may throw an adjective here and there but when we put him there it was with full knowledge of what he was going to do.

S: What about the African unity group?

K: I think even Pat will say that was a mistake.

S: When will he see the President?

K: Monday or Tuesday.

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S: Will you be there?

K: If I am not in Detriot.

S: Oh yes. I am sorry I can't be there but AP is trying to save money.

K: O.K. Bye.

X339 *

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
November 21, 1975
Time: 7:04 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How would you suggest that we deliver that Angolan note -- through the White House channel or as a regular note?

S: Through the White House channel in the manner in which it is drafted now. The Soviets won't make that much distinction.

K: I am afraid if we send it through the State Department it will leak out.

S: It is known in the State Department so it may leak out anyway. I think you can still send it through the White House or from your staff there. As long as it is in this form they will understand what is intended -- that it should be in a special channel.

K: That is right. O.K.

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X 340*

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
November 21, 1975
Time: 6:48 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I just wondered whether you -- I think Jerry has done it. Can you talk to your personal friend you saw yesterday?

S: I was trying to get to his wife! He is between his office and home. I will get him as soon as he gets hom. The British record is very clear that no such matter came up in the conversation at all. It is absurd the idea of going to third parties.

K: The basic point is that we have reached a level of total pathological... well, to assume that I would go to Callaghan to get....

S: If anyone knows Richards they would know he doesn't have to be put up to anything. I will make that clear about what happened to Pat today.

K: He said he would resign because I put Richards up to this and I said that is ridiculous.

S: We have had to withdraw the political prisoners thing.

K: Why?

S: It has been amended out of all shape. The Europeans are out in arms. They say it is a violation of the gimnish formula.

K: What is that?

S: On consultations.

K: I didn't want to do it in the first place. I called it because he sprung it on me. I then called and said I needed a week to do it and then he put it in there after waiting a week.

S: The Europeans were quite upset.

K: I never wanted it in to begin with.

S: It is done. O.K. I still have a package on the British Trade Protection Issue.

K: I am going to look at it now.

S: I will get to him as soon as I can reach him.

K: O.K. Thank you.

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X344 *

TELECON
Mr. Richard Valeriani/Secretary Kissinger
November 21, 1975
Time: 5:03 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

V: You were a big hit talking about Spain at 11:55.

K: Did you get a lot of mail?

V: I am calling to see if you can clarify for me this Moynihan business.

K: It is beyond my comprehension.

V: The story is that he called a news conference to quit and the President talked him out of it. Our staff thinks he will resign on Sunday.

K: No. He is extremely upset about the Richards attack on him.

V: Someone told me that Richards was drunk when he said that, did you hear that.

K: No.

V: He has no problem with the Administration?

K: No, absolutely not. He is a good friend of mine. I have made it plain that one or two things I would have said less extremely but there is no problem.

V: This is something he feels personally upset about?

K: He feels upset about the Richards attack.

V: Will he see the President next week?

K: Yes.

V: So he won't resign on Sunday?

K: I would be astonished.

V: Did he tell you he would resign?

K: I have gone through this before on two occasions with him. He will think this thing over for a few days.

V: You would like him to stay?

K: Yes.

V: You do not want to be quoted on any of this?

K: You can say I want him to stay and that I consider him a close friend.

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V: He has a close realtionship with the President?

K: There is no problem with the Administration.

V: O.K. Thank you very much.

K: O.K. Dick.

X 336

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TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
November 21, 1975
Time: 8:00 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

S: I talked to him. He said yes, we knew it hadn't come up in any formal conversations. He said there were three conversations. The British said they only had notes on one.

K: What do you mean three conversations?

S: I said I could assure him that it didn't come up. He said you mean to tell me that a speech by the British representative criticizing the U.S. representative was not even talked about before hand. In any case....

K: How are there three conversations?

S: I don't know how.

K: I sat next to him at the meetings and there were no other conversations.

S: That is in effect what I told him. The British convered themselves by saying they only had notes for one conversation. I told him in very categorical terms and he accepted that. I don't know what he will write.

K: It is a very sick situation.

S: He said he wasn't the one who put it in Moynihan's head.

K: Who did?

S: He said it wasn't he who did it.

K: Moynihan claims Richards told him that.

S: I don't know where Richards got it. Ramsbotham got instructions from home to say it didn't come up.

K: It didn't come up at all!

S: I don't even know whether the word Moynihan came up. It is clear that the British would have come to you saying our British representative is going to blast your Ambassador.

K: Why don't you call Ramsbotham to see if they can do something to clarify the thing. Moynihan said that Richards implied that this might be well received in Washington. You know, I don't care any more.

S: Let me talk to Peter.

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K: There is no way I could have raised this with Callaghan.

[redacted]

B6

X349 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt
Sec. Kissinger
November 21, 1975
3:29 p.m.

S: On the Callaghan thing about the MBFR timing. We are making major effort in NATO to get some of these issues resolved. I wanted to check with you that you still agree that if we can get this done before this session of the MBFR that we should get OPtion 3 on the table before recess for Christmas.

K: What do we gain by that?

S: I would not kill myself to get it done but you recall Callaghan says they would like to do it before the defense estimates in February.

K: Could we not do it before the beginning of of the next session?

S: We could but I am not exactly sure of the timing of it. The theory is the Soviets would have time to mull it over during the recess and we would not have to answer so quickly so many questions which might not be easy to answer.

K: My instinct is to do it at the beginning of the next session though I am opened minded about it. They must know pretty well what we are going to do.

S: Theissue is how to deal with the questions the British are raising.

K: I would not want us to be driving too hard

S: We are going to make suggestions that supposedly take care of what the British and Germans want.

K: I would like to put China on the agenda of the restricted meeting.

S: Of the restricted NAC session.

K: Yes. That is what Callaghan thought we should do.

S: O.K. We will do that.

K: Good.

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X 347 *

TELECON
Mr. Maw/Secretary Kissinger
November 21, 1975
4:00 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: A lot of the newmen are implying that I mislead the Congress when I testified at my confirmation hearing.

M: I saw that in the Post this morning. It is ridiculous.

K: Have you looked at this stuff?

M: I glanced at it quickly -- you characterized your role on the thing as minor.

K: My role or the US role.

M: Your personal role. As I recall, I haven't pulled the pieces together yet -- which I will do . It quotes what you said in your testimony and then characterizes it.

K: If you can get me the facts together.

M: Ok, I am on my way up to the Hill. I will do it when I get back.

K: Ok, there is no hurry.

END

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X345 *

TELECON
Ambassador Moynihan/Secretary Kissinger
November 21, 1975
Time: 4:45 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I am delighted that you gave it some more time for thought.

M: Sure.

K: I am told Pat that the Mission or you know someone else is putting out at least newspapers say here is that your concern is that I colluded with Callaghan on this. That can't be serious.

M: Try to tell that to the New York Times. I have said it last night to Pat Bennett.

K: I don't know what he said to you about the idea. I have never discussed you with Callaghan at all.

M: You told me that when I talked to you this morning. It was all over town and it seemed to me that the position wasn't tenable. I am mad at him but I can't do anything about it. Let me be very clear this is not anything that we have said a word to anyone about.

K: First of all If I wanted to do it I would call you. The method of involving a foreign minister is too disgraceful to be discussed among serious people.

M: Don't you worry about me you can handle this thing. Give me the weekend -- the President has asked to talk to me and I will be seeing you too. Alright?

K: It is too humiliating for me to call Callaghan to ask him to put a statement out, but I will be happy to do that.

M: I wouldn't suggest that you think about such things. The word is all over it may have been spontaneous generation. Paul came up to me with this thing at 11:30 just before General Assembly.

K: What did you say?

M: I said you don't know what you are talking about. Listen you have worries and this should not be one of those.

K: I have two separate problems. First I want to preserve you for Government service -- you have done a good job -- you have moved the American people and raised the key issues and our disagreements are not presenting any problems to your performance. The second, is there must be something that can happen in the world in which my moral standing is not immediately attacked.

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M: You plotted the Bay of Pigs invasion.

K: Whatever you can do in that respect not to add fuel to the fire.

M: The only person who raised it with me is Hoffman.

K: Gweortzman was in here to see someone about it. Schecter was around also.

M: Refer those people to me.

K: Can I do that?

M: Of course you can.

K: Because I don't know what got into Richards.

M: On the Times this morning, they went out of their way to say it was the official position of Great Britain;.

K: There was no conversation whatsoever. It never came up.

M: I don't know why it would have.

K: Exactly -- there was no reason to raise it..

M: Don't just -- just refer those people to me.

K: Pat will you keep in mind some of the things I told you this morning.

M: Yes, and I will be in touch with in the morning.

K: Good.

X353 *

TELCON

[redacted]

Sec. Kissinger
November 22, 1975
10:25 a.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

B6

K: How are you [redacted]? B6

[redacted] Fine. I saw you at a distance the other day at Rambouillet. I was in Paris at that time. It looked like a very impressive conference there. B6

K: It worked very well.

[redacted] I thought so and the reports have been good. I called to speak to you about -- I have been talking to Mr. Seidman and after Elliot Richardson had announced his desire to leave London it again spurred my interest in London and I had tried to reach you before I spoke to him but you were not available -- you were out of town. He suggested I write to you and to the President. He said he would speak to him about it. One thing that appealed to him is that I told him I would like to have it and if fortunate enough to be sent there I could only stay through this term. And that seemed to please him and if they had some one else important that they wanted, that would serve both purposes -- my desire and the other person's. I have had a very busy week here so I have not had an opportunity to write to you. B6

K: I will talk to the President early next week.

[redacted] He also asked me to write a letter to the President which I have not been able to do for the same reason. B6

K: That would be helpful too.

[redacted] I will get one off and send it in the mail either this afternoon or tomorrow. I am still at the office here now. B6

K: Good.

[redacted] And I will be 63 in January. We have seven grandchildren and [redacted] misses them and says they grow over night and urges me not to want to do anything next term. It might be a good solution for you and a wonderful way for me to finish my diplomatic career. B6

K: I will take it up with the President and you know I think well of you.

[redacted] Thatis very kind of you and I am most grateful to you. Please give our warm regards to your nice wife. B6

K: Thank you.

[redacted] Look forward to seeing you in the not too distant future. B6

K: Thank you. My best to your wife.

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X351 *

TELCON
Ted Koppel
Sec. Kissinger
November 22, 1975

RELEASED IN FULL

TK: I wanted to call you and let you know that the kids still love you. We are doing a Moynihan story tonight.

K: Jesus Christ.

TK: We have been told that he wants to quit. That he feels pressured by the State Dept.

K: Oh, come on. Pressured by whom in the State Department.

TK: I don't know whom else it would be but you.

K: Well, it is nauseating.

TK: Is he threatening to quit?

K: Yes he is threatening to quit all right.

TK: Over what issue.

K: That the British Ambassador attacked him and he believes that this had the approvel of the US Government. There has to be a lvel of paranoia in which people have a minimum degree of fairness.

K: Moynihan is a friend of mind. Let him cite one God-damn pressure. He has had the run of the bloody place up there.

TK: Well in fact would the British Ambassador have made the attack without the tacit approval of the US Government.

K: Of course, is is conceivable that the US Government would put a foreign ambassador up to making a speech.

TK: No. Not to me.

K: Is there any depths to which we are not going to sink in our machismo? MASOCHISM

TK: I am just asking.

K: You call the British Ambassador and ask him. He made the same speech last Saturday to a group of 35 congressmen.

TK: I accept what you tell me. I don't think it that crucial of an issue as far as that point goes but it will look bad in terms of all the other things that have been happening in the past few weeks. Is he going to stay or do you want him to stay?

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K: Ted, you look at all of my quotations all week long.

TK: They have been very conciliatory.

K: I haveexpressed full confidence. It is impossible to give him everything he wants. I knew what he would do there. I had read his commentary. That is what led to his appointment.

TK: Do you approve of his tactics. That is not your tactic.

K: Sometimes he is a little exhuberant in his expressions. But the basic direction I approve of .

TK: You have the choice of getting things done or

K: There has been no dispute between Moynihan and myself of any consequence.

TK: Let me ask you the question. Do you feel you are going to be able to accept him.

K: I have no idea.

TK: It is up to him now?

K: I have made it as clear as possible that from my side that the thought that he might resign did not cross my mind. There were no real disputes. We have to take out some sentences in a speech but you have read the speeches. They are certainly aggressive enough even with the deletions that are made.

TK: Yes. All the speeches thathe has made these past couple of weeks have had the approval of the State Department.

K: Except the one in San Francisco. In that one I disassociated us from the OAU part but not from the Amin part. Hell if you know the excuses between the UN and the State Department it is minor league stuff.

TK: O.K. Thatis very helpful and I will put that in tonight. Are you doing any traveling next week other than Detroit.

K: No.

TK: May I come and seen you.

K: Is is urgent.

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TK: Not at all. For some strange reason we get to see you 2-3 times a day and when we are back here I do not have the opportunity

K: I will make an effort.

TK: I will call.

K: There was no dispute. I was stunned when this thing happend. In any normal period no one would believe for 30 seconds that the U.S. Govt would get a foreign ambassador to attack its own ambassador that the foreign government would do it.

TK: When is Moynihan coming down-tomorrow?

K: I have no idea. I think Monday or Tuesday.

TK: Is he seeing you and the President.

K: Certainly together. Now you know there was no dispute between Moynihan and me. If you had asked me at 11:29 on Friday morning I would have said to you Moynihan is a close friend of mind as indeed I said to a whole group of press guys on Thursday evening at11:30. He said he was thinking of resigning. I talked him out of resigning. This was on Friday. The next thing I know it is in the newspaper that there has been a mortal struggle with the State Department. On what. Let him name one issue on which there has been a mortal struggle.

TK: Why did he not whole the newspaper conference.

K: Because I talked him out of it.

TK: Andit was left that he would come down and talk to you next week.

K: That's right. It is now anybody who wants a little publicity can -- it is now the fashion to start attacking me.

TK: After a while it is going to become counter-productive. You arealmost due to come around to the other end of the trend now.

K: It is a total outrageous absurdity.

This is for your guidance not for quotation.

TK: No quotation but for information.

K: Don't say I am complaining about it.

TK: O.K.

X352 *

TELCON
Bob Anderson
Sec. Kissinger
November 22, 1975
9:45 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Bob, you know this story that we put the British up to -- that seems to be gaining ground.

A: The Richard business.

K: Yes. Is there someway that we can just totally flatly deny it and tell them to check with the British.

A: We will get that around. I can talk with Bernie. Jerry O'Leary is trying to see what is behind all this. I can talk to them about it.

K: I don't know what is behind it.

A: They are suspicious that Moynihan called a press conference and 10 minutes before it he cancelled it and they want to know what happened.

K: You can tell them I talked to him and pleaded with him not to do it but there has not been any dispute between him and me. It is a God-damned outrage.

A: I saw that they carried your quote where you siad that you were happy with what he was doing and you were a close personal friend, etc. I don't think they are looking at this business as a quarrel betwen you two but on the business of Richards I will get going on that right away.

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X354 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Buffum
Sec. Kissinger
November 22, 1975
10:30 a.m.

K: What is that nonsense that after he introduced the resolution and we called him back on November 13 and took him to the woodshed. He was coming back for the Thorn dinner.

B: Is this in the story? I will look into it.

K: Yes.

B: I will look to see what it was. He was here for the Thorn Dinner.

K: He was not called back for it.

B: No. He was invited to the Foreign dinner from the beginning. I had not noted that particular point. Of course, that may also relate to the woodshed.

K: Where would that have come from.

B: I cannot imagine who uses that kind of language. I really don't know. I know a number of people knew you saw him alone afterwards but as far as I know no one knew what transpired in that conversation.

K: I had no one there.

B: I called him the next morning and asked him if there was anything relative in thatconversation and he said to work through you. And that is all I knew about it.

K: O.K. Thank you.

B: Righto.

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X362 *

TELECON
Scotty Reston/The Secretary
November 24, 1975
Time: 11:55 a. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Scotty, how are you?

R: Do you have a time?

K: I am going to Detroit today.

R: When are you coming back?

K: Tomorrow.

R: I have to go to New York tomorrow and Wednesday. Maybe I can try later in the week. When are you off to China?

K: On Saturday. Are you in town Friday? Why don't we get together on Friday?

R: I will call yourSecretary and maybe we can fix it up for Friday.

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X 363 *

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
November 24, 1975
12:13 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: What did you find out about the Angola thing?

S: It is on Scowcroft's desk for White House approval.

K: When I approve a goddamn thing it gets sent.

S: I just discovered that's where it was. I guess it has to get sent through those channels.

K: It gets sent through the White House but I do not need Scowcroft to approve my goddamn cables.

END

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X367*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Pappas/Secretary Kissinger
November 25, 1975
Time: 6:40 p.m.

K: How are you?

P: Tired out. I was in Washington yesterday. You had an excellent meeting in Detroit.

K: I enjoyed it.

P: Over 4,000 people were there. We had a good meeting too. Max conducted an excellent meeting -- people from all over the country.

K: I am delighted.

P: I talked with Mr. -- the Ambassador just before I left -- he sends his warm regards.

K: He is a good man.

P: Excellent man -- very dedicated to his job. It is a difficult circumstance. They had a meeting for some anniversary there -- there were 200,000 youths that past by the Embassy. They were not hostile just stoped for a while. I understand I just give you this for your information -- that the 230 is going to be reduced.

K: What 230?

P: That we were going to loan to Greece.

K: That is what they asked for, we never promised them that much.

P: The report in the paper said 230.

K: Maybe it is from all sources.

P: I hope nothing is reduced.

K: Nothing will be reduced that we have in the budget.

P: Another thing that I think will help a great deal -- they need corn there. If we can give 350,000 tons of corn on a credit basis I think that will help a great deal.

K: Let me take a look into that. I am one-half hour late for a dinner in my honor -- can I call you tomorrow.

P: Can I call you, would that be more convenient.

K: Yes, you call me.

P: What time?

K: Oh, I don't know -- around noon.

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P: Good. Take good care. I wish I was at the dinner.

K: Thank you. Bye.

(Y 366) *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Lord/Secretary Kissinger
November 25, 1975
Time: 7:15 p.m.

K: Have you seen thatmessage from the Ch....

L: Yes. I think we should go back on it.

K: Why don't you go back on it. It is a misrepresentation -- nothing like this was ever said. There is some son of a bitch in the White House who is putting this out.

L: It is unbelievable. They claim that this is the Japanese account of this talk.

K: Newsweek says Henry Kissinger was assured that Mao would receive the President.

L: I am talking about the back channel.

K: We told the Japanese nothing. They were referring to the Newsweek thing.

L: It is the same people in the White House trying to make it look like we pinned down an agreement for the meeting.

K: Say it is tru I mentioned this but I never made -- I never told anyone about the content -- it is pure invention.

L: These should go back to Teng?

K: To these two people. I am dying to leave here, I am late for a dinner.

L: It is true -- I am just trying to clarify this.

K: You realize the most important thing is to get something onthe record not whether it is correct.

L: I wanted to be precise.

K: The Chairman wrote some words out but I never referred to the content.

L: Good.

K: O.K.

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X368 *

TELECON
Ambassador McCloskey/Secretary Kissinger
November 25, 1975
Time: 6:29 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

M: I am -- may I correct any stories that you are going to Moscow next month?

K: I would keep it....

M: I am getting a lot of calls on it.

K: I would keep it open but not confirm it either.

M: That is helpful to know. The Chicago Tribune has it firmly that you would do both Madrid and Moscow. Are you going to the Fortune dinner soon?

K: Within the next half hour. Are you going.

M: I was invited.

K: Do you want to ride with me?

M: Yes, thank you.

K: O.K.

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X365 *

TELCON
Sandy Socolow (CBS News)
Sec. Kissinger
4:00, November 25, 1975

RELEASED IN FULL

S: I have what I think is a very distressing human matter in Luanda. I don't think you have anybody there. Our two reporters, Don Webster and Bill Mutschman both Americans have been arrested by the MPLA and have been in jail since last Friday. We think they are in jail and they are being alternately accused of being either South African or CIA agents.

K: Have you talked to any of my people.

S: Bernie Kalb spoke to somebody yesterday.

K: I have somebody waiting now. I know enough and I will do something and get back to you.

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X374 *

TELECON
Senator McGee/Secretary Kissinger
November 26, 1975
Time: 7:18 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How areyou?

M: Good. I just got back from out west. I tried what we were talking about. They wanted me to raise with the 3rd week in January -- their preference would be the 21st on Wednesday at 11:00 a.m. They are flexible, however.

K: The President may make his State of the Union address on the 20th.

M: They have a recess between semesters -- they go in around the 15th so they could play around with any day that week.

K: What is my window?

M: Your what?

K: What is the time which is best?

M: They were only trying out for size the 21st or 22nd of January.

K: Let me see whether -- I will definitely do it at the end of January. If I wanted to do it the following week would they accept that?

M: They didn't want it earlier in January, that's all.

K: On the 15th of January they are coming back?

M: WEll, really about the 12th.

K: I will propose a date between the 21st and the 4th of February.

M: That would be fine for them. You have a good trip.

K: Thank you and thanks for all of your support.

M: O.K.

K: Bye.

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X 372 *

TELECON
Mr. Sidey/The Secretary
November 26, 1975
Time: 3:10 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

S: What do you mean you are attending to State business rather than helping Time magazine?

K: I helped Fortune magazine last night.

S: I was trying to put together a little column about next week, being we will be in the great Republic of... Is there anything you can tell me how Ford contemplates this or what his views are?

K: What I said in the speech at Detroit -- have you read it -- pretty much reflects our thinking. Our relationship with China depends above all on the degree to which we can bring our foreign policy perceptives into some sort of alignment with theirs. This depends upon their perception of us and our leaders. This meeting could be very important although a great deal cannot come out of it.

S: How did this reflect his mood?

K: We put a book together with every conversation with Mao and a book on what the Chinese have said on every major issue since 1971. He has been reading these and I have been meeting with him.

S: He was in China before.

K: He has a favorable recollection of it. He was impressed by Chou.

S: He is fascinated by it? This again will be put in very personal terms.

K: The personal terms do matter a great deal.

S: I am one of your supporters in this. I think it is foolish to conduct business through cables.

K: Especially when their ambassadors have no authority.

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S: Even though we have a mission there, you have to have our public leaders talk to each other. I just wanted to get some background.

K: The major thing -- this is a visit where really the personal relationship counts. The assessment they make of each other is kind of crucial and can't be judged by what is said at the end of the trip in a communique, if there is one.

S: See you in Peking, if not before on the Alaska pipeline.

K: Isn't that a nightmare?

S: OK, Henry.

X370 *

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
November 26, 1975
Time: 7:13 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

S: There have been a number of calls to different people in the building trying to embarrass you with the Chinese trip. I told everyone not to comment.

K: Good. Can you go over that list of bilateral things. See if there is one or two we can get finished for my trip to the Soviet Union -- like the Maritime Union.

S: O.K. Say, Ducket briefed Jackson on that radar thing. He has written a letter to the President. There is supposed to be a paper coming to you on SSC versus direct approach. I don't know what we will do about these briefings.

K: You mean be coping?

S: Yes.

K: I don't know what to do.

S: The only hope is that Jackson says he will devote himself to the campaign after January 1.

K: That means he will come after me.

S: He is just going to go out and raise money, etc. But I am sure it will be among the issues. I don't know how we can stop Ducket from carrying on a relationship that he has cultivated for three years. We could wait until we decide what to do so it could be included in the briefing. I will go over that list again.

K: I have no idea -- give me a memo by Friday. And have a good holiday.

S: O.K. Thank you.

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X369 *

TELECON
Mr. Max Fisher/Secretary Kissinger
November 26, 1975
Time: 7:34 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

F: Fine. You were a great success.

K: Was it alright?

F: Yes. Everyone says why weren't you there. I told them that I had to meet with the President and that group. That was one of the biggest crowds they have ever had. Did you feel the reaction of the crowd.

K: The reaction was very good.

F: I spent quite a bit of time with our mutual friend. You have really got a great friend there.

K: At least until my back is turned.

F: Absolutely not. I isolated where the problems were coming from.

K: Where do you think they come from?

F: Some of the advisors and also some from his political campaign. We had a long talk about the White House and other affairs.

K: He didn't help me with the Moynihan matter.

F: I need to sit down and talk to you. I spent 1/2 hour with him. When are you leaving for China?

K: Saturday.

F: I have to sit down with you. I know this man more years than you do. I know what kind of individual he is -- I can tell you this that the things he had to say would make you blush. What it means to the country, to him and to the whole world.

K: I appreciate this.

F: I don't want to go into it on the phone, but I am being frank with you. I quoted chapter and verse on this thing, but I am telling you this as sure as I am talking to you how this man feels.

K: I appreciate this very much.

F: I didn't want to talk to him on the phone, we went into his own problems. He has problems with a few characters. I hope he got the city of New York settled today. When I sit down and talk to you in detail, I think you will understand. I put it on the table.

K: You are very nice.

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F: I believe in what I am doing. These politicians like Church -- some of that stuff is just politics. All they are thinking about is what the chances of being President are.

K: Yes.

F: You get out in our part of the world you saw the crowd that turned out in one week for you.

K: Yes.

F: Your polls are running 60/70% in the country. The Reagenite rightwingers are taking shots at the Soviet policy. These guys don't know what the options are.

K: How much are they willing to spend?

F: On balance I want you to know I have to have a talk with you and share what I talked about -- it is a plus.

K: You are very nice.

F: That is seriously what I say to you.

K: I hope we can get together soon. I will weigh what you say very seriously.

F: Have a good trip.

K: I will see you when we get back.

F: Thank you.

K: O.K.

X373 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Eric Severeid/The Secretary
November 26, 1975
Time: 12:37 p. m.

K: Hello, Eric, how are you?

S: Pretty good.

K: Somebody brought to my attention a commentary you made yesterday in which you stated as a fact that I leaked the Schlesinger change in order to keep the President from changing his mind.

S: One of your people did.

K: None of my people did.

S: I am sorry I have to disagree with you.

K: Do you know for a fact that one of my people did?

S: I have no doubt about it.

K: You know we reached a lovely point when a Secretary of State can be accused of these things when for a week I voted against this change. When you say one of my people did say it was done in order to keep the President from changing his mind because I wanted Schlesinger out, is that what you think?

S: One of your people did and boasted about it. I didn't use it for Time and maybe I shouldn't have used it now.

K: It is practically inconceivable to me. I know you are a serious person and you didn't do it maliciously.

S: You know I am not. If I said all the things I should say ...

K: If one of my people did it, only one or two of my people knew about the scheme and knew I was violently opposed to it.

S: They shouldn't claim credit for it then.

K: They shouldn't. They certainly shouldn't do this.

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S: It is a hell of a g. d. atmosphere here.

K: It is an awful atmosphere. I want to tell you on my word of honor, if this still counts in this city, I didn't know about it until after I got back from China. I opposed it not because we didn't get on but because it wouldn't solve any of the problems. If there was a motive for leaking it, it was to freeze the decision lest I change his mind. If any of my people did it, which I tell you is almost inconceivable, since they knew my views, they did something absolutely outrageously against my desires. But do you know this as a fact? This is for my own information and not to criticize you. Have you heard one of my people do this?

S: I can't go into that. I am not a careless person. I just avoid printing a lot of these things even if they are true. I have no doubt about this.

K: You I have no doubt that the man did.

S: At least he boasted he did at the time and right after this.

K: I find this shocking. I find this absolutely shocking.

S: Well, Henry, God bless you.

K: All I want you to know, if he did -- if anyone else had told me I wouldn't believe it. It is even worse than I thought it is. One or two confidants that I had who knew about it would respect this decision. There were no victories gained in this thing and on the Moynihan thing there was no debate between him and me except on an adjective here and there. But that is a different matter. That was your opinion. I don't protest about that.

S: Well, Henry, I don't know what to do about these things. It is my birthday today. What a way to start the day.

K: You know how I idolize you and since I consider this a moral issue, that is why I called you.

S: If I can find out that I am wrong on this I will let you know, but I don't think so.

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K: If you are right, I am very shocked.

S: It is a shocking world.

K: The only people I discussed this with before the event were my closest friends because I was so terribly troubled and if they have done this, then this town is even worse off than I thought it was.

S: There is always that remote possibility that somebody was boasting. I don't know why he took the credit for something.

K: This was not a victory for anybody. OK, Eric, happy birthday.

X 371 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. David Binder/Secretary Kissinger
November 26, 1975
Time: 5:54 p.m.

B: I heard from a Russian and an American source that you will expect to see Brezhnev on the 15.

K: There is no confirmed date yet.

B: Is that in the ball park?

K: I have said all I am going to say on that subject.

B: The Russian seemed to know what he was talking about.

K: I don't know whether he did or didn't.

B: Would I be embarrassing anyone besides myself if I went with that.

K: It isn't helpful at this point.

B: You made the remark that it is possible.

K: It is not firm.

B: O.K. Have a nice Thanksgiving. I enjoyed seeing you the other night.

K: Thank you. Nice to see you. Bye.

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X3806 *

TELECON
Mr. Funseth/The Secretary
November 28, 1975
Time: 2:42 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Have you announced my trip to Japan?

F: No, Sir.

K: You are to announce the trip to Japan and there is no further discussion. Why was it not done before?

F: Because EA suggested in light of your briefing this afternoon you might want to do it then.

K: It is not up to EA's business what I do. Are you going to take the press along?

F: That is my understanding.

K: How are you organizing it? On the trip?

F: I thought...

K: How else are you going to do it? You were told at 8:30 this morning to get this organized.

F: No, I wasn't.

K: That is what Habib told me. Who do you take orders from? As long as I am here, I am in charge. I told the Bureau I wanted it announced. I insisted that they not deal with the White House press office on this trip.

F: I will take care of it.

K: There is no way you can do it at 3:00 when they are leaving tomorrow.

F: Let me see if I can do it. There is a State Department Press Officer helping Nessen.

K: I told you people I don't want anything to do with the Nessen people on this trip. I do not care to touch them. You had no right to make this announcement this afternoon.

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F: I was not told you wanted this announced at noon or I would have done it.

K: I told Habib yesterday that I wanted it settled whether or not the press was going with me and I did not wish to work through the Press Office.

F: This is the first I heard of it. I will get in touch with Habib right away.

K: And if he tells you it is okay you will do it?

X379 *

TELECON
Mr. Habib/The Secretary
November 28, 1975
Time: 2:55 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Of course, they didn't announce it.

H: It has been done.

K: It was not done when I wanted it.

H: I had written on it: 12 noon announcement. It was given to them for 12 noon.

K: It wasn't done.

H: When you give someone something...

K: They claim you told them to wait until 3:00.

H: Why in the hell did they say wait until 3:00?

K: That is when I am having my press conference. There is no way we can do it without doing it through Nessen. Then we will hear I am taking the press away from the President.

H: The reason for press accompanying -- you only mentioned that to Funseth. I only found out about that 10 minutes ago from Funseth. I had not been informed about press accompanying. It is up to him to organize.

Secretary hangs up.

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X378 *

TELECON
Ambassador Moynihan/Secretary Kissinger
November 28, 1975
Time: 7:00 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: We are discussing this Security Council exercise you are engaged in. Have you any later word?

M: No, we are due to reconvene in 15 or 20 minutes. But I have no information but what I gave to Joe which was 1 hour ago.

K: Our thinking is that we can go as far as the phrase the Palestinian question. Joe and I think....

M: And Saunders and soforth.

K: Don't mention Saunders -- Hertzog is an authority. For the U.S. to veto a resolution because it includes the Palestinian question is unthinkable. The next issue if they put all the other resolutions -- we have to vote against them.

M: Do you say vote against or veto -- we can abstain.

K: What do you think?

M: We are trying to get the Syrians to take that out -- we have said it is unacceptable.

K: That is a position you should hold to, even if it is changed at the last minute. You say they are trying to take it out?

M: Yes. I talked to the Chinese, also, who say they will not participate in the vote. At this point the other side cannot pass the resolution.

K: That is good.

M: But then, neither can we.

K: If the -- if it comes to the point where Molag makes some assertions about the PLO participation we cannot let him say it is the consensus -- we will have to say the majority.

M: Could I work out the majority of the Council members wish to invite the PLO but we are not a part of that majority -- is that correct?

K:Right. He can say it is a procedural question and you would say we are not part of that majority. (to Sisco: What are the other possibilities) The French idea of all relevant resolutions.

M: We may not come to that if the Syrians give in on the present thing.

K: We could go along with that and you say at the end you want to make clear that as far as the U.S. is concerned the relevant resolutions are 242 and 338.

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M: These are the only relevant ones?

K: Yes. But this is not as good as the first alternative -- that is not one I would have brought into play on our side. We are going to be in the air.

M: When.

K: At 8:00 a.m. on Saturday.

M: You will get a report when you leave. I will be in touch with Joe all evening.

K: How does it smell to you?

M: It will work out alright. I have no instinct for this place, however. (to Joe Lorenz: What is your instinct?) The Syrians are on the phone to Damascus -- he thinks it is pretty good.

K: My instinct is they will go for it because they have gone this far. We will have to have a talk about January 12 session. I wnat it in February, but let's not worry about that (to Sisco: suppose it says 12 January, can we get it delayed a week?) D on't worry about that now, who will be the chairman in January?

M: In January -- Maritania? (who is the chairman in January?) Tanzania -- that is not the worst.

K: Why don't you proceed on those lines and keep Joe informed the rest of the evening.

M: Oh, yes. We will also call you tomorrow.

K: You can get the plane -- we also have rapid communications.

M: O.K. Good. Have a good trip.

K: O.K. Thank you Pat. Bye.

RELEASED IN FULL

X 376 *

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
November 28, 1975
Time: 2:07 pm

D: Missed first sentence

K: It makes us feel your government is really interested in great solutions,

D: That is not quite the case. I had a long talk with Sisco and we had talked about it before you left for Detroit. I am calling you now aboutthe proposal Waldheim is putting before our Ambassador.

K: Which is what?

D: He said that the text that would be agreeable to the Syrians has a paragraph to reconvene the Security Council on January 12 to debate the Syrian question and to invite the PLO according to Resolution 335 of the Assembly. That is unacceptable to us.

K: I already made clear that we would oppose it.

D: What I am really trying to ask you is that if it is possible for the text to be parallel to the one of last year.

K: That may be impossible now. We cannot prevent debate on the Middle East. Any members of the Council has the right to ask for it. We can prevent an invitation to the PLO as part of the resolution.

D: Even in the original text, there is urgent consideration of 338 in the report of the Secretary General, why do they have to put it as part of the resolution. To tie it into that is_____.

K: Are you asking us to veto the UNDOF if it has any reference to the Middle East discussions at all? I agree that we should not have anything in there inviting the PLO.

D: Or for that matter any specific date.

K: Why?

D: Because it ties the extension to a date of the Security Council.

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K: Do you want us to veto on that ground?

D: I am asking you to try to change it.

K: That we are trying to do. I have asked Buffum to find out from Jerusalem if you want us to veto, the UNDOF extension if we can't get everything.

D: I don't have specific instructions on this. I will have my Counselor talk to Sisco about it. I want you to stick to the original text. If you would put out your views, they will agree to it. You don't think so?

K: No. I know it is impossible to get this from Jerusalem but I think we have done very well to eliminate all the issues we have. Now we will get them to eliminate the invitation to the PLO, we hope. To cut out the discussion, that I would question.

D: I will try to get from Jerusalem their position on it and I will have it passed on to Sisco.

K: We agreed that the reference to the other resolutions should be out.

D: You do think that if we have no choice we should leave the question of reconvening of the Security Council on debate.

K: Yes. I am not looking forward to the debate. It will not be the most edifying thing to happen.

D: No, as you said, though, any member can convene a debate.

K: Right. On the other hand, it is hard to veto a debate which is in the Soviet's ability to convene anyway.

D: It is the same logic anyhow. Why do they need it then.

K: They need it as a minimal facesaver.

D: Besides a facesaver, I think they want to tie it to the Palestinian question.

K: That they want to do eventually.

D: If there is a debate, they will invite the PLO. Then, we will face that problem. If we could cut if off in the beginning, it would be better.

K: There is no question it would be better if we can cut it out. The question is, must we veto it if we can't cut it out.

D: I will try to get a direct answer to you, Mr. Secretary. When are you leaving for China?

K: Tomorrow morning.

D: I will get back to your people today on this. I want to tell you I heard your speech in Detroit which I thought was very good. I am here in San Francisco because I made a commitment some time ago to speak to a large group of Jews.

K: Did you hear the full text?

D: Yes, from this and talking to some people here, they received it very well, expecially the part on Russia and Cuba. I will try to get to Sisco before you leave. Buffum is not the greatest enthusiast.

K: Sisco will be with me.

D: That's what I mean.

K: But Sisco is with me sothat together we can handle anything that comes up.

D: I will be in touch with Sisco later and if no other difficulty I will call you later.

K: Ok

END

X 375 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
November 28, 1975
Time: 5:25 p.m.

D: I have given the details of our reply to Sisco. Basically we want you to make an effort to get this out. If this is not obtainable we would like to prepare a statement to the President of the Security Council. Third, if this is not possible we would not go along with a veto if the resolution does not relate to the PLO. Forth, we request that if the majority in the UN want to pass this resolution with those passages that you would veto it.

K: That is my -- that is what we intent to do.

D: I gave the details to Joe. I wanted to feel as if we had talked about this.

K: That is a reasonable proposition.

D: I can tell my government that is what you advocate?

K: Let me confirm it, but I am almost certain this will be accepted.

D: If you have any hesitation can someone call me?

K: Of course. Can I also ask you that what we have said not be printed in the newspapers.

D: If you show me one thing that we have talked about that you read in the newspapers....

K: I know it never comes from you.

D: Whatever is in Israel in the cabinet, I cannot tell, but none of our conversations are printed.

K: I will call you if there is any change.

D: Are you stopping in Honolulu tomorrow?

K: No Anchorage.

D: I would meet you at the airport if you were. How about on the way back.

K: No we will stop in Anchorage tomorrow. I will have left the President by then.

D: Is there any decision on the date of Rabin?

K: We were supposed to get it this afternoon. We will get it before we leave today.

D: Whom shall I be in touch with?

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D: Larry, or Scowcroft?

K: Scowcroft is coming -- Larry is staying.

D: I will be in touch as to the date with Larry.

K: You will have it Monday.

D: Have a nice trip if I don't hear from you again.

K: O.K. Thank you.

SH1A *

TELCON
Ambassador Von Staden/Secretary Kissinger
December 8, 1975
Time: 7:50 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you.

V: Who is talking?

K: Mr. Kissinger, did you want to talk to me?

V: I was told by the protective service force that I should call your office and so I called your secretary.

K: I guess Mr. Bremer....

V: I talked to him about 10 minutes ago.

K: I have no idea what it is about. As long as you are on the line, I am so unhappy about a Newsweek story which criticized me, but which claimed that while a German visitor was seeing me I made some remarks about the Congress. This probably came out of the meeting between Schutze and you.

V: I cannot tell you how this happened. I had to same reaction when I saw this because it pointed to that conversation but I haven't seen anyone from those papers.

K: If I thought you had done it I wouldn't talk to you about it. I consider it certain that you didn't do it. Schutze should have his attention called to it.

V: I can't imagine he wasn't the only other German present at that meeting.

K: I don't know how we got on the subject of the Congress anyway.

V: You mentioned that you had to go that afternoon.

K: To the Committee.

V: Yes. I can't -- I really have no explanation. I was struck when I saw it.

K: I will see you Wednesday morning. I may have to change that because of a meeting the President called. I had assumed that your foreign minister wanted me to do the Furth thing.

V: I think so.

K: I am doing it for him and my parents.

V: He appreciates it very much. He has to leave at 2:00 p.m. because he has his meeting with Sauvagnargues.

K: Yes.

V: I learned from this after it had been arranged. I think he is very interested.

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K: I think he is. O.K. Mr. Ambassador I will see you Wednesday.

V: Yes.

K: I will make very sure not to make any sarcastic jokes to you.

V: (Laughter) I must saw I was struck when I saw this.

K: I will take a confidence pill so that I don't look harrassed, worried frightened because if I lose this income I will be in bad shape. O.K.

V: See you on Wednesday.

SH11 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Barry Schweid/Secretary Kissinger
December 8, 1975
7:15 pm

S: Can you tell me now if we are going to Moscow?

K: The decision hasn't been made yet. But it is 50-50.

S: I have a personal problem about this. Apparently the AP will not send me unless we go to Moscow.

K: We will decide that later today or tomorrow.

S: Has the Ambassador been in yet?

K: Yes. I just talked to him. There is no sense going to Moscow unless we have positions worked out in great detail.

S: I have one logistical problem. At that news conference you did leave the impression...

K: I will not go to Moscow escept on assurance they will change their old position.

S: Can I do any of this to U.S. official?

K: Yes.

S: Ok. Thank you..oh, I have one more thing...Ted went on the air and did something on Angola that makes us believe there is some covert operation underway.

K: There is nothing.

S: Ok. Thank you.

END

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DATE/CASE ID: 24 APR 2003 200102979

SH17*

TELECON
Ambassador McCloskey/Secretary Kissinger
December 9, 1975
Time: 6:03 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

M: I thought you would be pleased to know that everything the press said this afternoon was good. They were of the view that it was a worthwhile thing to have done to establish the record. It is am important point of reference on the subject even though some of it won't get in the papers. McLean of the Chicago Tribune said this puts you on a firmer footing in Washington. He meant that personally also, because the air was not clear of the charges before.

K: Good.

M: One of the others, I forget his name, said the staff people on Jackson's Committee called him and suggested why didn't you take the invitation to appear before the Committee. I thought that question might have arisen in the briefing.

K: That is alright.

M: You should be satisfied with it.

K: Good. Thank you.

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SH16 *

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/The Secretary
December 9, 1975
Time: 2:50 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: .... my press briefing saying we did not draft any of these agreements.

S: The unilateral statements?

K: I said whatever negotiating I did never extended to drafting on SALT.

S: I think that is correct.

K: My recollection is...

S: The only thing you did was that statement with Dobrynin on the G5 stuff.

K: Everything on the agreement was done in Helsinki.

S: Or subsequently by the legal types who came to Moscow.

K: The point I made at the press conference was what I negotiated was from agreements in principle. As soon as we had an agreement we shifted to negotiators.

S: Remember we had a 9 hour delay until they came on the plane with the formal agreement. They worked on it on the plane.

K: Would you check on that to make sure?

S: Did you see the memo to the President on the Dobrynin meeting?

K: Where is it?

S: It is there with you.

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SH18 *

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
December 9, 1975
Time: 6:06 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

D: Hello.

K: Anatol, one point.

D: You have changed your mind?

K: No, I think it will turn out in our interest.

D: I think it is much better. In the final analysis it will be better.

K: In the sense -- well to arrive in Moscow without having a chance to study our views is rough on Brezhnev. It is easier on Gromyko because he knows the subject so well.

G: (Laughter)

K: I want to talk to you about the signal. We can't wait until I get there.

D: What signal?

K: That beam you are beaming into our Embassy in Moscow.

D: I have asked them...

K: See whether you can get me a reply within a few days.

D: I will try to do my best.

K: Maybe you could turn it off until I get there.

D: And then you could switch it on again.

K: You could give me a radiation treatment.

D: Than you will be radioactive. Once again I could send another today.

K: We really are sitting on it here but too many people know about it. We will catch hell unless we can say something is happening.

D: Your reports from Moscow say it is continued?

K: Should we check?

D: Maybe it is helpful.

K: We will check.

D: You are leaving tomorrow?

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K: When you put a bulb into the Ambassador's room it starts glowing when it isn't in a socket -- does that mean anything?

D: Nevertheless you check with your Embassy.

K: Let me check and I will let you know.

D: O.K.

S/123 *

TELECON
Mr. Enders/The Secretary
December 10, 1975
Time: 9:30 am

RELEASED IN FULL

E: (missed first part) Chuck Robinson is passing the message on.

K: And Simon claimed he never heard of the thing but he said he is willing to work it out.

E: Excellent. I have a call into Simon. He was in a meeting and I didn't want to pull him out, but I will send you a cable on the plane with the results.

K: I told him I would make a joint proposal by him and me.

E: You would like to mention him in the speech?

K: Why not?

E: We will tell him that the full details of your speech should go into his speech to the IMF in January.

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SH29 *

TELECON
Mr. Frost/The Secretary
December 10, 1975
Time: 11:25 am

RELEASED IN FULL

F: How are you?

K: I am fine. I am already half an hour late for my plane.

F: Bless you deeply for calling back. The thing is I wondered if we could achieve 10 minutes when you are in London this weekend at any time -- you say.

K: Will you call me at Claridges Friday night or Saturday morning.

F: Lovely. I will be in town this weekend.

K: The best would be to go through the Embassy. The office will close but the Embassy will have a line to me.

F: Should I call the Embassy and ask to be put through.

K: You will figure out a way. Either call Claridges or call the Embassy -- one or the other.

F: I will do it Friday night or Saturday morning. Lovely.

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SH33*

TELECON
Mr. Sisco /Secretary Kissinger
December 18, 1975
11:25 am

RELEASED IN FULL

S: Buffum informed me that Moynihan is giving a press conference at 11:30. I wanted to know if there is any guidance.

K: I talked to him.

S: Well then, that is done.

K: It is hopeless.

S: Yes. Secondly, there must have been 150 Congressmen there and the point I made is the one you indicated which is the one I made yesterday. It was rough sledding. The questions are hostile -- it is the Vietnam syndrome all over again. They bitched like hell that there is no consultation ahead of time -- but you know if this is the case....

K: But we consulted with them

S: I made this clear, but to them consultation is giving them a veto over the decision-making process.

K: But that isn't true. We didn't make any decision til we discussed it with them.

S: It is irrational up there.

K: Now, how is it possible that my instructions, my personal instructions that no memo on Angola be sent to the Hill til I got back were not followed.

S: This is how I understood it. Humphrey asked for some answers to questions and AF sent it up to him.

K: They didn't do that. They prepared a full scale explanation.

S: I haven't had time to read in on any papers. I have spent my time preparing for these hearings. But up there it is the Vietnam syndrome. I think I got across that they [illegible] are not dealing with an Administration that has an interest in Angola but we are dealing with what you described.

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K: Do you think you made any headway?

S: I don't think I changed any minds. Most of these people came in with their minds made up. It was about the sharpest briefing I have been in in three months.

K: Ok

END

S/H38 *

TELCON
Amb. Moynihan
Sec. Kissinger
11:00 a.m.,
December 18, 1975

RELEASED IN FULL

M: *Morning, welcome back to your country.*

K: Thank you, Pat. I don't know if it is my country.

M: The first time in years they have not been waiting for you with some kind of legal actions.

K: That is true. Pat, somebody told me that you are giving a press conference at 11:30. I wonder if you could stay off Angola. They are voting today.

M: No strain at all.

K: I don't object to a press conference. I think you should.

M: No problem at all. The only way I got into it as you know ...

K: As it happens, I agree with 98 percent of what you said. The part I did not -- I agreed with all of it. Look for all practical purposes, I agreed with it. No point in going into finepoints. Africans tell me when you say Soviet colonialism it wrings the wrong bell. One should use another word to convey the same thought.

M: Maybe they do.

K: That is what the Nigerian Foreign Minister said to me yesterday. It is that sort of nuance I would make.

M: *It conveys the wrong thought because it sticks in t heir* f------g gullet. They don't like tothink about it. We have had some extraordinary reactions up here so you will note. Privately one African after another comes to us and say you are going to help us. We have said talk to Washington. It is not our business.

K: I know they want us to help them. That is the weird thing.

M: Yesterday, I , the host country, gave the last speech. It is impressive. By this point we have had 15 -- barely paying attention to the podium. They sat down and listend to me. Not an accusatory speech but a hard one and the Africans in particular are scared and it was that the Angolan thing hastheir attention and they don't know how to explain it.

K: Let's put it this way. I have no objection. What I don't want is any specific proposal for a solution right now;that you havenot done. I have read your cables.

M: The only thing..

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K: We will move in that direction but I first have to stem the panic in Africa.

M: It is pretty panicky in Africa.

K: It is panicky.

M: We pick it up here. They come to us panicky.

K: I am going to send Schaufele there next week and I will calm them down and explain to them. Then we will move into a diplomatic phase. No later than the first of the year.

M: My press conference is the usual end of the session.

K: I have no objection to the press conference. I am concerned with thevotes here. If Angola comes up if you complain about Soviet intervention you have more than my blessings but you say that that is the key issue that the Soviets are trying to impose their solution by military force. I have no problem with that.

M: I will leave it at that. They will probably say will it come to the Security Council. I will say if the OAU makes a judgment explaining it they may bring it up if they like.

K: Good luck, Pat.

M: O.K.

S1442

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TELECON
Mr. Winston Lord/Secretary Kissinger
December 19, 1975
Time: 8:15 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Are you going to be in tomorrow morning?

L: Yes.

K: I have redone the letter. I wonder whether you could edit it first thing in the morning and then meet with me. You might disagree with the approach.

L: What time do you want to see it?

K: About 9:30.

L: O.K. Good.

K: Thank you.

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DATE/CASE ID: 24 APR 2003 200102979

SH44 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Wm. Rogers
Sec. Kissinger
December 20, 1975
9:30 a.m.

K: I am not all that keen to accept the luncheon date with Manley. It ruins a whole day.

R: I think we ought tosee if we can't suggest that he come up there to the place and have lunch with you at the house. Does that make more sense to you?

K: I had rather have that.

R: I think that better. That was an idea we originally floated six months ago when we were thinking about it the first time. I think he might do that. We can go back and tactifully ask him.

K: Let's wait until Monday.

R: All right. You want to think about it over the weekend.

K: Yes.

R: That would be my suggestion.

K: I did not realize I could not land in Ocho Rios.

R: The big airplane can land only at Montego.

K: You will be in on Monday.

R: Oh, sure.

K: I will talk to you on Monday,

R. O.K.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 24 APR 2003 200102979

SH53 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Mr. Rogers
12/22/75; 5:30 pm

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: You can now tell the Jamaicans if he wants to come over and have lunch with me but for me a day there is so.. This may be the only chance I get for relaxing and it spend it in Kingston. I don't want to be impolite. It is about the only quiet week I am going to have for awhile.

R: Quite frankly, I have already made a private probe in that direction and the response was favorable.

K: If he would come for dinner I would prefer it even more. That way I don't miss time in the sun.

R: They are laying on the whole thing very nicely. The food and service will be the way you will like it. I will mention the possibility of a dinner. My indication back is that he would be delighted.

[redacted] B6

K: Thompson?

R: He will do it either way. I suggest you leave it up to the prime minister.

K: Why don't you do that. Are you going to give me a briefing book?

R: Yes, sure.

K: Okay. Thank you.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 22 MAY 2003 200102979

SH45*

TELCON
Mr. George Meaney
Sec. Kissinger
12:28 p.m.
Dec. 22, 1975

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you George?

M: Listen, I can't have lunch with you tomorrow. I have a sort of special lunch I do once a year with a couple of old friends atthe club here. They go out of town. I can't make it tomorrow.

K: Do you want to do it Wednesday?

M: Wednesday, I could. Whattime?

K: Do you want to bring Lane?

M: If he is available. I will find out.

K: 1:00 at the State Dept. I don't haveanything. I just thought we should review where we all are.

M: Good. I will get hold of Lane. I know he is in town. I will check with him. I will let your secretary know.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 24 APR 2003 200102979

SH49 *

TELCON
Sec. Kissinger/Funseth
12/22/75/ 5:25 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I did not send out a written correction.

F: It was an addendum to the transcript. I just spoke over the phone.

K: Okay.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 09 JUL 2003 200102979

SH57 *

TELCON
Sec. Kissinger/Schaufele
12/23/75; 5:05 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Bill, do you think we should get some of my remarks of this morning around in cable form rather than . . .

S: Yes, indeed. I have told them to bring me the transcript as soon as they have it.

K: You mean after five hours they have not gotten it? Particularly to places like Sahara. What happened to that cable to Ghana. That has to go tonight. You ought to mention what I said about MPLA and about South Africa.

S: I have an aide memoire for the cable and I think we should give them additional talking points based on this press conference.

K: And other states, too.

S: Cameroon and some other places.

K: Okay.

S: Thank you.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 24 APR 2003 200102979

SH58 *
RELEASED IN FUL

TELCON
Sec. Kissinger/Valeriani
12/23/75; 6:00 pm

V: Mr. Secretary, how are you.

I take it you saw Dobrynin this afternoon. I take it you discussed Angola with him.

K: It was our usual Christmas meeting.

V: Did he wish you a Merry Christmas?

K: The problem is he doesn't really believe in it.

V: Since you didn't talk about Christmas, did you talk about Angola.

K: Yes, we discussed Angola.

V: Is it safe to say you called him in to, did you repeat the warnings to him?

K: Well, I will not go into what I discussed with him. I do not speak different privately than I do publicly.

V: Was it friendly?

K: It was a serious session.

V: No question about your trip late next month?

K: Look the problem, you come closer to covering it than most of them. We have two separate problems. We have to prevent them from gaining ground and we cannot prevent the principle of super-power adjustment.

V: Okay.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 24 APR 2003 200102979

SH65 *

TELCON

SEc. Kissinger
Amb. Dinitz

RELEASED IN PART
B6

Dec. 24, 1975
11:00

D: Sorry, I was on the line to Israel.

K: I had a talk with Dobrynin yesterday and he suggested that [redacted] who have been taking trips in the Middle East meet in Geneva for a reassembling of the conference. I think it a good idea. One, [redacted] cannot have anything substantive and [redacted] has no substantive charter and will focus on it away from the Security Countil to Geneva. B6 B6 B6

D: As lond as we understand it should not go beyond the framework of Geneva.

K: (Jokingly -- the real purpose is to bring the PLO in.) It would be with the understanding of course that nothing will happen there.

D: I will call Israel right away and get back to you.

K: Could I have it this afternoon.

D: I will try to get it to you sooner.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 22 MAY 2003 200102979

SH64 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELCON
Amb. Dinitz
Sec. Kissinger
12:05 p.m.
Dec. 24, 1975

D: The PM is on the way between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv and I will be speaking to him about 3:30 and I will have an answer to you by 4:00.

K: O.K. I think it would call some attention to Geneva. Nothing serious could come out of it. [redacted] does not know a damn thing. He is in exile and you know [redacted] B6 B6

D: I think provided we have an understanding that we would only talk within the agreed framework.

K: I don't want anything from there. What could possible come out of it. If we want to begin something you can bet [redacted] and [redacted] would not be the ones to do it. B6 B6

D: I am thinking about the way it would be interpreted -- not as erosion, etc. I would suggest the meeting would talke place and say it is consultations.

K: Between the two Co-Chairman in Geneva.

D: Based on the framework of the Geneva procedure.

K: That far, I don't think the Russins would be willing to go. We are willing to say nothing beyond the procedures set for Geneva. If we were going to do that (go beyond) we could do that in the Security Council.

D: I will talk to him at 3:30 and be back to you about 4:00.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 22 MAY 2003 200102979

SH69 *

TELCON
12/24/75; 3:45 pm
Sec. Kissinger/Rogers

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: I have -- what is the name of the of my house down there? Is it Edwards?

R: Are you inscribing something?

K: Jim Callaghan called me and said the place where Churchill used to stay belonged to Edwards and I ought to look him up.

R: Do you want think . .

K: I thought it was Mitchell. Who is Edwards?

R: Do you want me to call and find out?

K: Yes. I understand that it has been raining down there.

R: I talked to them yesterday and they promised me sunshine.

K: Is Dudley Thompson coming or not coming.

R: I said, look, tell the Prime Minister that we would like to do it and he can find out how many Jamaicans he will have. Himself, himself and wives or another couple, if he wants -- presumably Dudley Thompson. I will get back.

K: Will you mention Thompson's name to him.

R: Sure. I think the Prime Minister will want to bring Thompson.

K: I read he will be at the airport to greet me.

R: I think he will be.

[redacted] B6

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 22 MAY 2003 200102979

*

R: It is not uncomfortable.

K: Find out who the house belongs to and who Edwards is.

R: Okay.

SH70 *

TELCON
Sec. Kissinger/Mr. Schaufele
12/24/75; 4:25 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Your letter to the heads of government is again to defensive.

S: Okay. Those were the ones who recognized the MPLA.

K: Oh.

S: That is the one Tanzania . . . I thought the tone there should be a little different.

K: I would not say I would like to put our views before you and would be glad to hear yours. Rather I do wish to get your ideas. I would say you must understand our concern of this matter. It is that the Yugoslavs plus Cuba is pushing one of the factions. For the rest of it I do not object to it too much.

S: No problem.

K: Will I see the other letters too?

S: Yes. They were on my desk when I came up there.

K: I don't want to keep you here.

S: I had not thought of leaving.

K: Maybe I could see you around 5.

S: Okay.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 29 APR 2003 200102979

SH71 *

TELCON
SEC Kissinger/Mr. Rogers
12/24/75; 5:25 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

R: Best I can discover is that Edward's house may have been the name of the house before Mitchell took it over. He has only been down there since the war. It is the Harold Mitchell house, sometimes called French_____.

K: I wondered if there is a guy called Edwards.

R: Mitchell is there in the great house, the house of the estate is considerably removed from the house you will be in. The estate is the Prospect estate and owned by Sir Harold Mitchell. He is the only personality that would fall within this ambit of who you might want to pay respects to.

K: I do not know why Callaghan . . . why were we such pests at the OAS general Assembly?

R: At the meeting? The Chileans were unhappy. The Costa Ricans were pleased about it. The first consideration was the idea of your coming down there sometime in June right in the middle of the election campaign. We wanted to delay the decision.

K: I have got to go now at any rate.

R: That is the answer. Foreign Ministers will be at the General Assembly and you probably will have to be there. It is not a happy prospect.

K: Why?

R: Somebody will come after you. It will be taken as an example of U. S. support for the regime.

K: _____Foreign Ministers will be there?

R: The Mexicans may boycott and conceivably Jamaica and Trinidad. They will not do much in terms of political campaigns here. It is settled.

K: They are going to harrass me no matter what I do.

why

R: That is the truth but/ give them extra targets.

K: I saw your note to Larry.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 29 APR 2003 200102979

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R: Larry told me he showed it to you.

K: Can you wait until April?

R: As I told Larry, I would be prepared to stay around pending your trip if I can be of help to you. I do not want to jump ship inspiring stories that Kissinger's team at the State Department is jumping ship. We can do it. We can do it in a way that will not embarrass you.

K: Okay. Good.

SH76 1*

TELCON
Sec. Kissinger/Amb. Moynihan
1/5/76; 1:00 pm (215 m)

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

M: You don't know the degree to which you owe me the pleasure you have had the last ten days.

K: How is that?

M: _____ was going to put Jamaica on the list of places Jews are not allowed to go.

K: I am deeply . . .

M: Did you have good weather?

K: Yes. It was good.

M: We would like to get some directions on how you want us to behave up here this week. I am having lunch with Ambassadors, saying nothing. I am having the Pakistan Ambassador today. Areyou looking for anything from anybody?

K: Basically, we cannot accept any change in 242 and 338.

M: I say that to everybody.

K: Nor can we accept something that says the PLO should participate in future negotiations.

M: That we have in cables.

K: The question is, what do we do if supposing somebody says it must take into account the legitimate interest of the Palestinian people, which is what we have already said in public documents and thatis what I am still a little torn about. What do you think?

M: I do not even have a thought on it yet, Henry. I will commence to do so.

K: The Israelis want to stonewall any mention of Palestine but also the Israelis had a chance last year to settle with Jordan and didn't do it.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 29 APR 2003 200102979

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M: We are going to be sending down information the soldiering got up here but there is one detail. Waru (?) last week proposed to British and French that it may be best to have a little debate rather than an indifinite adjournment.

K: I would rather like that. We will use that or a postponement into March. If you cannot get an indifinite postponement, perhaps a two-month postponement. We will not be much worse off in March than we are now. The _____ will not be any worse and we will have gained some time.

M: All right. Let me sort of press that. Okay. There are things like Angola and mercenaries--people like the VOA keep expecting me to make statements on this.

K: Didn't Sisco brief you?

M: No, probably because I wasn't there. It really would help if people just told us what is going on.

K: Sure. I am in favor of that. Are you coming down for lunch with Allon on Wednesday and the dinner?

M: Yes.

K: Why don't you get yourself briefed. On the mercenaries, that is totally untrue.

M: I would have told called up David _____, UN correspondent, and said what the hell is the matter with you.

K: That is totally untrue.

M: Untrue. I will see you Wednesday in the Cabinet and we will go over to see Allon together maybe.

K: Good. Wonderful.

SH77 1*

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Sonnenfeldt
1/6/76; 2:42 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

(missed first part)

S: Going to try to get it at the head of the New York Times. I was going to ask you if at your appointment whether you can get him to do something about the Canard thing, about these three ex-silos. It is total falsehood, The size and that these can be converted overnight into missiles.

K: Let me see about that.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 29 APR 2003 200102979

SH75 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Mr. Atherton
1/5/76; 12:50 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: These sob's have leaked another and that is that we will do anything to prevent convening of the Security Council.

A: That is the Dec. 23, 1975 memorandum of understanding. It reaffirms the one which was concluded last September. The quote is an accurate quote; that is, not precisely the same as the English text.

K: What is clear is we cannot make any agreement with the bastards.

A: That was in the different historical context.

K: Reaffirming it though.

A: We reaffirmed the validity of the memorandum in our September 1975 memorandum.

K: I see the Allon interview is not particularly friendly.

A: Did you see Rabin's speech before the Zionist?

K: No, what did it say?

A: Pretty much what he said to you in private. Outlines Arab _____ and reaffirms need to hold firm against military and economic pressures.

K: This cannot go on. I think they will force us to do a public statement against him.

A: But at what point.

K: Not before the Rabin visit.

A: We will publicly have to stand with them through the Security Council.

K: I do not think we should let ourselves get provoked.

A: No.

K: Okay.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 29 APR 2003 200102979

SH91 *

TELCON
Sec. Kissinger/Bobrynin
1/6/76; 3:00 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: It has been suggested to me that for me to be abroad during the State of the Union address at least mix new news about coddling the Soviet Union with adjusting our procedure to you. As we have proposed that date therefore, if it is absolutely impossible. . .

D: Gromyko just sent me a telegram and asked if possible to arrange the 19th, if possible.

K: To arrange the evening of the 19th.

D: Yes, on the evening of the 18th.

K: Okay. Let me try this again. If I have. . . I will let you know by tomorrow morning.

D: He says please ask Henry if it will be possible to arrive on the 18th.

K: I will call you tomorrow morning.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 29 APR 2003 200102979

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(SH93)

TELCON
Sec. Kissinger/Sen. Percy
1/6/76; 4:20 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

P: I trust you had a wonderful time down there.

K: We had a wonderful time.

P: We were down in Barbados. I was told to call about the letter from Ribicoff, Glen and myself.

K: Glenn called me on this. I have to tell you this brilliant bureaucracy has not yet given that letter to me.

G: It would be highly desirable if you could make a statement on this. We don't think you have ever made a major policy statement.

K: In principle, I would be glad to make a statement. I am just not sure I can do it by the 30th because I will be in the Soviet Union around the 20th. Until about the 27th.

G: The letter that we sent tooyou gave the dates of the 19, 20, and 29 & 30. We suggested you for the final time. I am sure we could move that day to whatever is convenient for you.

K: Can I let you have an answer by the end of this week. I will do it.

G: Take into account we would move the final day to a day which would be convenient to you. The role of the State Department in this and your own personal role is highly important. It may serve your interests as well as the Congress'.

K: The only problem I will have to appear before a friendly committee will be such an unusual experience I don't think I can handle it. I will get preparation and perhaps I can make it. I may just have a total collapse at the first friendly question.

G: We will wait to hear from you at the end of the week. If it's at all possible for you to urge Inspector General Rudely Ranger (?) to appear the final day, it would strengthen it and I think his testimony would be extremely important.

K: Okay. Let me look into that.

G: Many thanks to you.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 29 APR 2003 200102979

SH96 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Atherton/Secretary Kissinger
January 6, 1976
Time: 5:43 p.m.

K: Are you getting a chronology of these events for me?

A: Yes sir.

K: Who talked to whom and when. If I could have it within the next hour -- it doesn't have to be 100 % accurate.

A: I am trying to sort out the key messages now. Should I bring them up?

K: Yes. O.K.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 29 APR 2003 200102979

SH92*

TELCON
Sec. Kissinger/Mr. Harris
1/6/76; 4:15 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

H: I have a poll coming in tonight. I am going to be in Washington tomorrow. This will be on a full examination of detente and the whole area of foreign policy. I could come in late in the afternoon. The last reading in December on you was very good, 60 %.

K: That had slipped down.

H: You doubled him (the President)

K: I could do it about 5:45 for 15 minutes.

H: On the Middle East we are doing something about the middle of January. I think it is time the people of Israel get the boom lowered on them.

K: Good. I would appreciate hearing from you.

H: Why don't I come in at 5:45.

K: Okay. Good.

H: Thank you very much.

K: Good.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 19 MAY 2003 200102979

SH90 *

TELCON
Sec. Kissinger/Dr. Daniel Borstein
1/6/76; 2:55 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

to enlist
B: I have got a question for you. I would like/your assistance and advice. The librarians have been invited to send a group to the People's Republic of China.

K: Yes.

B: And I would be put in charge of the arrangements as Librarian of Congress and I am concerned that we should if possible use this as an occasion to clear up relations between the People's Republic and us. I find my statistics show that in last year we received almost 67,000 items from the Soviet Union and we received 62 items from the People's Republic of China. They have put all sorts of obstacles out so I wondered if there might be some appropriate way to further the flow in both ways--if we could persuade them to open up a little, to at least agree to let us have a few of the things we want to get. I wanted your advice on what you thought the chances were to stimulate a response from them.

K: Minimum.

B: You don't think they care enough.

K: They don't give a damn

B: You see no reason why we should not let our librarians go.

K: No, but I have no objection to your raising the issue.

B: I thought I would answer the invitation and make a statement.

K: I would not do it until you were there.

B: I was not sure I would go.

K: Why don't you go. Or if you send your deputy, tell him to raise it. That is not the way to deal with them. I would rather you make the statement after you or he has raised it.

B: Not mention anything in advance. I had hoped it would be possible to do this.

K: That is not the way to deal with them.

B: We will follow your advice, Henry. Best to Nancy.

K: Thank you.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 29 APR 2003 200102979

S0122 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec. Kissinger/Bobrynin
1/6/76; 3:00 p. m.

K: It has been suggested to me that for me to be abroad during the State of the Union address at least mix new news about coddling the Soviet Union with adjusting our procedure to you. As we have proposed that date therefore, if it is absolutely impossible. . .

D: Gromyko just sent me a telegram and asked if possible to arrange the 19th, if possible.

K: To arrange the evening of the 19th.

D: Yes, on the evening of the 18th.

K: Okay. Let me try this again. If I have . . . I will let you know by tomorrow morning.

D: He says please ask Henry if it will be possible to arrive on the 18th.

K: I will call you tomorrow morning.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 18 NOV 2002 200102979

SH89 *

TELCON
Sec. Kissinger/Sen. John Glenn
1/6/76; 2:50 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

G: We had sent a letter over on the 17th regarding some hearings held by the Senate Government Operations Committee on the 19th and 20th and the final days the 29th and 30th. This will involve arrangements as spelled out in the letter. There are many new methods, such as you suggested. We'll have processing plants that we should be explaining here to better deal with the Congressional level. We had invited you to participate personally in this or send someone if you could not. I wanted to make a personal invitation to you and hoped you could arrange this on the 30th.

K: Let me look at my schedule and let you know in a coupld of days.

G: Our letter was December 19.

K: Frankly, I had not received it yet, so that tells you something.

G: We had invited Romish (?) to come to testify also on a formal or personal basis or as Inspector General of IAEA and we have had no indication from him yet. I didn't know what your feeling on this was. I hope to know other ideas you might have. We thought he might be a valuable witness.

K: I'll get back to you in a day or so.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 29 APR 2003 200102979

SH84 1*

TELCON
Sec. Kissinger/Sonnenfeldt
1/6/76; 9:10 a. m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: I am going to see the President. Did you have anything urgent.

S: George Shultz called me yesterday [redacted]

B6
B6

[redacted]

K: Is he in town?

S: No, at home. After you are back from the President, we should talk about the Quadripartite meeting and NATO because the foreign ministers want to know.

K: After I get back.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 19 MAY 2003 200102979

SH87 *

TELECON
Mr. John Swearingen/Secretary Kissinger
January 6, 1976
12:35

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

S: Just fine. I appreciate your returning my call. I am sorry I missed you before Christmas.

K: I called about the operation in Zaire, and to urge you to delay any final decision til we see what the World Bank is doing because in this situation where everything is so shaky we don't want to add any more to it.

S: Our problemx is we are spending 20 million a month and the cost was originally estimated at 400 million and now it looks like 900 million. The original plan involved ban k financing of 230 million and 150 (?) million of financing from other banks around the world. In view of the economic situation in Zaire where Mobutu is in deficit, the banks have indicated they will not disperse any more money for our project. So it is a project which has doubled in cost and it is at an uncertain stage so it may come to the stockholders putting up the equity...

K: When are you going to make your decision?

S: We are at the point of advising Mobutu now.

K: Can you wait for a week til after the OAU meeting.

S: There is no way to meet til after that. We hope to meet the 12th or 13th next week. What we would propose to tell his is that the cost of this project has gone out of sight. The cost of the power line which the World Bank and IMF is financing has gone out of line and will be delayed. We have to make a reassessment of the project. We do not wish to abandon it but reassess it as to the time frame and cost and it may mean refinancing the deal. The government has a 20% interest in it. We haxexx may have to ask the government to forego it. After we advise the Zaire government of our situation, at best it will take 4 to 6 months to decide on a course of action to take from here.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 19 MAY 2003 200102979

K: My problem is how much bad news we inflict on them in one week.

S: Right. And that is why I wanted to talk to you. I have talked to McNamara but not for about ten days. His group is making a study as to whether they can participate in the project as an equity. But they will not have a answer on this, in my opinion, before the end of January. But even if they say they are willing to participate, they will have a lengthy negotiation to effect that in terms of contractual matters. I don't think we can continue to pour 20 million a month into this when we are not sure we can secure the money necessary to see it to completion. I am aware of the situation in Angola and do not wish to do anything that would have a crucial impact on that but I have my stockholders money to look after.

K: I understand the situation and the more delay you can have the better -- even a week would help us.

S: What kind of a date?

K: The 19th.

S: Can I relay that to my partners on this. We only have a third interest. The other is the Oppenheimer Group from Johannesburg. Mitsui has a 6th and the other is French. Can I relay to them we would delay a contact with Mobutu til the 19th.

K: If it doesn't get to be a public event.

S: I would not be.

K: Ok, then you may.

S: I will take this matter up with my partners and see if I can persuade them to delay til the week of the 19th.

K: OK, that would give us a week.

S: Have you any indication from McNamara as to the World Bank's participation?

K: No, but I have talked to him and urged him to give it sympathetic consideration.

S: Ok. I will proceed and advise your office as to our decision.

*

SH88

TELCON
Sec. Kissinger/Dr. Fritz Kraemer
1/6/76; 12:55 p. m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: I was wondering whether you could come over here late in the day today say around 6:00 if I send a car for you.

Kraemer: Henry, that is not possible for a purely technical reason.

[redacted] B6

K: Do you want to try tomorrow then?

Kraemer: Tomorrow would be better, yes.

K: Do you prefer it in the middle of the afternoon or at the end of the afternoon?

Kraemer: You see, I have to go back here to my car.

K: How about 3:00 then?

Kraemer: All right.

K: If I have you picked up about quarter of 3.

Kraemer: At the Mall entrance.

K: I will have you picked up at quarter of 3.

Kraemer: At 1445 then.

K: Okay.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 22 MAY 2003 200102979

SH102 *

TELCON
Sec. Kissinger/Mr. Danny Kaye
1/7/76; 11:55 a. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Delighted you are coming down.

Kaye: I will be down sometime this afternoon. What time tonight?

K: 7:30.

Kaye: The State Department?

K: Yes. You've got to wear a tie, you know.

Kaye: I am going to wear a tie. Is it a big bash?

K: Yes, about 100 people.

Kaye: Anybody else coming from up here?

K: Yes. Nobody from Hollywood.

Kaye: I think Rabin is coming out next month sometime.

K: The end of the month.

Kaye: How are you feeling?

K: I am feeling fine.

Kaye: Up to your neck?

K: A little bloodied.

Kaye: Are you going to be around tomorrow morning so I can see you?

K: I will make sure it happens. Basically, I have no time. Let's see. Tomorrow, Thursday . . .

Kaye: I can have a cup of coffee on my way to the airport.

K: How about around 10:30.

Kaye: 10:30 will be fine.

K: Terrific. We will do it then.

Kaye: Good.
K: See you tonight.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 29 APR 2003 200102979

SH108 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Habib
1/8/76; 3:00 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I know this is one of the biggest things to hit EA since you could build a new embassy. I want you to call the embassy and express my condolences and see if they will accept foreign delegations.

H: We sent a cable already asking them to find out.

K: Why did you sent it out.

H: We were thinking we would get a faster answer there. We can duplicate it here.

K: Will you call Han Hsu.

H: I will do it right now.

K: Thank you.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 29 APR 2003 200102979

SH112 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Sen. Alan Cranston
1/9/76; 12:55 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

C: Regarding SALT I know there is an idea Gerard and Senator Foster have proposed to deal with Soviet violations. I don't think a white paper at the State Department would work. I suggest having some impeccable outside group including conservative people.

K: That is an interesting idea.

C: I think something like that is needed. I am getting calls on this here.

K: It is really sheer demography. When you have strong forces of great complex you can always find some aberration. Even Zumwalt never claimed it when he was Chief of Operations. In the present state of America can one find a group of people that is responsible.

C: I think it could be done. Not just the State Department and the group but include the Defense Department and Colby.

K: I will never appear on violations without a member of the Joint Chiefs or the Secretary of Defense and a CIA guy. (up on the hill)

C: That is why a white paper by the State Department would not be a good idea.

K: I agree. We will think about names. If you have any names . . .

C: Packard might be one except he is Chairman of _____ committee. I got Brock and Mathias to support the idea. About those nuclear processing plants, I gathered from your people there is no particular thought for a need for implementation and I would like to urge you to put some people on that.

K: I am looking at that again.

C: It would be pretty useful to do it with Mathias and Brock, who is in nuclear matters because of Tennessee, quite constructive and not as rigid as supposed. The combination could make the three of us working together mean a constructive combination if we could devise a bill.

K: Very good. When you come back, Alan, let me have a talk with you. We are going to have our differences on specifics. I would like to get some people together to rescue a _____. It is not self-serving. We are going to get through 1976 but if the Democrats think they are going to win, it cannot be in their interest to start with one crisis after another like Kennedy.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 29 APR 2003 200102979

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C: I agree.

K: Let us have a talk when you get back.

C: Fine. Good luck in Russia.

K: Thank you.

SH117 *

TELECON
Ambassador McCloskey/Secretary Kissinger
January 9, 1976
Time: 5:35 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

M: He brought along Rosenfeld. I won an acknowlegement from them that they had gone too far. I made a strong case that we were active diplomatically before and that the Congressional vote set us back.

K: Killed us.

M: I used the word thwarted. I said we could have an honest difference of views on your references to the grain and the Soviet Union. So we spend a good deal of the lunch talking about this. Rosenfeld had written it. When I told Phil I wanted to talk about it he asked if he could bring Rosenfeld along.

K: O.K. Thank you.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 1 MAY 2003 200102979

SH118 *

TELECON
Mr. Maw/Secretary Kissinger
January 9, 1976
Time: 5:37 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: They told me too late that you wanted to see me. Can we make it tomorrow morning.

M: That would be fine. Are you going up stairs for a minute. I could catch you up there and tell you what I have done.

K: Yes.

M: What time are you going up?

K: About 5:15.

M: Good. I will come and go up with you.

K: O.K.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 1 MAY 2003 200102979

SH116 *

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
January 9, 1976
Time: 5:17 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

D: Hello?

K: Yes.

D: I would like to tell you now about the Middle East Security Council. I received a telegram. I will give you a summary of this and then I could come to you. I could do it through Eagleburger. Two points, the instruction I have is to see you. It goes to all the members of the Security Co-ncil. It is a statement of our position in connection with the Security Council business. Main point, the Soviet Government believes that when discussing the Middle East situation the Security Council must lean on its resolutions after the 1967 war and the 1973 war respectively, relying on 242 and 338. The main result of discussions in the Security Council must be the creation of the necessary conditions for the resumption and working of the Geneva Conference. Now I have something to add in this connection. We don't want to change Resolution 242 or 338. What we are trying for is the end of the discussions should be a resumption as soon as possible of theGeneva Conference.

K : If you do it on the basis of 242 and 338 we will support you.

D: I understand that the question is really about the Conference and participation. We don't want to change 242. We don't have a specific position but our representatives should be talking about how to deal with it.

K: We had better not do that in New York.

D: As of now we don't intend to propose any new resolutions.

K: I mean the contact between our representatives. Let me look at the document. When am I going to have it?

D: In 1 1/2 hours.

K: Do you want to come in tomorrow morning?

D: At 10:00?

K: How about 9:30.

D: Good.

K: See you then.

D: I will give you what is here. 9:30 I will come to you as usual.

K: O.K. Good.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 1 MAY 2003 200102979

SH119*

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Mr. Rogers
1/10/76; 10:40 a. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

R: I want to check to see if you would want to see Alex for 10 minutes this morning.

K: I don't see how it is possible. I am not conducting foreign policy here. They are loading me up. There are a number of things I must do. How much notice does he need?

R: Not much.

K: Let me call you in half an hour.

R: Look, don't worry about it. I have not given him any indication.

K: I will call you in half an hour.

R: Okay.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 1 MAY 2003 200102979

SH125 *

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
January 12, 1976
Time: 5:56 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

S: The vote has just been taken. It was 11 to 1 with we the only ones against it and three absentions.

K: Who were the absentions?

S: I would assume the French, British and Italians. This part is over. You have a real maniac there. I have never heard him speak before.

K: How did he respond.

S: He made a procedural point that all that was reflected in the statement was that there was a majority, which was alright. But then he took off saying that a subversion of procedures could be equated with totalitarianism and that when procedures erroded liberty goes with it.

K: He is mad.

S: That is the correct word.

K: Look what it does to us with Egypt.

S: I know, I know.

K: O.K. Thank you.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 23 MAY 2003 200102979

SH126 *

TELECON
Ambassador Schaufele/Secretary Kissinger
January 12, 1976
Time: 7:15 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: What is going at the OAU?

S: I just sent you a memo of what will be the consensus.

K: What does it say?

S: They have called for an appeal for African unity; condemnation of South Africa; condemnation of all foreign intervention; establishment of a six man Presidential Committee and an appeal for a ceasefire.

K: That is good.

S: It is fine. Oh, and also recognition of Angola as a state.

K: But not of the MPLA.

S: Right. It was worked out with Amin and the two opposing blocks. We are hoping they will rap it up in the next few hours.

K: Isn't that good?

S: It means two things -- we will have to go to Clark to get the hearings postponed and be prepared for an appeal of funds, especially if the South Africans withdraw.

K: First we will appeal for everyone to get out. If that is turned down, we will ask for funds. O.K. Thank you.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 1 MAY 2003 200102979

S H124 *

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
January 12, 1976
Time: 5:36 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How did they take it in New York?

S: I have the debate on. The motion was put as in the past under rule 37 -- hearing them as a state. Moynihan has made his speech. Right now he is responding to the Russians.

K: On his instructions not to respond to any one.

S: He is just coming on.

K: I do not want us to lead the charge.

S: I will tell you in a moment.

K: I am sure no one else is charging. Why not let everyone talk and then vote.

S: A number have spoken. I can't hear what he is saying now.

K: Why don't you call me back in a few minutes?

S: O.K.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 1 MAY 2003 200102979

Dictated by Moynihan's Secretary 1/12/76 as referenced in attached Telcon *

SH122

1. Eliminate the first full paragraph on page three beginning, "I wish to emphasize at this point . . ."

2. Add two new paragraphs.

RELEASED IN FULL

A. Insert before the last two paragraphs:

My government is not prepared to acquiesce in an action which will undermine the negotiation process, which is the only process that can lead to peace, for the representatives of the PLO have repeatedly told the General Assembly of their disdain for systematicalegotiations. They have openly declared their hostility -- indeed their contempt -- for the work of this Council. They categorically rejected Security Council Resolution 242 which for years has served, and continues to serve as the only agreed basis for serious negotiation. If I may use a judicial analogy, not inappropriate here, the PLo is in contempt of this Council. The only purpose for which it could be appropriately before this Council would be to purge itself of this contempt.

B.

To conclude, the United States remains committed to the "Balanced whole" achieved by Resolution 242 and we are more convinced than ever that any any effort to tip this balance by altering the subject matter of the debate or the identify of the parties participating could jeopardize the possibility of achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 1 MAY 2003 200102979

SH128*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Funseth/Secretary Kissinger
January 12, 1976
Time: 7:56 p.m.

K: Would you call Johnson and tell him that no agreement has been worked out because we haven't submitted a position yet?

F: Yes sir.

K: O.K.

F: O.K. Good night.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 09 JUL 2003 200102979

SH133 *

TELECON
Mr. Funseth/Secretary Kissinger
January 13, 1976
Time: 6:35 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Have you set up a press conference for tomorrow?

F: I was waiting to hear from you.

K: Now it is too late?

F: No it isn't.

K: Have they got the television set up?

F: We can do that. We told them it would be tomorrow or Thursday, so either one is convenient.

K: I have no briefing book now.

F: I am going over it now.

K: Maybe I will get it by midnight.

F: It will be up in about a half an hour.

K: That is too late, I am leaving.

F: I can get it up to you right now, but I won't be able to review it.

K: Should I wait for one day or announce the trip to Moscow.

F: What are you going to say if they ask tomorrow. What time will it be announced?

K: At 11:00. Could it wait another day?

F: There is an advantage to having it tomorrow in the wake of the Angola thing.

K: We can still change it tomorrow morning to Thursday?

F: Yes. What time tomorrow?

K: 11:30.

F: O.K.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 09 JUL 2003 200102979

SH130 *

TELECON
Ambassador Schaufele/Secretary Kissinger
January 13, 1976
Time: 5:55 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Are we sending instructions to Bruce for the NATO debate tomorrow?

S: I am not aware of that. On Africa?

K: Yes.

S: We will get something out to him.

K: The British are instructing their ambassadors. But ours are so bright...

S: I assume we will have to stick to the same line as we have before?

K: Yes. I want to have a meeting tomorrow morning.

S: Have you scheduled it yet?

K: No, but I will.

S: Are you having a press conference tomorrow?

K: No, Thursday.

S: O.K.

K: OK. Thank you.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 1 MAY 2003 200102979

SH132 *

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
January 13, 1976
Time: 6:26 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I thought we had decided that I wouldn't send any letters to anyone but Brandt.

S: I thought you decided that we would send condensed versions ....

K: The versions you have here are not really condensed.

S: It has something on Portugal and Spain.

K: Since they will exchange ideas it is one thing to get in touch with Brandt but to go to Krieskyand Jorgensen to actively lobby.

S: We have to give them some message.

K: Did they ask me for an opinion?

S: Jorgensen did.

K: I would transform the Kriesky and Jorgenson into an oral message.

S: Can you get that out now so I can act on it?

K: Yes. By the way, the Brandt letter is fine.

S: O.K.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 1 MAY 2003 200102979

SH 129 *

TELECON
Amb. Schaufele/Secretary Kissinger
January 13, 1976
9:22 am

RELEASED IN FULL

missed first part

K: To see whether the aid which Angola was receiving is the same as sent to all other black African countries.

S: I see.

K: I think it is about the same.

S: I think so too, because the figures also include military sales.

K: But even without that if you deduct Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Algeria -- the Sub Sahara. Can you try it? What came out of the OAU -- anything?

S: Nothing. The efforts to compromise were fruitless and they have adjourned til the second session of the Summit. The moderates held through but we have to go back to the drawing board. I don't know what this does to the Clark Hearing. He may postpone it. He is in Iowa and I haven't had a chance to talk to him. I am going to do up the next steps. The Africans discussed among themselves about going into the UN. I have problems with that too. Nothing will come out of the UN. I don't know whether we can go back to the Soviets and say let's get everybody out or not.

K: Well, we ought to have a meeting on it. I will try to settle it.

S: OK.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 1 MAY 2003 200102979

SH134 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
January 13, 1976
Time: 6:32 p.m.

K: I have forgotten what I wanted. Oh, if I have a press conference tomorrow what do you think of my giving the oral message to the Russians on Angola at that time.

S: I think you ought to do it. The basic points in there are as valid for the Russians as for the Americans who need to understand the situation.

K: I can't read it word-for-word. Could you rewrite it.

S: Sure. I think theoperational part of it you shouldn't say anything about.

K: No, no. I want to explain why I am going and first explain the importance of a strategic arms limitation, but secondly.....

S: On grain we have to do the same thing.

K: I don't have to discuss it tomorrow.

S: They will ask you why you aren't stopping grain shipments. You should say it is a long-term program and it imposes all kinds of disciplines on the Russians -- it forces the Soviets to make certain economic decisions like buying when they don't want to and calling it is one of the pieces of leverage you can't use. It would be better if you have some other leverage to use. By the way, Layman wants to go to Moscow.

K: No, I am not going to have six watch-dogs with me.

S: The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs has the request.

K: I am not going to take him, that is final.

S: I think we made a mistake going as far as we did. What time are you having the press conference?

K: It is scheduled for tomorrow.

S: Is it in time to give you this first thing in the morning?

K: Yes.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 30 JUN 2004 200102979

SH131 *

TELECON
Senator Sparkman/Secretary Kissinger
January 13, 1976
Time: 6:20 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: How are you?

S: I am feel ing very good. I hope you are?

K: I feel fine.

S: I didn't expect you to call back tonight, but I am glad to talk with you. At the time I called -- this morning a [redacted] came B6
to my office and talked about a lady over here [redacted] B6
Her husband has disappeared over in Vienna and they said they understood you were aware of the case and that you were going to take it up with Dobrynin today.

K: I am not sure of the name, but there is one case of a person who has disappeared whom we will take up. We haven't had a reply yet.

S: He is a Russian by birth but a naturalized American citizen.

K: I know thecase.

S: They are naturally -- they tell me she is in great distress about it.

K: As soon as we know something, frankly, I doubt that we will learn anything, this is that type of a case. But I will let you know.

S: I understand that. I hope you have a great year.

K: You fellows in the Senate can contribute to it.

S: I will sure try.

K: Many thanks to you Mr. Chairman. Good to hear from you.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 1 MAY 2003 200102979

SH136 *

TELECON
Mr. Ted Koppel/Secretary Kissinger
January 14, 1976
Time: 4:45 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6 B6

[redacted]

HK: I know you are trying to pin me down to something. If I know my friend Ted Koppel. Give me the question.

TK: Basically it is instinctive and I wanted to get a response from you. I get the impression that with the SALT agreement you are counting on getting your agreement now and then it will dribble out and not come before the Senate until after the election is over.

HK: That would be unreasonable in my judgment.

TK: It will come up for a vote around the peak of the campaign?

HK: It is not impossible. We don't have all that much to lose. Who will vote against it?

TK: I don't know. You went from a very strong warning to the Soviets on Angola into talking about the SALT agreement to day. You are not warning them in terms of the trip but in terms of a Congressional reaction.

HK: Yes, in terms of all the things that will happen during the year.

TK: In other words, if they keep pressing the anto-detente mood will make SALT suffer?

HK: Yes, but I don't draw the conclusion that it will be dribbled out through the year.

TK: O.K.

HK: Even if it happens -- it isn't our present plan. It is a possible option, but it is not a likely outcome.

TK: O.K.

HK: You see.

TK: Right.

HK: O.K. See you soon.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 1 MAY 2003 200102979

SH153 *

TELECON

Ambassador Schaufele/Secretary Kissinger
January 15, 1976
Time: 7:50 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

S: I thought you said you would be back on the 26th.

K: That doesn't mean I can testify right off an airplane. I cannot possibly arrive on Sunday night and testify on Monday morning.

S: We can take care of that.

K: I have Rabin here the 27th and 28th so I recommend the 29th.

S: O.K. I think they announced it but I will get them to change it.

K: O.K. Wait a minute how did that cable to the NATO Ambassadors about Angola leak?

S: I talked to Barry Schweid about 7:00 tonight. He made it clear that it leaked out of the Pentagon. I don't know what we can do about that -- they are on most of our cable distribution.

K: O.K. Thankyou.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 1 MAY 2003 200102979

SH148*

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Win Lord
1/15/76; ~~X~~ 4:25 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

L: I was thinking about the Moscow trip. On reflection I would like to go for historical and personal reasons.

K: Don't do it to do me a favor.

L: I understand exactly how you put it. I think it is for my sake. It is an historic event.

K: I think it is going to fail. The Pentagon is on an all-out effort to stop it. Will you tell my outer office to put you on the list?

L: Yes. I will write a cruise missile breakthrough for you as my contribution.

K: Good. I am delighted.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 1 MAY 2003 200102979

SH146 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Barry Schweid
1/15/76; 2:35 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

S: On Angola. ☒ This business of the cable going to NATO telling them the defense has collapsed. Is there a cable reporting the demise.

K: I cannot comment on State Department cables. There was a meeting at NATO and obviously there were instructions sent. There is no question the Cubans have been aiming at the Northern front.

S: One of the two US supported forces "have collapsed" and they talk of the national front people fleeing for their lives to Zaire.

K: Some of this stuff is absolutely inaccurate. I don't want to go into it.

S: I would be happy to report the right version.

K: Collapse is perhaps exaggerated. But that ~~there~~ they are gaining, there is no question.

S: And NATO is aware of this and has been so advised.

K: They are advised of the best we know.

S: All right. We are trying to get a line on how the other line is doing - UNITA. You said the Cubans are trying to cover all of Angola but I wonder if there is something on the fall of the other front.

K: It hasn't happened yet.

S: The South Africans fight well, don't they.

K: Yes.

S: Are we going to ask the House to keep aid going.

K: We have not decided yet.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 1 MAY 2003 200102979

SH142 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Schlosser
1/15/76; 11:10

RELEASED IN PART
B6

B6

S: When can we get together? I am not feeling up to snuff today. I do want to see you.

K: We could do it . . .

S: Will you be in Washington the following week after your trip?

K: Let's do it during that week.

S: Okay. I will call you Monday, the 26th and we will set lunch, breakfast or ~~lunch~~ dinner.

K: Do you want to have lunch on the 26th? The 27 and 28th I am taking care of Rabin.

S: Lunch on the 26th. Fine.

K: Good.

S: Take care of yourself.

K: I will look forward to seeing you then.

S: We will have lunch on January 26th. Will you be delayed?

K: ~~After~~ I have to be back.

S: I will see you then on the ~~the~~ 26th.

K: Okay.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 1 MAY 2003 200102979

SH140 *

TELCON
1/15/76; 11;00 a. m.
Sec Kissinger/Ted Koppel

RELEASED IN FULL

Koppel: I am doing a three part series next week on detente while you are in Moscow.

K: Aren't you coming with me?

Koppel: No but would like the series to run while you are gone. It defines the routes of detente; who's for it; who's against it and why, where it is going. I would like to do a five-minute interview before you leave. Would that be possible?

K: I will do my best. Maybe Saturday morning.

Koppel: Okay. If it could be early because I go up to New York for that show. Would it be possible to do it around 9:00?

K: 9:30. It may have to slip to 10:00.

Koppel: In your office?

K: We will have to let you know. If things turn out the way you predicted yesterday, which is not absolutely impossible, it is not because it was planned that way when you predicted it. It is one way things could evolve. If there is a chance, I will take my chances on getting an overall settlement. If not, we will have to look at overall possibilities.

Koppel: Okay. Thank you.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 1 MAY 2003 200102979

SH141 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Ken Freed
1/15/76; 11:03 a. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

F: I saw Dobrynin going in last night. I assume he came in to talk about SALT. Did you give him proposals we are going to go with the next day or two?

K: Yes.

F: There is no way you can talk about that, I guess.

K: No.

F: Okay. Thank you.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 1 MAY 2003 200102979

SH143 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Les Gelb
1/15/76; 11:50 a. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

G: I ~~wanted~~ wondered if I could come by today and talk some SALT ~~to~~ with you. Is that possible? I am going to write a piece for the Sunday editions. I am afraid I turned red when you said it.

K: You are wrong about this morning there was a big dispute between the big chiefs and myself.

G: I think not.

K: Can you explain to me why they don't explain these feelings at NSC meetings?

G: Brown made a pretty strong case at the last NSC meeting.

K: On what?

G: Cruise missiles. Backfire s.

K: It depends what kind of case you are talking about.

G: On the case of the backfire he wanted to backpeddle what you told Gromyko last November.

K: Schlesinger?

G: You and Schlesinger.

K: That is simply not true.

G: I think it would be very useful and perhaps somewhat marginally useful for you to hear me out before I write this thing.

K: Where are you now?

G: At my office. Ten minutes from you.

K: Why don't you come at 12:15 for half an hour.

G: Okay.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 1 MAY 2003 200102979

SH 163

1*

TELECON
Mr. Funseth/Secretary Kissinger
January 16, 1976
Time: 7:45 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: What is wrong with you people. We have missed all the evening shows.

F: I brought that up to you at 5:30 and said....

K: And no one can come in and say it is a matter of urgency.

F: I explained very carefully that you should see that -- so I could catch the evening shows on NBC and CBS. We didn't come out too badly. CBS said Kissinger didn't oppose the suit but that it could have adverse effects on our relations with the Arab countries.

K: Will you point out that I didn't ask them to delay the suit. I pointed out the consequences but made clear to the Attorney General that it was a legal question. The breakfast wasn't primarily on that subject anyway.

F: Fine. O.K. I understand.

K: It is a goddamn disgrace.

F: I don't know what to do Mr. Secretary. I brought it up and explained the importance of your seeing it and said you should mention it to Levi.

K: He wasn't here.

F: O.K. At 5:30 when I found you hadn't had a chance to see it I brought it up to the 8th floor. The line was so long I didn't have a chance to catch your eye. However, we came out alright. ABC didn't even carry it. CBS said Bechtel said we will fight the suit and we were lucky. I will call the newspapers though.

K: O.K. Do that.

F: Yes sir.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 09 JUL 2003 200102979

SH162 1*

TELECON
Ambassador Schaufele/Secretary Kissinger
January 16, 1976
Time: 5:32 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Did you do that folder on all the comments on the Angola business?

S: They are down at the desk where it is being compiled.

K: Does that mean they saw the Chinese note there?

S: I don't have the Chinese note.

K: Would someone put it all together. I asked for it 72 hours ago.

S: You want the intelligence reports also?

K: I want the classified and unclassified documents and I want it in the next few hours.

S: Will do.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 1 MAY 2003 200102979

50126 1*

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Dobrynin
1/16/76; 3:50 p. m.

K: When are you going out?

D: I am just behind. Anything new for me to say to ~~Kosygin~~ Brezhnev or Gromyko, your old friends.

K: I do consider them old friends.

D: The same to you.

K: I am committing political suicide going to Moscow at this time.

D: I would not go that far but I understand political danger.

K: I am doing it because we ~~ought~~ owe it to history to try to make another effort. If we fail they will say he should not have gone and if we succeed all hell will break loose. On some of the ideas I gave you as my own you know, don't phrase them into these exact numbers I gave you. Where I said to train off some backfire against ship launched Missiles. How we work out the numbers we have to have a little flexibility in Moscow. The difference between the first and second -- outside the counting. In the second one you don't count the _____ as MIRVs and there may be one other wrinkle. In the second one we would probably ask that the overall totals be reduced to 2300 by '80.

D: You mentioned this before.

K: The advantage of the second one is that it is a separate protocol.

D: On the real issue there will be no counting. Both of them. Ships with ~~MIRVs~~ missiles against backfire. Without any numbers.

K: Exactly. It is a number _____ in that whatever number is established for backfire will establish the number for ships.

D: Cruise missiles we will have it within the agreement itself.

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K: In the heavy bombers, and the other stuff is the same.

D: You exchange big fire for . . .

K: Right. The third possibility was to leave something for later discussion. Yet another variation, but I am talking as a statement, can have the cruise missiles/ backfire issue for a lesser time than the whole agreement, say five year period for an interim agreement. On the second variation then we could have more numbers in each category.

D: Okay.

K: You, Gromyko and I or whoever ought to get together Tuesday night briefly so that we can discuss the tactics. As a friend I have to prevent to be charged with ending too quickly to a different approach so we have to decide as we did in B_____ negotiations. Who puts forward what.

D: You will decide how to handle it.

K: One final thing. We must have a serious talk about Angola. I don't care what the Congress does. The very people who fought against it will then take it out on something else.

D: Yes, I understand this.

K: You explain this to your leaders. I look forward to seeing you in Moscow.

[redacted] B6

D: . . . Whatever is best. See you on Tuesday. You don't know if there are any surprises for us in the State of the Union- will there be any surprises?

K: No. It looks to me, the draft that now exists is mostly domestic.

D: I am sure.

K: There will be something on foreign policy. At present no particular country is mentioned. As it stands it is not a major problem for you.

D: Okay, Henry. Thank you. See you on Tuesday.
END

SH159 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Sen Javits
1/16/76; 4:00 p. m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

J: I am alive. I called you especially because I had a very successful trip to Latin America and will be happy to deal with the other if you have the time. In the first place I think we naturally cooled off Torrijos.

K: Good.

J: I thinkit is highly doubtful that _____ the part for the Panama Canal. Now the bad news. It is my judgment that the situation in the Canal Zone among American employees if more ins _____ than Panamanians across the state. That is a rather domestic judgment, but my judgment. Whatever that implies, government people and consultants with people who are running the Zone or sending somebody down to look around, I would strongly urge you to do it.

K: Good. I think it is a good idea.

J: That was my impression. That side of it is very hot. Torrijos guarantees tranquility for six months but I told him that it was absolutely impossible in my judgment. I am speaking of a little. It would take even more time for what is necessary to do the job. That may have been rhetoric, but I don't think so. Your presence is very very much desired and commented on, etc.

K: I am going down on September 16. I have every intent to go to friendly countries which means getting out of Washington.

J: There are some very impressive young leaders and new guys. I will give a memo to the assistant secretary on that. I think we have a really great friend in the new President of Venezuela. Notwithstanding that his country has people who are bxtxxx bitter. I had a meeting with them and nearly blew my top. There is a very sharply divided feeling. The new guy in Peru, a new General, looks to me like a very different type and a fellow you might be able to do something with.

K: I am planning to go to Peru.

J: And Brazil?

K: Brazil, Venezuela and Costa Rica.

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J: We have a great friend in Columbia. Lopez. The Foreign Ministers of both Peru and Brazil are very rhaspodic about you.

K: I ought to get them to talk to the Senate. I want to talk to you also about what we are going to face in the Congress. We are weakening this country where it is going to be a menace to all our friends.

J: I may be wrong, but You have no mistake about why I feel what I do.

K: When we talk.

J: Of course. Please lecture me because you are my friend.

K: I want to work out what can be done to work out the situation.

K J: I am at your service.

K: Maybe we can do it, even Monday.

J: Monday is all right. Or tomorrow I am free.

K: Tomorrow I am getting a physical checkup. Could I let you know tomorrow?

J: I would rather know today

K: I don't think I can do it today. Sunday. Can I call you tomorrow about Sunday.

J: I will get you. About 10 or 11. What do you say about that.

B6

J: I would ride it out. Okay. I will try. I will call you in the morning.

K: You may not have a hell of a big choice.

SH164 *

TELECON
Frank Sinatra/ Secretary Kissinger
January 16, 1976
8:09 pm

RELEASED IN PART
B6

S: Hello, Henry, how are you?

K: Ok. How are you?

S: Just fine. Do you want me to straighten out Angola for you?

K: I need some of your enforcers.

S: I see you have your hands full. I called you about the dinner for the Prime Minister.

K: Yes?

S: Would you consider...wehave 3 performers, it will be very quick. I have planned to do 12 minutes. I t would be a marvelous close if I introduced you and you said some nice things about the Prime Minister.

K: Frank, fond as I am of you, if someone else gets 12 minutes, I want 12 minutes.

S: Laughter. Ok. I will give you 12 minutes. How's Nancy?

K: [redacted] B6

S:

K:

S:

K: I will do it about 5 minutes. I will make a few brief remarks.

S: That's right.

K: I will be happy to do that. What is ~~the~~ it? Black Tie?

S: Yes. When I know you are there, I will call you. You will be staying at the same hotel.

K: The Beverly Hilton?

S: Yes.

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Sinatra continued

K: I will be there a day early.

S: That's fine. What are you doing for dinner the night before?

K: I am giving a talk for Buff Chandler.

S: Why don't I wait until it gets closer?

K: Ok. I would love to see you. I really look forward to seeing you.

S: I will bring the [redacted] formula for Angola.

K: I just need a few of your people. We have the Jews in one part of the world. We need some Italians.

Laughter.

END

SH158 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Dobrynin
1/16/76; 3:50 p. m.

K: When are you going out?

D: I am just behind. Anything new for me to say to ~~Xxxxxxxx~~ Brezhnev or Gromyko, your old friends.

K: I do consider them old friends.

D: The same to you.

K: I am committing political suicide going to Moscow at this time.

D: I would not go that far but I understand political danger.

K: I am doing it because we ~~ought~~ owe it to history to try to make another effort. If we fail they will say he should not have gone and if we succeed all hell will break loose. On some of the ideas I gave you as my own you know, don't phrase them into these exact numbers I gave you. Where I said to train off some backfire against ship launched Missiles. How we work out the numbers we have to have a little flexibility in Moscow. The difference between the first and second -- outside the counting. In the second one you don't count the _____ as MIRVs and there may be one other wrinkle. In the second one we would probably ask that the overall totals be reduced to 2300 by '80.

D: You mentioned this before.

K: The advantage of the second one is that it is a separate protocol.

D: On the real issue there will be no counting. Both of them. Ships with ~~MxVxx~~ missiles against backfire. Without any numbers.

K: Exactly. It is a number _____ in that whatever number is established for backfire will establish the number for ships.

D: Cruise missiles we will have it within the agreement itself.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
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K: In the heavy bombers, and the other stuff is the same.

D: You exchange big fire for . . .

K: Right. The third possibility was to leave something for later discussion. Yet another variation, but I am talking as a statement, can have the cruise missiles/ backfire issue for a lesser time than the whole agreement, say five year period for an interim agreement. On the second variation then we could have more numbers in each category.

D: Okay.

K: You, Gromyko and I or whoever ought to get together Tuesday night briefly so that we can discuss the tactics. As a friend I have to prevent to be charged with ending too quickly to a different approach so we have to decide as we did in B_____ negotiations. Who puts forward what.

D: You will decide how to handle it.

K: One final thing. We must have a serious talk about Angola. I don't care what the Congress does. The very people who fought against it will then take it out on something else.

D: Yes; I understand this.

K: You explain this to your leaders. I look forward to seeing you in Moscow.

B6

D: [redacted] See you on Tuesday. You don't know if there are any surprises for us in the State of the Union- will there be any surprises?

K: No. It looks to me, the draft that now exists is mostly domestic.

D: I am sure.

K: There will be something on foreign policy. At present no particular country is mentioned. As it stands it is not a major problem for you.

D: Okay, Henry. Thank you. See you on Tuesday.
END

SH161 1*

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
January 16, 1976
3:20 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I have a letter from Stu Symington oppoising any trade offs of Cruise Missile range against backfire.

S: That is not what we are trading.

K: It must mean there is something going on because Ed Teller got to the Vice President on the same theme.

S: The point to make is that it isn't that at all.

K: But Symington is normally strong on SALT.

S: But he happense to be against these weapons.

K: But he is for the Cruise Missile.

S: But so are we. That is what people don't seem to understand.

K: I have an uneasy feeling about this mission.

S: I would like to tal ke to you about the way of presenting it that gets across our point.

K: Like what?

S: What we are talking about is not range. We are talking about how each side handles the category. It is designed to handle in connection with the Vladivostok limitations. The range area is out of the _____. We are talking about what one pays the other side in return to have a system the other side thinks you shouldn't have or should limit yourself on.

K: I think it was a mistake for me to go because if we succeed all hell will break lose and if we fail it will be said we should never have gone.

S: On balance it is wiser to have the Agreement this xxx year. You and I know that interests could not be served without xx your doing this. If we are right on this point, there is no xxx other way.

K: OK.

END .

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 1 MAY 2003 200102979

SH 155 *

TELCON
Bd Klein
Sec. Kissinger
Jan. 16, 1976
12:50 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

EK: O.K. I promised to call you earlier in the week but we just returned from Puerto Rico on Wed. and you have been tied up and now you are off on your trip. Perhaps we should try for my coming down when you return.

K: Why don't we do that. How was PR?

EK: Sunny. Very, very pleasant. It is nice to get away. We came up with an insipid add campaign for NEWSWEEK which I hope will sell a lot of copies.

K: Where were you?

EK: Ceramar (sp). Right next door to Dorado Beach. It is nice to get away.

K: How are your children.

EK: Very, very well. How about yours?

K: Fine.

EK: Good. Are you taking them with you on this.

K: Unfortunately there vacation does not coincide with this.

EK: You will be back in a week.

K: The 26th. Call me then.

EK: O.K.

K: Good.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 1 MAY 2003 200102979

SH170 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Schaufele
1/19/76; 2:55 p. m.

K: I know the bloody bureau is not eager in that global report that I am trying to put together on Angola. But I still want it.

S: You want more than you have?

K: You guys always want to pick cables that support some limited AF point of view. Last week there was Kenya, Zaire and Zambia saying they were worried about Soviet domination.

S: They were supposed to be added to the group Saturday.

K: They were not.

S: I will see why not.

K: I want to see you before I leave because I want you to prepare a statement for me.

S: Okay.

Word after Schaufele whited out on orig.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 23 MAY 2003 200102979

SH173 *

TELECON
Mr. Scotty Reston/Secretary Kissinger
January 19, 1976
Time: 5:47 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Scotty how areyou?

R: You are off are you?

K: That's right.

R: To what purpose -- is there something useful that can be said about this.

K: I am in despair. I am going knowing full well everyone will shout at me. The thing to do would have been to say I am not going under these conditions. The strategic arms limitation ismore important than the ups and downs of our domestic debate and I think we should give it one more try. If we fail at least we will have known we have done everything we could.

R: You must have some reason for believing.....

K: I believe since the Soviets were the ones that asked for this trip -- since we told them they have to modify their position -- we have changed the date three times and they have accepted that -- they must have a strong reason for wanting an agreement and they must realize that with Angola and the mood in this country another failure would be a significant setback. If we mortgage everything to secure debating points we will be in bad shape.

R: It is worth a try and you do the best you can against the historical problem. It is a hell of a problem. I don't think they would want you to come and fail.

K: If I go and fail because of their intragence they will have one hell of responsibility.

R: Is that the kind of thing you can talk to Dobrynin about in advance and have some indication of where you are going?

K: You can be sure I have talked to him in advance.

R: They must be more worried about this decline of trust in this country it is not in their long-term interests.

K: That is true, but you and I know that a year into a confrontation with the Russians many of the most vocal attackers of detente today would be screaming for more peace moves. We would be where we are today but with less favorable positions for us. It is hard to conduct negotiations over a period of time.

R: Angola can't be that important to them.

K: They may not know how to get out of it. It is a serious matter now there are 8,000 Cuban troops. We can't even send money to friendly governments who want to help Angola and the Cubans can send in 8,000 troops.

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R: Have you had any talks on the Hill about this before you went away or is it so political.

K: I have talked to Hubert and to Javits and a few members of the Foreign relations Committee. My impression is we can get support for a SALT Agreement.

R: What is the alternative?

K: There is no alternative. Without SALT the gaps will be larger against us. It is too bad that the intellectual community is turned off, because they could explode these charges if they wanted to with some analysis.

R: I had a funny point I wanted to put to you. When you first came here I said I thought there was a role the press could play if there was an understanding.

K: Yes.

R: What has been going through my mind was that if in the spring we had had enough trust so that you could have told us what the Soviets were doing in Angola there were many views that would have been printed. Congress would then have implored you to go into Angola.

K: We couldn't have done it before this summer. We didn't know at before July.

R: There was alot of time between July and the end of the year.

K: We started briefing the Congress in August. We briefed eight Committees 25 times.

R: You are going from Moscow to NATO and coming back when?

K: Sunday afternoon.

R: Well, my best wishes go with you, my dear friend.

K: Thank you Scotty and let's get together when I come back?

R: Look forward to it.

K: O.K. Good.

SH174 *

TELECON
Secretary General Waldheim/Secretary Kissinger
January 19, 1976
Time: 6:37 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

W: I know you are leaving tonight so I won't keep you long. I wanted to ask you about Lebanon. Everyone presses me here. I made an appeal yesterday. I don't know whether you intend to do something about it?

K: What do you think we can do?

W: It isn't easy. The Christians and the Moslems are not ready to accept any international intervention or action by the Security Council. The Moslems don't want to i nternalize the problem and the Christians are interested in doing so. The other day a member of their parliament came to see me. He was all in favor of some sort of action by the international community. I told him that it was difficult as long as the government is not ready.

K: Why don't you let me get in touch with a few countries to see what they will be willing to do and get back to you.

W: If Karami maintains his resignation it will be a serious situation. If Lebanon is disintegrating, it will creat a terrible situation in the Middle East as a whole.

K: I will have Sisco get in touch with you as soon as we hear from the parties.

W: I though we should have an exchange of views.

K: I appreciate your concern.

W: I am in contact with a number of delegates here. We cannot request a meeting of the Security Council in this regard. It won't resolve the problem. Some bi-lateral action in Lebanon would help.

K: We will see what we can do.

W: As far as the debate on the Middle East you have been informed the Arabs have agreed on a resolution that contains the three elements -- the self-determination, the right to return, etc. I have read the statement of Moynihan this afternoon and I was talking with Sisco last week. I think they want to get something out of that debate.

K: I looks like that to me. We are taking a look at it but I am not optimistic.

W: We have to see how we proceed further. One last thing, Cyprus after some trouble we have had it looks better. There seems to be an agreement that we start on the 17th of February. Clerides withdrew his resignation. They want to set up only two committees which should go to Cyprus and discuss this. I told the Turkish Ambassador that we should discuss the package deal -- we should have some substantive discussions here.

K: We will support this and we will use our influence to that effect. I must run, Mr. Secretary.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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W: I wish you the best on your trip.

K: Thank you. Bye.

SH176*

TELECON
Mr. Atherton/Secretary Kissinger
January 19, 1976
Time: 7:10 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: We have to get Sadat an answer about our communications with Asad.

A: I have one in preparation for you. We will send it to the plane.

K: O.K. Thank you. Oh, we also have to give Fahmy some account of what is going on in Lebanon and ask his opinion.

A: We will send you three messages on Lebanon. One to Israel, one to Fahd and one to Fahmy.

K: Good.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 2 MAY 2003 200102979

SH175*

TELECON
Mr. Robinson/Secretary Kissinger
January 19, 1976
Time: 7:09 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

R: You had indicated you wanted to talk to me before you left. We haven't advised Ansary perhaps we should wait until you get back?

K: I am prepared to do that.

R: I think we should sit down and talk about it before I talk to him. The oil agreement negotiations are to commence on Monday and there is an eleven man team.

K: It had better be tough.

R: I have sent you a memo on that.

K: Maybe you can get my delinquents to give it to me.

R: It just sent up about 6:00. I wanted you to know the developments today.

K: I have to pack.

R: O.K. I have convered everything that is important in the memo.

K: Good.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 2 MAY 2003 200102979

SH181 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Sec Simon
1/26/76; 11:20 a. m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: Bill, how are you?

S: Fine. Welcome home.

K: Thank you.

S: Have a good trip?

K: Yes. I was wondering, if you want to run for the Democratic nomination, whether you would want to have dinner with Lew Wasserman tonight.

S: (Laughs) That is not a bad idea.

K: Can you make it?

S: I asked Mary to call a few minutes ago. I have the _____ in from New York when I accept making recommendations for the financing. If it were a social thing, it would be one thing. But it is impossible.

K: Don't blame me if you don't make it.

S: Is he from New York or California?

K: California. There is no other Cabinet member I ever ask to anything.

S: You are a good friend. [redacted] B6

[redacted] B6

S: I am going to see you in 10 minutes.

K: Right.

S: On my way over.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 2 MAY 2003 200102979

SH180 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Joe Kraft
1/26/76; 8:05 a. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I did not get your message until too late last night.

Kraft: How was your trip?

K: It was good. It is hard to convince the press but it was good. They are setting up some fictitious objective like a total agreement in principle but given the variety of different issues it was better to come home and get ourselves in order before taking that next step.

Kraft: Will you be going back?
far
K: It depends how/we are along.

Kraft: How does Brezhnev look?

K: Good. They made more moves than they could make in 6 months by exchanging papers.

Kraft: I had written something along those lines and was planning to use it.

K: What is your basic point?

Kraft: I said those people who thought Brezhnev was weak and on the 25th party Congress were wrong.

K: That is my impression.

Kraft: Okay. I hope to see you soon. Will you be around for a while before Laramie?

K: The trip is to San Francisco but I had promised McGee for a year I would give a speech there.

Kraft: Do you know whether you are going to Latin America or Africa?

K: I am almost certainly going to Latin America on the 16th and the last ten days of March, if I go, to Africa.

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Kraft: Dallas and Denver?

K: I would go in between to Dallas and Denver, in early March or the first half of March if that schedule holds.

Kraft: Give my best to Nancy and thanks for calling.

K: Bye.

SH183 *

TELECON
Mr. Funseth/Secretary Kissinger
January 26, 1976
Time: 4:27 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I would like you to get in touch with Chandler's people and see whether that meeting can be put on the record, but in a way that makes them feel as if they are errand boys. Make them feel that too many stories have been getting out.

F: You will probably get a telegram from Chandler proposing a lunch.

K: If I do this on the record I don't need a press conference and then I can do the leadership meeting at 3:00. O.K.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 09 JUL 2003 200102979

SH 188 *

TELECON
Congressman Doc Morgan/Secretary Kissinger
January 26, 1976
Time: 5:57 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Mr. Chairman, I read with sadness you are planning to retire.

M: Yes. I think I have someone who can beat me.

K: There is?

M: No, I didn't have any opposition at all this time. It is my own decision that it is time for me to get out.

K: It is a great loss to the country. You are one of the great people I have been privileged to serve with here. I probably won't be here either so I can't say I will miss you, but the country will miss you.

M: Thank you.

K: You are a great man -- we will miss you.

M: Well, thank you.

K: O.K. Bye.

M: Bye Mr. Secretary.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 2 MAY 2003 200102979

SH190*

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger
January 26, 1976
Time: 6:07 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

(Missed first part)

S: And said he discussed this business of your statement with the Prime Minister. Their preference is that it be a Moynihan statement. If that isn't possible we talked about it being from the State Department. My recommendation is why don't we entitle it Department of State release.

K: Absolutely_____

S: They are worried about the Saunders' syndrome, just for example. I said you will find this statement breaks no new ground.

K: It supports them 4/5ths of the way.

S: I don't think it is that important. We can play it overseas as your statement.

K: O.K.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 2 MAY 2003 200102979

SH197 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Peter Rodman
1/28/76; 3:20 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Are you going to get these questions by the time I go to dinner tonight--like the 5th quarter.

R: I have asked Sisco for them. He says there are answers.

K: I know that Sisco is one of the two most important men in the world. When I ask for a g d answer from . .

R: I thought he was going to do it directly.

K: He can do it directly but I want to find out the answers. Okay.

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SH195*

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Winston Lord
1/28/76; 2:50 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: What have you been doing on Angola?

L: I am working on it.

K: My problem is I have time to work on it now. When will I get it?

L: I was shooting for 3:30 per our conversation.

K: If you are still working on it there is no chance of my working on it.

L: What I can giveyou in 15 or 20 minutes would not be as good as in 45 minutes it would be.

K: How are we doing on the San Francisco speech?

L: That we are making good progress on. I hope by tonight I can get it to you. Certainly by tomorrow morning.

K: How about the Laramie speech?

L: That is coming along slowly. That I can have for you by tomorrow night.

K: Except I have about three hours this afternoon I can work on it.

L: Let me get the Angola thing as it is in 15 or 20 minutes.

K: Okay. Half an hour is okay.

L: Okay.

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SH202 *

TELECON
Mr. Philip Geyelin/Secretary Kissinger
January 28, 1976
6:20 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I was so honored to receive a phone call by you today I have been bragging all over the building.

G: It will get you into a lot of trouble.

K: Not in this administration.

G: I am calling you to confirm something which has been arranged with you to speak to the Society of Newspaper Editors.

K: I do not know anything about it. For me...

G: For you to address the newspaper editors.

K: No one has mentioned it to me.

G: Well I am glad I call.

K: What is the date?

G: It is April 13.

K: It has never been raised with me.

G: I am a lowly member of the program committee but Mike O'Neal is in charge of this and he led me to believe it has been penciled in.

K: Possibly one of my maniacs did it. But I will do it.

G: They are getting together a kind of foreign policy panel consisting of Brezinski, Ball, Vance. They would like you to speak at lunch.

K: Yes. I did it last year. I had fun doing it. They asked questions from the floor.

G: This will be a panel of questioners, but we will try to get friendly ones.

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K: Is it only going to be questions and answers? That would be easier for me.

G: You spoke briefly last year.

K: In about one-half hour.

G: It did not seem that long, Henry.

K: That's because I was so brilliant.

G: I will check with them. The thing I have in front of me says one speaker, Secretary Kissinger. Status is you have been invited, but it has not been confirmed.

K: Ok. I will confirm it.

G: Can we settle on opening remarks and then questions?

K: About 10-15 minutes?

G: Yes. It is better than asking you to make a major policy pronouncement.

K: It is easier for me. Because on a speech I spend days. I am now working on the statement for the Clark Committee tomorrow.

G: When do you speak?

K: Tomorrow morning.

G: You said you wanted to talk about unity.

K: That's right.

G: You did not argue the case either. Is this a public statement?

K: It will be. It is hard to do first class writing under Secretary of Stateship conditions.

G: I will drop you a letter confirming the time and date.

K: Ok.

G: Thank you Henry.
END

SH209 *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ms. Sally Quinn/Secretary Kissinger
January 29, 1976
Time: 7:37 p.m.

K: How are you?

Q: Fine. I am sure you are crazy to do this.

K: I think it is suicidal to talk to you.

Q: I had one question. Everyone is saying that they don't believe you didn't know about Joan's job.

K: I would have approved it if I had known. It happens I didn't know about it.

Q: Tell me why you like Joan?

K: She is always cheerful and extremely loyal, warm hearted and very steady friend besides being very intelligent.

Q: Were you surprised at the outcry of rage when she got the job.

K: I don't think I would call it rage.

Q: I don't know.

K: I think the town is very poisonous right now.

Q: Why?

K: I don't have many reasons -- it is a vicious town. I told Joan that I wouldn't help her get a job but if she could get one on her own I would approve. She applied for a job a few years ago but it feel through. But with this job, since I had already approved the other, Robinson felt he had the authority to hire her. I feel he was right.

Q: I talked to Ms. Hobby today and she was very complimentary about Joan.

K: We are lucky to have her. I told her I would not get her a job -- she got it on her own merits. She shouldn't be disqualified because she is a friend of mine.

Q: Do you think this appointment could hurt you or her or Tom in any way?

K: It certainly hurts her feelings. There has to be a little generosity to make life bareable. Joan has done favors to lots of people but one doesn't have to assume there is a pay off for everything.

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Q: I didn't know much about her but I have learned more about her after the interview. I must tell you I was very surprised. She is quite a warm person.

K: Was it more or less favorable?

Q: Yes it was. I don't want to write powder puff pieces.

K: Write a puff piece and they will put it on the front page.

Q: Since people have found out that I am doing this piece, I have had a lot of calls saying I hope you will stick it to her.

K: What do they say against her?

Q: That she is a social climber.

K: That is all. That is unusual in this town. Listen I am unfortunately 15 minutes late to a dinner I am giving. If you want to call me with some specific questions that's fine. What are you going to do with what I said. Will you check every quote with me before you print.

Q: If you wish.

K: I might have gotten carried away.

Q: The day you get carried away is the day I want to be there with my notebook.

K: It was fine until you said with your notebook.

Q: (Laughter)

K: O.K. Bye.

SH205 *
RELEASED IN FULL

Secretary Kissinger/Win Lord
3:50 p.m. 1/29/76

K: I have got the speech -- that is what I called about. It is impressive.

L: Well we have an extensive cutting job to do and we are starting that now.

K: I think the Angola thing came out very well.

L: How was your reception.

K: Well, they treated me respectfully but not very cooperative. We will have to see what the press does with it.

L: Was it all open session?

K: Yes. Okay.

L: We will get you Laramie.

K: When are you briefing the Chinese?

L: Tomorrow. There was no way I could get to it today.

K: Yeah -- that's fine.

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SH 2004 *

RELEASED IN FULL

Secretary Kissinger/David Binder
3:40 p.m. 1/29/76

B: I was pretty impressed with your statement but I don't think many other people were.

K: Really.

B: No, I rode off with a British correspondent that was screaming and hollering.

K: On what theory?

B: Kissinger is arrogant. This is just a pattern of thought that runs through a lot of press and a lot of correspondents. I thought it was a hell of a performance. At least it gives them something to think about.

K: It opened the issue.

B: I thought it did. I wanted to ask you if you have seen this PRAVDA Observer statement?

K: I have seen it but they will have to tell you if they want to do something.

B: That was it really. I just thought that it was really very good. First class.

K: Well, you are very nice. See you Saturday.

B: Good. Thankyou. Bye.

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S14206 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Hubert H. Humphrey
1/29/76; 3:55 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

H: We are wrestling over here with a problem. We have a budget committee that demands that in '76 authorizations that we provide for the interim quarter. This thing came up originally on the Israeli thing but that is only secondary even though that is the _____. We are not supposed to take Fiscal '77 , bonafide for the interim of all '76 authorizations on everything whether State Department, economic assistance. It must provide authority for the three months that is not provided for because of the change of the fiscal year. At this point we will have to do something like that and either that or there is no authority for the three months. What is your view?

K: The logical thing in my view would be to take existing figures and extend them three months.

H: And not add anything?

K: No.

H: What we were contemplating doing is take the existing figures of the Bill. And simply authorize a prorata part for the three months.

K: That is what I would recommend. I may get into trouble doing that so if you will do it on your own, I will support that.

H: Because this bill is/a substantial amount, and because it is composed in the diplomatic way, I ~~don't~~ want to be sure we are not getting out of line.

K: It sounds reasonable to me.

H: Thank you.

K: Thank you.

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SH203 *

Secretary Kissinger/Jules Katz
3:30 p.m. 1/29/76

RELEASED IN FULL

K: missed first part . . . to go over this bloody statement but Dent told me he hasn't seen it.

Katz: We sent an earlier version. We did not send him the last version. We are sending it right now. It has not changed much.

K: But will people feel they have a sense of participation?

Katz: Absolutely. The substantive part is the same for the most part. The only changed part is the introduction. It was worked over to get the point over on Foreign Policy.

K: But is it comprabale?

Katz: Absolutely. We have had very little difficulty with the other statements.

K: Good. thank you.

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SH207 *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Ted Koppel
1/29/76; 4:10 p. m.

Koppel: I am just going over some materials from this afternoon and there is something here you did not say.

K: From this morning?

Koppel: Yes. An exchange you had with Senator Clark. He says to you (Koppel reads exchange which goes something like: "You certainly won't object to us using money to permit commitment abroad, hundreds of millions of dollars" and then you came and said you would check with Congress.) The implication of Clark's question is you might go beyond money and you do not knock that down.

K: I don't know whether you even got the sequence straight. I interpreted his question that 28 million is not enough now.

Koppel: I have looked at the tape three or four times now.

K: We will not propose any American military personnel or advisors.

Koppel: I know you have said that in the past.

K: And there is no change in that.

Koppel: When you go and are asking for assistance, the only kind you are asking for is financial.

K: Yes and don't assume we are going to ask for it.

Koppel: You haven't decided yet?

K: No.

Koppel: Is it right this is a tactic and you may not go through with it.

K: Well, say it in a more subtle way.

Koppel: I am not a very subtle man.

K: Be subtle for once.

Koppel: Look, for something like that 28 million I would have to conclude you are not going to do it.

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K: We have not decided yet.

Koppel: Okay. It is ridiculous for me to ask, if you did, 28 million is not nearly enough. Can you give me a ballpark estimate what would be required in terms of money?

K: I have not worked it out but alot more than 28.

Koppel: Would it call for 1 million or is it a matter of 10's of millions.

K: It would be more than 28 million and it would probably be less than 100 million.

Koppel: That gives us some idea. Thank you.

SH208 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
January 29, 1976
Time: 6:02 p.m.

S: I have been listening to you all day. I think you made some headway.

K: You do.

S: Yes. The news stories are making people think about it. We had a meeting with Schaufele and Sisco.....

K: Hold on. Can I call you back in a minute?

S: Yes.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
January 29, 1976
Time: 6:06 p.m.

S: We really have to think about some course of action.

K: Have you seen the Observer article about the Pravda thing. They claim there is more conciliation.

S: On the coalition?

K: Yes.

S: Did I see something else that said they were denying it?

K: I think so. Have you seen that speech?

S: It has some very good stuff in it. I am looking to see where it can be cut down a little.

K: It has some excellent stuff but no clear cut point at the beginning.

S: I am at page 11 and up to that point I think it has a point.

K: Read it through carefully will you and give me your views.

S: O.K.

K: Good.

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SH211 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Sen. J. Glenn Beall
1/30/76; 3:40 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

B: I am calling you about a very mundane matter of purely political significance to me. You have an invitation from _____ to receive the Man of the Year Award. I know you don't like to do this any more than I do but I recognize your time constraints but it would be nice if you would go.

K: My problem is if I start accepting these I have got to be everywhere. Let me take a look again and let you know next week.

B: Okay. Good. Thank you.

K: Okay.

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SH212 *

Secretary Kisssinger/Minister Ansary
3:30 p.m.
1/30/76

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

A: Fine, how are you?

K: I just want you to know I have heart attacks just knowing what you do in London and Paris.

A: Your pace is so much harder, I think you should really relax.

K: But you are having a much better time.

A: I am much better, but you know they are taking all kinds of tests. I am grateful that you took the time out to call me. Thanks very much. How have you been?

K: Okay.

A: You know our last meeting in London -- we got over so many problems. I am sorry that things have not moved as fast as anticipated because I don't know what the problems are on your side but I have the strong feeling that you and I should get together.

K: I understand you are going to see Robinson next week. After you talk to him, you and I should get together.

A: Fine, I will be in Nassau for about 10 to 12 days, then we can sort of maintain contact and see what the convenience is for us to get together. If the two of us get together, we can get everybody lined up. After I talk to Chuck, I will be in touch. Nice to hear from you.

K: Okay. Goodbye.

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SH210 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Lord
1/30/76; 12:55 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

(Missed first part)
L: Several of us are working.

K: I think the first part is the best. All that needs is a little tightening and a few parahraphs that explain how we are dealing with genetic prospects. The Soviet part should follow more logically on that. I have been testifying along those lines for the last two days.

The traditional one of budgeting . . but leading to a better world not when you get into SALT. But it should be what alternative they _____ because one day somebody is going to propose one. We are dealing with basic theory, nothing that cannot be avoided by Soviet rhetoric. That can be led into the Soviet part.

L: I think we can make a better case in the strategic balance with the Soviets and on the Defense _____.

K: On Angola it should be more along the lines of my testimony yesterday.

L: We stress the global thing.

K: The conclusion is a little too testy. You can't say these people are nowhere to be found when the Defense budget is worked on. Above all we need national unity. The issues that are being criticized are Russian issues but whenever there is a case of standing up there is a divided country.

Will I have one of your writers with me on the trip?

L: I think you should take Rodman and Charlie Hill. I have the French here. On the Soviet thing, we have to begin to answer questions we are going to have world policemen. Don't you have to acknowledge they are going to be in some places. You have got to show it is not absolutely contained in every part of the world. It is something we have got to hit head on.

K: We are changing when the Soviets appear with little questions; that is a serious matter.

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L: I think we can say what is involved. We'll get it to you.

K: When will I get it?

L: Certainly this evening.

K: Okay.

L: We can have Laramie by 4 or 5.

K: Okay.

SH214 *

TELECON
Mr. Ken Freid/Secretary Kissinger
January 30, 1976
Time: 6:08 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

F: I have a problem that maybe you can help me with. The General Manager of AP saw you on television and realized you were talking about the power struggle between the Administration and the Congress. Now he w ants a major story on it. I thought maybe next week I could see you and do a backgrounder on it?

K: Sure, why don't we do that.

F: Any particular time?

K: Why don't you call me when I get back from the West Coast.

F: O.K. I will call you on Thursday and we can get it done.

K: O.K. Good.

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SH213 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dent/Secretary Kissinger
January 30, 1976
Time: 5:43 p.m.

D: I just wanted to tell you I can't imagine a better job than what you did with the Senate Finance Committee today. The Administration has a greatly strengthened position because of it.

K: Aren't you nice.

D: I think you disarmed them over the subject of communication this summer.

K: Except Ribicoff.

D: He is vindictive. He was much softer than I anticipated. He couldn't avoid making a little bit of trouble.

K: Aren't you nice.

D: The way they got into SALT and detente was interesting.

K: You are nice to have come along with me. It showed a lot of support.

D: Any time Henry.

K: O.K. Nice to talk toyou. Bye.

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SH222 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Ed Kline/Secretary Kissinger
January 31, 1976
Time: 2:43 p.m.

EK: I have just come from lunch with Rabin, your good friend.

HK: He is my good friend.

EK: He said nice things about you. He was delighted on his meetings in Washington. Everything went well and he thought he would get what he came for. He was happy about the whole thing. I was telling an editor here that we journalists have become so dignified that we sometimes forget that we have come to ask questions. No one else even asked a concrete question to find out anything.

HK: I am not the beneficiary of these restraints.

EK: (Laughter). I just came back from the lunch literally so I am really full but it was interesting. No one bothered to ask about Golan's book or your retorts on the subject.

HK: It is ridiculous.

EK: There was one specific reason I called and something came up between the time I placed the call and now. If you have any time I would like to come down and talk to you professionally or socially, if it fits in with your schedule.

HK: Let's arrange for lunch or breakfast.

EK: Whatever is convenient for you.

HK: I will be out of town for the first three days of next week but let's do it soon afterwards.

EK: You will have your secretary call me?

HK: Yes.

EK: The other thing that came up between the time I last called you and now is I hear that Lena Wortmuller has an appointment with you next Friday.

HK: I am seeing her because I like her work, but I am sure she wants to convince me to let communists into the Italian Government.

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EK: I am not there to defend her. Someone asked me if it was possible for you to see her earlier than next Friday.

HK: Why?

EK: She apparently wants to go back.

HK: Let me take a look at my schedule. She has one of two reasons to see me. Either she plans to assassinate me or she wants to talk to me about Italian communists.

EK: I think it is the latter, although she may offer you a leading role. There is a possible future for all of us to play in one of these Italian grotesqueries.

HK: I will call your office if I can do it earlier. I don't have my calendar with me.

EK: I will wait for you to call at your convenience.

HK: When people catch on, they will realize that movie people and atheletes a lways get to see me.

EK: And not journalists.

HK: Right.

EK: I would like to have a social dinner with you at your convenience.

K: I would like to do it. I will make a suggestion next week.

EK: O. K. Talk to you then.

HK: Right, bye.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELECON
Secretary Simon/Secretary Kissinger
January 31, 1976
Time: 12:34 p.m.

S: How are you?

K: O.K.

S: [redacted] on your statement in the Q's and A's about trade and trying to remove the impediments. My testimony said the same sort of line. B6

K: I said we are not pressing for it now.

S: That means that we are still -- that is still our goal but not now.

K: Not at this moment.

S: We are going to relax and see how things go?

K: That's right.

S: Just as long as I get on the right train. They will pick it apart. Of course we want to remove the impediments but with what is going on in Angola we don't want to press for it.

K: Right. Your testimony was good?

S: We had a non-stormy session.

K: So did I except for Ribicoff.

S: Hartke and Ribicoff are the only ones on that committee who give you a hard time. They will do that on everything to everyone. But if you say the reporting on your testimony you know that was good.

K: Was the reporting good, I haven't seen anything on it yet.

S: Yes, they quoted everything you said. It was a very positive report for you in many ways.

K: Good, I will look for it.

S: O.K. Thanks very much Henry.

K: O.K. Bye.

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SH228 1*

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/ Wasserman
2/5/76; 4:02 p. m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

W: The effect of the other night has been fabulous for you. The papers and word of mouth has been unbelievable.

K: I enjoyed the party.

W: I think it is publicly the most effective thing you have done in your career out here.

K: Oh, really.

W: Yes. Today's Los Angeles Times quotes your whole speech, mostly jokes.

K: Maybe I can get a job as a writer.

W: Yes. I wouldn't worry about that. [redacted] B6

K: Thank you, Lew.

W: I have never seen anything like it.

K: Thank you. You have been a very good friend.

W: I may be back there in a month or so.

K: Let's have lunch or dinner.

W: I will pay you a visit anyway.

K: Good. Wonderful. Bye.

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SH231 1*

TELECON
Senator Pastore/Secretary Kissinger
February 5, 1976
Time: 6:30 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: Jim.

[redacted] B6

P: Let me know when you are ready to go.

K: If I could be excused around 12:30.

P: Sure.

K: I appreciate this.

P: No problem.

K: Thank you. Bye.

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SH 241 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Mr. Saunders
2/6/76; 1:25 p.m.

K: New intelligence matter from the Soviets we are getting. I know I am not cleared for it.

S: I send you a memo explaining . .

K: _____ explained it to me.

S: I sent you several pieces, the ones we have I have sent.

K: What do you do. Where are you talking from -- a car?

S: No, upstairs.

K: I have not ever seen one piece and I would would like to know how these get sent to me.

S: I have sent them up and what happens beyond that I don't know. I bring them to Paul. I have asked them to return them to me personally.

K: I am sure he does because I have never seen any of them.

S: Well . . .

K: Okay. Thank you.

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SH234 B6 1*

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Robert Kleiman
2/6/76; 11:50 a.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

Kleiman: I just had a word with Larry.

K: My testimony ended earlier than I thought.

Kleiman: How did it go?

K: This was a nuclear enrichment. It went okay.

Kleiman: I called you with some brief piece of information and a question. When we talked the other day on the backfire numerical numbers of backfire I gave you a news reaction to the idea of a unilateral statement. I thought you were referring to another US unilateral statement. I have a feeling now that you were not.

K: No.

Kleiman: I had lunch with [redacted] and I think you had this thought before. This question came up and he said a Soviet unilateral statement. I told him I would pass this on to you. Do you know him. B6

K: Yes. I met him. He is a nice guy.

Kleiman: He . . .

K: On my first visit to Moscow he took me to his apartment and had some talks.

B6

Keliman: He is an interesting fellow. They are friends with [redacted] and his wife. He is clued in somewhere and he obviously has more information than he needs. [redacted] put this to them very sharply. They can be as secretative as they like but they can sometimes announce what their program is. B6

K: Okay, Bob.

Kleiman: The speeches -- I don't have the full texts. But reading the press accounts it is confused and I am confused as to exactly what it is you are trying to say.

K: I have to say, Bob, it is getting to be tough. When the New York Times

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not I
tries/to run the text of a speech on SALT. What/am trying to say is we are trying to improve relations with the Soviets. A new year of relations. I made a detailed explanation of the origin of SALT and I will continue it. However, it cannot be compatible with irresponsible issues. I think it is one of the speeches I worked hardest on and it is discouraging when the newspaper of _____ has not printed the text of it.

Kleiman: There is no way to make it up here fast and I talked to Larry about that.

K: I with you would look at the SALT part because it is a major statement of it.

Kleiman: What about this Mansfield thing?

K: I am not going to have a confrontation with Congress beyond what they generate. I don't think he has read the speeches.

Kleiman: ~~XX~~ There has been this divided handling on this report, emphasizing SALT and conditions of Angola.

K; I think if you read the San Francisco speech, there was one sentence in there about the Congress on Angola. I think _____ is absolutely right. There were 15 pages on SALT and 15 more why we cannot avoid Soviet problems.

Kleiman: Right. Is there some way you capsule detente.

K: What we are trying to do is get a permanent relationship that creates a new relationship beyond the _____ period. And I think this country has lost its mind. The arms race is not going to get any easier to solve.

Kleiman: Right. Okay. I have a feeling that your problems are with 2 superpowers -- with the Russians and the Congress and it is a problem on how to handle both of them.

K: Partly because Congress is after me because I am the strongest figure in the Executive branch.

Kleiman: I don't see any possibility of a bipartisan foreign policy and wonder if the problem is just to disagree on the issue.

K: That certainly would not be my effort.

Kleiman: How do you do it. Who is in Congress?

K: There is no clear-cut leadership.

Kleiman: Mansfield isn't providing it?

K: No.

Kleiman: It is an interesting piece by Joe Kraft yesterday on detente. Did you see it?

K: Yes.

Kleiman: Urging not to make too much of the Angola thing.

K: We have to take something on Angola to make sure this doesn't happen again.

Kleiman: How do you do that with this Congress?

K: Bob, if it happens again, then we are going to see massive erosion internationally.

Okay. I have got to run.

Kleiman: Thank you.

SH238 1*

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
February 6, 1976
Time: 1:58 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

S: Yes sir.

K: Oh, excuse me, I didn't.... (HUNG UP)

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S/H245 *

TELECON
Congressman Doc Morgan/Secretary Kissinger
February 10, 1976
Time: 7:07 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: Mr. Chairman, I am supposed to testify before your committee tomorrow morning. [redacted] I was wondering since this is the last day if you want me to I will be back. It was supposed to be reporting on my Soviet trip three weeks in the past. It might be better if I appeared when I come back from the Latin American trip. However, whatever you wish. B6

M: There is no great business on the floor tomorrow. We might not have as good an audience. We don't begin until 11:00. I hate to interfere with your plans. Where can I get back to you tonight?

K: Why don't youcall Larry Eagleburger tonight and he will get back to me?

M: Where will he be?

K: You can call him through the White House operator and they will connect you with him.

M: Tell him I will get in touch with him tonight.

K: Or McCloskey, that would be even better. You can get him through the White House also.

M: O.K. We will get word back to you and see what we can do.

K: O.K. Good.

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SH243 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Sen Javits
2/10/76; 2:55 p. m.

J: You know that Middle East gentleman I talked to you about Friday morning seems to be pressing. He is willing to see the Israeli Ambassador in Paris. Do you know who he is?

K: No, not yet.

J: Could you have your people get on it?

K: Yes, I will get on it today.

J: Good. I will call you later. [redacted] B6

K: [redacted] B6

J: I will not bother you any more now.

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S#248 *

TELECON
Mr. Lord/Secretary Kissinger
FEbruary 11, 1976
Time: 6:57 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: Can you make sure that some effort is put on the Latin American work. I know you think I am picking on [redacted] but his speech writing is not one of his best qualities. B6

L: Hill and I are on this also, but the first Venezuelan draft he did completely.

K: It was a C-.

L: We can draw certain things out of [redacted] but Hill and I will be there for the other things. I will get Peter working on this one too. B6

K: Good.

L: The Venezuelan thing that you have tonight is a step forward.

K: O.K. Good.

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SH247 *

TELECON
Mr. Hartman/Secretary Kissinger
FEbruary 11, 1976
Time: 6:54 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I am sorry that they got it screwed up about seeing you.

H: I wanted to see you on general things. I didn't want to talk to you about Turkey until you have read the papers I sent up.

K: I wanted to review EUR matters with you.

H: That is what I wanted to do with you.

K: Can we do it tomorrow.

H: Yes.

K: I am not in control of my schedule -- they never tell me when someone is waiting.

H: O.K. We should have a specific meeting on Turkey with Macomber before he goes back. I just gave the memos to Barbian to put in your briefcase.

K: I shall read them then.

H: Good I will get a time for tomorrow.

K: O.K. Good.

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SH253*

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Amb. Dinitz
2/12/76; 3:00 p. m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

B6

[redacted]

D: I was away for four days in bed, you know.

K: No.

D: I had the flu. Everybody has it. That is why I was not personally inquiring about how she was.

K: This paper on your purchasing tanks. My understanding was you had a deal with the Germans and we had to tell the Germans we had no objection. Now B_____ wants us to write letters collecting these tanks, saying we need them ourselves, and give them to you.

D: The Germans want to give them to you. They are afraid to do it directly because of their foreign office. The idea was they would give it to you and you would release it to us.

K: That was never made clear to me. What I said is we will tell them we have no objection if they give them to you.

D: That was not a difficulty.

K: They wanted to hear it from us.

D: No. I think maybe we have not made ourselves clear.

K: I do not think we can do it. I don't think we can ask for them and then turn them over.

D: Why is it difficult. Actually the situation is like this. We have asked for these tanks from you. You are very much in short supply of them. The dates are 3, 4, 5 years, I think for supply. We have found from the Germans they have some they can give us but not directly because of political considerations. Is it wrong if you say

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to them you would appreciate it if they would release it to you and you would release it to us. And you are helping to get them earlier.

K: Yes. But I will have to check this. I don't think that will be so easy.

D: I think that is really all that is required.

K: Then they come back into our inventory and we have the same problem we had to begin with.

D: By your writing letters.

K: Of course.

D: I had the understanding you would be giving it to us and who would object.

K: Our bookkeeping is going to get into trouble. Let me check.

D: I know the Prime Minister is very anxious to help.

K: I am willing to help you but I thought all you required was a word from us.

D: That was never the case. Why should the Germans think you should mind because you are selling us tanks all the time. We need you to do it because of their own political situation.

K: Let me check on that.

D: And you will let me know.

K: Yes.

D: When are you leaving for Latin America?

K: Monday. Do you think you could get your friend [redacted] under some sort of control. What we did for the Kurds was not exactly against the interests of Israel. B6

D: I saw the one nasty piece. Did he write again?

K: Yes.

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D: I did not see it. I doubt whether I can have any impact on him.

K: I don't much give a damn. It is getting to be absurd.

D: He has a grudge against you anyway.

K: Yes, and that's his choice. Okay.

D: Thank you on the other thing.

K: Thank you.

SH267 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Rogers/Secretary Kissinger
February 13, 1976
Time: 7:25 p.m.

K: Is there any chance of moving the OAS meeting?

R: Last year we moved it a month before it started.

K: Could we move it to June.

R: The 10th of June it is set to begin. It goes on for two weeks. The two days of meeting of ministers.....

K: Will you move it to the end of June I have to go to the OECD meeting.

R: You are also committed to go to the CENTO meeting.

K: Can you move it to the end of June.

R: Sure. We will take care of it.

K: O.K. Thank you.

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SH265 *

TELECON
Mr. Joeseph Alsop/Secretary Kissinger
Febraary 13, 1976
Time: 6:50 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

A: Fine. I wanted to aim for 8:30.

K: Why don't you just start without me.

A: We have a nice dinner which I know you will enjoy.

K: Start without me.

A: We will wait until 8:30.

K: It will be closer to 8:45 or 9:00.

A: O.K. Do your very best.

K: O.K. Bye.

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SH257

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELECON
Ambassador Zahedi/Secretary Kissinger
February 13, 1976
Time: 5:34 p.m.

Z: Good afternoon, Mr. Secretary how are you?

K: O.K.

[redacted] B6

Z: I have something which has to do with Angola and Senegal. One of my men has talked to President Sengar three days ago. I thought I would brief you on that if you like. Shall I tell you on the phone or do you want to see me?

K: The problem is that I am leaving for Boston on Saturday morning.

Z: Can I talk on the phone?

K: Sure.

Z: He is very upset. He is very sad because he was counting on the United States.

K: I was also.

Z: I know you have been trying to help. He has asked Waldheim that because of the situation he is going to ask them to come back to his country. He said you are planning to go in March.

K: Yes, in April.

Z: He said March. Anyway, He hopes he could discuss it with you. He has been grateful to the French for their help and aid. He is not happy with the other European countries. He has asked Japan for aid. They didn't want to get involved. He believes they have to think twice before taking anything. However, he is against any decision which would make the radicals who are against South Africa anyway in a more difficult position.

K: Yes.

Z: This is one of my men who is very close with the President. Our Queen is going there at the end of this month. You are going later on. In case there is anything which you would think that we could help with -- I thought I would bring this to your attention.

K: Let me.....

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Z: Think about it.

K: Let me think about this.

Z: I didn't want to wait until the 15th.

K: Let me give you some ideas -- when is she going?

Z: On the 25th.

K: To Senegal?

Z: Yes. As the guest of the Senegalese.

[redacted] B6

See you on the 25th.

Z: Good, Mr. Secretary.

K: O.K. Bye.

* *

SH266

TELECON
Assistant Secretary Greenwald/Secretary Kissinger
February 13, 1976
Time: 7:02 p.m.

K: I find that these guys screwed up the dates for the OECD meeting.

G: The ministerial?

K: Yes, because I have an OAS meeting at the same time. Is there any way we can change the OECD meeting?

G: I will look into it.

K: Can you.

RELEASED IN FULL

G: Yes.

K: Good. Good bye.

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SH274 *

The Secretary/Larry Eagleburger
February 25, 1976
2:09 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: Hello.

E: I thought you would like to know that the two fellows that have been held in Lebanon for 6 months have just been released..

K: Great.

E: I thought you might also be interested to know that the FBI wants to talk to me about a security clearance for [redacted] Maybe he's getting something. B6

K: Maybe my job. That would make me feel extremely happy.

E: That worries me.

K: Yeah, it must mean that don't you think?

E: Oh, not your job.

K: No, no I don't mean that but he's getting something.

E: Yeah. Okay sir.

K: Thank you. Congratulations.

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SH271 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Congressman Thomas Reiss/Secretary Kissinger
FEbruary 25, 1976
Time: 7:07 p.m.

K: How are you.

R: Fine.

K: I just found out that some idiot in my Department told you you couldn't ride down to South America on my plane.

R: I was amazed.

K: I am mortified. You can always make a place. We can throw off a typist -- but maybe they don't realize that. I had no idea about it.

R: I was surprised.

K: It was in our interest to have a Congressional representative down there. I would have loved to have you down there.

R: I am chairman of the Trade and International Monetary Policy Committee and felt I could do some work down there as I am opposed to the trade bill as it now stands.

K: It would have been easy. My apologies -- it was my loss. You would have added a great deal. I would like to get to know you better.

R: I think we have a lot of friends in common since I represent Beverly Hills and Los Angeles.

K: Maybe I could do some campaigning for you.

R: No, I have decided not to run again for Congress.

K: My apologies and if you ever get into this position again please call me directly.

R: I didn't want to bother you.

K: Well, Bill Simon told me about it and I was mortified.

R: I wanted to be one Congressman to tell the Venezuelans we still love them.

K: Which they need.

R: I would like to stop in VEnezuela and probably will later this year. I want to thank you for fighting Bill Simon on the commodity agreements. I am on the Presidential Commission on price and shortages -- this is something that has a lot of promise. Especially when you came out with it the first day of the World Bank meeting.

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K: Well, I hope to get to know you anyway and my apologies again. It is a screw up -- it was one of these things.

R: After eleven years in Washington I can understand how it could have happened.

K: Nice to talk to you and I regret the circumstances.

R: Well, I hope we have a chance to visit again in the future.

K: Nice to talk to you. Bye.

R: Thank you very much Mr. Secretary.

SH273 *

RELEASED IN FULL

Ted Koppel/The Secretary
February 25, 1976
3:45 p.m.

Koppel: . . . (Missed first part) I think you are in trouble on this one. I really do. Have you got time to see me for a few minutes?

K: What do you mean I am in trouble? Look you guys are not going to push me into blasting him.

Koppel: Are you going to meet with him?

K: I haven't decided yet . . . and you could also consider the impact on the Chinese.

Koppel: I think we are worrying too much about the impact on the Chinese and not about the impact on the Americans.

K: This is not for quotation?

Koppel: No, this is not for quotation. I think you are likely to get into real trouble over this one.

K: No matter what I do I am doomed because that is the mood. I will be glad to see you if you want. Why don't you come at 3:45?

Koppel: If I may let me come then.

K: Okay.

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SH275*

The Secretary/Winston Lord
February 25, 1976
2:07 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: Hello.

L: Hi, welcome back.

K: Thankyou. Would you call the Chinese and propose [redacted] to them? I want you to do it. Can we do that right away. B6

L: Yes.

K: Tell them we will announce it as soon as we hear from them.

L: Any particular time?

K: I don't think they react well to deadlines. I will see you around 3:30 about the speeches.

L: I sent you a memo about that.

K: Where is it.

L: It should be there shortly.

K: Okay, thankyou.

L: Yes.

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SH276

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
February 26, 1976
Time: 3:10 p. m.

D: Hello. Hello Mr. Secretary.

K: How are you?

D: Fine. Thank you for returning my call. I had subsequent to our conversation yesterday I talked with Rabin. With regard to the UNDOF with the Syrians we have no intention of working towards the expulsion of the UNDOF. He will make a statement tomorrow in the papers that we are interested in keeping the agreement. The other thing, he told me that Allon will see you on the 12th. Did you know that?

K: Yes, he invited himself.

D: He called Rabin from the airport before he left for Mexico.

K: Allon went to Toon and said he could stop in Washington on the way back if I could see him.

D: I didn't hear from you so Rabin asked me to check to see if this was arranged. Toon said you invited him for lunch which is fine.

K: I try to be friendly.

D: I am going to see Allon tomorrow when I go to Miami. Do you want lunch for just the two of you?

K: No, you too.

D: I didn't know whether there was any intention of you being alone.

K: Absolutely not.

D: I will see Allon tomorrow.

K: Make a suggestion of whom to have there at the lunch. I think the fewer the better.

D: It should be a working lunch since it is the only meeting -- you thought about four people besides?

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K: Fine -- four, five, three -- whatever you want.

D: I will deliver the resumee of our conversation also.

K: Yes.

D: I told him that you appreciated that he has done this.

K: There is no problem between him and me.

D: I told him about UNDOF and he said call you immediately and say you shouldn't be concerned because that is not the line of the government. Do you have anything else -- I will relate what was in our conversation yesterday. I suggested to Rabin that instead of teams of lawyers that we should send our description of what we consider to be the end.....

K: I am not so eager to hurry things along.

D: I understand. Rabin understands the difficulty of the publication but he had no choice. O.K. Mr. Secretary.

B6



I will be back on Monday because I am going to Florida.

K: O.K.

D: O.K. Mr. Secretary.

K: O.K. Bye.

SH251 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Sis co
2/27/76; 11:50 a.m.

K: As I understand it Herman wants to be back for the Simon visit.

S: That is what I understand. He is coming here on the 29th.

K: I will be in Palm Springs and ~~wanted~~ wondered whether he would like to wait another week until after the Simon visit.

S: I will put this to him.

K: I will not be able to see him before Wednesday.

S: Let me check it out and tell him this and let him have his choice.

K: Okay. Thank you.

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(SH282) *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Wm. Rogers (ARA)
2/27/76; 12:50 p.m.

K: Is the House Foreign Relations Committed going to hear about our trip?

R: Yes. We are working on that now. We will have it by the end of the day.

K: Make it something like the Costa Rican thing.

R: That was my idea.

K: A combination of Venezuela and Costa Rica.

R: That was the line we were working on. A rundown on what you said in each particular stop.

K: Make it upbeat.

R: Upbeat all the way.

K: You are keeping in mind that you said in two weeks you are going to give me a paper.

R: Yes. We are having a _____ meeting this afternoon aiming for a follow-up paper in two weeks.

K: Good. Okay.

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SH279*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Joe Kraft
2/27/76; 10:30 a.m.

K: I did not have a chance to call you yesterday. You had left a message.

Kraft: I was being a little bit busy in Cambridge. Is there a chance of coming in to see you in the next . . what is today, Friday?

K: I am going to Palm Springs today. KWHK Where are you now?

Kraft: I am in Cambridge now but coming to Washington at 12:00 and have until 5 free.

K: Do you want to come in at 2:30?

Kraft: Perfect. I want to talk about where things will be triangularly. 2:30 will be good.

K: 2:30. Good.

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SH285 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Ikle
2/27/76; 3:35 p.m.

K: I have read a summary of your press conference. I find it a little hard to understand how an ACDA Director can attack a proposal that has been made.

I: Part_____.

K: That I can understand. And there should be no limits on cruise missiles.

I: No, That these particular . . . let me send you a UPI . . .

K: The Russians stories make it sound all like the limits we have made should be dropped.

I: There is always a risk in doing these things. I was addressing the Humphrey, Kennedy, Javits Resolution. I will send it up to you.

K: The danger is when it is all done people will wither say there should be no limit on cruise missiles or no cruise missiles.

I: I was carefully trying to avoid that in talking about this and so. .

K: What Reuters reports is that you said that we should keep cruise missiles outside the agreement.

I: I tried to avoid that.

K: He said the agreement should ~~hex~~ not have a limit on cruise missiles. And large limits are impossible to face.

I: This I did say but I was to the Senate position.

K: Send me it.

I: Some get it right and some get it wrong. I will send the UPI summary.

K: Okay. Good.

I: One guy asked me whether you had asked me to do it and I said this was not the case. I said you had mentioned something yesterday in public and it was on TV. I said it was desirable from your point of view if I said it was not and that is the way it was told.

K: I am gag ainst. That is the way I believe it.

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SO 127 *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Yury Vorontsov
8/2/76; 9:25 a.m.

K: I just ~~talked~~ got through talking to Eagleburger and before you say anything I want to explain my outrage, my apology and we are issuing a statement today in my name and if I can get to the President he will shortly issue one within the next day or so. It is absolutely inescusable and I cannot express my outrage in sufficient strong terms.

V: That is fine, Henry and I appreciate that but could you really do something.

K: I will call the Governor and Mayor of New York City personally today.

V: Really something must be done to stop this.

K: I could not agree more. I do express to your foreign ministers whatever differences we have on foreign ~~p~~ issues this is a disgrace that a thing like this can happen.

V: I hope you really do something.

K: I will call the Mayor and Governor personally today and I will call you back after I have talked to them.

V: Thank you.

9:38 a.m.
K: I have just talked to the -- the Mayor is out of town. I talked to the Deputy Mayor and they are going to provide additional police protection and issue a statement today and I will talk to the Governor in a few minutes. We will do our absolute utmost.

V: The best thing would be to find the perpetrators and put someone behind bars. That would stop this thing.

K: Of course. It is an outrage. There are a lot of things that can happen politically but there is never an excuse for this.

V: I am glad you understand this, but I thought you always did.

K: I can tell you, I am officially and humanly outraged by this.

V: ~~I am sure~~ You can imagine how outraged we are. There will be a protext from Moscow.

K: That is very proper and we will make a formal apology. END

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SH292*

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Don Kendall
3/3/76; 2:50 pm

Kendall: There is supposed to be a meeting of the 2 government commissions on trade.

K: We will probably postpone it.

Kendall: The problem is they obviously don't want to call you themselves to say this. _____ is supposed to go to Canada for a meeting and his health is bad and they were hoping to put it together so he can go to Canada and then come down here. Nothing much is going to be accomplished.

K: They should have told you that before we went into Angola.

Kendall: We ought to make progress in some areas. Hopefully that will not happen again. Katoljek (?) [redacted] was here when we mined Haiphong.

K: I went over there to discuss SALT.

Kendall: I just think it really is going to be a setback from their standpoint. That meeting was set up as one of the few things from the '72 agreement. I think it is going to be bad on both sides. They are really concerned about it.

K: That is not the point. We will let you know, really, next week.

Kendall: Would you?

K: Yes.

Kendall: I would really appreciate it. I am going to Geneva tonight. When I get back I will get a date for that dinner for you. I would like a month on the calendar so we can get a group together.

K: Let's discuss it when you get back.

[redacted] B6

Kendall: Good. Okay. I will talk to you when I get back.

K: Okay. Good.

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DATE/CASE ID: 6 MAY 2003 200102979

SH290 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Rogers (ARA)
2 3/3/76; 09:50 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: The cable from Hurwitch is good.

R: Correct.

K: Can we do that within the next 24 hours.

R: Yes.

K: Did we ever send out my speeches to all the countries?

R: They are being printed now and we are going to send them out to the Ambassadors.

K: That was last week. Why don't we get our ambassadors to deliver it.

R: Each of our Ambassadors did get a copy of each of your speeches as it was delivered.

K: You had the good idea we could get the collected ones out.

R: I have already given those you have given as they were delivered and it was given to each of the Latin American Foreign Ministers and now we are doing it in a package.

K: That is already a week old. Why should it take so long?

R: I don't know. It is the printing process is the best answer I can give you. The order went out as soon as we got back.

K: I want to give you an order now. I want it done by tomorrow night. And take this to our ambassadors here.

R: Yes.

K: Let's get it done by tomorrow.

R: I will check and tell them it has to be done.

K: Just tell them I insist it has to be done tomorrow.

R: Okay.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 6 MAY 2003 200102979

(SH299)

*

TELECON
Mr. Eagleburger/Secretary Kissinger
March 3, 1976
Time: 5:19 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

E: Rabin said if the Embassy is asked, which they probably will be, whether they were informed of our intentions on military assistance to Egypt they will say that Israel was informed of it but a higher authority in the State Department has informed them that the U.S. is interested in the supply of six C-130's only to Egypt. Israel has made a policy that it is against any supply of military equipment to Egypt.

K: You know who did it to me.

E: Yes, but the question is this silly thing of the higher authority in the State Department.

K: He can say he has been informed by the Secretary of State that the only subject under discussion is the six C-130's.

E: You don't mind saying the Secretary of State.

K: Can he say we have been informed by higher authority that the only issue now.....

E: the only subject under discussion at this moment is six C-130's. It is a critical issue -- he has a problem with the PM's credibility back there. He will not be able to hold the fact that Sisco talked to Dinitz a few days ago and didn't mention it.

K: We should say he has been informed that the only subject under active discussion at this moment are the six C-130's .

E: O.K. Right.

K: O.K.

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S4296 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Senator Sparkman/ Secretary Kissinger
March 3, 1976
Time: 4:46 p. m.

K: I wanted to call you with all these stories of secret agreements between the Egyptians and ourselves. You have seen the entire documentation.

SP: I didn't understand what I read anyway. Mansfield called me -- he was very disturbed. It was supposed to quote Sadat as having said something.

K: Right. Our problem is this -- Sadat is in trouble. He is overstating and exaggerating, but we don't want to slap him around -- we don't want to call him a liar.

S: I agree with you. I knew of nothing but someone told me that the New York Times wrote a story and what it was about. I didn't read it in the paper. However, Mansfield called me and asked me if I would check on it.

K: Maybe I will call him too. I want you to know there is nothing -- no documentation that you haven't seen.

S: How did that get in the Times?

K: I think Sadat exaggerated what he has.

S: There are people drawing conclusions?

K: No, he claimed these things, but he went beyond what is true. But if we called him a liar that makes it worse. We are going to say that the documentation was given to the Congress and we can't go on a conversation.

S: Mike will be pleased if you call him. He hadn't read the article but the news paper reporters were calling him.

K: I will call him.

S: O. K. Thanks to you.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 6 MAY 2003 200102979

SH297 *

TELECON
Senator Mansfield/Secretary Kissinger
March 3, 1976
Time: 4:48 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you Mike?

M: Surviving.

K: It is a difficult period for everyone. Two things: first, I just talked to Sparkman about the story in the New York Times. Here is the problem -- all the documentation has been given to the committee and it doesn't support what Sadat is saying. Sadat is saying these things because he is in trouble and we don't want to call him a liar. We will probably say all the documentation is before the committee without going into a long explanation. There are no commitments that you don't know about. I can't be sure what conclusions he will draw from any conversations. In terms of the written record and actually the verbal record there is nothing to support this.

M: I used the word alleged.

K: I didn't even know you had made a statement.

M: Sparkman is looking into it for me.

K: I will call Case also. I wanted you to know because Sparkman told me you were worried about it. If we could have a lunch or breakfast sometime because the last thing I want is a debate between the Congress and the Executive on foreign policy if it is under my control.

M: Why don't you get in touch with Sparkman and Case too and then we will get together.

K: O. K. Good.

M: O. K., Henry, bye.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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DATE/CASE ID: 6 MAY 2003 200102979

SH295 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Senator Javits
Sec. Kissinger
March 3, 1976
3:40

K: I have looked through the records of everything and there is nothing to what Sadat is saying with the one--that is I have looked through the written record. I have not looked at all of the oral conversations that may have taken place . You have seen everything that is connected with the Sinai agreement. There have been no other agreements. Some assurances have been transmitted back and forth. I do want to say it is extremely trickey. He is obviously doing this because he feels under enormous heat. We don't want to take him on too much. You see.

J: It seems to me the formulation that everything material has been disclosed and often people, based upon oral conversations and impressions that they have of certain impressions, and that there is no use in arguing about those. They are not precise enough to base a statement on one way or another.

K: I have looked through the entire written record and there is nothing that he can have that is in any way supportive of what he is saying. I don't doubt -- you take -- we no doubt at various points said we would keep the interests of the Palestinians in mind. And at some point they can enter the negotiations.

J: What I would do if I were you, now that I have asked you to look at it, is to call Case and Sparkman as for the House side you have to decide that.

K: Good point.

J: I think you should do it rather than to wait for them to call you.

K: Good.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 6 MAY 2003 200102979

SH298 *

TELECON
SENATOR CASE/SECRETARY KISSINGER
MARCH 3, 1976
Time: 5:58 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

C: Hello?

K: Hello?

C: Yes, Henry.

K: I wanted to call you with respect to what Sadat has been saying.

C: I was sure he was misquoted or mistaken.

K: You have seen all the documents.

C: Ihave no doubt about it -- I don't recall anything of this sort in anything I saw.

K: There is one assurance in which Israel assures him that it won't initiate military action against Syria.

C: But that was Israel.

K: Yes.

C: Right. We did not ask to or see those tings. As far as American assurances go I saw nothing that justifies that comment.

K: As far as the Palestinians are concerned there is nothing to justify that comment either.

C: I am not going to say anything other. ....

K: We don't want to call Sadat a liar, that is our problem.

C: I won't say anything about it except that I saw nothing that justifies these comments.

K: And all the documentation has been submitted to the Congress.

[redacted] B6

K: O.K. Good.

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SH291 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Sisco
3/3/76; 2:38

RELEASED IN FULL

K: We have written everything that is relevant to the committee. People are saying is there any ~~xxxx~~ unpublished part.

S: No. What Funseth said on the record was just right and namely we have submitted everything relevant. You remember all the documentation was submitted and things particularly touchy we then showed to Case.

K: But they do not have anything along those lines.

S: No, they do not.

K: That is what I mean.

S: No.

K: Thank you.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 09 JUL 2003 200102979

(SH294) *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sen. Javits
Sec. Kissinger
March 3,'1976
3:25 p.m.

J. ... any aggressive or over action or war by Israel. I if it in front of me.

K: The only thing to that and this has been arranged by Israel. We told him that we would use our full influence against a non-provoked attack.

J: Of course the difficulty with this is (quoting Sadat) "Yes, we have concluded three secret agreements"and the representation to our committee of course is that we knew everything and that everything had been delivered.

K: That is correct.

J: Was this included in the documentation.

K: Let me double check to make sure.

J: He says the first is this one, the second is the US pledges to bring about a disengagement similar to the first disengagement on the Syrian front and third that the US pledges to do all it can to insure the participation of the Palestinian in any settlement.

K: The third one is total nonsense.

J: These are the three secret agreements I took and did not announce. The Times said at his news conference...

K: Let me look...

J: Look at the story.

K: Between what the Committee saw and what Case saw you have seen everything. What Case saw only concerned assurances that went back and forth.

J: Good. Would you check and call me back.

K: Good.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 6 MAY 2003 200102979

(SH304)*

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Max Fisher
3/4/76; 4:40 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

F: Is there any chance of seeing you before I leave now.

K: When are you leaving.

F: First thing tomorrow morning.

K: It is going to be tough. We could have done it between 3:00 and 4:00.

F: Nobody said,I asked your office and you can't do it this evening.

K: I have a dinner which will last until 10.

F: If I can see you at 10 it will be all right. I am going to Al Cederberg's birthday party and could I get hold of you later.

K: Why don't you go over with xxxxxx to Al's birthday party. Come here about 6:00.

F: I will see you at your office at 6:00.

K: I may be 15 minutes late but . . .

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SH 305 *

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
March 4, 1976
Time: 4:24 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: He has accepted our recommendation on these meetings.

S: To postpone them?

K: Yes.

S: Should we say anything to the Soviets separately or let the thing happen?

K: Don't you think we should let it happen?

S: We could say something to Varonstoff about not having these high exposure activities.

K: Well, don't you think we should j ust let them find out.

S: Yes... I will tell Charlie.

K: O. K. Good.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 6 MAY 2003 200102979

 (SH301) *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/ Ted Koppel
3/4/76; 3:15 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

Koppel: In your testimony today you were asked whether there would be other purchases of support equipment. Were you anticipating for the next few months or support purchase period. Rumsfeld would be _____ if it were limited to C-130's.

K: I don't expect anything in the next few months.

Koppel: That means in the next few months.

We have information from several different sources that there may be a meeting of OPEC ministers in Panama City, Florida. This Saturday.

K: Never heard of it. If it happens, it will be news to me.

Koppel: The T_____ AFB has been alerted to expect 7 - 9 large planes.

K: Maybe it means the President is coming to Florida.

Koppel: He would not bring 7 - 9 large planes. We only called T_____ AFB after we heard the OPEC story.

K: I have never heard of it. That doesn't mean there is not. Did you check with the State Department?

Koppel: I brought it to Funseth's attention but thought I would ask you, since I wanted to talk to you anyway.

K: I have heard nothing. I am not being cute. I literally have heard nothing. The first word I heard of it was what you just said.

Koppel: It would be interesting.

K: It would get out a big Jewish vote.

Koppel: You don't have anything planned for Saturday.

K: I will be in Atlanta.

Koppel: That is just a hop, skip and a jump away from Florida.

K: I will be tied up until 5 pm.

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Koppel: Dean Rusk will ~~be~~ sit in for you.

K: Dean Rusk will be sitting in with me.

Koppel: Okay. When you go to Boston are you making a speech?

K: Yes.

SH302 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Mike Mansfield
3/4/76; 3:40 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

M: How are you?

K: I want to tell you how much I regret your announcement today. You have been one of the great figures of my stay here.

M: You have been a great friend, Henry, in a great time. Like the 27th Psalm says, there is a time to stop and a time to go.

K: I will be a good friend after you are out of office, too. We may be out of office the same time.

M: (Laughs)

K: You have been great and I am sorry for the country for your decision.

M: Thank you and I will be seeing you.

B6

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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SH3Ø3 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Rogers (ARA)
3/4/76; 4:12

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Do you know Frank Pace's effort to press executives as a form of transfer of technology?

R: Yes. He has been doing it for 6 or 7 years.

K: He is here and he has some ideas about Brazil, Peru and Chile. Would you be willing to see him for ten minutes?

R: I would be delighted to.

K: So when I am through I will sent him down to you. He'll be glad to see a Democrat. Rogers is the only Democrat I have around here.

R: You will be sorry about that pretty soon.

K: I will send him to you. He also wants to see Geisel. Why don't you and I discuss that. I am basically in favor of that and it would show we are doing ~~xx~~ something on the transfer of technology.

R: That is the best way to do it.

K: Okay. He will be down in about ten minutes.

R: Okay.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 6 MAY 2003 200102979

SH310

RELEASED IN FULL

*

TELECON
Mr. Funseth/Secretary Kissinger
March 5, 1976
3:50 pm

.....missed first part

K: ...put out a statement. Now, we are putting out answers to three questions.

F: When I started doing the narrative I couldn't track it without the questions. But they weren't the questions that were in the paper. These were, I thought, the three main points.

K: Ok, run it up and I'll have it in the outer office with some changes. Delay it -- I know the protective association is protecting Atherton.

F: I can't delay anything. It has gone out.

K: I thought I had the right to clear these things.

F: You cleared the substance, Mr. Secretary, and said you wanted it out right away and I sent it out.

K: Well, I wanted to say it is a representation of close diplomatic consequence...you better come in and correct it.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 09 JUL 2003 200102979

S4319 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador McCloskey/Secretary Kissinger
March 5, 1976
Time: 4:53 p.m.

K: I called you earlier to discuss that Funseth disaster but it is beyond repair.

M: He told me and I remember you saying you wanted to see it again.

K: I didn't check carefully what they handed me.

M: I should have made sure that he heard you.

K: I called him three times to see the thing -- it could hardly have been after posting.

M: He understands what is wrong.

K: The damage is we have one assistant secretary reading memcons to newsmen and we are putting out a statement that goes further than what we are telling the Israelis. We have told them we won't put forward a plan without consultations with them, now we are saying we won't put forward a plan at all.

M: I could have let that go by and have caught the significance of it later.

K: I am not blaming you. I wanted to see it again.

M: And it is out and....

K: But what is the significance -- by posting it does it count as a State Department statement?

M: Yes indeed. The arrangement was because the press had to write on Friday for Sunday's release when the Israelis broke the embargo, I think some of them tried to hustle the press office to get it sooner.

K: My statement of improprity is directed more at Sheehan than Atherton.

M: The statement wasn't put in?

K: Yes, that is correct and why wasn't it?

M: I will have to clarify that. I didn't realize that wasn't in there.

K: Insofar as Sheehan was briefed it represented a gross violation of confidence not authorized by the Secretary.

M: I didn't realize that wasn't in. I knew about the last sentence at the time of the posting.

K: O.K.

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M: He is trying very hard -- it was understandable -- it was a lapse on his part. I think he moved away from you and for that I have to take responsibility that he didn't hear you.

K: I called Larry three times saying I wanted to see it again.

M: That gives us credit for being more devious than we are. His not coming back to you was because he didn't hear you.

K: On a matter of this importance a little guy like Funseth shouldn't take it on himself to post things. If he had gone to Sisco that is far enough.

M: I shouldn't trust -- alright I had better not say that.

K: I repeatedly said serious error of judgment.

M: That is inexcusable, I agree.

K: O.K., Bob it is not your fault. Thankyou.

M: O.K.

SH 326 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Mr. Habib
3/5/76; 3:50 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I would like to move Romolo back to the 12th of April. Can you do that?

H: Romolo back to the 12th. That was the original date.

K: Move him back.

H: I am sure it will be possible. He made it clear to Sullivan it would be at your convenience. Are you going to be around at the end of the month for Malik?

K: I will not be around at the end of the month.

H: We will get together with your staff and get dates on that.

K: Make sure my staff tells me. It is not as good as their independence.

H: I love you. Okay.

K: Isn't there an ANZUS meeting in August and it's for the deputy secretaries.

H: That is correct.

K: But I have not been down there and maybe this would be a good time. Where is it?

H: Canberra.

K: What is the weather like this time of year.

H: It is wintertime but it never gets really cold.

K: I would like to see Australia and New Zealand.

H: You are seeing the A_____ foreign minister next week. My going there was wonderful.

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K: If I go to ANZUS I want you to go.

H: Yes. I will go. They are favorites of yours.

K: How far is Bali from Australia?

H: About a 7 or 8 hour flight.

K: I cannot go there.

H: You have got to go to the other side of Indonesia.

K: It is on the other side?

H: Yes. It is a good 7 or 8 hour flight.

K: Then it is useless.

H: What about Fiji.

K: I am thinking . .

H: Papua. I was there . . . New _____.

K: I met with the foreign minister and he we had such a conversation.

H: He is terribly proud and completely over-awed by you. He has your picture on his wall and terribly proud that he has met you. I could tell you some interesting things about him socially .

K: Don't flatter yourself. The chances of you and me talking socially is _____.

H: No, there is not. 12th for Romolo.

SH314 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Funseth
3/5/76; 2?40 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I have Bernie Gwertzman here. Are you going to post this in time for it to be found?

F: Yes.

K: When?

F: Within the next 15 to 20 minutes.

K: Can I see it?

F: Oh, yes.

K: Say a gross error of judgment.

F: Yes.

K: Have it posted within the next 10 minutes.

3:05 p.m.

K: You have 2 minutes to produce a statement or I will get somebody. . .
F
F: What do you mean?

K: You had it for 3 hours.

F: I told the press they would have it in mid-afternoon.

K: I notice you did not say anything about Reagan.

F: I was not asked.

K: Have you ever heard of planting.

F: As a practice we don't plant. We did last week. That was not discussed. I thought it was a clearly if asked question.

K: Yes.

F: That was Larry's instruction to me.

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K: What did you say about Dinitz?

F: That question wasn't asked.

K: Why can't you say the Secretary is seeing Dinitz today.

F: I am sure they will focus on that this afternoon.

SH 3109 *

TELCON
Lars Nelson
Sec. Kissinger
March 5, 1976
12:25 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

N: We had a report that the Cubans have invaded Mozambique with T-34 tanks and that the tanks had come in through Bera (sp). Have you heard anything about this?

I think the report is untrue as a result of errors in our own operation.

K: I was asked something similar yesterday in my testimony that they were coming from Angola. I have just not heard this and I have seen no report to this effect.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 6 MAY 2003 200102979

SH311 *

TELECON
Mr. Ted Koppel/Secretary Kissinger
March 5, 1976
2:30

RELEASED IN FULL

HAK: What is this, your daily press conference?

K: What?

HAK: A daily meeting?

K: Oh, I know and I am beginning to get embarrassed about it, but we are getting more information on our OPEC meeting in Panama City and I wondered if you had seen anything on it.

HAK: I haven't, but I can't believe it is true.

K: I can't either, but we have a camera crew and correspondent there and security is unbelievable and one plane has come in from Phillips Petroleum and no one will talk to anybody. I don't know what is happening.

HAK: Well, god damn it, we have to find out. Have you checked with anyone in the Department?

K: No, I thought if anybody would know, you would know. The OPEC part is rumor.

HAK: The OPEC part is wrong, but I wonder what sort of a meeting is going on.

K: The air base has been alerted to expect over 7 or 9 private planes.

HAK: Then, I'll find out from Scowcroft, if the air base has been alerted.

K: Could you have someone call me?

HAK: Yes. If you don't hear from me you'll know there is nothing to it.

K: Are you and Simcha still on diplomatic relations?

HAK: Yes.

K: .....I am giving you hell on Africa today.

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HAK: Why?

K: Your policy. I attended Clark's Subcommittee today and you should have heard those professors.

HAK: Oh, xxxxx you're quoting.

K: Yes.

HAK: What did they say?

K: They said you should come out against Rhodesia...

HAK: Who were the professors?

K: There was a very sharp guy, Griffith.

HAK: He is good -- did he criticize me?

K: No, he made an interesting observation. He said it is because of your successful policy in the Middle East that the Soviets had to look elsewhere and so they have concentrated on South Africa.

HAK: That I agree with.

K: But they described the African policy as bankrupt and going no where and the other guy from Aspen Institute...

HAK: Who is that?

K: A guy named Nielson. You know him?

HAK: Yes.

K: Is is quiet and seems a decent fellow -- but they were not sanguine about our policy and were saying if we do not dissociate ourselves from Rhodesia and South Africa ...

HAK: And let the Cubans clean it up.

K: They made a point that you have been hinting at a long time. They said if we think we have problems with the Cubans in South Africa, wait til they move into the Panama Canal Zone.

HAK: And, therefore?

K: Well, it is a no-win proposition in terms of aligning ourselves with Rhodesia or South Africa. In their view, South Africa is much more

evil than the Soviet Union. And waving the flag of Communist inflitration in South Africa doesn't do anything.

HAK: Ok, we will see. They haven't always been right.

K: Ok. And I would appreciate it if you could get a word in case you do find anything down there in Panama City.

HAK: Ok.

END

SH315 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/LSEagleburger
3/5/76; 3:07 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

E: They are checking on the statement and I will have something in a minute. What a bout Kilpatrick?

K: Yes. Why don't you get him in that. He is better than Smith. He (Funseth) did not make the comment about Dinitz either.

E: They are all asleep down there. They did not ask about Reagan. The statement is on its way up to you.

K: You can say as you know Dinitz is coming in this afternoon.

E: I told him on the Dinitz thing I thought there was substantial reason to _____ that one.

K: That is correct. Very substantial reason.

E: Yes.

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SH317 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Atherton
3/5/76; 4:07 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Did you clear what they have put out about the public policy thing?

A: It is what I ~~thought~~ showed you this morning.

K: How can we say it is in the US interest to draw a _____. That is the Israeli position. How can we live with it. When we get stuck we will have to do it.

A: I believe we have said that before.

K: I wanted to drop that part. Since my role is now that of the British Queen, and it is not possible. I wonder if there was some responsible person who thought of the national interest.

A: Mr. Secretary, I thought you read this this morning.

K: I glanced at it and was told it should be put out as a statement, which is different. When it gets posted it is a State Department statement. It's not like the spokesman said it.

A: Let me get together with Bob and see if . .

K: There is nothing ~~anybody~~ that can be done that I can see. To withdraw it draws attention to it.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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SH321 *

The Secretary/V. Rosovsky
3/8/76
7:30 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: How are you?

R: It is nice of you to call back.

K: Not at all.

R: I am calling you because I wanted to put my good word to the invitation that was extended to you from the American Jewish Congress.

K: I haven't gotten it yet.

R: You haven't seen it probably.

K: I haven't seen it.

R: This is the national conference of the American Jewish Conference and they wanted to have you talk and give you an award which I would have the priviledge of introducing you and Hertzog would make the presentation.

K: Well, can I talk about non-Jewish matters?

R: What?

K: Do I have to talk about the Middle East?

R: I don't think that it's that specified. The point is that we thought it would be an important occasion for a Jewish organization to honor you and I thought it would be useful from your point of view also.

K: I would be tempted to accept it.

R: If it fits into your schedule, it would be a very nice occasion.

K: I am tempted to accept it.

[redacted] B6

R: Well, that is all I wanted to say and I hope I will see you in Washington in April.

K: That is good.

R: Okay.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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SH322 *

TELECON
Mr. McCloy/Secretary Kissinger
March 8, 1976
3:10 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

M: Bundy called me up and

K: I have trouble hearing you.

M: Can you hear me now?

K: Yes.

M: I have had a call from MacBundy and he is in a big tizzy because he heard something about a project on uranium. And he was wondering what the government was doing. I said I don't know. I have no connection with disarmament. He said this is a situation which he understands was a production on eliciting uranium which would cut cost and time and everything else. Has Paul Doty talked to you about it?

K: No, But let me look into it and get back to you.

M: I don't know -- Paul Doty knows about it, I am sure.

K: I will get in touch with Doty.

M: I am sorry to bother you about it. But I said I would give you a rigg.

K: You couldn't bother me.

M: I got so heavily involved in this ____ thing. I am coming down in a week or two.

K: I would love to see you. Let me know when you come down. I am anxious to see you.

M: It won't take more than a half hour.

K: I would love to see you.

END

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SH329 *

TELCON
Sec. Kissinger
Vorontsov (USSR)
March 9, 1976
4:05 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

V: Hello, Henry.

K: How are you?

V. Fine. How was your testimony?

K: You know most of the time they say we are cooperating too much with you . This morning they were complaining that you and we should cooperate to get the Europeans out of the nuclear business. I can't win.

V: It is difficult to please a big crowd. About Gromyko's cable. He wants to remind you that in January you were talking with him about this item that we suggested for the discussion the banning of the new systems of weapons of destruction. You agreed in January to have the exchange of opinions between the representatives of the Soviet Union and the US. Tentatively, it was agreed that the exchange of opinions should be started in February in Moscow. Until today there is no reply from the American side.

K: O.K. Let me call you before the end of the week.

V: He mentions as well that in Geneva in the Disarmament Cmte they should start discussing together with the experts the text of the agreement to that effect according to theUN Resolution but the American representatives there said the US did not intend to send their experts to Geneva to work on this in the spring on this question. Gromyko said we don't qute understand why all of this footdragging on this item. That is in short what he wants to tell you.

K: O.K. Good, thank you.

V: Fine. Thank you. Buy.

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SH331 *

The Secretary/Sen. Robert Morgan
3/9/76
2:50 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

M: (missed first part) . . . Fine, how are you today? I am sorry to have to other you on a constituent matter.

K: Listen, when I get phone calls from the Church Committee members the best thing you can raise with me is a constituent matter. You were very nice by the way. I have no complaint -- in fact, I don't have so many complaints against the Church Committee

M: In some areas we fought over . . .

K: I think the whole enterprize was dangerous but that wasn't your fault. I thought you were a little bit one sided.

M: They were obsessed with that. We neglected almost everything else because for some reason our chairman was obsessed on that. Mr. Secretary, I don't know whether anyone mentioned the Tanzania question to you or not. . . Nello Teir Construction Co. of North Carolina did several million dollars worth of work in Tanzania. When they went in, the engineering wasn't proper so they had to stop and wait for proper engineering. They waited until they got a road really built. The Tanzanian government agreed to a settlement of $7 million but they don't have the money to pay it. If they apply to AID we might loan them enough money to pay it. They finally applied and I think it has gone through AID - Mr. Murphy, I don't know if you know him. And he can't come to the Congress without your approval. If you take $7 million out of a North Carolina Construction Co. cash flow and you could very well make it soft. I have been told for several weeks that it was a question of getting your approval so that it could come to the Appropriations Committee Chairman.

K: Well, frankly I know nothing about it. Can I check on it and call you back.

M: If you could I certainly would appreciate it.

K: What is the name of the Company?

M: Nello Tier.

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K: I will call you tomorrow. I would certainly be inclined to be favorable.

M: I certainly appreciate it. Thank you Mr. Secretary

K: All right.

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SH338

TELECON
James Reston/Secretary Kissinger
March 10, 1976
5:45 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I am sorry we did not get word to you earlier.

R: It's no great problem.

K: Can it wait until Friday, or is it urgent?

R: I have just been reading these dreadful things about you and wanted to check up and see if they were true. Are you free for Breakfast?

(Laughter)

K: No. I am going to Boston tonight and will be back tomorrownight. Can you come in on Friday? At 12:00?

R: That's fine.

K: Good, see you then.

END

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S4334 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec. Kissinger
Mr. Joseph Alsop
March 10, 1976
2:25 p.m.

A: Hello, Henry. I am sorry to call you.

K: I called you the other night and I have been extremely busy. I was very touched by your letter. I understand.

A: Unforgivable. I felt very guilty about it.

K: We are all desparate right now. You were not doing it for malicious reason.

A: I sure was not.

K: I understand but it will certainly not affect our relationship.

A: I would like to talk to you about this problem. I deeply care about what happens to you and I really am awfully worried now.

K: They are going to get me.

A: I am not sure you ought to let them. Let's have a quiet lunch -- the three of us or something like that on the weekend and see where we come out on it.

K: O.K.

A: I have a good practical common sense about that sort of thing if I do say so.

K: No question about it. I would appreciate it.

A: I don't know the overseas factors. If they arewhat I think they are there are things that I think you really must do.

K: Like what.

A: Too long to talk about over the telephone and should not be talked about over the telephone. It involves all sorts of judgments on people and God knows what . We might have Sunday lunch quietly.

K: Let me check with Nancy. At any rate we will plan to get together on Sunday.

A: I wake up and go to bed worrying about it. Not for myself in the least but I do care about what happenes to you. What happens inyolyes what happens to all the rest of us for Christ's sake.

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2.

K: Let's talk about it.

A: Sorry to have called you but on a personal basis.

K: I am glad you did. No reason to be disturbed.

A: Good-bye.

(SH340) *

TELECON
Senator Case/Secretary Kissinger
March 10, 1976
5:58 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

C: I think it went ok this morning.

K: Yes, I think so too.

C: Jack told me about his talk with you and I support the view he had about making this a commercial one if you can.

K: We are looking into that. I will get an answer on that by Friday.

C: It would be helpful and if we could hold off any further commitments until after the election that would be good.

K: I think we can do that. I am not saying definitely because I do not know what the mess will be in the Middle East.

C: It is just our view.

K: That's certainly our intention not to put any more requests for you.

C: It would do much to allay everybody's fears about the whole thing. It would be significant for Sadat and on the other side.

K: I will do my best to see what can be done.

C: That's all anybody could ask you right now.

K: Ok. Thank you very much.

END

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(SH346) *

The Secretary/Mr. Funseth
3/12/76
2:58 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

F: (Missed first part) I was asked about Jackson's charges that you had hit the stump.

K: Did you give the answer I told you.

F: Yes. I said you had not abandoned non-partisanship. I said you discussed pertinent issues and that you had . . .

K: I told you to say that critics had no right to undermine foreign policy without getting a reply.

F: Well, I did Mr. Secretary.

K: Did they ask about Carter?

F: They really pressed hard on non-partisanship.

K: Well, tell them I am taking both republicans and democrats (laughter)

F: If you escort Allon, I think they are going to hit you on it.

K: Well, that's fine.

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SH341 *

The Secretary/Secretary Simon
3/12/76
9:45 am

RELEASED IN FULL

S: (missed first part) Hell of a speech yesterday. That really was.

K: You're a political expert. Am I in wrose trouble or less?

S: You're doing what I did some months ago. What you are forcing them to do is fight on your grounds.

K: Well, I figured I was bleeding to death with these guys running around screaming about weak America.

S: I agree. I had a really super trip Henry. Sadat told me to send you his warmest love. I told him you would appreciate that..

K: You should have reminded him that he promised me Fahmy's job if I leave.

S: It was quite a interesting trip and the Syrian part of the trip really surprised me.

K: Did you meet Asad?

S: Oh yes, I spent 2-1/2 hours with him.

K: I think he is a super guy.

S: He said they don't agree with disengagement and so on but he said "we want to start with you right now on the economic side.

K: Did Asad send you any greetings for me? We are good friends you know.

S: Oh yes. I really think the economic efforts . . .

K: When can we get together?

S: Let's have our secretaries get together on it.

K: Good. Welcome back Bill. And will you god damnit do something controversial. You have pulled the economy through so the only issue left for them is foreign policy.

S: The speech yesterday was just the beginning of that.

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54 359 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
March 15, 1976
Time: 4:28 p.m.

(MISSED FIRST PART)

D: They might be making some movements in the next 24 hours. We were anxious to know whether your people have any.....

K: I have a meeting at 5:30 to go over it. If I get any information I will tell you. We have no clear information now. We heard rumors that they may want to do something -- they want to restrain the PLO from going into Israel -- but we have no evidence of it yet. We have rumors that they may want to interpose themselves between the PLO and you.

D: You will have a meeting later on this?

K: Yes.

D: I will tell the Prime Minister this is what you have at this stage. If anything develops you will keep me informed.

K: Of course.

D: Thank you Mr. Secretary and I am sorry to disturb you in a meeting.

K: O.K. Bye.

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S4356 *

TELECON
SYG Luns/Secretary Kissinger
March 15, 1976
11:18 am

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: How are you? How nice to hear from you - -what a pleasant surprise.

L: How kind you are. I fell I should talk to you about the following. At the same moment the allies are beset by great difficulties, NATO headquarters is about to be immobliized by the 18th by a work stoppage. This is due to some governments having neglected the workers for more than one year... refused to get my views in increasing salaries. The US has joined these governments in a most uncompromising way. I am coming to you to see if you can do something.

K: You don't expect anything that would affect NATO would be brought to my attention to you?

L:? What, oh , I understand.

K: It would be too important to be brought to my attention -- I wouldn't be informed of something like this.

L: I understand, I get your point.

K: I have never heard of this.

L: I am sure. I support these workers as do 5 other Secretary Generals.

K: Which governments are against it?

L: Germany, Belgium and now America and some others are following them -- like the Dutch. I would be most helpful if you would review the matter...

K: I have to find out what this is all about. I k don't know what this is about. I have to find out and I will send you a cable by the end of the day.

L: Thank you and I am sorry to bother you.

K: You couldn't trouble me. Call me more frequently.

B6

[redacted]

L: Alright END

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SH361 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Saul Pett (AP)/Secretary Kissinger
March 15, 1976
Time: 5:50 p.m.

P: What is my chance of sitting down with you to discuss the situation you are in now -- the criticism you are getting and what it does to a man. Maybe a little philosophizing.

K: I don't know whether we can do it this week but how about in the next few weeks.

P: What shall I do?

K: Call Eagleburger.

P: O.K. I will call him next week?

K: Right.

P: Fine. I will do that. Nice to talk to you.

K: O.K. Bye.

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SH357 *

TELCON
ARTHUR HARTMAN
SEC. KISSINGER
11:25 a.m.
March 15, 1976

RELEASED IN FULL

K: (Referring to call from Sec. Gen. Luns) ... saying that we refuse salary increases for NATO and now there will be a strike.

H: We have held back both in the OECD and inNATO because they want complete cost of living increases and in all of the international institutions we have been resisting this because of our situation in Congress.

K: Take a look and see if we can do something and send a cable to Luns thatI clear by the end of today.

END

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SH362 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Eagleburger/Secretary Kissinger
March 15, 1976
Time: 6:43 p.m.

E: I have something here which I really don't want to bother you with, but someone has suggested that we drop our passport restrictions for travel to Cuba and North Korea.

K : Absolutely not. Out of the question.

E: I thought so. I will take care of it.

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SH371 *

TELECON
Mr. Barry Schweid/Secretary Kissinger
March 16, 1976
Time: 4:38 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

S: I wanted to run a report by you -- it was put out on a FBIS, FBIS 100. It goes on and on, so I won't bother you with all of it.

K: (Muffled reply) Hello.

S: Yes sir.

K: What is the point?

S: That Jordan has informed Israel that it is prepared for total peace and they will renounce the sovereign status of Jerusalem. It says the Americans know about this.

K: Renounce the sovereign status of Jerusalem?

S: Yes, and keep it under Israeli rule. This is supposed to be something the Americans are aware of. It is on the FBIS 100 if you are interested.

K: I have never heard any of this. It sounds wild to me.

S: There really is nothing specially new on Jordan then?

K: No, nothing of any significance. At least that I am aware of.

S: Good. Fine. Thank you sir. See you later.

K: O.K.

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SH366 *

TELCON
Amb. Schaufele/Sec Kissinger
3/16/76; 10:15 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: That cable to Mobotu is just about the opposite of what I wanted. I want to discuss it with him first before I tell him what we are going to do.

S: You want to lay it out before him. You want to consult him.

K: This sure as hell doesn't consult him. This tells him.

S: We can recast the cable in that light. I don't think we will have any problem with him.

K: That is fine. That is all the more reason for him to suggest it.

S: Fine. I will get it put in that vein then.

K: Right.

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SH365 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Amb. Mulcahy
3/16/76; 10:10 a.m.

K: Do you know this backchannel to Mobutu?

M: I have not seen anything moving in recent days.

K: No. The one Schaufele sent up here about . . . When is Bill going to be back?

M: Probably not until 8 or 9 tonight. He is reachable at USUN.

K: Okay. Thank you. Fine.

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SH372 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Habib/Secretary Kissinger
March 16, 1976
Time: 6:59 p.m.

K: Those instructions to the Thais -- were they cleared by DOD?

H: Yes sir. It has taken us a couple of days to get them. I had them cleared with both DOD and the NSC.

K: Good, you can let them go. You notice I said something about Korea?

H: Yes, we will hold on that -- not make it public. I agree with you.

K: If they say did he say anything publicly quote what I said before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

H: I will do that. Fine.

K: O.K. Bye.

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SH 370 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Dick Valeriani
3/16/76; 4:10 p.m.

V: I wanted to ask you about your testimony this morning. I understand while you were on the Hill your spokesman announced suspending talks with the Russians. I was curious. Why didn't you bring it up.

K: I did not want to give it that cosmic significance.

V: These are significant?

K: These are things in which we did not think it was the appropriate time so you should not overplay it.

V: Are you mad.

K: We are not happy about Angola. We have made that clear.

V: What do they / have to do to get these things going again. A general improvement in the climate?

K: There are many opportunities.

V: Is there an overall reassessment in the policy?

K: No. The basic policy is continuing. It is making clear it is not costless to act this way. Here is Javits about how they are not supporting us in the Middle East and he is .. one of the chief sponsors of the trade thing.

V: What about the political side of it.

K: This is a decision that was taken over 4 weeks ago and it has just leaked out now. We would have acted against it if we had wanted to get a great political effect.

V: Okay. Thank you.

K: Right.

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SH382 *

TELECON
Mr. Atherton/Secretary Kissinger
March 17, 1976
Time: 7:57 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: In that cable to Eilts -- make clear that we expect to win in the Congress. It is a question of how much debate they want. If Eilts thinks asking the question would raise serious doubts don't raise it. Leave it up to Eilts. It would avoid a debate and Administration spokesmen saying things which would look restrictive later, put that in also.

A: I understand.

K: O.K. Good.

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SH373 *

TELECON
Secretary Simon/Secretary Kissinger
March 17, 1976
9:03 am

RELEASED IN PART
B6

Missed first sentence

[redacted] B6

K: I don't think there are that many people around who have the guts to stand for what is needed.

S: It is an open invitation.... I am going to Brazil in May.

K: What do you think of this idea _____ had?

S: I have to worry about the Congress.

K: Which is in your hands, but if you could pry off in May some significant improvement, you would have done something for our foreign relations of a very significant nature.

S: That is what I wnat to do and Mario wants to do. Ok, and I will keep going down the list of Jewish leaders and as far as the financial community is concerned, I will take care of it for you.

K: Good.

END

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SH 375 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Ted Koppel
3/17/76; 12:35 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

Koppel: You have just been accused of being helpless and very emotional.

K: Who is that, Jackson?

Koppel: No, the Russians. The Russians are particularly talking about what happened yesterday as a display of helplessness and emotional.

K: What happened yesterday?

Koppel: Funseth's statement at the briefing.

K: Oh.

Koppel: What intrigues me though is the Russians seem to be exceedingly optimistic about SALT.

K: If they are I do not know why.

Koppel: You are not?

K: It depends on their answer.

Koppel: The kind of scenario that I could see building, if you had any indication that SALT was alive and well what is possible for political issues to get tough and once the primaries are over we revive the move toward detente.

K: We made this move 2 3 weeks ago. It is a serious move.

Koppel: It was never/ linked 3 weeks ago to Angola.

K: That is correct but we were positive they would figure it out for themselves what the reason was. I think we are living in that time now where everybody talks. This was not a high-level decision to figure this out.

Koppel: You were not intending this to be taken as a slap against SALT.

K: No. I wanted it to be taken as a sign the Angolans are not free.

Koppel: They are taking it as a sign this is an election year.

K: Believe me, we would have done this in any event and this was not intended to come out in the primaries or we could have put it out 3 weeks ago

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when it would have done him a hell of a lot more good. He did not need it in the primaries.

Koppel: Yes.

K: The time to put it out would have been before Florida. This decision was made in the middle of February.

Koppel: As far as SALT is concerned, nothing . . . you know the Russians and how talkative they are in town. Today they are being extremely talkative. Unless you call up, you are lucky to get a good morning out of them. Today they are being very helpful.

K: Good. I consider that to be a good sign. It also means we are getting through to them. The fact they say we are helpless and emotional, that is not the worst thing they could say.

Koppel: That is right. What they find interesting is that they find Jackson particularly interesting as a candidate. He has never openly opposed detente, just you. They say he attacks you, not detente.

K: That is not true but lately he has been shifting on that. I don't think it is true he has never attacked detente but he has lately shifted on that which indicates something on the public mood.

Koppel: Okay. Good. Thanks very much.

S#379 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Funseth/Secretary Kissinger
March 17, 1976
Time: 6:03 p.m.

K: We have done a lot of things here but we have rarely disavowed the Secretary of State.

F: What do you mean, sir.

K: I am the one who told Reston they are training some policy. Does that make little difference to you based on a memo that Rogers sent to me. Did I tell you to say we have no information?

F: We talked about the meeting at the General Assembly this morning. ARA came up with guidance saying there was no agreement between the Cubans.....

K: That is what Rogers made me aware of. You have made me look like a liar to Reston. How often have I told you to check everything you say with me? The only one I disagree with is the General Assembly which he screwed up.

F: The situation is where ARA said one thing to you and something else to me, but I think my language was such that we weren't aware there was any agreement between them. Have you seen my note on Ted Koppel?

K: No, I don't see any notes around here. What did it say?

F: I said EUR had advised me that we informed the Russians on the joint commissions two weeks ago. Ted said we had done it three weeks ago.

K: I said we made the decision three weeks ago.

F: O.K. I spoke to Larry on the Zumwalt thing.

K: Did the letter go the way I wanted it or the way you wanted it?

F: The way you wanted it, sir.

K: Alright.

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S1+397*

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
March 19, 1976
Time: 6:42 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

S: Jackson called. He was very friendly. You will/appreciate hearing that he has been trying to find ways of saying things we won't disagree with. He has been saying things about the Middle East and China to show that there are ways of agreeing on things. The campaign sometimes develops so that there are major disagreements, he said.

K: Did you mention that Crosby-Noise thing?

S: I pointed out the article in the Star which basically agrees. He thinks that is constructive. He is always better away from his wild ones.

K: Well, good. I appreciate it very much. How is the speech coming?

S: It is all back with Hill. I have written new stuff on several of the sections.

K: He will edit it and redo it tonight?

S: Yes, he has four or five comments to put in.

K: Have a good time at Rex's but I will need you over the weekend.

S: I will be in at mid-morning for the rest of the day and then will be availably all day Sunday.

K: O.K. Good .

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SH395 *

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger
March 19, 1976
Time: 5:06 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Is that dinner at the White House for Hussein stag?

S: It is a State dinner.

K: Why is it at 7:30 then?

S: I didn't know it was.

K: Maybe my calendar is wrong.

S: I will check that time. I think it must be wrong.

K: O.K. Thank you.

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SH390 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Sol Linowitz
3/19/76; 2:25 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: Sol, how are you?

L: I am fine. I did not get any word and thought you were busy and came back.

K: What a pity. I told them to ask you to come in but our machinery is extremely complicated.

L: It was kind of you and a very nice lunch.

K: I enjoyed it and you gave a great speech. B6

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SH399

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TELECON
Mr. Atherton/Secretary Kissinger
March 19, 1976
Time: 7:24 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Roy, the problem with that cable now is that it doesn't say what we exchanged with Asad. You have to have a few paragraphs in there. Just say what we tried to do is support stabilization.

A: O.K. I see your point.

K: Make sure he doesn't draw on paragraph two when he talks to them.

A: I will put an FYI arond that paragraph to make sure.

K: O.K. Would you also ask Eilts what he discussed with Sadat on the military question. Whether we can make a statement that we are not planning any more military sales this year which implies that we are planning them for next year. Also ask him if he wants to run it by Fahmy.

A: O.K. I will do a separate cable on that subject.

K: And redo this one?

A: Yes sir and redo that.

K: O.K. Good.

Mr. Atherton/Secretary Kissinger
Time: 7:27 p.m.

K: Have we started talking to the Indians about the PL-480?

A: No, the instructions are being drawn up still.

K: Oh come on. I am being driven crazy by the rice producers.

A: Let me check. They put the negotiating instructions together under the Agriculture Committee. They have to go to Delhi to do the negotiating.

K: O.K. And although it is not your area, will you check on the Indonesian thing also.

A: Yes sir.

K: Thank you.

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SH402 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Sam Lewis
3/20/76; 6:00 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: On this UN debate on Israel. I would like to know what we are going to say. The talking points you put down are so vague.

L: We have those pretty well shaped up into a draft of them but not in a complete statement.

K: Well, I would like to see it because I think we should be very careful that that is at least a strong statement.

L: Yes. All right. When would you like to look at that. The statement as it is presently being drafted is just an elaboration of the points.

K: But it depends a lot on how we put it. I don't want to be in the position as the Israeli lawyer.

L: I think our impression is that the Israelis will take some _____ and will _____ some of the points here. We were not planning to get into that position. We want to restate our position and essentially say what we made in '69 and '70.

K: Can I just see this.

L: Surely. We were not planning to go much beyond the points.

K: But I want to know what it is we said. I will not object to Scranton telling the Europeans that if they can come up with something we would take a look at it. We do not want to participate in the delivery of it.

L: What the British want us to do is help n_____ it. You could cut out some of that language if we could say we might consider ~~xxx~~ not vetoing it and once we start that we are committed, coming out with something we will abstain on. I talked to Bill Scranton today and he is perfectly prepared to veto and he is always understandably anxious not to look as the Israeli lawyer either.

K: Let's see whether Bill could _____ it.

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L: All right. This is going to come to a vote Tuesday morning or Monday night. One or the other and the debate will begin on Monday morning.

K: Just let me see the GD speech.

L: All right. I will try to get it up this evening [redacted]

K: Or tomorrow send it to my h ouse.

L: Okay.

SH401 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/MaxFisher
3/20/76; 5:40 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

F: We were talking about you last night. Schindler and ~~wives~~ wife dropped over to see us and we had a bite. We discussed you. We took you apart and put you together again.

K: What conclusion did you come to.

F: We think you are a pretty good guy and hope you are around for a while.

K: For the last one I am not grateful.

F: We just sat around and had some drinks. It was a warm conversation. We reviewed history and all the things of the '73 war.

K: That is an outrage.

F: I was involved in the history of that and he was involved in the history of that. Somebody has to set the record straight. That was one of the most outrageous things of all. You 2 may have differences but he is a good friend.

K: Oh, I recognize that.

F: He said I think the Israelis and the Jews are much better off so it is nice to hear someone say nice things about you , all the time having to read the newspapers. I had a call from Jack and I talked about it and I said you are trying to get language together.

K: We have the pr9inciple in getting it together.

F: If we can get it done Monday or Tuesday, I think we can save ourselves a big headache on these things. He told me you were getting to it Monday.

K: That is right.

F: The sooner the better. We came out on a very big plus on that meeting.

K: Good.

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F: I have my ratings. They have gone up since that time. If we can get this on the record and to Congres s before we get these NYT headliners we get it will be helpful politically and every other way. That is all.

K: Okay. Maybe Max, you have been a good friend and we will proceed on that basis.

F: That was all I wanted to talk about.

K: I am going to do it Monday or Tuesday.

F: Thanks.

K: Okay, Max. You are a terrific help and a good friend.

SH 405 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Bill Scranton
3/22/~~8~~76; 2:30 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

(missed first part)

S: This Arab-Israeli thing was here. I thought I ought to talk to you because the S _____ and a couple of others are trying to _____ down so we would not have to oppost it. The Pakistanis are helping. In the meantime some Arabs are trying tactical stories ~~K~~nd we are not worried about that. Will you look for me to veto almost anything?

K: No. I would rather have something that we could abstain from. *But I would prefer if we did not* _____ *on the resolution. So* if you can work with the Europeans behind the scenes and tell them it is not hopeless. What I would hate to do is work on something and get everybody -- or by vetoing. If you could get something.

S: They say they are going at it. There is an outside possibility there would be something.

K: Are they taking out the contempt?

S: Yes. Saying'deplores''Israel~~ xxxxxxxx~~ And calls on Israeli~~xx~~ authority to abstain from any measure of recrimination against Arab~~x~~ inhabitants of Eastern Jerusalem. They have taken out description of Holy land and say maintain violability.

K: Have you talked to the Israeli Ambassador?

S: Just getting him.

K: Touch base with him . .

S: We are trying to do it right now. I will tell him.

K: My answer is that I am not looking for an opportunity to veto it.

S: Okay. That is what I really wanted to know.

K: I guess that is your recommendation too, isn't it?

S: Yes, it is. Provided the same proviso you had. The important thing is that the ~~Egyptians xxxxxx~~ Europeans do this.

K: Thanks for calling.

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SH407 *

TELECON
Mr. Hartman/Secretary Kissinger
March 22, 1976

RELEASED IN FULL

missed first part

K: But do you mind if I return on the 27th?

H: No.

K: I am not going to Lisbon after the CENTO meeting.

H: You had said that earlier.

K: How about going in June after the OECD meeting?

H: Sure. I just have to check when the Presidential elections are but if that doesn't conflict it would be alright.

K: It is a popular election?

H: Yes. It will be country wide voting. But I don't believe they have fixed a date. It should be 2 months after which would put it at the end of June.

K: Which would coincide.. Then, I could skip Luxumbourg. I hope you haven't send those cables.

H: No, they are with you.

K: These cables are like I am inviting myself.

H: The Norweigians invited you.

K: Yes, but they sound like I am inviting myself.

H: I didn't know that.

K: Will you look at them?

H: Yes.

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K: I could skip Sweden and go there after the OECD. That would be an alternative.

H: I think the Swedish trip would be good. You have something there that could be accomplished.

K: I can do that in June.

H: Yes.

K: I would go to Lisbon in the Swedish spot and to Sweden at the end of June if that doesn't work out for Lisbon.

H: Ok. Let me take a look at it.

K: And let me know.

H: Ok

END

SH41Ø *

TELECON
Mr. Eagleburger/Secretary Kissinger
March 23, 1976
Time: 11:02 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

E: Have you heard the news.

K: We lost?

E: Beyond that we relaxed a little soon. The news so far is ascribing it to detente so we will hear about it for a couple of weeks.

K: That detente brought it about?

E: The commendary is that there is some evidence of Regean taking extra votes on his attacks against you and detente. These are the early commentaries. Novak and NBC.

K: Who is Novak?

E: Of Evans and Novack.

K: [redacted] B6

E: I think Ford let it go too easily.

K: You know there...

E: I thought I would do what I could to cheer you up.

K: It may bring out the yahoos again, but you know what I will do.

E: I think predictions by Timmons are out of date now.

K: You know the tragedy is we had it licked. Any victories would have done it.

E: I know, Henry.

K: O.K. I will see you tomorrow.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 7 MAY 2003 200102979

SI7 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Sam Lewis (IO)
3/24/76; 12:55 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I was under the firm impression that no speech yesterday was necessary and would not be given afterwards. That it would be delivered shortly before the vote if we had finally decided to veto.

L: My understanding with you was we would give it toward the end of the debate and that was yesterday. This morning they are having informal consultations on the draft and this afternoon leading up to a vote late tonight.

K: This miscommunication. The first idea was to use it as we vetod.

L: Right.

K: Which meant after the vote. Then rather than have an explanation of it, the vote, either we could have it after the vote . .

L: Yes.

K: But this is not . .

L: At the time they spoke it looked like there would be a vote.

K: I decided they would speak shortly before the vote. I did not decide they had the right to speak.

L: That is some failure of communication between you and me.

K: I thought it was a technical point whether we speak two minutes before the vote or two hours after the vote. But I did not think we would make a speech 2 days before the vote. Now it looks as though our veto is a price we pay to the Israelis for the speech.

L: Well, I don't think that impression would be much different if we spoke this afternoon.

K: I had a slight preference to speak right before the vote. That endless battle between you, Sisco and USUN must stop. I insist on being in on the policy decision. How did he get it off?

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L: He called me and said he wanted to make some private remark.

K: There are none.

L: I realize that. I said I talked with you and nothing would interfere with your policy on the Middle East. He said we needed to say it in writing. I said okay. I think you should talk to Sisco or the Secretary.

K: An informal contact by Scranton with the PLO is a major policy.

L: He talked to Sisco and said he went into detail and Sisco tried to get it down in writing and he accepted and took out the sensitive points.

K: Scranton has no ability to withstand anything, so if I had known, I would have stopped him.

L: The informal remarks he made to me were helpful.

K: He said he is prepared to talk to the PLO in the corridors.

L: He said anybody.

K: Including the PLO. He doesn't have to name them. Does he have to say I am going to speak to the British Ambassador in the corridors. Does that make history.

L: My understanding was he felt by saying something like that he could reestablish communication with the other council members.

K: Well, it is your job to get our policy carried out and I am going to get it carried out and there is not going to be this free-wheeling. When you speak of informal consultations in the corridors, a professional ought to know what it means. Not argue with me like a lawyer. That just is not possible. Scranton is a reasonable man and would have listened on this.

L: That comment he did not tell me he was going to make.

K: I never thought we were going to make the statement yesterday. I was under the firm impression we were not going to give a statement yesterday. Well, okay. I understand what the problem was then.

S18 *

The Secretary/Sen. Javits
3/24/76
1:15 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Jack, I just don't think we can change this thing any further. I think we are going to far as it is and I have tried it out on Eilts who is very very uneasy about it. He's strongly against it. Isn't there some way of doing it with a minimum of publicity?

J: If you wish, we can take a further look at it -- the three of us -- that is Case, Humphrey and Myself. If you can do it some time today I will try to line them up. Case issued yesterday some kind of a generalized statement of his worries. I believe that what we do could have an effect on the committee and the Senate. Before we finally say nothing can be done, I think we ought to discuss it once more.

K: Are you saying that you would vote against it?

J: I am not saying that. All I am saying is that the statement that I suggested to you last night would assure our getting it through with no problems. If that cannot be done then I suggest the three of us talk further to see if there is any formula that you can work -- but not the FMS. I can't tell you that I will vote against it.

K: Well, it is a hell of a responsibility to take and for nothing because I have told you what we are going to do.

J: It is a hell of a responsibility. That is why I think we should talk once more.

K: Okay, well let me . . . my problem is it would have to be late today. How about 6:30.

J: I will line them up for 6:30. And I will be back to you.

K: Good.

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DATE/CASE ID: 16 MAY 2003 200102979

SI 3 *

The Secretary/Mr. Funseth
3/24/76
12:30 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

F: The press asked for a delay until they got back from the airport.

K: Don't mention that point about the Soviets. If anyone says anything more just say . . . if they say what about the Soviets, then you can say of course this is obvious that it cannot be done without Soviet support. But I want to cool it now.

F: I think yesterday you said that. That the Soviets were obviously aware of a new agreement.

K: Just say that the Soviets are aware of our view.

F: Why don't I just refer to your comment?

K: Good.

F: Thank you sir.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 13 AUG 2003 200102979

SI 4

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TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Scranton
3/24/76; 12:38 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: You get yourself in the newspaper and you'll get yourself in competition with me.

S: Don't worry. That is my last interest.

K: I was just kidding.

S: Are the Israelis jumping all over you?

K: Yes, but don't let it worry you.

S: I'm not. I just want to make sure . .

K: I cleared that text;I read it personally. I think it was the right thing to do. On the PLO I am going to have our spokesman say we have not changed our policy on the PLO and your speech was repetitious of what we said in '68 and '69 each time there was a debate.

S: You have to have a veto?

K: Are you asking me?

S: Yes.

K: It depends what the resolution is.

S: Okay.

K: If you could go in the direction we were talking on Monday, I would prefer no veto. I think we have to veto.

S: They are now trying to be very accommodating and I don't want it to get so accommodating it looks so ridiculous for us to veto.

K: For domestic reasons it would be better to veto. We have taken flack before and if you can get it, get the abstention form.

S: Okay.

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SI 19 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Amb. Kosciusko-Morizet
3/25/76; 3:10 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Just one further clarification. Our judgment is -- but we will be guided by your recommendation -- that on the whole it would be better if youasked for the Security Council or you and the British without us. But if you think it is better we join you. We will follow your advice. The reason we think it better to do it is that the Syrians shall not believe that having some questions we immediately run to the Security Council. Do you see what I mean?

M: Yes.

K: Thatis not really asked for but we had exchanges with them. But we are prepared to go to the security council. We think on the whole it would be better if you did it. And so do the Egyptians, we think.

M: We understand.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
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SI 31 *

TELECON
Ambassador McCloskey/Secretary Kissinger
March 25, 1976
Time: 6:35 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I don't care what...

M: I said that to Humphrey, himself this morning.

K: That is the basis on which it was sold to me.

M: They have started the 77 legislation this morning.

K: What if I said I couldn't do it for two weeks.

M: The republic wouldn't have fallen.

K: I have crises going on and I don't understand why I am put under this kind of pressure.

M: The dates are agreed to for sometime before you actually testify.

K: It was a week when I had the Turkish Foreign Minister here. I never liked it.

M: We have the two appropriations committees after us also which I am trying to hold off. It has to come sometime that the Secretary of State gets out of testifying on this bill.

K: Make clear that I can only spend an hour -- if it is more than this I have to cancel out tomorrow.

M: O.K. Fine.

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SI 26 *

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
March 25, 1976
Time: 5:50 p.m.
(Missed first part)

RELEASED IN FULL

D: Something to the President before it is cleared with the President.

K: It is a way....

D: It is a way not to commit themselves. Our people are sitting right now.

K: I wanted to give you this. I wanted to make sure you have every piece of information we have.

D: I will probably have later tonight a reaction-where can I reach you?

K: I will leave word at the White House, I will be at the Turkish Embassy.

D: O.K.

K: O.K. Good.

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DATE/CASE ID: 16 MAY 2003 200102979

SI 24 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Amb. Dinitz
5:43 p.m. 3/25/76

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I have just had information which is not yet confirmed but probably reliable that the Syrian division in the D_____ area is moving. We don't know where and we know that the Syrians have pulled their peacekeeping teams from Beirut.

D: So that must have been what they sent you.

K: Making it a foreign ministry recommendation means that we do not have to take . .

D: No, I understand. When I told it to Rabin we don't have to do it before it is cleared with the President.

K: Of course.

D: It is a way not to communicate _____ our people are saying right now.

K: I want to make sure you have every piece of information.

D: I appreciate it. I will pass it on to them right away. I ~~xx~~ probably will have an answer later on tonight. Where will I reach you?

House

K: I will be at the White Dinner. The White House will find me.

D: Okay.

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SI 27 *

TELECON
Mr. Steven Debrough/Secretary Kissinger
March 25, 1976
Time: 5:55 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K:I am having some problems with the Turks in the neogtiations. It is mostly Turkish domestic politics so they can show some figures to show progress. I was wondering we appreciated that letter you have agreed to send. I was wondering whether there was any chance of increasing that figure to $75 million?

D: The one in the letter is $50 million?

K: Yes.

D: Would you settle for $65 million which is the pattern of the past. We have been exceeding $60 this year it is $86 million so far.

K: Yes.

D: I can get two price impressions up a little. I feel more comfortable not going up but I realize it is a price impression.

K: They have some experience in not getting everything they have been promised.

D: This is a very touchy issue with the Bank. I am meeting with my directors tomorrow morning.

K: Can I tell them there will be some increase but we are not sure how much?

D: Yes, that is o.k. I hope you have a good dinner. I know this is a painful process.

K: They are the greatest bazzar merchants.

D: You have my sympathy and I hope some of my money.

K: Thank you.

D: I will call you in the morning.

K: O.K. Good.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
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SI 20 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Atherton
3/25/76; 3:12 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: In that cable to the Egyptians you might tell them we have approached the French informally and told them what it is we are doing so if they are asked they give him the same answer. You better get that response out right away so it can still be delivered right away. Say in thinking it over we think there is more merit in France's idea than our first judgment and have sounded out the French and told them we would support the initiative if they thought well of it. And we have told the French we thought the Egyptians were in favor of it. If the French approach them they give them the same answer.

A: Okay.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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SI 18 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Amb. Dinitz
3/25/76; 3:05 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: We have 2 other developments which I want to bring you up to date on. We have had a message from the Egyptians saying they thought the best solution was for a security council meeting in which we would support no outside intervention and they said the real problem is outside intervention by Syria, Iraq, Libya and the Soviet Union. They do not mention you.

D: They thought that the best solution.

Iraq,

K: No, they thought the real intervention was by Syria,/Libya and the Soviet Union. They don't mention and and they don't mention themselves but they suggest a security council meeting called by France and that would slow things down. We have gotten in touch with the French and given them a very guarded outline. We did not give them any specifics and asked them what they thought of a security council meeting and we said we would be willing to sponsor it with them or with the British but we are not approaching the British until we hear from the French.

D: And you have no reply.

K: No. We have just done it. Since you called I got that message from the Egyptians.

D: I understand.

K: We are telling you every diplomatic exchange we have and we are counting you will do the same with us.

D: We will.

K: We are doing it on the basis you will keep it as tightly as yesterday. I have no complaints.
~~You should~~
D: I will say other diplomatic exchanges and developments to be equally related.

K: I don't know when the vote is in New York. Make sure there is no leak out of your embassy about it. Not until we have done it.

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D: No one knows it except the Prime Minister.

K: Is he satisfied?

D: He is very satisfied. I didn't think you would do anything different and I said you are under tremendous pressure to abstain.

K: That is exactly right.

D: I know I have my spies there.

K: We will keep you posted but we would like your reaction to all these events if any as soon as possible. And certainly no later than ope ning of business here tomorrow.

D: Okay.

SI 21 *

The Secretary/Amb. Dinitz
3/25/76
3:25 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

D: Henry?

K: Mr. Ambassador.

D: I am sorry. I was on another line.

K: Two other developments which I want to bring you up to date. A message from Egypt saying that they thought the best solution was a security council meeting. They say the real problem is outside intervention by Syria, Iraq, Libya, and the Soviet Union. They do not say you. They say the real problem is outside intervention. They don't mention themselves. They suggest a security council meeting called by France -- which would slow things down. We have gotten in touch with the French. We didn't give them any account of the specifics. We said we would be willing to sponsor it with them or with the British but we are not approaching the British yet.

D: You have not gotten an answer from the French yet?

K: No, this just happened five minutes ago. Since I called you, I have gotten that message from the Egyptians.

D: Okay, so I will add this to my . . .

K: Now, we are telling you all the diplomatic exchanges and we are counting that you will do the same with us. You will keep it tightly.

D: Haven't we.

K: Yes, I have no complaints about this week.

I don't know when the vote is in New York. Just make sure there are no leaks out of your embassy about our decision until we have done it.

D: No one knows except the Prime Minister. He is very satisfied. I said you are under tremendous pressures.

K: Okay. And we will keep you posted but we would like your reaction to all of these efforts as soon as we can. Certainly no later than Opening of Business tomorrow morning.

D: Okay.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 16 MAY 2003 200102979

SI 16 *

6

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Amb. Dinitz
3/25/76; 2:50 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: We have just received a reply to our message from the Syrians

D: I see.

K: Let me give you the jist of it. They plan a study to the foreign ministry.

D: Before it goes to the President.

K: Right. These are answers to questions they gave and are being presented as a foreign ministry decision to be given to the President. Syrian forces would be located in the capital.

D: (repeats what Secretary said)

K: In certain regions of the Bekaa.

D: (Repeats what Secretary said)

K: And in the mountains where the fighting is now in progress. Guaranteeing the response of the Lebanese is the basic objective. Our efforts are concentrated on being secure. It is technically difficult to tell precisely the forces needed. But in any case we do expect it would be a large force. Syrian withdrawal will take place once calm has been restored. A political solution achieved. And when Lebanon establishes can exercise their responsibilities. And finally they are not satisfied with our position towards Lebanon and with the Syrians. So if you will tell us the same thing, everybody will be made at us. The Egyptians have told us they are not satisfied with us.

D: We have not told it to you.

K: Why don't you.

D: I can recommend it to the foreign office.

K: What I would appreciate is a denial of the Golan Book.

D: I will remind them as soon as they meet there to a issue a denial.

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K: The only other thing in that cable is that they emphasize theywill withdraw if they do it as soon as possible but when the Charge said this might be several months, he did not reject that. And they said orally that they would not station any forces. in Southern Lebanon. That those forces would only be inter_____ between combatant parties, which meant basically the capital and area of M____ Lebanon. I am sending back a message . . .

D: This is in answer to your question.

K: That is right. This is not conveying a decision. This is a foreign ministry study. So you have to be careful to understand it correctly. It begins saying within this framework of study being made the foreign ministry, we . . . . believe it useful to answer questions raised by your plan to study being submitted to the President and from this I assume they will send our reply before something is told the President. I do not interpret this as a crisis situation.

D: Could you give me an indication of your reply.

K: Yes, I am telling you. First I want your expert advice from Jerusalem. So we will not reply until tomorrow morning. I am replying this has been received and we want to repeat again our warnings against unilateral actions until we have a chance to formulate a more formal reply.

D: I see.

K: Okay?

D: Yes. Okay. I will try to get it to the Prime Minister right away.

K: Any other ideas?

D: -

. . . . You would not give unilateral steps.

K: Translate it into Hebrew and it will be the same.

D: You should not be so cynical with me when I have not read what you read to me.

K: The answer is we are studying this and we want to repeat our warning against unilateral action because of incalculable consequences, or something

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like that. I have not had a chance to talk to my associates.

D: Okay.

K: Okay.

SI17 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Amb. Kosciusko-Morizet
3/25/76; 3:00 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I had some further word from the Syrians which sort of worries us and I was wondering whether you could ask your foreign minister in light of what I told you this morning and in light of what I sent him yesterday, what you would think of calling a Security Council meeting which either France or France and Britain could call. We are open-minded. We will take your lead on this. We have not approached anyone else on it so we will not go to the British until we have heard from you. But the Egyptians for your information, we asked the Egyptians what they thought and the Egyptians told us they thought the best solution was a security council meeting called by France.

M: I will convey the message as soon as possible.

K: Could you let us know as soon as possible.

M: Yes.

K: Okay.

M: You have serious fear about this . . .

K: Not in the next 24 hours but maybe over the weekend. We have no conclusive proof but there are an accumulation of signals and also some of the questions we are being asked are direct Syrian suggestions to us they may be quite serious this time.

M: All right.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L. FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 16 MAY 2003 200102979

SI 12 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Atherton
3/25/76; 12:10 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Can you do a cable to Eilts again on that FMS thing to tell him we are putting up the letter of authority today. Wecondly, this is likely to lead either to a package or letters of at least a testimony and I would like to get his reaction: 1, how they would feel in response to their letter we said we have been told by the Egyptians they do not plan to make any further sales this year and under those orders we therefore to not plan or intend to submit any further request to the Congress this year. Therefore it is not us but the Egyptians saying it. Do you see what I mean.

A: Yes. I am not too optimistic about the reply.

K: Tell them if they don't want it in a letter tell them something like that is likely to appear in a testimony. If they do not want that, we can still go the commercial route.

A: Is it our judgment we say something we cannot get it through.

K: There is no way. We screwed this up by saying we would open up a supply relationship which served no useful purpose in an election year.

A: Okay. I will put something up for your approval.

K: There is no peace. What are we going to say if they ask us in a hearing, "Do you plan to sell anything in this present year?"

A: We can say we have no plans.

K: Then it will be decided.

A: I think it would be in that judgment.

K: Okay. Can you do that?

A: Yes.

K: Okay.

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SI 11 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Sam Lewis
3/25/76; 11:40 a.m.

K: I take it nothing will happen on a resolution without communication with you.

L: Joe Sisco and I need to see you for 5 minutes. I have got the resolution to take a decision on.

K: What is your recommendation?

L: My own recommendation -- both our recommendations -- is if we could get a series of changes to abstain but - . I think chances are I would end up vetoing. Scranton doesn't want to put any more conditions whether you would abstain.

K: You are not going to tell me what he wants. He is going to be told what to do.

L: Yes, Sir. We have got this for you to look at if you have a few minutes. I am in Joe's office.

K: Okay. In a few minutes.

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SI 48 *

TELECON
Senator Javits/Secretary Kissinger
March 26, 1976
Time: 7:53 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: We have heard from the Egyptians. I think we can work out some formula although it probably can't be in writing. In testimony...

J: In testimony we could agree upon a colliquey. Today went very well.

K: You were very helpful, as always.

J: Shall we put anyone on it or what is the next step?

K: Let's wait to talk until Monday.

J: You are appearing next week?

K: Yes, but we will get together before then.

J: Good. Have a nice weekend. [redacted] B6

K: O.K. Bye.

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SI 38 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Hartman
3/26/76; 9:35 a.m.

K: We got that damn thing up to $70 now.

H: Up to $70. Well, that is goog. I don't think we can complain about that. B_____ was called out to the Embassy to talk to E_____ We will put in a draft letter these things we are ready to make available to them.

K: Okay.

H: We might want to think of initialing if they can go that far today because if they sign it seems to me we would have to publish it and I would prefer to it after _____ has met on the '76 bill.

K: I agree.

H: Although there will be stories about it. Already the Turkish press is saying it is $250 million. Okay?

K: Okay.

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SI 37 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Mr. Steven DeBrough (Exim Bank)
3/26/76; 9:32 a.m.

DeBrough: I talked with my troops this morning and I tried to stretch them as far as possible and what I would propose to do is redraft around $70 million. Is that okay?

K: Fine.

DB: I shall do it.

K: Thank you. You have made a real contribution.

DB: I understand your problem.

K: Okay. Thank you.

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SI47 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELECON
Mr. Peter Lisagor/Secretary Kissinger
March 26, 1976
Time: 5:48 p.m.

K: How are you?

[redacted] B6

L: We had a problem -- I talked to McCloskey about it. We had Regean to speak at the Grit Iron Club, but he konked out on us and we were wondering whether you would be interested in speaking for the Republicans.

K: I don't think I should speak for the Republicans.

L: Bob said the same thing.

K: If you have real problems in finding someone come back to me.

L: I will sometime mid-week. You will have to prepare for it, Carter is speaking for the other side so they will know you are not challenging him.

K: I could do a job on him.

L: Right. Thanks Henry. I appreciate the call.

K: O.K. Peter. Thinking of you and I hope to see you soon.

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SI 51 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Terhorst (Jerry)
3/27/76; 12:40 p. m.

T: I am calling as Vice President of the Grid Iron Club. One of the chores of Vice President is to stand in and as you know Peter has not been feeling very well.

K: Yes.

T: As you may have heard, Ronald Reagan was scheduled to be one of our dinner speakers. Jimmy Carter is the speaker for the Democrats. Just between you and me, Reagan has fallen by the wayside because 2 speeches are too much for him to make in this week. We are looking around for a speaker and came up with your name and Peter said he hoped you would be gracious enough . . .

K: No, I said I am not the best man to speak for the Republicans.

T: I understand that. The symmetry was not as clear as if you were a professional politician. Nevertheless, given the attention on detente a number of us thought it would be ideal if you should wish to use the 5 minute period to say whatever you like.

K: Can I let you know Monday?

T: Yes. That would be fine. Thank you very much.

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SI 53 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Win Lord
3/27/76; 3:30 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I looked over a list of speeches you are doing. I don't know what possessed you to thinking I might speak on art in Israel. I am doing the American Jewish Committee Reception and it takes place at the Hirshhorn but I am not going to speak on art.

L: What did you want to speak about?

K: Sure as hell not about art.

L: I got the impression from Larry you wanted something about Hirshhorn and what art means.

K: Hirshhorn has nothing to do with this thing.

L: I am talking about April 4.

K: Yes. That is the dinner the American Jewish Community is giving and they are giving me an award for public service.

L: Okay. We have plenty of time to adjust it. It is not a major speech.

K: No. About 15 minutes.

L: I suggest you look at it. What did you want it on.

K: Sure as hell not art. Where is the LOS thing?

L: That will be coming within minutes. Even though there is some disagreement with Treasury.

K: Okay. Are you fairly pleased with it?

L: For a first draft, yes. And they take a lot more work but for a first draft it is not bad.

K: Okay. Let me take a look at that.

L: You should get that any minute.

K: Okay.

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SI 55 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Amb. Dinitz
3/27/76; 5:40 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I have just had a conversation with our Ambassador in Syria who is here to see how much of the X Golan we can take away from you.

D: (laughs)

K: Seriously, he thinks going through the French would to him would indicate it is less ominous than the Hussein conversation looked because they to me -- Hussein came there not to see whether peace -- he was with our message that said we would help on political conditions if that was enough.

D: Right.

K: Hussein is not a messenger. He got into the act. I am just giving this to you for you to evaluate. The Syrians only approached the French and their approach to the French was to get us to withdraw our opposition which I suppose means to _____. From that I would assume that there is a chance they will wait until they have our answer through the French.

D: I understand.

5:54 p.m.

K: I want to read you what we had from Asad which is now a message. Let me read the whole thing to you. I note incidentally we get no information from you at all.

D: I have asked in Israel and we have no diplomatic exchanges and we are sending to you daily what there is.

K: We don't want to get into a position as in '73 where we were not fully kept up.

D: I asked about it, if we have any intelligence information.

K: King received your message receptively. He called Asad who told him : it is very bad . King refused all proposals and Asad , he now has to go in. He told King over phone he must send in a division. Will stay our of the South of Damascus.

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D: I better take this verbatim.

K: (Asks, "Can we have Saunders?")
Asad's assessment is that forces opposing Left badly demoralized. Only Syrians can operate them. Asad asked King to inform us and to ask for US support in restraining Israel.

D: That is basically what they told the French.

K: Asad insists he is getting pressure from Frangie and other leaders he cannot ignore. Asad says there is only a matter of ~~xxxx~~ hours before he must move. King says Asad sounds very demoralized.

D: They talked on the phone?

K: Yes. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ They have told Asad to get in touch with us. in Damascus. Asad and King standing by for word and reaction from US. That is the text of the message.

D: That is the same message that you gave me just before.

K: That was passed on the telephone. This is the full message. Just to complete our information, it is that Asad is having major domestic difficulties over the Lebanon problem.

D: You mean there is pressure for him to move domestically.

K: That is right. And we would also appreciate it if in your reply you could address the question of whatever any international guarantees you would consider acceptable. Because that question has been put to us.

D: Yes. By the French.

K: By the French. We are drafting some holding replies which I will communicate to you when we get them.

D: Yes. Because right now I am instructed to say we are standing by.

K: I understand and this is what we are communicating to them. But we have to communicate something to them.

D: I am trying to wake up the people in Israel. I have been on the phone. As soon as I have something I will let you know.

K: Okay. Thank you.

SI57

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TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Dinitz
3/27/76; 5:30 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: We have just had some word from the French that they have been called in to Syria and that the Syrians have told them that the Jumblatt visit failed and that they are thinking or planning to move. They have asked the French to ask us to withdraw our opposition because we had told them 4 times in the last 2 days we were opposed which the French have now done asking which guarantees were acceptable. We told them last night what we told you 2 nights ago about the limits -- not about your actions -- but what kind of moves by them were in our view almost certain to trigger an Israeli reaction. We gave it as our view the issue was heavy equipment -- what you told us.

D: Yes. I understand.

K: It's Saturday. You can't write it down?

D: I am writing as we went. As you speak.

What will constitute in your estimate in the eyes of the Israelis.

K: I have got a rewritten version of what you told us on whatever the first evening of this crisis was. Essentially what you told us. That is just so I don't have to sum it up again. To that they have never replied. We also sent a message to Hussein this morning to tell him we were prepared to help with a political solution so that the Syrians would hear something positive. (Secretary reads body of phone call.) Hussein had gotten in touch with him right away and said what companies he should talk to to bring about a political situation. He was very pleased that you had called Asad.

D: Hussein was.

K: Yes. But the Syrians told him apparently also it was too late or ~~nearly~~ too late. So we have had 2 reports. We have not yet heard from the Syrians. I still would urge you to do nothing.

D: I will pass this on.

K: We are meeting now and I will tell you what we are going to say to the French which has to be our next move. We do not see any sense in getting in touch with the Syrians until they get in touch with you.

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D: Because they owe you an answer.

K: And there is no sense in accelerating the process.

D: Do you have any idea their urging of the French to talk to you came after the Syrian got your answer.

K: Hold on and let me check. (Secretary confers with Atherton/Day/Murphy). Yes. They got it before the Jumblatt visit and this was after the Jordan visit.

D: Okay. I will pass it on.

K: The French also say that Frangie is urging the Syrian move and other Christian leaders.

D: That is saying it in their name.

K: They are saying it apparently in their name. The French have asked us what international guarantees could be worked out to eliminate a Syrian move to make us withdraw our opposition. We just got that message like 5 minutes ago.

D: Yes. To satisfy you to withdraw your opposition.

K: Right.

D: Yes.

K: Can you get us a reaction as quickly as possible?

D: Yes. I will get it on to Israel. Now we have in Israel about 1 a.m. I guess first thing in the morning we will read it. I will get an answer by tomorrow morning.

K: Okay.
(confers with Atherton/Murphy/Day)
My associates think that they may actually move within hours so we better get an answer fast. The impression is that the move might happen tomorrow morning local time.

D: Before they even answer you.

K: That seems to be Pickering's view, our Ambassador in Jordan who talked to Hussein. We have heard nothing from the Syrians since our delivery of our message this morning in which they complain about our limited influence on Israel.

D: That is in Jordan.

K: Pickering is reporting of Hussein's conversation with Asad. He did it on the telephone he considered it so urgent.

D: I see. What we have is 2 indications -- the French and Jordan.

K: And an absence of communication to us which could be ominous.

D: I will get it to them right away.

K: Okay.

D: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. We will be in touch.

SI58 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Dinitz
3/27/76; 7:02 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Here is what I am doing just to get some holding action. We are calling the French Charge. The Ambassador is not in town. And we are telling him roughly since they are going to go to the Syrians we thought the best thing was to tell them what we are doing with the Syrians like last night so they have the same courtesy from everybody. First on the basis of present messages we are saying that a quickly declared move of Syrian military forces into Lebanon would almost certainly result in Israeli military intervention. They feel through the various categories you give us -- then we would say the pace of Israeli intervention will increase if Syrian military intervention were in. We say we are in contact with the Israeli government.

D: With regard to the second point. The South of the Damascus access . They say we would not allow . . . you to confine ourselves to the limit.

K: No, I understand. I was trying to give them a sense. . it is perfectly clear from this.

D: I understand. I did not want you to have a misunderstanding.

K: I understand. If it is at the borderline, it would be more serious.

D: Absolutely.

K: They proposed international guarantees so we asked them what they have in mind and what they would recommend to the _____ of the Syrian 3 forces, general modalities and length of stay. In _____ the same/we have already asked the Syrians and we are asking French to ascertain from the Syrians what their intention might be. It is basically a combination of the 2 messages they already sent the Syrians.

D: Yes.

K: We are sending messages to Hussein in which we say we must say in all frankness to promise to -- that on the basis of the message, we can only say a move on categories described to us by Jordan would bring very harsh response on an Israeli countermove.

D: Yes.

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K: Then we also said we are in touch but it will take at least 24 hours to get any additional ideas. We are urging him to explore once again with Asad the possibility of a political solution achieved with American cooperation. Without military moves. That is all.

D: Yes. I got through. I woke him up. I gave him the jist of the whole message. And he said our immediate reaction is our position does not change and asmed me to keep our cables going with all the information.

K: I did not expect it to change.

D: I understand.

K: I want your people to consider as they reflect on this so that we do/only do it as muscle-flapping on both sides. If the PLO prevails in Lebanon and/Asad gets overthrown by radicals, they will stay. Then the end result may still be that Lebanon will become part of the Syrian system except for a different route. I think this should be considered by your people.

D: Well.

K: You might then have a more radical Lebanon and a radicalized Syria. We can do nothing now until we have everybody's reaction. Our guess is the chances are 55-45 that he will not move before he has had an answer from us and that he cannot move on the basis of this answer either.

D: Okay. I will pass it on. I presume within a few hours everybody will wake up to a new dawn and I will get a message probably during the night.

K: We would appreciate it no later than first thing in the morning. A considerate analysis of the problem. Not just 3 _____ in the form of ultimatums.

D: No. No. That is not an ultimatum. Our answers were short but not ultimatums.

K: I mean the very last one.

D: As far as our people do not see any good can come out of Syrian intervention. Even if it forestalls battle for a while. Syria will create a process of elimination and will swallow on.

K: What if the Left wingers do the same thing.

D: Maybe that can be fixed by events and by threatening the Christian forces and diplomatic or political activities. We have definitely felt Syrian intervention is a very very bad thing.

K: You know, an analysis. .

D: I have asked them to be more elaborate.

K: You know exactly what we have done. I am assuming you have no quarrel with that.

D: No.

K: They have no encouragement from us. Well, they would not come through the French if they were encouraging.

D: Okay. He was much too sleepy to be intelligible.

K: What the hell is he going to do when we have a real crisis.

D: He will wake up. I asked if we should inform Yigal. He said go give it to them in a cable in a few hours.

K: Okay. Good.

SI 60 *

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
March 28, 1976
12:55

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Mr. Ambassador.

D: Mr. Secretary. I am waiting to talk to the Prime Minister on a guarded phone because there is no substance in the message back. There is only a reiteration of our policy.

K: That -- there is no decision?

D: What I have is the same thing I told you last night. We appreciate the information and reiterate our position on the subject. But I have asked for an evaluation of the situation and how we see it. And I will be talking to the Prime Minister in a few minutes to see if there is anything he can add to it.

K: It is an odd method of conductin business. We flood you with information and you flood us with ultimatums.

D: No, Mr. Secretary, there were not ultimatums.

K: Then, three points -- of one line.

D: No, we...

K: Here is a situation in which we put considerations before you and we don't even get a substantive answer except a reiteration of your position. It is a hell of a way to conduct business.

D: That is why I want to tal k to the Prime Minister but I can not relate more than what I get. When I talk to him I hope we will be able ...

K: The point is there is no change in your position and there is no answer to our guarantee question. Not even an answer.

D: No, I have no answer. What we have, I don't know if you have this information, but we have it that the Egyptians are planning to send a battalion of PLA to Lebanon.

K: We have heard something like that last week.

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D: Today it was on the move.

K: But they are supporting Jumblatt.

D: I am just putting this out as additional information.

K: We think that the radicals can win.

D: This is one of the things I have asked Israel.

K: You seem to think they can't

D: That is what I asked in my question to the Prime Minister. I think we might approach it from a different estimate as to what is the ability of the Christian forces to resist.

K: Did they have a meeting, a cabinet meeting?

D: They did not raise it in a cabinet meeting. The Prime Minister and Foreign Minister discussed it.

K: How long a meeting? 20 Minutes?

D: I don't know. I will call you as soon as I talk to him. I didn't want to call you with my one sentence answer because I knew you would not like it.

K: You are correct in your judgment.

D: I will call you as soon as I talk to him.

END

SI 68 *

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
March 29, 1976
Time: 8:09 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

D: Goodevening Mr. Secretary.

K: I just wanted to tell you for Rabin that those explanations were quite helpful in putting energy behind me. I really am trying everything to keep the Syrians out. I have told the French and the British there is no way we will agree to it and rather than work on guarantees, we would rather work on a ceasefire in Lebanon.

D: I told him this morning the explanations were helpful but it would be good to relay your impressions.

K: The short term analysis is right but your long term analysis is right also.

D: I just saw the British Ambassador -- [redacted]. B6

K: [redacted] When the French informed us rather than have the British hear it from the French I informed him. B6

D: Yes, he said we are all working together on the Lebanon situation. He said he had been hearing from you all weekedn. [redacted] B6

K: O.K.

D: Thank you Mr. Secretary.

K: That is all that happened today. The king is making a pitch for Syrian intervention but I am playing for time.

D: They will have an article about me in the Parade or Potomac, I think it is, magazine. I saw today part of the draft. He accusses me of being your dupe and that he is convinced that you delayed delivery and the Pentagon was behind it. I am inviting him to talk to him tomorrow....

K: Go over it hour by hour.

D: Yes, when I do it they think -- I think it is important that some doc uments be released of the role that was played. Obviously the Pentagon is carrying a propaganda effort out. Regardless of what happens 72 hours after the Presidential decision the planes were released, I told him this. He is referring to articles by the Economist which I have not seen. I am inviting him tomorrow morning specifically to try to change his mind. I hope I will succeed. You are the villian and I am the fool.

K: There is no doubt that the Pentagon was dragging its feet.

D: I know. The big question is that I am too close to the Secretary of State.

K: That is a horrible crime for an Ambassador.

D: I am trying to get this straightened out. I know what criticisms do to you.

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I was very upset after the March thing. The first three days none of us realized the extremity of the situation.

K: We couldn't do anything if we didn't realize it. Even in the first three days I permitted sidewinders to be sent to Israel.

D: On El-al, I remember.

K: That is right.

D: This is not the problem. Sometime we should put our heads together, maybe when we are out of office, and get the record straight. This upsets me personally because I know you have a great role to play in this. This is one of the greatest achievements on your part. I got a report on Passman.

K: How was it?

D: It was horrible conversation. He was using vile language with regard to Israel.

K: Really.

D: Yes, he said that Israel is greedy and unthankful. It is putting pressure on him. Everything we pass in Congress he will ask for a restraining measure to stop payment so that Israel doesn't get it. Unless Passman lies it is a situation which concerns us very much. He is very unfavorable.

K: Let's talk about it. I have to go to a dinner and I am already late. Let's talk tomorrow.

D: Maybe I should call Scowcroft.

K: That wouldn't do any good. Let's you and I talk first and then I will talk to the President.

D: He is very violent.

K: Let me talk to you tomorrow.

D: O.K. Thank you Mr. Secretary.

K: Good bye

50128 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Yuri Babenko
3/29/76; 8:30 a.m.

B: I got a message from Gromyko and he wanted me to talk to you on the following. Do you have a minute now?

K: Yes.

B: He would like to tell you from the 31st of March we will have to start to do something on the underground nuclear test agreement and he ~~w~~ says that on the 31st we should discontinue the nuclear test above the end of 150 k add since we do not have the agreement yet because of the negotiations he recommends for you an idea. Soviets find perhaps that from March 31 we should de facto. He would like to draw his attention to both our information, fulfilling the agreement between the 2 sides. If your side concurs, we can package notes to put this display into effect and we could make joint or separate statements to this effect. He recommends your reaction to these suggestions would be appropriate at the earliest possible date.

K: Yuri, could I let you know tomorrow?

B: Yes.

K: Okay.

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ST 61 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Yury Vorontsov
3/29/76; 8:30 a.m.

B: I got a message from Gromyko and he wanted me to talk to you on the following. Do you have a minute now?

K: Yes.

B: He would like to tell you from the 31st of March we will have to start to do something on the underground nuclear test agreement and he w says that on the 31st we should discontinue the nuclear test above the end of 150 k and since we do not have the agreement yet because of the negotiations he recommends for you an idea. Soviets find perhaps that from March 31 we should de facto. He would like to draw his attention to both our information, fulfilling the agreement between the 2 sides. If your side concurs, we can package notes to put this display into effect and we could make joint or separate statements to this effect. He recommends your reaction to these suggestions would be appropriate at the earliest possible date.

K: Yuri, could I let you know tomorrow?

B: Yes.

K: Okay.

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SI 63 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Sauvagnargues
3/29/76; 12:32 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I think you should take Lebanon back.

S: We just got back from skiing for about 5 days. I was quite happy in the mountains and when I came back I heard of this Lebanon problem. We were just wondering about the possibility of showing some kind of international guarantee and . were wondering what could be done about that. Do you think that the 4 power members could do something to ensure that here intervention would be limited in cause and time.

K: I believe it is best to keep the Syrians out. It is only if the Syrians absolutely decide to go in. I am against . . we should consider these guarantees question.

S: At present your feeling is that it would be better to keep them out.

K: Yes. I think if the Israelis move it would have grave consequences.

S: On Israel.

K: On everybody. If the Syrians move, the Israelis may move.

S: My first reaction was when I came back if things really get out of hand, the only . . . possibility of military intervention is Syrian intervention.

K: I agree but my view is we should all make a national effort to keep the Syrians out and only if . that fails should we look for 4 power guarantees.

S: I am very hesitant myself.

K: Because we ask . for 4 power guarantees and we will get ourselves into a hell of a situation.

S: I would say 4 power caution of the limited Syrian intervention.

K: Why don't you send what that would look like and sent us the text.

S: Of course. I wanted to have your first-hand reaction on that.

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K: My first-hand reaction is it is best to keep the Syrians out. If they do go in we should consider a guarantee or assurance.

S: Security Council force for a limited period.

K: I would not to designate the Syrians as the spokesman, would you?

S: Syrians? The Egyptians . .

K: Let me think about this. I don't want to do it off the top of my head. I will get a message to you before the end of the day.

S: I will consider that too. I just wanted to get your first-hand reaction. We will consider it here.

K: We will consider it here.

S: And get something tomorrow morning.

K: Okay.

SI 66 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Jerry TerHorst/Secretary Kissinger
March 29, 1976
Time: 6:50 p.m.

K: I think I had better not do it -- it is too political.

T: I respect your decision even though...

K: There is nothing I would rather....

T: We would love to have a speech from the good Dr.

K: I would love to do a job on Carter.

T: Last year we had you tentatively scheduled, but you couldn't make it.

K: I was supposed to speak on foreign policy. This year is different.

T: You could do that this year.

K: But you would still have to get a party spokesman.

T: Yes, you are right. To our regret...

K: I would try to help you otherwise. Say, how is Peter?

T: He is feeling better. He goes in Wednesday's for treatment. Depending on how that goes we will know whether he can be at the dinner on Saturday night. Well, thank you for considering.

K: O.K. Thank you. Bye, bye.

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SI 65 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Funseth
3/29/76; 2:25 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Did you get a chance to make that statement?

F: Yes, Sir. I was asked and I made it. Koppel tried to press for some specific comment in many different questions which I did not do.

K: This is the last thing we will say on the subject.

F: Okay.

K: We have nothing more to say on it.

F: I think this makes the point.

K: And you said a decent lack of compassion.

F: Yes.

K: And lacks essential human understanding.

F: Indecent lack of compassion and essential lack of understanding on the part of the authors.

K: Yes. Okay.

F: Okay.

K: You said we are not commenting because of the totally distortion.

F: Yes.

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SI 62 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Sisco
3/29/76; 12:15 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

S: On the addition of this sentence that you told Fahmy welcoming the . .

K: No. At least make some reference.

S: Well, we have -- I am worried about the Egyptian reaction. Maybe the sentence we have got in here now (reads sentence)

K: Can't we say constructive Syrian assistance?

S: Yes. This guy Fahmy is on our back every night on this gd thing.

K: Then let's call the attention of Asad that before the HIRC today I called attention to his constructive role in the current crisis. I would add it to that cable in which you send him . . . or has that gone?

S: We sent it forward. (checked with staff)

K: I took something out of that cable you handed to me. Does Funseth ever do anything?

S: He is right here. ("Do you have another cable," Sisco asks Funseth.)

K: Has he got it?

S: No. He is going over the statement here with it. We will just have this put in where the other was and sent it out.

K: Okay.

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SI 73 *

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
March 30, 1976
8:56

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: Look, Mr. Ambassador, I wanted to tell you we are sending a senior person to Lebanon. We have no confidence in the reporting we are getting out of the situation. [redacted] B6 [redacted] And if you hear from the Christians -- don't take what he says as a statement of our policy. We are thinking of Dean Brown, but he is associated with the Black September so I don't know. If he doesn't go we will bring Bill Porter up from Jidda. But we need an assessment of the situation. If the Christians can hold out you are right. If not, you are wrong. If we can engineer a ceasefire without Syria, it is the best solution, but we can't do that with what we have in place there now.

D: I understand. I saw a report that the Syrians are cutting military supplies to the left-wing groups.

K: Right.

D: So they might have decided to weaken the fighting without intervention.

K: But we have another report that the Russians are putting in supplies.

D: I didn't see that.

K: What I find ominous is that Callaghan urged Gromyko to get in touch with me to calm the situation.

D: That was several days ago.

K: Yes, but he hasn't done it.

D: We will let you know as soon as we hear anything. I don't think the meeting took place.

K: But when you hear that we are sending a senior person, his job is to find out what is going on and to engineer a ceasefire without Syrian intervention.

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D: A secret mission?

K: No, we will announce it.

D: Will he come with a political suggestion?

K: No.

D: Who is Dean Brown?

K: He was Ambassador to Jordan in 1970 and then Under Secretary for Management.

D: Him or Bill Porter?

K: Yes. It gains time and shows we are taking a more active role and ~~xxx~~ can be used as a device against intervention.

D: I will pass it on.

K: Will you make sure you are reachable the rest of the day?

D: I will be in Boston but they will know where to reach me at all times.

K: Good.

END

SH 351 *

The Secretary/Mr. Art Hartman
3/13/76
10:05 am

RELEASED IN FULL

K: (missed first part) Is that why you're back?

H: Yes.

K: Well, actually what I called you about by accident -- I just picked up a memo which explains the reason for Soames unhappiness with some of the communications. Let's write him a letter and say -- explaining what my views are. Can we do that on Monday?

H: Sure. I was not absolutely that we were picking up the criticism he had and I am not convinced that that is what he meant.

K: Then let's just write him a letter in different language.

H: Okay.

K: Good. Thankyou.

H: Are you going to see Spaak today?

K: I didn't think you would want to be here. I am only going to talk to him for 10 minutes.

H: I think he just wants to see you and that will fix him up with Soames.

K: Yeah.

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SI 74 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Attorney General Levi
3/31/76; 3:30 p.m.

L: (missed first part) . . very well and I hope it is true.

K: Aren't you nice. If you get a good criminal case out of it it is good for you.

L: Against me.

K: No, against me. No ATtorney General has ever indicted any Secretary of State.

L: If you read the papers, I have not indicted anybody. Do you have any advice as to whether my wife and I should go to the Jordanian reception this evening.

K: I think it would be nice.

L: You don't think [redacted] B6

K: No. It would be a nice jesture. I will be there.

L: Good. Thank you.

K: Maybe I'll see you.

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SI 75 *

TELECON
Mr. Toussaint/Secretary Kissinger
March 31, 1976
Time: 5:48 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I just want to make sure that Scranton will give a brutal speech..

T: He is speaking in 45 minutes. We are giving him a stronger speech than the one you saw today.

K: Can I see it.

T: Surely. We will get it up to you right away.

K: I want him to stress the total hypocrisy of this performance -- is it that strong.

T: He doesn't use those particular words, but he did strengthen it.

K: Scranton is in the Security Council can I reach him?

T: Yes, we can get him out of there.

K: See if he can place a call to me and bring up that speech.

T: Yes sir.

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SI 76 *

TELECON
Ambassador Scranton/Secretary Kissinger
March 31, 1976
Time: 5:55 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I just wanted to make sure I haven't seen the new draft. I have to get a better system where it isn't some deputy assistant secretary drafting speeches I don't see.

S: Yes sir.

K: I want to make sure you use some of the words we used this morning -- that we consider this an exercise in hypocrisy of condemning one party. I have no problem just glancing at this thing with what they have drafted. Where a country that has put 15,000 troops in and imposed its political solutions and another country that has withdrawn, although it was previously involved, and is now being condemned while the first country isn't being condemned. It only means unsuccessful interventions get condemned. We are abstaining because of our general concern for the feelings of others. Do you see what I mean?

S: Yes, I think it is mostly there, Henry, but I will take another good look at it. I have seen what the British are going to say and the French and we are the strongest by far.

K: But that is alright. Are the British abstaining?

S: Yes, they are.

K: How about the French?

S: At the moment. At the moment they haven't brought in the resolution because the Japanese and the Swedish are objecting to a few minor things. I think the British, the French and the Italians will abstain.

K: I would get a little indignation in also.

S: If you don't find it is alright don't hesitate to call me. We have to get this speech clearing thing worked out better, boss.

K: We are making some progress in Lebanon.

S: I knew you would boss.

K: O.K. Good.

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SI 79 *

TELECON
Mr. Eagleburger/Secretary Kissinger
March 31, 1976
Time: 6:07 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

E: Karlene is typing a card she is at the Wentworth hotel.

K: Do we have the phone number?

E: She was going to get that and she should give it to the White House operator.

K: Good. I am going home after that reception.

E: We will tell the White House operator.

K: If you can get that moron to pack -- if you can get one of those to pack my suitcase, I won't have to do all the work around here.

E: Right now, Mr. Secretary.

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SI 78 *

TELECON
Mr. Eagleburger/Secretary Kissinger
March 31, 1976
Time: 6:20 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

E: I just gave them my assurances that it was bullshit. They will run an answer you gave in Dallas -- you answered the question by saying we are on the upswing.

K: Who is they?

E: AP. This REgean speech will mention Sonnenfeldt. It will be almost totally on foreign policy.

K: I think it will hurt him.

E: I think that is right.

K: I think we should let the White House reply.

E: We will be waiting a long time.

K: If they won't defend the Secretary of State that is their problem.

E: I will get you a report on it as soon as I can.

K: I think we should treat it with contempt.

E: I went into this one because Spencer worked out with AP to run the charge and counter charge at the same time, that is all.

K: If Funseth is asked about it, say it is a contemptable lie.

E: Should Funseth say anything tonight?

K: Say it is an irresponsible invention. I wouldn't say it is contradicted by our policy. He is authorized to say it is contemptable and an irresponsible invention.

E: O.K.

K: But only in response to questions -- don't call around.

E: O.K.

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SI 86 *

TELECON
Senator Javits/Secretary Kissinger
April 1, 1976
Time: 7:15 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

J: I don't think we have a deal because on of our members is going to go off on his own. I am disappointed. That is the story. I guess you have seen it coming.

K: What do you mean?

J: I am releasing you from any answers to our questions. There is no deal in which I can commit the three. One will not be available for this kind of arrangement.

K: What does that mean in practice?

J: Some action may be taken which will mean opposition to you. I don't want you to commit yourself under those circumstances. I may be able to speak for Humphrey. He is not yet acquainted with this development. It leaves you free do answer questions any way you wish.

K: What will you do?

J: I am going to consult with Humphrey first before I make any decisions.

K: It will be a national disaster if you stop this, you know that Jack.

J: I realize it very thoroughly. I would hope you would still make the same answers to the same questions. I can't ask you to do that because I can't offer you what I promised you in return. I didn't deliver your answers to this person, so your confidence has been maintained.

K: I am inclined to stick with my answers because they are my convictions.

J: You couldn't give me happier news.

K: I can't get pushed beyond this.

J: I don't see what else there is you can say.

K: Right. I am going to stick to those answers. Everyone will have to consult his own conscience. I know your views. I leave it to everyone.

J: That is very sensible. I will talk to Humphrey before you come in.

K: Good. I know what your role has been despite the influence of Case.

J: O.K.

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SI 84 *

TELECON
Mr. Taft Schreiber/Secretary Kissinger
April 1, 1976
Time: 6:00 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

S: How are you Henry?

K: O.K.

S: I wanted to call you about a couple of things. First, I have been having a number of calls about the Regean speech. I think that at least from the calls I have had and they certainly are no survey, but most of them didn't believe what he said. Most felt, about 3/4ths of them felt, how could Regean say such things without quoting some authority.

K: Yes, it is a lie. I have put out today that it is a lie.

S: I know that it seems to me that you -- I don't know what Ford wants you to do. Henry Salador said you should call a press conference and say that you never said it, but that you have said all along that the Congress of the U.S. would not support the the military to the extent necessary and that if the failure to support continued we could wind up a secondrate power.

K: I haven't even said that.

S: Do you remember when you said we have a no-win policy and at that time you indicated that if Congress didn't turn around it could be serious for our country and that Congress wouldn't support the needs that were necessary for you to take another position. Generally the people are not at all for Regean. They think he has hurt himself, but maybe in North Carolina some people want to hear those tough words. The people that I have talked to didn't think it would work plus the fact that he said we would have a lousy economy after the election isn't necessary. It helps to be optimistic. Are you going to do any more or just put out your statement?

K: I will leave it at that.

S: When are you coming out here again?

K: Over Christmas.

S: Not Christmas you mean....

K: Easter.

S: Are you going right back or can I have some people in. We had a good dinner. What we are doing is nonfund raising now. There are a lot of people I would like to have you meet and listen to some things that would be good just to have the word out of where you stand. If you can't do it now we will do it another time.

K: O.K. Taft. Let me think about it.

S: D on't worry.

K: I am not worried.

S: O.K. Good.

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RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D), 1.4(D), B6

SI 85

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS, A/RPS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 25X6
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 31 DEC 2028
DATE/CASE ID: 24 SEP 2003 200102979

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
April 1, 1976
Time: 6:08 p.m.

D: Hello?

K: Hello.

[redacted] B1

D: The only thing we said was that you didn't oppose...

K: That is fine. We want to stiffen their backbone. We oppose a separate state because it will be impossible to keep the Syrians out in that case.

D: But you -- there is one sentence that you might not have caught, but maybe you did, you are so fast.

K: They have come to the conclusion...

*

D: That you are not interested in any contacts with them.

K: I caught that. That is no longer true.

D: Good, so we will keep each other informed.

K: Yes. We have reports that a ceasefire has been agreed to.

D: That is what I heard on the news, but I have heard nothing from Israel.

K: If that is true we may be over the worst of it.

D: Brent told me it was on the ticker. It would be a good sign.

K: We had that report this morning and now there has been confirmation from Jumblatt's associates.

D: As I say, we will keep each other informed.

K: I think we have breathing space anyway.

D: I think it is helpful.

K: We did
n't get ourselves panicked.

D: Thanks to you for coming in and managing the situation.

K: It was heading in the direction of Syrian intervention.

D: Right.

K: You have been personally ...

D: My government has been...

K: Your own personal advice was very good that first night.
Thank you Mr. Secretary.

D: You know, that Allon is coming again at the end of April and May.

K: I won't be here.

D: Until the 7th, right?

K: Yes.

D: I cabled him today on that saying you would be out of town. The only way for him to see you is to come back on the 10th. By that time you will be back. I didn't commit you to seeing him, but on that date you would be here. I advised him to postpone his visit until then. But you will be able to see him if he decides to come some time in the week of the 10th?

K: Oh, certainly. I will give a lunch for him.

D: I don't know what there is to discuss but I think he is trying to promote his book that he has written. That is why he wants to be here.

K: Tell him that by that time I am sure he will have denied the Golan book.

D: I sent a message to him...

K: It is a moral issue to me -- it isn't doing me any damage here.

D: Did you hear him yesterday.

K: No.

D: He was asked by Agronsky that know ing the Secretary personally do you think if there was a decision which would harm Israel that the Secretary of State would do it. He said no, I don't believe he would take any decision knowingly harmful to Israel. I think he will resign before doing it. That was Golan. I was shocked.

K: I am so stupid I may unknowingly affect Israel.

D: He was very -- [redacted] B

K: [redacted] B

D: No, he knows you only from reading all the intimate conversations.

K: O.K.

D: See you tomorrow.

K: Right. Bye, bye.

SI 89*

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
April 1, 1976
Time: 7:50 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K:Mr. Ambassador, we are having a problem. I have made every effort to work out what you wanted on the C-130's. I first tried a letter now I have worked out questions and answers. Now Case says he will oppose it anyway. I tell you -- you are going to get into a quarrel with the President on this.

D: We have not been active...

K: I am really speak ing about a common problem.

D: Not even with Javits and Humphrey.

K: Javits has been helpful. Look hold on.

D: If I get into it now I will be in trouble on both sides on our position of principle to oppose any sales. Case is the one?

K: He is the problem.

D: Let me think about it and see what can be done tomorrow. It is not a matter for tonight is it?

K: The hearing is tomorrow. I suppose if I kill an assistant on the telephone you will be a witness.

D: What.

K: Oh, I have this stupid assistant here who is driving me crazy.

D: What time is the hearing tomorrow, Mr. Secretary.

K: 10:00 or 11:00.

D: I will see what and if I can do. I will not be disturbing...

K: I understand your problem. I think we have really handled that Syrian crisis very well now.

D: That is the opinion of the government too, to the extent that they can say a kind word.

K: We are having reports now from Brown -- he has talked to the Chrisitans and they want the Syrians in.

D: It depends on what Christians he talked to.

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K: If the ceasefire holds we have no problems. I am sharing that information with you -- it is no policy don't read policy into this.

D: You are sharing information.

K: That's right.

D: The thing in the conference on the 5th quarter has been going very tough.

K: For you?

D: For everyone. There was a real fight going on there. All the Senate is for it. Passman is against it. They are using the President's name all the time. The House members took a vote among themselves -- seven were for Passman, six opposed him. So and all the Senators are for the 5th quarter.

K: How long will that conference go on?

D: I don't know. They were still in session. They might take it back to the floor where it will develop into an open fight. He went to the extent that he said even if you appropriate it I will not give the money.

K: I have told you....

D: I know your position on this, but someone must counsel him that it is unnecessary to bring this so public. After all there was the commitment that he gave to the Prime Minister that this was the aid for the fiscal year not for some months. But to go outward in such a manner we can't understand it.

K : Yes, well I don't know what to say.

D: I talked to Javits. I advised him to see the President.

K: So did I.

D: He said he had asked for a meeting simply because I want to divert it. If it goes to Congress it is a democratic victory and he won't get credit for it.

K: Right. O.K. I have to run. Bye.

S182 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Ken Freed
4/1/76; 3:34 p.m.

F: I thought maybe it was the Chamber of Commerce or Spartacus calling. Spartacus by

K: I don't know whether Funseth pointed out Athens survived many centuries.

F: Yes, he did. I am doing a very broad story picking up on your points that the Soviet Union is not _____. I need a 20-minute talk on background for a broad political outlook. Can we get together in the next week or so.

K: I will do my utmost.

F: I am going to be around on Saturday.

K: Okay. Give me a call Friday.

F: Okay.

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SI81 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Ken Freed
4/1/76; 3:34 p. m.

F: I thought maybe it was the Chamber of Commerce or Spartacus calling.

K: I don't know whether Funseth pointed out Athens survived Spartacus by many centuries.

F: Yes, he did. I am doing a very broad story picking up on your points that the Soviet Union is not _____. I need a 20-minute talk on background for a broad political outlook. Can we get together in the next week or so.

K: I will do my utmost.

F: I am going to be around on Saturday.

K: Okay. Give me a call Friday.

F: Okay.

Third line "e" missing off the

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S0136 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Funseth
4/2/76; 12:04 p.m.

F: To clarify one point with regard to the Greek reaction, EUR was under the impression you wanted me to volunteer a statement. I thought only if a question is asked.

K: No. Don't you think?

F: Yes.

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SI 99 *

TELECON
Mayor Beame/Secretary Kissinger
April 2, 1976
Time: 5:50 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: How are you, Mr. Mayor?

B: Fine. I understand you called today and when I got back Ambassador Scranton had called so I called him to give him a run down of what has and is planning to be done. I don't know if you are up to day on it.

K: No, not really.

B: I spoke with the police commissioner he has a concentration of policemen in the area and in addition has strongly beefed up the two areas. The plainclothesmen who will watch the people as they come out of the Consulate to follow them to see that they are not molested has been beefed up from 10 men to 30 men and 2 sargents. He will do that and he made an offer to bus the children. I accepted that offer so at least that will protect them.

K: I appreciate all these efforts and you have issued a statement. I haven't seen that.

B: It was read to you?

K: To my assistant.

B: I did issue a statement in that regard but we have gone beyond the statement to get to the bottom of it. The point I wanted to make is they have beefed up the area and the surviellance and the security and we will do everything we can to help. I mentioned this to Scranton that we have cut back our policy forces so much it will be at our 1960 level.

K: We appreciate this very much. It is producing a major diplomatic problem for us.

B: I know that. In the city we are getting a lot of pressure from certain groups. and areas which are not demands, but we understand that this is a sensitive matter. I mentioned it to Scranton. I appreciate whatever can be done with the bill that was passed on the UN policy...

K: I will put myself behind that -- that is a fair request.

B: We will do whatever we can.

K: It is a pleasure to talk to you.

B: How is Mrs. Kissinger?

[redacted] B6

B: Good. Give my best to her.

K: And my best to Mrs. Beame.

B; Very well, thank you

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SI 96 *

TELECON
Mr. Funseth/Secretary Kissinger
April 2, 1976
Time: 4:46 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I never saw the President today.

F: O.K. How did the hearing go?

K: Alright, I think. O.K.

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SI 102 *

TELECON
Mr. Atherton/Secretary Kissinger
April 2, 1976
Time: 7:50 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

A: There was one bit of business from this morning. We have held off on briefing the Jordanians. We wanted to be sure you would approve the message.

K: It can wait until tomorrow?

A: Yes, we have set up a time to get in touch with them first thing in the morning.

K: Could you add to the message to Asad the quote I said this morning about how constructive they have been?

A: Absolutely. Have you approved that message otherwise.

K: I am just now looking at it.

A: Pete and I are standing by.

K: You two are really doing well.

A: I hope we can keep it up. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

K: O.K. Bye.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 19 MAY 2003 200102979

SI 100 *

TELECON
Minister Vorontsov/Secretary Kissinger
April 2, 1976
Time: 7:37 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

V: Hello?

K: Uri.

V: Good evening. How are you?

K: Fine.

V: There was a very good statement by the President tonight. On another matter...

K: I want you to know I talked to the Mayor of New York. They have increased the number of plain clothesmen from 10 to 30. They have increased the number of police and detectives and we hope this will do some good.

V: They won't be able to do it all the time. It would be best to take care of the idiots who are causing the problem. Let's hope your actions will produce results. On Lebanon, Gromyko has paid attention to the news agency reports that seven American naval ships are going towards Lebanese shores. I would like to read you a note I have received from Moscow.

K: Sure.

V: (Reads attached note.)

K: Will you send it to my office?

V: Yes.

K: We will reply to it. We have no interest in intervening and we hope all countries will exercise restraint in this particular situation.

V: We pledged that in this message.

K: If you do we will do our utmost. We will give you a formal answer within a day.

V: O.K. I will send it to you.

K: O.K. Thank you. Bye.

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Moscow paid attention to the news agencies reports that 7 American naval ships are steaming towards the shores of Lebanon. These reports cannot but cause some concern. If they are true then such a step by the United States can only complicate even more the situation in Lebanon and around it.

The Soviet Union strictly adheres to the principle of non-interference into the events in Lebanon which are its internal matter. We have the right to expect the same from the United States and the other nations.

We believed and continue to believe that the people of Lebanon - and only they themselves - can and should decide all the questions concerning the internal life of their country.

The US interference into the internal affairs of Lebanon would - quite obviously - not only aggravate even more the situation in Lebanon proper, but would inevitably lead to a new sharp aggravation of the situation in the Middle East in general and not only there.

Moscow would like to hope that the Government of the United States will treat with understanding this message of ours and will not allow any actions to occur which could transfer the internal crisis in Lebanon into a serious international conflict.

SI 103 *

TELECON
Mr. Atherton/Secretary Kissinger
April 2, 1976
Time: 7:55 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: One thing I thought you should know that the Soviets sent a note that they are worried about our ship movements. They hope we won't intervene. I would like you to take a look at it when it gets here and draft a reply and say we will not intervene as long as everyone else stays out. Maybe this will make them get Jumblatt under control.

A: Should it go out this evening.

K: No, it can wait until tomorrow.

A: Good, Mr. Secretary.

K: O.K. Thank you.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 03 JUN 2003 200102979

SI 94 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Deputy Mayor of NYC Daniel Freedman
4/2/76; 9:35 a.m.

K: I am calling you about these attacks on the Soviet Mission. There were some shots fired into it again today and it is really going to lead to the most serious foreign policy complications for us if it is not better protected.

F: Would you like us to put out a statement?

K: Could you do that?

F: Sure.

K: If you could put out a statement saying that I have called you, that would help us in Moscow.

F: Fine. How can I get you to read the statement before we put it out.

K: Could you call Mr. Eagleburger.

F: How do you spell it?

K: E A G L E B U R G E R. Call through the White House line, 456-1414.

F: We will read it to him. Okay. Thank you.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 19 MAY 2003 200102979

SI 95 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Funseth
4/2/76; 12:04 p.m.

F: To clarify one point with regard to the Greek reaction, EUR was under the impression you wanted me to volunteer a statement. I thought only if a question is asked.

K: No. Don't you think?

F: Yes.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 13 AUG 2003 200102979

SO 135 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Deputy Mayor of NYC Daniel Freedman
4/2/76; 9:35 a.m.

K: I am calling you about these attacks on the Soviet Mission. There were some shots fired into it again today and it is really going to lead to the most serious foreign policy complications for us if it is not better protected.

F: Would you like us to put out a statement?

K: Could you do that?

F: Sure.

K: If you could put out a statement saying that I have called you, that would help us in Moscow.

F: Fine. How can I get you to read the statement before we put it out.

K: Could you call Mr. Eagleburger.

F: How do you spell it?

K: E A G L E B U R G E R. Call through the White House line, 456-1414.

F: We will read it to him. Okay. Thank you.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 18 NOV 2002 200102979

SI 108 *

TELCON
The Secretary/Ambassador Dinitz
3:10 p.m.
4/3/76

RELEASED IN FULL

D: (missed first part) . . . Fine, How are you. We got a communication from . . .

K: I am reading it now.

D: I was leaving for out of town for New Orleans and I was anxious that you had it before I go. If you have any remarks, they would be appreciated by us to see if it is consistent with his approach to us.

K: It seems to me that Chamoun's approach is quite similar but other Christians have other views. But let me make it absolutely clear -- we are not promoting Syrian intervention. We moved some ships toward Lebanon last week.

D: I read about it.

K: The Soviets have picked it up so it should stay in the same channel. They sent us a note complaining. We are going to send them back a rather sharp reply. We do not accept the proposition that intervention is only from outside forces and those who send in supplies.

D: That would be good.

K: But nobody is urging Syrian intervention at this moment.

D: Yeah.

K: My assumption is that you and we are on identical tracks.

D: Reading the communication, do you think you can also be of some help?

K: With arms? Not in our present form of government. But why don't you and we can replace it?

D: We are trying to do the best but there are some things we don't and others that are too dangerous to move.

K: It is very dangerous to arm the Christians. If it gets into the newspapers and the Egyptians find out about it . . .

D: We are inclined to go along the same route. I understand.

K: We are in favor of what you are doing.

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D: I sense that and I will pass it along.

K: Okay. When do you come back? I will be off the stage at 2:00.

D: I am flying to New Orleans now and I will be back tomorrow at noon. If I have anything, I will immediately communicate it to you.

K: You didn't get my sarcasm.

D: I'm sorry what did you say?

K: I am talking to the Jewish Congress tomorrow at 3:00. You can come back any time after that.

D: _____ will be there to represent me. He is my better half.

SI 109 A *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Don Kendall
4/5/76; 2:37 p.m.

K: How are you, Don.

Kendall: Fine. I have 2 things. [redacted] B6

K: I think I will be in Africa.

Kendall: Lightfordka is better than Africa.

K: I agree with you.

Kendall: Number two, are you going to be in Washington on Thursday?

K: No.

Kendall: I am leaving for Moscow on Saturday night and I am going to be there next Monday, Tuesday . . . .

K: I will be there on Friday.

Kendall: This coming Friday?

K: In Washington.

Kendall: All right. I could fly down around Friday.

K: Okay. Why don't we see what we could work out then.

Kendall: You tell me what time to be there. I have a big dinner party at 7:30 so it would have to be by 6:00.

K: How about 3:00?

Kendall: Three -- no problem. I will be at your office at 3:00 Friday.

K: Okay. See you then.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 02 JUN 2003 200102979

SI 114 *

TELECON
Mr. Hartman/Secretary Kissinger
April 5, 1976
Time: 6:13 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: How are you doing with the Greek?

H: I have given him the set of principles and exchange of letters and told him we won't make any further changes on beefing up the language. I told him we could finish up our discussions in a couple of days and fix a date for the Minister's arrival.

K : I am going to be out of town. Also I can't give a dinner on Passover evening [redacted]. B6

H: Not even a Greek?

[redacted]

H: This is Wednesday the 14th? B6

K: Yes, there is no way I can do it. It will be considered an insult by every Jew in the country.

H: The other dinner you had free was Monday night.

K: Monday night [redacted]
If you can all hang by your toes.... B6

H: And you leave town on Thursday?

K: No, I amy leave Friday morning, but Thursday is again Passover.

H: Yes.

K: I can do something Sunday night.

H: Let's see how they com back. If it looks like we are progressing to a solution we can look at an earlier date. If not they may not be interested. Sunday night is a possibility.

K: And conceivably Monday night if we break up by 10:30.

H: You have a pretty full schedule on Monday night.

K: I don't pay any attention that in this whore house.

H: I thought you were seeing important people...

K: Oh, Romalow (sp) -- I can't do it on Monday.

H: Well, let's see what they come in with. If it is important enough they might want to do it on Sunday.

K: O.K.

H: I will see you tonight anyway.
K: O.K. Good.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 21 JUL 2003 200102979

SE 1/12 *

TELECON
Mr. William Paley/Secretary Kissinger
April 5, 1976

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: How are you?

P: Fine, how are you? I hear you are going to be in town next week.

K: On Thursday.

P: I was wondering if you had the time, if you thought it would be interesting to have an off-the-record luncheon with a group of my people and me.

K: The answer is yes, it would be interesting to me. I am speaking at a luncheon that day. I suppose you could do it anytime.

P: Anytime you say.

K: Let me look at my schedule and get in touch with you.

P: I am coming to the meeting Pete Peterson is having.

K: I would love it.

P: I always like to see you.

K: There is a dinner that [redacted] is giving. Are you going? B6

P: We have been invited [redacted] B6

K: I don't know the lady and you were one of the attractions.

P: She is a good friend of Stu Symington's. Does that ring a bell?

K: I have seen her.

P: They have been courting.

K: If I don't go do you want to meet with these correspondents in the evening?

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P: I can do it anytime. I want to make sure some of them are there and they will be on theair -- especially Walter ~~Cou~~ Cronkite. We dould do a dinner or drinks.

K: *Ok, I will definitely do it.*

END

SI 120 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Dick Valeriani
4/6/76; 12:12 p.m.

V: I want to tell you if you would like to respond to any of them -- the bit of the Morton statement and Civil Service Commission and all that -- our cameras are available.

K: Dick, I appreciate it. The synchronizing mind dedicated to the destruction of people is notable.

V: It is pretty apparent . . .

K: I understand the Civil Service Commission is putting out a statement.

V: The Post read the story rather hard.

K: The Civil Service Commission is putting out a statement saying there was no influence and we have the thing and you can get it from Funseth.

V: All right.

K: The whole thing is an absurdity.

V: The Post wrote the story that you wanted them to do it.

K: The report doesn't mention me.

V: Except that he is a future brother-in-law. That is all it says.

K: I have not even read the report.

V: One guy says he doesn't remember it. The report says the placement of David Maginnes was widely recognized as a concession to a future Cabinet officer.

K: The remarkable thing is we did not decide to get married until the end of '73.

V: All I am saying is if you feel you would . . .

K: I appreciate it very much and I don't see that ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ there is much point in it. But you are a friend and I appreciate it.

V: Right.

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SI 118 1*

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Sec Matthews
4/6/76; 10:14 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

M: I have been working on that matter we discussed yesterday afternoon. I have a suggestion for you. Namely, that you refer any questions that you get here on the matter. We are prepared to say in checking our files through the news bureau and public affairs bureau that our information is that you did not personally intervene in this matter in any way and in '75 no corrective action was recommended by the Civil Service Commission. That seems to me to end the issue.

K: Okay, what we can say is that. This information seems to you incorrect but for elaboration . . .

M: That is right.

K: I frankly don't know what did happen. Do you know?

M: Yes. I have the full report and I will send it over from the Civil Service Commission if you like.

K: Yes. Because all I remember is that David Maginnes had applied, that he had not heard for a few months. Then I asked General Haig to look into it, he made one phone call but can't remember to whom.

M: It is one of those things that kind of grows with innuendo and inflection. The conclusion spoke of the Civil Service Commission saying there is a contradiction in testimony regarding the appointment. There is evidence, says the report, in the form of foreign testimony that this individual was to a competitative appt. a must hire and he was given preferential treatment in appointment to the to position. That allowed the violation of Executive Order 1_____ but no correction action was taken and there is a contradiction in the testimony. The man says he can't remember who told me to do this but I had the impression I was to do it. That is fairly inconclusive evidence. It is the reason they could make no conclusive evidence. My own instinct is that somebody is trying to make a story here and the less opportunity they have the better.

K: What is it you will say?

M: Our press bureau will say that we have no evidence that you have personally intervened in this matter whatsoever and secondly, we will point out that the Civil Service Commission after reviewing the matter made the statement no corrective action is required in this case. End of quote.

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K: Okay.

M: Can you think of anything else to be helpful?

K: If I do, I will call.

SI 116 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Eagleburger/Secretary Kissinger
April 6, 1976
8:05 am

K: The Maginnes thing is on the front page. I don't know what to do.

E: I was going to call Haig.

K: I have called him. He doesn't remember.

E: I don't know what we can say except we don't know anything about it. And we could ask HEW to get us a report today. I don't know what to do about it. If Haig doesn't remember and you don't then it is bullshit. I think we should say no comment unless HEW can flatly deny it. Why don't I give them a call this morning and see what they can do.

K: All I know is that I asked Haig to look into an application he submitted to see where it stood. Haid said he made one phone call but he doesn't remember anything else or exactly what he did.

E: HEW is the answer.

K: But can the Civil Service Commission publish a god damn report without asking me? What is the Civil Service Commission anyway?

E: Obviously. It is an administration outfit. I don't know who heads it. But it makes a claim that you influence it. The only thing to do is to get the Secretary of HEW to issue a denial. The Civil Service Commission is outside, is supposed to be outside influence.

K: But in decency they should call me.

E: That is correct. And I shall see the head of the Commission today and ask him why he did it.

K: You stay out of it.

E: But I don't think you should get into it. The trouble is neither one of us knows what Haig did. You want me to call Secretary of HEW or do you want to do it?

K: No, I will call him.

E: That is the only thing I can think of -- that they deny it.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 12 AUG 2003 200102979

SI 123 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Funseth
4/6/76; 3:50 p.m.

F: The networks have asked if Sonnenfeldt could appear before their cameras briefly to repeat what he said.

K: What did he say?

F: Itis a long briefing. He deplores press interpretations. These have been disturbing to millions of Americans of Eastern European descent.

K: It .....

F: I am reading Reuters story.

K: But that is quoted from the text?

F: Yes. He repeated it.

K: He repeated it?

F: No.

K: Did you say my objection is to using these documents?

F: Yes. I made a very strong statement at the beginning. The networks wanted it to be a news conference and Koppel got very enraged during the briefing. I told him we had not arranged to have cameras. He ought to be allowed to do it.

K: Did you make clear I think this policy for pressure . . .

F: Yes, Sir.

K: Did they get into the David Maginnes thing?

F: I referred them to the Civil Service Commission and they released it later to other reporters who have asked for it.

K: That letter is not all that helpful.

F: It makes that point that says you have ~~nothing~~ nothing to do with it. It reached right out of that letter. I think we should leave it there.

K: Okay. Thank you.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 13 AUG 2003 200102979

SI 124 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. David Frost/Secretary Kissinger
April 6, 1976
Time: 4:50 p.m.

K: How are you, David?

F: I am very well, and all the better for speaking to you. Are you well?

K: I am fine -- I am writing a speech.

F: I thought you said riding on a speech?

K: No writing.

F: I was calling you to greet you and since I was in New York until tomorrow at 4 or 5:00 I was wondering if I came down to Washington if you would be free for lunch or drinks.

K: I am very busy, however, there is a slight chancethat I might be free for lunch but I won't know until 9:00 tomorrow.

F: I would be super.

K: Could you call me tomorrow morning or could I call you around 9:00.

F: I hope you will be free -- we will talk about 9:00 in the morning. Good speech writing.

K: Nice to talk to you. If we miss eachother this time, there will always be a next time.

F: Alright -- lovely, Henry.

K: Bye.

F: Bye.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 02 JUN 2003 200102979

SI/25 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
April 6, 1976
Time: 5:00 p.m.

D: About two hours ago I got a reply from Israel which contains evaluations in reference to your questions. I was wondering how you want me to handle it.

K: I am working on a speech right now. Maybe I could see you at 6:30 -- if not, I would just as soon do it tomorrow.

D: I can come at 6:30 -- it is better because I have to fly to Canada tomorrow. If you rather, I can submit it in writing.. I can do this.

K: Do you have it in writing?

D: Yes.

K: Why don't you send it to my office.

D: Send it to -Larry?

K: Yes.

D: On the operative part -- on the first option -- the Syrian option -- we are against it. On the second one -- we want to know more details because we are not sure what it really means.

K: I don't know either what it really means.

D: We need to know its scope, composition and under what authority it would be. That is included in the report I am sending. If you can illuminate us it will be helpful to us in forming our opinion. If we get a satisfactory picture it will probably be the lesser of the two evils.

K: If you have watched the evolution of my thinking in the past two weeks you have contributed a lot to your government. I have not said any critical...

D: I am happy when it comes to substance we can work together and we shout at eachother on the minor matters.

K: The Golan book is not a minor matter -- it is a moral question to me.

D: The government has not been bad on the Golan book. I told them to say...

K: Now it would be senseless to say anything. Here is Golan on the front page of the Washington Star and on all the television shows...

D: So I will turn it over to you and if you have any questions you can reach my by phone. If you want me to come in tonight you can call me.

K: O.K. Good.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 21 JUL 2003 200102979

SI 130 1*

TELECON
Mr. Buckley/Secretary Kissinger
April 7, 1976
Time: 6:34 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

B: Fine. And you?

K: O.K. I wanted to call you to tell you I appreciated your column.

B: I am so pleased. There is another one I sent you yesterday which is an elaboration. I had a chat with Ronald which I hope will have some benefit.

K: I don't think he will get the nomination anyway. He should keep the country in a position -- well if the democrats won it would be a disaster whatever you think of Ford. I appreciate your doing this.

B: You are nice to call. I look forward to seeing you on the 14th.

K: I thought it was the 15th.

B: Well, whenever it was. I was upset about the problem with Jim.

K: You don't do these things -- the Buckley's are an honorable family. How do his chances look this year.

B: It depends on whether Pat goes for it. He would be difficult to defeat -- it would be hard for me to vote against him. Apart from him, the opposition isn't very galvanizing.

K: I would be for Jim even against Pat.

B: We shouldn't underestimate his strength. I am glad you are giving Garment a nice teather.

K: Yes. But basically Pat did what I wanted him to do -- most of the disagreements were inventions of the press.

B: I know -- we talked several times when he was in and you were very pleased.

K: Most times he went beyond bounds but... he made unnecessary enemies sometimes there is no need to take on the Third World in order to take on the European Community.

B: Henry, Take care of yourself, and see you on the 15th.

K: O.K. Bye.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 02 JUN 2003 200102979

SI 127 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sen. Buckley
Sec. Kissinger
April 7, 1976
10:50 a.m.

B: Henry.

K: I am doing a PhD thesis on the conversative mind and I wondered if you could help me. I have to understand why the conversatives are attacking the people who are defending the hardest policy in the Administration. I am tol you consider my remarks to our Ambassadors as showing softness and I am interested in what way they show softness.

B: I said nothing about softness. Not yours but Sonnenfeldt's. I believe the summary referred to in the Economist suggested that a policy of the US is to say yes to a greater degree of autonomy of countires within the Soviet hegemony but to do nothing to encourage their escape from that relationship.

K: But you had no objections to the remarks of mine. I understood you had objections to those.

B: The letter you sent me...

K: There is a cable in which I object to communist participation -- it is in the press today and it says you had a copy of it too.

B: I pay no attention to that. My thing was only addressed to the Sonnenfeldt thing. I am sore as hell at the NY Times. I pride myself on never slipping documents to anybody.

K: Frankly, they told us they got it from your office.

B: That is an absolute lie.

K: I know you well enough to know you would not do that. Only on the Sonnenfeldt thing. The trouble is I spent two weeks preparing what I thought was authoritarian policy and it was printed in the San Francisco newspaper and the NY Times did not put it out. They get a su-mary of someone else's extemporaneous remarks that is somewhat garbled and that becomes an authoritarian document. Our policy has to be, of course we try to encourage escape from the Soviets but they have to get greater autonomy before we can talk about the next step.

B: I was commenting only on the summary that led me to believe that there was quite a shift from what our Eastern European policy.

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K: Sonnenfeldt is one of the hardest liners we have around. Our policy is to get first autonomy and then to see whether we can win them away but to talk now in grand, eloquent terms when they don't have autonomy is -- maybe it is good for ones morale but this did not represent a change in our policy what Sonnenfeldt said.

B: I am glad to hear that but surely the summary could be fairly read that there is to be resistance in escape from the Soviet authority.

K: I have been raising hell about putting out the summary. It is misleading. No one cleared it properly. Even if there are 25 initials -- no one is going over a four page document word for word. These were introductary remarks with a group of Ambassadors. I want to assure you it is not a new statement of policy and I would think -- if you talk to Sonnenfeldt you would consider him one of the toughest people we have here.

B: I appreciate hearing that.

K: Second, I read that you found what I said objectionable.

B: I have made no comment on that.

K: It is in the Binder story.

B: From the House of Representatives I had a copy of each. I set yours aside. I was only concerned about the other one.

K: O.K. Thank you.

SI 128 *

TELECON
Mr. Winston Lord/Secretary Kissinger
April 7, 1976
12:22 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

L: I would like to go along for extraneous events based on our conversation of a few days ago, but there is somthing to be said for my going in that our delegation there makes us a little nervous. Jules and I want to get them under control. And maybe I could be of help to you.

K: Do you think Robinson can give a good briefing?

L: Yes, but he is slated to go up on the hill with Simon and Richardson on corrupt practices. I asked Funseth if the briefing could be done in New York and piped down here.

K: I don't think so. Everyone knew I needed Robinson here for the briefing.

L: That has been set for sometime. I think that Jules Katz would be as good as Chuck Robinson in this kind of briefing as long as you have someone with him, like myself, on a political level. On this issue, Jules knows this better than Chuck. And he and I will be in New York, if you let me go. Funseth does feel it is better done here than up there.

K: I agree with him.

L: What -- to do it here?

K: Yes. Why don't you do it and then come up to New York and then come back with me. You could still be there in time for the lunch.

L: We will work something out. You think it should be done here as well.

K: Let me think about it.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 13 AUG 2003 200102979

SI 131 *

TELECON
Mr. Hartman/Secretary Kissinger
April 7, 1976
Time: 7:00 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: You wanted me to call you.

H: We now have the latest proposals from the Greeks.

K: How are they?

H: They go quite a way towards us -- they accept our format.

K: I agree with Macomber -- it should be an exchange with Morgan or Sparkman.

H: I wondered whether you would have time to go over it tonight.

K: I have to work on a speech tonight and these idiots in my front office have left me no time to even sit down. Must we do it tonight -- we must, oh we must.

H: I want to try to get the thing finished up -- I can do it in 10 minutes.

K: I have had five people who can do things in 10 minutes here tonight. Can I call you back -- I have some people in my office.

H: O.K.

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SI 133 *

TELECON
Mr. Lord/Secretary Kissinger
April 7, 1976
Time: 8:32 p .m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Have we invited the Congressional delegation to the lunch?

L: Yes to the lunch and reception. There will be McCloskey, Case, Gilman there, but we have invited them all.

K: O.K.

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SI 137 1*

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELCON
Kay Graham
Sec. Kissinger
April 9, 1976

K: I bet you think I am going to yell at you about something.

G: I don't think that every time you call me these days but some of the time.

K: Only when you attack my brother-in-law.

G: That did not do too well.

K: I am not calling about that. [redacted] wants me to get him a place in the Royal Enclosures. B6

G: Are you kidding.

K: He wants us to help him. Something in England. In the course of that conversation -- I wanted you to know why he was so made on Sat. night. It was that you were introduced and the Post Editors and the Star was not referred to.

G: I knew that and I am sympathetic with that.

K: That was the problem and not anything that someone had said to him.

G: I asked. Those things are done very whimisically. The President's assistants -- Sorenson and Joe Califano were not.

K: And someday will come when I want be.

G: I think what happened was that Dick Wilson whom I know indirectly was saying we had done a good job on the strike -- Mayer, Meg and me. That is why he did not introduce the Star. He was not introducing us as a local paper. Just because of the strike.

K: I didnot even know who he was.

G: He is the General Manager who did the strike stuff. I supposed that was what they were doing. They could not say out loud that we are introducing you because of your success in the strike. (Silence from HAK) Henry, have you gone away.

K: No, I was thinking.

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G: When I sat down I expected them to do it and I was worried about their not doing it. None-the-less, Henry, we haveall been in situations like that. You don't pout. He told everyone in earshot and a few not.

K: I am just calling you because you seemed to be worried thatsomething had been said about our conversation and that had caused it.

G: No, No. What I said to you -- we could have another three hours. There are a lot of things that I did not say that could be done, have been done, in other situations and all that

K: I just wanted to put your mind at ease. There was a very specifid reason in case you had not heard it.

G: I did hear it. Is he rather funny and premodonish. Have you not had your feelings hurt 10,000 times and not shown it.

K: I probably would have shown it 9 million times.

G: You just don't.

K: In public I would not. I might yell at you privately.

G: I would never even if Joe had been introduced and not me.

K: You make yourself weaker.

G: To me it is not very stylish. You don't do that. Whatever Dick Wilson did whom I hardly know, he did rather whimisically and not thoughtuflly, I sure did not expect it or want to be introduced. I was just sort of surprised.

K: By now everyone has forgotten it but I wanted to call you

END

SI 140 1*

TELECON
Mr. Henry Brandon/Secretary Kissinger
April 9, 1976
3:00 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

B: I was wondering in your exposition that was reported in the New York Times, you use the words in referring to the Communist parties as they achieve control of West European governments.

K: You must remember these are notes of some notetaker. This is not a carefully considered statement.

B: It is in the public domain now and everybody is asking questions about what it means. You talk about if Communist parties achieve control....

K: No, significant participation is what I am concerned with.

B: Does this mean the American attitude would be different if they did not achieve control?

K: I told you, if they had significant participation our attitude would be as I described.

B: So, it leaves you elbow room.

K: Don't look hard at that. We are not looking for excuses to go with a fashionable group. There is a death wish.

B: Whose?

K: Of the Western intellectuals.

B: I think the Europeans see that it is inevitable.

K: Let them admit it and that it is bad.

B: They wouldn't want the US to abandon Western Europe.

K: We will discuss it when it happens.

B: Therefore, they are trying to find a way of discussing the problem.

K: There is no reason why we should withdraw our relations with non-Communist countrys because one of the others has gone Communist.

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B: But you say it would cha nge...

K: I thinkthere is something sick going on when two extemporaneous statements are picked up and picked apart. I didn't go over these documents. It is absurd and I won't do it.

B: There are the center of discussion now.

K: That is tough.

B: Those who were present say it was fairly accurate.

K: I am not saying it is inaccurate but the formulations -- if you are going for nuances.

B: You leave a door open, then.

K: Not much.

B: Alright. When does Nancy get back?

K: Monday. But it doesn't apply to the countries who have not gone Communist. Alright.

B: Thanks for returning my call.

END

SI 143 1*

TELECON
Mr. Scotty Reston/Secretary Kissinger
April 9, 1976
Time: 5:10 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

R: I am fine. How are you?

K: It is going the way my friends predicted.

R: It is getting a little rough but you anticipated that.

K: Nothing unexpected.

R: The thing that worries me about it is what the reaction will be in Peking and elsewhere -- the Soviet Union. This is all perceived over there.

K: The biggest foreign policy problem we have is the foreign perception of where the United States is going because this debate on foreign policy isn't discussing any real issues. The margin available for change isn't that great and therefore to the extent that people believe there could be a major change here it is bound to be unsettling.

R: I can't make out the Peking thing at all Henry.

K: I think it is 75% domestic in the sense that the radicals -- that Teng went too dramatically towards -- to far towards -- he is a Chou en-lai disciple but he stressed economic progress too much. He could have survived that except for the fact that he moved the armed forces commanders out of their fiefdoms. When it came down to it -- he had no friends left. He became more dispensable as the Chinese perception of their need for us declined. This is for your information only, but I had the distinct impression that he was going to be kept on as a symbol of their continuity with us, this is an impression I gathered when I was there last. The fact that they could dispense with him is indicative that they are prepared to give themselves the option of moving away from us. That hasn't happened yet.

R: Do you see any reaction, besides the Jews in New York, out of Moscow.

K: Moscow has restrained themselves in this period -- detente has essentially worked. The anti-communist movement is as strong now as it was at the height of the war. They might conclude that it is just hopeless.

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R: Which would be silly.

K: Right.

R: That would be confusing policy and public opinion with campaign rhetoric.

K: There is a great unanimity among the candidates that detente has been a one-way street. I could make a strong case that it has been. It has been a one-way street in our direction rather than theirs.

R: That is an argument you can't make.

K: It doesn't help them to make that argument.

R: How do you proceed?

K: I believe the basic elements of our foreign policy are sound. I think if the democrats come in to office they will pursue them. I think the most useful thing I can do is keep the basic structure of our foreign policy alive.

R: But basically you don't really see any serious lurch from either Peking or Moscow.

K: No. I think they are both giving themselves the option of pulling away. We are beginning to use up our fat. The point will be reached where it won't take much more to push them over the edge. We are not there yet. For example, there could be a Middle East crisis where detente will be less restraining than it would have been a year ago.

R: The Carter thing is picking up some considerable steam.

K: It looks that way.

R: Up here at the Pulitzer Board today when people were asked who would be the candidates about three to one thought it would be Humphrey.

K: Not knowing much about domestic politics, I personally would say it depends on the Pennsylvania primary. If Jackson wins Hubert will probably get the nomination. If Carter wins the vote I don't know how they could stop him.

R: If he took that and they were to broker it the nomination wouldn't be worth much.

K: I have to go to a ceremony for Peter.

R: On the Peter thing, the whole thing looks very bad, but Pete is taking the view that it is an incident.

K: I have made it a longer speech than I planned and I am making it about the

press and the government rather than totally about Peter alone.

R: Is Nancy back?

K: She will be back Monday.

R: Oh, sorry about tomorrow.

K: That's o. k. Let's get together soon.

R: Yes. All the best. Bye.

K: O. K.

SI 142 1*

TELECON
Mr. David Binder/Secretary Kissinger
April 9, 1976
Time: 4:26 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

(MISSED FIRST PART)

B: Could you imagine him being at the ambassador level?

K: That is the most likely.

B: That says something about our relations.

K: We haven't really addressed that problem. It might be at the foreign minister's level.

B: I understand you haven't addressed it -- it is a question that comes up in the detente context.

K: We haven't addressed it.

B: I am sorry about that stuff last week, but it was all over town and bound to come out.

K: The purpose of those meetings was to have a discussion and then someone writes down a summary and you have to defend the summary. I understand that you had no choice.

B: I had to come out with it. You can't win them all. Have a nice weekend.

K: O.K. Thank you.

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SI 136 *

TELCON
Arthur Hartman
Sec. Kissinger
April 9, 1976
9:20 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Since I don't know how to deal with the Operations Center -- not ever having been given the number -- I did not send out the two cables.

H: Can I send them. They are o.k.?

K: Yes.

H: The Greeks are coming in at 11:00 and will give me an answer.

K: What dates.

H: The alternatives of Monday night dinner and Tuesday morning meeting or Thursday meeting and lunch.

K: I hope they take Thursday.

H: We will see what their response is. We have a message in from Bill that we are really on the borderline in the case of what we offered them. He thinks the Turks would think only half their level is justified for Greece. I think we stick with the 700. I have already made it military assistance.

K: You have made it only military assistance? You were not authorized to do that.

H: When we discussed the alternative of 750 or narrowing.

K: Not in any way that I focussed on it.

H: I thought that was agreed.

K: You never even mentioned it.

H: Yes I did, Mr. Secretary. I said the alternative was going higher which I did not like because of the Turkish feelings. Well let's see what they come back with this morning.

K: Yes, but I just did not understand it. That is no way to do business. Did you give them my changes.

H: Yes.

K: I hope you did not maneuver them too much. If you did it in a way to get an agreement, I am going to disavow you. I want it equal. I do not want to write a document that endorses the Greek position.

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H: We put in the points of your UN speech. We are now quoting it textually.

SI 138 1*

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Art Hartman
4/9/76; 2:37 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

K: What is it you need to talk with me about. I haven't got much time.

H: The Greek response.

K: What is it?

H: The response is a problem. They have asked for economic assistance of $300.

K: Impossible.

H: I told them that. They said we want an oral assurance. I said there is no such thing. This changes the whole basis of what we have been talking about. I want to show you the paragraph they have come in with on Cypriots. They did not like your speech. They eliminated reference to Greek-Cypriot community. [redacted] B

K: When does he want to come?

H: They have not said. They registered the fact I have given them an alternative. They say they have to have agreement on the language. It seems to me the Monday date is out.

K: Yes.

H: What I am trying to do now is get it typed so you can read through the whole thing. Obviously we cannot accept their aid proposal.

K: We may have to wait until tomorrow morning. Maybe 9:30.

H: Okay.

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DECLASSIFY AFTER: 31 DEC 2028
DATE/CASE ID: 24 SEP 2003 200102979

SI 146 *

TELECON
Mr. Peter Lisagore/Secretary Kissinger
April 10, 1976
Time: 3:00 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: I just wanted to find out how you were?

L: I hear you wowed them last night.

K: It was a tough act to follow.

B6

L: I heard he was great.

[redacted]

L: When are you leaving on the African trip?

K: At the end of April.

L: My daughter said to give you her best. She said if one Lisagor isn't tripping you up the other is.

K: She tripped me on the way to the platform, that's right.

L: She didn't mean it really.

K: She is a wonderful girl.

L: Well, thank you for calling.

K: O.K. Bye.

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SI 144 1*

TELECON
Mr. Bernie Goertzman/Secretary Kissinger
April 10, 1976
Time: 10:45 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

G: Fine. I thought your speech was very thoughtful last night. I could hardly hear you with that loud speaker system they had.

K: Really.

G: The tone was wrong. You sounded very hoarse. It was a good evening. Listen, the reason I was calling is I am doing an analysis on where Soviet-American relations stand today and it seems everyone I have spoken to thinks the outcome on SALT looks unpromising.

K: Let me do this on deep background for your understanding only. The outcome depends on when we are willing to spill bureaucratic blood. We have this thing in a frame where it takes one or two decisions to conclude it.

G: When we came back from Moscow you were encouraged...

K: Don't ascribe this to me because it will unleash a flood of leaks again.

G: The Pentagon thinks they can dig their heels in...

K: There is an inevitability about it when you realize the problem of setting levels in the absence of an agreement. We have never had to do this with such a formidable enemy.

G: I can foresee a situation where you can run into way after the election.

K: If we don't have any bad setbacks on SALT over the year if there should not be an agreement -- I still think there is a chance -- but assuming we don't -- basically it is at a level to which an agreement shouldn't be too difficult. This is really for your own guidance. Most of this stuff will get itself sorted out as soon as the mad-men are out of the race.

G: Has the President said let's not talk about it until after the primaries.

K: No we are having Verification Panels. The blood spilling will settle itself. It is my judgment that the range within which an agreement is possible is very finite and that we are very close to that. We shouldn't get confused by the extraordinary hysteria around now. What have the Soviets done except Angola that is so irresponsible?

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G: The Administration has drawn the publics attention to Angola.

K: We have to call attention to Angola because if it isn't challenged it could be a major problem.

G: Are the Russians saying that they might as well sit back and see what happens and that in the end they will have to compromise too.

K: In all fairness, they have made more compromises than we have.

G: However, you are still on the same issues have have been on for some time. Everyone says they don't want the surface missiles.

K: That is right.

G: That is what is so crazy. I know people at the Pentagon think that we will do the Russians a great favor by having a SALT agreement.

K: It will all straighten itself out.

G: You have to wait until the election is over?

K: I don't think so, necessarily. We are doing the intellectual work now and we can pick up the pace.

G: The odds are eight to two against?

K: It is really dependent on how much time the President has physically available to give to it.

G: Once there is any movement the opponents start screaming.

K: Yes, and screaming for stupid issues. The Pentagon is trying to protect programs on SALT that they cannot protect on a unilateral budget. They won't submit them to Congress as part of their five-year program.

G: It seems at some point the Chiefs will have to decide what they really want and stick by it.

K: That is right.

G: If there wasn't an election in November, we would be talking about a small time frame?

K: Yes and if the liberals hadn't abdicated -- don't forget that -- we could get an agreement in two months time.

G: Don't you have the feeling that now in the Senate they can't get it through this summer?

K: I have the sense when I go up on the Hill that the animosity -- the problems that I have with it aren't so much on the Hill any more.

G: Not on SALT anyway. I think the liberals recognize your dilemma. They should have checked before they issued that statement on the cruise missiles. Your problem with the Hill will focus on Turkey.

K: That will be massive.

G: Are you going to try to push that one?

K: Probably.

G: Brademus is practically salivating now.

K: To do what -- screw the United States?

G: His view is he is defending the U. S.

K: In what way?

G: He has a view of the morality...

K: Oh come on Bernie.

G: I agree on his intentions, but I am giving you his rhetoric.

K: Oh, I know his rhetoric.

G: On SALT it is a question of really when both sides want to put the political force behind it, and...

K: That it is relatively achieveable.

G: You have been saying that for some time.

K: But I am right. I have written down what agreement is achieveable -- maybe I will seal it up and put it away and open it up when we get a final agreement to see how close the final terms are or whether they are better or worse.

G: In January you discussed it in broad terms with us -- you were talking about one of the options like reducing the 2400 level -- and the ALCM thing was on the way to being settled. Then you made a proposal back to the Russians...

K: We went to another conception -- the one I came back with hasn't been tested.

G: Just to put the contested issues aside -- that was the easiest thing and get together what the President could agree on.

K: Basically.

G: The Russians then decided to stick on their previous position?

K: More or less.

G: They are so upset about cruise even though they would get a free ride on backfires it isn't worth it to them?

K: Not necessarily. Bernie I have to run.

G: Nice to talk to you. Thank you.

K: O. K. Bye.

SI 158 1*

TELECON
Mr. Barry Schweid/Secretary Kissinger/Mr. Sol Pett
April 12, 1976
Time: 6:30 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

S: I have two requests to make you even more famous.

K: Maybe.

S: Our photo people are wondering if it is possible to take some at home pictures for strictly picture display.

K: Let me ask Nancy.

S: O.K. I will check back with you tomorrow? I didn't know she was home. How is she?

K: She is fine. She got back this morning.

S: While I have you on do you know that Sol Pett has been trying to see you for a couple of weeks?

K: Yes. I am so busy.

S: He says he wants to say a word to you?

K: O.K.

P: Hello.

K: You did a decent piece on me a few years ago, and I haven't forgotten.

P: I had a word from Larry that I might be able to see you later this week?

K: I will try to see you before I go to Africa.

P: How shall I act, how shall I proceed from here.

K: Get in touch with Larry.

P: Tomorrow.

K: No, I won't know any more then than I know now.

P: I would really like to do this.

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K: I would basically help me.

P: It would be a picture of what a man is going through.

K: You can see what I am going through just by reading the papers.

P: It is bad for my image to be put off this lo ng.

K: I will do my best to see you as soon as possible.

P: O.K. I will talk to Larry then.

K: On Wednesday.

P: On Wednesday.

K : Yes.

P: My mother is waiting to hear.

K: O.K. Bye.

P: Bye.

SI 149 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Mr. Hartman (EUR)
4/12/76; 10:54 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Why are we saying Bitsios is coming here to discuss peace and security in the Eastern Mediterranean area. Is that what Brademas wants?

H: No.

K: We are discussing the gd bases.

H: I thought it does us some good to talk about . . .

K: Why not say it is to continue the discussions on . . . .

H: Sure.

K: On . . .

H: . . . our bilateral relationship.

K: Our bilateral relationship specifically the issue and status of US bases in _____ as well.

H: Okay.

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SI 153

1*

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Barry Dunsmore
4/12/76; 1:05 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

D: I want to ask you about _____'s story in the Times yesterday on SALT. He used the word deadlock.

K: I would not agree with that.

D: Are things considered slowed-down?

K: No. We owe them a reply.

D: Will you hand-carry it to Moscow?

K: No. We need one more go-round at least. This is on background.

D: Yes. You mean back and forth before you could think of going there. He quoted a State Department official, "Neither side came across with a creative idea . . . . is that unduly pessimistic?

K: Yes.

D: Are there any new ideas?

K: I don't want to go into that. But I just want to say we are not in a January "deadlock".

D: Am I correct if I keep saying backfire and cruise as still being problems?

K: Exactly. Are you coming to Africa with us?

D: I am pretty certain I am.

K: Good. Look forward to having you.

D: Thank you.

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SI 151 1*

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Phil Habib
4/12/76; 12:27 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

H: We got a reply from the North Vietnamese. It is a lengthy . . .

K: Just get to the point.

H: It does not say we are willing to meet. It says we are waiting to hear from you. But it maps out the policy saying we are ready to totally mix relations according to the assurance. They say they have behaved with good will and good support and we have not.

K: Bring the stuff up.

H: They suggested the possibility that we both simply inform the press we have received a reply which we are studying and should not go beyond that at this point. Sonny Montgomery -- we should inform him.

K: Not until you have talked to me. Don't say you _____ about this thing.

H: I am trying to hold the press spokesman from saying anything. I am going to suggest he has not checked on this today.

K: He has already briefed, hasn't he.

H: No, I don't think so.

K: That is okay.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 13 AUG 2003 200102979

SI 154 1*

TELCON
Arthur Hartman
Sec. Kissinger
April 12, 1976
2:35 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: The Canadian For. Min. called me and I told him I would call back at 6:00. He has a number of problems. One, is the purchase of long-range aircraft and what happens if Lockheed goes bankrupt.

H: They have been discussing it.

K: Something about ICNAV. Could you give me a memo on these by 5:30.

H: Yes. Was there a third thing. Did he take up LOS.

K: Not yet. But he may.

H: There is one issue on the Straits they are concerned about. We haveassured them we are not pressing as far as the two areas that Canada is interest in -- the Northwest passsage and some place off the coast of Maine. I will get you a memo on that as well.

K: Did you get that from my outer office.

H: Yes -- we have already started a memo. Bitsios said he wanted to get a complete night's sleep and expects no one there -- I will meet him. Shall we fix a time for tomorrow.

K: Yes. Work it out with my office and we haveto get an appointment with the President.

H: I will check your calendar.

K: I absolutely must be there (with the President.)

END

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SI 152 *

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
April 12, 1976
12:31

RELEASED IN FULL

D: Did Larry pass to you the message on the Saudis?

K: No.

D: Can I takea minute to tell you?

K: One minute.

D: It is a C-130 plane; an air force transport. It had 23 Saudi military and some civilians.

K: Are you going to let it go?

D: Sure. They are at the hotel being interrogated -- not the Americans, they are having dinner with our air force people. The plane will be released and all the passengers released. I gave Larry more of the details which he can give you.

K: Ok. I'll talk to you later.

END

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SI 157 1*

TELECON
Mr. Hartman/Secretary Kissinger
April 12, 1976
Time: 5:50 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Can we move Bitsios to 3:00?

H: Tomorrow afternoon?

K: Yes. Yo have no right to cancel my appointments with the President. Romulo is here -- do you think it is proper to have the President see him without me there?

H: I guess your office didn't know. 3:00 tomorrow would be fine.

K: Should we have Clements there?

H: I think it would be good to involve him.

K: You had better get him there and discuss what the issues are then.

H: Alright.

K: Good.

Mr. Hartman/Secretary Kissinger
Time: 5:54 p.m.

K: Have you seen these talk ing points these guys sent to me?

H: On the Canadian?

K: Yes. What do you suppose they will contribute -- that much I knew on my own. It says we want to be as forthcoming as possible to your requests and we will review it in that light. What does that say? On UNCTAD I plan to attend UNCTAD personally. That is alright.

H: We are not certain what points he is going to raise, that is the problem. Also it is a very touchy thing with Defense as to what kind of assurances they can give him if something happens to Lockheed. All we can do is say we are sympathetic to their requests and supportive.

K: You must admit...

H: I didn't see these. I was up on the Hill.

K: Supposing I didn't have these talking points -- I would not be worse off. O.K. Thank you.

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SI 161 *

TELCON
Sec. Kissinger
Talcott Seelye
April 13, 1976
9:15 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: It is sort of rough to have you the recipient of my rows here. I just want you to know before I start yelling everyday that I don't hold you responsible. Robinson is going with me as you know. He is not going on a pleasure trip. Would you be good enough to set up appointments forhim. He is only going to Zire. Please tell the host governments that he is coming and wants to discuss economic problems. Have the Embassies' sent in schedules.

S: Yes. The Embassies have been instructed to submit schedule and they have done so. I thought they were veted with you -- they were supposed to have been.

K: Where possible I would like to meet with the Embassy staffs. In a few places I would like to go out into the country.

Spain
S: Amb./has a reply in from Nyerere. He says it is impossible to reach him because he is in the bush. He will be able to reach him by Friday. Spain feels it would be counter-productive to go to the (Minister?). I think we can do it by Friday.

K: Kaunda will be traveling. I hope you sent a cable not telling him what we wanted but asked him.

S: We did and we are waiting for a reply.

9:35 a.m.

K: Have we heard from Ethiopia.

S: NO.

K: You have not heard at all.

S: We heard yesterday.

K: That he could not reach anybody.

S: The Ambassador was able to talk to them. They mentioned problems they hoped to resolve. The Ambassador thought this was a positive reply and said he would follow-up.

K: Could I get my daily schedule in each place.

S: Yes. It is in S/S.

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SI 165 *

TELECON
Ambassador McCloskey/Secretary Kissinger
April 13, 1976
Time: 6:02 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Do you think we could get Inouye to let me go by noon? There is a swearing in of Thomas Gates by 12:30 and a cabinet meeting and I would like to come out by 12:15.

M: We will do our best. The story of the reply to the North Vietnamese is out. I think we should tell Montgomery about it.

K: Say that they said the usual thing and now we are going to study it. I don't want it out in the press.

M: Apparently someone is on to the story.

K: They should just say we have the reply. I know how it is out -- it is the only thing that EA thinks it is worth doing these days.

M: I will speak to Montgomery about it. We have Long and Ribicoff coming, however, Long may not be there because of a slight cold.

K: O.K.

M: What did you think of th Hayes reception?

K: Wasn't it something.

M: He is something else.

K: He had them all there.

M: Now he has made it legal.

K: O.K. Good.

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SI 160 i*

TELECON
Larry Eagleburger/Secretary Kissinger
April 13, 1976
8:10 am

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Have you had a chance to look at the papers?

E: Millie read me the Murray Marder thing which I didn't think was too bad.

K: I haven't found that.

E: It highlights the fact that you thought of leaving in '73.

K: I think we should cool it.

E: In the clips Millie read to me that was the only story. I think we should too.

K: You know Protocol scheduled breakfast for me with a nothing group of Congressmen and Senators but it will show on their charts.

E: What?

K: It will show on their charts that they had the meeting. I would have thought if they couldn't get the senior people they wouldn't -- there is no sense in my meeting.

E: This is this morning.

K: Yes and also they have put all the Senators near me and the Congressmen at the end of the table and the State Department people near me. This is the 8th breakfast they have done this to me.

E: I will not happen again. I have personally talked to Henry Catto about this and it will not happen again.

END

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SI162 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Scotty Reston
Sec. Kissinger
April 13, 1976
9:50 a.m.

R: Since you are going to answer questions today, why don't you ask these guys that question that you put to me -- what is the Sec. of State supposed to do to defend himself against charges of this kind. Raise the issue.

K: You mean at the beginning.

R: No. When it seems appropriate.

K: In my introductory remarks or in answer to a question.

R: You may get a question that will give you a chance to recite on it that would probably be preferable . Who is asking questions.

K: Roberts, Ben Read, Yoder from the Star.

R: I will get somebody to ask you if you want it.

K: You mean just to say -- Thompson (the other one to ask questions.) - Neiman curator.

R: They will probably ask you anyway -- what about these charges.

K: You mean on the papers.

R: Yes and you can tee-off on that and say whatevery you like about this whole press...

K: Have you seen the spech I gave when Lisagor received the award.

R: No.

K: I will send it over. Where he got the Weintal Award. I made a few comments about the relation of the press to the Govt. I will think about this Scottie. I think at some early time I will do it if not today.

R: I will leave it alone unless you call me back. While on the phone, I was going to write about China. What do we know about Hua.

K: Nothing.

R: We don't know what camp he is in.

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K: He has generally been considered in the moderate camp.

R: But outside of that --

K: We know practically nothing. Only conversations we know of were those he had with Nixon.

R: Was that useful.

K: Yest but it was not spectacular but useful.

R: What did it show about him.

K: It did not show any great change from the previous policy. In fact, it did not show any change from the previous policy at all.

R: Call me back if you want me to have someone ask you that question.

SI 167 *

TELECON
Mr. Robinson/Secretary Kissinger
April 13, 1976
Time: 6:23 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: By tomorrow morning I would like a list of what to do at UNCTAD. I am being flooded with stupid proposals. I am spending three days of my time at UNCTAD and I should accomplish something.

R: New proposals?

K: No. What I have now is for two weeks of bilaterals. I must know who I will see for lunch and what I will do.

R: I will get on it right away. Who has been...

K: I don't know anything that goes on in this Department.

R: O.K. I haven't been involved but I will get into it. There was to be a memo which would outline the proposed plans that was promised to me tonight.

K: Why can't I give a reception for all of the delegates? Is that so bad?

R: No, what would be the best.

K: A one evening reception for delegates and then I have two lunches and a lot of bi-alterals -- some of them can be in groups.

R: Let's see what we can do to cut down the number and still give you the same coverage.

K: I am look ing for results now.

R: I will get right on it. I think there is something being prepared.

K: Will you kindly produce it by first thing in the morning.

R: Yes. I wanted to report to you that things went well on the shoe import thing, but if you could call the President....

K: He won't make a decision before tomorrow.

R: No, he says tonight. Simon and I both think you should call him.

K: O.K. Right.

R: I will get on this matter right away.

K: O.K. Good.

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SI 170 1*

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
April 13, 1976
Time: 6:48 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: The question I had I have settled. The problem was I have to refuel and for a while it looked as if Cairo was the only place I could do it. This would have fueled tempers in Israel at a great rate.

D: So how did you settle it.

K: I am going to Crete and I will probably get the plane shot down by the Greeks.

D: When are you going?

K: A week from Friday.

D: Do you know that Mrs. Mier is coming in the middle of May. She is going to get the national award from the AFL/CIO.

K: If you get me invited I will come.

D: She will be in Washington one day.

K: Shall I give a lunch or dinner for her. Tell her I will do anything she wants.

D: Let's discuss it later. Anything on the Lebanon situation.

K: We have had an intelligence report that the Syrians have decided to go in but we have no corroboration for it. It comes from the Moslems. I have to go to a birthday party for Nancy.

D: Give Nancy our love. I am in San Francisco but I would love to talk to you and her when I come back. I would love to have you over with a few other couples for dinner. I don't know whether you would like it. Ted Asley is coming into town.

K: Of Warner Brothers'.

D: Yes. I will be in touch with you. We miss Nancy -- we haven't seen her in a long time.

K: You might say you occasionally missed me.

D: Well, happy birthday to Nancy.

K: O.K. I have to run.

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SI 174 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Schaufele
Sec. Kissinger
April 14, 1976
3:05 p.m.

K: In going over this schedule, is Addis again.

S: It is not on yet, but it is not off yet. I have a call into Hummel and I am waiting for that to get through. We have nothing more from Addis. I know you said if nothing by the close of business we would not do it.

K: Don't you think?

S: I agree but I do owe him at least the chance to get a call through and I am trying that now.

K: What do we do if we don't go to Addis?

S: The best suggestion I can come up with is delay your departure from Dakar a couple of hours and in Nairobi do bilaterals with Marcos, Thorn and anybody else who is there. You would get to Nairobi about 22 hours earlier.

K: Thatmeans I will be in Nairobi for four days.

S: Right. We have considered again Cameroon but that logistics problem is pretty bad. Someone suggested you might go to one of the land-locked countries in the Sahel but there is only one that you could go to and that is Upper Volta. Two have had coups and condemned pople to death and Mali we do not have such good relations with. It (UpperVolta) is a very small post to have a visit like that.

K: That is senseless -- totally senseless.

Maybe we just stretch the thing out a bit along the way.

S: We can stretch the time out along the way.

K: Let's take a look at that.

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SI 173 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Dep Sec Robinson
4/14/76; 10:10 a.m.

R: You are going to be seeing Bill Simon at noon today, is that correct?

K: I don't know.

R: You are going to the Cabinet meeting. There is an action memo on your desk urging that you hold a meeting with Simon today. He is not going to be available tomorrow.

K: Gdammit, set it up.

R: After the Black Caucus?

K: I am not a dentist. After the Black Caucus is absolutely out of the question. I have talked to him on the phone and he said he would look at it.

R: Okay. We'll set it up.

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SI 175 *

TELECON
Mr. Lars-Erik Nilsson/Secretary Kissinger
April 14, 1976
Time: 6:44 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello?

N: They said down stairs that you have agreed to meet with the liberation leaders in Dar es Salaam and Lusaka. Is that correct?

K: I am exploring this but we haven't got the schedules yet.

N: Is it a question of timing or whether you will do it at all.

K: There is a good chance of it.

N: Would it be for Rhodesia?

K: Primarily.

N: Do you know which ones you are contemplating -- I am sorry to press you for this sir, but it is a big story in Africa and here. Perhaps Swapo?

K: No, it is being worked out.

N: Would I be safe in guessing Encomo?

K: If you do it on your own he is certainly one candidate.

N: Thank you very much Mr. Secretary

K: Bye.

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SI 176 *

TELECON
Mr. Winston Lord/Secretary Kissinger
April 14, 1976
Time: 7:14 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

(THEY FIRST TALKED ABOUT THE SPEECH)

L: I gather the Black Caucus meeting went well?

K: When you send someone there he should take notes not just be an observer.

L: There was to be a notetaker from AF.

K: O.K. It went well, but I don't know what that means.

L: In terms of keeping the domestic front quiet.

[redacted] B6

L: You have me as a WASP ally. I will keep getting the pictures.

K: I think Carter's ethnic purity remark was well calculated.

L: It will lie with people below the surface. He has the blacks rallying around him anyway.

[redacted] B6

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SI 183 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Von Staden
4/15/76; 4:30 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Sonnenfeldt is not here so I have to do it personally.

V: Yes.

K: Look, I wanted to say something personally to the Chancellor, not you. He attacked me publicly on television for what I said on Communism in Italy and I just don't think as between old friends personally and between our 2 countries that is appropriate. All the more so I know he agrees with me.

V: When did it happen? I must explain.

K: I just got a ticker and he attacked me for my saying it is inevitable.

V: Yes. Mr. Secretary, the . . . .

K: I don't want to send our Ambassador in to protest officially.

V: Well one possibility would be to call the Chancellor. Another possibility would certainly be to send a message to me. I am not in my office at this point in time.

K: I recognize he has political difficulties but so do I.

V: I very much regret it Mr. Secretary. The question is if you want me to make a communication I can certainly do that.

K: Are you recommending that I should call him. That makes it too important an event.

V: There is no problem for me to call the Chancery and draw the attention to this event. If I only could have the. . . .

K: I am leaving town tonight for four days.

V: Do you happen to have the ticker before your eyes, Mr. Secretary?

K: Yes.

V: What Agency is it?

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K: From DPA.

V: DPA. And does it date from today?

K: Yes.

V: And it quotes the Chancellor speaking on television.

K: He says in a television interview "one should be reticent even if one is the Secretary of State." "He does not consider it inevitable that governmentsof large West European states will be setup with decisive communist influence." Which no one has said.

V: Yes. It seems to me a rather short version of what he must actually have said. Well, my . . . .

K: I just think that, I really think it is a lousy procedure when we do not have any disagreements. Even if we did it would not be the most ideal procedure.

V: It doesn't indicate to what the Chancellor referred. Did he refer to the . . .

K: I don't care what he referred to. If he can be quoted as attacking me I don't think he should say it. "Schmidt attacks Kissinger's Remarks on Europe."
V: That is the headlines, so to speak?

K: Yes. It doesn't make any difference what he really said.

V: What I could do, Mr. Secretary, there is no problem to doing that to draw the attention to the Chancellor to the DPA information and telling him you had called me about this.

K: You can certainly tell him it doesn't make my life here easier. We have certainly gone out of our way never to do anything like this that could embarrass him.

V: I see that point very well. It is a very difficultissue and . . .

K: You know very well I only report when I am asked at the press conference and then I have to state my view. If I were the German Chancellor I would be scared out of my mind if the U.S. said we don't care.

V: The quotation said you considered it inevitable; that is what the Chancellor said.

K: That's ridiculous.

V: That is what the information says.

K: That is right but I don't know whether . . .

V: I will have to check.

K: I don't want to call him. I don't think it is worth it.

V: I don't think so. I think you are right.

K: I would not have called you if Sonnenfeldt were here but I am going away and I didn't want to let 4 days go by.

V: When are you going to be back?

K: On Wednesday.

V: Of next week?

K: Yes and then I am going to Africa.

V: You are only two days in Washington?

K: Two days.

V: Then I will have a chance to communicate.

K: Have a good rest.

V: Thank you. I am sure it is a very shortened version which doesn't put the accent right but I am going to find out.

K: Thank you.

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

SI 186 *

TELECON
Ambassador McCloskey/Secretary Kissinger
April 15, 1976
Time: 6:08 p.m.

M: The head table guest of ours used the State Department lobby to put out a release.

K: I heard about it later.

M: It is outrageous.

K: [redacted] B1

M: He had to write it before he came down here.

K: And without knowing what is in the agreement -- what did he say.

M: Well, essentially there are several reasons for todays announcement on the agreement -- Turkey remains in violation of U.S. laws. Congress doubts the wisdom of sending arms to Turkey. If Kissinger plans to spend one billion for arms to Turkey and one billion for arms to Greece he will be escalating the arms race.

K: It is awful.

M: Did the foreign minister get anywhere with him?

K: I am sure he didn't tell him -- maybe we shouldn't have invited him.

M: I will see him soon and I will just raise hell.

K: He never told me. He should have told us before he came wouldn't you think?

M: Absolutely. Well, I will be seeing him while you are in California and I will be sure to give it to him.

K: Do you think it does a lot of damage?

M: No, I think it is being ignored also I noticed Goertzman and Ketly going off when he started.

K: We would have been better off with not inviting him and let him issue it up there.

M: I would have defended inviting him to the lunch because he is just mean enough to have been worse if he hadn't been invited.

K: Where is the Greek government -- it was done at the Greeks initiative not ours.

M: To put the agreement together?

K: Yes, we didn't ask him to come ove here.

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M: Oh, well I will leave this statement up there for you.

K: [redacted] O.K. Thank you.

B1

SI 184 *

TELECON
Mr. Rogers/Secretary Kissinger
April 15, 1976
Time: 4:42 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How about Catto?

R: That is more attractive.

K: Then we could announce the shooting match together.

R: Can I get an hour to thing about it.

K: Yes.

R: My instinct is more favorable in this case.

K: You will still be in charge of it.

R: Let me thing for an hour and I will call you back.

K: O.K.

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SI 195 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Rogers/Secretary Kissinger
April 21, 1976
Time: 6:04 p.m.

K: Hello Bill. Marilyn Berger wants to talk to Bunker about a show she is putting together on Panama. That is inconceivable to me. How about you talking to her.

R: Does she just want to talk or does she want me to go on the show.

K: No, just to get background. Can you be ambiguous enough?

R: Yes, I can be the soul of ambiguity.

K: Except on things you believe in. O.K.

R: I will talk to her if you think it will be helpful. I don't guarantee anything.

K: Well, don't go into all this business -- the basic point is to say that we haven't made the final decision.

R: And that the Congress will have ample opportunity to look at it.

K: Yes. I will tell Scowcroft to send her to you. Don't you take the initiative.

R: O.K. Don't worry.

K : O.K. Thank you.

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SI 192 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Ben Bradlee (POST)
4/21/76; 4:14 p.m.

K: Given the hypocrisy and paranoia of this place there are two things I want to mention. Somebody told me--they said that the reason I didn't come to the George Stevens. . . .

B: (Laughter)

K: I was working on the Law of the Sea speech and can't get away.

B: I work on the theory occasionally in our enlightened self-interest to have a good time together.

K: The real reason I am calling is I have been told and read in John Osborne you are of the view because I did not respond to you that evening at the movie premier I therefore don't object to Woodward and Bernstein. My view is this. This is for you and I would be glad to sit down with you and go over it. Their really major significant mistakes both as to sources and as to context and sometimes as to part that concerns me. On the other hand, for me to get in a debate with them in which I repeat charges I cannot then explain. They will get their source who are self-serving guys to repeat it. It is a useless exercise. Therefore, I have taken the position I talk to nobody. Not to Osborne.

I will say no more about that book. That silence should not be construed as approval. What I would like to do, when all the sales that can be serviced are serviced I would like to sit down with you and go over what they have done because I think it has some _____ of journalistic effort. We can do it in a month or two. Itdoesn't. . . they have put together something rather staggering.

B: My feeling about the book is that 45 minutes with a good editor and could have saved them 95 percent of their problem.

K: Somebody with a little sophistication of how a government works could have pointed out it is not so unusual when printed in a certain light.

B: The only reason it came up was someone behind you or me was taking notes at a furious clip.

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K: I thought it sort of curious they have that one quote here.

B: I did see her. They said How come I revealed their source to Kissinger. I heard you say that you talked to Eisenhower and, oh, what's his name.

K: Buzhardt. What I got from what you said is this is apparently from the context.

B: It is.

K: If Eisenhower and Buzhardt say maybe these guys will say what they did say.

B: And when.

K: You didn't?

B: Of course, I didn't. I have been in this bunker so long.

K: You might blow it to Liv Ullman.

B: It has crossed my mind. Don't worry about either of those things. I am going to try to do some more writing and reporting and in a couple of months I am going to take you up on this.

K: Good.

SI 196 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Habib/Secretary Kissinger
April 21, 1976
Time: 6:23 p.m.

K: For my press conference tomorrow I know you have drafted replies that any six year old could handle. What if they ask me about the Presidential letter promising aid. What are the facts?

H: On February 1, 1973 the President sent a letter in which he discussed considering aid up to $3 and a quarter billion.

K: Did he say consider?

H: I haven't seen the letter but I think that is what he said.

K: I think we said it would have to follow constitutional processes, right?

H: Yes. He established the commission in Paris which followed constitutional processes. This is after the signing of the agreement.

K: Will you make sure you give me some of these facts in writing within the next 1/2 hour?

H: Yes sir. You will have it in writing within the next 1/2 hour.

K: O.K. Good.

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SI 190 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Hartman (EUR)
4/21/76; 3:55 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: What are we going to the Turks for?

H: This has to do with a series of bomb threats plus the fact we have via the Cypriots this material came forward from the Turkish part of the island.

K: Would you believe what the Turks give you?

H: It turned out to be a British saying it with an unsavory record and he at least did bring the stuff across and I think it is worth going to the Turks, not saying it is governmental which it may be but look here. These facts have been brought to our attention and we would appreciate your looking into it and see what he says.

K: Okay.

H: I think we have enough information. Until we actually had interrogated the event and now that we have done that and the British are sending out their interrogator and he has been involved in a number of other affairs.

K: Okay.

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SI 198 *

TELECON
Ambassador Schaufele/Secretary Kissinger
April 21, 1976
Time: 6:50 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: One of the cables you were kind enought to let me see says that the Zambians have proposed specific topics I should cover in my speech.

S: They would like a general indication of what you will say.

K: You will not send any substantive cables that I don't clear.

S: No, no. I wanted to talk to you about what you want to tell them in advance.

K: Not a newspaper.

S: No, this would go to the President's office. The newspaper did an article on some points that they thought you should...

K: What are they -- can I know them?

S: You haven't gotten those yet. I will get them to you right away.

K: Have you send the cable out to (McFel)? Is the language clear or is it cream puff language?

S: It is fairly straightforward.

K : Can I see about Victoria Falls. I have no interest in going there -- I want a clear cut answer -- has that gone out?

S: Just a minute. No it hasn't gone out.

K: Has it been drafted?

S: Yes.

K: I am leaving in 1/2 hour. I will just run the whole thing from up here if this goes on

S: We will get those up to....

K: Hangs up.

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SI 199 *

TELECON
Ambassador Schaufele/Secretary Kissinger
April 21, 1976
Time: 7:25 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Did you think that inviting Cama(sp) -- I hadn't suggested it.

S: I thought why not ask both of them -- I don't see any harm in it.

K: You had better look at my UNCTAD schedule -- I suppose we can drop someone.

S: Since we tried to get a hold of both of them I thought if we invited just one the other would find out.

K: O.K. What is your idea about a press conference?

S: The embassy suggested you do one on your arrival.

K: It is out of the question.

S: It should be when you come back for the UNCTAD thing. There is a certain amount of logic in having completed the bilateral portion of your trip and then giving a press conference.

K: In Lusaka, the speech I would put in fairly strongly the idea of closing borders as an idea that we would support.

S: That is fine. That is good. I think we will just strengthen that general language that we had at the noon meeting.

K: Right. It turns out that I don't have to go to the NSC meeting in the morning could I have some of the drafts.

S: The speech drafts?

K: Yes, by the morning.

S: Yes. I will get to Win right away.

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SI 208

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RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

TELECON
Mr. Hartman/Secretary Kissinger
April 22, 1976
Time: 7:05 p.m.

K: On that stop in Suda Bay -- I can't guarantee you this won't get out on the plane.

H: I think they were right to say it probably would get out.

K: I don't see how I can keep it secret.

H: I don't think we should. He came back again and wanted to suggest Rhodes.

K: Now there won't even be any pretense because I would be getting there after dark.

H: Rhodes (place) is terrible. I think there is nothing wrong with it getting out. We have agreed to normal operations in Suda now.

K: I think Kubisch could find some tactful way of mentioning it to him.

H: We don't have his final word yet.

K: Did I see a final cable saying he won't do it. They have to get off the line where domestically they kick us around and internationally they try to use me. This can't go on.

H: That's right. No that cable was someone reporting in on his impressions, it wasn't the final answer.

K: Oh, maybe Jack could put -- he can't insist on it I know.

H: You are not coming down because it isn't serving your purposes. If he would go to Rhodes...

K: Right, it is odd for us to try and understand why he would go to Rhodes and not Suda Bay. It is odd for us to normalize relations under these conditions. It doesn't seem to have affected the Turks as much as we thought.

H: No, they are concentrating on their domestic politics.

K: I have promised Bsitsios that we would make an effort to initiate a Turkish reply.

H: They have turned over a reply but we don't think it will be any good. Once we find out what it is we might want to urge them to put in some more territorial details.

K: [redacted]

H: You may be seeing Calayangil in Nairobi.

K: Is he down there?

H: Yes, he has accepted your luncheon invitation.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE B1
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CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 25X6
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 31 DEC 2028
DATE/CASE ID: 24 SEP 2003 200102979

K: That makes it all the more important that Bsitsios show up in Suda Bay.

H: Did Wells' message on the labor thing come up to you at lunch.

K: What was it.

H: That the King was anxious to make a contact with the AFL/CIO.

K: Was there a specific proposal?

H: No, just that we mention it.

K: I mentioned it to him.

H: They have made one contact through Brown.

K: The next time they make a contact they should let us know and we can let Kirkland to something.

H: O.K. Fine.

K: O.K. Good.

SI 203 *

RELEASED IN FULL

telcon
Sec Kissinger/Sonnenfeldt
4/22/76; 4:18 p.m.

K: I think this is a damn good letter.

S: What?

K: Nothing. I just want to check with you. I am making a few minor changes.

S: I decided not to put in the grain points because it is vulnerable. It is a typical example of an instance where we have a greater stake than the Russians and therefore we lose more than they. It is a false point.

K: I am putting it in a different way. Have we heard from the IMS about the date?

S: Yes. The 22nd.

K: Maybe we can talk a few minutes about what I think I ought to say.

S: You have a meeting with Ikle.

K: Why don't you come in at 5:15 just before that meeting.

S: Okay.

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SI 201 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Amb. Dinitz
4/22/76; 10:43 a.m.

D: Welcome back to Washington.

K: Thank you.

D: I understand you are leaving tomorrow for Africa.

K: That is right.

D: Since we will not have a chance to see each other, there are 2 or 3 items. With regard to Africa, I wanted to remind you of our request if you have a chance to . . .

K: I have a press conference in 15 minutes. If it is things that are not likely to come up at a press conference, I would rather call you this afternoon.

D: You can call me this afternoon. There is information Hussein on his way to London saw our Ambassador on his request to ask our Ambassador to pass a message to us to be tolerant with the Syrians. Our ambassador told him in light . . . .

K: The Egyptians have formally told us the Golan Book is shocking to them so that whoever leaked it you can be happy now it has achieved its purpose.

D: Shocking?

K: That is is shocking to them.

D: The Prime Minister did comment on the book a couple of days ago. He said it was maliciously done in order to spring the relations between our two countries. Did you see the statement?

K: No.

D: I will find it and get it to you.

K: I would like to have it, but he didn't deny its accuracy?

D: I think he did. But I will get it and pass it on to you.

K: Thank you.

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RELEASED IN FULL
SF 111

TELECON
Mr. Hartman/Secretary Kissinger
May 9, 1975
12:59

K: Could you call Ramsbotham and make clear what I was discussing with Callaghan was my analysis of the Portuguese situation. We will not do anything in particular about this.

H: He understands that. Hal and I had lunch with him yesterday and went over it once again and said nobody has the solution to ~~fix~~ this, this is an ~~ally~~ analysis.

K: Tell him I want to put my analysis before him. We will do nothing separate from our allies on this . I wanted Callaghan to understand this.

H: Will do.

END

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SI 229 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Day/Secretary Kissinger
May 10, 1976
Time: 7:31 p.m.

K: I have the Vice President coming for dinner to my house in five minutes -- could I get this cable up here.

D: It has been in Sisco's office for some time.

K: He exists to get things done not to be a bottleneck.

D: He has made some changes, but I will see that it gets to you right away.

K: Hangs up.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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SI 214 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
5/10/76
TheSecretary/Sen. Javits

K: . . . (missed first part) Yeah.

j: At 12:30 I am making my speech for you on the floor. I am giving the President a lot of credit through you.

K: Excellent.

J: Now, one thing I forgot to tell you. Three days ago Caglayangil addressed a letter to you, actually Demirel signed it, suggesting a meeting of the foreign ministers in Oslo.

K: He told me that too, but when I stopped in Greece to refuel I was told that this letter hasn't arrived yet.

J: I told him that I should tell the Secretary about this. You know I am always careful about that.

K: I will get a letter off today.

J: Now, this speech covers both Lusaka and Nairobi and I think you will like it. It is very glowing.

K: That's very nice.

J: If you want, I could have it read to your office if you like.

K: That would be very nice.

J: Okay, I will have it read to your office.

K: I appreciate that.

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SI 236 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sam Lewis
Sec. Kissinger
10:05 a.m.
May 11, 1976

K: You should draft the statement along the lines I told you.

L: On the concilliatory track.

K: That's right. The decision went the way I thought it would. So now draft a statement -- concilliatory but firm and leaving open a door. Let me have it as quickly as possible.

L: We are working on it now. I think there is a possibility we can get this thing put off and Bill is going to work On it.

K; We should not promise a positive vote in a month. We should say it is not the time we can consider it.

L: Can we hold open the door the attitude that it would be more positive within a month.

K: Hold open the door -- depending on part of that action.

L: We will get it to you soon.

K: Within the next half an hour. You don't need 10 guys drafting it.

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SI 239 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Mr. Atherton (NEA)
5/11/76; 11:04 am

K: Do you think you are going to let the status of limitations go before you are going to testify on the Somalia matter?

A: No. We just got the changes this morning. Do you want to see them again, Mr. Secretary?

K: No. But I want you to go up firmly.

A: I agree.

K: Starting no later than tomorrow.

A: We may be able to start this afternoon. Bob had some meetings.

K: Okay.

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SI 238 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Mr. Habib (EA)
5/11/76; 11:00 am

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Would you mind putting your gd bureau on something other than North Vietnam for 5 minutes a day.

H: What is the matter?

K: We will not get in touch with Montgomery. He does not run the foreign policy of the United States. Number two, you are going to send a message to the North Vietnamese saying we will have to confirm if we are asked the fact that we have sent a message but we will not reveal its contents. Until you have done that Funseth is not authorized to say anything about it nor anyone in EA. I want the North Vietnamese down-played. It is not the objective of our policy to normalize relations with them, which is the only message I get from EA.

H: Let me ask you. Can you reconsider simply telling Montgomery we are responding?

K: Are you telling me . . .

H: Because he is on our side now. And by simply telling him we are responding I think can keep him in the camp.

K: And if he is not in the camp?

H: I would just as soon have him as not have him. I think it is useful to you. His first experience with them has been so bad it turned him off.

K: After you have informed the North Vietnamese, I will consider it.

H: Can we do it after we inform the North Vietnamese?

K: Then you come back to me.

H: I don't see why we have to bother you.

K: Because I think you guys are playing.

H: You signed the right one.

K: Which did I sign?

H: You have agreed to everything we have suggested.

K: You come back to me.

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SI 248 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Sonnenfeldt
5/12/76; 2:38 p.m.

S: . . . on the Genscher thing.

K: Genscher called me.

S: Kinkle called afterwards to confirm all the things. I guess we have to pass something to the Swedes about the time of your dinner there.

K: First we have to say something to the Norwegians.

S: They would like you to get there at 10:00. I think 9:30 is a little early -- the Germans.

K: Oh, 10:00--the later the better.

S: And then they will have a chopper too if the weather is all right to get you to the airport at 6:00 or 6:15.

K: Okay.

S: I will get together with Hartman to get these other things together.

K: I think we should cancel my bilateral with Genscher in Oslo. It would look too ridiculous.

S: For some reason he still seemed eager to do it.

K: I think we better use it for Crosland if I need.

S: Okay.

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SI 251 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Amb. McCloskey
5/13/76; 9:00 a.m.

M: One last word on the speech. I like it; however, I have one problem. On page 23, "I can state . . . . (reads)

K: I didn't say that. Did you edit this thing last night, Larry? We have to say further Soviet and Cuban intervention would raise much . . . .

M: Okay.

9:05 a.m.

K: Where do you think these stories all came from that the Michigan primary caused the cancellation of the signing ceremony.

M: Mr. Secretary, I honestly don't know. First, Oberman stopped by and said do you know why American correspondents have been invited by the Soviets to the foreign office. I said I don't know. He said our people think it is a bilateral matter and the threshold. Shortly thereafter Gwertzman called me and said this cancellation in Moscow today is the result of White House concern about the primary. I said who told you. He said two people but I don't trust their roles. I said that is news to me and then I spoke to Funseth to see what he said and had Funseth call Gwertzman. Somebody inspired Gwertzman to get suspicious that it was the White House holding up. I ~~have~~ put an item in our evening reading last night on it.

K: Okay. Thank you.

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SI 254 *

TELECON
French Amb. Kosciusko-Morizet/Secretary Kissinger
May 13, 1976
10:05

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

KM: Fine. I just came from Paris. My wife told me I had to call you. I saw the President. I am at your disposal.

K: It was not that urgent. I wanted to tell you I was pleased with my visit to your President. Let me ask one protocol question. I am giving a luncheon for him. The Vice President will be there but I am the host. Can I propose a toast to the President or will the disparity in rank bother him?

KM: The President does not intend to make a substantive speech.

K: Neither do I. Is it appropriate for me to make some remarks about him?

KM: Very short and propose a toast to him and to the President of the United States.

K: The people there will expect me to say something. Or I could ask the Vice President to say something.

KM: May be. But just a few remarks. But no political speech.

K: Do you think I could say that what we failed to achieve with Pompidou we have achieved with Giscard.

KM: Yes.

K: I am joking. It will not be political. Just how much we appreciate his qualities and leadership.

KM: There will be no prepared speech.

K: That is the same with me.

KM: I think it will be alright.

K: We are endorsing his statement on Africa.

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KM: He told me about it.

K: I am testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee today and giving it a strong endorsement. I told him if he hadn't proposed it to me I would have proposed it to him. I was going to urge him to do that but not in so much detail. He is more imaginative.

KM: The purpose was not to appear to be discriminating against the Africans and nevertheless....

K: I understand exactly. what he is doing and if it doesn't ruin you I am one hundred percent behind it.

KM: I think it is very good that we can act together.

K: Good. I will talk to you soon and we all look forward to the visit.

END

SI 257 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/MaxFisher
5/13/76; 3:20 p.m.

F: I hope we have a chance to visit. We are throwing a shindig for Sisco. The President's council wants to throw a lunch. If we move that to Washington, would you come?

K: Yes, but not on the date you plan.

F: If we find a date.

K: Absolutely. With great pleasure.

F: I would like to do that.

K: Maybe you will do the same for me when I leave.

F: Are you leaving already?

K: No.

F: I promise that personally because that is for sure. Right now we have plenty of problems with the elections. The President is speaking to the American Jewish Community.

K: Yes, I know.

F: They tell me you have been very helpful. I thought the speech was very shallow and I want to thank you for that. I understand you are leaving town.

K: This minute as a matter of fact.

F: When will you be back? You will be in next week?

K: Yes.

F: Then I would like to have the pleasure of a visit with you.

K: Okay. Good.

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SI 260 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Amb. McCloskey
5/14/76; 11:22 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I notice that they at that lunch for Giscard have very few members.

M: I have not seen the list.

K: Can you do something about that?

M: Yes.

K: And can we get some calls made and get them invited?

M: Yes. Let me get the list right away.

K: There should be Morgan and people like that.

M: Yes. All right.

K: Or Finley or somebody and also some from the Senate.

M: When is it?

K: Tuesday night. It is our usual screwup.

M: It is your lunch?

K: Yes.

M: I will get on it.

K: Thank you.

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SI 261 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/David Packard
5/14/76; 3:05 p. m.

P: I understand you are not coming to San Francisco Thursday but on Friday.

K: I am not coming. . . . I have not changed my plans for Thursday. I thought I was coming to the Commonwealth Club on Thursday.

P: I got a backchannel message through Ed Carter and wanted to find out from you what your plans were.

K: My plans are what we talked about yesterday.

P: That you ~~xx~~ are going out to San Francisco Thursday for lunch and going to Los Angeles Friday.

K: Correct.

P: I will get a hold of Ed Carter and try not to bother you any more.

K: You know, my situation. I may have to change that.

P: I understand.

K: But that is my present plan.

P: I wanted to confirm that. Ed Carter had a little different story. We understand if you have to change your plans.

K: Okay.

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SI 262 *

TELECON
Mr. Sullivan/Secretary Kissinger
May 14, 1976
Time: 6:25 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

S: Thank you for calling back. I don't know whether Larry has given you an idea of what I am looking for.

K: Well, you haven't written about my resignation in five months, so it must be about time.

S: It isn't that one. The theme of the piece we are doing says that in the what appears or what is the last six months of the Ford Administration you are showing an enormous amount of energy and doing a great deal of travelling and that you are concentrating on areas of concern you skipped in the past.

K: Like what?

S: Economic ones...

K: I have been talking about those since the Energy Conference.

S: Also geographical ones such as Latin America and Africa and the third thing is a heavier and stronger moral tone in the speeches you are making. You make more appeals to America's special position in the world and its role in the world. We have a number of people in the foreign affairs department who are talking about your creating a legacy...

K: Well, but...

S: Those are the main notions and I wondered how you react to these?

K: You have to consider the conditions in which I have to conduct foreign policy -- we are speaking on background now.

S: As you like.

K: We had first to wind up the Vietnam war which people seem to forget today and then we had Watergate. Itwasn't until Ford came in that we could begin to build up the architecture again. If you look on the economic side starting in early 1974 with the Energy Conference there has been a series of proposals in the energy field and in the general field for underdeveloped countries. I hate the word legacy. I think you are right in saying we are trying to outline a structure for our foreign policy, but that is the job of the Secretary of State. I am not doing it for myself. It isn't a legacy. The problem we face as a nation is we have gone from peace marches to war marches in four years with the pendulum swinging with enormous emotionality. What we need is some conception of the world toward which we are heading which is sufficiently complicated so that it takes account of reality and serves as an anchor and a compass point.

S: There is a friendly and unfriendly way to put that. Some of the people suggest that you are seeking to limit the options of a successor to lay down lines that are strict and from which the next person can't swerve.

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K: Why shouldn't he be able to swerve — just because of some speeches.

S: Take Rhodesia -- it would be difficult to take the opposite option.

K: The opposite option was used up — it isn't has if it hadn't been tried.

S: Yes. One point that I suggested that you haven't addressed is the sense of urgency that I think appears with your very heavy travelling and your working very hard on the economic problems and SALT, for instance. Do you feel...

K: I think it is comperable to my annual travel schedule.

S: Except for the shuttle period it looks like more.

K: I haven't compared it. The OAS meeting last year took place in Washington so I didn't have to travel for that, but I attended the NATO, OECD and CENTO meetings and these are normal activities.

S: Yes. There is one very good sentence that I have taken note of and I wonder if you would put that on the record -- that we need some conception of the world that deals with thecomplexity of the situation.

K: Which takes accound of the complexities. O.K. I don't think you are that far off the mark. However don't make it look as if I am on a big ego trip. Of course if that is what you feel...

S: There are a couple of thepeople who will end up being quoted who put that construct on it, but there are others who treat it more seriously and this one quote from you gives it a touch of class.

K: O.K.

S: Thank you very much.

SI 259 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Art Hartman
5/14/76; 10:20 a.m.

K: Art, what possessed us to lift travel restrictions on the Soviet Union right in the middle of a primary campaign when they have not done anything like that for us?

H: I have not heard about it.

K: You have given a lot of guidance to Funseth that we have opened up a new area to which they can travel.

H: I know of no new decision on this.

K: In accordance with CSCE. That is all great stuff if they had done the same thing.

H: Are we volunteering?

K: They wanted Funseth to volunteer it. His instructions are to confirm if asked. My question is why not do it all. Can't we wait for 2 months.

H: We have had a reciprocal program.

K: Maybe if we were opening up something, which as far as the guidance is concerned indicates that they have not reciprocated. Can you give me something on my European trip or is it too early.

H: Yes. Let me ~~give~~ make sure you have the NATO stuff.

K: The NATO part I can handle. How about Sweden.

H: I have not given you anything on Sweden. I assumed there was going to be a talk with Palme and we have no bilateral problems with them. I will do up a section on Sweden.

K: And a little bit about these people. Have we arranged the timing so we can make it?

H: Yes. The Germans understand and I think we have told them to go to the Swedes.

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K: I don't want to offend the Swedes.

H: The movement was just a half hour.

K: I have an uncle in Sweden whom I would like to see at some point. What am I doing Monday night?

H: Okay. I am away from my desk.

K: I have got to see him at some point.

H: I will work on some times when that can be done.

K: If there are large dinners, maybe he can get invited to some of them.

H: Okay.

K: Thank you.

SI 269 *

TELECON
Dr. Ikle/Secretary Kissinger
May 15, 1976
Time: 5:50 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

I: This is on the completion of the ABM protocol ratification. It was ratified last year. We haven't exchanged the documents yet we were waiting for the PNE thing. Now Hyland suggests we go ahead -- there is no point in combining the two any more. I wanted to check with you to see if we can do it on a low-key basis.

K: That is fine.

I: I also sent a memo...

K: I have been considering whether I should take it up with Genscher personally -- I am seeing him next week.

I: Since it gets so much into detail it would be good to follow up with a working document. That would be a good idea.

K: I was reading this memo this afternoon.

I: A long one was sent to you on the trip.

K: It caught up with me this afternoon. There are three additional conditions.

I: It is up to you whether you think that goes too far.

K: I would like to review them or have someone explain them to me before I commit myself. Can we get together for 10 minutes early next week before I leave?

I: Shall I set it up?

K: Why odn't we do that before I leave.

I: Do you want someone there with the State Department view.

K: Whatever you want. This is not a personal view. Will you set it up then?

I: Yes, certainly.

K: O.K. Bye.

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SI 265 *

TELECON
Mr. Funseth/Secretary Kissinger
May 15, 1976
Time: 1:07 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: John Wallach called my wife and told her that one of the Hearst people wants to come on the trip.

F: I just now got the note. I don't see why we can't accommodate one more. I think it would be good.

K: O.K.

F: I am going over the transcript now and will have it for you this afternoon.

K: As they edited it?

F: No, they are now editing it. It looks alright in general. I don't want to bother you with it until I know what they want to say.

K: I would like to condense that answer about how the trip was planned. I don't mind giving them the substantive reasons.

F: I have braketed that section and will give them only the minimum.

K: Don't you do anything without my approval. You don't edit with my seeing this.

F: I have a preliminary indication that they may drop out the Q's and A's on the Sheehan thing.

K: That would suit my marvelously.

F: They are going to talk to me and tell me what they propose at 4:00.

K: O.K. Fine.

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SI 266 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELECON
Mr. Atherton/Secretary Kissinger
May 15, 1976
Time: 2:36 p.m.

K: Have you seen that cable from Damascus with the three questions?

A: I have sent a suggested reply to you summarizing the language because the telegram is a little undecipherable unless you have the outgoing to refer to.

K: What conclusions do you draw?

A: Maybe I am listening in the dark but I think we have evoked a little interest. I am encouraged that Daoud is showing this interest.

K: On paragraph twoB I would not only say it is clearly understaood by Rabin but I would say it is accepted by him because that is the truth. I think for their own internal position it would help if they could say that.

A: I understand.

K: Now what is this paragraph two C what does that refer to?

A: We want your advice about the readiness of the Palestinians. We will welcome a dialogue as soon as we know it will be helpful to the peace process. They want to know does the both mean we and the Syrians or the Syrians and the Palestinians.

K: We have to change that to unofficial.

A: That is what we meant, yes.

K: I would say preferably through one of your emmissaries or through a trusted nonofficial. I find it interesting. Now probably Lebanon will blow up tomorrow morning.

A: It blows up a little every day, but I think the most important thing coming up is the meeting with the Syrians and the Egyptians. The fact that this will happen.

K: It is better for us if they don't get together before the end of the year. If they agree on a common strategy, we can't respond to them this summer.

A: I don't think there is much danger of that Mr. Secretary.

K: When is Hermann coming back, I would like to see him.

A: He is not planning to come back. [redacted] B6
[redacted] He said nothing about any intention of coming back unless you B6
wanted to see him in Europe, I could....

K: I would have him come back the first week of June for a few days.

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A: O.K.

K: I want to discuss that (mic) business with him.

A: Well, I wonder if he could have some personal reason for wanting to come back and then we could give him his orders.

K: Fine. We should have the UNDOF thing settled before he comes and will you send me another cable right away?

A: Yes, I will revise this one right now.

K: O.K. Thank you.

SI 268 *

TELECON
Ms. Meg Osmer/Secretary Kissinger
May 15, 1976
Time: 5:03 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

(MISSED FIRST PART)

O: At your convenience tomorrow -- either in my garden or at your house.

K: Can we talk in the morning about it?

O: Of course. What time do you want to talk?

K: Around 9:00 or 9:30.

O: Shall I call you?

K: Yes, call me through the White House board.

O: I tried to call Nancy through the White House and they won't even take a message so I did try. Are you alright, you sound distressed.

K: I am not at all distressed. What are you going to ask us.

O: Basically as a couple of the pressures being married and not being married -- it will be a little like the McCall's thing. How life changes -- Nancy has mentioned her difficulties in finding time to see her friends. About her career and trying to find time for that being the wife of the Secretary of State.

K: Are you going to ask me any questions.

O: I am asking both of you questions -- are you afriad you will be left out?

K: Of course.

O: I am going to ask you if you are afraid to go to England because your wife will leave you for your dog. If there are things you don't want to answer don't answer them.

K: Do I have a chance to delete some questions and answers later?

O: I am not going to ask you any of those nasty questions. That is Barbara's job. By the way some people are going to stop by my house tonight for cocktails. I would love to have you and Nancy come also.

K: What is your address in case we will be able to make it?

O: [redacted] B6

K: If we can do it you don't need a phone call?

O: No, If you feel like stopping by I would love seeing you. I am very excited about doing this tomorrow.

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K: What is your phone number, in case you can't get in touch with me tomorrow?

O: [redacted] Just because of the film crew problems what do you think the time frame would be. B6

K: Around 2:30.

O: Relax Henry. You sound tense.

K: I have about 15 people waiting to see me.

O: O.K. Thank you.

SI 264 *

TELECON
Senator Javits/Secretary Kissinger
May 15, 1976
Time: 11:13 a.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: How are you?

J: I am o.k. I have been out on the tennis court.

K: You will break our hearts.

J: I will break your hearts when I die of a heart attack on the tennis court.

K: You will be playing tennis when they put me away.

J: I don't think so. Now what has been happening?

K: What do you mean?

J: I heard you were depressed a little underthe weather -- are you worried about anything?

K: Did I make that impression?

J: No, I got it from others.

K: Let me get to another phone. Speaking as a friend, it depresses me a little to have heard that the President was hurt in Texas by my speech.

J: I can't conceive of it. What I plan to do today is beat the hell out of the New York delegation, although it may hurt Rockefeller. It is very clear and manyothers feel the same way, that it is inconceivable.

K: That is the only thing that bothers me. Connolly and people who know Texas tell me that it didn't matter.

J: It doesn't mean a thing. And that committee gave you a vote of confidence the other day.

K: I wanted to tell you how much I appreciated what you said among the moderates. We have strengthened ourselves.

J: I wish you had read this speech in advance. I don't see how we can do anything else. I really went to town at the Rippon Society. I went to town on this guy.

K: He appeals to every base instinct we have. You notice that Carter isn't picking any of itup.

J: You could have written my speech. Be of good cheer. The reception was great. Everyone I talked to said other people are after you -- not them.

K: (Laughter)

J: They don't know who but someone else. If it is a small band of ultraconservatives they don't have the voting power.

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K: Do you think we can get the Byrd Amendment repealled?

J: Yes. I genuinely do. Henry, one other thing, remember you and I talked about your book. I would like to talk to you about it privately before you commit yourself.

K: I won't commit my self before I leave office. No matter what you hear there are no talks or no commitments at this moment. I have let Maw talk to people -- I mean people who make a proposition talk to him but he doesn't tell me. If you want to talk to me as a friend that is fine.

J: I will be back to you and we will make a date. [redacted] B6

K: [redacted] B6

J: O.K. Be of good cheer.

K: O.K. Thank you Jack.

SI 267 *

TELECON
Mr. Funseth/Secretary Kissinger
May 15, 1976
Time: 3:15 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I just want to make sure that you and Aherne are not doing a separate negotiation with Barbara Walters.

F: No, I understand that.

K: May I have a transcript so I can make notes too. I may want to revise some things, and Bob needs one.

F: Do you want to go over the whole thing before it is edited?

K: Yes, I amy want to indicate things that I want taken out also.

F: O.K. I will send one to you right away.

K: And send one to McCloskey.

F: I think one has already been sent down to him.

K: O.K. Thank you.

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SI 271 *

TELECON
Mr. Atherton/Secretary Kissinger
May 15, 1976
Time: 6:26 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Did Brown ever get back?

A: Yes, but he had to leave for a Middle East Institute meeting to Cairo. He should be back in a few days.

K: Did he ever pass that message?

A: Yes, but there was no response. He will be back soon.

K: I saw a cable where it says Fahmy wants to see Brown.

A: I think he has to -- I think it is a good idea. Hermann said he was going to do it unless we told him to the contrary.

K: O.K. Good.

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SI 280 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Mr. Rogers (ARA)
5/17/76; 5:18 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: What is that letter in the Washington Post today that Mexico is going Communist and we have kept it from the President.

R: I didn't even see it.

K: It is in the Post and the President asked me to comment on it and it will of course mean a visit of me to Mexico announced on May 24.

R: Let me take a look at it and get back to you.

K: Can you draft an answer for me.

R: I didn't notice it. Nobody brought it to my attention.

K: You better hold off on when we should make the announcement.

R: We will hold it off.

K: It will not be this Friday.

R: When is a good time?

K: Before this primary is not.

R: Wednesday or Thursday of next week?

K: Yes, but even then it will get us into the California primary. First tell me the facts on this gd thing.

R: Let me get back to you.

K: I would think you could balance a Communist against a Fascist regime.

R: (laughs) We have. It is a balanced trade.

K: It is not exactly clear to me in what wat Mexico is Communist.

R: Okay. I will get on that.

K: Okay.

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SI 279 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Sonnenfeldt
5/17/76; 4:45 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

S: Your meeting you are having with the Paris press. La Monde and some of the other papers made something of this offhand remark of yours which was badly reported in La Monde now that the Europeans have stopped fooling around with trying to define their identity we can work with them on other things. La Monde interpreted that that you were delighted . .

K: That is not what we meant.

S: I wanted to remind you Le Monde continues to write articles and shall use whatever kind of quotations it can find to demonstrate that and this happens to be one you used in an article a couple of weeks ago. You were making a facetious remark.

K: Yes.

S: But anyway it is kind of symptomatic of Le Monde's attitude and some others there.

K: Okay.

S: I talked to Brent about the other matter and we are going to have a paper with the substantive paper to the outcome.

K: Hopefully ~~xxx~~ in time to study it.

S: It will be ready in 15 or 20 minutes.

K: Okay. Good. Thank you.

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SI 282 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Herb Schlosser/Secretary Kissinger
May 17, 1976
Time: 6:55

(MISSED FIRST PART)

K: All you want to do is get me out of a job.

S: The issue is whether you will leave in January or stay for another four years. Will I see you tomorrow evening at the French Embassy.

K: Yes, maybe we could get together.

S: I look forward to that. I will be staying over and going to California or New York, whichever I hear in the phone call. In any event it would be good to get to gether afterwards.

K: O.K. Herb, I have to dress for dinner. Good bye.

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SI 281 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Joseph Kraft/Secretary Kissinger
May 17, 1976
Time: 6:41 p.m.

JK: How are you?

HK: Fine how are you.

JK: O.K. I missed you this morning when I needed you. It is nice to chat however.

HK: What happened.

JK: I was writing something about the Giscard visit and look ing for guidance. I thought he might ask something on non-proliferation in Pakistan.

HK: Did you write that?

JK: I said he ought to.

HK: That is not unhelpful and he might.

JK: I gather that the last time he read things off a card.

HK: Who?

JK: The President.

HK: In talk ing to him?

JK: Yes.

HK: No, that he never does.

JK: They did not have the impression it was him they thought it was the aides.

HK: You mean about non-proliferation?

JK: They didn't specify the subject. They said one of the problems was that if you are going to talk to the Presdient you have to talk by yourself not from notes. Do you think there is a possibility of it being raised?

HK: There is a possibility of it being raised just because of the general policy.

JK: What else might be talked about?

HK: East/West relations. North/South relations. The issue you mentioned might come up. European/American relations and of course you write that on your own but the situation in Europe with respect to the communists.

JK: I gather that from accounts because I have been in the far west that you had a good chat about north/south relations in Paris.

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HK: I had a good talk with him. His proposals on Africa are very creative. The basic approach for the industrial countries is to see where they are going and what they want to achieve -- that is very creative and it is a policy we can support.

JK: And that we have already supported.

HK: Yes.

JK: On East/West is there much business to be done.

K: Don't ask me.

JK: Yes, one of the reasons proliferation is interesting is that it brings you back to the subject of East/West.

HK: Yes.

JK: Right. In European/ American relations he seemed very irritable about statements being made here. Here they released views by him I mean Giscard.

HK: I think that we and he substantially agree. You may not have noticed in Europe but very few statements were volunteered here. One was when Brazinsky well when it was implied that it was just as well for the communists to come to power in Italy because of the corruption in the Christian Democrat party.

JK: Giscard referred to that in certain terms. It seems that he is being needled by your ambassador in Paris.

HK: But so am I.

JK: Really by your ambassador -- at least that is my impression.

HK: Oh really, on what grounds?

JK: On the grounds that you talk to much. He professed to be horrified at the London statements.

HK: Well in London he was among the most vocal congratulating me on my statements. These are fragments of a discussion that doesn't list everything we talked about.

JK: I asked him why he didn't say anything. He said it was the end of the day...

HK: That isn't true. I spoke at 9:00 in the morning. Did he express displeasure to you too.

JK: Yes.

HK: It is a happy house.

JK: I am sure this is not a surprise to you.

HK: No, I didn't thing he would carry it to this extreme.

JK: When you say there is a good feeling about the European/American end -- what is the consensus.

HK: I would think that some of what you had in your columns about playing it hard until one had a decision to make is correct. We don't disagree on that.

JK: I see. Yes. He seemed to be sort of -- I can see that. He seemed to be annoyed by Haig's declarations.

HK: He was annoyed on the principle that the NATO Commander shouldn't give political instructions.

JK: What is this I hear about you giving speeches in California?

HK: I have an invitation to the World Affairs Council so I will be giving one speech there.

JK: When would that be?

HK: On June 4th.

JK: You will just go out and come right back?

HK: I might stay over there until the next morning. I might follow the same procedure which you have seen in Dallas.

JK: You mean have a lot of meetings.

HK: Yes.

JK: You will be going to Latin America?

HK: Yes.

JK: And then to NATO at the end of May?

HK: Wednesday I am going to NATO and I will be attending OECD at the end of June.

JK: This Wednesday is NATO?

HK: Yes.

JK: I will see you at some point tomorrow. I hope things go well with you. I think this is your best time.

HK: I appreciated the column you wrote the only minor quarrel I have with it is that I am doing it because I think it is necessary not to further my own self-image.

JK: Perhaps that may be a little unfair. I assume you don't mind waiting down guidance for the future.

HK: It would be helpful for my successor not to have to make all these tough decisions while taking the heat for them all.

JK: Do you have any indications from them that they intend to do things in a hurry.

HK: Who?

JK: The democrats.

HK: I don't think they have any idea of what is going on.

JK: You have no Russian or Chinese plans?

HK: No.

JK: Is it your impression that the Russians want to do a SALT agreement?

HK: Yes, it is.

JK: What about Michigan?

HK: We will have to face that later this week. Joe I have to get dressed for that dinner tonight.

JK: O.K. I will see you tomorrow. Is there a chance of seeing you Wednesday?

HK: No, I am leaving on Wednesday.

JK: O.K. I will see you tomorrow.

HK: O.K. Bye.

SI 278 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Sen. Hugh Scott
5/17/76; 4:25 p.m.

S: I was calling you to put in a word for [redacted] who has talked to Carol Laise and Chuck Robinson. He is anxious to be considered for the Bahamas. B6

K: I don't know anything about him.

S: Eagleburger knows about it.

K: I will talk to Eagleburger.

S: I am just putting in a word.

K: I appreciate it and will put in a word.

HS: Okay. Thank you.

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SL 275 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
May 17, 1976
2:40 pm

D: I want to congratulate you on your show with Barbara Walters.

K: It gets me out of my job.

D: You said you would be prepared to go but not that you were.

K: That is not how the press sees it.

D: No, but I read it properly and that is what you said. You have something for me?

K: No, I am returning your call.

D: Alright. I received a response from Allon with regard to the question from our last meeting about the possibility of sending French forces into Lebanon. Our opinion is it is negative. And the reason is that should France even send a token force to Lebanon that more than it would be peace keeping, it would be a cover up for massive Syrian intervention which could not be broken. But if a situation could develop of an international force which could be composed under the auspices of the UN, this could be a worth while suggestion to examine. The reason I called you is you wanted our reaction to this.

K: That is right because it is apt to come up tomorrow.

D: I had lunch with Begin (sp?) and I told him are doing your best.

K: It is practically impossible to do it.

D: And Jacques reminded me to ask you about a meeting.

K: You tell Begin that since he is a man who doesn't break promises, I have passed on the list to the Soviets and they have not rejected it. I did it in my own way -- that I do not have the right to do it, but I don't think the Vice President's speech will add to the reception.

D: But he is your friend.

K: Yes, but I didn't know about this.

D: He has always been tough on the Russians.

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K: So have I.

[redacted] B6

K: [redacted] B6 You tell Golda they can stop building memorials for me i in Senegal.

D: You re-read this book.

K: *It was made before her latest.*

D: She is not doing it anymore. She was upset in March and has not repeated it. She has behaved like a gentleman, if one can say this of a lady.

K: She is saying it privately.

D: Not anymore. Oh, the French have just put a suggestion for the debate in the UN.

K: What?

D: Did you hear about it? I will not bother you with this, I will talk to Atherton about it.

K: Do that. We are going to try to kill it.

D: Ok, I will talk to Atherton.

END

UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASED IN FULL

SL 274 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Ann Armstrong
5/17/76; 2:30 p.m.

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A: I am so thrilled. We hear we are going to have a dinner party on the 25th.

K: I don't know whether I can dare to meet with any Texan any more.

A: I don't know whether I dare be seen with you in terms of your Rhodesia policy. I cannot wait to have you here.

K: A year from now they will understand it was the only thing to do.

A: It makes me so sad.

K: I hope you are a better ambassador than you are a political analyst.

A: Right.

K: I seem to remember things were fairly tight.

A: I thought it was going to be close. I really did. I would not have guessed that Nebraska either.

K: Yes. These EUR-types, I don't trust about my schedule.

A: All right.

K: I would like you to understand what I want. I would like to leave it up entirely to Callaghan when he will see me. Don't tell him what these guys tell you is my best time. Pick whatever he wants as the best time. If he wanted to have breakfast Wednesday, that is fine. But leave it up to him. I would be glad to keep out of the afternoon session which I did not attend last year either.

A: You would be willing to skip the afternoon session of the CENTO meeting.

K: Right. I have to see Thatcher and Heath. He has asked to see me.

A: When?

K: When. You know I think it would be a little bit better if I did it after Callaghan. I insist and EUR is opposed to my seeing Heath. He is an old friend. I always see old friends. I will not leave London without seeing Ted Heath.

A: You must see Heath. I will call Callaghan and make the claim you want him to set the time.

UNCLASSIFIED

K: If he doesn't care I will see him before the others. I don't want to waste a breakfast on Wednesday. I would like to have Callaghan have ~~his~~ the sense I ~~want~~ took into account his, Callaghan's problems.

A: I will talk to him directly. If you would rather . . .

K: Both of whom have requested to see me.

A: All right. Okay. Do you want me to get back to you by telephone?

K: It is up to you. You can send me a cable.

A: I will cable you. You don't mind skipping the afternoon session of CENTO.

K: As for the dinner you understand I have got a lot of friends in London who would be glad to do it if it is difficult.

A: I am so honored. I am very honored about it.

K: I don't want to tell you whom to invite. I don't mind which people are there.

A: Spiers told me myself and Mike Pistor.

K: I don't know who that fellow is.

A: He is our USIS guy.

K: I would like Dennis Healy for example.

A: That is not the cable that they showed me.

K: It would be miraculous if my people did anything the way I want it. I want a couple cross-section, a few editors and publishers and a few politicians. I don't mind having Healy for dinner. As long as you have Healy there.

A: To balance it off.

K: And I will not have a chance to see Healy otherwise.

A: You want about 16 people or do you care if it is a little more.

K: I don't care.

A: Between 10 and 18. No spouses. It will be just the personages themselves. That is the way you want it.

K: Anything you think is better is fine with me. If you would like to have 24 with spouses that is just as well as 18 without spouses.

A: Let me put together a draft list. Who knows your wishes best.
K: I'm beginning to wonder.
A: Kx Do you want me to talk to Sonnenfeldt or Eagleburger.

K: You better have Sonnenfeldt there. Eagleburger would be the best.

A: As far as drawing up the list.

K: Yes. The sort of cross-section that Pamela Hartwell would get together.

A: Is she somebody you would like to have?

K: Yes.

A: She entertained us last week because of her friendship for you.

K: She gave a great party for me the last time.

A: Politicians, academicians, a few of the Bank of London types.

K: You can have a few editors and publishers.

A: We counted on that. We will have a cross-section. I will go a little heavy on editors and publishers.

K: I would really like to find out what they are thinking. You can have a little more of the editors and publishers than of the other types.

A: Okay. You are coming in from Belgium that afternoon so would 8:00 be okay.

K: Yes. You can make it stag or not.

A: Let me line up some names. If it looks like a good balance, we might. I will not make any moves until I have talked to Larry. Shall I let him know about your schedule with Callaghan?

K: Yes. It is that Callaghan realizes I would come to him first. Don't you think that is important?

A: Yes, I do. Just so he knows he is number one. You have been asked by these other 2 people and want to do it, in concert with him afterwards or anytime if he doesn't care.

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K: Invite Dennis ~~Healy~~ to dinner if he can make it.

A: I will try to get Dennis Healy. He and Callaghan ~~xxkx~~ are getting along pretty well.

K: He is a bully and likely to be prime minister and a old friend of mine.

A: He is a very attractive friend of mine.

K: Thank you.

SI 276 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Meg Osmer
5/17/76; 2:04 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Listen, Meg. I would never in a million years have agreed to an interview if I had not thought you would show this on your first day as you told me you would. I had no reason to give 2 back-to-back interviews.

O: From my point of view when I asked you to do the interview and talked about it in terms of your birthday I thought it was a good peg and we had no idea you were doing an interview with Barbara. What could we do when we saw the same things coming out Sunday night. My office is screaming and yelling with me.

K: You knew.

O: I didn't.

K: I would never have done it for anyone but you.

O: I appreciate that.

K: I would have had it in my house. It just is not right.

O: When I spoke to you yesterday I said I did not know about the Barbara thing. It makes it difficult for me to hold it. I would never have done it. I have always kept my word. I have never gone back on it and never would. When I spoke to you about doing it I had no idea there was a commitment.

K: I still did not think there would be any problem. You said it would be strictly personal.

O: I cannot not ask.

K: You said it would give you a chance to show Nancy.

O: It does. It is very nice.

K: But by the time this thing goes on I feel in a way I have been had.

O: So do I and I don't want you to. I am taking slaps from everybody here at ABC.

K: The easy way would have been to have an interview 2 weeks from now. I thought you wanted it for my birthday.

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O: I didn't know what you were doing. The only thing was the thing about the resignation. Everything else is in keeping with what we said. Exactly as we said.

K: I would not have particularly agreed to come on this Thursday.

O: I am only under fire because of what happened. I didn't know there would be anything to do.

K: There is probably nothing, Meg, to do.

O: I called the White House at 6:15 this morning and asked them to let me know when you got up so I was the one. They said how can we quote NBC if we have it.

K: If i had thought anything like this could happen, I would have said I will not go into that. Then you would not have had anything.

O: If I had thought this was going to happen I would have done it 2 weeks from now. You know me well enough to know this is the last thing I have wanted to do. I have wanted to do Nancy.

K: I talked Nancy into it. She doesn't like to go on TV.

O: I have wanted to do it for a long time. I have tried not to be aggressive about it. I had no idea there would be anything intervening to create any problem. You have got to believe it.

K: I think it is bad for us to put on a long tape that is about 2 minutes.

O: It is no 2-minutes clip.

K: You are doing a whole question and answer thing tonight.

O: It is 40 seconds. It is not 2 minutes. I put on 30 seconds this morning. That is all. It is not 2 minutes. I would have done anything for this not to have happened. I have always trusted you and one of the foundations of our relationship is that you have always trusted me.

K: I would never have done it if I was not very fond of you.

O: You can understand the position I am in.

K: I would not have done it if it was going to be on the evening news. It is not fair to Barbara. You are knocking Barbara.

O: I am not.

K: Tonight NBC I suppose will run Barbara Walters and you will run Meg Osmer. The American public will think I am straining to get out. Except for CBS which is climbing the walls.

O: I will tell you all I can do.

K: It doesn't make any difference if you cut it.

O: You are saying don't put it on at all.

K: That is my view but I know you can't sell your people.

O: I fought them not to put the whole thing on this morning. I have done nothing but fight battles all day. When you left yesterday I said I don't know if I can hold it. You said could you try to hold it until Thursday. The argument was let us use a piece of it on the evening news.

K: I think it is a gd outrage. NBC and ABC tonight are going to have clips talking about my resignation. You are both killing me. If Ford wins tomorrow all of the Yahoos are going to say it is because of my policy of resignation.

O: Do you think it is going to make a substantive difference if we just talk about the story. Barbara released it last night.

K: She had every right to.

O: If she puts that on and has her interview, if by some stroke of generosity I can convince them to keep our clip off, do you think that will make a substantial difference? Can I put this on Thursday?

K: Yes. It is a strictly different story then.

O: This Thursday.

K: Yes.

O: If I can get this commitment from them, they say you are going to do another interview.

K: I will not give another interview. But I will promise CBS something after you.

O: Believe me I didn't ever think you would do a substantive interview and I have wanted to do Nancy for a long time. I asked in terms I felt in good faith. I have never told you that was not the reason and my intentions.

K: There is no question about your intentions. I did it because you said it would be a nice human piece because it was my birthday. If you take the significant thing out it looks as if some one talked this way saying in effect what Rogers Morton said. It is giving 2 interviews to 2 different networks saying slightly different things.

O: In a way if we put the whole thing on tomorrow it takes the curse off.

K: If you put the whole thing on Thursday it is not what we agreed to do but I can live with that.

O: You have got to appreciate the facts. I did not know all the facts then that I do now. Now did the brass.

K: Only because I have talked to you. You would be in an even more untenable position if I had not talked to you. Why would I have given an interview yesterday if I had not believed in good faith it would not have been showed until the 27th. How could it serve my purpose to be on 2 shows in the same week. If you had done it on my birthday you could have said look today is Henry Kissinger's birthday and showed him and Nancy together. Now it looks like Kissinger is pushing it like a book of _____. But if the price is not to have something tonight, I am willing to accept it. To have 2 people talking about my resignation totally out of context it will look as though this guy panicked and got every girl to interview him this weekend.

O: If I could sit on it I will. They think they have been burned.

K: They have been burned. Except for you they would not have one square inch of film.

O: I agree with you. You leave on Wednesday. When do you come back?

K: A week from Thursday.

O: I will check and see what I can do. Can I call you back? Are you going to be there?

K: Yes. You got them a gd interview with Nancy which nobody has gotten.

O: It is lovely and charming and she looks delightful.

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K: All of these make perfect sense if it doesn't get sensationalized.

O: I have been arguing your point of view. It is delightful and I think we should let it be and stop getting caught in Barbara Walters' backwater. I am trying to give you some idea of what I am up against.

K: You tell them I will never go on ABC again if they are going to _____ on this. You have to tell them what you told me. There must be a minimum of honor.

O: I will call you right back.

SI 273 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Fred Dent
Sec. Kissinger
May 17, 1976
8:35 a.m

D: Henry, Good morning.

K: How are you Fred.

D: I am just back yesterday evening from Helsinki and on Sat. afternoon Ambassador Austad and I mentioned to Pres. Kekkoken -- the Amb. had been authorized to mention his visit forthcoming to Washington in early August. The President reacted so spontaneously about it.

K: He is a hell of a guy.

D: He certainly is. The other thing I was in Gotenburg making a speech. I saw the cable that came advising of expected demonstrations on your forthcoming visit. I wanted to suggest that you get a strong evaluation that if it is going to take place it would certainly be disruptive to relationships there where we are planning on opening a Consulate General in Gotenburg. The cable was from Stockholm. If there is a nasty mess in Stockholm I think it would be unfortunate for you naturally and for over-all US-Swedish relationship and unnecessary as far as you are personally concerned. I wanted to suggest you get a good strong evaluation.

K: It will remind me of Washington. I do agree with you.

D: I think on the whole, it is on the up and up. I met with Volvo and SKS(?). They have a problem with the Fed. Trade Commission. I will call Calvin(?) over there and talk with him about it.

K: I appreciate your saying this and I will take a look at it.

D: Fine. Thanks for returning the call.

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SI 277 *

TELECON
Margaret Osmer/Secretary Kissinger
May 17, 1976
2:50 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

O: I have told them I will not deal with the story.

K: They are stealing something under false pretenses.

O: I have done all I can.

K: What do you mean? When you make an interview that is embargoed til May 27 and then break it...

O: It was not. When we discussed it coming out of the elevator, I said it would be a problem to hold it til May 26 because of the Barbara Walters interview.

K: I didn't agree with it then but Inever gave my permission.

O: I have told them to get me offof it. I have told them I think this is incorrect and I would notdo it.

K: Who is the President of ABC?

O: Bill Sheehan. I have been discussing it with the Vice President, Bill Lord.

K: I will never to dnything again for ABC. They will not get the time of day in the State Department while I am here.

O: I appreciate that. The decision is not in my hands. I have argued with every sense of logic and honor I have. I think they are making a mountain out of a molehill.

K: Ok.

O: You have got to believe me.

K: You are honorable and I believe you have done all you can.

O: You have to.

K: I believe you.

END

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SI 287 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Funseth/Secretary Kissinger
May 18, 1976
Time: 6:49 p.m.

K: I have read your transcript -- you have turned it into a real political issue. They will all say the White House turned me off.

F: They said it was your own decision -- that is what the wire services have been saying.

K: Why couldn't you have said the only dates that were open were the 3rd and 4th and when I reflected on it there was no way I could give a speech that close to the primaries because it would look like a political speech.

F: I said the fact that you would be in Europe until the 27th and if you spoke in California it would be too close to the primaries caused you to change your mind.

K: What did the wires say?

F: They ahve reported it straight. They haven't said any of that.

K: They are saying at the White House that they turned me off.

F: They asked me and I said it was your own decision.

K: I never discussed it with the President -- why couldn't you have said that?

F: I said I am confident you made the decision on your own. They said did he discuss it with the President. I said I don't know, but I will ask him.

K: Who asked?

F: Koppel, Landry and one other one. I haven't seen that played on any of the wires. I think the key was that I said I am confident he made the decision on his own.

K: O.K.

F: Hello.

K: O.K. Thank you.

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SI 284 1*

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Funseth
5/18/76; 4:25 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Did you say I had cancelled my California plans?

F: Yes, Sir. There was only one question. They wanted to know whether you had talked about it with the President.

K: No. Did you tell them that?

F: I said I didn't know. I said I would ask you. I put it in the context the way we talked about it. They were trying to see whether he had ordered it or whether you had ordered it. I said it was your judgment your office should remain non-political.

K: I don't want to make stories the White House talked me into it.

F: No. It was purely your decision.

K: Okay.

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SI 283 1*

TELCON
Geo. Shultz
Sec. Kissinger
May 18, 1976
8:55 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: George, how are you?

S: Pretty well, You looked well last night and Nancy. I thought your answer to the question on your possible continuance in office next year was very artfully done and I think that was just right. I think you hit it just right.

K: Good.

S: On that paper. I have a plus and minus about it. I don't think it has enough focus to satisfy Giscard and I would say first that the initial part about Italy is good and the way it is described is the way to handle it and it is important and he will understand that all right. But I think that this north-south business is something that the conference out to focus on and I think this reflected one of your earlier views that it is time to sort of fish or cut bait on this issue. There are just a hundred balls in the air now that various people have thrown up there. Seems to me in this kind of conference in a very brass tacks sort of way the leaders should say now we have to stop indulging in ideas nd see what operation we are willing to do and agree on it and try to get behind it and that requires some good staff work. It is possible for anyone to say can you possibly get prepared by that time. I think with intensive effort if they work in good faith if they are told they will. Something could be produced that would be useful.

K: On north-south.

S: On north-South. I would be inclined to wrap Africa into that package. I understand that Giscard has a special interest the re but after all the Japanese have a special interest in Asia. We have a special interest in Latin America. Why single out Africa. I would just include Africa in there and say so and work with Giscard on that. He wants to be the chief African. Fine. Let him be. I think it is an important focus of attention and that hard staff work, and I have some optimism on that because there are so many ideas in there. Which means that everbody has been thinking about it. The ideas are different but not all that different. It seems to me there is a lot to work with. Itis not virgin territory by a long shot. I would be inclined to put a lot of emphasis on that.

K: O.K.

S: Beyond thatit seems to me that the Rambouillet group can take a little credit for the wrodl economic expansion that is

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going on. It probably cannot over do that but that was the purpose of the first one and things have gotten a lot better practically everywhere since then. And there is the inflation question to be concerned about and one could register on that. The other possibility is in the trade area and you and Hal arethe only people that I have mentioned this idea of Schmidt's to. Whether some version of that of joining the United States and the Common Market is something you would want to put forward here I don't know.

K: I think it should come from the Germans.

S: It is a potentially exciting outcome in the sense of the idea being put forward. I would not go into this little section on European Community. I don't know whether Brent caught up with the fact that I brought that subject off my little piece of paper after you and I talked. I think Giscard might find that offensive. I did not bring that to my discussions with Shmidt and Callaghan.

SI 288 1*

TELECON
Mr. Rogers/Secretary Kissinger
May 18, 1976
Time: 7:08 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Those idiots in my outer office say you are having the OAS papers rewritten.

R: We are trying to improve them.

K: I never read them you know.

R: I know. I am just trying to improve the quality.

K: Oh, o.k. That's fine. Thank you.

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SI 289 1*

TELECON
Mr. Eagleburger/Secretary Kissinger
May 18, 1976
Time: 7:12 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

E: On the basis of a pool interview they are projecting a comfortable lead for Ford in Michigan including a break on the democratic crossover.

K: Did they have anything to say about my cancelling my speeches?

E: I didn't watch it, Henry. I just got this report from my political poll watcher.

K: O.K. Good.

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SI 286 1*

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Carla Hills
5/18/76; 5:03 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

H: It occurred to me th at as I was leading the delegation it would be extremely helpful to get 10-15 minutes of your time to get your advice and of what will be accomplished by this State Department-HUD conference. I have been working with your staff.

K: ~~Axcix~~ If I were to tell you I don't know what the damn H_____ conference is, is it going to finish me?

H: You could point the things.

K: When is it?

H: May 31 through June 11.

K: I am leaving tomorrow. I will be back on the 27th. Is there time enough if we ~~g~~ meet then?

H: Yes, I think so. I think this comes right in behind your Nairobi conference and that I talked to Bill Scranton but we ought to at least have an idea what we are trying to sell. We are sending a lot of government people out there. It ought to be useful to have some uniform position. Any ideas off the top of your head.

K: I would like to think about it. I don't want to bluff you. Let's meet on the ~~29th~~ 28th.

H: At your convenience.

K: Good. Nice to hear from you.

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SI 291 1*

TELECON
Ambassador McCloskey/Secretary Kissinger
May 19, 1976
Time: 9:08 a.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: Long said to me at the French dinner if we had senior personnel up there we could have gotten that thing reversed. If we can get a senior person up there now, he said, we could still get it reversed.

M: Robinson would be the natural one.

K: I agree. I said to Long you can't have the Secretary of State on every issue. He said he didn't want the Secretary of State. [redacted] B6
[redacted] So on this happy note. B6

M: O.K. I will see what we can do.

K: O.K. Good.

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SI 295 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/~~Bill~~ Phil Geyelin
5/28/76; 12:30 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: Bill, McCloskey is calling ~~Bill~~ Ben Bradley about the Nicholas Von Hoffman column which is a new low.

G: I have to tell you, I have saved myself the trouble by not reading it so I don't know what offense has been made.

K: That I have styled the Lebanese affair to try to keep it going. I am trying to raise some hell about Mozambique.

G: ~~Can't~~ You want to raise hell about that?

K: Yes.

G: Why?

K: The money was appropriated by Congress last year. Secondly, the money is being given in order to help Mozambique as a result of the cutoffs of its rail lines to Rhodesia. It is given in food aid, not in cash, and some other commodities. Third, we are desperately attempting to get some handle and by getting the moderates like Nyerere and Kaunda to deal with the Mozambiques so they don't permit the Cubans and foreign countries to deal with them directly, we have to show some signs of good faith. If the U.S. cops out the Rhodesians are going to get slaughtered. Arnold de Borgrave was worried and I said go down and he says they can't last 3 months. I think that is exagerrated. I think we should give the moderates something they can argue with. If it wants to go with the Soviets and Cubans $12 1/2 million is chicken feed.

G: We felt like recommending a debate.

K: In the way it is playing into the hands of the bigots like [redacted] B6
A year from now whoever is in office is going to be grateful for what absolutely has to happen. I talked to the conservatives in London--not the labor people -- they feel there is no alternative to the road we are going.

G: Yes.

K: We are trying desperately to keep Mozambique from throwing itself more in totally with the Angola-type situation.

H: All right. Let me review it.

K: I know you are not going to undo the editorial.

H: We have in the past.

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K: I keep praising you so when you write one totally out of the ballpark you have got to give me a chance.

G: All right.

K: Maybe we can get together..

G: I have not heard as much explanation of it as you have given me in the papers.

K: That is true because it is _____ in this insane Republican debate going on.

G: How is your morale?

K: Mine is fine. When you reach a period you might as well do it right because nothing else does anything.

G: Are you going to be here?

K: For a week.

G: Maybe next week.

K: A breakfast with you and whomever you would like to bring.

G: Meg.

K: I happen to like Rosenfeld.

G: They are going on a tour of 5 capitals.

K: This Sunday?

G: I hope you have alerted your ambassadors. It started out with your wife.

K: Katherine told me they are going. I think it is a good team.

G: They are going to Lisbon.

K: Are they going to Egypt?

G: No. Lisbon, Rome, Madrid and Paris.

K: I was hoping they would go to Egypt and Syria.

G: Meg knows quite a little about the Italian scene. You might want to

sound the alert. They are liable to cause all sorts of incidents. Have you briefed Katherine?

K: I have not, to tell you the truth.

G: All right. I would love to come over with Steve next week.

K: We will fix a time.

SI 293 1*

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Mr. Habib (EA)
5/28/76; 8:12 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

H: Good morning.

K: Which of those great _____ have you got working for your told Lester Wolf we are going to recognize Communist China after the elections?

H: Nobody. What is happening is the President is saying we are going to complete normalization.

K: And then you have to explain what that means, right? Because he might have a margin of maneuver.

H: No. Les Wolf says he got it from a senior official. Win Lord and I testified before the committee.

K: What did you say?

H: The same old crap.

K: What is your definition of the same old crap?

H: The constant repetition of what you and the President have said for the last 9 months to such an extent that nobody asks us any more.

K: And it is what?

H: That our relations are governed by the Shanghai Communique and as the President has said when they ask when, you say there is not any timeframe. This goes on and on.

K: We know it goes on and on.

H: I don't think anybody said to Les Wolf we are going to recognize it after the elections.

K: Why do you have to say it means we withdraw recognition. That is a subject we have just not reached agreement on yet.

H: Withdrawal recognition? I don't think I have ever said that.

K: Or what are the boys trying to prove?

H: I don't think so. The witnesses yesterday were Ray Cline. You can imagine what they had to say. He is convinced -- he has got to say you could have done this or that or the other thing in 1971.

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K: Ray Cline doesn't worry me.

H: The only officials that have said that have had to be Win and me.

K: Who else?

H: Who knows?

K: I don't know.

H: People in the government.

K: They are quoting people in the government.

H: You have said there are . . .

K: I have always said there are a number of issues that have to be settled. And they have not been settled yet and if your boys could say that, we would be better off. If they weren't running to the Democratic side, which might not win.

H: That is not what they are doing. They stick to the book. This question comes up all the time. Just as it does with you. Every press conference. They know the answers.

K: Why is it a newspaper story.

H: Because yesterday at the hearings Zablocki said this and Les Wolf followed him. This was a subcommittee here. This was the guidance we put out.

K: I didn't see the guidance.

H: We have always said you don't say one word that has not been said by the Secretary or the President.

K: We know after all what ~~this~~ your boys want.

H: No. My boys don't really want that. They see the problems as well as anybody. The whole question of the issues involved has been discussed in every forum.

K: Let me see the guidance.

H: I told them to show you the guidance today. I said the Secretary has to see it in the morning before the press conference. Because the question came up yesterday. He had to go with the old guidance. He took a stupid

question. What evidences of progress have we made in the last 6 months. I told our guys I don't want a recounting of the details for the reason I don't want to give Reagan ammunition to flog the President with.

K: Not unless it is absolutely necessary.

H: Funseth or Brown should have it in his hands already.

K: Okay. Good.

SI 302 | *

TELECON
Mr. Atherton/Secretary Kissinger
May 29, 1976
Time: 1:55 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I am assuming that Murphy has been called off?

A: Yes sir. I sent the cable right out to him. He was asking for permission so he would not have gone ahead.

K: I don't see any point in it.

A: When he presented your points he said he hoped Asad would reply directly to him. The ball is in their park now.

K: If we force them into a too quick reply we are stuck.

A: There is one problem -- he is due to leave on the 10th for his home leave. He should probably mention this to Da'oud without making any specific points to the fact that he is leaving.

K: Yes.

A: However, I said he should take no initiative about meeting with Asad.

K: O.K. Fine.

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SI 300 1*

TELECON
Mr. Rogers/Secretary Kissinger
May 29, 1976
Time: 1:00 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

R: The complete set of the talk ing points and the toasts will be in the office in a minute or two. The group is working on a revision of those which will be ready later in the afternoon.

K: What are they sending up?

R: The present drafts.

K: Is it the one I commented on?

R: They are sending the talking points for Santiago and the toasts for Santiago and Bolivia.

K: Right. Since the duplicity of the foreign service is beyond belief are they just sending back the papers that I have already commented on? The first batch I have sent down for revision.

R: You commented on the Equadorian toast that has been revised already.

K: What are they doing this afternoon?

R: They are revising the talking points on the cooperation for development issue. They can send it up by the end of the afternoon.

K: Why don't they do that and you have an agreement on the explanation?

R: Yes.

K: What does it say?

R: First, it is our understanding that the text makes clear the preparatory conferences occur before the negotiating sessions. The list of products whether we are for it is not necessarily the list that will be at the negotiating session. Why don't I bring the whole text up?

K: O.K. Good.

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SI301 i*

TELECON
Mr. Greenwald/Secretary Kissinger
May 29, 1976
Time: 1:49 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I am assuming you are redoing the OECD speech?

G: Yes, we are doing a part of it. It has been parcelled out. We should have the drafts to Hill by the end of the day. We promised it to you by Tuesday.

K: Because there is a new draft of the north/south section.

G: Yes, that is right -- we have incorporated that.

K: There isno point in reading this then?

G: Yes, don't read it. We will have the full text for you on Tuesday.

K: Good I am not expecting it until Tuesday afternoon.

G: Yes sir.

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SI 299 *

TELECON
Mr. Rogers/Secretary Kissinger
May 29, 1976
Time: 12:49 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

(MISSED FIRST PART)

K: ... talk ing points for the Latin American trip which I wanted revised and the toasts. I must have them this weekend; it is the only time I can work on them.

R: They should have been there last night.

K: I only have the scope papers that are not worth reading.

R: I was assured they would be there last night.

K: I haven't seen them. Can you let me know within the next half an hour. I am planning to go early today. How about the UNCTAD paper?

R: We are agreed about the explanation. I think we can sell it and I think you can go along with it.

K: I hope there isn't too much chicken shit in there.

R: We are trying to keep it out -- as much as we can. I don't think it will destroy the advantages he has been able to preserve.

K: Who is there?

R: The whole group.

K: Treasury -- who is there from Treasury?

R: Bestine, but he is in touch with Jerry by phone.

K: Good, Jerry is a good man. Call me back in a few minutes about this -- will you?

R: I will shortly.

K: O.K. Good.

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SI 304 i*

TELECON
Mr. Rogers/Secretary Kissinger
May 29, 1976
Time: 2:25 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How about those cables. I asked to have them sent to key Latin American ministers.

R: I will get them up to you. They haven't come in yet?

K: I haven't seen them.

R: I will be sure to get them to you within the half hour.

K: I hope we can avoid the Panama issue.

R: I have no sense that it will come up. There may be a proposal for a resolution which we may be able to join.

K: Like what?

R: That negotiations are going forward.

K: Even that may be too strong. It doesn't accomplish anything.

R: It makes them feel better and reminds us, which is its purpose.

K: We don't need to be reminded of Panama.

R: As far as I can tell no one has a chip on their shoulder.

K: Can we do a cable to Silvera and a few others asking them to help us have a conciliatory session.

R: That is what this will be. We are going to do one to Silveria, Blanco and the Venezuelan.

K: O.K. Thank you.

R: Good. We will get it up to you soon.

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SI 303 1*

TELECON
Mr. Eagleburger/Secretary Kissinger
May 29, 1976
Time: 2:05 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

(MISSED FIRST PART)

K: How are you?

E: I have an upset stomach today. I must have eaten something yesterday.

K: Larry, that African paper looks like the usual crap they give me.

E: I haven't had a chance to read it.

K: It looks like they are hustling their normal rotation off on me.

E: You remember some weeks ago you told Schaufele to clean it out.

K: Yes, but he is only moving people around in the African Bureau.

E: That is unacceptable.

K: I want new people brought in there.

E: It will change on Monday. If they are just moving them within the Bureau that is unacceptable.

K: How much of this is routine. I think 80% of it is. And then all they are doing is moving people around in the bureau.

E: I will take care of it first thing Monday, Henry. Not all of it is routine.

K: And I want all the Ambassadorial recommendations by Tuesday.

E: O.K. I have them but I want to goover them. They are on my desk.

K: I want them by Tuesday.

E: You will have them.

K: They are only showing me percentages and I am sure that 80to 90% of it is routine.

E: I will have to check the figures they gave me. They were going to have a 45 % shift.

K: O.K. Make sure it is within the Bureau.

E: It isn't acceptable any other way.

K: O.K. Thank you.

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SI 306 *

TELECON
Mr. William Buckley/Secretary Kissinger
May 29, 1976
Time: 2:50 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

B: How are you?

K: O.K. and you?

B: Just fine.

K: I have two requests.

B: Of course.

K: One is, I would like to write a letter to your brother but I don't want to send it to his office. Can I send it through you?

B: Of course. Mark it personal and send it to my office.

K: Good, I will send it next week some time. It isn't unfriendly but I want to make one or two personal points. Tell him I will still support him for Senator.

B: Have you seen what Pat has said lately?

K: Yes, Pat has said a lot of right things [redacted] B6

[redacted] B6

B: Did you see the letter in the Times yesterday in answer to the 65 graduates from Yale?

K: That I rather agreed with.

B: He wasn't criticizing you.

K: Pat won't attack me personally and I won't do anything against Pat personally. When I say I will support your brother I mean he wouldn't want public support from me.

The second thing is Parade is publishing an article saying that I am challenging Reagan to a debate and I want to tell you what I am doing about it. When I was on the West Coast Parade said they wanted to take pictures for a layout. While he was taking the pictures he was bantering around and I might have said I would be willing. I never intended it to be an interview. This thing won't be published until tomorrow. I am issuing a statement this afternoon saying I am not challenging Reagan; that I consider my office non-political and also that I have cancelled two speeches I planned to give in California as being too close to theprimary dates. I am sending a copy to Reagan.

B: By letter or cable?

K: By cable. I would not like to get into a political debate with

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Reagan. I have cooled all my political activities.

B: You would like him to ignore the Parade episode?

K: Yes. I would like that. I will issue a statement. Let me read it to you. (READS STATEMENT CONTAINED IN SCOWCROFT TELECON)

B: That is well worded. It gives nothing away while maintaining a formal position.

K: It isn't challenging him and he doesn't have to give anything away by ignoring it either.

B: The Parade person isn't acting as his agent?

K: If he were to challenge me himself I might have to change my mind -- but no he isn't acting as an agent.

B: Brenan asked me to ask you if you would be willing to appear with him on Firing Line. I thought I would ask you, however I felt you might decline. He will be talking about strategic weapons.

K: I would say no. I don't consider Brenan a political person. I don't think it is appropriate for my office however. I resent the situation that I am being maneuvered into a position that I am in favor of a low Defense budget however. I have been pushing high Defense budgets -- I never cut a Schlesinger budget. In fact I kept some things in that he wanted to cut out.

B: What would you do if you were Foreign Secretary in Great Britain having to mix it up with the gang.

K: Right now I feel I would rather be Foreign Secretary any place than in a country where people condemn a man for supporting things they support.

B: Preferably in Athens.

K: I don't know enough about Athens and Sparta to make a comment. I have done some research however, and found that Athens lost its wars through over-extension.

B: Don't tell the Vietnamese gang that argument Henry. Bless you.

K: If you could get word to Reagan ...

B: I will get word to him this afternoon.

K: Tell him I am issuing the statement and sending him the text in about 1/2 an hour.

B: If I need to get ahold of you?

K: You can call me through the White House.

B: Alright. Good.

K: O.K. Bye.

SI 297 1*

TELECON
Mr. Atherton/Secretary Kissinger
May 29, 1976
Time: 9:43 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I want Murphy not to request an appointment with Asad. The Syrians have our proposals they do not need to be pushed.

A: I wasn't aware that he was suggesting this.

K: Oh, yes we don't get the same distribution on cables. It says that now that UNDOF has been settled I am requesting an appointment with Asad to receive their proposals. Now why the hell...

A: When he made a presentation to Da'oud he said he would like to make an appointment and get a response...

K: You will get a message off to him this minute saying he should not request an appointment. When the Syrians have something to tell us they will. We should not press them. You will get an answer off.

A: Yes sir.

K: Parker is going to Amman. He is not to discuss the HAWK deal. Why is he going?

A: For the Jordanian Development Conference. I will make sure he knows not to discuss the HAWK's. I can't imagine that he would.

K: I wouldn't be surprised if he was put up to it.

A: I will get that word to him....

K: Yes, but get word to Murphy first. I am assuming it will be done within the hour.

A: Yes sir. I will be in the office before then.

K: O.K. Good.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 05 JUN 2003 200102979

SI 310 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Robert Funseth
Sec. Kissinger
June 1, 1976
3:45 p.m.

F:...I didn't get a sandwich until 3:00. The briefing ran late with the Rogers thing.

K: Did they respond -- did it get attention.

F: Yes, I think it did. They asked good questions and I think it is getting good play. I noted the Reuters lead -- "The US bluntly warned the less developed nations against going along with the communist lead economic proposals."

K: Good.

F: The Lebanon thing was the main thing asked at my briefing.

K: Did it come out as a joint statement of State and Treasury.

F: Yes and I think Rogers did very well.

K: It made clear that it was by the two Secretaries.

F: Correct. The second paragraph was a joint statment by Secretary of State Kissinger and Secretary of Treasury.

K: Good.

F: I think it came out the way you wanted it too.

K: O.K.

F: I got in when asked about Lebanon what Edmund and Blont (SP) said about you that Washington is supporting Syrian partition of Lebanon -- I denounced it as a lie.

K: Good. Thank you.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 13 AUG 2003 200102979

SI 312 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Atherton/Secretary Kissinger
June 1, 1976
Time: 6:59 p.m.

K: Do you know when Ramadan is?

A: I believe it is in September.

K: It certainly isn't September. Could you find out. I would like to move that Iranian visit to August.

A: O.K. Let me check.

K: Can you call me right back.

A: Yes, and I will give you a call back.

K: O.K. Good.

Mr. Atherton/Secretary Kissinger
June 1, 1976
Time: 7:06 p.m.

A: Ramadan is August 22 to September 24 with the holidays three days after that.

K: We could go to Iran then in early August.

A: Yes.

K: Do you think that will create some heart burn?

A: On the dates we have sounded out?

K: Yes, I am just concerned with running to Europe, running to Iran, running back to Europe to give a speech and running to Puerto Rico.

A: It may create some problems, but we could explain your reasons and work it out. Have you seen the telegram about an armored care from Malloy for (Maurice).

K: Yes, I think I am in favor of it.

A: If you agree I am inclined to go directly to the agency and save a lot of time.

K: Yes.

A: O.K. Thank you sir.

K: O.K. Good.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 30 MAY 2003 200102979

SI 313 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Stabler/Secretary Kissinger
June 1, 1976
Time: 9:56 p.m.

S: Two things if I may. The King thought if you were agreeable the best thing would be for you to see him Friday morning then he could take you off by himself for a chat. It would be up to him to maneuver the private meeting.

K: What time?

S: 9:00 because then he is going to the White House to say goodbye to the President.

K: He wants to see me. I know that EUR is opposed to this.

S: Maybe EUR is but not myself. The King talked to me about it...

K: I have to see whether they have scheduled some time for me with the President.

S: For that morning?

K: Yes, is he seeing the President three times?

S: He is seeing him in the morning then going by the White House to say goodbye at 9:45. If it would be agreeable to you you could have coffee and then he will arrange to take you off for a private talk.

K: O.K.

S: If this is alright I told him why don't you mention it to the Secretary when you see him tomorrow. He said he would do that. I think it is the best way.

K: O.K. Good. Does that give us enough time.

S: At 9:00 it would give you 35 minutes which I think would be enough.

K: O.K. Fine.

S: He may want to suggest a bit earlier. I think he will mention it to you tomorrow. The second thing is Ariolta (sp) wants to see you alone.

K: You act as if you had never been in this building. I only have to shoot Sonnenfeldt and Hartman. What's his point?

S: He feels more free to talk about things than if some of his people are hanging around.

K: Don't we have something scheduled?

S: There is a 4:30 scheduled. The only unclear thing was whether he wanted to see you alone or the usual.

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K: Does he want the 4:30 alone?

S: Yes, he said 1/2 hour if that was agreeable with you.

K: That is fine.

S: We will set up a briefing of others about what happened in the NATO meeting.

K: What do you mean.

S: We have the usual post-NATO briefing of the Spanish.

K: Who will do it?

S: Get Arthur to do it, since you will be...

K: Let Arthur stress that I urged the admission of Spain.

S: Yes, that would be something that Ariolta (sp) would like to hear from you also.

K: O.K. That would be fine.

S: Thank you.

SI 315 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Mr. Atherton
6/2/76; 1:25 p.m.

K: Somebody in your bureau must be talking their foolish heads off again.

A: What happened?

K: Look at the Gwertzman story and those that say we consider the Syrian move helpful.

A: I am puzzled by those.

K: Bernie is a careful guy.

A: I know and I am not saying he talked to anybody here. I think he quoted Administration sources and he was not trying to reach me.

K: We are going to take a teriffic beating in Egypt if it looks like collusion.

A: I am recommending we do a message to Fahmy.

K: Let's not think; let's do it. What are the facts?

A: They are not altogether clear. The intelligence people are trying to sort them out. It seems a battalion or so went into the North maybe 400 and the troops dug in on the Lebanon side of the border have deployed further West along the Beirut road and in the valley. And they perhaps have additional troops that came across but nowhere near the numbers the press have been putting around.

K: We don't want to give the wrong signal to the Syrians either.

A: I think we have to continue saying what we have been saying.

K: We have to say we consider any foreign intervention to be extremely dangerous and if it increases the risk of escalation increases too.

A: I believe we have to and I will talk to my people here but I don't think any of my people here are taking any other line.

K: Okay.

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SI 317 *

TELECON
Mr. Ken Freed/Secretary Kissinger
June 2, 1976
3:40 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

F: You met with Dobrynin yesterday. Did you get anywhere on SALT?

K: You can assume we always discuss major subjects. But I don't think it is a good idea to give out what is discussed every time I meet with an Ambassador.

F: I understand, but I thought if there was some involvement there.

K: We are talking on background, I would just keepthings where they are.

F: Ok. Anything new on the Cubans --you said maybe in a week or so.

K: It is too early, we are still analyzing it.

F: Does it look good?

K: It is too early for us to tell. There is something going on but then what develops, we can't be sure.

F: You are not pessismistic?

K: We have no evidence that it isn't true. When they use Palme as a intermediary, they don't want to lose any friends, so I think they want it to go on.

F: I talked to you about doing a story..

K: Are you going on the trip?

F: No, Barry is.

K: Let's wait til I get back. I don't have time before. I will do it when I get back.

F: Ok.

END

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TELECON
Ambassador McCloskey/Secretary Kissinger
June 2, 1976
Time: 5:05 p.m.

K: When can we tell him the thing is coming to a vote.

M: We are trying to get it to a vote next week. We have the two committees locked over the procedural matter of whether a waiver is required. The budget committee is trying to discipline the foreign relations committee because we got it up there late. We are going back to the Foreign Relations Committee tomorrow.

K: You think within two weeks we can have it?

M: Yes, we may have to ask you to call Muskie at some point.

K: O.K. Thatisfine.

M: O.K.

K: O.K. Thank you.

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SI 318 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELECON
Ambassador Zahedi/Secretary Kissinger
June 2, 1976
Time: 4:30 p.m.

[redacted] B6

Z: Yes sir. I am at your service.

K: I cannot do it at the end of June because of that summit meeting. I will come the first week of August either the 5th or the 6th.

Z: You haven't been to the Caspian have you?

K: No.

Z: Good. His Majesty may go to the Caspian. He would then fly you to the Caspian so you will stay there that night and go water skiing the next day and...

K: I am crazy about His Majesty and I will do almost anything for him, but water skiing I will not do.

Z: O.K. How long will you stay?

K: Let's settle that closer to the date.

Z: I would be the 5th or the 6th. It wouldn't be less than two days?

K: That is right.

Z: Thank you for the advice you gave me. I told His Majesty and he agreed he shouldn't pay any attention to it.

K: I am working with him. I keep telling him he has ruined it and he is more cooperative.

Z: Well, his Majesty has agreed not to ask....

K: Oh, about the other thing. Oh, Anderson. You shouldn't -- I am seeing Bush today and I will see if he can issue a denial.

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Z: He talked to him yesterday and had someone talk to someone in the Embassy. I think everything is alright. If they want to deny it it is alright but I don't insist.

K: What was it Simon said last year? What was the word he used?

Z: I don't dare to repeat it.

K: [redacted] B6

Z: Yes.

K: Now we have to confirmations.

Z: Right.

K: You have to give the Shah my affectionate greetings. He is one of the few world leaders for whom I have high substantive regard. If he had a country of 200 million we would all be better off. Come to think of it, if he had a country of 200 million he might conquer the world.

Z: You don't want me to tell him that?

K: You can tell him that. You don't think he would mind that?

Z: No, I think he would like it.

K: Tell him I said it with affection.

Z: I have talked to him yesterday. I said it again and he knows it. He also speaks of you affectionately. I will see Waldheim for lunch. If there is anything I could do?

K: What is the subject.

Z: The Shah is giving the 50 people a dinner and Waldheim is giving them a luncheon tomorrow for a few of us. We will discuss different matters.

K: I have nothing in particular to give him.

Z: Have a great time until I have to honor and privilege to see you again and give my respect to Nancy.

K: O.K. Ardeshir. See you soon.

SI314 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Lloyd Norman (Newsweek)
6/2/76; 1:20 p.m.

N: Sorry to break in on what apparently is a very heavy day for you but thought you could fill me in on some details of Golda Meir's visit with you.

K: What interesting details?

N: If she came up with any new ideas.

K: I didn't ask her to.

N: I thought maybe she did.

K: It was a review of the situation as she saw it. There was no attempt to come up with anything new.

N: Did she say anything particularly noteworthy?

K: We are old friends and I don't think we should go over that.

N: I thought it was light or jovial or something you could talk about.

K: I would just as soon not and I appreciate your calling.

N: I appreciate your calling back. Thank you.

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Habib/Secretary Kissinger
June 3, 1976
Time: 5:00 p.m.

K: There was a letter here which has disappeared again that Mallog asked me for a dinner on the 29th.

H: Yes.

K: I assume that since he is an ally you have turned it down?

H: No, we put a memorandum to you suggesting that you accept it and I thought you had accepted it.

K: I haven't see that yet.

H: It is something you should do.

K: I think so also. There is something that the damn Afghan...

H: The Afghan wanted to give a dinner, but they would be satisfied if you dropped by at their reception.

K: Can't we have a lunch for the Afghan?

H: Yes, you are doing that, but they wanted to do something for you.

K: Couldn't they do it the next day?

H: I think you aren't free the next day.

K: O.K. See whether some of the fools around me can straighten it out.

H: I will get right on it.

K: O.K. Thank you.

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SI 324

*

TELECON
Mr. Lord/Secretary Kissinger
June 3, 1976
Time: 7:37 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: To make your life easier I have got yesterday the President said he has to give a speech -- it doesn't matter where -- in which he wants to list positive things in our foreign policy. I thought we could slap together eight or ten of the more boastful things in that speech and send it to him.

L: Which one is that?

K: The Buchan one.

L: That is mostly European -- you want it in the global sense?

K: Yes, basically that things are going well. Maybe Peter can do it.

L: Ihave him work ing on the Buchan speech. We will get it done.

K: Don't put any real investment into it.

L: What they need is the substance? In what form should it be? Are we talk ing about a few pages.

K: Six or seven pages of what is right with American foreign policy.

L: Should it be fully developed?

K: No, I think extended talking points or an outline.

L: We can do that.

K: I have gone through the Dominican toast -- are you responsible for that.

L: Yes, along with Rogers.

K: It isn't related to the previous agenda and needs a paragraph on why each of the proposals are important.

L: O.K.

K: O.K. I have written some comments in the margin and I will leave it here.

L: I held up the development one because it needs more work.

K: O.K. Good thank you.

L: We will get on that right away.

K: O.K.

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SI 320 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec. Kissinger
Wm. Rogers
June 3, 1976
9:35 a.m.

K: First, on this Hurwitch cable from the Dominican Republic about the credits, why can't we do this?

R: I am trying to do that. I am going to go back to Bill at Agriculture and tell him we really want to do ti. I am taking a strong crack at it today. It is a lunatic, idiotic, petty thing we should be able to clear away. I am making a special effort with Bill. If it does not work with Bill I will ask you to ca-l Butz.

K: Right. Second, on whether anyone should be present with Penochet, let me thing about it.

R: I don't feel passionately about that. If you want to have no notetacker or a junior officer notetaker.

K: If a notetaker is present, it will be you. I am not going to have a junior officer notetaker. But doesn't he wish to meet alone.

R: Popper said they would not be terribly unhappy about the suggestion of a notetaker.

K: They won't be anymore unhappy 24 hours from now. Who is furnishing the interpreter? He or we?

R: I am underthe impression either way.
an interpreter
K: If we have/~~axxxxxxxxxx~~, we will a notetaker. Hervas is good and an effectivenotetaker. I could work with him afterwards and would not be too bad of an arrangement.

K: I will thing about it. I would like to have a serious talk with him and since I am not on the same waive length with you guys on this business. I just am not eager to overthrow these guys.

R: The issues are absolutely separate. Who governs Chile and what they do about human rights. They use it as a leverage against the government. Theother is corruption.

K I know but I think we are systematically underming them.

R: We have been pretty forthcoming if you look at our record on aid,

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K: You and I can talk about it on the plane and I am sure that they will let us do it if we would let them know from the plane want they?

R: I think so. No great rush about it.

K: There are no black tie dinners, right?

R: None from beginning to end.

K: What have you arranged for Silvera?

R: You are having dinner with him after his reception. He is delighted at the prospect. He mentioned he would have to stay at the reception until about 9:00 or so.

K: We could have dinner about 9:30.

R: Yes. That would be time for dinner.

K: Is that with wives or a working dinner.

R: Either way. We are putting it up to you.

K: What do you think?

I think it makes more sense as a working dinner.

R: I think so. We have a lot of business to talk with him about. It is not just OAS , the General Assembly etc.

K: I lean toward a working dinner. I don't want to see De La Flor the night before I leave. Can't we switch him and the Urguayan.

R: Sure.

K: I think it a good idea to see a left-winger on the same day I seen Penochet.

R: I had notthought of that. A nice point.

K: O.K.

R: I think we can do that. Let's try.

K: O.K.

SI 323 *

TELECON
Mr. Barry Schweid/Secretary Kissinger
June 3, 1976
Time: 6:03 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

S: I have been trying to get a couple of minutes with you so I can do an advance on the Latin American trip -- that can have some quotations from you -- what are your objectives, what you hope to achieve.

K: Let me see whether we can do it....

S: I know you have to get out of town tomorrow. I have to write the story tomorrow at the latest. I have two and three minutes in mind. I don't think....

K: My problem is I have to get a hair cut right now. Will it take five or 10 minutes.

S: Yes, 10 minutes but possibly closer to five.

K: How late can you stick around here?

S: I can do it on the phone. I can put three or four questions to you right now.

K: I can't do it now, but how about 6:45. If I don't call you, you call me.

S: OK. Thank you sir.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
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SI 325 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Atherton
Sec. Kissinger
June 4, 1976
10:55 a.m.

K: When you raised the task force level thing with me the other day I did not know it was going to be publicly announced.

A: I did not either.

K: God-Damn it that is what I have associates for. Nor did I realize all of the ships were going to leave.

A: I was assured they would not -- those with evacuation capability. There was no discussion re the announcement. It was not authorized and I understand there was great embarassment about the whole thing at the Pentagon.

K: Is it true.

A: The carrier force is still within a 48 hour response, but it is in a different location. Off Crete and off Italy.

K: How the hell can that be?

A: I don't know I have been in touch withthe NSC Staff since yesterday to say it has to be back where it was promised and to get out a correction at the Pentagon that the announcement that gave the impression we were abandoning the whole evacuation.

K: Call up Clements and say I want it done within the next half hour.

A: Good. That will help me to reinforce it. I assure you I have been trying since yesterday to get it back to where it is supposed to be.

K: They don't pay us to try. There is a noteof conspiracy in this Department not to tell me these things until they are in the press. Why wasn't I told.

A: I am sorry about that. I thought it had come to your attention.

K: How can it come to my attention automatically.

A: We are working on it.

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SI 326 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. James Reston/Secretary Kissinger
June 4, 1976
3:07

R: I saw the George Gallop poll -- it says you can stay around.

K: I haven't seen that.

R: He says the latest nationwide survey says Secretary Kissinger is much more of an asset than a liability to President Ford.... (Reston reads article). A large number of Democrats as well as Republicans want him to remain in office.

K: What are the percentages?

R: (reads percentages)... 50 percent approval.

K: That is amazing.

R: Why?

K: Well, after 6 months of assault it is about constant.

R: I told you nobody reads the papers.

K: It has been between 50 and 52d percent almost constantly.

R: When we talked last, you mentioned the possiblity for a compromise in the Middle East. Are you putting forth any such compromise to both sides?

K: Yes.

R: How far along is it?

K: It hasn't moved. This is on deep background -- because the Arabs are so preoccupied with Lebanon.

R: What is new about it?

K: Whether something less than total peace can be negotiated for less than total return of the territories -- but on all three fronts simultaneously.

R: What about Geneva?

K: I don't see much chance for Geneva -- certainly before the election.

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R: What are you planning . Are you going to take 6 weeks off this summer?

K: No. I am going to Latin America next week and then I will be back . Will you be in town?

R: Yes.

K: Why don't we have lunch or breakfast?

R: Sure. How long will you be there?

K: I am leaving Sunday. There is an OAS meeting.

R: And then you go to Europe.

K: Yes, for the OECD meeting.

R: And Puerto Rico.

K: Yes.

R: That takes you to the end of June.

K: Yes, but with a week in between.

R: And what are you going to do in July?

K: I will be here.

R: I thought you would be going to the convention. How do you see this thing working out politically? Do you have any feel?

K: I was bothered by the Carter phenomenon but he gives you the sense that he is using the forces but not part of it. Jerry Brown gives the feeling that is he part of it.

R: It is outrageous. He has said not a god damn thing.

K: And REagan has said plenty but it is all outrageous.

R: When you have finished it will be Ford and Carter. The risks of dumping either are too great. I don't think they can do it.

K: I don't either.

R: I have never seen such opposition among the Jews for a leading candidate as Carter. It is evangelism.

K: Almost irrational.

R: Have you seen the statements from the American Jewish Community? The ones about the Jews and Carter?

K: That is stupid.

R: I think so.

K: I don't know Carter's views but I don't think the Jews should oppose people because they are Christians.

R: He is an odd fundamentalist.

K: What worries me is the cold-blooded opportunism. His evangelism will be put into whatever he considers opportune. If religion has any role it is to give him the opportunity to do what is expedient.

R: Yes. When you get back I will give you a shout.

K: Good. I would love to see you Scotty.

END

SI 329 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Mr. Rogers (ARA)
6/4/76; 3:51 p.m.

K: I have serious doubts about a joint Panama statement.

R: I am not happy about it at all. It will be after you leave town and number two, it is bland. Nothing ever gets covered from these general assembly meetings in the press.

K: Except this may. Could you get in touch with Scowcroft and get him to clear it in the White House.

R: I will be sure he sees it and rub their noses in it to be sure they get it.

K: Okay.

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SI 328 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/George Meany
6/4/76; 3:19 p.m.

K: I just wanted to suggest to you if there is anything you can do to help the Spaniards to help them create a democratic labor movement.

M: I had a talk with him yesterday.

K: He told me.

M: We have some contacts. We think we can help.

K: He is worried about the Communists getting control of the labor units. I think he is sincere.

M: Okay. We will do what we can there. We are going to get a couple of guys to go in there after the ILO meeting.

K: Our message seems to be getting across.

M: It is but we have got this damn PLO thing. They have not given up. We have a good crowd there and they are working together.

K: Talk to you soon, George. Thank you.

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DATE/CASE ID: 12 AUG 2003 200102979

SI 332

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Amb. Schaufele
6/5/76; 5:22 p.m.

S: Did you see the Nyerere letter?

K: No. Why should I?

S: He sent a good actual letter back and I asked S to pass it in to you.

K: Where are you -- at home?

S: No. I am here at the office.

K: In your briefing yesterday I thought you were too tough on the Rhodesians. Instead of saying never, never is there a _____ _____. why not just say if it leads to a reasonable conclusion we are willing to consider it.

S: I didn't say that -- they all reported that.

K: If everybody reports that, then the presumption is that is what we said. It doesn't make any sense. Say that conditions are not right for it now but if that is the way to bring about a conclusion, of course we ~~will~~ are going to do it. Now we are going to be accused of picking on the Rhodesians.

S: All right.

K: Secondly, I understand ~~this~~ you changed the terms of sale of two C-130's to South Africa.

S: I have just found out about this this afternoon.

K: Who knew in this building.

S: That is what I am trying to find out.

K: Who did it.

S: I think Department of Commerce.

K: Do you think it is a wise thing to do at this moment?

S: No, it is not a wise thing to do at this moment. The memo was prepared this afternoon while I was away and I don't know all about all the details at this point. But I don't see any sense why they went ahead with this or . . .

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But
K/ Who is "they?"

S: That is what I am trying to find out.

K: They have to be AF people.

S: Presumably AF people were involved with it.

K: How can we walk that back though.

S: I am on top of it now. I think we can probably walk clear of that.

K: What do we do about Rhodesia now? I don't want to have a news statement but I do not want the Department to keep saying we will never talk to Rhodesia because it is illegal. The British talk to Rhodesia and consider it illegal.

S: That is right and I carefully refrained from saying that.

K: What did you say?

S: I said we are not planning to meet with the Rhodesians. Then they asked whether it doesn't make sense if we didn't meet with the Rhodesians. I said well it may be done in the future and it depends on the meeting with Vorster and future developments.

K: I have no quarrel with ~~that~~ this. But just loosen it up a little bit and say if it is helpful but we don't want to talk just to talk. If it leads to and if of course is practical and if all parties agree to it, we may consider it.

S: Okay. We can get that out.

K: I may want to see you. Are you still going to be here in half an hour?

S: Sure.

K: Okay. Good.

RELEASED IN PART
B2 SF-181

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Larry Eagleburger
11:35 a.m. 6/5/76

K: Have you got that cable?

E: I'm just dictating it now. I can have it over there n a sealed envelope for you to look at in a half hour.

K: All right, now what I want is to refer to the breakfast conversation, say some of this is now seeping into the press as an Egyptian view, it happens concurrently when the Israelis are pushing the same point, of course they know it will lead to an endless delay--now it is xxxxxxx essential that if they are serious about what we discussed in Salzburg if they stopped this supercleverness--

E: Okay

K: And that he should talk urgently to Fahmy and let me know what he says.

E: Okay, I see what you mean. And I'll have it up--hand delivered over there, but I'm not going to send it through the machine I'll have somebody x bring it over to you within half-hour.

K: How are you going to get it to Eilts.

E: [redacted] B2

K:

E:

K:

E:

K: Okay.

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RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Ed Carter
6/6/76; 9:40 a.m.

K: I am glad you are still talking to me.

C: I have been trying to tell you Taft Schriber died.

K: I heard. I don't know what happened. B6

[redacted]

C: I am going to find out. I am in New York. I called to talk about the grove. Are you still hopeing to come?

K: It is the 24th, isn't it?

C: Yes. The weekend of the 24th. You are scheduled currently for a lakeside speech at 4:00 on the 23rd.

K: That is Friday.

C: Yes. Reagan asked to speak and they would not let him. He is not planning to come for the weekend of the 23rd. He is in our camp. He is planning to come the weekend of the 30th, not the 23rd.

K: He doesn't bother me. I think he is such a phony. He doesn't mean what he is saying. I have known him. If I wanted to come the weekend before. If anything happens, could that be arranged?

C: I think so. It is the first weekend of the grove and considerably less interesting. I believe you would enjoy the 23rd more but we could arrange it the 15th or 30th.

K: Okay.

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C: I have engaged you for dinner at one of the camps at night. Breakfast will be at our camp Saturday morning. At another camp is lunch Saturday noon. Dinner is at the camp with the Bectals and George Shultz will be at and seem anxious to have you. The one we are having lunch Saturday at David Rockefeller will be at.

K: Where would I stay?

C: I believe you would have a good time when you come.

K: That is no question. I know you don't permit telephones in the camp. How do we set up communications?

C: We will have to have a car standing by to take you to the Civic center.

K: And I can have a staff there?

C: I am sure.

K: I would have to have somebody there to cover the telephone.

C: Is there any problem on security?

K: They will probably want secret service in there.

C: Will you have the secret service get in touch with me and tell me what the requirements are?

K: Do you permit them?

C: Generally not.

K: I better do that.

C: I remember Bill Rogers came with you last time and I don't think he had any secret service.

K: He didn't have as much protection as I have.

C: That is the only problem I can contemplate. We ought to get it settled.

K: I will be in touch with you next week.

C: I am going to Europe Monday.

K: So do I.

C: Are you going Monday?

K: Sunday.

C: I am going to Copenhagen, Amsterdam and London for a week. My office will know where I am.

K: I will be in London at Claridge's on the 25th.

C: How long will you be there?

K: Two days.

C: We arrive the 28th.

K: I have got the German Foreign Minister calling me on the other line. I have got to go.

C: Okay.

SI 336 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Day(NEA)/Secretary Kissinger
June 14, 1976
Time: 7:07 p.m.

K: Have you seen this cable where Fahmy saw the press reports on our meeting with...

D: Yes sir and I have sent up a short time ago a proposed reply to him. The Israelis put out word both for the meeting there and here and said what it was about.

K: Let me see that reply.

D: Yes sir. I will find out where it is and get it right in to you.

K: O.K. Good.

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SI 335 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Mr. Sonnenfeldt
6/14/76; 2:45 p.m.

K: On that Giscard appointment, is there any chance of having them do it in the afternoon?

S: I can check it. They are leaving sometime in the late afternoon.

K: I see.

S: But I can check.

K: Or early in the morning.

S: I can call and see.

K: At any rate I will do it and chance my schedule.

S: I understand. Let's see if I can reach him.

K: Or at 12:00, on the meeting with Giscard.

S: I had a call from Kinkles. Schmidt has ruled out Hamburg. They cannot take the security risks because it is in the middle of town and surveying hotel space and will get back to us. It was a complete surprise to Genscher but he would meet over the weekend and they decided they could not take the chance.

K: That sounds hard.

S: I cannot figure it out. I did you a memo but I don't see what we can do.

K: I can't believe that.

S: Very strange. It is no more of a security risk than Munich was a couple of times you were there.

K: And they were going to give a social function, weren't they?

S: Yes. They have you more tightly locked up wherever they are looking now then if you were in Hamburg. I asked if they reached the conclusion Hamburg is out and they said absolutely.

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K: That is humiliating.

S: We never mentioned Hamburg.

K: They said Breman or Hamburg.

S: They said Breman instead of Hamburg because it was in a large park and best from the security standpoint. But would have to be Hamburg if they could not accommodate our people.

K: Maybe we should do it in Paris.

S: I don't know what to do. Genscher is traveling. We will have to wait.

2:50 p.m.

S: They will do it at 9:30 or 3:00, but let me know.

K: Three would be the best by far. Will you tell him 3:00 is the best.

S: Yes. I told him later is better.

K: This just looks ridiculous to me. They knew it was Hamburg all along. I cannot believe they made up their mind only at the last minute or Schmidt did not know it.

S: It is all very baffling. I could try to call Schuler but it was kind of unusual in that Kinkles himself is travling with Genscher but his assistant was saying categorically as though they had been given a word from the Chancery.

K: Do you think it is due to the fact I insist the meeting be in the consular.

S: I cannot believe they are that petty.

K: How would the security be different since we were in the same downtown hotels.

S: They always said it was right in the center of town and it had some problems whereas in Breman it would have been in the park. You have gone to Berlin.

K: I am not going to Berlin.

S: I mean you have been in Berlin.

K: The second question is how did anyone in this building change it -- why was this still open.

S: Somebody had the impression you wanted to wait.

K: I didn't give a damn whether they proposed the Imperial Palace in Brunswick.

S: This is what I told these people. Then there was a memo from Schaufele to you to hold the thing open.

K: It is going to be mortifying to us to chance our travel. When are they coming back to you?

S: As quickly as they have a place [redacted] nailed down.

K: I don't want to be in the same hotel with Vorster.

S: Yes. I can say if it is such a problem maybe we ought to do it in Paris. It is awkward since it was announced. I can try and call Schuler.

K: Find out what is going on.

SI 338 *

TELECON
Ambassador Von Staden/Secretary Kissinger
June 15, 1976
11:38 am

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Mr. Ambassador

V: Good morning Mr. Secretary.

K: I just have an AP announcement from Germany which sayd because of the intensity of the proposed talks as well as the importance of achieving results . . . the government has seen the need to meet in a quieter atmosphere. . . (Secretary reads ticker item). I don't normally call you but I would like to make an official protest against such outrageous behavior. The idea of meeting was first raised by me with Genscher in NATO -- saying if there was any embarrassment I would not raise it. He told me on Sunday in Bonn that he had discussed it with Schmidt and they wanted to do it. He then said to help the Social Democrats we should hold it in Hamburg or Bremen and Bremen would be best. But we could not find two hotels (I don't want to be in the same hotel as Vorster) in Bremen so we moved it to Hamburg. Your government even designated the hotel we should use. The first hesitancy I heard is in this announcement and now your government is announcing we are moving it before we have discussed it.

V: The difficulty I have -- it is difficult for me to react immediately. I was told by Mr. Rufus that a lot of telephoning had been going on between himself and the Foreign Ministry and Sonnenfeldt as far as the location was concerned.

K: But it never occurred to me that you would make an announcement before we discussed or decided on it.

V: I have to check what really happened. Could you tell me if you have the number of the AP.

K: Number 19.

V: From today.

K: Right.

V: I am going to inquire immediately.

K: I am seriously considering moving the thing out of the Federal Republic.

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V: That would be very grave. Let me try to get the facts together.

K: I was told Schmidt or Genscher wanted to give some social event for the delegations. I don't give a damn -- but this sudden change in signals... I am not going to have our foreign policy caught up in your signals.

V: The last sentence about the reluctance -- that was a piece comment.

K: Yes.

V: It was not part of the official statement.

K: No, but the official announcement about the results -- I don't appreciate being put on the spot. There can't be any results in the first meeting.

V: I will go and look into this immediately and hope to be able to give you a reaction.

K: You can tell them I am ~~not~~ going to put out the sequence of events if this keeps up -- thought not the part about the party in Hamburg. ~~But~~ Buton how the sequence took place.

V: I will be back to you and I consider this most regrettable but we will have to see what the government sources really said.

K: They had no business saying anything without our approval.

V: It depends on the details of how it came out -- whether it was a statement or a reaction to a question.

K: It could have been said that for security reasons, your government has considered another location rather than because of the intensity and importance of the meeting. You know we can't achieve results in Hamburg as well as anywhere else -- the site makes no difference. They now have us between Nuremburg and Munich and I can't imagine what hotel they could use.

V: They told me they had solved it.

K: How about Furth? They have some great hotels. We can meet at the Rad House.

V: I don't think they are up to that.

K: I don't think so. Suendorf (sp?) is another metropolis.

V: I don't even know that one. It is too bad and I was glad we had the opportunity to offer the facilities for this meeting. But sometimes it is just bad luck that something comes out in this way.

K: Get in touch with me or Sonnenfeldt later. But tell them I am not a bit amused.

V: I will

END

SI 340 *

TELECON
Mr. Joe Califano/Secretary Kissinger
June 15, 1976
Time: 4:55 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

C: How are you, Henry?

K: I am in good shape.

C: Listen, I am calling with respect to Coca Cola and something that has happened in Cuba. From two different areas Coke has gotten signals from Cuba -- one directly from the Cuban minister of finance and commerce who had been seen by a Mexican national who runs Coke in Mexico in connection with a football game. That one was renewed within the last month or so. They past word they would be interested. Secondly, through Colombia. The Cuban attache in Colombia said to a Coca Cola bottler that we would be interested in having Coke come into Cuba.

K: We would be violently against it.

C: You would. Well here is why I am calling. You know how much they want to get in there. You and I talked about this some months ago, but Herbie Jones who probably you don't know, went to Cuba with Mancowitz and they got interviews with Castro. He went on television and said Pepsi would soon be in Cuba. He said he was working through an Italian company to get them into Cuba. Austin was watching this and then these other things happened a few weeks afterwards.

K: [redacted] B6

C: Austin would like to go to Cuba, but I take it you don't want him to go?

K: I don't want him to go. It will give all the wrong signals. I will tell [redacted] about this, but I don't think he is as likely to listen to me as you are. B6

C: Well I guess there is nothing -- there is no way to do it but there is no way that he will do it without licensing. He won't let them do it if it is a problem. I don't know if you can have any inpact on [redacted]. Herbie Jones made some money off of interviewing Castro and now thinks — well, is there any way you can get a message to [redacted]? B6 B6

K: This I will do. I will tell him we will make it as hard as possible for him if he goes ahead. [redacted] B6

C: I would rather have the [redacted] in the world. O.K. Henry, take care of yourself. B6

K: You will be doing your best to take care of me.

C: We will have a lively few months. I think Reagan has a better than 50/50 chance of getting the nomination.

K: My hope will be to keep foreign policy from not being to devisive.

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I think if the democrats get in, they will be doing most of what we are doing. You think Reagan has a chance?

C: Oh hell yes. I think he has a tremendous chance. Some think he is going to get it.

K: I read your article in the Post this weekend. I thought it was very good.

C: It seems arrogant for people to be preparing -- you can't just come in.

K: They will be assailed by conflicting pressures, the democrats. You have so many premadonas in the democratic party.

C: I think you will be surprised on the foreign policy thing aside from an over-simplification of the defense debate and isolated issues that may explode over the Middle East, etc. I don't think foreign policy will be a major issue.

K: If they keep it to that platform I don't have to rush out to defend our foreign policy. Why on Africa?

C: Just a problem -- it can always explode there or in the Middle East.

K: I don't think that the democrats would be less for majority rule than the Lusaka Speech.

C: No, I was using it just in case it explodes. I don't see it as a major issue aside from the Defense budget. Those I think will be and they are debated unrealistically -- everyone knows you can't transfer defense spending to the domestic budget. Even two years out 75% of that budget he won't be able to touch. I would like to be ablt to tell him...

K: It was a very good piece. You can tell him that I will get in touch with [redacted] B6

C: O.K. Henry. Thank you and bye.

K: Bye, bye.

SI 343

*

TELECON
Senators Humphrey-Javits/Secretary Kissinger
June 15, 1976
Time: 7:43 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

H: This is your loyal agent.

K: And good friend.

H: Just a minute I am order up something more important than State Department business -- a cocktail. If you are taping this, please erase it.

K: I don't tape anything over here.

H: I have Javits and Case here. We have most everything in the bill resolved and I know it will met your general approval. On the human rights we dropped the House concurrent resolution and on the Export licenses under the 25 million we cancelled that, the ceiling is out -- all the major items have been taken care of. We worked out the thing on Chile permitting/Export-Import Bank and providing for spare parts.

K: How about the pipeline?

H: What did we do -- we left the pipeline in and took out spare parts. The big issue is on the Symington one.

K: Yes.

H: One of the people from the NSC came over. You understand that what we have provides only the kind of discipline the IEA would impose -- that the recipients sign up with them or some multinational organization when available. We have been told by the NSC that if we keep this provision in he will recommend a veto of thebill.

K: I haven't seen the actuall text of the Symington thing. I have a note here that says the Congress/adopt the Symington amendment in a form which would deny assistance to Brazil and Pakistan.

H: Only if they didn't sign up for the IEA inspection or if they didn't have a reprocessing plant.

K: That they would do.

H: They don't have to ratify the nuclear non-proliferation agreement. It says a recipient country wouldlose its economic assistance and all of its assistance if it received nuclear materials and reprocessing equipment and didn't join a multilateral organization or come under the aegis of the IEA. We thought that there should be some emphasis on bringing these countries into the framework of multilateral organizations.

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K: I don't know whether the agency does the inspection or whether they follow the procedures of the agency. I am worried about giving you a conclusive statement if it means that countries that accept IEA safeguards would be included but if there is some hangup there that I am not aware of.

H: Let me put Jack on and let you tell him the same thing. Jack...

K: As I understand the agreement between Brazil and the Federal Republic it involves IEA safeguards, but they are bilateral. Both are following the safeguards of the IEA.

J: Do they both come into agreement with the IEA?

K: I would just have to check. When do you need to know?

J: We are meeting at 9:30 in the morning.

K: I will let you know before 9:30 tomorrow.

J: You should let me know tonight. We will still be in session. Maybe you could get a fix on it and let us know.

K: O.K. Fine.

J: Just a moment let me see if any of the other guys wants a word withyou. Here is Hubert.

K: Hello.

H: When would you suggest that you call us?

K: When do you want me to call you?

H: We will be here at the Senate for the next one and a half hours. I will be in my office after that.

K: I will try to call you within the hour. If not I will call you in the morning.

H: We have finalized everything else. Every provision you had has been dealt with -- this is the only concern we have. You have everything but the capitol.

K: (Laughter) In Chile we think they are moving in the right direction now and don't want to kick them in the teeth.

H: The Chile Amendment is the one that the House proposed to us which modifies what we had in the Senate. You will have no difficulty living with it. You have the Import-Export Bank, you have PL-480, you have economic assistance if they make progress which you and the President certify. You have damn near everything you asked for.

K: I am seeing you for lunch on Thursday?

H: Yes. We need to get this thing settled.

K: O.K. I will call you tonight.

H: Thank you Henry.

K: O.K. See you soon.

SI 344 *

TELECON
Ms. Kay Graham/Secretary Kissinger
June 15, 1976
Time: 7:50 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

G: I wanted to bother you about a matter of information about what you thought could be done. There is a freedom of press issue in Spain. The magazine there has been operating since 1971 when they changed press laws. A man whom we met Sallas started a modern magazine and it is the best thing in Spain. It is like Newsweek or Time.

K: Yes.

G: We had lunch with this guy -- very bright -- and he told us that they were being sued because they printed something about the Government torturing someone. We talked to Praga (sp) about it. At the same time there were two silly issues that got them into trouble -- one was the travelling King and the other was a cartoon of him dancing. You couldn't understand what the issues were. We had lunch with Praga (sp) and suddenly there was a meeting and a suspension of this guys magazine for four months. He called me and said he wishes I could do something because this is unprecedented. I said has it happened under Franco? He said once for three weeks because of the violence issue. The background is that the Minister of Information is threatening to resign over the issue. He is baffled and said maybe Arias was nervous because of the King's visit. Howeverthe Council of Minister's decision took a neutral stand. The Foreign Minister and Justice and Commerce ministers are their only friends. I said I didn't know what I should do but I can get our people to write an editorial so I called home and there is a story by Stringer in the Post yesterday about the matter so I really thought I would ask you if there was anything else that I could do or that you could do.

K: Let me look into it and call you tomorrow night where will you be?

G: I will be here.

K: Let me call you at a more reasonable hour tomorrow night.

G: I will be out from 11:00 to 12:00 to dinner, but leave a message.

K: O.K. Are you having a good time?

G: Depressing and alarming. Alarmed about the state of democracy over here. We have been to Spain, Portugal and Italy and now here it is alarming also, isn't it.

K: It is not good.

G: But it is interesting and we have had a good time.

K: I am glad.

G: I gather in between a succession of trips.

K: Yes, after July first I will be here for a month.

G: How is Nancy?

K: She is fine. She had a good time in Latin America.

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G: Thank you for calling back.

K: I will talk to you tomorrow.

SI 337 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Dep Sec Robinson
6/15/76; 2:45 p.m.

B6

R: I just had a call from [redacted] who said his good friend [redacted] is meeting with you. B6
He is scheduled at 5:00.

K: Yes.

R: He wanted to forewarn me he is interested in becoming Ambassador to [redacted]. B6

K: Oh, Jesus.

R: I know we don't have an opening there and there is undoubtedly no possibility. He is an outstanding personality.

K: There is absolutely nothing I can do for him.

R: I just wanted to forewarn you.

K: I can't understand people applying for jobs.

R: I thought you ought to be forewarned.

K: I am very grateful.

R: That is one of the primary subjects.

K: Are you coming to the OECD meeting?

R: Yes. What time?

K: 6:30.

R: I have that reception. I sent you a memo. I knew it unlikely.

K: If you want to do something for the Department you ought to see I get your memos. For whom?

R: Representatives for the 6 countries.

K: I will come up.

R: If you could be there it would be very helpful.

K: I will come up.

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TELECON
Ambassador McCloskey/Secretary Kissinger
June 15, 1976
Time: 7:55 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I just had a call from Hubert. He said they made all the demands except on the Symington Amendment. It now reads assistance is denied to countries who accept nuclear materials and don't accept IEA safeguards.

M: It looks like the Amendment may penalize Brazil and Pakistan.

K: They do accept IEA safeguards, don't they?

M: I think Brazil does, but not Pakistan. It seemed that they were giving something to Symington as this is his last term. He will be leaving at the end of theyear. I don't think we could do better.

K: Can we tell him to go ahead with the Symington part the way it is?

M: I will have an opinion the first thing in the morning.

K: They want it tonight.

M: O.K. I will get that for you tonight.

K: O.K. Thank you.

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TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Mr. Sonnenfeldt
6/15/76; 3:15 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Have you seen that the Germans have now announced that they have asked us to move.

S: No. Guess that is to protect themselves.

K: They made a public announcement saying because of the urgency of the meeting, the intensity of the discussions, they are uneasy and need to achieve the result they are urging both participants to select a more secluded place. I think it is a g d outrage.

S: I don't know what we can do.

K: I have protested to Von Staden and will move it out of Germany.

S: Maybe you should talk to Genscher. I guess they felt they had to get off the thing of Hamburg.

K: If they had said for security reasons.

S: They don't want to admit that -- they have domestic problems. As a practical matter they are supposed to survey it and tomorrow morning . . .

K: I almost certainly will move it. Have we heard from the French?

S: They have still not called back. I am sure it is going to be all right.

K: If we move to _____ or _____ it would be another blow.

S: I don't think that will be much of a problem. We have had one run thru on the communique. They think the text is much too combative and the French have a text on no confrontation, very positive about Nairobi. There is going to be a bracketted text.

K: We sure as hell will not have anything positive about Nairobi.

S: I made that very clear. Unless you want to call Genscher, I think we have to sit tight.

K: Except I am very inclined to move it.

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S: I think we have to hold out to see what the report is tomorrow on the facilities.

K: I don't give a damn what the report is. It is outrageous behavior.

S: They felt the heat.

K: What heat?

S: Genscher panicked. Schmidt didn't consult the Chancery at all. Schmidt said you guys discuss it and didn't pay attention to it.

K: They said they wanted to give a social event.

S: Yes. That must have been Genscher because it might be a fiasco to them.

K: How.

S: Demonstrations.

K: In Vienna?

S: With the South Africans no matter where you go.

K: Switzerland?

S: Maybe less so. But it is a novel thing for him to be traveling around Europe and nobody knows who is going to show up.

K: Paris?

S: I think it would be the same everywhere. Rather than start fresh with another government.

K: Paris has the great advantage we could do it right there.

S: I think the French would have great worries when it was announced. I think we have to grin and bear it and see what these guys say in the morning.

K: I am extremely annoyed.

S: I don't blame you.

K: Where they have us is right next to the Austrian border.

S: Next to the Czechlosvakia border. Between Nurenburg and Munich. I don't think it is much of a problem. It is secluded in the woods somewhere.

K: We are 70 kilometers apart.

S: The meeting place is 35 from each place.

K: That is right.

S: That part should not be too bad.

K: On those roads. It is at best a 40-minute ride.

S: They will have cops to clear the road.

K: Even then it is 40 minutes.

S: I don't know what we do except wait until tomorrow morning.

SI 341 *

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
June 15, 1976
Time: 5:30 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I wonder whether we can make some soundings about moving it.

S: Who would you like to pick?

K: What do you think?

S: I really thing that Geneva is better. Kreitsky's first reaction would be to find out what the Austrians think.

K: The Germans put out a statement saying that security had nothing to do withit.

S: They can't admit that.

K: Why didn't they ask whether we could make that statement?

S: We announced it was in Hamburg which they agreed to and they figured that they had better get off the hook. There was an article in Der Spiegel...

K: What did it say?

S: I don't know yet, I haven't gotten a copy. They did mention it to me and I think of all the possibilities...

K: We don't have a good location in Geneva.

S: We have a mission there.

K: It is in an office building.

S: I have no idea what the hotel situation is there. I could talk to the Swiss Ambassador about some other locations.

K: Don't you think they will buck whatever we do?

S: The Swiss less likely than others. There are two calls from the Germans -- Hermass (sp) tried to reach you.

K: Me?

S: Either you or me. I am trying to get him back. Hansen is going to call me also.

K: Why don't you find out what they say.

S: OK.

K: O.K. Thank you.

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SI 349 *

TELECON
Ambassador McCloskey/Secretary Kissinger
June 15, 1976
Time: 8:12 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

(MISSED FIRST PART)

M: What we could accept were if it were transferred into a resolution but we should not accept it in the bill. We did tonight give them some alternative language.

K: Would you do me a favor and call Humphrey with this. If I translate your language it may be inaccurate.

M: Sure, I will do that right away.

K: O.K. Thank you.

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SI 342 *

TELECON
Ambassador Von Staden/Secretary Kissinger
June 15, 1976
Time: 6:04 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

V: Good afternoon Mr. Secretary. I am calling you because I got a message from Bonn and a second message from Helsinki where Foreign Minister Genscher is at this time. He was informed of our conversation this morning. I will read you a statement which was issued by the Government and a personal message from Genscher.

K: Yes, please.

V: I will read the Government statement which says: The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany welcomes the meeting between the American Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa. The Federal Republic of Germany considers these talks a useful contribution to a peaceful solution of the problem. It has been informed of the meeting and has rendered its assistance for a meeting in the Federal Republic of Germany. A suitable location will be confirmed and published in joint agreement. Minister Genscher adds these thoughts which I would like to read to you in German. I am not sure of my translation into English.

K: The danger of your not being precise is practically zero, Mr. Ambassador.

V: Thank you, Mr. Secretary, you are very kind. The Foreign Minister had instructed the State Secretary to call you but he wasn't able to get through (reads statement in German). The translation is: As from the beginning, he welcomes the scheduled meeting and assumes it will take place in Germany as previously discussed. It isn't for us to determine our own role in this context.

K: We will get a report tomorrow about the location and we can make a decision after that. It would have been easily settled if we had been in contact earlier.

V: I only learned this morning in my conversation with the Chancellor's Foreign Policy Advisor from contacts that took place yesterday evening with regard to the location. It was my understanding and I talked to him before you called me that it was only security considerations which played a role here. I still don't understand how this formulation...

K: The security considerations we can understand, because we can not afford to look as if great results will happen there.

V: This is understood. The statement which the speaker made said with regard to the location that it will be confirmed and published in joint agreement.

K: Why don't we make the final decision tomorrow. I have to tell you we are now looking at Geneva because the whole setup -- 70 kilometers apart, 30 kilometers -- we are having someone look at the place tomorrow.

V: From what I learned from these to messages and from the telephone conversations which we had they are most anxious to have it as previously discussed in Germany and I think I would miss my duties if I did not say it probably would cause a great disappointment.

K: I appreciate this very much and we won't do it friviously, but we will be in

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touch with you tomorrow before we make a final decision so you won't read anything in the papers before we decide it.

V: I will certainly inform our people back in Bonn.

K: First I want to get a report about the location and what our people think of the location of these places.

V: I understand.

K: Then we can make a final decision.

V: It was my feeling and I think the Chancellor shares this that we were most anxious to have it in the Federal Republic.

K: We will not change it lightly.

V: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

K: O.K. Mr. Ambassador.

SI 348 *

TELECON
Mr. Robinson/Secretary Kissinger
June 15, 1976
Time: 8:13 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I can't get Simon who is on the Washington Monument grounds. I have left word at his house to have him call me.

R: I think it is important that you get him before the announcement comes out. He is prepared to release it.

K: Will you call Parsky for me to say we are adamant on it. I will talk to Simon and we will be glad to have a review. I have taken it in the case of Brazil but this time it has come too far.

R: I have made both those points but I will call him again. I will reconfirm our position. They are going to argue this as a joint working group but that is just playing with words.

K: Tell them we can set it up some other time.

R: Fine, I will get in touch with him. I will take care of it.

K: O.K. Good.

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SI 369 *

TELECON
Mr. Richard Valeriani/Secretary Kissinger
June 16, 1976
Time: 6:55 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

V: Thank you for calling. Is it safe to interpret your statement that the United States won't be driven out politically from Lebanon.

K: That is right.

V: What does review of evacuation plans mean?

K: If we have to evacuate there are 14 Americans there.

V: There is no update because of the murder?

K: No, what other people are doing will determine what we will do.

V: Will the first recommendation have to come from the Embassy?

K: We are in touch with other countries in the area to get their judgment.

V: Right now you are still in that process?

K: That is right. We won't make a decision until tomorrow sometime.

V: O.K. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

K: O.K.

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SI 350 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Dep Sec Robinson
6/16/76; 9:50 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I have just talked to Simon and he said on that communique that you and Parsky should work it out.

R: I just talked to Parsky and told him we will not agree to any reference to the working group.

K: That is fine. If they want to have a working group on balance of payments, it is something strictly on the areas. I ~~don't~~ didn't say that but am telling you that.

R: Okay. You are meeting with me in a few minutes. You have a joint arrangement with the foreign minister and I think it might be appropriate to talk about that.

K: Basically it is one of these things that getsbureaucrats excited. They said balance of payments within the framework of commissions. I could live with that but didn't say that to Simon.

R: I will go with that if you like. He, Parsky, wants this working group set up.

K: Block it.

R: I think we can get together with him but to announce a working group now would be a mistake.

K: Okay.

R: I am going to see you in a few minutes but you might mention the commission on economic . .

K: I will not mention anything. I don't want to fight our bureaucratic battles with the minister.

R: I saw him yesterday. On the nominations Kenderly (sp) had no intention of holding up.

K: I understand that they have been approved.

R: It got out of hand. I will take it up with Parsky as soon as he gets out of the EP meeting.

K: Okay. Good.

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SI 368 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
June 16, 1976
Time: 5:42 p.m.

D: Hello.

K: Anatol, how are you. You know our Ambassador...

D: I heard, I am sorry.

K: I wanted to tell you that we are moving our fleet closer in as a precaution only if necessary to evacuate our people. We have 1400 Americans there and I wanted you to know that we have no intention of a military operation in Lebanon and that the only purpose is to move our people out. We will let you know the names of the ships. I think it would be helpful if we could avoid threatening notes back and forth.

D: Closer to the shore?

K: They are going to stay 12-14 hours out.

D: Of the time to go -- our time?

K: 12-14 hours away from the coast.

D: You will take 12 hours to reach the shore -- I understand.

K: And the reason I called you is so that we can avoid shooting at each other because we have to decide within the next 48 hours which way to evacuate Americans and which way...

D: What do you mean which way.

K: Whether by helicopter or by road into Syria.

D: I understand.

K: If we do it by road we will move the ships back.

D: You really...

K: It depends on military operations -- what is going on in Lebanon. We cannot afford to have any more Americans killed there.

D: You have already decided?

K: No, we will make the decision within the next 48 hours.

D: I will inform my people.

K: It is intended as a friendly gesture to you.

D: I thank you for informing me and I will inform my people right away.

K: O.K. Anatol

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SI 358 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Dean Brown
6/16/76; 2:03 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: I have just come from the President and we would like you to go out there as soon as possible. Can we announce that we have asked you and that you have agreed.

I have only one request.

B: Will you call my wife?

K: Of course.

B: I hate to ask you to do this. [redacted] If you would call her, of course I will go. B6

K: Okay. Of course I will do it.

B: I am fine. Tomorrow morning or something?

K: If at all possible. I don't know how we are going to get you there. On a boat?

B: Let's worry about that tomorrow.

K: I am proud to be associated with you.

B: Do you know who did it?

K: We think it is a splinter group of the PLO.

B: The Black September group who was after me.

K: That is what we think.

B: You will call my wife.

K: She will probably kill me.

B: Well, you will are at a safe distance from her.

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SI 359 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Pete Day/Secretary Kissinger
June 16, 1976
11:40 am

K: I don't suppose that cable to the Shah went out?

D: You took it with you last night.

K: I took it with me because those sons of bitches never tell me what I have with me.

D: It is a good cable.

K: It is probably too late now.

D: Sadat is going to be there 6 days so it might not.

K: (To Habib in office) You saw a comeback copy?

D: I haven't seen that.

K: Habib says he saw it. I didn't know we were having conversations with the Libyans about improving relations.

D: We aren't, but we have had discussions with them when they released an American they had been holding -- it was as a result of a conversation the Charge had.

K: You have to keep me informed about these things. What do the Egyptians think if we start whoring around with the Libyans?

D: It wasn't that major a thing. It was an incidental conversation. One of our men had it with the Trade Minister.

K: The cable I saw today?

D: I haven't seen that.

K: Someday I am going to get the distribution straight so that Deputy Assistant Secretaries see the cables I have seen.

D: I have done little else this morning except work on Meloy. So I havent' read all the cables. By the way Roy has come back.

K: Because of Meloy.

D: Yes, Phil thought he should.

K: Ok

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SI354*

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Dep Sec Robinson
6/16/76; 11:05 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

(missed first part)

K: . . . arms control. I don't know what to do.

R: I have already told him that he has come out with statements inconsistent with the State Department and Administration and asked him to get together with Phil Habib.

K: Sonnenfeldt ought to be in on anything that concerns arms control.

R: I agree. Except for calling in Ikle and explaining the machinery.

K: That was correct -- will you make sure -- Habib doesn't know anything about arms control.

R: He is working with George Vest.

K: But Vest doesn't know anything about arms control. Sonnenfeldt should supervise you.

R: I don't [redacted] tell him how to go about it.

K: That part should be Sonnenfeldt, Vest and Ikle.

R: I will call Phil Habib and make sure we set it up on that basis.

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SI 353 *

TELECON
Mr. William Rogers/Secretary Kissinger
June 16, 1976
10:35 am

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: That White has lashed out at the Chileans down there. I think I have made it very clear what my strategy is. I have not become a super liberal. This is not an institution that is going to humiliate the Chileans.

R: The instructions were clear to him. This is in an effort to try individual cases.

K: According to the Washington Post after the Chileans ~~presented~~ rejected the report, he made a passionated defense of it and then humiliated the Chileans. It is a bloody outrage.

R: Then he has gone beyond his instructions.

K: What are we going to do?

R: I am going to call him right now and find out exactly what happened.

K: Who is White anyway?

R: Number 2 to Maillard.

K: Why don't we get him out?

R: I will call him. I don't trust [redacted] anyway. B6

K: I know but it was a direct quote. I understand you have been confirmed -- congratulations.

R: Did it happen this morning?

K: Yes.

R: And what about the others?

K: They all were.

R: Good

END

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SI 362 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Atherton
6/16/76; 3:54 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I want a message sent to every Arab from Morocco over about this and it should be a very tough one and ~~they~~ that we would appreciate any cooperation they could give us.

A: Right. I already have some working on that. My question is whether it is okay going to the Libyans.

K: We have had communication with that horse's ass you have got there.

A: I have not been in touch on the Lebanese thing. I think in this case they ought to be included.

K: We can't let our ambassador get killed and keep turning the other cheek.

A: I agree. I think we should go to everyone. In this case. I will have something up for you.

K: Okay. Good.

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SI 364 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Christine Ockrent
6/16/76; 4:13 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

O: You are very kind to return my call. How are you?

K: I am fine.

O: I am in Washington for a few days working on a --two projects which I would obviously very much like to talk to you about and also see you. Is there any chance at all I would be able to come to see you very briefly?

K: Not today. We have just had two ambassadors assassinated.

O: I heard on the radio. I heard your name. Where.

K: In Beirut. How long are you going to be here?

O: I will be here tomorrow and I will be here again next week.

K: I will be in Europe next week.

O: You will be in Europe.

K: Conceivably I could see you Saturday morning.

O: Saturday morning. All right. Good. I -- I will be in Houston but I will be glad to fly back for that occasion.

K: Why don't you see me when I come back from Europe?

O: When?

K: About the 30th.

O: I am going back to Paris on the 25th. Are you going to be in Paris at all?

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K: On the 21st and 22nd.

O: Our roads never meet, do they?

K: It seems that way. When are you going off?

O: ~~Wkx~~ I am going off to Europe on the 25th.

K: No, this weekend.

O: Tomorrow night. But I could delay that if I really have a chance to see yo

O: I can make it flexible.

K: The only realistic time for me is Saturday.

O: Saturday morning.

K: Or early afternoon.

O: Could we make a tentative appointment?

K: Let's say 2:30.

O: Okay. Can I call and maybe have a camera crew.

K: No. I am not ready to be interview yet.

O: You don't know what it is about.

K: What?

O: I am doing a program on food policy.

K: I am not ready to be interview right now.

O: Okay. I understand.

K: If you want to talk about projects I would be glad to do so.

O: I would and you are very kind indeed.

K: Okay.

O: 2:30 on Saturday.

K: Okay.

SI 357 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Amb. Dobrynin
6/16/76; 11:45 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

D: I was intending to call you. You are first.

K: We have a problem in which we were wondering whether you could be of some help. Our Ambassador in Lebanon and his deputy seem to be kidnapped by somebody.

D: You don't know exactly?

K: We don't know by whom. We suspect it is somebody from the rejectionist party from the PLO. We are not sure. Of course we are not ~~planning~~ blaming you for ~~this~~ once.

D: Good.

K: But if you have him in the Russian Embassy will you send him out.

D: That is a promise.

K: Secondly, you will be in contact there with people that we are not in contact. Any influence you can use.

D: If you know anything.

K: As soon as we know we will let you know. In the meantime if you pick up anything, if you could let us know you will have our profound gratitude.

D: I will do it right away. Gromyko told us for the decision to seek experts. He thinks they could be in contact there because it is not exactly sure when discussions will begin. They will have a chance when you are there for discussions.

K: That is the best conclusion.

D: I will send a cable right away.

K: This is not a foreign policy matter between us.

D: It is humanitarian. After all we are mutual about our ambassadors.

K: Thank you.

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SI375 *

TELECON
Mr. John K. Galbraith/Secretary Kissinger
June 17, 1976
Time: 5:20 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

G: Normal and you?

K: Fine. I am seeing you Saturday?

G: Yes, we are having lunch.

K: I have a feeling that I agreed to do something with you some weekend in July. I wonder when it was and whether it is still on?

G: It is still very much on. I have written you about it when I didn't get down.

K: What is the weekend?

G: My impression is it is the weekend of the 21st and 22nd. I will call your secretary right back with the information.

K: O.K. Of July?

G: Yes, of July. I will tell you who is coming -- Heath, Kay Graham, the Canadian scientist, Jack Jones. I think it will be a relaxing and interesting weekend. We are looking forward to having you and Nancy with us.

K: If I can't do the whole weekend is any part of it o.k.?

G: Yes surely. Is Saturday too late to have all the details?

K: No, I could handle it on Saturday.

G: Did you get my letter?

K: Yes, and I appreciate it. We will talk about that too.

G: I will avoid giving you any instructions on foreign policy.

K: I would love it -- it would be better than my colleagues.

G: Would that be a relief to you?

K: Yes, I would love to talk to you about it.

G: Alright. I will be talking to you then.

K: O.K. Bye bye.

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SI 371 *

TELECON
Ambassador Ramsbotham/Secretary Kissinger
June 17, 1976
Time: 11:40 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I called you earlier but we have since gone through London. We have decided to evacuate in Beirut partly with your convoy and partly with another one.

R: I am glad you are going to use a convoy.

K: We wanted BBC to broadcast our message. If there is any way you could expedite this...

R: You have been through your Embassy.

K: Yes.

R: The announcement is the one we agreed upon?

K: It is almost the same as yours. We are telling our people to come to the Embassy -- your Embassy -- not really, I just wanted to give you a heart attack.

R: Yes, I will try to expedite the broadcast of the message. Is the airport open?

K: We don't think so.

R: Some say it is and some say it isn't.

K: If it is open we have no problem.

R: You already put your message through London so I don't have to do anything but supplement it?

K: That is right.

R: Very good.

K: Thank you, Peter.

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SI 373 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Amb. Dobrynin
6/17/76; 1:59 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I am late for a meeting with the President so we have to make it quick.

D: One minute. Did Hyland mention to you I called you?

K: Yes.

D: I saw two telegrams. First for the President and Secretary of State to be informed confidentially and in advance of this in Lebanon in connection with the assassination of the Ambassador and to proceed under the assurance that the United States does not intend to take any military actions. This is the first message. The second is that they were in early contact with the PLO during the night. This may be belated but I think this may be of interest to you. Gromyko asked that we tell this personally for the President. The leadership of the PLO in Lebanon investigated the killing of the American Ambassador. The investigation proved the abduction was made in the neutral zone in the National Museum area. The leadership states the method is an apparent provocation of those forces which do not strive for peace but further aggravation. The PLO asked the Soviet Union to inform the United States Government of the above said. Secondly, in confidence they cannot ask for specifics to the American side but tell us in their own reply. It is important for you to know what they tell us. They have assured us that they are not going to have anything to do with what happened to the United States ambassador but condemn those senseless acts. The Lebanese are taking most urgent measures to find and punish the criminals. One of these indications was it was not the intention of the Palestinians and that during the entire war no damage or harm has ever been done to your embassy or created in the western part of Beirut. PLO leaders reassure us the assassination of the United States ambassador was by those who have nothing in common with the PLO. We would like to say we have no doubt as to the reliability of the information received from the PLO leaders.

K: Good. I appreciate this very much. And express my appreciation to your leadership.

D: Have you decided to do anything on the evacuation?

K: Nothing yet. I will let you know.

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D: I will take it and report to you. I have some other things I will report to you later. Moscow would like to discuss with you about what we can do with Cyprus. But I will not bother you with this. I will see Hartman this afternoon and I assume Hartman will report to you.

K: Okay.

*

SI 374

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
June 17, 1976
Time: 4:40 p.m.

K: What do you think about going to the Hague Thursday night?

S: Well, I think it would be insulting if it is too late -- you would have to get there by 4:00 or 4:30 to make not -- not just make it for dinner. I was trying to figure back to -- but it means you have to get out of the other place by 2:00 and I don't know whether you can. I can check and see.

K: I am not stay ing there, I am going to London to next day.

S: I can check and ask them, but I am a little concerned.

K: Whom should I see in London in addition to Crosland.

S: You saw the opposition people the last time...

K: Yes.

S: You know on the government side I don't think there is any point in you seeing anyone else.

K: Any private people that I should see. That would mean I have a lunch free.

S: The Royal Institute could put together some people for you. We know the guest list for the luncheon...

K: If you know it -- I don't know it. They have it in the outer office, but I haven't see it.

S: I am sure you got a copy. Well, it is the regular ISS people, Bertram, Dudan (sp), there are 10 people, at least. I could talk to Schonfield if you want.

K: Let me think about that.

S: They could get 20 or 25 people — some business and some economics...

K: Is the Royal Insitute the place ...

S: Yes, it is a perfectly respectably place.

K: I met the newsmen a few weeks ago. Why don't you see and tell them we will confirm it on Monday.

S: Let me see if they can do it on the 24th or the 25th is your luncheon.

K: Yes, o.k. Good.

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SI 386 *

TELECON
Mr. Shlaudeman/Secretary Kissinger
June 18, 1976
Time: 8:25 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I am counting on the fact that something is being done on the spare parts for Chile.

S: You should have a memo up there now.

K: There will -- I will tell you what will happen -- there will be a memo that will be left behind, I will not get it and everyone will be covering themselves. Where is that memo?

S: We sent it up a few minutes ago.

K: I want you to go ahead with it, but I want to see the memo.

S: O.K. I will go ahead.

(SECRETARY HANGS UP)

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SI389

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin
Sec. Kissinger
June 18, 1976
10:45 a.m.

K: Anatol.

D: Hello, Henry.

K: One quick thing. As you know we are moving overland tomorrow.

D: To Syria?

K: Yes.

D: How many of you? It doesn't matter.

K: We don't know how many people are going to be wanting to move.

D: Just those who want too?

K: Yes. We are going to keep our embassy open. For you information we have, in order to keep the situation calm, we have decided against a military evacuation and therefore are taking the overland route.

D: I understand.

K: But what I wanted to say is we are moving our fleet much closer.

D: What do you mean closer?

K: About 30 miles off the coast.

D: Why are you doing that?

K: In case there is any interference of our movement by the Palestinians.

D: You are going to announce it.

K: We are not going to announce how far. We are not going to make any threatening announcement. Just telling you for your information.

D: How many ships -- it doesn't matter.

K: About 6 ships.

They will stay until the convoy is in Syria and the will move off.

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D: One convoy or more.

K: We cannot be sure now.

D: Do you hope to finish within the day.

K: We have been given assurances by the Palestinians that they will not interfere. We are not expecting any trouble. If you could contact the Palestinians and urge them to cooperate. We are not looking for difficulties.

D: You have already informed them through your channels.

K: I think so.

D: They should know. We should apprise them of this information1

K: I think they really know it. It is up to you. I just want your people to know. It is not essential thatyou pass it to them.

D: You have passed the message for them to know. You can expect 2-3 days.

K: I think in one day -- tomorrow.

D: It will then be over.

K: It could take two days. But a high probability is one day and then the fleet will move off to where it was.

D: You disappear on Sunday and I disappear on Saturday.

K: Yes. I am going to

D: I am going to Bermuda with my granddaughter for one day. That is why I am interested to know everything is all right or I would postpone.

K: We don't foresee a crisis and if everyone keeps his cool we will get it over with calmly.

D: I think so. O.K., Henry. Thank you.

SI 385 *

TELECON
Mr. Habib/Secretary Kissinger
June 18, 1976
Time: 8:03 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I want you to make sure that the Americans are told that this may be the last organized convey we are running.

H: It will be done right now. I am on my way to the Operations Center to take a phone call.

Mr. Habib/Secretary Kissinger
Time: 8:23 p.m.

H: We have communicated the frequencies to the Syrians. Can we now inform the British about the aircraft.

K: Yes, and tell them it has been worked out with the Syrians. Will you get the Americans...

H: Yes, it has been done. It has already been broadcast and will be repeated at 6:00 a.m. in the morning.

K: Their time.

H: Yes.

K: Can that say this will be the last organized chance.

H: It doesn't say that exactly -- I told them to say it in the same way.

K: O.K.

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SI 383 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Schaufele/Secretary Kissinger
June 18, 1976
Time: 6:06 p. m.

K: There will not be a joint press conference with the South Africans.

S: Absolutely no.

K: You had better make that clear.

S: O. K.

K: O. K. Good.

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SI 381

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Sen Jacob Javits
6/18/76; 3:01 p.m.

J: Are you okay?

K: I am fine.

J: But you are still traveling.

K: Yes.

J: I wanted to thank you for talking to Echeverria.

K: Not at all. I also talked to . . what's his name.

J: Kintana? (sp)

K: Yes.

J: He is a nice guy.

K: Yes.

J: It started them all up and they are moving again. That was all satisfactory. It is sad and I don't know but I am dubious about the report talked about with Passman, about the fifth quarter. He was not going with more than $200 million. In addition he is passing out a comparable amount to Egypt and Jordan. The lowest we talked about was $250 million. I think I'll call him.

K: Why don't you call him. I happened to be there when he made the call but I didn't know what he was talking about until it was finished and he explained it to me.

J: I will call him. I talked to Rush this morning. When Giscard was here he asked me to come over and see him and we had a date when I ran into a problem with my family. So I have applied again for a date and asked for July 5 or that week. And wanted to tell you too so you would have it in the back of your mind.

K: I am seeing him Monday and can put a word in.

J: Well, that is all my subject. Do you like my bill?

K: Except for Chile, I think it is great.

J: You didn't care for Chile much.

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K: No. Still you went further than I felt you might go in Chile.

J: I am here but we ran into a real tangle and got so much else that was satisfactory that we went on everything.

K: That is right. I think you did very well.

J: Take care and don't wear yourself out. When will you be back?

K: A week from Monday. Let's get together then.

J: I hope to see you..

K: Jack, I have talked to Carl Maw about that other conversation and he will be in touch with you.

J: Good.

SI 387 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELECON
Ms. Kay Graham/Secretary Kissinger
June 18, 1976
Time: 8:52 p.m.

G: How nice of you to call me.

K: I hope you understood why...

G: I sure did. It is the most gastly business over there.

K: I did talk to the Spanish the next morning. I received a reply. It in fact amounts to the fact that they won't close the magazine. They said they are reopening the case and they will study it. That is about as much as you can expect from a proud people.

G: What did you do?

K: I told them I thought it was unwise, that it would be hard to convince the American public that a government was so insecure that it couldn't tolerate a cartoon about itself. I told it to them as a friend, not officially.

G: Jolly good. I think it mattered. You would love the editors.

K: Where are you?

G: I am home.

K: Oh, you are back.

G: Yes, I rode back on the Concorde -- it is fascinating.

K: Less jet lag?

G: Much less. I had lunch with Giscard, alone!

K: He is my favorite European leader.

G: He is yummy.

K: He might not be tough enough for the job.

G: I think he is tough but somehow not political enough-

K: He doesn't ever put it all together. He has these great ideas [redacted] B6
[redacted] Listen, Kay, I am an hour late for a dinner. I didn't B6
want to let another day go by without answering you.

G: No, you must go. You are very nice to call.

K: O.K.

G: Thank you, Henry.

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SI 408 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Eagleburger/Secretary Kissinger
June 19, 1976
Time: 9:55 p.m.

K: You won't forget that letter to Perle?

E: I have them check ing all your records to make sure it was true.

K: I never saw the Turkish Ambassador. If he said I implied something to him -- well, this is something they are using with the Jews.

E: I won't forget it.

K: It should be an indignant letter -- to make a charge in writing for which there is not the slightest basis in fact and to say it was confirmed by authoritative sources -- well. What sources could that be?

E: It is impossible -- that is the point. I will send it to you Monday with a draft so you can look at it.

K: O.K. Good.

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SI 394 1*

TELECON
Mr. Sam Lewis/Secretary Kissinger
June 19, 1976
Time: 6:37 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Am I cleared for knowing what happened at the UN session today?

L: It came out fine. We got the consensus and the short version of our statement was read. I think that was the best outcome.

K: O.K. Good. That was the right solution.

L: I thought your remarks at Andrews were really just right.

K: Aren't you nice.

L: That is one kind of ceremony we are having too much practice having.

K: I appreciate your saying that.

L: I was a great admirer of Frank's.

K: I couldn't stand him at first, but he won me over.

L: I understand that Sherer was one of his closest friends.

K: It came out well and my outrage wasn't directed at you. I think we are long slope here.

L: We are harrassed into things and the double standard is bad. I think we should be on the defensive on occasion.

K: I want to put some of those things you said in my UN speech.

L: O.K. Good and have a good trip, sir.

K: Alright. Thank you, it came out well. O.K. Bye.

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SI 405 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Arthur Burns/Secretary Kissinger
June 19, 1976
Time: 7: 59 p.m.

B: How are you, Henry?

K: O.K. Arthur.

B: I am calling from San Francisco. I got a call from Hugh who tells me the staff of the OECD have drawn up a communique which indicates a strategy of coordinated economic policies on commodities. I haven't seen the thing, I know nothing about it. If that is what the communique says it would be troublesome for the Treasury and at the Federal Reserve.

K: We can't accept it then.

B: Right. I wanted to alert you to it.

K: Thank you Arthur.

B: When are you leaving?

K: First thing in the morning unless this situation in Lebanon gets worse.

B: You won't be back until after the summit?

K: Right.

B: I hope it goes well.

K: I won't do any damage and it may do a little good.

B: You are right. Well, I look forward to seeing you, Henry. Bye.

K: O.K. Bye.

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SI 393 *

TELECON
Mr. Luers/Secretary Kissinger
June 19, 1976
Time: 3:08 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

L: Mr. Secretary, Scherer has just called -- they have seen the statement. Salim is suspicious about what we are preparing to say. It is Bud's judgment about the latter part in reference to slaughters in Africa -- that it will be taken as undermining the consensus that they have permitted us to get away without a vote...

K: Has he seen it.

L: No, Salim hasn't seen it.

K: Can you leave out...

L: Yes, we could use the hypocritical paragraph without the citations. There is som question about whether they will force us to vote.

K: If that happens he should ask for instructions.

L: He won't be able...

K: Well, he should vote for it but he should then read the whole statement.

L: O.K. And if we can get the citation then we can leave out this other part.

K: Yes. O.K.

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SI 416 *

TELECON
Mr. Funseth/Secretary Kissinger
June 29, 1976
Time: 6:36 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I have -- I trust that you have taken care of Somers?

F: Yes, I called him from Puerto Rico and he was still in Denmark. I had the Consul General deliver the transcript to him personally and I called the Consul General back on Monday to see that it had been done.

K: The new text?

F: Yes, it was clear that he used the entire new text. They are translating it into German to be used for publication.

K: The German text was tolerable without the changes.

F: It was a good interview. We will be releasing it tomorrow morning at 10:00.

K: When is he releasing it?

F: The magazine comes out at about 7:00 in the morning tomorrow.

K: How can that be when did he get the text?

F: We sent it from Puerto Rico. We worked out the release time together.

K: Yes. O.K. Good. Thank you. Bye.

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SI 415 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
June 29, 1976
Time: 5:35 p.m.

D: Hello?

K : Anatol.

D: Hello, welcome back.

K: How are you.

D: Thank you very much. I would like to make a suggestion to organize some reception in connection with your bicentennial.

K: What do you mean?

D: For the diplomatic corps. It is my own personal suggestion. I think it would be a good idea.

K: That is a good idea. Let me think about that. That is a good idea. Now Anatol, I am calling you about this death sentence to the American in Angola. I know it isn't a question of the Soviet Union having anything to do with it directly, but we would appreciate it very much since we have no diplomatic relations if our concern could be conveyed to the Angolan government or if you could use your influence on a personal basis. I think you know what will happen here if this is carried out. There is no Angolan government we we recognize at this time. I don't want to argue the merits of the case -- I want to do it on human grounds. We are approaching a number of other countries at the same time. We are not holding you responsible.

D: How many Americans -- one or two?

K: One. I have trouble — there seems to be something wrong with the line.

D: What is wrong.

K: I have trouble hearing you.

D: As of now?

K: Now it is better.

D: Well I will send a telegram that you mentioned it...

K: That is right.

D: Not specific obligations, but at the same time human concern.

K: O.K. Anatol, thank you very much.

D: Maybe we can sit down and discuss this when will you be free?

K: Maybe some time this week. Let's try it. O.K. Thank you Anatol, bye, bye.

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SI 419 *

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger
June 30, 1976
Time: 6:40 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

D: Welcome back. I just got a call from Israel. We have finished a meeting regarding the plane. They asked me to ask you to help on the following matters. Maybe there is a possibility for you to send an urgent message to Sadat asking him to appeal to Amin to ask that nothing happen to the passengers. Also that he won't let the plane take off because we feel they will release some of the passengers and take the Israelis somewhere else.

K: We will do it.

D: We have asked Waldheim to intercede and we feel if he hears from you...

K: We have done that.

D: The third thing is Rabin asked me to ask you if you know of any African country who would have contacts with Amin?

K: We have approached Mobutu on it.

D: You think this is the only one?

K: That is the only one we know of.

D: I think that is correct because the Kenyans don't...

K: No, they are in danger from Uganda.

D: Yes. Those people they want from the Kenyans were those that were arrested when they were trying to shoot the El Al plane down when it was in Kenya. This is all we can think of. If you have any suggestions we would be grateful.

K: We will approach the Egyptians and if Waldheim hasn't gone out we will do that too.

D: I am very grateful and sorry to bother you.

K: No, no not at all.

D: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

K: O.K. Bye.

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SI 423 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Roy Wilkins/Secretary Kissinger
June 30, 1976
Time: 5:08 p.m.

K: I wanted to call you to tell you how sorry I am about that foul up involving the appearance before the NAACP. There is no one for whom I would rather speak and no organization for whom I would rather speak than this. I was originally told weeks ago that I shouldn't speak at anything that would cause political trouble during this period. I got scheduled then with the Prime Minister of Japan and several other people and it wasn't possible to cancel them. I am proud of our African policy and would like to discuss it with a group such as yours. I wanted you to know -- I have to trust you won't repeat this -- that this has much more to do with internal politics than anything else.

W: I understand -- I understand completely.

K: And frankly just for your information I told them all to hell with it and I tried to change what I had done, but by then I couldn't change it. The concerns had to do with the Mississippi delegation, and I am not proud of it.

W: I well appreciate, Mr. Secretary, the position you are in and you can depend upon me to treat it...

K: You have been a friend of mine for long before I was in public service. I wanted you to know that I am pursuing this policy that I announced in Lusaka with great energy and not always with great support from certain segments of the Republican Party. There is another thing if you want to organize a meeting later -- a dinner or a lunch or anything you think would be helpful to the NAACP at which I could speak, I would be honored to do it.

W: That is a possibility. We will turn that over in our minds about having a luncheon meeting that would prevent to many people from knowing what about.

K: Yes, if it is a little later I think the sensitivities here would be a lot less.

W: Well probably as late as September?

K: That would be very possible for me. And then you can have as many people as you want.

W: You can depend upon me to observe discretely...

K: We are not pulling back from this policy -- my talks with the South Africans give me hope that in some areas we can make progress.

W: We understand that and we will abide by it.

K: I am glad I had a chance to talk to you and I hope you will call on me for later.

W: I understand that and thank you.

K: O.K. Bye

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SI 422 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Day/Secretary Kissinger
June 30, 1976
Time: 8:00 p.m.

K: Is there any evidence that Porter talked to the Saudis after our meeting?

D: He talked to Saoud and we have a cable that came in yesterday about that. I think I have it right here. He went over the same ground that you discussed in your meeting, but I don't see where he reported on the meeting. I think the point at which he was going to do that was when he said he would be having a meeting today with Fahd. Then he would go over the points in more detail. He saw Saoud yesterday and discussed the same subjects but I don't think that was his definitive report of the meeting in Paris. It takes time to set up these meetings because these people aren't in Jidda part of the time.

K: O.K.

D: I think you have the cables to Fahmy and Waldheim that you asked for?

K: Yes, I do. Thank you.

D: O.K.

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SI 420 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Day/Secretary Kissinger
June 30, 1976
Time: 6:47 p.m.

K: I think we should get a message to the Egyptians to see whether they can help with the Ugandans on that plane thing. Say that if there is another PLO atrocity it would make everything very difficult here.

D: Right.

K: Don't you think? Is that a PLO group?

D: The only information is that it is connected with the PLO. These are our present conclusions.

K: The Israelis have asked us to do it. If we don't there will all hell to pay.

D: I don't see any reason why it wouldn't be a good idea. However their connections with the Rejectionist group hasn't been as close as with the Fatah.

K: And also to Waldheim and see what he can do.

D: Right.

K: If we can get them out tonight I would appreciate it.

D: You would like to sign them out?

K: Yes. I wouldn't make it confrontational -- just see what they can do.

D: O.K.

K: Say it would create grave difficulties here. Since the deadline is tomorrow morning we had better get it off tonight.

D: Yes sir.

K: O.K. Right.

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SI 418 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON

Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
June 30, 1976
Time: 6:35 p.m.

S: The guidance on the French thing is public. I guess Funseth will get some questions tomorrow. If it is asked I think he / should say we have been informed but we can't commend on substance since it hasn't been published.
That is o.k.

K: / Do you see any problem with the Die Ziet interview?

S: No, it repeats a lot of things you have previously said.

K: They have put it out in English now.

S: No, I think it is fine.

K: O.K. Good.

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SI 429 *

TELECON
Ambassador McCloskey/Secretary Kissinger
June 30, 1976
Time: 5:26 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

M: I have a note in to you in connection with your African program and the problem of getting the money in the present Appropriation Bill. Schaufele and I saw Inouye this afternoon and he has asked that we go to Brook.

K: I will call Brook, either this afternoon or tomorrow morning.

M: O.K. Fine. Were you able to get Pastore today?

K: Look, Bob, I just don't have the time on my schedule. I will try to get him tomorrow morning, but just make sure that these idiots have the subject on my desk when I call.

M: O.K. I gather the Memphis thing is off?

K: Yes.

M: That is very disappointing. For a crowd who at one time wanted you to go to a shopping center....

K: I am embarrassed. I called Roy Wilkins, to make your job easier, I talked to him and told him I am ashamed but that it wasn't a something I could do when these guys are hunting for Mississippi delegates. What they don't understand is that if Ford looks like he is getting inroads to the Negros he might get more delegates. He will never get the Reagan people anyway.

M: It is another example of why they are in such difficulty there.

K: O.K. Bob thank you.

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SI 421 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELECON
Senator Curtiss/Secretary Kissinger
June 30, 1976
Time: 6:55 p.m.

C: Mr. Secretary I will be brief -- I know you are busy. It is a matter that has hung on for months — [redacted] B6

K: Oh Jesus.

C: I appreciate what they have done and approve of him getting a position where he didn't need confirmation from the senate not to embarrass the President. This has gone on and on -- Brook had an investigation...

K: My understanding is he is getting a post that doesn't require confirmation.

C: In the last day or two there has been some equivocation. Larry Eagleburger has been afraid because Brook is howling wolf. It seems the thing to do is to go ahead and do it and they will keep still. They don't have a thing against him because they have the report right in front of them. If you could tell them to wind it up, it would be fair to you and fair to the President.

K: I didn't know there was an additional problem. I thought it had been worked out with you.

C: In the last 24 hours Larry Eagleburger said Brooks raised some questions. I think a word from you would be helpful.

K: I will talk to Eagleburger first thing in the morning. If there is any additional problem I will have him call you.

C: O.K. Thank you very much.

K: Alright.

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SI 417 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Harry Schlaudeman
6/30/76; 12:12 p.m.

K: . . . demarche has been made to Argentina urging them to make a demarche to Argentina on human rights. In what way is it compatible with my policy.

S: It is not.

K: How did it happen?

S: I will make sure it doesn't happen again.

K: If that doesn't happen again something else will happen again. What do you guys think my policy is?

S: I know what your policy is, Sir. And will make sure they know too.

K: What can be done about this now?

S: Let me see if we can't send a clarifying message.

K: You better be careful. I want to know who did this and consider having him transferred.

S: I will look into it.

K: I want an answer this afternoon.

S: Yes, Sir.

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SJ4 *

TELECON
Mr. Funseth/Secretary Kissinger
July 1, 1976
Time: 7:12 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I have read that press briefing -- it was testy today, wasn't it?

F: Yes, it was.

K: What is the reason.

F: I don't know. Most of it was Marvin Kalb and then there is an episcopal priest that comes from the White House Kensolving -- he was ask ing about the PLO.

K: But when they kept hitting you on Lebanon.

F: It was Marvin Kalb and Geortzman.

K: Because he had written it. Are they going to do nasty stories tomorrow?

F: There hasn't been anything on the wires -- either Rueters or AP -- about that that I have seen. They have been testy all week.

K: Why did they hit on the NAACP?

F: It wasn't them it was Kensolving again. That wouldn't have come up if he hadn't been there.

K: At which point you should have made -- well I guess you did in a way -- you should have said there are a lot of foreign visitors.

F: That is what I said to him.

K: Yes. O.K. Thank you.

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SJ 11 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Day/Secretary Kissinger
July 1, 1976
10:43 am

K: In the light of the cables we have had I wonder whether it is a good idea to go to the Syrians about the attacks on the PLO camps.

D: We wanted to ask their views about the particular aspect -- we told them what we were going to do.

K: Did we tell them we were going to the Christians?

D: Yes.

K: They are bound to consider that intervention.

D: They know we have been keeping in touch with the factions. We tried to put it in terms of intervening as we have before -- to put it in terms of a cease-fire. In going to the Christians, we have to ~~explain~~ expect that if we go to them it will get to the Syrians.

K: I wonder if we should hold up.

D: They haven't been able to get to anyone there -- any Christians. They might have gone to the Syrians already.

K: Try to hold up on both of the messages if you can.

D: Yes sir.

K: I don't see what we are gaining.

D: The marginal hope that we could prevent a set of atrocities after the camps are taken. I don't think we can prevent it from happening, but perhaps thwart the ferocity of it. It is only a marginal hope.

K: And I have my doubts about putting someone into the Christian territory.

D: That is what I talked to Hunt about. It is a wild idea and it -- the man might be in some risky place. I am sending up a recommendation to you through Habib and Larry has seen it which will be to you later today. It is that we pull a man out of Jidda and put him into the Embassy , which needs an Arabist. He is needed there and then when talk of partition

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D: Calms down we could put him in then.

K: Ok, but make sure everything stops.

D: We will do that right now.

END

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SJ3

TELECON
Mr. Ted Koppel/Secretary Kissinger
July 1, 1976
Time: 5:34 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: Ted, listen, I am on the way up to swear-in Phil Habib.

TK: I will make it brief -- are you free next Wednesday for dinner?

K: What is that the 7th?

TK: Yes.

K: No, that is the Queen's dinner.

TK: [redacted] -- you can bring her along too. B6

K: Will you give us another date, we would love to do it.

TK: OK. Take care now. Bye.

K: Bye.

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SJ1 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Sonnenfeldt
7/1/76; 12 noon

S: Talk to Rogers and be sure he understands what you are trying to do on this East-West business. EB and EUR are trying to soft peddle the thing allegedly on the grounds the Europeans are not interested ~~in~~ which is not true. They did not want a lot of publicity of a communique. I have been trying to make clear you were serious.

K: Those sobs never believe I am serious.

S: You wanted this business proper ly studied without fanfare. The British and Germans are pretty prepared to do this and publicly the French as well. If the OECD is too difficult and public, we may have to find some way to do it quietly.

K: All right.

S: I have trouble making them think you are serious.

K: After I got through talking, ~~Mr~~ Giscard sent me a note saying this is something the four ought to discuss.

S: That is feasible enough and find a way quietly to fit it back into the OECD mechanism without telling anybody how it happened. At the OECD we are required to bring something forward.

K: Where?

S: Paris in the executive committee.

K: Absolutely.

S: They are expecting something from you. There is a meeting going on.

K: I am going to see him this afternoon.

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SJ10 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Moynihan/Secretary Kissinger
July 1, 1976
9:07 am

M: I wanted to check with you. I am going to Israel to get an honorary degree at Hebrew University.

K: Good.

M: It couldn't be nicer but last night I learned my schedule and it starts with a meeting with Peres when I get off the plane. This is also a governmental thing. I wanted you to know that and hear anything you wanted me to be careful about. I am going to give the Commencement Address for the foreign recipients of... the most distinguished is Andrei Sakharov, who, of course, can't come. After Brezhnev's speech, enough is enough, -- but I wanted to talk to you to see if you have anything for me or any cautions for me.

K: With the Israeli government we are on a parallel strategy. There isn't anything we want them to do that they are not doing in any policy sense. In the immediate future there are no problems. In the middle term there aren't any governmental problems but they ought to think through with more precision of how they see the thing evolving. They can't count on us to be more precise as a nation.

M: About their future?

K: Right. But now there are no disagreements between them and us on the issues before us. On the PLO I am in agreement with them, though some may not agree with me here. I don't see why they should deal with them (PLO) til the PLO recognizes their existence. We have a proposal which we put before the Arabs -- it was developed by me and Rabin, when he was here. It has not been accepted by any Arabs but has not been rejected either. We want to get a formal Arab response. I would prefer it if you didn't highlight this. I wouldn't demand an Arab response because then it is apt to be negative and then, of course, we have to face what do we do then. On Sakharov, I have two problems with Berlin. I don't believe in the _____ of their common posture. I don't deny that there aren't tactical disagrements but the problem has not been affected by the Berlin decision and I have no problem with you pointing out the hypocrisy of this.

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M: From a distance I was umbraged by the behavior in Nairobi when the Eastern bloc decided what can or can not be gotten from theWest.

K: And make no contribution of their own.

M: Right.

K: One has to have understood the two levels -- one on which a vote is acted by 1/2 of the Communists and they aren't even studying the proposals. The abstaining of the delegates was less scandalous than the negative vote of the Communists.

M: You don't mind my raising that?

K: No. Can I say two other things. I keep hearing from the press that you are saying I put Reston up to that column wanting you to resign. I had not talked or communicated with Reston for 3 weeks prior to that, nor had Eagleburger. I did have breakfast with him on that day, but it was the day the column appeared.

M: There were 25 at that breakfast and only one man got that story. What I said was the Reston column, no matter what the truth was, there was no way tp pressure a foreign diplomat...

K: I disagreed with you then and regretted it that you left. We don't have to debate that decision.

M: I have not said that and went out of my way....

K: My major concern is that whatever we might have clashed on and whatever happened -- let's face it, you are the last person I want to have a disagreement with.

M: Did you get a note from me? I sent you some clippings and told you I thought you had every right to make the statements you have been making. And that it is appropriate for you to makes these statements.

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K: They didn't bring it to my attention.

M: Well, too many were written from hotel rooms.

K: How does the campaign look?

M: If I am nominated I will win.

K: You think you will win.

M: If I am nominated. With 5 people in the race and a low primary turn out it becomes statistically random. Last time we elected a Democratic Senator was in 1950.

K: I think it would be a good thing for the country if you were elected. Nobody will be happier than I.

M: I thank you and I will give your regards to the King David.

K: You are seeing Peres -- you might see Rabin.

M: I am seeing them all and Golda too.

K: How long will you stay?

M: Til Thursday.

K: Have you been in Israel?

M: Never.

K: They are exhausting.

M: The last word on Lebanon-- what is it?

K: I think in Lebanon it is fair to say our policy and the Israelis is fairly synchronized and we are not pressuring them. Why should they interview? At some point we have to be x carefulx that the whole band doesn't turn on us -- the band of warring Arabs . But the Israelis have played it cool and will.

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M: They haven't been storming about the bottom half.

K: That was their first reaction. The Syrians screwed this up. They are in there now, but they don't dare tackle the PLO. If they leave it will fall to the PLO. It is a god damn mess.

M: Thank you

K: Ok

END

SJ2 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Ed Brooke
7/1/76; 3:35 p.m.

B: The President came over. It is a mad-house over here today.

K: It is no longer as urgent as I thought it was yesterday. I called about the appropriation bill for South Africa. I talked to Inouye about those $2 million for South Africa.

B: I intend to press my amendment on that.

K: I really think it is essential. I don't know what Alan thinks he is doing.

B: He is crazy.

K: It is the only hope for whites down there.

B: I just hope we can get the Administration to get some conservatives on our side and what Alan is doing is self-defeating.

K: [redacted] B6

B: He is not helping his cause.

K: He cannot help the fight.

B: Exactly. I am pressing the thing. As soon as he comes back, we are going to press on and I am trying to get the votes lined up. I am trying to get 51 to support.

K: Mozambique doesn't need money from us. They can get it from the Russians and China. Their issue is if we need a settlement in Rhodesia we have got to get them to hold down the guerrillas so we can get a moderate black leader in there. We will never get power. Mozambique holds the key to this.

B: I understand this. We have got some supporters today and will continue to work on it. Pastore (?) is becoming the great obstacle in the Senate.

K: Do you think there is any chance in my talking to him.

B: There might be. You might want to call him. Particularly if you can convince him he is not helping the situation at all.

K: Maybe I will call him this afternoon.

B: Okay.

K: Thanks, Ed. END

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SJ7 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Pete Day
7/1/76; 10:50 a.m.

K: What is your reading of the Hussein situation?

D: With respect to the Russians and Hussein?

K: Yes.

D: More or less what we expected. He got a deal offered to him by the Russians. He did not plan it at the time. He came back to Jordan to consider it. I am sure he expects to consider it in relation to what we might be prepared to offer. I don't think he is interested in the British-American deal but we have still a final offer to make. He is basically waiting for that.

K: Why don't we put that together now.

D: Yes. We are doing that this morning. We will have something for you very quickly.

K: Thank you.

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SJ 36

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Amb. Schaufele
7/1/76; 12:12 p.m.

K: Are you doing these talking points?

S: You have them up here. You had them last night.

K: Last night I re-edited them.

S: I have not seen them.

K: I know what happened. The fools are spreading them all over the gd building.

S: I will get them and I will redo them.

K: What you have to do, talking to Nyrerere you have got to find out precisely what they are proposing. Before we proceed along this route also we have to if we are asking the British to come forward with a plan, we have to know their attitude. And if they agree the British can also I think plan.

S: That is what Callaghan suggested.

K: You can see what you can come up with.

S: Okay.

K: Now let me see what the fools have done.

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SJ16 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Hartman/Secretary Kissinger
July 2, 1976
Time: 4:32 p.m.

K: Are we going to do an approach to Angrum (sp) now that we have heard from Markarios?

H: I sent up a message to you to Bitsios which says is it alright to go ahead with the Turks now that we have heard from Markarios.

K: O.K. Fine. I think that is the best way to proceed?

H: O.K.

K: Good.

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SJ 13 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Amb. Schaufele
7/2/76; 9:45 a.m.

K: You can't be gone for 2 weeks. I know these Africa trips are leisurely and I know . . .

S: We can go back to the drawing board. The problem is commercial transportation. That is why we had to bring in the defense attache's plans. I don't have that message here in front of me.

K: If you leave on the 6th and don't come back until the 20th, we are going to be treading water all that time.

S: Let me get back to the schedule and see if we can telescope it somehow. I think I am only spending 24 hours. I think I can get back earlier.

K: Okay.

S: Let me get back to the drawing board.

K: Okay.

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SJ20 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
7/5/76; 8:10 p.m.
Sec Kissinger/Amb. Dinitz

K: I have some bad news to tell you.

(Jake)

D: I am sorry.

K: You used American equipment outside of Israel. We will have to apply the law.

D: What American equipment?

K: C-130's so we will have to put a temporary freeze on military shipments.

D: You are kidding me.

K: I am calling Ben Rosenthal to tell him that we are applying these principles. You know you have no right to do this without prior consultation.

D: Only weaponry, not equipment.

K: Are you tell me there was no American equipment used?

D: No, I don't think so. We have not used -- sub-machine guns.

K: And C-130's.

D: Machines can be used.

K: Not the military version of it.

D: When your people in the Pentagon come to ask Congress -- on this operation -- if they knew to use this they would be smarter. Because it is an excellent sample for long-range units. A case could be made.

K: Yes. Well, you will get in touch with Rosenthal and Brademas.

D: Yes. In the meantime, I will ask him to leave the freeze on the Turks.

K: You will be in the same boat as the Turks.

D: I almost bumped into you last night. I was in the international trade center. By the time I was apart your party was over. You were in the next room.

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K: Isn't that a pity.

D: I didn't know about it until it was too late. I have one request to make to you, if you don't have anything to tell me other than this suspension of American equipment to Israel. We appreciate what you did with the Kenyans. Your ambassador met and so on. They will be facing pressure in the OAU as will be Iksor (?) and whatever can be done and Israel suggested that perhaps maybe you can talk to Sadat and he will help to mitigate criticism against Kenya.

K: I think there is little sense in Sadat helping. Shutting up is not his _____.

D: I hoped for his sake if there is a UN debate that he is not going to take the lid in this.

K: If there is a UN debate we will introduce a resolution against terrorism and we are drafting it now.

D: You have read to me things only what you tell the Prime Minister.

K: We have appreciated the Egyptian allies and we will veto any consideration of Israel.

D: I am talking about Egypt. I just came from McNeal's so. I was there with Brzezinski.

K: Which?

D: Brzezinski.

K: Zbig?

D: Yes. He was pressing Israel and so on but I was on the show in Washington and Quandt was there and there was a three-way debate. What they all say is that would be a possibility for the real moderates to show they are moderates. If Egypt is going to use this opportunity . . .

K: Let's see what is going to happen. I am sure there will be a debate.

D: I am talking about from your own point of view and ours -- we are interested in keeping the Egyptians on a fairly moderate _____. The purpose of my request is whatever can be done to help Kenya, Kenyatta was not in the picture.

K: We found that out.

D: I wanted to tell you on the boat.

K: But we had already approached him by that time.

D: The people were -- it was too crowded.

K: I know. We know all about it.

D: I didn't know it the first time and yesterday they asked me to tell you and there was nothing to say when there were so many people around. The more you encourage him the more he goes along. He is happy with the consequences.

K: We have seen him a few times and if I can keep our ambassador from peeing in his pants . . .

D: You have one of those there?

K: Yes. You are going to come out ahead on this and there will be no playing around.

D: I am not worried.

K: We will not let Kenya get _____ for this.

D: Good. We are very appreciative. I want you to know your and the President's reactions were very helpful to set the tone and that is helpful. You can't imagine what is happening in the embassy. Hundreds and hundreds of calls -- we had 70 operators working yesterday. People are bringing cases of champagne and letters.

K: It was a terrific thing.

D: You have restored confidence in international order.

K: It was a terrific thing to do.

D: We should try to capitalize on this. You had some State Department officials for whom it was very difficult to swallow.

K: There is nothing being reported out of here.

D: Before they straightened the line they said to our people this is an opportunity to separate between the radical Hob___ and Arafat and I know should be . . . those people. .

K: You know this is not my policy.

D: They changed their tune. Larry was handling it very well. The quote in the New York Times is in today.

K: I have not seen it.

D: Senior State Department officials say it was an attempt to . . (proceeds to read from NYT article). It was a good quote.

K: Okay.

D: Are you going to stay in Washington for a while?

K: No. I am going to Chicago tomorrow but I will be back tomorrow night.

D: I am here and available if there is anything I can do.

K: Can you get the embargo lifted.

D: Which embargo?

K: I am not going to be accused by Rosenthal. . . As you know it has nothing to do with the merits of the case. The law has to be upheld.

D: You could have more than 24 hours of pure satisfaction. You have to send me harpoon if you don't know -- and I feel you do -- all the work we have done.

K: For once I give you total support in something.

D: I know. You know I nearly . . .

K: This was not directed at you. At Brademas, Sarbanes and Rosenthal.

D: But we each noticed that you began to get good writing in the liberal press. I have seen 2 articles in the Post praising your policy and I have seen an article by Ludwig defending your policy against Ball. I began to be suspicious.

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SJ21

TELECON
Mr. Terry Sanford/Secretary Kissinger
3:15 pm
July 7, 1976

RELEASED IN FULL

S: Looks like you have got matters of the world fairly calmed down.

K: It is fairly calm.

S: I just wanted to check back with you and see about getting you back down here in the month of July.

K: Can I check with my wife and let you know about the end of the week.

S: Yes.

K: I hadn't counted on all these State visitors for the Bicentennial.

S: I am flexible. The only thing I have is for the 27th and 28th.

K: I coudlnt' come anyway then.

S: Look on into August then. I am going to be in Europe August the 1st through the 10th.

K: That time I could't do anyway.

S: Other than that, the rest of August is alright -- if you need to find a date.

K: I will be in touch with you as soon as my schedule is a little clearer.

S: We are looking forward to it and want you to know we still have a great interest in it.

K: Good. I look forward to it.

END

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SJ 26

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TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Hugh Sidey
7/8/76; 3:25 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

S: Happy third anniversary.

K: It was a great day.

S: This is just -- no, it isn't frivilous. I was just looking for a line from you. Somebody said those three days were worth three billion dollars on the Defense budget and sent to the Kremlin(?). That may be a bit of an exaggeration.

K: I really think there is no other people that could have celebrated that day with so much joy and so much optimism. After all we have been through it was a testimony to the vitality of the American people.

S: It truly is.

K: It really makes this debate on who is pessimistic and optimistic sort of absurd. It is an optimistic people.

S: That is great. That is all I need.

K: It was so totally optimism. That was the beauty of it.

S: I hope and I think it will . . .

K: What other country would invite sailing ships from all over the world.

S: Did you go up there?

K: Yes, I was on the Forrestal and then the Waynewright which went down the length of the harbor and saw everything.

S: I stayed around and watched a little of it through Walter and others.

K: I had a great time.

S: Thanks.

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SJ32

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Tony Crosland
7/9/76; 12:55 p.m.

B6



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B6



B6

Incidentally, we have heard from ~~the~~ Kaunda and he is very receptive to the idea. I am arriving at 5:00.

C: What we need are people in touch for a talk before dinner.

K: Why don't we fix it for 7:00. Or whenever if you have another idea.

C: Why don't we provisionally say 7:00.

K: Don't hesitate to let us know, if there is anything we can do.

C: It is extremely kind of you.

K: Not at all.

SJ44 *

TELECON
The Secretary/Marvin Kalb
7/10/76 11:55 am

RELEASED IN PART
B6

Kalb: I have had so little occasion to talk to you seriously.

[redacted] B6

Kalb: I wanted to do my piece tonight about the terrorism issue and I think that we are saying that you have certain quite specific ideas in mind.

K: We have to go in two steps Marvin. This is on deep background. At this phase our concern is not to let the Soviets get . . .

Kalb: Is it going to be difficult to get a general expression of concern on that?

K: We are not yet sure.

Kalb: Really.

K: Yeah, that is why we are trying not to be too specific about it. We may nail ourselves too much into a position too early.

Kalb: But I can't understand why the Europeans would be hurt by a strong statement on terrorism

K: Well heroism is not one of their main attributes.

Kalb: What is between the lines? What we are talking about in general [redacted] terms is a strong statement of condemnation of hijackers and terrorism and not to confuse that with the "legality" of the Israeli raid.

K: That is right.

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Kalb: One other thing is I might. About a conference for Lebanon. No one else has picked up on it but I have heard you mention it several times. Is that conference in your mind to include the Lebanese parties and outside major and minor arab parties?

K: It could be either but I think it might be best to keep it to the Arab parties.

Kalb: How does that look?

K: My estimate is that over a period of weeks it is going to crystalize.

Kalb: A little more blood-letting?

K: You have to look at the long-term situation and what emerges out of that is not all that bad

Kalb: What are you doing this weekend? Are you going to have any fun?

B6

K: I am going up for my third dinner in 4 evenings with the Queen.

Okay, Marvin are you going to be in New York next week?

Kalb: No, I still can't move that much. Why are you going?

K: No.

Kalb: Listen, if you ever have time I would love to shoot the breeze with you. I know that's a silly question.

K: No, no, let's do it next week.

Kalb: If it were possible, I would love it.

K: Good.

SJ45 *

TELECON
The Secretary/Larry Eagleburger
7/10/76 12:000

RELEASED IN PART
B6

E: . . . . (missed first part) Gerheart's attorney that they were all executed this morning.

K: Oh, [redacted] B6

E: Mathias didn't even get there. There has been no official confirmation yet but that's what the lawyers have got.

K: You better get an outraged statement ready.

E: Yeah, I am doing that.

K: Okay.

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SJ37 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
The Secretary/Ernst Van der Buegel
7/10/76 12:55 pm

K: Hello.

V: Hello Henry.

K: Ernst how are you?

V: I am fine and you?

K: Okay, About the 20th, my problem is that it is the evening of the diplomatic reception by the President of the diplomatic corps. So I cannot not go to that.

V: We have no luncheon appointment.

K: Is that fixed?

V: It is fixed. We are arriving in the morning in Washington. We are staying at the Georgetown Inn and we will be at the state department when?

K: About 1:00. Should I invite Sonnenfeldt?

V: No I don't think so. Let's have the four of us. I can talk to Hal later.

K: Terrific.

V: See you then. Thank you for calling.

K: Bye.

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SJ391 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
The Secretary/Leigh
7/10/76 11:20 am

L: I need some clarification. You referred to the Geneva Convention. I thought it was a masterful handling of the whole thing but I thought perhaps it was the Hague convention you meant.

K: I must have got it screwed up.

L: Well, then I will correct that.

K: I meant the Hag ue convention.

L: Fine, thank you very much.

K: What did you think of it otherwise?

L: I thought it was excellent.

K: Okay, good.

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SJ 38

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sam Lewis
Sec. Kissinger
Saturday, July 10, 1976

K: I want to point out to you if that speech that Scranton is going to give is not cleared in plenty of time, he will be prohibited from speaking.

L: I sent it up last night and he will not give it without your clearing.

K: Make sure I have it.

L: Yes, sir. I sent it up about 6:00. Did he mention to you that he was going to have the press conference.

K: He did not and I wish he had not said what he did.

L: We are getting the text. He is getting a whole series of questions.

K: He is not making African policy.

L: He certainly is not. He was reporting on his trip to Africa. ~~That is making African policy.~~

K: That is making African policy.

L: He is certainly trying to follow your African policy. I agree the Post article is unfortunate. We are getting the the exact text. We have the Q's and A's section which is what the Post article is drown on.

K: O.K.

L: I will get it up to you before your press conference.

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SJ 40

TELECON
The Secretary/Dick Valeriani
7/10/76 11:40 am

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you Dick?

V: Fine thanks.

K: Will you get on tonight?

V: It is going to be tough

K: Is NBC on at all on Saturday nights?

V: Yeah, they have a Saturday night show but I don't know -- on an election night. In principle they want something but they have got to find some news. I would like to flesh out about your comment of the resolution dealing with terrorism.

K: Do this on your own.

V: Oh sure.

K: We will probably call for some expression of condemnation of terrorism.

V: In the past we have not been successful in getting the third world and the poorer countries to do that have we?

K: Well, that is the basic problem. We haven't finished drafting it yet. But for obvious reasons it would be better to have some co-sponsors.

V: Okay, thank you.

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SJ 72 *

TELECON
THE SECRETARY/Mr. Atherton
7/12/76 6:40 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Have you that cable from Porter? In the light of this I think we really have to do something.

A: I asked my people this morning to drop everything and do a paper for you which we will get to you tomorrow on the pros and cons on having any representation there. I think we really have to give it a rigorous examination.

K: When Fahd tells us we have to do this we almost have no choice.

A: The British Ambassador has made this recommendation too.

K: You can tell the British that we have this report and ask them what do they think. And send it to Seelye and get his advice. Ask him in the light of these circumstances what does he think.

A: In fact I wonder if we ought to do it bit by bit and get the British views before going to Seelye. If we do it I think it ought to be an international movement with the British and others that are still left there -- what few there are.

K: Are the French still there?

A: Yes.

K: I want Seelye to reduce the Embassy staff immediately.

A: We have a message prepared telling him that when he leaves we want him to reduce. Most of the people left there are security people and they will of course leave when he leaves.

K: But Fahd thinks we ought to close the Embassy totally. What do you think?

A: Well, I thought about it all weekend and my view is that we should. But I think we ought to do it in concurrence with the British and others. We can't leave while others still stay. The risks are increasing and we may have a situation where we couldn't to id without putting in a landing party.

K: And that might not work against opposition. The PLO might be so desperate that they might be delighed to kill a few hundred Americans.

A: If they get too desperate they may not be too rational. We have something already being prepared for you. I will get it rushed up along. Do you agree we will hold off on Seelye until we talk to the British?

K: Yeah, but get in touch with Seelye.

A: All right.

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SJ 71

TELECON
THE SECRETARY/MR. SONNENFELDT
7/12/76 5:10

RELEASED IN FULL

S: I'm sorry to interrupt you but the Soviets in Geneva have approached our arms control delegation to hand us a thing on CW and are ready to start bilaterals.

K: That was suppose to go to Ikle.

S: It hasn't been done. I want to send it to them and PM

K: Dobrynin told me he was going to have it delivered.

S: He didn't. I just talked to them.

K: I don't want another story that I was negotiating this thing separately. You are to tell them what I just told you. Dobrynin said he was going to deliver it to them.

S: Okay, I will tell them exactly that.

K: I haven't even read the god damn thing yet. Have we gotten a translation yet?

S: I think they have sent over a very rough translation. We still have to get a proper translation.

K: Are you sure they didn't deliver it to ACDA?

S: Well, they just asked for it. I will ask Ikle whether he got such a thing.

K: Dobrynin told me he was going to deliver it to them.

S: Okay, I will do that then. If he hasn't I will just send this thing over.

K: I would rather have Ikle call Dobrynin.

S: Okay, would you prefer Ikle to call the Soviets and ask for it?

K: No, give them this but let them ask for the translation.

S: Okay, good.

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TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Mr
7/12/76; 9:36 a.m

K: I saw that cab

A: Seelye's recor

K: Right. I want
my specific appro

SJ50 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Sam Lewis
7/12/76; 1:00 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I can't find in that rewritten version any reference to national sovereignty which I asked you to put in it.

L: It is in the last paragraph. We inserted it also on page 4 or 5. It is a reference to national sovereignty and territorial sovereignty.

K: Where?

L: I am just getting it. It is page 5 -- in the middle of page 5.

K: On page 5 ". . . must be . . . " must go out.

L: That was an "L" statement.

K: I don't give a damn.

L: Okay. We can say and territorial integrity to strengthen the previous sentence.

K: All right. I have gone over the changes of Scranton. I put stet where I don't . . I don't think think it is a help for us in Africa for us to be extremely that categorical about Uganda.

L: This was my instinct also.

K: Where you say the support given to the hijackers. You are just as well off saying apparent support given the hijackers.

L: Okay

K: Well, I have marked it. Where it says cannot seriously question . . he says does not believe. I just think -- I have my doubt whether we are forcing the other Africans into a defense of Uganda.

L: The resolution evidence is increasing but I think tactically that is right.

K: I have no question that is right but if anybody comes back you can escalate(?).

L: Okay.

K: I have marked it up. You can get it back.

L: Okay. Thank you.

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SJ54

TELECON
THE SECRETARY/Amb. Scranton
7/12/76 6:17 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Bill, I just got your personal statement at the end of this.

S: Oh yeah.

K: And I wanted to talk frankly to you about it.

S: You go right ahead.

K: I can't accept the proposition that after we have a statement that all of us have agreed to that a personal statement can be added that doesn't have to be cleared. The only conceivably interpretations could be that either you tried to get me to approve it and I didn't or I didn't want it in a formal statement and got you to make it under the guise of a personal statement. It doesn't make us look very good.

S: No, that doesn't help you at all Henry and I am sorry if that makes it look like that. I have been extremely disturbed about this. I had had a number of qualms about all of this. I just think that the Israelis were right on this one.

K: But let me --just so I understand -- did you feel that the statement we approved here didn't go far enough?

S: Yes, I did feel that way that it didn't go far enough.

K: Did you say that to Sam Lewis?

S: Yes, I did. I thought it was not completely suitable for the situation as it was.

K: Did you try to get anything additonal in there?

S: When the thing finally came up I took it home on Saturday morning and I changed a good sum of it over the weekend and I sent that in on Sunday night.

K: And I accepted it.

S: Yes you did. Almost everything.

K: But let me tell you the instructions I gave Sam. On Saturday morning I said send this to Scranton -- get any changes, rewrites or anything he comments on and lets talk about it Sunday. Then this morning at the staff meeting I am assuming that Scranton has approved this statement. He only came in with your changes about noon. I had no idea you had any other view.

S: Well, I'm sorry that's my fault. I thought I made it clear to him this morning that it didn't in my

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judgment go far enough on the event itself.

K: I wouldn't have had any objections to having 2 or 3 paragraphs in there describing the suffering of the people.

S: Next time I will try to do it in plenty oftime.

K: You must know I have tremendous admiration of how you have conducted yourself.

S: I know that Henry.

K: And I don't feel at all that you have been anything but meticulous but my problem is I can't write these things myself. I just assume everybody has agreed and I just change those things that bother me. In retrospect I agree but I would certainly have been able to agree to the human suffering involved of innocent people. Well, what was the reaction to it?

S: I really don't know. I just came from there and so far I think the reaction is tremendous.

K: What was the reaction to the other speeches?

S: You're asking a non-objective observer but everybody seemed impressed about what Richard said about Mrs. Bloch but were disappointed on the rest of the speech.

K: That is what I expected.

S: The German, which is the first time he has ever spoken, was fine and I think it will get some play because it was the first time. But I will be blunt with you under the circumstances it didn't seem very strong but I think it will get some play because of the novelty.

K: What I am trying to do is make a strong position which doesn't raise rip it with the Arabs and the Africans. YOu know we are negotiating on the South African things with Schaufele.

S: I am sure it did not rip it up here with the Arabs or the Africans because I talked with an Arab and an African after the speech.

K: No, no, that won't rip it. Well, listen when you have a concern give me a call in the future. Really my admiration for the way you have conducted yourself is . . .

S: I think I know that and one thing I never resent is when someone makes a criticism -- I take it.

K: Thank you very much Bill. We'll talk soon.

S: Okay.

SJ52 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Roy Atherton
7/12/76; 3:21 p.m.

K: That message to Toon is too explicit. I think that part of it I ought to tell Dinitz. If he tells it to [redacted] Allon we will have it in the Israeli newspapers. B6

A: It was drafted a couple of days ago. I think it needs to be revised.

K: I don't want to have that much about pressing the Maronite(?).

A: I think probably we ought to review it again.

K: Maybe to Rabin but not to Allon.

A: He will be seeing Rabin tomorrow or Wednesday so there is time.

K: Okay. Thank you.

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SJ53 *

TELECON
THE SECRETARY/WIN LORD
7/12/76 4:55 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: . . . the Schaufele conversation?

L: Yes I have. The guy here had not had any report from his people there.

K: Did you tell him what my concern was?

L: Yes, confidentiality and everything else.

K: Have you heard?

L: Unbelievable.

K: You know I am in tears of rage practically.

L: My own judgment is I don't think Peking isgoing to overreact on this thing. I think we ought to get Nessen tomorrow to make some statement.

K: We can talk about it after we discuss the other issue at 5:00. I just wanted to make sure you had talked to the British.

L: Yes, I have.

K: Good, thank you.

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SJ51

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Sam Lewis
7/12/76; 3:20 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: At that one point in the Scranton statement where it says does not appear, I think we can say we believe Uganda has not carried out its obligation.

L: Okay.

K: Otherwise, stay with my changes.

L: Okay, Sir.

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SJ 74 *

TELECON
Mr. Funseth/Secretary Kissinger
July 13, 1976
7:25 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: If the South Africans put it out and you confirm it tomorrow it will look like, well, triply mysterious.

F: We could addit to the schedule. It is a little awkard to put it out this much late.

K: What happens if the South Africans put it out. I don't understand this place. It is totally beyond my comprehension.

F: I think I will consult with Dick tomorrow....

K: I don't know why I am not consulted about what I put out about my schedule.

F: I think it best to take a chance that the South Africans won't put it out and then if they do, say there was a screw up and it was left off the schedule.

K: Yes, but it will look worse.

F: It is too late to do anything meaningful now.

K: OK.

END

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SJ 55 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
The Secretary/Mr. Sonnenfeldt
7/13/76 4:15 pm

K: It turns out that Scranton isleaving first thing in the morning but he could make the stop over the weekend.

S: Well, that's good.

K: But could you call him and tell him what's needed or go up tonight.

S: Well, I could go if that's needed but let me call him first and he should really touch base with John Volpe and we can give him the one of the papers.

K: Okay, at any rate that is where it is and I will see you at 5:00.

S: Okay.

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SJ 73 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Governor Scranton/Secretary Kissinger
July 13, 1976
4:05 pm

K: I am calling you about the following. We need to get some people who have a reason to go to Rome who can talk to the Italian leaders about the political situation and about the need for reform and the need to form a strong government.

S: Yes.

K: You are going to Europe.

S: Yes sir, I am.

K: I was wondering about two things because time is of the essence. Could you redo your itinerary so you could go to Rome earlier. If you agree I will send Sonnenfeldt up tomorrow to go over the details with you.

S: Unfortunately, I leave at 7:30 tomorrow morning. I think I could do this though. I go immediately to London just over night. Then to the Hague and from there to Geneva. I could give up Geneva and go instead to Rome and do Geneva later.

K: Well, let me call later this evening. Let me talk to Volpe. When could you be there?

S: I could be there Saturday mid-morning until Monday night.

K: I will get Sonnenfeldt to call you later today because we are also sending Lodge there. What is the next time you could go.

S: The next time I could get there would be the following weekend. I would go to Rome the following weekend. Now can I ask you a question? Here is the current situation up here. The British have been giving instructions that they are to vote no against the African resolution. But if the African resolution changes they are then to get new instructions depending on what the changes are. In the meantime the french have come to me . . . I want you to know all of this because I may be calling you quickly. If we have a resolution or a statement by the President, I want to know what it is before I withdraw. All right General?

K: Of course. You came out very well yesterday in the press.

S: We did very well up here and we did very well in the American public and I don't think it is going to take away from what you are trying to do and I am very sorry if it does because I know how much moreimportant it is for you to do what you are trying to do.

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K: Look, I called you at the minute it happened but these things are not only irretrievable -- it is a nuance and I haven't had any indication that it has done any damage.

S: No, I don't think it has.

K: Well, then my judgment was wrong.

S: No, I am not sure it was but we won't know for a while.

K: I want to talk to you today before you leave. Are you reachable around 7:00 tonight?

S: Yes, you can get me through the communications center at the USUN and in the meantime I will see what options I have and will tell Sonnenfeldt or you -- whoever calls first.

K: Many thanks.

TELCON
Sec Kissinger
7/14/76; 2:51

K: I want to g
a statement o

L: Part of the
about going ah

K: The secon

SJ58 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
The Secretary/Amb. Kosciusko-Morizet
7/14/76 6:05 pm

K: How are you Mr. Ambassador?

M: Thank you for calling me back. Under instructions of my department I want to mke clear what is our position regarding the debate in the UN considering the very recent evolution. You know the Africans seem to be ready to withdraw their resolution if Amin agrees to do so. If they withdraw, we think that we are better not to vote on the American/British resolution because the withdrawal is already a success for us. Of course we are ready to vote for the American/British resolution if it is not withdrawn. We are sure we will not get more than 5 or 6 votes at the most and the resolution will not pass. I wanted to inform you about our impression.

K: When is the vote? Is the vote today?

M: NO, I think tomorrow. We try to see if Amin agrees with the withdrawal of the resolution.

K: Well, let me think about this and we will take this very seriously. Let me consider your views.

M: If they announce the introduction of the resolution . . .

K: Right, I understand that.

M: So I am waiting for word from you.

K: Right, thank you.

M: Thank you very much Mr. Secretary.

K: Right, bye.

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SJ77 *

TELECON
The Secretary/Deputy Secretary Robinson
7/15/76 7:12 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I had breakfast with Bill Coleman this morning who told me he is pushing two projects. National _____ and aircraft noise abatement. I am rather behind them and I told them to talk with you and Rogers.

R: He told me today he was trying to set up a meeting with Richardson. We had been talking about the noise abatement problem.

K: But you favor both programs?

R: Yes, and I will follow through on it. When you have a few moments tomorrow I have a number of things I have to get to you.

K: Well you know some day maybe you can turn your managerial talents to my outer office. It is run by mad men.

R: Well, I have a few things and I will need 5 or 10 minutes so I will call them.

K: Okay, fine.

"e" at end of have is partly missing from orig.

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SJ65

TELECON
The Secretary/Mr. Funseth
7/15/76 7:01 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

F: Yes sir. I have had some questions if we were prepared to provide a read out of your meeting with Schmidt.

K: Just say it concerned mostly North/South relations.

F: Can I say anything about Rogers meeting with those people?

K: You better ask Rogers. I didn't even know he was meeting.

F: He was meeting with Hiss and Hermes while you were in your meeting.

K: Our meeting concerned mostly North/South and a little bit of East/West relations. You can tell them that. But you'll have to check with Rogers on the other.

F: Did you hear about Canada?

K: No what?

F: Trudeau said that they can play any tune they want and they can fly any flag they want but they just can't call themselves the Republic of China.

K: Well, I think that ought to do it. Don't you?

F: Yes sir.

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SJ63 *

TELECON
The Secretary/Art Hartman
6:15 p.m. 7/15/76

RELEASED IN FULL

H: Yes sir.

K: Am I ever going to get the EUR draft for that toast tomorrow? If I don't you can throw it out the window.

H: No, you have it. Dick Aherne just called me about it. I will call and have him get it right in.

K: I have asked for these things 48 hours ahead of time.

H: Mr. Secretary, it was up there then. Aherne just called and said he thought it should be a little more topical. I don't know . . .

K: Well, could I see what you sent and what he is playing with?

H: Yes sir.

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SJ86 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Dick Aherne
7/16/76; 3:33 p.m.

but not overnight

K: I hope that Carter understands that I will do the campsite/in any event. I don't give a damn what you do. I am telling you since human language doesn't seem to get through to anybody.

A: All right. I will tell him that.

K: I thought the problem was staying overnight.

A: No it is more sophisticated. They have the same problem during the day with the high grounds and woods around the camp. They have taken the same grounds the Secret Service has.

K: Talk to Arnold and see what he says before you cancel it.

S: Okay. I will.

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SJ 85 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Lew Wasserman
7/16/76; 10:17 a.m.

K: How are you?

W: Weary. I am getting too old for convent ions. In talking to Abe and Casey they thought maybe you would be free Monday night for dinner.

K: I think I probably would be.

W: If so Ellie and I would come down and why don't we do that.

K: Good. Why don't you. On Monday. Sunday night isn't possible?

W: Sunday?

K: I would slightly prefer Sunday night but I can do either.

W: Let me check with Case and Abe.

K: Why don't you check it and whatever you can work out we will arrange.

W: I will get back to your office.

K: Thank you.

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SJ 84 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Art Hartman
7/16/76; 9:41 a.m.

K: Now that you have inflicted these idiotic thoughts on me will you tell me what that was about hotdogs?

H: He apparently was interviewed before he came over here and he said he knew quite a bit about America but he doesn't like hotdogs and discussed the thing and preferred hamburgers. Not a great pun but it is topical.

K: Yeah.

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SJ 78 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Roy Atherton
7/16/76; 9:18 a.m.

K: Are we in contact with the PLO or are we doing it through the Egyptians?

A: Both. The security man at the embassy -- their security man in Beirut. We have a report in this morning on the talk they had.

K: I don't get those reports. It is ridiculous.

A: It is.

K: This place has disintegrated.

A: I can't believe the press don't know.

K: What does the PLO say about evacuation?

A: They say they will cooperate fully if we want to use the airport and if we want to use the road.

K: Let's use the road.

A: We have the problem with Seelye. He has had some reservations about the road and he also had some on the airport. We are going to talk to him about the road on the secure phone today. Once he gets into the Syrian area there is no problem.

K: Okay.

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SJ80 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Armstrong/Secretary Kissinger
July 16, 1976

K: Hi Anne, how are you?

A: I am fine. you mentioned that you wanted me to call you Friday to see if there is anything new.

K: Nothing. We haven't heard a word from the British . I haven't heard from Crosland since he left.

A: Oh.

K: Why don't you go and see Crosland and say we have to have a sense of what they are planning or this thing will disintegrate. Do it in a friendly way. But say we have to have an idea of what their schedule is.

A: What specific questions do you want me to ask?

K: Well, I don't know what they are doing and what their time-frame is.

A: I get there Monday morning.

K: You can wait til Tuesday.

A: I will call him Monday and if I can see him then I will, if not I'll wait til Tuesday.

K: Good.

END

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SJ81 *

TELCON

RELEASED IN FULL

Sec Kissinger/Phil Habib
7/16/76; 8:07 a.m.

K: I just wanted to know whether that message was passed to the Chinese last night.

H: The man who was to call, I was not told by him.

K: I am going to see the President this morning.

H: He was trying to get in touch with them last night.
made in a couple of hours; it will be

K: If he has not done it the decision will be a waste of time.

H: He will have done it.

K: Certainly he will have. You will say he has done it and he will just have done it. Will you tell me when he has done it and what time he has done it?

H: Yes, and what the answer was.

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SJ83 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Harry Schlaudeman
7/16/76; 9:30 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: What happened with the Excelsior?

S: I think what really he wanted is about what the press is saying, that Echeverria is pulling a power play there.

K: It says right-wing people took over.

S: I think they are more conservative. But that doesn't mean it will be any more anti-American.

K: Why would Echeverria want to put more anti-American people in there?

S: His problem is control. The problem is Schearer. Schearer was criticizing him. I don't think the ideology is all that important.

K: If he gets away with that, doesn't it carry all the other newspapers.

S: Yes. That is what he wants to do, I guess.

K: Okay.

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SJ82 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Amb. Zahedi
7/16/76; 9:24 a.m.

K: How are you?

Z: Fine.

K: I understand that you are going to get a position from Carter.

Z: He has asked me but I said I am sorry I cannot accept.

K: I see. Well, are you going to campaign for him?

Z: No, I decided it is not a good one so I would try to do my own.

K: When are you going off?

Z: I was planning to go tomorrow, but I have a dinner Tuesday night so am leaving Wednesday.

K: What dinner? Oh, the diplomatic reception.

Z: I changed my plans.

K: Then we have time to talk.

Z: Yes. I have been talking yesterday with my Queen and asked her to give the message and will talk to them again tomorrow. So I am coming back from New York tonight.

K: Why don't you call me. I thought you were planning to leave.

Z: I was planning to/but changed my plans because of the reception.

K: Then we will talk next week.

Z: Yes.

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SJ90 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
The Secretary/Mr. Atherton
7/17/76 1:25 pm

K: Roy, one thing -- what is this palover going back and forth between Beirut and Tel Aviv about a Palestinian state?

A: Seelyee sent a long message which went around to a lot of places. This was the Tel Aviv comment on that.

K: Why do we do it knowing it will leak and knowing it will just raise hell.

A: I can't explain that. I agree it was not a message we needed. It was mostly a message about what the positive elements. were.

K: But why send it around. We have enough troubles.

A: I am not disagreeing.

K: Well, who sent it around?

A: He did. He sent it out from there with a number of addressees.

K: Does every Ambassador have the right? So he determines how much leaking there will be in effect?

A: I am sure he wasn't thinking of it as something that would be leaked.

K: Couldn't he have sent it here and asked if he could send it around?

A: That would have been a much safer thing to do.

K: Can you make sure that happens in the future.

A: The only way we can do it is to issue a directive saying that an Ambassador should not give lateral transmission of messages unless authorized.

K: Well, let me think about it. Roy, how was it possible to have this deal cooked up with Saudi Arabia without my ever knowing about it.

A: What deal?

K: Look in the financial page of the Times. Parskey is saying that we have deals with Saudi Arabia. Under that guise, they can take over all economic relations with Saudi Arabia.

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A: I will have to check that one. That got by me.

K: Okay.

A: Mr. Secretary, did you have a chance to meet Lane?

K: No, and I am leaving now. That is your problem with my outer office. I just can't handle this place the way it is being handled now.

A: I will check with them then.

K: Will he be here on Monday.

A: Oh yes.

K: Why don't we say between 10 and 11:00 on Monday?

A: Fine. Another thing, Seelye is very insistent on the road convoy. He has even suggested that due to the general political atmosphere he ought to wait a few days.

K: That is fine with me. What is your opinion?

A: My opinion is that we continue to explore the airport alternative as a subsequent operation to the convoy.

K: Look, we are not going to jeopardize 400 people just to save Seelye's ass.

A: No, no, it would be just a small plane with about 4 people on it.

K: That is fine. But I am not sure staying a few extra days isn't a good idea.

A: Okay.

SI376 *

TELECON
Secretary Clements/Secretary Kissinger
July 17, 1976
Time: 10:45 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Listen is my impression correct that you are getting the charters or do we do it.

C: We are going to contact the charters and have them on a stand-by basis depending on how many and when we need them.

K: You have them in Rome so that we can move them fast?

C: Yes. I will have the information before noon tomorrow. I will know what is available, what the capacity is, where they are and when to have them there.

K: They will be ready to move on Saturday so we can forget about it, right?

C: Yes, I will keep your office informed.

K: O.K. Good. Thank you.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
DATE/CASE ID: 06 JUN 2003 200102979

SJ89 *

TELECON
The Secretary/Mr. Funseth
7/17/76 10:36 am

RELEASED IN FULL

F: Good morning.

K: Hello Bob. I want you to say it isn't true about my not going up there. Just say I haven't made a final decision.

F: That is what I said. And when that story came out yesterday we called people last night and said what I said at the conference -- that you had not made up your mind.

K: Okay.

F: What if I am asked about this Rowan thing? My inclination would be to say I don't have anything on that.

K: Yeah, but you won't get by with that on Monday.

F: Yeah, but it will buy us some time if they ask me this morning.

K: Well, if they ask you this morning, just say you don't have anything.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 24 FEB 2003 200102979

SJ97 *

TELECON
The Secretary/Amb. Dinitz
7/19/76 4:47 pm

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: Mr. Ambassador, how are you?

D: Fine thank you mr. Secretary.

K: We have a number of very sensitive things in respect to the Middle East and Lebanon and some Soviet actions and I didn't know whether you want me to discuss them with Baron or whether you want to come back.

*Bar-ON

D: Well, let me say this. If you think that I should come back, I will come back. If not, maybe I will send _____ to your office and . . .

K: But can he contact Rabin alone?

D: No, he has the direct channel.

K: And he is reliable?

D: Absolutely. 100%.

K: Well, that is what I wanted to check with you.

D: 100%. He is in on all of our communications.

K: So When I tell him something should go only to Rabin, can I count on it?

D: Absolutely.

K: I may not be able to see him until tomorrow.

D: If you think it is something that requires my coming, I will come.

K: No, I just want to bring you up to date on some things that have happened. Tell him I will arrange to see him tomorrow.

D: All right. Now, Mr. Secretary, I got a cable from Allon who said Nancy expressed interest to come sometime and visit us. He invites her to come to Israel as his guest at any time she wants. But he asked me to convey to you that he will be more than glad to take care of her. So if she feels she would like to come some time in the future, let me know and I will arrange it.

K: Okay. I notice that there is no invitation to me as part of this.

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D: No, Mr. Secretary we didn't think that you needed an invitation from us. You had mentioned to me that Nancy would like to come on a private visit and . . .

K: Okay. Fine, I appreciate it very much,

B6



D: Okay, so I will call Hanan and tell him.

K: Okay.

SJ110 *

TELECON
The Secretary/Mr. Atherton
7/19/76 5:55 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How did we get over 400 evacuees now except by actively recruiting?

A: I don't know. I assume that is the number that came in to sigh up. But I don't see the problem.

K: The problem is that we are clearing out Beirut so it can be attacked. Every other country got its people out quietly. Only we had to make a huge production out of it.

A: Well, circumstances have changed since we started planning the evacuation.

K: That scheme may be good for Guatemala in an earthquake but it is really difficult to do it in this mechanical way.

A: The situation in which it is happening has changed since we made the decision.

K: What is our interest in the other foreigners?

A: Well our interest is basically in our people and we didn't make a big thing out of all of this. We simply said we would be doing this and that others would be welcome to join.

K: But you don't know what Seelye is saying.

A: The only public announcement has been this one.

K: Where did that Swedish request come from?

A: That I don't know Mr. Secretary.

K: Well, they certainly gave the impression that somebody was trying to organize as many people as possible.

A: I honestly think that we have not been going out of our way to try to encourage non-Americans.

K: Did the germans put into the newspaper others could register with them?

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A: I don't know how they handled it.

K: How many are dependents of our people?

A: About half are accounted for by our Americans. There is also a small number of Lebanese employees of the Embassy. My suspicion is the fact that there has been all of this publicity about a possible Christian attack which has emerged since we began organizing the evacuation and it has caused people to do this.

K: Why don't you call Baron (BAR-ON) and say that if the Christians play around with us, we will have to change our attitude toward them.

A: Okay.

K: Although, it's a hell of a situation where we have to pass a message to the Christians through the Israelis.

A: I would rather you pass it to Dinitz the next time you have him in.

K: Okay. good.

A: Thank you.

SJ91 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Ed Carter
7/19/76; 10:25 am

C: I was over at George Shultz's having dinner with him and Hal Sonnenfeldt. Schmidt made a good impression on everbody.

K: He is teriffic. I am going to move heaven and earth to get the secret service -- they will not let me stay overnight. I can come for lunch and overnight for a dinner. We can do three of the four things we planned to do, unless you have already gotten somebody.

C: George told me there was that problem. The sleeping accommodations are very easy to protect. It is a solid building with only 1 window in the thing. It is a cinch to protect that. I think from your point of view coming in and out the same day really is not the best public relations. It looks like you are coming to make a speech instead of to be a guest.

K: I think if we could give these secret service people anything like a permission to put a light outside the building to guard it.

C: We will do that.
They say
K: / it is completely dark and everybody can sneak up there.

C: We have got a light. In the last 15 years I have been there, there have been at least 10 members of the cabinet who stayed there. It is really silly.

K: If they will not protect me, I may take State Department security in to protect me.

C: I think you ought to stay for breakfast. I think you will have a good time.

K: I know I will have a good time. I will call you this afternoon.

C: I am going to New York on the 4:00 flight.

K: 4:00 your time?

C: Yes. From 1:30 - 3:30 I will be in the bank meeting. Aherne has the numbe

K: Aherne will call you.

C: If there is any risk, it is at the speech. "r" missing on the original.

K: I am going to take my chances on the speech.

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SJ94

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Bob Funseth
7/19/76; 12:16 p.m.

F: I just learned that Ikle had a backgrounder briefing this morning with 10 reporters in his office on nuclear proliferation. Apparently it went on and into some detail. I am going to try to find out what he said.

K: He said we are opposed to it.

F: Yes. Someone from his office is testifying on this subject tomorrow. I will try to find out what he said.

K: Okay.

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SJQS *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Winston Lord
7/19/76; 1:07 p.m.

K: That was not fair to your staff. I know your staff doesn't hold this view.

L: That is all right. I was trying to raise this big junk of money which I think if useful but . . .

K: How are we doing on the speech?

L: I have to see what now comes back to me. As of this morning I was not very happy with it.

K: Is it getting worse?

L: I don't say it is getting worse. It is a structural pattern -- Japan gets diffused . . .

K: I didn't want it diffused throughout. I said we could have Japan at the first section of _____. You can't split it up.

L: I don't want to prejudice you.

K: It can't.

L: Hopefully there has been progress.

K: How could they split it up when I had specifically said it couldn't be.

L: That part is easily fixed.

K: What I wanted was a more conceptual discussion on security. At the end of which we have Japan. At the end of Japan use it as a bridge to the other sections.

L: We moved it in terms of easing tensions . . . China . . .

K: I want to put all of that into the Japan section.

L: Yes. Hopefully progress has been made.

K: My problem is we have less than 48 hours to get it done.

L: We can do it. For Chicago we did it.

K: Okay. But that was easy.

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L: We will have it to you in about an hour.

K: Okay.

SJ96 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Amb. Schaufele/Secretary Kissinger
July 19, 1976
4:37 pm

K: Did Larry tell you what I want sent to Nyere?

S: Yes. He has drafted it and I saw it and it is fine.

K: What did Clark want?

S: He wanted to talk about my trip but it was very general. Dick Clark understands why I was being general. His staffers tried to bore in but I shut them off.

K: I hope you were very general.

S: I was.

K: What did you tell them.

S: After we talked to the Africans and South Africans we went back to the Africans and we are consulting with all concerned to see if we can come up with something worthwhile. He asked about the guarantees and I said that was one idea.

K: Did he raise Kenya?

S: No. I think he will come off that.

K: Having the Israelis as allies is always a good idea.

S: Yes.

END

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SJ100 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/MaxFisher
7/20/76; 12:16 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

F: I just got back after a couple of weeks.

K: How are things?

F: Pretty good. I would like to come in and talk to you Friday.

K: I will be out of town. How about next week?

F: I will pick out a day next week when I am free to come in. But I would like to sit down and give you my background.

K: All right.

F: Saturday?

K: No.

F: Let me see what day I come in next week and we can go over what took place. I will just -- your secretary will know when you are free?

K: Right.

F: Things were pretty ecstatic with the way things worked out. I think it would be good for you to get a few reactions which I have that might be useful.

K: Absolutely.

F: Let's do that. You will be in all next week?

K: Yes.

F: I will pick out a day and see how it fits in with your schedule.

K: Teriffic.

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SJ 102 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Joe Kraft
7/20/76; 12:44 p.m.

K: I notice you are beginning to change your mind about Carter.

Kraft: Slightly. Not about Zbig.

K: Is he very super-charged?

Kraft: No.

K: Zbig?

Kraft: No. He is staying out of the way. He went up to Maine.

K: You never made a fundamental judgment.

Kraft: I said maybe. I was very impressed by the choice of Mondale and the choice to resist the consensus of choice.

K: That I understand.

Kraft: I thought maybe I would be seeing you in Montreal but I gather you are not going.

K: It is tough for me to go now.

Kraft: Since the dispute.

K: It is sort of an absurd dispute and it is not a foreign policy reason. It is more an internal domestic reason.

Kraft: I would like to see you at some point.

K: How about early next week?

Kraft: I think that sounds very good. Let me see. We have been invited to the White House Tuesday night and I am going to be coming back early with Polly. Anytime Tuesday would be good.

K: Can you hold on?

Kraft: Sure.

K: How about lunch on Tuesday?

Kraft: Lunch Tuesday is perfect.

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K: See you at 1:00 on Tuesday.

Kraft: See you then.

K: Good.

SJ101 *

TELECON
Mr. Hummel/Secretary Kissinger
July 20, 1976
12:18

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Have you determined to what document that Singapore cable refers.

H: You mean the leak?

K: Yes.

H: It is the reuters story and it is a fellow who covers the Pentagon.

K: From what cable did he get it and what are the facts. Have we been talking to the Pentagon?

H: Yes, there have been several cables back and forth. Singapore finally decided they didn't want the F-4's and wanted the F-5 E's instead. And there has been a lot of telegraphic traffic on this. Singapore is now off the dime and has made a request.

K: But there is a specific quote in a government document to which Holdridge refers.

H: Ok. I will find out . You want me to call you back or give you a memo?

K: Call me back.

H: Ok.

END

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SJ 105 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Win Lord
7/20/76; 3:57 p.m.

K: Win, you have at least another hour. I am just beginning to work on that speech.

L: I am just about through my editing.

K: What do you think of the speech?

L: I think we heading towards a pretty good speech. We still have a slight structural problem with Japan. I don't think there is any other way to do it. We get into easing tensions and economic issues and nobody else would know.

K: It is just sort of lost in the other places. I am thinking of moving the Southeast Asia section back to the last section.

L: Then you have the problem of putting them into an economic context. I think it is better putting the Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia sections into separate places. I think it is better where it is.

K: Well, let me see when I get there how I feel about it.

L: I don't think they will get you back to that problem.

K: The end is purely economic.

L: That is all right since we have so much security and political stuff before.

K: You think the speech is pretty good now.

L: But by the time we get finished in the next 24 hours it will be good.

K: Are you going to have a chance to do another editing tomorrow?

L: Yes. By that time it should be good.

K: All right. Thank you.

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SJ107 *

TELECON
The Secretary/Amb. Zahedi
7/21/76; 12:20 pm

RELEASED IN PART
B6

Z: How are you?

[redacted] B6

I have talked to His Majesty. Both sides are kind of embarrassed. He thought he was being insulted. From your Embassy they have written a telegram saying you will go only for such and such a timeand then go back.

K: It is ridiculous.

Z: He would loveyou to stay all the time in the Caspian. The group of people who are going in advance, they will make all the necessary talks so you don't have to go through the details. Everyone would be at your service in the Caspian. You would get together for the meetings with whomever you wish and the same time have time for some relaxation.

K: Wonderful.

Z: This is definitely this way. You will stay at the Caspian?

K: The evening of my arrival I had better stay in Tehran. It will be dark when I arrive and I understand they don't like to fly at night.

Z: You can do it the next morning and stay there until the morning you take the plane and there would be two planes at your disposal -- one for Nancy and one for David.

K: I was pulling your leg on that, Ardeshir.

Z: No honestly, everything is at your disposal. I mentioned about Frank Zarb and said there was some misunderstanding on him. He should either go earlier -- but if he goes earlier it is no use -- Puskan(sp?) is in Europe. I suggested three to four weeks after your visit.

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K: If it is four days after there can be no change in our position, there is no use for him to go.

Z: It is only 92 hours after, not four days. Then the time is up to you. When you see His Majesty it is up to you when Zarb comes.

K: Ansary will take the responsibility for cancelling it. You will notblame it on me, will you?

Z: No, I blame myself. I said since Ansary will not be able to come to Europe I will suggest some other date after we decide I will call you.

K: That is fine.

Z: I am leaving tonight. I am going to call Brent about the F-16's. I hope you will have the answer on the intelligence thing before you come?

K: Terrific.

Z: I am at your disposal. I hope Nancy and David will enjoy the trip. Anything you need you just order and we are at your service. My staff can reach me.

K: Marvelous.

Z: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. It was wonderful to see you last night.

K: It was wonderful to see you to Ardeshir.

SJ121 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Phil Habib
7/26/76; 11:45 a.m.

K: I am assuming it is all being stopped.

H: Yes. The message is gone. I have got a copy of it. You ought to have one in your office a list of countries to which the message went both for info and action. The info ones included those we ~~have~~ had not decided to send the letters so they did not deliver any aide memoirs. Selected countries got messages which are on the borderline or can be swayed and it is just calling it to their attention. The process is not a bad one and is consistent with what you wanted done. That is why it went the day you gave your speech.

K: These sob's don't send my speeches unless it serves their purposes. Let me see the guidance and maybe we will reinstate it.

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SJ 120 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Mr. Habib
7/26/76; 10:58 a.m.

K: Can you ask IO to stop anything that they are executing of this cable, since you are not telling me who got it and who didn't. It is to be stopped now.

H: Okay.

K: Then I m a y reinstate it but it is to be stopped and there is to be no further action taken. I don't assume you knew what they were doing. Do you think that is the way to run a government?

H: I would like to see a list of the countries.

K: I would like to see the cable.

H: I was just asking about it. I had been out an hour.

K: They are ordered -- to all embassies -- if they have not already done it to stop it. I want to see a cable, a list of the countries and what they said. I want to know why they thought they had the right to do this.

H: I think once you made your speech all of this is being worked on with other countries. We are doing this . . .

K: There is only one country you forgot to touch base with. That is me. I did not know you were doing it.

H: Once your speech was made the idea was to get the word around.

K: I was never told.

H: The speech -- it has got to be publicized. Why did you make the speech.

K: I make many speeches the Department does not get behind.

H: They ought to get behind every one.

K: Within the next 10 minutes they will stop carrying this out. I want to have a phone call here in 10 minutes saying the executions are being stopped.

H: Okay.

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SJ 136 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
The Secretary/Mr. Habib
7/26/76 6:37 pm

K: That cable which I finally got to, they sent not only to Korea but Puerto Rico. In the aide memoir.

H: In the aide memoir.

K: It went to practically everybody.

H: Some of them it is only for info not for action and some of the countries were hard core.

K: But they are also,in the usual incompetence of this Department, being sent to addressees that had already been addressed in my letter.

H: Those were for info only.

K: Like who?

H: Botswana, Dar es Salaam. No, they took that into account. It is all being handled.

K: Do you think the Department of State knows that Korea sent fighter pilots to Cairo?

H: Cairo is not all that bad. There is a Consulate General in Cairo and there is some indication that they have got some good economic relations going. They have been doing rather well in the Middle East lately.

K: Okay.

H: Can I ask you another question?

K: What is it?

H: When are you going to let me send that execute message?

K: Maybe never.

H: Well, the problem is the thing already went out and alot of them have already done it -- it went out on the 27th.

K: Nobody had a right to sent this thing out. Since I cannot get discipline, I can at leat make your life as difficutl as possible. Don't give me this nonsense. They are sending out this as a verbatim of the letter and it includes all of the countries that I disapproved for the letter. They used my speech to circumvent my instructions.

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H: Only the countries are sympathetic to our argument.

K: Like Damascus?

H: Damascus is on for info.

K: Like Mobutu?

H: That is the one I would have taken off if I had had a chance to look at it before. In para 2, it says "Beirut, you are not to present the aide memoir."

K: Phil, you will not be able to lift this restriction. Either this Department will get organized or we will each go our separate ways.

H: In this case, we are following up on your speech.

K: Then why are they putting in the Puerto Rico stuff as much as the other? I had explicitly rejected this approach in a letter. It is total lack of discipline. If they wanted to appeal it, they should have.

H: Ididn't know you had rejected it. What I knew was that you didn't want it to go to hard core countries. All right now Iunderstand. I understand a little more why you are so angry about it. Well, give me a ring tomorrow.

K: Maybe.

SJ122 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Amb. Schaufele
7/26/76; 12:45 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Botha told me that Bowdler has asked to see the Prime Minister. What is that about?

S: He has asked to see him. I don't know.

K: Botha says he has asked to see him.

S: Let me check.

K: Find out.

S: I will get back to you.

K: Maybe about the Zambian debate.

S: I think that is what it is about. I want to confirm it.

K: Okay.

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SJ 123

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Amb. Schaufele
7/26/76; 12:55 p.m.

S: Sir, that is what it is about. He suggested another approach to South Africa. We went back and said he should tell them we hope the debate in the Security Council wouldn't adversely affect the outcome and he should participate in a low-key way.

K: Right.

S: So that is what it is about.

K: Okay.

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SJ 124 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Bob Funseth
7/26/76; 1:03 p.m.

F: Botha just spoke to reporters in the building and said he was not commenting on anything of substance. He said there were severe problems to overcome and a meeting between you and Vorster was unlikely during your upcoming trip. He was asked if Scowcroft participated and he said you would have to ask the Secretary. LARS said you seemed to be less optimistic than when you came in. He said you have to [redacted] draw your own conclusions. Do you want me to say who participated?

K: Yes. You have got to say who was here and say there is no change in our prospects. There is no reason to be less pessimistic than before.

F: No reason to be less optimistic than before.

K: Right. Just say the prospects have not changed any.

F: We are still working on it.

K: Right and we have never characterized the prospects.

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SJ 133

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
The Secretary/Roy Atherton
7/26/76 5:42 pm

K: Is it possible to go from Islamabad to the Philippines without stopping in Delhi?

A: I would not recommend it Mr. Secretary. If you were to fly directly over India and not even stop for a few hours -- we would have to explain. I think it could be done and you could meet with Mrs. Ghandi and Chavan. Who knows, they might come back to say that Chavan won't even be in the country. But we should at least make the approach.

K: Okay, I will make my mind up tomorrow.

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SJ 127 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Barry Schweid
7/26/76; 3:12 pm

K: I am not recognizing the PLO.

S: I am not writing about the PLO. But I would like to get the right slant on your meeting with Vorster.

K: It is not imminent.

S: Okay. That takes care of the trip. What about the PLO. It is just essentially for that rescue operation?

K: The contacts are straight security contacts. All that they do is how many people at what place there is. The Israelis know everything about what we are doing.

S: Are they alarmed?

K: Not even uneasy. On Lebanon there is just no problem between us and the Israelis.

S: It is fascinating the way it keeps turning. Are the voice of the people going to get out okay.

K: We are going to know tonight. It looks pretty good now.

S: Well, sir. Thank you so much.

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SJ 138 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Art Hartman
7/27/76; 9:27 am

K: Portugal is now out, right?

H: Yes it is. Apparently Soares felt without a vote he could not be considered a government. His talking to you would be inappropriate.

K: I know Carlucci's heart is broken.

H: He did want you to come.

K: Bs. He will at best tolerate me.

H: I hate to disabuse you. He really did want you to come.

K: I have 2 choices. I can either leave at midnight on the 4th or stay overnight in London.

H: We will check to see if anybody is there.

K: Can we do it without the embassy throwing things into motion.

H: We are checking to see where people are.

K: It is beginning to look as if I am imposing myself on them.

H: They will do it very lightly.

K: The next question is on the way back do you think the Dutch will object if I came there in the morning and left in the evening. Will they insist on staying overnight.

H: No. I think if you have a days talks and a lunch it is okay.

K: There are 2 possibilities. One is arrive 2 weeks from yesterday evening. Monday evening, whatever day it is.

H: The 9th.

K: Yes. Monday.

H: Monday in the evening.

K: And leaving the afternoon of the 10th. The other possibility if I stay and visit a friend in Normandy is to arrive the morning of the 11th and leave the afternoon -- late afternoon of the 11th.

H: Yes. I don't have my paper in front of me but the foreign minister suggested the 10th or 11th the other day. In any case he will be back around that time.

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K: Can you explore that and let me know.

H: Preferably the second.

K: Probably.

H: The day of the 11th. Okay.

K: Yes.

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SJ 140

TELECON
The Secretary/Phil Habib
7/27/76 5:27 pm

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D), B3, CIA

K: On this trip, what is your judgment -- should I come back after Islamabad or go on around?

H: I would really ask your own feelings. Do you really want to have a last fling before the elections with these people? Would it be useful? They would be delighted for you to come for however short a time. You have had long-standing invitations. Now EA doesn't think you ought to go to the Philippines because there is nothing to do there and Marcos has not been treating his own people in the best way lately. He's got some trials coming up and you would not want to be there on the day he sentences a bunch of guts to life imprisonment. My view is it would be useful.

K: I am not so sure it is but I really can't be in the position that I must make my trips dependent on the domestic situation.

H: No, but you don't want to arrive when he is sentencing his leading opposition guys to live imprisonment. There is no progress on the base negotiations. My feeling however is that you don't want to stay long enough to do something anyway. It might be useful to lay some things out with the Base agreement.

K: Like what?

H: There is no question that they are being unreasonable. Remember since you have seen Marcos, he has been to China, the Soviet Union, he's headed the G-77.

K: I saw him in Nairobi don't forget.

H: What did he do in Nairobi for you?

K: Nothing.

H: That's right. It is perfectly easy to turn around from Israel and come home.

K: Okay, I will think about it overnight.

H: It would bring you back around the end of the week. Can I ask you another question.

K: Quickly.

H: Did George Bush raise with you the question of these hearings [redacted] B1, B3

K: I told him to push it into mid-week if he can.

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I am going to try to get [redacted] to take it on from their end. B1, B3

H: Do you want me to take care of it or are you doing it?

K: No, I will do it.

H: Okay, thanks.

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SJ137

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Governor Scranton/Secretary Kissinger
July 27, 1976
9:15 am

K: Reagan really ripped it with you when he took a Pennsylvanian without considering you.

S: He knows what my answer would have been. We have been working like hell all last night.

K: Is it making an impact?

S: Not much of any. The Southerners are really mad.

K: It is a cynical move.

S: Sure. It is obvious. Three questions. We have Zambia coming up and the Zambian Foreign Minister wants to see me at 12:15 and the Tanzanian Foreign Minister at 1:15.

K: Good.

S: Did you meet with the Foreign Minister of Tanzania?

K: Not on this issue.

S: You didn't meet with him the other day?

K: I didn't know he was in Washington.

S: He gave the impression he had to run to Washington just to meet with you and the UK said he did but I ~~ax~~ know you were on the West coast.

K: Whether he met with anyone else here I don't know, but he didn't meet with me. We have been in touch with Kaunda but you know about these exchanges.

S: Yes. The British have gotten instructions that they can accept a resolution that will condemn South Africa and use the word condemn. And I don't know what we can or can not accept along that line.

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K: I would like to avoid it because we can use the South Africans later this month. So if the South Africans haven't admitted that they have done it...

S: We are going into session this afternoon.

K: Couldn't we condemn the raid and have a session as to who did it?

S: Let's see what we can work out up here and I will get back to you on it.

K: I have told Botha about what we are trying to do there and that he can be in touch with you and you will do your best to come up with something that isn't too offensive but I didn't make any promises as to what that would be. We did say we don't agree to Chapter 7.

S: Ok. I'll see what we can do.

K: How was your visit to Italy?

S: I got the impression that everyone is looking at this as an interim thing and the DC will have to go it alone and the real crisis will come in about 4 or 5 or 6 months.

K: If Carter gets to be President it will be a lulu. He has given them all the wrong signals.

S: I think Andreotti is pretty good but he is not a new face.

K: They must have taken you seriously because nothing leaked.

S: I was pretty serious.

K: That is very interesting.

S: I don't know what Cabot did after I left but I assume Hal will tell me.

K: Cabot just came back.

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S: One other inquiry. Did you see Ambassador Trucco and that emissary from Chile on human rights?

K: No. I saw him last week when he brought in a group of boy scouts to sing for my wife.

S: (laughter). We get the damnest stories back here. I am going to call ARA.

K: He told me they were going to promulgate a new Constitution but there was no emissary with him. It is getting hard to conduct foreign policy in secret from you with your intelligence. I am inclined to feel we should take a look at that human rights thing up there.

S: We can make this a real confrontation.

K: I feel that Chile is no great bargain. The whole thrust of human rights is always directed at our friends or people who want to be friendly. We don't have to settle it now.

S: I have to come down to Washington on Thursday for the President's meeting with the Pennsylvania delegation. Are you going to be there Thursday morning? I would like to see you.

K: Good.

S: I will get that arranged.

K: I want to. Do you want to have breakfast?

S: I don't think I will be there in time -- we have a late meeting that night before. Ok, boss -- I'll be there. -- probably late Thursday morning. Ok, boss.

END

SJ142 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Habib/Secretary Kissinger
July 28, 1976
8:05 am

K: Should we offer to the Chinese some assistance?

H: I haven't seen a report of how bad it is. Is there loss of life?

K: We don't know.

H: If there is no loss of life the Ambassador normally has the right to extend $25,000 immediate humanitarian assistance. There is a fund that exists for that. After that you have to get into appropriated funds.

K: See what we can do. I trust you did not release that cable yesterday?

H: I am afraid to.

K: No, you are just trying to... the Phillipines have been told not to proceed further?

H: We sent Sullivan a cable saying not to do anything further with it.

END

Mr. Habib/Secretary Kissinger
9:33 am

K: I want a message on my desk offering some assistance to the Chinese. 25,000 is an insult.

H: No, that is just something we plug into the Red Cross. No, we have a better suggestion. as to how to do it. I have checked with the disaster people and we have plenty of money. Congress has replenished the funds.

K: Can I...

H: I will give you something shortly.

END

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SJ 143

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Amb. Wm. Scranton
7/28/76; 9:44 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

S: As you know the picture up here changes every 5 and 1/2 minutes. At the moment we have a resolution which you have seen done by the Africans.

K: I have not seen it.

S: I thought IO people showed it to you. It is very, very strong. It is not something we could probably go along with. The British, French and Italians and Japanese want to have a meeting at noon today and have asked for our participation in it because they object to this resolution also but their present tendency is to try and revise the resolution so they could accept it or at the most abstain. Shall we participate in this talk with them.

K: My instinct is yes. What is yours?

S: Mine is too but that leaves us with two options or maybe more. One is we try to persuade them to come up with a resolution which would be all or ours. The Swedes are unhappy too. We are the most unhappy as usual.

K: I don't know what it is about IO that makes them think I may not see resolutions that are being debated. I have never seen the stupid thing.

S: I will call them.

K: My instinct is to have you meet with these peopls and to see whether we can get a resolution we can support. [illegible]

S: The only thing, I don't want to be left with the US left alone vetoing it.

K: I would be very reluctant to veto. I would tend towards abstension. If there is chapter 7 language, then we would have to veto.

S: There is some very bad language at the moment.

K: Like what?

S: It condemns South Africa for everything -- their racist business and it has the two final paragraphs which are operative declaring that the liberation of South Africa is a prerequisite for lasting peace in the region. In the event of South Africa committing further acts of aggression against Zambia, the Security Council would meet again to consider measures including actions under chapter 7 of the UN Charter.

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K: I don't see how we could do that.

S: I don't either. I have talked to the Zambian and Tanzanian foreign ministers. They say what they are looking for out of this meeting is some action out of the Security Council which would make it possible in the future if they need it to have chapter 7 action.

K: We would probably have to veto saying that the liberation of South Africa is a prerequisite for lasting peace -- that we would have to veto, if they don't take that out.

S: All right.

K: Regarding South Africa if necessary I could abstain from and point out this is no way to make progress.

S: Okay. Let's go from there and I will call you back.

K: Good. Thank you.

55145 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Amb. Armstrong
7/28/76; 11:50 a.m.

K: I hope when you become Vice President you will keep in mind your old friends.

A: I want to tell you I am not any more after that job than I am yours. The world can relax on both counts.

K: I am not used to an ambassador in London who is not after my job. I want to ask you -- the only reason I wanted to stop in London was to break my trip. I don't have anything world breaking.

A: I will be here if you come August 4. I was going to be at the American Bar if you come later.

K: Do you think Callaghan suggested this just out of friendship or do you think he really does have something to talk about?

A: As I understand it Callaghan was not going to be here.

K: I got a message he was going to have a dinner with me.

A: I didn't know. I am at home.

K: The only thing . . .

A: I think it is worthwhile. I don't think it is out of friendship.

K: We could talk about Africa.

A: And you may want to talk more about their economy. They are organizing their budget cuts beginning next week. At this point it looks pretty good.

K: Callaghan Crosland won't be there. Where is he going to be?

A: You got me off base. I am at home.

K: Give me your judgment on whether Callaghan would be just as happy if I didn't show up.

A: It would not hurt his feelings.

K: I could fly straight to Tehran.

A: What did the message say and when did you receive it?

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K: About an hour ago -- that he would be glad to see me the morning of the 5th or if I came early enough for dinner he would give a small dinner.

A: Let me check this. Who do you want me to talk to?

K: Call Jock Covey or call me. Call Eagleburger.

A: Okay. Will do.

K: Give me your recommendation. The utility would be we could talk the African thing over once again. I don't think I have ever had a clear meeting of the mind with Tony about this.

A: I have told you my feeling about this so it might be the perfect chance to see one without the other.

K: I could probably arrive by 7:30.

A: By 7:30 on the 4th. Nancy will be with you and David?

K: That is right.

A: Great. I hope it works out because selfishly I would love to see you.

K: I am trying to butter up all Vice Presidential possibilities.

A: I don't want to even think about a future without you.
There are no indispensable people but you come about as close to it as anybody I know.

K: I will probably see you next week.

A: I trust so.

K: Okay.

SS 148

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TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Sec Butz
7/29/76; 9:30 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Now that the Australians have recovered from the shock of what you told them last night, they are running amuck. They are madder than hell now.

B: They already knew.

K: They are pretty mad now. Peacock said he would like to settle the whole issue with you while they are still here.

B: I had a call this morning from Jack Smith in the embassy up there. He has been dealing with Jules Katz. I was not completely filled in on the details last night, as you were not. I thought we were getting progress on this $20 million. Apparently we had some legal snags. I am told the lawyers in State stopped it.

K: BS. I will get the lawyers in State to change. We'll do whatever we can to help our foreign policy.
B: One is the free trade zone border.

K: They are willing to agree nothing should come in through that loophole if you will make an adjustment in their quota.

B: They are asking us to increase the quota to 60 million pounds. If we do that, if a beef goes from 65 -- we have quarterly to estimate the beef control and make a report to the President. If it exceeds the quota the President has to impose a quota. In the absence we have voluntary quotas in shipments. They have been negotiating and Jules Katz has been doing a good job and they have been difficult negotiations. He has this year's all done. Only yesterday I was talking with my people who are responsible for these reports and they indicate there is a strong likelihood in the next quarter they will exceed the quota which will require the President to impose quotas. That would be bad. I said if there is some way -- don't do it before the election. It would raise hell with 15-20 nations.

K: I don't understand the issue enough.

B: I have my people getting in touch with Jules Katz. If there is some way to work out this 20 million overage I am for it. The Australians want it increased by 60 million pounds.

K: I can't tell you which figure is right.

B: We will do the best we can.

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K: Good.

B: Time is short before noon. END

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SJ 149

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Ted Koppel
7/29/76; 12:34 pm

RELEASED IN PART
B6

Koppel: I thought you needed a little boost before you meet with Ecevit.

K: I see.

[redacted] B6

Koppel: [redacted] Our bureau chief from Cairo who is a very dear friend is here and he would appreciate it if he could have 15 minutes with you. Could that be combined?

K: Maybe Saturday morning.

Koppel: Okay. What time?

K: Let's aim for around 10:00.

Koppel: Okay. Very good. Thank you.

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SJ 159 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELECON
The Secretary/Mr. Funseth
7/30/76 5:50 pm

K: Did they make a lot of fuss over that Spanish article?

F: They never raised it. I had to raise it. They just hassled me about the PLO.

K: Oh no. Well, Brown is [redacted] B6

F: Well, we built it up by just putting it out one day at a time.

K: I was always in favor of just saying what it was.

F: This week we first confirmed the contact with the evacuation. Then it came out about the contact with Meloy. It could have been worse but they went around and around on it.

K: Okay.

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SJ 155

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RELEASED IN FULL

telcon
Sec Kissinger/Phil Habib
7/30/76; 2:10 pm

K: My instinct is to abstain from that resolution.

H: Unless -- Tap Bennett told me there might be some chance to make some change in it. They think they would like to go along with it.

K: I know what they think.

H: The more I read it the more I thought of abstaining. I read the abstention statement and . .

K: I have not seen that.

H: It is attached. There were 2 papers given to you. One is for going along with it and the other is for abstention.

K: There is nothing attached at all.

H: The action memo kept changing.

K: There is no abstention memo.

H: I will get one down to you in 30 seconds.

K: Fine.

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55158 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Hartman/Secretary Kissinger
July 30, 1976
12:26 pm

K: Are you going to be at the Hague?

H: I hadn't planned to go or send someone. I can have someone go there. The appropriate person is Dick Vine. He is my Deputy for that area.

K: If he is as precise at The Hague as he is on Ottawa he will be a tower of strength.

H: No, he is very good in that area. I don't know that you need someone there. It is a day of consultation with the Dutch. But if you want someone.

K: Let me think about it.

H: Ok

END

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SJ 157 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Lord/Secretary Kissinger
July 30, 1976
12:16

K: Have you seen that proposal that I go up to New York for two hours for the Law of the Sea Conference on Wednesay?

L: Yes.

K: Does that make any sense to you?

L: There is something to be said for it. It might look a little grandstand, however, there is something to be said for it.

K: Like what?

L: Well, you will meet with the Chairman to underline your personal interestand the urgency of the issues.

K: We don't have a position.

L: We are inching towards one. This is mostly a political and symbolic gesture.

K: I will think about it.

L: I did see Arthur Burns about China. He is not going til October and may not go then what with the earthquake. On the African speech, it is much more dynamic in this draft. I am not clear to what extend you want to create expectations of dynamic progress.

K: I want to indicate the direction in which we want to go.

L: You want to hit middle ground.

K: Yes. good.

'eND

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Mr. Rogers
7/30/76; 4:34 pm

K: Remember when your pal from Guyana was up here claiming he was being attacked by the Brazilians?

R: Yes.

K: Do you remember how many troops the Brazilians found near the border?

R: Couple hundred.

K: That is what I thought. He was also complaining about our not selling him weapons. What was the story?

R: He was complaining about this. What he understood was our unwillingness to sell to his neighbors Surinam.

K: Is that true?

R: No. We had technically designated Surinam to receive them. When the Dutch pulled out we gave them the okay.

K: We are not selling or never sold any.

R: You wrote a letter to Will s[illegible].

K: I know I wrote a letter.

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SJ 161 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
The Secretary/Jules Katz
7/30/76 7:02 pm

K: I am delighted in your decision.

Katz: Thank you. I trust that Larry has conveyed this to you.

K: I can't tell you how delighted I am.

Katz: Well thank you. I am honored and I am ready although not altogether willing.

K: You are a professional and a dedicated man and I have no question you will work out well.

Katz: I have talked to Bill and I think we have resolved the operating problems and I hope to take some time off and be back before . .

K: I am delighted and I want you to know that I know it wasn't easy to make the decision. It is a nightmare to work with me.

Katz: That was the last of my concerns.

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SJ 164 *

TELECON
Joan Braden/Secretary Kissinger
Saturday, July 31, 1976
2:51 pm

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: When are you leaving town?

B: Not forever.

K: Why am I so nice to you?

B: Because I saved your commodity agreement.

K: Someone has told me you are the iron lady. To watch you beat up on Rogers and Habib is terrific.

B: Yes, but you were terrific. Did I tell you what Javits said to me?

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K: No.

B: I said Senator Javits that is a very good question and I would be free to argue my case all the way up to the Secretary but when to comes to our conversations, they are private. He said could you come and state your advice and I said no. He said that is why we need an independent agency. I said no one could have gotten as far as I did.

K: Good. I don't want you to be mad at me. I understand you suggested you, Nancy and I have dinner tomorrow night. I have to work on a speech.

B: I have no plans. Why...

[redacted] B6

END

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SJ172

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Funseth/Secretary Kissinger
July 31, 1976
Time: 7:05 p.m.

K: did you talk to Dinitz?

F: He just returned my call. He said the only thing on background that he said to Israeli correspondents was that at your meeting you reiterated the U.S. position on the PLO. That was the only thing he said -- he said the rest was pure speculation on the part of the Israeli press. He was going to have his press man call them on this.

K: The unfortunate thing is it is almost all complete true. Well, you just stick to your line saying we won't comment on private diplomatic exchanges and foreign policy will be enunciated by formal policy statements

F: That is what I have done.

K: O.K. Good. Thank you.

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SJ 162 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Mr. William Rogers/Secretary Kissinger
Saturday, July 31, 1976
12:29 PM

K: You are going off to England?

R: Yes. We will be in London tomorrow but then we are going to Bonn on Monday. To see people in the Ministry of Finance and Economy.

K: You are not going to discuss Africa with the Germans?

R: No, it has nothing to do with that. It is a follow up on the Schmidt thing.

K: I know. You are going to talk to the British about Africa. Peter Ramsbotham is here telling me that.

R: That's news to me. I sent you a note saying that Rollins wanted to see me. That's all I know about it.

K: All you should discuss is the economic plan. The political strategy I want to discuss.The next day I am sending Schaufele over. You and Bill together ought to discuss prior to a breakfast I am having with Callaghan on Thursday morning some of the strategy. Then I would like you to join that breakfast unless the Prime Minister wants to see me alone, which I doubt. Will you do that?

R: Yes.

K: I do not want you to discuss with Rollins beyond the technical economics because otherwise we will have too many people talking about technical moves. Who goes where at what time you are not competent to discuss.

R: Certainly.

K: Is Ed Yeo going with you?

R: To Bonn.

K: Make clear to Ed Yeo that it is not simply economic conditions we are concerned with with the Italians.

R: I do not think he is going to talke to them. Do you want him to?

K: No, in fact, I think it would be better if he did not.

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K: We will probably get the Communists anxious to talk about free trade plans.

R: Ok. I will see you Thursday morning.

K: No, see me Wednesday night.

R: Ok.

R: Good.

END.

SJ 168

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RELEASED IN FULL

Telecon
Mr. Funseth/Secretary Kissinger
Saturday, July 31, 1976
4:00 pm

K: I am assuming you are calling around with that statement?

F: With the Silberman or Humphrey statement?

K: The Humphrey is in answer to questions.

F: I have questions from Oberdorf and Gelb.

K: Silberman. We had questions from ABC. Are you telling me you are not volunteering it?

F: We already had questions from the three networks.

K: Have you dont it? Has it been done? Are you getting it around to the others? No.

F: We will call around then.

K: Mr. Eagleburger will have to learn that any stupidity in this place will be committed.

F: Well on a Saturday those are the people we usually call.

K: You don't call the Times and Post?

F: No.

K: Why not call CBS while you are at it. Now, when you hang up.

F: Ok.

K: Do you think you should call the Times and Post?

F: Well, I think if we take care of the wires, it will be all right.

K: Have you called the wires?

F: Yes.

K: Have you already done it or are you going to do it when you hang up?

F: I have already called them.

K: You have given our statement to ABC and NBC. So you will now call CBS and give them our statement?

F: Yes sir. K: All right.
END

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SJ 166 *

TELECON
Larry Eagleburger/Secretary Kissinger
Saturday, July 31, 1976
3:10 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

LSE: He has two points. (He reads from cable.)

K: Which we are prepared to maintain.

LSE: He worries about somebody saying something about it.

K: It also may prevent the PNGing and people may also say the SOB... We will volunteer it but make that change.

LSE: Good.

K: Get it out now..within the next 15 minutes.

LSE: I will.

END

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SJ 167 *

TELECON
Richard Ahern/Secretary Kissinger
Saturday, July 31, 1976
3:55 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Can you still lay on that panel if they confine it to 20 minutes?

A: I will call right away and see.

K: I would have to know who is on the panel.

A: Well, John Hughes of the Christian Science Monitor, Tom Johnson of the New York Times, Ethel Payne of the Chicago Defender and Ronald H. Brown of the Urban League.
K. Do you think it is a good idea?

A: I think it would add something to it that you won't get out of it by making a speech and saying thank you.

K: Ok. Tell them 20 minutes only. Who is coming to the dinner?

A: (did not get answer)

K: I want David if he is coming with me.

A: Right. There is going to be a very simple group. I will call them and see if I can't get that too.

K: Ok.

END.

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SJ 169 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Funseth/Secretary Kissinger
Saturday, July 31, 1976
4:23 pm

F: UPI has called us for guidance on two wire service reports citing Dinitz as a source of a story stating that Dinitz told you that Israel felt a Syrian deal with the PLO may create an intolerable situation on its border with Lebanon. That Israel would not put up with a settlement which meant resumption of guerilla attacks and stationing a large number of Syrian troops along Lebanon's border with Israel.

K: I absolutely will not respond...

F: Do you want to hear the rest of it?

K: Yes.

F: According to Dinitz you understood Israel's position and did not expect any Middle East peace initiatives until Lebanon fighting ends.

K: Why don't you call Dinitz on my behalf and ask him...

F: Wait a minute...there is more. Dinitz said that you hasd expressed understanding of Israel's concern, but had reservations about the agreement being implemented.

K: Simply say we do not make it a practice...

F: Wait a minute. I want you to hear the rest of it.

K: ok, go ahead.

F: That you said there were no changes in the U.S. attitude toward PLO. That you told Dinitz that the contacts with the PLO had been only technical in nature as the American Embassy is situated in an area of Beirut controlled by Palestinian fighters. That you said that new political moves aimed at bringing about a settlement in the Middle East could not be undertaken at present. Fresh initiatives to restart negotiations were impossible while fighting continued in Lebanon.

K: Simply say we do not make it a practice to discuss private meetings between Israeli Ambassador and we speak for American policy not he. Give that as an answer and then call him and ask him what the explanation of this is.

F: You want me to call him directly, or his counselor?

K: You call him directly.

F: Yes, sir.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 25 FEB 2003 200102979

SJ171

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Telecon
Larry Eagleburger/Secretary Kissinger
Saturday, July 31, 1976
6:30 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Aherne has talked to these Urban League people and they want to have a panel of newsmen ask me some questions. What do you think?

E: If it works, its great. But there is some risk. The risk is they will ask why haven't you ~~jux~~ pushed the Bryd Amendment repeal. The question is whether there will be an attempt to embarrass you. But if they have asked you, I think you should do it.

K: They said they would rather give up the dinner with me and have a panel.

E: Then I think you should do it.

K: Ok.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 25 FEB 2003 200102979

SJ170 *

TELECON
Mr. Bernstein/Secretary Kissinger
July 31, 1976
Time: 5:25 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

B: I am fine. I called because friends of mine are involved with the Soviet refugee problem and are concerned about this young man who is trying to defect to Canada. They are afraid he will be turned back from Canada.

K: We have checked and are told that is not the case.

B: That is all I wanted to know.

K: In any event, we will make it clear that we will take a very dim view of it, if that is the case. Our understanding is there is no problem.

B: That is fine. Thank you very much. They were wondering if we could offer asslyum to him.....

K: If the Canadians do it they do it for the same reasons they did the Chinese thing.

B: It is a question of keeping in the good graces of the Soviets?

K: Yes. Pushing him over here will not help any. You can be sure that I am looking into it. I am doing my best to support it.

B: Thank you very much. I hear from Joan Braden that you are going away for five weeks.

K: No, for only one week.

B: Possibly we should talk again when you get back.

K: O.K. That would be fine.

B: Then I will call you when you get back and thanks for returning my call.

K: Not at all Bob. Bye, bye.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 25 FEB 2003 200102979

SJ 177 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
The Secretary/Amb. Dinitz
8/2/76 12:42 pm

D: Thank you for returning my call Mr. Secretary. I have a little message from Rabin that he wanted me to pass to you personally.

K: Yeah.

D: He wanted me first to tell you that he appreciates it very much and nobody will no about it. You can be sure that if Egypt becomes involved in any way, that we will not take advantage of the situation on the Egyptians front. He asks you not to pay attention to various voices in Israel that criticize Egypt on the violation of the agreement on the legal ground and so on. We have no intention of sharpening our position.

K: Well, I am meeting our Ambassador in Tehran and will be giving other reasons but you will understand.

D: He says you can use this information in any way you want.

K: No, no, I will understand.

D: He was anxious that I pass this on to you as soon as I could.

K: Okay, good.

D: Okay, thank you Mr. Secretary.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 25 FEB 2003 200102979

SJ 174 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Funseth/Secretary Kissinger
August 2, 1976
Time: 3:03 p.m.

K: Are any of our characters going to be their tonight?

F: No, except for Valeriani, but I haven't seen him today.

K: O.K. Have you distributed this thing?

F: Yes, sir.

K: O.K. Fine.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 25 FEB 2003 200102979

SJ180 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
The Secretary/Mr. Zarb
8/2/76 4:11 pm

K: When are you meeting with Ansary?

Z: The 9th or the 10th.

K: I didn't think we intended to have no role in these negotiations at all. I haven't a clue as to what to propose. Am I up to date to where we were in the last negotiations?

Z: Poats and Robinson have everything.

K: Where is Poats? Is he with me?

Z: Yeah, he's Robinson's assistant or No. 1 man. Well, what can I do do you want me to send it over to you?

K: No, I will get it from Poats. What I wanted to know is what position you are willing to move to.

Z: We have got that on a piece of paper also.

K: I don't want to be here when you aregoing to move. And then if necessary I will meet you. And my apologies. I didn't know that Poats was with you.

Z: Well, I will have it to you tonight.

K: Many thanks.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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SJ 189 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Phil Habib
8/3/76; 5:45 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I did not hear. How did that meeting with the Yugoslavs go? Sorry to bother you about a matter of some concern.

H: We are just writing a report. It went well. He did not come in with any specific complaint about Silberman or request for action against him. He came in with something he would not say in his own words so he read it to us. It went over the complaints of a newspaper campaign against Yugoslavia. Saying that certain government officials had contributed to this.

K: I have got to run. ~~XXXXXXX~~ I am leaving tomorrow and no one has given me time to leave instructions with anyone. I need that Philippine cable. I would like a summary report of what went on in this meeting to go to Belgrade and the embassy should be told to shut up.

H: Yes, sir.

K: I think that gd embassy when I read their reporting cables, they are conducting their own foreign policy.

H: We have a cable drafted right now to be put up in a few minutes. We understand the same things you do. They are going in the foreign ministry with all kinds of stupid statements and stimulating a press battle with the Yugoslavs and they have to be told.

K: You see we have made a public statement and repeated it in our press briefing and told the Yugoslav ambassador.

H: That is it. Yes, sir.

K: Is Larry with you?

H: He just left.

K: Okay.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 25 FEB 2003 200102979

TELECON
Secretary Coleman/Sec
August 3, 1976
Time: 4:03 p.m.
(MISSED FIRST PART)
K: I hope you will
matters.

C: I have to see h

K: It would help f
domestic things. It

C: Yes.

K: I don't know wh

SJ184 *

TELECON
Mr. Winston Lord/Secretary Kissinger
August 3, 1976
Time: 2:35

RELEASED IN FULL

K: That message to the conference is not what I want. I don't give a damn about the Cylonese (sp). I want two or three paragraphs explaining the importance we attack to the conference and say that I will give this my personal attention. I wouldn't make quite that much of the personal leadership.

L: Yours or his?

K: Mine.

L: A lot of the elements are in there. We will adjust it and get it back to you this afternoon.

K: But I had better get it off tonight.

L: O.K. I will get it back to you this afternoon.

K: O.K. Fine.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 25 FEB 2003 200102979

SJ181 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELECON
Mr. George Schultz/Secretary Kissinger
August 3, 1976
Time: 12:21 p.m.

K: How are you?

S: Just fine. Just happened to be in Washington today and thought I would give you a call.

K: Good, how are you.

S: Fine. I talked to Simon and he has agreed to have suffer with me tonight at 7:00. He said he would like to have Henry Kissinger join us more than any one else. I am sure he is busy, he said.

K: I have to go to a White House dinner at 8:00. Where is here?

S: Room 806 at the Haye-Adams Hotel.

K: You are meeting around 7:00?

S: Yes.

K: Maybe I can get dressed and come over to spend 45 minutes with you.

[redacted] B6

S: O.K.

K: It was good to see you at Bohemian Grove. There was a nice group of people there.

S: Yes, Reagan was there the following week [redacted] B6 It is a fine group of people.

K: A lot of them have been very friendly. I will see you around 7:00 tonight.

S: Great.

K: O.K. Bye.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
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SJ 187 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Zarb/Secretary Kissinger
August 3, 1976
Time: 3:35 p.m.

K: I have now read that memo you sent over. It is a rehash of the other one. It is impossible that major foreign policy things are discussed that I have to see the Shah and I don't know what you are planning.

Z: Now I am planning to see what they have to say.

K: It is not just an oil deal. He says this is no good then what do I say. Ansary will come up with something and then I can't say anything because I -- as the President's foreign policy adviser -- don't know what is going on.

Z: The areas of negotiation or the areas of flexibility?

K: I don't need the figures just the areas.

Z: Shall I do a one-pager for you telling you the areas of flexibility.

K: It is impossible for the Shah to be realistic -- to stick to the $11. He might have our price rises go slower than the OPEC ones....

Z: I want to give you what you need, but I must know what would be useful.

K: All the areas in which you want him to make a move.

Z: When are you leaving?

K: Tomorrow morning.

Z: I will get it over tonight.

K: Do you want to have breakfast tomorrow morning?

Z: O.K. Do you want me to come over to your place?

K: Yes, that would be fine.

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SJ182 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Frank Zarb/Secretary Kissinger
August 3, 1976
Time: 12:29 p.m.

K: What you sent me is the latest proposal you made. The thing that concerns me is when I see the Shah if you see Ansary three days later and make a proposal to him that I haven't seen I will look like an idiot.

Z: I left it with Ansary that this was our proposal.Have you got the thing we sent over an hour ago ?

K: No.

Z: That will be more comprehensive. We would like to see how this works with his concept. We can move up with prices -- we can be flexible with future price increases and then we would be able to make a very meaningful outfront payment. They will have to give up some price increased further down the line.

K: Yes.

Z: We want a price discount that is more than what he has been talking about. We want to come out with something like a $1.00 increase. I want him to come back and negotiate down to it.

K: After the increases...

Z: Yes. If he froze the price today and we signed a contract for the whole 300 million barrels, and we paid a substantial amount before we took delivery, they would be in a good position. That is a pretty good deal. He is thinking he might get rid of some of the extra volume through barter deals, but I don't think that will happen.

K: Let me look at the other piece of paper and then talk to you again.

Z: O.K. I would be happy to come over and talk to you, or give you any piece of paper you need.

K: O.K. Frank. Thank you.

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SJ 198 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
The Secretary/Mr. Habib
8/12/76 4:42 pm

K: I want you to raise hell with him.

H: I raised it a half an hour ago and sent him off with a very strong message. I really was very strong with him. He was with Joe Greenwald so I gave it to him face to face. He got a little red.

K: You told him we are not amused?

H: I told him you were not amused by this kind of behavior. I told him about the problems they were creating for us and we were not going to be the fall guy. That was the phrase I used. I told him that the proposal we were working on was Nyerere's

K: No, that you have no right to say.

H: I said that Vorster would not deal with SWAPO directly. I said Vorster was working on it.

K: You cannot leave the impression that they have accepted it. You call him back and say . . .

H: I said that was Nyerere's proposal.

K: Bill, just a minute. I am going to get a minimum of discipline. The point is we cannot leave the British with the impression that the South Africans have already accepted anything. You can tell him that Vorster is ~~saying~~ studying that proposal subject to another meeting with me. Call him back and say that they have not accepted it. You call him and say when you reported it to me that I just wanted to make sure there is no misapprehensions in London.

H: No, he got the message. Perhaps I went a little too far.

K: No, that's okay. You just call him back right this minute.

H: Right now.

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SJ 204 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
AMB. SCHAUFELE
SEC. KISSINGER
AUGUST 16, 1976
4:00 p.m.

K: ..... go to Sekou Toure

S: Did you see the last version that we sent to N. Y!

K: Don't you think it absured that a 2 paragraph letter takes two weeks of a bloody bureaus time to...

S: Yes. We sent up a last version after your talk to me in NY and I did not get a thing from the sectariate that it had been approved. We will ger it out the way it is.

K: Now. Within the next 10 minutes.

S: O.K.

K: Wait. Now the African fund. I know you are all againt it. I have been talking to Giscard . I would like a draft up here on Wednesday agreeing with it. We owe the French an answer. By Thursday it has to be out.

S: Fine.

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SJ201 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON

Sec Kissinger/Monroe Leigh
8/16/76; 12 noon

K: We better get in touch with the governments that are going to be affected by the federal register action.

L: There is only one going to be affected. It is Australia. He is being told this might happen tomorrow explaining we have a month in which to modify it or perhaps work towards its elimination.

K: Okay. Thank you.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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SJ 205 *

TELECON
The Secretary/Amb. Dinitz
8/16/76 5:15

RELEASED IN FULL

D: (missed first part) . . . because from the PLO he has given the statement in which he said the Soviets arepressing on the US to release the blocade on the supplies for the PLO. It is the same article.

K: I hope you realize that this was a note which was handed to us in the Presidential channel.

D: I understand this. There was no way it could have come from here. The story consistently makes references to the PLO. Now, I had a call from Rabin and I will be seeing . . .

K: I will see you at 11:30 tomorrow.

D: He asked me to see you alone afterwards tomorrow.

K: How many people in Israel know about the message?

D: That I cannot tell you. I would imagine the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the Minister of Defense and maybe the Chief Military Adviser.

K: Not the whole Cabinet?

D: I am pretty sure not.

K: Okay.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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SJ 210 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Amb. Dinitz
8/17/76; 2:35 pm

D: I talked to the prime minister on the proposed suggestion of this to the other big power.

K: Yes.

D: He says in essence it is all right. He would have been happier if the last sentence would have been a little weaker when you say that Israel will take special care to confine its action to this purpose. Maybe something like . . . . to make it a little bit less strong.

K: Okay.

D: Basically he has no problem. I thought I would ~~xxx~~ let you know before I leave.

K: Good. Thank you.

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SJ 208 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Amb. Schaufele
8/17/76; 10:42 am

K: You said in your note the British are unhappy about the little we tell them.

S: Yes.

K: Why are we telling them so little.

S: They feel apparently that we have not been as forthcoming with them as we should. We have talked to them -- they were concerned about your conversations with Botha.

K: Are you telling them what goes on?

S: Only in general terms. There is not a great deal that we can tell them. It helped yesterday when we gave them a copy of the summary thing.

K: Why don't you tell them that I am planning to work out a schedule with the South Africans and that is the only thing I am discussing with them.

S: Okay. I think I could do that best with Duff when he comes.

K: If Samuel says they want to know it now . . . .

S: We can do it . All right.

K: Tell them that is the only thing I have talked with them about.

S: Right. Okay.

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SJ 214 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
SEC. KISSINGER
ROY ATHERTON
August 18, 1976
9:37 a.m.

K: Roy you are seeing Vorontsov today?

A: He invited me to lunch while I was away.

K: I hope you will not go into any substance.

A: No. I want to know what lines he is pursuing.

K: Tell him he will get an answer on what he left here tomorrow.

A: Any problem in my chiding him a bit about their arms going to these people and keeping the pot boiling if he gets into that subject. I have nothing else to say to him.

K: That draft I have here and you can pick it up but do not give it to him until tomorrow.

A: O.K. I want bring the subject up.

K: Here is another draft. Who did this.

A: I did a 2 paragraph draft that I gave Larry to show to you.

K: I have redone it a bit. Very minor.

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SJ 215 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
PHIL HABIB
SEC. KISSINGER
AUGUST 18, 1976

10:05 a.m.

K: When EA returns from the toilet will you tell them...

H: I have already told them.

K: I want retalitory action.

H: They understand.

K: What is their definition of retalitory action.

H: They were told to consider what military actions there could be.

K: Are there fishing boats we could shoot-up or capture.

H: Yes there are fishing boats. There are things that we or the South Koreans could do. There are means of retaliating along the DMP itself. All of these though are facing two very strong arms of camps along the line. Fishing ships are vulnerable, because there are more South Korean fishing boats. There are not so many military vessels.

K: We cannot have Americans killed. I hope that is clear.

H: I have made that very clear to them. I have impressed on them the seriousness of these and that you want to impress this on them.

K: How could it happen that there were no Americans there.

H: I have many suspicions about that. The account from the Embassy has gaps. For example say when they went there they talked to the North Korean who said O.k. trim the trees. Then he told them to stop. A while later 30 North Koreans came. How much later; why are they not talking abou it.; where was our action team.

K: Why trim trees there at all.

H: These things go on all the time there. Tourists go there, press go there. Meetings are held there. It is the only spot where the two sides or sort of face to face. It is supposed to be a special de= militarized area. The only things to be carried are small arms but where were our action teams. We have a whole team trained the minute anything lookis like it is going to happen. Where were they; why weren't they called.

K: Are they getting me answers by 12:00.

H: Yes. All the answers and a clear map of the area showing where each incident happened.

K: I may move it up to 11.

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2.

H: I will tell them to hurry up. YOu may move it to 11:oo.

K. o.k.

SJ 218

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TELECON
The Secretary/Herb Schlosser
8/18/76 5:00 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Okay, how are you?

S: We will see you for dinner tomorrow. This will be at the River Club. There will be about 30 some people and some senators and others. We may invite Secretary Simon.

K: That is fine. He is a good friend of mine.

S: Will I have a chance to see you before that and if so how do I make arrangements?

K: Uh. I have to talk to a group of people at 4:00. But I could see you I guess around 3:00. Hold on a second.

S: Right.

K: Yeah, I could see you around 3:00. Do you want to come to my suite? I'm at the Crown Center.

S: So am I. Where is your suite?

K: I have no idea. What? (talks to somebody in the room) Room 1442.

S: 1442?

K: Right.

S: Why don't we just say we will have an appointment at 3:00. They will have my name?

K: Yeah, although around that nut house . . . Should I send somebody to pick you up?

S: That would be fine. I'm in room 1042. I will see you at 3:00. Excellent.

K: Good.

S: Goodbye.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 3 MAR 2003 200102979

SJ 224 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELECON
Mr. Yeo/Secretary Kissinger
August 21, 1976
Time: 9:31 a.m.

K: How are you?

Y: Fine. I wanted to call you to see if you wanted any further description of the Mexican situation.

K: What Mexican situation?

Y: Mexico is practically broke.

K: Is it Mexico or Brazil.

Y: It is Mexico.

K: He told me it was Brazil.

Y: The...

K: What he discussed with me is that we are trying to bail out...

Y: We are attempting to ehlp...

K: No, no, the only reason I am confused Ed is because he told me in Kansas City that he was -- that Brazil was broke.

Y: Well, the ...

K: Are those...

Y: In the first instance it involves Mexico and the jist is that they have about $23-25 billion in debt and they have $150 million in reserves. They are losing $150 million a week.

K: Then the question is do we want to bail out Echeverria?

Y: There are two questions. The first instance is there is a question of whether it is even bailable. There is a question of whether we get the IMF, which I have done, there is a question of whether the situation can be saved in the financial sense or whether they will have to reschedule the debt. If they do that we will have a bunch of badly bent bankers. Our people have $10 billion down there. The shock of this would badly affect Brazil -- the financial shock.

K: I see.

Y: Because in reality the Mexican situation is one of the greates financial con jobs of all time. They concealed their numbers -- there is no one in the financial community that has any idea of the situation.

K: Can this wait until Monday morning.

Y: Yes, it certainly can.

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[redacted] B6

Y: I wanted you to know about it now because Echeverria is under tremendous pressure.

K: To do what?

Y: If he decides to save the situation he has to accept a brutal devaluation.

K: Which he said he would never do.

Y: But he has to because of the line up of events, not because of what we are telling him. By reducing the budget deficit he has to reverse everything he has done to save it. People are telling him about the realities of the situation -- not realities manfactured by us.

K: He could turn on us.

Y: That is the second alternative. He could declare a debt moratorium, impose controls and turn on us.

K: I think that is more likely. What do we do then?

Y: Well, I think there are a number of things we could do to prepare the way. There is one final thing -- he would join OPEC in wxchange for some money.

K: He will do that in practice if not in name. That knocks him off the GSP.

Y: He is sitting under enormous pressure -- facing great humiliation.

K: Can I propose this -- can I get my people to work over the weekend and we get together at 9:30 on Monday morning or is that too late?

Y: No, no. I will be here this weekend working. The only thing I have had a very limited group in the Treasury working on this for fear it will leak out. If it does that then rather than make it through the next week it wouldn't make it through Monday afternoon.

K: Let me put to work here Rogers and Shlaudemann and tell them not to have more than one other person working on it, if that is possible in this organization. Whom should they get in touch with, you?

Y: Fine.

K: Let's meet at 9:30 Monday morning.

Y: Fine.

K: O.K. Good.

SJ 226 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Winston Lord/Secretary Kissinger
August 21, 1976
Time: 11:00 a.m.

K: I just wanted to get your impression — you felt that I came across defensively on the Newman thing?

L: I didn't think it was a good performance. I wouldn't have gone at all because you knew they were going to ask about the platform and there were no good answers.

K: We thought that it was useful for me not to look as if...

L: You were sneaking around?

K: Yes, or as if I was ashamed. Did you see the Today show?

L: No, I missed that.

K: The mistake I made was to answer his individual questions.

L: You should have pointed out the platform has positive stuff in it.

K: I should have said the platforms — every platform is a compromise. There are a lot of things we didn't like and a lot of things that Reagan didn't like.

L: There is an editorial in the Star that says the platform supports your foreign policy.

K: It was a mistake.

L: Your sense of humor doesn't come through on television. I gather you had a terrific session with the kids.

K: That doesn't do any good.

L: No. How was the mood of people — did you pick up any hostility?

K: Yes. Out in the halls I was a celebrity though. I think this week was a very unfortunate week.

L: And a bad choice for the Vice Presidency.

K: I don't want you or Betty to say anything at all that could be said I was unhappy — out of loyalty you could complain. I am outraged by it.

L: I don't complain on personal terms, but the foreign policy is good — he should point to it. That speech was good, he should have done that sooner.

K: I and my close friends shouldn't say ...

L: We have to be very careful.

K: Yes. I don't want the word to get around that I am in the dumps. Are you going to the Brinkley's tomorrow?

L: Yes.

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K: O.K. See you there.

L: Have a good weekend.

SJ237 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Habib/Secretary Kissinger
August 23, 1976
7:23 pm

K: Hummel is doing this with the Chinese -- that means since we have to keep morale up, cables will be sent to Peking; country directors will sit int -- right?

H: No. He is going to have a quiet lunch with Han Hsu. He told me that he and Win think he should not do this. I told him he should go ahead because these guys have been needling us.

K: Why do they think that?

H: They think it will be counter-productive and it is demeaning.

K: When is he doing it?

H: Tomorrow or the next day -- as soon as he could get him. I was doing a memo on this and it points out their view. Let me send it to you -- it has the talking points and they have a view that maybe he shouldn't do it.

K: Hummel discussed it with Lord?

H: Winston is the only person it has been discussed with..

K: Plus the country director.

H: I don't know but Winston is always involved in anything to do with the Chinese. We always talk to Winston about these things -- we do it as a matter of course.

K: Ok.

H: I will get it in to you.

END

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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TELECON
Senator Hu
August 23,
5:45 pm

K: How ar

H: I am fi

K: It was a

H: I know i

SJ 229 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Jacob Javits
8/23/76; 10:34 am

J: Did you enjoy the convention?

K: Of course I did. Why shouldn't I. At least they are not indifferent to me.

J: No doubt about that. I called you on this Saudia Arabia sidewinder deal. I understand a letter of offer is proposed to come up today and Case is going to put in a letter of disapproval.

K: What you have to understand is that the original deal was for $2,000. Did you know that?

J: I understand it.

K: We cut it down to $2,000 and we had infinite _____ with the Saudis about it.

J: If Case is going to put in a resolution I think it might be worth it to get together and talk about it with him. In other words why involve yourself in some kind of struggle if it may not be necessary.

K: Okay. You are suggesting we hold up the letter?

J: Yes. A day and give yourself and myself a chance to talk to Case. Maybe we ought to do it together.

K: Okay. I will hold it up today.

J: Let me talk to him and I will be back to you shortly.

K: Okay.

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SJ 230 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Clements
8/23/76; 11:05 am
(missed first part) . . . On

K:/ What happened in Korea.

C: It is possible because they have been talking back and forth.

K: I suggest before I can get to the President you hold up on this.

C: That will be fine.

K: Will you hold it up. The press play has been good. If you hold a briefing on a tree chopping you make yourself the laughing stock of the world.

C: Some have been rumbling around over the weekend with Nessen. No one is going to release something without talking to me. Until I hear back from you nothing will happen.

K: Okay. Good.

C: Are you going to call me back?

K: I will call you back within the next hour.

C: Did you have a nice weekend?

K: Yes. Did you?

C: Yes.

K: Okay.

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SJ 227 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
SEC. KISSINGER
Under Sec. PHIL HABIB
August 23, 1976
8:00 a.m.

K: I note in the newspaper we rejected the North Korean note.

H: We never did.

K: Who the hell is in charge here.

H: What happened is there has never been another contact since then.

K: The headline in the NY Times says rejected by the U.S.

H: How could it be rejected when nothing has been done. What happened is at a meeting that happened a couple of hours after the raid, the North Korean gave it to our Adminral and nothing was said according to our report of yesterday. It could not have been rejected. Whether some General or someone said something that he did not report or some newspaper man said I do not know.

K: Let me read the story. I just looked at the headlines.

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SJ 236 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Rogers/Secretary Kissinger
August 23, 1976
Time: 6:00 p.m.

K: I appreciated your memo.

R: You got it already?

K: Yes.

R: Oh. It is a wild idea.

K: I can't do it without Vale. (?)

R: No, no.

K: And they won't want me out of it.

R: No, no. In a sense it would be a help. I am calling from my car.

K: Oh, so we had better not talk about it on the phone.

R: Right. Do you want me to come in -- I am not very far from the Department.

K: I thought you were on your way home.

R: No, Cassie made a mistake.

K: Well, unfortunately, I have someone waiting for me -- Joe Kraft. You know he can't be turned off.

R: O.K.

K: When will you be at home?

R: In about a 1/2 an hour.

K: O.K. Why don't I call you then.

R: Fine.

K: O.K. Good.

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SJ 247 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Barry Schweid
8/24/76; 3:13 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

S: I called to get an idea on the prospect of when the meeting with Vorster would take place. We have had the briefing since and they have made the point it depends on the report you gave to Schaufele and Rogers.

K: It is a good possibility but I want to hold up final decision.

S: Their going there, this is just to tell them what you are going to tell us later. You are looking for something from them?

don't
K: I/want to make a judgment on the situation.

S: Would that be in Africa that you would see him?

K: Probably not.

S: There was a report from Germany you might see him there.

K: We have not set a definite place yet.

S: If I may -- Bob had a few things to say about Namibia.

K: What did he say?

S: It seemed like calculated criticism of this report favoring elections not until the end of '78. He said it didn't go far enough and on SWAPO he said we take the view all ~~of the~~ ought to participate in that. The Times is impressed with that. It seems to be the first implicit criticism on South Africa since the commission report.

K: Well, that is our position.

S: Yes. I didn't know how to take this. As really an attempt to get a message to South Africa or restatement of an old position.

K: I would not say it is a restatement of a totally old position and it is to make our position clear.

S: No, right. I thank you.

K: Nice to talk to you.

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SJ249 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Esenbel/Secretary Kissinger
August 24, 1976
5:38 pm

K: how are you?

E: I am busy and I know you have been busy and I am trying to be helpful. I don't know what is happening in New York. You received the reply from Mr. Charlyangil to you which I sent. I would beg you to look into the Presidential Determination in Colorado.

K: We will spring it loose immediately.

E: Yes, because we are losing time and we have only a few days left.

K: If it isn't signed I will get it signed tomorrow morning. There is no question about it.

E: We were promised.

K: I will get it done in the next 15 minutes.

E: Thank you because Ankara is putting pressure on me.

K: I will put word out in the next 15 minutes.

E: Thank you.

END

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SJ 240 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Bob Funseth
8/24/76; 11:12 am

K: Did we decide now about this non-aligned conference?

F: You said you wanted to hold it for a day.

K: Good. Can you have Lewis go through their resolution to pick their issues so we don't have to comment on everything on which the U.S. has direct responsibilities like Korea and Puerto Rico. It still doesn't explain Guatanamo and Panama but can you get Lewis to take a look at that?

F: Yes, sir, I will. I will call him right away.

K: Good.

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TELECON
Mr. Habib/Secretary K
August 24, 1976
Time: 8:34 p.m.

K: Did you see our

H: Yes. I did.

K: What did they s

H: They don't int
him in 1974 and reext
people they wanted.

*

H: Of course. But we are not going to tell them that.

K: Will you tell them we are outraged.

H: I spoke that way to the Ambassador but I don't know whether our Ambassador will speak that way to Park.

K: You tell him doesn't anyone do what they are told any more.

H: Everyone sucks up to the guy whose country they are in. Let's see if we can toughen this one.

K: Will you send one message out there and say we are extremely annoyed by this press campaign.

H: Alright.

K: Considering that they threatened caution to begin with.

H: And their second stage of counsel was to seek assurances.

K: Can you make that clear.

H: Yes. I will get it out tonight.

K: And tell Snieder we expect him to be firm.

H: Yes.

K: You sound enthusiastic.

H: He will do it if he gets a start. B6

You just get that out.

H: O.K. Tonight.

K: Thank you.

SJ 242 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Mr. Yoe (Treasury)
8/24/76; 1:03 pm

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.5(D)

Y: Since we last talked two things have happened. One is Daou acting for Viddever offered ~~Viddex~~ Fund services this morning. Two is that Ritodde(?) who runs the Central Bank came back and asked for the beginning of immediate negotiations on the basis of the plan we had layed out for them whereby there would be secret negotiations between the Fund and Mexican Government.

K: Good. And if that happens I don't need Rogers to go down there. The less political I can make it the better off I am.

Y: Much better.

K: You are sure they didn't give you a stretch of the beach in Cancun. A little hotel . . .

Y: I will not be doing the negotiating. The Fund will be doing this.

K: But you are not forgetting your friends -- remember the undertow in Cancun is very bad. Take the income but not the vacation.

Y: This is good news though.

K: This is really the best thing that could happen and they must have rammed it down Echeverria's throat. There are only two possibilities. Either he doesn't know the full implications [redacted] B1 Either he doesn't know about it in which case it will still blow up when they have to implement it or he ~~doesn't~~ does and they rammed it down his throat. His instinct is positive as I said yesterday. It is much better if you handle it. The only way for us to get into it is if they refuse to talk.

Y: You have to get into it.

K: I mean sending emissaries to Echeverria. Watch one thing. They may be working us in to get a lot of conditions stated that they will then kick us in the teeth with.

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DECLASSIFY AFTER: HAK'S DEATH

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Y: The conditions are coming from the IMF.

K: It is unavoidable. If you smell the beginning of a confrontation you better tell me so.

Y: I have done a memo and will have it hand-delivered.

K: I would be very grateful.

Y: I will keep your people informed through Dale at the Fund.

K: Okay.

Y: I don't plan on telling anybody except Bill, that this thing is actually starting to transpire.

K: I will tell nobody except Schlaudeman.

Y: Okay. Thank.

K: Good work.

Y: Thank you.

SJ 256 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
SEC. KISSINGER
Ted Koppel
August 25, 1976
2:35 p.m.

TD: I wanted to ask a couple of quick question about the Korean news. One, assuming you are right now going to accept the North Korean offer as long as they give some assurances in return.

K: Not quite in the way they have made that offer.

TK: Can you be a little more explicit.

K: First, they have to give us absolute assurances of the security of the personnel before we discuss anything. This is on background. We don't want to create the impression that there was anything about the disposition of the personnel there that entitles them to beat up Americans. After that there are some additional things that we will have to ask of them.

TK: You are concerned about ramifications on the armistice agreement.

K: For example. We want to have the outcome in such a way it is clearly understood that they were at fault.

TK: Will they give you that kind of...

K: Maybe not in words but maybe in actions. In words they have gone pretty far for them.

TK: Yes. In so far as the Chinese involvement is concerned there is a sense about all of this. Although people say the Chinese have taken no direct action, they have been involved.

K: Not that we know of.

TK: Sometimes they do it without our knowing it.

K: It is obvious that neither the Chinese nor the Soviets have given them much support. I thought you were through reporting.

TK: Just today and tomorrow. Then I go back to more important things of life -- my novel.

K: Hope I get a cut.

TK: I will see that you get a soft-cover copy. When you had your direct contact with the Chinese last week...

K: That was an accident. I mean an accident that it happened on the same day.

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TK: You discussed it no doubt.

K: We mentioned it.

TK: We could say the Chinese have been helpful and leave it at that. I know you don't like to press them too hard.

K: We stated our basic position.

TK: Do you get a response at a time like that or do they just take note.

K: Our experience is they never tell us what they are going to do .

TK: You would have to say they have been helpful.

K: I would have to say they have not given them any public support or anykind of support.

END

SS 260 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Pete Day
8/25/76; 6:06 pm

K: Do you think we are going to get a substantive reply from N_____?

D: I admit it is a long wind-up.

K: We got a second one. One on the atmosphere and one on the personalities.

D: There is a third one on his talks with Shonon. (?)

K: Did they ask the questions. How do they visualize it; what is the Israelies role. We gave them a list of questions.

D: The talk begins to get into that. But it is not heavy on substance. I hope on the future cables we get more. It is a long wind-up.

K: I don't understand what they thought they were doing there.

D: Hoton mentions going through the talking points with them so they have raised the questions and I am sure they will send to us all they are able to get out of those people. We may not get answers to all the points obviously. I do wish they would quit the preliminaries. I suspect some more cables tonight.

6:44 pm

K: Who is briefing the British?

D: On the . . .

K: On the trip. Is anybody?

D: These cables just literally just came in.

K: ~~Are~~ Will you make sure to give them the substance.

D: I will and set up a meeting early tomorrow morning.

K: You give him a summary on the telephone.

D: Okay.

K: I don't get in these cables it is tying down my trip.

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D: We have a cable coming up now to takdates.

K: And the principle of the sequence of moves that are to follow. Otherwise we are going to be just sitting somewhere.

D: Okay.

SJ 259 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Funseth
8/25/76; 6:05 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: When am I doing that CBS thing?

F: You only said you tentatively agreed. I think Friday afternoon would be the most convenient time for you.

K: Why? Because then I would not have had a haircut for a long time.

F: No. It looked like you would have more time. You could do it tomorrow if you wanted to.

K: I don't know what my schedule is tomorrow.

F: I spoke to Leslie Stalling. I conveyed the feeling you were not getting into the campaign and if she asked you about Carter you would not answer. You are more inclined to answer questions about Ford's achievements in your own interest and she said okay. She is going to tell you the three questions she plans to ask you before she begins.

K: Which are they?

F: She is still composing them. She might say those I suggested. She is prepared to it taped to time. I think this is preferable. They couldn't edit it. It might be tight getting the transcript back.

K: Then do it Friday morning.

F: Okay. I will tell Jock to get it on the schedule.

K: Okay.

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SJ 255 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Habib/Secretary Kissinger
August 25, 1976
x 12:25 pm

H: On the guidance you gav e Funseth. Could we make a change. You told him to say we are studying to determine if the exercise....

K: Just drop out those two quotes.

H: Thank you and he will separate the two as you said.

K: Ok

END

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SJ 253

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Weisner/Secretary Kissinger
August 25, 1976
11:52 am

missed first sentence

K: Yes, I agree, Rogers should come back. You should tell them to try out these tentative dates with the countries they are visiting.

W: Ok.

K: Or we will be operating in a vacuum, can youdo that?

W: Yes, right away.

END

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SJ 261 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Art Hartman
8/25/76; 7:04 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Do you interpret this to mean the French are absolutely determined to go ahead or a repetition of their existing position?

H: I asked my fellows how it might have happened and what usually happens after vacation is over the foreign minister makes a list of events that happened during that period and then announces the results in his briefing. It could be that the spokesman, who is a Gallist, decided to give this another twist at a time when Chirac was leaving and they might have trouble with the Gallist. Who can tell whether it is new and they have changed. All I have seen is this AFP ticker and they very often twist things. The other thing is I don't think there has been any review because there is no time and Giscard has been vacstioning during this period.

K: Okay. Good.

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SJ 257 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELCON
SEC. KISSINGER
Under Sec. Habib
August 25, 1976
2:45 p.m.

K: I want Sneider to be told when he is told to take something to Park he has no latitude on that.

H: I checked on that. He could not get to him right away and he got to him through this fellow. It is a normal way of operating. I would have done the same thing.

K: Yes. You know G-D well what happened. Can I see the draft answer.

H: They are working on it.

K: Don't tell me...

H: I sent them off to draft it after the meeting when I got back here. Gleysteen and Hummel.

K: Phil, it is now 4 hours after the meeting. It would take a moderately intelligent undergraduate five minutes to draft it.

H: I know. They are probably typing it in script for you. Did you hear about New YOrk?

K: It passed as a consensus resolution and...

H: And Caglayangil and Bitsios are meeting in New York this afternoon. Your playmats are something. Bennett wondered if you might wanted to call them before they leave to go back.

K: Tell them to [@##$%¢. The Turks will probably convert that ship into airplans.

H: Both appear happy. The Greeks got a resolution but the Turks got a consensus resolution.

K: [redacted] B6

H: They wrung it out to the last instance.

K: They achieved what they always do -- namely nothing. It leaves everything unsettled about the Sesmic.

H: Right.

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H: Right

K: And we could have done it for them 10 days ago plus the Sesmic.

H: I know. Bitsios feels he has a resolution and you know the resolution is practically the same thing you suggested.

K: It is less good for the Greeks than the one I had suggested.

H: Right. It has more of the Turkish stuff in it.

K: .....???..... Minister of Justice clearly, but this says keep it in mind as one possibility.

H: Right.

K: At the end of the process mine was much vaguer than that.

H: I think we probably had a pretty strong influence along the way.

K: When we started dragging our feet and got the British to go with us.

H: Bennett said Caglayangil displayed a slight bit of statesmanship at the end.

K: Caglayangil is not bad. The major thing is when you have that thing can we get it checked out in Korea.

H: Oh, yes. We have plenty of time to do that. We will announce the meeting tomorrow. That gives whats-his-name time to go in the morning and get Park's agreement. It has to be done that way or we will set off a whole chain of problems. Even if we have to delay the meeting for a day, it is important to get him on board especially after has been chastized and he knows it.

K: If you phrase this thing properly we can make it look as if we are winning.

H: The South Koreans will probably think they don't want to do it but I am sure they can be persuaded that it is the best way.

K: What will they want to do.

H: He is on this hardline kick but he will get off it. He is a Korean. The other guy is down a little bit so you kick him in the balls. You don't help him up.

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3.

K: No, but you clinch your game before.

H: It will work.

K: O.K. Fine.

H: I will get it to you right away.

TELCON
SEC. KISSIN
ROBERT MCCL
AUGUST 26,
12:15 p.m.

K: I have
That none o
I don't kno

M: The fac

K: Can we

SJ263 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec. Kissinger
Mr. Eagleburger
August 26, 1976
8:10 a.m.

K: Please see that the foreign policy themes paper ./..goes to the Vice President today.

E: I have Millie getting it on its way now. It should be on the way.

K: Fine.

E: I talked to her about half an hour ago.

K: On my desk when you come in in the Daily News Summary there is an article by Frank Starr in the Chicago Tribune which I'm sure my (faithful colleagues) fed to him.

E: Who?

K: In the Chicago Tribune.

W: O.K.

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SJ 265 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
SEC. KISSINGER
ROBERT MCCLOSKEY
AUGUST 26, 1976
11:38 a.m.

K: I have talked to Ribicoff and he thinks you should show the letter to him and Bingham and he won't insist on its coming out.

M: All right.

K: He says he has been told that there is a compromise that we might be willing to accept and the ball is in our court. I said I did not know what he was talking about.

M: As I told you Greenwald went to Treasury as a contingency to explore what possible compromise there might be. However, he now thinks and when he gets back here will recommend that you talk to Ribicoff and see if you can stand him down.

K: I can't.

M: I don't think so.

K: That I have already tried.

M: We are drafting the letter for you that will put you in opposition to it and will have it to you shortly. Have you talked to Percy and Pastore.

K: Not yet. I will do that next.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
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SJ 271 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec. Kissinger
FRANK WISNER
August 26, 1976
2:50 p.m.

K: Could you do a message to Low for Kaunda and say in the light of his speech, does he want to continue -- yes or no?

W: All right.

K: And secondly, to get tied down on these states.

W: On the travel. All right. Good. I will get that our right away.

K: Let me see it first.

W: Yes, that's right.

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SJ 273 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Pete Day
8/26/76; 6:46 pm

K: Would you get a message to Helms to tell the Shah we would put in a letter on the F-16's next week. But to give it as a message from me.

D: That we will put it in next week. Yes, Sir.

K: Good. Thank you.

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SJ 274 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6, B1, 1.5(D)

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Frank Wisner
8/26/76; 6:50 pm

K: Did you talk to Botha about the announcement?

W: I only talked to him in general terms. That is to make it on Monday and we agreed on no specifics except to say I would be ~~going~~ working on a draft and would get together with him after you approved it.

K: Does he agree?

W: Yes.

K: We better tell the various embassies abroad.

W: Why don't I get a draft together.

K: If they have it Monday morning that is time enough.

W: I would try to have a draft for you first thing tomorrow morning.

K: What ~~does~~ do you make of the Kaunda statement? I think he is just pushing himself.

W: As you know we only have fractions. Second, there were 5 speeches and they were from a number of people and very styled and had he stepped out of line he would have been ~~in~~ obvious. Rather he is sending a signal to the South Africans and it is the sort of thing that they always do.

K: Should we not send the cable?

W: No. I think we should send it and there is no disagreement.

K: We have got to get the gd trip together.

W: I have talked to Schaufele Monday and/~~said~~ he is getting a cable together.

K: We have not heard on the Nyerere talks.

W: No. They are in Kinshasa today.

K: Of course.

W: We should begin getting Nyerere tomorrow.

K: Okay.

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DATE/CASE ID: 14 APR 2003 200102979
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 25X6
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 26 AUG 2013

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K: I don't know what we can do for Mobutu.

W: When I told Botha Zurich was go Monday he sounded like a happy ~~xx~~ child.

K: Good. Where do we stand in regard to hotels.

W: Perfect. The Swiss have really a strong preference for hotels around the Dolder. There is a possibility of demonstrations and they are worried about security. They have asked us please to accept what they have offered.

K: I bet you it is no 400 meters. I bet it is in the same complex.

W: I just can't tell you. I know it is a separate building because the South Africans will be ~~xx~~ the only ones in the building.

K: [redacted] B1

W: Yes.

K: I take it our consulate is no good for the meeting.

W: It looks not.

K: If they don't want us in town it doesn't do us any good to meet there.

W: I guess so. Anot her question is how they can really begin to identify what opposition there is going to be.

K: They didn't want Basle because they could not clear out the hotel.

W: There is no hotel space.

K: That is no tragedy. Okay. Good.

7:28 pm

K: I think you should give the full text of our letter to Botha on Monday. Tell him I think now there might be some merit at their studying it before they meet.

W: All right. ~~W~~ Should I tell the British that?

K: No. Or do they want us to?

W: They want to be assured the South Africans were going to get the full text at the meeting or before. If we told them since they asked it could be one more step.

K: How are the British.

W: Calm, steady.

K: Okay. When are they going to Dar Es Salaam, tomorrow?

W: Yes.

K: Rogers will come back then?

W: Yes. And Schaufele waits to go to Mobutu.

K: When will Bill be back?

W: My guess is Tuesday, the 31st.

K: If he is going through Johannesburg, shouldn't he see the South Africans and have a chance to tell them at the airport?

W: He is going to see Bill Bowdler and we told the press it was for that purpose.

K: Make sure he doesn't tell [redacted] too much. B6

W: Okay.

K: He doesn't have to know every nuance.

W: No. Just see where we are.

K: Okay.

SJ264 *

TELCON
SEC. KISSINGER
SENATOR RIBICOFF
August 26, 1976
11:35 a.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

R: I am at an outside phone. Let me to to a private phone and call you back.

K: O.K.

K: I am calling you about that letter you sent me. I have had McCloskey draft a rather tough reply because the letter was really -- the exchange of letters was well -- my reply anyway was well after the Sinai Agreement was passed by the Congress. I would like to suggest the following. I cannot accept the principle that all confidential exchanges have to be shown to the Congress but I would be glad to send McCloskey up to let you see it. It is not a question of keeping it from you.

R: We are right in the middle right now of that Arab boycott provision -- the tax bill. The letter was drafted by Bingham and I could not refuse to sign it. I have been taking the lead in this thing.

K: It was not an excessively friendly letter either on your side. I just want you to understand my position. I cannot have governments believe that every confidential exchanges published by us but I would be glad -- actually as it happens in this case there are no commitments. It is simply a statement of our policy that had always existed and I will be glad to let you and Bingham see the letter. You can show it to me to satisfy Bingham. I don't know whether any of it has to be used. It has never been made public to anybody.

R: I don't want to have it used.

K: This is my problem but I don't want you to hink we are hiding something.

R: I am here at the House WAys and Means Committee. If he shows it to Bingham and comes downstairs at the Longworth Building. We will be here in the morning and coming back at 2:00 in the afternoon but I think the problem that has been put to the Treasury and the State Department by the conference on the Arab boycott provisions in the tax bill is both by Long and Ulman -- does the State Dept and Treasury Dept have an alternative proposal. I have never seen one from either State or Treasury. Whehter you have one or not I have not the slightest idea.

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K: We are against the law. We would like to do it through diplomatic channels.

R: You have not and you are not going to unfortunately. It gets worse and not better. The whole history of it gets better. It is in there and the Senate voted for it overwhelming. It is in the bill and to go to the floor on this issue at this time, both the House and the Senate will certainly uphold it. It is a question of whether anybody has an alternative. Ulman has talked to someone. I don't know whether at State or not and Long has but no one has seen an alternative.

K: Frankly, I have not either .

R: Yes. As it was put last night and put this morning that the responsibility is on State and Treasury to come up with an alternative.

K: You know it would not be the first time that I did not know what is going on.

R: I know that the tragedy is on big issues that get in the public domain that you take the rap on that those are often things that no one has talked to you about. You have [redacted] with this thing. B6
He has been meeting with people. He brought the Saudi Min. of Planning to meet with Ulman and others and members of my staff. I was not here. I did not meet with him. He wanted to meet with me. As I get it he was very, very heavy handed. You know in how he handled everything--warning everybody that America's economic future depended on this claus and that there is no give on what he is going to do on the Arab boycott. Everybody has a right to a boycott. Some boycotts have gone all along the line what you sell to somebody who sells to the Arabs. This is not acceptable

K: I will look into that.

R: If McCloskey comes up I will be more than pleased to talk to him. Why don't you keep the letter in your pocket. If you satisfy Bingham and me let it die. Get McCloskey to get hold of Bingham and then get hold of me. I can get out of here and he can catch me on the Senate Floor or the Ways and Means Comittee meeting--in the Longworth Building. Only take a few minutes.

K: Terrific.

R: O.K., Henry.

SJ 281 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Art Hartman
8/27/76; 1:02 pm

K: Could you draft a particularly warm note to Sauvagnargues?

H: Yes, I will. I don't know why they picked D_____.

K: Who is he?

H: He is their UN representative and chair ed the North-South conference in Paris and was not particularly brilliant at it.

K: How is he towards us?

H: I think he is friendly but Robinson dealt with him very closely and would have a better view.

K: Is he their French UN representative?

H: Yes.

K: He is more unimpressive.

H: I think Scranton thinks he is friendly and works well with us. He was not involved in this last business.

K: I am going over to Europe to see Vorster. I wonder whether I should not stop in Paris?

H: I think there is enough to discuss. I did a note to Humphrey and it was very bad. He managed to work himself around where he wants the President to call in both committees and both have hearings.

K: Okay. Good.

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SJ 285 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Hartman/Secretary Kissinger
August 27, 1976
Time: 5:50 p.m.

K: I don't want to push you but when can I have these congratulatory messages?

H: I will get them right up to you.

K: They are already pushing me to send the LOS messages.

H: I thought they had gone up...

K: It isn't a hard problem — I can dictate them myself.

H: Yes sir. I will get it right up.

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SJ 282 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Frank Wisner
8/27/76; 2:51 pm

K: I know that AF ambassadors are incapable of expressing a clear thought. About my travel schedule, there is no need for Steve Low to see the President personally. It is perfectly possible to handle that with Chona(?).

W: Right. Or someone else at a similarly low level.

K: So will you tell him he doesn't need to discuss my schedule with Kaunda. He makes it sound as if I am just taking a trip. He says the Secretary is going to be taking a trip.

W: I have not seen that yet.

K: He should say depending on what Vorster tells me I am going to come there to see whether we can get it concluded. Otherwise, it doesn't make any sense.

W: Exactly.

K: Can you draft some bloody instructions?

W: Will do.

K: Tell him not to bother Kaunda with that.

W: Right. I will get right with it.

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SJ279 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Pete Day
8/27/76; 9:58 am

K: Are we drafting something for these two officers in Nicosia?

D: Yes. We have drafted a memo for you and instructions which I will take to Phil and have by noon for you.

K: Okay. Good.

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SJ 283 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Ikle/Secretary Kissinger
August 27, 1976
Time: 5:20 p.m.

K: I just was testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about arms sales when an ACDA man -- without any notice to me -- well I can only minimize this by describing his remarks as a provocative and it can even be described as insolent manner -- began opposing our requests...

I: Did he talk while you were there?

K: He was invited but it was obvious that there was some pre-arrangement...

I: Not to my knowledge.

K: I know it was cooked up between Case's staff member and Lehman.

I: He asked for someone to come which we can't turn down.

K: Don't you have any foreign policy responsibilities -- don't you think?

I: That is what we talked about on Monday.

K: Do you think that cutting a few 100 mavericks from Saudi Arabia is worth the risk of having the Saudis decide that the U.S. is too unstable to deal with and going to Europe?

I: I was worried about this kind of thing occurring. I wanted to minimize this. There are two factors. One is what position we can take. I would like to hear from you on a working ACDA position which doesn't become an untenable one in relation to our foreign policy. I will turn it off. The second is Congressional testimony.

K: I can't prevent you from testifying but here this fellow shows up and I never got any indication that he was going to be there.

I: We have been trying to get from H some coordination about when you testify, but so far we haven't had any results. I was trying to get someone there to find out about your reasoning...

K: I don't know enough about these individual items. I put my case on foreign policy grouns. It seems an unusual risk however to go up there now. They want to cut it in half. I don't know whether 700 mavericks makes any difference but going to the Saudis after we have made a deal with them and cutting it in half -- well we will lose them as a stabilizing force in the Middle East.

I: Well, whenthe C-130's came up for Egypt I wrote a memo and I personally walked it up to Sisco, myself. I like to get involved in these important issues. I think we have to avoid doing an analysis which looks at it from just the arms control side.

K: This fellow said the Pentagon refused to give him an analysis now and he couldn't make a judgement. You gave these people another excuse to delay.

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I: They did refuse to give us an analysis. What would be useful now? We could say we saw the analysis on Monday and here...

K: I can't ask you to go against your convictions, but if you could say the arms control considerations aren't so important that they override foreign policy...

I: Do you think some trimming of the numbers would be very bad in our relationship?

K: On the sidewinders we have trimmed them by half before we submitted them. Now another trimming would make all the sidewinders go for training. They estimate that they need 600 for training alone.

I: I think some of these numbers are large.

K: They started with 4500 and we went down to 1000. On the mavericks I think they are large. I am willing to cut the mavericks a bit.

I: I am in agreement with you that foreign policy has an overriding concern. Whom sould we work with on this? I can make a statement on Monday...

K: Why don't you talk to McCloskey. I hope Atherton is back on Monday.

I: Do you think on mavericks a cut back might be o.k.

K: Yes. O.K. Good.

SJ 277 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Phil Habib
8/27/76; 9:40 am

K: What happened in Korea?

H: The other side agreed to have the meeting but a day later. That is normal. When you ask for a meeting they don't normally accept. So they went back on their agreement.

K: Okay.

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SJ 284 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELECON
Mr. Bruce Van Vorst/Secretary Kissinger
August 27, 1976
Time: 5:31 p.m.

V: On your testimony yesterday, there was one question that isn't quite clear for Clark. This is regarding Schaufele's visit and Kuanda's statement. Kuanda's statement seems out of character.

K: We have assurances...

V: That he is not upset?

K: Not inthe slightest. He was in a position where a lot of radical statements were being made...

V: Clark was a little confused by it.

K: We were confused by it at first. It was the opposite of the conversations.

V: Kuanda was dissatisfied with nothing Schaufele was telling him?

K: Absolutely not. [redacted] B6

V: O.K. Thank you very much.

K: O.K.

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SJ 290 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Amb Dinitz
8/30/76; 4:15 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: No matter what you say we will give none of the 2 sidewinders to the Saudis.

D: I thought when we say to the press today maybe it would be helpful for both of us to say in the course of the conversations the subject of the Egyptian-Israeli agreement was discussed. It was agreed that the technical people of both sides will meet in order to compara date. I think that ~~xxx~~ will defuse any other formulation. I think it would help defuse the suspicions.

K: If you leave out the first sentence. Just say it was agreed that Israel and the United States intelligence experts would meet to compare data about -- not violations -- about observances of the agreements.

D: In order to compare data on the observance of the agreement. Yes, okay. I will check it with home and if it is okay with them . . .

K: Don't say the subject of violations was discussed.

D: The subject of observance.

K: Yes. Thank you.

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SJ 294 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELE CON
Hal Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
August 30, 1976
9:45 pm

K: I did not get your message until I came back from the White House.

S: I wanted to see you about a variety of things. The most immediate one is this delegation, or team, we want to send to Paris.

K: For what?

S: On the Law of the Sea.

K: How about 9:00 am tomorrow morning.

S: That would be fine.

K: 9:00 or 9:15. I am sorry about it. It did not get to me.

S: That's ok.

END

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SJ 292 *

TELECON
The Secretary/Barry Schweid
8/30/76 6:45 pm

RELEASED IN PART
B6

S: Today's Africa! No PLO today. I would like to be able to suggest in my story what is it that has happened since April 27 in Lusaka that calls you to renew an initiative and I am really at a loss. I am able to use a lot of colorful words but I kept asking myself and I couldn't come up with anything so I thought I would ask you.

K: What do you mean?

S: Well, except for the obvious, what brings you back to Vorster again?

K: Because I think some progress can be made.

S: But ultimately I have to deal with getting Smith to the table.

K: Maybe or maybe not.

S: Is there any other way?

K: Well, you know don't write it as if the fact that we are making an initiative means that it's going to be a success

S: Well, we are going there because we have some hope.

K: To move things forward -- not necessarily to succeed.

S: But I can't begin to suggest what it is.

K: Well, there are two separate problems. One is Namibia and one is Rhodesia. Actually, I am giving a speech on that subject tomorrow. Why don't you listen to that?

S: I will be listening to you here. We have been concentrating on Rhodesia as far as this trip is concerned. Should we broaden it?

K: Definitely. The last thing I want to suggest is that we are going to settle Rhodesia on this trip. We will try to move it forward a bit.

S: Perhaps I don't see things between the table. I don't even know that Vorster's working for us.

K: Are you going along on this trip?

S: Not knowing how long it will go and having a place rented in Martha's Vinyard, I think I have opted to take my vacation.

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K: [redacted]

S: [redacted]

K: [redacted]

B6

S: I really think it's open ended. I don't know when you will be able to come back.

K: Well, it is not going to be a thirty day shuttle.

S: It seems pretty clear that you will go on. I think you are committee already.

K: Not fully.

S: Well publically by going as far as Zurich.

K: All right.

S: All right. Thank you and I will make another trip.

K: Okay, good.

SJ 293 *

TELECON
William Rogers/Secretary Kissinger
August 30, 1976
9:05 pm

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: What is your overall judgment on that speech?

R: I think it is pretty good. I like the extent to which you are laying out for the American people where we are going.

K: Have you seen the conversation with Nierere with the British?

R: No. I heard about it from a fellow at the British embassy.

K: I do not think we are going to make it on Rhodesia at this time. Are you pretty sure we will make it on Namibia?

R: Yes.

K: Do you think it is worth my going there?

R: Yes. I think there is a good chance to make progress on Namibia and a less than even chance on Rhodesia. The effort, your making the effort is desirable in terms of the reaction of the American people. In the historic sense we have to try even if it does not work.

K: You don't think your colleagues will run around screaming failure?

R: No. I think they are check-mated by the effort being made. If the effort is not made, they will say there is no effort being made on Africa.

K: [redacted] B6

R:

K:

R:

K:

R:

K: Ok. We will have breakfast. You think the speech is basically all right?

R: Yes. Have you seeen my comments?

K: I am working on them now.

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Rogers - 2.

R:: I think it will go over well. It is very timely. I would like to have had another day on it in terms of style. But there is elegance in part of it and its on the right track.

K: Ok.

END

SJ 286 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Bob Funseth
8/30/76; 1:05 pm

F: One other point on Korea -- is it all right if I confirm that meeting is going to take place tomorrow.

K: Why don't you ask Hummel?

F: He would like us to announce it. There is pressure for us in the Pentagon and in Seoul and he thinks I ought to if I am asked.

K: Okay.

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SJ 301 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
The Secretary/Mr. Sonnenfeldt
9/3/76 9:10 am

K: Have you talked to Genscher about Tuesday.

S: They are working on it because he is travelling on Tuesday and that was not a good day but they are going to try to fix it.

K: But shouldn't we offer it then to Schmidt too? If it is in Bonn, it doesn't look good.

S: We discussed that. Genscher will be in the south of Germany campaining.

K: If it's in Bonn it doesn't have to be in the god damn airport.

S: It was either the Bonn airport or the Frankfurt airport. But Genscher is not in Bonn. He is travelling in the south on Tuesday. On MOnday, it would have been better.

K: The trouble on Monday is I would have to leave Zurich early.

S: They are trying to get back to me with a suggestion of Frankfurt, or Stuggart, or Munich.

K: I can't go to Munich!

S: They will probably suggest Frankfurt. They have to see if they can somehow change his schedule.

K: Would somebody please explain to them if they would like to meet in some castle on some mountain top hanging from trapezes it doesn't matter to me.

S: I . . .

K: I am not blaming you, I am blaming those fools who work for me.

S: How much time do you have?

K: If I go to Africa, it will be tight. If I don't go to Africa, I don't care.

S: I told them you were flexible. I told them you would go wherever they wanted. If it is Bonn, it would be difficult for you to just be at the airport. And they agree with that. Tuesday is a bad day for GEnscher. They will get to him as quickly as they can and come back with a proposal.

K: They understand why I can't do it on Monday?

S: Yes.

K: Wouldn't it be decent to offer it to Schmidt?

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S: It is awkward to do it now because it is Genscher's initiative.

K: But I am just wondering from Schmidt's position now since I will see Callaghan and Giscard but not Schmidt in Germany. But wouldn't you think it would be better to drop a word to Schmidt's Assistant that this is cooking?

S: I can tell them that. I don't know whether Schmidt would want to travel for it.

K: Look, if Genscher can come to Frankfurt, he can come to Bonn. I am just concerned as to how it looks to Schmidt. It may be that Schmidt will want the same publicity that Genscher wants. How will it look in Germany? Now, if Schmidt says he can't do it -- fine.

S: I can call and tell them that . . .

K: Just tell him I just wanted Schmidt to get the message. I didn't want him to get the wrong idea.

S: I will call him and tell him that on Tuesday you could stop somewhere in Germany.

K: Yeah, but only in that time frame. I think it is the only decent thing to do. And Schmidt is an old friend of mine.

S: I will call.

K: I'd appreciate it. As a matter of fact, can you come by my office for three minutes?

S: Yeah.

K: Good.

SJ 300 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
THE SECRETARY/PETE DAY
9/3/76 9:00 am

K: I know I couldn't be so lucky that you have the same cables that I have -- but on the off chance that you do, could you reply to that fahmy cable on Libya.

D: Right.

K: I am here and this is something that I can do in three minutes with one of my secretaries so could you do it in five? Simply say that this is just a reply and that they have our full support.

D: Right. I will have that right up.

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SJ 298 *

TELECON
The Secretary/Sen. Mike Mansfield
9/3/76 8:15 am

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Mike, how are you?

M: Fine. I just wanted to wish you the best.

K: Aren't you nice.

M: It is a tough one but I guess you are use to them.

K: I am very touched by your call. Mike, it may be in fact that I will go and come back before I go on to Africa. I have just learned this morning that the African nations are holding a meeting on Sunday. If it drags on a couple of days then I might come back for a couple of days before I go there. I don't want to jump into that without knowing what has gone on at the meeting.

M: Oh, I agree. And henry I am planning to go to China again.

K: I heard. I wish I could go with you. I wouldn't mind staying out of the campaign.

M: I just wanted you to know that you have got my best wishes and my heartfelt prayers.

K: You are a great human being and friend.

M: Good luck and maybe we can get together when you get back.

K: If I come back I will get my office to get in touch with you. Thank you Mike.

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SJ 302 *

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.5(D)

TELECON
The Secretary/Dr. Ikle
9/3/76 9:20 am

K: I had agreed with Bhutto [redacted] B1

I: It is an interview in Le Point. I was not aware of your wishes.

K: I must insist as Secretary of State that you clear these things with me. I thought your speech during the week was entirely out of place. To introduce the concept that grey areas are part of SALT is entirely out of context.

I: That is not the way I put it. I grant there were a couple of sentences in there which maybe should not have been. I was unaware that you were going to say anything more about Pakistan.

K: I haven't seen the article. I have just seen the comment from the Pakistanis. I made a public statement that we wouldn't exert any public pressures. [redacted] B1 I think we may be able to work it out if we can just keep everybody quite for a while.

I: In this case, you are of course right and I defer to your judgment here.

K: Okay, thank you.

I: Sure.

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CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 25X6
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 3 SEP 2013

SJ 304 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
The Secretary/Mr. Sonnenfeldt
9/8/76 3:00 pm

K: I wanted to congratulate you.

S: Why?

K: Carter is attacking you now.

S: Did he today?

K: He will at the B'nai B'rith. In this article . . . (reads article)

S: That's your friend Brezenski.

K: That is unacceptable. (reads more)

S: It really is. Is somebody going to react to this? The President obviously doesn't do that.

K: I think he should do something.

S: Yeah. I heard last week one day from his people down in Atlanta -- they were saying they were going to do something with this. At least he seems to be in favor of Helsinki because he is criticising the Russians for not living up to it.

K: Yeah. Look, that paper that the Germans gave you yesterday. Can you call the Yugoslav Ambassador and tell them we hope very much that they will make it possible to extradite this man?

S: I am not sure this information is accurate.

K: They know it is absolutely accurate.

S: I better find out a little more about it. Are they suppose to extradite him to us?

K: To France. But at least let's keep him from operating. Just say that this is our information and we know other governments are making there representations.

S: Do we have any specific standing other than this general point?

K: None.

S: Well, let me see about it. I have two or three other things that I wanted to talk to you about. I sent you a note if you have got a moment.

K: Yeah, I've got your note. Good.

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SJ 306 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
The Secretary/Mr. Atherton
9/8/76 6:55 pm

k: I took it out -- I just don't want any reference to the '67 borders.

A: I think that is fine. No, I think it was a good chance, in fact, I appreciate all your suggestions.

K: Don't be condescending Roy. I will be there about 7:30.

A: Very good. Have you seen Toon's report on his meeting with Rabin?

K: Yeah.

A: It looks very good and I think we will have something for you in the morning.

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SJ 315 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
The Secretary/Dean Rusk
9/8/76 3:15 pm

K: I needed to talk to you about if I go to Africa next week what commitments I may have to make. I would like to get an understanding with Carter that he would honor those. And there is nobody around Carter that I would trust to talk to.

R: I am not that close myself, Henry. I think really if it is something of that importance the thing might be for the President to call him. Previous Presidents have called candidates when something of real importance comes up.

K: I hate to tell you that I don't trust him that much. I just read a speech that he is giving to B'nai Brith. He is saying that we stumbled into the quagmires of Vietnam and Cambodia.

R: You know I just haven't seen any of that material. I haven't actually talked with him personally. Except once or twice on the phone. I don't meet with him. I am not a member of his group.

K: But I was hoping you would be able to get through to him. I would much rather have you try to get through to him than me

R: Is this primarily a financial commitment?

K: Yeah.

R: What about congress?

K: That too.

R: Well, if you will let me know when you will be talking to him and the essence of what it is I am pretty sure I can get through to Carter.

K: You can't come up here?

R: I'm afraid no I can't. My wife has a problem you know and I am getting her off to California this weekend and I am opening up a center for 240 students.

K: Either thrusday or Friday?

R: No, I am getting all of the Chambers of Commerce which I am the host to promote exports. Elliott Richardson is going to be a speaker. And I don't see how I can miss that.

K: Friday afternoon?

R: You're a hard man,Henry.

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K: I hate to have you talk to Carter without having talked to me.

R: Well.

K: Let me see what I can do. Maybe we can send a plane for you.

R: If it could come to Macon Georgia and pick me up that would be a great help. At one or two o'clock. If you want to keep it quiet, I think there is also an air base in Macon.

K: I know it is a terrible nuisance FOR YOU to come up here but if we can do it with a plane then it is only an hour and a half each way.

R: If you can drop me off in Athens that would be a help. But I will be in Macon for it to pick me up.

K: If we can get a plane, we can do whatever you want.

R: All right. I will be at home here except for one hour at 4:00 until noon, tomorrow. So If you could let me know what the arrangements are . . .

K: You know that Jane will want to call you. I will let Jane call you and I will see you Friday afternoon.

R: Good.

SJ309 *

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.5(D)

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Mike Mansfield
9/9/76; 10:23 am

K: How are you? You are considering that foreign aid appropriation including Africa.

M: This afternoon.

K: And there is a provision prohibiting aid to Mozambique and Angola. [redacted] Mozambique is absolutely essential to the effort we are now pursuing. All the moderates are pulling them over to the moderate side. They don't need our money, as such. They can get it from China or Russia. It is a symbolic gesture. I would like to have them not get kicked in the teeth at this moment. There are two possibilities. I am talking to Inouye and he may offer an amendment to strike this. The other possibility is to delay it until I will be back. B1

M: We have sent out notices so we are sort of stuck. If things develop, we will try and set it aside.

K: If you could possibly do that. I am going to call Alan later and explain to him the only hope the whites and Rhodesia have is the policy we are pursuing. They will be driven out in two years if we stall this policy.

M: You are going to talk to Inouye?

K: Bill Rogers has talked to Inouye and he said he was sympathetic. I talked to Dick Clarke and Percy and Brooke.

M: And you will talk to Alan.

K: But I will not have a chance to talk to him until this afternoon.

M: We will not get to it before 2:00.

K: Okay.

M: Thank you, Henry.

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CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 25X6
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 25 MAR 2013
DATE/CASE ID: 14 JUL 2003 200102979

SJ 319 *

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.5(D)

TELECON
The Secretary/Mr. Atherton
9/9/76 7:06 pm

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, M. GRAFELD, DAS, A/RPS, ACTING
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 14 APR 2003 200102979
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 25X6
DECLASSIFY AFTER: HAK'S DEATH

K: Do you think NEA could interrupt its pro-PLO propaganda for a few hours to change the schedule for Saud and Fahmy -- or do you need an absolute catastrophe?

A: We have been working on it.

K: What do you mean you have been working on it. I want you to just change it.

A: Well, we have to tell them an alternative time and we have been trying to get something worked out on your program and schedule.

K: Now look, let's get a few things straight. I will see Saud and Fahmy if I have to drop everybody else off the list.

A: All right. We will work on that basis.

K: What do you mean work on that basis? How the hell are you going to get that done?

A: By putting up a telegram for you to approve. We also have to work out something with Allon.

K: Look, first let's get Saud and Fahmy. Why you guys packed that week so much I will never understand. The fact is I will see Fahmy down here. I will see Saud down here. How October 1? I know the FRG foreign minister is here but He is leaving right after lunch.

A: That is one of the possibilities we had in mind.

K: We cannot insult the Saudis. Let him come on Yom Kippur.

A: Will you do that?

K: That is right I can't see the Saudi Arabian Ambassador on Yom Kippur without losing the Jewish vote. How long is Saud going to stay here.

A: Through the 5th.

K: Would he be willing to stay longer?

A: That is one of the things we want to put to him. His speech is now scheduled for the second in New YOrk.

K: We have got the Brazilians too. I cannot have an official function for the [redacted] Brazilians on Yom Kippur either. B1

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A: I think we out to just give Saud a choice of extension.

K: It must be done within the next two hours. You will not get anything done by sitting there and weeping with Sober.

A: I am not with Sober.

K: How can you do anything without Sober?

A: Mr. Secretary may we get you up something early tomorrow with messages to both of them?

K: That means it will take a week. Why can't it be done tonight?

A: It can possibly but it's a question of your schedule. I will do my best.

K: The people who are refusing to move my schedule will not be any more amenable tomorrow morning. It has got to be done. (Secretary hangs up.)

55320 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
The Secretary/Richard Valeriani
9/9/76 7:20 pm

V: You are being offered 6 minutes of prime time between 10 and 11 o'clock.

K: I am really sorry but I can't do it.

V: I am just throwing that up to be banked for the next trip.

K: You have actually done pretty well. Were you on tonight?

V: Yeah.

K: On Mao?

V: Yeah. I hear you are going to postpone your news conference.

K: What is your advice as a friend? Should I cancel it?

V: Well, do you have something you want to say?

K: Well you guys on the plane hear everything but I want to get to the general public.

V: If you feel it ought to be out you ought to do it. It is not my choice. If [illegible] you're stuck with it you're stuck with it. I haven't heard of anyone organizing a boycott.

K: [illegible] What time do you want me tonight if I do it?

V: We could do it now if you wanted. otherwise it would be between 10 and 11 o'clock. It's up to you.

K: Well I'm already 20 minutes late for a reception. I guess I better not.

V: Okay.

K: See you on Saturday.

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TELECON
Senator Brooke/Se
September 9, 1976
Time: 4:43 p.m.

(MISSED FIRST PA

K: I have ta
wouldn't use anythi

R: He was

SJ 307 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Huang Chen/Secretary Kissinger
September 9, 1976
9:45 am

(The Secretary spoke to the Ambassador through an interpreter)

I: Ambassador Huang doesn't speak English so I will pass o;n whatever you would like to say.

K: I want to express to the Ambassador my personal sadness and the condolences of the United States Government about the death of Chairman Mao, whom we had the priviledge to know and who was one of the greatest men of our time. He has changed the history of the world and we feel priviledged to have known him. And on our side, we will continue the policy of normalization which he contributed to initiating according to his principles, which we discussed with him. I wanted to express these things personally and on behalf of the United States Government to the Ambassador. If you would communicate this also to Peking we would appreciate it. We will be sending a message directly also.

I: Ambassador Huang would like to express his deep gratitude for your message of condolence and he will convey this message of condolence to our government.

K: We will inquire when you have opened the condolence book and I will come over to sign it.

I: We will let you know as soon as we have everything prepared.

K: My deepest condolences again.

I: I express again our deep grattitude for your condolence.

K: We will be in touch again soon.

I: Thank you very much.

END

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SJ308 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Bill Rogers
9/9/76; 10:15 am

K: Have you seen the New York Times?

R: I have not.

K: The front page. The whole gd thing spilled out by the British.

R: Oh, my God. From London?

K: Yes. Including the role played by Smith. Everything. Would you call Ramsbotham and say I am protesting officially now.

R: Yes, I will.

K: The damage it does is not just officially; that I am really beginning to have some personal doubts now.

R: It is perfectly obvious we cannot conduct negotiations with circumstances like this. If we do not have confidence that they can cooperate . . . .

K: And when they keep positioning us so that they are the good guys all the time.

R: I will call Peter right now.

K: Okay.

R: Botha's here. Do you want to see him?

K: The peop le that are so brilliant here have scheduled a meeting at the White House here. They have kept my whole afternoon free but this morning when I should be calling senators it is tied up.

R: I called Inouye.

K: What did he say?

R: He and Humphrey had talked about Zambia and Zaire. I gave him some background and said you cannot affront Mozambique at this moment. So the leadership is going to be pushing this on and Louie is not anxious to push. I said if worse comes to worse . . . . .

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K: I will call him if I can ever ~~xx~~a get five minutes free when I want it free.

R: I have a draft letter which the President might want to consider sending down.

K: Well. Let me see it.

R: Okay.

TELCON
Sec Kissin
9/9/76; 3:

R: One of
style.

K: He is a

SJ 313 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Sen Mansfield
9/9/76; 4:00 pm

M: I called to because I understand no letter is necessary. That you had a conversation with Allen.

K: Yes and he takes my assurance.

M: Good enough. I tried to get Goldberg. Do me a favor. Call Brooke and tell him before he gets on the floor.

K: Okay. I will call him.

M: Thanks, Henry.

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SJ312 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sen. James Allen
Sec. Kissinger
September 9, 1976
3:35 p.m.

K: Senator.

A: Excuse me just a moment. ----- Hello

K: I just wanted to call you to tell you that you have dealt with this matter in a most gentlemanly fashion.

A: Thank you very much. I appreciate that. Sen. Percy just stuck his head in the phone booth and said he thought this was a real fine adjustment.of the matter that we have agreed on tentatively.

K: I just wanted you to know that you have shown great statesmanship and I still would like to explain our African policy to you if you are interested in it.

A: I would like to talk to you about it.

K: Are you in town tomorrow.

A: I will be here.

K: What would be a convenient time for you.

A: Any time. 10:00 something of that sort.

K: O.K. Should I come up or can you come down here.

A: I am watching several pieces of legislations.

K: I will come to your office around 10:00 or where do you suggest.

A: The Vice President's ceremonial office. You might want to talk to several other senators as well. If you don't object to getting 2-3 others to sit in also.

K: Wait a minute, I have a press conference tomorrow morning. How about tomorrow afternoon.

A: That would be fine. Might be even better.

K: How about 2:30.

A: Sounds good.

K: Let's say 2:30 and anybody you want to bring along I leave to you.

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2.

A: There would be very few I would ask. In the VP's ceremony office.

K: Fine.

A: I have no objection to coming down there but there are several pieces of legislation I have been watching.

K: I understand and I am happy to come up.

A: One other thing, has Amb. McCloskey spoken to you about the letter.

K: No.

A: About the letter that you would give to the Chairman of the Committee that none of these foreign funds would be spent in Mozambique under the bill.

K: If it was the understanding -- do we have to put it in writing. I am afraid of these things leaking.

A: I would have your express world.

K: You would have my express word.

A: That will satisfy me then.

K: Except for that item we are reprogramming, you have my express word and I shall put it into my files in case there is a change after January.

A: Sounds good. All right sir.

K: Let's make it 2:45.

A: Fine. This 3 and a half million that is in the bill to Mozambique is coming out you understand.

K: I understand.

A: All right.

SJ 325 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
The Secretary/Larry Eagleburger
9/10/76 9:20 pm

E: A TWA plane out of New York for Chicago has just been hijacked. Apparently there are about six hijackers. One of the hijackers is reportedly wired to blow up. We have no indication who the hijackers are or their demands. I'm at a dinner now but I will come back to the Operations Center in about a half an hour.

K: But what can you do about it?

E: Well I just want to keep on top of it. We don't have the vaguest idea what they want. The tragedy is after three years of no hihackings in the United States we have one now.

K; You will be glad to know that tonight is the Roy Wilkins dinner which has just been called to my attention at 9:15 at night. Of course my outer office couldn't tell me at 6:00 that it had to go then.

E: Well, I don't know what I can say about that but if anything breaks on this other I will let you know.

K: How many people on the plane?

E: About 80 apparently.

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DECLASSIFY AFTER: HAK'S DEATH

SJ 324 *

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.5(D), B6

TELECON
The Secretary/Hugh Sidey
9/10/76 7:33 pm

S: You caught me right at my clams Rockefeller. This is very simple. They wanted it written in the usual fashion but they said last week that Hugh Sidey talked with Henry Kissinger who has had more contact with Mao than any other leader. Is that any problem?

K: No, that is no problem [redacted] B1

S: No, none of that. (reads from article)

K: I made nine trips to China if you want to be correct.

S: Where did we get six? Oh, I see -- you made six visits with Mao. (continues reading from article)

K: No, you cannot ascribe the physical appearance to me.

S: Okay, we will just take that out.

K: Or say you got that from others.

S: Okay, on down -- what about this quote you gave me? "Mao gave me the most cold blooded analysis of the world balance of power that I have ever heard. He analyzed countries and their leaders in terms of power."

K: This I would not do. That is an attack on him.

S: Is it?

K: Just say when speaking of the balance of power that despite his strong ideological convictions he analyzed the balance of power with amazing acuteness.

S: Okay. Then it says Mao's capacity to admire people was severely limited. Is that too much of a knock.

K: Yes. The Chinese don't like you to say anything about their leaders. Don't ascribe any of that to me.

S: But then we say he seemed to admire Richard Nixon.

K: "respect" but don't ascribe that to me.

S: He grilled Kissinger about American politics.

K: I would say he grilled visitors. The less you can ascribe to me the better off I am.

*

S: Okay. Mao was frank that he wanted to see Nixon re-elected and McGovern defeated. Then he did not understand why we pulled out of Vietnam with only a loss of 50,000 men. If Vietnam was a mystery -- Watergate was also one. He thought that any government that allowed such a thing to happen must be soft.

K: But I think on the whole you can bring me in a few times but don't center it around me. It is just too dangerous.

S: Okay. His talk about the Soviets was uncompromising.

K: AGain, don't ascribe that to me.

S: Mao believed that there will be ultimately a world war. The Chinese with their small farms would emerge a dominant power. Mao never talked like an imperialist. He expressed no material vision of China's future. What about this one - - Mao was a divinity - I don't believe he had any personal friends.

K: You can say he was treated live a divinity.

S: Okay. In all the hours of talk he never mentioned his wife.

K: I think you should write this as if its a composite of various views. Because the Chinese may be very nervous right now.

S: Okay. Then in his last meeting with you Mao talked about being called by God. I think we printed that before.

K: We did?

S: Yeah and then you kidded him that if the two ever got together -- Mao and God -- that would be too difficult a combination.

K: Really, our foreign policy could be effected by this. Please separate the rest of the stuff and not write it all around me.

S: Okay, we haven't had any problems [redacted] B6

K: Did you do that one?

S: Yeah.

K: It took me a long time to get out of that one. okay. Thank you.

TELCON
Sec Kissing
9/10/76; 11:

M: It is anc

K: It is a s

M: It is goi
lot more tha

SJ 326 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
SECRETARY KISSINGER/DEAN RUSK
September 11, 1976
11:45 am

DR: How did your press converence go?

HAK: I think it went pretty well.

DR: Carter or I did not come up,did we?

HAK: No.

DR: The situation is the same as it was yesterday. I am not a spokesman for Jimmy Carter. I did talk with him and I can tell you that I think there is a good chance things could work out if things develop favorably in Africa. The importance as I see it of having some representative African leaders on board and also you are keepin- inclose touch with some of the Congressional leaders?

HAK: He can be absolutely sure both of those conditions will be met. We will not proceed without full support from African leaders. And we will fully brief the members of Congress you mentioned to me yesterday.

DR: Jimmy Carter will not talk to his staff about it.

HAK: Tell him I think he is behaving very patriotically.

DR: Ok. Good luck to you.

HAK: I said this is not a partisan matter and we would take non-partisan support. Thank you Dean.

DR: Ok. Good luck.

END

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TELECON
WILLIAM ROG
September 1
5:07 pm

HAK: I am
a paper as
Vorster see

WR: I thin

HAK: Rathe

SJ327 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
SECRETARY KISSINGER/RICHARD VALERIANI
September 11, 1976
12:50 pm

RV: That was a nice gentle treatment you got today.

HAK: Yes it was. You guys are getting soft on me. I had so many cracks on Carter prepared.

RV: Well, you can use them later. You said today you had not decided yet if you will see Smith and that seems a far cry from what you said yesterday. I thought maybe you are getting something from Africa that is pretty upbeat.

HAK: No. If I meet him it will have to be if I get an indication that something is happening.

RV: Are you going to see Botha today?

HAK: Yes.

RV: Ok. Thank you. See you Monday.

END.

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SJ 329 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
THE SECRETARY/WINSTON LORD
September 11, 1976
5:20 pm

HAK: You remember you have to do this paper for the White House?

WL: We have done it. I sent it to the White House already--to Bud McFarlane. He already has it. I sent a copy to your staff.

HAK: So you are sending things directly to the White House now--under your own signature. I recognize you guys who are trying to take over.

(Laughter)

WL: I sent it directly to the President under my name.

HAK: I had such a good reply prepared to Jimmy Carter on the B'Nai B'rith, but they never asked any questions. Ok. Thank you.

END.

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SJ 343 *

TELECON
The Secretary/Herb Schlosser
9/25/76 3:30 pm

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: How are you?

S: Congratulations. That was a great achievement. You did it again. Are you tired?

K: Yeah.

S: Well done, though.

K: Well, aren't you nice.

S: It was something that had to come sooner or later.

K: Well, we will have a rocky few weeks but we ought to be over the worst of it now. Where are you?

S: I am at the beach. How is it where you are?

K: I am at the office.

S: [redacted] B6

K: [redacted]

S: Will you be in town this coming week? I am calling to tell you about what is taking place tomorrow night.

K: I have had to put off my visit to New York a day. I will be in town Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thrusday.

S: Do you have any time?

K: Can I give you a call on Monday when my schedule is a little clearer?

S: That is fine. Maybe I can get David Brinkley.

K: I will be there next week too so we can surely get together then. Is this going to be a good party tomorrow night?

S: All of the broadway establishment will be there

K: Well, you know I practically belong to NBC. Well, let's stay in touch.

S: Okay, try to get some rest.

K: I will see you either this week or next.

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SJ340 *

TELECON
The Secretary/Ambassador de Olloqui of Mexico
9/25/76 12:27 pm

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: Mr. Ambassador.

O: Congratulations on your success in South Africa. And congratulations on everything you have undertaken. I will be very brief.

B6

[redacted]

O: Thank you very much Mr. Secretary. I will see you tomorrow.

K: Bye.

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SJ 334 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
The Secretary/Max Fisher
9/25/76 10:10 am

F: Henry, welcome back. Nice job my friend.

K: Thank you. Well, I hope it can hold together now. Now, Max, I am calling you about these proposals about the Saudis. We have cut the stuff down to about 35% of what was originally in there. Well now they are passing a resolution cancelling it. You probably can get away with it because of the election but next year people are going to ask who is responsible for the high oil prices. I don't see how this can be in the Jewish interest.

F: I'm not aware of any of this.

K: It's been taking place in the last two days. There is a massive Jewish campaign going on. They can get away with it but I just wonder whether it is in the peoples interest to do it.

F: No, it is not.

K: We already paid a tremendous price with the Saudis to cut the sidewinders and the Mavericks. I can tell you we cannot keep the Middle East stable without them. And once these bedoins turn, they stayed turned.

F: Bill Scranton told me this morning so let me check into this. I thought we had it put to bed.

K: That is what I thought.

F: I don't know what has happened. It is going to be touch today because tiday is a holiday. Let me check into it.

K: Thank you Max. And Happy New Year.

F: It's been a great achievement.

K: Thank you Max. Bye Bye.

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SJ338 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
The Secretary/Ellsworth Bunker
9/25/76 11:00 am

B: I wondered if I could have five minutes with you before you go up to the UN to bring you up to date on Panama.

K: Are you in the building today.

B: Yes, I'm in the building.

K: Well, let me see later this morning.

B: All right. I will be here.

K: Good.

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SJ336 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
The Secretary/Ambassador Burelli of Venezuela
9/25/76 10:40 pm

K: Mr. Ambassador, I am engaged here in a debate with my people who tell me your people don't know when the Foreign Minister will be in New York. And since I want to see him can you let me know in the next half hour?

B: He's in new York now. I think he will stay until at least Wednesday. He will speak on Monday.

K: But he may go back this week? Could you do me a favor and find out in the next hour? I don't want him to go back without having seen him.

B: Yes. Mr. Secretary what is your phone number?

K: 632-9630.

B: All right. Congratulations Mr. Secretary. I am very happy because of your success.

K: Aren't you nice.

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SJ 339 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
The Secretary/Larry Eagleburger
9/25/76 11:20 am

E: One of the reporters on the trip called Millie this morning and said they have from de Borchgrave the clauses of the secret agreement with Ian Smith.

K: There isn't a secret agreement.

E: That's what I told him. But I just wanted to check with you.

K: You tell him that there are the five points and the sixth point is a summary of a working paper of an economic thing.

E: Right.

K: There is no agreement and if they claim there is, it is a god damn lie.

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SJ 348 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Coleman
9/27/76; 4:16 pm

C: I want to congratulate you for the superb job you did in South Africa and offer you a couple of suggestions if you want to hear them. Suggestion number one is I think in connection with your briefing the people you ought to make a special point to brief Young, Diggs and Jordan. Make it confidential and off-the-record. Secondly, I know part of your program is that if it doesn't work in southern Rhodesia and the whites have to pull out that there be some method with a trust fund where they can be reimbursed for their property. I hope for the blacks that they will be taken care of.

K: The whole idea of the trust fund is to build up Rhodesia's economy.

C: That point had not come up.

K: Diggs cannot go around slaughtering us.

C: I said you are being irresponsible as hell. This is the first Secretary of State and I have known every one since 1945 and no one had the guts to go and work it out. Here is a guy who goes and tries and you guys better stop politics and if you get Diggs, Young and Jordan, they are the most responsible. Diggs is chairman of the subcommittee. Diggs and Young are very responsible. If you want me to be there I would love to do it. I think the plan is brilliant. Diggs is saying the real problem is they are giving the money to the whites to get out. But what about the blacks.

K: Absolutely untrue.

C: You ought to emphasize that the majority of it goes to the blacks to build up their economy.

K: Okay. Good idea.

C: Okay.

K: Thank you.

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SJ 350 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
The Secretary/Amb. Ramsbotham
9/27/76 7:03 pm

K: I am going to be sending ou a message that Kaunda just wrote me. Also, I have just talked with the Tanzanian Ambassador and he has a message from Nyerere. They are both agitated that you seem reluctant to call a conference.

R? We are not reluctant?

K: I didn't have that impression. I am just telling ;you what their impressions is. I don't think you are. They are all pleading for you to call a conference.

R: Ameeting if you like.

K: A meeting to set up a transitional government.

R: Rollins is leaving tomorrow and will be with them there. We are not at all reluctant -- we just want to to it in the right way. You are sending a message from Kaunda?

K: A letter that Kaunda sent me.

R: And one from Nyerere?

K: That was an oral message.

R: All right, I will pass that on but I don't think you need worry too much.

K: Would you ask my friend Tony what is his definition of a seasoner politician?

R: A seasoned politican?

K: Yeah, I want to get the offici al definition.

R: Yes indeed. Incidentally, thank you for what you said last night.

K: Oh, you're welcome. But I frankly, if I were you, which I am clearly not, I would do one quick round and then I would call a conference and see who shows up.

R: Good advice.

K: Okay, good bye.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H. MILLER
DATE/CASE ID: 12 MAR 2003 200102979

SJ352 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec. Kissinger
Mr. Black (Enquirer)
Sept. 28, 1976, 12:15 p.m.

K: Mr. Black.

B: Mr. Secretary, how are you?

K: I wanted to invite you to a lunch I am giving today. Did you get an invitation?

B: No, I did not.

K: That is what I suspected because they left the message with some telephone operator at the Enquirer and I am sure she rushed right out to find you. I am getting together a few editors to talk about this African trip and remembering your attitude on the panel I would like to have had you there.

B: I wish I could be there. And I thank you very much. You did very well.

K: I think it is all confusing right now but they have accpted the basic procedure but they never can bring themselves to say that about something that Smith put forward. They first have to say no but they have already notified us that they have accepted it.

B: How do you feel about South Africa.

K: A messy problem.

B: You will have to work on that later.

K: Yes. Sorry to have missed you (at lunch).

B: Wish I could have been there.

K: I wanted you to know I thought of you.

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SJ 353 *

TELECON
Cong. Wayne Hays/Secretary Kissinger
September 28, 1976
Time: 1:25 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

H: I hear what is going on there -- you want me to give you some political advice?

K: Get lost?

H: No, not that. I went to a meeting the other night where I said I was scared to death to see Carter get elected because I didn't know what would happen to this country if you weren't Secretary of State. I got a lot of applause on that one. This was a mixed group also. If I were you, I wouldn't go back to Africa any more.

K: I am not going again.

H: That is the only criticism I have heard.

K: Oh, really.

H: The whites resent it.

K: The whites will get killed.

H: The people back home don't understand that -- I understand that.

K: Isn't that interesting. Our intelligence tells us the whites can't hold out longer than next year.

H: That is probably right. But do it after the election.

K: We are not going again. We are going to push the British out front now.

H: Is Eagleburger still in your office?

K: He is. As a matter of fact, he is here with me.

H: Can I speak to him for a minute.

K: Absolutely. And thanks for calling Wayne. You can always get through to me no matter what your position is. You were a good friend here.

H: I still am. I told these people -- you should have heard me. It would have made you feel good. I said who else recognized the Chinese -- who else could have gotten the Jews and Arabs together.

K: Thank you Wayne. You are a good friend. Here is Larry.

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SJ361 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Phil Habib
10/1/76; 3:54 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: The Chinese told Schlesinger that we had made an official protest about the trip. That you had made an official protest.

H: No official protest made. You know exactly how it was done. ~~x~~Very personal and unofficial.

K: I think what I should tell Schlesinger is you talked to them unofficially after he was already there, not to use it for specifics.

H: Personally and on a personal basis to Han Hse and I stressed that. It was a ~~xxx~~ bit of advice not to create problems and make the wrong kind of specifics.

K: It had nothing to do with the trip.

H: Of course not. On the contrary. He was already there. They had the meeting with the ~~Presidentx~~ press and they were taking along so many press people we were concerned they were going to use it for a _____ to flog us.

K: I will tell Schlesinger all you told them was they should not use it for publicity against it.

H: And ~~xxx~~ in particular with reference to the press they were taking along. In his conversation they told him ~~xx~~ two or three times and he never recounted that he had been invited in 74. You know that. They made a point of mentioning that two or three times.

K: The sob's.

H: They not only did it once but two or three times and of course he knew nothing about it.

K: Because the invitation was cancelled when the President said he would come.

H: They rubbed that in two or three times. It was in the reporting.

K: Okay.

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SJ 363 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
William Rogers/Secretary Kissinger
Saturday, October 2, 1976
10:10 AM

K: What are you doing over there?

R: We are talking with the UK. Scowcroft called a meeting with Greenspan and Yeo.

K: Good. Have you seen that thing from Lowe that claims we gave them a different paper from the five points that were published.

R: No, I haven't.

K: That isn't true.

R: Absolutely not.

K: I have never seen such a bunch. In every other negotiation when you have broken the back they do everything to see it succeeds. Not these guys.

R: They are establishing public positions.

K: Have you ever called Newsweek back?

R: Yes. I sent you a paper on it. I talked to Sullivan and told him it was garbage.

K: OK. Call me when you get back.

R: OK.

END.

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SJ364 *

TELECON
Frank Wisner/Secretary Kissinger
Saturday, October 2, 1976
10:17 AM

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Have you seen that cable from Zambia that they calim the paper we gave Nkomó and Kaunda that the thing is different than we put forward?

W: I have seen it.

K: Put it isn't.

W: It could not possibly be because it was developed in Pretoria.

K: We did not give Nkomo a paper at all. Would you get hold of him and tell him we did not give Nkomo a paper at all?

W: Right sir. I will do that right away.

END.

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SJ 366 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Art Hartman
10/4/76; 12:19 pm

H: I would like some guidance. The German Ambassador called and said he is anxious to come in and discuss the Gromyko talks. He is particularly anxious to know whether or not the President raised with Gromyko the Berlin issue because that apparently came up in the conversation with Genscher.

K: What came up?

H: That Genscher had asked that something be said about Berlin when he saw the President.

K: Only. . . no, it did not come up.

H: It did not. And he is also wondering whether MBFR came up.

K: It did come up but only in a very general way and having to do with the fact they will not give us an answer until . .

H:..until we put forward figures.

K: Right.

H: May I give him general things along the lines of Gromyko's speech.

K: Certainly.

H: The positions that were discussed. If he has any further questions, I will refer him to you.

K: Yes.

H: The Greeks have now come back with their final position and there are two positions. I would like to bring our people home.

K: You will first explain what the positions are.

H: Okay. I will get a memo up to you today.

K: Either a memo or you come up but we will not establish the autonomy of the bureaus.
(Hangs up)

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SJ 368 *

Spot on Original

TELECON
The Secretary/Mr. Habib
10/4/76 4:51 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Can you find out why no one from our delegation was at the Gromyko speech?

H: I asked the same question myself.

K: But what was the answer?

H: The answer I got was that Tap Bennett had somewhere else he had to be. And Scranton wasn't there -- he was out of town -- on a political thing. When I saw this, I raised my eyebrows four feet in the air.

K: I want Scranton to write a letter to Gromyko apologizing and to give it to the Soviet UN mission.

H: Okay.

K: They did the same to me but that was in retalitation. Gromyko has come to every speech of mine. I think it is just totally wrong.

H: I assure you it was the first question I asked.

K: But I wasn't told about this until the Russians told me. Nobody brought it to my attention until Dobrynin brought it to my attention.

H: He spoke at noon.

K: Right.

H: And Scranton wasn't there and Bennett had something else.

K: Look, what would they have done if I had of gone? Are you telling me I would have been the only American there? No UN Ambassador would have accompanied me?

H: I had a feeling that they thought you would cover the fort for them. But you know where Scranton was. He was down here because you were down here. If you would have gone, he would have been with you. I tell you I asked the same question and I have given you the same answer that I got. If you had of gone, certainly Scranton would have been with you because he wouldn't have been at the Cabinet meeting.

K: Okay.

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SJ 376 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Secretary Simon
10/12/76; 11:15 am

RELEASED IN FULL

S: It was funny. I got a call from (Gus?) . He is like the weather. He has not come to me in about a week. I said we might as well have that meeting. He is going to come down over the next three or four weeks and we will have dinner.

K: Good.

S: I can walk from one subject to the next.

K: I would appreciate it. I have given some thought to it. It has a lot to recommend.

S: A natural.

K: It could be combined with some other things.

S: At the same time build a wherewithal to do all sorts of other things.

K: I appreciate it.

S: I went to Yeo because Sonnenfeldt and Hartman chaired with him. At the staff meeting I put the boys to work.

K: We don't have any super-bright advice. We have the need. I was wondering whether Sonnenfeldt and Hartman and Katz could get together with Yeo and if you could instruct Yeo to put that imaginative mind to work on the problem. . .

S: You are talking about the mobilization of gold and colateral loans. I want to go over that with Yeo. When the IMF legislation had not passed, it was insurmountable.

K: If you take a personal interest. .

S: I have done so. You tell Hartman and Art to call Yeo to get together. That would be terrific.

K: Good. Okay. Thank you.

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SK2 *

TELECON
Ambassador Armstrong/Secretary Kissinger
October 13, 1976
9:55 am

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

A: I am fine. You have been sneaking out for more candlelight dinners with Crosland without me.

K: We were watching the debate together with mounting horror.

A: When he brought in the Vatican and then the eastern Europe thing...

K: The Vatican he could have handled if he had explained properly what Helsinki was. The problem is that he was on the defensive. Carter could have been destroyed. His facts were wrong and his arguments tawdry.

A: Right.

K: The first question was the best speech in our behalf that was made and then instead of rushing into the Defense budget, as his advisors had told him, he had said "What is non-substantive about what Mr. Frankel said?"

A: That was really bad.

K: Look, I am concerned in this mindless place of mine -- to ease pressure on the Labor people I thought it would be a good idea if Rogers briefed Mrs. Thatcher - - to get her off Crosland's back.

A: He did.

K: I thought he would do it after he saw Crosland and now I am afraid they will think we are playing politics because he saw her first.

A: What can I do?

K: I told Crosland I thought Rogers should see Margaret Thatcher and Crosland said that might not be a bad idea but I will talk to Bill about it first. And then I put in a call to Margartet Thatcher to say probably he would call on her. And then I had to leave town and didn't get to talk to her... If you could explain this to Crosland and -- how did the meeting go?

A: Fair to middling. Mawdling was there. She had said no one else would be there. I went with him and then Mawdling was there. I

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A: didn't feel too good about it. She is adamant that the 5 points be the basis and that they are non-negotiable. She was upset about Crosland's remarks which implied that they were.

K: Rogers is not the toughest man that we have got. Tell me, did he get across the scheme we are following?

A: Yes. And that it was in everybody's interest not to debate but to get them to the conference table.

K: Did he explain what document we are trying to produce at the conference?

A: Yes, but I am not sure she understands. The argument was not in dealing but was in principles. Now she wants Crosland to say the British Government supports the 5 points.

K: He can't say that and maintain his position.

A: If I had been Rogers I wouldn't have felt too comfortable coming out of that meeting.

K: Did Rogers do a good job in explaining it?

A: I would give him a B plus. He went there under very tough circumstances. Labor is having terrible problems. We don't want this to be political and I don't think Thatcher does. She said that would be horrible for the free world.

K: If she blows it up that is what will happen.

A: I know that.

K: Did Rogers get that across to her.

A: I think he tokk did. But there was no sense of commitment out of that meeting and then Mawdling left early.

K: He is no strength.

A: But he pops off and could say he didn't hear the end of it.

K: They are not going to announce anything.

A: Yes, but next Wednesday the government has called for a debate on Rhodesia and after that they are calling for a review of sanctions. Thatcher hopes they can get it on a basis of 3 months instead of per annum so they can get the conference going. She argued that putting off the conference for a week or two doesn't matter. She is afraid that if Crosland and the laborites are not firm enough on standing behind the 5 points it will drive Smith out.

K: I agree with her partly but the time to do that is when the conference is going -- but not now before the conference. She may play into the hands of the radicals.

A: Right. The problem is the debate. I think she needs talking to before then. Unless Bill got something out of the meeting that I didn't. Some nuance that I didn't pick up. Will Bill come back?

K: You will talk to her. Why don't you come here and let me talk to you and then go home again.

A: Ok.

K: We can't do it on the phone.

A: I was planning to come on Monday.

K: You better talk to her before then.

A: When will you talk to Bill again. I think you should get a read out.

K: He is in France but there is no sense in sending him.

A: I would like you to talk to him.

K: I don't care about a commitment. I want her to understand the problem. Let's both think about it and talk in a couple of hours. Will Bill see Crosland?

A: Yes and Duff and Rowlands.

KL Will you be there.

A: No, he didn't invite me.

K: God damn it, you make sure you go there.

A: One of them is over.

K: God damn it. I can't give instructions or orders every day. It is unthinkable that our Ambassador is not there.

A: I was not invited.

K: It is tru I did not give him specific instructions. He should since I take you along to every god damn meeting. Excuse me for using language Texans don't understand. I do not understand the stupidity of the god damn State Department. Excuse me -- I don't see the sense of not having you there.

A: There isn't an;y.

K: You should have been there. Did he go alone?

A: Yes.

K: With nobody?

A: Nobody.

K: Talking to three Britishers alone? God damn it.

A: He asked me to the meeting this morning. On the way to Thatcher's I learned he set up the meetings with Rowlands, Duff and Crosland.

K: I don't know if there are any of these meetings still going on.

A: I will find out.

K: And in the future, you go to every meeting whether you are invited or not and if anyone says a word you have them call me.

A: I didn't even know there was any meeting til he got here this morning.

K: Who set them up?

A: I didn't.

K: Save me from these stupid amateurs. Nobody in his right mind goes to a meeting with a foreign government alone. It means there is no god damn record.

SK1 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Mr. Hummel
Sec. Kissinger
Oct. 13, 1976
9:55 a.m.

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K: I want EA to keep its mouth shut about China, as hard as it is to do.

H: I thnk we are.

K: Then where does Gwertzman get all of his stories.

H: Not from us. I will reinforce what we have already said repeatedly.

K: You are to say nothing.

H: Yes, sir. Everybody understands that.

K: Most of what is said is wrong anyway. I don't know whether it will increase trade. Sombody told Schweid that this means trade will increase with China.

H: Could not have been anyone in the EA Bureau. I will touch base with the China experts in EA and, INR and CIA

K: The first implications are not clear to me.

H: Not to me either.

K: Maybe these people have such brilliant thoughts someone could do a memo for me.

H: We are trying to get one. The situation changes every hour.

K: What is the latest.

H: Nothing other than the latest telegram this morning. Students arrested at Ching-Hua University -- about 30. We think there is a high level meeting because there are VIP aircraft arriving which indicates a probable high-level meeting.

K: They did not waste any time after the morning period was over.

H: Right. I think they have been restraining themselves during that time. Now it has blown open. It makes us all think again about their political processes and reliability and the maturity of their government.

K: Yep.

H: I will reinforce again the absolute prohibition of commenting or speculations on China.

K: O.K.

SK10 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Robert Funseth/Secretary Kissinger
October 13, 1976
Time: 7:03 p.m.

(MISSED FIRST PART)

K: Tomorrow morning about what the rules are I would rather cancel the thing.

F: Who said there was a hassle?

K: I thought you would have worked it out by now.

F: I did. I called him back this evening....

K: What are the rules?

F: It is deep background.

K: And he accepts that?

F: Has someone told you anything different?

K: Jock told me you hadn't worked it out until an hour ago.

F: No, it was worked out long ago. I just called him again tonight to check like I always do.

K: O.K.

F: And we will state them again at breakfast before we start tomorrow.

K: O.K. Thank you.

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SK4 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Armstrong
Sec. Kissinger
October 13, 1976
11:50 a.m.
A: It's me again.
K: People are going to start talking.

A: I have been thinking this over and I will go anywhere, bear any burden, etc. I will come to Washington if you think that is best. I have been thining about -- we have here a lobbying problem. Our immedicate crisis is next Wednesday. There will be others after that. We have to handle this now. We have the conservative back-benchers in arms.

K: Remember they are probably listening in.

A: I was thinking it might be more useful if you could send Schaufele or Wisner over here to do this job. If I come there, get back Sunday night, have to leave again Monday, who is left in charge of getting the job done of talking to the MPs and really to the press.

K: We don't want -- first we cannot do any lobbying that the British Government does not want us to do. Point two, we certainly cannot send people from her to do it.

A: No. But I meant it seems to me that what we want is not a big blow-up next Wednesday.

K: I would like to discuss what I want with you in a way that I cannot do on the telephone.

A: I see.

K: It is clear that I don't want a big blow-up but on the other hand -- the British have to handle their own domestic politicis but I want everybody to understand what the limits are. In other words -- you way you don't want to come.

A: No. I will come. What worries me is I get back here on Sunday and leave again on Monday.

K: There are two solutions. ONe, you come and you don't go back on Monday or on Monday we can still send somebody over there. You come and give me your advice . I cannot put to you the subtleties of this on the phone.

A: I understand. The other thing. Do you want me to bring anybody with me from the Embassy who could then stay on the ground here.

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K: If Ron wants to come that is fine.

A: All right. What about Sietz.

K: I don't want to spread it much further.

A: O.K.

K: Sietz, I don't know. Who is that.

A: I have told Eagleburger to check him out when he was here with you to see what you all thought of him there. See what Larry Found out. He is our African expert. But if you have any doubts about him.

K: Let me talk to Larry.

A: All right.

K:: An we will get -- I will get his judgment. I have a horror of spreading these things. The Foreign Service has a great faculty of writing letters back and forth.

A: I quite understand. I think if I can bring somebody and I am happy to bring Spiers if you don't want the other one. That person could be on the ground all next week.

K: I don't want to give the impression we are doing a lobbying effort in the British Parliament. That is the last thing I want to do.

A: The press here is horrible in the Guardian this morning and our people cannot explain our policy.

K: What is the Guardian saying.

A: Dr. Kissinger Gearing Loose End. Describes Carlson's attack yesterday. What the conservatives said about him. Implications of a shift in the Anglo-American position and...

K: You had better come back.

A: O.K. Says this is a vanishing trick which you have performed. Anyway it needs people here to be able to enunciate our policy.

K: Right.

A: Get Larry to call me about which guy should come with me.

K: I will see you Friday.

A: Ask Larry to call me so I can get them moving.

K: O.K.

SK7 *

TELECON

RELEASED IN FULL

The Secretary/Don Kendall
10/13/76 4:45 pm

DK: Henry, on the 22nd of October, I am taking agroup of 13 chief executives to Mexico to meet with Portillo. Murphy from General Motors, Sears and Robuck, Arco, and some others. It will be about 13 or 14. I have been working on it since last June and Portillo asked if I would put such a group together. He wanted to make a serious effort to try to get American investments back in Mexico. He was very serious. He has told us that he plans on spending the entire day with us. They have requested no government involvement. Whether he is serious or not only time will tell but some people are beginning to find out about this and I wanted you to know it in case there is any message you would like to get across at the meeting. And I wanted you to know so you won't wonder why I didn't tell you.

K: Well, I think it is a good idea. We have had an opportunity to have a long talk with Lopez Portillo recently. Except you might get across that it is awfully hard to do business with them when there is this constant harrassment publically. He has to chang the tone a little bit.

DK: I think he already knows that. He has also asked me to put put together a list of people in the business and academic communities for the inauguration.

K: Do you want us to have our Ambassador alerted?

DK: I would just as soon not. I think the less information that is out about it the better. But I leave it up to you. Once it gets into that -- you sending communications down there -- then too many people know about it.

K: Okay, fine.

DK: Good.

K: Many thanks.

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SK3 1*

TELECON
Ambassador Armstrong/Secretary Kissinger
October 13, 1976

RELEASED IN FULL

missed first part.

K:...foaming at the mouth about this sequence of events. You have got to come back here and read this stuff so you know as much as the British counterpart and then get back there before the debate.

A: While I was on the phone with you Rogers called from Heathrow and asked a secretary to call Paris and say he would be an hour late. I have a copy of a cable here, which has not yet gone out, which he wrote .

K: It is unthinkable. You must know everything the British government said. Can you get back tomorrow and spend Friday and Saturday here and go back Sunday.

A: I will do it.

K: Well, you probably can't get here tomorrow. You can read all the cables -- the exchanges with the Africans and exchanges with the British and then when you are brought up to date you will be informed of every conversation -- so you will know as much as Crosland. But the problem is how to get you ready and I see no other way but for you to come back here and I will sit down with you for an hour and explain our strategy to you.

A: If there is anything you want me to do here before...

K: Be here Friday. I will be gone xxxx part of Friday and Saturday and I can see you Saturday afternoon. Texas isn't playing this Saturday.

A: That is not my vice like soccer is yours.

K: How do you feel about the ethnic vote?

A: I don't know.

K: The first guy who appeals to the Angol-Saxons may win. They are still in a slight majority here.

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A: After you get Rogers' cable see if there is anything you want me to do here. Meanwhile, I will check planes and times.

K: Be here on Friday so you can sit in on my Africa meeting. It usually starts around 10:00.

A: Who should be my contact? Eagleburger?

K: Schaufele.

A: Schaufele?

K: Schaufele and Wisner.

A: I shall become an instant Africa expert.

K: We will get you the cables and have them segregated into those that deal with the policy. You don't have to read the housekeeping ones. I will have them sorted.

A: I would prefer them sorted.

K: Sit in on our meeting and then I will have an hour with you on Saturday.

A: Good.

K: You will go back Sunday.

A: No, I will stay on - no, no, that's right, to meet with Thatcher.

K: I want you to be sure you are there while this conference is being organized.

A: I was supposed to be in the US to do some apolitical , but political, appearances in New York, Chicago at the Foreign Affairs Council and Houston at the Chamber of Commerce.

K: When?

A: Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday. New York, Chicago and Houston. But if this needs doing, this needs doing.

K: I would like you to -- let's consider what to do.

A: I was doing this as a pro foreign policy junket. They are all good forums.

K: You might be able to go over for a day and come back again.

A: Sure. If I could fly out of Washington Saturday night.

K: You might be back here again Monday night.

A: Yes.

K: Let's plan on that.

A: Or Tuesday morning in time for the first on e in New York.

K: Good.

A: See you then.

END

SK17 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
The Secretary/Jerry Schecter
10/14/76 7:00 pm

S: (Missed first part) . . . I just thought you didn't want to see me. That is because I went with Schlesinger. That doesn't mean I am disloyal.

K: I am not one of his enemies.

S: I don't think you are. But it was really a spectacular trip aside from Mao dying. To see that border area . . . it was a whole different perspective.

K: In what way?

S: There are all different kinds of people along there.

K: I would like to see you.

S: Your wish is my command.

K: Hold on half a second. How about having breakfast with me? 8:00.

S: Tomorrow morning?

K: Yeah.

S: Terrific.

K: Then I would like to hear about your trip.

S: I look forward to it.

K: Whom is Time backing for the Presidency?

S: Uh, I haven't figured that one out yet. Probably Carter.

K: Are you going to declare it?

S: I don't think so. Hedley's been out on the road all week and he thinks it is still undecided.

K: That is what all the Ford people are saying.

S: I just didn't get a positive sign. I was in St. Louis and I got really the same thing. Neither candidate sparks much enthusiasm. But there was a lot of talk about change and a lot of talk about the President sort of talking himself out of the job by what he said in the debate.

K: I think that is unfair.

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S: The problem is people don't look at the substance of of what you are saying. They are looking to see if you have got command of your office.

K: I have got command of my office and they're still attacking me.

S: You may be there another four years.

K: I could then transfer Eagleburger who is sitting here.

S: You may make him rich and famous. Transfer him to Yugoslavia -- that's what he wants.

K: He may have learned some from Moynihan and Silberman and really do a number on me.

S: He won't do that.

K: Okay, Jerry, see you at breakfast at 8:00.

S: Okay.

SK14 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Art Hummel
10/14/76; 10:15 am

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I assume from the press guidance you are giving me we have reported to the Vietnamese.

H: Yes, you cleared off the telegram or I understood you cleared off the telegram to go out to Paris.

K: I understood I hadn't. What did it say?

H: It gave a text of a note to be delivered.

K: I know you wanted to give them a date for the talks. I know I did not approve that.

H: I will have to check into this. We did not do anything we did not think you approved.

K: There is a clear incongruity in what you think I approved and what I approved.

H: Was it your impression that cable to Paris was not to have gone out?

K: I have no precise recollection. You want to propose a precise date and I know that I did not approve.

H: I will have to check into this.

K: What you could have gotten back is something I did not act on and they sent it out anyway. I know I did not approve a date. It was one of those over-eager notes of ours full of procedure. I thought I wanted something general. Get me the cable.

H: All right, Sir.

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SK20 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Mr. Robert Funseth/Secretary Kissinger
October 14, 1976
Time: 7:21 p.m.

F: Did you see the broadcast? I thought it was very good.

K: Yes, except that I look too fat.

F: Now you are getting vain. I am just as glad she left out the Carter part.

K: Yes.

F: I reached Oberdoffer -- it will be in the first edition.

K: That we gave no such assurances.

F: Yes.

K: O.K. Good.

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SK22 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON

Mr. Eagleburger/Secretary Kissinger
October 14, 1976
Time: 8:50 p.m.

E: Did you just ring me?

K: No.

E: This is Larry.

K: Have you called him yet?

E: I am on the phone with him now. I said I would know everything that is going on in Saudi Arabia. The Secretary told Clements to call you. No one has approached anyone.

K: Where did he hear it from?

E: The desk at Roy's instructions called Porter and said Clements would be c alling him. I asked where did he get the details. Roy says no one said anything, but he must have gotten them from the desk.

K: There is nothing going on. I can't give anyone that sort of veto power.

E: I said you can talk to Clements tomorrow but you cannot have a veto over him. If you insist on resigning then go ahead.

K: He has no right to veto it.

E: His argument is it is too sensitive.

K: Then let him go back. He should go back to him.

E: O.K. Let me talk with him some more.

K: O.K.

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SK18 1*

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.5(D)

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Amb. Scranton
10/14/76; 10:49 am

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS, A/RPS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 25X6
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 27 JUN 2013
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K: Your Grace.

S: Your Worship. How are you?

K: Pretty good. We are having an African strategy meeting and I want to get your latest input. I know you are in a tough spot. We have a lousy connection. I can hardly hear you.

S: I can't hear you very well.

K: They probably put it in via London to let the British get a look. I once called Crosland from Zurich and they put it through Washington and it was one of the times I got some points with Crosland.

(hangs up & call is replaced)

K: I know the Africans also are telling you we ought to put these things forward more specifically.

S: Yes.

K: I think that is a trick.

S: So do I.

K: I think it is going along strangely enough quite well. We have an intelligence report of which I asked them to send you a text that shows that since this comes from a SWAPO official and since it is not written by an ambassador who knows anything about our proposal so it doesn't have any English. Our people might have known it hurt me. I think we have to -- the Zambian foreign minister understands; Salim cannot fail to understand this. Nyerere understands us. Nyerere never responded to my letter from which I am assuming he is working to implement it. Kaunda understands it. We have told the Angolans what we are doing. I have told Waldheim. It is one of the worst kept secrets I have. I think we have to sit tight and if necessary veto.

S: There are only two things that bother me. One is that there is actually a lack of information on the part of the SWAPO people that are here. That doesn't mean Waldheim doesn't know.

K: That is the problem -- even that I have trouble believing. Because the Zambians know; the Angolans know; the Tanzanians know.

S: No, he doesn't.

K: If he has seen my letter to Nyerere, he knows.

S: Right but Nyerere will not let him really tell the SWAPO people because Nyerere is playing this very careful game of where he is insisting that either we or the South Africans make some statement here which puts the ball in our court which is where it should not be. We are not going to make any statement.

K: My worry is that if they don't want to put it up to SWAPO, why should we.

S: I agree.
great
K: The/danger is that if we put it up we will find ourselves in the same position as Rhodesia and I am willing to do this eventually when the Rhodesians convene the conference and it is under way before I ling the two things together.

S: In view of the facts of what I find here is what I have been doing over and over again. I have been saying Nkomo is not here. How are you going to do anything dramatically or what you want to do and expect us to help unless or until he will return and then if he so desires see the Secretary.

K: That is fine with me. The only thing I do not want is a tramatic confrontation where he comes out and says I have told the Secretary the ideas are unacceptable. My strategy which is not heroic is to keep the thing sufficiently confused to exhaust them a bit and since they are all such tough operators I am beginning to think they understand this.

S: I think some of them do and some do not.

K: Right but the key ones do. I also tell you now I am going to keep it confused until somebody 's nerves go. Maybe it will be mine.

S: No it won't.

K: I want the Rhodesian conference well launched. Because suppose they come up with an interim government in Rhodesia. I think we are then home free on Namibia. Then every African will know this is the road to power. Elementary if you look at that intelligence report. If this is correct and I find it almost impossible to conceive that it was invented because it had to come from somebody who did not know the debate here. If it is correct, SWAPO has hurt this and is moving in our direction.

S: I will get that.

K: I have the strong impression that Kaunda is working on these guys.

S: The other caveat I want to put to you is this. When it comes down to brass tacks, if there is a veto, there is a veto. Tactically it doesn't bother me at all. But I want you to know I think we ought to give you a very thorough analyzing of what that means to us at the UN because whether we like it or not on the Namibia thing the UN is involved. It is different on Rhodesia.

K: Yes.

S: Playing these guys here is a different game than playing Kaunda and Nyerere and company. I want you to know before it gets down to that what we believe this would do personality wise and substantive wise when that event comes.

K: You ought to send it in a way it doesn't get leaked. I know it would not be you. As a letter to me or hand-delivered memo.

S: Are you going to be there Monday?

K: Yes. I will be in New York Tuesday.

S: I may come down Monday and if I do I would like to see you.

K: And if not I will see you in New York Tuesday.

S: Okay.

K: If there is something I ought to do on Tuesday, for example talk to Salim. .

S: Okay. Thank you.

K: There was one other thing. If it comes to me I will call you back.

S: Do give orders to get that intelligence thing to me.

K: That will come right away.

S: Thanks, boss.

K: Right.

(a few minutes later)

K: I am seeing that [redacted] tonight and I am doing it only because I think he is [redacted] in a key position. Somebody tells me you feel he has not been helpful? B1 B1

S: He is helpful in doing what you are trying to do which is confuse. That is all right. I want you to be alerted to one thing.

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K: What is he saying?

S: He came up here yesterday and he is a flambouyant character as you may know.

K: Yes. Be easy because he calls me by my first name.

S: You are running the world.

K: I have met him for an hour and we have become great friends.

S: He is now a kingpin and is throwing his weight around.

K: They will all get mad at him.

S: Our own friends on the Security Council are really irritated by this but even more important he now is having a special meeting with the Africans this morning, which is exactly what you want and which will be fine if they believe him.

K: He is doing my work. I figure they will not believe him but I figure it cannot do us any harm.

S: No. At the present time it cannot. Where it can is if he really turns off our friends on the Security Council.

K: I have not asked him to do anything. I have told him what is available.

S: I understand that thoroughly and got the idea right away. I said yesterday afternoon when the Britishman was causing me trouble I said look. All it is doing is causing confusion and the more the better.

K: It is confusion but I also am getting Africa to put forward -- althought that is a courteous title for the [redacted] B1
basically our program, if he understands it.

S: Just be wary of this character because we have had all kinds of problems with him in the past and secondly, remember all our friends don't trust him a foot.

K: Remember the saying of Metternich. The easiest people to deal with are vane people. The only ones harder to deal with are perfect or honest ones.

S: That is why you are so effective.

END

SK15 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Winston Lord
10/14/76; 3:25 pm

[redacted] B6

L: Ordinarily this thing ought to be cleared with me anyway.

K: It is obvious that it is a conciliatory gesture.

L: Of course.

K: Within a year they are going to invite me again. It is a little insulting not to be invited.

L: You will be invited either way after November. There is no question in my mind.

K: That is a secondary action. I think we should proceed this way. Will you call Gates? I don't accept on the proposition I have to call him.

L: I can call him back or Hummel can.

K: Don't have Hummel call. You call Gates. You can explain he cannot go to Peking and have dinner.

L: I will take care of it.

K: How are you doing on the speech?

L: I reserve judgment whether we can make it by 2:00.

K: The way to use the examples is stress that one always has to choose between various ends, between making big moral declarations and not achieving anything or having the moral conviction and achieving something. It is my view moral and foreign policy express itself through conviction and by going through stages and not only through formal statements.

L: Right. There is a matter of procedure involved.

K: That is how I would bring in the examples. I would not spend much time on immigration.

L: As an example.

K: Yes. I am convinced that one more pro-Israeli speech would make people throw up.

L: I agree.

K: I take it you are going to root for the gd mid-westerners.

L: I am ambivalent.

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K: I might take you to a world series next week.

L: I was not going to be that presumptuous.

K: You are going to take care of the Chinese thing.

L: Yes, I will call Gates.

K: Thank you.

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.5(D)
SK23 *

TELECON
Governor Scranton/Secretary Kissinger
October 15, 1976
Time: 10:16 a.m.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 25X6
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 27 JUN 2013
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K: How are you?

S: I am alright.

K: We have our daily African meeting soon and I wanted to check in with you -- that [redacted] misrepresented our position. B1

S: I am not surprised.

K: He admits he misrepresented it. He took poetic license because he said the gap between our position and what he wants was so small. He thought he could take the liberty to do this. Do you think there is total confusion in the instructions?

S: As far as we can make out there is. Either he or his representative here -- his name is [redacted] have you met him? B1

K: Is he the Ambassador here in Washington? No he is the one you made the comments in rebuttal on, right?

S: Yes. [redacted] I thought that was the best comment. Either he or Walter is to appear before the African meeting this morning. At that time he will tell them of these five points that he made yesterday. He will say there is some difference from what he indicated with regard to political prisoners. B1

K: Well that is alright. He never told him in a straight fashion that the South Africans would be represented there. Reinhardt told them that the South Africans would be in Geneva for negotiations. That is all.

S: I know what you did. I worry about this guy. He said to me last night that the ball is in our court because we have to make an announcement. Reinhardt has told me about your instructions to him.

K: The worst judgment is for the U.S. to put forward a proposal and give the Africans an opportunity to jump all over it.

S: Right.

K: All the intelligence we have says Nyerere is trying to move this thing.

S: Well...

K: Whether he is or not, he hasn't rejected anything. Nor has Kuanda.

S: As I understand it you told Reinhardt to tell Walter that there would be no statement until there was an agreement with the Africans in New York as to the text of the statement.

K: I don't want to offend you with respect to your colleagues, but the group I am least eager to negotiate with is those in New York. So he will not make a statement until I get the agreement of the Africans in New York.

S: Reinhardt told them it was the Africans in New York.

K: Then he misunderstood me.

S: Then I suggest...

K: Can you get that straightened out.

S: I think it would be better if he called Walter. He won't be in New York for long.

K: He is changing his mind about going back -- he might be here until this afternoon. I -- say I am not interested in negotiating this with the delegates in New York -- I am trying to get it out of New York and into responsible hands.

S: That is what I thought.

K: If the Africans tell me what they want then I will make a statement.

S: What threw me off was his statement.

K: I think he misunderstood that. Just a minute Jack is here -- let me ask him. (Speaks to Reinhardt) No, Jack says Walter was supposed to go back to the permreps to give them that news, but not to negotiate with them. Couldn't you just try to run him down and tell him this.

S: I will. O.K.

K: O.K. I never told you it wouldn't be complicated.

S: When you have this many people involved it is a mess -- just keep us confused -- it is the best thing you can do.

K: As long as you are not confused -- you know everything we know.

S: See you Monday.

K: Good. I will be up there Tuesday -- if there is anything I can do.

S: You might see Salim (sp) but we can work that out later. Tell Jane to get me a time for Monday.

K: I think it is set for 12:30.

S: O.K. Boss. See you soon.

K: Bye.

SK26 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
Ambassador Armstrong/Secretary Kissinger
October 15, 1976
Time: 2:11 p.m.

K: I have talked to Crosland. He seems pretty miffed. You had better stay here and not talk to Thatcher. In that case I can see you Monday.

A: That is perfect. Then I will get with your Secretary and see what time is a good time.

K: O.K. Good.

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SK 24 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
The Secretary/Amb. Armstrong
10/15/76 12:50

A: Have you gotten Crosland yet?

K: No.

A: I talked to Duff and he said oh my goodness -- it is just inconceivable what Rogers did and in fact it sounded practically like a demarche. So I don't know whether he has talked to Crosland but I just wanted to give you that. He may still be awfully upset.

K: It is inconceivable.

A: I know but I thought I would use all my female wiles and soothe him but I guess I didn't do so good.

K: Should I call Callaghan?

A: I don't see why you have to call Callaghan. I would call Crosland.

K: I haven't gotten through to him yet.

A: I don't know whether this has gone as high as Callaghan. My answer is I don't know.

K: You got it from where?

A: From Duff. We called our Embassy to find out whether Thatcher . . .

K: You better not see Thatcher again.

A: Well, remember I left it with you that I would see whether Thatcher would be available. But I was trying to find out what their whereabouts would be Sunday and Monday in case you wanted me to see them. Now the other thing I wanted to tell you is that the President's asked to see me here on Monday but I know he will understand if you decide for me to go back there.

K: Let's settle that tomorrow.

A: Okay. On this Callaghan vs. Crosland -- I think Crosland yes because then he will feel that he is being arched over again.

K: Okay.

A: Okay. Bye Bye.

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SK 28 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Win Lord
10/16/76; 3:31 pm

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: How are you getting on?

L: Fine. I need about another hour and a half.

K: I don't need it before 6:00.

L: We can have it by 5, I think.

K: I will come back here at 6:00.

L: We should have it then.

K: Are you fairly pleased with it?

L: Yes. It is going to require more writing and editing. I think we made progress.

K: Good.

L: How was your trip?

K: It was a tremendous success in Boston and I have talked to the Business Council before and it was also very, very good.

L: The Chinese were extremely friendly. They made a point. This was the first time since the mourning and they have a new chef and the guy next to me started talking about Chou en Lai.

K: Really.

L: Yes. The Ambassador made some suggestions he may be leaving next spring. He was saying he has been there four years.

K: You notice they hit us in the charts about the fallout.

L: It is not in the charts. It is in Washington.

K: They delivered a second message from Peking.

L: Today?

K: Apparently today.

L: What I saw was we made the point and our guy called back and made a point.

K: There was something that came from the leadership in Peking and they wanted it passed on to the leadership . . .

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L: It is the leadership in the Liaison Office here. It was done within an hour.

K: Oh.

L: They want our leadership in State to know it.

K: I think just before the election I want to have a talk with Huang Chen with just you there. So they don't think I am just doing it as a lame duck if we lose.

L: I think it is a good idea.

K: November 1 or the Friday before the election and tell them where I think this thing can go.

L: Tell them what you see for . . .

K: Yes.

L: It was the old mood for the first time in some time.

K: I am beginning to think it was the left-wingers.

L: And people had to be careful how they conducted themselves. It is premature, of course.

K: The last fact of the lunch is interesting.

L: They say this is the first one since the mourning.

K: Was it a good meal?

L: No, it was not that good. It was Cantonese food.

K: Are you going to the world series on Wednesday?

L: I look forward to that.

K: I may stay overnight. Wednesday night. I will go back the next morning. You can go back with me. I think to go back at midnight it gets too hectic but I have not decided yet.

L: I look forward to that. We will get this to you certainly by 6:00.

K: I will be back here by 6:00. I will do a review tonight and if you could do one tomorrow.

B6

L:

[redacted]

B6

SK30 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Frank Wisner
10/18/76; 12:40 pm

K: I would like Scranton to see your talking points for your meeting with the Angolans as well as your report of the conversation.

W: All right.

K: Could you have it in an envelope at Scowcroft's at 3:00?

W: All right. Will do.

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SK31 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Win Lord
10/18/76; 12:43 pm

K: Is it true you are working on the speech?

L: I certainly am.

K: Second, I would like Ambassador Scranton to look -- do you have the transcript of our talk with Chau Kuan Hua?

L: Yes.

K: Or do they have it in the White House.

L: I don't know whether she has send a copy to Peter or not.

K: I will ask him to drop by your office when he is through with me in about 10 minutes. What do you think of the speech?

L: I think it is much better.

K: My thought is to drop the secrecy section.

L: I talked to Larry about that and it is going to make the headline.

K: It is going to inflame the press and I would seek to combine the two sections on peace and human rights.

L: That is what I am working on now. I think there is a way to solve that.

K: By sticking in the LOS.

L: I don't think we are going back to that. I think it is soluable.

K: If you could solve that problem, I would be grateful.

L: Okay.

K: Thank you.

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SK32 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Frank Wisner
10/18/76; 3:12 pm

K: _____ gave Anne Armstrong a version of Annex C which I have never seen. Where did he get it from?

W: Let me check my files. Let me check and make sure he has the right one.

K: It shows a majority of European members which is wrong. It is the one which came out too which is the one I gave Smith. There is no sense producing new Annex C versions. Also, were there any new versions produced afterwards?

W: No.

K: One of these two ministeries must be in white hands. That is not the one I have.

W: I will make sure he gets the correct one.

K: Okay. Good.

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SK36 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
The Secretary/Dick Valeriani
10/18/76 7:30 pm

V: You don't know it but I am going to find out Bill Safires Sources.

K: Oh really.

V: No, what I'm really calling about is"Henry the K"won his first race.

K: You're kidding.

V: No, Friday night at the race track in Pennsylvania.

K: What did you do, castrate him?

V: (laughter)

K: Am I getting a cut? How much did you get?

V: You're getting recognition. He got 1500. We cleared 1300 and believe me we needed it. The other thing -- I understand from sources which are not Bill Safires -- that you are going to the World Series.

K: Yeah.

V: How would you feel about a camera observing you with a microphone.

K: Around my neck?

V: No, in your pocket.

K: Listening to everything I said?

V: Yeah.

K: No. THey can observe me but no microphone.

V: Has NBC asked you to go on live coverage yet?

K: No, they're not that imaginative.

V: You are not kidding about that.

K: No, I am serious.

V: I know. They have got a serious problem up there. But you would have no objection with a camera observing you then?

K: No.

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V: You are a Yankee fan then?

K: Oh yeah! I thought you were calling me about that story they are all pumping up about China.

V: Oh, what story?

K: Oh, I said in Boston that we are not selling arms but we do not take an attack on China lightly.

V: No, I am dealing with more substantive matters.

K: You know Safire's sources right?

V: No, I don't know.

K: The guy kills me. He has let off me for a few weeks now.

V: He has run out on Carter so he's back on you.

K: You know there were some great weeks when Lewis and Safire were both on me constantly.

V: It is nice to be in the limelight.

K: Are you coming to the speech?

V: Yeah.

K: It is going to be the first speech to a Jewish audience that has only three paragraphs on Israel.

V: Really. You are not going to mention General Brown?

K: No, I thought I would promise him the first year's production on the B-1. No, we are speaking on morality in foreign policy.

V: It is non-political right?

K: What is more non-political than morality?

V: (laughter) Okay. See you later.

K: Okay. Bye.

SK 34 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Jim Anderson
Sec. Kissinger
Oct. 18, 1976
4:55 p.m.

A: I was struck, and I should have been on Friday, but nobody was, by your statement about China.

K: What did I say?

A: Where you say "We believe that the territorial integrity and sovereignty of China is a very important ... (reads statement) and any massive assault on China..."

K: You are smarter than most of the others.

A: I guess we were suffering from Friday fatigue and obsessed by Cuba. First, you have never said anything like that publicly nor has anybody.

K: Not that explicitly.

A: Second, were you working on some intelligence or were you afraid that the Soveits were taking advantage of the turmoil.

K: I just wanted to state our position.

A: What?

K: I was asked a question.

A: The question was about arms to China and you said nothing about US help or support or anything like that. Were you afraid they might be tempted by the political turmoil.

K: Not particular. I just wanted to state our position because there had been some public statement that we would not sell arms.

A: In other words, we wanted to leave open the possibility of selling arms.

K: Not necessarily. Just wanted to state our basic view.

A: Did this come up with your talk with the For. Min.

K: No. Just a general statement.

A: The fact that it is being stated excluslively -- did we get or do we get some kind of response.

K: No. If I had wnated to make that big of an event I would not have said it in Boston.

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A: It really snuck by me until I thought about it overnight. The only reason for stating it now -- first of all this does take our China position significantly further.

K: Just makes it explicit where it was implicit before.

A: I see. And combined with our relations with The Soviet Union...

K: It is not directed against the Soviet Union. After all there it no law that they are going to attack China. All of this is on background.

A: Senior official.

K: No for deep background -- for your education.

A: O.K.

K: O.K. Jim. I have to run now.

SK35 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
The Secretary/Mr. Funseth
10/18/76 5:05 pm

K: I know it wouldn't be of great interest to me but everyone else seems to think you got hit pretty hard on that China question at your press briefing.

F: I . . .

K: Don't you think I should have been told? What did you say?

F: I said I would not elaborate on what you said.

K: Who asked you?

F: Ken Freid.

K: Well, what implications are they giving it?

F: I haven't seen anything that they have filed on it. I think they think perhaps you had some special reason to give a warning to the Soviets.

K: Then, that means that China will be picking it up.

F: I am sure they have.

K: Okay, do you think they are going to come back to you tomorrow ?

F: I think they could. I will be with you but we can work something out on it.

K: Okay, thank you.

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SK33 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Amb. Schaufele
10/18/76; 3:23 pm

K: Is Romfeld coming down just to see me?

S: Romfeld? As far as I know he is.

K: There is a chance the President may want to see me tomorrow in the morning and if so, could I see him in New York?

S: Sure. I will have to check exactly how long he is going to be there.

K: Check to see if he is free to see me Wednesday in New York at 10:00. And you can tell Scranton he can forget about the other appointment.

S: Okay. I will be back to your secretary.

K: Thank you.

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SK39 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Dick Aherne
10/21/76; 9:30 am

K: I am figuring I have a choice in what happens in Connecticut or is that just done for the pleasure of the locals.

A: No. I thought I would run it by you when I saw you.

K: I want a lunch -- not in the evening. You don't get a good turnout in the evening.

A: Okay. They are perfectly amenable to what you want to do. I spoke to them yesterday from New York and they are estatic about having you there.

K: Is somebody arranging a press conference?

A: I talked to Funseth . . .
Yes or no.
K:/ I know you talked to them here. Have you talked to them about it.

A: Yes, Sir. What I have not resolved about it is who is doing what. I think Funseth and I better do most of the work on it.

K: That is all right. But I want a press conference.

A: You will have a press conference.

K: Okay.

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SK45

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TELECON
The Secretary/Bob Funseth
10/21/76 7:20 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I suppose if I had gone on Issues and Answers, then Face the Nations would be screaming right?

F: Exactly. Don't worry about it.

K: Should I do Issues and Answers next weekend.

F: Before the election?

K: No.

F: Yeah, if you want to.

K: Oh hell, I have done them all now. When can I get the god damn book?

F: Well, If we get it done too early, it isn't relevant. Do you have time to look at it before tomorrow?

K: Right. Okay, thank you.

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SK 38 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Win Lord
10/21/76; 8:10 am

K: Those two things for the UN are total hack jobs.

L: I don't agree with that but you are right. We will rework them. We will certainly rework them.

K: These people are half drunk when I get up. I don't need two whole pages.

L: We said it was too long. I agree it has to be cut but there was some thought given to it. It was no hack job.

K: Can't we make it a little more elevated.

L: All right.

K: I have not read it with great care but it is the typical IO stuff.

L: They made an effort and we reworked it. I realize it is too long and it was not lack of effort.

K: I am not saying it was a lack of effort. It should have a little touch of humor. That bothers me most. At the concert all you can give in two or three minutes is give a little uplift.

L: I agree they are both too heavy. Particularly for a dinner audience.

K: At the dinner the audience will want to feel they heard something significant, even if we restate what we've said hundreds of times what we feel the world is like. To say the UN . . . . on this, it is too heavy.

L: There is a section on that.

K: It is burried in paragraphs of praise.

L: We did try some new twist on that.

K: That doesn't bother me as much as the other one.

L: I agree it has to be shorter.

K: Okay. Can you do something about that.

L: Yes. I want to assure you there was an effort put in.

K: I am sure.

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L: As a consolation to you, it is not something that was ripped off in half a day.

K: [redacted] B6

L: IO does make an effort and that has nothing to do with this.

K: IO kills itself on the LOS stuff.

L: IO makes an effort -- most of the others we have to start from scratch.

K: Can you do something about that.

L: Yes. I will get on it.

K: That group at the council certainly isn't wild for Carter, is it.

L: No. I think the whole populous is turned off by the campaign. Meg Greenfield summed it up pretty well in Newsweek.

K: When?

L: At the end of this week's Newsweek.

K: I didn't see it.

[redacted] B6

The wild thing about the President is instead of attacking Carter on the boycott, he said oh, no, we do it too.

L: You can never win that way.

K: He could certainly win if he said of course we are against the boycott but this guy is at least responsible.

L: He has to point out the whole morality issue. That part of the issue has to be hit as well as the international interest on Saudi cooperation.

K: Okay. If you can redo this.

L: Okay. I will.

K: Thank you.

(Secretary called Lord right back at 8:19 am)

K: Can you have it by the end of today?

L: Yes, we can *do* that.



B6

L: We will get it today.

SK48

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Win Lord
10/22/76; 3:40 pm

K: The one that has to be written for tomorrow is the one in the Kennedy Center.

L: I understand. We are writing both. I realize that is the one you really need.

K: That is the one I have to do in four minutes. For that some elevated quotation would be helpful.

L: We have a good quote from Bacon.

K: You cannot get a German.

L: I am working on it personally, as are Charlie and Peter. We will get it to you.

K: At this meeting today--there are no other agencies so it is all right. Fine.

L: The LOS?

K: Yes. It is okay.

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SK49 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
The Secretary/Sen. Kennedy
10/22/76 2:50 pm

TK: (Missed first part) I saw Lou Wasserman. We had a good chat.

K: We had a good talk. Did he tell you what I said to him. I told him I would support you in 1980.

TK: Well, it is close. It is going to go right to the wire I think.

K: Is it?

TK: I think so. That is what they are saying up there.

K: Massachusettes?

TK: That will be Carter. But they are writing off Connecticut now which is rather interesting.

K: Really.

TK: And Rhode Island although that poll is a little old. I think tonight is really a crucial thing on it. I am going to Greece and they were kind enough to give me some work over there and afterwards I was going through Italy and I was in touch with Chinelli(?) about what the possibilities were of seeing any of the people there and how you handle the communist party. I thought if it presented some significant problem I would just not go there. They have been nice enough to give me an award and I am not interested in embarrassing them. I thought I would check to see what sense do you have? Chinelli(?) thought I could see Segra who is theforeign policy spokesman.

K: Of course alot depends on how the election comes out. If Carter wins, I suppose it may not really make a hell of a lot of difference. He said he would be more permissive than we would be. If he loses it, then it will be four years of Ford. Even if you were to see him, you wouldn't do a hell of a lot of damage.

TK: The INstitute of Foreign Affairs is doing some kind of reception.

K: Oh, he would be among others?

TK: Yeah.

K: Then I think it is no problem.

TK: It seems privately would be more difficult?

K: Particularly given your name -- it would be more significant.

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TK: Do you think that is possible or do you advise against it?

K: When are you going?

TK: A week after the election.

K: Can I think about it over the weekend.

TK: That would be fine.

K: And I will be in touch with you next week. How can I reach you?

TK: Through my office. I will be in Massachusettes all week.

K: Your campaign is Okay?

TK: It is all right. My nephew has done a fine job. They have got the busing and the abortion issues but we have worked hard and we have got good people so it is going well. I have my big debate in a week.

K: Oh really.

TK: I have scheduled it for Haloween afternoon during the patriots game.

K: You are going to have 500 people watching.

TK: That will be too many.

K: Okay Ted.

SK 51

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TELECON
The Secretary/David Rockefeller
10/25/76 2:55 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

R: I was wondering if you had any word that you could give me on Joe Sisco?

K: Let me call you tomorrow without fail.

R: Okay. I will send to you by Chuck Robinson who is up here, the memo that Joe Reed prepared on my Iraq visit for you to look at.

K: Wonderful. And let me know when you come to Washington.

R: I certainly will and if you could let me know on the other I would certainly appreciate it.

K: I will.

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SK60

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
The Secretary/Art Hartman
10/25/76 3:50 pm

H: (Missed first part) . . . a short photo opportunity. He has got a lot of political friends in this country. I think for just a photo it is worth it.

K: The San Marinan?

H: They have got the whole Italian group up on the Hill. I think just a photo Mr. Secretary.

K: Does he understand that?

H: Yes, they know it is a photo.

K: Secondly, on the Cyprus rpoposals. I think we shouldn't put them forward until after the Cyprus debate.

H: I thought it would be an advantage to have them on the table so that they were a fact. What I am afraid of is after the debate the Greek Cypriots will have made such a hash of things.

K: When is the Cyprus debate?

H: It won't be until the end of November.

K: Let me think about it.

H: How did the scenario look to you?

K: It is fine. My only concern is the timing.

H: The comments we are getting back -- Bitsios is talking about what you said publically. He is basing all of his judgments on the few things that were in your UN speech.

K: Then why should we do it?

H: I think it is useful to have the US and the Nine saying here is a reasonable point of view. They have orders to go in immediately after the debate.

K: How about waiting until after the election.

H: We can do that.

K: If we get a big blow up in Greece . . .

H: Okay, right after.

K: But check with me again at that point.
H: Okay, I will. I won't send it out.

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SK57

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TELECON
The Secretary/Amb. Armstrong
10/25/76 2:50 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

A: Hello Henry.

K: How are you Anne?

A: Fine thank you. I just finished seeing Tony Crosland and I can't talk to Callaghan until tomorrow morning. He was awful apologetic.

K: Well, just do it on the phone. Can't you do it on the phone?

A: I gave of course the letter to Tony which he read immediately.

K: Is he mad at me?

A: No, I think he feels a bit badgered. I think I should have worn some more perfume. He said he couldn't quite understand your letter because he thought he was doing everything you mentioned in it. I said I knew your feeling because I had just talked to you. I put his mind at ease that my phone call to Callaghan would be nothing that he didn't already know about.

K: Why don't you call him and tell him I wanted to strengthen his hand a little bit against others who were worried about it.

A: He also thinks that Richards will be a tough bargainer and he emphasized that they sent a big and strong support organization over there with him and that they are going to be firm. He said at the appropriate time he would put that document out.

K: Good. Why don't you put it in writing. I am very worried about who listens in on these lines.

A: I understand. He realizes that you are terribly interested in this and that you are watching it carefully. He wants to keep doing these things in concert and shoulder to shoulder.

K: Good.

A: He really does have a marvelous sense of humor. Okay, we will send the rest in a cable.

K: How was your trip in America last week?

A: Well, I went so fast god knows what kind of impression I made but I guess if I had made any bloopers I would have heard about it by now.

K: Whatis your impression?

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A: I guess it was all right. Anyway I was in very high esteem since I kept telling them I had been talking to you for hours upon hours.

K: Look forward to seeing you soon.

A: We will keep in touch then.

K: Terrific.

A: All right. Bye.

SK54

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
The Secretary/Lars Eric Nelson
10/25/76 10:05 am

N: It was said in Geneva today that it might be necessary to call on you to clear up the dispute on the five points. He might invite you to come to Geneva. Would you go?

K: I have no plans to go.

N: How about to Paris to talk to the Vietnamese?

K: No. The Paris thing is basically an accounting of the missing in action. I hope that is clearly understood.

N: Right. On the Geneva one though -- is that definitely out of the question?

K: No, I don't think it would be appropriate to go to Geneva.

N: Would this be handled by Frank Wisner?

K: Or someone comparable.

N: Thank you very much for your time.

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SK61 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Mr. Sisco
10/26/76; 2:45 pm

K: Hello, Mr. President.

S: Thank you. I might get used to that title one of these days.

K: I have the following problem. You remember when you were under secretary the North Koreans were driving us crazy through David Rockefeller. They used to have some contact with us.

S: Yes.

K: We cannot have any official contact with them but wondered whether David Rockefeller invited them to his house and he would have you there. He wondered just if you would just listen to what he had to say.

S: Absolutely. I would give you a report just as I did when I was under secretary. I would get any guidance.

K: That is not what I want you to have.

S: I would go in cold in other words.

K: I will talk to you.

S: Fine. When would it be?

K: I will tell David to get in touch with you.

S: Okay.

K: I will tell David if this gets out I will disavow it. He did it on his own.

S: All right, Henry.

K: Thank you.

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SK64 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec. Kissinger
Murray Marder
October 26, 1976
6:02 p.m.

K: Murray, I wanted to tell you I have reviewed the cable in question and it sustains what I have told you. You cannot use it but I want to tell you that it is a case where the distinction between the five points we presented to him and the additional phrases we told him to add.

M: Does he have you on the point of conceding that the black leaders cleared their demands.

I don't want to be too precise.
K: /I have told you that we have given him our judgment of what we thought he could add. At any rate, I don't think it would really be a very fruitful thing to pursue -- to go into this as a legal issue.

M: There was a Reuters item earlier today in which they were posing it as the crux of the dispute that would wreck the conference.

K: I don't believe that. Nothing I have seen of the discussions sustains this.

M: It also says that when this was presented to the black leaders they raised no objections to it.

K: Well, I don't want to go any further because I gave you the correct version earlier. They can nit pick it to death now.

M: I am going to stick primarily to what you said on Face the Nation.

K: Okay, I just wanted to tell you that reading over the cable sustains what I have said.

M: All right. I will try to present it as clearly as I can the.

K: I know you will Murry. Okay

M: Okay.

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SK 63-*

TELCON
Sec. Kissinger
Murray Marder
October 26, 1976
4:30 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you Murray?

M: Fine.

K: I understand you want to be straightened out on Africa.

M: A little bit.

K: You are determined to make hash out of it.

M: We are determined to keep it in balance if we can.

K: This is on deep background. O.K.?

M: Yes.

K: O.K.

M: It is the Smith statement about the message he is evidently holding it in the belief that he can use it as a defensive instrument.

K: For your understanding -- the 5 points in Pretoria did not include the white chairman and the two ministers. He said when you go out there do your best. I did. It was my impression that it had possibilities. As you can judge yourself from what Nyerer said. He did not say unaceptable proposals.

M: Said he would not go into details.

K: O.K. Then we had the choice of telling Smith either put forth the five points from Pretoria or to tell him to put in what he wanted. Our concern if we did not ask him to put it in and he surfaced them at the Conference and said we had told him to surface it at the Conference there would be all sorts of stories of secret deals. You see, so we told him to put it in.

M: Right.

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K: That is the long and short of it.

M: What he says is the message said that the points had been conceded and cleared.

K: That goes much too far. Although given the pressure under which he was working he might well have thought as we thought that they might well be acceptable and I am telling you for your guidance it may well turn out that they will be acceptable with minor modifications.

M: Right. I follow that. What I, without seeing the message of course, wonder -- I have no way nor does anyone.

K: I have not looked at the message.

M: I have no way of knowing if it will be embarrassing.

K: I have not looked at the message b ut I doubt it. Not in the context of all that has happened. These messages were not drafted on the basis of legal documents but on the basis of conversations that we had. I would have to look at the messages. He cannot derive a contract from them. That is no way to conduct a negotiation anyway.

M: I don't know how it is turning. It may be that.

K: It looks better on the basis of the consultations by far than tl the public statement.

M: It is simply at this time the points keep coming up and the office asked me to resolve it. I said their is no way. It is a difference of interpretation that is being put on a message. He says it was cleared. The Secretary says on Face the Nation....

K: I would have to say Murry for your guidance it was certainly greater cohersion on the part of Kaunda and Nyerere as I have publicly stated. It does not do me any good to get this into a debate with them on what they have accepted if they don't want to back it up. I do not want to call them liers. Moreover they could not speak for the other two.

M: I am aware of that. Therefore the language could come into question as to whether we had no specific objection to that or what has to be taken up with the others.

K: They don't deal in that position.

M: The point is, is the message in that position that if it blows and he presents it does he then have you in a position where l he says you are holding back on the message.

K: I doubt it seriously. I have to look at the message. I have never considered it that way. I will look at the message.

M: You have no intention of putting out the message.

K: No. Now that message was sent on the Thursday before the speech and at that time he had already pretty much accepted the hold five points and my real concern was do I get him to put these two ministries into his message or to put it forward at the conference.

M: I follow that.

K: Given all the histories that we go through with secret agreements here I decided to let him put it in his five points. On balance that will not work out tactically so badly. It gives everyone something to argue about.

M: Having decided to do that does he have you over a barrel on that point.

K: I doubt it.

M: We are not making a major issue out of it but simply trying...

K: Frankly, I have not looked at the message. None of my associates thought we were making a legal commitment or giving a legal assurance . We were giving our judgment of the state of discussions.

K: That is the essence that we wanted to explain here as well as we could. I appreciate it.

M: O.K., Murry. Thank you.

SK62 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Sonnenfeldt
10/26/76; 4:10 pm

K: On that Soviet non-use of force proposal I am not very clear what it is.

S: It is a resolution which is coming up for debate in the first committee which in effect would endorse it but proposes some kind of a polling by the Secretary General next year but phrased in a way it predetermines the outcome. We have all sorts of problems because of the implicit mention of the Brezhnev document so it is pretty clear we would want to try to change it or kill it and there is a committee of contact.

K: Scranton is seeing the Russians this afternoon.

S: Bennett called me after Scranton talked with you.

K: I told him I did not want to make a judgment until I talked with you.

S: In the first place they have the vote no matter what. We have to be careful and not believe too much what the Russians are saying which is they would prefer to do it jointly with us because they will do it without us since they have 95% of the votes. He ought to make clear we have strong reservations on the text and we cannot support it as it is now but if appropriate amendments were made, we would not object having a study next year. That way we have a chance to have some amendments and we can abstain and we can keep the Europeans in mind and the Chinese who are extremely opposed to it.

K: I would like to be on the side of those opposing it.

S: I told him to be clear to oppose this text right now and unless there is sudden changes in it, we would have to oppose it. Hold open what we would and would not do. I guess that is the line he will take.

K: Will you stay on top of this?

S: Yes.

K: Thank you.

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SK67 *

TELECON
The Secretary/Amb. Dinitz
10/27/76 12:40 pm

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: How are you Mr. Ambassador?

D: Fine thank you. I am in Boston at the Boston press club.

K: I will be up myself tonight.

D: In Boston? Where are you appearing?

K: I am not appearing anywhere. [redacted] B6

k: We have had some Lebanese people here and they say you have slowed down supporting them.

D: NOt that I know of. You mean Charles?

K: Yeah. I said I don't want to know what is going on but just as long as it was not done at our urging. We ought to have a review of that situation fairly soon.

D: I will have Rabin's remarks by the end of the week.

K: Well then maybe on Saturday we could get together.

D: Good. I think it would be helpful.

K: Are you talking to all of your radical Jewish friends up there?

D: It is worse than that. It is Arabs too.

K: Okay Simcha.

D: Okay Mr. Secretary.

K: Good bye.

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SK71 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Scotty Reston
10/28/76; 2:46 pm

R: How are you?

K: Okay. Only four more days.

R: I don't think we will make it.

K: And our long national nightmare will be over.

R: That was our friend, wasn't it. Mr. Ford, our long national nightmare. Is there anything we can do about the British? Can't we think in revolutionary terms about them. We could let them join our empire.

K: I will tell you we can on November 3. And I think it is under control until then. Don't ascribe this to me but I don't know what can be done but I think it can not be done as a purely economic matter and it is not a matter of informing them. It is a question of maintaining its self confidence because we will realize how important they are to us phychologically. Even now in the midst of their crisis on Africa they are if we don't agree with everything they do a tower of strength.

R: One of the great tragedies of our time. Chris_____ once said one of our great misjudgments at the end of the war was we did not realize the whole system that rested on the western powers had been broken.

K: Yes.

R: I did not understand when C_____ came into B_____ and said we cannot carry on now in Greece and Turkey.

K: That is true. The fact we thought we could mediate between the British empire and the Soviet Union.

R: It is fascinating to look back over this period to realize that in these thirty-two years since Roosevelt's last term both bodies have been in the White House exactly 16 years. I think of it as being a period of Democrats which it hasn't.

K: I have often wondered whether the tragedy was not the Truman victory in '48. If Dewey had won--even though I prefer Truman--the Republicans really have not had a President who was a Republican. They had a war hero and an oddball. Nobody has made the Republican party a responsible one of government. Even when they do they behave like the opposition.

R: This is strange. They have had these people in office and have done nothing about bringing up young people. They don't know how to act.

K: Eisenhower acted as above; Nixon separated himself from the party in every campaign so they have had the White House and never really the government.

R: That is right. I have one point after this thing if over next week. I would like to do a piece on your thoughts about the world as it has changed 35 years after Pearl Harbor which comes up shortly after the election.

K: Why don't we have lunch.

R: Yes, let's do.

K: It is an interesting thing to think about.

R: Have you got any feeling about this or are you as confused as all the rest of us.

K: I have done some thinking about it but I am sure that -- it certainly is a good topic.

R: I have switched topics on you. About the election.

K: My head tells me it is Carter -- my gut tells me we may all be surprised but I don't know why I say this. Only because Carter should be much further ahead.

R: But people hate to vote against their President.

K: That is why I think when they finally get into the booths they may not vote for Carter.

R: I think that is quite possible. I would bet it the other way.

K: If I had to bet it, I would too. Have you been around the country?

R: Yes, but it is a different country. I could remember when the old populous rhetoric worked and for a simple reason. They could go around comforting the afflicted and it worked because a majority of the people were not all well off. Now whatever you say a majority of the people are fairly well off. They don't particularly give a damn about the people left behind.

K: Yes.

R: They act like all important people.

K: I don't know whether Carter comes across to the people as genuine.

R: That is the problem. He is unfamiliar. Even many in the South I find. Well, we will see.

K: Let's get together next week.

R: I will call you as soon as it is over and we will chat about that thing.

K: Good.

SK80 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
The Secretary/Mr. Funseth
10/29/76 6:07 pm

K: I just had a call from Dobrynin in which he said you said we protested to the Soviets about the treatment of Soviet Jews.

F: I never said that and even Freed didn't say that. They asked me specifically about the Jews and I just confirmed the situation of Jews wasn't discussed.

K: Can you get me the exact quote?

F: Yes sir. Right away. I will bring it up.

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SK87 *

TELECON
The Secretary/Mr. Hartman
10/29/76 4:34 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I know EUR is opposed to my having Felini (sp?) over here. But I invited him and I want him over here.

H: I'm not aware of that. Okay, any particular time?

K: Do it some time in November.

H: All right. I will be in touch with your staff.

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SK81 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
The Secretary/Mr. Funseth
10/29/76 6:42 pm

K: This AP story. It is a god damn outrage

F: Yes it is.

K: Did we announce the Dobrynin thing in advance?

F: It was on your schedule this morning.

K: Is it always on there?

F: Sometimes it is and sometimes it isn't

K: Can we do anything?

F: It is Friday night. If you try to put something out, it will just make it worse.

K: Can you call Freed and say we are god damned outraged?

F: I already have a call into him and he hasn't returned it. It is a cheap story.

K: Did anyone else run it?

F: No, I haven't seen anything else.

K: We should have said we don't discuss these things.

F: Well, you know it's one of those things where you're damned if you do and damned if you don't.

K: I think in the future that is what we will do.

F: Yeah, the hell with it.

K: Okay.

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SKSG

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Amb. Dinitz
10/29/76; 4:42 pm

D: I see that I will not have the material for the meeting tomorrow so we can do it on Sunday.

K: There is no hurry.

D: Or Monday if it is all right with you.

K: Yes.

D: I would appreciate it if you could do it in the morning.

K: Okay. Let's do it at 11:00.

D: Okay. 11:00 in the morning.

K: Thank you.

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SK75

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RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELCON
Sec. Kissinger/Scranton
10/29/76; 10:29 am

K: I just wanted to find out what we were doing on the non-use of force vote this afternoon but I have since talked to Sonnenfeldt who is running the Department.

S: Depending upon what you think the ultimate objection of the Soviet Union is in this other than propaganda, we are -- due to Tap Bennett primarily who is standing here -- relatively well off. We have got quite a number of abstentions, particularly from countries that count. We have China voting against.

K: Are you saying he is standing well or he is doing well.

S: He looks very well when he stands up.

K: Be nice to him. He is from Georgia.

S: I am trying to be very nice to him.

K: I have noticed an increase in his self confidence when the votes were very high.

S: We are all being very nice to Tap because all of us want a job in the next Administration.

K: He asked whether he could do anything for me and I knew what he meant.

S: Relatively speaking, I think it is in pretty good shape. We are putting in a practical campaign but we are talking to a number of our Latins and Africans.

K: To maximize the abstentions not to vote against.

S: That is it exactly.

K: You should make a brief explanatory statement that as it stands now we are not for the resolution but we do not oppose the study of it.

S: Okay. We will do that. Frankly, we have had relatively little problem with Koznotsov who has been quite direct. Israelian has been very difficult.

K: Who is Israelian?

S: He is the [redacted] of the Soviet Union and bluntly an sob. Koznotsov has been very decent and we have been very decent with him. Okay, boss. B6

K: Okay. Very good.

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SO 132 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELECON
The Secretary/Amb. Dobrynin
10/29/76 6:10 pm

K: Anatol, there was absolutely nothing said about a protest.

D: But . . .

K: Wait a minute, I am just telling you what the text says. It did not discuss the harrassment of Jewish visitors. The answer is "the situation of Jews in the Soviet Union was discussed." Then it says can you be more specific. And the transcript says "I cannot be more specific." That is all he said. All he said was the situation of Jews was discussed.

D: But . . . (inaudible)

K: That is not in here. But it isn't true. (Secretary talks with Funseth.) He did not say we had protested. He said the Soviet Union is aware of our position.

D: The situation in the Soviet Union was discussed . . .

K: It was an unfortunate way of expressing it. It was suppose to deal with the emmigration question.

D: The whole implication is that it was a protest of the harrassment of Jews.

K: Did you read the whole text?

D: No, I didn't.

K: I think if you read the text . . .

D: It is very clear . . .

K: Look , I think if you read the whole teanscript.

D: You have never published our meetings and why was it necessary to do it today.

K: You can see there was no protest. I will say in response to any other questions we will not discuss this subject.

D: But. . .

K: Well, Anatol, I urge you to read the whole press conference and you will see that we listed the topics that were discussed.

D: Why did you do it today?

K: We said we talked about non-proliferation, SALT, the Middle East, and other bilateral issues. I have trouble hearing you.

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D: I have to explain what it is and make an announcement to Moscow.

K: [redacted] B6

Let me send over the whole transcript. It was not something that was volunteered. It was not well phrased I agree with you. What was discussed was emmigration.

D: Emmigration?

K: That is correct.

D: But it says "The Soviet Union is very much aware of our position on the treatment of Jews." They quote it.

K: Let me see.

D: It is AP Number 75. You will see what kind of story it is.

K: Look, the question was this: "Gov. Carter has expressed concern about what is going on about Soviet Jews. Has the US done anything on this?" It says: "I cannot answer specifically but the Soviet Union is very much aware of our position on Soviet Jews." This is not in the context of our meeting. This is a different part of the press conference. I regret it Anatol, I genuinely regret it.

D: (Inaudible)

50131 1*

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
The Secretary/Amb. Dobrynin
10/29/76 6:05 pm

D: (Missed first part) . . . The Secretary of State Henry Kissinger today protested the harrassment of Jews.

K: Total, absolute, outgageous!

D: This is what Funseth said.

K: Well, god damn these bastards. I said . . .

D: This is a record.

K: I haven't seen the transcript. What I told him to say was if the question was asked was that our position on this issue was known.

D: But I have an AP ticker . . .

K: Let me first look at what was actually said willyyou?

D: All right.

K: I can't believe that Funseth said this.

D: This was on AP.

K: I don't believe he said that. It is inconceivable that he said this. Let me find uout and I will call you back in five minutes.

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SK74 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Hal Sonnenfeldt
10/29/76; 10:15 am

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I understand our friend Dobrynin raised the non-use of force problem and said there was going to be a vote this afternoon and wants to know what we are going to do.

S: We are going to abstain.

K: Could that have been checked with me.

S: I thought it is what we talked about yesterday.

K: What about the resolution?

S: The resolution is unchanged. As it is written it prejudges the outcome. We could conceivably gone along with something that would have studied the issue if you think it is desirable.

K: I want us to make a statement that we do not object to a study but cannot go along with it as it is.

S: I agree with you. I thought that was what we said the other day when we talked about it. I will call Bennett and tell him that.

K: It may be in here? Hold on a second. (Talking with LSE)

S: That list of refuseniks. Do you have any objection is I send it over to him and say you meant to give it to him but here it is.

K: Who brought that?

S: B'nai B'rith.

K: Considering we are sending missiles to freedom fighters, that we are approving computers to China we do not approve to the Soviet Union, what favor are they doing us.

S: At the moment you are doing this not because of the results.

K: Let me think of what we will do with the refuseniks.

S: I got it back saying get it over to them.

K: You take it up with Vorontsov sometime and leave me out of it.

S: Okay.

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SK 76

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TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger
October 29, 1976
11:05

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I wanted to tell you on the computer, we have sold you the same computer two years ago.

D: It is the same?

K: It is .

D: I didn't know.

K: There is only a slight technical difference with respect to safeguards which is of no practical consequence -- which has to do with internal arrangements in China.

D: I can mention that.

K: You can. It was two years ago in INTOURIST. It is the same.

D: I didn't know which was which.

K: You have the same one -- you got it two years ago.

D: I think it is in connection with what I discussed with you.

K: Ok, thank you.

D: Thank you. We will be in touch with you on the 2nd.

END

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SK78 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Mr. Shlaudeman
10/29/76; 4:34 pm

K: I notice that Escovar and Paris both complained about what we allegedly did with the New York Times. I would like to get a message to them both saying we had nothing to do with it. And why don't you write them a letter bringing them up to date. Also we ought to do this with some of the others.

S: We will have up to you before the end of the day messages to the others, too.

K: Okay. Good.

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SK82 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
The Secretary/Mr. Funseth
10/30/76 12:00

F: (Missed first part) . . . he says that on the last trip he approached you on behalf of the Today show to appear on the Today Show. They wondered if you were interested in appearing next week.

K: Let's wait until after the election. How the hell did Gwertzman get this story?

F: I think he just sat at home and wrote it up.

K: Nor does he have any evidence.

F: You know on the Dobrynin thing we didn't announce that in advance that you were meeting with him. That didn't appear on your schedule until after the meeting was over.

K: No other papers covered it.

F: I couldn't get Freed or Schweid so I called the AP bureau and said the story was factually in error. They may issue a correction. Okay, that is all I have today.

K: Okay, good, thank you.

F: Yeah, bye.

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RELEASED IN FULL

SK95

TELECON
The Secretary/Mr. Funseth
11/1/76 6:22 pm

F: Well, we have got our reaction out to everybody. I think we have a reasonably good chance of killing it. I don't think it will be too bad. None of the evening news are going to carry it I don't think.

K: Yeah, well then we are all right.

F: Okay.

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SK91A *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Sec Simon
11/1/76; 3:45 pm

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: I don't know whether one can afford to talk to you. I may wind up in the hospital.

S: He is not going to live. It is a matter of hours.

K: [redacted] left a message for him. I didn't know it was that serious. B6

S: Yes. Massive. Brain damage. He has been in a coma for the last two days. No hope. None.

K: Isn't that awful. Fine man. What are you doing this afternoon?

S: What I am doing is catching up.

K: I wondered whether you wanted to come over for half an hour to chat. I have got nothing world shaking. I thought it might be a good chance to review where we both are.

S: Late, I hope. 6:00.

K: How about 5:30.

S: Can you do it at 6:00?

K: Probably. If not I will call you.

S: Okay.

K: Okay.

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SK92 *

TELECON
The Secretary/Amb. Seelye
11/1/76 4:37 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: First of all, where did this Weintraub piece come from?

S: I don't know. Bill did not speak nor did Frank Wisner speak to him so we have no idea what the source is. My only surmise is that th picked it up in London and put it together. Do you want our press people to pursue it?

K: No. IN the talking points you did for . . .

S: Kaunda?

K: No for Bill. The Kaunda talking points I just gave to Jock ten minutes ago so you should be getting them sometime in the next three hours. Where we said we would not hold still for foreign intervention we better make it clear this means from outside Africa. But do it by cable.. Can you do that right away?

S: Certainly will.

K: Good. Thank you.

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SK88 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Mr. Phil Habib
11/1/76; 11:53 am

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Everybody understands that just because you send a statement in here and take it out again doesn't mean you make it.

H: I stopped that statement.

K: When are we speaking?

H: Maybe tomorrow.

K: Okay. At any rate, I want that statement toned down.

H: That is why I sent it to you.

K: It is not possible for us to flail South Africa.

H: They wanted me to sign off on it and I said hell no.

K: Cut it down to 3 pages.

H: Okay. And tone it down.

K: Draw on my Philadelphia speech.

H: Okay. I will get it revised and to you within an hour.

K: Okay. Good.

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SK 90 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Bob Funseth
11/1/76; 12:22 pm

F: I was asked by CBS before Dinitz came in whether I could confirm Dinitz was coming in.

K: Yes, don't mention Huang Chen. He is not going to come in today.

F: UPI has -- from some congressional source that legislative group leaving Friday doesn't have your permission to go to Moscow.

K: (Talking to someone in his office) Have we forbidden executive people to come with that commission through Eastern Europe? Yes. I would just let them go to Western Europe.

F: Okay.

K: If they ask you about Smith leaving Geneva, say that has been discussed with both the British and us and we attach no particular significance to it. He is leading a senior delegation there.

F: Okay. Thank you.

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SK100 *

TELECON
The Secretary/Cong. Facell
11/2/76 3:30 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

F: Fine, I appreciate you calling me right back.

K: You know I am an independent, I am not even a republican. No sense attacking me.

F: I don't want to attack you.

K: But Mr. Chairman, I really have high regard for you but to be accused of colluding with the Soviets to keep you from doing your work the day before an election where we have been accused of being soft in Eastern Europe. , . . .

F: I understand thoroughly and I apologize for that. I am not attacking you, I am not in anyway trying to influence the election.

K: Well, when I looked into it, our people weren't very smart either. They led you to believe one thing . . .

F: See, I thought it was game playing. We thought the release was moderate but that was wrong. But then when I got jumped on with both feet -- I thought I am really not playing games.

K: I was very much impressed with our breakfast. My concern is that you can have anybody you want as an advisor but if they sit on the committee and they are people who also have to deal with foreign governments . . .

F: I hear you. There is absolutely no question, reservation, or doubt in my mind about the need for you to be able to instruct the appointees anyway you want. We don't want to get them into a bind. We do need their help and advice. It is not going to be easy.

K: You can count on that.

F: Here is the thing that I see we can do. The action we are taking is not an official meeting in any sense requiring a vote. Nor is it official in a sense of a report to any government.

K: But I will bet that a lot of these governments will consider it provocative.

F: I don't know why. We are not going to be holding meetings in their towns.

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K: Well, what do you want us to do?

F: What I am simply suggesting is that the whole context of this trip is -- I think -- fairly low key and fairly legitimate.

K: And I am strongly supporting the trip.

F: I am asking you to consider that executive people can go ahead and go on and act under any instructions you give them.

K: Suppose they went to advise you but not go to any meetings?

F: Let's say I go to Romania and the congressional guys decide they want to meet with the high level people in the Romanian government. If there is an executive commissioner, he can decide whether he should go to the meeting.

K: I just basically don't want our guys to go to any meeting in any country where testimony will be taken. I don't mind anybody going along with you giving advice.

F: Let's say I get lucky and I get to go to Moscow -- which I doubt -- well obviously I would like to be able to meet with high officials in the Russian government to discuss everything. Well, I think it would be extremely useful if I went to those meetings -- if the executive commissioner were with me. We are not planning formal public meetings or hearings.

K: My instinct would be that it would be better for somebody from the Embassy to go along as a notetaker. If the other guy goes, who dies the foreign government think he is or who he represents.

F: Well, why don't they both go if there would be any doubt about it.

K: I would have no hesitation of sending the Ambassador along.

F: Now we are talking the same language.

K: Everybody knows the Ambassador is under us and not under you. If we set this precedent, the next thing I know Scoop Jackson is going to hold SALT negotiations in Moscow.

F: I got that. I think that just psychologically and perhaps from a useful standpoint, I think there is some benefit in them going along under whatever instructions you would give them.

K: My inclination is to say they should go with you as advisors. They should not participate in the meetings but they are available to you for advice and consultation. The Ambassador goes to any meetings with you.

F: That would be extremely useful to us. They would then be as fully informed as the rest of us.

K: Well, that is my strong inclination. Let me sleep on it.

F: That would be fine. I am not issuing any statements to the press at all.

K: No, and I will put out a statement tomorrow saying that you and I have talked and that as always we have had a good meeting of the minds.

F: I have not told the press at all that I am talking with you. All I am saying is that we have had nothing but the finest cooperation and and it just caught me by surprise at the last minute. There is no question in my mind that you ought to have the right to instruct the commissioners if you want to.

K: When are you leaving?

F: Thursday morning bright and early.

K: Why don't I talk to you tomorrow afternoon because I am going to be in New York tonight and I will be back around noon tomorrow. How does it look to you?

F: I don't know. It is going to be so damn close. I think Carter is going to carry Florida. The weather's been good -- that should be in Carter's favor. I have never seen an election like this. I have about concluded that all of the uncertain, questionable people who have reservations are probably Carter people. The Ford people have no touble making up their minds. It could be a big swing. Either way, I am just going to be happy it is over.

K: And we will be friends as far as I am concerned.

F: I don't think anybody could come close to doing what you have done.

K: Aren't you nice. Thank you.

F: Okay, Bye bye.

SK99

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TELECON
Ambassador Seelye/Secretary Kissinger
November 2, 1976
Time: 2:51 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: After a meeting you are not entitled to send out cables I don't see.

S: Yes...

K: For example, I want to see the instructions that go out based on our discussions.

S: They should be coming up to you very soon. We are doing them.

K: Talcott, with all affection, the meeting ended at 10:30 -- it is now four and one-half hours after that for a two paragraph instruction.

S: They were also doing the Kuanda talking points. We will have them right up to you.

K: Alright.

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RELEASED IN FULL
SK 1/16
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TELECON
The Secretary/Amb. Enders
11/3/76 5:27 pm

E: I called just to say that unless Carter does another one of his flip flops, the chances are I might not be working for you much longer and it fills me with sadness and to tell you how devoted I am to you and to your cause.

K: Well, Tom, you were among the two or three best appointments I made. You are a great officer and a good friend and I really hope you will stay on a bit.

E: I certainly will stay on a little while. I will take up your offer if I decide to move and ask your advice. You almost moved the margin in a favoragle way. I know of your own activities. How is the President bearing up under this? Pretty down?

K: He is very down. You know the avoidance of any two of 100 errors might have done it.

E: Mr. Secretary, you have an extraordinary record in foreign affairs and it has meant a great deal to me to be some part of it.

K: Well, Tom, since both of us will always be active in public life, our paths will cross again. I would always consider it a privilege to work with you again.

E: I want to keep in touch. I wanted to say how sorry I am and how devoted I am to you. Well, that is it. Good bye.

K: Bye.

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SO 133 *
RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin
Sec. Kissinger
November 3, 1976
4:30 p.m.

D: I just wanted to say to you that I am going to miss you--in the future I mean.

K: I will miss you too. If it is possible to have a Marxist friend...

D: No problem. It was so narrow.

K: If we had obtained a SALT agreement we would have one.

D: That is my impression. I think it would have changed the outcome.

K: I will stand outside the government for what I have stood for inside. You can be sure of that.

D: I know. Perhaps we can sit down quietly sometime and talk.

K: I would like that. I owe you an apology. Believe me I did not know what they were doing. It was inexcusable.

D: It is o.k.

K: O.K., Anatol, thank you.

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SK115 *

TELCON
Sec. Kissinger
Don Kendall
November 3, 1976
4:35 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

DK: How are you?

K: How are you Don.

DK: Not very happy obviously. It was damned unfortunate but I am afraid it is what we deserved.

K: We did it to ourselves.

DK: Exactly, we did it to ourselves. God knows that the results are going to be but it is a crying shame.

K: It is an unfortunate thing. These guys are not fit.

DK: No question about it. I was with George Shultz yesterday.

K: Is he in the East.

DK: Yes, he was at Flanigan's last night. We were together there. We were together all afternoon. I don't know when he is going back to San Francisco. He told me he talked to George Meany right after Carer had had a meeting with him (George (Shultz) has maintained a good relationship with him.) He said that guy is going into the White House and when he came out he said, "We got everything we asked for." I saw a letter from Paul Hall and he got everything he asked for.

K: Yes , but you cannot conduct government that way.

DK: Of course not.

K: It is great stuff when you are a sort of hick politician.

DK: Who in the hell is he going to bring in with him. He has all kinds of people thinking -- Sec. of Defense, State, Treasury -- I guess we will not know until we see who he picks. You be sure and safe the last Thursday of each month.

K: What is that.

DK: Our Directors meeting.

K: Let's talk about that when I get myself sorted out. I won't make any commitments until I talk to you and I appreciate it very much.

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DK: You know what I think of you, Henry. You have done an absolutely marvelous job. Much has been accomplished and it was a crying shame in the campaign that that accomplishment was not used as a plus.

K: Exactly. That is where we are to blame.

DK: Exactly. Look at the platform.

K: We could have lived with the platform if they had managed to get it out otherwise. They had plenty of opportunity to stress our record.

DK: But they did not. I didn't see the third debate.

K: It was a nothing debate.

K: The second one was a disaster. The meeting with Portilla was good. He listend for four hours about how to attract more investments. He sat there himself and must have taken 20 pages of notes.

K: He is a good man.

DK: We are all impressed with him. When things sort out let me know.

K: Let's have a talk then.

SK109 *

TELECON
Mr. Funseth/Secretary Kissinger
November 3, 1976
11:54 am

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I would suggest you set your briefing for 2:30.

F: I was going to set it for 1:00.

K: You let the other ride for 2 hours.

F: Ok.

K: Announce it as soon as it is out -- say they cannot ____ us any more. Tell them I will be down and make a brief statement but I will not concede. Tell them since I didn't believe one word he said during the campaign, why should I believe he wants to fire me.

END

Secretary called Mr. Funseth right back:

K: Don't say that I am going to make a statement. Just set it for 2:30 and say...don't you think?

F: I would think at 2:00 we could tell them.

K: Ok, at 2:00. You can tell them then I am coming but not before.

F: Ok.

END

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SK113

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TELECON
The Secretary/Art Hartman
11/3/76 3:55 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

H: Larry filled me in on your talk with Danny Fascell. I have to call him back and I wondered if there was any further word on what you wanted to do. I got the word that you were thinking about letting them go to the places but not to the meetings.

K: Yeah. What do you think?

H: I think it is a purely personal problem. That is -- their wives get to shop in more places.

K: But how was it that the commissioners agreed on a schedle of places that they would visit without my knowing that these plans were made?

H: The staff just assumed they were going and made these plans. We just didn't say anything to them until we had a decision from you.

K: I would like to talk with Larry. I really think if our Ambassador goes in with them that is enough. I just don't see what purpose is served by having our commissioners in these capitals.

H: I don't like to have our Ambassadors there but I think they must go.

K: But isn't it customary for our Ambassador to accompany Americans around?

H: Congressional people. They have been turned down in all Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union. Including Romania but not Yugoslavia.

K: The the question is do we want our people to visit Western European countries and be in the Embassies.

H: That is right.

K: Let me talk to Larry about it and call you back.

H: Okay.

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Sk111 *

TELECON
Max Fisher/Secretary Kissinger
November 3, 1976

RELEASED IN FULL

K: If there were more Jews in Texas we might have won.

F: You are telling me. That organization I put together did a knock down job.

K: You did a damn good job. It is a tragedy.

F: I came into town with Bob Teeter. You know him?

K: Yes.

F: He said if they would listen to Henry Kissinger on foreign policy and eastern europe it would make a difference of 5 points. Of course, that is all hindsight.

K: A campaign was a good way to prove their independence.

F: We talked about that. We are going to have to be looking at a different situation in the next months. The world is going to change.

K: Yes.

F: It is quite a shock to you?

K: I expected it.

F: But when I got up this morning the sun was still shining.

K: You have done a job of which you can be proud. You have served the Jewish people and been a good American.

F: I just wanted to know if I could get in and talk to you.

K: You are welcome. You have been a friend.

F: Ok

END

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SK/114

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin
Sec. Kissinger
November 3, 1976
4:30 p.m.

D: I just wanted to say to you that I am going to miss you--in the future I mean.

K: I will miss you too. If it is possible to have a Marxist friend...

D: No problem. It was so narrow.

K: If we had obtained a SALT agreement we would have ~~[illegible]~~.

D: That is my impression. I think it would have changed the outcome.

K: I will stand outside the government for what I have stood for inside. You can be sure of that.

D: I know. Perhaps we can sit down quietly sometime and talk.

K: I would like that. I owe you an apology. Believe me I did not know what they were doing. It was inexcusable.

D: It is o.k.

K: O.K., Anatol, thank you.

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(K 112)

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
The Secretary/Mr. Hartman
11/3/76 3:40 pm

K: We are not going to give up in principle. Just tell Fascell I would be giving up a principle and I want the new President address it. Tell him the DCM is going to accompany the commissioners but I cannot let the commissioners travel around. They can try to pass a contempt resolution.

H: The commissioners are over there to shop as far as I can see. All right.

K: Thank you.

H: See you next week.

K: Right.

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SK 118 *

TELCON
William Paley
Sec. Kissinger
November 4, 1976
10:14 AM

RELEASED IN FULL

P: I am ashamed.

K: Why?

P: I thought I was a good projector.

K: 5,000 votes would have changed it.

P: It was fantastic. I tried to get by Nelson's but I stayed so late at the studio I thought it better to go right home. I thought maybe you and Nancy would like a quiet weekend this week.

K: This weekend we cannot do it.

P: I will be going to Russia/next the weekend and I will call you when I get back.

K: Would you do that? It was such a joy to see you.

P: Give my love to Nancy. Is she all right.

K: Yes.

P: I hope all is o.k. with you.

K: Everything is fine. When are you going over.

P: Leaving a week from today and stopping in Lond and then to Moscow and back here the following Thursday and Friday

K: I will call Dobrynin and have him get in touch with you.

P: That is not necessary but it would be nice of you to do it. I will call you when I get back.

K: That would be marvelous.

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SK123

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RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D), B3, CIA

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Director Bush
11/5/76; 2:33 pm

B: Just a quick word. [redacted] it should be good for five years if that is any comfort. B1, B3

K: (Secure phone-didn't hear)

B: We will be back. Okay.

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SK/25

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TELECON
The Secretary/Amb. Seeyle
11/5/76 5:10 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I don't think we should send any advice to Richard. It is too complicated now for us to second guess this.

S: Too complicated? In other words, don't send anything at this point?

K: I don't think so.

S: Okay. I prepared a cable to you.

K: Nothing's come to me yet.

S: I sent it up to you about two hours ago.

K: Well, let me take a look at it.

S: Let me get Jock to get it out for you.

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SK123

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D), B3, CIA

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Director Bush
11/5/76; 2:33 pm

B: Just a quick word. [redacted] it should be good for five years if that is any comfort. B1, B3

K: (Secure phone-didn't hear)

B: We will be back. Okay.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS, A/RPS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT H MILLER
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 25X1, 25X6
DECLASSIFY AFTER: INDEFINITE
DATE/CASE ID: 26 MAY 2004 200102979

SK137

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TELCON
Roy Atherton
Sec. Kissinger
November 8, 1976
9:55 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Did you call Zahedi?

A: I called him that morning

K: What did he say.

A: With the line we were taking he said he had no problem.

K: I don't want to know his problem. I want his assurances.

A: We agree to get together early this week. I want to go ove with him...

K: I want an assurance from the Iranians that it was not being done.

A: He told me that they would not do anything improper or illegal. I wanted to go over with him what is proper and leagal within our laws.

K: You will do it today.

A: I will get hold of him. He was in New York.

K: He was here Friday.

A: He assured me but in an off-hand way.

K: I want an assurance.

A: The problem is that there are a lot of things under our law that he may not be aware of. He may give us an assurance of thinkgs that he does not know that are illegal.

K: By the end of the day you will have done it, G-D Roy. I want it by the end of the day.

A: I will do it.

K: Just cut out those staff meetings and speeches.

A: Alright I will get him in today.

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SK130

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TELECON
The Secretary/Mr. Funseth
11/8/76 5:45 pm

RELEASED IN PART
B6

F: She has it from her sources that you met with Bill Paley several times and there was a good possibility you would become President of CBS after you left office.

K: What did you say?

F: I didn't say anything.

K: Tell her I have never discussed anything like this with Paley.

F: Okay.

K: Don't you think?

F: Yeah. [redacted] B6

K: I rather like her.

F: I have never met her.

K: Give her my warm regards. Tell here there is nothing to it. I have never discussed that subject.

F: Okay sir.

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SK136

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TELECON
Minister Bar-on/Secretary Kissinger
November 8, 1976
11:55 am

RELEASED IN FULL

missed first part

B: ...expresses his appreciation.

K: When you talk to the Prime Minister will you tell him I appreciate that so far he is the only Israeli who has said a friendly thing.

B: I think there are so more Israelis and will be more in the future.

K: That I am certain of but they are silent now.

B: There is one idea I had and that is would it be worthwhile to do it through Toon because he was present.

K: Ok. That is easier for me. Let me see how I can do that.

B: Thank you so much.

K: I will do something. I would prefer to do it through Toon and that is probably how we will do it.

B: Thank you so much indeed.

END

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SK135

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TELECON
Minister Bar-on/Secretary Kissinger
November 8, 1976
9:30 am

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I don't know why those idiots didn't put you through yesterday. What is the problem?

B: The Prime Minister called me last night. You know the Senatorial delegation after the meeting with the Prime Minister, Senator Ribbicoff, Senator Baker and Ambassador Toon asked to stay behind and Senator Ribbicoff asked if we could let Senator Baker and Senator Glenn visit the Dimona. The Prime Minister explained it would be extremely difficult indeed and would cause him grave difficulties both with the government and publicly. Senator Baker was insistant upon trying to make the visit.

K: I hope your intelligence is as good as I expect because you will have found out that when I talked to this group I urged them not to ask it.

B: The Prime Minister was wondering if there was anything at all to do to get Baker and Glenn not to insist upon this.

K: Let me see what I can do. My trouble is when I talked to them, Ribicoff, Glenn and Baker -- they were all sitting there plus their wives. I made it as plain as any reasonable person could that they shouldn't ask for it and I thought Ribicoff understood and Ribicoff would take care of it.

B: He said I have nothing to do with this, I am only transmitting what Senator Glenn and Senator Baker want to do.

K: Whey are they leaving.

B: .....Wednesday morning.

K: Let me see what I can do.

B: Thank you very much.

K: Don't send this through your foreign office. I know what the problem is and I am not looking for -- it just can't lead to any sensible results.

B: Of course not and I am transmitting directly to Rabin.

K: Should I call Ribicoff?

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B: This might be a good idea.

K: Where are they staying?

B: At the King David.

K: Ok

END

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SK128

TELECON
The Secretary/Chief Justice Burger
11/8/76 4:45 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Mr. Chief Justice, how nice to hear from you.

B: I see you will be getting a little bit of a rest finally.

K: I have got the prospect of a rest.

B: I almost envy you. I just received a call from the Ambassador of Mexico who said he had a formal invitation which would be the subject of a conversation between himself and the new President-elect. urging me and Mrs. Burger to attend his inauguration. I assume that there is something in the machinery for a delegation from the US down there and I was a little puzzled by a direct invitation to me.

K: There is something in the mill. I was going to head the delegation. But there is a custom on the part of the Mexican President also to invite some personal guests.

B: Well, in the first place, I am not overly anxious to take a trip to Mexico City. I am overly anxious to avoid any diplomatic problem.

K: Well, Mr. Chief Justice, there are no diplomatic problems. We could make you the head of the delegation. I have no overwhelming interest in it. Frankly, I wanted an excuse to take a vacation in Mexico but I can do that any time.

B: I have no desire to head the delegation I assure you.

K: I am sure we can work this one out. I will check exactly what the Mexicans have in mind.

B: Because I don't want to get wires crossed here. If I can make it, I would be perfectly content to go as a personal guest of the President.

K: Let me check just what this is about. I have never headed a delegation to one of these events.

B: I just headed a delegation to the funeral of the Irish President, but there were no complications there.

K: Let me check.

B: Henry, I will do it any way you want.

K: Many thanks.

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SK132

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Marvin Kalb
11/8/76; 12 Noon

RELEASED IN FULL

Kalb: I wanted to say no matter who he is, he will not be you.

K: Aren't you nice. I just hope you put him through the same scrutiny you did me.

MK: Never mind. You got off easy.

K: I did and don't think I don't know it.

MK: How do you feel, okay?

K: I feel fine.

MK: I was talking to Koppel and we wanted to burst into your New Year's party. At Caneel Bay.

K: I may not go to Caneel Bay.

MK: I thought if you were going . . .

K: Are you going there?

MK: (His wife) and I have been there almost ten years and I thought I would try it. But I thought I don't want to surprise him.

K: We may not go. It depends a little on the transition. I am going to take a few months or a week off after January 20.

MK: You should. You could certainly use a little bit of a rest.

K: How is your book coming?

MK: The mystery is coming along very well. The best parts always relate between the Secretary of State and this extraordinary television reporter.

K: I saw your publisher and he thinks it is terrific.

MK: Marshal and Porter?

K: I forget who it is. Somebody who said he is head of Simon and Shuster.

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MK: You were very much in my mind through Tuesday evening of last week and I told you once at the birthday party something that is true and no matter who replaces you, it cannot be the same and you were in this job in a fairly unique position for a reporter.

K: I am touched. I considered you and Bernie good friends as far as the adversary relationship permits it and I will continue to consider it that.

MK: I learned a lot and from that if someone is wise or foolish enough to put me into a government job, what I learned will be put to use.

K: I have always believed you and Ted and some of the others ought to spend a year or two in the government to round your perspectives.

MK: I was at the State Department for two years in '56 in Moscow at the Embassy.

K: If the new people ask my opinion and you don't prohibit it, will you permit me to mention you as a possibility?

MK: Yes.

K: They may not have enough imagination to think of it themselves.

MK: You know my area of interest and passion. The fundamental thing is to carry on a policy that gives Israel the best chance of surviving and maintains a strong, growing, viable American position in the Arab world. It has been your position.

K: And which reduced the Soviet influence to do mischief.

MK: Since Tuesday they are suddenly getting very cosy. They feel there is an opportunity for them.

K: Oh, yes. There is a hiatus now. I think Carter has to move quickly to make clear that he is in charge in the Middle East.

MK: I hope he does because there is too much sweat and too many miles that went into getting us where we are now. We had a line in the book that we put in as a joke that when Kissinger leaves he is going to set up an international corporation called Kissinger, Inc. and whenever a government needed a negotiator, it would turn to Kissinger, Inc.

K: (Laughter)

MK: Well, will you allow several of us to have a quiet dinner for you and Nancy?

K: I would love it.

MK: I would like to proceed on that and I will check with Jane to see what evening you might be free.

K: That is very nice.

MK: Good luck.

K: Thank you.

*

SK/133

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Barry Schweid
11/8/76; 12:13 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

S: I would very much like to see you to do a farewell interview piece.

K: Barry, that is what I have been trying to avoid. I don't think it is a good idea for me from a lame duck status to say either perspectives for my successors or to evaluate my own policy.

S: I understand and agree with you in the first point and half on the second but I think we could restrict it and narrow it to the sort of personal things that would not have any problem. I know quite what you are talking about. Such things as are you going to write a book -- where do you plan to live. If you look back, that sort of gets into the second thing.

K: My problem about the past is this. As long as I was an active Secretary of State I had responsibility to mobolize those points of my policy. Now my policy is a matter of public record. Whether I say it was good or bad doesn't add anything to it and is self-serving. I have turned down 15 interview requests to do retrospectives. Whether I can talk to you about what my plans are -- that I am willing to consider.

S: Good. I agree with you but I think interview by somebody who knew and understands what you are saying could still record it without saying good or bad. I think we could say what is important and pressing. Personal is what I am interested in.

K: Personal I would consider, but the other I would not do. Not talking to the press is not my more normal attitude.

S: No, I understand. Perhaps we can do the personal.

K: Let me think about that.

S: Would you have me call back in a few days?

K: Sure and if I don't you check with me or Funseth.

S: Good.

K: You have always been decent, I can tell you now when there is little you can do for me.

S: I appreciate it and I am looking for a piece.

K: I am positive about this. I don't have even the slightest question about it.

S: Okay. Good. END

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SK/31

TELECON
The Secretary/Minister Baron
11/8/76 5:25 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

B: On this matter, I got a message from both the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister and they have asked me to transmit to you the following: (reads message) They have asked me also to respectfully suggest whether this might get to the attention of the Syrians.

K: Yes, we will have an opportunito to do this because our Ambassador is here and he is returning. But he won't see Asad until the end of the week so I hope you won't do anything before then.

B: Frankly, it doesn't look to me as if it can't hold until the end of the week.

K: Okay, and I will get in touch with our Ambassador and I will let you know what he says.

B: Okay. Shall I send this over to Mr. Eagleburger?

K: Yes.

B: Okay.

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SK 134

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Ted Koppel
11/8/76; 1:03 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

TK: I didn't want to call you last week. It has been a extraordinary three years for me and I have enjoyed it immensely. You are an intriguing man and if I had had a teacher like you earlier, I might not be quite so cynical.

K: You have been a good friend and you are one of the people I hope to stay in touch with even when I am gone.

TK: In some ways I am very sorry and in other ways glad for you and particularly for Nancy. We have had a good friendship in spite of being on other sides of the fence. I think that friendship will be much easier in the months and years to come. If you ever feel you need me, please call me.

K: I will be concerned with foreign policy for quite a time and our paths will cross and of course we can see more of each other socially.

TK: I hope so. It has been a remarkable period. I can't remember when I have had more fun.

K: It means a lot to me. I hope we meet soon.

TK: We are lucky to have had you.

K: Thank you, Ted.

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SK/152

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Bob Funseth
11/10/76; 4:34 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

F: I have been getting a lot of calls about the Ribicoff proposal.

K: Why don't you say that I am delighted to accept.

F: You better be careful. The pay isn't very good as a consultant.

K: Really?

F: About $100 a day.

K: What is the Ribicoff proposal?

F: He remarked that Carter named Henry Kissinger as a special envoy to work on peace in the Middle East.

K: Envoys get more than consultants.

F: Maybe.

K: Why don't you say before I find what the pay scale is, I don't want to say.

F: Okay.

K: I don't think I should comment.

F: I don't either.

K: Just say I have no comments.

F: If you repeat you are ready to help your country, it looks as if you are looking for a job.

K: Also, we have no comments. Are you getting calls?

F: Yes.

K: Just say we are making no comment.

F: Okay.

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SK140

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TELCON
Sec.Kissinger
David Landes
November 10, 1976
9:35 a.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: David, how are you?

L: Fine. And yourself. How do you feel now that you can look forward to some kind of change in activity.

K: I frankly don't know. It will be a tremendous change of life.

L: Yes. Hawthorne says any kind of change gives an impulse of creativity and new kind of work. As hard as you have been working you may be working harder.

B6

K: As you know I had pretty well decided to leave anyhow.

[redacted]

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B6

K: Let's have lunch next week.

L: It would have to be a day like Tuesday. Let me look at my calendar. I guess Monday or Tuesday of next week would be all right.

K: Is Friday possible.

L: Not immediately but if we could put it off until the Friday after Thanksgiving. I teach on Fridays.

K: I may be away then. Monday I could not do it for lunch.

L: You don't have to feed me.

K: Monday anytime except for lunch.

L: Fix a time

K: Not between 3:30 and 5:00.

L: How about late morning. Something like 11:00 on Monday the 15th.

K: Yes. O.K. Good.

L: One thing to talk about is the whole UNESCO business. I don't know what kind of signals ....

K: That is coming out pretty well.

L: I understand. I got signals that the Soviet Union was going to make trouble where the Arabs were not ready to make it.

K: It has to go through two stages. First after a resolution passed that the regional groups could make the decisions.

L: Are you keeping a close eye on that stuff.

K: Oh, yes. I asked the head of that conference -- the Sengalese to come over here and talk to him and he has handled the freedom of the press and the Israeli issue so far very well.

L: I gathered. I would like some of your thoughts and advice on how to put -- I want say to put an end to, but put a damper on the tendancy to introduce and trying to pass resolutions of a political character conerning Israel archiology. I agree that getting Israel back into it , it is not in the position of a power nation. What is the best strategy. It is causing a lot of aggitation.

K: Let's talk about it Monday.

L: O.K. I will be there at 11:00 on Monday morning.

K: Good. Look forward to seeing you.

SK144

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TELECON
Mr. Shlaudeman/Secretary Kissinger
November 10, 1976
10:30 am

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I have been looking at these Panama exchanges. I do not want Jordan to explain or do one more god damn thing. We have put it out to them and they can take it or leave it.
S: I fully agree. I will send up a cable to you giving him instructions.

K: And as for Boyd saying we promised a date. Certainly there will be a date in the next phase of negotiations, but we didn't say when it will be given. You were there, weren't you?

S: Yes. That is right, we certainly did. I will send that up to you.

END

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DATE/CASE ID: 22 JUL 2003 200102979

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SK/148

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Herbert Mitgang (NYT)
11/10/76; 11:23 am

RELEASED IN PART
B6

M: Thank you very much for returning the call. I am the publishing correspondent of the New York Times. And there have been various expressions of interest in your memoirs, of course. I am just wondering when you are going to look at the various expressions of interest?

K: I may look at them in December but I won't make a decision until after I have left office.

[redacted] B6

K: I just will not make a decision until after I leave office.

M: I see.

K: We are talking here on deep background.

M: That means I cannot quote you.

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K: You can write your impressions but you cannot ascribe it to anybody.

M: I cannot ascribe it to anybody. I am not familiar — I have read all about it. I cannot say that we spoke.

K: You cannot.

M: I cannot. All right. I will certainly honor that. I have spoken to several of the other presidents. I must say there is such huge interest. Far more than in the previous presidents.

K: (laughter)

M: About whom I wrote from abroad.

K: I have not made any decision and I have not even looked at any proposals yet.

M: I see. Do you think you will write your memoirs?

K: Oh, hes. But I don't know how quickly.

[redacted] B6

M: I see. Okay. Well, I certainly appreciate your talking and I will honor the deep backgrounder.

K: Okay. Good. Thank you.

M: Thank you very much.

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.5(D)
S/A 93

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Jim Lowenstein
11/10/76; 10:31 am

K: On the Greek base negotiations there is to be no further discussions.

L: Okay.

K: And I want Kubisch to freeze these guys.

L: All right.

[redacted] B1

L: Okay. We will get an instruction out to him.

K: Just tell him there is nothing further to discuss.

L: That was a bad situation.

K: [redacted] Whatever their private views, I have never seen a foreign government be so explicitly political. B1

L: [redacted] B1

K: Okay. Fine.

L: All right. We will do that.

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CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 25X6
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 27 JUN 2013
DATE/CASE ID: 02 SEP 2003 200102979

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SK145

TELECON
Governor Scranton/Secretary Kissinger
November 10, 1976
10:38 am

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

S: Good morning, your worship. I am fine.

K: What I want to see is what you call me after January 20th.

S: I have no formula but the Romanian Ambassador tells me the highest tribute is Your Beautitude. You haven't won that yet.

K: Seeing what the Makarios is doing I am not sure I want that.

S: I have a rebellion on my hands and the majority of the delegation feels we should not veto the Vietnam admission.

K: They can think what they want. What do you mean?

S: We have a delegation.

K: You don't mean Foreign Service officers?

S: No. The members of the delegation. The brought it up this morning at the staff meeting. And I think the main reason is twofold. One is obvious -- the repercussions in world opinion.

K: I think that is minimal.

S: And that in their judgment we are being illegal with what we did 3 years ago when we requested the International Court of Justice to pass on the criteria ~~and~~ for membership, which they approved. And this veto is not in this criteria.

K: If you want it changed you have to discuss it with the President.

S: I think I have to let you know in case somebody decides to go public.

K: Ok.

S: Are you going to get anywhere in Paris?

K: No. If we had won the election, yes. But we will not be able to get anywhere in any difficult negotiation til Carter is in.

S: Ok, General.

END

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SK/15 1 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Marvin Kalb
11/10/76; 3:50 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

MK: I am delighted -- we have agreed on dinner on the 21st.

K: Okay. When is that?

MK: A Sunday night. Well after the game.

K: Good.

MK: On the Ribicoff thing I sense what your reaction might be and could you express it to me and assume it is on deep background.

K: I am willing to be helpful but I don't think in a regular capacity. But I wish them well and I will do what I can to be of assistance.

MK: When you say not a regular thing you are not getting a job in the State Department but if a special assignment arose in the Middle East and Carter asked you to help, you don't want to say no.

K: It is sticky. My disposition is to try to be helpful to a President.
You
MK: /k have had that record since '61.

K: On the other hand he ought to get started in his own way. Certainly if he asks my opinion my disposition is to be helpful. I don't think it is in his interest or anybody's to take on a regular assignment.

MK: I tell you something, when that story ran the Arab reporters came to me once again on the mistaken assumption I am still your unofficial spokesman....

K: At any rate my friend.

MK: They said this would be marvelous and fascinating. Ahram has done a story on this. You are going to hear all kinds of stories.

K: When you said-you left word you wanted to talk to me about the Ribicoff idea, I said what the hell is the Ribicoff idea. I thought it had to to with the Ribicoff dimona and therefore didn't return your call. Somebody just brought me a ticker three minutes ago.

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MK: It is Ribicoff in Israel. They are making an assumption the way it is coming out of Israel, it had to have come from Rabin or Peres and stuck into Ribicoff's account and you are being tied to the Middle East. Ahram is going very big tomorrow on this.

K: I am sure it is his own idea. I don't think Carter should be embarrassed by having to react to it.

MK: He is hiding out anyway until next week I think.

K: Let's see. I have told you my basic plan.

MK: One other thing. When Funseth mentioned you might be meeting people to discuss your future, a couple guys asked me about a lunch with Paley, Brock, and Reinhardt putting in a pitch to get you. Is there anything you can tell me?

K: It is not true.

MK: You didn't meet with them on Monday?

K: No. But as a general rule I don't think I should be asked — this doesn't happen to be true but you are aware I am a good friend of Paley's.

MK: I have seen you with him on several occasions.

K: I don't think I should be asked to comment on things that have nothing to do with my position as Secretary of State. On the daily press briefing questions, I will have to turn them aside. I will not agree to something until many weeks after I have left here.

MK: Have you seen that story in the financial section of the Times a few weeks ago on the shakeup of CBS and Taylor and Paley denying Kissinger would be Chairman of the Board?

K: Yes. It was a more complicated formulation.

MK: I like the idea of working for you, Sir. From now on I call you Mr. Chairman. Thanks for returning the call.

K: Right.

SK146

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TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Phil Habib
11/10/76; 11:03 am

RELEASED IN FULL

H: On our Egyptian information. The Israelis have been in to talk to Roy about this. We are going to be talking to the Egyptians in an hour. Roy suggested we talk to the Israelis and tell them what we intend to do about the same time so they cannot accuse us of . . . . .

K: Yes. Okay.

H: Thank you.

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SK/55 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Jim Lowenstein
11/11/76; 11:30 am

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Before that mindless bunch keeps running on, I don't see any sense in presenting these Cyprus principles next week.

L: Okay. I agree.

K: Would you get in touch with our allies and also draft a cable to the Cypriots saying that in the circumstances of their statements, there is no point.

L: Okay.

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SK157

TELCON
Sec. Kissinger
Min. Bar-on of Israel
November 11, 1976
3:39 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Mr. Minister.

B: Mr. Secretary, good afternoon.

K: Mr. Minister, I have this question to ask you. I have tried to avoid asking it up to now but I think the time has come when we have to know. We keep getting enormous amounts of intelligence reports that the Israelis have been meeting with the POL.[b7] Usual they are in Paris. I don't want to have a denial that they met in Paris. The report sometimes concerns semi-private Israelis like _____, the new Dir. General. We have now had it from other sources. Secondly, I was told by Sen. Javits that his office had been approached by two PLO representatives who claimed meeting with Gen. Pellet somewhere. late on original

B: Mr. Secretary, I will of course check this but I give you one thing which I do know. Four Israelis belonging to the left wing -- one who is Gen. Pellet have apparently met with some PLO people in Paris. The Knesset is demanding that they be prosecuted according to the law and I have seen an announcement saying that the legal problem will be checked. Otherwise if there is no legal basis on which one can prosecute they will not be prosecuted. This I know. This is what you have just mentioned Sen. Javits said. It is true that Pellet who is an Arabist-- for the past five or six years has been meeting with four people who have met them.

K: O.K. That is good to know and I take it this was not in any way authorized by the Government.

B: Not at all. The Govt. has strongly condemned it and went out of its way and as I said they are checking to see if it is contrary to any law.

K: Has there been any other contact.

B: Not as far as I know but I will make sure and I will ask very explicitly. I doubt it very much indeed.

K: O.K. Thank you very much.

B: May I take this opportunity to say on the Security Coundil meeting today I am sure that you know exactly how unhappy we are.

K: Yes. But we are trying to get removed most of the stuff you are objecting too.

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B: We would have hoped that there would have been nothing at all. It leaves us with a feeling of giving the Egyptians encouragement and rather harmful at this time.

K: Let me see where it stands now. I will call Scranton in a little while.

B: Thank you very much.

SK154

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T ELCON
11/11/76; 9:25 am
Sec Kissinger/Jim Lowenstein

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Jim?

L: Yes, Sir.

K: I don't want any further talks with the Greeks.

L: I understand that.

K: But you are not carrying it out. Every day there are cables coming in.

L: The second one that came in had already taken place by the time of our conversation. That was a report of a dinner the night before and crossed with ours.

K: He is still pursuing it. I see something about a Devos letter. I don't know what that is.

L: It is about a month old and to SACEUR and permits the Greeks to sit in the NPG and receive classified information.

K: I want a message to Kubisch in which he tells Bitsios he has been instructed to have no further discussions with him.

L: Okay.

K: I think the behavior of the Greeks is absolutely monstrous.

L: We had sent something to you last night but it did not include instructions to Bitsios.

K: Have I signed that?

L: Not yet.

K: It is not complicated. It should go out.

L: But you want to go to Bitsios.

K: I want him to inform Bitsios we do not appreciate his tone of his comments and he is instructed to have no further comments.

L: Okay. We will add that to the message that came up last night.

K: Right.

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SK158 *

RELEASED IN FULL

ELECON
The Secretary/Don Kendall
11/11/76 6:30 pm

DK: (Missed first part) So Anderson said actually the thing was based on information that he had from the State Department. I said let me see it. He sent what he got and he has a confidential cable which Stoessel reports to State on my visit. He's got a memo which was circulated around the State Department saying that I haven't looked after US interests and I have only been interested in myself and we just can't have things like that that are not being controlled by the Department. Listen, I don't give a damn about this because I have had so many stories one more doesn't hurt, but before you leave that organization if there is some gd way this can be used. So many business people are not going near embassies because of these cables. Up until Stoessel I always told the embassy what I was doing but I had an understanding thatit would not be sent in cables. I thought I had an understanding with Stoessel but he quoted one part of the conversation that he shouldn't have put in the cable. If we are going to expect the embassies to blend with the business community, we have got to have some way that this can be controlled.

K: I agree with you completely.

DK: It is marked confidential — limited distribution.

K: That doesn't surprise me.

DK: Can this be stopped?

K: It can't be stopped by me any more.

DK: Can it be stopped by anybody?

K: In a new administration it can be stopped.

DK: Because I am not going to go in any embassies and tell them anything any more.

K: Look, when you talk to a Foreign Service officer, you have to assume he will write a report on it.

DK: I always made the point of the part that I didn't want reported.

K: Listen, be of good dreams. As soon as I am out of here, they will do things to me that will take you out of the news. Okay, I have got to run. Nice to talk to you.

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SK162

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Bob Funseth
11/12/76; 2:55 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Did Lake come up at the briefing?

F: Yes. The asked me for your reaction and I said the points you had given me.

K: Like what?

F: That you and I had discussed it this morning. That you had no personal expression about his nomination. Specifically that it was up to the president-elect to name the transitional representatives and you had indicated to me about it except that the State Department would fully cooperate with the transition. And they dropped it.

K: Good.

F: Kalb asked me had you specifically and personally approved the rule to the UN on the position we took on the statement. I said in general it is an instructed delegation. It is tricky though. If we say yes this time you might get caught into a checklist.

K: Don't say we did give a checklist. You won't have to answer it again tomorrow.

F: Yes.

K: You can give the answer is yes and you want to say right now you will not do it again.

F: They really went after me on that Israeli thing today.

K: I don't doubt it.

F: Kalb, Fried and Schweid.

K: No question. Did you say it is exactly what we have been saying?

F: Yes.

K: Did you say we softened.

F: I did. They said why didn't you leave it extreme and veto it.

K: That is the Israeli view.

F: They centered at it--they got very emotional--those three. But I think the Lake thing came out all right.

K: Okay. Good.

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SK/60

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Roy Atherton
11/12/76; 10:20 am

K: Roy have you seen that behavior of Allon towards Toon at the airport.

A: No, I have not seen it.

K: In front of a complete delegation and a lot of newsmen he refused to shake hands with him and said because that is the minimum.

A: Was this as a result of the vote yesterday?

K: You are not an assistant secretary for nothing. Did you do that by yourself or is there a staff aide.

A: I thought it all through myself.

K: Could we have abstained?

A: We could have but I think it would have been wrong. We were in a position where we had to decide where the traffic would bear it most and our real problem now is maintaining some measure of confidence on the Arab side. I think they are in real risk of going off the deep end in this period ahead. That is interesting because the signals we got from the Israelis were much lower key than in the past.

K: They never made an approach xk at our level.

A: They never came in with what they did before. I expected there was a message from Rabin to you. We kept them informed. I told Bar-On and Scranton told H_____ in New York.

K: Was there anything new from what we said before?

A: There are no elements in there we didn't at some time or another support publicly in statements. And to remind what we said as not going along with the statement last May.

K: Will you get to Funseth this and make sure he says it says nothing we didn't say before and eliminated those points to which we objected in May.

A: Yes. Have him call attention to Scranton's statement yesterday where he issued a strong statement about the Holy land.

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SK161

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TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Roy Atherton
11/12/76; 2:29 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Have you gotten Bar-On?

A: Yes.

K: What did he want?

A: He had a reply on something you had given him whether they had information on these reports between the PLO and Israelis. He sent over a piece of paper which he got from Jerusalem which I was going to attach and sent up to you in a memo. I gave him your message on the other and he said he would convey it.

K: I think it is an outrage.

A: Toon says the foreign minister denies Allon said it. But we have Toon's report which quotes him.

K: Yes. Okay.

A: It is some confusion.

K: I am sure he said it.

A: No doubt. Toon says he said it but they struck it from the record.

K: Right. Okay.

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SK1661

RELEASED IN FULL

TELECON
The Secretary/Pete Day
11/13/76 11:35 am

D: (Missed first part) . . . He is coming back this afternoon.

K: I am worndering if we should send Toon in to see Rabin. One, to protest against Allon's behavior. Second, to point that what we agreed to is exactly what we agreed to in May. Third, with the debate on Syria, it gives us a much better platform to resist pressures on Israel and fourth, this is unacceptable behavior and I am calling Toon back for consultations.

D: Do we want to build it up to that big a thing — calling Toon back? This is a typical Allon reaction.

K: We kept them closely informed and we had nothing from them. Would you draft a cable like that. Put in the Toon recall and I may take that out. Would you send it up?

D: Yes. I will send something right up.

K: Good.

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SK174 *

TELECON
The Secretary/Sen. Gale McGee
11/15/76 6:45 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: You still going to get me out to Wyoming? (laughter) Well, it was disconcerting as hello.

M: Well, I didn't think it was possible for them to just pick a guy and sell him like they did but they did. I realy didn't think it was possible. So we weren't disturbed at all.

K: You had no inclination?

M: We couldn't believe it.

K: Well, it is a great loss to the country.

M: One of the nicest things that happened to Lorrie and me when we were on the road, President Nixon called us one morning and we had a very nice long visit saying much the same thing.

K: Well, I want you to know that among the contacts I have had in Washington that I cherish most, is yours. It is an unbelievable loss to the nation.

M: You are great to sy that. Lorrie remarked when we were flying back here on Friday that you know the really nice thing about this is we are getting the flowers while we can still smell them. But it takes a great philosopher to look at it like that.

K: What are you going to do now?

M: I don't know what I am going to do. I know that I am going to read a few books for a change. Dean Rusk and I had a little chat but I don't know how hard up they are. You know with some of these young upstarts they have. I desperately hope that he can work at it. But we will keep our fingers crossed. I will have to look around for something.

K: I don't know what it is that I could do for you but if you have any idea where a word from me might be hlepful, I hope that you will consider that you are doing me a favor if you let me do it.

M: Well, as I said, I've mentioned it to Dean Rusk -- maybe the UN.

K: If there is a chance, I will certainly mention it -- I am going down there on Friday. But I will certainly express my views.

M: I would be very appreciative of that. But I must say I still feel very uneasy about your not being at the helm there.

K: Well, many thanks.

M: And thank you very much.

K: I hope we stay in touch with each other. We were allies for a long time and as far as I am concerned, I hope we will stay that way.

M: You can count on me.
K: Wonderful
M: Thank you, bye.

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SK 173

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TELECON
The Secretary/Mr.Atherton
11/15/76 6:15 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

A: Mr. Secretary.

K: Did I see a cable that Rabin has cancelled the appointment?

A: Rabin couldn't see him when it was originally scheduled and they suggested Allon. Toon sent back word that his instructions were to see Rabin. They are trying to reschedule it.

K: for tomorrow?

A: They are not sure that they can do it tomorrow. I think he is getting a little bit of a cold shoulder.

K: A little bit!

A: But he was very firm in his response. He said his instructions were to see the Prime Minister.

K: Is Dinitz back?

A: He gest back tomorrow evening.

K: Would you tell Dinitz there will be no appointments for him with any senior official until Toon has seen Rabin?

A: Okay, I sure will. I will certainly get that across.

K: It is really incredible. They are not stopping either.

A: The more I think about it I think they really have started this campaign in an effort to tie the new administration's hands on this issue. They will want to disassociate themselves from what we have done. At least it is beginning to look that way to me.

K: Okay.

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SKITO

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Sam Lewis
11/15/76; 12:09 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I have David Landes of Harvard here and he has an idea with which I am sympathetic. He feels that rather than going to UNESCO every time and fight defensive battles on specific issues whether we couldn't put forward at the conference at least as an American decision something which would go to the general assembly so there is a general rule adopted at the end of the conference which ends these battles and we should do these in other instances. I wonder when I am through you can see him and he can see Reinhardt.

L: Sure.

K: I think it would be good if we made a strong case for it.

L: I would be delighted.

K: Why don't you come up in ten minutes and take him off. And work out something with Reinhardt that he could take down with him Friday with a speech in which we say we have gone through six weeks of debate on issues which should not have been here to begin with. How can we get a constructive position. It might help the Africans who don't have to vote every time.

L: Right. We have been pushing something in IO. The occupied issue is being delat with in UNESCO simultaneously. The resolution they are trying to adopt is unacceptable in light of a lot of things besides the basic position we took in New York. We are going to want to vote and be against it. They are trying to condemn Israel before we see a mission there.

K: I think we should oppose it. First, it is not proper for UNESCO and second, on the merits.

L: There will be those who try to dispute it as backing out from what we said in New York last week and there will be a strong argument.

K: That's fine.

L: Thank you, Sir.

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SK/72

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Gov Scranton (secure phone) RELEASED IN FULL
11/15/76; 3:30 pm

S: I just wanted to report two things. I just had a long conversation with Hertzog.

K: You tell him I am fit to be tied.

S: I will indeed. I did tell him about the Allon statement.

K: They wanted us to stand up on UNDOF and on the general assembly debate and when we make one tactical move, they carry on as if we had sold out Jerusalem.

S: You don't need to tell it to me. He knows this. Hertzog is different. He says he reported to the Israelis over a week ago that this was going to happen and that the United States could do nothing else because of the Egyptians who were going to give in on all the language. He says this report came out of Bar-On xxx at the DCM in Washington. The reason the Israelis were not alerted on what we were doing is Dinitz met with the Cabinet and said don't worry -- the United States has not changed and the United States is not going to do this.

K: It is an outrage.

S: I thought you ought to know this because if you are dealing with Dinitz on this subject . . . . .

K: You can say what I discussed with Dinitz. I told him I could give him a blanket promise to veto it.

S: They are saying in their press you did promise. I think the culprit is right. Maybe I am wrong. You know better than I do. Hertzog went to the length of telling the press we had played this absolutely honestly with them.

K: Oh, I saw that.

S: I thought you ought to know this. The other thing is we have just gotten on a completely quiet basis confidentially from the Canadians the fact you sent a letter up there about CIEC. Is this correct? They showed it to us and what it is supposed to have said.

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K: What we said was that on the whole we thought it was better if the meeting did not take place.

S: All right. I will get into that and get back to your boys. I wanted to make sure this is correct.

K: It is correct.

S: How are you otherwise -- all right?

K: I am fine.

S: All right. They may vote on Vietnam this afternoon and I have the statement here and we will make it.

K: All right. I don't have my heart in it any more than you do.

S: I know that. Okay.

SK/71/

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TELCON
Sec Kissinger/A. Dobrynin
11/15/76; 11:10 am

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I have been asked by the President to call you about the agrément for Toon.

D: Yes.

K: It seems to us really extraordinarily improper that a government would use the agrement procedure to attempt to select whom we send there. You have had it now for two months. We thought maybe right after the election you would do something. The President asked me to tell you if we don't get a reply within the next two days we will have to make a public statement and we would have to have contact with you here only at the DCM level and prevent any further contact with you. I had to do this.

D: Why me.

K: Because we cannot have an ambassador in Moscow—why should the Soviet Union have an ambassador here.

D: I don't know what they are doing.

K: It is not dimplomatic custom for a — you have nothing against Toon except that there are newspaper stories that he is opposed.

D: You understand that perfectly well. It is not for me to say. They didn't answer so it is definitely a sign that they obviously are not very happy about it.

K: Gromyko told me when he was here there would be no problem — it would happen fairly soon. I don't want to have a public rumpus with the Soviet Union in the last two months in office but we cannot accept the position that when we send somebody as Ambassador to the Soviet Union that agrement is simply withheld for 6 weeks without any word at all. Nearly two months now.

D: I understand that.

K: How would you react if you sent somebody over here.

D: You say there may be another one. I am sure about it. It is a question about the administration, as you are now presenting your case. It has nothing to do with the Secretary of State or with the President or the Administration. As I understand the situation it is a question of diplomacy.

K: What has Toon done to the Soviet Union?

D: I don't know.

K: Nothing.

D: I don't know. I have no specific authority. I hope you don't hold me responsible.

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K: Why don't you see if you can get some response from Moscow by the end of this week.

D: As for the end of this week, I don't know. They have to give some reply as I understand it.

K: We would appreciate it. Yes.

D: Something on this case.

K: Exactly.

D: Even if they don't want him they should say so — yes? No if they want another one. There are two choices in this case. Your demarche is not now on the ambassador. As affecting our relationship I don't think it is a proper thing.

K: You know my great personal admiration for you. We have no complaint against you.

D: I don't know.

K: You can certainly tell them we will make a strong public statement on this issue.

D: It is the government. They make the decision — not the ambassador. Why should I oppose Toon. It will be rather soon but it is not the administration. I will see why they object. Okay?

K: Okay.

D: Good. You are going to Williamsbur-?

K: Just for the afternoon.

D: Okay, Henry. We will be in touch.

SK180 *

TELECON
Mr. Pete Day/Secretary Kissinger RELEASED IN FULL
November 16, 1976
Time: 6:13 p.m.

K: Have we heard whether the Israelis are seeing Toon?

D: No we haven't. We conveyed the message to the Embassy that you asked us to. I assume that will have to be disgested in Tel Aviv before we know anything. It wouldn't have gotten there before the end of the day so we haven't called Toon as we had expected we would. We should call him first thing in the morning.

K: If he hasn't had an appointment by then I am going to cancell my appointment with Yaacobi and Dinitz.

D: We can send him a cable tonight and that way you would know first thing in the morning.

K: Either way is o.k. Pete. Thank you.

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SK/176

TELECON
Minister Bar-on/Secretary Kissinger
November 16, 1976
10:06

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello, Mr. Minister.

B: Good morning. I am sorry to disturb you. I got a call last night from Simcha who transmitted a message from the Prime Minister. I understand Ambassador Toon asked to see the Prime Minister to talk about the remarks by Allon.

K: That is correct.

B: The Prime Minister, as this has been made known that this would be the subject says it would be difficult for him to have a constructive talk and he was wondering if it might not be possible, since the Ambassador is coming back tonight, if you could take it up with him.

K: I haven't noticed that you have any hesitation to cause us problems.

B: The Prime Minister was asking whether it might be possible for the Ambassador to see you here. The request for the meeting was through the Foreign Ministry and it was clear that this was the subject matter.

K: No Foreign Minister has the right to deal with any American Ambassador this way -- not to speak of an allie. You know what we are doing... And we have been supporting you. And I know you have been unleashing the press in this country -- you personally.

B: I have not Mr. Secretary.

K: Of course you have and I know it.

B: I have not. I have not tal ked to a single newman with the exception of one and I explained then without saying anything about the United States -- it was about the Egyptian position, not the US. I did not talk to anybody.

K: Let's not worry about this now. I will get Atherton to let you know who we are going to handle it.

B: Thank you sir.

END

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SK177

TELCON
SEC. KISSINGER
MIN. ESCOVAR (VENEZUELA)
November 16, 1976
10:15 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

E: It is nice to hear from you. I am here in New York on the way to Europe and for me it is a pleasure to say hello.

K: Aren't you nice. Is there any chance of your coming to Washington.

E: I am leaving today with the President for Europe and I had the opportunity to say hello and to express to you my great affection and best regards.

K: I am terribly touched. Are you going to be in Mexico for the inauguration of the President of Mexico.

E: No. I will accompany the President for 15 days in Europe. That is why I have to leave this evening.

K: I see. I want you to know that working with you was one of the great joys of being in public life.

E: Thank you very much and I hope to see you in Venezuela or any other place. You can be sure that I have a good friend in you and great admiration and affection for you.

K: The feeling is mutual.

E: Thank you very much.

K: Have a good trip.

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SK/97 *

TELECON
The Secretary/Pete Day
11/17/76 4:35 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Did you think I was too tough on Dinitz?

D: I think that was just right. You simply stated your unhappiness with it. He was obviously unprepared to discuss it in any case.

K: I thought it was an outrageous statement.

D: I said to Dinitz as we went down — I said "I assume the Foreign Minister had to say something but I hope this is the last statement we will hear on this subject" and he said, "Well, you are the ones that have kept it boiling." Which I couldn't believe. I really do think it has to come to an end.

K: Yeah. Good.

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SK/99

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TELECON
The Secretary/Dr. Ikle
11/17/76 7:47 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

I: We are just about ready to present this statement suggesting an agreement on radiological warfare.

K: All of our people feel there just hasn't been enough time for consultation.

I: It has come from very junior FSO's and you and I discussed it.

K: You and I discussed it once.

I: And you felt we could go ahead in this administration. I think it would be slightly embarrassing to just fall silent suddenly.

K: When is it?

I: It is suppose to be tomorrow.

K: Can I call you first thing in the morning. Let me look over those various cables

I: Surely. I will be travelling up there but the message can reach me. If you think we shouldn't then I will let someone else give the talk and I will do other things. But I think it would be embarrassing.

K: That part doesn't bother me. Let me get word to you by 8:00. Who should I call, John?

I: There will be someone in the office by 8:15. If your office calls my office someone will get the message to me.

K: Okay, good.

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SK/91

TELECON
Mr. Ed Klein/Secretary Kissinger
November 17, 1976
10:36 am

RELEASED IN PART
B6

missed first sentence

HAK: I feel fine.

K: I understand you have become sweet.

HAK: That is what you say so it must be true. You must have gotten 5 witnesses before you believed it.

K: We triple checked it. Why I am calling, there are two things. One is small and tactical and the other larger and strategic. I understand Scott Sullivan is going to be seeing you on Friday.

HAK: Yes, I think he wants to see me about an article he was doing -- may be it is that.

K: No. We would like to do a major summing up in a week or two and we would hope this conversation would be a separate piece. I would love it to be on-the-record.

HAK: Out of the question.

K: Are you telling everybody the same thing?

HAK: Yes. I am not seeing anybody. I decided to see Sullivan because I thought your piece was more sensitive but I don't to do any on the record...

K; I just wanted to be sure we were being treated the same as everybody e lse.

HAK: You are being treated better.

K: Could he do a piece something like: "He is known to believe that?"

HAK: Let me think about it.

K: I would like you to be comfortable with the method. What I want from that meeting between him and you is to be sure it is accurate and sensitive.

HAK: And you have been decent throughout. Unless something happens in the next 6 weeks -- I don't think I have been badly treated. I have been fairly treated. I may have disagreed with some stories.

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K: The other thing is if you have time I would love to come down and spend some time discussing a few things about [redacted] your future. If you have time. B6

HAK: Ok. Can I call you back. I am going away next Tuesday for about a week. Can it wait or do it before?

K: That is fine. At your convenience when you come back.

HAK: We will do it no later than that and if I find an hour before we will do it then.

K: And I can come down anytime, except for Friday.

HAK: Good. I would like to see you.

K: Good, thank you very much.

END

RELEASED IN FULL

SK2001 *

TELECON
The Secretary/Mr. Sonnenfeldt
11/17/76 7:57 pm

S: Did he tell you about his conversation with Callaghan?

K: who?

S: Lever. RAmsbotham has sent over a note to Hormats which says that after his conversation with Lever on the phone, he wished to convey the following to the White House. (reads statement)

K: But that is what we were working on this morning.

S: (reads more)

K: Isn't that good.

S: Yeah, on the fact of it it is. The questions is the question of the sterling balance. I guess that is the key. So the answer to the Callaghan letter will have to be redone.

K: Completely. What I think we ought to do is to assume that what we say -- it is their interpretation and start from that premise.

S: Okay, that is what we will proceed on then.

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SK/198 *

TELECON
The Secretary/Hal Sonnenfeldt
11/17/76 7:35 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Why are you opposed to this statement since he is carrying on like a banshee?

S: Winston called me this morning and said there were problems with our allies on it.

K: What allies?

S: The Europeans. I took Winston's word for it. Ikle now tells me that this is a conspiracy. I feel it is not worth the trouble. Winston said it is something that commits the new administration. I don't think it is worth spending capital to put this over. I told Ikle to talk to Winston. He shouldn't have called you for gods sakes - - you have got other things.

K: Well, he is sure bugging me.

S: Well, let me have my guy look into it again.

K: But can you call me right back cause I don't want to be accused of not returning calls.

S: Okay.

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SK195

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Amb. Seelye
11/17/76; 3:30 pm

K: How did the Sudan get eligible for arm sales.

S: They had requested C-130's and in order to be forthcoming we had to get a presidential determination from the White House. That went over several weeks ago. That is the basis for it.

K: Right. There is no program to sell any particular arms to them.

S: No. There is a possibility of selling C-130's which are non-lethal and pretty harmless.

K: I had never heard of that.

S: That is all.

K: Okay.

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SK183

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TELCON
Robert McNamara
Sec. Kissinger
10:50 a.m.,
November 17,1976

RELEASED IN FULL

M: How are you these days? I am doing very well.

K: Do you need an international researcher.

M: I am asking you. You need some help on that book. I am delighted to do anything for you. Last Saturday I was in Pakistant and Bhutto in a conversation asked me to pass on a bit of information. He said that the Soviet Ambassador acting under instructions came to see him and told him that the Egyptian For. Min. which would have been about 10 days go from now, was in Bulgaria and met with Gromyko and made two points. 1. He apologized for the UAR's past behavior and added they had been beseiged by you. He did not put much weight on it.

K: Does he believe it.

M: He believes it in effect it is Sadat's duplicity approach to foreign policy. He doesn't think the UAR is moving into strong relations.

K: He believes he actually said that?

M: He believes it. Fahmy said that was right. To me it is important because I have seen him since. Sadat's power is limited in dealing with his own internal and external problems. We are having a hell of a problem with him. That is really the only reason for passing it own to you. I think it is a sign of weakness.

K: Listen, Bob, I will tell you one thing, no matter how much you prepare yourself--I don't know whether you went through it, but when you finally separate yourself it is sort of a shock but I was in that state of shock until we made that UN vote and the Jews started unleashing on me. And I am a new man now.

M: I know you are.

K: Here we are. We have vetoed 8 resolutions for the past years. Given them $4 billion in aid. Voted for resolutions composed entirely of our own statements and deleted things we objected to previously and we still or treated as if we have done nothing for them.

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M: I was amused when he added up loss in sales and aid to US sales to Israel and said I think you are paying too much for what you are getting from them.

K: Whatever we are paying for it is not gratitude.

M: I have found out that you cannot buy gratitude. I get kicked around and so annoyed by people.

K: I was pleased at what Harriman said about you the other day.

M: You are so nice. I must say I was very pleased too.

K: It is long over due.

M: I started to read this morning that Schell book. I just got back from Asia and I am still on that time. You know who Jonathan Schell is.

K: He is a Harvard guy and has written some intelligence pieces.

M: He is intelligent but hammering and saying that the problem with Vietname is that we all liked.

K: They don't understand that all of us were confused.

M: Therefore the public is getting the wrong lesson. It was not that they were led by a bunch of liers it was by people who did not see the problem. The Pentagon Papers were to allow scholars to look over the past and see what the lessons were and the stupied NY Times and the rest have drown the wrong conclusions.

K: Because they were using it for political reasons.

M: Or to sell newspapers.

K: I don't know whether it will happen but when I write my recollections of that period I will have to go back to '67. Even if I write about 69. I will have to have a flashback to "67 which you handled practically alone.

M: I don't know whether I told you but in the beginning of that, someday I will tell you how that happened. Because I was alone. The rest of the people were not interested in it. They thought it was not worth pursuing.

K: You can't say this but one of the chief people against it in the ne meeting I attended with the President was Clark Clifford.

M: Absolutely.

K: In October 67.

M: No question.

K: He described me as one of the Harvard professors -- were you there.

M: I was.

K: You remember. He said all the wrong things that Johnson had done. Also the intellectuals asked for something more and this was just another ploy.

M: No question. On many occasions. I have never said this to others but you were present and saw it.

K: I appreciate it. I am not surprised.

M: It is a sign of weakness and that is the important thing.

K: Also a sign of incipient duplicity.

M: O.K. See you soon.

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SK/185

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Pete Day
11/17/76; 9:30 am

RELEASED IN FULL

D: I am assuming you will not be able to meet with Yaacobi today. We have called Toon and they think that they may consider seeing him tomorrow but they will not know until later in the day and they are sending an immediate cable reporting that Allon gave a statement in the Knesset which is going to make us even more unhappy. From that end Toon thought we ought to put Dinitz in the deep-freeze.

K: If it is nasty, we are going to have to call Toon back.

D: It sounds like more of the same.

K: You have released that package of letter exchange with Javits?

D: Yes. It was released yesterday afternoon. It didn't get any notice as far as I could tell. It is an issue that had its play.

K: Allon is going to start it up again.

D: He will if . . .

K: You call the Israeli embassy and say unfortunately my schedule does not permit me to meet Yaacobi or should I see Yaacobi without Dinitz.

D: I think it is just better not to without Dinitz. I think it is better not to see him.

K: Yes. But they are really

D: They are at this point. That is true. Even is he gets to see Allon tomorrow they have made such an issue of it and with Allon making another statement, there is no excuse for another statement. They said it over and over again. They are prolonging it. I don't know what the purpose is unless to signal the new administration that they cannot be handled with impunity. It is counter productive.

K: And they know our diplomacy.

D: Which is the reason Allon has not been willing to see Toon. I think that is reason in itself not to see Yaacobi as well as seeing Dinitz. It makes more graphic our own feeling.

K: What is the explanation in your view for his making and continuing to make these statements?

D: I think there are probably three. One, he has made a public statement before a Cabinet committee and he probably was asked and he had to say something, and he said the same thing and it was under circumstances that required him to say something. That is just a guess until we get the cable. Two, I think they are

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trying to make a point partly for the new administration that they react very strongly when we do things that they do not like. It is a typical Israeli way of lashing back. Third, they do as you mentioned in referring back to their reaction to the UNDOF last year, this is the way Israel reacts. They get overwrought and it takes a week for them to calm down. All three of them would be the reason.

K: Yes.

D: I think we have to be displeased. I will tell the embassy you cannot see Yaacobi and Dinitz this afternoon. I think that is the right response and I think that is what Toon thinks we should do.

K: Okay.

D: And we will wait until . . .

K: You will take care of calling the embassy and saying unfortunately my schedule does not permit me to see him.

D: Yes.

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SK184

TELECON
Mr. Sarnoff/Secretary Kissinger
November 17, 1976
11:15 am

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

S: Good, thank you. I was wondering and hopeing we might be able to get together at your convenience.

K: How about next Monday?

S: Fine. What time?

K: How about 11:00 in the morning?

S: Fine. I look forward to it. See you then.

K: I will see you then. Are you going to bring anybody? There is no need, but I need to know for our people here.

S: I might bring our editor-in-chief, if you think it would be useful.

K: I only need to know for our security people.

S: Ok, then I will come alone.

END

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SK186

TELECON
Mr. Pete Day/Secretary Kissinger
November 17, 1976
10:38 am

RELEASED IN FULL

missed first part

D: . . . if you are willing to see Jacobi for a few minutes. It would be politicall awkard at this point. He has been bolding over for a few days just to see you. I think I would like to revert to your earlier idea of seeing him without Dinitz. I was trying to get a hold ofLarry to talk about it. If you pry Dinitz loose and see Jacobi I think that would be the best solution. I thought maybe you might ask Larry if he could talk frankly to Dinitz. Dinitz is trying to call your office about the appointment.

K: Let him suffer a bit. I will probably agree but I will think about it.

D: I thought may be Larry could do that -- he gets along very well with Dinitz in that way.

K: You will get confirmed. There are now two Arabs in the Senate. Relax. They won't get down to your level.

D: I am not worried about that.

K: No, it is correct advice. You are bound to be right every now and then. But I want to think about it.

D: Ok.

END

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RELEASED IN FULL

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SKI93

TELECON
Mr. Larry Eagleburger/Secretary Kissinger
November 17, 1976
11:00 am

K: How about calling Dinitz and telling him I will see that Jacobi at 3:00 but I think it wo uld be better if Bar-on came along til Toon has had an appointment with Rabin.

E: At 3:00 today. I will take care of it.

K: That we should...

E: I know what to day.

K: They should handle it without ~~conflict~~ confrontation and if they want a brawl they will have a brawl. I am the Secretary of State of the United States.

E: I will take care of it with pleasure.

END

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SK/92

TELECON
Mr. George Franklin/Secretary Kissinger
November 17, 1976
11:50 am

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

F: David and I were wondering if you have had any more chance to think about it.

K: I think I better not go. I don't think it is the right time. for me. I will be in between the last week of my incumbency.

F: I can see that. Dennis Healy will be coming.

K: If I was out of office or being in office I would have come.

F: We are all disappointed, but I gather you have made up your mind.

K: I don't think it is a good time to go there.

F: Ok, the best of luck to you and hope to see you soon.

END

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SK/188 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Sec Gen Waldheim
11/17/76; 10:53 am

K: Will you hold it against me if I go for your job. It is tax exempt isn't it.

W: I am glad you have a good sense of humor. You may run.

K: No. I am your friend and you know I stand by whatever we said previously.

W: I am most grateful for your help in this regard.

K: You called me a few days ago and I had gone out of town and you have to remember a lame duck secretary is not treated as carefully.

W: I hope we can maintain our personal contact. I appreciate your friendship and helpfulness.

K: You can be sure.

W: It is encouraging to know and that we can continue this contact.

K: You can count on it.

W: As far as this is concerned, I think xxx later towards the end of this month or beginning of next month the President of the Council who happens to be the Panamanian ambassador is a good man who . . .

K: It would be better next month. Who is the President then?

W: The next one we will have will be Romanian.

K: I think it would be better after the Mexican President is installed.

W: I think we have to find out now what the Chinese want and when they want to have it. The Panamanian President of the Council tried to find out some time ago but they gave him a dilatory answer and he is dealing but has not gotten the final answer. My impression is that they are not opposing but it is a question of timing. It could be in our interest to wait until December.

K: We will go along with whatever consensus develops on it.

W: You heard about the new interest other nations have/shown.. . . using cautious ways.

K: It doesn't surprise me.

W: There was not too much enthusiasm in the membership here.

K: Your real problem is my candidacy.

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W: Well, is there any chance to see you again. Are you coming to New York?

K: I am coming tomorrow and it will be very brief and I will not have a chance to see you. I am bound to be in New York and would like to see you once more while I am in office.

W: I would be very happy whenever you are coming here for a moment and I would be delighted to see you for maybe lunch or in any event to chat. Whatever you prefer.

K: Absolutely.

W: Only yesterday I got a call from the President of the Austrian Chamber of Commerce wondering whether you are still interested in accepting an invitation to speak next year before the Austrian Chamber of Commerce.

K: When -- what month?

W: They said between February and April -- May, whatever it is.

K: The later the better. If it were in May I might consider it.

W: He is a leading figure in the Austrian politics. Solinger (?) is the President of the Austrian Chamber of Commerce and is attaching great importance to your coming and invites you and asked me yesterday on the phone whether I feel there is still a chance.

K: The later the better.

W: Good. In principle I can tell him you can do it ?

K: Tell him I would be willing to consider it.

W: The later the better.

K: Yes.

W: Good. Thank you for calling and I wish you all the best. Let me know when you are going to be in New York. I really want to see you.

K: Right.

W: I really want to see you.

SK189

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TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Pete Day
11/17/76; 12:44 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: The Israelis have now proposed the following. Rabin will call Toon tomorrow for a meeting before the end of the week, and can Dinitz then come over with Yaacobi for consultations. I think we ought to tell him go but I will not see him alone until after Toon has seen Rabin.

D: I think that is appropriate.

K: I don't know why Toon told them what he wants to see Rabin about.

D: That puzzles me too. He may not have. It was a bad thing to do.

K: Will you explain all of this to Toon?

D: Yes. I will send him a cable.

K: Tell him he should not emphasize at his meeting with Rabin he is not too polite.

D: Okay.

K: You see what I mean?

D: Yes.

K: Okay.

2:40 pm

K: Have you seen that Allon statement?

D: Yes, I have. It came a while ago. It is more amazing than his previous statements.

K: His statement is that this resolution was worse than the May resolution. Is there any possible basis for that?

D: The only one is this — the May one did not contain any reference to Jerusalem. This one did which was in agreement with our long-standing position on the problem and consequently we were able to go along with it. From the Israeli point of view it would be something of a negative factor. It doesn't alter it.

K: Will you do additional instructions to Toon for when he sees Rabin to add the strongest protest to the characterization as weak as if we owed them something.

D: Right. It would be useful to make the point to Rabin who has not before been a party to these complaints that what we did in New York does not have the effect of sticking the irresponsible elements in the Arab world. Quite the contrary and we consider that to be a total misinterpretation of the political

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facts of life. I think that is an unfortunate aspect of their reaction. They misread and wrongly assess what we have done.

K: Good.

D: I will try and work that in and you can see how you like it.

K: Will you do that?

D: Yes.

K: It was an aim on our part to strengthen the responsible elements.

D: Which I think probably has happened. At least from the reaction we have had so far.

K: Yes.

D: Find. I will do that.

K: Good.

SK206

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
11/19/76; 3:26 pm
Sec Kissinger/Amb Dobrynin

K: You have just decided to accept my proposal.

D: We accept him as Ambassador to Moscow.

K: That is a wise decision.

D: It is what I am calling you about. Gromyko asked me to tell you.

K: I appreciate this.

D: What about SALT. Is it better to wait until the next Administration?

K: Well. If you will permit me to do some more assassination plots in this country so I can get rid of some people, we will have SALT talks before January 20.

D: You are seeing the President elect.

K: I know you have my office bugged because I was just talking about SALT and what I would tell the President elect. I was going to tell him the thing to ask is to tell you to destroy all your heavy missiles.

D: It is a modest proposal.

K: I know you were just waiting to accept that, I can tell him.

D: I looked at his last press conference and it was not quite clear what his position is on SALT.

K: It is not fully clear to me either. We were just debating that. Are you willing to negotiate it before January 20?

D: I am interested and we are prepared anytime possible.

K: Let me talk to the President about it.

D: Next week let's get together and quietly discuss things.

K: I will sit down with you but I don't promise you I will be quiet.

D: I am used to it. So I will prepare myself for the occasion.

K: It was good to see you at that lunch the other day.

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D: You let me know.

K: Wait. I am going away Tuesday.

D: Tomorrow.

K: Tomorrow to Plains but Tuesday to Mexico. Maybe late Monday afternoon we can meet for a drink. Let's aim for that.

D: Okay.

K: I will call you Monday morning.

D: Thank you very much, Henry.

SK205

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TELCON
SEC. KISSINGER
AMB. ANNE ARMSTRONG
NOVEMBER 19, 1976
10:23 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

A: Hello, Henry. It is anne.

K: I am on the way to WhiteHouse so make it fast.

A: Javits called me from Paris this morning. He said he spoke to Yeo, Cheney and Scowcroft and he told me that he wanted to come to London on Monday or no later than Tuesday to meet with Callaghan or Healey to tell them that the mood of the American Congress and the American public opinion would not support a loan for the sterling balances.

K : Jesus Christ! Who put him up to this.

A: My dear, that is why I am calling you. I said did Yeo, Cheney or Scowcroft ask you.

J: He said no but if you don't believe me you call Scowcroft. I am calling you and not Scowcroft.

K: I will call you back. That is outrageous. If he wants to see Callaghan that is his business. You tell Callaghan we speak for ourselves and not through Javits. Make appointments for him but he represents nothing.

A: I will. He said he wanted to see Callaghan and come out and make a statement to the press.

K: Im possible.

A: Well it certainly struck me as strange.

K: I will call you this afternoon our time. But at any rate don't get him cranked up as our representative.

A: I quite agree but I wanted to check with you.
He is at the Plaza Athenee or I can leave a message at the Embassy. I am to call him back there. I have not called Callaghan or Healey until after I talked to you.

K: I am going to a meeting on this subject this minute. Let me call you back this afternoon and if I have not got the time I will have Eagleburger call you.

A. Fine. I will be at a Westminister musical festiavel at 8:00 our time. Do you want to speak to Spiers if I am not here.

K: Yes.

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A: I will tell him to be on the look-out for the call if I have to go.

K: O.K. Good.

A: Thank you.

SK208

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TELECON
Mr. Roy Atherton/Secretary Kissinger
November 22, 1976
Time: 6:26 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Can you explain to me why it should take from 9:45 in the morning to now to produce two cables.

A: There were four cables...

K: Why?

A: We had one going...

K: Well, where are they -- I am leaving...

A: We got a little behind in the drafting because I was diverted -- but they should be up to you within five minutes.

K: O.K.

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SK209

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TELECON
The Secretary/Mr. Hartman
11/22/76 5:55 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Before I get out of here I am going to get that gd Soviet apartment thing started and you are not goint to block me.

H: Did you see the note in your book today?

K: No.

H: It says where we stand on the request that we have made and what we need on the things that they have promised us.

K: In my . . .

H: In your notes for your meeting today.

K: For what meeting?

H: Your meeting with Dobrynin. He told me on Friday that he was meeting with you so I prepared it. I think we can go ahead now.

K: Okay.

H: Then we have got something to show the congressional committees.

K: But you will give me this as a farewell present or should I send you to Chad?

H: Oh Chad. That would be a pleasure.

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SK210 *

TELECON
The Secretary/Marquis Childs and Jane Childs
11/22/76 6:05 pm

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: How are you?

C: Pretty well, how about you?

K: I am fine.

C: I am bothering you for just a minute because I know that you are going to head the delegation in Mexico and we were asked or invited to go down but I wanted to know what your reading is about the way Echeverria is behaving.

K: Not very well.

C: He is behaving strangely isn't he?

K: We don't know but what he might not be thinking of a coup.

C: Do you think that is possible?

K: No, but he is certainly not fading out like Mexican Presidents usually do. He is building himself a future position.

C: Well, it won't be at the UN will it?

K: That is what he would like.

[redacted] B6

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[redacted] B6

K: Bye.

C: Thank you so much Henry.

K: I will see you tonight probably.

C: Okay.

SK213 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Dick Valeriani
11/23/76; 10:30 am

RELEASED IN FULL

V: I am sorry I didn't get back to you last night. I went to see Henry the K run.

K: How did he do?

V: Came in second. I wanted to check before you left for Mexico on your feeling on the meeting Saturday.

K: I thought it was a good meeting.

V: Were your concerns alleviated?

K: At this point my interest is to see that he succeeds.

V: I know that.

K: I don't think I should make any comments. He is making a very serious effort to get on top of it.

V: Do you think he is getting there?

K: I think he is definitely getting there.

V: How about the people briefing him.

K: We are talking on deep background. I don't really want to get into this.

V: Do you think he is getting the right kind of information?

K: I will have to see.

V: You came out with a good feeling rather than apprehensive.

K: Yes. It was a good meeting.

V: You were satisfied with the way it went.

K: Yes. I did more talking than he did.

V: Did he listen attentatively?

K: As well as you can on your knees.

V: (laughter) Okay.

K: Right.

V: Thank you. Have a good vacation.

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SK222 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Cy Vance
12/3/76; 3:56 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you?

V: Fine.

K: Congratulations. It could not have been a better choice and if I could have selected my own successor, you would have been my choice.

V: Could I come see you?

K: Absolutely.

V: I would like to come down Tuesday afternoon.

K: I am going to NATO Tuesday.

V: When are you coming back?

K: The following weekend.

V: Not until the weekend.

K: How about Monday. Can you come Monday?

V: A week from Monday, sure.

K: The week after or this Monday.

V: I can't this Monday. I have got to go to my last meeting of the Rockefeller foundation where I am bowing out as chairman. Let me try and see if I can. I do really want to have a chance to catch you.

K: I am tied up most of the morning with Andreotti but I can free the afternoon from about 3:00 on I am sure.

V: Let me see whether I could break away after lunch and meet you in the later part of the afternoon.

K: I have got to go to the White House dinner.

V: I think we can have a couple of hours together and you can give me guidance and steer me and when you get back, have some more time.

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K: We have an office for you here. I have issued a statement saying how great the appointment is and everyone should support you.

V: You are sweet to do that.

K: I will make available to you immediately all the cables I get and you tell me how you want to handle it. We ought to give you security from the State Department.

V: Do you think I really need it?

K: Yes.

V: I do have to change my phone because last night it rang off the hook.

K: I think we have to unobtrusively assign some State Department security people to you.

V: We can talk about that Monday.

K: Whatever services you want in the meantime . . .

V: Can we let that ride until Monday?

K: Absolutely. All the mechanics we can work out on Monday.

V: I will try and get there by 4:00 on Monday if that is all right.

K: Terrific. You let us know when you arrive and we will pick you up at the airport.

V: Okay. That is great.

K: I think it is a great thing for the country. I have always admired you and tried to recruit you for various jobs.

V: Thank you.

K: So I am very reassured by this. Of course you have my total support.

V: What is that -- I couldn't hear.

K: You have my total support.

V: I know that. I hope as we go along through the years that I can -- and I know I can -- feel free to call on you for advice, help and anything we need.

K: My disposition is to be helpful and whatever I can do I will be delighted to do.

V: You will. That is wonderful.

K: My warmest congratulations. If you see the President-elect, tell him I congratulate him on this appointment.

V: Thanks, Henry.

SK 2211 *

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Phil Habib
12/3/76; 3:18 pm

K: Have you talked to Hartman about that matter?

H: Yes. He is supposed to have a paragraph up to you. He feels the meeting between him and Kubisch and Macomber--they felt it was well for them to get together and at that point somebody suggested it to you and you felt there might be some value to meeting with them. In any event they should get together and I don't see any need for it. It will get the Greeks all excited.

K: All right, then we will not do it.

H: He is supposed to have a note to you.

K: He has. I wanted to know whether it was before or after.

H: After.

K: You agree with me that the Vance appointment was a good one.

H: I think it was the best possible when you look at the other names.

K: I certainly recommended him.

H: I am glad you did. That is the kind of person you would like to have succeed you. He will never be dishonorable with respect to anything you did.

K: You worked with him in Paris.

H: I know him very well.

K: He will keep you on.

H: I am not so sure you will recommend it.

K: I would strongly recommend it.

H: I will tell Hartman to scrub it then.

K: Yes.

H: Good.

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SK220 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Bill Rogers
12/3/76; 2:14 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: When I see Boyd can I make this suggestion of separating Defense from the other arrangements.

R: I wouldn't. I would rather leave that to the negotiating process. My own feeling about it is the more we stay out of it, the better off we are from the Washington end. I think it is better to have Ellsworth go back and listen for another round rather than make a substantive suggestion at this point.

K: Okay. Good. Well, I just wanted to get your judgment. In the selfish manner of this Department they have got more people coming to this meeting.

R: I noticed that. Shall I peel out?

K: No. You I want there.

R: It seemed quite overloaded.

K: I am just going to drop Habib. What Jordan is doing up here only the devil knows.

R: He is on his way to Florida for 5 or 6 days of vacation and golf.

K: I want you to come. We will have to drop Habib.

R: Phil is a helpful guy to have around. With his relations with Vance, he will be helpful. I don't know that he isn't a good man to have in this meeting.

K: Yes. That is a good point. Okay. I will get back to you on this.

R: Okay.

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SK223

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TELCON
Sec Kissinger/John Lehman
12/3/76; 5:00 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

L: I wanted to touch base because Fred and I are ready to send in our resignation letters dated the 20th but wanted to touch base with you to make sure you knew before we sent them, if you want them handled in a different way.

K: You send them to the President, don't you?

L: I ought to be sending it to you but formally they go to the President. Fred dated his the 19th and I dated mine the 20th. Just to make it an exact 8 years from the time I started working for you to the day.

K: Yes.

L: When you get a little time maybe when you get back from Europe, I would like to chat with you about the future -- how we can best keep your views.

K: I would like to talk to you about it and to make sure there is a coherent foreign policy view.

L: Right. Eliminate any of the silly disputes that some factions might have. We will never be able to bring people under control like the steering group.

K: Let's have a talk when I come back. Do you think I should go and see Jackson before this thing is over?

L: I think it would be a good idea. It probably would not be a good idea to publicize it too much.

K: I have no interest to publicize it.

L: Just to sit down and talk with him as a farewell call but really more of a far-reaching discussion than that but that would be the obvious courtesy call. I think it would be a good idea. If you want, I will explore it with him.

K: Let's hold up until I decide because I don't want any stories that he rejected it.

L: Absolutely. Right. However you want to handle it.

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SK224 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Marvin Kalb
12/3/76; 5:05 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

Kalb: You had a good time down there?

K: Yes. I had a great time.

Kalb: Did the President-elect contact you before his announcement on Vance?

K: No. This has to be off the record anyway because I am not taking calls from anyone except old friends.

Kalb: Okay. I am not going to quote you because he made a reference in the news conference that implied he checked with you.

K: It depends what checked means.

Kalb: Did he check with you about the selection of Vance as Secretary of State?

K: He would have to talk about this. I thought you meant did he tell me ahead of time he was going to make an announcement.

Kalb: Did he discuss Vance with you?

K: I think he knows my view of Vance which is highly favorable.

Kalb: I assume you knew him.

K: I knew him in '67 - '68 on the Vietnam negotiations.

Kalb: Right.

K: I tried to recruit him for the Nixon administration.

Kalb: So your sense is it is in good hands -- like Allstate.

K: I think he is the best man he could possibly have appointed, don't you?

Kalb: That is excellent. I have known him fairly well during the 60's but not well -- just on the fly. But mostly during the period when he was working on the Paris Peace talks and I thought during that particular time he appeared to be skillful and knowledgeable.

K: He is calm, decent, honorable, thoughtful and I think he is a superb choice.

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Kalb: Yes. Cardid did -- did you see the news conference . . . well, he was asked whether there would be a role for you. There was a large hint that he dropped in which he said in a particular part of the world, I would reserve the right to call on him.

K: Yes.

Kalb: He does mean the Middle East there, doesn't he?

K: I have urged him not to make any precise suggestions until he gets everything together and I really don't think it is a good idea for me to do something on a semi-permanent basis.

Kalb: I remember you telling me that.

K: Yes.

Kalb: But you did also say that if a specific assignment came along, that you felt you could help on, you would.

K: Absolutely. I want it to succeed. And it is in all of our interests. We have come through ten years of civil war. We have got to succeed. The next 8 - 10 years are absolutely decisive.

Kalb: When will you see Vance?

K: He has a board meeting Monday and he is going to try to come down late Monday because I am leaving for NATO Tuesday.

Kalb: That is right.

K: We will almost certainly get together Monday.

Kalb: Remember -- what you were thinking of, I want you to think of but I was trying to crack a joke. Please have your meeting on an occasion when I can have a picture of both of you -- you know the succession.

K: It will be about 4:00.

Kalb: If you could allow us in for courtesy.

K: Absolutely.

Kalb: He is not going to NATO with you, is he?

K: I doubt it. I don't see how he can.

Kalb: You have not talked with him about it.

K: No.

Kalb: It would be almost too fast.

K: If it had been somebody totally new but most of these governments know him in one way or another.

Kalb: I had a private feeling when the idea came up, a lot of my colleagues got excited but there was one thing that gnawed at me. That was the sense I don't think you should look like the Hirak of international diplomacy.

K: It should not look like my successor needs me.

Kalb: That is why I think Vance is a good selection and your judgment is excellent. I thank you. I am glad you had a good time in Mexico. Bernie told me he got a word in with you.

K: The devil.

Kalb: Okay.

SK230 *

TELECON
The Secretary/Amb. Dobrynin
12/4/76 12:15 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

D: (Missed first part) . . . You see how attentive to your remarks I am.

K: I want to congratulate you on getting approbation for doing what should be taken for granted. I thought it was a good thing.

D: Really. We were quite a little surprised about the whole thing. It wasn't intentional.

K: I never thought there was any such intention.

D: That is the point. It wasn't intentional. But it was done so it would clear the way out. Henry, there is a letter from Mr. Brezhnev to the President on the subject of a letter which was sent from the President to Mr. Brezhnev. This is the answer saying that it is a good idea and he hopes that we will keep our relations on a equal basis. So how to do it?

K: Why don't you send it over to Scowcroft. Can you send me a copy?

D: Maybe I will send my assistant and he will give it to your secretary.

K: Yes. Send your assistant to my secretary. Anatol, I am so glad that you are following channels religiously in my last four weeks in office.

D: Do you know Vance very well?

K: Very well. I worked with him for many years. He is very judicious and very fail minded and I think on the policies on which you and I are interested, he will pursue lines very parallel to what we are doing. He will be coming down here and why don't I invite you to lunch for the three of us.

D: That would be good.

K: He is coming down on Monday and we will then work out arrangements. And I think he will come down permanently about the 15th of December.

D: Anytime after Monday, I will be available.

K: It won't be next week because I am going to NATO.

D: Well, just arrange it.

K: I will askhim if he has no problems and I think he won't. He is a good friend of mine.

D: Okay. Thank you very much.

K: Good Anatol.

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SK227 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Ted Koppel
12/4/76; 3:11 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

TK: You looked sensational. Tanned and well rested.

K: Yes. Where was I on TV?

TK: I have got the camera on you right now. We are across the street and zooming in through the window. How was your vacation?

K: Very pleasant. We missed you. We expect you to show up.

TK: Normally I don't let you go without me. Do you remember when we came back from China last year Cy Vance had just been there and you told me of a conversation with the Chinese . . .

K: That was a personal conversation.

TK: I wanted to be clear on what the proposal was for. In effect a no first strike agreement.

K: Something like that.

TK: Yes. Our indications are the Chinese are the only ones who are exceedingly unhappy.

K: I don't think the Israelis are exactly jubilant.

TK: That is possible but they are being more diplomatic about it.

K: Are the Chinese saying bad things?

TK: We have a man in Hong Kong and he is telling us the Chinese are not happy and not making much of a secret about it. It doesn't surprise me, does it you?

K: No.

TK: I think the Chinese view him as being a fuzzy _____.

K: Of the people that were available, he was the best choice.

TK: What is going to happen to Brzezinski. Do you know?

K: I don't know. My instinct tells me he probably will not be NSC advisor having said he will be.

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TK: It will be a struggle, although Vance is low key.

K: All we will need is Schlesinger in the White House and it will be a three course ring.

TK: You put Schlesinger in CIA -- it could happen.

K: It could.

TK: How is your schedule for the next couple of weeks because we wanted to have you and Nancy over some evening.

K: Next week I am going to be away.

TK: Right -- in Europe. Are you going away for Christmas?

K: We have not decided. Why don't we talk over the next weekend.

TK: That will be fine. In fact, I am not sure we would have anybody else over. Just a quiet evening.

K: We would love to do it.

TK: Good. I will give you a call next week then.

K: Good.

SK329 *

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(C), 1.4(D), B3, CIA

TELECON
The Secretary/Roy Atherton
12/4/76 11:00 am

B1, B3

K: Roy, there is another [redacted] case [redacted] Do you know about that? B1, B3 B1, B3

A: Yes I do. [redacted]

K: [redacted] B1, B3
.I think it is okay under these circumstances don't you?

A: [redacted] B1, B3

K: Well, why don't you go ahead then.

A: Yes sir.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT L FUNSETH
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 25X1, 25X6
DECLASSIFY AFTER: INDEFINITE
DATE/CASE ID: 16 JUL 2004 200102979

SK329 *

TELECON
The Secretary/Roy Atherton
12/4/76 11:00 am

RELEASED IN PART
B3, CIA

K: Roy, there is another [redacted] case [redacted] Do you know about that? B3

A: Yes I do. [redacted] B3

K: [redacted] B3
I think it is okay under these circumstances don't you?

A: [redacted] B3

K: Well, why don't you go ahead then.

A: Yes sir.

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DATE/CASE ID: 26 MAY 2004 200102979

SK 232 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Peter Ramsbotham
12/6/76; 1:00 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

R: I have been in touch with Tony Crosland. He would be very happy to see you Saturday morning.

K: Instead of Friday afternoon?

R: He would like to do that too on Friday afternoon, with officials and would you be prepared to do this because he would like you to come alone if you could for a chat with him at his house and you can have photographers.

K: Oh, sure.

R: You and he would be on your own for an hour on Saturday morning at Landsdown place.

K: I know where it is.

R: It can be as official outside as they like.

K: Excellent.

R: I think you are engaged for lunch.

K: Yes.

R: And you are going to the football game that afternoon together. Dennis Healey would like to catch you for a moment.

K: We will do that after the football at the end of the day.

R: We will work on that.

K: Good.

R: Privately in the evening are you staying in town? He said if you would like Nancy to come to Kent he would be delighted.

K: That is very sweet of him but I don't think we will do that. We are going to the threatre and if he would like to join us, we would be delighted.

R: In the evening.

K: Why don't you give him the choice.

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R: We will fix it.

K: Since he made me switch from a first division football match to a second division match, he got 10 points there. It was a true proletarian move.

R: Okay. Good.

SK-231 *

TELECON
Ambassador Ramsbotham/Secretary Kissinger
December 6, 1976
9:50 am

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I know your Foreign Secretary specializes in being difficult. Let me explain why I want to see him Saturday morning rather than Friday afternoon. If I spend Saturday in London it will be for personal reasons and without doing anything official at all I will be in the same position as Simon. . . and since I am changing the soccer game to accommodate him.

R: You want an hour's talk on that morning.

K: If not with him, then somebody.

R: Saturday morning.

K: Yes - with somebody who has plausible responsibility.

R: You are coming back on Friday afternoon.

K: I will be coming back earlier than I had planned so I can see him at 4:00.

R: You will be seeing him at 4 and you will have the evening free.

K: No, that evening the Prime Minister is giving a dinner.

R: And Saturday you will join him at the soccer game.

K: Yes. I want to see some personal friends in London. But if I had an hour's appointment -- if not Crosland, maybe Richards will sacrifice himself.

R: Certainly, but I don't think sacrifice is the word. But I am sure he will be delighted.

K: Or Healy.

R: We will do that. An hour would be about right.

K: Yes.

R: I would love to see you sometime before I leave on the 14th.

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K: How about breakfast on the 14th.

R: I would love to do that.

K: Good

END

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RELEASED IN FULL

SK234

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Pete Day
12/6/76; 3:53 pm

K: Pete, I just had a call from Dinitz who of course has denied any evil conduct with respect to that resolution but he also says that they have information that they are moving 700 Syrian troops into _____ tomorrow and they are warning against it. The minimum we have to do is tell Sarkis so that we don't get accused of having tracked it.

D: Okay. We will send out something.

K: Okay.

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SK233 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Amb. Dinitz
12/6/76; 3:45 pm

RELEASED IN PART
B6

D: I just talked to Habib and I understand the mixup that you are extremely upset.

K: There is no mixup. We are just not going to be blackmailed all the time.

D: It is not a question of blackmail. When I called to Sam Lewis I told him our delegation was having a resolution. It was not a fete accompli. This morning I heard from Hertzog that last night he talked to Scranton about it. He was not committing Scranton to anything. I heard it this morning together with you.

K: You know as well as I did you wanted to get us on record on an anti-PLO vote.

D: We wanted a clear resolution that indicates our willingness for Geneva and resolutions 224 and 338. That was the purpose of the exercise. And we wanted your support of it. There was no intent to blackmail you. There was no previous consultation.

K: To put this in without informing us was not proper.

D: I agree but it was not done deliberately. Hertzog was so (headstrong?) even before I had a chance to talk to Lewis.

K: We will probably abstain on the Egyptian resolution.

D: I understand from Habib it was amended.

K: Yes and we will vote against the amendment.

D: I will too and that means the whole resolution because it will probably be accepted by the others.

K: Of course.

D: My suggestion and don't think for a minute we were trying to do anything improper.

K: I had sent a cable to Fahmy urging him to . ...

D: But we didn't know it. I had no idea and I am not saying that I should have known. It is completely within your right to do it and we would of course welcome it but we had no idea.

K: I told you I would do my best to prevent this thing from happening.

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D: I think we were talking about that. You would oppose it. We didn't really know you were trying to prevent it. That I just learned from Habib now. You told me you had not studied it but your predisposition was not to support it.

K: I have told you you cannot make us vote like/trained lions every day.

D: We don't want you to vote like trained lions or untrained lions. We didn't want the Egyptian resolution.

K: Why didn't you let it go to a vote.

D: Our people without consulting Washington -- Hertzog [redacted] B6
had the bright idea and convinced Allon, [redacted] B6

K: So we have to vote twice. Once against the PLO. We kick the PLO guy out of Washington again.

D: We are not doing it for the PLO. We were trying to be objective.

K: You cannot be so naive as not to know what would happen.

D: My feeling was to withdraw. Then you don't have to vote. It was not our purpose to bring it to a vote against the PLO.

K: If you can get them to withdraw it, we will see about the other vote. You cannot ask us to vote twice in two days .

D: I want to assure you our mind did not work this way. We thought as a result of our objection we would get some magnificent show of courtesy.

K: You could not be that naive.

D: That was the calculation of our . . .

K: That group must be a bunch of idiots.

D: They must be. I raised hell -- not on substance. You cannot do that without talking to the Americans first. He talked to Scranton last night personally -- not officially -- that is what he intends to do and he said it is a splendid idea.

K: I have unfortunately to run along.

D: I have a message from the Prime Minister. We got news that the Syrian forces are planning to from the 7th to move to _____ and they are sending several hundred people. The Prime Minister asked us really to ask you to bring it to the attention of the Syrians not to do that because that would put the situation in a dangerous way. That I just got from Rabin on the phone.

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K: Okay.

D: I appreciate it. Maybe it was stupid but it was not malicious.

K: Okay.

SK238 *

TELECON

The Secretary/Amb. Dinitz
12/13/76 6:40 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

D: I hope I'm not disturbing you . . .

K: Oh, Simcha . . .

D: Because Rabin wanted me to pass on to you two points of information. I think the meeting was very good.

K: You had your Defense Minister well coached.

D: I could have of course claimed all the credit but he really — ever sinse he came here — he is full of praise of whatever happened in the past and what you did. You never know but I think he really feels it. I had planned to give him hell to tell him to look at the situation first but I felt he was very receptive from the beginning. He was on Walter Cronkite tonight and said beautiful things about you. It was a taped interview of about 20 minutes but he really was full of praise — I think well deserved. Two things — first of all — I wanted to tell you that for the last few days we are conducting a level control of the area around _____ with regard to boats — not who are exiting but boats who are coming in. Suspicious vessels we are veering away to other ports. This has been working now for a number of days.

K: As long as the Syrians don't object, why don't you keep it going?

D: The Prime Minister wanted you to know about it since you had been out of town for the last few days.

K: Well, let's see what the Syrians do. You never know, they might welcome it. How long have you been doing it?

D: About 10 days.

K: That is interesting.

D: And so far there are no problems.

K: Well, let's see what happens. I will tell the President.

D: I think that answers several problems.

K: I think if you get away with it, it is a good move.

D: It was my suggestion.

K: It is a good idea. And it is very interesting that there haven't been any complaints. What's the nationality of the ships?

D: Some of them Egyptian, some of them Libyan. Ships is too big a word for them.

K: I understand but it could not be modest. No Soviet ships?

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D: No, no, no. For instance, a couple of days ago, there was one with trucks on it and we told them to go . . .

K: Did you tell them to go to Haifa (?)

D: No, we told them to go some place north (laughter)

K: Okay.

D: The second point of information is thePrime Minister saw Hussein on the weekend.

K: How did it go?

D: I just have the preliminary report. He is going to send me within a day or two the full report. He said there was no revelations. I will give you a full report.

K: On the first point, let's keep it going until we see what hell breaks lose and then let's examine it together. I will keep it at my level.

D: Yeah. On the other thing, I will probably have within a day or two and I will get in touch with you.

K: Okay Simcha.

D: Okay. Thank you Mr. Secretary. Best regards to Nancy.

K: Okay.

SK239

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TELECON
The Secretary/Terry Sanford
12/13/76 4:45 pm

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: I am so sorry that in the fall I never could accept your friendly invitation. I just got so wrapped up in these affairs here that I just couldn't get away.

S: Well, I don't see how you could have kept up with all of it and it is sort of sad to see you won't be making any more trips. It's been a tremendous period in world history and I think you have played a major part in shaping it.

K: Well, you are nice to say that.

[redacted] B6

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[redacted]

B6

K: Thank you. Bye.

SK243

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RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Bill Edmondson
12/14/76; 1:09 pm

K: Can you ask Ramsbotham whether when we see the South African tomorrow we can give them a general idea of what the British are thinking without going into details but just the procedures.

E: Okay.

K: Maybe a rough idea of the plan. Without being very specific.

E: Yes. Okay. Will do and we'll try to get back to you this evening when we meet.

K: Okay.

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SK2421 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Phil Habib
12/14/76; 12 noon

K: On that UN resolution on Rhodesia, I want to vote against the one that condemns us.

H: Okay. I would agree.

K: On the grounds that considering what we have done for Rhodesia, that is unconscionable and we should make a very tough statement.

H: Okay. We will go along with the British one.

K: We will go along with the British one.

H: Okay. Can I have another second with you?

K: Yes.

H: Have you had a chance to focus on the visit of Sarkis' representative?

K: Yes. I will probably see him on Tuesday morning.

H: Have you talked to Roy about it?

K: No, why?

H: He is coming in tomorrow and I thought we might see him and review this AID stuff.

K: Okay.

H: We will get a memo to you after that.

K: Absolutely, particularly since you are the key person here anyway.

H: It is because I thought . . .

K: It is okay. Really -- I am for it.

H: Second thing -- one more thing. This is not my idea to raise it with you. You have a memo on the Guyana problem.

K: What is that?

[redacted] B6

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B6

K: Okay.

H: See. I didn't even give you an argument.

K: Okay.

SK244 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Win Lord
12/14/76; 3:08 pm

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: That article for Time.

L: It is coming back to you this afternoon.

K: Then it is much too late.

L: No, it isn't. I talked to Schecter two hours ago. We have a new conclusion. We have it cleaned up and if you release it we can give it to Schecter.

K: You can't until I have worked over it.

L: He said it is fine tomorrow. John Wallach was at a dinner yesterday with Vance, Brzezinski and Peres and Peres was very flattering of you and secondly was pushing the step-by-step saying it should be continued with a token Geneva Conference and third, a personal emissary was an important proponent of the process.

K: Yes, but I am not going to be it.

L: I am not saying he was pointing to you.

K: What was Brzezinski's attitude?

L: This was cutting across the Brzezinski approach. Wallach was impressed with Vance [redacted] B6
Vance is in support of what you have been doing.

K: They will build shrines and synagogues here.

L: We can get it as soon as possible. [redacted] B6

K: [redacted]

L: [redacted]

K: Thank you.

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SK248

TELECON
The Secretary/Dick Valeriani
12/15/76 6:45 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Hello.

V: Did you have a nice lunch?

K: Lunch? Oh yes, yes indeed.

V: Have you thought about the overseas writers?

K: Can I call you about it tomorrow?

V: Sure. I would like to put in another request although I'm sure you won't do it. But Meet the Press would like to have you on.

K: No.

V: I told them what I thought your answer would probably be. Okay, thank you.

K: Thank you Dick.

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SK 246

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger
December 16, 1976
Time: 12:36 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

S: I know you are busy but I have a number of things to check out -- one thing I want to check is Agronsky and Karnow.

K: I have no objection.

S: They do want to put something on film.

K: Hold on 1/2 a second.

Hello.

S: Yes. I wanted to be sure about it. I will have lunch with Winston because he is in the same ball park and see how to handle it.

K: O.K. Good.

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SK247 *

TELECON
The Secretary/Charles Robinson
12/16/76 10:38 am

RELEASED IN FULL

R: I just wanted to urge you to try to find a date or time that is convenient to meet with Yakub-Kahn, the Pakistani Ambassador.

K: To do what?

R: To follow up on your commitment to Guirangaude.

K: Commitment! For god sakes don't you guys push me. What did I promise?

R: You indicated that you would talk to him.

K: But I forget about what.

R: You agreed to talk about a postponement or a moratorium.

K: Okay.

R: And there is an article in the Washington Post. . .

K: That is all right. I will probably see him tomorrow.

R: Friday is when it was scheduled.

K: Don't get me mad.

R: I won't if I can help it. We will get a paper to you today.

K: How many people know about this?

R: Winston Lord and Hal Sonnenfeldt are the only ones that I know of. We will try to keep it down to a handful. There is a question of whether you want Roy Atherton to sit in on the meeting with Byrode.

K: Byrode will have to sit in.

R: And Atherton as well?

K: Yeah.

R: Okay. And you can send someone to Brazil if you want. That was my other reason for calling.

K: Okay.

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SK249

TELECON
Mr. Atherton/Secretary Kissinger
December 17, 1976
Time: 5:26 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: On the 50 million for Israel...

A: Yes.

K: When Am I going to do it. I still haven't gotten the paper.

A: I think it must be in one of your action folders -- let me check with Jock.

K: Can we get the thing signed tomorrow morning.

A: I think we can do it. We have to renegotiate the agreement with the Israelis and we have to clear it with OMB. The memo asks your authority to clear it with OMB.

K: Why don't you clear it with OMB and then I will sign the memo when it comes.

A: O.K.

K: O.K. Good.

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SK253

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Phil Habib
12/17/76; 3:04 pm

K: Scranton can abstain but only if he writes a tougher statement than this. I want him to say that we are putting the assembly on notice that from now on we will vote against any resolution condemning us.

H: Okay.

K: Get an additional paragraph and after I approved that, he can abstain.

H: Okay. I will get right to him.

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K252 *

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Professor Brzezinski
12/17/76; 9:30 am in New York

RELEASED IN FULL

K: In my view it is the most interesting job in the government.

B: I suddenly remember you saying that to me four or five years ago when I was visiting you in your previous job and I remember it very clearly.

K: I still think having had both the Cabinet position and NSC position you are more in the -- you get more of an overview in the NSC position.

B: I think so and it is the kind of a job in which one gets exposed to many more unlearning experiences but more opportunities to make a constructive input.

K: Because you can back the issue. In a Department there are so many decisions that really don't affect the fundamental strategy very much that are just necessary.

B: I hope very much that your schedule will permit it for me to come and see you before too long and talk to you and get your sense of how best to operate. I must say that I remember when you sent in your job after Rostow and made jokes about it but I think it is much more difficult to go in after you than Walt.

K: If I may suggest something to you, Zbig. I think within six months the events are going to impose their own necessities. I don't know anyone in the country who I think has a better overall grasp than you do.

B: I can think of one person immediately that I am speaking to.

K: I wish you all the best and I will give you any public support I can.

B: I will always remember you coming in '68 and I am sure we have disagreed in the past and we will again and it in no way detracts from the respect I have for you.

K: I have had eight years doing that and I am delighted it is going to such good hands.

B: I will call you. Are you going away?

K: I will be on Christmas day for a week.

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B: Perhaps after the New Year's I will try to make an appointment with you.

K: Certainly.

B: Okay.

K: Certainly.

B: All right.

K: I am sure Scowcroft will give you any cooperation he can too.

B: Yes. I have no doubt he and Hyland will be very helpful but if you can, I would like an overview discussion with you. It would be extremely valuable.

K: At least I can give you my experience in that position.

B: Right. Your concept of the position was particularly interesting.

K: I think it is a position in which you can have a distinct influence on shaping the direction of events.

B: It is going to become difficult because the problems are becoming increasingly difficult to control.

K: I learned it is always better to dominate it rapidly than let them build up. That is sometimes much easier said than done. My best to M_____ and congratulations.

B: To end on a joke -- I suppose Stanley Hoffman is preparing our tooling, don't you think?

K: I would think so.

B: All the best.

K: Thanks.

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X255

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
MR. PALEY
SEC. KISSINGER
December 17, 1976
11:45 a.m.

K: Bill, how are you today? That was a nice party last night.

P: We enjoyed having you. I wanted to correct something I said last night -- that is the understanding we had in Moscow was a proposal put forward on my part and accepted verbally but not signed by them. I think I said that the agreement had been signed by both parties but this was the modus operanda in which we would pay so much money and certain conditions were lined out that he accepted in principle and we proceeded accordingly. Regarding that arrangement we would have had a preferred arrangement. When my people got there they said forget about that and started with new figures which was beyond what they decussed with me. Our people have been ordered to come back and now I have a cable reconfirming the first figures he gave to me.

K: I figured that once you pulled out they would run for cover.

P: We have to stick together now -- the three of us. I just did not want you to believe that I had this in writing on both sides. It was a dirty runout.

K: I will tell Dobrynin that it is G-D stupidity.

P: I did not mention this before, but I mentioned his name and they said as far as they are concerned they think of him as an American.

K: I have hard that they say this.

P: I had not mentioned his name but obviously as a result of the lunch you had arranged they gave me VIP treatment. They could not have been nicer. I got a long beautifully. It was a great surprise to me when they pulled away.

K: I wish I had known about that. It was probably some idiot at a lower level. You should have gone to Dobrynin.

P: They are coming back now and we have permission from the Dept. of Justice we will go back as a group and divide up events which can be done easily and they won't have us over the barrell. O.K., Henry, we will see you soon.

K: O.K. Good.

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SK254

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/J. Javits
12/17/76; 3:14 pm

RELEASED IN PART
B6

J: When we talked the other day I didn't talk to you about a case of a guy by the name of [redacted] I understand you hold decision in your hands. B6

K: I?

J: Only you can decide whether he will or will not be extradited. I wanted to set in to you my interest.

K: I don't know anything about it.

J: Apparently it has to be decided before January 5. He is an Indian who is charged in India of having stolen money. [redacted] If he goes back it will be over. B6

K: My inclination from what you tell me is not to extradite him.

J: Take a look at it.

K: Okay.

J: I have/talked to not K opple (?) but will.

K: Do you want to come in Tuesday around 2:30?

J: Let's say yes and I will check it out on my calendar.

K: Okay.

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SK257 *

ELCON
Sec Kissinger/PWRodman
12/18/76; 4:40 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Where are you?

R: At home.

K: Peter, this morning at the Africa meeting, which you missed . . . .

R: I was there this morning. At 11:00.

K: Were you?

R: Yes.

K: They were talking about these talking points for these various meetings. Do we have those?

R: Yes. I have everything on Africa.

K: Even if I didn't myself do it?

R: You reviewed them all in meetings.

K: That's right. I wanted to make sure we had all talking points.

R:Jockwould always make a copy and send it over. I have systematically gone through his file to make sure I had everything. Those are one of the important items.

K: Okay.

R: Okay. Good.

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SK262 *

TELECON
Mr. Eagleburger/Secretary Kissinger
December 20, 1976
Time: 7:08 p.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

K: Larry, why don't we do the speech on the 10th where there is no conflict?

E: Alright. That is probably better. We have to double check in the morning to see if that date is free, but I will do that. I think it is better not to worry about having to follow after the State of the Union.

K: Can [redacted] spend three more weeks working -- he can retire after that. That Jewish thing should never have been permitted to reach that point. B6

E: I must say in [redacted] defense that he didn't know about it. B6

K: What do you mean?

E: Neither of us knew until Fisher raised it.

K: Why didn't he go after it.?

E: Well, I will take care of [redacted] first thing in the morning. I tried to reach him today, but he was sick. I will call him first thing. B6

K: Just say they are registered as a foreign agent -- I want to do it gently.

E: We will. Say, it will be informal remarks, but I don't think [redacted] is out to do you any harm. B6

K: They want as much benefit as they possibly can.

E: Let me come at it gently.

K: It is the sort of thing one can have settled ahead of time.

E: We will take care of it first thing in the morning.

K: I would like my parents to be invited.

E: That has been done.

K: They haven't been told.

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E: Well, I know it is in the works.

K: Is someone drafting some remarks for the 11th?

E: Yes, and for the press club too. You will have both.

K: O.K. Good.

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SK 259

TELECON
The Secretary/Amb. Dinitz
12/20/76

RELEASED IN PART
B6

D: A few minutes ago Rabin submitted his resignation to the President which means . . .

K: That he is in office permanetly.

D: So now it is a transitional government. And probably either tomorrow or the day after the Prime Minister will submit to the Knesset a bill asking for the fixing of a date for the new election.

K: Is there a constitutional limit of time in which the election must take place?

D: It cannot take place before 90 days.

K: It cannot take place before 90 days?

D: Yeah.

K: How can it take 2-1/2 million people 90 days to make up their minds?

D: 3-1/2 million. We would just make noise if we were 2-1/2 million.

K: No, no, you would make noise if you were 35. When will the election be?

D: Around May. The bill has not been drafted yet but the Prime Minister intends to have it sometime in May. Early May or middle May or late May, I do not know. While I have you on the line, I got a message from the Prime Minister that the Lebanese roads are muddy so they have asked us to help them pave these roads with pebble. We are not going to send our people to do the work, but we are supplying them with gravel and pebble.

K: Look, you are going away when?

D: On the 23rd.

K: That is on Thursday. Well, I have to see you for about 15 minutes on some of the military sales.

D: Any time.

K: Which is raising quite a ruckus here.

D: Yeah, I saw that article in Aviation Week.

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K: That did not come from our building.

D: I know that. I know who it came from.

K: I would like to go over with you some reports that are coming in here and get you to make some authorative statement.

D: I would be very glad to do this.

K: I am just trying to prevent problems down the road.

D: I understand. If we have a talk we can also talk about some of the things that are resulting from the developments in Israel.

K: That would be fascinating. When are you leaving? On the 23rd?

D: Around noon. No, I'm sorry, around 8:30 in the morning but if you want to see me I will postpone that. I mean I will postpone the time but not the day.

K: Why not?

D: I am speaking in Palm Springs.

K: Well, my problem is I will not be back from Boston until noon on the 23rd. [redacted] B6

[redacted] we can talk over the phone.

D: Okay, so I will simply take a later plane.

K: And then I will fix something with you for the earliest time on Thursday.

D: As you know, I am seeing Vance at 6:00.

K: Yeah, I saw him today.

D: Okay Mr. Secretary. So we will be in touch.

K: Good.

SK260 *

TELECON
The Secretary/Amb. Esenbel
12/20/76 6:52 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

E: How are you Mr. Secretary?

K: I am fine. How are you Mr. Ambassador?

E: I am so happy to hear your voice again. And I will be seeing you in New York on the 11th.. There is a big dinner I will be coming to with my wife.

K: Isn't that nice.

E: I wanted just to talk to you about this transition period. I assume you have been talking to Mr. Vance. He knows our problem and he knows me. He knows Turkey. I would very much like you to impart to him the importance of this defense treaty.

K: I have and I think you will find he is much more sympathetic than you think. from his reputation.

E: Yes, but during this critical period before the new administration is inaugurated, we would very much appreciate it if you would make them understand how important is this situation.

K: I have done that.

E: If by any occasion you can see him again, please try to remind him that it is a rather urgent matter for Turkey because we are entering a new election year and I am a little bit bothered about this thing.

K: I think you will find him quite sympathetic

E: All right. Thank you very much Mr. Secretary.

K: Right.

E: I hope very much to see you in New York and we will have a party for you on the 13th I guess.

K: That is right.

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SK261

TELECON
The Secretary/Amb. Dobrynin
12/20/76 6:25 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

D: (Missed first part) . . . I think it is a good personal touch.

K: How about having lunch with Vance and me on January 4. He can't do it this week because he's going to Plains. At 1:00 here.

D: Okay. January 4 at 1:00 in your office?

K: In my dining room in the State Department.

D: I understnad that. Okay, thank you very much.

K: As long as I have got you on the phone, do you think you could calm down your Ambassador to Zambia a little bit.

D: In Zambia? Are you serious or what?

K: He's really giving inflamatory speaches.

D: What's his name?

K: I don't know his name.

D: Do you want me to say anything to Gromyko? I really don't know anything about it.

K: I think it will create a bad impression if we cut each other up in Africa right now. I will get you the facts tomorrow.

D: Okay, then I will be prepared to send something to Gromyko.

K: But at any rate, January 4 we will meet

D: When are you leaving?

K: On Saturday.

D: I wish you a merry Christmas.

K: And I wish you a merry Christmas Anatol.

D: I have something to warm you up.

K: I appreciate it very much that you came to my dinner. I was very touched.

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D: It was very important and I really saw your appreciation.

K: Well, it is mutual.

D: Okay, Henry, thank you very much.

K: Okay Anatol.

SK2C5 *

TELCON
SEN. MANSFIELD
SEC. KISSINGER
DECEMBER 21, 1976
10:05 a.m.

RELEASED IN PART
B6

M: Good morning, Henry.

K: Mike, How are you?

M: Fine. Two things. As an insider on the way out I want to wish you a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year and a splendid future.

K: Aren't you nice.

M: ~~Xxxxxxx~~ Secondly, remember [redacted] B6

K: Yes.

M: What about it?

K: I have ordered having him promoted.

M: Good.

K: Could you hold on a second. Larry Eagleburger is just coming in. He tells me all we can do is give him a pay increase and put him before the Promotion Board. We cannot do it ourselves. We will recommend him to the Promotion Board. That we have done and we have given him a pay increase which we can also do but we cannot actually do the promoting ourselves. I will leave a very strong letter and Larry has already submitted his name. I will leave a strong letter for the promotion Board.

M: Good. He finished fourth last time and only three were selected. That is how close he came last year.

K: Then, he has a good chance. ~~How are things with~~

M: How are things with you and Nancy.

K: Fine. We are trying to decide what to do.

M: We are both in the same boat.

K: Mike you have been one of the great men I have worked with. I want you to know this.

M: You are very kind, Henry. It works both ways.

K: Will you be in Washington?

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Yes.

M: /Most of the time.

K: I hope I will have the privilege of getting together with you when we are both out of office.

M: We will. Take care of yourself and my best to Nancy.

SK269 *

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELCON
Sec. Kissinger
Roy Atherton
Dec. 21, 1976
9:20 a.m.

K: Roy, this letter about [redacted] I think is a little to explicit and might be too embarrassing for Carter if it got out this way. B6

A: You rather a little more elyptical.

K: Yes.

A: I will try a new formulation and send it back to you.

K: And where you say he wants to get off the boycott list, say I think he will settle for a *de facto* right to do business.

A: O.K.

K: Good.

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Sk263

RELEASED IN PART
B6

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Winston Lord
12/21/76; 9:29 am

K: Will you try to do something a little better for that press thing tonight.

L: Yes. I have got Charlie on it and alerted Peter. You have something already?

K: Yes, which is not any good. On the Globetrotters, to teach them to dunk -- I don't know what that means.

L: To dunk is when you go up and shove it in.

K: I can't say a lot of these jokes. What is Geese?

L: His name is Goose and PA had a typographical error. The guy is a magician.

K: I know who he is. See whether you can find something more amusing to say.

L: On the Globetrotters?

K: Yes, at the beginning.

L: I think the fact you are getting a lot of dribbling from the State Department is a good line.

K: That is assuming they know what dribbling means.

L: You got my note on China.

K: Yes. I will not have [redacted] there. B6

L: I understand.

K: Do they know it?

L: I didn't specify this time. They assume it is a private meeting. I made that clear when we tried to make the appointment before. I don't think it affects who they bring.

K: Right.

L: So long.

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SK268 *

TELECON

The Secretary/Mr. Gruenwald
12/21/76 4:10 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

G: How are you?

K: I am fine.

G: I have been thinking about whether you would possibly enjoy a little party up here in New York among your other hundreds.

K: I am quite literally eating my way out of this place.

G: I don't want to impose on your time.

K: Can we do it after I leave? I would love to do it.

G: Whatever you prefer.

K: Would you prefer before? I would like to do it but it's a little difficult before the 20th.

G: Well, in that case, why don't we do it after you come back from your holiday. You are going away right after the 20th aren't you?

K: About the first of February.

G: Would you like to have it sometime between the 20th and the time you leave? Or do it after you get back from vacation?

K: Could I get back to you.

G: Any time. Whatever you want to do.

K: It is a very nice thing to do and I would love it.

G: Swell.

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SK270

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TELECON
The Secretary/Amb. Dinitz
12/21/76 6:48 pm

RELEASED IN FULL

D: How are you Mr. Secretary?

K: Okay.

D: I have difficulty in getting flights on Thursday. I can change my flight from 8:30 to 12:30.

K: The trouble is I will be in Boston.

D: I know that. I thought of two possibilities. A, maybe you can . . . when are you leaving?

K: Tomorrow morning.

D: Would you like me to stop in this evening or early tomorrow morning?

K: No, I am tied up all evening.

D: If you think it can wait until I come back.

K: It is something that should be dealt with. I can't discuss it on the phone. I have to see you before my people here begin leaking against you.

D: The other possibility is for me to see you . . .

K: Why don't we do it early tomorrow morning?

D: That would be fine.

K: Okay, why don't you come in at 8:00.

D: 8:00 would be fine. Thank you Mr. Secretary.

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SK267

RELEASED IN FULL

TELCON
Sec Kissinger/Roy Atherton
12/21/76; 1:30 pm

K: I know NEA no longer briefs me but when Marvin Kalb has to tell me about an Egyptian-Syrian communique, it is getting ridiculous.

A: I don't know about it either. I have not seen it. We knew there was going to be one.

K: He says they have agreed to coordinate or unify or something.

A: The last I heard, they were going to issue one. Why don't we get ahold of it and send you a little memo with a quickie analysis.

K: Okay.

A: Good.

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SK276

TELECON
Ambassador Schaufele/Secretary Kissinger
December 24, 1976
Time: 1:15 p.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: Could you send those Rhodesian plans -- not the talking points -- to Botha?

S Yes, I wanted to check with you before I did it.

K: I think I have given him so much that it doesn't add anything to it, with a note to say it isn't to be taken up with the Rhodesians, and I have told Richard to see what could be done to conform it to Annex E and he agreed and would make an effort. Richard doesn't object if I go into detail about it.

S: How was Richard otherwise -- he doesn't have much to offer. I just wish he would stop talking.

K: Well, yes. O.K. Thank you.

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SK274 *

TELECON
Mr. Cyrus Vance/Secretary Kissinger
December 24, 1976
Time: 10:10 a.m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: How are you Cy?

V: I am alright, how are you?

K: O.K. I have arranged for lunch with Dobrynin for the 4th and I have told the Chinese as you suggested that I was going to have lunch with you and them after that. I think we have to invite them in case it gets out that we had lunch with Dobrynin and they weren't invited to a lunch. It wouldn't be good. I am assuming that is still on.

V: It is still on.

K: You just name it -- the 10th is fine. I am going to New York after the 7th, but could come down.

K: Why don't we do it on the 7th?

V: Fine. You got a second, Henry?

K: Yes.

V: Botha called me last night and said he is going home Friday next. He said he wanted a moment to chat. I said I would see him next Thursday when I will be back in Washington and I wanted to check with you to find out what was going on before that time.

K: We are backing the British proposal. Also we think their tactics were lousy and I think that he is inclined to go ahead with that. A lot depends on what his perception of the new administration is. If he thinks you are out to do him in he is less likely to support it. You don't have to give him any assurances on South Africa -- we haven't. I think that it would be helpful just to tell him what I have just told you. A second point is to indicate to them in some way that there is a point beyond which it isn't possible to push people.

V: What?

K: That if they accept this we will back this plan we will back this plan and it will not be a departure for another major change.

V: I am just making a couple of notes. Let's see if there is anything else. I guess that's about everything I can think of for the moment.

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Vance/Kissinger

K: I will be gone next week Cy.

V: You will be gone all week?

K: Yes.

V: I have to go down to that island which is like going to the north pole. I have hitched a ride with Fritz Mondale so I have to leave Monday morning and maybe will have to stay through Wednesday. Well, have a good holiday.

K: Same to you Cy. O.K. Bye, bye.

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SF 201

TELECON
Mr. Hartman/The Secretary
June 6, 1975
Time: 6:50 p. m.

RELEASED IN FULL

K: I have settled with Dobrynin that the two Ambassadors will cooperate there.

H: O. K. Do you want to sent a note to France and Germany and the British on this?

K: Yes.

H: Saying we think it is a good idea.

K: Will you work with them?

H: I will get something up on this.

K: Yes, will you?

H: O. K.

K: Two additional things. On Sovena coming, any time the week of the 23rd would be better for me.

H: They had suggested the 27th.

K: I would like to keep open that for my vacation.

H: O. K. Not the 27th.

K: If I go I would like to go for a week. I have tried to explain this before.

H: Not to me.

K: Are you arranging a dinner for Antone?

H: Yes, he suggested the date of the 21st.

K: The 21st is a Saturday, impossible!

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H: Well, we will just have to wait until he gets back and get a date, one that is free on both your calendars.

K: My children will be here that weekend.

H: When do you get back from leave?

K: That will be impossible. I will be involved on Middle East issues. How about the week of the 23rd?

H: He had to go back to Paris. .No wait a minute, that is right, he would be back by the 21st.

K: Why don't you check with him?

H: O.K.